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&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This book presents in a popular form the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy—dialectical and historical materialism. It is intended for the people who are studying philosophy and are trying to understand the problems of our day&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library work|title=ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism|author=B. M. Boguslavsky, V. A. Karpushin, A. I. Rakitov, V. Y. Chertikhin, G. I. Bzrin|publisher=Progress Publishers|published_date=1978|published_location=Moscow|type=Book|source=http://library.lol/main/1ea2df27ace048696dc734405f7d977f}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreword ==&lt;br /&gt;
Many people are trying their best to grasp the meaning of the rapid changes occurring before their eyes and to understand how they are affecting their own lives. They are trying to develop their own view of the world and thus determine their place in it. But it is not simple to form a view of the world without knowledge of existing doctrines and theories. There are diverse theories explaining, each in its own way, the events occurring in the world. And it is vital, though not at all easy, to choose among them the one that is nearest to the truth and that is borne out by life, by the development of science and the real course of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors will consider their task rewarded if this book helps the reader to comprehend the phenomena and events in nature and society and to form a scientific, Marxist world outlook.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Dialectical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;1. The Fundamental Question of Philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The Gist of the Question ====&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1881, a man jailed for his active Opposition to the tsarist autocracy sat over a sheet of paper in a solitary confinement cell in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg, now Leningrad. The death sentence had already been passed on N. I. Kibalchich, and the day of his execution was not far off. But it was not of his doom he was thinking: his mind was on a fascinating scientific problem to which he had only just, so shortly before his early death, found a solution. There, on the sheet of paper, was the scheme of a jet-propelled aircraft, the first in the history of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Twenty-two years afterwards, in 1903, the eminent Russian scientist K. E. Tsiolkovsky, who had elaborated in detail the design of the jet-propulsion engine, laid the foundations of jet-propulsion theory and demonstrated that jet-propulsion engines could be used for interplanetary flights. Thirty years later, flying vehicles with jet engines were constructed and tested. Soon jet planes appeared, and in 1957, the first artificial earth satellite was launched in the USSR. Following a series of unmanned space flights, the first manned spaceship with the Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on board was successfully launched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started a new age. Jet-propelled spaceships set off for the Moon, Venus and Mars.  It could never have happened had the human mind not conceived the principle of jet propulsion and developed relevant scientific theory, and had it not posed to men the task of penetrating space. All man-made cosmic bodies are the products of scientific thought. And as thought need not necessarily be unique to earth-dwellers and there may be other beings in the universe who may well be our intellectual superiors, it is natural to suppose that other cosmic bodies whose origin is so far not clear to us may also be products of thought. Then why not suppose that the Earth with everything there is on it is also a product of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One could indeed make such a supposition but would it tally with the evidence of science and experience?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Light travels 9, 440, 000, 000 kilometres a year. This distance is called a light-year. The Milky Way&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a giant cluster of stars and other bodies, of which the solar system is a part—has a diameter of almost 100, 000 light-years.  It moves among other clusters of stars (galaxies) which are vastly removed from it. The part of the universe which scientists can observe with the aid of powerful optical and radio devices has a diameter of 26, 000, 000, 000 light-years. This vast area is puny, compared with all other areas of the universe as yet out of the range of the available means of observation.  And the Earth, with its continents and oceans, plants, animals and human beings, is an infinitesimal speck in the vast universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to scientific evidence, life on Earth has existed but a short time compared with the Earth’s existence, while the living organisms make up but an insignificant part of the sum total of bodies we call the Earth. As for the human race, it is relatively young, having appeared just a little over a million years ago.  Space flights and scientific research have conclusively established that between the Earth and its natural satellite, the Moon, no living organisms exist, let alone rational beings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, although the universe evidently contains an infinite multitude of life forms, only a very small part of them possess the faculty of thought. Modern science confirms Engels’ observation that “the time of organic life and still more that of the life of beings conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and Self-consciousness come into operation….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-1|1]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern science suggests that thought is merely one of the numerous products of the universe. The supposition that the universe, which is infinite in space and time, is the product of thought is hardly tenable. Supporters of this view may argue that our scientific knowledge is anything but complete, there being still much that we do not know. That is true enough. Yet, ignorance &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; no argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have thus come to a point which merits close consideration. To form an idea of a science, one should, first of all, be informed of the basic problems it is concerned with. In chemistry, for instance, the question of how atoms join and separate and how, as a result, substances undergo changes of composition, is basic to all other questions. Knowing this, we can already form a basic idea of the science of chemistry. It is so with all other sciences. To know the fundamental question a science &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s concerned with, is to know what it is about.  Hence, in order to form an idea of what philosophy is, we must find out what its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fundamental question&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All bodies and the mechanical, physical, chemical and physiological processes they undergo are usually described as material phenomena, or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Pride, shame, joy, and all other feelings supplied by our five senses, as well as thoughts teeming in the mind are usually described as ideal, or spiritual phenomena or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has long been observed that man’s capacity to distinguish colours, sounds and smells, as well as his feelings and his mind improve with age, as his body develops and as he learns to perform diverse jobs, handling different objects and associating with other people.  Some grave bodily diseases cause aberration or even loss of consciousness while with the destruction of the body sensations, thoughts cease altogether. These facts show that spiritual phenomena are based on material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other facts have also been noted. When we say that a boy has smashed a window without meaning to, the idea is that he did not intend to smash it. This does not, however, mean that the hand threw the stone of its own accord, irrespective of the boy’s intention. Clearly, his action was prompted by some emotion or idea.  He simply did not aim the stone well and it hit the wrong object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man is not a machine but a creature that thinks and feels. All his actions—reasonable or otherwise—are prompted by his emotions or ideas. Before making a plough and tilling and sowing the field he &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;thinks over&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; how it should all be done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The desire for freedom and anger at social injustice long ago caused slaves to rise up and fight their oppressors. Love of their country moved men to fight invaders to the death. The immediate source from which such actions sprang were, again, men’s ideas and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reflecting on these facts, one was naturally led to conclude that material phenomena were the products of spiritual phenomena which were, therefore, decisive to human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This view spread particularly when society became divided into the antagonistic classes of toilers, who worked hard and lived in poverty, and masters who did no work and appropriated the wealth produced by others. Education, science and art became the exclusive privilege of a tiny minority—the ruling classes. Their will became law, regulating the behaviour of everyone. That made it seem as if consciousness were primary in relation to the material life of society. Hence the conclusion was made that even outside society, indeed in the whole world, spiritual phenomena dominated material ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Which then derives from which? The material from the spiritual, or vice versa? Does matter originate from consciousness or consciousness from matter? Which is primary, spirit or nature? Philosophers began to argue about it back in antiquity. This problem is the key to all other philosophical problems. The philosophers divided into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;two camps&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: those who regarded nature, the material world, as the product of consciousness, of spirit, which they held to be independent of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; those who regarded consciousness, spirit, as the product of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Engels said that the question of the relation of consciousness to the material world was the great fundamental question of philosophy as a whole, observing that it also involved the question of whether consciousness was capable of truthfully reflecting the world. The views of various philosophers will be discussed here later. For the time being, let us look at the main question, the subject of long-standing dispute among philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Faith or Knowledge? ====&lt;br /&gt;
What is primary&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;spirit or nature? If you ask this question of a believer, you may be sure of the answer. For God, whom he believes to be the creator and ruler of the world, is also, to him, the spiritual source of all existence.  True, the believers are unable to prove it be cause, taking religious doctrines on trust as they do, they put faith above knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle ages, when the church had political as well as spiritual power, the clergy persecuted scientists, throwing them into dungeons, torturing them, and burning them at the stake. Today, clergymen no longer deny the importance of science. Moreover, they claim that science is quite compatible with faith, although, unlike the immutable, exact and infinite truth of religious faith (as they describe it) scientific knowledge is unstable, inexact and limited. ‘Science has its limits,&amp;amp;quot; wrote the Metropolitan Nicholas. “It has to do merely with what one can see, touch and hear and thereby infer. But there is another realm ...  the realm of faith. Besides the visible world, there is one which is invisible. Science cannot reach it, but faith can.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course there is much in microcosm and space that we cannot see. Yet, it was science and not religion, that penetrated into the “‘invisible world” with microscopes, telescopes and other instruments and helped obtain exact knowledge of what was going on there. And the theologists’ “invisible world” is still a mystery, like the invisible clothes of the naked king Hans Christian Andersen wrote about in one of his tales. Just as in the tale, faith in the ‘invisible’ is only for those who would not trust their eyes, their ears and their minds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it true that knowledge and faith are compatible? What is the difference between them?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;L’ile des pingouins&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; by Anatole France we find the story of a man with a charge brought against him in the absence of any evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That Pyrot had stolen the eighty thousand haycocks certainly no one hesitated to believe.  They never doubted it as their ignorance in the matter gave them no reason to doubt, and doubt is impossible without a reason, because one cannot doubt a thing for no reason the way one can believe a thing for no reason.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Catholic educational institutions the fol lowing rule is effective to this day: ‘‘We must believe that what looks white to us is black if the hierarchic church should choose to describe it so,... persuading ourselves that all this is just, and abandoning with unquestioning obedience any judgements to the contrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jean Bodin, an opponent of medieval obscurantism, wrote in the 16th century that a student of mathematics who believed a theorem suggested by the teacher, without understanding it, could be described as having faith without having knowledge. However, once he had understood the demonstration of the theorem and seen its truth for himself, thus achieving knowledge, his faith was lost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A scientific assumption may prove to be inexact or even erroneous. But it is still knowledge, not faith, because the assumption was based on evidence, even though this was insufficient. That does not mean we should reject any judgement the reasons for which we do not know. Having thought it over and checked it thoroughly, we must establish whether it may be considered true or untrue. Refusing to control one’s thoughts, blindly following a sudden hunch, common prejudices, or even books is a false path in knowledge. To quote an example, communism, Lenin pointed out, is not blind faith in conclusions picked up from books, but views at which one must arrive after weighing and thinking over thoroughly what one has read comparing the conclusions with the proofs and satisfying oneself that the conclusions have been proved beyond any possible doubt. Lenin wrote: ‘““Communism will become an empty word, a mere signboard, and a Communist a mere boaster, if all the knowledge he has acquired is not digested in his mind,” if he accepted pedantically “the cut-and-dried conclusions he had acquired, without putting in a great deal of serious and hard work and without understanding facts he should examine critically...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-2|2]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The building of socialism, Lenin wrote, required ‘‘the really enlightened elements for whom we can vouch that they will not take the word for the deed….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-3|3]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us assume that we put the fundamental question of philosophy to one who has never heard of it before, and let us assume that he will say at once: “Certainly, matter is primary and consciousness is secondary”. The important thing then is to see how that person will prove his assertion and disprove the opposite idea. If he fails, we shall have to admit that it is faith, and not knowledge, on his part. It may even seem to him that no arguments can generally be adduced in favour of idealism, so that there really is nothing to disprove, while the truth of materialism is so obvious that it needs no proof. Actually, however, every philosophical doctrine gives definite reasons for its conclusions. If one is seeking knowledge rather than faith, one needs to sort out the conclusions and arguments furnished by different philosophical trends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Materialism vs. Subjective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Here is the substance of one such doctrine: We have merely three types of knowledge: (1) that which we hear, see, feel by touch, etc., i.e., our sensations; (2) that which we conceive by reason of memory or imagination, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., our conceptions; (3) we also know ourselves, having an awareness of “self”, of “spirit” which is capable of sensing, remembering, feeling and dreaming. We have a notion of objects solely because we see or smell or feel them, i.e., because we perceive them physically. Without this ability, we would know nothing about the external world. When we see something round, yellow-red on one side and dark-red on the other, feel a smooth rounded surface and perceive a specific smell, we know it is an apple.  The sensations are all we know about this particular object. Thus an apple is nothing but a combination of sensations. Likewise, all objects we observe in the room, street, field or woods, i.e., all external or material things, are combinations of visual, tactile and other sensations.  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;All&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we know about such things are our impressions of them. These impressions exist only in the mind. Men, however, regard a visual or other sensation as a likeness or image of an external thing. What they proceed from is that unless we acknowledge the existence of sensible things outside us, it is impossible to explain how sensations arise. Yet, when we dream we feel sensations, although the things and events we are dreaming of exist only in the mind. Therefore, to explain sensations it is not at all necessary to assume that things have an objective existence. As we need not assume this to explain dreams, so we need not assume it to explain what we feel in our waking hours.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This doctrine which holds that everything commonly regarded as material exists solely in the mind of the subject (man) is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;subjective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as distinct from &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which holds that the primary source of being is not man’s consciousness but consciousness without man, some objective spirit independent of human consciousness. We have just stated the reasoning of the subjective idealist George Berkeley (1685-1753), who wrote: “...all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-4|4]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; His teaching boils down to two points: (1) outside consciousness there is nothing, and (2) to exist is to be perceived; what nobody perceives does not exist. This doctrine conflicts with the materialist proposition that (1) apart from and independent of the mind there are objects which produce sensory reactions in us, and that (2) sensible objects exist even when they are not perceived by the senses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us see what Berkeley, the most significant exponent of subjective idealism, has to say further. Asserting that notions emerge and are dropped solely at man’s will, Berkeley wrote: ‘‘But ... the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will.  When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see no, or to determine what particular objects Shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-5|5]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this Berkeley was perfectly correct. But from his words it follows that outside the mind there exist things which, acting on our eyes, ears, etc., cause sensations. In other words, sensations (which are phenomena of consciousness) entirely depend on the objects which cause them and which exist independently of the mind, i.e., on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects. That it is indeed so has been established by natural science. Lenin wrote: “...outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves... which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour.  This is precisely how natural science regards it.... This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-6|6]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus scientific evidence and the facts which Berkeley himself has to acknowledge prove &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the truth of materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. But even after recognising the independent existence of the source of sensations Berkeley remains an opponent of materialism. Defending religion, he addresses the materialists thus: ‘’...I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without, in a being distinct from ourselves.... But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit, you Matter...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-7|7]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus to prop up faith in the primacy of spirit, Berkeley has to forego both logic and science and have recourse to god. Yet, while he asserts that god exists, he gives no proof of his existence&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;god is absent from the list of objects of knowledge with which Berkeley opens his discourse. After promising to present philosophical knowledge the truth of which has been demonstrated, he presents us with a proposition to be taken on trust.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, as he maintains that god is an independent source of sensations, Berkeley acknowledges by the same token that something which exists outside and independently of mind produces sensation; that the object producing the sensations exists whether or not it is perceived.  Thus, this philosopher does, in fact, unwittingly disprove subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What then, according to Berkeley himself, made him accept that “without a mind” there is something whose existence does not depend on us, and this something produces sensations in us? It was, above all, the indisputable fact that sensations arise and disappear &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;independently&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of “the mind”, unlike notions which we can usually evoke in the mind just when we like.  This difference between sensations and notions is a fact which conflicts with subjective idealism. To be consistent, a subjective idealist would have to deny that sensation results from causes which are outside, and are independent of, the mind. That is just what many contemporary subjective idealists do. Rudolf Carnap, for instance, wrote that the line between sensations and notions is “rather arbitrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This assertion is contrary to fact. For example, I can &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;imagine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; myself, if I like, basking in the sun on the beach. But I cannot~however much I may like to-make my body &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;feel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; warm with the sun or make my eyes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;see&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the surf.  Transformation of that which we can conceive into that which we can see and feel does not depend on arbitrary choice. There is only one conclusion to be made from this, namely, that subjective idealism, which denies that the sensations we experience have a material source existing outside the mind, conflicts with the facts conclusively established both by science and experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No one in his right mind would deny that illusion and reality are two different things.  How to tell dreams from reality, fact from fancy? The common way is to regard whatever exists solely in the mind as illusion; and whatever exists outside the mind (irrespective of whether or not it is perceived), as reality or fact. Berkeley rejects this method of telling between seeming and being and claims that the objects and events we observe when awake exist merely in the mind in just the same way as those we dream about. No one would subscribe to the view that fact and fancy are the same thing. So Berkeley declares that his philosophy, too, has a method of distinguishing illusion from reality~by comparing notes with other people. The sensation most of them regard as fact is fact, and the one regarded otherwise is illusion. Nevertheless Berkeley himself says that the majority may be in error and often are. Most people denied for thousands of years that the Earth is round and believed that the Sun moved round the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Surely opinion polls would not do as a method of differentiating between seeming and being. Still, neither Berkeley nor his successors found any other. Some of them even thought it quite unnecessary to make such surveys because, they said, there was practically no difference between illusion and reality. The subjective idealist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) cited the following: a pencil partly submerged under water seems broken, and this is called an illusion. But Mach was of a different opinion.  He wrote: “It makes practical, but not scientific, sense to speak of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;illusion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in such instances.  Nor does the oft-repeated question whether the world is real or whether we have merely dreamed it up, make any sense from the scientific point of view. Besides, the weirdest dream is a fact as good as any other.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-8|8]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What Mach means by a “‘scientific point of view” is utterly unacceptable to science because the object of science is to penetrate through what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;seems&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actually&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is. It is easy to imagine what will happen to a scientist (or anyone for that matter) who will take guidance from Mach’s doctrine, for he will fall into every pit scattered along the path of the rainbow-chaser and wishful thinker.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our sensations are all we know about an object, says Berkeley, and consequently “‘... the object and the sensation are the same thing”.  Thus the basic premise of Berkeley&#039;s subjective idealism rests on the assertion that we know nothing at all about things save through our sensations of them. Yet we know that a commodity has its value, which is, however, impossible to perceive by the senses. We know that light travels at a speed of 300,000 kilometres a second, which man can neither see nor even imagine. A radio transmitter emits waves whose properties have been thoroughly studied even though they cannot be perceived by the senses. And so &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ad infinitum&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Berkeley&#039;s doctrine leaves out a most important part of human knowledge&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or abstract ideas. Berkeley denied their existence, reducing knowledge entirely to sensations and notions. Such a theory, which rests on the denial of concepts, is incompatible with genuine science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us presume that objects are merely combinations of sensations. Then the Earth, with everything and everybody on it, is a combination of sensations. It follows then that each of us is the only person in the world while all others are mere sensations. That is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;solipsism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  Berkeley and most of his successors concede that other people also exist, i.e., they reject solipsism. Bertrand Russell, the modern idealist philosopher, remarked: “As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician, this surprise surprised me.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-9|9]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And no wonder.  It is hardly logical for one who would be the sole being in the world to be surprised that nobody else should claim the distinction. Yet, another subjective idealist, Carnap, writes that the very question as to whether other people exist is impermissible in philosophy. Nor is it fortuitous, for subjective idealism immediately leads to solipsism. After all, there are but two possible answers. One may either acknowledge the truth of subjective idealism and agree that every one of us is the only person in existence; or one may acknowledge, with the materialists, that there are other people too and subjective idealism has not a leg to stand on. There is no third answer. Human experience and science alike prove that materialism is correct and knock the bottom out of subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Materialism vs. Objective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
We find a different form of idealism in the teachings of its classical exponents, such as Plato (428/427-347 B. C.) in ancient Greece, and Hegel (1770-1831) in Germany. These philosophers recognise that nature exists independently of mind. According to their reasoning, we perceive with our senses individual objects of which the world consists, but sensory experience yields only superficial knowledge such as even little children can have. Sensory experience does not give us ultimate knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the essence of things. Man can have sensory experience of colour, smell or taste. Recollection of these perceptions will bring specific objects to his mind. Yet, that which is common to them and makes them what they are, i.e., their essence, can neither be perceived by the senses nor imagined.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in Plato’s time science was not confined to sense-data. After all, sensory experience and notions tell us merely what isolated, transient, accidental objects look like. Science, however, seeks to understand their essence. This requires that one should be aware of the common, stable and lasting qualities which are at the basis of and manifest themselves in isolated, contingent facts and things. Briefly, to conceive what the things the world consists of really are, one must form a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concept&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The object of sense-perception or representation is a specific individual thing, e.g., the isosceles triangle drawn in my notebook. The object of thought, on the other hand, is the essence (the essential, principal properties) of all triangles which have ever existed or will ever exist, fixed in the concept of “triangle.” It does not make the slightest difference to the nature of a triangle what material it is made from, what size or colour it is, and so on. The individual features differentiating the innumerable triangles there are in existence are equally of no significance. Yet every triangle must possess all the features of the triangle as such, constituting its essence which is always the same, whatever happens to its innumerable individual expressions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, all material things as perceived by the senses are external manifestations of the essence of the given things while their essence is the root, the inner source of phenomena&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that to which they owe their existence. Sensible material objects exist objectively, outside consciousness. Yet that is but the external aspect of reality. The basis of the material phenomena comprising the world is the eternal essences, which can neither be created nor destroyed, of individual external phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are these essences in Hegel’s view? The essence of a triangle does not depend on its material, size or colour. The essence of all triangles is what is common to all of them, viz., that every triangle is a closed straight-lined figure forming three angles. It is impossible to see or even imagine the essence of a triangle, since one can imagine only things which can be perceived by senses. The triangle I can imagine may be drawn in chalk on a blackboard or in pencil on white paper, but nobody can imagine a ‘“‘triangle in general’. It is not a material object, not even a visual representation, but an abstract idea, i.e., a concept. Essence (heat as such, plant as such, speed as such) becomes comprehensible through thought alone. Does this not suggest that at the basis of all reality there is thought which man can mentally perceive but which exists, without ever appearing or disappearing, independently of whether or not it has been grasped?&lt;br /&gt;
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From this Hegel drew the conclusion that the true basis of the world, which exists outside consciousness and which we investigate, is concepts or ideas, while all material objects and facts are products and manifestations of ideas.  Whose ideas? Since they embrace the whole world they must clearly be the ideas of some ‘spirit’ which Hegel calls “world spirit&amp;amp;quot; or the “absolute idea’. According to Hegel, the ‘’absolute idea&amp;amp;quot; and the world are identical. Nature is the “‘other-being of the absolute idea”, and ‘“‘we should ... speak of nature as a system of unconscious thought, as fossilised intelligence’ and of man as the ‘conscious idea” (unlike animals, let alone plants and minerals).&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-10|10]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Like every material object, man is a manifestation of the infinite spirit which is at the basis of the world, but a manifestation possessed of consciousness, of the “finite spirit&amp;amp;quot;, and able to think and grasp the essence of things, or concepts, and conceive the world as the thought process of the world spirit. Consequently, the “world spirit’ knows itself as a spirit, and the “world ideal” thinks of itself through man. Hegel wrote of his philosophy that it was a “‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;representation of God in his eternal being prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-11|11]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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That is the gist of objective idealism which holds that the world is based on the impersonal spirit, the ‘“absolute idea’ rather than on man’s individual consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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The starting-point of objective idealism is that we know the material world outside the mind through thought, by forming concepts of the essence of things. Therefore thought is a means of knowing the essence of things, and this knowledge is the concept of their essence.  This is an obvious deduction. The objective idealists, however, say: If we know the essence of things by thinking and forming concepts, then the world outside the mind must consist of concepts, not of objects. But is that logical?  If our &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of things&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a concept, it does not follow at all that the essence of things is a concept. Concepts exist in the mind while both the essence of things and the things themselves exist independently of it.  Consequently, unlike concepts, which are ideal, the essence of things, as well as the things themselves, are material. The essence of the triangle existed when men knew nothing of it, and even when men were not there at all.  As for the concept of the triangle, it emerged when men had attained a high enough standard of knowledge. It is plain that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; essence of things is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; while the idea or the concept of it is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Consequently, logic attests the truth of materialism and the unsoundness of objective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The objective idealists argue that the real world comprises isolated objects, each having a beginning and an end, while the ideal world comprises abstract concepts which have neither beginning nor end, i.e., are eternal. But while each thing is indeed finite, we cannot say this of the real world as a whole. Every material object springs from other objects (otherwise it would have to spring from nothing), It cannot disappear altogether—as it disappears itself, it gives rise to other material things. Consequently, the real world has neither a beginning nor an end, it is eternal. Certainly the world of concepts shares the fate of mankind which has evolved the concepts and is using them. Yet mankind came into being at a definite point of time, nor did Hegel himself allow it any eternal existence. We know when the concepts “patrician”, ‘fief’, ‘factory’, “electron”, etc., emerged and when the concepts “‘epicycle”, ‘phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;, etc., were dropped. Concepts are mutable and temporal. They emerge at particular stages in the progress of human knowledge and are refined and amplified. Nature, which is infinite, is primary, and its conscious reflection—the world of concepts, which are finite—is secondary.&lt;br /&gt;
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In objective idealism, the consciousness of the “infinite world spirit’, which existed prior to the creation of nature and of any ‘‘finite mind”, i.e., man, is considered to be at the basis of the world. But, first, although it is not at all unusual to observe a person without consciousness (e.g., in a dead faint, under ether, and so on), nobody has ever met consciousness without a person. Second, even granting the impossible and conceding that consciousness can exist separately from its material source, can it be allowed that nature is the product of this consciousness? The realisation of an idea indispensably requires the presence of certain material phenomena (present even before its realisation). Basically, it proceeds by way of transforming material phenomena into other such phenomena emerging in the process. Material phenomena are never a product of nothing. These are facts proved by science and experience. No objective idealist has ever been able to disprove them or produce a single piece of evidence to show that nature has been created out of nothing by a bodiless spirit. Only one who sets reason and science at naught can believe such things. ‘‘To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science’, to make it “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actual knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that is what I have set before me,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-12|12]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hegel wrote. In truth, however, Hegel, like Berkeley, turns his back on scientific knowledge and embraces religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as there are subjective idealists who do not believe in god, so are there objective idealists who say god does not exist. But is it possible by deleting the word “god” from a philosophical doctrine to prevent idealism leading to religion? This is how Lenin answers the question: any form of idealism holds nature to be secondary, derived from intelligence. Yet, to produce nature, one must exist independently of it. ‘‘That means that something exists &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;outside&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; nature, something which moreover &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;produces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; nature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In plain language this is called God.  The idealist philosophers have always sought to change this latter name, to make it more abstract, more vague....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-13|13]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That, however, changes nothing. The idealist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy conflicts with scientific knowledge, with human reason and experience, and therefore &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idealist doctrine, even one whose supporters reject religion, objectively clears the way for religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is something else subjective and objective idealism have in common. All existence, Hegel taught, whether nature (‘fossilised&amp;amp;quot;, unconscious thought) or human  consciousness (thought knowing itself as thought), is thought.  The essence of objective idealism is the identification of being with thinking. And the subjective idealists hold all existence—both nature and man’s consciousness—to be the subjective experiences of the human spirit. Hence both the objective and subjective idealists are unanimous in reducing all existence—that commonly termed material and that commonly termed ideal—to consciousness or in identifying matter with thought. As a result, any form of idealism contravenes such patent facts as, for instance, that my thinking of a ticket for a performance at the theatre and the ticket itself are two different things. Hard as I may try to persuade the usher that the thought of a ticket and an actual ticket are the same thing, he will never let me in just for thinking of the ticket.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everyday life people start from the conviction that all their perceptions, notions, ideas and concepts of things depend on the things themselves, not the other way round. After all, things exist even when we have no notion of them. Hence people in their daily lives naturally share the materialist point of view. They do not usually, however, stop to think why they should share it; they take it for granted. What, then, is the difference between this practical materialism and philosophical materialism? By comparing the arguments for and against philosophical materialism we have learned that the materialist answer to the fundamental question of philosophy is no rash prejudgement but an inference that necessarily follows from all that science has found out about nature, about men and their thinking—in a word, from human experience as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall now examine two important scien&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;tific&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; proofs of the materialist answer to the fun&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;d&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;amental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Science of the Earth’s Past and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
No evidence of perception or thought ever being discovered in inanimate objects, science regards life as the first indispensable requisite of consciousness. When did life emerge on earth? Different sciences have helped find the answer to this question. Physicists, for instance, have found that by measuring the number of the first and last terms of the radioactive series of uranium, actino-uranium and thorium and the amount of helium present in minerals and rocks one can make a fairly accurate estimate of the age of geological deposits. Using this method geologists have established not only how old the earth’s crust is (almost 4,000 million years) but also the duration of individual geological epochs. By examining various layers of the crust, geologists and palaeontologists have found that no life, not even the simplest, existed before 3,000 million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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Microbiological research has shown that microorganisms which are the oldest living things on earth are incapable of sensation, let alone thought. They possess only irritability. The study of fossilised animals (palaeontology) shows that over hundreds of millions of years animals gradually became more complex until, in the Tertiary period (from sixty-nine million to one million years ago), mammals appeared, including the higher animals capable not only of sensation but also of perception and conception.  Nevertheless, consciousness, the ability to think, is found only among humans. And analysis of the products of radioactive decay found in the layers of the earth’s crust which contain the fossilised bones of the hominids, man’s immediate ancestors, attests that man’s separation from the animals took place from five to one million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Earth with all that is on it is the product of sensations and ideas, then whose sensations and ideas were they during the thousand million years that there was yet no life on earth? The idealists fail to answer this question in the context of knowledge. “Natural science positively asserts,’ Lenin wrote, “that the Earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that ... matter is primary and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-14|14]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Thus the only alternative is either the modern natural science and materialism that necessarily follows from it or idealism and the consequent denial of the elementary truths firmly established by science.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. Physiology of the Brain and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to the physiology of the brain.  Investigation of higher nervous activity has proved that the cerebral cortex has specialised areas where sensations are produced when impulses resulting from the stimulation of sense organs (the eye, the ear, etc.) are transmitted to them by afferent nerves. If one of these areas (in the back of the head) is destroyed, the result is blindness, and if another area located at the temples is injured, the sense of hearing is lost. Destruction of certain areas in the cortex renders a person unable to perceive an object as a whole, although colours will still be perceived. There are areas (or, rather, points) in the cortex whose stimulation by electricity arouses vivid recollections, and so on. The brain Sharply reacts to oxygen deficiency. The slightest drop in the blood supply to the brain gravely affects its function, causing a sudden suspension of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Science has incontrovertibly proved that sensations and ideas depend on the normal functioning of an intricately organised material organ&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the brain. In other words, consciousness depends on particularly organised matter (the brain) which does not depend on consciousness.  Natural science “inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-15|15]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Subjective idealists, on the other hand, hold that any body, the brain as well, is a combination of sensations, from which it follows that the brain is a product of consciousness rather than consciousness the product of the brain. Therefore the subjective idealist Avenarius, just as Mach, openly rejects the findings of natural science, asserting that ‘the brain is not an organ of thought’ and that notions and sensations are not functions of the brain. By this token, Lenin observes, he “denies the most elementary truth of physiology&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-16|16]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Here again we must choose between the facts firmly established by physiology, and thus materialism, and idealism which makes one deny what has been proved in the physiology of the higher nervous activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. What, After All, Is Philosophy? ====&lt;br /&gt;
How does philosophical knowledge differ from other scientific knowledge? Before Marx, it was commonly believed that philosophy furnished exhaustive and final answers to literally every question concerning nature, men and thought. The German idealist philosopher Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814) wrote that philosophy “exhausts all human knowledge in its fundamentals.... Each investigation made resolves a question once and for all&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-17|17]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The philosophical systems of the German philosophers Leibniz, Kant and Hegel represent attempts to provide final solutions of all cardinal problems even where essential scientific evidence was not yet available.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels held a different view of philosophy and its goals. They argued that the problems and laws dealt with by chemistry, botany or any particular science concern merely one sphere or aspect of reality. Yet, there are general problems concerning every sphere, and general laws operating in every sphere of nature, society and thought. These general problems and laws are dealt with neither by chemistry nor botany nor any particular science.  They are investigated by philosophy. As we discussed the fundamental question of philosophy we Saw that its correct solution was a deduction from knowledge obtained by all sciences together. The same goes for all other philosophical problems. Philosophy examines and compares the facts and laws discovered by different sciences, sums up this material, and draws the general conclusions that necessarily follow from it. Consequently philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;science of the more general laws governing the development of nature, society and thought&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is the conclusion of all knowledge amassed by mankind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every scientist, whatever his field, uses such general concepts as the material and the ideal, motion and rest, continuity and discontinuity, cause and effect, truth and error, and so on.  The meaning with which he invests them often seems to him self-evident. In fact, however, the meaning of these concepts intimately depends on a definite understanding of the general problems and laws philosophy is concerned with. In attaching certain meanings to the concepts, the scientist actually proceeds in his research from the solution of certain general problems although he may be unconscious of the fact. As they follow a certain conception of general laws, a certain solution of general problems, scientists, consciously or otherwise, take a definite philosophical stand. This does not prevent some of them being perfectly ignorant of the fact that their principles constitute a definite kind of philosophy, all too like Moliere’s M. Jourdain who had no idea he had been talking in prose all his life.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles or method of research is what the scientist proceeds from, what guides him in his work. And that, as we have just seen, is actually the philosophy he shares. Consequently philosophy is both the conclusion of all sciences (and of the experience on which they rest) and the method of all science and experience.  &lt;br /&gt;
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Science does not stand still. Important discoveries often result In revolutionary upheavals in science, making it necessary to more narrowly specify and even revise earlier findings. Lenin wrote: “...natural science is progressing so fast and is undergoing such a profound revolutionary upheaval in all spheres that it cannot possibly dispense with philosophical deductions.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-18|18]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hence there can be no final or exhaustive system of knowledge. Philosophy must be developed and refined as knowledge accumulated by different sciences extends. Thus science advances philosophy. And as the philosophy evolved from a higher level of science iS more true and exact, so is the scientific and practical activity following it more successful and fruitful. The noted English physiologist J.B.S. Haldane wrote: “...a good deal of my recently published research has been inspired by my gradually increasing knowledge of dialectical materialism. ...I find dialectical materialism a valuable tool in research…”’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-19|19]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The materialist philosophy thus advances particular sciences. As for idealist philosophy, it does science harm. Commenting on the harmful influence of idealist views on the work of the physicist Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein wrote: “This is an interesting example of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpretation of facts by philosophical prejudices.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-20|20]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Hence philosophy is knowledge such as is not found in any other science. Marxism rejects the view&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;which emerged in antiquity and is now advocated by the existentialists—that philosophy has allegedly nothing to do with knowledge of reality, and that by ignoring and despising scientific knowledge philosophy shows man that he should not depend on such knowledge but solely on his inner world in which he is sure to find the answers to his anxious questions about what he must aspire to, what eschew, and what he generally should and should not do.&lt;br /&gt;
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There exists another old view that, apart from knowledge of what occurs in nature, society and mind, nothing concerns philosophy.  “To look at things philosophically’ commonly means to judge things with supreme indifference, just looking on and never interfering in anything. If, on the other hand, a person actively pursues his ideals and fights what he believes to be wrong, people would say of him: “He has a practical, not a philosophical, turn of mind. He is a practical person whose ideals have nothing to do with philosophy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This view of philosophy was utterly rejected by Marx, who wrote: ‘The philosophers have only &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interpreted&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it.&#039;’&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-21|21]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Philosophy does not merely answer the question as to what the world is but also what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;attitude&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we should take towards it, how we should remake it. It is not merely knowledge of what there is but a way of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;looking at&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; what there is, a definite view of the world, a world outlook which determines our aims and goals. Philosophy makes the scientific explanation of reality a means of transforming it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we encounter one more distinction between philosophy and all other sciences. The law, for instance, which states that “...capitalistic accumulation ...constantly produces...  a surplus-population”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-22|22]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; i.e., unemployment, is recognised by science not because Marx and other philosophers consider it just, but because it represents authentic knowledge of capitalism. Every science confines itself to seeking knowledge in its proper field. Objective knowledge does not depend on a scientist’s ideals, likes and dislikes. The questions about what we should aspire to and what attitude we should take towards the world are answered by philosophy. It gives expression to man’s practical attitude to the world, his world outlook. As man is a social being, so is his outlook a social phenomenon, and in class society it expresses the interests of a definite class. The opposition of two currents in philosophy, materialism and idealism, is, now as before, an expression of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being either with one or with the other of these two opposite currents constitutes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship in philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opponents of Marxism take roughly the fol&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;owing line of argument: assuming that philosophy is true knowledge and its doctrines are true inasmuch as their authors have succeeded in learning the truth about the world, it does not matter whether the doctrines are to somebody’s advantage or disadvantage, for in the presence of truth interests are silent. Conversely, assuming that the aim of philosophy is to teach what benefits a certain class, it does not matter whether or not its teachings are true, for in that case they need not conform to truth but to the interest of that class. Therefore, they conclude, the statements “philosophy expresses authentic knowledge’ and “philosophy expresses class interests&amp;amp;quot; are mutually exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must, however, remember that philosophy emerged with the division of society into classes. In class society, in every age the decayed classes which must leave the scene along with the decayed regime under which they have ruled are opposed by other classes which have to crush the old regime and help society ascend to a higher stage. The reactionary classes think in terms of the past, for they fail to see that the existing order has run its course and is no longer serviceable. In a nutshell, they have a perverted view of the state of things. Furthermore, the reactionary classes are vitally interested in having everybody share this view for, so long as it prevails, the masses will believe that the existing order is immutable and will dumbly submit to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The revolutionary classes, on the contrary, are objectively interested in making truth accessible to as many members of society as possible, because so long as the masses believe what the reactionaries tell them it is difficult to rouse them to a struggle against the existing order. It is only after they have learned the truth that they may be victorious in the revolutionary struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Does this mean that such a role in the life of society may belong to true and false statements bearing merely on what is happening in society? To see whether or not it is so, let us look at the bitter struggle that developed during the Renaissance between the supporters and opponents of Copernicus and his follower, Galileo. The ideological positions of the contending parties expressed antagonistic class interests. Although neither Copernicus nor Galileo ever concerned himself with social and political problems in his writings, many people were burned at the stake for supporting their ideas.  Nor would Copernicus and Galileo themselves have escaped the stake if Copernicus had not died just when his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was published in 1543, and if Galileo had not recanted. Nevertheless Galileo had to spend the remaining nine years of his life in confinement imposed on him by the Inquisition for, as the sentence runs, “having held... the doctrine that the Sun is the centre of the terrestrial orbit and does not move westward from the east whereas the Earth does so move….”&lt;br /&gt;
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Galileo was condemned because the scientific truths he defended overturned the prevailing unscientific conception of the world. Scientific comprehension of reality makes people approach everything they learn critically, checking it against experience and reason, which helps them learn the truth about what occurs in society. The unscientific world outlook suggests that people should rely neither on science nor on their own experience and intelligence but solely on what their leaders tell them. (“The Fuhrer thinks for you.&amp;amp;quot;) Therefore, even where scientists say nothing against the existing order of things, the knowledge they spread and the scientific outlook seizing the people’s minds helps them see things in their true light; they no longer blindly believe those who unduly extol the established order, and come to understand that the old system is on its way out and must make room for the new. Hence, the scientific world outlook, as it takes hold of the masses, promotes their interests, making them aware of the tasks before them and the way to accomplish them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Truth is the ideological weapon of the masses in the struggle against the existing order and reactionary classes which defend it. And falsehood, spread by the reactionary classes, makes the masses impotent and submissive slaves. For this reason the quest for truth, for knowledge, for science is the ideological expression of the class struggle. The materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;true&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conception of reality and the idealist solution—a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;false&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one. Hence, the antagonism of the two camps in philosophy has always reflected the antagonism of class interests.  Today too, materialism serves the interest of the proletariat and other progressive classes, whereas idealism serves the capitalist and other exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin showed that idealism does not, however, spring from class interests alone. The process of cognition itself may breed idealism, as it is a process which “... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;includes in it&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transformation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantasy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;...&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-23|23]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Should the assertion that consciousness is primary be all that the idealist doctrines are about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in other words, should they be entirely false—their role would be merely reactionary and they would have nothing to offer us. However, in spite of their idealism, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and other philosophers did, in fact, make significant contributions to man’s quest for true scientific knowledge. Hegel elaborated the dialectical method.  It is a revolutionary method, although Hegel himself did not apply it to nature but only to the development of concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whose class interests a philosophical doctrine will serve depends on the doctrine itself, not on its author’s intentions. In 1899, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel published a book, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Die Weltsratsel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (The Riddle of the Universe) in which, by advocating the materialist outlook in natural science, he knocked the bottom out of idealism. For all that he was no revolutionary politically, the bourgeoisie of all countries fiercely turned on Haeckel, while in Russia the entire printing of his book in Russian translation was sentenced by a court to be burned.  Lenin observed that “this popular little book became a weapon in the class struggle”’,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-24|24]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; a weapon against the bourgeoisie, despite the author’s bourgeois political views. At the same time, the philosophical writings of Bogdanov (criticised by Lenin in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;), who set out to fight the bourgeoisie on behalf of the proletariat, actually promoted the interests of the former, as their author advocated idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxist-Leninist philosophy is simultaneously the science of laws governing the development of nature, society and thought and the world outlook of the working class, affirming communist ideals and moral principles. In it, elucidation of truth and defence of class interests do not exclude but, on the contrary, necessarily imply each other. That is why the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is an instrument for the revolutionary remaking of society and a method of scientifically examining social phenomena which helps find the correct path towards the historical goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#anchor20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2. Revolution In Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Social and Historical Prerequisites of Marxist Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
When capitalism became entrenched in Western Europe, turning millions of peasants into wage workers whose lot was back-breaking toil and appalling poverty, many workers imagined that the source of their misery lay in the machines, in mechanised production, which had replaced manual work. The early 19th century was marked by a spontaneous mass movement of workmen destroying machines as a protest (the Luddites). Soon, however, the workers’ understanding increased and the first class battles were fought between them and their exploiters. The Chartist movement in England in the 1830s and 1840s, the French workers’ uprisings in 1831 and 1834, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, and subsequent strikes made it clear that a new class had emerged, destined to abolish capitalism and end the era of exploitation of man by man. To effect the drastic change, the proletariat had to understand the laws of society’s development much better, and to see how to employ them much more clearly, than the other revolutionary classes needed to, which carried out less stupendous social reforms. It took new ideo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ogical equipment, a new world outlook to accomplish tasks unprecedented in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such were the material, socio-historical prerequisites of Marxist philosophy. Its emergence was prepared ideologically by preceding philosophy, natural science and the social sciences from which Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820-1895) proceeded.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Ancient Dialectics and Modern Metaphysics ====&lt;br /&gt;
One of the greatest achievements of philosophy before the emergence of Marxism was Hegel’s dialectics. What are dialectics? Two thousand five hundred years ago no particular sciences, e.g., physics, geography, botany, and SO on, were yet in existence. There was only one form of knowledge: philosophy (Greek for “love of wisdom&amp;amp;quot;) which embraced everything.  Philosophers concerned themselves with the earth and the sky, things and creatures, society and mind, seeking to grasp everything at once.  Proceeding in this way they could not fail to observe that all things are in state of perpetual motion, that they appear and disappear, are connected in one way or another and marked by inner contradictions. “This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world” is commonly called dialectical thinking or the dialectics of the ancients. ‘‘But this conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately. ..&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-25|25]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The structure and characteristics of celestial bodies, the Earth, minerals, plants and animals are studied by particular sciences. In antiquity there were no such sciences and knowledge was not specialised. There was pure speculation founded on simple observation without experimental proof.&lt;br /&gt;
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As time went on, particular sciences appeared one by one. For more than two thousand years, however, attempts to find out the truth about natural phenomena were more often based on pure speculation than on experimental research. It was not until the 16th-17th centuries that experimental natural science took shape. That epoch saw the emergence of classical mechanics which explained with remarkable accuracy very many terrestrial and astronomical phenomena and was broadly applied in industry. Physics vastly extended its knowledge of heat, light, magnetism and electricity.  The scientific basis of modern astronomy was laid. Voyages around the world and the geographical discoveries made at that time vastly increased men’s knowledge of continents, oceans, seas, mountains, deserts, rivers and lakes.  By the end of the 18th century, botanists and zoologists had studied and described some scores of thousands of plant varieties, and almost twenty thousand animal species. Human anatomy was investigated for the first time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanics, however, outpaced all other sciences. Its success in a variety of fields, its experimental verification and mathematical precision inspired in scientists a belief that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the laws of mechanics were the key to all phenomena&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of inanimate and animate nature alike.  This &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mechanistic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; view prevailed among scientists in the 17th-18th centuries. From the principle of mechanics that ‘“‘every body remains in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled by external forces to change that state’ it was deduced that all motion is due to the application of an external force which compels a body to change its state.&lt;br /&gt;
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The natural scientists’ mechanistic views were fully shared by the 18th-century materialist philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
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One thing about the discoveries made in astronomy in the 16th-17th centuries was that there was nothing to tell the astronomers whether the solar system had ever been different from what they observed. On the contrary, from the laws of classical mechanics it followed that the planets had always been moving in the same orbits and would continue in them forever. The geographical discoveries had yielded much new information but no evidence that there had been a time when the Earth’s surface was in a different condition. It followed then that the continents, oceans, mountains, rivers, deserts were just where they had always been.  In other words, the Earth’s surface would always be as it was since time began. Botanical and zoological data concerning many thousands of plant and animal species gave no indication that there had been a time when they did not exist. On the contrary, everything seemed to suggest that although individual plants and animals were born and died, the species went on indefinitely.&lt;br /&gt;
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Available scientific data suggested that although everything in nature was in a state of motion, that motion was merely a repetition of the same cycles and forms. And as the forms—being the most essential thing in any part of nature—were immutable, motion engendered nothing new, while nothing essential ever disappeared.&lt;br /&gt;
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That deduction was natural to science at that time. Before investigating the relationship &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects and their action on one another, and so the processes developing in them and the variation they underwent, the scientists needed enough information about the structure of the objects, which, however, they could only gain by abstracting from what actually happened to the objects (from their relationships, interaction and change). When viewed in such terms, the phenomena under examination emerged as a totality of immutable, fixed objects.  The differences and contradictions emerged and were viewed merely as existing between individual objects but never &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; them, the latter being considered altogether impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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This approach, which was necessary and effective at the beginning, became customary.  The connections and variations, temporarily disregarded, began to appear unimportant and then simply non-existent. As a result, a scientist engrossed in his particular field discovered in it innumerable characteristics which made it utterly unlike and apparently unconnected with any other sphere of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the conception was formed that movement was the repetition of the same forms which were always identical, permanent and unchangeable, that the world consisted of ready-made objects which could not be self-contradictory, and that connections between phenomena were superficial and inessential. This view focuses attention on only one aspect of the world, viz., on the inherent repetitiveness of motion and inherent stability of material bodies, and on contradictions &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things. Such a one-sided conception of the world, diametrically different from dialectics, is described as the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysical method&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thinking or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on contemporary scientific knowledge, 18th-century materialist philosophy adhered to the metaphysical method which was then prevalent. Like mechanicism, metaphysics played a progressive role in its day. Scientists amassed vast knowledge about the world by following this method. Yet, the metaphysical conception of motion, interconnection and contradiction is a step backwards, compared with ancient dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Hegel and Feuerbach ====&lt;br /&gt;
The weak points of 18th-century materialism were seized upon by the idealists who criticised its mechanistic and metaphysical approach. But proceeding from pure speculation and not, as a rule, from natural science, the idealists were unable to advance a more correct scientific interpretation of development, as they themselves largely reasoned on metaphysical lines. The change came with the appearance of Hegel’s doctrine which marked a turning point in the history of dialectics. Marx wrote that Hegel was ‘the first to present its (dialectical—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ed.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-26|26]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel&#039;s philosophy greatly influenced his contemporaries. In the ideological struggle which developed in Germany on the eve of the 1848 Revolution both the opponents and supporters of monarchy and religion (Young Hegelians and Old Hegelians respectively) adhered to Hegel&#039;s dialectical idealism. Later on, however, they went separate ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the Young Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), opposed Hegel’s philosophy, arguing that, like any idealist doctrine, it was actually a philosophical apology for religion.  By showing that religion and idealism were false and moreover played a reactionary role in the life of society, Feuerbach took a consistent materialist stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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His defence of materialism and atheism made a tremendous impression. Describing how warmly Marx welcomed the new opinion and how greatly he was influenced by it, Engels wrote: “Enthusiasm was general; we all became Feuerbachians at once.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-27|27]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1839, when Feuerbach became a materialist, Marx was twenty-one and Engels nineteen.  Both were Hegelians, but their militant atheism and revolutionary democratic views made it imminent that they should renounce idealism and adopt a materialist standpoint. Feuerbach’s work was a great encouragement to this transition. Engels wrote that of all the philosophers after Hegel, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx and himself was the greatest. However, it soon became clear to them that, as he shattered Hegel’s idealist philosophy, Feuerbach simultaneously discarded its rational content, dialectics. And thus, although he had advanced far ahead of 18th-century materialism, he still failed to cope with its major shortcomings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then what is the significance of Hegel&#039;s dialectics which Feuerbach overlooked and which Marx and Engels thought so highly of and used in evolving dialectical and historical materialism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It consists first of all in the teaching that, although there is repetition in movement, nothing&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;either separate objects or the stages and forms of development—is repeated completely.  The world contains no forms which eternally repeat themselves and are immutable. In general, there is nothing eternal in the world except the eternal change of forms and phenomena replacing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Hegel, all is interlinked in the world which is a single whole and every particle of which is involved in an endless multiplicity of relations. This is a very important point, not to be overlooked in scientific research.&lt;br /&gt;
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While Hegel’s dialectical method acknowledges that there are contradictions between things, it sees this as only one side of the matter; the other side is much more important, viz., “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;all things are contradictory in themselves&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;” and that inner contradiction “is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only insofar as something embodies a contradiction that it moves.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel&#039;s dialectical method disclosed the unsoundness of the metaphysical view which took into consideration merely the stability of real phenomena and our conceptions of them, and which therefore regarded the world as a totality of ready-made things, and thought as a totality of ready-made concepts. Such a view, Hegel argued, ignores the other, most important, aspect&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the eternal mutability of everything in the world, which is not a totality of finished things but of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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As he created his method, Hegel was the first to advance, formulate and work out in detail the main laws of dialectics which govern all development. He offered a dialectical interpretation of the most general concepts (categories) which play an exceedingly important role in science and experience. Lastly, Hegel, more amply and correctly than anybody before him, elucidated the complex and contradictory nature not only of thought but of the whole process of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much as they appreciated it, Marx and Engels nevertheless could not incorporate Hegel&#039;s dialectics into their doctrine because it was &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and consequently had serious flaws.&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, Hegel deduced the laws of dialectics not from existence but from consciousness. He maintained that nature and human history must be subject to those laws because everything occurring in nature and society was merely a reflection of consciousness, of the Absolute Idea.  To Marx and Engels, however, it was not “a question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-28|28]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx and Engels worked out a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dialectic in which the dialectical laws emerge above all as those governing the development of the real world (nature and society), whereas the laws of thought are their peculiar reflection in men’s heads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, although Hegel stated that development was infinite, the Absolute Idea in his philosophical system actually completed its development. Hence Hegel considered his philosophy to be final, all-embracing knowledge, while he considered the society in which it was evolved to be the crowning stage in the development of mankind. But a “system of natural and historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, is contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning&amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-29|29]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   and so is the “final” stage in society’s development. Hegel sacrificed to his idealist system the most important dialectical principle, the principle of development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, being an idealist, Hegel considered it somewhat degrading for the Absolute Idea to be embodied in matter, in nature. He attributed progressive dialectical development to nothing but the ‘conscious idea”, i.e., to men.  As for the “unconscious idea”, i.e., nature, it, according to Hegel, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not develop in time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was for this reason that Marx wrote that dialectics with Hegel “is standing on its head.  It must be turned right side up again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-30|30]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It was for Marx and Engels to evolve the materialist dialectical method which is diametrically opposite to Hegel’s idealist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Philosophical Generalisation of New Scientific Discoveries ====&lt;br /&gt;
Discriminating use of Feuerbach’s materialist ideas and Hegel’s dialectics is merely one aspect of the philosophical work of Marx and Engels which ensured continuity between their own doctrine and those of their philosophical predecessors. The other aspect of their theoretical work was the summing up of new &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the 19th century, the study of heat, magnetism, electricity and light revealed that even within the pale of physics reducing all to mechanical phenomena was out of the question. It was still less possible with relation to chemistry, botany and zoology. The progress of natural science cut the ground from under the feet of mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Hegel convincingly demonstrated the internally contradictory nature of consciousness, extensive research conducted in the 19th century in the natural and social sciences demonstrated no less convincingly the inherently contradictory nature of many natural and social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the 1840s, the universal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conservation and transformation of energy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was discovered, in accordance with which energy neither disappears nor is created anew. This law, which states that mechanical, thermal, electrical, chemical energy is mutually convertible, led to the deduction that all phenomena in the universe are connected in some way, that the &amp;amp;quot;unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific fact&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-31|31]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the latter half of the 18th century, M. Lomonosov and J. Hutton suggested that the Earth’s surface was quite unlike what it was in the past. In the 19th century, so much evidence was accumulated about how substantially and recurrently the Earth’s appearance used to change that the science of geology was born.  Geologists found that none of the stages of the Earth’s development (e.g., the Archean, Proterozoic, Palaeozoic, Mesozoic, Cainozoic) had been a repetition of any of the previous stages.  The beginning of every new era meant the disappearance of a number of continents, islands, seas, mountains, etc., and the appearance of entirely new geological phenomena, as well as substantial climatic changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1755, Kant suggested that the solar system did not exist eternally but had naturally emerged at some time in the past, and he formulated a hypothesis, according to which the solar system originated and developed out of a nebula. The 18th-century scientists, in whose minds metaphysics reigned supreme, remained deaf to the call to stop regarding astronomic phenomena as unchangeable cycles eternally repeating themselves. In 1796, however, Kant’s hypothesis was supported and carried forward by Laplace, and in the middle of the 19th century it was substantiated mathematically. Although in the 20th century the Kant-Laplace hypothesis of the origin of the solar system was supplanted by others, it is now commonly accepted that the solar system appeared at some time in the past as a natural result of the development of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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There emerged comparative anatomy and the physiology of plants and animals, and it was revealed that there is an essential likeness and connection between rather distant species.  In the first half of the 19th century it was discovered that all plants and animals are built of cells which are built more or less on the same pattern and which feed and multiply in roughly the same way, whether they be the cells of a seaweed or a tree, of a minute infusorian or man. This signal discovery put it beyond all doubt that all living things are mutually connected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another new science, palaeontology, established that over hundreds of millions of years many plant and animal species had been replacing one another, some of them dying out and others appearing in their stead. It was found that nothing in nature was eternal, stages of development never repeating themselves but replacing one another in an eternal succession.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the mid-19th century the English scientist Charles Darwin discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of natural selection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; establishing the connection between all living beings and demonstrating that their development was no repetition of the old but the extinction of the old and emergence of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, as early as the first half of the 19th century natural science began to study the interconnections of objects and changes within and between them, rather than isolated objects; processes, rather than finished things. This led to the discovery of the intrinsically contradictory character of everything in nature and in society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The metaphysical mode of thinking thus came into conflict with scientific knowledge which testified to the “universal, all-sided, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; connection of everything with everything...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-32|32]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Newly-obtained knowledge has made it clear that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nature contains nothing eternal besides the eternal succession of developmental stages, each of which disappears sooner or later to be replaced by an essentially different stage which shares the fate of its predecessors; that the world is not a totality of things but of processes, connections and relations, and that all phenomena are marked by inherent contradictions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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To draw such conclusions was to subject to a revision the dominant mechanistic and metaphysical views and prejudices which had got hold of scientists and philosophers. It took extraordinary power and boldness of mind to generalise scientific knowledge in terms of philosophy, as Marx and Engels did, and declare that ‘‘in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ast resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-33|33]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Role of Practice in Human Existence ====&lt;br /&gt;
While nature exists independently of man, his entire existence—both physical and spiritual&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depends on nature. A person lives or dies, and, if he lives, he is happy or miserable, all depending on the external world around him.  That world, acting on man’s sense-organs, produces sensations, emotions and ideas in him.  This was how the pre-Marxian materialists explained the dependence of the spirit on nature, of consciousness on matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx was the first to see and expose the onesidedness of that view which suggests that the external world alone is capable of affecting man while all man can do is passively perceive and reflect on the things and events around him.  But can a person merely gaze at things, listen to sounds and reflect and do nothing else? Not unless he is a paralytic unable to move hand or foot, and even then he must be looked after by others who certainly do more than just feel sensations and reflect.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Feuerbach quite rightly observed, in order to live, man must satisfy his needs. But Feuerbach went no further than that. Marx, on the other hand, showed that in order to have that without which man cannot live, i.e., food, clothing, shelter, the means of protecting himself from savage beasts, and so on, man has to act on the things round him so as to make them satisfy his needs. Unlike the old materialists’ imaginary man, real man does not merely look on, but acts; he does not passively suffer the influence of the external world but influences it himself. The external world changes man, but man changes the world too. Man’s activity whereby he changes the external world, i.e., nature and society, is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Practice implies influencing nature in order to gain one’s livelihood (work, production); influencing other people (social or public activity), and influencing nature so as to gain knowledge (scientific experimentation).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels proved that practice, which the old materialists overlooked, was of immense significance to men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. Practice as the production of the means of subsistence is the primary condition of human existence. Its significance is clear if only from the fact that man’s survival depends &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Animals as well as men have to influence their natural environment to protect themselves against hunger, cold and enemies. There is, however, an essential difference between man’s work and animal behaviour. In order to sustain itself an animal tackles the object directly whereas man tackles objects with the aid of implements he manufactures himself, and forms certain relations with other men. These relations greatly affect man’s behaviour, moulding him as a social being. Work gave rise to human intelligence and transformed the primitive herd into human society with its morals, science and art. In a word, work is what makes us human, it is man’s essence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Marx was the first to show that the progress of mankind from the lower to higher stages of civilisation is determined by the progress of commodity production which, in the long run, determines the course of history. Consequently practice has the decisive role in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. The old materialists’ error was that while they spoke of man’s dependence on the external world they overlooked the other side of the matter or the dependence of man’s environment on his influence. Men have changed the appearance of the Earth out of all recognition.  Vast forests have been felled, marshes drained, artificial rivers and seas created and soil, climate and the composition of the atmosphere greatly altered and new varieties of plants and animals developed by man. The crops and animals we raise have been bred by man. Our natural environment bears the stamp of men’s practical activity. Men themselves, the relations that have been established among them and the things they have created are all products of this activity. Hence, although it is true that material conditions influence man a great deal, it is also true that these conditions themselves are to a great extent products of the practical activity of generations. Therefore the influence of these conditions on man includes the influence on him of other people’s practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having thus exposed the unsoundness of contemplative materialism, Marx and Engels showed that practice plays the decisive role in men’s material and intellectual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until the mid-19th century nobody had managed to supply a materialist explanation of the history of human society. All philosophers—idealists and materialists alike—arrived at an idealist interpretation of society. Yet, by that time the progress of social relationships and the social sciences had prepared enough material for solving the problem. First, however, one had to examine the material thoroughly, draw general conclusions from it, make proper deductions and, overcoming the ingrained views which had dominated society for centuries, take a path yet untrodden by any thinker. That was what Marx did. Having demonstrated the unsoundness of the old materialists’ idealist view on history, Marx, using the latest information provided by the social sciences and subjecting the workings of modern society to a detailed and penetrating examination, was able to offer a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist explanation of human history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to be dealt with further on in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote that Marx was “the founder of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism ...’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-34|34]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The creation of Marxist philosophy sbelind the defeat of mechanism and metaphysics characteristic of the old materialism and the triumph of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism. Contemplation was exposed and the immense role played by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; elucidated. The idealist view of society was overcome and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;historical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism created. These changes were so extensive as to make the emergence of the Marxist doctrine a real &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 3. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Conception of Matter in Ancient Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
A Hindu philosopher, Kapila, who lived 2,500 years ago, reasoned as follows. Nothing is eternal. Yet no thing can spring out of nothing nor can it be reduced to nothing, for when things are destroyed they do not disappear altogether but turn into stuff from which other things are made. Thus Kapila arrives at the conclusion that there exists some material which can be neither created nor destroyed, and of which all things are formed, namely, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other ancient philosophers similarly arrived at the idea of matter. Early Greek philosophers who lived at about the same time as Kapila sought matter among the bodies immediately observable in nature. Thales regarded water or moisture as the primary stuff or principle of things. Anaximenes identified primary matter with air. Heraclitus held that fire was primary. Empedocles believed that the universe was made up of particles of earth, water, air and fire. Democritus taught that matter consisted of eternal, indestructible and unchangeable bodies, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atoms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, so small that they cannot be diminished any further (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atomos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, indivisible) or seen or touched. Atoms possess hardness, size, shape, weight and motion. Everything consists of atoms arranged in particular ways.  When a particular combination of atoms, a thing, breaks up, the thing is destroyed. Diversity of the real world, according to Democritus, is due to the diversity of atom combinations.  Subtle emanations of atoms, thrown off from the surface of an object, penetrate the sense-organs, producing sensations and then ideas, for which sensations are responsible. Both sensations and ideas are impressions left by the emanations of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Democritus taught that (1) matter is real and exists independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations; (3) sensations and ideas are impressions produced by matter; (4) matter has certain physical properties and is the stuff of which all things are made (it is the ultimate level of nature); (5) matter is immutable: atoms have always been as they are, and they will always be so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Revolution in Natural Science. Philosophical Controversy ====&lt;br /&gt;
The view that matter consists of atoms which are the immutable, ultimate level of nature governed by the laws of mechanics persisted to the end of the 19th century. In that century, however, the connection between electricity and magnetism was discovered. Shortly afterwards, electromagnetic fields, waves, charges and the electromagnetic nature of light were discovered and investigated, giving rise to electrodynamics, the science concerned with these phenomena. None of them was found to contain atoms. Some people expected that with time atoms would be found, after all, to be the basis of electromagnetic phenomena. Others, who saw that everything could not be reduced to atoms, began to think that along with bodies which consisted of atoms, i.e., along with matter as they understood it, there were natural phenomena of an essentially different kind, such as electromagnetism, which they considered to be immaterial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were others still who held that electromagnetic fields, waves, charges, and so on, were not really natural phenomena but concepts invented by physicists to make it more convenient for them to describe their observations.  These people maintained that, unlike matter composed of atoms&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the reality of which they never questioned—electromagnetic fields, waves, etc., exist only in mind and not in reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Austrian physicist Ernst Mach took a different line. He argued that nothing (and not electromagnetism alone) existed outside consciousness. There is nothing but our sensations, he wrote, and to believe in atoms is not a whit better than to believe in witches. This subjective-idealist theory was rejected by all but a few natural scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the turn of the 20th century it was found that atoms of certain chemical elements are capable of changing into atoms of other chemical elements (e.g., an atom of radium changes into one of radon and then of lead); that the atom is a system of particles charged with electricity (electrons), and electromagnetic fields; that the mass of electrons, contrary to the laws of classical mechanics, alters with their velocity. That which scientists called matter (atoms) was reduced to electromagnetic phenomena, to what was termed electricity or energy and was regarded as immaterial. After these discoveries, the majority of scientists were inclined to think that matter does not consist of atoms but of electrons. Some scientists, however, who had earlier believed in the existence of atoms but denied the reality of electromagnetic phenomena, now held that since the atom itself presented fields, charges and waves, it meant that there was no matter; there were merely physical concepts. All views that had been commonly accepted in natural science now came under sharp criticism. Natural science reached a crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists were not slow to see their opportunity and claimed that the new discoveries apparently corroborated the idealist views.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was urgently necessary to disprove the new form of idealism, and by drawing philosophical conclusions from the new scientific discoveries, enrich Marxist philosophy and show the way out of the crisis in natural science.  That task was brilliantly carried out by Lenin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The New Concept of Matter Elaborated by Lenin ====&lt;br /&gt;
In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin showed that Mach’s “new” doctrine was actually the old doctrine of Berkeley, altogether inconsistent with science. Lenin wrote that the new discoveries had exposed the unsoundness of metaphysical materialism which held nature (atoms) to be immutable, infinite in extent but finite in depth, and saw everything as mechanical motion. Not only did the new scientific discoveries confirm dialectical materialism but they enabled it to be enriched by the philosophical deductions which Lenin made from them. He conclusively proved that nature is as infinite in depth as in extent that “the electron is as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inexhaustible&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as the atom, nature is infinite...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-35|35]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , it has no “ultimate&amp;amp;quot; level. Therefore, to declare that matter consisted of electrons rather than atoms would be to retain the metaphysical conception of matter. The whole point was that in the transition from one level of nature to another, deeper level, many properties of the former disappeared, being replaced by other properties, not present at the previous levels. There were no immutable things or properties, no immutable form of motion to which motion at all levels could be reduced.  The electromagnetic structure of the atom was not evidence of its ‘“dematerialisation”’ but of man’s deeper knowledge of the atom. The trouble with physicists was that they knew none but mechanistic and metaphysical materialism.  Therefore they took the collapse of the mechanistic method and metaphysics for the collapse of materialism. ‘“‘Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-36|36]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Natural science, Lenin wrote, “... will overcome all crises, but only by the indispensable replacement of metaphysical materialism by dialectical materialism”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-37|37]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and, above all, by the replacement of the narrow concept of matter (embracing the atoms alone) by a broad dialectical concept. Matter is “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it”; “...matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-38|38]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Such is Lenin’s definition of matter. It comprises three points, viz., (1) matter is that which exists apart from and independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations in us; (3) matter is that which our sensations and consciousness reflect in general.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All that which produces sensations is real, but not all that is real produces sensations.  Thus, we cannot feel the ultraviolet rays, processes going on in the centre of the sun, or endless other phenomena. Important as the second and third characteristics of matter are, the main thing that distinguishes what is mater.  ial from what is immaterial is that the former exists outside consciousness. Lenin wrote: &amp;amp;quot;...the sole ‘property’ of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of existing outside the mind.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-39|39]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That precisely is the distinguishing feature of Lenin’s conception of matter. For Lenin, not only all that is real objectively exists, but all that objectively exists is real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now you may ask: “Is shadow material? Is the absence of light rays reflected from a surface material?’ But their absence is just as much a reality independent of the mind as their presence is. Both these phenomena are thus equally material. If, besides, we take it into account that the world is no collection of finished things but a totality of processes and relationships, we shall see that the idea that material is corporeal, i.e., the metaphysical materialists’ view, must give way to another, which regards the gravitational field and electromagnetic wave propagation and all kinds of connections existing outside the mind (including social relationships) as material phenomena.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern scientific discoveries attest that Lenin’s conception of matter is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early in the 20th century everything in nature was believed to consist either of discontinuous microparticles (substance) or of continuous electromagnetic fields. Both were taken, by and large, to be subject to the same laws which govern the objects possessing mass and velocity or macroobjects which we meet in ordinary experience. It seemed no less obvious that if discontinuous substance (in which case motion occurs along a definite line, receiving a definite impulse at each point of the line) is the opposite of the continuous field (in which case motion consists in wave propagation) then no object can be a substance and a field simultaneously.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As scientists investigated such fields and particles with a mass of a billion-billionth of a gram, moving almost as fast as light, a wonderful world, the microcosm, opened up before them. In that strange world certain laws of classical mechanics lose their force and are replaced by other laws. Substance and field coincide in the same object and particles do not possess simultaneously a definite impulse and a definite position. In fact, the more definite a particle’s position, the less definite its impulse, and vice versa. When these and other unusual laws of the microcosm were discovered, scientists evolved, in the mid-20th century, a new branch of physics, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantum theory&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, the idealists hastened to take advantage of its unusual character and insisted that quantum objects and processes did not really exist, being merely concepts invented by scientists to explain their experiments. That was, however, rejected by leading physicists. One of the authors of the quantum theory, Louis de Broglie, wrote that whether he studied macro-objects or micro-objects a physicist was sure of their objective existence, for “it is doubtful that he would be able to pursue his research usefully, by abandoning all belief in objective reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-40|40]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Einstein pointed out time and again that the certainty of the external world existing independently of the researcher underlay the whole of natural science. Planck and Born, who made significant contributions to quantum theory, held the same view. Concerning micro-particles, Born wrote: “I maintain that we are justified in regarding these particles as real in a sense not essentially different from the usual meaning of the word.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-41|41]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; As for the ambivalent opinion accepting the reality of things of everyday experience (macrocosmic objects) while denying the reality of microcosmic objects, Born wrote that “there is a continuous transition.... Where does that crude reality, in which the experimentalist lives, end ... and where does the atomistic world, in which the idea of reality is illusion and anathema, begin?  There is, of course, no such border; if we are compelled to attribute reality to the ordinary things of everyday life including scientific instruments and materials used in experimenting, we cannot cease doing so for objects observable only with the help of instruments”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-42|42]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And, Born concludes, quantum theory “calls for new ways of describing the physical world, but not the denial of its reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-43|43]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the view of leading contemporary physicists whose research results have induced them to arrive at certain propositions of dialectical materialism spontaneously, although they do not consciously support Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, many outstanding modern physicists have consciously accepted dialectical materialism as the only philosophy consistent with modern science. They are P. Langevin, F. Joliot-Curie, J.-P. Vigier, Sakata Shoichi, and others.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this confirms Lenin’s prediction that the spirit of materialism, which is inherent in natural science, will enable it to overcome every possible crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4. Matter and Motion ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Is There Matter without Motion? ====&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this question one must first clearly understand what matter is and what motion is. We have already discussed the nature of matter. As for motion, it was established as early as the 19th century that mechanical motion is merely one form of the motion of matter, which has different, if connected, forms.  Engels evolved the following basic principles of the Marxist conception of the forms of the motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, the forms of the motion of matter are essentially different, none of them being reducible to another. For example, although chemical reactions play a major role in the processes occurring in the body of an animal and in the formation of species in the anima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kingdom, it would be quite wrong to attempt to reduce animal life to a chemical form of motion. With the emergence of life, there come into effect biological laws, not operative in inanimate nature; life is a form of motion, essentially different from any other (although it is connected with other forms of motion).&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, under certain conditions some forms of motion turn into other forms. Thus, at a certain stage in the development of matter and the complication of chemical processes, life appeared as a new form of the motion of matter. At a certain stage in the development of the animal kingdom, man was singled out from it; there emerged a new form of the motion of matter, namely, social processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, complex forms of the motion of matter include relatively simple forms, by no means being merely their sum. All chemical reactions necessarily involve electromagnetic and other physical processes, although the de&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isive role here belongs to the laws of chemistry. All vital processes in plants or animals necessarily involve a great number of chemical reactions, though the decisive role is played by biological laws. All social processes necessarily involve biological processes occurring in man. But the decisive role in the social process is undoubtedly played by the laws of the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Engels advanced also the important idea that the classification of the forms of the motion of matter underlies the classification of sciences.  The further progress of science has fully confirmed these ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of modern scientific conceptions, the following groups of forms of the motion of matter may be isolated: (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;physical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or change of the position in space, velocity, mass, energy, electrical charge, temperature, volume and other characteristics of real objects; (2) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;chemical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the conversion of substances, combination and recombination of atoms; (3) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;biological forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or life and changes occurring in plants and animals; (4) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the changes occurring in human society and peculiar to it alone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each of these forms of motion exists objectively, outside the mind, and is a material process. The motion of human feelings, moods and ideas, on the other hand, exists merely in man’s mind. Certainly emotions and ideas do not exist without their material seat, i.e., the brain. “But,” Lenin explained, “‘to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-44|44]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; While they are a social phenomenon, emotions and ideas are at the same time spiritual processes, and this distinguishes them from all other social phenomena, which are material processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This shows the one&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sidedness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the mechanistic materialists’ view that motion presumably boils down to the movement of bodies in space, wholly explainable by the laws of mechanics, in the process of which bodies never change, always remaining the same. Hence, according to this conception, matter is immutable and motionless. Yet the deeper natural science penetrates into nature’s secrets, the more obvious it becomes that nature contains no immutable objects, and that the motion of matter is not confined to a single form of motion but comprises &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any kind o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; change at all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then is nothing at rest in the world?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When lava ejected from a volcano has solidified into rock, it seems to be at rest. Nevertheless, solid rock also undergoes constant change induced by temperature fluctuations, rain, wind, surf, electromagnetic processes, which sooner or later will cause the rock to crumble. Long as its rest may be, it is still of a transient nature. Lastly, the rock moves relative to the sun, just as the Earth does. In mechanics generally, two bodies which are at rest relative to each other are performing identical motions relative to a third body. Therefore every object which is at rest moves. It is only resting in a certain respect. It is clear that rest is a particular instance of motion.&lt;br /&gt;
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While rest is finite and relative, motion is infinite and absolute. In other words, it is uncaused and indestructible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For this reason, all attempts to interpret the laws of nature so as to show that motion is not indispensable to matter, that matter without motion is possible, have failed. The second law of thermodynamics is a case in point. It reads that in a closed system, in which no energy is received from outside or lost, all forms of energy tend to be converted into heat. As heat can only pass from a hot to a cold body, the temperature of every part of such a system must eventually become exactly the same, and the system must reach thermal balance, when no conversion of one form of energy into another occurs. Regarding the universe as a closed system, the physicists Clausius and Kelvin concluded that in some time all forms of motion except heat would disappear and a balance of heat or the “thermal death” of the universe would set in.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet movement is indestructible in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. Becoming incapable of changing from one form into another, movement would be destroyed in that respect, should a thermal balance be established. Engels wrote that to believe in the “thermal death” of the universe was to believe that movement was not indestructible. Besides, the ‘thermal death” of the universe implies that movement has both an end and a beginning. If there is a point at which movement loses its ability to change into different forms, there must have been a point at which it acquired that ability. One who believes that the universe will reach thermal balance, must also believe that the ‘world clock has to be wound up, then it goes on running until it arrives at a state of equilibrium from which only a miracle can set it going again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-45|45]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If nothing but an external impulse, intervention by a preternatural force, i.e., a miracle, can pull the universe out of its impending balance, then, plainly, it could only be by a miracle that it has been put into its present rather restless state. Thus, Engels held, the idea that movement is destructible, which is implied in the theory of “thermal death”, leads to religion quite unavoidably. Indeed, in 1951, Pope Pius XII said: “The farther back we look, the richer we find matter to be in free energy.... Thus everything seems to indicate that the material universe, charged as it was with incredibly vast reserves of energy, received, at a certain point in time, a powerful initial impulse.... Hence, creation in time; and therefore, a Creator; and consequently, God.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-46|46]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As he criticised the theory of “thermal death”, Engels expressed his confidence that the progress of science would refute it. As early as the 19th century the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann showed that the tendency towards changing all forms of movement into heat in a closed system is the tendency towards the changing of this system from a less probable to a more probable state. However, as was established in the mid-20th century, all states of a system comprising an infinite number of particles are equally probable. Assuming that the universe is a system of an infinite number of particles, one must accept that thermal equilibrium will never be its most probable state.  Nevertheless, in terms of the general theory of relativity, the conditions of the existence of the universe do not remain immutable. Therefore the universe is not a closed system, and even should it comprise a finite number of particles, it still would not reach thermal equilibrium.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern natural science bears out the tenet of dialectical materialism that motion is an intrinsic property of matter, its mode of existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Does Motion Without Matter Exist? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Thermodynamics and electromagnetic theory, which emerged in the 19th century and covered a very wide range of natural phenomena, took no account of atoms. (Their connection with the electromagnetic phenomena was yet to be established.) Scientists almost unanimously believed that matter consisted of atoms, while everything else (energy, electromagnetism) was thought to be “energy”, not matter. Wilhelm Ostwald, a German chemist and physicist, reasoned that as thermodynamics and electrodynamics had solved a great number of problems of physics and chemistry, ignoring the existence of atoms, it might be presumed that all other problems of natural science could also be resolved without having to assume that atoms exist. Hence, the assumption was false, and atoms did not exist. Having made that deduction and never doubting that atoms alone were matter, Ostwald concluded that the ‘ultimate’ level of matter was not matter, which did not exist anyway, but motion. Everything in the world consisted of “pure motion.” That gave rise to ‘‘energism”, a philosophical concept according to which the world was based neither on matter nor spirit but on energy, which was identified with motion. Insisting that both materialism and idealism should be discarded and replaced by energism, Ostwald wrote: ‘The simple and natural removal of the old difficulties arising from the antithesis between the concepts of matter and spirit by subordinating both to the concept of energy appears to me to be a great improvement...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-47|47]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin exposed the erroneous nature of this theory.  To assert that both matter and spirit boil down to energy, he pointed out, is to contend that neither matter nor mind exists, and there is only movement. But no scientist has ever denied yet the existence of ideas. And no wonder, for how can one express ideas, while insisting that ideas do not exist? Moreover, the belief that ideas exist and matter does not is an idealist point of view with nothing new in it. Such is Lenin’s first argument against energism.&lt;br /&gt;
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His second argument is, briefly, this: &amp;amp;quot;Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word ‘energy’ ” and thought that in that way he ended the contradiction between materialism and idealism. If we designate as energy both movement outside consciousness (physical, chemical, physiological and other processes) and movement inside consciousness (varying sensations, strivings, ideas), “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;f we ‘subordinate’ both matter and mind to this concept, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verbal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; annihilation of the antithesis is beyond question...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-48|48]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; But, in reality, the question whether mind depends on matter or vice versa remains. So does the irreconcilable conflict between materialism and idealism, which offer opposite answers to this question.&lt;br /&gt;
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The discovery of the electromagnetic nature of atoms made it obvious that Ostwald was wrong and, in 1908, he acknowledged that the existence of atoms was beyond question. In the middle of the 20th century, scientists could see atoms for themselves, photographed by an electronic microscope.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even so, attempts were made relatively recently to revive the view which Ostwald himself had renounced. In 1948, Bertrand Russell wrote: “It is energy, not matter, that is fundamental in physics’ because “both relativity and quantum theory have had the effect of replacing the old conception of ‘mass’ by that of ‘energy’ &amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-49|49]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and if mass has taken the place of energy, the latter has taken the place of matter, as mass is, indeed, matter. Russell&#039;s reference to the theory of relativity here concerns the relationship between energy and mass, discovered by Einstein.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even supposing Einstein&#039;s discovery did mean that mass was replaced by energy, it does not follow that matter does not exist, since its place has been taken by energy. Its existence is really a question of whether the world contains anything besides ideas, emotions and sensations. The answer to this does not depend on whether real objects have the properties of inertia and gravitation, i.e., mass.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides, Einstein’s discovery does not imply any replacement of mass by energy. If we put a piece of iron on a hot stove, it will get hot as it receives energy from the stove, the latter losing the same amount of energy. According to classical mechanics, the weight of the piece of iron and of the stove does not change&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;their mass remains the same. Einstein’s discovery, however, discards this notion, and implies that when an object transfers its energy to another object, it also transfers a certain amount of mass, while every time mass is transferred from one object to another, some energy is also transferred. Einstein wrote: “...a piece of iron weighs more when red-hot than when cool; radiation ... emitted from the sun contains energy and therefore has mass; the sun and all radiating stars lose mass by emitting radiation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-50|50]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; When a piece of iron gets hot from the stove, the mass it thus acquires is practically negligible. But the sun, which radiates huge amounts of energy, is losing mass at a rate of 4,000,000 tons a second.&lt;br /&gt;
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So that attempt to revive energism was also unsuccessful. Now, another question arises.  Ideas, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. They exist only in men’s consciousness. Does it not follow, perhaps, that the succession of sensations, ideas, and so on, is motion without matter? In other words, while it is erroneous to think, as the energists do, that any kind of movement represents motion without matter, would it not be correct to say that in some instances, i.e., mental processes, it is a case of motion without matter?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that conceptions, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. Yet they are always somebody’s conceptions, sensations and aspirations; they cannot exist without man.  And man is not immaterial. Therefore the succession of ideas, emotions, etc., is far from being motion without matter; it takes place in man, a material being. It is the idealists alone who, in the face of all the scientific and practical evidence, maintain that ideas may exist without a material expositor. In fact, however, whether apart from mind or within it, motion without matter is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5. Space and Time ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Can Matter Exist Outside Time and Space? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every material object has shape, is three-dimensional, occupies a certain place, is at a definite distance from other objects and at some angle to them. These relations of coexistence of material objects are known as spatial forms and relations or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;space&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The succession or simultaneous occurrence of material facts, the duration of each and the irreversible character of the succession of phenomena, which has but one dimension, one direction—from past to present—all these relations of material phenomena are called temporal relations or relations in time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can matter exist outside space and time?&lt;br /&gt;
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This question can occur only to those who acknowledge the existence of matter. The subjective idealists, who deny the existence of anything apart from mind, hold that space and time exist solely in man’s mind. All those, however, who never question the existence of matter as an objective reality take it for granted that all material phenomena exist in space and time, outside man’s consciousness, just as matter does.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question whether matter can exist outside space and time was posed in the 18th century by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;–&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;1804). He recognised that the objects around us exist apart from mind and independently of it. “...I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me...”, he wrote, “as I am that I myself exist....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-51|51]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Vis-a-vis time and space, Kant argued that, whereas spatial and temporal relations are inherent in things themselves, we can only learn about this through our contact with things, from experience, in the course of which “...objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions... .”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-52|52]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Experience is the source of our conception of things. It is impossible to observe all facts of a kind (for example, al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; instances of bodies submerged in liquids).  Therefore, no matter how many facts we have observed, we cannot deduce from that experience any universal rule admitting no exception.  We cannot, for instance, assert that all bodies immersed in a liquid are subject to pressure. We can only draw a partial conclusion from experience since there may be some bodies which do not undergo pressure. Consequently, “if... a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-53|53]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Our geometrical judgements about space (e.g., that a straight line is the shortest line between two points) are conceived as universal rules admitting of no exceptions.  Our judgements about time are equally assumed to be rules without exceptions. Hence, these judgements have not been derived from experience. And if our judgements about time and space are not founded on experience, then their source is clearly not outside the mind but within it. Consequently, the ideas of space and time are inherent in the mind as forms of contemplation which are present there before any actual contemplation, observation or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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To prove his idea, Kant also adduced the following. Imagine that everything has disappeared: you will see empty space in your mind’s eye. But try to imagine that not only things but the very space they occupied has also disappeared, and you will find it impossible. One can imagine that no events occur.  But it is impossible to imagine that time itself has disappeared. Consequently, the notions of space and time are inherent in the mind and are so firmly fixed in it that, try as it might, it cannot get rid of them. In other words, notions of space and time are built into the mind, and are present there before and regardless of any observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s contention that our notions of space and time have nothing corresponding to them in the real world, and that they do not indicate actual, objectively existing relations or properties of things but ideal relations existing only in the mind makes him a subjective idealist.  According to his thinking, the notions of space and time are a pair of glasses, as it were, through which we look at things. Outside our consciousness, there is neither time nor space.  Thus, Kant arrives at the conclusion that matter exists apart from time and space.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant is right in saying that universal judgements cannot be derived from experience, from contemplation. Nevertheless, experience is not merely passive contemplation; it also actively influences things, which makes it possible to substantiate judgements of a universal nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our mathematical judgements of space and time possess, according to Kant, universality not present in other scientific assumptions which Kant himself acknowledged as being derived from experience. But laws discovered in physics, chemistry and other sciences are also of a general character. Contrary to what Kant believed, there is no gulf between geometrical (and, generally, mathematical) and other scientific concepts. We imagine a point, for instance, as a tiny spot on a sheet of paper, a straight line, as a thin thread made taut by a weight hanging from it, and a plane, as the surface of a mirror. Our conceptions of space are visual images reproducing what we saw or felt.&lt;br /&gt;
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Evolving concepts of space, geometry singled out some properties and relations of physical objects, neglecting all their other properties and relations. Geometrical figures have neither stuff, colour nor temperature. The spatial characteristics themselves are reflected in geometrical concepts in a rather peculiar way.  In the classical work of the known Greek mathematician, Euclid (about 300 B. C.), a point is defined as something without dimensions, having position only; a line, as having but one dimension, length; a plane surface, as having two dimensions, length and breadth. As well as we may understand it, we cannot picture it.  These notions are represented in the mind by a spot, a thread or a mirror. Yet, although our notions of space are undoubtedly consistent with the actual spatial relations and properties of things, they are also distinct in that geometrical notions, like all other scientific notions, are more exhaustive and accurate than our notions.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, geometrical concepts, too, are only approximate reflections of actual spatial relations, being generalisations derived from previous experience. As geometrical concepts take into consideration but a small number of spatial properties and relations of things, disregarding all other properties and relations, one can deduce from the known properties of things hypotheses logically following from them. In sciences founded on experiment, every hypothesis needs to be made more exact and correct as new evidence is obtained. The same holds for geometry whose propositions do not express properties of bodies with absolute exactness, but only approximately and, like all other scientific theories, have to be refined as new knowledge is accumulated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invention of new geometries by N. I. Lobachevsky (in 1826) and G. Riemann (in 1854) showed that geometrical judgements were indeed subject to improvement and correction, and that our judgements about space do not possess “universality admitting of no possible exception’. Thus, the postulate that only one straight line can be drawn through a point in a plane parallel to another straight line in the same plane (or, to put it differently, that there is only one line parallel to the given line through a fixed point) has no effect in Lobachevskian geometry. Meanwhile, physicists have found real objects to which this geometry conforms. In the 20th century, the theory of relativity has introduced even more drastic corrections to our notions of space and time. Clearly, such a fundamental change in our notions and judgements about space and time is due to the further accumulation of experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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This offers a most convincing refutation of Kant’s idea that these notions are not rooted in experience and, similarly, of his deduction that they originate in the mind and not in the real world. If the idea that things exist apart from us, which we derive from our contact with . things, reflects their objective existence (and Kant acknowledged it), then the notions of space and time, equally derived from contact with things, also reflect objectively existing spatial and temporal properties and relations of material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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Practice, which refutes the idealist conception of space and time, confirms the materialist understanding of them, according to which there are, besides the perception and conception of time and space, also spatial and temporal properties and relations existing outside man’s consciousness. Such relations are inherent in all material phenomena. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Time and spac&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; are universal forms of the existence of matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the basis of this materialist view?&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, perceptions occur independently of man’s will and mind. This, among other things, makes most philosophers, including Kant, acknowledge that perceptions are produced by objects existing outside consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, we derive the most authentic scientific knowledge of nature from research into changes which occur only in space and time.  What would geology be without data on the spatial disposition of the layers of the Earth’s crust, the location of the continents, etc., and the length of the successive geological epochs?  What would remain of electromagnetic theory if we took away the data on the spatial arrangement of the electromagnetic fields and the movement of electromagnetic waves in time and space? Natural science cannot exist without notions of space and time which faithfully reflect the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, the behaviour of animals demonstrates that they coordinate their actions with spatial and temporal relations in nature. Mach himself, who denied that time and space exist outside the mind, admitted that much. He wrote: “...time and space are systems of the sensations of orientation,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-54|54]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; providing for biologically expedient reactions of adaptation. This undoubtedly applies to men as well. “If the sensations of time and space can give man a biologically purposive orientation,’ Lenin wrote, “this can only be so on the condition that these sensations reflect an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; outside man: man could never have adapted himself biologically to the environment if his sensations had not given him an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objectively correct&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idea of it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-55|55]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Fourthly, man (unlike animals) transforms the environment, adapting it to his own needs.  In doing so, he evolves and clarifies his ideas of space and time. If these ideas were not more or less correct reflections of the objectively existing relations between real things, any attempt to rely on them whilst changing reality would be doomed to failure.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Do Time and Space Exist Outside Matter? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Most philosophers who were convinced of the objective reality of space and time (from ancient philosophers to 18th-century philosophers) held that independently of atoms, there exists a limitless void in which they move; that—as the 17th-century French materialist Gassendi wrote&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;outside atoms there exists only time, which does not depend on things, for whether things exist or not, and whether they move or not, it always flows evenly, being subject to no change. Yet, the great Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B. C.), who recognised the objective reality of space and time, contended that spatial properties and relations were inseparable from things, having no existence outside matter, and that vacuum did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the middle ages, this idea of Aristotle&#039;s was thought to mean that “nature abhors a vacuum”. Until the 17th century, they saw a confirmation of this in the operation of a pump, in which liquid moves upwards, overcoming its own weight, to prevent vacuum (a clearance between the level of the liquid in the tube and the piston). The idea that space was inseparable from matter was supported by the eminent 17th-century philosophers Descartes and Leibniz. Arguing that vacuum could not possibly exist, Descartes wrote: “There is...  nothing but matter in the entire Universe&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-56|56]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; All adjacent bodies touched, transmitting further pressure or impact which instantaneously spread throughout the universe. Leibniz, too, wrote that “...there is no space in which there is no matter”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-57|57]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, many scientists considered that vacuum really existed. The founder of classical mechanics, Isaac Newton, was one of them. He believed in the existence of absolute space—an absolutely immovable void, separating celestial bodies from one another; and of absolute time—a flow of continuity existing. separately from matter and not to be changed by any material processes or events. That conception of space and time was predominant in natural science till the beginning of the 20th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels expressed some very important ideas on whether space and time can exist without matter. Engels wrote that the idea of absolute time and space existing apart from and independently of matter was a graphic expression of metaphysical materialism. He criticised that view from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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How is a concept formed? From a multiplicity of properties, relations and states of objects we select the most essential, discarding the rest. A concept is indeed a reflection in our consciousness of different things, phenomena and processes in terms of their more substantial characteristics. But the source of concepts which arose long ago may be forgotten, and then the characteristics of a real object which underlie the concept will begin to seem to exist independently. That is what happens to the concepts of space and time which have been formed by separating from real phenomena their relations in space and time. To regard the height, length and breadth of real objects, as well as the simultaneity, succession and duration of real processes, as existing separately from these objects and processes, is equivalent to accepting that viscosity exists somewhere apart from viscous substances, and independently of them, or that reason exists separately from men. “It is the old story,” wrote Engels. “First of all, one makes sensuous things into abstractions and then one wants to know them through the senses, to see time and smell space.... The two forms of existence of matter are naturally nothing without matter, empty concepts, abstractions which exist only in our minds.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-58|58]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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But if it is true that space and time are forms of the existence of matter, it is equally true that they do not exist apart from matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectical interpretation of space and time proposed by Engels clearly pointed in the direction in which the scientific investigation of these forms of existence of matter was to go. And 20th-century physics has indeed followed that direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on discoveries made at the end of the 19th century, mainly that all interactions occur at a finite velocity, and that the velocity of light is independent of the inertial system to which it is referred, Albert Einstein (1879–1955) evolved the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of relativity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This theory ended the view that the properties of Space and time were independent of the motions of nearby matter. When asked to explain the gist of his theory in a few words, Einstein said: “They used to think that if all things in the world disappeared, space and time would remain; a&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d in accordance with the theory of relativity, with the disappearance of all things, space and time too must disappear.”&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the Special Theory of Relativity, all material objects and processes exist in the integral form of space-time, of which the relations of space and time are different but inseparable aspects. Two events are separated by a space-time interval which is independent of the framework of reference. The time interval between events is but one aspect of their space-time characteristic; it varies depending on the system of reference. So does the space interval, the size of which depends on the reference system.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the General Theory of Relativity, the local properties of both space and time are direct consequences of the existence of nearby matter. In turn, they have a causal influence on the motions of that matter. Let us note that the space-time pattern may change depending on circumstances. Thus in the cosmos it is different from ordinary experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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These discoveries have shown that the single absolute space-time form of matter’s existence is expressed in temporal relations and spatial relations which are relative; that not only are space and time inseparable from matter, but their pattern depends on the distribution, movement and interaction of masses of matter and has an impact on them; and that the common characteristics of space-time are expressed in different space-time patterns, depending on the nature and scale of the material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists seek to interpret these discoveries to their own advantage. They contend that the dependence of a body’s length and of the time interval on the frame of reference presumably means that relations of space and time are not inherent in matter at all, but depend entirely on the observer&#039;s subjective qualities and reactions. Thus the idealists assert that a body&#039;s length and the time interval between events exist merely in our consciousness. Dingle, for instance, claims that this follows from the theory of relativity, which, he alleges, “declines all attempts to assign to matter any properties whatsoever’. ‘“Now this,&amp;amp;quot; commented Max Born, “is a misrepresentation of the theory of relativity, which has never abandoned the attempt to assign properties to matter, but has refined the methods of doing so...”&lt;br /&gt;
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To make it clearer, here is the example suggested by Max Born. Let us suppose that we cannot for some reason directly observe a cardboard circle but can see the shadows it casts on some screens placed at different angles to it. All the shadows will be different save that they will all be elliptical. On studying the axes of the elliptical shadows, we shall have enough evidence to show that they have been cast by a circle and to find its radius. The projections of the properties of the object concerned (the cardboard circle) relative to other objects, which play the part of reference systems (the screens), differ. But in each case the real properties of the object concerned (the circle) remain identical. Shadows of different size and shape are relative expressions of the absolute size and shape of the cardboard circle.  Similarly, bodies and time intervals of different length are relative expressions of the absolute length of the space-time interval, which is independent of the reference system. The shadows cast by the circle are as real as the circle and the screens. The different lengths of the bodies and time intervals in different reference systems are as real, as independent of consciousness, as the space-time interval (whose expressions they are) and the corresponding reference systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear that the interpretation given by the new theory to space and time is not only dialectical but also materialistic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such are the philosophical conclusions drawn from the latest achievements of natural science, that they have not only confirmed the dialectical-materialist proposition that space and time are inseparable from each other and from matter, but have also made it possible to refine and enrich that proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 6. Consciousness ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Consciousness Is a Reflection of the Material World ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once there was a patient in a hospital who had lost the use of all his senses except hearing and sight. The doctors noticed that whenever he shut his eyes and covered his ears, he became unconscious. He regained consciousness only when his good sense-organs were functioning.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here is a more ordinary case. When sleeping “like the dead’’, without dreams, a dog-tired person loses consciousness. He has neither ideas nor feeling. He does not react to strong light or noise. But if his sense-organs are subjected to some unusually strong stimulation, he will react to it. If, for instance, a shot is fired at close quarters, he will hear the sound.  The sensation will be followed by notions, emotions and, finally, by ideas—he will regain consciousness. This shows that a person who experiences no sensations has neither notions nor thoughts. Thoughts may appear and exist only on the basis of sensations, perceptions and notions, as the result of their being processed.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is sensation, what is perception? When touching one thing we feel that it is a sphere, and touching another, we feel that it is a cube, our perceptions reflect the shape of these objects. When we recall how we felt these bodies, we have a representation of them in our mind.  It is clear that representations, just like sense-perceptions, are reflections of different aspects, characteristics and relations of material objects.  Ideas (notions, judgements, conclusions), as we saw, arise, in the final analysis, from sensations and perceptions, which are mental reflections of the external world. Hence, all our ideas are also mental reflections of the external world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every reflection is secondary to what is reflected. Therefore, consciousness is secondary to matter. In denying this, idealists stubbornly oppose the idea that consciousness, thought in particular, is a reflection of the real world.  How do they defend their view?&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that to err is human. What does an erroneous idea reflect, which has nothing corresponding to it in the real world? Goblins, brownies or mermaids do not really exist, yet the notions of goblin, brownie and mermaid do. But, say the idealists, if these notions do not reflect anything, then other notions and conceptions equally do not reflect reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealists also argue that while such notions as “eight”, ‘the square root of 81”, “a plane”, etc., are commonly accepted to be true, it becomes clear on analysis that there is no such thing as “eight in general’’ in the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world any more than there is a real life “square root of 81’ or any body which has length and breadth but no height. Hence, mathematical notions have no objects to correspond to them and therefore they are not reflections of anything at all.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists also assert that people have numerous notions of things that ceased to exist long ago. Palaeontology and history entirely comprise ideas of things that existed long ago and disappeared. On the other hand, man is capable of looking into the future. Tsiolkovsky, for example, predicted interplanetary flights at a time when they could only be dreamed of. What reality did his judgements reflect then?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us first take a look at the so-called false notions, such as “mermaid”, for instance. It implies a half-woman half-fish, fond of dancing and singing and given to enticing handsome young fellows to their ruin. Women, fish, dancers, singers and “cruel charmers” indeed exist.  The notion is false merely because it combines things which in reality are separate (woman and fish), and disjoins things which go together in a living being (the trunk is separated from the legs and the fish tail from the fish).  The idea of a mermaid is therefore a reflection of reality, but it is a distorted reflection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly no “eight as such” or two-dimensional bodies exist in nature, but then there are no creatures with merely the general characteristics of the bee, eagle or elephant; they are all quite definite, individual animals. The fact, however, that the notion of an animal does not imply every possible characteristic of an elephant, and that the notion of fruit does not imply every possible characteristic of an apple, makes it no less certain that these notions reflect some characteristics of the elephant (and other animals as well), or some characteristics of the apple (and other fruit as well). The peculiar quality of a notion is just that it reflects only some, and not all, characteristics of an object. This also refers to the mathematical notions. The notion “‘eight’ implies merely the quantitative aspect of things, regardless of everything else. The notion “a plane” implies only two dimensions, regardless of the third dimension and all other characteristics of bodies. Yet this one-sidedness, so to speak, of mathematical notions does not alter in the least the fact that they are reflections of properties and relations which really exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to situations where we think of what is no more or what is yet to be. From the metaphysical point of view, the world is a totality of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;final&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things, and so the idea of a thing which does not exist at the moment does not reflect anything. And from the dialectical point of view, the world is a totality of processes, connections and relations, and so ideas reflect processes, connections and relations rather than final things. In its progress from the state in which it was a hundred million years ago to the state in which it is now, the Earth has passed through numerous intermediate stages. Learning the connections between these stages—the laws of geochemistry and geophysics, which exist now too—and starting from the present condition of the Earth, scientists mentally fathom the condition in which it was hundreds of millions of years ago. To quote some other examples. Having grasped the dialectical connections—physical laws which existed in his day too—Tsiolkovsky mentally traced the chain of events which would inevitably, and actually did (when men turned these laws to use), result in space travel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The historical process of capitalist society&#039;s development, which has resulted in a third of mankind embarking on socialism, also consists of definitely related stages. Having studied their relationships and starting from the state in which society was in the sixties and seventies of the 19th century, Marx mentally grasped the events that were to take place fifty or a hundred years later. In each instance, whether turned to the past or to the future, people’s ideas reflect, above all, the relationships existing at the present moment. So the argument supporting the view that thought is not reflection does not hold water either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, “our consciousness is only an image of the external world”, a reflection of it. Material phenomena exist outside us, while their reflections, ‘‘the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-59|59]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then how does thought relate to the brain?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Carl Vogt, a 19th-century German scientist, answered this question by saying that thought was related to the brain in much the same way as bile to the liver. But bile is just as material as the liver which produces it. Vogt’s assertion implies that thought is as material as the brain producing it. In other words, consciousness is a variety of matter; it is matter. And matter, as we know, is that which exists outside consciousness. If we assume that consciousness &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s matter, we shall arrive at the statement: “Consciousness is that which exists outside human consciousness.” Now, that obviously makes no sense, This alone shows the absurdity of Vogt’s conclusion, which Engels called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vulgar materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists also reduce the material world to Consciousness. What is the difference, then, between what they say and what Vogt says? It was not by chance that Lenin wrote that “to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-60|60]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 17th-18th centuries, when they still knew very little about the essential distinctions between organic and inorganic nature and between man and animals, many materialist philosophers held that not only living creatures but inanimate things too were capable of thought or at least of sensation. It followed from this that even a stone was not insensible.  This doctrine, which draws no line between animate and inanimate things, and views transition from inorganic to organic nature not as the emergence of something new but merely as a variation of something old, is known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;hylozoism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin opposed the metaphysical notion held by hylozoists with the dialectical view that the transition from the inanimate to the animate does not merely involve a variation of old things but also the emergence of something altogether new, of sensation, which “is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-61|61]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; whereas matter which is not so organised is incapable of sensation. As he rejected both the view equating mind and matter and the view underrating the contrast between them, Lenin stressed that the difference was absolute only within the bounds of the fundamental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He insisted that it was not to be conceived metaphysically, as if there were nothing whatsoever in common between matter and consciousness. “...This contrast must not be made ‘excessive’, exaggerated, metaphysical ... the antithesis of matter and mind,” Lenin pointed out, “has absolute significance only within the bounds of ... the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-62|62]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Reflection Is a Property of Matter ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what do matter and mind have in common that makes the antithesis between them relative? In answering this question, Lenin suggested that we must “assert that all matter Possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-63|63]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The essence of this is that after passing through Some stages, material reflection, which is inherent in all nature, reaches one where it becomes something essentially new, turning into the mind, which, consequently, not merely differs from matter but is also linked with it by reflection, albeit of a highly peculiar nature.  This brilliant idea, put forward by Lenin in 1908, received conclusive scientific confirmation later on, especially in the second and third quarters of this century, thanks to the great strides made by neurophysiology and the emergence of information theory and cybernetics.  If a meteorite falls on to the ground at a speed not exceeding several hundred metres a second, it makes a hole not much larger than its own size. A meteorite which falls at a greater speed, breaking on impact together with the ground it falls on, makes a much larger hole than its own size. But when the speed reaches from two to four kilometres a second, both the meteorite and the ground it touches instantly turn into gas, and a huge crater is formed. Thus the trace left by a meteorite is something like the imprint of its characteristics&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of its size, shape and composition, the speed of its flight and the angle at which it fell. A meteorite will leave different traces in solid rock and in soft grass-covered ground.  But in either instance, the trace will reproduce the meteorite’s individual features. The trace left by a meteorite is its reflection resulting from its impact on the surface of the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with every reflection. When one material object acts on another, the latter changes in such a way as to reproduce certain characteristics of the former. Reflection takes place when one material phenomenon reproduces the characteristics of another material phenomenon acting on it. Dialectics, which tells us that all things are interconnected, so that “everything affects and is affected by every other thing”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-64|64]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , sees interaction in every material process. That this is so follows most conclusively from modern physics which regards all natural processes as different kinds of material interaction. But interaction, the influence of material phenomena on one another, leads, as we saw, to the reflection of these phenomena in one another; and if interaction is inherent in all matter, so is reflection too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One most important feature of this relation is that ‘an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-65|65]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It takes a falling meteorite to leave a trace on the ground; but then a meteorite may exist for a very long time without falling and leaving its trace.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reflection consists in the reproduction of peculiar characteristics of the object reflected.  The reverberation of an avalanche in the mountains, for example, is a process of reflection.  The noise of the avalanche is the thing reflected, the mountains are the reflecting objects, and the reverberation is the reflection. Both the noise and reverberation consist of sound waves or air vibrations of a similar pattern. In this instance, the reflection and that which is reflected are of an identical physical nature. That, however, need not always be the case. The main sources of information on the plants of the geologic past are plant fossils preserved in the rocks: leaves, roots, fruits, flowers, etc.  Fossil leaves, for instance, reproduce every single detail of a leaf’s surface. Here, the reflection—a piece of rock—has physically nothing in common with the thing reflected, i.e., a plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why do we describe both the reverberation of an avalanche and plant fossils as  reflections? What is the connection between these widely different phenomena? It is the likeness between the reflection and the thing reflected. The phrase “reproduction of certain characteristics of the thing reflected” implies one-to-one correspondence between the reflection and its object, i.e., that every element or state and every relation between elements or states of a thing reflecting something corresponds to only one element or state or relation in the thing reflected. Moreover, every reflection is always limited. The impression of a leaf in the rock, for instance, reflects the spatial form of the leaf’s surface but not the cellular or molecular structure of the leaf.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the nature of the reflecting thing or process, images may be reproduced in diverse forms. But no matter how different the forms may be, they are identical in content, having the same organisation as the phenomenon reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such are some general characteristics of reflection both in organic and inorganic nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. From Irritability to Mental Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every living organism is characterised above all by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metabolism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., continued interchange of material with its surroundings. Another important characteristic is what we shall term here ‘‘survivability’’, meaning the capacity of a living organism to react to external influences in a way which increases the chances of its survival. Lastly, all living organisms are capable of growth and reproduction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Earlier, we mentioned the law stating that all material systems tend to proceed towards greater chaos, developing from complex forms of motion to simple chaotic heat motion of particles. At the same time, the processes of life such as the development of species show the preservation or even increase of order.  The reactions of a grown-up animal are more orderly than those of a newborn. Species of later origin are usually more highly organised compared with those long extinct. The capacity of living bodies to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;survive&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is of great importance to reflection. That is the main requirement which every variation in an organism must satisfy. When a ray of light, penetrating through a chink in the door of a dark cellar, falls on a green plant that has sprouted in the cellar, the stem begins to grow in the direction of the light which helps it obtain the carbon necessary for its growth. When roots strike an obstacle, they curve so as to bypass it.  Plants usually react to external influences rather slowly. But it is not always so. A pumpkin tendril, for instance, begins to curl up five minutes after being touched, and in twenty minutes coils up completely. Insectivorous plants respond even more quickly. And the simplest unicellular animals, like amoebae, infusoria, etc., react to some external stimuli very quickly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Irritability&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;—a quality which distinguishes living organisms from dead things, and which consists in a body’s capacity to react to the environment in a way which helps it survive—depends on the structure of the living organism’s body. The latter is such that, on being stimulated, (1) reflects those characteristics of the external phenomena which increase or decrease its chances of persisting in a living state, and (2) transforms the reflections into internal chemical and physical processes, enabling it to effect a response essential to self-preservation. This quality of living organisms emerged in the process of natural selection. Organisms that were built in such a way, that their reactions to the environment provided for their preservation, lived and multiplied, while all others died out. Thus, the structure of the body of a living organism is, in a way, a reflection of the conditions under which it exists.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the basis of the mechanism responsible for transforming external stimuli into responses in plants and the simplest animals (i.e., irritability) are chemical reactions induced in organisms by different stimuli. Let us take, for example, the chain of chemical reactions and corresponding movements with which a Venus’s fly-trap (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dionaea muscipula&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) responds to a chain of stimuli. As an insect alights on one of the leaves, a chemical reaction starts in the plant, which makes the leaf curl up. In response to the movements of the insect which Naturally tries to get away, a chemical reaction begins, causing the projections along the outer edge of the leaf to overlap, the leaf closing on the insect and pressing against it. In response to the insect’s frantic movements, another chemical reaction sets in—the numerous small bristles on the upper surface of the leaf begin secreting a digestive fluid. The insect’s body is disintegrated and the nutrients are absorbed by the leaf. Two series of events are present here, namely, a series of stimuli and a series of corresponding chemical reactions. As both were repeated thousands of millions of times, they finally became connected in a way which reflects the relationship between the events producing the given reactions. The chemical reaction causing the leaf to curl up began to induce the chemical reaction causing the outer projections on the leaf to bend and overlap, the latter reaction, in its turn, setting off the chemical process by which the digestive fluid is produced. As the reactions are greatly accelerated by enzymes (proteins), they follow one another more quickly than the stimuli, so that the plant gives all three responses (i.e., the leaf curls up, its projections bend and overlap, and the digestive fluid is produced) even to the first stimulus (the insect alighting on the leaf). The first stimulus is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;signal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the other two are to follow, and the plant responds in advance. An amoeba in pursuit of prey trying to escape behaves in a similar way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As many proteins, acting as catalysts, accelerate chemical reactions in living organisms hundreds and even thousands of millions of times, it is evident that this enormous difference in the rate at which chains of reactions occur in living organisms and the rate at which changes in the environment occur, which are reflected in the reactions, plays a great role in the life of plants and animals. In the more highly organised animals, a special tissue develops whereby an organism’s responses increasingly anticipate external phenomena. It is the nervous system. An anticipatory reflection effected through the nervous system is called a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  However, we shall discuss reflexes further on.  At this point we shall merely note that modern scientific evidence reveals that changes which are only forthcoming but which are associated with existing facts can be reflected not only by man (as was mentioned earlier) but by the simplest animals and even plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reflections which appear, are transmitted, stored, processed and retrieved are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;information&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Information is the amount of order in the reflecting object reproducing the amount of order in the object reflected, the former being the information carrier and the latter the information source, and is used in the process of control. As every living organism is a self-regulating system, reflection in this case represents information. This cannot be said of inorganic systems, in which self-regulation is not present. Information is transmitted from the regulated part of a living system, which is in immediate contact with the environment and receives stimuli from it, to the regulating part, in which information is stored and transformed into a change by which the organism must respond to the external stimulus in order to survive. This new information is then transmitted from the regulating to the regulated part which, being in direct contact with the environment, responds to the stimulus. Information not only circulates within a living organism but is passed on from generation to generation, thus ensuring transmission of qualities by heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the great scientific discoveries of the 20th century is that heredity operates through &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;molecules&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of which living cells consist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since neither the emergence nor development of plants and animals is possible without natural selection, and thus without heredity, which depends on information transmission (i.e., reflection), the development of species is based entirely on biological reflective processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason to suppose that in plants, viruses, and the simplest unicellular animals, reflection is accompanied by sensation, still less, by emotion. In their case, only irritability is present but not mental activity, even of the most primitive kind. Rudiments of mental activity are found in more highly organised, multi-celled animals not possessing a backbone (invertebrates). Most of these (insects, shellfish, earthworms) have a centralised nervous system which regulates their responses to stimuli and co-ordinates their movements. Although it is sometimes possible to produce a conditioned reflex in such animals, their behaviour is, on the whole, automatic. Their actions depend on unconditioned reflexes, i.e., responses to specific stimuli, transmitted by heredity. Thus a female spider lays her eggs in a brood-cocoon which she carries about for 15-20 days. She continues to take care of the cocoon even if the eggs are, for some reason, dead. A female spider will stay in the egg-laying posture for as long as it usually takes to lay eggs, even if she does not lay any, and then will clip the edges of the empty cocoon and carry it about just the same. Similar behaviour is found among bees and wasps too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does this essentially differ from irritability?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that, with the emergence of life, all phenomena come to be divided from the point of view of their effect on the preservation of life, which may be either good or bad. Reflection in living matter not endowed with mentality consists in the differentiation of phenomena as favourable and unfavourable to life and in the regulation of appropriate responses. Hundreds of millions of years of natural selection have resulted in the emergence of conscious experience. The latter represents reflections of the characteristics of what is going on in the external world, i.e., sensations, on the one hand, and motivations to attain desirable, and avoid harmful, objects, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both sensation and motivation are subjective experiences classed as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mental activity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The subjective nature of experience (mental activity) lies in the fact that a sensation, feeling, etc., is experienced only by a specific individual (subject). Lenin noted this when he wrote that only “the usual &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;human&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensations familiar to all” exist and ridiculed the notion of “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ictitious sensations, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nobody&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’s sensations,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-66|66]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; which stresses the fact that every sensation must be somebody’s sensation. This refers to animals as well. With them, too, sensation is always a sensation experienced by a definite organism and non-existent outside it. We already know that sensations are reflections of external phenomena, for this reason, living beings of the same species, when exposed to the influence of the same external phenomenon, experience similar sensations. When an artist portrays objects as they appear to him, other people, as a rule, recognise their own perceptions in the portrayal. This reveals the content of sensations and notions, which does not depend on the reflecting subject (man), but on the external objects which are reflected. Similar sensations may, of course, be experienced only by beings whose sense-organs, by which the given phenomena are perceived, are similar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mental activity is subjective also because it comprises not only reflections of the properties of external phenomena but also the subject’s attitude to them, the specific motivation.  In lower animals, it is confined to pleasure or pain, attraction or repulsion, while in highly organised beings it includes a wide range of needs and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must, however, be remembered that neither the simplest motivations of a bee nor man’s most complex requirements and emotions are purely subjective. These motivations are reflections of the significance objectively attached, as far as individuals are concerned, to the things towards or away from which the motivation is directed. These mental phenomena, like sensations, have some objective content which is independent of the subject. For this reason, we can have an idea of what others may feel under various circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If sensations and motivations changed nothing in the connection between organism and environment, they would have been eliminated in the course of natural selection as useless.  I. M. Sechenov (1829-1905), a Russian physiologist, found that for living beings, sensation was of two-fold significance, serving to differentiate the conditions of an action and to guide the actions appropriate (i.e., expedient or adjustive) to these conditions. The enormous significance of sensation and motivation to the adjustment and behaviour of living organisms was also stressed by Sechenov’s follower, I. P. Pavlov (1849-1936).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Changes in the environment, brought about by the vital activity of the creatures inhabiting it, depend on the particular features of both the living organisms and environment itself. Simultaneously, the changes which living organisms undergo under the impact of the environment also bear the imprint of the internal organisation of these organisms. The rabbits brought in the 15th century to the tiny Atlantic island of Porto Santo, in the absence of beasts of prey there, changed so much that a new species emerged, half the original size, with different colouring and habits. But if some other animals, e.g., foxes or wolves, had been brought to the island, they would have undergone quite a different sort of change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The environment exerts its influence on the animal only through the internal organisation of the latter. In the interrelationship of animals incapable of mental activity and their environment, the animals’ internal organisation plays a comparatively minor part, as compared to the environment. The addition of a new factor, i.e., mental activity (first, sensations and simple motivations and next, with more highly organised animals, perceptions, notions and emotions), essentially alters the interrelation of the organism and the environment. As animals develop a more complex mentality, they begin to influence their surroundings in more complex ways. Pavlov was the first to establish the presence in animals of the so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orientation reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby in any new situation threatening danger, all other kinds of behaviour are inhibited, and the animal performs actions based on the specific situation. When the action producing the needed result is found, this form of behaviour is fixed and conditioned reflex is established.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As more and more highly organised animals appear, the significance of mental activity as a regulator of behaviour increases and so does the significance of the brain, the organ which controls uninherited forms of behaviour. A frog which has had the cerebral hemispheres excised continues to behave in the same way as before the operation. A pigeon, however, although it can still fly and keep its balance well after a similar operation, cannot properly react to stimuli and would not even feed. As for a dog, such an operation disables it completely. This shows that the brain plays an ever Greater part as the internal organisation of animals becomes more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Labour, Language and Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
Modern science has established that there is much in common between the nervous and mental activity of man and animals. Certainly, appreciable distinctions between them have also been found to exist. So what are the distinctive traits of human mentality, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific data obtained in the 20th century conclusively confirm the truth of the Marxist proposition that man raised himself out of the animal world thanks to labour. Numerous excavations have yielded evidence that stone implements were fashioned back in the palaeolithic period (or the old stone age), when apeman evolved. That led to the transformation of the animal herd into a social community and the emergence of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At the close of the palaeolithic period, about a million years ago, primitive man, or Neanderthal man, appeared, Excavations at rock-shelters in which Neanderthalers lived have shown that they made stone adzes and pigmy tools from flint flakes. Later, in the middle palaeolithic period, when they began to hunt large animals together, Neanderthal men learned how to make flint spear tips, daggers, knives, scrapers and bone implements. The body proportions of this species and size of skull are similar to ours. But the vault of the skull is low, and the thigh and lower and upper arm bones are curved.  With the development of labour and implements in the later palaeolithic period, the primitive human herd of the Neanderthalers give way to the primitive communal society of Cro-Magnon men, who do not significantly differ physically from recent man and possess intellect of the simplest kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An animal’s mode of life, habits and mentality are determined by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;natural&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions, i.e., by its own nature and by the environment.  Man, however, is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; being. His mode of life, activity and mentality are almost entirely determined by the kind of society in which he lives. Certainly, the emergence of labour, society and specifically human mentality (consciousness) was accompanied by essential changes in the structure and functions of the brain and nervous system in general, which, in man, have some distinctive qualities, not found in animals.  Still, an infant’s nervous system, though indispensable, is not yet a sufficient condition for Consciousness. The mentality of a child growing up in isolation from human society does not rise above an animal&#039;s, and will develop into consciousness only if the child interacts with other people, i.e., society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be able to fashion and use implements and kill large animals, primitive men had to act jointly and circulate information of ever greater variety and scope. The advantage of common effort was two-fold. Not only did it make feasible that which was beyond the possibilities of single individuals, but it enabled the information picked up by single individuals to become accessible to all. Yet, to be accessible to all, information must be equally understandable to all. And, if it is of a multiple nature, then the signal conveying it must clearly be such as to indicate not unique but diverse phenomena that possess, at the same time, such common characteristics as must produce a uniform response in every member of the community. Then what information should such a signal convey? Different individuals may have more or less identical sensuous images and notions of similar things only if they have observed the latter under identical circumstances. If the circumstances of observation appreciably differ, so will the sensuous images differ with different individuals. The signal must, however, be common to a class of things, as well as to all those involved in a common effort. Hence, the information conveyed by a signal is not a sensuous image but a concept, a general idea; and the signal itself is a word by which the idea is expressed. Lenin wrote: “Every word (speech) already &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;niversalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-67|67]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of a tree, for instance, contains no reference to its height, girth, shape, foliage, vertical or horizontal position. To imagine a tree devoid of size, shape and position is impossible, for nobody has ever seen it. Only a word, which is uttered and perceived as a signal reflecting the characteristics common to trees in general, makes the concept possible.  No concepts or ideas could arise without the material phenomenon—a signal which, in the present instance, represents a combination of sounds, i.e., language. “Language is as old as consciousness.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-68|68]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That concepts cannot be formed even by highest (Anthropoid) apes is obvious enough from the following example. By imitating people, a chimpanzee learned to get bananas surrounded by burning candles. He turned on the tap, filled a mug full of water and extinguished the candles. He could also cross a pond using a raft and pole. Once, when he was brought to the pond, there was a raft with a pole at the bank, while in the middle of the pond there was another raft with some bananas on it. All round the bananas were lighted Candles, and beside them stood the familiar mug. The chimpanzee got on the first raft and reached the other raft. Picking up the mug, he got back to the bank, ran up to the tap, turned it on, filled the mug and hurried back to the pond with it, intending to put out the candles with the tap water. He proved incapable of abstracting from the distinction between water running from the tap and water in the pond and form the image of water as such. Yet even a five-year-old, when it uses one word to describe that which runs from the tap, that which fills a pond and that which falls from the sky as rain, has the notion of water as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man’s capacity to think is one of the principal qualities distinguishing human consciousness from the mentality of animals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An animal pays attention only to such things in its surroundings which relate to the satisfaction of its needs. It is incapable of catching the varied interactions of objects, i.e., of grasping the laws to which the latter are subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is quite different with man. His ancestors could already use one object (unsuitable for immediate consumption, e.g., a stone) to act on another so as to obtain yet another object, an implement, which equally would not be able to satisfy a biological need. An implement cannot be fashioned from just any kind of stone but only from hard and durable stone, which must also be workable. The fashioning stone, too, must meet certain requirements.  The fashioning requires a specific technique, and the implement must be of a specific shape.  Haphazard strokes and just any shape would be to no purpose. To kill the game, the implement must be applied in a certain way. It is a chain in which every link is connected with its neighbours in a specific manner. So that they could work, our ancestors had to find out about these interconnections and relations.  Consequently, the latter had to be correctly reflected by the mind. Actions, both fruitful and fruitless, were repeated thousands of millions of times, and in the course of hundreds of millennia there gradually began to form the habit of relating the reflections of objects in the mind in the same way as they are related in nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This habit involved not only sporadic phenomena, but also such as occur everywhere and always. For example, “if an object is harder than a second object and the latter is harder than a third, then the first object is harder than the third’. Or, “if an object is inside a second object and the latter is inside a third, then the first object is inside the third’. Thus, man learned to infer the unknown from the known, the unobserved from the observed, and that which is to be from that which is. Thanks to this capacity, engendered by labour, our ancestors arrived at this train of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reasoning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: if I bring one kind of stone to bear on another, I Shall obtain an object with which, by using it in a certain way, I shall be able to kill a certain kind of game.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Animals’ activity consists in their adapting themselves to the environment. In doing so, the former certainly affect the latter. The destruction by starfish of more than 350 square kilometres of the Great Barrier Reef, off the north-east coast of Australia, from 1966 to 1969 is but one example of this. Nevertheless, such changes are unintentional and, as often as not, harmful to the animals that have brought them about. Human activity, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, on the other hand, consists in man’s adapting nature to himself by completely refashioning things, so as to make nature serve his own needs. This was reflected in the mind by way of a substantial remodelling of perceptions and notions, emergence of concepts, deductions—in short, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideas&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. To conclude, one of the principal qualities differentiating human consciousness from animal mentality, i.e., thought, owes its rise to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us note also that in human labour, unlike animal activity, the creation of a new object, e.g., an implement, is preceded by an image of it. To form such an image merely from the correlation of sense-perceptions and representations is impossible, as sensuous images reflect nothing but the objects previously observed. A new implement is, however, an object previously unobserved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Useful information acquired by a generation of animals is transmitted to the next only biologically, being embodied in the genetic code, i.e., by heredity. Hence the extremely slow evolution of animal species other than man. In human society, however, information is passed on from generation to generation with the help of language and is objectified in implements and other articles of material and Spiritual culture. And this enormously speeds up the rate of progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. Subject and Object in Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
It has been shown by scientists in the Soviet Union and other countries that both the environment and the animal&#039;s physical condition, mental experience, reactions and their results, have an effect on the animal as an integral whole, an entity existing at each given point of time. In this entity, according to the observation of Henri Wallon (France), the ‘subjective and objective factors form an indivisible unity.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-69|69]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As it does not single out either the environment or itself from this situation, the animal does not mentally reflect the relations between itself and the environment. Thus, “...the animal does not ‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’ itself to anything ... for the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-70|70]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Both the animal&#039;s orientation activity, aimed at finding the most suitable tactics, and retention of the method hit upon reflect merely the unity of the surroundings, the animal&#039;s state, its response and the end result in a definite situation, whereas man, in the process of labour, masters some connections of the external world, and some connections between his own and other workers’ efforts. Ever since our ancestors began to master those connections, the latter were reflected increasingly in man’s mind. The ability to discriminate between the reflections of the environment and of oneself (and so of the relation between oneself and the environment) was especially important in this respect. In its turn, the reflection of the environment became dissected into images of things, people, their actions and relations, the reflection of oneself—into images of one’s own body, its parts and their interactions, and, lastly, into images of one’s own conscious experience. Relations between these images, as they exist in the mind, reflect the relations between their prototypes, as they are in reality. In this way, the animal&#039;s mentality is transformed into human mentality, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. “Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;immediate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-71|71]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man owes his capacity to detach himself from the environment to social relations above all. To be able to separate from the situation all that which belongs to him alone and become conscious of himself and his attitude to external existence, man must associate with his fellow-creatures, with whom he establishes relations in the process of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;If&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it is true that the consciousness of self and a conscious attitude to the external world is what fundamentally distinguishes human intelligence from the animal’s, it is no less true that man’s capacity to think about his own ideas, sensations, feelings, strivings, etc., is of equal significance. The ideal phenomena that occur in the mind itself are reflected in consciousness as well as what happens in the environment and man’s own body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consciousness is capable of imaging itself, of being a “reflection of a reflection&amp;amp;quot;. As I recall the impression made on me by the snow which covered the top of a mountain I saw from a distance, I think of my own perception.  As I analyse the opinion I have formed of somebody I met yesterday, I think of my own thoughts. As I do it, I am aware that my perception is but an approximate reflection, and the snow may well be not such a pure white as it seemed to me from afar; and I realise that my judgement of the man I met yesterday is only an approximate reflection of what he may prove to be in fact. Man’s consciousness reflects not only relations existing in the external world and relations between himself and the external world, but also the relations between his own sensations, representations and concepts on the one hand, and the things whose reflections and copies all of these are, on the other. Man correlates the mental images he forms and their archetypes as copy and original.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While acting under the influence of its needs and psychological responses, the animal is not aware Of the latter, as it has no mental capacity of ‘‘self-reflection’’. Man, too, may have motivations (e.g., attraction or repulsion) he is utterly unconscious of, although his behaviour may be greatly influenced by them. Still, man is aware of many of his needs and aspirations as goals which he sets himself and consciously pursues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In man, the capacity for reflection, which animals also possess, is carried to a much higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The formulation of a goal and elaboration of a suitable plan of action proceeds in the aforementioned way, whereby external objects and their relations, the conscious individual and his attitude to the objects are all reflected in the mind. These reflections represent a sort of substitute, or model, of objects and connections. Man can mentally use these substitutes (models) in much the same way as he would handle their material originals, had he to deal with the matter practically. Before taking any practical steps, which may or may not help him achieve his purpose, he can mentally rehearse his actions, as it were, so as to see what their results may be, and select the best plan of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. The Highest Known Form of Reflection ====&lt;br /&gt;
For all its peculiar character, reflection of the world in the human mind is merely another stage in the development of the forms of reflection existing even before man. Demonstrating that the higher animals’ behaviour shows the simplest forms of disintegration of an unfamiliar object into components (analysis), combination of things and actions to achieve a goal (synthesis), and what Pavlov was later to term orientation activity (a kind of experiment), Engels wrote: “The basic features of the method are the same and lead to the same results in man and animals, so long as both operate or make shift merely with these elementary methods. On the other hand, dialectical thought—precisely because it presupposes investigation of the nature of concepts themselves—is only possible for man....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-72|72]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, before human consciousness had evolved, its moderately developed prerequisites already existed in animals. Animals could form subjective images of the objective world (sensations, perceptions, representations) and have a fairly wide range of feelings long before men appeared. Therefore the separation of subject from object was nothing fortuitous. Man’s mind anticipates reality by years and decades. But anticipatory reflection, though extending over smaller periods, is what other organisms have too. Generally speaking, all characteristics of the human mind, i.e., consciousness, are due to society. But human society did not spring out of nothing either; it developed from the animal herd.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these facts must be borne in mind if we are to fathom—as Engels wrote—“the prehistory of the human mind, for tracing the various stages of its development, from the simple protoplasm ... of the lowest organisms right up to the thinking human brain. Without this prehistory, however, the existence of the thinking human brain remains a miracle.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-73|73]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists maintain that consciousness is an inexplicable property of the mysterious immaterial “soul”. However, anthropology, neurophysiology, neuropathology, zoopsychology, and other sciences have shown that this contention has not a leg to stand on. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cybernetics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has been particularly effective in disproving the idealist conception of consciousness and  provides scientific evidence in support of the dialectical-materialist view. This science deals with automatic control and communication mechanisms in diverse systems, such as a machine, a complex of machines, an organism, a plant or animal species, man and, finally, society. On the basis of cybernetics, devices have been developed which can receive, store, analyse, retrieve and transmit information. Self-teaching systems, biomedical disease-diagnosing computers, etc., have been developed. Both the theoretical results of cybernetics and results obtained with the aid of computers prove the unity of the reflectory processes in animate and inanimate world, at premental and mental levels, in man’s nervous system and society&#039;s economic system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these scientific achievements of the 20th century forcefully confirm Lenin’s idea that, apart from the question as to whether the ideal or the material is primary, “the difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-74|74]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; For, besides the difference between them, the material and ideal phenomena are similar in that in both there occurs, as the result of the action of some material objects on other material objects, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the former in the latter, the reflection which lies at the very root of matter. Consciousness stands out merely as the highest of the known forms of reflection, as the supreme product of matter, as “a function of that particularly complex fragment of matter called the human brain&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-75|75]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. Laws of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Law? ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1911, Ernest Rutherford, a British physicist, calculated how alpha rays would be scattered by an atom of gold, should its nucleus be a point object, and how they would be scattered, should the nucleus be larger than that. Then he exposed a thin foil of gold to the action of alpha rays. The scattering indicated that the atomic nucleus has a diameter of roughly one thousand-millionth of a millimetre, i.e., that the atomic nucleus is a point object.  The discovery worked a revolution in the views on the structure of the atom. No doubt, Rutherford could repeat his experiment as many times as he liked. But his discovery, the connection between his calculations, experiments and conclusions, was absolutely unique. Rutherford could no more re-discover what he had once discovered than be born once again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the unconditioned reflex (e.g., the involuntary blinking of the eye when an object ap&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ears suddenly right in front of it) implies a relation repeated many times not only during the lifetime of any one person, but throughout hundreds of generations of men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, some relations occur only once and some are repeated. Moreover, they may be essential and inessential. For example, hydrogen and nitrogen combine to make ammonia only at definite pressures and temperatures and in the presence of a catalyst accelerating the reaction. The relation between them is essential to the making of ammonia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for inessential relations, it must be borne in mind that those which may be inessential in one respect may prove essential in some other, and vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There may also be chance and necessary relations. How long an animal may live depends on the circumstances of its birth and life. The relation can be multiform. It may be such that the animal will live merely a few hours or days, or it could be such that the animal will live several decades. These are relations which may or may not occur, depending on the circumstances, and, in this sense, we may call them chance relations. But whatever the circumstances of an animal&#039;s birth and life, it must die sooner or later. Death is inevitable, and in this sense, the relation between birth and death is a necessary one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different relations are of varying significance to the understanding of all that occurs both outside and within us, as well as to the success of our activities in any field. The most significant are those which are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (i.e., common to many things and processes), essential and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;necessary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Such relations are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  A law is a relation which persists as long as phenomena subject to it persist (regardless of any change they may undergo during that time).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of physics, chemistry, biology, history, political economy, and all scientific laws in general, are mental reflections of the laws governing the development of nature and society, which themselves are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring, essential and necessary relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the mind and discovered by men as they investigate nature, society and thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that, as it draws general conclusions from the findings of particular sciences and from scientific laws concerning separate aspects of reality, dialectical materialism arrives at the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;most general laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, called the laws of dialectics. Let us see now what they are.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#calibre_toc_53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== §2. The Law of Transition of Quantity into Quality&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus (530-470 B. C.), whom Lenin called one of the founders of dialectics, said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything is always changing and always moving.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; This is how he illustrated his idea. When you step into a river for the second time, water has already flowed downstream, so you are actually in different water. Hence, you cannot step into the same river twice. Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, went even further. He said that you cannot step into the same river even once, for even as you are immersed into the water it keeps flowing, and your foot is in different water every instant. Generally, said Cratylus, you cannot make a true statement about anything because even as you are uttering the words the thing you are talking about disappears, giving way to something else. Thus, whatever you may say can only be false.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At first sight, this statement seems a mere quibble. But a closer examination reveals that it follows naturally from a definite conception of change and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Cratylus, change is the disappearance of the old and appearance of the new.  From this standpoint, an impassable gulf lies between water that flowed downstream a moment ago and that which has taken its place.  How should change appear to a consistent adherent of this view? He should see a fantastic vision like this: a cloud floating before his eyes is displaced in a flash by a spreading oak, a sleeping kitten, a crag, a dancer, and so forth, all coming in quick succession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was, of course, an exaggeration. But the view on change as the fina&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; disappearance of some objects and sudden appearance of others essentially implies that every object exists but for a moment, perishing almost as soon as it has appeared. Could anyone say anything about such an object, which would be consistent with its real nature? Certainly not. Were change indeed as Cratylus conceived it, no true statements would be possible at all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it is not so in reality. Although material objects are in a process of change, they do not disappear at once but persist for varying lengths of time. Whereas a cloud’s existence is comparatively short, the age of a cliff runs into millions of years. The mass of water or ice particles we call the cloud does not spring out of nothing; it results from condensation of vapour. Nor does it turn into nothing when it disappears. And so it is whenever anything appears or disappears. Therefore, to think that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change implies the destruction of one object and the appearance of another can only be erroneous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The contrary view is that no changing object disappears. So, for instance, the Ganges, for all the changes it has undergone, is still the same great river of Hindustan as it was hundreds of thousands of years ago, and as it will be hundreds of thousands of years hence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take the view in direct opposition to Cratylus, i.e, that every change is a change in what was, is and will be, and check it against scientific evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By using a microfilm, the division of a living cell (which in the human body takes from one to two hours) can be observed. As it divides, the cell undergoes a number of vital changes such as the halving of chromosomes, fission of the content of the cell, etc., but the cell still retains its identity. There then comes a point where these gradual changes end. The old cell disappears and two new ones appear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with plants. Buds develop gradually, undergoing changes imperceptible to the eye, and up to a point they are still buds. Then the gradual development is interrupted. The buds break and the tree is suddenly covered with foliage. A seed is a living body in which metabolism and other processes go on all the time, and often for a very long time. Yet, regardless of all these changes, a seed remains a seed until the moment when a leap takes place. The seed coat breaks and the embryo begins to sprout. The seed is replaced by a plant which did not exist until then.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, it is erroneous to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in a plant or an animal implies the disappearance of something that did, and appearance of something that did not, exist before the change. It is, however, equally wrong to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in plants and animals is merely a change in what did, does and will exist. As a matter of fact, both kinds of changes occur—the change in what existed and continues to exist (it never stops) and the change which represents the destruction of old and appearance of new objects (i.e., a break in continuity, a leap).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Botanical and zoological evidence proves both Cratylus and those of the diametrically Opposite opinion to be wrong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, it is appropriate to recall the processes in inanimate nature already mentioned, which also present a unity of change in the old and the appearance of the new. No matter how one or more particles move about in space, these processes are still mechanical and reversible. But as soon as the number of chaotically moving particles attains a high enough level, a new form of motion appears, viz., heat processes, which are irreversible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This holds of society as well. Contrary to the reformists, who claim that capitalism may turn into socialism through a series of gradual changes, the latter merely prepare the ground for socialism which emerges only after a revolution, a break in continuity. Of course, exploitative capitalist society persists from the time the Capitalist productive relations become predominant till the moment they are abolished by a revolution. It undergoes continuous significant changes along with the growth of its productive forces, concentration of capital, etc. Nevertheless, this all serves to aggravate the contradictions inherent in capitalism and intensify the class struggle. Only a break in continuity, a revolutionary upheaval, dislodging the bourgeoisie from government and taking the principal means of production out of their hands, can end capitalism and bring forth a new society based on public ownership, in which power is taken by the working class led by its party, and exploitation of man by man is finally abolished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned the valuable contributions to knowledge made by philosophy and the natural and social sciences in the last quarter of the 18th century, and especially the first half of the 19th century. Over that time, the findings of both the individual sciences and philosophy underwent appreciable change. But the middle of the last century was the turning point in mankind’s intellectual progress. Marx and Engels, who had critically refashioned and drawn general philosophical conclusions from knowledge already gained by mankind, evolved a new doctrine, quite different from all previous philosophical theories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a break in continuity, a revolution in the development of human thought, marked by the appearance of a philosophical doctrine unparalleled by anything in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in exactly the same way that the continuous change in the natural sciences had paved the way for a leap, a revolution in our views on nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, gradual change, whether in science or society, causes the destruction and disappearance of the old and an abrupt break in continuity, the appearance of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of the old and the appearance of the new are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;qualitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. All other changes, whereby different parts or aspects of an object become re-arranged, increase or diminish while the object retains its identity, are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Relative to all the changes suffered, for instance, by an animal during life, birth and death represent qualitative changes. And relative to an animal’s birth and death, all the changes it may undergo during life are quantitative, as all that time it remains itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qualitative changes may be of two forms: (1) “something did not exist, but now it does”, and (2) “‘something existed but now it does not’. Quantitative changes, on the other hand, are infinitely diverse, e.g., “larger—smaller&amp;amp;quot;, “more—less&amp;amp;quot;, “more often—more seldom”, “faster—slower”, &amp;amp;quot;warmer—colder”, “lighter—heavier”, &amp;amp;quot;worse—better”, &amp;amp;quot;poorer—richer”, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, you would hardly find anybody sharing Cratylus’ point of view, but there are plenty of people sharing the diametrically opposite, if equally metaphysical, point of view. These people argue that it only seems to us that there occur breaks in the processes going on in the environment and in the mind, and that on thorough examination we must see that things never stop changing. For should a process be interrupted, it could not be resumed without outside assistance any more than a broken eggshell can become whole again, unless somebody comes along and glues its broken edges together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us, for the moment, agree that change is always continuous. It will appear then that a growing poplar, for example, is in a state of continuous change. The poplar sprout turned into a mature tree continuously, just as the seed turned into a sprout, the flower into fruit and seed, and the bud into a flower. The transformation of a little into big poplar is undoubtedly a continuous change, for, big or little, it is still a poplar. But if the transformation of the seed into the little poplar also is a continuous process, then there must be a diminutive poplar in the seed; and if the transformation of the flower into fruit and seed is a continuous process, then there must be infinitesimal seeds, and so infinitesimal poplars, in the flower. Because, after all, a poplar may change continuously only while it exists, no matter what its size. The changeover from &amp;amp;quot;non-poplar” to “poplar” cannot be continuous because the disappearance of that from which the poplar sprout has formed, i.e., the seed, amounts to a break in its (the poplar’s) development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another argument advanced in support of the metaphysical view that gradual change knows no interruptions is this. All stages of motion are related as cause and effect and are therefore continuous. All motion is therefore continuous. If we accept that there is a break, a gap between stage A and stage B, we must admit that they are not connected, whereby stage B has no cause. Yet to accept that something may exist without cause is to believe in miracles. Hence, leaps or breaks in continuity are impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this, we must say first of all that interruptions of continuity, leaps, do not occur without any connection with the preceding stage of motion. A leap is always prepared and caused, i.e., causally determined, by previous continuous motion. Thus, the birth of a living being is prepared and caused by the essential changes in the embryo during pregnancy. A social revolution is prepared and caused by sharpening conflict and mounting class struggle. A revolution in science is caused by the accumulation of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, the leap itself determines the character of subsequent continuous motion. The character of all vital processes and the rate at which they proceed in the embryo and the newborn are utterly different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Diverse aspects of people’s life in society develop after a revolution in a manner quite different from that before the revolution. The trend and rate of the progress of knowledge before and after a revolution in science are altogether different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there is a close connection between a leap and what comes before and after it.  Continuous changes cause a break and that, again, causes continuous change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be noted that the leap does not occur at random but only when continuous change reaches a limit which is definite for every given process. How exact the moment is for a victorious revolution is sufficiently clear from Lenin’s letter of October 24 (November 6), 1917, which concerns the uprising.  Lenin wrote: “...the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night. History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk ... losing everything. ... To delay action is fatal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-76|76]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science also becomes ripe for a revolution at quite a definite point. As accumulated knowledge was leading up to the need to create relativity theory, both Poincaré and Langevin, independent of each other, were approaching the discovery. If Einstein, who realised the need for a thorough revision of some physical notions sooner and better than others, had not worked the revolution in science, it would have been brought about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps later and differently—by the efforts of other scientists, because it had become absolutely necessary. Einstein himself was actually of that opinion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, continuous change develops up to a limit determined by the nature of each process, after which a leap inevitably occurs. The limit beyond which continuous change is interrupted is described in philosophy as the measure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us see if a break in continuity does indeed imply a rift between adjacent stages of development, as metaphysicians would have it. Take an animal, a dog, for example.  The changes it undergoes during its life are continuous only with respect to two breaks, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., birth and death. In other respects, however, some breaks, or leaps, occur during the dog’s life as well. The first of them is the attainment of physiological maturity (at eighteen months to two-and-a-half years old). In turn, the changes a puppy undergoes in that period are continuous only with relation to two breaks between which the changes occur, i.e., between birth and physiological maturity. In other respects, there are breaks in that period too. Moreover, if we subject the animal&#039;s birth itself to a detailed examination, we shall see that this leap, this break, does not occur instantaneously but is of a certain duration and consists of a succession of continuous changes and leaps.  Each of the latter, lesser leaps, so to speak, consists of still other continuous changes and related leaps, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every continuous change in nature, society and thought is such only with respect to its “own” breaks or leaps. But at a deeper level, continuous change consists of special continua and special leaps. Equally, every leap is such only with respect to its “own” continuous changes. The leap itself has an infinitely complex structure. It comprises continua and leaps, which also comprise continua and leaps, and so on. Change is continuous only with respect to its “own” breaks, its own beginning and ending. But in other respects it contains breaks. In other words, there is no such thing as absolute, “pure&amp;amp;quot; continuity. A leap, or a break, is such only with respect to the change whose continuity is broken by it. In other respects, however, the break itself contains continuous changes. It is not an absolute, “pure” break, but an inexhaustibly complex process, all the stages of which are causally related.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical tenet that continuous quantitative changes, upon attaining measure, cause abrupt qualitative changes which in their turn determine the character of the further continuous quantitative changes is called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of transition from quantity to quality and vice versa&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This law plays an essential role in man’s practical activity. Thus, it is known that engineers and chemists concentrated for a long time on evolving new methods of working diverse materials so as to make them meet the ever growing requirements of industry and everyday life. There came, however, a point where this continuous improvement of the methods of working natural materials, combined with other changes in science and technology, brought about a leap, a qualitative change in that particular sphere. Today, in the 20th century, especially in its latter half, whenever new demands are made on materials, engineers and chemists, rather than try to evolve new methods of processing available materials (which often would not answer the purpose anyway), develop synthetic materials with predesigned properties answering a specific need.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To quote an example from another sphere.  Guiding themselves by the law of the transition of quantity into quality, revolutionaries reject not only reformism, but the anarchism of adherents of the ultra-left, who fail to realise the utmost importance of continuous development of the revolutionary movement, involving an ever larger proportion of the masses and paving the way for the revolution which will take place, not at the will of a handful of people, but only where and when the necessary conditions mature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to ensure the success of any kind of activity, whether industrial, social or scientific, we must closely observe the processes we have to deal with, not miss the point where the continuous quantitative changes are superseded by a break in continuity, and be able to modify our proceedings accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The Law of Negation of the Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The tender seedling sprouting from an acorn, a mere twig which anything, it seems, can easily destroy, grows, down the centuries, into a monumental tree inspiring awe at its great strength and the complex organisation of its root system, trunk, bark, branches, leaves and flowers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How puny, short-lived, fragile and primitive vis-a-vis their organisation and behaviour were the first unicellular animals which originated more than a thousand million years ago, and how much more complex and durable is the anatomy, physiology, psychology and behaviour of recent highly-organised mammals (e.g., dogs or monkeys).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar things may be observed at every turn. The helpless infant becomes a vigorous, intelligent person, an expert capable of tackling tasks of great complexity. And what a vast distance indeed there is between primitive society, almost entirely swayed by the forces of nature, and modern society which makes these forces, including atomic energy, serve man, and creates seas, forests and artificial Earth satellites.  Our far-reaching, all-embracing, fast-advancing knowledge, too, is a far cry from the primitive beliefs of our cave-dwelling ancestors. This progress from lower to higher forms consists, as we have seen already, in an endless succession of stages, essentially distinct from each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does one stage change into another?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exposure to a temperature of several thousand degrees Centigrade will cause the destruction (negation) of an amoeba. The next stage in its development will not take place, i.e., life will end and will give way to physico-chemical processes of inorganic nature. On the other hand, the method whereby the developmental stages replace one another (the method of negation), which is intrinsic to the amoeba, consists in division (which occurs under specific conditions) resulting in the emergence of two new amoebas in place of the original one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acorn, when consumed by an animal, is destroyed; although its negation contributes to the animal’s further growth, its own intrinsic development ends there. Had it been allowed to proceed stage by stage according to its intrinsic method, it would have turned into the sprout of an oak.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The succession of developmental stages proceeding in accordance with the laws inherent in the given object (but not such as results from the intervention of external forces destroying the given form of motion) is termed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does dialectical negation work? If you dig the ground under an oak seedling, you will find no acorn there. What has become of it?  Like most green plants, the oak builds its body from the substances it draws from the soil (via its roots) and from the air (through its leaves, which contain chlorophyll). When a new plant is about to emerge, there are yet neither roots nor leaves. The first little green leaves and roots are formed from the material contained in the acorn. The protective outer coating decomposes and has no part in the new plant, but the embryo and the food by which it is surrounded turn into a sprout. No sooner does a tiny root appear than it gets busy extracting from the soil the substances helping to build the plant while the first green parts of the shoot begin at once to assimilate from the air the substances which go to build the body of the sapling. Therefore the plant replacing the acorn contains both the substances that were contained in the acorn and the substances that were not contained in it. The same may be said of the oak which will grow from the sprout. The young oak will be like its parents in many respects, but owing to the unique circumstances under which it has formed and developed, it will not inherit some of the parents’ characteristics, while it will acquire some that the parents did not have. Dialectical negation con&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ists in the fact that something of the stage which is negated is lost, something becomes part of the new, negating, stage (although in a modified form), and something entirely new is added.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All three elements are also present when a breed of animals disappears and another breed appears in its place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining an enormous range of plant and animal species which replaced one another over hundreds of millions of years, palaeontologists have not discovered a single instance of re-emergence of an extinct species. In nature, nothing is ever completely repeated. Although later species possess some features of earlier, extinct species, they always lack some of their predecessors’ characteristics while possessing other features absent in their predecessors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific evidence utterly disproves the metaphysical view that development amounts to a repetition of identical cycles, always returning to the starting point, i.e., that development moves in a circle. An individual living organism does not develop in a circle. Certainly, when from an acorn there grows an oak of the same kind as its ancestors, that is, in some respects, a return to what already existed. But in some respects the new oak differs from its ancestors.  Indeed, should it be an exact repetition of them and should they, in their turn, have repeated every characteristic of the previous generations, oaks would exist forever. Yet it has been established beyond any possible doubt that there was a time when not only oaks but the species they have replaced did not exist. Some species disappear and other ones appear precisely because every organism, while it inherits much from its parents must also differ from them in some way. As such variations accumulate over long periods, old species are replaced by new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When a new stage in society&#039;s development comes, it does not mean that all the people, technology and science pertaining to the old formation have disappeared. If it were so, no new stage in society’s development would take place. In order that it can take place, it is necessary (1) to abolish the obsolete social order, together with both the state system which protected it, and the ideology which sanctified it; (2) to make the members of the old society part and parcel of the new society (the role of different classes being essentially changed) and utilise the industrial, technological and scientific advances of the previous stage; and (3) to create, on the basis of progress in science and technology and on the basis of a new ideology, qualitatively new relations of production and a new state system, and raise the productive forces to a new, higher, level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, no stages in the process of development are eternal; each stage disappears sooner or later, being negated by each following stage, and so on. Dialectical negation (i.e., a succession of stages of development, proceeding in accordance with the objective laws inherent in a given object or process) does not consist merely in the disappearance of some obsolete features of the stage which is negated, but implies, as well, the retention of some of the features of that stage and emergence of entirely new features which never existed previously.  For these reasons, the succession of developmental stages is progressive. Although no stage is ever completely repeated, some features of earlier stages necessarily recur—although in a different form—at later stages, in consequence of which development proceeds in a spiral. All the above-mentioned peculiarities of development are called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of negation of the negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, after throwing off the colonialist yoke, a country starts building the new life, its people must certainly abolish all vestiges of oppression, eliminate entirely the sorry aftermath of imperialist rule and sweep out all anti-popular practices and institutions holding back national development. Nevertheless it is certainly necessary to preserve the buildings, enterprises and educational establishments which were constructed under colonialist rule, and place at the service of the people that which formerly served its oppressors. It is necessary to preserve, build up and use for the people&#039;s benefit the scientific knowledge acquired under colonialism by a small proportion of the oppressed people. But, apart from that, a people having embarked on independent development must create in the social, public, economic and cultural spheres of their country’s life much that is entirely new, that was never heard of before. In this situation, therefore, all three features comprising the law of negation of the negation can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. The Law of Unity and Conflict of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;What causes a thing to move, to develop?  Why does it change?&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, for instance, is that nut rolling along the ground? It has been shaken off the branch by another branch which broke off and fell on it. The branch was broken off by a stone suddenly rolling down the hillside. The stone was tumbled from its place by a landslide which was started by a sudden gust of wind. This sequence could be prolonged indefinitely. Observations of this kind suggested to philosophers the idea which was formulated by Baruch (Benedictus) Spinoza, one of the most prominent materialist philosophers of the 17th century, who wrote that whether a body is in motion or at rest must be determined by another body, whose motion or rest is, in turn, determined by a third body, and that by yet another body, and so on to infinity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proposition that every object both begins to move and stops moving only under the impact of another object is closely associated with the one that opposite properties, characteristics and tendencies, e.g., motion and rest, cannot be combined in the same object at the Same time. A moving object cannot simultaneously be at rest. If it is at rest, it is clear that it is not moving.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These two propositions must be the sole intelligent explanation of the causes of motion, of development. Such was the conclusion arrived at by nearly all noted philosophers and Scientists of the 17th-18th centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, when we try to understand how different objects are organised, examining them “each one by itself, alongside and after each Other,&amp;amp;quot; we, as Engels observes, “do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-77|77]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally enough, when looking into the structure, qualities and specific characteristics of objects, scientists first of all discover contradictions between things rather than within individual things. Nevertheless, when they begin to investigate the processes going on in a body and the connections between it and the external world, they are confronted with an essentially different situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As they are examining a living organism, for instance, paying close attention to what is going on within it, scientists discover that it is continually assimilating substances from the environment and simultaneously excreting substance into it. Furthermore, these diametrically opposite processes are so closely interconnected that it is enough to prevent a living organism from assimilating certain substances from without for excretion to stop at the same moment, while as soon as an organism becomes unable to discharge certain substances into the environment, it stops assimilating substances from it at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An analogous situation can be observed in inorganic nature. As long as the atoms of different chemical elements were regarded alongside each other and people did not realise that atoms of one element can be transformed into those of another, opposite physical and chemical properties appeared to be distributed among the atoms of different elements while no opposites were thought to be present inside the atom itself. Since the beginning of research into radioactivity, which has to do with the transformation of atoms, the situation has changed.  The atomic nucleus, in which almost the whole of the mass of the atom is concentrated, was found to consist of particles carrying a positive charge, viz., protons. Although, as we know, Similarly charged objects repel each other, protons do not fly in different directions but are held together in the nucleus by diametrically opposite forces (so-called nuclear forces) by which the protons are attracted to one another.  These opposites, viz., proton attraction and repulsion, are so intimately interconnected that one does not exist without the other. It is precisely this contradiction, inherent in the atomic nucleus, which causes the transformation of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everybody knows that by sawing a magnetised bar in half, one does not get two separate poles. Each half will be a magnet with a North pole and a South pole. One can divide each piece into two again, and the result will be the same. One certainly may, if he likes, deprive the magnet of its North pole. For this, one must demagnetise the bar. But when one does this, the South pole will disappear simultaneously with the North pole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that a body appears to be either at rest or in motion only as long as we ignore the body’s inner workings and its relationship to the surrounding environment. When we take all that into account, we shall find that every resting body is in motion and every moving body is at rest; that rest and motion simultaneously and inseparably belong to one and the same body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The two laws of dialectics generalising our entire knowledge of nature, society and thought, which we have considered here, show that all motion is a unity of inseparable opposites, viz., quantitative and qualitative changes; continuous changes and breaks of continuity; disappearance of the properties of the stage which is negated and the retention of its properties; recurrence and uniqueness; stability and change. Being aware of the self-contradictory nature of all things and events makes it much easier to discover what causes every object to move and change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What causes, for instance, the peculiar form of motion we call life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An organism lives only as long as metabolism continues, which includes two opposite processes, viz., assimilation (i.e., transformation of food into body substance) and disintegration of body substance and excretion of the products of disintegration. When metabolism stops, life ceases. In any plant or animal, metabolism, as Engels wrote, “does not take place as the result of a process to which it is subjected from without.... On the contrary, life, the metabolism which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a self-implementing process...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-78|78]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , i.e., a process which is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inherent&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in a living body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the organism’s age, the work it has performed, its condition and numerous other factors, either constructive metabolism (assimilation) or destructive metabolism (excretion) may be predominant. Even where the two kinds of metabolism are at close enough levels of intensity (which may occur only for a time) the balance between them is not complete but approximate and relative, the opposition between them does not disappear but merely diminishes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, life is motion which is not due to any cause external to the organism. The cause that sets the organism in motion is internal. The source of this motion is the interaction of the opposites inherent in it, i.e., assimilation and excretion. Even partial, approximate equilibrium between these opposites is possible only for a limited space of time. They are never so completely balanced as to neutralise each other.  They are always opposed to each other, as long as there is life in general (and so its source&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the conflict of opposites). Hence, life is self-motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us look at a society in which the means of production are privately owned and which is divided into classes of the exploiters and the exploited. In the absence of the exploited, existence is impossible for the exploiters for whom would they exploit? And where there are no exploiters there can be no exploited. The struggle between these classes wherever private property predominates is the chief source of society’s progress from lower to higher stages, e.g., from slavery to feudalism, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism. Society is not set in motion by some external force. On the contrary, the force responsible for society’s development, i.e., the class struggle, is inherent in society. Therefore, human history is self-motion caused by the conflict of opposite classes in society itself. Even when their forces become more or less balanced, they can still never be completely so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to deny the role of external influences which may further or hinder one form of movement or another. Nevertheless, all movement takes its source from internal contradictions, so that the emergence of new contradictions gives rise to a new form of movement, while with their disappearance it gives place to another form of movement for which other contradictions are responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus every material or spiritual phenomenon or process is a unity of Opposites which inherently belong to it and are inseparable. The source of any object’s movement lies in the interaction (&amp;amp;quot;conflict&amp;amp;quot;) of opposites which are inherent in it. Therefore movement is self-movement. Opposites can attain only partial, relative equilibrium, and that only for a time; they can never become balanced completely. The disparity, the contradiction between them is always present in varying degrees, being as indestructible as motion itself. The unity, the equal effect of opposites, is temporary and relative, whereas their conflict is eternal and absolute. Such are the tenets of materialist dialectics which constitute the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity and con&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;lict of opposites&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The significance of this law to dialectics is such that Lenin wrote: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-79|79]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, both the law of transition from quantity to quality and that of negation of the negation may be regarded as particular instances of the law of the unity and conflict of opposites, which reveals the source of all development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is an example illustrating the Significance this law has to the working people’s struggle against capitalist oppression.  Advocates of the capitalist system allege that the conflict of internal contradictions, i.e, the class struggle, is not a source of the development of society but an obstacle in its way. According to them, strikes, demonstrations, etc., bring factories to a standstill, and so hold back the development of production and of society at large. They say that only with class peace and co-operation between employers and workers can technology advance and production develop rapidly. In fact, however, in all capitalist countries where the working class is well-organised, its economic struggle compels the capitalists to raise wages, reduce hours and improve conditions in one way or another. The capitalists thus have to improve plant, technologies and organisation of production. But, most important of all, the broader and more vigorous the people’s movement is, the sooner the revolution comes which abolishes capitalist oppression and raises production and the entire life of society to a new stage of development which capitalism cannot attain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. Categories of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Category? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Earth has a satellite, the Moon. Some other planets in the solar system also have satellites, and so do the planets revolving round other stars, besides the Sun. Saturn, for example, has nine satellites, the largest of which is Titan. Being a satellite of Saturn, Titan is thereby one of the satellites of planets in general which revolve round diverse stars. Satellites, in their turn, belong to solid cosmic objects which form merely a part of the cosmic bodies in general. Thus, as we pass from the most narrow to the more and more inclusive of the aforementioned concepts, we shall have a series of concepts in which every following concept is broader than the preceding one, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TITAN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF SATURN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SOLID COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take another concept, &amp;amp;quot;wheat&amp;amp;quot;.  Wheat is a cereal, and all cereals are covered-seeded plants having one seed leaf, which, along with the plants having two seed leaves, form the class of covered-seeded plants. The latter, along with the naked-seeded plants, belong to the seed plants, which, in their turn, belong to plants (to which seedless plants also belong). In this case, too, we have a series of concepts ranging from the specific to the more general, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
WHEAT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A CEREAL,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT HAVING ONE SEED LEAF,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT,&lt;br /&gt;
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AN ORGANISM,&lt;br /&gt;
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A SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
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A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
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MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
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All concepts of material objects (e.g., the oak, the bee, the biplane) are links in similar series, and the series are linked with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since wheat is one of the cereals, all the attributes of the latter are included in the concept “wheat&amp;amp;quot;, which implies, besides, the particular attributes of wheat differentiating it from all other cereals. The concept “cereal&amp;amp;quot; implies all the attributes of the covered-seeded plants with one seed leaf, plus those which distinguish cereals from the rest of such plants.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is the same with other concepts, the meaning of the more general concepts being implicit in the more restricted concept, while implicit in the latter also are the attributes whereby the given subclass is differentiated from the other subclasses of the class to which it belongs.  Therefore the attributes of an organism are implicit in the concepts of all plants (of which more than half a million species are known) and in the concepts of all animals (of which more than a million species are known). Yet the concept &amp;amp;quot;matter&amp;amp;quot; occupies a special place among the concepts of material objects. Being the most comprehensive, ultimate concept, it is implied in millions of diverse concepts of material objects, animate or inanimate, natural or manmade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Matter is not the only ultimate concept embracing a vast multitude of narrower concepts.  Philosophy is concerned with the following ultimate concepts: matter and mind, motion and rest, the general and the particular, substance and phenomenon, quality and quantity, cause and effect, necessity and chance, possibility and reality, content and form, structure and function, and so on. These ultimate concepts are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each category embraces an enormous number of narrower concepts, while all categories combine to embrace all concepts at the command of human thought. And, as the content of a category is included in all the concepts brought under it, the apprehension of diverse phenomena and processes in nature, society and thoughts largely depends on what each category is intended to express.&lt;br /&gt;
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The distinction between categories and other concepts was noted even in antiquity, and philosophers have been arguing about it ever since, advancing different doctrines of categories.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look at Kant’s account of categories.  Kant stresses that each category, as it unites a multitude of narrower concepts, thereby serves to bring together, reduce to order and synthesise our knowledge; therefore categories are exceedingly important to apprehension. The train of thought he pursued is as follows. When they first found a metal that would not oxidize, men formed the concept ‘gold’. The first voyages round the world produced the concept &amp;amp;quot;globe”. Navigators who had reached the Arctic Ocean for the first time, saw huge floating mountains of ice there. Thus, the notion “iceberg&amp;amp;quot; emerged. All ordinary concepts are the result of sense-perception of material things, i.e., they are derived from experience. Therefore they represent knowledge of phenomena of the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Categories, on the other hand, represent a different form of synthesis. Facing an unfamiliar thing, we immediately start looking for its cause and trying to see what is accidental and what is necessary in it, and so on. All contact with things, all experience necessarily involves these considerations. Even before we know the cause of the given phenomenon, we are sure that it must have a cause, as well as both chance and necessary attributes. Hence, according to Kant, we have the idea of necessity and chance, of cause and effect, in a word, of all categories, prior to contact with material things, i.e., prior to experience. From Kant’s point of view, categories are not derived from experience but are prior to it, are something, in fact, without which human experience would be impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant held that so long as categories—unlike ordinary concepts—are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience, they contain no knowledge about the material world: there is nothing in objective reality corresponding to categories.  All categories—necessity and chance, cause and effect, and so on—are conceived merely in thought. It appears, then, that our major concepts, i.e., categories, do not depend on the material world at all, that thought is independent of matter. Proceeding from this idealist point of view, Kant held that categories do not emerge at all, but have been present in human consciousness ever since man appeared. Neither the number nor essence of the categories ever changes. There are as many categories today as there were thousands of years ago, and we understand them now just as they were understood then. Kant asserted further that as necessity is the opposite of chance, it follows that they are mutually exclusive because in combining them the mind would contradict itself, which is logically impossible. The relation of cause and effect and other categories are equally incompatible, being opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look into this interpretation of categories which modern idealists are still using in one way or another. In our daily contact with material things, we have to resort to concepts, e.g., a pulley, an engine, a switch, electric current, a television set, industry, cost, efficiency, oxygen, a germ, the nervous system, and so on.  We never derived any of them from experience, having learned them from teachers or books. Moreover, with the exception of discoverers and researchers who may introduce a new concept on the basis of experience, nobody can claim to have derived from experience a concept previously not known. We receive all our concepts from other people. Does it follow from this that these concepts have not been derived from experience but are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience? Certainly not. Even though you and I derived no concepts from experience, others did a very long time ago, and later on still others, drawing on freshly gained experience, amplified, refined and developed them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the fact that the concepts we apply in our daily lives have not been derived by ourselves does not in the least mean that they have been derived by nobody at all. If people use concepts already made, that does not prove their non-empirical origin, i.e., that they have not been acquired from experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical materialism has weighty proofs of the empirical origin of all categories. If all categories were present in human thought ever Since it began, we should have also found them in the thought processes of primitive tribes. In fact, however, that is not the case. N. N. Miklukho-Maklai (1846-1888), a famous Russian traveller, anthropologist and ethnographer, established, for example, that the Papuans in New Guinea, who were familiar with some categories, e.g., causality, did not know other categories. When bartering their goods, they placed respective items opposite one another, as they did not know how to count. Not only were they ignorant of quantity as such but they had no notion of number. “Counting”, Engels wrote, “requires not only objects that can be counted, but also the ability to exclude all properties of the objects considered except their number—and this ability is the product of a long historical evolution based on experience.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-80|80]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Scientific investigations proved that many primitive tribes lacked both experience and the notion of number, let alone the knowledge of the categories of quantity or matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, if categories were inherent in the mind, i.e., prior to experience, they would be inherent also in the mind of a little child. As it is, a two-year-old, while possessing a variety of notions, has, nevertheless, no notion of number or quantity. These facts conclusively show that categories, like all other concepts, grow out of men’s experience as it progresses from one stage to another, some of them emerging earlier than others, so that their number is not invariable. Of course, a category takes much longer to arise than does a narrower concept.  Moreover, this process is still carrying on today. The categories of structure and function, for example, emerge after Kant. Our descendants will undoubtedly evolve new categories on the basis of experience yet to be gained.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having disproved the idealist point of view that cause and effect, necessity and chance, quality and quantity just do not exist in the material world, and merely our notions of them exist in the mind prior to experience, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that all categories and concepts, “all ideas are taken from experience, are reflections ... of reality.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-81|81]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The ultimate concepts are different only in that the characteristics of objective reality they reflect belong not to some but to all things and events.  Hence the great significance of these key concepts to knowledge. Lenin wrote of them: &amp;amp;quot;Man is confronted with a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;web&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of national phenomena... categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-82|82]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Disproving the metaphysical assertions that the categories are invariable both as to content and number, that they have no interconnections, and that opposite categories cannot coexist, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that categories develop, represent a unity of opposites, and that all categories are interconnected, as they reflect different characteristics and aspects of the external world and different processes going on in it. “...If &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; develops,” Lenin wrote, ‘does not that apply also to the most general &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-83|83]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; We shall concern ourselves here with only some of the categories of materialist dialectics, viz., cause and effect, and necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Cause and Effect ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 18th century, many scientists believed that the ability of bodies to burn was due to a special substance, &amp;amp;quot;phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;. The more phlogiston there was in a body, the more readily it burned, and a body that had given off all of its phlogiston could not burn. Phlogiston was invariably the cause of fire; fire was invariably the effect of phlogiston. From that point of view, phlogiston could not be the effect of fire, nor could fire be the cause of phlogiston. Another contemporary view was that heat was caused by a weightless substance, &amp;amp;quot;caloric&amp;amp;quot;. According to that view, a cold body became hot owing to caloric passing into it from a hot body contacting it. Textbooks on chemistry had listed caloric among chemical elements up to the mid-19th century. Caloric was considered to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of heat, and the latter to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of caloric. It seemed obvious that no contrary state of things, i.e., that heat phenomena should be the cause of caloric and caloric the effect of heat, was at all possible. All electric phenomena known at that time were ascribed to the action of invisible electrical fluids which produced electric current as they flowed from one body into another. These electrical fluids were believed then to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of electricity, and electricity to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of the electric fluids. Such conceptions of heat, electricity and other phenomena gave rise to the idea that once A was the cause of B, it could not possibly be the effect of B. This understanding of the relation of cause and effect boiled down to the undialectical, metaphysical view that opposites (such as cause and effect) cannot coexist in one and the same object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysical understanding of the categories of cause and effect has been upset by the further progress of knowledge which showed that the world is not an assemblage of final things but a totality of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today everybody knows that in a hydroelectric station the movement of the water stream is the cause of the electric current produced by the station. And in the case of a machine tool being switched on, the electric current is the cause of its mechanical motion. In the former instance electric current is the effect of mechanical motion; in the latter, it is the cause of mechanical motion. In the diesel locomotive, heat is the cause of the mechanical motion of the locomotive’s driving axles, and simultaneously the mechanical movement of its parts, their friction, causes them to become so hot as to make it necessary to install special cooling devices to prevent a fire. In other words, heat is simultaneously the cause and effect of mechanical motion. If we regard the links in the chain of causality as processes, we shall find that when process A, in acting on process B, causes a change in it, process B, in acting on process A in its turn, also causes changes in it, so that the chain looks like this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;⇌&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;B&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, every process, as it acts on another process, itself is acted on by the latter, which means that all relationships which exist in nature and society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interact&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and that the opposites (cause and effect) are comprised in one and the same thing or event.&lt;br /&gt;
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On establishing the cause of a phenomenon, a scientist must necessarily find out what reverse effect the phenomenon has on its cause, which facet of the interaction is predominant and to what extent it is so, and what reasons are responsible for it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Influence of the effect on the cause from which it sprang has a particularly significant role in organic nature. When the controlling part of an organism is informed by the part under its control about some change occurring in the surroundings (e.g., the appearance of something of possible food value), it “orders” the controlled part to respond in a specific way (e.g., to try and get hold of the thing). The result may be either fortunate or otherwise. The thing may prove to be edible or obnoxious. The controlled part at once informs the controlling part which issues the next order. In the first instance the order will be to try and consume the thing; in the second, to withdraw as quickly as possible. This process, described as &amp;amp;quot;’feedback’, is widely applied in modern technology, especially in cybernetic devices. Feedback systems, whether natural or manmade, would be impossible if the effect (i.e., the system’s response to the action on it of an external object) were not the cause of its own cause (i.e., if the system’s response failed to cause changes in the external object which has provoked the response).&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us consider the example of a developing nation retarded both economically and culturally after years of colonial misrule. To raise labour efficiency from its low level, such a nation must, quite obviously, push up the cultural and living standards in the first place. An ignorant, underfed worker cannot be very efficient, of course. So, the growth of cultural and living standards is the major cause of the growth of efficiency in a former colonial country.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, if we view the matter from a dialectical standpoint, we shall see that here too cause and effect interact and change places. For, clearly enough, higher cultural and living standards depend above all on higher labour efficiency, or, to put it differently, higher cultural and living standards are the effect of higher efficiency. The growth of labour efficiency is both the cause and the effect of the growth of living and cultural standards, just as the growth of living and cultural standards is both the cause and the effect of higher labour efficiency. In a striving to achieve national prosperity, one should be guided by a dialectical understanding of the categories of cause and effect.&lt;br /&gt;
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====  §3. Necessity and Chance ====&lt;br /&gt;
Chance is commonly taken to mean that which might or might not occur, or might occur in any way. Necessity, on the other hand, is understood as that which must occur and cannot but occur.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the interrelation of necessity and chance in the world around us?&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the answers to this question may be: There is nothing that necessarily must occur and nothing that might not occur. Anything, any event, however incredible, may occur, and it may occur one way or any other way. From this standpoint, nothing is impossible. There is no such thing as necessity. Everything in the world is the outcome of chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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The famous French author of the 16th century Francois Rabelais satirised this view in his book about a giant, Gargantua, who was brought into the world through his mother’s ear. Anticipating that his readers will not believe such a thing possible, Rabelais says that even though such strange nativity has not a semblance of truth in it, still nobody would dispute it that there is nothing impossible to god. And if god wished so, all women would henceforth deliver their babies through their ears.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those who deny necessity and believe that anything is possible (so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;indeterminists&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) would have to accept that although the stone on which he has just sat down is silent, it could well burst into song presently; that although the dog is a four-legged animal, it is nevertheless quite possible that a dog may have a puppy with twenty legs; that, so far, two by two is four, but it is quite possible that, by tonight, two by two will have become one....&lt;br /&gt;
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The mere fact that indeterminists deny necessity and the laws of nature in word only but practically recognise both, is enough to show how vapid their doctrine is. Even the “fathers of the church”, who repeat that, as far as god is concerned, no necessity exists, that everything is possible for him, depart from their indeterminism at every step. Thomas Aquinas, a prominent theologian of the past, nowadays regarded as the principal authority of the Catholic church, had to admit that many spheres of reality were subject to necessity against which god “the omnipotent” himself was powerless.  E.g., god cannot abolish the past or alter the fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles or turn untruth into truth, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opposing indeterminism are, among others, adherents of mechanistic determinism. Faith, they maintain, allows any violation of the laws of nature, any miracle. Science, on the other hand, demonstrates that everything is subject to the laws of nature and is ruled by inexorable necessity. Nothing can occur in any other way than it actually does occur. Assuming that an event might occur contrary to the positive law—an event that need not have happened, a chance event&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that event would be uncaused, i.e., it would be a miracle. And miracles do not happen, nor can they happen. Following this train of thought, Spinoza, the materialist philosopher already referred to, came to the conclusion that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nothing occurs by chance in nature, and everything is predetermined&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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This point of view found corroboration in classical mechanics whose laws, which precisely determine the trajectory described by isolated bodies, enabled scientists to predict with striking accuracy where a body moving in space would be at any given point in time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, when science came to face more complex things than trajectories of individual bodies, it knocked the bottom out of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us turn to the following example. In a society of commodity producers, writes Marx, price is “the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity’s value.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-84|84]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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That is a law. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the price offered by each buyer.  In every business transaction price is either higher or lower than cost. To give another example, the ideology of a class is determined by the place occupied by the latter in the given System of relations of production. In feudal times, noblemen regarded serfdom as being in the nature of things. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the views held by every single member of a class. Alexander Radishchev, the Decembrists and Alexander Herzen were all noblemen but at the same time were opposed to serfdom.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the plant and animal kingdoms we see that no plant or animal lives forever—such is the law of nature. There are also laws which determine the maximum life-span for different &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;pecies. Oaks may live to an age of a thousand years, but many things may happen to an individual shoot. It may perish on the second or twentieth or two thousandth day of its life.  There is no law fixing the exact day and hour of the death of, let us say, the tree growing in front of your house. This holds of all plants and animals.&lt;br /&gt;
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By accepting that every event is inexorably determined and inevitable, we arrive at fatalism. It was in this way that Vulich, from Lermontov’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A Hero of Our Time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reasoned when, holding a pistol at his temple, he said: “If I am destined to die this moment, it will happen whether or not I fire; and if I am destined to stay alive today, then I shall stay alive whether or not I press the trigger.” Fatalism so obviously runs counter to ordinary experience that it was rejected even by the most prominent adherents of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet how one is to avoid becoming a fatalist after accepting that everything is inexorably predetermined was something none of them was able to explain, for fatalism necessarily follows from mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The all-important biological law of natural selection does not imply in the least that every creature less fit than others is doomed to sterility and early death or that every better-adjusted creature shall live long and have numerous progeny. A less-adjusted individual may happen to live to the utmost limit possible for its species, or it might die at birth, and so on. The law does not lay down the particular chance with which an individual is to meet.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is much the same in inorganic nature.  According to the second law of thermodynamics, already referred to, a closed system tends to proceed towards less orderly forms of motion. In the last quarter of the 19th century, it was established that the law does not hold of every change in such a system, whose several parts may proceed towards either greater disorder or greater order. Increased disorder is, however, much more probable than increased order or greater order. Increased disorder is general direction in which a closed system tends to proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
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To quote another example, a soluble substance placed in a liquid at rest is diffused throughout the liquid. If we place a grain of potassium permanganate at the left wall of a vessel containing water, its molecules will begin scattering in the water. After some time, the concentration of the solution will be uniform throughout the vessel. Each molecule of permanganate is jostled by water molecules. If the impulses are sufficiently numerous, the number of impulses pushing permanganate molecules towards the place of smaller concentration (towards the right) will be roughly equal to the number of impulses tending towards the place of greater concentration (towards the left), because the water molecules are in a permanent condition of irregular motion, whereby the number of molecules moving in all directions (if sufficiently great) is approximately the same.  But if each permanganate molecule receives as many impulses to the left as to the right, then what about the law of the uniform distribution of soluble substances, which is possible only provided that many more permanganate molecules move from left to right than from right to left?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us mentally divide the water in the vessel into sections. Within the limits of each section the permanganate molecules will be distributed more or less evenly. But the closer to the left a section is, the more permanganate molecules it contains. Each molecule moves both to the right and to the left at a different rate of probability, but since in any two adjacent sections the one on the left always contains more permanganate molecules than the one on its right, more permanganate molecules cross the line from left to right than from right to left. This will go on until the concentration of permanganate in adjacent sections becomes equal, or, rather, approximately equal, for, to obtain an absolutely uniform solution, the number of molecules of both permanganate and water must be infinite. Yet, although the vessel contains but a finite number of molecules, it is still a very great number.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-85|85]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That is why in such experiments, the law takes effect with great precision, deviations being detectable only with the aid of highly sensitive measuring instruments.&lt;br /&gt;
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Seeing that indeterminism and mechanistic determinism lack justification, some philosophers choose the “golden mean”, saying that events may be either necessary or accidental: minor events refer to chance, and major—to necessity. Chance events&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;since they do not spring from necessity—are subject to no laws and are, from this standpoint, nothing short of miracles. As for necessary events, they are conceived as inexorably predetermined, so that all we have to do is go fatalist and, washing our hands of it all, dumbly wait for the blows of fate to fall. This “golden mean” attitude, as we see, combines the vices of both aforementioned views and, besides, leaves it up to anyone to categorise some events as miracles and attribute others to doom.&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, we can neither agree that all events occur by chance nor that all events are inevitable, nor that all events are divided into accidental and necessary. Adherents of these doctrines hold that every event is either absolutely necessary or absolutely fortuitous and that none may be a combination of necessity and chance. In fact, however, every event is a unity of these opposites. How does it come about?&lt;br /&gt;
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The examples we have cited show that individual events occurring in the sphere regulated by a certain law essentially differ from one another. Then what about recurrence? And if there is no recurrence, then what happens to the law? Let us look at price formation involving hundreds of thousands of commodities over scores and hundreds of years. We shall see that, barring extraordinary cases in which regular price formation was prevented by unusual circumstances, the price of a commodity was determined, by and large, by its cost. This holds true of other economic laws as well. Each of them, as Engels pointed out, is valid merely as a tendency, an average. This applies equally to nature. Thus, the tendency for the survival of the fittest recurs in hundreds of thousands of plant and animal species.&lt;br /&gt;
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That nothing recurs in identically the same Shape either in nature or society has already been mentioned in our discussion of the laws of dialectics. Nevertheless the recurrence of some relationships—which is not absolute but approximate—necessarily takes place. That is exactly how necessity expresses itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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Adducing the fact that there is an infinite multitude of possibilities for an isolated event, and that the realisation of one of these possibilities is a deviation from the law, indeterminists say that, so long as an event may deviate from the law to no matter what extent, i.e., contravene it, it means that there simply is no law, and anything whatever may occur. This would be difficult to counter if isolated events could indeed deviate from the law &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;without restriction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The point is, however, that while a law allows numerous possibilities for an isolated event, it also sets a limit to them, drawing the line between what is possible and what is not.&lt;br /&gt;
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Energy imparted on impact by one molecule to another may vary infinitely. But the law sets a limit beyond which this cannot go. A molecule cannot impart more than its own energy.  Individual events can deviate from the law within certain limits, but no event can be in contradiction with the law. That is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each of the vast number of events whose general result is a law constitutes a deviation from the law in one direction or degree or another, and in that sense it is an accident—but an accident by no means uncaused. In this, the law does not fail but is observed: chance is the form in which necessity finds expression. It is only through chance, if anything, that a law Operates, as it circumscribes the area within which straggling may occur. A law is hard to discover precisely because it expresses itself only in terms of its opposite, i.e., deviations from it, because the universal, necessary, recurrent connection it states reveals itself only in isolated contingent events with variable characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;p-p9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:Pictures/10000000000004630000031AFA5615A6C2A7295C.jpg|class=calibre5]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We sometimes come across the following reasoning: with respect to a mass of objects (e.g., molecules in a solution or microparticles in cosmic rays), necessity indeed manifests itself in chance, and the laws are operative on the whole, without determining all that may happen to any one molecule or particle. Yet, in the case of single objects subject to the laws of classical mechanics, pure necessity holds sway, leaving no room for chance. In this instance, the laws are absolutely definitive with respect to each single object. After all, do not the Earth, Mars and other planets repeat absolutely the same movements, exactly defined by the laws of classical mechanics, over thousands of millions of years? Yet, one could think so only as long as measurements were taken with instruments not so very precise. Applying more perfect instruments, 20th-century scientists have established that each revolution of the Earth round its axis is different from the last. The Earth’s movements round the sun are not identical either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examined in detail, the trajectory of any separate object is found to consist of millions of infinitesimal segments, each being a deviation from the regular course. Only their sum conforms to the law. This holds of every individual object. Each of them is the sum of numerous constituents contained in it at a deeper level. In other words, every single object amounts, at a deeper level, to a mass of objects, and the law to which it is subject is the sum of the irregularities occurring in the numerous elements constituting the object. Lenin wrote: “... social science (like science generally) usually deals with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mass&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; phenomena, not with individual cases.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-86|86]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; So, if the distinction between individual and mass objects is relative, so is the distinction between exact laws and such as formulate a certain general tendency. As Lenin put it, ”... law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-87|87]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A dialectical approach to the question is essential to technology as well as science. Electrical engineers, above all, are keenly aware of this, because nothing can be achieved in electronics without a dialectical conception of necessity and chance. In fields other than electrical engineering, too, the old mechanistic view will only do to design simple and crude mechanisms. To attempt to build a machine consisting of numerous more or less independent units and requiring a thousand times more accuracy than any high-precision lathe, in the expectation that everything will proceed in strict conformity to the laws, would be absolutely useless, for it would only need the minutest element to fail for the whole system to fail. The more precise and complex a mechanism, the less reliable it is. Thus, in 1962, the 18-million-dollar US rocket launched towards Venus had to be blown up in flight for no other reason than that a hyphen had been omitted from the computer programme. Recently developed devices are so designed that their elements may go wrong or even break down, but the total behaviour of all elements, nevertheless, ensures correct behaviour of the system as a whole.  Systems of high complexity and precision can be made more reliable only given a dialectical conception of the correlation of necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quantum mechanics, genetics and cybernetics, which developed in the 20th century, have yielded such strong evidence in support of this approach that the majority of leading scientists today have come to share the dialectical view on necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, categories, like all other concepts, are derived from experience and are mental reflections of certain characteristics of the real world. As fresh experience and knowledge are gained, the content of categories is modified and refined. A category reflects the external world correctly only when conceived as a unity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 9. Practice, the Root and Yardstick of Knowledge ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Is the World Cognisable? ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now appropriate to look at the other aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy mentioned at the beginning of this book: Is consciousness capable of truthfully reflecting the material world? Is man capable of discovering the laws governing the development of nature and society, the essential properties and relations of external objects? And if he is, then is his knowledge complete, exhaustive and final or is it only partial? The sum total of the conceptions and doctrines offering answers to these questions constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;epistemology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;episteme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, knowledge, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;logos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, theory, account).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are all familiar with a wide variety of things and possess information the validity of which nobody would ever question. We know how to switch on electricity, solder a can, start a machine or look up a ‘phone number in the directory. This store of information tested by ordinary experience seems to put it beyond all possible doubt that our knowledge is true and authentic. Yet, what may at first sight seem absolutely indisputable very often proves untrue. Relying on their experience, men used to consider the Earth to be flat and stationary and believed that the Sun travelled up and down the sky. The notion of the atoms as the ultimate, non-divisible particles of which the universe is composed had persisted in science until the close of the 19th century. Today, however, every schoolchild knows that the Earth is shaped very nearly like a globe and is rotating round the Sun, and that not only are the atoms divisible, but the atomic nuclei too are divisible, being composed of elementary particles.  Such facts make us wonder if what we know is indeed true and indubitable. Suppose we wake up one day to find it was all wrong, as has happened more than once in science as well as everyday life? Is there a trustworthy method of cognition guaranteed against mistakes? Such doubts arose in philosophers’ minds early in antiquity. Whereas the old Greek materialist philosophers Democritus (c. 460-370 B. C.) and Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) were sure that the world is cognisable and our knowledge gives us a true idea of things and events, Cratylus, already referred to above, asserted that the world cannot be cognised because things change too quickly to be known.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, we find in the history of philosophy arguments both for and against the possibility of knowing the world. Therefore, it is not a question of filing isolated facts but rather of analysing the substance of cognition and ascertaining its main characteristics and objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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Different philosophical schools exercise different approaches to the problem of the world’s cognisability and offer different solutions. To understand the epistemology of dialectical materialism more thoroughly, one must have at least a general idea of the epistemological conceptions of its forerunners, as dialectical materialism did not spring out of nothing but is the result of a critical comprehension of the epistemological doctrines whose shortcomings and weak points were exposed in the course of history, thanks to the strides made by science, technology and other forms of human activity.  Dialectical materialism has, at the same time, absorbed all that was valuable in the conclusions about the nature, principles and yardsticks of knowledge evolved by the preceding philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Agnostic Epistemology ====&lt;br /&gt;
The doctrine which asserts that it is impossible to know the universe was called agnosticism (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;agnostos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, unknown, unknowable).  Accepting sense-perceptions to be the source of all knowledge, agnostics reason roughly as follows: so far as our sense-perceptions are consistent with reality, our knowledge is true; but so far as they are not at all like the objects as they are by themselves, outside sense-perception, it is false. But may we compare our perceptions of an object with the object itself? The English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) had this to say about it: “The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-88|88]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly, then, we have nothing with which to compare our perceptions, we have no means of verifying whether what they tell us is consistent with reality. Therefore we cannot say if they are true reflections of objects or if they are a fiction. It is possible that there are external objects endowed with the qualities such as we perceive. But it is quite possible also that nothing of the kind really exists. This, in agnostics’ view, is a problem men cannot solve.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you may remember, Hume’s predecessor George Berkeley, the subjective idealist, also considered sensations to be the sole source of human knowledge. But while he held that all external objects are merely combinations of sensations, he simultaneously accepted the existence of god, whose being is independent of sensation. Berkeley was inconsistent on this point and contradicted himself as he claimed that the source of sensation (god) exists independently of the latter. Hume differs from Berkeley in following up more consistently the idea that sensations are the sole source of knowledge and denying the existence of god—although he was, of course, an idealist. This aspect of Hume’s agnosticism at first appealed to some scientists because it was spearheaded against theology. Nevertheless, the more clearsighted of them soon saw that agnosticism conflicts with science, for the chief aim of science is to know reality, and consistent agnosticism leads to a denial of the very possibility of knowing the objective world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Ordinary experience—whether individual or general—tells us that sensations are indeed the source of our knowledge of the external world.  Most of what we learn in everyday life or in experimental science is based precisely on sense-perceptions. Both materialists and agnostics agree on this point. They begin to differ when it comes to the question of the role of sensations in cognition, and of their origin. The materialists maintain that sensations transmit and process information received by the brain from the environment. The agnostics deny that the material world exists and so deny the possibility of cognition. But that is not all. As they reduce all knowledge to sense-perception, the agnostics are unable to explain how certain ideas and concepts, irreducible to sensuous images and sensations, arise in man’s consciousness and especially in the system of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Agnosticism as an independent trend emerged when experimental natural sciences and mathematics made rapid strides, i.e., it is of recent origin. It coincided in particular with the period of high development of mathematical analysis, higher algebra, and so on. These branches of mathematics employ concepts like infinity, function, the infinitesimal, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;-space vector, etc., which cannot be constructed from or reduced to sensations. They are, nonetheless, conclusively established scientific realities, of practical as well as theoretical importance.  This fact spotlighted the deficiencies of agnosticism which was unable to explain the origin and significance of many basic concepts current in modern science.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Rationalism and Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
Development of the theory of knowledge was appreciably influenced by philosophical rationalism (Lat. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ratio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reason). Assigning a subordinate role to sense-perceptions, rationalists held that the ultimate goal of cognition, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., the discovery of laws and basic qualities and relationships of objects, can be attained only by reason, on the ground of logical reasoning alone. However, every discourse must have a beginning, a starting point.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a starting point must be provided by certain major premises, “axioms” or “principles&amp;amp;quot; relating to the universe or its individual parts. But where do they spring from? Where do the laws and rules of logic spring from, which enable us gradually to deduce from the principles all valid knowledge? Adherents of religious rationalism believed that divine providence imparts them to philosophers and scientists at its will. Atheist rationalists, on the Other hand, maintained that the principles, axioms and laws may be discovered by thinkers who, by continually training their minds, become capable of conceiving by intuition all the necessary initial judgements which must be clear, definite and indisputable. Human reason is the highest authority, and once it finds no discrepancies in the concepts and theories of its making, there can be no better proof of their validity. This line of reasoning unmistakably reveals the influence of mathematics, especially of geometry. It was no coincidence that Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher, one of the founders of rationalism, was also the father of analytic geometry.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is known, Euclidean geometry was considered for centuries the model of logical arrangement of scientific material. What many thinkers found especially praiseworthy about Euclidean geometry was that it begins with the postulation of a limited number of axiomatic, i.e., supposedly self-evident, truths, from which, step by step, in accordance with the rules of logic and by rigorous demonstration, theorems are derived one after another. Rationalists, who put it above all that knowledge should be perfectly logical, made the axiomatic method their ideal.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, putting divine revelation aside, where do we take axioms from? Why is our intuition capable of furnishing distinct and clear knowledge of the real world, and how can we ascertain the connection between the immediate consequences of the axioms and the material objects, if sense-perceptions should be an unreliable source of information? Rationalism could supply no answer to these questions. It received a severe blow from science in the 19th century, when three mathematicians, Lobachevsky, Riemann and Bolyai, each independently showed that Euclid’s “axiom of parallels” (the fifth postulate of Euclidean geometry) was not self-evident and could be replaced. In the process, non-Euclidean geometries were developed, distinct and at the same time logically consistent.  Recently, especially after the discovery of the theory of relativity and numerous experiments, including those made possible by space flights, it has been shown that non-Euclidean geometries furnish a much clearer and truthful idea of the external world, compared with Euclid’s geometry. Thus the doctrine of rationalism which managed to explain some facts of scientific, above all, mathematical, knowledge, failed to grasp the connection between scientific laws and cognitive activity, on the one hand, and material phenomena, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Theory of Knowledge in Classical Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we saw, neither the agnostics nor the rationalists were able to provide a coherent theory of knowledge. By exaggerating the significance either of sense-perception or of reason and opposing them to each other, they lost sight of the fact that both sensory perception and reason are combined in the act of cognition. For example, a physicist watching (i.e., perceiving by sight) oscillations of the pointer on the scale of the measuring instrument, correlates them with changes in the electromagnetic field. He thus combines in one process logical inference and visual perception. Those, however, who divorce mind from reality and draw the line between the logical and sensuous aspects of the process of cognition oversimplify it, distorting the real, complex nature of cognitive activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant, the founder of German classical idealism, attempted to overcome the conflict of agnosticism and rationalism, bringing the theory of knowledge into line with the results of contemporary natural science and mathematics.  The natural sciences rely, of course, on observation and experiments. But, knowledge thus obtained grasps merely the changing and contingent external aspect of things. Behind things as we know them, or “phenomena” in Kant’s language, are concealed objectively existing material things, or “things-in-themselves&amp;amp;quot;.  Things-in-themselves generate phenomena. But between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself there is a gulf. We perceive the former through sensuous experience while the latter may be only apprehended by the mind. The mind itself moulds &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; categories, i.e., categories not derived from experience. There are twelve categories, including necessity, causality, etc. They play the main part in the formulation of scientific laws. Thus, according to Kant, sense-perception gives us no knowledge of things-in-themselves and leaves it open to question how we know that they exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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As was already mentioned, Kant also conceived time and space as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. These serve to bring into a system the empirical knowledge derived from sensuous experience. Kant is, however, unable to explain how and why the categories and other &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms may generally be applied to sense materials and what information the latter supply concerning the things-in-themselves, which are unknowable in principle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s philosophy is self-contradictory. On the one hand, making a concession to natural science, Kant acknowledged the existence of objective things-in-themselves and considered them to be the source of sensations. On the other, striving to pursue consistently the principles of rationalism, he denied that sensations and sense-perceptions provide a truthful enough reflection of the objective world and assigned the decisive role to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. Pointing out this contradiction in Kantian epistemology, the German philosopher Jacobi wrote that there was no entering Kant&#039;s Philosophy without the thing-in-itself, but to remain within that philosophy with the thing-in-itself was equally impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel, the noted German philosopher and exponent of the dialectical method, who strove to overcome the contradictions of Kantian philosophy and make it more consistent, finally rid the theory of knowledge of German Classical idealism of the thing-in-itself, throwing out, in the process, the elements of natural-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;cientific materialism. According to Hegel, human knowledge is continually developing, being driven by internal contradictions. The world is cognisable, but the deeper thought penetrates into the secrets of being, the clearer it becomes that, through the process of cognition, the Absolute Idea reveals its own objective laws in the real world. It turns out that to know the world is to know its spiritual, ideal essence. Although Hegel made a great contribution to the doctrine of the active and dialectical nature of human knowledge, his theory of knowledge was thoroughly idealistic and therefore met with disapproval from experimental natural science. Besides, Hegel was not always abreast of contemporary physics and mathematics, and his conclusions on the laws governing the development of nature were often at odds with the conceptions advanced by the greatest scientists of the 19th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealist philosophers failed to evolve a theory of knowledge matching the needs and results of theoretical and experimental natural science.  This was not done by the materialist philosophers either, many of whom were eminent thinkers. Despite the considerable popularity and the influence it exerted on science and culture, pre-Marxian materialism, too, was not free from some shortcomings vis-a-vis the conception of the cognitive process.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Theory of Knowledge in Metaphysical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 17th, 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, natural science pursued its inquiries by mechanistic methods. It was to this that the theory of knowledge evolved by metaphysical materialists owed its main characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The crucial principle on which this theory rested was that man is capable of forming a more or less correct idea of and cognising the external world. The basis of knowledge, the means of communication, as it were, between man and reality, are sense-perceptions. The sense-perceptions are images, ‘copies’, mirroring the external world. This view on the significance of sense-perceptions to the process of knowing was not merely expressive of the common-sense attitude naturally shared by every normal person, but was the earmark of contemporary natural science in general. It was this conception of sense-perception that subjective idealists and agnostics attacked with particular vehemence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The weak point in the theory of knowledge of metaphysical materialism was that it overemphasised passive contemplation, i.e., observation of objects, with no attempt to change them.  The contemplative character of pre-Marxian materialism was due to the generalisation of the principle current in natural science that the scientist’s role is, above all, to observe nature, not to alter it. This principle fitted that comparatively early stage in the history of experimental science where it accumulated facts, systematising and classifying them. Certainly, over the 17th-19th centuries, experimental methods involving an active influence on things examined kept improving and developing. But, exponents of metaphysical materialism still failed to grasp their full significance. Passive contemplation and underestimation of the active role of cognition were also due to the fact that metaphysical materialists underrated the importance of analysing the objective laws of thought.  And that, Marx noted, was the weakest point of the previous forms of materialism. Metaphysical materialists viewed cognition as passive observation of, rather than active intervention in, nature and society. The fact is, however, that genuine scientific knowledge becomes available only in the course of remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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While they acknowledged that our notions and sensations are images of material things and events, metaphysical materialists failed to explain the principles underlying the development of thought. They could not say how and why knowledge underwent change, as  they believed its basic methods and forms to be stable and immutable. It was this that rendered their doctrine vulnerable and incapable of answering many of the questions posed by the development of society and science. It was therefore necessary to evolve a fundamentally different approach to the problems associated with the investigation of men’s cognitive activity. This need was answered by the theory of knowledge advanced by dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Cognitive Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
For centuries, men wondered how celestial bodies had originated and what directed their movement, paying particular attention to the Earth’s natural satellite, the Moon. After the telescope was invented and men began to use intricate astronomical instruments, employing astrophotography, radar, etc., they learned a great deal about the Moon. All this information was the result of numerous observations. Even so, until quite recently astronomers and astro-physicists could give no adequate answers as to how the Moon originated, what its invisible side was like, whether the Moon‘s surface was hard or friable, and what was the origin of the lunar craters and “seas&amp;amp;quot;. By obtaining answers to these questions, men would be able to unravel many secrets of nature and form a clearer idea of the history of the solar system. Scientists advanced numerous hypotheses explaining more or less plausibly different facts. On every substantial point, several hypotheses were advanced, and for a long time it could not be decided which of them was correct. The French 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte, for instance, positively asserted that the reverse side of the Moon would ever remain a mystery to men. Nevertheless, the artificial satellites which made pictures of the Moon’s far side, as well as the exploration of the lunar topography by Moon robots and astronauts who brought back samples of moon rock made it possible to supply exact answers to the above questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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In considering this, we must note the following basic points. First, that observation, whether by means of the senses or instruments, is essential to knowing an object. Second, that men can cognise the essential properties of a thing and the laws governing it only by dynamically interacting with the phenomena under investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To observe external phenomena without intervening in their vital functions, without interacting with the processes examined, is to engage in passive contemplation. We can only derive some information about things and events from this but we learn nothing about their more intimate connections, basic qualities and relations.  Contemplating a tree, we can describe the colour and shape of its leaves, the shape of its crown, the peculiar qualities of its bark, the kind of soil its species prefer, and so on. However, to determine how old a tree is from the number of rings visible in the cross section of its trunk, we have to saw it up. To find out how plant cells are built or how biochemical reactions proceed in them, we have to use a microscope and chemical reagents. We have to create artificial surroundings for the tree or its parts, keeping it in the dark or in an atmosphere devoid of carbon dioxide or planting it in soil artificially deprived of one or another of the nutrients usually present in the soil, and so on.  We shall have to subject the tree to still more complex operations in order to find out the degree of hardness or pliability or the chemical composition of the timber; this means bending, breaking, applying chemicals to different portions of the trunk, the roots, branches and leaves dozens of times. This active interaction with the object is described as experimentation. We learn from the latter what we cannot possibly learn from passive contemplation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at the following conclusion: The cognitive act includes (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;object of cognition&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; (2) experimentation or man&#039;s action on the object performed with the aid of instruments, tools, etc.; and (3) &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a reflection of the object’s qualities and distinctive properties, discovered during experimentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now define the crucial difference between the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism and those of the previous philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever those systems were—materialist or idealist&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they all described the cognitive act as a dichotomy, or two-fold relation, of the objects concerned and knowledge. Experimentation, i.e., man’s active influence on the objects cognised, was disregarded. That is why both the materialist and the idealist philosophers failed to find an effective method to justify their solutions concerning the world’s cognisability. In other words, the previous philosophical systems lacked a yardstick by which their philosophical positions could be verified.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical materialism approached theory of knowledge from an entirely different standpoint, shifting the emphasis to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective yardstick&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of knowledge. Unlike the agnostics and the Kantians, the dialectical materialists affirmed that the world was cognisable. Rather than reason about how far sensations, representations and conceptions are consistent with the things-in-themselves they reflect, dialectical materialism concentrates on finding out how sensations, representations and conceptions appear and how knowledge contained in them enables man to act and find his bearings in the surroundings and so shape them to his needs. Engels wrote: “If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, ... making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable ‘thing-in-itself’.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-89|89]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The soft landing and recovery of the lunar probes, the long excursion of the lunar mobile laboratory, the successful manned flights to the Moon all verify our knowledge on the structure of the Moon’s surface. Artificial synthesis of a gene of yeast, accomplished in 1970, substantiates our knowledge of the physicochemical structure of genes, i.e., biological units of heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the cardinal position of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is this: Cognition of the external world stems from experimentation carried out by man with the aid of tools, instruments and other devices. If our knowledge of the most essential properties of the things involved in these experiments helps us to reproduce or produce certain material objects or work certain desirable changes, then it is regarded as valid.&lt;br /&gt;
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The experimentation in question is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;praxis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, doing, action). Let us now consider the characteristics and structure of practice, and the part it plays in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. The Basis and Yardstick of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
Practice is a word of many meanings. For undergraduates to have practice means to receive practical training (e.g., teaching practice) in the authentic working conditions of their chosen profession. For a doctor to have a large practice means to be sought after by patients. Now the philosophical conception of practice has a particular meaning of its own.&lt;br /&gt;
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Man is in contact with very many phenomena relating to nature, society and thought. To be able to find his bearings and act in the complex conditions of modern society, for instance, he must know the laws governing the development of society. Obviously, unlike natural objects, social formations, the class struggle, the development of culture cannot be studied with the aid of tools or instruments. Does it not mean perhaps that practice which we have only just described as the basis and yardstick of knowledge fails as soon as we come to more complex cognitive acts?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us not jump to conclusions. As a matter of fact, work and practice in general are social phenomena. In order to carry them out, men have to associate, maintaining some form of self-organisation, exchanging information, storing, passing on and extending experience.  Therefore we shall conceive practice, or, more broadly, social and production practice, as the sum total of processes and actions arising from man‘s purposeful influence upon objects, and shaping the conditions for this activity and its development. In this sense, the class struggle in antagonistic class society is a crucial element of social and production practice, for it springs from the development of productive forces and relations of production, and its progress and results are decisive for the advance of social production. During the class struggle, not only are various political doctrines advanced, but we also see how faithfully they express the interests of particular classes, how far their professed goals are consistent with the society&#039;s need to develop, and to what extent their proposed forms and methods of struggle are effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now divide man‘s entire activity into two closely associated kinds of activity—objective and subjective. Objective activity embraces the whole of man’s social and production practice, as it is carried on on the basis of laws which are independent of men’s subjective intentions and will. It is impossible, for instance, to forge water with a forging press or drive in nails with a turbo-drill designed for sinking holes in the ground. It is impossible to abolish class struggle in a society which rests on private ownership. In interacting with nature in the process of his productive labour activity, man relies first of all on the objective properties of the things and implements he has to deal with.  Of course, man sets himself a goal consciously and is conscious of his actions, but the main and decisive role belongs to the objective circumstances and the laws to which such actions are subject independently of man’s will and consciousness. The founders of dialectical materialism pointed out that initially the subjective, i.e., cognitive, activity is intertwined with the objective, practical activity. Only at a comparatively later stage of development does it become detached from the latter. In comparing the mode of thinking of a savage and of a child it is easy to see that the simplest habits of thought, the ability to observe and establish similarity or difference result from the handling of material objects. One must not assume, however, that it is enough to appeal to practice to have all the intricate problems of cognition finally solved. The desire to get final, immutable answers to all questions that may arise in science or everyday life is characteristic of the metaphysical approach to knowledge. Some of these answers seem to us indisputable and are indeed worth following within the limited sphere of everyday life, being sound common sense. “Only,” Engels remarks, “sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-90|90]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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The very way in which our knowledge undergoes change depends on the forms of practice. Wherever practice is stable, certain actions tending to be repeated over decades or even centuries, knowledge derived from it similarly appears to be stable and immutable. But as soon as any serious changes occur in practical activity, knowledge associated with them begins to change rapidly. Generally speaking, practice is extremely varied, there is an element of uncertainty in it, it possesses so wide a range of qualities, characteristics and individual features that it is actually impossible for us to know them once and for all. It is this uncertainty, mutability and mobility of practice that is a crucial factor in knowledge. Practice, Lenin said, is so indefinite that it won&#039;t let our knowledge ever stand still. But can it, then, be the yardstick of knowledge? We know that by carrying to its utmost limit the assertion about the changeability and mobility of external objects some philosophers arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to cognise the world because things change more quickly than they can be judged and described. Nevertheless, nothing disproves the idealist view on cognition better than practice, in which actions repeated scores and hundreds of times produce more or less similar results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that hundreds of artificial Earth satellites, for example, are moving round the Earth in scheduled orbits, that Moon probes land in a definite spot time and again proves best of all that practice, be it production activity or scientific experiment, serves to discover stable, recurrent characteristics and properties of material things and to derive true knowledge of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, we can draw the following three conclusions: (1) practice is the objective basis of cognition and simultaneously the yardstick showing to what extent knowledge of this or that thing is far-reaching and true; (2) practice is mobile, indefinite and changeable enough to prevent knowledge from freezing up, and is the chief factor in the progress of knowledge; (3) practice is definite enough to separate true from false knowledge, the materialist from the idealist approach, and to affirm the truth of the materialist theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §8. Knowledge and Truth ====&lt;br /&gt;
Knowing is a process in which subjective operations and procedures of thought are closely linked with objective experiments and forms of activity. Knowledge which is the product of this process bears the imprint of these interrelated aspects. Therefore, it is very important to ascertain what in our knowledge depends on objective, and what on subjective, factors.  Turning to the history of science, we may trace the development, for instance, of our knowledge of the cosmic bodies comprising the solar system, and in particular, the Moon. The rudimentary knowledge preserved since hoary antiquity appears, on closer examination, to consist of two different parts. Some of it depends on the structure of man’s sense-organs (e.g., the eye), on the place from which the observation is made, on the observer&#039;s skill, diligence, power of concentration, and so on. And some of it—this is the second part—depends neither on an individual person nor on mankind in general.  The fact that on different days of the month the Moon appears sometimes as a disk and sometimes as a sickle, depends partly on the observers position and partly on the objective position of the Moon and the Sun. However, the Shape of the Moon and the rate at which it revolves round the Earth, or the chemical composition of Moon rocks in no way depend on the observer’s position.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the means of observation are improved, Optical telescopes being replaced by radio telescopes, radars, lasers and space laboratories, our knowledge of the Moon is becoming more and more complex and varied. Simultaneously, that part of knowledge which does not depend either on the individual or on mankind in general but is determined by the objective factors accounts for a greater share of our knowledge of the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can we claim, however, that at some stage we have either attained or will attain a level of knowledge at which it will depend a hundred per cent on the objective factors, no longer containing anything dependent on man?&lt;br /&gt;
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The nature of the bulk of information available to modern science depends not only on the object investigated but also on the diverse instruments enabling the investigator and the object to interact. Although all such means of obtaining knowledge exist objectively, they are created by men and so must, to some extent, depend on the subjective factor. Moreover, we cannot exclude from the cognitive act the human brain, the nervous system, the observer&#039;s skill, capacity, the acuteness of his senses, and so on. Therefore, although that part of knowledge which does not depend on man tends to increase, the subjective element still remains, to a greater or lesser degree. The purpose of science is to increase continually the volume of that part of our knowledge which reflects the basic characteristics, properties and relations of objects and which does not depend on the individual man or mankind in general. Lenin defined this part of knowledge as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see from the above example one of the main characteristics of objective truth. It is that objective truth keeps changing, developing and increasing. Ancient philosophers, who gave much attention to astronomy, were fairly well informed about the planets as can be seen from the lunar calendars compiled in the remote past, records of the dark areas found on the bright lunar disk, the ability to calculate the periods of full Moon and to forecast eclipses of the Sun. All these are obvious elements of objective truth. Still, their proportion in the mass of fantastic mythological descriptions of the Moon was exceedingly small. Since the invention of the telescope three and a half centuries ago, the volume of objective information about the Earth’s natural satellite has been growing incessantly.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that at every single stage in the history of knowledge, objective truth ascended a step higher, ousting the subjective elements more and more. These stages in the development of objective truth are known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relative truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or the relative form of objective truth).&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, objective truth, influenced by Practical activity which keeps developing and becoming more complex, also continually develops and cannot be final, complete and immutable. On the contrary, it appears as a succession of relative truths concerning an object, each Successive stage in the development of truth being fuller and more far-reaching than the Preceding one. Lenin described this process as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectics of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Unlike Kant and his followers who held that the phenomena and the things-in-themselves were divided by a gulf dialectical materialist epistemology regards cognition as a succession of interconnected acts of arriving at relative truths which contain objective information about things, their properties and internal interrelations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can a process like that result in exhaustive, all-embracing knowledge of objects? If we recall that the material world and even individual fragments of it possess a practically endless number of properties, connections and relations, it will be obvious to us that to attain complete and ultimate knowledge embracing every aspect of the thing we study is impossible. This is all the more true as the things round us keep developing and changing, thus taking on new properties and new connections. Living organisms consisting of thousands of millions of interacting cells, economic systems comprising hundreds of enterprises, millions of workers, hundreds of thousands of machines and other tools for manufacturing different goods, are so complex that to know everything about them is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, full, exhaustive knowledge, also described as absolute truth, may be achieved only with respect to very simple objects, with relatively few constituents and connections. We find such objects in mathematics, for example, but even there a great deal of abstraction and restriction is needed to enable one to describe something as ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if we say that ultimate truth is unattainable, do we not thereby deny its objectivity?  Does it mean that the agnostics, who deny that the world is cognisable, are right? Such assumptions can hardly find justification. If we approach cognition dialectically, not as something that must have an end, but as incessant extension of our knowledge of the external world, we shall have to agree that the world is cognisable, not in the sense that we may cognise it once and for all, but rather that we can keep adding to and expanding the relative truths available to us, verifying and refining upon them with the help of practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, absolute truth and relative truth are, as it were, two forms of objective truth, while absolute truth itself may be regarded as the result of an endless succession of relative truths Superseding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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This ends our brief exposition of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. Having Surmounted the metaphysical opposition of sen&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;uous and rational knowledge, dialectical materialism posed in a new way, and, moreover, solved in a new way, the question of the world’s Cognisability. Knowledge was discussed for the first time in terms of social and production Practice as the basis and yardstick of the world’s cognisability. It made possible a new understanding of the relationship formed by sense-perception and logical thought in the process of cognitive activity. New light was thrown on a whole range of complex problems associated with the modern forms and methods of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 10. The Dialectical Path to Truth ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Origin of Sensation ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have been introduced to the principles of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.  Now we shall examine how cognition proceeds, the stages it passes through, how these are connected and the part they play in our knowledge of the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;amp;quot;... Suddenly ... I saw very clearly a quick and blinding black lightning . . . ,&amp;amp;quot; says one of Kuprin’s characters. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; still cannot understand the reason for that phenomenon. Was it an error of sight strained by the incessant play of lightning or was it an accidental disposition of the clouds, or was it some peculiarity of that nasty boggy depression?”&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar, if not quite so extraordinary, incidents occur to everyone. Our visual, auditory, tactile and other similar impressions usually permit us to adjust, yet often we do not trust them because impressions of this kind may occasionally be deceptive. Often the weather is cold for one person and hot for another. The surface that seems perfectly smooth to one person seems rough to another. Facts of this kind were often cited as evidence that our sense organs are unreliable and the sensations for which they are responsible, far from reflecting the properties of things, generally cannot be used as proof that the real world exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now what is sensation? How does it depend on the sense organs, and what produces it? In speaking of sensation we have to distinguish between two meanings of this term. Firstly, sensation may mean the interaction of the sense organs and the environment and the material process of transmission of information from one part of the nervous system to another. Secondly, this term is used to describe the result of the above-mentioned process, i.e., the image arising in the brain, which is already a fact of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for example, man’s visual perceptions which supply almost 90 per cent of all the external information he receives.&lt;br /&gt;
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Light falling on an object is partly absorbed and partly reflected and so received by the eye.  Light consists of electromagnetic waves of different length, and which of them will be reflected and which absorbed by the object depends on the physicochemical nature of the object’s surface. Hence, the very character of the waves that are reflected already contains unidentified information about the nature of the object. The first conversion of the light rays received by the eye occurs when they are refracted in passing through the transparent covering of the eye.  Then they are focused by the lens of the eye upon the retina. There, in accordance with the laws of geometrical optics, an image of the object is formed. The geometrical image is like one we can see on the opaque glass plate at the back wall of a photographer’s camera. A chemical procedure developed at the close of the 19th century has made it possible to fix the visual image formed on the retina, so that now we know that the image differs in many respects from the object. First, the image is flat (two-dimensional) while all material objects are three-dimensional. Second, it is much smaller than the object and is symmetrically inverted.  Third, the image formed on the retina only shows those details of the object which are big enough. This depends on how the object is lighted, as well as on its size and the distance between it and the eye.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that the image on the retina is a natural reflection which depends on the physical nature of the object, the eye and the light.  How does it initiate the sensation of vision?  The light waves reaching the retina start complex chemical and biochemical reactions in the cells, which serve, in fact, to code the information received by the eye. Every signal coming from without produces a definite bio-electrical impulse. When these reach the cells of a particular area in the brain, viz., the optic centre, a new transformation takes place there. It is decoding which initiates visual perception.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the process whereby visual perceptions are produced is of a material nature. It results from the interaction of such material systems as light waves and man’s optic system. It is a highly complex process including a range of successive transformations, whereby some kinds of energy are converted into some other kinds.  Nevertheless in all such transformations the principle is observed that every species of external stimuli is attended by definite and distinctive visual images. That is not all, however. Let us recall, for instance, the fact, already referred to, that all images formed on the retina are inverted. Yet everybody knows from experience that we do not see things upside down. It appears that the brain not only perceives images but actively intervenes in the process of perception. The optic centre in the brain adjusts the images consistently with man’s individual and social experience, on the basis of knowledge derived from social practice. Thus, while knowledge emerges on the basis of sensations, the latter form under the influence of knowledge previously acquired and confirmed by practice.  This is corroborated by the following experiment. A person puts on a contrivance which inverts al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; visible objects. In a dark room, against a black background, a candle is placed on an invisible support, which the person sees inverted, with the wick at the bottom. But when the candle is lighted, it is immediately perceived as being in a normal position. Why? We know from experience that a flame always points upwards, and so the brain automatically corrects the “mistake” of the experimental apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we see that visual perceptions, as a fact of consciousness, are far from simple. They must be related to the external world, but they do not simply mirror it. On the one hand, we cannot do without sensations, because with their help we receive sensuous images of the objects around us. On the other hand, we cannot fully rely on sensations as they often produce illusions, erroneous representations, and images conflicting partly or completely with experience and experiment. How do we overcome this contradiction? How far are sense-perceptions to be trusted and what part do they play in cognition?&lt;br /&gt;
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Before these questions can be answered, we must find out more exactly the extent to which sensations depend on the external object and on the percipient subject.&lt;br /&gt;
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The organs of vision in man and animals are, of course, rather different. This tells on both &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;v&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isual sensations and resultant images. Under normal daylight modern man can distinguish several hundred basic colours and hues. At the same time, some animals, e.g., dogs, perceive objects only in black and white, distinguishing them by the intensity of the greys. Bees do not perceive red. They perceive only yellow, blue and violet and also ultraviolet rays. Consequently, other things being equal, one and the same object will be perceived differently by different optic systems, causing different sensations in them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Organs of vision, like other sense organs, appeared and developed during biological evolution. They helped living organisms adjust to the environment and were important factors in the struggle for survival. As the conditions of life affecting the different organisms inhabiting the Earth vary a great deal, the sense organs are very diverse. The “ultraviolet” vision of the bee, whose active life occurs in bright sunlight, enables it to receive a maximum of biologically useful information. That kind of vision would not do for rattlesnakes which are nocturnal animals. Therefore in their evolution they developed a special kind of “heat” vision. Snakes have several thousand nerve cells, located in small indentations just below the eyes, capable of perceiving infrared rays. This enables them, in absolute darkness, to hunt warm-blooded animals whose body temperature is at least a few degrees higher than the outside temperature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus sensation depends on the sense organs as well as on the nature of the object and conditions of perception. A sensation is an image of the objects which produce it. At the same time, it is a subjective image which depends not only on what is perceived and under what conditions, but also on the percipient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The cognising brain and the sense organs supplying information to it are not simply objects of external influence. Recognising the active interaction of the subject and object of cognition is the cornerstone of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. It is in this interrelation that the sense organs supplement and correct one another making it possible to form the necessary images of the external world we are to live in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike animals, whose activity is almost entirely determined by heredity which leaves comparatively little room for the development of individual habits, men have evolved, over hundreds of thousands of years, an immense capacity for adjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside society, the development of specifically human acts, including cognitive acts, proves to be impossible. A little child can perceive different colours and geometrical images of objects, but it develops the idea of distance, size, etc., only in the process of active movement in space, assisted by adults.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ability to make out colours, shape and distance is formed as a result of personal experience associated with sustained activity.  However, the character of sensations does not depend on individual experience alone but on culture as a whole, the level of society&#039;s development, and the social system to which the individual belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus a comparison of modern and of some historically retarded peoples’ spatial perception of things shows that the latter lack a perception of linear perspective. This fact does not depend on any national or racial characteristics but solely on the level of social production and living and cultural standards at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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To sum up. Sensations depend on (1) the properties and particular characteristics of material objects; (2) the conditions under which they act upon the sense organs; (3) the organisation and condition of the perceiving system, including the brain; (4) previous individual experience and knowledge; (5) the cultural level of society; (6) the character of practical activity carried out during perception. Consequently, sensations are images which, besides having the qualities and characteristics of the objects perceived, also bear the imprint of numerous other factors.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how do sensations pass into forms of knowledge which reflect and fix, more or less “purely”, the relations characteristic of real objects?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. The Significance of Language for Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
When two persons look at or touch the same object or hear the same tune they form certain sensuous images. In order to co-operate in production, in social and home life, people have to inform each other about what they have seen and heard, share their impressions and store and communicate varied knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sensations and the visual images based on them contain a certain amount of information about the surroundings. But we cannot pass &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n sensations, ‘extracting’ them from one head and putting them into another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how is information transmitted in human society? What means of storing knowledge do men possess? It is language. Language is the means of transmitting and storing knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sense organs enable us to perceive material things. Using telescopes we can look at faraway heavenly bodies. With the aid of an oscillograph or a photographic plate one can see the trace made by an elementary particle.  But we cannot see or touch thought. After all thought is ideal in form. Man’s thought is not only the result of social progress. Mastering the immense wealth of thought, the treasures of science and culture, is a prerequisite of the further progress of mankind and the basis of allround development of the individual. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;,” Marx and Engels wrote, “is the immediate actuality of thought.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-91|91]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; They pointed out that thought, which is ideal in nature, finds its sole material expression in language, thanks to which it can be perceived by men. It is just because language is the material vehicle of thought that it is able to play a twofold role, being simultaneously the means of communication and of knowing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Language is a distinct sign system. Think of what is round you, look at the ordinary household things, look at what you come across in the street and at work, and what will you see?  You will see that the world is full of signs and systems of signs.&lt;br /&gt;
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The striped barrier by the railway crossing is not just a pole painted black and white&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it is a sign telling you to stop. A wedding ring or a white smock are not just a piece of metal or an article of clothing respectively, but signs of being married or belonging to the medical profession. Insofar as things not only serve a useful function in industry or in the home but communicate information, they are signs. Any sensible material object capable of communicating information is a sign. In this sense, signs are some times described as substitutes for other objects. Things other than those created by man can also be signs. The imprint left by a prehistoric reptile in a limestone block or the smoke rising over a distant wood are instances of so-called natural signs. The former is evidence of an extinct animal and the latter of a bonfire or a forest fire. A natural sign is the result of the interaction of two or more material objects, e.g., of the prehistoric animal and calcareous rock. They have a number of disadvantages which make them inconvenient for use in communicating and producing knowledge in human society. They are often impossible to transmit or store or reproduce perfectly (cf. the smoke or the rock just referred to). Besides, the information they communicate is about a single event. To describe a class of animals with the help of natural signs would take a thousand, perhaps a million, such signs. Even so, the description would be incomplete since all impressions left by an animal are bound to leave out of account many of its characteristics, traits, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a certain likeness between natural and manmade signs based on a similarity between the sign and the thing it stands for, e.g., a portrait, drawing, map or the plan of a machine or a building. These signs do not result from the immediate interaction of different material objects. They are made by people with the aid of implements. They are highly conventionalised. Quite perceptible in a portrait, it becomes paramount in an architectural plan or mechanical diagram. But, however conventionalised, there is a certain similarity between the signs of the kind described (i.e., a diagram of a lathe or a map) and the objects designated.  Soviet cosmonauts who circled the Earth many times confirmed that the continents’ outlines were like their representations on maps. Yet as we pass from a portrait to a map and from that to a technical drawing, the measure of conventionality increases. This makes it possible to designate aggregates rather than individual objects. This reveals an important characteristic of signs, viz., the more conventionalised a sign is, the more general it becomes thus making the number of objects it can designate greater. Nevertheless, the generalising capacity of this kind of sign is limited, because it must, to some extent at least, look like the object designated, in terms of geometrical form or colour or material or whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the distinctive features of human language is that it has none of the limitations of all the other sign systems. In this sense, it is a special sign system. The basic elements of language are words. They are formed from sounds or their combinations and are independent language units. With the emergence of writing systems, people learned to represent words with the help of graphic signs. The sound form, however, has always been the main element in all existing languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Linguistic signs, or words, are material phenomena. They act on our sense organs (the ears) and arouse auditory sensations in us. Yet, unlike other material phenomena, whether natural or manmade, words have no value in themselves but only as a means of producing, communicating and storing information. Words are utterly conventional and can under no circumstances be considered images of material things or events because they reflect neither any of their characteristics nor any of their relations to one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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But does it contradict the assertion that language serves to express and communicate knowledge which is, after all, a reflection of reality? Not at all. These notions are not the least contradictory.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand how language and words take part in reflecting reality (although they do not reflect it in themselves), we must consider more closely what words are. We know that the words of any language are conventional. The properties of words as special material phenomena are in no way connected with the phenomena they name. That is why identical objects or groups of objects are represented by different words in different languages. The totalities of things, events, states, mental experiences, social phenomena, etc., designated by a word, form its meaning. This meaning is not inherent in the word as such but is assigned to it depending on how it is used in practice, in human intercourse.  As language develops along with society, words gradually develop new meanings which usually coexist with the old, or they may come to express entirely different notions (e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, healthy, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, noise, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, a surgical instrument) so that it is not always possible to tell the precise meaning of a separate word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike other manmade signs, words possess an unlimited capacity for expressing general characteristics and relations between objects, just because they are not images but conventional signs (symbols).&lt;br /&gt;
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Every word&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;building&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;electron&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, progress—refers to a larger or smaller aggregate of things, rather than to individual things. Emphasising this distinctive quality of words, Lenin wrote that &amp;amp;quot;every word... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;universalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-92|92]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Natural signs (impressions or traces) convey the individual, singular characteristics of objects, and so are unsuitable to express general features and relationships. Manmade signs (maps, diagrams, etc.) are conventional and so suitable for unqualified generalisation. The words of a language are fully conventional, their capacity to generalise is infinite, yet one can express in them any information about individual objects. This shows the dialectics of the development of sign systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must see how a finite number of words form an infinite number of linguistic expressions which fix pieces of information. Language does not just consist of words. Every language also contains special rules, i.e., grammar. These rules help people make combinations of signs, i.e., assemble words into sentences. Not every sequence of words is a sentence. So that, “The Earth Sun the round revolves” is not a sentence and carries no information. On the other hand “The Earth revolves round the Sun” is a sentence communicating an astronomical fact. People are often unconscious of grammar rules and use them automatically, acquiring the appropriate habits from education and speech communication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Combinability is the thing that makes human language distinct from animal sounds. Animals also use sounds to transmit the simplest information. This ability is for the most part inherited. Even with gregarious animals like some birds, beavers and various mammals the capacity ‘to interact through sounds does not depend on the form of communication. An incubator chicken raised in solitude reacts to the sounds made by hens no worse than the chickens hatched by a hen. Some animals, e.g., dolphins, use several dozen sound signals to express anxiety, to call for aid, indicate the presence of food, challenge an adversary, call for attack.  and so on. Some investigators even talk of a dolphin language.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, neither the dolphins nor any other animals possess language in the sense in which we speak of human language. This is particularly clear from the absence of combinability which enables differentiated sound signals to be assembled into an infinite number of sentences. That is why all information accessible to the animals, which they are capable of passing on to each other, does not go beyond a comparatively limited assortment of sounds.  For this reason, the animals cannot develop the form of intellect which we term human thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasising the significance of language to the progress of knowledge and thought, Lenin wrote: “The senses show reality; thought and word—the universal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-93|93]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Language can express the universal in two senses. In the first place, words and sentences do not designate individual objects, properties and relations, but their totalities. In the second place, language is universal. Unlike sensations, words and sentences may be passed on from one person to another without having their sense and meaning distorted. Though some of the individual, subjective points of knowledge are partly lost, everything which is general and essential, and without which community life and common effort are impossible, is retained.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Abstraction and Concept Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The process by which we pass from sensation to verbal thinking is described as abstraction, and its results as abstractions or concepts. In ordinary life, an “abstraction” is often used to denote something hazy, vague, incoherent, detached from life. There is some reason for it, too. Some abstract notions, divorced from practical activity, are indeed recondite and of little use in everyday life. However, theory of knowledge is interested above all in far-reaching scientific abstractions without which one simply cannot understand the secrets of nature, bring out the true causes of social progress or formulate scientific laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, what are scientific abstractions? Where do they spring from? And what distinguishes profound and true from shallow and false abstractions? Many people think abstractions emerge simply as a result of the isolation of common characteristics of things and events, which are reflected in sensations. From this standpoint, minor or dissimilar features are simply neglected, while the features common to the totality are selected and fixed in the abstraction. The process of abstraction does, indeed, imply discarding what is dissimilar and singling out what is general, but that is far from being all.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for instance, the Scientific abstraction “four-dimensional space&amp;amp;quot;, fundamental to the special theory of relativity which plays a major role in modern physics.&lt;br /&gt;
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We already know that real material space is three-dimensional, and our sense organs, under no circumstances, permit us to discover phenomena such as occur in four-dimensional space. However, we often resort to the concepts of one- and two- as well as three-dimensional space.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see that these concepts are abstractions which result from isolating certain properties and characteristics of real bodies. The concept of a sphere (which is three-dimensional), for instance, is formed when we disregard the differences in the size, colour and material of various spheric bodies and isolate their geometric shape alone as their common characteristic. The linear, or one-dimensional concept is also an abstraction, whereby we neglect the size, geometric shape, etc., of bodies and isolate the distance between them as the sole characteristic.  The concept “two-dimensional space” is also an abstraction. Plane geometric figures (e.g., circles, ellipses, trapeziums and triangles) possess only two dimensions.&lt;br /&gt;
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These abstractions are more or less connected with sensations—sensuous images of objective things and events. We can imagine a sphere, a quadrangular building site, the line between point A and point B, etc., but to see or touch a four-dimensional cube or sphere or imagine an event occurring in four-dimensional space is something we are unable to do. For all that, not only does multi-dimensional geometry exist but there is also a physical theory describing material events with the aid of the abstraction “four-dimensional space”. From this, it follows that there is something in our concepts, in abstractions, which is not immediately present in sensations and which cannot be derived simply by omitting or selecting certain characteristics of the objective world which are fixed in sensation. Then how does correct abstraction proceed?&lt;br /&gt;
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Knowledge is not a mirror reflection of reality. Dialectical materialism, which considers consciousness, thought as secondary, states that once it has emerged, it follows its own laws, being marked by certain specific features. One of them is that the mind is capable of connecting, arranging and unifying elements of sense-perceptions not in the way they are connected or arranged in the immediate sensuous images.  Moreover, as he learned to isolate connections and relations, man improved this capacity, creating and inventing new connections and relations and bringing them together often in the most fanciful ways. That was how mythological and folk-tale monsters of half-men half-horses, ogres, and so on, appeared. Four-dimensional space is the child of scientific imagination. This abstraction was arrived at not by neglecting characteristics of reality but, contrariwise, by magnifying and projecting the old abstractions “two-” and “three-dimensional space.”&lt;br /&gt;
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From this, it follows that the process of abstraction is complex, dialectical, contradictory. Along with comparison, isolation of the general and omission of the particular, it involves imagination, the rearrangement of real connections and constituents. It must be noted that this occurs not only with respect to complex abstractions, like “infinity”, “four-dimensional space”, etc., but also with respect to comparatively simple and familiar concepts, like “circle” or “red colour.” We all learn at school that a circle is a plane closed curve, with all its points equidistant from a particular point in the plane, called the centre. The length of line bounding a circle is called the circumference. The abstractions “circle” and “circumference” result from the generalisation of the geometrical properties of familiar things such as a wheel, a round button, the visible disk of the full Moon, and so on. With the aid of modern grinding machines more and more precise disks can be made, with radii differing by no more than thousandths of a millimetre. The discrete structure of solids makes it, however, generally impossible to turn out a disk with absolutely equal radii. Therefore, strictly speaking, no wooden, stone or metal disk actually answers the geometrical description of a circle, and all we can do in practice is continue to improve precision standards. But if we are unable to beat the barrier erected by nature in practice, we can surmount it in imagination by projecting the process begun in practice beyond what is called the threshold and is fundamental to the formation of abstractions, though we are unconscious of it in everyday life. Comparing a poppy, a ripe tomato and blood, we can form the concept of red, Indeed, there are no real objects that are simply red&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they are always a certain shade of that colour. The concept “red&amp;amp;quot; isolates something general which allows us to apply one name to millions of similarly coloured objects, rather than use a million names.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we can isolate the main stages of abstraction. The first, the formation of the initial totality, consists in isolating a set of things, processes, phenomena, situations, etc. The second, the matching and comparison of the elements of the initial totality, includes two procedures, one to bring out similarity and the other disparity. The purpose of this stage is to isolate certain common properties, connections and relations characteristic of the elements of the given initial totality. The third stage is that of denotation and generalisation. It consists in naming the common characteristic, connection or relation selected at the preceding stage. The given characteristic is invested, so to speak, with linguistic, verbal shape. From this point on, we operate with signs, with all the consequences that this entails. A word or word combination becomes the expositor of the notion. The fourth stage is the threshold and the further determination of content. Certainly, the three last mentioned stages are seldom divided in time and usually proceed simultaneously, interlacing, interacting and supplementing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the content of an abstraction, or concept, is meant the sum of characteristics which may be regarded as the definition of the given concept. Let us recall, for example, the definition of a circle. The sum total of all the elements forms the sense of the concept, while the elements themselves form its meaning or, to put it more precisely, its initial meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the process of abstraction, we pass from the sensuous form of knowledge to abstract, verbal thinking. This transition is always connected with loss of perceivability. It is sometimes said that concepts may be perceivable and non-perceivable, and that one of the most important distinguishing features of modern science, as compared with classical science, consists in the changeover from perceivable to non-perceivable concepts. In truth, however, all concepts are non-perceivable. It is just that some of them are more ordinary and have a rather simple connection with perceivable, sensory representations, and others are less ordinary, with a long series of intermediate abstractions between them and sensuous images. We can easily call up the image of an acquaintance but we are unable to conceive the image of man as such, who is neither a man nor a woman, neither old nor young, neither a European nor an African.  Man as such is an abstraction which is no more perceivable than four-dimensional space or a mathematical infinity. Certainly, the concept “man” is closer to the sensible material phenomena than the concept “four-dimensional space.”  This explains why the latter is harder to comprehend. Loss of perceivability does not mean, nevertheless, that abstract notions stop being the reflections of reality. Of course, they are not its sensuous images like sensation and representation. It does not, however, follow that they are not images at all. The fact that concepts exist and are expressed by signs was repeatedly used by idealists as a reason for alleging that our notions were as conventional and symbolic as the signs themselves. But the dialectics of verbal thinking consists in the use of conventional signs, i.e., words thus representing the highest form in which reality is reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin said that our concepts are copies, images of reality. The proof of it is that with the aid of concepts—even the most abstract of them—we are able to recognise, interact with and remake sensible things.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must answer one more question, about the difference between scientific and unscientific abstractions. After all, in the process of abstraction, men, following their fancy, recombining connections, rejecting some and introducing other elements and relations, also created such concepts as god, mermaid, personal immortality, and so on. At this point, we should recall the yardstick of truth already discussed, i.e., practice. Abstractions do not exist in isolation, unconnected with other products of the mind. A number of specifically related concepts may form another concept, new knowledge, more concrete, more exact and full, giving a more comprehensive description of a thing or event. If immediate or mediate utilisation of these concepts enables us to observe the properties and relations they express, we can say that they correctly reflect the things observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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If on the basis of such concepts, having performed the actions prescribed by them, we attain the goal, we may be confident that our abstractions have stood the test of practice and are true and adequate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The yardstick of practice again reveals its cognitive significance, this time as a means of appreciating how far-reaching and adequate, how objective and scientific our abstractions are. For this reason, Lenin, as he gave a brief formula of the process of cognition in general, pointed out that it proceeds from living perception to abstract thought and from that to practice which is the start and finish of the total cognitive act. However, the transition from abstractions to practice is not simple. It comprises a number of intermediate steps, the most important of them being modelling and theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Model in Cognitive Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate aim of cognition is to produce knowledge allowing man to carry on some activity conducive to the satisfaction of his material or spiritual needs. This essentially requires the use of models. Like many other terms widely used in everyday life as well as in science, &amp;amp;quot;model&amp;amp;quot; is a word of many meanings.  One can speak of a new model of a lathe, anew dress model, an artist’s model, and so on. This term acquires a special meaning in the theory of knowledge. Supposing there are two objects, A and B. Object A is the model of object B if (1) A is in some respect simpler, more convenient or easier to study than B; (2) certain features, qualities or peculiarities of A are a reflection of the qualities, peculiarities or habits of B, which are being investigated; (3) in all other respects A is distinct from B (these distinctions may concern material, shape, size, etc.); (4) knowledge derived from the investigation of A may, with some adjustments, be further applied to B to explain one or another of its peculiar features, predict its behaviour, and s&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
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If A satisfies these conditions with reference to B, it is a model of B, and so we can use it in place of B with the same result. But why should we use a substitute rather than the object itself? The point is that often we either cannot use it for various reasons, or we can obtain the necessary result more quickly and cheaply with a model. In developing large hydro-engineering installations or complex assemblies, their simplified small-scale models are first made. On the bank of a small artificial pond, they build diminutive electric power stations one-hundredth or one-thousandth the normal size, reproducing all essential characteristics of the installation.  Experimenting with a model, one can weed out mistakes and introduce corrections in the design at comparatively little cost.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not all models are, however, simple copies of objects. The algebraic formula x&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; + y&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; = z&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; may be regarded, in a sense, as a model of the geometric circumference. Of course, a drawing on the blackboard is a more palpable representation which can also be viewed as a model, but the formula, without being representational, is, in some respects, better. Mathematical calculation, algebraic in particular, is more exact than measurement with compasses and a ruler can be. Besides, many complex processes generally cannot be visually represented. Such is the behaviour of biological and social systems with their millions and even billions of interacting elements. We cannot possibly have a visual representation of the interaction of all industrial establishments, communications, transport, shipment of raw materials and goods on a national scale, which we must know to be able to plan and scientifically manage the socialist economy. Still, all of it can be represented adequately enough by a system of mathematical equations. These equations will be models of the economic system. By putting in concrete figures instead of certain variables, we can calculate other variables very accurately. Intricate mathematical models are handled by computers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, there may be physical models, like mock-ups, simplified copies of things, or sign models, like mathematical equations, conventionalised diagrams, etc. Between these extremes, we find other types of models combining physical and symbolic features in varying proportions, e.g., the ordinary classroom glo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;b&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.&lt;br /&gt;
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One must, however, discriminate between sign models and other sign systems, e.g., language. Words are not images of objects but their significants. Nevertheless, all models (including sign models) are, in a sense, patterns of the phenomena examined.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the relation between abstraction and model-building? How are abstractions and models connected? As follows from the definition, models do not reproduce all characteristics of the object but only such as are essential to the research. Clearly enough, to be able to build or select a model, one should be informed about some properties and connections of the object or process concerned. This information, expressed in special concepts, precedes, therefore, the building of a model. The success of the model, its practical and scientific usefulness, depends on how correctly the abstractions underlying it had been elaborated, and how essential are the characteristics of the phenomena under investigation which they reflect. After the model is made and is used in the laboratory or in production, it helps fill up a gap in knowledge and elaborate new abstractions reflecting hitherto unknown characteristics of the structure and behaviour of the given phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The processes of abstraction and model-building are interrelated. The objectification of an abstraction in a model is described as its realisation or materialisation. Before launching the lunar probe &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lunokhod-1&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, scientists collected all available information about lunar topography and the physicochemical structure of the Moon&#039;s surface. Working from these data, they built several models of the automatic laboratory and tested them under conditions closely resembling lunar conditions. After the design of the probe was corrected and improved, the real probe was built and launched to the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus model-building proceeds through several stages. At the first stage, the main abstractions are elaborated, isolating the most essential of the object’s known characteristics. Simultaneously, the aim of the ensuing research is formulated. At the second stage, the model is designed and built. At the third stage, model experiments are conducted. At the fourth stage, the experimental data are applied to the object concerned. However, though important, modelling by itself does not yield the result sought.  Both to build a model and to apply the experimental data to the object, we need scientific theory. The revolutionary doctrine of scientific communism created by Marx and Engels and Darwin&#039;s teaching on biological evolution, classical and quantum mechanics, all are scientific theories. Theory is the highest form of cognition, integrating observation and abstraction, model-building and experimentation. Without theory, these important stages of cognition are limited and sterile. It was this that made the founders of dialectical materialism pay such great attention to theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Theoretical Level of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus published a new theory on the revolution of celestial bodies, which maintained that the Earth was not the centre of the universe round which the other planets and the Sun revolved. The Copernican theory conflicted with the Earth-centred system of the ancient Greek philosopher and astronomer Ptolemy, which was supported by the church. The Copernican theory not only undermined the prestige of the church and opposed Ptolemy, but appeared to contradict the obvious. Any observer can see that the Earth does not move while the Sun describes a regular arc in the sky, rising in the east and setting in the west. At night, one can see the Moon and planets moving in the sky in their various orbits.  These things were reflected in Ptolemy&#039;s doctrine, which was, strictly speaking, not a scientific theory but a description of what was observed. As the observable trajectories described by celestial bodies were highly complex, the geocentric system itself entailed extremely intricate constructions which nevertheless failed to explain some puzzling phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Copernican theory, however, which on the face of it, contradicted the observable facts, produced a momentous change in scientific thought and human culture in general. It explained, simply and accurately, the phenomena under observation, made it possible to predict new phenomena, and broke the ground for modern astronomic research.&lt;br /&gt;
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Explanation, prediction and definition of the character of scientific research, experimentation and observation are three cardinal functions of every scientific theory. This is brilliantly illustrated by Marx’s economic theory. Many facts on which Marx based himself in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; had been described by other investigators. Bourgeois thinkers were not ignorant of the class struggle, economic and political inequality, exploitation, pauperisation of working people, and so on.  Yet they were unable to explain them from a consistent viewpoint, predict from them the future course of history and define the main direction of revolutionary effort. Marx’s economic theory based on the law of the development of capitalist society formulated by him, alone explained the available facts and, moreover, accurately predicted the main stages and objective laws of the transition from capitalism to the new communist formation, which was subsequently affirmed by the entire process of the world revolutionary movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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What, then, makes a theory capable of performing its principal functions? Why can they not be performed merely on the basis of observation, of men’s immediate practical activity?&lt;br /&gt;
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We call a theory not just any totality of views but a specifically organised system of correlated scientific laws. Scientific laws, as we know, are reflections of objective laws to which the phenomena under investigation are subject. These phenomena comprise what is often called the substantive part of a theory. Scientific laws reflecting fundamental, stable, recurring and Necessary connections prevailing in the given substantive area, which are logically correlated, form a theory. Thus, Kepler&#039;s laws are a theory of planetary motion because they express stable necessary connections inherent in the planets.  Marx’s economic doctrine expounded in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; also is a theory in the strict sense of the word, as the laws contained in it reflect necessary economic relations and are connected according to the principles of dialectical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic, primary laws of a theory are often called principles or postulates, while in theories expressed in mathematical terms they are called axioms. These primary laws are not logically proved within the given theory, but all other laws are logically deduced from them, and so are considered proved. From this it does not, however, follow that the principles and postulates of a theory are indemonstrable. Nothing is taken on trust in science. The laws which are accepted without logical demonstration within a theory may be demonstrated within another, more general theory. Kepler’s laws, which appeared at first as postulates of the planetary motion theory, were subsequently demonstrated, i.e., deduced from the more general principles of Newton’s celestial mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary laws of every theory, if they are not deduced from more general principles, are accepted either because their truth immediately follows from practice or experiment or because the final consequences of these laws are consistent with experiment and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;bservation.  The latter is decisive to the evaluation of a theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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One should not think that the laws of any science are always obtained by generalising the results of observation. Should it be so, it would be relatively easy to discover new laws. Any trained expert could do it. What makes genuine scientific creative work so difficult is that formulation of a new law or principle often requires ingenuity, imagination and even a departure from the phenomena observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many recent scientific theories were formulated not in laboratories but at the writing desk in the scientist’s study because the development of new principles calls for complex abstractions and abstract theoretical thinking. Thus, the law of value which states that commodities possessing different useful qualities are exchangeable provided that equal amounts of socially necessary labour went into their making, could not be discovered from simple observation of the market, of isolated transactions. After all, the actual exchange of commodities is influenced by demand, supply and other factors which make the price either higher or lower than the average cost. Marx has to evolve a range of abstract notions, e.g., abstract labour, the amount of socially necessary labour, etc., to be able to rise above the chaotic commodity-money relations prevailing in capitalist society and formulate the law of value. This law, which at first glance appears to contradict obvious facts, made it possible to formulate and deduce a range of other laws of capitalist political economy, such as the laws of surplus value, capitalist profit, primitive accumulation of capital, and so on, which provided the basis for predicting the future of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A scientific theory therefore enables objective phenomena to be explained and predicted because it is a system of laws, not a description of isolated events or fragments of the material world. Laws, therefore, perform a twin function. On the one hand, they are the most far-reaching reflections of the objective, stable connections existing in the substantive part of a science; on the other hand, they appear as logical forms, essential for deducing other laws and so-called final consequences, i.e., statements containing information about individual events and phenomena. A law possesses a high degree of generalisation, being a concentrated reflection of the essential characteristics, basic properties and behaviour of the objects studied.  This is what ensures its particular role in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Purposeful human activity of any kind is all the more successful, if it rests firmly on scientific theory. This is of particular significance to the communist transformation of society. It is for this reason that the Soviet Communist Party pays such great attention to developing the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting from the distinctive characteristics of theory and the part it plays in scientific cognition, we can now view the role of abstraction in a new light.&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws of every scientific theory are always formulated by abstraction. They do not usually contain evidence of sensible things, as they do not have recourse to sensory representations and images but to the more general and abstract concepts. This poses before every scientist the problem of interpreting abstract laws in terms of observation. In other words, so that the laws and their corollaries should be applicable to sensible things and events and verifiable by experiment and observation, they must be translated, so to speak, from the language of abstractions into the language of sensuous images which we use in describing our sensations and notions. This is the focal point for the problems of the link between conception and sensation, of thought proceeding at different verbal levels, and of the interaction between theoretical and practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already mentioned several times that the emphasis on practice as the principal source of knowledge and the yardstick of truth is the basis of Marxist epistemology. Nevertheless, the general philosophical question of the connection between thought and practical human activity acquires a particular form with reference to scientific cognition. It is, in fact, the relationship between theory and experiment, between the theoretical and empirical levels of cognition because, whereas scientific theory &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s the highest form of knowing reality, scientific experiment is an essential part of social and production practice, indissolubly linked with the development and improvement of theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Empirical Level of Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
The wide use of experiment as a major means of cognition is the main distinguishing mark of modern natural science.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scientists and philosophers of the past, drawing on everyday experience, common sense and observation, accumulated, classified and passed on to us many valuable facts touching on diverse aspects of nature. The conjectures and hypotheses put forward by them, e.g., the atomistic hypothesis, continue to surprise us by their depth and keen insight. And yet, the spirit of experimental research was perfectly strange to science both in antiquity and the middle ages.  That was due, on the one hand, to the relatively low level and growth rate of the productive forces and to the widespread predominance (especially in medieval Europe) of philosophical idealism and utmost deference to the church, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rapid development of technology associated with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, gave a strong impetus to the new trend in scientific research and provided the material conditions and prerequisites for it. The change to experimental science, marking a turn from a passive, contemplative approach to nature to active intervention in its secrets, took place first of all in those branches of science which were more closely related to industry, navigation and weapons production.&lt;br /&gt;
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To cross the oceans steering by the stars, build steam-engines and railways, and produce synthetic materials, man had to learn to see nature with his own eyes, not as the Bible saw it. But to be able to do that, he had to revolutionise the very philosophical basis of his view on the world, to surmount idealism which held experiment in contempt and saw the ultimate proof of truth in the dogmas of the church, rather than in scientific evidence. That is why modern natural science was ushered in not only by mathematicians and other scientists but also by materialist philosophers who, following Francis Bacon, proclaimed observation and experiment to be the decisive factors in the cognition of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main principle of philosophical materialism in general consists in the recognition of the objective world existing independently of the human mind. Directly following from this is the demand that cognition should concentrate on studying the characteristics and objective laws of this world. Materialists have always held observation, furnishing immediate sensory data, to be the chief method of cognising matter. Nevertheless, as we know, it is not always Possible to explain complex phenomena from observation alone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Cognition of the essential properties of the objects investigated and of the laws they obey is often made easier by placing the objects in unusual, often artificial, conditions, by refashioning the surrounding medium with the aid of special devices.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experimental natural science emerged in the 17th century. In three centuries it achieved much more than science had achieved previously in almost two millennia. The success was due above all to extensive experimentation. The chief goal of classical experimental scientists was to cognise, to study the properties and laws concealed from the passive observer. Their efforts were a practical refutation of the Kantian thesis that there is an impassable gulf between the thing-in-itself and knowledge. Kant required that the investigator should proceed without introducing any changes in the object, so that it could be cognised in its pure, pristine state, undistorted by the investigator’s interference.&lt;br /&gt;
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But is this not a contradiction of the very idea of exper&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ment? Do we not demolish the natural integrity and qualities of things and processes as we pass high-tension current through them, subject them to monstrous pressures, place them in a vacuum and bring their temperature down to almost absolute zero? Certainly, such apprehensions are not altogether groundless. However, as they used instruments which extended the limits of our natural sensitivity and applied complex apparatus, experimental scientists always tried to reduce to a minimum the researcher&#039;s influence on the object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically, this was due to the fact that experimental science could not, right away, undertake complex experiments taking into account the role of the subjective factor. Another reason was that experimental methods developed in natural science in complete isolation from social life. Thirdly, it was determined by the philosophical standpoint shared by the majority of scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Research was conducted on the lines of spontaneous scientific materialism which&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;like pre-Marxian metaphysical materialism—viewed cognition of the world merely as its explanation.  That approach ignores man’s active, transforming, practical activity which dialectical materialism considers to be the heart of the theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The demand for the interaction between the cognising subject and the object to be considered and their interdependence and mutual influence to be reflected in the theoretical picture of the world was formulated by Marx in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Theses on Feuerbach&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and was later realised in the experimental practice of the recent natural sciences, technology and the social sciences. As quantum mechanics has demonstrated, the nature of the motion of micro-objects is such that the instruments we use in studying them appreciably affect some of their characteristics. Therefore, in quantum mechanics, the condition of the objects of experiment must be described, taking into account the instruments and th&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the subjective idealists’ view, this proves that the object does not exist without the subject, the latter playing the decisive part in the relationship. In point of fact, however, every level of the motion of matter obeys its own objective laws, calling for specific methods of experimental and theoretical research. The probable, statistical motion of elementary particles is objectively marked by uncertainty. Experimenters always have to bear that in mind. As they act on some of the characteristics of the micro-object, they also produce changes in other characteristics, so that a comprehensive picture of the process can be obtained only by taking into consideration the interaction of the experimental apparatus and the micro-objects under investigation. This indicates a deep insight into the objective laws of nature, rather than a subjective caprice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In modern technology, the need to examine objects together with the subject acting upon them and cognising their work is associated with the development of supercomplex machines, automatic systems, high-speed electronic computers, space laboratories, complex control systems, and so on. Take, for instance, the experiments connected with Soviet space flights.  The aim of the experiments was not merely to study the parameters of the spaceship and the effect of weightlessness, etc., on the cosmonauts.  The main thing was that these and many other parameters and characteristics were studied in the light of their interaction and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new type of experiments, where the object is cognised in its interaction with the subject, are extensively conducted on a sociological level as well. Thus, in the course of building communism, we encounter at every step diverse social experiments whereby various forms of organising production and management, education and upbringing, service and city planning are cognised and appreciated. In each case, the cognising individual appears both as the subject and the object of the experiment as he simultaneously acts on and is affected by diverse experimental factors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, scientific experiment is a special kind of cognitive activity aimed at acquiring more knowledge of objects and processes in nature and society. It is realised with the aid of special apparatus, instruments and devices, under controlled conditions. The most essential requirements an experiment must satisfy are (1) that the apparatus should ensure the highest standard of precision of measurement and observation possible for the given class of appliances; (2) that the experiment can be repeated (this is essential because obtaining reliable results mostly requires a mass of experimental data allowing for statistical processing, which eliminates the influence of chance occurrences and disturbances); (3) that the experiment should be conducted in conformity with a set of methods worked out beforehand and ensuring control at every stage of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All experiments satisfying the aforementioned requirements and implying not only material objects but also material facilities and conditions are often called material experiments. Besides these, speculative experiments play a considerable role in modern science. A speculative experiment differs from a material experiment in that its objects and apparatus exist solely in the experimenter’s imagination.  A speculative experiment is a sort of a model of a material experiment, meeting all requirements the latter should satisfy, the only difference being that for some reason it cannot technically be carried out in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to their purpose, experiments are categorised under the three general headings of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discovery&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discover&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something new are exemplified by Edison’s search for a material suitable for the filament of the incandescent lamp. Almost six thousand experiments were made before the right material was found.  Research of this kind is sometimes described as the trial-and-error method which boils down to trying out a number of variants, the unsuccessful attempts being discarded. However, scientists usually prefer to conduct such experiments not at random but on the basis of a theory or hypothesis, thereby reducing the number of trials and errors to a minimum. The laws established as a result of generalising the data yielded by such experiments are called empirical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second kind of experiments aimed at &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of something are made with a view to verifying a hypothesis. A hypothesis affirmed by experiment becomes a valid scientific theory while the one refuted by it is discarded and replaced by another. Such tests are of particular importance in choosing one out of a number of hypotheses. We have an example of it in the experimental discovery of new chemical elements. The Russian scientist D. I. Mendeleyev (1834-1907), having discovered that the elements show a periodic variation in most of their properties (the periodic law), hypothetically described some chemical elements not yet discovered in his day. His prediction was justified by subsequent investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the third kind of experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something are made in order to produce new objects which are then investigated or applied in practice. A few years ago, a group of Soviet scientists led by Academician Flerov synthesised a transuranium element which was named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Kurchatovium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in honour of the Soviet physicist Kurchatov. This element exists only in laboratory conditions and disintegrates very quickly. Nevertheless, its production, as well as the synthesis of other transuranium elements, is an important experimental achievement, facilitating a deeper study into the structure of substances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, experiments may serve as the groundwork of new laws, hypotheses or theories or they may serve to verify them. However, experiments often play both parts simultaneously.  For this reason, our classification is only tentative and should not be regarded as absolute and final.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering the significance of experiment to cognition, Lenin emphasised that experiment is a variety, a part of social and production practice. “An experiment,” he said, “is already practice.” Comparing the structure of experimentation and labour, it is easy to establish their similarity. In both there is an object of practical activity, implements and means whereby this activity is carried out, and, lastly, man. The difference is that the main purpose of labour is to produce material values, objects and conditions to satisfy various needs, whereas knowledge, acquired and accumulated in the process of production, plays a subordinate, albeit significant, part. The main purpose of experiment is, on the other hand, to produce new knowledge. Even so, there is no fundamental difference between scientific experimentation and production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foregoing clearly shows the intimate connection between the two levels of knowledge—theoretical and empirical. Higher, theoretical knowledge is embodied in scientific principles, postulates and laws. Empirical knowledge results from immediate observation and experimental evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both levels of knowledge supplement each other, and it is only in close unity that they produce a picture of the external world satisfying the requirements of objective truth.  Lenin’s formula, “From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice”, brings out the thoroughly dialectical character of the process of cognition, showing that it develops in a spiral. Empirical knowledge which arises out of living perception, out of scientific experiment, poses to us fresh problems, leading the mind to draw general theoretical conclusions. A scientific hypothesis derived from theoretical research requires experimental verification in the course of which new properties of the objects examined may be discovered. Every loop of the spiral not only reveals fresh relative truths but also provides the prerequisites for further advance. At the same time, the appearance of new forms and types of experimental research puts forward complex epistemological problems concerning the peculiarities of different varieties of theoretica&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and empirical knowledge. This interconnection of philosophical and scientific problems provides the basis for the fruitful co-operation of scientists and philosophers urged by Lenin fifty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Investigation of the main problems and principles of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism not only reveals its essential difference from all other philosophical systems and demonstrates its perfect agreement with the results and methods of modern science, but also proves that study of this theory is a major condition of mastering Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Historical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 1. The Science of Historical Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is Historical Materialism? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Mankind has existed for many millennia. It has travelled a long and arduous road, full of struggle with the primordial forces of nature, with want, hunger, oppression, devastating epidemics and bloody wars. Thrones crumbled, and mighty kingdoms fell. Civilisations came and went. Some of them vanished utterly, but others left an indelible mark on history. Famous war lords, mighty kings, heroic popular leaders left their names to posterity. But there were millions who remained nameless. They were the ones who made armies strong and kings mighty, whose blood flowed in times of popular unrest.  What part did they play in history? What can guide us through the tangled maze of events that form the body of history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regimes that were, to all appearances, unshakable, were often shaken by popular revolutions. What are these revolutions? Are they disastrous accidents disrupting the regular march of history? Or are they the legitimate outcome of previous history, determining the future course of events? What impels people to rise against powerful forces? Where is the theory able to explain these things in keeping with the authentic historical facts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current age is one of victorious popular revolutions, one in which peoples choose the path they would follow. What scientific theory explains the successes scored by the socialist countries, the mounting working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the liberation of many African, Asian and Latin American countries from colonial oppression, the rapid progress of science and technology, the active involvement of the masses in every part of the world in the making of history? What scientific theory explains, in a word, the very substance of the current epoch?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No doubt, both present and past history may be explained in various ways. Or it may be left unexplained, and one may simply drift along, from day to day, ignoring theoretical problems.  Yet it is getting harder and harder to live like that, because every person&#039;s life, irrespective of his wishes, is becoming more closely linked with the general course of world history. This being so, everyone should obviously be aware of his place in the world and of the relationship between a person’s activities and the processes developing in the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Theories seeking to explain society have never been lacking. Many of them are long forgotten. Others sprang up quite recently and time alone will show if they will stay.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-Leninist science of society, historical materialism, is the only social theory which although founded over 125 years ago, has lost none of its vitality and continues to win support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is it so? It is so because historical materialism answers the questions posed by social history and meets the hopes of the millions. It is so because historical materialism is not a mass of frozen dogmas but a living, creative theory, capable of developing and enriching itself by general conclusions drawn from historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only does historical materialism explain the past and the present, but it enables us to foresee the future and take an active part in the process of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. The Subject Matter of Historical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
What sort of science is historical materialism?  What is its subject matter, what does it seek to learn about society? How does it relate to philosophy and the social sciences? Has it already explained every law of history? What does it say about the meaning of history and about man’s destination?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us first see what is the proper subject of historical materialism. Society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s investigated by many sciences, which is only natural, for society has diverse aspects. All social sciences study one object, viz., the life of society, but they each regard society from a particular angle, e.g., from the angle of economics, population, history, culture, and so on. The subject of a social science is thus one facet of society’s life, isolated for the purpose of investigation from the close-knit unity of interrelated social phenomena. What distinguishes historical materialism from other social sciences in that respect?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with economic history, economic statistics, industrial economics, the economics of supply and distribution, the theory and history of finance, etc., political economy is a more general science as it elucidates more general characteristics of the economic life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Civil history is also a general social science, more general, for instance, than demography, the science of population. It seeks to explain particular features of the historical development of individual nations. Historians thus study the most concrete and specific manifestations of the general historical tendency of a nation. The tendency, which comes to light when the historical events are related, obeys the laws of society’s development. But how can we discover these laws?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principles of dialectical materialism refer to society as well as to nature. But as it deals with knowledge generalised to the maximum degree, i.e., with the most general laws of nature, society and thought, dialectical materialism has no special reference to society as distinct from nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Historical materialism is a philosophical science concerned with the specific laws o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; social development as distinct from the universal laws of being.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; The laws of historical materialism do not operate in nature but only in society. And as society is inseparable from men, social laws can manifest themselves only through human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism as a philosophical science considers the general aspects, tendencies and laws of social development. It always keeps in sight the relation of social being and social consciousness, of the object and subject of history. In historical materialism, every problem is examined and explained, taking account of the correlation of the objective and the subjective, of the circumstances and man, conditions and intentions, i.e., of the correlation of social being and social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we can state more specifically what historical materialism investigates and why it differs from the other social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, historical materialism studies the general objective laws governing the development of any human society. As these general laws of world history operate variously in different historical epochs or phases of mankind&#039;s development, historical materialism investigates the most general phases of world history, socio-economic formations and the objective causes of their appearance and disappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, historical materialism always considers the relations between social being and social consciousness. This enables it to explain the laws of history not as the effect of some mysterious forces lording it over men but as the effect of historical laws manifesting themselves through men’s activity, through their struggle to attain their goals which often have nothing in common with the general course of history but which nevertheless stand in organic relation to it. In a word, historical laws appear to the student as the real motive forces of and factors in history, i.e., they appear to him in the shape of the masses and specific historical figures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a philosophical science, historical materialism has no pretensions to being an absolute theory able to explain every puzzle and turn of history, such as the old philosophical science was wont to assume. Every fact and turn of history require all-round scientific explanation while the philosophical elucidation of every fact consists in exercising a correct approach to its investigation, employing correct methods of research, comparing it with the general historical laws and tendencies, and applying to it the criteria of historical progress. Historical materialism provides such a method for investigating and evaluating diverse social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, historical materialism is more than a method of investigating social phenomena. It has a theory of its own, i.e., a theoretical substance of its own which explains the more general of historical tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism has found that history proceeds from lower to higher forms of social organisation and that the change to higher forms is inevitable because the old forms become outmoded and stand in the way of further progress. Historical materialism, basing itself on historical evidence, on the long experience of mankind, has proved that a society without exploitation and oppression, based on free labour, is not a dream or utopia, but the result of its intrinsic development, that the transition to such society, i.e., communist society, is as inevitable as transitions of society to higher forms were in the past. This crucial conclusion is supported by historical evidence, economic analysis and the experience of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The successes scored by the revolutionary working-class movement demonstrate in practice how the progressive historical tendency presses forward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The October Revolution in Russia and socialist revolutions in other countries have given this tendency a global dimension and shown the peoples of the world where their future lies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism does not deal with all questions of the building of socialism and communism. Such questions are the field of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific communism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Being a philosophical science, historical materialism is the method of scientific communism, furnishing, in addition to historical and economic justification, also the most general, philosophic, justification of the inevitable change to communism and showing the revolutionary path of society&#039;s transition from capitalism to communism. For this reason, historical materialism is inseparable from the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The organic relation between historical materialism and the theory and practice of the struggle for communism is the expression of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; historical materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is the theoretical reflection of the needs and goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois critics of Marxism strive to show that the connection of historical materialism and the interests of the working class and the communist ideas, which is openly proclaimed by Marxist philosophers, presumably indicates the class limitations of the Marxist-Leninist social science. They allege that to produce an authentic scientific theory one must rise above classes since, they insist, a class approach to science results in biased and narrow thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is this really so? Can a person living in a class society rise above class interest? In a class society, no one is above class. To live in society and be free from it is impossible. An individual may imagine himself to be free in that sense, but in reality one cannot, in modern society, be free of class interest. The idea of such freedom is a bourgeois illusion, nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every philosopher, artist or writer, whether he intends it or not, always defends and expresses in his work the interests of a particular class.  In this sense everyone shares a party viewpoint whether or not he belongs to a party. This does not mean that the interests of a class can only be supported by its own members. An ideologist’s partisanship depends on what class he supports, rather than on what class he belongs to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and Proudhon were most indignant when Marx concluded that they were ideologists of the French petty bourgeoisie, which in their minds was tantamount to calling them “Paris shopkeepers.” Marx explained then that he had not referred to their calling, for that was quite beside the point. What he had meant was who they actually represented, whose interests they objectively reflected and supported.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, it must be borne in mind that in an exploitative society, where there is an impassable gulf between mental and manual labour, the classes whose lot is manual labour (workers and peasants) are unable, as a rule, to advance ideologists from their own midst. Their ideologists most often are members of other classes, who have enough time and money to get an education and at the same time are capable of understanding whether history is moving so that they go over from their own class to the progressive social classes. E.g., the 19th-century Revolutionary Democrats in Russia were ideologists of the revolutionary peasantry. None of them, however, was a peasant himself. Herzen was a nobleman by birth, and Chernyshevsky, Belinsky and Dobrolyubov were of the lower middle class. The ideologists of the working class, Marx and Engels were not workingmen themselves, but that did not prevent them from writing consistently on behalf of the working class and promoting its struggle, the aims and methods of which they elaborated scientifically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, every thinker is a spokesman of a definite class. Does it make him narrow-minded? The answer cannot be a simple yes or no, for that depends entirely on the class. The bourgeoisie, as a class, has long been brought into conflict with the advancement of history. Today its interests do not merely clash with those of other classes but with the development of society at large. Therefore, a modern bourgeois ideologist, being true to the interests of his class, can’t help giving a garbled picture of society’s development, nor is he capable of producing an authentic scientific theory of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is fundamentally different with the ideologists of the working class, for the interests of the working class, unlike those of the bourgeoisie, reflect the historical tendency. The working class is a consistently revolutionary class. It has a stake in social progress and so has no need to falsify social history. Moreover, only from the standpoint of the working class, the exponent of social progress, could a genuine scientific theory of social development be produced.  Nor was it by chance that such a theory was evolved by the ideologists of the working class, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy does not imply that it is limited but that it is scientifically objective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism is a theoretical generalisation of real human history, a generalisation of the evidence supplied by other social sciences. The scientific dialectical method by which historical materialism investigates the life of society, considering society in the process of its continuous development, implies that historical materialism itself keeps developing as it draws general conclusions from fresh historical experience and the findings of the social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 2. Materialist Concept of History ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Emergence of Historical Materialism—a Revolution in the View of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Men began to ask themselves long ago what force governed the development of society.  Religion and the church told them that they, miserable sinners, were to turn their thoughts to god and hope for his kindness and forgiveness.  God the almighty held their destiny in his hands. “Man proposes, and God disposes”, the church taught. “Be humble, be meek, and trust in the divine providence.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some thinkers rebelled against the authority of the church and appealed to reason. They saw in man’s rational creative activity the mainspring of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will remember that at the beginning of this book it was mentioned that philosophers, depending on their answer to the fundamental question of philosophy&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i.e., what is primary, matter or consciousness—divided into two camps in explaining the world in general and elucidating the relation of spirit and nature—materialists and idealists. However, as soon as the pre-Marxian philosophers came to consider society, all of them, materialists and idealists alike, took an idealist attitude. That this attitude should have been shared by Hegel was not surprising, for Hegel was an objective idealist to whom society was a stage in the development of the absolute spirit. But then, the idealist attitude was also shared by philosophers who were part and parcel of the history of materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideologists of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie, the great 18th-century materialists Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius and others, seeking to understand the essence of society&#039;s development, maintained that men’s opinions were determined in every age by the predominant social conditions which themselves depended entirely on men’s own volition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The last great materialist philosopher before Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, who passionately criticised idealism and religion, simultaneously held that religion was the groundwork of social history, that its forms determined the face of an age. In Feuerbach’s view, if society was bad, it was because its religion was bad. To make society good, its bad religion (e.g., Christianity) should be replaced by a good religion. With this end in mind, Feuerbach invented a new “perfect religion of love” in the belief that a society founded on such a religion should itself become perfect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea that society is the outcome of the spirit, or a result of men’s spiritual (religious, political, legal, etc.) activity, held undivided sway in pre-Marxian philosophical, sociological and historical literature. The viewpoint had become a tradition. It pervaded fiction and was generally taken for granted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He had to be courageous indeed who not only called the idea in doubt but scientifically proved that it was untenable. It took a combination of scientific genius and supreme personal courage to do it. Karl Marx had both. For the first time in history he showed that before man could indulge in thought, science, philosophy, politics, religion, and so on, he had to eat, drink, to have shelter, and so on. In other words, man had to satisfy his material needs first. This idea, which now, many years after the emergence of Marxism, is considered to be self-evident, worked a revolution in views on society, signifying the birth of a new, materialist conception of history. Although apparently simple, Marx&#039;s idea has far-reaching implications. If, to be able to think, man must satisfy his material needs, it means, first of all, that at the basis of history is the production of all those things which go to satisfy man’s material needs, i.e., the production of food, clothing, houses, and so on. Therefore the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;production of material goods is the basis of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next conclusion: if history is based on the production of material goods, then the decisive role in history belongs to the producers of the material goods, i.e., the working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of the change Marx worked in ideas on society will become clearer if we consider the fact that sociologists before Marx examined at best only the ideological motives of human activity, usually neglecting the economic circumstances, which they treated as a side issue, inessential to history. Before Marx, all thinkers reduced history entirely to the doings of individual personalities, paying no attention to the masses. In their view, history was made not by the people but by heroes towering above the crowd.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist conception of history formulated by Marx and Engels showed that the people were the history-makers and producers of all material and spiritual values available to society. That was why Lenin wrote: “The discovery of the materialistic conception of history, or more correctly, the consistent continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social phenomena, removed the two chief shortcomings in earlier historical theories.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-94|94]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx proved, first, that history is based not on ideas but on material production; and, second, that it is made not by isolated heroes and military leaders but by the masses, the working people above all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Human society is a highly complex phenomenon comprising a maze of diverse relations and connections. People work or exploit others, they love, suffer, fight their enemies and die, they pray to god or damn him, and in doing all this they form widely varied relations with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But history does not boil down to individual actions. It also embraces group and mass action.  Classes and nations fight one another fiercely, to the death; peoples rise against their oppressors; destructive wars and horrible epidemics devastate whole countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This tangled maze of facts and events was extremely puzzling. For thousands of years eminent thinkers who took a keen interest in the destinies of mankind were unable to understand what governed history—this chaos of events and facts. Was it god? Was it the conflict of good and evil? A hero’s or an emperor’s will? Were there, after all, any laws that determined social development? Idealism which dominated the views on society, failed to supply a scientific answer to these questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist conception of history was able to supply such an answer. The conclusion that material production was primary with relation to intellectual activity was in itself enough to suggest that preeminent among all complex social relations—family, religious, class, national, political, legal and others—were those formed by people engaged in material production or directly associated with it, which were primary and definitive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fast thinkers were unable to extricate themselves from the tangle of events and facts because they had no yardstick to help them tell the substantial from the unsubstantial, the principal from the secondary things. Marx was the first to discover such a yardstick. Having selected the relations emerging among people in the process of production, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as principal and crucial to the life of society, Marx was able to apply to social phenomena the common scientific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;yardstick of recurrence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, without which the laws of social development cannot be discerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As is known, no two countries are the same.  Every country has a different economic level and staple industries, different history, language, national culture, different customs, political institutions, and so on. But does this imply that different countries may have nothing in common? No, it does not. Having formulated the conception of the relations of production and examined them in different countries, each with its own conditions, Marx was able to find that which was common to all countries at the same stage of development (e.g., at the capitalist stage), and to evolve the concept “socio-economic formation” which expressed in a highly generalised form the prevailing situation in all such countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preface to the first edition of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Marx, addressing German readers, wrote that if, upon reading &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which dwells for the most part on the development of capitalism in England, they would say that it had no reference to Germany, they would be quite wrong, as a more developed country merely presented a less developed one with the picture of its immediate future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. History as an Objective Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
By entertaining a materialist conception of history and applying the yardstick of recurrence to society, Marx and Engels were able to discover the laws of social development and interpret human history not as the result of arbitrary individual action, nor as the result of divine activity, but as an objective natural process developing, like nature, independently of men’s intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels conclusively proved that society proceeds from lower to higher forms, through class contradictions and class struggle, to a classless communist society; and that communism was not a utopia but the necessary product of social development. The founders of Marxism not only showed why communism was inevitable but discovered in the working class the force which was to destroy capitalism and build a communist society. It was proved from the operation of the objective laws governing society&#039;s development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some bourgeois philosophers attempted to show that no such thing as social laws generally existed. With this purpose in mind, they advanced a theory to the effect that in society, unlike nature, nothing ever was or could be repeated because every historical occurrence was unique and without parallel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, no historical event occurs twice.  Every social phenomenon, as a sum of individual characteristics, is unique. Let us compare the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century and the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th century. The French revolution is associated with the storming of the Bastille, the guillotining of the French king and queen, with the names of Robespierre, Danton and Marat, with the common people thronging the streets of Paris, singing the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Marseillaise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Carmagnole&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English bourgeois revolution involved the beheading of the king, Cromwell’s dictatorship, and at the end of it all, the bourgeois “glorious revolution”, the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, and the restoration of monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The two events are apparently rather dissimilar. The countries are unlike, and so are the peoples, with their different customs and habits.  But what is the most essential thing about these two events? Is it the songs they sang then in London and Paris? Most probably not. Is it the method by which the respective kings lost their heads? Hardly so. What then is the principal meaning of the two events?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English bourgeois revolution set out, above all, to abolish the old feudal system and establish a new, capitalist system. And even though, owing to the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, this revolution failed to carry out its tasks consistently, it nevertheless cleared the path for capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principal aim of the French bourgeois revolution was to abolish the old feudal regime and establish new, capitalist relations. Hence, these two events have something in common, they have recurring characteristics. Besides, these characteristics were fundamental to both events, while the characteristics that did not recur were inessential to the course of history.  That common factor of the two events was reflected in the concept “bourgeois revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, historical events present a unity of the recurrent and the unique. It is usually their most substantial features that recur, while it is the inessential, minor features that are unique and particular and do not recur. But if there is regularity in social phenomena it means that society and history in general obey objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An adult member of society finds in it fully formed social relations, relations of production, a state structure, etc. Although he may influence the circumstances to some extent by his activity, he cannot choose them. The laws operating in society are as objective and independent of individual will as are the laws of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet there are some distinctions between the laws of nature and the laws of history. The chief of these distinctions is that the laws of nature not only operate independently of human will and consciousness but are altogether independent of men. For them, man might simply not exist. They were just as effective when there were no people as they are now. Of course, having knowledge of natural laws, man can often accelerate their action or channel it in a direction useful to society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Knowing the laws of species formation, man learned to hasten it by artificial selection, producing new strains or races of useful plants and animals in a comparatively short time. But the laws of species formation, by themselves, operate independently of man. Natural selection was effective ever since living creatures had appeared, before man evolved at all. Moreover, man also, as a biological species, is the product of natural selection. Thus, the operation of laws of nature does not in the least require man’s participation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is altogether different with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws of social development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Although they operate independently of man’s will and mind, they are always realised through men, through human activity. Therefore history is entirely the product of human activity. History is made by men, but they have to make it in accordance with the objective circumstances prevailing during the lifetime of each generation, and not just as their fancy takes them. Thus, human activity is one of the conditions necessary for the laws of history to operate. In fact, it is the main condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rudolf Stammler, a bourgeois philosopher and one of the early critics of Marxism, maintained, as he tried to prove the &amp;amp;quot;unsoundness’”’ of Marxism, that if under the laws of nature an eclipse of the Sun were to occur, nobody would ever think of setting up a party for the promotion of the eclipse. Then why organise a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arty for the promotion of revolution”, if one regards the proletarian revolution as the inevitable effect of the laws of history? Since an eclipse of the Sun occurs without men’s participation, then the revolution, if it is inevitable, will also occur without their participation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An eclipse of the Sun, indeed, occurs without men’s intervention. That is true. But human activity is not found among the conditions which lead to an eclipse. Therefore the idea of setting up a ‘’party for the promotion of the eclipse of the Sun”, as Plekhanov justly observed, could only originate in a lunatic asylum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A revolution, however, is quite another thing. It is performed by men, there can be no revolution without them. Their activity is the main condition out of the whole sum of circumstances which make the revolution possible. And this being so, then it depends on people, on the degree of their organisation and political understanding and their eagerness to fight for their rights, whether or not the revolution will take place, and how soon. That is why the creation of a party that would purposely and methodically prepare the masses to perform a revolution is necessary and justified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, the laws of social development manifest themselves in men’s activity. Nevertheless, even a fleeting glance at history shows us that as their activity developed people usually pursued goals which did not flow from these laws. The laws of social development were discovered by Marx and Engels only in the mid-19th century, and the masses became familiar with them later still, and not in every country at that. What were people guided by, then? After all, they are not animals but rational beings endowed with the faculty of thought. They consciously pursue certain ends and consciously select the means towards them.  That, however, does not yet imply that people co-ordinate their individual goals with the mainstream of history. This explains why they used to conceive history as a chaotic tangle of human strivings. Somewhere, opposing strivings clashed and cancelled each other out, somewhere else, strivings running in the same direction converged, and somewhere else again more complex combinations of forces emerged.  And the overall historic tendency pressed on through this chaos of chance occurrences, just as necessity in general presses through mass of chance events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this means that history develops spontaneously, that people made history unconsciously, and that produced the false impression that history is made apart from people, without their participation. Under such conditions, human effort was wasted on a vast scale. This, among other things, explains the extremely slow pace of history in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the emergence of Marxism and the discovery of the laws governing the development of history, the character of society’s development changes. For the first time, the broadest sections of the people are able to take part consciously in the making of history.  As a result of the proletarian revolution, this possibility becomes a reality. Under the new conditions, the squandering of human effort is reduced to a minimum, as the chaotic clashes of individual intentions are superseded by the people’s single collective will directed at the building of a new, communist society. This single will is expressed in the Communist Party which organises the masses and directs their aspirations towards one goal. This makes social development proceed faster than ever before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The profound social changes which occurred in the Soviet Union after the victorious socialist revolution of October 1917 are a case in point. In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, L. I. Brezhnev said: “Within a historically short period of time, a huge backward country was transformed into a country with a highly developed industry and collectivized agriculture. It now takes only two and a half working days for our industry to produce as much as was produced in the whole of 1913.... Within the lifetime of a single generation, the Soviet land liberated itself completely and for ever from the onerous burden of illiteracy.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-95|95]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Historical Necessity and Human Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The following questions may be asked: if social development is governed by laws which are objective but are implemented through men’s activity, what role do men play in history? Are they not slaves of objective necessity? Can man be free? What is implied here is not political freedom, nor so-called civil liberties, but freedom in terms of the relation between man and the objective laws of history. This question was often pondered by eminent thinkers of the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many of them believed that man’s will was capable of making history. We had seen, however, that this view is unsound, as history proceeds according to objective laws. Others held that man is powerless in the face of historical necessity, being its slave. But is it true that nothing depends on men? Was it not men who produced society’s entire wealth? Was it not men who staged revolutions, sweeping away regimes believed to be unshakable? Inquisitive human thought kept seeking the answers to such questions. The great Dutch materialist philosopher, Spinoza, was the first to approach the correct conception of the relation of necessity and freedom, while Hegel produced its profound definition when he said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom was apprehended necessity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This definition, confining freedom to the domain of knowledge, may be satisfactory to Hegel but not to one who has a materialist conception of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the first time in the history of science, Marxism approached this question from a standpoint fundamentally different from Hegel&#039;s.  We are concerned not only with the problem of freedom with respect to knowledge but, above all, with the problem of the freedom of human activity, of man’s practical freedom. Is it enough for one to apprehend necessity to become free? If one knows that, for certain reasons, an undesirable event is bound to occur and, being able to counteract it, still does nothing but is content with just the knowledge of it, will such knowledge be worth much, and can one be considered free under such circumstances?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us assume that under capitalism all workers know the laws of capitalism’s emergence, development and decay and realise that capitalism must be superseded by socialism.  Will it be enough to end capitalism? Not likely.  The apprehension of necessity is certainly needed to make men really free. Necessity is blind and man is its slave as long as he fails to apprehend it. But even after he has apprehended it, man cannot be free. The knowledge of necessity is but the first requisite of actual freedom. The second is to translate knowledge into action, necessity into practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When workers have realised the historical necessity of the destruction of capitalism and the building of communism and proceed to act on this knowledge, capitalism will inevitably collapse and give way to communist society. The Marxist definition of freedom, therefore, is: “Freedom ... consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-96|96]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, Hegel’s idea is not rejected but thoroughly refashioned. Let us look into the Marxist definition of freedom given by Engels.  In its context, “‘control&amp;amp;quot; should on no account be understood to mean man’s arbitrary power over the external world. What it means in fact is that if necessity is not apprehended, man is its slave, but once it has been apprehended, man is its master.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of history, man was controlled by nature and was its slave. As man gained knowledge of the Jaws of nature and built strong productive forces, he released himself more and more from the grip of natural necessity. We mean man not as an individual but as a member of society. Man’s freedom both with respect to historical and to natural necessity depends on the kind of society he lives in. A wrongly organised society, founded on exploitation, makes its members slaves to historical necessity, and simultaneously prevents them from devoting sufficient effort to the remaking of nature. It is entirely different in the case of modern socialist society, rationally organised and developing in a planned fashion. Under socialism, historical necessity has been apprehended and the laws of history are applied in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the problem of human freedom is a social problem. People can enjoy a full measure of freedom only in a society in which the exploiting classes have been abolished and the productive forces serve to enrich the whole of society rather than a handful of capitalists, and are used for gaining and increasing control over nature. That was why the transition from capitalism to socialism may be described as a leap from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freedom implies no annihilation of objective necessity. The latter can never disappear. Once man has apprehended objective necessity, it stops being external to him. It becomes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;intrinsic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; content of his convictions. This being So, man can act freely, i.e., in accordance with his own convictions. At the same time, he becomes an instrument of histor&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al necessity. A fettered revolutionary, driven on foot to forced labour in Siberia, was free with relation to historical necessity, while the armed gendarmes escorting him were its slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, man becomes actually free once he has gained knowledge of objective necessity and learned to act in full consciousness of what he is doing. The question of men’s practical activity, of their conscious, active, free involvement in the making of history, is not an abstract theoretical problem. It is a practical problem. In a society building socialism and communism, the activity of every person, his creative participation in the effort of the whole people, has a particular meaning. The new society may be built only provided free participation of all members of society. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that every member of society should be informed about the laws of history and should act accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another side of this important question is that history must not be regarded as a fatalistic process whereby people carry out the one and only possible course of events, dictated by historical necessity. Historical necessity manifests itself in different ways, and not necessarily at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History is governed by laws, but its ways are not fatally determined. Their choice is decided in the struggle of social forces, as a result of which one of the possible variants of historical development is determined. And, certainly, reaction may temporarily triumph, the forces of progress may temporarily be defeated. But in the end, the forces of progress get the upper hand, That was what happened in People’s Hungary after World War II.  In this concrete case, historical necessity manifested its ultimate irresistible force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Material Conditions of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of every nation develops in a definite place, under definite natural conditions. These natural conditions (otherwise called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;geographical environment&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) vary. The area inhabited by a people may be covered with mountains and forests or it may be a desert or the tundra or it may be fertile. It may be situated in the cold Far North or in the hot South. And of course, the country’s nearness to trade routes and centres of civilisation is crucial. Availability of fertile soil, a mild climate, abundant mineral resources and neighbours who contribute to its historical progress by trade and cultural exchanges give advantages to a country, whereas their shortage puts it in a disadvantageous position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Favourable natural conditions may speed up the progress of society while unfavourable conditions may retard it. To get a concrete idea of the role played by natural conditions in the life of society, they must be divided into two groups, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the natural resources of the means of subsistence and the natural resources of the means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, The presence or absence of the reserves of wild edible plants, game, fish, etc., belong to the first-mentioned group, and minerals, natural communications, natural resources of energy, etc., belong to the second.  At the early stages, when material production was utterly primitive, the natural means of subsistence were of paramount importance, and the natural means of production had no role in the development of society, nor could they have any. At the modern stage, of course, the latter play a decisive part in the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, the influence of the geographical environment on society does not boil down to the natural means of subsistence and production. Great significance is also attached to the climate, availability of impassable terrain or an insular situation, all of which hinders links with other peoples. Geographical location facilitates or handicaps the protection of national frontiers from enemy attacks. For a long time, natural trade routes played a particularly important part. Large cities and towns were usually built on the banks of navigable rivers. Convenient sea routes were also vital. Running close to different countries, they promoted the development of crafts and trade in coastal areas, and later on of manufactures as well. When the sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and the East lay mainly across the Mediterranean, it promoted the rapid economic growth of Italian sea ports. Afterwards, when the sea routes shifted to the north of Europe and passed through the English Channel, it promoted the economic growth of the Netherlands, Flanders and England.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does this mean that the geographical environment determines historical development, as some people used to believe?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, the geographical environment cannot determine the development of society, if only because it remains relatively constant over millions of years, while social changes occur within much shorter periods. The natural conditions in France, for example, changed imperceptibly over thousands of years while French society underwent momentous change. The whole of French history, so rich in events, coincides with a period during which the geographical environment hardly changed at all. This holds true of the history of any other country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of human society, when the productive forces were puny, nature held sway Over man, who had neither knowledge nor any Means of protection against the blind forces of Nature, and who was her slave. Obviously, in those circumstances the influence of the geographical environment on the development of human society was far greater than later on.  As society developed, the productive forces grew and knowledge increased, man gradually escaped from his bondage to the elements. Consequently, with the progress of science and technology, the role of the geographical environment constantly decreases. Moreover, using the results of scientific and technological progress, man has gained the ability to influence nature on an ever-increasing scale. In the circumstances of private ownership and capitalist production in some countries, man’s impact on nature often entails irreparable harm to the environment and is fraught with grave dangers.  For nature is a finely balanced system capable of self-regulation, and depredation of the natural resources upsets it and impairs this capacity for self-regulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever the successes of scientific and technological progress, the effect of the natural environment on society will always be a positive quantity because, no matter how advanced, society will always exist in a specific geographical environment, in a definite set of natural conditions which influence, and will continue to influence, the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Well-considered, methodical use of the natural resources under the planned socialist economy and the socialist system based on common ownership open up great possibilities for conserving the environment. In the Soviet Union, for example, there are special laws and agencies concerned with preserving natural resources and protecting the environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, at the present rate of production growth and with increasing urbanisation, individual countries or even groups of countries can do little to prevent irreparable damage to nature. There is an urgent need for an international system of conservation measures involving all, or at least all the industrially advanced, countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress” L. I. Brezhnev said that among the problems facing mankind “there is the problem of protecting man from the many dangers with which further uncontrolled technological development threatens him, in other words, the conservation of nature.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-97|97]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size and density of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;population&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is another standard factor in society’s existence and development. This is obvious since history is made by people, who are its primary requisite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size, growth rate, density and other characteristics of population are essential to society’s development. Without a minimum number of people, society cannot function.  Nevertheless, although different demographic characteristics can influence society&#039;s development for better or worse, the population growth, density and composition are not what determines the development of society. For example, the succession of socio-economic formations cannot be explained by population growth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, when the Earth’s population is increasing at an ever faster rate, and is expected to mount, at the very least, to 6,000 million in the year 2000, bourgeois sociologists and economists are making much of the theory that the population grows in geometrical progression and the means of subsistence increase in arithmetical progression. Hence they view population growth as an eternal evil threatening innumerable calamities, such as famine, wars and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;so&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, overpopulation is not a law of nature. It does not appear because there are too many people but is due to the conditions of production under capitalism. Capitalism constantly produces a surplus-population. Economic crises, chronic unemployment, destitution are not at all the effects of overpopulation, but are, indeed, its causes. Bourgeois overpopulation theories are wrong because their authors regard the conditions, which are merely produced by capitalism, as absolute and eternal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In reality, the growth of labour productivity, made especially rapid by the technological revolution, provides for an abundance of goods unthought of in the past. However, the progress of science and technology encounters obstacles created by capitalism, whose interests have long come in conflict with the interest of the working people, of the bulk of world population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic lag in many countries which only recently rid themselves of colonialist exploitation is also due to capitalism which plundered the natural wealth of the colonial countries and so held back their economic progress.  It is because of this capitalist-bred economic lag that in some Asian and African countries, population grows faster than the productive forces. But that will not last. As they develop their economy and adjust birth rates to economic growth, the young independent nations shall achieve economic prosperity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the character of society and its progress, the change from one social system to another, do not depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;on either the geographical environment or the growth of population. The latter can only further or hamper social development, being themselves dependent on the mode of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History develops on the basis of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is its determining factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. Material Production as the Basis of Society’s Existence and Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The Mode of Production of the Material Goods ====&lt;br /&gt;
To ensure his subsistence man must provide himself with food, clothing, shelter and so on. He cannot get all these things ready-made from nature. Ever since man raised himself from the animal world, he has used more and more products of nature that need to be processed. Man cannot eat meat raw, it must be cooked first. Even primitive man, before he could wrap himself in an animal&#039;s skin, first had to kill the animal, skin it and cure the skin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to subsist, man has to produce material goods from objects found in nature. Material production has always been—and still is—the basis of human existence. As history marches on, production undergoes change and develops its forms and means. It makes up the basis of history. People produced food and clothing, built houses, and so on, in every age.  Stages of social history are differentiated not by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;what&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; men produce but by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;how&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;by what means&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, they produce the material goods necessary for subsistence. In other words, historical periods are differentiated, above all, by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modes of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on which they are founded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, at the basis of history are successive modes of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every mode of production has two aspects.  One of them expresses man’s relation to nature, i.e., the degree to which he controls it. This aspect of the mode of production constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;productive forces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of society. The more advanced the productive forces, the greater man’s control over nature, and vice versa. In primitive society, in which the productive forces were hardly developed, nature had control over man.  The further progress of productive forces through the ages has caused this relation to change. In socialist society, which has at its disposal up-to-date technology and is rapidly moving forward along the path of scientific and technological progress, man increasingly controls nature, subjugating its blind forces to the benefit of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other aspect of the mode of production consists in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. These express the relations among people, arising in the process of the production of material goods and determined by the level and character of the development of productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both aspects of the mode of production form an indissoluble unity and cannot exist separately since people, in processing various objects, i.e., interacting with nature, associate with other people taking part in the process of production, i.e., interact with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides the production of material goods, another area of material production is the production of man himself. It is performed by the family, whose forms also underwent changes in the course of history, while its influence on the historical process diminished as society developed further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, it would be a mistake to regard the family merely as a link in the system of material production; it also plays a vital role in ethical, legal and other spiritual relations.  The family does not simply carry out the physical reproduction of man. It is a highly important sphere of the education of the new generation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For all that, the material functions of the family, associated with the reproduction of man, always were and continue to be essential to society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The productive forces of society are the foundation of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Society’s Productive Forces ====&lt;br /&gt;
The productive forces include people and the means of labour, i.e., the objects and instruments of labour. But objects of labour themselves must be either obtained or produced by man, and instruments are also results of man’s labour activity. Thus, the productive forces consist of living human labour or of labour already performed and embodied in the objects and instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these things become productive forces only if they are part of the process of production. Prospected mineral deposits which are not developed are not a productive force, although they may become one in future. The most up-to-date machine tools, kept under lock and key in the storeroom, are not a productive force; they become one only after being made part of the process of production. This holds of people as well. An able-bodied person who does not work cannot be considered as a productive force. Men and the instruments of labour belong to the productive forces only when associated in the production of material goods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to reduce the productive forces to production technology alone, as some Western scholars do when they give their own, somewhat biased interpretation to Marx’s social doctrine. The instruments of labour by themselves, without man, cannot function productively. Therefore, the productive forces must include man who creates or operates the instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, society’s productive forces comprise two integral elements, viz., the implements of labour and people possessing industrial skills.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a rule, the productive forces develop progressively. The capacity of the instruments of production, such as energy sources, transmission mechanisms, tools, etc., keeps increasing. As a result, the working man also undergoes change: his production experience grows and new occupations appear and develop. In this way, man’s control over the natural properties of things, over the forces of nature, gradually extends. Man produces new objects with new properties not existing in nature. Thus, the level of the productive forces changes. But that is not all, for their character also changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the productive forces coincides, by and large, with the character of labour, and may be individual (private) or collective (social). This differentiation depends on how men employ the implements of labour, whether they do it single-handed or in a group where effort is shared and co-ordinated. The process of labour—whether individual or social—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not depend&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on man’s choice. It is determined by the character of the implements of labour and, more specifically, by the instruments of production, the bone and muscle of the production process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, some instruments (practically all handicraftsman’s tools) may and must be employed individually while others can be used only by a group of workers. A machine, for instance, is an instrument of production which can be used only collectively for it requires raw materials, energy, half-finished products, and so on. Besides those who run the machine, it takes dozens, if not thousands, more workers to make it function productively. Ownership has nothing to do with it. Regardless of property relations, labour in mechanised production is collective, social. The steam-engine revolutionised capitalist production just because, by making production a social process, it created the major material precondition of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As long as man employed ready-made or primitively worked tools in production, he accumulated elementary knowledge in diverse fields of activity. The progress of production caused science to emerge and develop. Thus, astronomy emerged because people had to determine from the position of the stars and planets the seasons of the year, which was essential to agriculture and animal husbandry. Geometry arose from the needs of land surveying and construction. Geography owes its origin to the development of high-seas navigation and trade. Production does more to promote science than dozens of universities, wrote Engels. Hypotheses advanced on the strength of accumulated knowledge are tested by practice and, if confirmed, become scientific truths.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When primitive instruments of labour are Superseded by machines, science as a system of knowledge of the external world begins to play a far more important part in the development of production. That is but natural. Mechanised production requires detailed knowledge of the properties of things, of the forces of nature and of how they can be utilised. In turn, such knowledge is applied and embodied in instruments, mechanisms and production technologies. In this way science begins to turn into a direct production force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 19th century, owing to numerous important scientific discoveries, science played a much greater role in production than ever before. But its role today in the development of productive forces is even greater. As a result of the revolution in science and technology, applied sciences have become part and parcel of the productive forces. More and more scientific discoveries are being made, some of them directly contributing to material production. Scientific information is produced on a vast scale, doubling its volume approximately every ten years. The revolution in science and technology has brought about a situation where production is increasingly becoming a field of the technological application of science, the latter itself appearing as a direct productive force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whereas under capitalism, production as a whole, including the latest results of science, serves to enrich a handful of capitalists, while increasing automation breeds unemployment and causes much misery among working people, under socialism, the progress of science and technology is made to serve the whole of society, all working people. Under socialism, scientific and technological progress has practically no limits and can freely bear its fruits: larger and better-quality output, lighter work, more leisure, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The role of science as an immediate productive force is determined not only by its direct effect on the technological standards of production, on the progress of technology. Science also makes an immense contribution to the development of the producers of material goods, to improving their cultural standards and skills, and to perfecting the organisation of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The CPSU takes all necessary measures to promote the revolution in science and technology. As a result, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his report ‘“The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, &amp;amp;quot;never before has our country possessed such a huge economic, scientific and technical potential as today.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-98|98]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Speaking at the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev said: “The priority task is still to speed up scientific and technical progress.  Its significance, you will recall, was strongly emphasised at the 24th Congress of the CPSU.  We Communists proceed from the belief that the scientific and technical revolution acquires a true orientation consistent with the interests of man and society only under socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In turn, the end objectives of the social revolution, the building of a communist society, can only be attained on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-99|99]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet people is solving the task of combining the technological revolution with socialism, i.e., utilising socialism’s advantages over capitalism in order to ensure the growth of material production and an improvement in the people’s living standards.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Relations of Production ====&lt;br /&gt;
Not every relation formed by people in the process of production is a production relation.  Human relations are complex and many-sided.  Production relations are, above all, economic relations among people who get together for the purpose of producing material values. These relations are of a material character. This is not to say that they are material in the same way as a thing may be material (for they can be neither measured nor weighed), but that they are objective, that is, independent of man’s mind and will. Thus, production relations are economic relations of people engaged in material production, which shape and change independently of people’s consciousness and intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are these relations in more specific terms? Basically, all production relations depend on who owns the: means of production.  In fact, the form of ownership of the means of production underlies all economic relations in any kind of society. Property is not a thing, nor is it a relation between man and a thing. It is, in the last resort, an economic relationship established through men’s relation to things, particularly to the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another essential aspect of production relations is the exchange of activities between men engaged in material production. People participate in production in various ways. They “exchange” the results of their efforts. Thus the Capitalists, who own the means of production, play the part of organisers of production while the workers, who sell their labour, are the immediate producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exchange of the results of human effort is not confined to capitalist society. It occurs in any society because there is always a division of labour, even under the primitive-communal system, where it was, of course, of the simplest kind. In socialist society, too, the results of labour are exchanged between two classes of working people (i.e., workers and farmers), different social strata and groups of professional workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, production relations are characterised by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;distribution of output&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Every class receives a part of the national income in a manner and quantity rigidly determined by the prevailing relations of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief characteristics of production relations that we have enumerated are inseparably combined in material production. The unity of the three aspects of production relations is as objective as production relations themselves.  It means that production relations can change only as a system of three aspects, none of which can undergo serious qualitative change separately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are several &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;types of production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; known in history: primitive-communal, slavery, feudal, capitalist and communist. Mankind is marching along a road which ascends from lower to higher forms of production relations. This road may wind or zigzag, for historical development does not proceed in a straight line. In some cases reactionaries managed to halt history. So, after the French bourgeois revolution an attempt was made to restore not only monarchy but feudalism as well. That attempt slowed down the development of France, but it failed all the same. It shows us the objective character of historical development. Despite all obstacles, society still arrives where it should under the objective laws of history.  These laws cannot be repealed. History may at times develop more slowly but sooner or later it will make headway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Progressive development of society from lower to higher forms is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  It can be of two types. The first, progress in an exploiting, antagonistic society, is achieved at immense sacrifice, which is out of all proportion to the strides actually made. Marx figuratively described this type of historical development as an abominable idol that would drink nectar only from the skulls of the slain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second, progress under socialism, is of an entirely different character, as all classes and sections of society have a stake in it. The development of socialist society proceeds in a planned manner. It is guided and directed by a Communist or a workers’ party. Having cognised the laws to which society is subject, it leads the masses, directing the efforts of all working people towards a single goal and ensuring the best possible results of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The unity of productive forces and relations of production constitutes the mode of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In every historical epoch a particular mode of production was predominant, the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist modes of production succeeding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, in studying history it is easy to observe that at no time did a mode of production exist all by itself. The picture was always complicated because while a new mode of production took shape, some elements of the old mode persisted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current epoch has seen the emergence of the socialist mode of production which is steadily advancing on the capitalist mode of production in the world economy. Socialist integration within the framework of the socialist world economic system, the steady and rapid economic growth of the socialist countries, all foretell the inevitable triumph of the socialist world system in the economic race with capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Succession of Modes of Production Is a Law-Governed Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having discussed what a mode of production is, we can look at how they function and why they supersede one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the main, we can single out three principal laws to which the mode of production is subject.  They are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of contradiction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; between various aspects of the mode of production. These laws expose the workings and development of the modes of material production. And since production activity, in the final analysis, is the foundation on which every other social human activity rests, these laws are of immense social significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of the unity of the productive forces and production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; expresses the organic connection between various aspects of the mode of production. Every mode of production, at any period in its history, necessarily involves a complex interaction of the productive forces and relations of production. The productive forces are the content of material production, and the relations of production are its economic form.  The mode of production exists and functions in society as an integral whole, an active socioeconomic system in which material production, in any of its phases, is embodied in economic phenomena and cannot exist without them. E.g., the capitalist productive forces exist as constant and variable capital, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., as the means of production owned by the capitalist, and as labour which is a commodity bought by the capitalist. The productive forces of capitalism form and function only as long as the economic interaction of labour power and the instruments of labour (which are the major component of the means of production) takes place. Therefore, in society, the productive forces do not exist in a “pure” form but only in their economic form. They can only be separated from their economic form, i.e., from the relations of production, in the imagination, as a theoretical abstraction, to make their analysis more convenient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The consequences of the law of unity of the productive forces and relations of production are of great significance to economic practice and development, as well as to the life and development of society in general. If the mode of production exists and functions as an integral whole, then clearly, every appreciable variation of any of its aspects will affect the entire mode of production. Thus, the more social the process of production becomes in modern capitalist enterprise, the more the material prerequisites of the socialist economic system mature in the womb of capitalism. Also, the higher the concentration of production and the centralisation of capital in the modern capitalist economy, the more manifest the economic need for replacing private by common ownership of the means of production. Therefore, it is a matter of replacing the mode of production as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then how do the different aspects of the mode of production interact? For an answer, we must look to the law of correspondence and the law of contradiction between the aspects of the mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of correspondence between production relations and the level and character of the productive &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orces &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was discovered by Marx, who drew general conclusions from numerous facts bearing on the economic history of society. To substantiate this law, Marx looked into the history of the division of labour and of the emergence and development of co-operative association, manufacturing and mechanised production. The results of his research are stated in the first volume of his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Here are some of Marx’s judgements on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of European economic development shows that the need for mass production destroyed the craft guild in which the master workman and his apprentices made a commodity entirely on their own, from beginning to end. The strong point of this method is that the article bears the stamp of the craftsman’s skill. The craftsman’s work in this case is creative, and he himself enjoys a respectable place in the social scale. Yet the craft guilds, typically medieval and preserved nowadays almost exclusively by the goldsmiths, crumbled under the impact of expanding commerce. A craftsman cannot, after all, produce artistically finished articles on a mass scale. Besides, the jealousy with which craftsmen guarded the secrets of the trade greatly hindered the progress of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Division of labour and the introduction of machines ruined the medieval craft guilds.  They were replaced first by co-operative asso&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;iation in which craftsmen’s work was shared and coordinated. Even this simple innovation was enough to boost enormously labour productivity and profit. On the other hand, the artisan’s work lost its creative quality. Now it was no longer an expression of the craftsman’s art, and the craftsman himself was no longer an artist. Creative work was replaced by monotonous drudgery, each worker performing some elementary operation over and over again. That spelled the birth of what Marx called ‘partial man”: the worker contributes only a part of the article, and his whole life becomes tied to this part, which, incidentally, cannot be marketed as such. Thus, through economic pressures, the craftsman whose art and its secrets had been a source of personal pride started in the co-operative association his slide into totally dependent production that later ended in the factory.  What happens next? Again, under economic pressures, viz., a growing demand for goods and a growing thirst for profit with a view to further investment in profitable enterprise, the machine finds its way into the co-operative association. Inventors of machines had in mind technical improvement of production as well as economic considerations. They sought to make work less arduous, increase labour efficiency and ensure a higher rate of profit. What effect it would have on the economy and society was something the inventors and organisers of production did not trouble their heads about.  &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having penetrated the co-operative association, the machine at once alters the character of economic relations among the co-operative artisans. Their former independence, already somewhat curtailed by division of labour, now completely disappears. The machine is not, as a rule, owned by the individual artisan; it is the property of the workshop owner and a means of exploiting the workers. The workers are no longer able to launch production on their own because the instruments of production have become very costly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There then appears a system of machines in the workshop and it becomes a real factory.  Yesterday&#039;s artisan and workers in the workshop become today’s proletarians. They possess no instruments of production; the sole commodity they own is their labour power and this they sell by hiring themselves out to a private employer. They have to do this in order to make a living for themselves and their families.  By his work, the worker not only covers the production costs but produces surplus value besides. And the capitalist appropriates this surplus value as profit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Detailed examination of capitalist production led Marx to the conclusion that every change in production starts with the instruments of labour as men improve them, as they increase the speed of the machines and build up the capacity of the energy sources. New machines require new skills, and this causes change in the worker who handles the instruments of labour or controls machines. Besides mechanising production, men improve the latter by breaking it down into separate operations permanently assigned to separate workers or mechanisms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Technical improvements, the further division of labour, development of new skills—in a word, the modification of the productive forces—induce economic change, i.e., an adjustment in the production relations. This is the relationship expressed by the law of the correspondence of production relations with the productive forces, which operates as an economic tendency.  The law imposes no rigid mechanical dependence of production relations on the productive forces. It would therefore be inexact to describe it as a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of obligatory correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&amp;amp;quot; The law of correspondence operates as an economic tendency in the modern capitalist economic system as well. But the demands of the law of correspondence run up against the selfish economic ends of the monopolies and cannot be satisfied unless monopoly power is overcome.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, we inescapably come to the third law regulating material production, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Production relations, which correspond to the productive forces only by tendency, are usually in conflict with them. This conflict, inherent in the mode of production, is exactly what makes it develop.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where does the conflict spring from and what is it about? How does it develop and how is it resolved? These questions remained a puzzle to social scientists and economists before Marx.  And no wonder. For to answer them one had to get to the bottom of society&#039;s economic development and be a revolutionary as well, i.e., to combine an exact economic analysis with a social analysis of the interplay of the class forces and the way social revolutions tend to develop.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is manifested in three main ways. Firstly, the productive forces, as the most mobile element of the mode of production, outstrip (and this is the main tendency in world history) production relations which are usually more conservative and lag behind.  This is obvious because the relations of production change objectively according to the change undergone by the productive forces. This shows once again that the conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is a fundamental attribute of economic development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, at a certain stage, the internal conflict in the mode of production, under the private ownership of the means of production, develops into an antagonism, the productive forces and production relations being embodied in antagonistic social classes. For example, in the capitalist economy, the proletariat is the most important part and the living embodiment of the productive forces while the relations of production (capital, above all) are personified by the capitalists. Therefore the conflict in the mode of production must sooner or later, depending on the maturity of the economic system, be expressed as antagonism and conflict between these classes. The growth of such antagonism in the economic and social spheres inevitably brings about social revolution in bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conflict in the mode of production as it develops into antagonism, expressed in class conflict, is the socio-economic precondition of social revolution. The relations of production, having come in conflict with their productive forces, become a drag on economic and social progress. They twist it out of shape and slow down its growth rate. An obvious instance of this is modern state-monopoly capitalism which has distorted the development of material production in favour of militarism, promoting the war industries at the expense of culture and health. Militarisation of the economy is pushing the capitalist world into the abyss of another economic crisis. The capitalist relations of production hamper the development of the productive forces, retarding its growth. Comparison of the economic growth rates in the socialist and the capitalist countries dramatically demonstrates the advantages of the socialist economic system. Economic integration of the socialist countries further enhances these advantages and provides favourable conditions for their realisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outmoded production relations act as a brake on social and economic progress. Imperialism brings with it unemployment, racial hatred and police outrages, neocolonialism and suppression of democratic freedoms. The headlong chase for profit, attempts to prolong the life of capitalism—which is doomed by history—by aggressive wars and similar means, continuing plunder of the developing countries in the guise of aid, are all expressions of the current capitalist relations of production, of state-monopoly capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the conflict in the mode of production comes out in the fact that, even after becoming a brake on the progress of industry and society, the relations of production still remain the prime mover of production. We may ask ourselves: What makes material production function in the United States and other state-monopoly countries? It is still the headlong pursuit of profit. Under state-monopoly capitalism the big capitalist corporations can reap, with governments’ assistance, high monopoly profits, instead of average profits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, the modern capitalist relations of production have become self-contradictory.  While they are a stupendous roadblock to social progress, these relations of production—of which profit is part—still provide for the further development of the capitalist economic system.  This bears out the conclusion, made by Marxist-Leninists long ago, that capitalism will not collapse of itself. Only united action by all anti-monopoly forces will clear the road for the further progress of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. What Is a Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of material production operate throughout human history. But world history has gone through a succession of phases, viz., the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist systems, and has now entered a socialist and communist phase of development.  These phases, signifying stages in the progress of world history, are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;socio-economic formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept “‘socio-economic formation” was introduced by Marx and was widely employed by Engels and Lenin. According to Lenin’s definition, a socio-economic formation is an integral social organism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The skeleton or economic basis of each formation consists of the relations of production Which are predominant in it. They determine the economic tendencies and the character of the classes common to a particular formation, determining, in the long run, its social system, ideas and institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The flesh or body of a formation consists of the social classes existing within it, and the institutions they set up to protect their own vital interests. These are not merely the institutions of the ruling class, rooted in and serving the predominant relations of production, but also all other essential social institutions, many of which derive from the inner contradictions of the mode of production. Thus, socialist ideas under capitalism spring from the conflict between the social character of production and private appropriation. The same conflict is ultimately responsible for the emergence of the communist parties of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of key significance to the definition of a socio-economic formation is, however, the relation between its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant relations of production, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;superstructure&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant ideas and institutions. Formations may be rather similar as to their productive forces, but they are always distinguished by the specific character of the basis and superstructure which not only determine the pattern of a formation but, more important still, functionally depend on each other.  The basis produces the superstructure, and the superstructure ministers to the basis. But their functional connection is even more far-reaching. This connection alone makes it possible to see whether a social phenomenon belongs to the basis or to the superstructure. Let us take the state for example. Should we always refer to it as a superstructure? It depends. It cannot properly be called a superstructure in relation to the church, for instance. The state is a superstructure only relative to the predominant relations of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is the state to be regarded as a superstructure with respect to the productive forces? By no means. There are countries now that achieved more or less similar levels of the productive forces but differ greatly in bases and superstructures. This difference expresses the main contradiction between moribund capitalism, on the one hand, and socialism, which has become the decisive force of progress, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this holds true for the economic phenomena as well. They are of basic character only in case they are related to the ideas and institutions that are determined by these economic phenomena and work for them. But can we call production relations the basis from the point of view of their economic role in relation to the productive forces? The answer is no, because in that case the relations of production do not&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they—play the part of the basis with reference to the development of the productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are numerous things in society which have too many functions to be referred either to the basis or to the superstructure. Thus, language, the family, machines and the productive forces in general, the natural and technological sciences, the nation, and so on, should be referred neither to the basis nor to the superstructure. Certainly the basis and superstructure influence them a great deal and often turn them to account. But that does not alter the essential fact that they are social phenomena of a particular kind, not to be referred wholly either to the basis or to the superstructure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Therefore, although these social phenomena are part of the formation as an integral social organism, they do not serve to distinguish one formation from another. They may be&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and they usually are—similar or even identical in entirely different formations. Consequently, only phenomena which can be definitely referred to the basis or to the superstructure as belonging distinctly to a formation and stemming ultimately from the mode of production are the distinguishing marks of a formation. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. The Specific Laws of Socio-Economic Formations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Then what are the laws whereby the social Organism called the socio-economic formation springs forth, develops, matures and decays?  The laws of material production operate during the existence of a formation. They provide for the continuity of world history, investing it with a progressive general tendency and binding together widely different and even opposite phases of historical development and types of social structures. But do they provide for the emergence, development and collapse of specific social organisms such as socio-economic formations? Certainly not. Nor is it fortuitously that Lenin mentions that each socio-economic formation develops in conformity with certain laws specific to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; specific to each formation are the subject of political economy. For example, Marx&#039;s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a detailed exposition of the economic laws governing every stage in the development of capitalism. The chief one is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the production of surplus value&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the latter being seized by the capitalist as average or monopoly profit. Marx thoroughly investigated the operation of this law, tracing its immediate and indirect consequences and the way it interacted with other economic laws, and outlined the social development tendency resulting from this law. Thus, this law has a broad social meaning expressed in the tendency which social development has to pursue under the impact of the economic forces. The law of surplus value shows the position and role of the proletariat in the capitalist economic system, which, in fact, render the proletariat the grave-diggers of capitalism and builders of a new, socialist system. Hence, the proletariat’s world-historic revolutionary role is more profoundly substantiated if viewed from the standpoint of capitalism’s chief economic law. It was for this very reason that Marx said that his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was a shell fired at the head of the world bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However great the social significance of the economic laws of each particular formation, specific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, not immediately invested with economic content, are also essential to the life of a formation. For example, as he summed up historical experience, Marx established the general tendency of the class struggle throughout the period of capitalism. The class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists inevitably results in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the class struggle under capitalism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has, of course, economic antecedents, yet it does not itself refer to the economic sphere. It is a social law specific to a concrete formation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interaction of the economic and social laws specific to each formation and the common laws of human history determines the destiny of each formation. An all-round examination of the complex interaction of all social and economic forces with reference to the history and maturity of capitalism enabled Marx to arrive at the scientifically-founded conclusion on the communist tendency of world history in the epoch of the capitalist social formation, namely, that, as it goes onward, history must pass from moribund capitalism to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §7. The Communist Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism and communism are two phases or large periods in the life of a society resting on collective ownership of the basic means of production, in which the exploitation of man by man has been abolished. Socialism is the first phase of such a society. It comes into being as a result of the socialist revolution, handing over political power and the national wealth to the working people and giving them access to culture. The toilers become genuine masters of society. As this society moves closer to communism, its development takes new forms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism emerges from capitalism or even from some pre-capitalist social system. It cannot build its social and economic framework in the womb of the old society which rests on private ownership of the means of production.  The foundations of the old exploiting society must be destroyed by a social revolution. Communism, on the other hand, develops on its own social and economic base and does not need a social and political revolution or the class struggle to bring it into the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Progress of socialist society to communism is subject to certain objective social laws which extend to the main areas of the life of society comprising men’s economic, social, political, and intellectual activities. As a result of the operation of these laws, the material and technical base of communism is created, socialist relations are transformed into communist social relations, and people attain all-round development. The complex nature of the process of transition from socialism to communism follows from the very numerousness of the objective social laws involved in it. In the economic sphere, for instance, one can single out the high and stable growth rates of production development which is free from crises and unemployment and sufficient for the building of the material and technical base of communism; the growing role of progress in science and technology; integration of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of full-fledged socialism; development of socialist into communist labour, work becoming the prime vital requirement of everyone; a steady growth of efficiency; the drawing together of co-operative and public property, and their eventual transformation into communist property; growth of social consumption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws operating in the socio-political sphere in that period are, to name but a few: the gradual levelling out of living standards in town and country; the steady drawing together of the working class, collective farmers and intellectuals, and obliteration of class and social distinctions; integration of mental and physical work; the greatest possible growth of the social unity of society, the peoples thriving and drawing together still more; the gradual emergence of social uniformity and full social equality of all members of society; development of the socialist state of the whole people into communist public self-administration: the greatest possible unfoldment of socialist democracy; and the gradual refashioning of everyday life on communist principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The changes which the intellectual life of society undergoes in the period of transition from socialism to communism are equally complex.  We shall name merely a few, viz., the inculcation of a new attitude to work; getting rid of private-owner mentality and hangovers of the past; the further growth of socialist culture; all-round development of the individual; and the increasing dependence of the character and rate of social development on the spiritual qualities and constructive efforts of every man and woman.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 4. Classes and Class Relations ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Class? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The word “class” derives from the Latin classis, a group called to arms, a division of the people. Tradition ascribes to Servius Tullius, a legendary Roman king (578-534 B. C.), a new division of Roman society into classes or orders.  At that time there appeared in ancient Rome an army into which all free citizens able to carry arms were enrolled. Servius Tullius divided the soldiers into five classes or orders according to their wealth, i.e., their ability to provide their own horses, armour, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Subsequently, the word “class&amp;amp;quot; was applied to large groups of people into which human Society came to be divided. But can any large group of people be regarded as a class? We are accustomed to apply this term to such large groups as the bourgeoisie, the working class, the peasants. Yet in modern society doctors also form a large group. There are almost 700,000 of them in the Soviet Union alone. Steel workers form a large group too, but are they a class?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many scholars tried in vain to define the concept “class”, although the fact that society was divided into classes and that a struggle was going on between them was observed long ago. So, even at the time of the Restoration in France there were historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet) who saw in the class struggle the key to French history. Nevertheless, the question what is a class, on what grounds people may be referred to one class or another, was still left open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some investigators claimed that the division into classes rested on the difference in intellectual standards: the more gifted and active, the more apt to command formed the ruling classes; the dull and stolid formed the oppressed classes.  Life and history demonstrated, however, that this was not so at all. There were too many ignorant fools and dolts among the ruling classes, while the oppressed classes advanced from their midst many people of undoubted talent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other people attempted to explain class division by income and property. Indeed, examination of the class structure of any society reveals a glaring disparity in the incomes of those of the ruling and the oppressed class. But the question is why—why this disparity, why is it that the ruling classes are rich and the oppressed poor?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, it was said that classes were distinguished by their position in society. Some classes were privileged, others, on the contrary, were underprivileged. But again, the question why it was so was left unanswered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great contribution of the Marxist-Leninist theory is that it has managed to solve this complex problem. Marx and Engels furnished brilliant examples of materialist study of the position of every class and each stratum within it, showing that the class struggle is entirely political. The most comprehensive, profound and complete definition of classes in Marxist-Leninist theory was given by Lenin in his work &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Great Beginning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin writes: “Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-100|100]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this definition Lenin points out four distinctive marks differentiating classes, viz., (1) their place in a historically determined system of social production; (2) their relation to the means of production; (3) their role in the social organisation of labour, and (4) the share of social wealth they get and the methods by which they get it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main indication was, in Lenin’s view, the relation of a class to the means of production that establishes a social group as a ruling class enjoying every privilege. Estrangement from the means of production turns a social group into an oppressed class whose lot is destitution and deprivation of rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin’s definition of classes, which sets forth the objective characteristics of a class, cut the ground from under the feet of those who defined classes from an idealist point of view, arbitrarily combining people into classes or, equally arbitrarily, excluding certain groups from concrete classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, Lenin isolated the fundamental, most typical features of all classes, thus furnishing the guide and key to the class structure of a socio-economic formation, which greatly facilitated the study of class society. In other words, Lenin’s definition of classes is of great theoretical significance to a correct understanding of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, Lenin defined classes in an exploiting society as groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Why Society Split Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now that we know what a class is, we must look at how classes came about. They emerged long ago, when systems of writing either did not yet exist or were only beginning to develop, so that we have scanty sources on those times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still, numerous scholars who painstakingly collected evidence about the life of ancient peoples in different parts of the world, have gathered enough information for us to trace the general outlines of the historical processes developing in the remote past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Excavations of ancient settlements and burial places and the implements, utensils, ornaments, bones of the animals which primitive men hunted, and other relics found by archaeologists help to reconstruct a picture of our remote ancestors, community life, their activities and way of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the instruments of labour were very primitive at that time (they were usually made of stone or wood), men got food for themselves with their aid and successfully hunted big, strong beasts. How did they manage to do it?  Men lived in large communities, hunting animals and gathering wild plants together. Without mutual assistance, they could never have survived because they would have been helpless against predators lying in wait for them at every turn.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Primitive society knew no division into classes, no subjection and oppression, no exploitation. People provided the means of subsistence for themselves by common effort and consumed them also in common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing general conclusions from concrete research, Marxism supplies the general picture of society&#039;s division into classes. The first class division occurred when the primitive-communal system disintegrated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disintegration of the primitive-communal system and the emergence of class society was a lengthy process which did not occur simultaneously everywhere. According to historical evidence, class society emerged in ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the 3rd millennia B. C.; in India and China, in the 3rd-2nd millennia B. C.; and in Greece and Rome, in the first millennium B. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, class division of society was based on the surplus product which turned, with the passage of time, into private property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the primitive-communal system, the productive forces—and so labour productivity—were at an extremely low level. What little was produced was almost immediately consumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In those circumstances there was no basis for social inequality. When, as a result of quarrels between clans or their individual members, prisoners were taken, it was a problem what to do with them. To keep them in the community was usually impossible as there was not enough food to go round as it was. Nor could the prisoners be made to work for the community as there were no implements to spare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So prisoners of war were either eaten up (while cannibalism was still practised) or allowed to return to their own clans after hostilities were over, or, circumstances permitting, were retained on an equal footing with the rest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This continued as long as society did not produce much. But as time went on, implements were improved and labour became more efficient. Finally, production reached a level where man began to produce more than merely his sustenance. There appeared the surplus product, something over and above bare necessity, which had momentous social consequences for mankind, bringing about social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The surplus product meant that means had become available for maintaining and employing extra labour. Whereas prisoners of war had earlier been killed, they now came to be prized as a source of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although all this happened very long ago, Similar facts are still observable in our own time among some peoples whose development has been retarded for concrete historical reasons. Thus there is ethnological evidence that the nomad tribe of Masai in East Africa killed their prisoners for want of means to maintain them. However their neighbours, the Wakamba, who engaged in agriculture, were able to use slave labour. As they disposed of the surplus product, they had food and implements to spare for extra labour. Therefore the Wakamba did not kill their prisoners but turned them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War prisoners were not the only source of slave labour. Besides them, the class of slaves was formed of debtors who failed to pay their debts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, one may ask, did they not share out the surplus product equally among the clan or tribe? Why did social inequality replace the equal distribution of products which had been the rule for millennia? The point is that products are distributed and consumed depending on the way in which they are obtained. The old hunting and fishing peoples procured food for themselves in large groups. Their primitive implements did not allow them to get enough to keep body and soul together single-handed, without their kinsmen’s assistance. Thus, at the early stages of society’s development, social production took shape, and its necessary consequence was social consumption, when the bag was at once equally divided among the members of the group. That was determined in the first place by the economic mode of life of ancient peoples and tribes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They had no conception of storing supplies because it was hardly practicable. The meat from the animals they killed spoiled quickly.  Of course, if sold, it could fetch money that could be saved. But at that stage money did not yet exist. Hence, the economic circumstances did not encourage thrift.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another reason why they could not accumulate supplies was that as very little was produced, nothing was left over, and there was nothing left to save. Besides, hunting depends on luck. A hunter may kill a large beast today and share with the others, or he may come home empty-handed tomorrow and be given a share of the others’ kill. Plekhanov observed that the custom of sharing is a sort of mutual insurance without which hunting tribes could not possibly go on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the collectivist rules of behaviour, customs and traditions of the primitive-communal system stem from the predominance of common ownership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, even in the context of this primeval collectivism, as more and better implements were made, individual production gradually made headway. In primitive society, weapons, clothing, food, ornaments, etc., had already become personal property. These articles are fitted for personal consumption by their very nature. To handle a spear, a bow or a boomerang with adequate skill, the primitive huntsman had to adapt himself to the individual  article, as well as adjust it to himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growing use of individual implements told on the standards and customs of social consumption. It may be assumed that by custom the bag was divided depending on each member’s contribution to the success of the hunt.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar customs have been observed among peoples whose development has been retarded.  If the quarry is killed by two men, the skin goes to the man whose arrow struck nearer the heart; the one who strikes the last blow receives the best cut, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the spread of individual-type implements and individual production, the primitive commune began to disintegrate and socia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inequality set in. As the social division of labour progressed, the primitive commune finally disintegrated and the tribal system was destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major division of labour was associated with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of cattle-breeding (pastoral) tribes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At that stage, the cattle-breeders, provided they had large enough herds, already enjoyed a surplus over their own consumption. Exchange, which was earlier merely accidental and concerned only what was left over by chance, now became regular between pastoral and agricultural tribes. As a result, social wealth increased and more slave labour was used.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major social division of labour occurred when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;handicrafts separated of&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom agriculture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Exchange thus penetrated into the community. Economic inequality increased, and, besides the division into free men and slaves, there appeared distinctions between the rich and the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As more products were made specially for exchange, the latter became a vital social necessity, rather than a practice among individual producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next major social division of labour was the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of mental from manual work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby mental work was monopolised by a tiny minority, by the ruling classes which took the management of production and public affairs entirely into their own hands. And hard physical work became the lot of the vast majority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those were the main causes and circumstances underlying the division of human society into large social groups, into hostile classes.  How did the classes form?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They formed in two ways. Firstly, they formed as there emerged in the clan an exploiting elite initially consisting of the aristocracy, and as impoverished members of the clan were turned into slaves for their debts. Secondly, they derived from the enslavement of war prisoners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us begin with the first way. How did the exploiting elite come to stand apart from the more or less uniform commune? Primitive men enjoyed approximately equal living conditions while heads of families and communities enjoyed equal social status.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Common interests were looked after by functionaries under the supervision of society. They were concerned with settling disputes, superintending water reservoirs and religious practice. The functionaries were invested with certain rudimentary powers of government, but by and large they were merely the servants of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the productive forces increased and communities joined into larger groupings, the division of labour proceeded further, and special bodies were set up to take care of common interests and settle disputes. These bodies, which acted on behalf of the society as a whole, were isolated from, and might even be hostile to, individual communities, and they gradually became more independent. Eventually, this independence of public offices with relation to society evolved into domination over it. The former servant became master. Individuals who had risen to power merged into whole ruling classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second way in which classes formed was thus. As production developed, extra labour was required. At first, neither the individual community nor the larger society could provide it. The source of extra labour was found in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conquerors became aware that it was more expedient to spare the prisoners and make them produce the surplus product. With time, however, community leaders, who had the surplus product in their control, began to enslave their fellow-tribesmen by legal means which they devised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such are the two principal ways in which classes formed. Their common result was slavery which was the first form of exploitation, typical of antiquity. Slave-owning society comprised three classes. The first class—the slave-owners—included the ruling aristocratic elite and later, a larger section of the rich. The second class was composed of freemen—farmers, cattle-breeders and artisans who usually became dependent on slave-owners. The third class was composed of a heterogeneous mass of slaves of different nationalities and languages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus was society divided into the classes of the exploited and exploiters, the oppressed and their rulers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Class Antagonism ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of all antagonistic class societies since the disintegration of the primitive-communal system has been one of the struggle between classes. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, nobleman and serf, capitalist and workman, in short, oppressor and the oppressed, were forever in opposition to each other, Waging an incessant struggle, now secretly, now openly, which ended either in the revolutionary remaking of society or in the destruction of the warring classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is important in this respect to note the role of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working classes in social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The question has often been posed in the history of social sciences as to the relative worth or even necessity of different classes in society.  This question has no single answer for all ages.  There was a time when the landed aristocracy was a useful and indispensable element of society. Then the bourgeoisie, inexorably produced by history, launched out against the landed aristocracy, smashing its political rule and itself gaining political and economic supremacy. Yet never, ever since classes emerged, has there been a time when society could dispense with the working classes. The names and social position of these classes changed, the slave gave place to the serf, and he to the proletarian, who, although not a bondman, had nothing except his labour power. The history of all antagonistic class formations shows that whatever modifications the leisure classes may undergo, society cannot go on without the class of producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As antagonistic class formations succeeded one another, the forms of exploitation were modified, but the labouring classes ever remained oppressed. The crudest forms of exploitation were practised under slavery. The slave was treated no better than a draught animal.  He was deprived of every right, he could not have a family, and in ancient Greece he could not have a human name, only a nickname.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In his treatise on agriculture, Varro, the Roman writer living in the 1st century B. C., mentions in a most natural way that agricultural implements are divided into three kinds, namely, the talking kind, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., the slaves, the kind making inarticulate noises, e.g., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;xen, and the mute kind, such as vehicles. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The class structure of feudal society stems from the following features of the latter. Firstly, the feudal economy was natural, tending to be self-sufficient. Secondly, the means of exploitation under feudalism was binding the peasants to the soil. The feudal lord who owned the land allowed plots of land to the peasants so that they should work for him. To get the surplus product, he had to have on his land peasants who had plots, implements and animals. A peasant who has no plot, no horse, no farm, is not a suitable object of exploitation.  Thirdly, the peasant was personally dependent on the lord. As he had land, he only worked for the landlord under compulsion. The feudal economic system rests on extra-economic compulsion, serfdom, the peasants’ legal dependence on the landlord, and their underprivileged position.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under capitalism. society&#039;s class structure underwent a change. The feudal lord and the serf were replaced by the capitalist and the worker. Compared with the slave, who was wholly dependent on the slave-owner, or with the underprivileged serf, the worker is legally free. Nevertheless, his dependence on the capitalist is as great, only its form is different. The worker is deprived of the means of production.  All he has is his labour power, and he may make his living by selling it. The only one who can buy and employ labour in capitalist society is the capitalist. So the worker has nothing for it but to sell himself into bondage to the capitalist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Slaves and slave-owners, serfs and landowners, workers and capitalists&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;these are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal classes of three antagonistic class formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, viz., slavery, feudalism and capitalism. It would, however, be a gross oversimplification to view the class pattern of a formation merely as the relationship of the basic classes, i.e., the classes which express the essence of the dominant relations of production. No “pure” socio-economic formation ever existed, for every formation included some elements of the previous stages of social development, as well as seeds of the future socio-economic formations.  Classes which are associated either with vestiges of earlier production relations or with those which are just beginning to develop are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;non-basic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in slave-owning society there were nonbasic classes of free citizens preserved from the primitive-communal system, i.e., small peasants and handicraftsmen. As the slave-owning system developed, these social groups disintegrated and joined the ranks of the lumpen proletariat. Under feudalism there were the social strata of artisans and traders organised in guilds and companies. In the later middle ages there began to form the bourgeoisie and the working class which were to become the basic classes of the next socio-economic formation.  In many capitalist countries landlords and peasants continued for a long time as non-basic classes. Prominent among the non-basic classes of capitalist society is the petty bourgeoisie.  Non-basic classes and other social groups join the class struggle on the side of opposite basic classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How irreconcilable the basic interests of the antagonistic classes are is witnessed by countless and incessant class battles, armed revolts and other sharp conflicts which abound in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Slave-owning society was shaken to its foundations by gigantic slave rebellions. The uprisings under Aristonicus in Asia Minor and Spartacus in Rome have gone down in the history of liberation struggles as major landmarks symbolising the slaves’ splendid courage and dedication.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many peasant revolts under feudalism also have gone down in the history of liberation struggles. Let us recall the famous Jacquerie in 14th-century France, when Jacques Bonhomme—the contemptuous name by which French seigneurs called peasants—got the feudal lords, from the South of France to Paris, trembling in their boots. We may also recall the German peasants’ uprising in 1525, which Engels regarded as the cornerstone of German history, the famous Russian peasants’ uprisings under Ivan Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin und Yemelian Pugachev.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proletarian movements have also left a deep mark on history. The uprising of workers in Lyons (France) in 1830, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in the 1840s, workers’ active participation in the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune, the first socialist revolution—such were the stages of the proletariat’s struggle in the 19th century. These movements showed that the proletariat had become an independent force in society capable of becoming the vanguard of social progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the class struggle pervades all of the most substantial aspects of social life, it naturally develops in its every major sphere, such as economic, social and intellectual spheres. Having studied vast historical material, Marx and Engels established that in all antagonistic class societies the class struggle develops along three main lines, taking the form of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic, political and ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; struggle. Each is waged by different classes to protect and defend their interests, but the methods of such defence are, of course, different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the capitalists guard their profits, going to al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lengths to multiply them, while the workers fight for human working conditions and social security in illness, disability and old age. Even in this struggle workers develop a sense of solidarity, an awareness of the unity of class interests, and the rudiments of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The workers’ economic struggle, even if it should develop spontaneously, can grow into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;political struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This occurs where the state with its instruments of power joins the struggle on the side of the ruling class. Dealing with the workers by legal and extra-legal means, unleashing police reprisals and sending regular troops to put down industrial or student unrest and “riots”, the exploiters’ state introduces violence into the struggle, which is, as a rule, armed violence. Then the revolutionary proletariat is obliged to spearhead its struggle against the political machinery of the exploiters’ power, i.e., against the bourgeois state. The first step in the direction of political struggle is the political strike. Let us recall, for instance, the Obukhov defence in Russia in 1901. Such instances of workers’ economic action turning into political struggle are not infrequent in our own times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet political struggle may be of different kinds, depending on its general line and goals that are being fought for. Policy in the workers’ movement may be of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reformist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or trade-unionist, as Lenin referred to it) or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kind. Reformist policy does not aim at taking society beyond capitalism. It does not affect the basis of property but confines itself to a struggle for improving workers’ living standards and extending their rights within the existing social system. Revolutionary policy, on the contrary, is aimed precisely at overthrowing this system through the proletariat’s struggle. That is why revolutionary policy alon&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; furthers the political maturity of the proletariat and the masses led by it. Whereas the workers movement arrives at a reformist policy on its own or under trade union guidance, it must be brought to a revolutionary policy by the party of the working class. Only such a party can raise the political understanding of the proletariat and its allies enough to make them aware that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production and the conquest of power by the proletariat are urgent goals of the day-to-day political struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Efforts to elevate the workers’ movement to the level of conscious and well-organised revolutionary political struggle encounter obstacles put up by the right wing of social-democratic parties and within communist parties, by opportunists and revisionists who would revise the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism.  Petty bourgeois and nationalist revolutionists (the leftists in the workers’ movement) are only good at revolutionary phrases, but are useless when it comes to consistent revolutionary policy. True to their adventuristic spirit, they sooner or later lose contact with the masses and either substitute provocations for the revolutionary struggle or swing it towards nationalism, running counter to proletarian internationalism. Therefore, in guiding the workers’ political struggle, Marxist-Leninist parties have to fight on two fronts, both against right-wing opportunism and left “revolutionism.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At present, the chief danger the international workers’ movement has to cope with is that of the “left&amp;amp;quot; deviation of which the policy pursued by the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most notorious expression. Having embarked on nationalism, richly flavoured with Chinese racialism, the CPC leaders have long broken off with Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was pointed out at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: “Now it is far too little to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teaching; they are directly hostile to it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-101|101]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Maoists are seeking to bring about a split in the world communist movement and undermine the unity of the world socialist system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our discussion of the proletariat’s political struggle naturally brings us to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problems. The political and ideological forms of the class struggle are closely interrelated.  Through their ideologists, classes justify their policies, i.e., their aims and goals. Ultimately, any policy stems from material interests, but its theoretical justification (the justification of class aims, goals, strategy and tactics) rests with ideology. Ideology is a sort of political compass.  It may contain illusory ideas, fallacious goals, groundless “grounds”, pipe dreams and vain hopes. All such things are characteristic of the ideology of classes doomed by history and leaving the historical arena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is only one ideology which does not deal in illusions. It is the scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology of the working class. It combines the highest level of scientific objectivity with the maximum proletarian revolutionism.  This is the source of its strength and ever-increasing prestige.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific socialist ideology is opposed by bourgeois ideology, which springs from capitalism. Some elements of bourgeois ideology persist even under socialism, especially at its initial stages, owing to the fact that consciousness lags behind being, whereby some vestiges of the old linger in the economy, everyday life and social relations, and also owing to the influence of alien views penetrating from the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For these reasons the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated: &amp;amp;quot;The positive changes in world affairs and the detente create favourable opportunities for the broad spread of socialist ideas. But, on the other hand, the ideological contest between the two systems is becoming ever more acute, and imperialist propaganda ever more subtle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“There is no room for neutralism or compromise in the struggle between the two ideologies. Here there is a need for constant political vigilance, active, efficient and convincing propaganda, and timely rebuffs to hostile ideological subversion.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-102|102]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Under capitalism, a law operates, according to which all the three forms of the class struggle are objectively bound to grow.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In every antagonistic formation, the class struggle&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;whether economic, political or ideological—is the driving force of social progress. Its significance increases considerably after the political struggle is joined by the working class, the most revolutionary class in history. It takes part in the revolutionary movement as the exponent of the interests of society at large. This puts the working class in the van of all working people exploited by capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Historical Destinies of Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and also the socialist revolutions which took place in some countries after World War II, have dramatically confirmed the proletariat’s capacity to realise its ideals and become the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The overthrow of bourgeois domination can be effected only by the working class because its very economic circumstances prepare it for the overthrow, giving it the opportunity and sufficient strength to do it. Capitalist society splits up and scatters the peasantry and other petty-bourgeois strata, whereas it consolidates and organises the proletariat. The proletariat is the only class whose economic role in large-scale production qualifies it for the leadership of all working people, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;exploited&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and oppressed by the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The bourgeoisie can be overthrown only when the proletariat becomes the ruling class, capable of suppressing the bourgeoisie’s inevitable resistance and organising all working people to build socialism. That was what made Marx insist that the class struggle necessarily results in the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt; the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx, Engels and Lenin were always highly ironic about sundry projects for equalising the classes, bringing about a “harmony of capital and labour.” Exploding these castles in the air, Marx wrote that it was not the logically impossible &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equalisation of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; but the historically necessary &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;abolition of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which was the true secret of the proletarian movement.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-103|103]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What does “abolition of classes” mean? How can classes be abolished? Have they not continued for millennia?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin associated the abolition of classes with the elimination of class distinctions. He wrote: “The abolition of classes means placing all citizens on an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; footing with regard to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens equal opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-104|104]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abolition of classes is a lengthy process which occupies a whole historical epoch following a socialist revolution. It passes through a whole range of stages ending in the disappearance of classes. The socialist revolution overthrows the government of the exploiters, which paves the way to the abolition of classes. But however necessary, it is still, in Lenin’s view, not the most difficult task involved in the abolition of classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next important stage in the process is the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. According to Lenin, two important problems are solved in this period. Firstly, private property is abolished, which puts an end to the capitalist class. Secondly, the individual petty economy based on peasants and artisans is reorganised into a large-scale social economy. On the basis of socialist co-operation, the main class distinctions between workers and peasants are obliterated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first phase of communist society, socialism, immense efforts are made to overcome the remaining class distinctions. How this proceeds is clear from the recent changes undergone by the class structure of Soviet socialist society. In 1939, wage and salary workers and their families accounted for 52.5 per cent, collective farmers—44.9, and individual farmers and artisans—2.6 per cent. Twenty years later, in 1959, wage and salary workers accounted for 68.3 per cent, collective farmers—31.4 per cent, and individual peasants and artisans—0.3 per cent. In 1976, wage and salary workers accounted for almost 83.6 per cent and collective farmers for about 16.4 per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In future, as the material and technical base of communism is built and essential distinctions between physical work and brainwork are obliterated, the boundaries between the working class, farmers and intellectuals will vanish. Ail will become members of a classless communist society in which everybody will enjoy full social equality and an equal relation to the means of production, and there will be equal conditions of work and distribution and an equal opportunity for everyone to take part in managing public affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 5. The State ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The State and the Division of Society Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists would always depict the state as a body responsible for maintaining public order and safeguarding the interests of all classes and social groups alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This point of view is also current in modern bourgeois sociological literature. It is often expressed by the ideologists of the petty-bourgeois strata who seek to represent the modern capitalist state as a body extending equal protection to the rights of capitalists, factory, office and professional workers, farmers, students, and so on. They allege that laws enacted by the modern bourgeois state are equally acceptable to capitalists and workers, to the well-to-do and the poor. This state allegedly makes no distinction between the poor and the rich, between employers and wage workers.  They describe it as the “welfare state” providing for “social harmony,” “universal well-being,” and so forth. Advocates of welfarism try to bolster up their theory with examples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us suppose, they say, that the workers of a factory have gone on strike. The trade union has put forward reasonable demands for higher wages, better conditions and other improvements. However, should these demands be granted, the employers’ profits will suffer.  For this reason, the negotiations between the strike committee and the employers run into difficulties. Neither side will make concessions, blaming and abusing each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us further suppose that in the heat of the quarrel, a management representative loses control of himself, snatches a revolver from his desk and starts shooting at the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What will happen then? Quite obviously, say the “welfare state&amp;amp;quot; theorists, police will be summoned to the factory. The capitalist who fired at the workers will be arrested and put on trial. The court will sentence him under the laws of the country to whatever he should get for manslaughter or armed assault.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The description is usually followed by a list of countries and addresses at which similar incidents occurred. The readers are invited to check the facts and make absolutely sure that every word of it is true. The suggestion is that if the state were to safeguard the interests of the employers alone, it would not have punished employers for killing workers—it would have paid no attention. But the facts prove that the bourgeois state protects both the employers and the workers, and that it is committed to class reconciliation and class harmony. So say the advocates of the “welfare state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some acquaintance with concrete facts showing how the state has evolved will be enough to blow their arguments sky-high.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, we must note that the state has not always existed. It did not exist at the primitive-communal stage. Peoples whose development was retarded by concrete historical circumstances and who knew no division into classes had no state either. From this it follows that the state appears when society becomes divided into classes, i.e., with the appearance of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In primitive society, people lived in clans, dominated by tradition, customs, the prestige, respect and authority of the elders. At times, authority belonged to women, whose position then was not subordinate and oppressed as it is in antagonistic formations. Yet never under the primitive-communal system do we observe a particular order of people setting themselves over the rest of society as its rulers equipped with a machinery of coercion, such as armed forces, prisons and other enforcement organs.  In a word, under the primitive-communal system, the state proper did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, its absence did not disturb the social routine nor result in conflicts upsetting public order or the social system. The primitive-communal system was not threatened with chaos. Although there was no state, there were strong communal links among people, and society functioned normally. The force of custom and the elders’ prestige were quite enough to keep society going without any special enforcement machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the primitive-communal system all people were equal, nobody had any privileges, and the elders received no remuneration for their services. Their reward was universal respect and obedience. Primitive society knew nothing of class conflict and therefore needed no organ of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History demonstrates that the state emerged only with society’s division into classes, i.e, into groups of people one of which can systematically appropriate the labour of another or, in other words, exploit it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main and decisive characteristic of a state is public, or political, authority, which is always the dictatorship of the ruling class.  And dictatorship is a form of government relying on force, i.e., producing the legal basis of its own activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Next come the tools or organs of political power, which include the army, the courts, prisons, the police, intelligence and counter-intelligence. The government which controls them is itself an organ of political power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like power itself, its tools are unmistakably of a class nature. Take, for instance, the bourgeois army. So that an army recruited from the people (as it must be, for the time of regular mercenary armies has gone—although, of course, mercenaries are still used by imperialists) could be set over against the people and should, if need be, shoot at the people, soldiers are deprived of political rights, isolated from the people and inculcated with  anti-popular ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the organs of power to be able to carry out the will of the ruling class, there must be well-trained officials appreciative of their jobs in the government apparatus. Top government positions are filled exclusively by members of the ruling class. To maintain its apparatus, the state imposes all sorts of taxes on the population. Taxation in the bourgeois state is naturally geared to the interests of the capitalists. The working people have to bear the brunt of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, another characteristic of the state is division of the population over territorial units, which has superseded the division into tribes and clans. However, neither territory nor population separately are characteristics of the state. This is obvious since the state is not eternal. It emerged at a certain point in history, and it will inevitably wither away. Population and territory, on the other hand, were there before the state appeared and will be there after it has withered away. Only all characteristics taken together enable us to tell whether or not a social formation is a state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, the state arose because some classes felt the need to keep other classes under their own control. It arose from the conflict of these classes and is the tool wielded by the economically dominant class which, with the aid of the state, becomes also dominant politically and acquires, therefore, more means to suppress and exploit the oppressed classes. When society was first divided into classes, special machinery was required to safeguard the privileges of the ruling class. Such machinery for oppressing working people was first found in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;slave-owning state&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It gave the slave-owners the power to exploit the slaves. At that time, the communication service maintained by the society and state was undoubtedly poor, and mountains, rivers and seas were enormous obstacles to intercourse.  States therefore often formed within narrow geographical bounds. The state machinery was comparatively primitive, but sufficed to keep slaves in slavery and maintain the foundations of the exploiting social system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state has ever been the organ of oppression of one class by another. Thus, the ancient slave-owning state was the state of slave-owners, serving to keep the slaves in subjection, the feudal state was the nobility’s organ for oppressing serfs and villeins, and the modern bourgeois state is the instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. This regularity is clearly traceable throughout human history ever since society split into the antagonistic classes of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Were there no states which were above society and relatively independent of the opposing classes? Were there no exceptions from the general rule?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example of such an exception is provided by 17th-18th century absolute monarchy which kept the nobility and the bourgeoisie balanced against each other. Another instance is Bonapartism under the first and especially second French empires which set the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. It must be noted, however, that a situation of this kind emerges during particular historical periods when the warring classes reach an equilibrium which allows the state to become relatively independent of both classes and to act, to all appearances, as a go-between for them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; However, such a situation prevails but for a short time. As the alignment of the class forces becomes more definite and one class triumphs over the other which has to yield its leadership of society, the state machinery must also make its choice. More correctly, it does not choose but is chosen by the class which has established its own domination. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.g., the French absolute monarchy of the 17th-18th centuries manoeuvred long enough between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, making concessions alternately to the one or the other. Finally, however, the victorious bourgeoisie took the state machinery into its own hands. Engels wrote: ”...The state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap.”&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-105|105]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Historical Forms of the State ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; We learn from history that the state took numerous forms. Even in the epoch of slavery, in ancient Greece and Rome, advanced countries of their day, we encounter different forms of state. There appeared at that time &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;monarchy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;republic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;aristocracy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. Monarchy is rule by a single person. In a republic, all organs of power are elected by the citizens.  Aristocracy is government by a small privileged class. Democracy is people’s power (from the Greek &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;demos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the people, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;kratos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;strength).  Contemporary politicians clearly differentiated between these forms of state. Supporters of one or another of them engaged in a tense political struggle. Yet, whether they were monarchy, republic, aristocracy or democracy, they were all slave-owners’ states. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we look at the history of slave-owning society, we see that, for all their different forms of government, the common denominator of a monarchy and a republic was that slaves were not considered citizens enjoying civil rights and duties and, moreover, were regarded as less than human. The state and its law were for the slave-owners who alone were recognised as citizens enjoying full rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Slave-owning republics were organised on different lines. Some republics were aristocratic, some democratic. In an aristocracy, only a small number of privileged slave-owners took part in political life. In a democracy, on the other hand, all citizens (i.e., all barring slaves) played a part. These facts are essential, for only by bearing them in mind can we understand what the state is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The slave-owning system was superseded by feudalism, which was also of great significance to the history of the state. Under feudalism, the state began to serve a new ruling class, the nobility. The peasants, then the largest class, were bound to the soil. Only lords and gentlemen enjoyed certain rights, but the peasants had none at all. Their position was little different from that of slaves. Still, the serf had a cottage, in which he lived with his family, and a plot of land on which he was allowed to work part of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle ages, serfdom predominated.  But even then the state assumed numerous forms and both monarchies and republics could be found, although the latter were less numerous than in the previous period. However, the feudal lords who owned land and serfs controlled the state no matter what form it took. Clearly, neither the slave-owning nor the feudal system, where the majority was ruled by a tiny minority, could do without coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As under slavery so under feudalism the oppressed classes rose against their exploiters time and again. In medieval Germany, numerous peasant revolts finally developed into a real civil war against the landlords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless both slaves and serfs were crushed by the state machine for neither had a. historical future and so was incapable of setting up a social system under its own control. The famous Leyden papyrus describes a victorious slaves’ rebellion in ancient Egypt.  But what was the result? The slaves partly replaced the slave-owners, seizing their wealth and turning them into slaves in turn. Thus the foundations of slave-owning society remained just as they had been.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To maintain and preserve their rule, the landlords had to have a machine for keeping great numbers of people in submission. When a feudal state was a monarchy, it was ruled by a single person; when it was a republic, it was ruled by elected representatives of the nobility. That did not change the essence of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next important stage in the development of the state was capitalism. It began to emerge towards the end of the middle ages when, after the discovery of America, world trade expanded, extraction of precious metals increased, gold and silver became means of exchange, and the turnover of money helped to build enormous fortunes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Society was reorganised. Its division into lords and serfs was ended. The laws were proclaimed to be the same for everyone. They extended equal protection to all and protected property from those who had none.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, despite the change, the state continued as a machine helping the capitalists to subjugate the workers and poorest peasants, who were, however, nominally free. The capitalist state promulgated universal suffrage while bourgeois ideologists loudly denied that the state had anything to do with classes, contending that it expressed the will of the people.  All such doctrines merely glossed over the essence of the capitalist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever the shape, so long as it is a bourgeois state, so long as it preserves private ownership of the land, factories and private capital and upholds wage slavery, it remains a tool of the ruling classes for oppressing the masses. The working class has a very clear idea what it must do with this state machine. It must wrench it from the bourgeoisie, break it and replace it with new machinery serving the working class and its allies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, our examination of concrete facts bearing on the state’s development through the ages enables us to draw some important conclusions. Firstly, we have seen that the state arises with the appearance of classes. Secondly, the state has always expressed the will and interests of the ruling class. It is a machine for the oppression of one class by another. Lastly, every form of state—and they are rather numerous—must be judged above all in a class context. We must find out which class uses the state to ensure its domination and which classes the state suppresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The Bourgeois State ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what can we make of the example cited at the beginning of this chapter? The incident during negotiations between the strikers and the employers clearly shows that we are dealing, in this case, with a situation in which the bourgeois state takes the workers’ part. After all, who was punished? A capitalist, a member of the ruling class. Does it not prove that the state can be above classes, reconcile them, smooth over class conflicts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact is that in this case, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and advocates of reformism quote the example of an individual capitalist.  The thing to do, however, is to find out the real essence of the bourgeois state, to see whether it serves society as a whole or merely the bourgeoisie. Supposing we assume, for example, that the workers do not negotiate with the employers. The strike committee declares that the factory now belongs to the workers, and the employers are simply told they are no longer wanted. What will happen then?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Police will arrive in force to deal with the situation. Should the workers prove too much for them, troops will be sent too. The bourgeois state will do everything to show the workers that the principle of private property is unshakable. In practice, the state will defend the interests of the capitalist class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeois state defends the interests of an individual capitalist insofar as he belongs to the capitalist class. But should an individual employer commit actions detrimental to the capitalist class as a whole, he may be sacrificed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, we are dealing with a situation where an individual employer commits actions which may harm the capitalist class as a whole.  One can also imagine the following possibility.  The employer&#039;s firing and shooting to death a strike committee member could provoke a storm of indignation among the workers, a spontaneous workers’ rebellion. Such a spontaneous outburst could well infect other factories in the neighbourhood. To suppress the disturbances, troops and police would have to be sent, and, naturally, the capitalists will incur damage as many factories come to a standstill and property is destroyed during clashes between workers and police.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the capitalists would also sustain great moral damage, as the bloody clash with the people would shatter the faith in the “popular” character of the bourgeois state, the belief that the capitalist system, as its ideologists argue, most closely corresponds to “human nature.”  Therefore the capitalist class as a whole and its state may, and often do, sacrifice individual employers and capitalists, if it pays the class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our everyday experience proves the truth of the Marxist doctrine which regards the bourgeois state as a machine of subjugation used by one class against another, as an instrument of class domination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Its Forms and Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx considered his idea that the class struggle inevitably results in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to be one of his major contributions to the doctrine of classes and class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was advanced for the first time by Marx and Engels in 1848 in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which mentions the “proletariat organised into a ruling class.” As a term, the dictatorship of the proletariat was first used by Marx in his letter to J. Weidemeier of March 5, 1852.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When they expressed the idea of the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx and Engels could not yet answer the question as to what forms the dictatorship of the proletariat might assume and what was to be done with the old state machinery, for history had as yet supplied no answers. The 1848 revolutions in France, Germany and Austro-Hungary made it clear that the proletariat could hardly use the old, bourgeois state machinery. Moreover, the old state, geared to the exploitation and oppression of the masses, is a strong weapon in the hands of counter-revolutionary forces. Therefore, as they generalised the experience of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, Marx and Engels arrived at the conclusion that the old bourgeois state machine must be smashed in the course of the proletarian revolution and replaced by a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was still not clear what concrete forms the dictatorship of the proletariat could assume. The answer was supplied by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Paris Commune&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which was the first state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviets&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; appeared in Russia during the revolutionary battles of 1905-1907, and triumphed in 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Subsequently, world history produced yet another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat-the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people’s democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which triumphed in some countries after World War II.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that as the masses in capitalist countries fight for the triumph of the proletarian revolution they will create more forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat which will subsequently be established.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Demonstrating the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx emphasised that without it the working class could not hold power, suppress bourgeois counterrevolution, reorganise the economy and alter people’s psychology, or go over to communist formation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Critique of the Gotha Programme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Marx showed that between capitalism and socialism (the first phase of communism) there is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transitional period&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which cannot be circumvented. The purpose of this period is to extend and complete the socialist revolution and build an entirely different economic system, alter the social structure of society, ridding it of the exploiting classes, rear a new force of intelligentsia, work a revolution in people’s minds, and ensure the triumph of communist ideology.  The political organisation of society during the period of transition to communism must necessarily be the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did history bear out the truth of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitable nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is safe to say that the truth of this doctrine has been conclusively confirmed not only by the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia but by the experience of all other socialist revolutions of the 20th century. The sole path leading from capitalism to communism lies through a transitional period, through an epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a weapon of the socialist revolution are many. They include sustaining and consolidating the political power of the working class; ensuring political guidance of society by the working class and its Marxist political party: suppressing the resistance of the exploiting classes, overthrown but not yet completely abolished; putting an end to economic anarchy; nationalising the principal means of production and organising the economy on socialist lines in keeping with the chief aim of building a communist society; carrying out a cultural revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, these tasks have to be carried out in the context of the class struggle against the international bourgeoisie and against the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The leading and guiding force of the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the party of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Guided by the experience of the young Soviet Republic, Lenin named following five forms of class struggle: (1) suppression of the overthrown exploiters; (2) civil war; (3) neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie; (4) utilisation of bourgeois experts; (5) inculcation of a new labour discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the exception of civil war which need not necessarily accompany socialist revolution, these forms of class struggle proceeding under the dictatorship of the proletariat have universal significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is indispensable to the triumph of the socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie will not surrender its power without a struggle but will persistently try to use its political experience against the socialist government of workers and peasants. For this reason, the triumphant march of the socialist revolution is always accompanied by subversion, sabotage and political conspiracies by its enemies. The dictatorship of the proletariat suppresses resistance from the remnants of the overthrown exploiters, providing the requisites of a complete moral and political unity of society. Once it is achieved, the dictatorship of the proletariat need no longer suppress these remnants. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that, important as it was, suppression was not the chief function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A socialist society is one in which there are no irreconcilable differences and no struggle is waged between the workers and the peasants, and between these two classes and the people’s intelligentsia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;civil war&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a form of class struggle in the transitional period. In the case of the young Soviet Republic, it was imposed on working people by the exploiting classes and was a terrible calamity and a great handicap to the people’s progress to socialism. The peoples of China also suffered under the heavy burden of civil war. Bur there was no civil war in the European countries which took the socialist path. Civil war, therefore. is a form of class struggle which need not necessarily occur in all countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us consider the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This mainly implies the peasantry. It would be a mistake to consider such neutralisation as a line for isolating the petty bourgeoisie politically from the revolution. Actually, it is a question of skilfully paralysing the possible wavering of the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie (particularly the peasantry) towards counter-revolution, with a view to enlisting the peasants’ participation in the building of socialism. All slogans moved by the Party on the peasant question served this purpose. It was no accident that the triumphant advance of Soviet power was given overwhelming support by the middle peasants everywhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience derived by the CPSU from its successful effort in winning the peasants’ support for the socialist revolution is of immense international significance. It is of special importance today to the developing countries and the national liberation movement with its emphasis on the agrarian question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;utilisation of bourgeois experts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in the interests of the revolution and socialism was a controversial issue in the young Soviet Republic. Many “‘left&amp;amp;quot; revolutionaries would not hear of it, being morbidly suspicious of all such experts. Nevertheless, life soon proved them wrong. Today, all socialist countries employ old experts. It only has to be ensured that they do not obstruct the country’s political course or serve any anti-socialist ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Last but not least comes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inculcation of a new labour discipline&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin considered this form of class struggle particularly significant.  And no wonder, for it has to do with millions summoned by the revolution to smash the old way of life. It is therefore extremely important to direct the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses towards building the new society and to inculcate a new attitude to labour, the state, and discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A line must be drawn between the expressions of the last-mentioned form of struggle in the period of transition to socialism and that under socialism. Whereas in the transitional period, the ideological struggle inside the country is an acute form of the class struggle, under socialism, when society has attained moral and political unity, the social basis of such acute struggle disappears. There remains, as Lenin wrote, the systematic &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;guidance of all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; working people. That, according to Lenin, also is a struggle, but a struggle of a particular sort, the overcoming of definite, albeit entirely different, resistance, and a quite different sort of overcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now the struggle is waged no longer between classes or social groups but between integral society and individual exponents of survivals of the past among its members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dictatorship of the proletariat develops along with the whole of society. In conditions of full-fledged socialism it transforms into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;state of the whole people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet history may be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition from capitalism to socialism; (2) the period of development from the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the state of the whole people (1934-1960); and (3) the state of the whole people which is developing, as the building of communism advances, into communist public self-government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Concerning the first-mentioned period, one must take note of Lenin’s idea that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lies in constructive, educational and organising activity of the state building socialism for the first time in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state of proletarian dictatorship begins its transformation into a state of the whole people as soon as the building of socialism is completed. The best documentary proof of this process as it developed in the USSR was the adoption of the 1936 Constitution—the Constitution of triumphant socialism. It gave expression to new principles of democracy, embracing the whole people. Unequal election quotas for workers and peasants were abolished, and universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot was introduced. Development of democracy under socialism is an objective process. Socialism cannot advance unless it extends and improves its democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process whereby the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat has developed into the state of the whole people was completed in the early 1960s as the result of the complete and final triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union. The working-class dictatorship in the USSR was not abolished but gradually developed, as socialism advanced, into a state of the whole people. The leading role played by the working class in Soviet society and the state is further developed in the process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the building of communism advances, the state of the whole people undergoes a good deal of change. Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1977, to give legal expression to the establishment of the state of the whole people in the Soviet Union, proclaims the right of citizens to take part in the administration of the state and society, and in the discussion and adoption of laws and the decisions of national as well as local significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This article is of special importance in that it gives tangibility to the provisions of the Constitution on who has the plenitude of political power, and the right to participate in administering the state and society in the USSR. To declare that political power in a country is vested in the people is not enough. Al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; constitutions have proclaimed it, ever since the time of the Greek city-states. Yet, the fact remains that through the ages it was just as Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed: ‘Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” The purpose of Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution is to name the concrete things which make it possible for the people to take part in administering the state and society. What are these things?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, it is the people’s right to wield political power. Political power in the USSR is exercised through Soviets of the People’s Deputies which are to be found at every level, from the Supreme Soviet at the head of the country down to the local Soviet of the smallest settlement. What does it look like in terms of numbers? In 1977, there were altogether over two million elected Soviet deputies. Furthermore, every Soviet sets up some standing committees which enlist the assistance of public-minded citizens in carrying out their work. To quote 1977 figures again, there were almost thirty million such activists involved in the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to administer effectively the state and society, the working people should not only take part in political decision-making, but also see how decisions are carried out. In the Soviet Union, this is done through a major social institute known as People’s Control. Its bodies, elected by citizens, are to be found at every factory and office, supervising the work of the management. In 1977, the elected bodies of People’s Control comprised nine million citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the people cannot be said to have all political power, unless women take part in administering the state and society. In the Soviet Union, women currently account for 31 and 35 per cent respectively of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, and for 48 per cent of the deputies of the territorial, regional, district, city, town, and village Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 6. Social Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Types of Social Revolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
When discussing the material life of society we mentioned that one socio-economic formation usually passes into another only via a social revolution. That does not mean, of course, that we must search history for a ‘slaves’ revolution” which ruined and shattered the slave-owning system. No such revolution actually occurred. Nor did slavery perish at the hands of the slaves, although its foundations had been thoroughly shaken by slaves’ rebellions. Slavery became a blind alley in mankind’s road to progress. It owed its downfall to its disgust for labour which wasted it away.  A society which has no respect for labour, has no future. It was because the slave-owning Rome was rotten to its core that the warlike barbarians conquered it so easily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social revolutions were performed when feudalism had to give way to capitalism, and in the current epoch of people’s transition to socialism; they are accordingly of two types, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois or socialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In the first-mentioned case social and political revolutions are spaced in time. As the capitalist economic system forms in the womb of fully-developed feudalism, it comes into conflict with the old feudal superstructure, thus necessitating a political revolution which will crown the social change—already accomplished under feudalism—with a bourgeois superstructure. For this very reason, there is no special period of transition between feudalism and capitalism for it proceeds, as it were, in the bowels of feudal society, so that the bourgeois revolution merely has to put the finishing touches to it by changing authority. This is why purely political bourgeois revolutions are possible, leaving intact the economic and social patterns of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is quite a different thing. In this case, the social revolution does not precede the political revolution but, on the contrary, begins unfolding only after the political revolution has been performed by the proletariat. Whereas the bourgeois revolution ends in seizure of power, the proletarian revolution merely starts with it. Whereas the bourgeois revolution usually has no comprehensive social and economic programme to offer, the proletarian revolution has one, and terminates in the construction of socialism. Whereas progress towards capitalism requires no transitional period, it is indispensable in the changeover to socialism. Lastly, whereas the bourgeois revolution merely substitutes a different form of exploitation, the socialist revolution sets out to rid mankind of all exploitation. That is why the bourgeois revolution does not even mention scrapping the feudal state machinery—the bourgeoisie takes control of the old state machinery and makes it serve its own interests.  To the socialist revolution, on the other hand, demolishing the bourgeois state machinery is the key task essential for establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough analysis of the history of revolutions enabled the founders of Marxism-Leninism to discover the objective laws governing the progress and consummation of social revolutions. First of all, let it be noted that the fundamental question arising in any revolution-the conquest of power-is resolved by revolutionary violence alone. This is a law of social revolution, particularly effective with respect to the socialist revolution. No ruling class was ever willing, or moved by compunction, to surrender its power to another class. As regards the bourgeoisie, there is ample historical evidence to show that it fights the revolutionary proletariat tooth and nail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The founders of Marxism-Leninism have discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal law of the social revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. As a general rule, a revolution cannot take place in the absence of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary situation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., without a national revolutionary crisis which breaks out when the lower classes can no longer bear the old way of life and are ready to overthrow the hateful system even at the cost of their lives, while the upper classes are no longer able to rule in the old way. Ina revolutionary situation, no class or group remains neutral. All social forces join in the struggle either on behalf of or in opposition to the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, not every revolutionary situation resolves itself in a revolution. That was what happened in Russia in the early 1860s, when the revolution was baulked by the tsarist reform of 1861. There was another revolutionary situation in Russia in 1914, but its development was interrupted by the outbreak of world war. Consequently, a revolutionary situation is not enough for a revolution to occur. Besides objective social changes, which are the essence of a revolutionary situation, subjective factors must also be present, viz., the revolution needs a leader in the shape of a political party, and it needs a real force in the shape of an alliance of the classes comprising the revolutionary people. Only given these conditions can a revolution be born out of a revolutionary situation and succeed under true and wise leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is Lenin’s classical formulation of the principal law of revolution: “... For a revolution to take place it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realise the impossibility of living in the old way, and demand changes; for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘lower classes’ do not want&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to live in the old way and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the revolution can triumph. This truth can be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters). It follows that, for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that the majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers) should fully realise that revolution is necessary, and that they should be prepared to die for it; second, that the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics (symptomatic of any genuine revolution is a rapid, tenfold and hundred-fold increase in the size of the working and oppressed masses—hitherto apathetic&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;who are capable of waging the political struggle), weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to rapidly overthrow it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-106|106]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. How the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Is Established ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We now come to another important question: Can the dictatorship of the proletariat be established peacefully? This question was posed long ago by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Marx accepted the possibility of the proletariat taking power in a peaceful way in Britain, the United States &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and the Scandinavian countries where no strong military or police state apparatus existed in the middle of the 19th century. It must be noted that such a peaceful way of taking power would still be a revolution, and in such a peaceful revolution the conquest of power would still have to be effected by force. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no less important to draw a line between revolutionary violence and the armed method of carrying out a revolution. The former is a necessary attribute of any proletarian revolution while the latter depends on concrete circumstances. Power does not have to be won by the proletariat by force of arms any more than a proletarian revolution needs to be accompanied by civil war. Neither is unavoidable. The dictatorship of the proletariat can, as history attests, be established peacefully, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a socialist revolution can proceed by peaceful methods&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theoretical account of this possibility was given by Lenin in 1917, in his April Theses.  Lenin wrote that under dual power which emerged after the February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution in Russia not only could the socialist revolution advance peacefully under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets”, but it was the only possible path towards the dictatorship of the proletariat under the circumstances.  Lenin indignantly criticised those who, in April 1917, called for an armed insurrection against the Provisional Government, describing them as irresponsible adventurers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some may object that peaceful development of the socialist revolution in Russia was interrupted in July 1917, and the proletariat had, after all, to seize power by arms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is quite true. But, firstly, the socialist revolution in Russia had indeed developed peacefully until July 1917. Secondly, Lenin&#039;s theory on the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat by peaceful means was dramatically confirmed by the 1919 revolution in Hungary, where a people’s government was established by peaceful means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may further be argued that peaceful development of the revolution in Russia was due to the unique circumstances of dual power that prevailed in the spring and summer of 1917, and that the Hungarian revolution, too, was performed in singular historical circumstances.  That is true. Even so, who can warrant that circumstances favourable to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat may not occur in future?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, the programmes of most communist parties in the capitalist world state that in contemporary conditions the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution is a real possibility.  This certainly does not imply any renunciation or revision of the problem of seizing power by force or by military means: the latter may become necessary just as it happened in Russia 1n 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there are two ways of solving the problem of power involved in a socialist revolution, an armed way and a peaceful way. Both imply the use of the people’s revolutionary force. Which of them a revolution will take will depend on the circumstances prevailing in the country concerned. Communists consider it their sacred duty to prepare the masses for either contingency. The military path calls for special preparation. The peaceful path is not easy either, the communist party having to help the masses to acquire sufficient political understanding and experience to tackle problems arising in a socialist revolution. Both methods were brilliantly mastered by Lenin&#039;s Communist Party in Russia. Both stood the test of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Which method is preferable? The choice depends entirely on the situation. If the possibilities of the peaceful method have been exhausted or, perhaps, are altogether absent, nothing remains but the armed way, which becomes a necessity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Should the revolution develop peacefully, does it mean that the bourgeois state machinery need not be demolished? As we mentioned, in the mid-19th century Marx considered that, as an exception from the general rule, that might be the case in Britain, Scandinavia and the United States in which the army and police were not greatly developed. In the epoch of imperialism, Lenin came to the conclusion that in all capitalist countries, the military and police machinery had attained full development.  Therefore, no exceptions should be made, and the rule&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i.e., the scrapping of the bourgeois state machine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;should become universal. It should even be smashed in the case of a peaceful revolution. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution imply that the parliament and all parliamentary institutions should be retained?  That too is determined by the concrete circumstances. Evidently, in traditionally parliamentary countries there is no pressing need to abolish the parliament either during or after the revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat can exist and develop quite well as a parliamentary democratic republic as it can now rely on the world socialist system to safeguard it from bourgeois counter-revolution and restoration of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Chilean tragedy,” the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated, “has by no means invalidated the communist thesis about the possibility of different ways of revolution, including the peaceful way, if the necessary conditions for it exist. But it has been a forceful reminder that a revolution must know how to defend itself.  It is a lesson in vigilance against present-day fascism and the intrigues of foreign reaction, and a call for greater international solidarity with all those who take the road of freedom and progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-107|107]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Recognition that the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected peacefully is of immense tacti&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;al significance in current conditions, serving to extend the scope of the labour and communist movements, increase the political understanding of the masses, and refute the bourgeois slander about the revolutionary movement and revolutionary theory. This thesis, now adopted by the communist parties of bourgeois countries, is a reliable weapon in their ideological struggle against leftist, adventurist trends in the labour movement seeking to push the working class and its party onto the path of adventurism and sectarianism. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Combined experience in the development of the world socialist system, said L. I. Brezhnev, proves that today the power is still the central problem the revolution has to solve. Transition &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;t&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o socialism is only possible if the working class and its allies use political power to abolish the rule of exploiters. Socialism can be victorious only if the working class, led by its Party, organises the masses for the building of socialism. It can consolidate its position only where people’s government succeeds in defending the revolution from the internal and external class enemies. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of social revolutions to human history cannot be overestimated. It was not for nothing that Marx called them &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;locomotives of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Revolutions immensely speed up the march of history. They make new social and political forces essential to society’s progressive development mature faster, resolve the contradictions that have been accumulating over the ages, and thereby clear the way for the progress of history. Socialist revolutions play an especially prominent role. They carry out the historic mission of liberating mankind from exploitation, abolishing social antagonism, ending the previously inevitable anarchy of social development, and eliminating all forms of the individual’s estrangement from society and culture. It must be noted in this connection that Marxist-Leninist theory emphasises a key point in revolutionary practice, viz., the creative and constructive nature of socialist revolutions. They close the prehistory of mankind and inaugurate the history of emancipated mankind consciously building a communist society and an entirely different type of civilisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. The Role of the Masses and Individuals in History ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is the People? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Society is a complex formation usually comprising diverse classes and social groups, each playing a different role in society’s development.  Under feudalism, for example, the peasants and artisans have to do the hardest jobs—they cultivate the soil, tend the cattle, produce food and clothing, build houses and provide luxuries too.  The nobles, on the other hand, engage in court intrigues, manage political affairs, vie for power among themselves, declare war and conclude peace, shine at balls. Which plays a more important part in history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We already know that human history is based on the production of material goods, in which the decisive role belongs to those who are engaged in it, i.e., to working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All material values available to society are created by their work. No doubt, their daily labours are less conspicuous than the doings of kings or generals; nevertheless, they are the real foundation of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A logical materialist view on history consists in recognising the decisive role of material production in society’s development and, consequently, the working people’s key role as the makers of history and the chief force of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The working people, who are the overwhelming majority, are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the masses. However, at different stages in history, a people does not comprise toilers alone. Generally speaking, the social strata constituting the people vary from one age to another. Therefore, to form a correct idea of what a people is, one must examine concrete stages of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primitive society&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which knew no division into classes and in which everybody had to work, all members of society represented the people. This pattern changes with the division of society into classes and the appearance of toilers and exploiters. The people comes to consist mainly of toilers, but at different historical periods it also includes the exploiting classes. One may say that the conception of the people denotes the social classes and groups jointly tackling progressive tasks facing society.  That was why during the transition from feudalism to capitalism the people included the bourgeoisie, which had an interest in the destruction of feudalism, as well as the toilers, i.e., the peasants, artisans and workingmen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History abounds in situations where the people rise up in arms to drive out foreign invaders. At such times, the people’s role as the saviour of the nation becomes particularly prominent. It was so when the Russian people fought to cast off the Tartar yoke, when they resisted the Napoleonic invasion, and in all similar cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The peoples—the Soviet people above all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;barred the way to Nazism, destroying it and thereby saving world civilisation from the threat of destruction. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since in class society the people is composed of different—often opposite—classes, it would be a mistake to consider it as a uniform formation.  Lenin cautioned against using the word (the people) “‘to cover up failure to understand class antagonisms within the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-108|108]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois countries&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the people is composed of the workers, farmers, progressive intellectuals, the mass of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. In many newly-independent countries and those fighting for their emancipation, the people includes appreciable sections of the indigenous bourgeoisie taking part in the struggle for national interests. Nevertheless, not all the bourgeoisie in such countries are part of the people. The so-called “compradore bourgeoisie”, subservient to and collaborating with the colonial powers and betraying the vital interests of their peoples, must be excluded. The compradore bourgeoisie is quite plainly an anti-popular force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation under socialism is altogether different: the people includes the entire population. This is not surprising because all anti-popular forces have been destroyed and society consists of the friendly classes of workers and peasants which are joined by the working, essentially popular intelligentsia. Thus, as socialism is being built, the social forces are consolidated. An example of such consolidation is provided by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which has shaped as a new historical entity. Formed of different nationalities, of two friendly classes and the intelligentsia, it is cemented by the unity of its vital interests, political views and moral standards. This unity rules out the possibility of class struggle within the people. That is one of the greatest achievements of socialism in the USSR. The unity of the Soviet people rallying round the CPSU indicates how far developed socialism has advanced along the road to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. The People’s Role in History ====&lt;br /&gt;
To comprehend the people’s role in history, one needs to understand how it contributes to society&#039;s material and spiritual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know that the people is the producer of all material wealth, both the means of subsistence and of production being obtained by its efforts. Engels wrote that nature was the mother, and labour the father, of wealth. But whose labour is it? Who works on the objects of labour and remakes nature, compelling the natural properties of things, the forces of nature to serve man and even creating new qualities and forces not found as such in nature? It is men, the working people, who are the most honourable and important on Earth. The people alone creates all material wealth of society by its labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, what part does the people&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the working people above all—play in the system of production? First of all, let us recall that the workers engaged in material production make up a part of the productive forces. They constitute living labour. Without it, dead labour stockpiled in the means of production cannot return to life. Although the character of the productive forces does not depend on men’s choice, it is still the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; who, in conjunction with the instruments of labour (which may be individual or social, based on a division of labour or otherwise, involving simple or complex cooperation) actually &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;determine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the character of production and so of the productive forces in general. And this is an essential characteristic of material production, determining to a great extent the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us look at the working people’s role in production relations. It would be incorrect to assume that in economic systems based on exploitation the relations of production are represented merely by the owners of means of production, i.e, by the exploiters, not the workers. No doubt, the most vivid embodiment of capital are the capitalists. Nevertheless, capital in its bourgeois form (unlike usury capital, for instance) exists only insofar as the workers’ labour power is a commodity which the capitalist can buy and which is consumed in the process of production organised on capitalist lines.  Labour power is as essential to the capitalist economy as capital itself. Its owners are the proletarians—a class which has a decisive role in history—and which constitutes, in our own age, the bulk of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The capitalist mode of production breeds the proletariat and helps it develop into a world revolutionary force. That is the key point of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bred by capitalist society, the proletariat is the exponent of new social relations and a force which is to destroy capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The proletariat, i.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;., the main body of working people in capitalist society, is the producer of the material goods essential to that society and of capitalist profit (and with it, of capital&#039;s might in general). Simultaneously, it is the exponent of future economic tendencies and embodies the social character of production and other material requisites of the socialist system of economy. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Holy Family&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, defined the proletariat’s role very exactly. To history.  they wrote, the intentions of an individual or even a class do not matter, even if it is a class as strong as the proletariat; what matters is what the proletariat is and what role it is to play owing to its place in the capitalist economy. The revolutionary role of the proletariat as the grave-digger of capitalism, liberator of society and builder of socialism has objective grounds. The proletariat’s revolutionary character necessarily results from the conditions of its existence, from its place in the capitalist economy, and from the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Apart &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom being the producer of all material wealth, the people is also the object and subject of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. The history of society is above all the history of the people, and in this sense the people is an object of history. At the same time, history is made by the people. It is the maker of history, its subject. It makes history not by a whim or caprice but in accordance with the objective laws of social development. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The people is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;decisive force in all revolutionary change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Every revolution in history was performed by the people. Even revolutions at the top performed by a narrow group always drew on the people’s discontent with the existing social institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For many centuries, the exploiting classes tried to keep the people from taking an immediate part in historical development, although they did not always succeed. Inhuman oppression again and again compelled the masses to rise against their overlords. It was not until the victorious proletarian revolution that the masses had become an active constructive force in history. As socialist society progresses, the people’s role as the architect of history, as a force building a communist society, increases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The people makes an immense contribution to human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The people creates language—a method of stating and communicating ideas—in the absence of which there could be no culture of any kind. Apart from making common effort possible, language furnished the foundations from which spiritual culture grew.  It also furnished the source of folklore, the starting point of every national literature. The people has created marvellous songs, dances, sculptures, paintings, buildings. These masterpieces are the sources on which professional writers and poets, painters and sculptors, composers and architects draw. From their labours, the people have amassed a vast store of information about the external world, from which science has grown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In primitive society, with brainwork not yet divided from manual work, the people’s role as creators of spiritual culture is obvious. After society divides into classes and brainwork and physical labour become separate, the ruling classes spare no effort to limit the people’s creative effort and, isolating it from spiritual culture, monopolise the latter. That naturally hindered the people’s spiritual activity but never stopped it. The people—that perpetual source of creative talent&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is the creator of spiritual values in class society too. All prominent figures in the field of spiritual culture always found in folk art an inexhaustible source of ideas and images for their own work.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. The Role of Outstanding Personalities ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Thus the people is the decisive force of historical development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Yet history has preserved numerous records of outstanding personalities.  In the past, historians and social scientists were convinced that great men were the prime-movers of history while the people was an inert mass only brought into motion by them. The entire world history was reduced to the doings of kings, military leaders, politicians, and so on. Books on history, as Plekhanov observed, looked like Lives of Great Men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every class in every epoch had its own ideas about greatness. In the view of the feudal ruling class, great men had to be of noble, preferably royal, blood. Hence all kings, emperors.  and so on, were great. Some rulers were, indeed, people of more than ordinary ability, but they were very few. For the most part, kings and queens were not particularly gifted and ruled merely by hereditary right.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalism, which swept out feudal privilege, has made wealth the yardstick of greatness.  But does a fortune make one an outstanding personality? Obviously it does not. The proofs are not hard to find, if proof be needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If, however, we put class prejudice aside and take a sober view of history, we shall have to acknowledge that there were a fair number of statesmen, politicians and generals who left their personal mark on some events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it holds that the decisive role in history belongs to the masses, historical materialism is far from denying the prominent role played by great men. Historical materialism only asserts that history is made by the people, not by great men. Some of the latter realised it. In a speech made in 1869, the German “Iron Chancellor” von Bismarck, referring to his friends who extolled his influence on events, said: “My influence on events with which I have had to do is in effect overestimated; but even so nobody has yet expected me &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;to make&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; history.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outstanding individuals are themselves a product of history, of definite social circumstances which enable such an individual to display his abilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Plekhanov justly observes, most of Napoleon’s marshals had been strangers to military art before the French bourgeois revolution. One of them had been a fencing master, another an actor, and another a barber. In feudal times nobody would have expected them to make a successful military career. Napoleon himself would have died an obscure general or colonel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, in order to play a prominent role, an individual must possess outstanding abilities. Yet abilities as such only potentially make an outstanding personality. This potentiality may be realised only given favourable social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Men do not pursue their historical activities singly. Social actions are performed by a mass of people. When several classes are involved, one of them usually assumes the leading role.  Thus, in the struggle against feudalism the people was led by the bourgeoisie. In the changed conditions of imperialism the exploited people fighting against the bourgeoisie is led by the proletariat. To ensure success to the struggle, a vanguard must be organised, consisting of the better-aware members of the foremost class, i.e., a political party of this class must be organised. As it functions, this party advances the more experienced and gifted of its members—political leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To recognise the outstanding role of communist party leaders is to acknowledge their authority, experience and foresightedness. The strength of communist party leaders lies in their close contact with the masses and in their capacity to express and defend the basic interests of working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, the people is not an anonymous mass, but a vast number of individual personalities, living, active architects of history. Then what is man, and how is he related to society?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Man Is the Sum of the Social Relations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism has introduced an entirely new conception of the social nature of the individual, proceeding from his intimate association with his environment. Of course, attempts to interpret the individual in close association with the Social environment were made before Marx—for instance, by 18th-century materialists. However, the first authentic scientific interpretation of the individual was given in Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx evolved the classical formula disclosing the social essence of the individual. The human essence, according to Marx, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is the sum total of the social relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This formula shatters abstract anthropologism, whereby both materialists and idealists vainly tried to discover and classify the specific features allegedly inherent in human nature. For the most part, their man was nothing but a copy of the biblical Adam, complete with halo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If man is essentially the sum of the social relations, then it is clear that every man is a child of his age, an exponent of its industrial, class, family, national, political, legal, religious and other social relations. Is the individual just a vessel for the social relations? According to the Marxist-Leninist view, it is by no means so.  Man takes an active part in the historical process. As regards outstanding figures, they are the torches kindling others or lighting the way for them. Maxim Gorky thus depicted Danko holding aloft his burning heart to give his people light.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This social conception of human nature underlies the Marxist approach to the unfolding and fullness of the personality. An individual exists and develops in the context of the social relations, actively asserting himself through them. As to the fullness of personality, this depends on one’s contacts with other people.  The more varied and intensive they are, and the more actively pursued by the individual, the more developed one’s personality will be. We must note at once that these factors should not be regarded as external to the individual. For example, one’s life activity is a personal characteristic, but it has a social meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the early stages of social development—e.g., under the communal system&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the individual was more integrated compared with contemporary man. The reason for this, Marx explains, was that the individual had not yet fully developed his relations, so had not yet put them in opposition to himself as independent social forces. This alienation of the individual from the social forces opposing against him starts at the beginning of civilisation and proceeds, becoming ever more complicated, throughout the history of civilisation, up to developed communist society. What, then, are the stages in this process? The explanation of this problem, too, was given by Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The relations of personal dependence (at first entirely primordial) are the first forms of society in which human productivity develops merely to an insignificant extent and at isolated points. Personal independence which is based on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dependence is the second major form wherein a system of comprehensive communal metabolism, universal relationships, all-round needs and universal abilities is built for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal unfoldment of individuals and the subordination of their common collective productivity as their common property, is the third stage.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-109|109]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These three types of relations between society and the individual are stages in the formation and development of man’s social essence. Capitalism destroys personal relations among men, changing them into relations in the world of things. Things as commodities dominate men and determine their relations. The capitalist division of labour and mechanised production have produced a man able to fulfil partial industrial or social functions but unable to fulfil himself in society as a human being. Communism alone wipes out the products of man’s historical development which cripple his independent personality and moulds an integral and harmonious personality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. The Individual in Communist Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what is an integral and harmonious personality?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The eminent French utopian Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and other utopian socialists sought to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of human nature applying the law of varied employment. Indeed, one who has mastered several complex skills becomes a different person, the one-sidedness and disunity of his personality being overcome to some extent.  Fourier hoped that, in this way, the complete personality of the medieval artisan could be revived. That, alas, was but a romantic dream, which very soon crumbled. In the age of mechanised production, changing the proletarian back into the medieval artisan is out of the question. Even were such a reversion at all possible, it would be a step backwards in the historical evolution of both the individual and the relations of society and the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, if it does afford some possible development of the individual, varied employment utterly fails to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of the individual. What, then, is the answer?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unable to solve the problem for the whole of the nation, bourgeois sociologists have divided society into a mass of drudges and a creative elite which, they claim, alone can hope to attain harmonious development. Yet, can society afford to make all working people slaves so that a small elite can devote itself exclusively to intellectual endeavour? Can the individual be fully developed in this way? Quite obviously, this is a utopia, but, unlike Fourier’s noble dream, it is a reactionary utopia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then where can we find a realistic programme for the full and harmonious development of human nature? Why does Lenin repeat Fourier’s words that in the society of the future everyone will know how to do everything? Is such a thing possible? Men will certainly continue to professionalise labour. Then what about the development of the individual?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man can and must be creative with respect to the things that mainly fill his life. Therefore the key to the problem is not quantity (numerous skills) but quality, i.e, making work creative and man a creator, turning ordinary activity into creative work. Then labour will not be a mere economic necessity but an indispensable need felt by every able-bodied member of society. Then what about man’s all-round development?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Putting the utopian and elitist approach to the problem aside, man’s versatility should be considered from the viewpoint of his most vital functions. What are they? Man must be creative, highly moral, highly cultured and physically developed. The CPSU Programme formulates all these requirements in the context of the current stage in the building of communism in the USSR. Versatility, from this standpoint, implies that the individual, as far as his activity and conduct are concerned, behaves actively, creatively, as a collectivist, and this gives him the greatest satisfaction. Can it mean, perhaps, the sacrifice of individual interests at the altar of communist duty?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communist world outlook and communist duty are of great significance to the moral make-up of the individual. Even so, the programme for the comprehensive development of the individual cannot be considered a simple realisation of communist duty. Anatoly Lunacharsky (the first Commissar of Education) recalls a remark Lenin made in a conversation when it touched on his model attitude to his duties. Lenin said: &amp;amp;quot;Need you tell an apple tree that it does its duty bearing fruit? When communist duty has become ingrained in the individual, it stops being a duty and becomes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; vital need. It will be a vital need for every member of communist society.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. Social Consciousness and Social Being ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Forms of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Is it not an oversimplification to say that social consciousness reflects social being? Is not the spiritual life of mankind much too complex to be reduced to this formula? That is how anti-communists usually attack this Marxist proposition. In general, can one bring spiritual culture, multiform as it is, into a system and reduce it to different levels and forms? Let us look at these problems and see if we can isolate the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal forms of human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first thing we come up against is the complexity and many-sidedness of this particular sphere of the life of human society. It embraces folk songs, epics, poems of all kinds, numerous literary productions, music, sculptors’ and painters’ works, scientific discoveries and inventions, sayings, and so on. Still, this enormous diversity is neither chaotic nor capricious.  Many scholars long ago expressed the idea that spiritual culture reflects the economic conditions prevailing in society. Marxism alone, however, was able to scientifically formulate this idea.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The notion of spiritual culture is itself a little vague. For this reason Marxists have replaced it by the more exact notion of social consciousness. In this way, they underline the fact that all products of spiritual culture are the result of the activity of man’s consciousness. And since man is not isolated from others but is connected with society at large, in a great many ways, his conscious life appears as social consciousness, and the aggregate consciousness of the members of the given society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism is based on the philosophy of materialism. This means that the question of the relation between mind and matter, between material being and intellectual activity is decided by Marxism in favour of matter, which is considered to be primary, while consciousness is considered to be secondary. With reference to history, the interpretation of this general philosophical principle is that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social being is primary and social consciousness secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This means that social being, i.e., men’s economic activity, material production and the relations formed by people in the process of production are at the basis of men’s spiritual activity. Social consciousness, i.e., the spiritual, ideological life of society, people’s varied views and ideas, political, legal, moral and other doctrines, reflects social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall try to examine social consciousness and select its main characteristics. The first thing which strikes us is the policy of different states, the more influential political parties, numerous political conceptions, theories and views. The varied and complex totality of political doctrines, conceptions, programmes, views, ideas constitute the political form of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Closely linked to it is another form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. It is the sum of principles and rules of human conduct endorsed by the state. Law is the expression of the will of the ruling class and is strictly enforced by the state through its extensive machinery of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are, however, principles of social behaviour which are dictated not necessarily and not only by the state. There are principles of conduct and criteria of good and bad, of right and wrong, which are observed and shared by tradition and are imposed by custom, public opinion and the authority of society as a whole or of a particular group. The totality of such principles of conduct and the ideas of what human conduct ought to be constitute the form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ethics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acquaintance with recent publications, paintings, films, plays, etc., is part and parcel of the life of a modern person. Books, pictures, films, plays arouse either pleasurable or negative emotions and stimulate thought. The varied activities comprised in this area of cultural life are the form of social consciousness called art.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor can the life of a modern person be imagined without such a form of social consciousness as science, without scientific notions of the multifarious world around us. We appeal to science and scientists, advocate a scientific approach to the investigation of nature, society and thought, fight against unscientific methods, and proudly state that we live in the age of the scientific and technological revolution. We discussed the role of science in society at some length earlier in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A particular form of social consciousness which seeks to give us a general conception, a general picture of the world, a knowledge of reality as an integral complex system and furnishes a methodology for studying the world has been named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Philosophy plays an immense role in society.  We only need recall that during the great French revolution the third estate advanced to victory under the slogans put forward by 18&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;th-&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;century materialists and Enlighteners. We may also note that Marxist-Leninist philosophy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s the theoretical basis of communism. This alone attests to the extraordinary significance philosophy has in the life of society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, sermons, divine services, quarrels between supporters of different religious trends, and so on play a certain role in the spiritual life of society. This form of social consciousness is known in Marxist philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the main forms of men’s spiritual activity or, to put it differently, the main forms of social consciousness. We shall now examine their association with social being. Since in class society&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;such as modern society is—political views hold an important place, we shall start our inquiry with this particular form of social consciousness. Let us begin with an example drawn from history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Ancient Greek biographer Plutarch tells us that Alexander, the son of Philip of Macedon, anxiously followed his father’s military operations. Philip annexed to Macedon one Greek city after another. Some of them capitulated after a long siege and others were taken by storm. As often as not, Philip bribed citizens to open the city gates to him. The successful king liked to say that a donkey laden with gold could take any city.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Greece at his feet, Philip was now planning an expedition against Persia. His ambitious son, Alexander, said bitterly that his father would capture all and leave nothing great or illustrious for Alexander to do. Alexander himself dreamed of conquest and saw himself as the builder of a world empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet Philip was suddenly assassinated and Alexander got the opportunity to carry out his ambitious plans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 334 B. C., Alexander of Macedon, who was twenty at that time, moved his troops into Asia Minor. For nine years (the campaign lasted till 325 B. C.) the peoples of Asia Minor, Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Central Asia and Northern India were plunged into bloody battles.  Alexander executed his plans relentlessly. He showed no mercy to whoever was bold enough to resist him, killing or turning them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alexander built the empire of his dreams. He destroyed the Persian kingdom and annexed its territories, conquering much of Central Asia and establishing his rule over Egypt. True, the Alexandrian empire did not last. In 325 B. C., Alexander, yielding to the demand of his spent troops, ended his expedition. In 323 B. C. Alexander died of fever. His generals began squabbling for power even before he was buried.  And soon the apparently mighty empire broke up into several kingdoms under Alexander&#039;s associates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now look at the matter from a different angle, as many historians and social scientists did. Philip of Macedon decided to unite Greece under Macedon, and he carried out his intention. Alexander the Great wanted to create a world empire. Plunging many peoples into bloody war, he created it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems that a leader gets an idea, proceeds to execute it and finally carries it out. Then the idea comes first and is followed by the action of the masses which causes change in social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, nothing can be simpler than to explain the development of world history from the doings of politicians and the influence of political views and theories. Thus, Plutarch associates the rise of Athens—one of the principal cities of ancient Greece—with the expedient policies of the legendary hero Theseus, and ascribes the foundation of Rome to another legendary hero, Romulus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, on going deeper into world history and examining the causes which actuated the outstanding personalities, such explanations prove utterly superficial. Let us examine the concrete facts associated with the activities of Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philip of Macedon has gone down in history as the king who unified Greece. But what were the circumstances of the unification? Greece was weakened by incessant wars between its city-states. During hostilities, vineyards and orchards were cut down, crops destroyed, cities and villages burned. Internecine wars devastated Greece. Many historians related that villages lay in ruins, blackened stumps were all that was left of olive groves, the fields were overgrown with weeds. That was one reason why Greece was weakened. But there was another reason, which lay in the very essence of slavery. As the internecine wars went on, the number of slaves kept growing and for that reason free artisans and farmers became ruined.  Because slaves were much cheaper to keep, owners of large workshops employing slave labour were able to undersell the farmers and artisans. So small workshops were closed one after another while large shops multiplied. Farmers became ruined and their land was bought up by rich people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The masses staged rebellions. History has preserved the memory of an extensive rebellion of the poor in Corinth. The rebels killed the rich in the streets and wrecked their houses. The rich, however, triumphed in the end, ruthlessly suppressing the rebellion. Aristotle relates that the rich took this oath: “I swear to be the people’s eternal enemy and to cause it as much harm as I can.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Frequent clashes of the rich and the poor also contributed to the weakening of ancient Greek cities.  Many rich slave-owners were willing to accept the control over slaves and the poor. Therefore they pinned their hopes on the Macedonian kingdom in their neighbourhood, which was waxing stronger.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this made it easier for Philip of Macedon to unify Greek cities under the aegis of Macedon.  He took advantage of the fact that ancient Greece had been weakened by the devastating wars between city-states, as well as of the fact that many Greek Slave-owners accepted his rule, prising their wealth more than the independence of their native cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to Philip’s son, Alexander. In his case, too, we find internal causes which lay in the very social being of ancient Greece and determined Alexander’s activities. In the 4th century B. C. it was increasingly felt that the internal sources of slavery in Greece were fizzling out. In order to develop further, slave-owning society had to be constantly supplied with slaves. Most of the free poor in Greece either had been enslaved or served in different armies as mercenary soldiers. Moving into the forefront were other sources providing slaves, viz., wars of conquest, subjugation of neighbouring and distant peoples and their enslavement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we look closely at the progress of hostilities conducted by Alexander, at the development of his military expedition, we shall observe this increasing tendency. Each time he won a battle, a great number of slaves were sent to Greece. For example, after his first triumph over the Persians, Alexander sent 60,000 slaves to Greece. After a second successful battle he sent 90,000 slaves. The number of slaves increased with every city taken.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough examination of concrete historical evidence, of political leaders’ views and goals shows that consciousness can never be anything else but realised being, and men’s being is the actual process of their life. We have tried to illustrate it by the examples of two prominent political leaders—Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. This approach to the analysis of different results of spiritual culture shows that in every sphere the results of the activity of consciousness are always a reflection of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But human culture is exceedingly rich and varied. Let us see whether it is corroborated by examples drawn from other spheres of spiritual culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Social Psychology and Ideology ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have considered but one part of man’s intellectual activity, i.e., his political views, political consciousness. It reflects definite aspects of social being, definite social needs. Yet, intellectual activity is highly complex and is not wholly reducible to politics. In human spiritual culture, we can isolate such areas or forms of social consciousness as morality, art, religion, science, philosophy and law. We know from experience that different principles of conduct, imposed by morality, works of art, religious beliefs, philosophical views, rules of conduct prescribed by law, and, lastly, science, play a great role in our life. The question is: Do these forms of social consciousness reflect social being as unavoidably as, we have found, political views do? Does the objective law of the reflection of social being hold equally in their case?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we must note that it is quite insufficient to analyse merely the more or less theoretically formalised views such as political conceptions, philosophical doctrines, complex ethical constructions, and so on. In human society, immense significance is attached to men’s moods and feelings. And it is very important to grasp the fact that all ideologies stem from one root, viz., the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the given age, characteristic of this particular age, the totality of its manners, customs, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every development stage of the productive forces necessarily presupposes definite human relations in the process of social production or, to put it differently, it presupposes a definite social pattern. The latter, in its turn, affects men’s psychology, their habits, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals which must necessarily become adapted to the prevailing way of life, to the means of gaining a livelihood. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Society’s psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; always ultimately matches its economic system, being determined by it.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To clarify this idea, let us look at some illustrations from the history of French art and literature. Many art critics quite justly call the outstanding French poet and novelist Victor Hugo, the talented artist Eugéne Delacroix and the brilliant composer Hector Berlioz a romantic trio. Yet, not only did each of them work in a different field of art, but they were in general quite far apart. At least, Hugo did not care for music and Delacroix despised romanticist musicians. Nevertheless, the productions of these men who were so unlike reflected the same social sentiments. Delacroix’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dante and Virgil&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is pervaded by the same mood which prompted Hugo to write his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hernani&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and inspired the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Symphonie Fantastique&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of Berlioz.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why should Hugo’s writings, Delacroix’s paintings and Berlioz’ music be psychologically similar? The psychology of French Romanticism will be clear to us only if we regard it as the predominant mood of a concrete class existing in concrete historical circumstances. We shall see why this movement in art, which was essentially bourgeois, should have taken so long to win acceptance from the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact was that the contemporary French bourgeoisie failed to understand much of what its own representatives sought to express in literature and art. Nor is such difference of Opinion at all unusual between ideologists and the class whose tastes and aspirations they express. It explains many features of mankind&#039;s intellectual and artistic development. In this particular instance, this difference of opinion resulted, incidentally, in the “refined elite” holding the “hidebound bourgeois” in great scorn which still continues to mislead many art historians, who are utterly incapable of understanding the supremely bourgeois character of French Romanticism. This intricate relation, the influence of social being on social psychology and, further, on more clearly defined areas of social consciousness must never be lost sight of.  Unless we pay attention to these interrelations, much in human culture will puzzle us. For instance, in classless primitive society, men’s conception of the world, their tastes, all their habits, customs, feelings, notions, strivings and ideas were directly influenced by their production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; But in a society divided into classes, the immediate impact of economic activities on the spirit and especially on ideology is much less obvious. While Australian aborigines have a dance representing herb-gathering by women, no dance popular among French aristocratic ladies in the 18th century can be linked in any way with production activities because they engaged in none. To be able to understand what the Australian dance is about, it is enough to know what role herb-gathering plays in the life of an Australian tribe. But to see what the minuet is about, it is not enough to be familiar with the 18th-century French economy. The minuet is one of the dances expressive of the psychology of the leisure class. This psychology underlies most of the customs and “polite manners’ of so-called high society. At first sight, the economic life, social being, seems to be ousted in this case by purely psychological factors. That, however, would be a superficia&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; judgement, for one must not forget that the very emergence of leisure classes in society is the result of its economic development. It means that in this case too, social being retains its predominant significance. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class regards the lower strata with profound disdain, so that it becomes distinctly characteristic of its psychology. Medieval French lords, for instance, relished verses representing peasants as most repulsive creatures:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Villeins are monsters one and all,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As ugly as anything,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing fifteen foot tall&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And misshapen withal—&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Humpchested and numpbacked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants’ social psychology was in an entirely different vein. Indignant at the aristocrats’ arrogance, they sang:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are just as human as they,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And we can suffer just as much as they.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants asked: “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a word, each of the two classes looked at things from its own point of view following from its own position in society. The position of classes, their antagonism tinged the psychology—the totality of sentiments and aspirations—of the opposite sides. The more tense the class struggle became, the more it influenced the psychology of the opposite classes. So, one who wants to know the history of ideology in a society divided into classes must reckon with this influence, otherwise much will escape his understanding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Morality as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to morality or ethics which is the totality of diverse principles of conduct imposed by public opinion and the traditions, habits and customs established in society. Everyone knows from experience the great significance attached to these principles on which human conduct depends. We speak of some acts as good and of others as bad. We consider one kind of behaviour to be nice or good and another shabby or bad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no law that you must say good morning to your friends. If you don’t, you won&#039;t be fined for it. Lack of common civility, churlishness or hardness are not punishable offences. Yet everybody would rather be polite, tactful and sympathetic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everyone knows that there is nothing pleasant in being considered rude or conceited or in earning public disapproval. That is why people try to conform—or at least seem to conform—to the commonly accepted principles of conduct or morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the oldest form of social consciousness. It appeared in primitive society much earlier than art and religion, also very old forms of social consciousness. One may say that morality appeared with the first human community. That is clear because no community, however small it may be, can exist without a system of morals. For this reason, historians have found no people without at least a primitive morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is evidence of peoples with no philosophy or science, no law and hardly any art.  It is still open to question whether some had or had not religion. But every people had morality of some kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact attracted the attention of historians and ideologists long ago. As they tried to explain the origin of morality, some of them ascribed it to god or other divine sources and maintained that morality was fundamentally immutable and in no way connected with what we call the material conditions of men’s life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet if we turn to the history of moral notions and principles, we shall see that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morals change along with living conditions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. They depend on the productive forces and when the relations of production change, morals also change.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Collectivistic production relations under the primitive-communal system bred collectivistic habits and traditions and a collectivistic morality. When, however, the productive forces advanced and it became more suitable for the purpose of production that people should privately appropriate some things, i.e., when the relations of production changed, people’s notions also changed. Having private possession of something, which had been considered previously rather unnatural and unusual if not altogether indecent, now was regarded as ordinary and quite consistent with the social interest.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the foregoing we can conclude that people, intentionally or unintentionally, ultimately derive their moral notions from economic practice.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examining &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;S&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one must always bear it in mind that the class pattern directly affects morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, if we look at developed capitalist European countries, we shall observe different moral conceptions some of which are rooted in their past history and some in their present mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall come across, first, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Christian-feudal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inherited from the past and preserving some moral views of the age of feudalism.  This Christian-feudal morality is divided, in the main, into Catholic and Protestant morality, and these are subdivided into a whole range of sects, from the Jesuit Catholic and Orthodox Protestant to liberal enlightener. Alongside such moral conceptions we find &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern bourgeois morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and next to it &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; projected into the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In countries following the socialist path, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., those having built socialist society and those in transition from capitalism to socialism, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; gains precedence. It is based on collectivist principles stemming from the domination of common ownership which corresponds to the development of modern production. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists often reproach Marxists for allegedly denying morality, and say that Marxism itself is amoral. Such allegations intentionally or unintentionally distort the essence. of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxists deny that there is any eternal morality resting on immutable dogmas. They repudiate all attempts to impose on men a moral dogma of any sort as eternal, final, immutable moral law, under the pretext that the realm of morality has principles of its own which exist forever. Marxists maintain that every moral theory, every totality of principles of conduct is, in the last analysis, the product of society&#039;s concrete economic conditions. In class society, morality is always of a class nature: it either justifies the domination of the ruling class or, as soon as the oppressed class becomes strong enough, expresses its indignation against the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the most resolute form of protest against the exploiters’ government.  It expresses the interest of the working class and all working people. Speaking about communist morality at the 3rd Congress of Komsomol, Lenin said that communist morality was that which helped to demolish the old exploiting society and to rally all working people round the proletariat building a new communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communist morality helps the proletariat in its efforts to win a happier future for mankind, to build communism. It musters working people against all exploitation, against private ownership which puts in the hands of an individual that which is produced by society’s common effort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Under the primitive-communal system, with its collectivist principles, morality was also collectivistic. In class society, change in the class pattern told most directly on the moral views of classes and individuals. In socialist society, communist morality begins to develop. In a word, in this sphere of man’s spiritual life, in this form of social consciousness, the rule that change in social being causes change in social consciousness also holds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Religion as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing on Plutarch, we can reconstruct one of ancient Roman’s religious customs. Imagine the sun-flooded streets of ancient Rome. A procession is slowly moving along accompanying a criminal to the place of execution. The armed lictors, full of official importance, step beside the man, while a little way behind citizens follow, exchanging their impressions of the trial and discussing the impending execution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doomed man does not seem to notice anything. He is plunged in thought and already far from the turmoil of life. But what is this sudden commotion? Why are the guards trying to push the man into a by-street? Why is he looking round with a renewed interest in life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another procession is moving towards them surrounding the chair in which a Vestal is carried, a priestess of Vesta, the Roman hearthgoddess. According to Roman custom, a condemned criminal who meets a Vestal on his way to execution is not executed. The Vestal has only to swear that the encounter was unpremeditated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, human laws had to give way to what they believed to be divine law. This illustration tells enough about the importance they attached to religion. One could quote numerous examples showing the role religion played in the life of other people, in other countries, in other times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us recall the crusades conducted in the middle ages. Apparently to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims, thousands of crusaders massacred Muslims. Let us recall the massacre of St. Bartholomew (1572) when 30,000 Huguenots were killed in Paris alone because of religious strife.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is religion, which can save a condemned criminal’s life and destroy hundreds of thousands of innocent people? How should revolutionaries approach this important social phenomenon? How are these questions answered in Marxism-Leninism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us hear first what representatives of religion have to say—the theologians, who are constantly dealing with religious problems and preaching religious principles. How do they define religion?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most Christian theologians derive the word “religion” from Latin &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reverence, which is connected with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religare&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to tie back. From the theological standpoint, religion is the link between man and god. Religion appears as a totality of statutes, dogmas, cults, rites and principles of conduct decreed by god and binding a believer to god.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar view is shared by non-Christian theologians. The Buddhists, for example, believe that religion boils down to the dogma on the attainment of salvation by Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhist religion, to the principles of conduct laid down by Buddha, which promise salvation and subsequent union with Buddha.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Muslims, followers of Allah, religion is embodied in the rules and principles of conduct written down by Allah in the sacred book of the Muslims, the Koran, which vouchsafe to the believer communion with Allah and salvation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up, theologians hold religion to be a bond between man and god. But first of all it is necessary to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;prove&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that god exists. The point is, however, that there are no means of proving it, nor can there be any.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is this so? To begin with, there were numerous gods whom men used to worship, but then it turned out that these gods did not exist. To mention but a few, they were Bel, Anu, Astarte, Osiris, Isis, Horus, Set, Zeus, Poseidon, Hades, Apollo, Athena, Hera, Artemis, Jupiter, Mars, Janus, Vesta. The list is endless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ancient peoples had implicit faith in their gods. When the ancient Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates dared question the existence of the Olympic gods and deride them, they were made to pay dearly for it. Anaxagoras owed his life to the intervention of Pericles, a leading Athenian statesman. All the same, he was banished from Athens. Socrates was condemned for &amp;amp;quot;neglect of the gods” and died by drinking a cup of hemlock, as was the rule in Athens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christian, Muslim and other theologians are convinced of the importance of religion to mankind because they think that the gods in which they believe really exist. Facts tell us, however, that religious beliefs also played a great role where the objects of worship were clearly mythological, i.e., imaginary. From this it follows that the theological conception of the role played by religion in the life of human society is plainly threadbare. What role does religion actually play?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, religion is a part of the spiritual culture of mankind. Whatever book on history we take, whether written by a theologian, a bourgeois scholar or a Marxist, we are sure to find a section on religious beliefs in the chapter devoted to the culture of a particular people or the culture of some historical epoch.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, we come across religion mostly in connection with culture and those spheres of life which are directly associated with spiritual culture. To be precise, religion is one of the principal forms of social consciousness, one of the major components of men’s intellectual activity, of spiritual world culture. As a form of social consciousness, it is, in a sense, comparable with such important areas of social consciousness as politics, law, morality, art, science and philosophy. After all, social consciousness does not merely reflect reality, social being. It shapes people’s conduct, leading them to act in the way they do. Each form of social consciousness does it in its own way. This equally applies to religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels and Lenin did much to elucidate the meaning of religion. We are already familiar with one constituent of the Marxist definition of religion, viz., that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religion is a form of social &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. That, however, is not all. Marxism also establishes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;specific nature of the reflection of the world in religion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While all other forms of social consciousness reflect reality more or less adequately, religion alone is the form of social consciousness which gives a distorted, fantastic picture of the external world. Marx said that religion “is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantastic realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the human essence”, that it is the people’s illusory happiness, a perverted view of a perverted world, “the general theory” of that perverted world, its encyclopaedic compendium, “its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-110|110]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Concerning the particular quality of religion as a distortion of reality, Engels wrote: &amp;amp;quot;All religion...is nothing but a fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which contro&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-111|111]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is how religion reflects the world. Nevertheless, religion does not boil down to a general world outlook, a general view of the world. It also comprises an emotional, sensuous element, a certain emotional reaction to the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religion should not be conceived merely as some kind of faith in the world being built on a certain pattern and being ruled by gods or other supernatural forces. Religion is not just a definite interpretation of reality, a peculiar theory of the world, however much distorted.  If it were so, it would have been shattered long ago, for it would be easy to prove that this conception of the world has no foundation in experience and to replace these fantastic notions by a scientific conception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, quite apart from other things, religion is a definite attitude to the world. One who has religious notions of the world conceives of himself as part of this fantastic world with which he associates certain hopes, illusions and expectations. This complex of feelings bred by religion makes the latter extremely tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious sentiments refer to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is of a dual nature being an expression of helplessness, weakness and fear on the one hand, and of hope on the other, which sometimes grows over into religious protest, ecstasy and fanaticism. Writing of this level of religion, Marx underlined that “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;protest&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; against real distress.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-112|112]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in Marxist theory two levels of religion are differentiated, viz., the world-view level and the emotional level. Religious notions and ideas constitute the so-called mythological (or worldview) element of religion—a body of myths dealing with the gods, legendary heroes and all sorts of spirits, with their relation to the world and man, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emotional level of religion—just as its ideological level~represents a twisted, distorted level of human consciousness. Religion distorts not only man’s consciousness, his world outlook, but his feelings, his emotional responses to reality as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would not, however, be enough to dwell on these two levels of religious consciousness alone. After all, we have stated that the forms of social consciousness influence and shape human conduct. The distorted conception and perception of the world, inherent in religion as a form of social consciousness, compel man to behave in a similarly distorted, perverse, inadequate manner. A believer worships his god in a definite fashion, performing different rites, offering sacrifices and prayers, kneeling, etc.  All this constitutes the ritualistic or cultic aspect of religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious activity is not, however, confined to worship. Groups, organisations and associations of believers, the churches adopt a definite attitude towards society and social issues, participating in the life of society, social conflicts, the class struggle, etc. These activities are marked by the religious conception and perception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that religion is a highly intricate social phenomenon comprising several levels some of which are related to consciousness, and some to practice. These levels are the result of the twisted, distorted, fantastic reflection and conception of reality. That was what led Marx, after evaluating and summing up all aspects of religion, to conclude that religion is “the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;opium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-113|113]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Lenin regarded this as the key Marxist proposition on religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Religion is a form of social consciousness. It is a distorted, fantastic reflection of the natural and social forces dominating men, a reflection in which earthly forces assume non-earthly, supernatural forms. It is a more or less compact body of mythological-philosophical notions, religious psychology and religious ritual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. Art ====&lt;br /&gt;
Speaking about art, Marx observed that its development does not always correspond to the general development of society, with the development of society&#039;s material basis, which is the skeleton, as it were, of society&#039;s organisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, an inquiry into the social role of art inevitably poses questions. Why did peoples (e.g., the ancient Greeks) far less advanced than the modern peoples attain such superb heights in art? How can we explain the fact that works of art produced long ago (e.g., under slavery) still continue to bring people aesthetic pleasure? These and other questions require concrete answers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all it must be understood that the art of a particular age is connected with definite forms of social development. We know that Greek art not only drew on Greek mythology but was rooted in it. And mythology is nothing but &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;folklore&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; giving an imaginative and fanciful interpretation of nature and the fundamental notions of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But is it possible, in our own age, for anyone to entertain notions of nature and society such as underlay Greek mythology, for instance?  How would Zeus the Thunderer compare with the lightning-conductor? Or the god of commerce, Hermes with the modern banking and credit system? Or the other gods of Olympus, with the modern transportation facilities, machines and especially robots?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet, the marvellous works of ancient Greek art continue to bring us aesthetic pleasure to this day. Why? To the modern man Greek art is, in a sense, the childhood of humanity. An adult person cannot be like a child. Still a child’s ingenuousness has a great fascination for him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is why the childhood of mankind continues to attract us as a peculiar and unique stage of social development. Marx remarked that there were unmannerly children and precocious children. Ancient Greeks were normal children. Therefore the peculiar charm of their art does not conflict with the rather primitive environment from which it sprang. On the contrary, those were the only circumstances in which it could possibly grow, and it is inseparable from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because it is rich and varied, ancient Greek art does not perhaps make a very lucid example. And yet, even in its case we can trace the effect of the objective law that social being shapes forms of social consciousness appropriate to it, leaving its mark on the very productions of the art of ancient Greece. Let us delve even deeper into history and look at the age in which human relations were much simpler and clearer and the connection with material production was immediately observable.  Will the period of the primitive-communal system supply us with examples corroborating the operation of the objective laws discovered by Marxism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First let us see how man’s notions of beauty developed. In different historical epochs different peoples had distinct, often opposing notions of beauty. Things that are considered beautiful in one age could be considered ugly in another. Why? How did notions of beauty form over the ages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scholars studying art in primitive society almost unanimously note that animals’ skins, claws and teeth are greatly valued by primitive peoples as ornaments. It was not that they found their colour and patterns particularly attractive. As he decorated himself with an animal&#039;s skin, a tiger’s claws or teeth, a bison’s skin or horns, primitive man was showing others that he was as quick and strong as the beast he had defeated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such conclusions are corroborated by ethnographic evidence concerning the notions of peoples which are still at one or another stage of the primitive-communal system. Students of the life of North American western tribes inform us, for instance, that some tribes like to wear ornaments made from the claws of the grizzly bear, the most savage of the wild beasts found in those parts. The red-skinned warrior believes that the fierceness and courage of the grizzly bear are communicated to him who decks himself with its claws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This example confirms conclusion that the aesthetic notions of beauty in the remote past were directly linked with peoples’ production activities and everyday life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now consider another example drawn from ethnography. Again, it must be remembered that in a certain respect ethnographic evidence gives us an idea of the primitive-communal epoch. Certainly, no existing tribe whose development has been retarded and which has remained at a certain stage in the primitive-communal system for a variety of historical reasons can be identified with peoples which lived in that epoch. Nevertheless, they have something in common, and these historical analogies enable us to form an idea of how our remote ancestors lived.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know, for instance, that women of many African tribes wear iron rings on their arms and legs. Wives of rich men may wear about ten kilograms of such ornaments. From our point of view, this is certainly very uncomfortable, yet the discomfort does not prevent many African women from wearing such “chains” of beauty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why does an African woman like to wear these “chains”? The reason is that they make her appear beautiful to herself and to others.  This results from a rather complex association of ideas. The passion for such ornaments is observed among the tribes which have but recently left behind the Iron Age, i.e., those among which iron is considered a precious metal. And everything precious seems beautiful because it is associated with the idea of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is another example illustrating the idea of the beautiful current among some African tribes. The Batokas who live in the upper reaches of the river Zambezi consider it ugly for a person not to have removed the upper incisors. Where does this odd notion spring from?  It is also due to a rather complex association of ideas. Batokas part with their upper incisors to imitate the ruminating animals. We may think it a somewhat peculiar desire, but the Batokas are a pastoral tribe with whom cattle spells wealth. Hence the idea that what is dear is beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have quoted examples of various notions of beauty held by some peoples. At first sight, these notions seem to have nothing in common.  But in fact they have. The notions of beauty shared by primitive and retarded peoples reflect certain aspects of their social being, of their mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hunting peoples consider the claws, teeth or skins of the animals they hunt to be beautiful.  What is hard to get is considered beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peoples familiar with wealth and social inequality associate the idea of beauty with wealth and social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pastoral peoples, whose life is most closely connected with cattle, associate their ideas of beauty with the most valuable thing they have, cattle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We find further proof of the inherent connection of art and social being in other kinds of art. Thus many African peoples have the keenest sense of rhythm, an oarsman singing in rhythm with the movements of the oars, porters singing in rhythm with their steps, and housewives singing in rhythm with their corn grinders. Basuto women, who wear metal bangles on their arms, which tinkle at every movement, often gather together to grind corn, accompanying the rhythmical movement of their arms by singing. The beat is the main thing in Basuto music, and the more rhythmical a song, the more beautiful it is considered. That was also characteristic of our remote ancestors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is the beat important? The answer is that primitive men chanted in rhythm with their work, and every kind of work had a chant adapted to its rhythm. As the productive forces advanced, the significance of rhythm in work decreased, although it is not lost altogether.  In some German villages, for instance, every season has particular noises associated with it, and every kind of work similarly has particular music associated with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Generalising these facts, students of primitive art point out the close similarity between the economic conditions of our primitive ancestors and contemporary retarded peoples whose life and art form the subject of ethnography. What makes many works of modern bourgeois art hard to appreciate is the absence of any direct connection between art and the methods of production in civilised society. We must see, however, that this is the result of nothing but the development itself of the social productive forces, which causes the division of social labour between different classes. The fact that society has become more complex, that the connection between art and social being has become more intricate, does not in the least disprove the materialist view of the history of art but, on the contrary, provides fresh and convincing evidence in its support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to French society in the 18th century. The class nature of this society directly affected the development of French art, and thus the drama. In medieval France, just as in Western Europe at large, the farce was predominant in the theatre. Farces were written and performed for the people. They were an expression of the popular views and sentiments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the reign of Louis XIII, the farce began to decline. It was considered to be only good enough for lackeys and not for persons of refined taste. The farce was supplanted by the tragedy. Yet the French tragedy had nothing to do with the ideas and sentiments of the masses.  It expressed the views, tastes and aspirations of the aristocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Time passed, and the aristocracy began to decline. The spirit of opposition steadily spread among the bourgeoisie and began to make itself felt in art as well. The growing third estate (the bourgeoisie) was dissatisfied with literature and the theatre which it would like to see more edifying. It was then that the bourgeois drama appeared, contrasting the virtuous bourgeois to the depraved aristocrat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, we see that this form of social consciousness, art, is directly affected by the changing life of society, changing social patterns and class relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We could quote more examples to show that other forms of social consciousness also reflect social being. There is, however, no need for it as we have already given many illustrations sufficiently corroborating the objective law governing the development of different forms of social consciousness, which was described in Marxist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. Revolutionary Theory and the Revolutionary Movement ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion we shall dwell on one more problem which is essential to the comprehension of the relation of social consciousness and social being. So far, we have stressed that social consciousness reflects social being, and that different products of social consciousness are, to one extent or another, reflections of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
May we conclude from this that social being is merely reflected in social consciousness, as in a mirror? No, such a conclusion would be quite incorrect. Precisely such a position on the passive nature of social consciousness, ideas and the spiritual life of mankind has been ascribed to Marxism by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, of the classes which are hostile to the working class and working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By establishing the fact that social consciousness depends on social being, that social consciousness reflects social being, Marxist-Leninist theory has by no means belittled the significance of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having given a correct definition of social consciousness, Marxist theory also indicates its place in the life of society. One cannot transform society by transforming ideas alone. To make society better, to make life truly human, it is necessary to reorganise social being. And social consciousness plays a highly important part in it. It gives man knowledge of the methods of transforming life. Seizing the masses, social consciousness urges them to work for the transformation of reality. That is why Marx stated that &amp;amp;quot;... theory... becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-114|114]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== 9. The Ideological Struggle and Human Rights&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the previous chapters we considered mainly the philosophical problems which make up the theoretical framework of the Marxist world outlook. But, however abstract its propositions, philosophy is never isolated from life. It always performs methodological and ideological functions, helping men to find their bearings in the complex social reality and the battle of ideas.  Dialectical and historical materialism is no exception in this respect. Let us take a look at the battle of ideas in the 20th century and the place of communist and bourgeois ideology in this battle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History has witnessed numerous coups, discoveries, wars and revolutions which left their imprint on subsequent developments. But whatever happened, the exploitation of man by man remained, and all development went on within the limits of exploitative society. The working people who performed revolutions saw their hopes crushed as one form of exploitation was replaced by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, historical progress was bought at too dear a price. Marx wrote that the progress of history in antagonistic society was like “that hideous pagan idol, whe would not drink the nectar but from the sculls of the slain.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-115|115]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia radically altered the course of history, translating into reality the dreams of the best minds of humanity. It destroyed exploiting society and created a new, equitable social system.  The triumph of the Revolution implied the triumph of the progressive new ideology of Marxism-Leninism which became predominant in a huge country occupying one-sixth of the globe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Two Ideologies ====&lt;br /&gt;
Adversaries of the working class like to say that there would be no ideological struggle if the Communists had not invented it. History, however, testifies to the contrary. It shows that ideological struggle has been going on ever since ideological relations started among men.  It was pursued in different ways and its intensity varied from one historical period to another, but no matter how its forms and pitch might change, it has always been there, expressing the interests of different, and often diametrically so, social classes at all stages in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the emergence of Marxism, ideological struggle becomes more intense. At a time when communism was yet a mere “spectre haunting Europe”, its founders wrote: “All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-116|116]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as Marxism emerged, all forces of the old world united against it ignoring their own ideological differences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle increased especially after the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution. From then on, the bourgeoisie’s &amp;amp;quot;righteous indignation” at communist ideology went hand in hand with its hatred for the Soviet system, giving rise to a combination of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle against the Soviet Union has always had an important role to play in the overall political strategy of imperialism.  For some time the imperialists hoped that their military superiority would enable them to get the upper hand in the ideological argument by sheer force of arms. That superiority was, however, but shortlived. As the balance of forces in the world changed, imperialism was faced with a historical situation, quite new to it, in which all expectations to resolve the ideological antagonisms by military means were doomed.  As a result, the global strategy of imperialism had to be thoroughly revised and the ideological struggle, whose outcome is to determine the direction in which history will move, was put in the forefront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the theories of “erosion of socialism”, “national communism” (or “regional Eurocommunism&amp;amp;quot;), and so on. Ideologists of imperialism seek above all to discredit Marxism-Leninism and real socialism, and sow discord in the developed socialist society, the world socialist system, and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today socialist ideology is a major factor determining the intellectual climate in the world. Not only is it dominant in the socialist countries, but it also has millions of supporters beyond their boundaries. This undermines the ideological positions of imperialism and causes bourgeois ideology increasingly to lose social support. Viewed from this angle, the development of history over the past sixty years has been marked by a series of setbacks sustained by bourgeois ideology, while Marxism-Leninism has gained new ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Anti-Communism—the Ideological Weapon of Imperialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, it would be wrong and dangerous to underestimate the possibilities of bourgeois ideology. While imperialism’s ideological positions were undermined, the monopoly bourgeoisie and its pundits were looking for new opportunities of counteracting socialism, brainwashing the masses and spreading anti-communism. The ideological stock-in-trade of imperialism was thus modified and updated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the political and military-strategic context imperialism has to reckon with the changed balance of forces in the world and, as it still hopes to crush socialism some day, is compelled to manoeuvre, stepping up ideological subversion against the socialist countries and trying to &amp;amp;quot;bore socialism from within.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adjusting to the new historical situation, bourgeois ideologists have changed their methods of fighting Marxism. In view of the immense popularity of socialist ideas, they can no longer pretend that there is no such thing as Marxism or abuse it to their heart’s content or indulge in vulgar anti-communism. Having to tread more warily, they increasingly turn to Marx, extracting isolated fragments from his works and adapting them to their own ends.  It comes as no surprise that the more the influence of Marxism grows, the more persistent are the attempts to revise it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In recent years bourgeois ideology united with revisionism. The mounting activity of revisionism, both right and “‘left&amp;amp;quot;, is supported by imperialism and plays an important part in ideological sabotage against socialism and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism was and continues to be the chief ideological weapon of imperialist reaction. The anti-communists would like nothing better than to see the socialist system split and become “polycentric&amp;amp;quot; and to see the “erosion of socialism&amp;amp;quot;. They think that growing contacts with the West will cause new value orientations to emerge in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, bringing about a sweeping degeneration of culture in them which will furnish a lever for remaking socialist society in the spirit desirable to the West.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism has become more active in the treatment of problems of political democracy and individual freedom. This has resulted in a campaign over the imaginary violation of human rights in the socialist countries, in which the present US Administration and government bodies in some NATO countries take an active part. In the course of the campaign, pluralistic bourgeois democracy is presented as a model while the inherent vices of capitalism—social inequality, exploitation, inflation and unemployment—are ignored. In spite of bourgeois propaganda, the masses are increasingly aware that socialist democracy alone can ensure freedom from exploitation and give the people a decisive part in government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that even notoriously reactionary writers are beginning to realise that the primitive anti-communism of some years ago with its myths and bankrupt doctrines can no longer help the imperialist countries to work out an effective policy. The article of Prof. A. Dallin of Columbia University “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR” is of interest in this respect. Prof. Dallin acknowledges that the Americans’ notions about the Soviet Union ever since 1917 have been full of ignorance and incomprehension, and that leading US statesmen and journalists are under the spell of the delusion and prejudice created by their own propaganda machine.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-117|117]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar to other forms of bourgeois ideology, anti-communism is not due to some politicians’ ill will, although there is no reason to deny it either. Bourgeois ideology in whatever form is nothing else but a distorted reflection in ideology of real developments occurring in the world and, above all, in the capitalist world. And if we want to understand and explain modern anti-communism, we must turn to capitalist reality in which lie the socio-economic and political roots of contemporary anti-communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The American Realities and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
The crisis of the 1970s has proved again that the socialist system has indisputable advantages over capitalism. It has confirmed the stability of the socialist economy and its inexhaustible capacity for satisfying, unlike capitalism, the fundamental rights and freedoms without which man cannot exist. Modern developments have, undoubtedly, served to increase further the prestige of the existing socialist society in the non-socialist world and enhance the attraction of the historical example set by the peoples having rid themselves of social oppression and exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These circumstances by themselves could explain the purpose of the propaganda campaign which is to convince peoples in the non-socialist countries that things are not so bad at all, divert their attention from their own deteriorating economic and social position to the problems of political democracy, and to slander socialism once again in the hope of making it less attractive to peoples of other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor is that all. This bourgeois campaign sets out to undermine the socialist system from within, seeking out malcontents and provoking conflicts in socialist countries. It is also designed to split the international communist movement, setting some communist parties against others under the false slogan of “national”, “regional”, and other brands of communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is nobody’s secret that this propaganda campaign has intensified after the new administration in Washington came into office, and that from then on certain American officials and government agencies have assumed the unseemly role of leaders and inspirers of this campaign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact, unprecedented for many years, certainly requires explanation. And it can be explained from the situation which had shaped in the United States by the time the present administration came into office. Yet, the roots of this situation lie in the American political history of the 1960s-1970s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The shots in Dallas which killed President J. F. Kennedy rang throughout America, ushering in an era of major political crimes. No doubt, the underlying social causes which led to the degradation of American politics had taken shape earlier and were engendered by the social and the state system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, however, not only the assassination of a president on whom different social groups pinned their hopes which, incidentally, were never realised, that shocked the United States.  It was also the disgraceful game the US official quarters described as investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; It&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; would be hard now to say exactly what caused the prestige of state authority in the United States to fall—whether it was the assassination itself or the sheer inability of a government spending astronomic sums on maintaining an intelligence service in the country to protect its own prestige and immunity. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This amazing impotence of authority and absolute impunity of the actual sponsors of the crime, doubtlessly, set off a series of assassinations each of which was declared to be the work of one individual or another. The authorities were not at all abashed by the fact that more and more such “individuals&amp;amp;quot; turned up.  Yet, each assassination as well as stereotyped “inquiry” made opinion increasingly suspicious of the government and doubtful of its ability to protect its citizens and uphold their rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this coincided with acute racial and national conflicts which aggravated the home situation still more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The war in Vietnam, which American journalists now describe as the dirtiest war in American history, was another fact which had disastrous consequences for the home political situation in the United States. Its impact on the domestic scene, although not fully unravelled yet, was immense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only that US servicemen were sent to die for what was incompatible with the genuine interests of the American people, which was the cause of mass desertion from the army and the reason why young men of call-up age fled the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor was it that thousands of American soldiers involved in massacres in Vietnam received lessons in moral degradation which no people can escape unscathed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, above all, that the Vietnam war itself was a flagrant violation of American law which states that the US Congress alone may declare war (Section 8, Art. I of the Constitution of the United States). And the US Congress never declared war on Vietnam. The war just went on, swallowing thousands of American lives, while presidents issued orders they had no right to issue under the Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus for several years while that undeclared war lasted, the US Government gave the people a memorable lesson in violation of law and civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, another unconstitutional process was developing during the Vietnam war. It was the concentration of power in the hands of the non-elective White House apparatus. Joseph C.  Harsch wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Christian Science Monitor&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 11, 1976: &amp;amp;quot;The seizure of the policymaking function by the White House and its concentration in the White House staff has been a process which began slowly and cautiously....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“... It began growing again under John F. Kennedy, and exploded in the Johnson and Nixon era.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harsch mentioned in the same article that the outsized President’s office numbered 1,831 persons including 61 special assistants to the President.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation in which government of the United States is carried out not by the heads of departments accountable to the Congress, but the White House personnel accountable to the President, is, according to Harsch, causing anxiety to the Congress which, he writes, has “lost its ability to get at and help control policymaking”. It is not accidental that James M.  Naughton wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 29, 1976, summing up, as it were, the presidencies of Nixon and Ford: “Six years of imperial Presidency and two of executive restraint worked in combination to alter the outlook, change the tone and, to some extent, restructure the shape of the executive branch.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The entire process is unconstitutional, whereby the Americans were given a lesson in autocratic disregard of the law for quite a number of years. Prof. Neustadt of Harvard University, whose opinions are often cited by the American press, considers in the light of these circumstances the institute of presidency as a “kingship” in the sense that it makes the Americans react to it emotionally just as other peoples respond to monarchy.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-118|118]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prof. Schlesinger writes in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Imperial Presidency&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Boston, 1973) that “‘the Presidency has got out of control” (p. X) and is hardly constitutional as it is, and that to keep “a strong President constitutional, in addition to checks and balances incorporated within his own breast” ... “the vigilance of the nation’ is also needed, or the Americans will have an imperial presidency (p. 418). How serious a problem of the “‘crisis of government institutes” in the United States has become is also witnessed by the conference held in Los Angeles in the autumn of 1974 (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Center Magazine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Vol. VII, No. 5, 1974, p. 31). The conference discussed the crisis in the contemporary presidency. One of the speakers at the conference was Senator Walter F. Mondale (now Vice-President), who said that it was necessary to raise the prestige of the legislative bodies and “curb any President’s illegal use of the most sensitive law-enforcement agencies of the government: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency.... They are ... instruments of great potential danger to our constitutional liberties.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Watergate was another important landmark &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n the chain of events which have resulted in the “crisis of confidence in the institutes of government” in the United States. The long inquiry, which revealed flagrant violation of elementary rights and liberties, and Nixon&#039;s eventual resignation showed once again that arbitrary rule had become routine in American society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To this should be added sensational exposures of the violation of civil rights and liberties by the American intelligence service agencies both at home and abroad, and of scandalous instances of corruption and tax dodging by American politicians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this has resulted in a powerful civil rights campaign in the United States spearheaded against race and national discrimination and the war in Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In that situation, the American propaganda machine tried to rehabilitate the “American way of life&amp;amp;quot;, “American system of values&amp;amp;quot;, etc., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n connection with the 200th anniversary of American Independence. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This campaign was not, however, much of a success, the festivities being overshadowed by the disgrace of the Vietnam war and Watergate. The general trend of American propaganda at the time is well illustrated by an article in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; devoted to Independence Day (July 4, 1976). It said among other things: “Two years after Watergate and four years after Vietnam, friends who were then ashamed of the United States seem to be saying now that they see America’s better values surviving.” Such was the cold comfort that bourgeois propaganda-mongers offered to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Add to it a series of scandalous exposures of immorality, corruption and tax dodging on the part of some Congressmen and prominent politicians, which equally attested to the breaches of the law by the powers that be. Obviously enough, in such circumstances the leading American statesmen have no reason to pose as champions of legality, civil rights and freedom.  The campaign “in defence of human rights” in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is regarded by the present US Administration as a major means of diverting the Americans’ attention from arbitrary rule and illegality in their own country, as well as a means of rehabilitating the American state system both in the eyes of the Americans and world opinion at somebody else’s expense, by harming the peoples whose socialist system provides an effective alternative to capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech, “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress&amp;amp;quot;, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the new Soviet Constitution &amp;amp;quot;gives further convincing proof that concepts of freedom, human rights, democracy and social justice become truly meaningful only under socialism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-119|119]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Mature Socialism and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels always viewed socialism as a social system under which free development of every individual is the condition of free development of all, of society at large.  Developed socialist society today gives each of its members a wide range of rights and freedoms. To illustrate, the 1977 Soviet Constitution ensures citizens such rights as the right to work, to housing, to education, the right to enjoy cultural benefits, the right to submit proposals to state bodies and criticise shortcomings in their work, freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work, the right to associate in public organisations, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is ensured by the socialist economic system, steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, free vocational and professional training, improvement of skills and training in new trades and professions. The right to work is not a new constitutional right, it was granted to Soviet citizens under the 1936 Constitution. Is it a mere reiteration of the previous Constitution or are there some new points here? Let us look into this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proclamation of a constitutional right is, of course, a very important thing. That every citizen should have the right to work and to equal pay for equal work, irrespective of social status, race, nationality, religion, sex, etc., is certainly of exceeding importance. No one would deny that the political and legal guarantees of this right are very important. Yet, they can be easily upset by the simple fact that there are not enough jobs in the country. Then labour exchanges will be overcrowded, newspapers will be full of advertisements placed by people looking for work, and there will be hundreds of thousands or even millions jobless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, the right to work has social and economic, as well as political and legal, guarantees. It means that the socio-economic structure of Soviet society (public ownership of the basic means of production, economic planning, crisis-free economic development) is such that since 1930 there has been no unemployment in the Soviet Union. All labour exchanges there closed in 1930 as nobody wanted them any more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in order to understand the full implication of the right to work in the Soviet Union it is not enough to know merely one, albeit essential, fact that unemployment was abolished there. The Soviet state provides employment for all of its citizens. The new Soviet Constitution considerably extends the content of the right to work, stating that at the current stage the Soviet state can do much more to provide favourable conditions for its implementation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today the Soviet state not only provides employment for all citizens, but also commits itself to make it possible for citizens to choose their trade or profession in accordance with their inclinations and be trained accordingly.  This is ensured by the wide network of state-run vocational schools with training free of charge. As for those who already have a trade or profession, the state gives them every opportunity to improve their skills or train for another occupation. Practically every enterprise—certainly every medium-sized or large one has numerous programmes for skill improvement and schools, including technical secondary schools, at which one can train in a new trade or greatly improve his qualifications without giving up his job. Many enterprises have technical higher schools. Training is, of course, gratuitous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of diverse political, legal, social and economic measures, including the abolition of unemployment, creation of new jobs on a mass scale and free vocational training throughout the country, demand for labour in the Soviet Union exceeds the supply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to housing&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a new constitutional right not to be confused with the article on the inviolability of the homes of citizens which can be found in nearly every constitution. What does this innovation in constitutional law mean?  Why was this right not mentioned in the previous Soviet Constitution? It was due above all to the fact that the available housing the Soviet Union inherited from the tsarist regime was insufficient. Although the Soviet Government did much even before the war for a fair redistribution of the available housing and launched the construction of new houses for working people, these measures were not yet enough. The Soviet Union lacked the industrial facilities for housing construction. Further, one must consider the fact that during the Second World War great damage was caused to the available housing, insufficient as it was. The Nazi invaders burned to the ground 92,000 villages and destroyed dwellings in 2,500 towns and townships. The Soviet state, naturally, had to spend time and effort to restore the ruined houses. For this reason it was unable for a long time to ensure its citizens the right to housing and had to limit itself to satisfying their elementary requirements in that respect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the strides made by the developed socialist economy, it recently became possible to launch the construction of houses by industrial methods. Let us see now how available housing has increased in the Soviet Union. The young Soviet state inherited from the tsarist regime altogether 180 million sq m of useful floor space in towns. This figure has by now been exceeded ten times, mounting to 1,860 million sq m. In the last decade alone, 34 million flats were constructed, which means that more than half the population and nearly three-quarters of the urban population live in new flats or houses. Since some people move into new flats and houses, those who remain in the old dwellings are less crowded, so the majority of working people have had their living conditions improved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Houses are built in the Soviet Union at an increasing rate. Whereas in forty-odd years, 1917-1959, only about 500 million sq m of floor space in state-owned houses could be built, 545-550 million sq m of floor space will be put into operation during the current five-year period alone (1976-1980). Such is one side of the problem, which is that at the current stage the Soviet state really can provide its citizens with comfortable dwellings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the problem is no less important. Rent in the Soviet Union is the lowest in the world, although it is paid for the use of modern dwellings with all conveniences.  Soviet citizens are astonished to hear foreign visitors complain that rent consumes more than a third of their earnings. In the Soviet Union, rent comes on average to 5-6 per cent of earnings. Since there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, and labour is in great demand, usually several members of a family have jobs and on this basis rent accounts at most for 2-3 per cent of the aggregate income of an average Soviet family. In many countries, as is known, apartment houses or tenements constitute a profitable industry. The Soviet state, however, has never regarded rent as an item of revenue. Both in the past and at the present time rent in the Soviet Union is expended on the maintenance and preservation of houses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great material possibilities for the construction of new houses and the social measures taken to ensure fair distribution of floor space at low rent thus make a real guarantee of the right of Soviet citizens to housing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was also granted under the previous Constitution. In this instance, too, the new feature consists in the much greater possibilities that now exist in the Soviet Union for the implementation of the right to education. In the 1930s, when the previous Constitution was adopted, the state could afford only four-year universal compulsory and free education and was just beginning to introduce universal seven-year education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At present, the shift to universal free ten-year education has been completed in the Soviet Union. Currently there are more than 167,000 general education schools, 4,300 technical secondary schools, and upwards of 850 higher schools. In 1977, there were altogether more than 99.5 million students in the Soviet Union, 49 million of them attending ten-year secondary schools. The total enrolment in technical secondary schools was in excess of 4.3 million, and at higher schools, five million. Education in the Soviet Union is free, and students of technical secondary and higher schools receive monthly government grants. Adults can get an education without leaving their jobs at any of the numerous night schools and night and correspondence technical secondary and higher schools and courses. Correspondence courses of higher schools and technical secondary schools have more than 1.5 and 1.2 million students respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The progress made by education in the Soviet Union stems from the development of socialist society, from the change in the life of the country which was launched by the Great October Revolution in 1917. They had built schools, colleges and universities and trained teachers in Russia before the Revolution as well. But they did it at a different rate. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Public Education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the official organ of the tsarist Ministry of Education, wrote shortly before the Revolution that it would take 180 years to abolish illiteracy among the male population of Central Russia, and 360 years to abolish it among the female population, also of Central Russia. As for the population of the fringes of the Russian Empire, the journal wrote, it would take 3,500 years to stamp out illiteracy among them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet government created an efficient system of public education which dealt with illiteracy within 19 years, and rapidly developed this system further in order to meet the growing cultural requirements of Soviet citizens.  Thus we see that the right to education is not only granted by the Constitution, but is also ensured by the effective education system that has been built under Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1977 Soviet Constitution grants citizens of the USSR the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to enjoy cultural benefits&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This is a new point in a constitutional law and a new constitutional right. It is not the customary article proclaiming the right to education which is to be found in almost all Constitutions round the world. This article goes far beyond mere education. It speaks of the opportunity to enjoy cultural benefits as of the right of every Soviet citizen, and of the guarantees of this right. After all, a well-educated person may remain culturally limited if he has no access to the treasures of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, treasures of national and world culture are accessible to all sections of the population. All museums and libraries are the property of the people, and the state of the whole people looks after their normal functioning and further growth. Before the October Socialist Revolution there were 76,000 libraries and only 180 museums in the country, and now there are 350,000 libraries and about 2,000 museums in the Soviet Union. Both libraries and museums are accessible to all. In tsarist Russia, however, more than two-thirds of the libraries and a great many museums were not open for the working classes. The Hermitage in Leningrad, for instance, which contains treasures putting it on a par with Louvres or the British Museum, was closed to ordinary folk for a long time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only were there few centres of culture and learning in tsarist Russia, but they were to be found mostly in the areas inhabited by Russians. Under Soviet government much was done to distribute them evenly throughout the country. To illustrate, there is an Academy of Sciences in every Union Republic, whereas previously there was only one Academy of Sciences, in the capital. There were 12 universities in tsarist Russia, situated mainly in the areas populated by Russians. At present, there are as many as 63 universities in the country, including Altai, Far Eastern, Bashkir, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Mari, Mordovian, Chuvash, and Yakut universities. The names alone show that in setting up these universities both territorial and national factors were taken into account, so as to ensure access to the benefits of culture in every area and to every Soviet people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 47 of the new Soviet Constitution reads: “Citizens of the USSR, in accordance with the aims of building communism, are guaranteed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This freedom is ensured by broadening scientific research, encouraging invention and innovation, and developing literature and the arts. The state provides the necessary material conditions for this and support for voluntary societies and unions of workers in the arts, organises introduction of inventions and innovations in production and other spheres of activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The rights of authors, inventors and innovators are protected by the state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we should like to call the reader’s attention to the fact that freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work is guaranteed to citizens “in accordance with the aims of building communism.” Why is the reference to the aims of building communism made in the Constitution? Is it not enough to proclaim a right and define it in purely legal terms? The point is that this is not an ordinary right which only needs to be exactly formulated. It is a right which is simultaneously a part of the main objectives of communist society. Many modern Constitutions grant this right as a mere formality, because today freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work is mentioned as a rule in important political documents. One finds it also in the Constitutions of states which cannot ensure their citizens even the right to education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is altogether different in the case of the Soviet Constitution. One of the major objectives of Soviet home policy is to build a communist society. The aim of communist society with respect to the individual is his all-round, harmonious development. And freedom of creative work is indispensable to the attainment of this aim. It is not enough to open wide the doors of secondary schools and universities and give a person a good education. Conditions must also be provided in which he will be not only a consumer, but also a producer of cultural benefits. And this is possible only when there is real freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work in society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much has been done in the Soviet Union over sixty years to enable citizens to exercise freedom of creative work. The workingman was barred from cultural benefits for millennia. He could not create them as he was illiterate and deprived. Even his consumption of cultural benefits was limited by the ruling classes to a pittance. Soviet government eliminated this historical injustice. It gave the workingman access to education, thereby giving him the opportunity to acquaint himself with the treasures of world culture. It also provided material conditions for spreading culture among the working people. It set up numerous educational and research centres belonging to the people, nationalised the theatres, art galleries, museums, conservatoires and philharmonic societies, and made them accessible to working people and their children. Freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work has a solid material foundation in the USSR. It currently has more than 850 higher schools; 350,000 libraries; 135,100 clubs; 154,000 film projecting units; almost 600 theatres; 94 circuses; 214 concert bureaux; about 2,000 museums; 149,000 amateur groups at trade union clubs. The new Soviet Constitution takes account of all this and sets the aim to provide ever better conditions for ensuring freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Western bourgeois press assiduously spreads the fiction that all public organisations except the Communist Party are banned in the Soviet Union. Practice as well as the relevant article of the Soviet Constitution on the right to associate in public organisations convincingly show that the allegation is groundless. Besides Communist Party branches, the Young Communist League and the trade unions, there are unions of writers, artists, actors and journalists, and numerous scientific, technical, medical, defence, athletic and other voluntary societies in the Soviet Union. We lack the space here merely to enumerate all Soviet public organisations. To name but a few, there are eight all-Union associations of workers in the arts, more than twenty all-Union scientific societies, thirty all-Union scientific medical societies, and numerous other public organisations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No wonder that there are so many public organisations in the Soviet Union. The life of modern society is complex and varied, and the interests, needs and aspirations of Soviet people are too diverse for any one organisation to cover them all. This explains why the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have been working ever since the Great October Socialist Revolution to provide and improve conditions for the function in a of numerous public organisations. It is not fortuitous that the new Soviet Constitution states: “Public organisations are guaranteed conditions for successfully performing the functions defined in their rules.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For illustration, let us take the All-Union society Znanie (Knowledge) which unites almost two million lecturers. It has a publishing house of its own, one of the largest in the Soviet Union, which brings out annually more than 400 different brochures and books to a total of over 25 million copies. The Soviet Writers’ Union, too, has everything it needs to carry on active creative work. Its central organ, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Literary Gazette&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, has a large circulation and enjoys great popularity. The Soviet Writers’ Union publishes numerous magazines, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Novi mir&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (New World), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Banner), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Druzhba narodov&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Peoples’ Friendship), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Voprosy literatury&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Problems of Literature), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Yunost&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Youth), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Koster&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Bonfire), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sovetish Heimland&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in Yiddish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet Literature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in English, German, Spanish and Polish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lettres Soviétiques&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in French), and so on. Besides these all-Union magazines, the Soviet Writers’ Union publishes magazines in the Union and autonomous republics, regions and territories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar facts can be quoted about numerous other public organisations functioning in the Soviet Union. Energetic, creative activity of diverse mass organisations is a feature of Soviet life. The new Soviet Constitution legalises and guarantees this characteristic of developed socialism. Thus practice shatters one of the fictions current in bourgeois propaganda and intended for people who know little or nothing about life in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, even a cursory glance at some of the rights granted and guaranteed under developed socialism shows that the prediction made by Marx and Engels about free development of all members of socialist society has been carried into practice. L. I. Brezhnev said: “The establishment of the principles of social equality and justice is one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolution. We have every right to say that no other society in the world has done or could have done as much for the masses, for the working people, as has been done by socialism! Every Soviet citizen enjoys in full the rights and freedoms enabling him to participate actively in political life. Every Soviet citizen has the possibility to choose a profession according with his inclinations and abilities, and to do work that is useful to his country and people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-120|120]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conclusion ==&lt;br /&gt;
The history of philosophical and socio-political thought is a record of hundreds of ideas and theories. Many old philosophers sincerely wished to point out the path to social justice and human happiness, as well as furnish people with knowledge of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, however sincerely they might try to help people, these philosophers remained alone or at best won a limited following. Whatever schemes for man’s happiness and welfare they devised, neither happiness nor justice materialised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the working class, at whose hands the world was to be transformed, had appeared in the world scene, it became urgently necessary to provide a doctrine showing how this historic mission could be accomplished. This doctrine was Marxism-Leninism which answered the practical questions posed by the class struggle of the proletariat, and not only explained the world but showed how to transform it. This doctrine, advanced in the late 1840s by Marx and Engels and carried forward in the epoch of imperialism by Lenin, has become today the world outlook of hundreds of millions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No romantic dreams or illusions, but rather the objective scientific analysis of reality which made it possible to determine goals for the struggle of the oppressed and exploited and the elaboration of concrete forms of this struggle have helped Marxism-Leninism to become an effective instrument for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The victorious socialist revolutions performed in a number of countries, the construction of socialism and the building of a communist society have become realities due to the fact that this titanic effort on the part of the masses has for its theoretical foundation the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which is the world outlook of the communist parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which was necessitated not only by the class struggle but by the progress of science, provides a truly scientific method of knowing the world and is the theoretical basis of scientifically building the new society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Born more than a century and a quarter ago, Marxism-Leninism has been going from strength to strength. It is strong because it is true, because it reflects the world correctly and gets to the root of things. This correct knowledge of the world owes much to Marxist philosophy. It is the profound philosophic justification of all fundamental propositions of Marxism-Leninism that distinguishes it from all previous theoretical conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was no accident that Marx, Engels and Lenin, who were great revolutionaries, politicians and economists and active members of the revolutionary movement, were also great philosophers who paid constant attention to the study and development of philosophy. That enabled them in times of social upheavals to find correct solutions and correctly determine the trend of social developments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy one can grasp the laws governing the development of the world, to understand, with their help, the intricate processes of social development, and to get a glimpse of the future, to foresee the course of human history.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= Notes =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-1|←1]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 1972, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-2|←2]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V, I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 287-88.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-3|←3]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 489.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-4|←4]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, edited by George Sampson, Vol. I, London, 1908, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-5|←5]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid. , p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-6|←6]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-7|←7]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 55.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-8|←8]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhaltnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, von E. Mach, Jena, 1906, pp. 8-9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-9|←9]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, London, 1956, pp. 195-96.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-10|←10]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1843, pp. 45-46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-11|←11]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-12|←12]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, London, 1931, p. 70.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-13|←13]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-14|←14]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-15|←15]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-16|←16]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-17|←17]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grohere Publikum tuber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, Berlin, 1801, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-18|←18]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 234.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-19|←19]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Science and Society, New York, Vol. If, Number 2, Spring 1938, p. 239.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-20|←20]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes in: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 1949, Evanston, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-21|←21]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1973, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-22|←22]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-23|←23]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-24|←24]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 348.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-25|←25]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1977, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-26|←26]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-27|←27]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, Moscow, 1972, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-28|←28]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-29|←29]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-30|←30]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-31|←31]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-32|←32]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-33|←33]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-D&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hring, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-34|←34]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-35|←35]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 262&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-36|←36]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-37|←37]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-38|←38]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 261, 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-39|←39]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 260-61.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-40|←40]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Louis de Broglie, Sur les sentiers de la science, Paris, 1960, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-41|←41]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Physics in My Generation. A Selection of Papers by Max Born, London and New York, 1956, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-42|←42]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-43|←43]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-44|←44]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-45|←45]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 285.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-46|←46]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Paul Labereune, L’origine des Mondes, Paris, 1953, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-47|←47]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Vorlesungen uber Naturphilosophie gehalten von Wilhelm Ostwald, Second edition, Leipzig, 1902, p. VIII.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-48|←48]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 270-71.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-49|←49]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, pp. 309, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-50|←50]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Evolution of Physics by Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, Cambridge, 1938, pp. 207-08.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-51|←51]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German, London, 1930, p. XLI.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-52|←52]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-53|←53]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-54|←54]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, historischkritisch dargestellt von Ernst Mach, Leipzig, 1897, p.  498.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-55|←55]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-56|←56]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Les Principes de la Philosophie, par René Descartes, Rouen, 1706, p. 92.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-57|←57]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: G. W. Leibniz, Ausgewahlte philosophische Schritten, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1915, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-58|←58]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-59|←59]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 69, 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-60|←60]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-61|←61]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-62|←62]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 245, 147.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-63|←63]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-64|←64]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-65|←65]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 69.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-66|←66]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-67|←67]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-68|←68]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-69|←69]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Henri Wallon, De a l’acte a la pensée, Paris, 1942, Pp. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-70|←70]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-71|←71]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-72|←72]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-73|←73]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-74|←74]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-75|←75]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 228,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-76|←76]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-77|←77]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 148.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-78|←78]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-79|←79]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-80|←80]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-81|←81]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-82|←82]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 93.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-83|←83]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-84|←84]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-85|←85]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: There are so many molecules in a glass of water that were it possible to mark them and pour the water into the ocean and allow sufficient time for the marked molecules to diffuse through all the oceans and seas, then, scooping up a glass of water from any sea or ocean, we should not fail to find about a hundred marked molecules in the glass.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-86|←86]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-87|←87]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 38, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-88|←88]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, Vol. II, Dublin, 1779, p. 163.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-89|←89]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-90|←90]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-91|←91]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 446.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-92|←92]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-93|←93]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-94|←94]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-95|←95]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-96|←96]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-97|←97]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, Pp. 12.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-98|←98]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-99|←99]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 56-57.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-100|←100]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-101|←101]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-102|←102]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, pp. 89-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-103|←103]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The General Council of the First International 1868-1870, Moscow, 1966, p. 311.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-104|←104]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, Pp. 146,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-105|←105]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, P. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-106|←106]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 84-85.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-107|←107]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, PP. 35-36.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-108|←108]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, pp. 111-112.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-109|←109]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Okonomische Manuskripte 1857-1858, Moscow, 1935, pp. 88-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-110|←110]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-111|←111]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-112|←112]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-113|←113]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See: K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-114|←114]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-115|←115]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1977, p. 499.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-116|←116]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-117|←117]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See A. Dallin, “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR”, Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 560-76.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-118|←118]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The New York Times, March 28. 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-119|←119]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-120|←120]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   L. I. Brezhnev, &amp;amp;quot;The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p- 6.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Progress Publishers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about philosophy]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:ABC_of_Dialectical_and_Historical_Materialism&amp;diff=59327</id>
		<title>Library:ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:ABC_of_Dialectical_and_Historical_Materialism&amp;diff=59327"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T19:19:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added categories and template&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This book presents in a popular form the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy—dialectical and historical materialism. It is intended for the people who are studying philosophy and are trying to understand the problems of our day&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library work|title=ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism|author=B. M. Boguslavsky, V. A. Karpushin, A. I. Rakitov, V. Y. Chertikhin, G. I. Bzrin|publisher=Progress Publishers|published_date=1978|published_location=Moscow|type=Book|source=http://library.lol/main/1ea2df27ace048696dc734405f7d977f}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreword ==&lt;br /&gt;
Many people are trying their best to grasp the meaning of the rapid changes occurring before their eyes and to understand how they are affecting their own lives. They are trying to develop their own view of the world and thus determine their place in it. But it is not simple to form a view of the world without knowledge of existing doctrines and theories. There are diverse theories explaining, each in its own way, the events occurring in the world. And it is vital, though not at all easy, to choose among them the one that is nearest to the truth and that is borne out by life, by the development of science and the real course of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The authors will consider their task rewarded if this book helps the reader to comprehend the phenomena and events in nature and society and to form a scientific, Marxist world outlook.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Dialectical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;1. The Fundamental Question of Philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The Gist of the Question ====&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1881, a man jailed for his active Opposition to the tsarist autocracy sat over a sheet of paper in a solitary confinement cell in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg, now Leningrad. The death sentence had already been passed on N. I. Kibalchich, and the day of his execution was not far off. But it was not of his doom he was thinking: his mind was on a fascinating scientific problem to which he had only just, so shortly before his early death, found a solution. There, on the sheet of paper, was the scheme of a jet-propelled aircraft, the first in the history of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Twenty-two years afterwards, in 1903, the eminent Russian scientist K. E. Tsiolkovsky, who had elaborated in detail the design of the jet-propulsion engine, laid the foundations of jet-propulsion theory and demonstrated that jet-propulsion engines could be used for interplanetary flights. Thirty years later, flying vehicles with jet engines were constructed and tested. Soon jet planes appeared, and in 1957, the first artificial earth satellite was launched in the USSR. Following a series of unmanned space flights, the first manned spaceship with the Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on board was successfully launched.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That started a new age. Jet-propelled spaceships set off for the Moon, Venus and Mars.  It could never have happened had the human mind not conceived the principle of jet propulsion and developed relevant scientific theory, and had it not posed to men the task of penetrating space. All man-made cosmic bodies are the products of scientific thought. And as thought need not necessarily be unique to earth-dwellers and there may be other beings in the universe who may well be our intellectual superiors, it is natural to suppose that other cosmic bodies whose origin is so far not clear to us may also be products of thought. Then why not suppose that the Earth with everything there is on it is also a product of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One could indeed make such a supposition but would it tally with the evidence of science and experience?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Light travels 9, 440, 000, 000 kilometres a year. This distance is called a light-year. The Milky Way&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a giant cluster of stars and other bodies, of which the solar system is a part—has a diameter of almost 100, 000 light-years.  It moves among other clusters of stars (galaxies) which are vastly removed from it. The part of the universe which scientists can observe with the aid of powerful optical and radio devices has a diameter of 26, 000, 000, 000 light-years. This vast area is puny, compared with all other areas of the universe as yet out of the range of the available means of observation.  And the Earth, with its continents and oceans, plants, animals and human beings, is an infinitesimal speck in the vast universe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to scientific evidence, life on Earth has existed but a short time compared with the Earth’s existence, while the living organisms make up but an insignificant part of the sum total of bodies we call the Earth. As for the human race, it is relatively young, having appeared just a little over a million years ago.  Space flights and scientific research have conclusively established that between the Earth and its natural satellite, the Moon, no living organisms exist, let alone rational beings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, although the universe evidently contains an infinite multitude of life forms, only a very small part of them possess the faculty of thought. Modern science confirms Engels’ observation that “the time of organic life and still more that of the life of beings conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and Self-consciousness come into operation….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-1|1]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern science suggests that thought is merely one of the numerous products of the universe. The supposition that the universe, which is infinite in space and time, is the product of thought is hardly tenable. Supporters of this view may argue that our scientific knowledge is anything but complete, there being still much that we do not know. That is true enough. Yet, ignorance &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; no argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have thus come to a point which merits close consideration. To form an idea of a science, one should, first of all, be informed of the basic problems it is concerned with. In chemistry, for instance, the question of how atoms join and separate and how, as a result, substances undergo changes of composition, is basic to all other questions. Knowing this, we can already form a basic idea of the science of chemistry. It is so with all other sciences. To know the fundamental question a science &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s concerned with, is to know what it is about.  Hence, in order to form an idea of what philosophy is, we must find out what its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fundamental question&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All bodies and the mechanical, physical, chemical and physiological processes they undergo are usually described as material phenomena, or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Pride, shame, joy, and all other feelings supplied by our five senses, as well as thoughts teeming in the mind are usually described as ideal, or spiritual phenomena or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It has long been observed that man’s capacity to distinguish colours, sounds and smells, as well as his feelings and his mind improve with age, as his body develops and as he learns to perform diverse jobs, handling different objects and associating with other people.  Some grave bodily diseases cause aberration or even loss of consciousness while with the destruction of the body sensations, thoughts cease altogether. These facts show that spiritual phenomena are based on material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other facts have also been noted. When we say that a boy has smashed a window without meaning to, the idea is that he did not intend to smash it. This does not, however, mean that the hand threw the stone of its own accord, irrespective of the boy’s intention. Clearly, his action was prompted by some emotion or idea.  He simply did not aim the stone well and it hit the wrong object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man is not a machine but a creature that thinks and feels. All his actions—reasonable or otherwise—are prompted by his emotions or ideas. Before making a plough and tilling and sowing the field he &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;thinks over&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; how it should all be done.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The desire for freedom and anger at social injustice long ago caused slaves to rise up and fight their oppressors. Love of their country moved men to fight invaders to the death. The immediate source from which such actions sprang were, again, men’s ideas and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reflecting on these facts, one was naturally led to conclude that material phenomena were the products of spiritual phenomena which were, therefore, decisive to human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This view spread particularly when society became divided into the antagonistic classes of toilers, who worked hard and lived in poverty, and masters who did no work and appropriated the wealth produced by others. Education, science and art became the exclusive privilege of a tiny minority—the ruling classes. Their will became law, regulating the behaviour of everyone. That made it seem as if consciousness were primary in relation to the material life of society. Hence the conclusion was made that even outside society, indeed in the whole world, spiritual phenomena dominated material ones.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Which then derives from which? The material from the spiritual, or vice versa? Does matter originate from consciousness or consciousness from matter? Which is primary, spirit or nature? Philosophers began to argue about it back in antiquity. This problem is the key to all other philosophical problems. The philosophers divided into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;two camps&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: those who regarded nature, the material world, as the product of consciousness, of spirit, which they held to be independent of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; those who regarded consciousness, spirit, as the product of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Engels said that the question of the relation of consciousness to the material world was the great fundamental question of philosophy as a whole, observing that it also involved the question of whether consciousness was capable of truthfully reflecting the world. The views of various philosophers will be discussed here later. For the time being, let us look at the main question, the subject of long-standing dispute among philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Faith or Knowledge? ====&lt;br /&gt;
What is primary&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;spirit or nature? If you ask this question of a believer, you may be sure of the answer. For God, whom he believes to be the creator and ruler of the world, is also, to him, the spiritual source of all existence.  True, the believers are unable to prove it be cause, taking religious doctrines on trust as they do, they put faith above knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle ages, when the church had political as well as spiritual power, the clergy persecuted scientists, throwing them into dungeons, torturing them, and burning them at the stake. Today, clergymen no longer deny the importance of science. Moreover, they claim that science is quite compatible with faith, although, unlike the immutable, exact and infinite truth of religious faith (as they describe it) scientific knowledge is unstable, inexact and limited. ‘Science has its limits,&amp;amp;quot; wrote the Metropolitan Nicholas. “It has to do merely with what one can see, touch and hear and thereby infer. But there is another realm ...  the realm of faith. Besides the visible world, there is one which is invisible. Science cannot reach it, but faith can.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course there is much in microcosm and space that we cannot see. Yet, it was science and not religion, that penetrated into the “‘invisible world” with microscopes, telescopes and other instruments and helped obtain exact knowledge of what was going on there. And the theologists’ “invisible world” is still a mystery, like the invisible clothes of the naked king Hans Christian Andersen wrote about in one of his tales. Just as in the tale, faith in the ‘invisible’ is only for those who would not trust their eyes, their ears and their minds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is it true that knowledge and faith are compatible? What is the difference between them?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;L’ile des pingouins&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; by Anatole France we find the story of a man with a charge brought against him in the absence of any evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“That Pyrot had stolen the eighty thousand haycocks certainly no one hesitated to believe.  They never doubted it as their ignorance in the matter gave them no reason to doubt, and doubt is impossible without a reason, because one cannot doubt a thing for no reason the way one can believe a thing for no reason.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Catholic educational institutions the fol lowing rule is effective to this day: ‘‘We must believe that what looks white to us is black if the hierarchic church should choose to describe it so,... persuading ourselves that all this is just, and abandoning with unquestioning obedience any judgements to the contrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jean Bodin, an opponent of medieval obscurantism, wrote in the 16th century that a student of mathematics who believed a theorem suggested by the teacher, without understanding it, could be described as having faith without having knowledge. However, once he had understood the demonstration of the theorem and seen its truth for himself, thus achieving knowledge, his faith was lost.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A scientific assumption may prove to be inexact or even erroneous. But it is still knowledge, not faith, because the assumption was based on evidence, even though this was insufficient. That does not mean we should reject any judgement the reasons for which we do not know. Having thought it over and checked it thoroughly, we must establish whether it may be considered true or untrue. Refusing to control one’s thoughts, blindly following a sudden hunch, common prejudices, or even books is a false path in knowledge. To quote an example, communism, Lenin pointed out, is not blind faith in conclusions picked up from books, but views at which one must arrive after weighing and thinking over thoroughly what one has read comparing the conclusions with the proofs and satisfying oneself that the conclusions have been proved beyond any possible doubt. Lenin wrote: ‘““Communism will become an empty word, a mere signboard, and a Communist a mere boaster, if all the knowledge he has acquired is not digested in his mind,” if he accepted pedantically “the cut-and-dried conclusions he had acquired, without putting in a great deal of serious and hard work and without understanding facts he should examine critically...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-2|2]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The building of socialism, Lenin wrote, required ‘‘the really enlightened elements for whom we can vouch that they will not take the word for the deed….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-3|3]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us assume that we put the fundamental question of philosophy to one who has never heard of it before, and let us assume that he will say at once: “Certainly, matter is primary and consciousness is secondary”. The important thing then is to see how that person will prove his assertion and disprove the opposite idea. If he fails, we shall have to admit that it is faith, and not knowledge, on his part. It may even seem to him that no arguments can generally be adduced in favour of idealism, so that there really is nothing to disprove, while the truth of materialism is so obvious that it needs no proof. Actually, however, every philosophical doctrine gives definite reasons for its conclusions. If one is seeking knowledge rather than faith, one needs to sort out the conclusions and arguments furnished by different philosophical trends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Materialism vs. Subjective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Here is the substance of one such doctrine: We have merely three types of knowledge: (1) that which we hear, see, feel by touch, etc., i.e., our sensations; (2) that which we conceive by reason of memory or imagination, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., our conceptions; (3) we also know ourselves, having an awareness of “self”, of “spirit” which is capable of sensing, remembering, feeling and dreaming. We have a notion of objects solely because we see or smell or feel them, i.e., because we perceive them physically. Without this ability, we would know nothing about the external world. When we see something round, yellow-red on one side and dark-red on the other, feel a smooth rounded surface and perceive a specific smell, we know it is an apple.  The sensations are all we know about this particular object. Thus an apple is nothing but a combination of sensations. Likewise, all objects we observe in the room, street, field or woods, i.e., all external or material things, are combinations of visual, tactile and other sensations.  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;All&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we know about such things are our impressions of them. These impressions exist only in the mind. Men, however, regard a visual or other sensation as a likeness or image of an external thing. What they proceed from is that unless we acknowledge the existence of sensible things outside us, it is impossible to explain how sensations arise. Yet, when we dream we feel sensations, although the things and events we are dreaming of exist only in the mind. Therefore, to explain sensations it is not at all necessary to assume that things have an objective existence. As we need not assume this to explain dreams, so we need not assume it to explain what we feel in our waking hours.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This doctrine which holds that everything commonly regarded as material exists solely in the mind of the subject (man) is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;subjective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as distinct from &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which holds that the primary source of being is not man’s consciousness but consciousness without man, some objective spirit independent of human consciousness. We have just stated the reasoning of the subjective idealist George Berkeley (1685-1753), who wrote: “...all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-4|4]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; His teaching boils down to two points: (1) outside consciousness there is nothing, and (2) to exist is to be perceived; what nobody perceives does not exist. This doctrine conflicts with the materialist proposition that (1) apart from and independent of the mind there are objects which produce sensory reactions in us, and that (2) sensible objects exist even when they are not perceived by the senses.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us see what Berkeley, the most significant exponent of subjective idealism, has to say further. Asserting that notions emerge and are dropped solely at man’s will, Berkeley wrote: ‘‘But ... the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will.  When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see no, or to determine what particular objects Shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-5|5]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In this Berkeley was perfectly correct. But from his words it follows that outside the mind there exist things which, acting on our eyes, ears, etc., cause sensations. In other words, sensations (which are phenomena of consciousness) entirely depend on the objects which cause them and which exist independently of the mind, i.e., on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects. That it is indeed so has been established by natural science. Lenin wrote: “...outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves... which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour.  This is precisely how natural science regards it.... This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-6|6]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Thus scientific evidence and the facts which Berkeley himself has to acknowledge prove &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the truth of materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. But even after recognising the independent existence of the source of sensations Berkeley remains an opponent of materialism. Defending religion, he addresses the materialists thus: ‘’...I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without, in a being distinct from ourselves.... But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit, you Matter...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-7|7]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus to prop up faith in the primacy of spirit, Berkeley has to forego both logic and science and have recourse to god. Yet, while he asserts that god exists, he gives no proof of his existence&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;god is absent from the list of objects of knowledge with which Berkeley opens his discourse. After promising to present philosophical knowledge the truth of which has been demonstrated, he presents us with a proposition to be taken on trust.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, as he maintains that god is an independent source of sensations, Berkeley acknowledges by the same token that something which exists outside and independently of mind produces sensation; that the object producing the sensations exists whether or not it is perceived.  Thus, this philosopher does, in fact, unwittingly disprove subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What then, according to Berkeley himself, made him accept that “without a mind” there is something whose existence does not depend on us, and this something produces sensations in us? It was, above all, the indisputable fact that sensations arise and disappear &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;independently&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of “the mind”, unlike notions which we can usually evoke in the mind just when we like.  This difference between sensations and notions is a fact which conflicts with subjective idealism. To be consistent, a subjective idealist would have to deny that sensation results from causes which are outside, and are independent of, the mind. That is just what many contemporary subjective idealists do. Rudolf Carnap, for instance, wrote that the line between sensations and notions is “rather arbitrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This assertion is contrary to fact. For example, I can &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;imagine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; myself, if I like, basking in the sun on the beach. But I cannot~however much I may like to-make my body &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;feel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; warm with the sun or make my eyes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;see&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the surf.  Transformation of that which we can conceive into that which we can see and feel does not depend on arbitrary choice. There is only one conclusion to be made from this, namely, that subjective idealism, which denies that the sensations we experience have a material source existing outside the mind, conflicts with the facts conclusively established both by science and experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one in his right mind would deny that illusion and reality are two different things.  How to tell dreams from reality, fact from fancy? The common way is to regard whatever exists solely in the mind as illusion; and whatever exists outside the mind (irrespective of whether or not it is perceived), as reality or fact. Berkeley rejects this method of telling between seeming and being and claims that the objects and events we observe when awake exist merely in the mind in just the same way as those we dream about. No one would subscribe to the view that fact and fancy are the same thing. So Berkeley declares that his philosophy, too, has a method of distinguishing illusion from reality~by comparing notes with other people. The sensation most of them regard as fact is fact, and the one regarded otherwise is illusion. Nevertheless Berkeley himself says that the majority may be in error and often are. Most people denied for thousands of years that the Earth is round and believed that the Sun moved round the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Surely opinion polls would not do as a method of differentiating between seeming and being. Still, neither Berkeley nor his successors found any other. Some of them even thought it quite unnecessary to make such surveys because, they said, there was practically no difference between illusion and reality. The subjective idealist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) cited the following: a pencil partly submerged under water seems broken, and this is called an illusion. But Mach was of a different opinion.  He wrote: “It makes practical, but not scientific, sense to speak of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;illusion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in such instances.  Nor does the oft-repeated question whether the world is real or whether we have merely dreamed it up, make any sense from the scientific point of view. Besides, the weirdest dream is a fact as good as any other.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-8|8]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What Mach means by a “‘scientific point of view” is utterly unacceptable to science because the object of science is to penetrate through what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;seems&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actually&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is. It is easy to imagine what will happen to a scientist (or anyone for that matter) who will take guidance from Mach’s doctrine, for he will fall into every pit scattered along the path of the rainbow-chaser and wishful thinker.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our sensations are all we know about an object, says Berkeley, and consequently “‘... the object and the sensation are the same thing”.  Thus the basic premise of Berkeley&#039;s subjective idealism rests on the assertion that we know nothing at all about things save through our sensations of them. Yet we know that a commodity has its value, which is, however, impossible to perceive by the senses. We know that light travels at a speed of 300,000 kilometres a second, which man can neither see nor even imagine. A radio transmitter emits waves whose properties have been thoroughly studied even though they cannot be perceived by the senses. And so &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ad infinitum&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Berkeley&#039;s doctrine leaves out a most important part of human knowledge&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or abstract ideas. Berkeley denied their existence, reducing knowledge entirely to sensations and notions. Such a theory, which rests on the denial of concepts, is incompatible with genuine science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us presume that objects are merely combinations of sensations. Then the Earth, with everything and everybody on it, is a combination of sensations. It follows then that each of us is the only person in the world while all others are mere sensations. That is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;solipsism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  Berkeley and most of his successors concede that other people also exist, i.e., they reject solipsism. Bertrand Russell, the modern idealist philosopher, remarked: “As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician, this surprise surprised me.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-9|9]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And no wonder.  It is hardly logical for one who would be the sole being in the world to be surprised that nobody else should claim the distinction. Yet, another subjective idealist, Carnap, writes that the very question as to whether other people exist is impermissible in philosophy. Nor is it fortuitous, for subjective idealism immediately leads to solipsism. After all, there are but two possible answers. One may either acknowledge the truth of subjective idealism and agree that every one of us is the only person in existence; or one may acknowledge, with the materialists, that there are other people too and subjective idealism has not a leg to stand on. There is no third answer. Human experience and science alike prove that materialism is correct and knock the bottom out of subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Materialism vs. Objective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
We find a different form of idealism in the teachings of its classical exponents, such as Plato (428/427-347 B. C.) in ancient Greece, and Hegel (1770-1831) in Germany. These philosophers recognise that nature exists independently of mind. According to their reasoning, we perceive with our senses individual objects of which the world consists, but sensory experience yields only superficial knowledge such as even little children can have. Sensory experience does not give us ultimate knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the essence of things. Man can have sensory experience of colour, smell or taste. Recollection of these perceptions will bring specific objects to his mind. Yet, that which is common to them and makes them what they are, i.e., their essence, can neither be perceived by the senses nor imagined.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in Plato’s time science was not confined to sense-data. After all, sensory experience and notions tell us merely what isolated, transient, accidental objects look like. Science, however, seeks to understand their essence. This requires that one should be aware of the common, stable and lasting qualities which are at the basis of and manifest themselves in isolated, contingent facts and things. Briefly, to conceive what the things the world consists of really are, one must form a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concept&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The object of sense-perception or representation is a specific individual thing, e.g., the isosceles triangle drawn in my notebook. The object of thought, on the other hand, is the essence (the essential, principal properties) of all triangles which have ever existed or will ever exist, fixed in the concept of “triangle.” It does not make the slightest difference to the nature of a triangle what material it is made from, what size or colour it is, and so on. The individual features differentiating the innumerable triangles there are in existence are equally of no significance. Yet every triangle must possess all the features of the triangle as such, constituting its essence which is always the same, whatever happens to its innumerable individual expressions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, all material things as perceived by the senses are external manifestations of the essence of the given things while their essence is the root, the inner source of phenomena&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that to which they owe their existence. Sensible material objects exist objectively, outside consciousness. Yet that is but the external aspect of reality. The basis of the material phenomena comprising the world is the eternal essences, which can neither be created nor destroyed, of individual external phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are these essences in Hegel’s view? The essence of a triangle does not depend on its material, size or colour. The essence of all triangles is what is common to all of them, viz., that every triangle is a closed straight-lined figure forming three angles. It is impossible to see or even imagine the essence of a triangle, since one can imagine only things which can be perceived by senses. The triangle I can imagine may be drawn in chalk on a blackboard or in pencil on white paper, but nobody can imagine a ‘“‘triangle in general’. It is not a material object, not even a visual representation, but an abstract idea, i.e., a concept. Essence (heat as such, plant as such, speed as such) becomes comprehensible through thought alone. Does this not suggest that at the basis of all reality there is thought which man can mentally perceive but which exists, without ever appearing or disappearing, independently of whether or not it has been grasped?&lt;br /&gt;
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From this Hegel drew the conclusion that the true basis of the world, which exists outside consciousness and which we investigate, is concepts or ideas, while all material objects and facts are products and manifestations of ideas.  Whose ideas? Since they embrace the whole world they must clearly be the ideas of some ‘spirit’ which Hegel calls “world spirit&amp;amp;quot; or the “absolute idea’. According to Hegel, the ‘’absolute idea&amp;amp;quot; and the world are identical. Nature is the “‘other-being of the absolute idea”, and ‘“‘we should ... speak of nature as a system of unconscious thought, as fossilised intelligence’ and of man as the ‘conscious idea” (unlike animals, let alone plants and minerals).&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-10|10]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Like every material object, man is a manifestation of the infinite spirit which is at the basis of the world, but a manifestation possessed of consciousness, of the “finite spirit&amp;amp;quot;, and able to think and grasp the essence of things, or concepts, and conceive the world as the thought process of the world spirit. Consequently, the “world spirit’ knows itself as a spirit, and the “world ideal” thinks of itself through man. Hegel wrote of his philosophy that it was a “‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;representation of God in his eternal being prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-11|11]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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That is the gist of objective idealism which holds that the world is based on the impersonal spirit, the ‘“absolute idea’ rather than on man’s individual consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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The starting-point of objective idealism is that we know the material world outside the mind through thought, by forming concepts of the essence of things. Therefore thought is a means of knowing the essence of things, and this knowledge is the concept of their essence.  This is an obvious deduction. The objective idealists, however, say: If we know the essence of things by thinking and forming concepts, then the world outside the mind must consist of concepts, not of objects. But is that logical?  If our &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of things&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a concept, it does not follow at all that the essence of things is a concept. Concepts exist in the mind while both the essence of things and the things themselves exist independently of it.  Consequently, unlike concepts, which are ideal, the essence of things, as well as the things themselves, are material. The essence of the triangle existed when men knew nothing of it, and even when men were not there at all.  As for the concept of the triangle, it emerged when men had attained a high enough standard of knowledge. It is plain that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; essence of things is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; while the idea or the concept of it is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Consequently, logic attests the truth of materialism and the unsoundness of objective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The objective idealists argue that the real world comprises isolated objects, each having a beginning and an end, while the ideal world comprises abstract concepts which have neither beginning nor end, i.e., are eternal. But while each thing is indeed finite, we cannot say this of the real world as a whole. Every material object springs from other objects (otherwise it would have to spring from nothing), It cannot disappear altogether—as it disappears itself, it gives rise to other material things. Consequently, the real world has neither a beginning nor an end, it is eternal. Certainly the world of concepts shares the fate of mankind which has evolved the concepts and is using them. Yet mankind came into being at a definite point of time, nor did Hegel himself allow it any eternal existence. We know when the concepts “patrician”, ‘fief’, ‘factory’, “electron”, etc., emerged and when the concepts “‘epicycle”, ‘phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;, etc., were dropped. Concepts are mutable and temporal. They emerge at particular stages in the progress of human knowledge and are refined and amplified. Nature, which is infinite, is primary, and its conscious reflection—the world of concepts, which are finite—is secondary.&lt;br /&gt;
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In objective idealism, the consciousness of the “infinite world spirit’, which existed prior to the creation of nature and of any ‘‘finite mind”, i.e., man, is considered to be at the basis of the world. But, first, although it is not at all unusual to observe a person without consciousness (e.g., in a dead faint, under ether, and so on), nobody has ever met consciousness without a person. Second, even granting the impossible and conceding that consciousness can exist separately from its material source, can it be allowed that nature is the product of this consciousness? The realisation of an idea indispensably requires the presence of certain material phenomena (present even before its realisation). Basically, it proceeds by way of transforming material phenomena into other such phenomena emerging in the process. Material phenomena are never a product of nothing. These are facts proved by science and experience. No objective idealist has ever been able to disprove them or produce a single piece of evidence to show that nature has been created out of nothing by a bodiless spirit. Only one who sets reason and science at naught can believe such things. ‘‘To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science’, to make it “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actual knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that is what I have set before me,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-12|12]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hegel wrote. In truth, however, Hegel, like Berkeley, turns his back on scientific knowledge and embraces religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as there are subjective idealists who do not believe in god, so are there objective idealists who say god does not exist. But is it possible by deleting the word “god” from a philosophical doctrine to prevent idealism leading to religion? This is how Lenin answers the question: any form of idealism holds nature to be secondary, derived from intelligence. Yet, to produce nature, one must exist independently of it. ‘‘That means that something exists &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;outside&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; nature, something which moreover &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;produces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; nature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In plain language this is called God.  The idealist philosophers have always sought to change this latter name, to make it more abstract, more vague....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-13|13]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That, however, changes nothing. The idealist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy conflicts with scientific knowledge, with human reason and experience, and therefore &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idealist doctrine, even one whose supporters reject religion, objectively clears the way for religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is something else subjective and objective idealism have in common. All existence, Hegel taught, whether nature (‘fossilised&amp;amp;quot;, unconscious thought) or human  consciousness (thought knowing itself as thought), is thought.  The essence of objective idealism is the identification of being with thinking. And the subjective idealists hold all existence—both nature and man’s consciousness—to be the subjective experiences of the human spirit. Hence both the objective and subjective idealists are unanimous in reducing all existence—that commonly termed material and that commonly termed ideal—to consciousness or in identifying matter with thought. As a result, any form of idealism contravenes such patent facts as, for instance, that my thinking of a ticket for a performance at the theatre and the ticket itself are two different things. Hard as I may try to persuade the usher that the thought of a ticket and an actual ticket are the same thing, he will never let me in just for thinking of the ticket.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everyday life people start from the conviction that all their perceptions, notions, ideas and concepts of things depend on the things themselves, not the other way round. After all, things exist even when we have no notion of them. Hence people in their daily lives naturally share the materialist point of view. They do not usually, however, stop to think why they should share it; they take it for granted. What, then, is the difference between this practical materialism and philosophical materialism? By comparing the arguments for and against philosophical materialism we have learned that the materialist answer to the fundamental question of philosophy is no rash prejudgement but an inference that necessarily follows from all that science has found out about nature, about men and their thinking—in a word, from human experience as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall now examine two important scien&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;tific&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; proofs of the materialist answer to the fun&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;d&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;amental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Science of the Earth’s Past and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
No evidence of perception or thought ever being discovered in inanimate objects, science regards life as the first indispensable requisite of consciousness. When did life emerge on earth? Different sciences have helped find the answer to this question. Physicists, for instance, have found that by measuring the number of the first and last terms of the radioactive series of uranium, actino-uranium and thorium and the amount of helium present in minerals and rocks one can make a fairly accurate estimate of the age of geological deposits. Using this method geologists have established not only how old the earth’s crust is (almost 4,000 million years) but also the duration of individual geological epochs. By examining various layers of the crust, geologists and palaeontologists have found that no life, not even the simplest, existed before 3,000 million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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Microbiological research has shown that microorganisms which are the oldest living things on earth are incapable of sensation, let alone thought. They possess only irritability. The study of fossilised animals (palaeontology) shows that over hundreds of millions of years animals gradually became more complex until, in the Tertiary period (from sixty-nine million to one million years ago), mammals appeared, including the higher animals capable not only of sensation but also of perception and conception.  Nevertheless, consciousness, the ability to think, is found only among humans. And analysis of the products of radioactive decay found in the layers of the earth’s crust which contain the fossilised bones of the hominids, man’s immediate ancestors, attests that man’s separation from the animals took place from five to one million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Earth with all that is on it is the product of sensations and ideas, then whose sensations and ideas were they during the thousand million years that there was yet no life on earth? The idealists fail to answer this question in the context of knowledge. “Natural science positively asserts,’ Lenin wrote, “that the Earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that ... matter is primary and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-14|14]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Thus the only alternative is either the modern natural science and materialism that necessarily follows from it or idealism and the consequent denial of the elementary truths firmly established by science.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. Physiology of the Brain and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to the physiology of the brain.  Investigation of higher nervous activity has proved that the cerebral cortex has specialised areas where sensations are produced when impulses resulting from the stimulation of sense organs (the eye, the ear, etc.) are transmitted to them by afferent nerves. If one of these areas (in the back of the head) is destroyed, the result is blindness, and if another area located at the temples is injured, the sense of hearing is lost. Destruction of certain areas in the cortex renders a person unable to perceive an object as a whole, although colours will still be perceived. There are areas (or, rather, points) in the cortex whose stimulation by electricity arouses vivid recollections, and so on. The brain Sharply reacts to oxygen deficiency. The slightest drop in the blood supply to the brain gravely affects its function, causing a sudden suspension of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Science has incontrovertibly proved that sensations and ideas depend on the normal functioning of an intricately organised material organ&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the brain. In other words, consciousness depends on particularly organised matter (the brain) which does not depend on consciousness.  Natural science “inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-15|15]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Subjective idealists, on the other hand, hold that any body, the brain as well, is a combination of sensations, from which it follows that the brain is a product of consciousness rather than consciousness the product of the brain. Therefore the subjective idealist Avenarius, just as Mach, openly rejects the findings of natural science, asserting that ‘the brain is not an organ of thought’ and that notions and sensations are not functions of the brain. By this token, Lenin observes, he “denies the most elementary truth of physiology&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-16|16]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Here again we must choose between the facts firmly established by physiology, and thus materialism, and idealism which makes one deny what has been proved in the physiology of the higher nervous activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. What, After All, Is Philosophy? ====&lt;br /&gt;
How does philosophical knowledge differ from other scientific knowledge? Before Marx, it was commonly believed that philosophy furnished exhaustive and final answers to literally every question concerning nature, men and thought. The German idealist philosopher Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814) wrote that philosophy “exhausts all human knowledge in its fundamentals.... Each investigation made resolves a question once and for all&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-17|17]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The philosophical systems of the German philosophers Leibniz, Kant and Hegel represent attempts to provide final solutions of all cardinal problems even where essential scientific evidence was not yet available.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels held a different view of philosophy and its goals. They argued that the problems and laws dealt with by chemistry, botany or any particular science concern merely one sphere or aspect of reality. Yet, there are general problems concerning every sphere, and general laws operating in every sphere of nature, society and thought. These general problems and laws are dealt with neither by chemistry nor botany nor any particular science.  They are investigated by philosophy. As we discussed the fundamental question of philosophy we Saw that its correct solution was a deduction from knowledge obtained by all sciences together. The same goes for all other philosophical problems. Philosophy examines and compares the facts and laws discovered by different sciences, sums up this material, and draws the general conclusions that necessarily follow from it. Consequently philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;science of the more general laws governing the development of nature, society and thought&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is the conclusion of all knowledge amassed by mankind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every scientist, whatever his field, uses such general concepts as the material and the ideal, motion and rest, continuity and discontinuity, cause and effect, truth and error, and so on.  The meaning with which he invests them often seems to him self-evident. In fact, however, the meaning of these concepts intimately depends on a definite understanding of the general problems and laws philosophy is concerned with. In attaching certain meanings to the concepts, the scientist actually proceeds in his research from the solution of certain general problems although he may be unconscious of the fact. As they follow a certain conception of general laws, a certain solution of general problems, scientists, consciously or otherwise, take a definite philosophical stand. This does not prevent some of them being perfectly ignorant of the fact that their principles constitute a definite kind of philosophy, all too like Moliere’s M. Jourdain who had no idea he had been talking in prose all his life.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles or method of research is what the scientist proceeds from, what guides him in his work. And that, as we have just seen, is actually the philosophy he shares. Consequently philosophy is both the conclusion of all sciences (and of the experience on which they rest) and the method of all science and experience.  &lt;br /&gt;
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Science does not stand still. Important discoveries often result In revolutionary upheavals in science, making it necessary to more narrowly specify and even revise earlier findings. Lenin wrote: “...natural science is progressing so fast and is undergoing such a profound revolutionary upheaval in all spheres that it cannot possibly dispense with philosophical deductions.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-18|18]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hence there can be no final or exhaustive system of knowledge. Philosophy must be developed and refined as knowledge accumulated by different sciences extends. Thus science advances philosophy. And as the philosophy evolved from a higher level of science iS more true and exact, so is the scientific and practical activity following it more successful and fruitful. The noted English physiologist J.B.S. Haldane wrote: “...a good deal of my recently published research has been inspired by my gradually increasing knowledge of dialectical materialism. ...I find dialectical materialism a valuable tool in research…”’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-19|19]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The materialist philosophy thus advances particular sciences. As for idealist philosophy, it does science harm. Commenting on the harmful influence of idealist views on the work of the physicist Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein wrote: “This is an interesting example of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpretation of facts by philosophical prejudices.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-20|20]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence philosophy is knowledge such as is not found in any other science. Marxism rejects the view&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;which emerged in antiquity and is now advocated by the existentialists—that philosophy has allegedly nothing to do with knowledge of reality, and that by ignoring and despising scientific knowledge philosophy shows man that he should not depend on such knowledge but solely on his inner world in which he is sure to find the answers to his anxious questions about what he must aspire to, what eschew, and what he generally should and should not do.&lt;br /&gt;
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There exists another old view that, apart from knowledge of what occurs in nature, society and mind, nothing concerns philosophy.  “To look at things philosophically’ commonly means to judge things with supreme indifference, just looking on and never interfering in anything. If, on the other hand, a person actively pursues his ideals and fights what he believes to be wrong, people would say of him: “He has a practical, not a philosophical, turn of mind. He is a practical person whose ideals have nothing to do with philosophy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This view of philosophy was utterly rejected by Marx, who wrote: ‘The philosophers have only &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interpreted&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it.&#039;’&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-21|21]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Philosophy does not merely answer the question as to what the world is but also what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;attitude&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we should take towards it, how we should remake it. It is not merely knowledge of what there is but a way of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;looking at&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; what there is, a definite view of the world, a world outlook which determines our aims and goals. Philosophy makes the scientific explanation of reality a means of transforming it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we encounter one more distinction between philosophy and all other sciences. The law, for instance, which states that “...capitalistic accumulation ...constantly produces...  a surplus-population”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-22|22]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; i.e., unemployment, is recognised by science not because Marx and other philosophers consider it just, but because it represents authentic knowledge of capitalism. Every science confines itself to seeking knowledge in its proper field. Objective knowledge does not depend on a scientist’s ideals, likes and dislikes. The questions about what we should aspire to and what attitude we should take towards the world are answered by philosophy. It gives expression to man’s practical attitude to the world, his world outlook. As man is a social being, so is his outlook a social phenomenon, and in class society it expresses the interests of a definite class. The opposition of two currents in philosophy, materialism and idealism, is, now as before, an expression of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being either with one or with the other of these two opposite currents constitutes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship in philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opponents of Marxism take roughly the fol&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;owing line of argument: assuming that philosophy is true knowledge and its doctrines are true inasmuch as their authors have succeeded in learning the truth about the world, it does not matter whether the doctrines are to somebody’s advantage or disadvantage, for in the presence of truth interests are silent. Conversely, assuming that the aim of philosophy is to teach what benefits a certain class, it does not matter whether or not its teachings are true, for in that case they need not conform to truth but to the interest of that class. Therefore, they conclude, the statements “philosophy expresses authentic knowledge’ and “philosophy expresses class interests&amp;amp;quot; are mutually exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must, however, remember that philosophy emerged with the division of society into classes. In class society, in every age the decayed classes which must leave the scene along with the decayed regime under which they have ruled are opposed by other classes which have to crush the old regime and help society ascend to a higher stage. The reactionary classes think in terms of the past, for they fail to see that the existing order has run its course and is no longer serviceable. In a nutshell, they have a perverted view of the state of things. Furthermore, the reactionary classes are vitally interested in having everybody share this view for, so long as it prevails, the masses will believe that the existing order is immutable and will dumbly submit to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The revolutionary classes, on the contrary, are objectively interested in making truth accessible to as many members of society as possible, because so long as the masses believe what the reactionaries tell them it is difficult to rouse them to a struggle against the existing order. It is only after they have learned the truth that they may be victorious in the revolutionary struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Does this mean that such a role in the life of society may belong to true and false statements bearing merely on what is happening in society? To see whether or not it is so, let us look at the bitter struggle that developed during the Renaissance between the supporters and opponents of Copernicus and his follower, Galileo. The ideological positions of the contending parties expressed antagonistic class interests. Although neither Copernicus nor Galileo ever concerned himself with social and political problems in his writings, many people were burned at the stake for supporting their ideas.  Nor would Copernicus and Galileo themselves have escaped the stake if Copernicus had not died just when his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was published in 1543, and if Galileo had not recanted. Nevertheless Galileo had to spend the remaining nine years of his life in confinement imposed on him by the Inquisition for, as the sentence runs, “having held... the doctrine that the Sun is the centre of the terrestrial orbit and does not move westward from the east whereas the Earth does so move….”&lt;br /&gt;
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Galileo was condemned because the scientific truths he defended overturned the prevailing unscientific conception of the world. Scientific comprehension of reality makes people approach everything they learn critically, checking it against experience and reason, which helps them learn the truth about what occurs in society. The unscientific world outlook suggests that people should rely neither on science nor on their own experience and intelligence but solely on what their leaders tell them. (“The Fuhrer thinks for you.&amp;amp;quot;) Therefore, even where scientists say nothing against the existing order of things, the knowledge they spread and the scientific outlook seizing the people’s minds helps them see things in their true light; they no longer blindly believe those who unduly extol the established order, and come to understand that the old system is on its way out and must make room for the new. Hence, the scientific world outlook, as it takes hold of the masses, promotes their interests, making them aware of the tasks before them and the way to accomplish them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Truth is the ideological weapon of the masses in the struggle against the existing order and reactionary classes which defend it. And falsehood, spread by the reactionary classes, makes the masses impotent and submissive slaves. For this reason the quest for truth, for knowledge, for science is the ideological expression of the class struggle. The materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;true&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conception of reality and the idealist solution—a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;false&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one. Hence, the antagonism of the two camps in philosophy has always reflected the antagonism of class interests.  Today too, materialism serves the interest of the proletariat and other progressive classes, whereas idealism serves the capitalist and other exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin showed that idealism does not, however, spring from class interests alone. The process of cognition itself may breed idealism, as it is a process which “... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;includes in it&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transformation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantasy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;...&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-23|23]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Should the assertion that consciousness is primary be all that the idealist doctrines are about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in other words, should they be entirely false—their role would be merely reactionary and they would have nothing to offer us. However, in spite of their idealism, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and other philosophers did, in fact, make significant contributions to man’s quest for true scientific knowledge. Hegel elaborated the dialectical method.  It is a revolutionary method, although Hegel himself did not apply it to nature but only to the development of concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whose class interests a philosophical doctrine will serve depends on the doctrine itself, not on its author’s intentions. In 1899, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel published a book, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Die Weltsratsel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (The Riddle of the Universe) in which, by advocating the materialist outlook in natural science, he knocked the bottom out of idealism. For all that he was no revolutionary politically, the bourgeoisie of all countries fiercely turned on Haeckel, while in Russia the entire printing of his book in Russian translation was sentenced by a court to be burned.  Lenin observed that “this popular little book became a weapon in the class struggle”’,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-24|24]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; a weapon against the bourgeoisie, despite the author’s bourgeois political views. At the same time, the philosophical writings of Bogdanov (criticised by Lenin in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;), who set out to fight the bourgeoisie on behalf of the proletariat, actually promoted the interests of the former, as their author advocated idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxist-Leninist philosophy is simultaneously the science of laws governing the development of nature, society and thought and the world outlook of the working class, affirming communist ideals and moral principles. In it, elucidation of truth and defence of class interests do not exclude but, on the contrary, necessarily imply each other. That is why the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is an instrument for the revolutionary remaking of society and a method of scientifically examining social phenomena which helps find the correct path towards the historical goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#anchor20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2. Revolution In Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Social and Historical Prerequisites of Marxist Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
When capitalism became entrenched in Western Europe, turning millions of peasants into wage workers whose lot was back-breaking toil and appalling poverty, many workers imagined that the source of their misery lay in the machines, in mechanised production, which had replaced manual work. The early 19th century was marked by a spontaneous mass movement of workmen destroying machines as a protest (the Luddites). Soon, however, the workers’ understanding increased and the first class battles were fought between them and their exploiters. The Chartist movement in England in the 1830s and 1840s, the French workers’ uprisings in 1831 and 1834, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, and subsequent strikes made it clear that a new class had emerged, destined to abolish capitalism and end the era of exploitation of man by man. To effect the drastic change, the proletariat had to understand the laws of society’s development much better, and to see how to employ them much more clearly, than the other revolutionary classes needed to, which carried out less stupendous social reforms. It took new ideo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ogical equipment, a new world outlook to accomplish tasks unprecedented in history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such were the material, socio-historical prerequisites of Marxist philosophy. Its emergence was prepared ideologically by preceding philosophy, natural science and the social sciences from which Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820-1895) proceeded.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Ancient Dialectics and Modern Metaphysics ====&lt;br /&gt;
One of the greatest achievements of philosophy before the emergence of Marxism was Hegel’s dialectics. What are dialectics? Two thousand five hundred years ago no particular sciences, e.g., physics, geography, botany, and SO on, were yet in existence. There was only one form of knowledge: philosophy (Greek for “love of wisdom&amp;amp;quot;) which embraced everything.  Philosophers concerned themselves with the earth and the sky, things and creatures, society and mind, seeking to grasp everything at once.  Proceeding in this way they could not fail to observe that all things are in state of perpetual motion, that they appear and disappear, are connected in one way or another and marked by inner contradictions. “This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world” is commonly called dialectical thinking or the dialectics of the ancients. ‘‘But this conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately. ..&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-25|25]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The structure and characteristics of celestial bodies, the Earth, minerals, plants and animals are studied by particular sciences. In antiquity there were no such sciences and knowledge was not specialised. There was pure speculation founded on simple observation without experimental proof.&lt;br /&gt;
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As time went on, particular sciences appeared one by one. For more than two thousand years, however, attempts to find out the truth about natural phenomena were more often based on pure speculation than on experimental research. It was not until the 16th-17th centuries that experimental natural science took shape. That epoch saw the emergence of classical mechanics which explained with remarkable accuracy very many terrestrial and astronomical phenomena and was broadly applied in industry. Physics vastly extended its knowledge of heat, light, magnetism and electricity.  The scientific basis of modern astronomy was laid. Voyages around the world and the geographical discoveries made at that time vastly increased men’s knowledge of continents, oceans, seas, mountains, deserts, rivers and lakes.  By the end of the 18th century, botanists and zoologists had studied and described some scores of thousands of plant varieties, and almost twenty thousand animal species. Human anatomy was investigated for the first time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanics, however, outpaced all other sciences. Its success in a variety of fields, its experimental verification and mathematical precision inspired in scientists a belief that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the laws of mechanics were the key to all phenomena&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of inanimate and animate nature alike.  This &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mechanistic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; view prevailed among scientists in the 17th-18th centuries. From the principle of mechanics that ‘“‘every body remains in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled by external forces to change that state’ it was deduced that all motion is due to the application of an external force which compels a body to change its state.&lt;br /&gt;
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The natural scientists’ mechanistic views were fully shared by the 18th-century materialist philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
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One thing about the discoveries made in astronomy in the 16th-17th centuries was that there was nothing to tell the astronomers whether the solar system had ever been different from what they observed. On the contrary, from the laws of classical mechanics it followed that the planets had always been moving in the same orbits and would continue in them forever. The geographical discoveries had yielded much new information but no evidence that there had been a time when the Earth’s surface was in a different condition. It followed then that the continents, oceans, mountains, rivers, deserts were just where they had always been.  In other words, the Earth’s surface would always be as it was since time began. Botanical and zoological data concerning many thousands of plant and animal species gave no indication that there had been a time when they did not exist. On the contrary, everything seemed to suggest that although individual plants and animals were born and died, the species went on indefinitely.&lt;br /&gt;
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Available scientific data suggested that although everything in nature was in a state of motion, that motion was merely a repetition of the same cycles and forms. And as the forms—being the most essential thing in any part of nature—were immutable, motion engendered nothing new, while nothing essential ever disappeared.&lt;br /&gt;
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That deduction was natural to science at that time. Before investigating the relationship &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects and their action on one another, and so the processes developing in them and the variation they underwent, the scientists needed enough information about the structure of the objects, which, however, they could only gain by abstracting from what actually happened to the objects (from their relationships, interaction and change). When viewed in such terms, the phenomena under examination emerged as a totality of immutable, fixed objects.  The differences and contradictions emerged and were viewed merely as existing between individual objects but never &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; them, the latter being considered altogether impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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This approach, which was necessary and effective at the beginning, became customary.  The connections and variations, temporarily disregarded, began to appear unimportant and then simply non-existent. As a result, a scientist engrossed in his particular field discovered in it innumerable characteristics which made it utterly unlike and apparently unconnected with any other sphere of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the conception was formed that movement was the repetition of the same forms which were always identical, permanent and unchangeable, that the world consisted of ready-made objects which could not be self-contradictory, and that connections between phenomena were superficial and inessential. This view focuses attention on only one aspect of the world, viz., on the inherent repetitiveness of motion and inherent stability of material bodies, and on contradictions &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things. Such a one-sided conception of the world, diametrically different from dialectics, is described as the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysical method&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thinking or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on contemporary scientific knowledge, 18th-century materialist philosophy adhered to the metaphysical method which was then prevalent. Like mechanicism, metaphysics played a progressive role in its day. Scientists amassed vast knowledge about the world by following this method. Yet, the metaphysical conception of motion, interconnection and contradiction is a step backwards, compared with ancient dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Hegel and Feuerbach ====&lt;br /&gt;
The weak points of 18th-century materialism were seized upon by the idealists who criticised its mechanistic and metaphysical approach. But proceeding from pure speculation and not, as a rule, from natural science, the idealists were unable to advance a more correct scientific interpretation of development, as they themselves largely reasoned on metaphysical lines. The change came with the appearance of Hegel’s doctrine which marked a turning point in the history of dialectics. Marx wrote that Hegel was ‘the first to present its (dialectical—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ed.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-26|26]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel&#039;s philosophy greatly influenced his contemporaries. In the ideological struggle which developed in Germany on the eve of the 1848 Revolution both the opponents and supporters of monarchy and religion (Young Hegelians and Old Hegelians respectively) adhered to Hegel&#039;s dialectical idealism. Later on, however, they went separate ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the Young Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), opposed Hegel’s philosophy, arguing that, like any idealist doctrine, it was actually a philosophical apology for religion.  By showing that religion and idealism were false and moreover played a reactionary role in the life of society, Feuerbach took a consistent materialist stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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His defence of materialism and atheism made a tremendous impression. Describing how warmly Marx welcomed the new opinion and how greatly he was influenced by it, Engels wrote: “Enthusiasm was general; we all became Feuerbachians at once.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-27|27]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1839, when Feuerbach became a materialist, Marx was twenty-one and Engels nineteen.  Both were Hegelians, but their militant atheism and revolutionary democratic views made it imminent that they should renounce idealism and adopt a materialist standpoint. Feuerbach’s work was a great encouragement to this transition. Engels wrote that of all the philosophers after Hegel, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx and himself was the greatest. However, it soon became clear to them that, as he shattered Hegel’s idealist philosophy, Feuerbach simultaneously discarded its rational content, dialectics. And thus, although he had advanced far ahead of 18th-century materialism, he still failed to cope with its major shortcomings.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then what is the significance of Hegel&#039;s dialectics which Feuerbach overlooked and which Marx and Engels thought so highly of and used in evolving dialectical and historical materialism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It consists first of all in the teaching that, although there is repetition in movement, nothing&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;either separate objects or the stages and forms of development—is repeated completely.  The world contains no forms which eternally repeat themselves and are immutable. In general, there is nothing eternal in the world except the eternal change of forms and phenomena replacing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Hegel, all is interlinked in the world which is a single whole and every particle of which is involved in an endless multiplicity of relations. This is a very important point, not to be overlooked in scientific research.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While Hegel’s dialectical method acknowledges that there are contradictions between things, it sees this as only one side of the matter; the other side is much more important, viz., “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;all things are contradictory in themselves&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;” and that inner contradiction “is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only insofar as something embodies a contradiction that it moves.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel&#039;s dialectical method disclosed the unsoundness of the metaphysical view which took into consideration merely the stability of real phenomena and our conceptions of them, and which therefore regarded the world as a totality of ready-made things, and thought as a totality of ready-made concepts. Such a view, Hegel argued, ignores the other, most important, aspect&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the eternal mutability of everything in the world, which is not a totality of finished things but of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As he created his method, Hegel was the first to advance, formulate and work out in detail the main laws of dialectics which govern all development. He offered a dialectical interpretation of the most general concepts (categories) which play an exceedingly important role in science and experience. Lastly, Hegel, more amply and correctly than anybody before him, elucidated the complex and contradictory nature not only of thought but of the whole process of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much as they appreciated it, Marx and Engels nevertheless could not incorporate Hegel&#039;s dialectics into their doctrine because it was &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and consequently had serious flaws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, Hegel deduced the laws of dialectics not from existence but from consciousness. He maintained that nature and human history must be subject to those laws because everything occurring in nature and society was merely a reflection of consciousness, of the Absolute Idea.  To Marx and Engels, however, it was not “a question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-28|28]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx and Engels worked out a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dialectic in which the dialectical laws emerge above all as those governing the development of the real world (nature and society), whereas the laws of thought are their peculiar reflection in men’s heads.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, although Hegel stated that development was infinite, the Absolute Idea in his philosophical system actually completed its development. Hence Hegel considered his philosophy to be final, all-embracing knowledge, while he considered the society in which it was evolved to be the crowning stage in the development of mankind. But a “system of natural and historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, is contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning&amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-29|29]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   and so is the “final” stage in society’s development. Hegel sacrificed to his idealist system the most important dialectical principle, the principle of development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, being an idealist, Hegel considered it somewhat degrading for the Absolute Idea to be embodied in matter, in nature. He attributed progressive dialectical development to nothing but the ‘conscious idea”, i.e., to men.  As for the “unconscious idea”, i.e., nature, it, according to Hegel, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not develop in time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was for this reason that Marx wrote that dialectics with Hegel “is standing on its head.  It must be turned right side up again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-30|30]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It was for Marx and Engels to evolve the materialist dialectical method which is diametrically opposite to Hegel’s idealist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Philosophical Generalisation of New Scientific Discoveries ====&lt;br /&gt;
Discriminating use of Feuerbach’s materialist ideas and Hegel’s dialectics is merely one aspect of the philosophical work of Marx and Engels which ensured continuity between their own doctrine and those of their philosophical predecessors. The other aspect of their theoretical work was the summing up of new &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 19th century, the study of heat, magnetism, electricity and light revealed that even within the pale of physics reducing all to mechanical phenomena was out of the question. It was still less possible with relation to chemistry, botany and zoology. The progress of natural science cut the ground from under the feet of mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Hegel convincingly demonstrated the internally contradictory nature of consciousness, extensive research conducted in the 19th century in the natural and social sciences demonstrated no less convincingly the inherently contradictory nature of many natural and social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 1840s, the universal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conservation and transformation of energy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was discovered, in accordance with which energy neither disappears nor is created anew. This law, which states that mechanical, thermal, electrical, chemical energy is mutually convertible, led to the deduction that all phenomena in the universe are connected in some way, that the &amp;amp;quot;unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific fact&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-31|31]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the latter half of the 18th century, M. Lomonosov and J. Hutton suggested that the Earth’s surface was quite unlike what it was in the past. In the 19th century, so much evidence was accumulated about how substantially and recurrently the Earth’s appearance used to change that the science of geology was born.  Geologists found that none of the stages of the Earth’s development (e.g., the Archean, Proterozoic, Palaeozoic, Mesozoic, Cainozoic) had been a repetition of any of the previous stages.  The beginning of every new era meant the disappearance of a number of continents, islands, seas, mountains, etc., and the appearance of entirely new geological phenomena, as well as substantial climatic changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1755, Kant suggested that the solar system did not exist eternally but had naturally emerged at some time in the past, and he formulated a hypothesis, according to which the solar system originated and developed out of a nebula. The 18th-century scientists, in whose minds metaphysics reigned supreme, remained deaf to the call to stop regarding astronomic phenomena as unchangeable cycles eternally repeating themselves. In 1796, however, Kant’s hypothesis was supported and carried forward by Laplace, and in the middle of the 19th century it was substantiated mathematically. Although in the 20th century the Kant-Laplace hypothesis of the origin of the solar system was supplanted by others, it is now commonly accepted that the solar system appeared at some time in the past as a natural result of the development of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There emerged comparative anatomy and the physiology of plants and animals, and it was revealed that there is an essential likeness and connection between rather distant species.  In the first half of the 19th century it was discovered that all plants and animals are built of cells which are built more or less on the same pattern and which feed and multiply in roughly the same way, whether they be the cells of a seaweed or a tree, of a minute infusorian or man. This signal discovery put it beyond all doubt that all living things are mutually connected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another new science, palaeontology, established that over hundreds of millions of years many plant and animal species had been replacing one another, some of them dying out and others appearing in their stead. It was found that nothing in nature was eternal, stages of development never repeating themselves but replacing one another in an eternal succession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the mid-19th century the English scientist Charles Darwin discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of natural selection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; establishing the connection between all living beings and demonstrating that their development was no repetition of the old but the extinction of the old and emergence of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, as early as the first half of the 19th century natural science began to study the interconnections of objects and changes within and between them, rather than isolated objects; processes, rather than finished things. This led to the discovery of the intrinsically contradictory character of everything in nature and in society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysical mode of thinking thus came into conflict with scientific knowledge which testified to the “universal, all-sided, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; connection of everything with everything...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-32|32]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Newly-obtained knowledge has made it clear that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nature contains nothing eternal besides the eternal succession of developmental stages, each of which disappears sooner or later to be replaced by an essentially different stage which shares the fate of its predecessors; that the world is not a totality of things but of processes, connections and relations, and that all phenomena are marked by inherent contradictions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To draw such conclusions was to subject to a revision the dominant mechanistic and metaphysical views and prejudices which had got hold of scientists and philosophers. It took extraordinary power and boldness of mind to generalise scientific knowledge in terms of philosophy, as Marx and Engels did, and declare that ‘‘in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ast resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-33|33]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. The Role of Practice in Human Existence ====&lt;br /&gt;
While nature exists independently of man, his entire existence—both physical and spiritual&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depends on nature. A person lives or dies, and, if he lives, he is happy or miserable, all depending on the external world around him.  That world, acting on man’s sense-organs, produces sensations, emotions and ideas in him.  This was how the pre-Marxian materialists explained the dependence of the spirit on nature, of consciousness on matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx was the first to see and expose the onesidedness of that view which suggests that the external world alone is capable of affecting man while all man can do is passively perceive and reflect on the things and events around him.  But can a person merely gaze at things, listen to sounds and reflect and do nothing else? Not unless he is a paralytic unable to move hand or foot, and even then he must be looked after by others who certainly do more than just feel sensations and reflect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Feuerbach quite rightly observed, in order to live, man must satisfy his needs. But Feuerbach went no further than that. Marx, on the other hand, showed that in order to have that without which man cannot live, i.e., food, clothing, shelter, the means of protecting himself from savage beasts, and so on, man has to act on the things round him so as to make them satisfy his needs. Unlike the old materialists’ imaginary man, real man does not merely look on, but acts; he does not passively suffer the influence of the external world but influences it himself. The external world changes man, but man changes the world too. Man’s activity whereby he changes the external world, i.e., nature and society, is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Practice implies influencing nature in order to gain one’s livelihood (work, production); influencing other people (social or public activity), and influencing nature so as to gain knowledge (scientific experimentation).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels proved that practice, which the old materialists overlooked, was of immense significance to men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. Practice as the production of the means of subsistence is the primary condition of human existence. Its significance is clear if only from the fact that man’s survival depends &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Animals as well as men have to influence their natural environment to protect themselves against hunger, cold and enemies. There is, however, an essential difference between man’s work and animal behaviour. In order to sustain itself an animal tackles the object directly whereas man tackles objects with the aid of implements he manufactures himself, and forms certain relations with other men. These relations greatly affect man’s behaviour, moulding him as a social being. Work gave rise to human intelligence and transformed the primitive herd into human society with its morals, science and art. In a word, work is what makes us human, it is man’s essence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Marx was the first to show that the progress of mankind from the lower to higher stages of civilisation is determined by the progress of commodity production which, in the long run, determines the course of history. Consequently practice has the decisive role in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. The old materialists’ error was that while they spoke of man’s dependence on the external world they overlooked the other side of the matter or the dependence of man’s environment on his influence. Men have changed the appearance of the Earth out of all recognition.  Vast forests have been felled, marshes drained, artificial rivers and seas created and soil, climate and the composition of the atmosphere greatly altered and new varieties of plants and animals developed by man. The crops and animals we raise have been bred by man. Our natural environment bears the stamp of men’s practical activity. Men themselves, the relations that have been established among them and the things they have created are all products of this activity. Hence, although it is true that material conditions influence man a great deal, it is also true that these conditions themselves are to a great extent products of the practical activity of generations. Therefore the influence of these conditions on man includes the influence on him of other people’s practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having thus exposed the unsoundness of contemplative materialism, Marx and Engels showed that practice plays the decisive role in men’s material and intellectual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until the mid-19th century nobody had managed to supply a materialist explanation of the history of human society. All philosophers—idealists and materialists alike—arrived at an idealist interpretation of society. Yet, by that time the progress of social relationships and the social sciences had prepared enough material for solving the problem. First, however, one had to examine the material thoroughly, draw general conclusions from it, make proper deductions and, overcoming the ingrained views which had dominated society for centuries, take a path yet untrodden by any thinker. That was what Marx did. Having demonstrated the unsoundness of the old materialists’ idealist view on history, Marx, using the latest information provided by the social sciences and subjecting the workings of modern society to a detailed and penetrating examination, was able to offer a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist explanation of human history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to be dealt with further on in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote that Marx was “the founder of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism ...’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-34|34]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The creation of Marxist philosophy sbelind the defeat of mechanism and metaphysics characteristic of the old materialism and the triumph of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism. Contemplation was exposed and the immense role played by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; elucidated. The idealist view of society was overcome and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;historical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism created. These changes were so extensive as to make the emergence of the Marxist doctrine a real &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Conception of Matter in Ancient Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
A Hindu philosopher, Kapila, who lived 2,500 years ago, reasoned as follows. Nothing is eternal. Yet no thing can spring out of nothing nor can it be reduced to nothing, for when things are destroyed they do not disappear altogether but turn into stuff from which other things are made. Thus Kapila arrives at the conclusion that there exists some material which can be neither created nor destroyed, and of which all things are formed, namely, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other ancient philosophers similarly arrived at the idea of matter. Early Greek philosophers who lived at about the same time as Kapila sought matter among the bodies immediately observable in nature. Thales regarded water or moisture as the primary stuff or principle of things. Anaximenes identified primary matter with air. Heraclitus held that fire was primary. Empedocles believed that the universe was made up of particles of earth, water, air and fire. Democritus taught that matter consisted of eternal, indestructible and unchangeable bodies, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atoms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, so small that they cannot be diminished any further (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atomos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, indivisible) or seen or touched. Atoms possess hardness, size, shape, weight and motion. Everything consists of atoms arranged in particular ways.  When a particular combination of atoms, a thing, breaks up, the thing is destroyed. Diversity of the real world, according to Democritus, is due to the diversity of atom combinations.  Subtle emanations of atoms, thrown off from the surface of an object, penetrate the sense-organs, producing sensations and then ideas, for which sensations are responsible. Both sensations and ideas are impressions left by the emanations of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Democritus taught that (1) matter is real and exists independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations; (3) sensations and ideas are impressions produced by matter; (4) matter has certain physical properties and is the stuff of which all things are made (it is the ultimate level of nature); (5) matter is immutable: atoms have always been as they are, and they will always be so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Revolution in Natural Science. Philosophical Controversy ====&lt;br /&gt;
The view that matter consists of atoms which are the immutable, ultimate level of nature governed by the laws of mechanics persisted to the end of the 19th century. In that century, however, the connection between electricity and magnetism was discovered. Shortly afterwards, electromagnetic fields, waves, charges and the electromagnetic nature of light were discovered and investigated, giving rise to electrodynamics, the science concerned with these phenomena. None of them was found to contain atoms. Some people expected that with time atoms would be found, after all, to be the basis of electromagnetic phenomena. Others, who saw that everything could not be reduced to atoms, began to think that along with bodies which consisted of atoms, i.e., along with matter as they understood it, there were natural phenomena of an essentially different kind, such as electromagnetism, which they considered to be immaterial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were others still who held that electromagnetic fields, waves, charges, and so on, were not really natural phenomena but concepts invented by physicists to make it more convenient for them to describe their observations.  These people maintained that, unlike matter composed of atoms&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the reality of which they never questioned—electromagnetic fields, waves, etc., exist only in mind and not in reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Austrian physicist Ernst Mach took a different line. He argued that nothing (and not electromagnetism alone) existed outside consciousness. There is nothing but our sensations, he wrote, and to believe in atoms is not a whit better than to believe in witches. This subjective-idealist theory was rejected by all but a few natural scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the turn of the 20th century it was found that atoms of certain chemical elements are capable of changing into atoms of other chemical elements (e.g., an atom of radium changes into one of radon and then of lead); that the atom is a system of particles charged with electricity (electrons), and electromagnetic fields; that the mass of electrons, contrary to the laws of classical mechanics, alters with their velocity. That which scientists called matter (atoms) was reduced to electromagnetic phenomena, to what was termed electricity or energy and was regarded as immaterial. After these discoveries, the majority of scientists were inclined to think that matter does not consist of atoms but of electrons. Some scientists, however, who had earlier believed in the existence of atoms but denied the reality of electromagnetic phenomena, now held that since the atom itself presented fields, charges and waves, it meant that there was no matter; there were merely physical concepts. All views that had been commonly accepted in natural science now came under sharp criticism. Natural science reached a crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idealists were not slow to see their opportunity and claimed that the new discoveries apparently corroborated the idealist views.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was urgently necessary to disprove the new form of idealism, and by drawing philosophical conclusions from the new scientific discoveries, enrich Marxist philosophy and show the way out of the crisis in natural science.  That task was brilliantly carried out by Lenin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The New Concept of Matter Elaborated by Lenin ====&lt;br /&gt;
In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin showed that Mach’s “new” doctrine was actually the old doctrine of Berkeley, altogether inconsistent with science. Lenin wrote that the new discoveries had exposed the unsoundness of metaphysical materialism which held nature (atoms) to be immutable, infinite in extent but finite in depth, and saw everything as mechanical motion. Not only did the new scientific discoveries confirm dialectical materialism but they enabled it to be enriched by the philosophical deductions which Lenin made from them. He conclusively proved that nature is as infinite in depth as in extent that “the electron is as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inexhaustible&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as the atom, nature is infinite...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-35|35]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , it has no “ultimate&amp;amp;quot; level. Therefore, to declare that matter consisted of electrons rather than atoms would be to retain the metaphysical conception of matter. The whole point was that in the transition from one level of nature to another, deeper level, many properties of the former disappeared, being replaced by other properties, not present at the previous levels. There were no immutable things or properties, no immutable form of motion to which motion at all levels could be reduced.  The electromagnetic structure of the atom was not evidence of its ‘“dematerialisation”’ but of man’s deeper knowledge of the atom. The trouble with physicists was that they knew none but mechanistic and metaphysical materialism.  Therefore they took the collapse of the mechanistic method and metaphysics for the collapse of materialism. ‘“‘Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-36|36]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Natural science, Lenin wrote, “... will overcome all crises, but only by the indispensable replacement of metaphysical materialism by dialectical materialism”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-37|37]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and, above all, by the replacement of the narrow concept of matter (embracing the atoms alone) by a broad dialectical concept. Matter is “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it”; “...matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-38|38]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Such is Lenin’s definition of matter. It comprises three points, viz., (1) matter is that which exists apart from and independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations in us; (3) matter is that which our sensations and consciousness reflect in general.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All that which produces sensations is real, but not all that is real produces sensations.  Thus, we cannot feel the ultraviolet rays, processes going on in the centre of the sun, or endless other phenomena. Important as the second and third characteristics of matter are, the main thing that distinguishes what is mater.  ial from what is immaterial is that the former exists outside consciousness. Lenin wrote: &amp;amp;quot;...the sole ‘property’ of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of existing outside the mind.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-39|39]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That precisely is the distinguishing feature of Lenin’s conception of matter. For Lenin, not only all that is real objectively exists, but all that objectively exists is real.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now you may ask: “Is shadow material? Is the absence of light rays reflected from a surface material?’ But their absence is just as much a reality independent of the mind as their presence is. Both these phenomena are thus equally material. If, besides, we take it into account that the world is no collection of finished things but a totality of processes and relationships, we shall see that the idea that material is corporeal, i.e., the metaphysical materialists’ view, must give way to another, which regards the gravitational field and electromagnetic wave propagation and all kinds of connections existing outside the mind (including social relationships) as material phenomena.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern scientific discoveries attest that Lenin’s conception of matter is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early in the 20th century everything in nature was believed to consist either of discontinuous microparticles (substance) or of continuous electromagnetic fields. Both were taken, by and large, to be subject to the same laws which govern the objects possessing mass and velocity or macroobjects which we meet in ordinary experience. It seemed no less obvious that if discontinuous substance (in which case motion occurs along a definite line, receiving a definite impulse at each point of the line) is the opposite of the continuous field (in which case motion consists in wave propagation) then no object can be a substance and a field simultaneously.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As scientists investigated such fields and particles with a mass of a billion-billionth of a gram, moving almost as fast as light, a wonderful world, the microcosm, opened up before them. In that strange world certain laws of classical mechanics lose their force and are replaced by other laws. Substance and field coincide in the same object and particles do not possess simultaneously a definite impulse and a definite position. In fact, the more definite a particle’s position, the less definite its impulse, and vice versa. When these and other unusual laws of the microcosm were discovered, scientists evolved, in the mid-20th century, a new branch of physics, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantum theory&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, the idealists hastened to take advantage of its unusual character and insisted that quantum objects and processes did not really exist, being merely concepts invented by scientists to explain their experiments. That was, however, rejected by leading physicists. One of the authors of the quantum theory, Louis de Broglie, wrote that whether he studied macro-objects or micro-objects a physicist was sure of their objective existence, for “it is doubtful that he would be able to pursue his research usefully, by abandoning all belief in objective reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-40|40]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Einstein pointed out time and again that the certainty of the external world existing independently of the researcher underlay the whole of natural science. Planck and Born, who made significant contributions to quantum theory, held the same view. Concerning micro-particles, Born wrote: “I maintain that we are justified in regarding these particles as real in a sense not essentially different from the usual meaning of the word.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-41|41]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; As for the ambivalent opinion accepting the reality of things of everyday experience (macrocosmic objects) while denying the reality of microcosmic objects, Born wrote that “there is a continuous transition.... Where does that crude reality, in which the experimentalist lives, end ... and where does the atomistic world, in which the idea of reality is illusion and anathema, begin?  There is, of course, no such border; if we are compelled to attribute reality to the ordinary things of everyday life including scientific instruments and materials used in experimenting, we cannot cease doing so for objects observable only with the help of instruments”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-42|42]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And, Born concludes, quantum theory “calls for new ways of describing the physical world, but not the denial of its reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-43|43]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Such is the view of leading contemporary physicists whose research results have induced them to arrive at certain propositions of dialectical materialism spontaneously, although they do not consciously support Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, many outstanding modern physicists have consciously accepted dialectical materialism as the only philosophy consistent with modern science. They are P. Langevin, F. Joliot-Curie, J.-P. Vigier, Sakata Shoichi, and others.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this confirms Lenin’s prediction that the spirit of materialism, which is inherent in natural science, will enable it to overcome every possible crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt; and Motion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;re Matter Without Motion? ====&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this question one must first clearly understand what matter is and what motion is. We have already discussed the nature of matter. As for motion, it was established as early as the 19th century that mechanical motion is merely one form of the motion of matter, which has different, if connected, forms.  Engels evolved the following basic principles of the Marxist conception of the forms of the motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, the forms of the motion of matter are essentially different, none of them being reducible to another. For example, although chemical reactions play a major role in the processes occurring in the body of an animal and in the formation of species in the anima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kingdom, it would be quite wrong to attempt to reduce animal life to a chemical form of motion. With the emergence of life, there come into effect biological laws, not operative in inanimate nature; life is a form of motion, essentially different from any other (although it is connected with other forms of motion).&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, under certain conditions some forms of motion turn into other forms. Thus, at a certain stage in the development of matter and the complication of chemical processes, life appeared as a new form of the motion of matter. At a certain stage in the development of the animal kingdom, man was singled out from it; there emerged a new form of the motion of matter, namely, social processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, complex forms of the motion of matter include relatively simple forms, by no means being merely their sum. All chemical reactions necessarily involve electromagnetic and other physical processes, although the de&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isive role here belongs to the laws of chemistry. All vital processes in plants or animals necessarily involve a great number of chemical reactions, though the decisive role is played by biological laws. All social processes necessarily involve biological processes occurring in man. But the decisive role in the social process is undoubtedly played by the laws of the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Engels advanced also the important idea that the classification of the forms of the motion of matter underlies the classification of sciences.  The further progress of science has fully confirmed these ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of modern scientific conceptions, the following groups of forms of the motion of matter may be isolated: (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;physical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or change of the position in space, velocity, mass, energy, electrical charge, temperature, volume and other characteristics of real objects; (2) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;chemical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the conversion of substances, combination and recombination of atoms; (3) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;biological forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or life and changes occurring in plants and animals; (4) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the changes occurring in human society and peculiar to it alone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each of these forms of motion exists objectively, outside the mind, and is a material process. The motion of human feelings, moods and ideas, on the other hand, exists merely in man’s mind. Certainly emotions and ideas do not exist without their material seat, i.e., the brain. “But,” Lenin explained, “‘to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-44|44]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; While they are a social phenomenon, emotions and ideas are at the same time spiritual processes, and this distinguishes them from all other social phenomena, which are material processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This shows the one&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sidedness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the mechanistic materialists’ view that motion presumably boils down to the movement of bodies in space, wholly explainable by the laws of mechanics, in the process of which bodies never change, always remaining the same. Hence, according to this conception, matter is immutable and motionless. Yet the deeper natural science penetrates into nature’s secrets, the more obvious it becomes that nature contains no immutable objects, and that the motion of matter is not confined to a single form of motion but comprises &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any kind o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; change at all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then is nothing at rest in the world?&lt;br /&gt;
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When lava ejected from a volcano has solidified into rock, it seems to be at rest. Nevertheless, solid rock also undergoes constant change induced by temperature fluctuations, rain, wind, surf, electromagnetic processes, which sooner or later will cause the rock to crumble. Long as its rest may be, it is still of a transient nature. Lastly, the rock moves relative to the sun, just as the Earth does. In mechanics generally, two bodies which are at rest relative to each other are performing identical motions relative to a third body. Therefore every object which is at rest moves. It is only resting in a certain respect. It is clear that rest is a particular instance of motion.&lt;br /&gt;
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While rest is finite and relative, motion is infinite and absolute. In other words, it is uncaused and indestructible.&lt;br /&gt;
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For this reason, all attempts to interpret the laws of nature so as to show that motion is not indispensable to matter, that matter without motion is possible, have failed. The second law of thermodynamics is a case in point. It reads that in a closed system, in which no energy is received from outside or lost, all forms of energy tend to be converted into heat. As heat can only pass from a hot to a cold body, the temperature of every part of such a system must eventually become exactly the same, and the system must reach thermal balance, when no conversion of one form of energy into another occurs. Regarding the universe as a closed system, the physicists Clausius and Kelvin concluded that in some time all forms of motion except heat would disappear and a balance of heat or the “thermal death” of the universe would set in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet movement is indestructible in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. Becoming incapable of changing from one form into another, movement would be destroyed in that respect, should a thermal balance be established. Engels wrote that to believe in the “thermal death” of the universe was to believe that movement was not indestructible. Besides, the ‘thermal death” of the universe implies that movement has both an end and a beginning. If there is a point at which movement loses its ability to change into different forms, there must have been a point at which it acquired that ability. One who believes that the universe will reach thermal balance, must also believe that the ‘world clock has to be wound up, then it goes on running until it arrives at a state of equilibrium from which only a miracle can set it going again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-45|45]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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If nothing but an external impulse, intervention by a preternatural force, i.e., a miracle, can pull the universe out of its impending balance, then, plainly, it could only be by a miracle that it has been put into its present rather restless state. Thus, Engels held, the idea that movement is destructible, which is implied in the theory of “thermal death”, leads to religion quite unavoidably. Indeed, in 1951, Pope Pius XII said: “The farther back we look, the richer we find matter to be in free energy.... Thus everything seems to indicate that the material universe, charged as it was with incredibly vast reserves of energy, received, at a certain point in time, a powerful initial impulse.... Hence, creation in time; and therefore, a Creator; and consequently, God.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-46|46]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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As he criticised the theory of “thermal death”, Engels expressed his confidence that the progress of science would refute it. As early as the 19th century the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann showed that the tendency towards changing all forms of movement into heat in a closed system is the tendency towards the changing of this system from a less probable to a more probable state. However, as was established in the mid-20th century, all states of a system comprising an infinite number of particles are equally probable. Assuming that the universe is a system of an infinite number of particles, one must accept that thermal equilibrium will never be its most probable state.  Nevertheless, in terms of the general theory of relativity, the conditions of the existence of the universe do not remain immutable. Therefore the universe is not a closed system, and even should it comprise a finite number of particles, it still would not reach thermal equilibrium.&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern natural science bears out the tenet of dialectical materialism that motion is an intrinsic property of matter, its mode of existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Does Motion Without Matter Exist? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Thermodynamics and electromagnetic theory, which emerged in the 19th century and covered a very wide range of natural phenomena, took no account of atoms. (Their connection with the electromagnetic phenomena was yet to be established.) Scientists almost unanimously believed that matter consisted of atoms, while everything else (energy, electromagnetism) was thought to be “energy”, not matter. Wilhelm Ostwald, a German chemist and physicist, reasoned that as thermodynamics and electrodynamics had solved a great number of problems of physics and chemistry, ignoring the existence of atoms, it might be presumed that all other problems of natural science could also be resolved without having to assume that atoms exist. Hence, the assumption was false, and atoms did not exist. Having made that deduction and never doubting that atoms alone were matter, Ostwald concluded that the ‘ultimate’ level of matter was not matter, which did not exist anyway, but motion. Everything in the world consisted of “pure motion.” That gave rise to ‘‘energism”, a philosophical concept according to which the world was based neither on matter nor spirit but on energy, which was identified with motion. Insisting that both materialism and idealism should be discarded and replaced by energism, Ostwald wrote: ‘The simple and natural removal of the old difficulties arising from the antithesis between the concepts of matter and spirit by subordinating both to the concept of energy appears to me to be a great improvement...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-47|47]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin exposed the erroneous nature of this theory.  To assert that both matter and spirit boil down to energy, he pointed out, is to contend that neither matter nor mind exists, and there is only movement. But no scientist has ever denied yet the existence of ideas. And no wonder, for how can one express ideas, while insisting that ideas do not exist? Moreover, the belief that ideas exist and matter does not is an idealist point of view with nothing new in it. Such is Lenin’s first argument against energism.&lt;br /&gt;
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His second argument is, briefly, this: &amp;amp;quot;Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word ‘energy’ ” and thought that in that way he ended the contradiction between materialism and idealism. If we designate as energy both movement outside consciousness (physical, chemical, physiological and other processes) and movement inside consciousness (varying sensations, strivings, ideas), “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;f we ‘subordinate’ both matter and mind to this concept, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verbal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; annihilation of the antithesis is beyond question...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-48|48]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; But, in reality, the question whether mind depends on matter or vice versa remains. So does the irreconcilable conflict between materialism and idealism, which offer opposite answers to this question.&lt;br /&gt;
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The discovery of the electromagnetic nature of atoms made it obvious that Ostwald was wrong and, in 1908, he acknowledged that the existence of atoms was beyond question. In the middle of the 20th century, scientists could see atoms for themselves, photographed by an electronic microscope.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even so, attempts were made relatively recently to revive the view which Ostwald himself had renounced. In 1948, Bertrand Russell wrote: “It is energy, not matter, that is fundamental in physics’ because “both relativity and quantum theory have had the effect of replacing the old conception of ‘mass’ by that of ‘energy’ &amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-49|49]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and if mass has taken the place of energy, the latter has taken the place of matter, as mass is, indeed, matter. Russell&#039;s reference to the theory of relativity here concerns the relationship between energy and mass, discovered by Einstein.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even supposing Einstein&#039;s discovery did mean that mass was replaced by energy, it does not follow that matter does not exist, since its place has been taken by energy. Its existence is really a question of whether the world contains anything besides ideas, emotions and sensations. The answer to this does not depend on whether real objects have the properties of inertia and gravitation, i.e., mass.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides, Einstein’s discovery does not imply any replacement of mass by energy. If we put a piece of iron on a hot stove, it will get hot as it receives energy from the stove, the latter losing the same amount of energy. According to classical mechanics, the weight of the piece of iron and of the stove does not change&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;their mass remains the same. Einstein’s discovery, however, discards this notion, and implies that when an object transfers its energy to another object, it also transfers a certain amount of mass, while every time mass is transferred from one object to another, some energy is also transferred. Einstein wrote: “...a piece of iron weighs more when red-hot than when cool; radiation ... emitted from the sun contains energy and therefore has mass; the sun and all radiating stars lose mass by emitting radiation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-50|50]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; When a piece of iron gets hot from the stove, the mass it thus acquires is practically negligible. But the sun, which radiates huge amounts of energy, is losing mass at a rate of 4,000,000 tons a second.&lt;br /&gt;
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So that attempt to revive energism was also unsuccessful. Now, another question arises.  Ideas, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. They exist only in men’s consciousness. Does it not follow, perhaps, that the succession of sensations, ideas, and so on, is motion without matter? In other words, while it is erroneous to think, as the energists do, that any kind of movement represents motion without matter, would it not be correct to say that in some instances, i.e., mental processes, it is a case of motion without matter?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that conceptions, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. Yet they are always somebody’s conceptions, sensations and aspirations; they cannot exist without man.  And man is not immaterial. Therefore the succession of ideas, emotions, etc., is far from being motion without matter; it takes place in man, a material being. It is the idealists alone who, in the face of all the scientific and practical evidence, maintain that ideas may exist without a material expositor. In fact, however, whether apart from mind or within it, motion without matter is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5. Sp&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ace and Time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Can Matter Exist Outside Time and Space? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every material object has shape, is three-dimensional, occupies a certain place, is at a definite distance from other objects and at some angle to them. These relations of coexistence of material objects are known as spatial forms and relations or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;space&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The succession or simultaneous occurrence of material facts, the duration of each and the irreversible character of the succession of phenomena, which has but one dimension, one direction—from past to present—all these relations of material phenomena are called temporal relations or relations in time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can matter exist outside space and time?&lt;br /&gt;
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This question can occur only to those who acknowledge the existence of matter. The subjective idealists, who deny the existence of anything apart from mind, hold that space and time exist solely in man’s mind. All those, however, who never question the existence of matter as an objective reality take it for granted that all material phenomena exist in space and time, outside man’s consciousness, just as matter does.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question whether matter can exist outside space and time was posed in the 18th century by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;–&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;1804). He recognised that the objects around us exist apart from mind and independently of it. “...I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me...”, he wrote, “as I am that I myself exist....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-51|51]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Vis-a-vis time and space, Kant argued that, whereas spatial and temporal relations are inherent in things themselves, we can only learn about this through our contact with things, from experience, in the course of which “...objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions... .”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-52|52]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Experience is the source of our conception of things. It is impossible to observe all facts of a kind (for example, al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; instances of bodies submerged in liquids).  Therefore, no matter how many facts we have observed, we cannot deduce from that experience any universal rule admitting no exception.  We cannot, for instance, assert that all bodies immersed in a liquid are subject to pressure. We can only draw a partial conclusion from experience since there may be some bodies which do not undergo pressure. Consequently, “if... a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-53|53]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Our geometrical judgements about space (e.g., that a straight line is the shortest line between two points) are conceived as universal rules admitting of no exceptions.  Our judgements about time are equally assumed to be rules without exceptions. Hence, these judgements have not been derived from experience. And if our judgements about time and space are not founded on experience, then their source is clearly not outside the mind but within it. Consequently, the ideas of space and time are inherent in the mind as forms of contemplation which are present there before any actual contemplation, observation or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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To prove his idea, Kant also adduced the following. Imagine that everything has disappeared: you will see empty space in your mind’s eye. But try to imagine that not only things but the very space they occupied has also disappeared, and you will find it impossible. One can imagine that no events occur.  But it is impossible to imagine that time itself has disappeared. Consequently, the notions of space and time are inherent in the mind and are so firmly fixed in it that, try as it might, it cannot get rid of them. In other words, notions of space and time are built into the mind, and are present there before and regardless of any observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s contention that our notions of space and time have nothing corresponding to them in the real world, and that they do not indicate actual, objectively existing relations or properties of things but ideal relations existing only in the mind makes him a subjective idealist.  According to his thinking, the notions of space and time are a pair of glasses, as it were, through which we look at things. Outside our consciousness, there is neither time nor space.  Thus, Kant arrives at the conclusion that matter exists apart from time and space.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant is right in saying that universal judgements cannot be derived from experience, from contemplation. Nevertheless, experience is not merely passive contemplation; it also actively influences things, which makes it possible to substantiate judgements of a universal nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our mathematical judgements of space and time possess, according to Kant, universality not present in other scientific assumptions which Kant himself acknowledged as being derived from experience. But laws discovered in physics, chemistry and other sciences are also of a general character. Contrary to what Kant believed, there is no gulf between geometrical (and, generally, mathematical) and other scientific concepts. We imagine a point, for instance, as a tiny spot on a sheet of paper, a straight line, as a thin thread made taut by a weight hanging from it, and a plane, as the surface of a mirror. Our conceptions of space are visual images reproducing what we saw or felt.&lt;br /&gt;
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Evolving concepts of space, geometry singled out some properties and relations of physical objects, neglecting all their other properties and relations. Geometrical figures have neither stuff, colour nor temperature. The spatial characteristics themselves are reflected in geometrical concepts in a rather peculiar way.  In the classical work of the known Greek mathematician, Euclid (about 300 B. C.), a point is defined as something without dimensions, having position only; a line, as having but one dimension, length; a plane surface, as having two dimensions, length and breadth. As well as we may understand it, we cannot picture it.  These notions are represented in the mind by a spot, a thread or a mirror. Yet, although our notions of space are undoubtedly consistent with the actual spatial relations and properties of things, they are also distinct in that geometrical notions, like all other scientific notions, are more exhaustive and accurate than our notions.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, geometrical concepts, too, are only approximate reflections of actual spatial relations, being generalisations derived from previous experience. As geometrical concepts take into consideration but a small number of spatial properties and relations of things, disregarding all other properties and relations, one can deduce from the known properties of things hypotheses logically following from them. In sciences founded on experiment, every hypothesis needs to be made more exact and correct as new evidence is obtained. The same holds for geometry whose propositions do not express properties of bodies with absolute exactness, but only approximately and, like all other scientific theories, have to be refined as new knowledge is accumulated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invention of new geometries by N. I. Lobachevsky (in 1826) and G. Riemann (in 1854) showed that geometrical judgements were indeed subject to improvement and correction, and that our judgements about space do not possess “universality admitting of no possible exception’. Thus, the postulate that only one straight line can be drawn through a point in a plane parallel to another straight line in the same plane (or, to put it differently, that there is only one line parallel to the given line through a fixed point) has no effect in Lobachevskian geometry. Meanwhile, physicists have found real objects to which this geometry conforms. In the 20th century, the theory of relativity has introduced even more drastic corrections to our notions of space and time. Clearly, such a fundamental change in our notions and judgements about space and time is due to the further accumulation of experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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This offers a most convincing refutation of Kant’s idea that these notions are not rooted in experience and, similarly, of his deduction that they originate in the mind and not in the real world. If the idea that things exist apart from us, which we derive from our contact with . things, reflects their objective existence (and Kant acknowledged it), then the notions of space and time, equally derived from contact with things, also reflect objectively existing spatial and temporal properties and relations of material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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Practice, which refutes the idealist conception of space and time, confirms the materialist understanding of them, according to which there are, besides the perception and conception of time and space, also spatial and temporal properties and relations existing outside man’s consciousness. Such relations are inherent in all material phenomena. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Time and spac&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; are universal forms of the existence of matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the basis of this materialist view?&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, perceptions occur independently of man’s will and mind. This, among other things, makes most philosophers, including Kant, acknowledge that perceptions are produced by objects existing outside consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, we derive the most authentic scientific knowledge of nature from research into changes which occur only in space and time.  What would geology be without data on the spatial disposition of the layers of the Earth’s crust, the location of the continents, etc., and the length of the successive geological epochs?  What would remain of electromagnetic theory if we took away the data on the spatial arrangement of the electromagnetic fields and the movement of electromagnetic waves in time and space? Natural science cannot exist without notions of space and time which faithfully reflect the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, the behaviour of animals demonstrates that they coordinate their actions with spatial and temporal relations in nature. Mach himself, who denied that time and space exist outside the mind, admitted that much. He wrote: “...time and space are systems of the sensations of orientation,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-54|54]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; providing for biologically expedient reactions of adaptation. This undoubtedly applies to men as well. “If the sensations of time and space can give man a biologically purposive orientation,’ Lenin wrote, “this can only be so on the condition that these sensations reflect an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; outside man: man could never have adapted himself biologically to the environment if his sensations had not given him an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objectively correct&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idea of it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-55|55]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Fourthly, man (unlike animals) transforms the environment, adapting it to his own needs.  In doing so, he evolves and clarifies his ideas of space and time. If these ideas were not more or less correct reflections of the objectively existing relations between real things, any attempt to rely on them whilst changing reality would be doomed to failure.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Do Time and Space Exist Outside Matter? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Most philosophers who were convinced of the objective reality of space and time (from ancient philosophers to 18th-century philosophers) held that independently of atoms, there exists a limitless void in which they move; that—as the 17th-century French materialist Gassendi wrote&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;outside atoms there exists only time, which does not depend on things, for whether things exist or not, and whether they move or not, it always flows evenly, being subject to no change. Yet, the great Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B. C.), who recognised the objective reality of space and time, contended that spatial properties and relations were inseparable from things, having no existence outside matter, and that vacuum did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the middle ages, this idea of Aristotle&#039;s was thought to mean that “nature abhors a vacuum”. Until the 17th century, they saw a confirmation of this in the operation of a pump, in which liquid moves upwards, overcoming its own weight, to prevent vacuum (a clearance between the level of the liquid in the tube and the piston). The idea that space was inseparable from matter was supported by the eminent 17th-century philosophers Descartes and Leibniz. Arguing that vacuum could not possibly exist, Descartes wrote: “There is...  nothing but matter in the entire Universe&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-56|56]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; All adjacent bodies touched, transmitting further pressure or impact which instantaneously spread throughout the universe. Leibniz, too, wrote that “...there is no space in which there is no matter”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-57|57]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, many scientists considered that vacuum really existed. The founder of classical mechanics, Isaac Newton, was one of them. He believed in the existence of absolute space—an absolutely immovable void, separating celestial bodies from one another; and of absolute time—a flow of continuity existing. separately from matter and not to be changed by any material processes or events. That conception of space and time was predominant in natural science till the beginning of the 20th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels expressed some very important ideas on whether space and time can exist without matter. Engels wrote that the idea of absolute time and space existing apart from and independently of matter was a graphic expression of metaphysical materialism. He criticised that view from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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How is a concept formed? From a multiplicity of properties, relations and states of objects we select the most essential, discarding the rest. A concept is indeed a reflection in our consciousness of different things, phenomena and processes in terms of their more substantial characteristics. But the source of concepts which arose long ago may be forgotten, and then the characteristics of a real object which underlie the concept will begin to seem to exist independently. That is what happens to the concepts of space and time which have been formed by separating from real phenomena their relations in space and time. To regard the height, length and breadth of real objects, as well as the simultaneity, succession and duration of real processes, as existing separately from these objects and processes, is equivalent to accepting that viscosity exists somewhere apart from viscous substances, and independently of them, or that reason exists separately from men. “It is the old story,” wrote Engels. “First of all, one makes sensuous things into abstractions and then one wants to know them through the senses, to see time and smell space.... The two forms of existence of matter are naturally nothing without matter, empty concepts, abstractions which exist only in our minds.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-58|58]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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But if it is true that space and time are forms of the existence of matter, it is equally true that they do not exist apart from matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectical interpretation of space and time proposed by Engels clearly pointed in the direction in which the scientific investigation of these forms of existence of matter was to go. And 20th-century physics has indeed followed that direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on discoveries made at the end of the 19th century, mainly that all interactions occur at a finite velocity, and that the velocity of light is independent of the inertial system to which it is referred, Albert Einstein (1879–1955) evolved the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of relativity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This theory ended the view that the properties of Space and time were independent of the motions of nearby matter. When asked to explain the gist of his theory in a few words, Einstein said: “They used to think that if all things in the world disappeared, space and time would remain; a&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d in accordance with the theory of relativity, with the disappearance of all things, space and time too must disappear.”&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the Special Theory of Relativity, all material objects and processes exist in the integral form of space-time, of which the relations of space and time are different but inseparable aspects. Two events are separated by a space-time interval which is independent of the framework of reference. The time interval between events is but one aspect of their space-time characteristic; it varies depending on the system of reference. So does the space interval, the size of which depends on the reference system.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the General Theory of Relativity, the local properties of both space and time are direct consequences of the existence of nearby matter. In turn, they have a causal influence on the motions of that matter. Let us note that the space-time pattern may change depending on circumstances. Thus in the cosmos it is different from ordinary experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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These discoveries have shown that the single absolute space-time form of matter’s existence is expressed in temporal relations and spatial relations which are relative; that not only are space and time inseparable from matter, but their pattern depends on the distribution, movement and interaction of masses of matter and has an impact on them; and that the common characteristics of space-time are expressed in different space-time patterns, depending on the nature and scale of the material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists seek to interpret these discoveries to their own advantage. They contend that the dependence of a body’s length and of the time interval on the frame of reference presumably means that relations of space and time are not inherent in matter at all, but depend entirely on the observer&#039;s subjective qualities and reactions. Thus the idealists assert that a body&#039;s length and the time interval between events exist merely in our consciousness. Dingle, for instance, claims that this follows from the theory of relativity, which, he alleges, “declines all attempts to assign to matter any properties whatsoever’. ‘“Now this,&amp;amp;quot; commented Max Born, “is a misrepresentation of the theory of relativity, which has never abandoned the attempt to assign properties to matter, but has refined the methods of doing so...”&lt;br /&gt;
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To make it clearer, here is the example suggested by Max Born. Let us suppose that we cannot for some reason directly observe a cardboard circle but can see the shadows it casts on some screens placed at different angles to it. All the shadows will be different save that they will all be elliptical. On studying the axes of the elliptical shadows, we shall have enough evidence to show that they have been cast by a circle and to find its radius. The projections of the properties of the object concerned (the cardboard circle) relative to other objects, which play the part of reference systems (the screens), differ. But in each case the real properties of the object concerned (the circle) remain identical. Shadows of different size and shape are relative expressions of the absolute size and shape of the cardboard circle.  Similarly, bodies and time intervals of different length are relative expressions of the absolute length of the space-time interval, which is independent of the reference system. The shadows cast by the circle are as real as the circle and the screens. The different lengths of the bodies and time intervals in different reference systems are as real, as independent of consciousness, as the space-time interval (whose expressions they are) and the corresponding reference systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear that the interpretation given by the new theory to space and time is not only dialectical but also materialistic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such are the philosophical conclusions drawn from the latest achievements of natural science, that they have not only confirmed the dialectical-materialist proposition that space and time are inseparable from each other and from matter, but have also made it possible to refine and enrich that proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 6. Consciousness ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Consciousness Is a Reflection of the Material World ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once there was a patient in a hospital who had lost the use of all his senses except hearing and sight. The doctors noticed that whenever he shut his eyes and covered his ears, he became unconscious. He regained consciousness only when his good sense-organs were functioning.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here is a more ordinary case. When sleeping “like the dead’’, without dreams, a dog-tired person loses consciousness. He has neither ideas nor feeling. He does not react to strong light or noise. But if his sense-organs are subjected to some unusually strong stimulation, he will react to it. If, for instance, a shot is fired at close quarters, he will hear the sound.  The sensation will be followed by notions, emotions and, finally, by ideas—he will regain consciousness. This shows that a person who experiences no sensations has neither notions nor thoughts. Thoughts may appear and exist only on the basis of sensations, perceptions and notions, as the result of their being processed.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is sensation, what is perception? When touching one thing we feel that it is a sphere, and touching another, we feel that it is a cube, our perceptions reflect the shape of these objects. When we recall how we felt these bodies, we have a representation of them in our mind.  It is clear that representations, just like sense-perceptions, are reflections of different aspects, characteristics and relations of material objects.  Ideas (notions, judgements, conclusions), as we saw, arise, in the final analysis, from sensations and perceptions, which are mental reflections of the external world. Hence, all our ideas are also mental reflections of the external world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every reflection is secondary to what is reflected. Therefore, consciousness is secondary to matter. In denying this, idealists stubbornly oppose the idea that consciousness, thought in particular, is a reflection of the real world.  How do they defend their view?&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that to err is human. What does an erroneous idea reflect, which has nothing corresponding to it in the real world? Goblins, brownies or mermaids do not really exist, yet the notions of goblin, brownie and mermaid do. But, say the idealists, if these notions do not reflect anything, then other notions and conceptions equally do not reflect reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealists also argue that while such notions as “eight”, ‘the square root of 81”, “a plane”, etc., are commonly accepted to be true, it becomes clear on analysis that there is no such thing as “eight in general’’ in the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world any more than there is a real life “square root of 81’ or any body which has length and breadth but no height. Hence, mathematical notions have no objects to correspond to them and therefore they are not reflections of anything at all.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists also assert that people have numerous notions of things that ceased to exist long ago. Palaeontology and history entirely comprise ideas of things that existed long ago and disappeared. On the other hand, man is capable of looking into the future. Tsiolkovsky, for example, predicted interplanetary flights at a time when they could only be dreamed of. What reality did his judgements reflect then?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us first take a look at the so-called false notions, such as “mermaid”, for instance. It implies a half-woman half-fish, fond of dancing and singing and given to enticing handsome young fellows to their ruin. Women, fish, dancers, singers and “cruel charmers” indeed exist.  The notion is false merely because it combines things which in reality are separate (woman and fish), and disjoins things which go together in a living being (the trunk is separated from the legs and the fish tail from the fish).  The idea of a mermaid is therefore a reflection of reality, but it is a distorted reflection.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly no “eight as such” or two-dimensional bodies exist in nature, but then there are no creatures with merely the general characteristics of the bee, eagle or elephant; they are all quite definite, individual animals. The fact, however, that the notion of an animal does not imply every possible characteristic of an elephant, and that the notion of fruit does not imply every possible characteristic of an apple, makes it no less certain that these notions reflect some characteristics of the elephant (and other animals as well), or some characteristics of the apple (and other fruit as well). The peculiar quality of a notion is just that it reflects only some, and not all, characteristics of an object. This also refers to the mathematical notions. The notion “‘eight’ implies merely the quantitative aspect of things, regardless of everything else. The notion “a plane” implies only two dimensions, regardless of the third dimension and all other characteristics of bodies. Yet this one-sidedness, so to speak, of mathematical notions does not alter in the least the fact that they are reflections of properties and relations which really exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us turn to situations where we think of what is no more or what is yet to be. From the metaphysical point of view, the world is a totality of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;final&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things, and so the idea of a thing which does not exist at the moment does not reflect anything. And from the dialectical point of view, the world is a totality of processes, connections and relations, and so ideas reflect processes, connections and relations rather than final things. In its progress from the state in which it was a hundred million years ago to the state in which it is now, the Earth has passed through numerous intermediate stages. Learning the connections between these stages—the laws of geochemistry and geophysics, which exist now too—and starting from the present condition of the Earth, scientists mentally fathom the condition in which it was hundreds of millions of years ago. To quote some other examples. Having grasped the dialectical connections—physical laws which existed in his day too—Tsiolkovsky mentally traced the chain of events which would inevitably, and actually did (when men turned these laws to use), result in space travel.&lt;br /&gt;
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The historical process of capitalist society&#039;s development, which has resulted in a third of mankind embarking on socialism, also consists of definitely related stages. Having studied their relationships and starting from the state in which society was in the sixties and seventies of the 19th century, Marx mentally grasped the events that were to take place fifty or a hundred years later. In each instance, whether turned to the past or to the future, people’s ideas reflect, above all, the relationships existing at the present moment. So the argument supporting the view that thought is not reflection does not hold water either.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, “our consciousness is only an image of the external world”, a reflection of it. Material phenomena exist outside us, while their reflections, ‘‘the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-59|59]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Then how does thought relate to the brain?&lt;br /&gt;
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Carl Vogt, a 19th-century German scientist, answered this question by saying that thought was related to the brain in much the same way as bile to the liver. But bile is just as material as the liver which produces it. Vogt’s assertion implies that thought is as material as the brain producing it. In other words, consciousness is a variety of matter; it is matter. And matter, as we know, is that which exists outside consciousness. If we assume that consciousness &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s matter, we shall arrive at the statement: “Consciousness is that which exists outside human consciousness.” Now, that obviously makes no sense, This alone shows the absurdity of Vogt’s conclusion, which Engels called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vulgar materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealists also reduce the material world to Consciousness. What is the difference, then, between what they say and what Vogt says? It was not by chance that Lenin wrote that “to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-60|60]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In the 17th-18th centuries, when they still knew very little about the essential distinctions between organic and inorganic nature and between man and animals, many materialist philosophers held that not only living creatures but inanimate things too were capable of thought or at least of sensation. It followed from this that even a stone was not insensible.  This doctrine, which draws no line between animate and inanimate things, and views transition from inorganic to organic nature not as the emergence of something new but merely as a variation of something old, is known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;hylozoism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin opposed the metaphysical notion held by hylozoists with the dialectical view that the transition from the inanimate to the animate does not merely involve a variation of old things but also the emergence of something altogether new, of sensation, which “is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-61|61]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; whereas matter which is not so organised is incapable of sensation. As he rejected both the view equating mind and matter and the view underrating the contrast between them, Lenin stressed that the difference was absolute only within the bounds of the fundamental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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He insisted that it was not to be conceived metaphysically, as if there were nothing whatsoever in common between matter and consciousness. “...This contrast must not be made ‘excessive’, exaggerated, metaphysical ... the antithesis of matter and mind,” Lenin pointed out, “has absolute significance only within the bounds of ... the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-62|62]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Reflection Is a Property of Matter ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what do matter and mind have in common that makes the antithesis between them relative? In answering this question, Lenin suggested that we must “assert that all matter Possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-63|63]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The essence of this is that after passing through Some stages, material reflection, which is inherent in all nature, reaches one where it becomes something essentially new, turning into the mind, which, consequently, not merely differs from matter but is also linked with it by reflection, albeit of a highly peculiar nature.  This brilliant idea, put forward by Lenin in 1908, received conclusive scientific confirmation later on, especially in the second and third quarters of this century, thanks to the great strides made by neurophysiology and the emergence of information theory and cybernetics.  If a meteorite falls on to the ground at a speed not exceeding several hundred metres a second, it makes a hole not much larger than its own size. A meteorite which falls at a greater speed, breaking on impact together with the ground it falls on, makes a much larger hole than its own size. But when the speed reaches from two to four kilometres a second, both the meteorite and the ground it touches instantly turn into gas, and a huge crater is formed. Thus the trace left by a meteorite is something like the imprint of its characteristics&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of its size, shape and composition, the speed of its flight and the angle at which it fell. A meteorite will leave different traces in solid rock and in soft grass-covered ground.  But in either instance, the trace will reproduce the meteorite’s individual features. The trace left by a meteorite is its reflection resulting from its impact on the surface of the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is the same with every reflection. When one material object acts on another, the latter changes in such a way as to reproduce certain characteristics of the former. Reflection takes place when one material phenomenon reproduces the characteristics of another material phenomenon acting on it. Dialectics, which tells us that all things are interconnected, so that “everything affects and is affected by every other thing”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-64|64]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , sees interaction in every material process. That this is so follows most conclusively from modern physics which regards all natural processes as different kinds of material interaction. But interaction, the influence of material phenomena on one another, leads, as we saw, to the reflection of these phenomena in one another; and if interaction is inherent in all matter, so is reflection too.&lt;br /&gt;
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One most important feature of this relation is that ‘an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-65|65]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It takes a falling meteorite to leave a trace on the ground; but then a meteorite may exist for a very long time without falling and leaving its trace.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflection consists in the reproduction of peculiar characteristics of the object reflected.  The reverberation of an avalanche in the mountains, for example, is a process of reflection.  The noise of the avalanche is the thing reflected, the mountains are the reflecting objects, and the reverberation is the reflection. Both the noise and reverberation consist of sound waves or air vibrations of a similar pattern. In this instance, the reflection and that which is reflected are of an identical physical nature. That, however, need not always be the case. The main sources of information on the plants of the geologic past are plant fossils preserved in the rocks: leaves, roots, fruits, flowers, etc.  Fossil leaves, for instance, reproduce every single detail of a leaf’s surface. Here, the reflection—a piece of rock—has physically nothing in common with the thing reflected, i.e., a plant.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why do we describe both the reverberation of an avalanche and plant fossils as  reflections? What is the connection between these widely different phenomena? It is the likeness between the reflection and the thing reflected. The phrase “reproduction of certain characteristics of the thing reflected” implies one-to-one correspondence between the reflection and its object, i.e., that every element or state and every relation between elements or states of a thing reflecting something corresponds to only one element or state or relation in the thing reflected. Moreover, every reflection is always limited. The impression of a leaf in the rock, for instance, reflects the spatial form of the leaf’s surface but not the cellular or molecular structure of the leaf.&lt;br /&gt;
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Depending on the nature of the reflecting thing or process, images may be reproduced in diverse forms. But no matter how different the forms may be, they are identical in content, having the same organisation as the phenomenon reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such are some general characteristics of reflection both in organic and inorganic nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. From Irritability to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mental&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every living organism is characterised above all by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metabolism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., continued interchange of material with its surroundings. Another important characteristic is what we shall term here ‘‘survivability’’, meaning the capacity of a living organism to react to external influences in a way which increases the chances of its survival. Lastly, all living organisms are capable of growth and reproduction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Earlier, we mentioned the law stating that all material systems tend to proceed towards greater chaos, developing from complex forms of motion to simple chaotic heat motion of particles. At the same time, the processes of life such as the development of species show the preservation or even increase of order.  The reactions of a grown-up animal are more orderly than those of a newborn. Species of later origin are usually more highly organised compared with those long extinct. The capacity of living bodies to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;survive&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is of great importance to reflection. That is the main requirement which every variation in an organism must satisfy. When a ray of light, penetrating through a chink in the door of a dark cellar, falls on a green plant that has sprouted in the cellar, the stem begins to grow in the direction of the light which helps it obtain the carbon necessary for its growth. When roots strike an obstacle, they curve so as to bypass it.  Plants usually react to external influences rather slowly. But it is not always so. A pumpkin tendril, for instance, begins to curl up five minutes after being touched, and in twenty minutes coils up completely. Insectivorous plants respond even more quickly. And the simplest unicellular animals, like amoebae, infusoria, etc., react to some external stimuli very quickly.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Irritability&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;—a quality which distinguishes living organisms from dead things, and which consists in a body’s capacity to react to the environment in a way which helps it survive—depends on the structure of the living organism’s body. The latter is such that, on being stimulated, (1) reflects those characteristics of the external phenomena which increase or decrease its chances of persisting in a living state, and (2) transforms the reflections into internal chemical and physical processes, enabling it to effect a response essential to self-preservation. This quality of living organisms emerged in the process of natural selection. Organisms that were built in such a way, that their reactions to the environment provided for their preservation, lived and multiplied, while all others died out. Thus, the structure of the body of a living organism is, in a way, a reflection of the conditions under which it exists.  &lt;br /&gt;
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At the basis of the mechanism responsible for transforming external stimuli into responses in plants and the simplest animals (i.e., irritability) are chemical reactions induced in organisms by different stimuli. Let us take, for example, the chain of chemical reactions and corresponding movements with which a Venus’s fly-trap (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dionaea muscipula&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) responds to a chain of stimuli. As an insect alights on one of the leaves, a chemical reaction starts in the plant, which makes the leaf curl up. In response to the movements of the insect which Naturally tries to get away, a chemical reaction begins, causing the projections along the outer edge of the leaf to overlap, the leaf closing on the insect and pressing against it. In response to the insect’s frantic movements, another chemical reaction sets in—the numerous small bristles on the upper surface of the leaf begin secreting a digestive fluid. The insect’s body is disintegrated and the nutrients are absorbed by the leaf. Two series of events are present here, namely, a series of stimuli and a series of corresponding chemical reactions. As both were repeated thousands of millions of times, they finally became connected in a way which reflects the relationship between the events producing the given reactions. The chemical reaction causing the leaf to curl up began to induce the chemical reaction causing the outer projections on the leaf to bend and overlap, the latter reaction, in its turn, setting off the chemical process by which the digestive fluid is produced. As the reactions are greatly accelerated by enzymes (proteins), they follow one another more quickly than the stimuli, so that the plant gives all three responses (i.e., the leaf curls up, its projections bend and overlap, and the digestive fluid is produced) even to the first stimulus (the insect alighting on the leaf). The first stimulus is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;signal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the other two are to follow, and the plant responds in advance. An amoeba in pursuit of prey trying to escape behaves in a similar way.&lt;br /&gt;
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As many proteins, acting as catalysts, accelerate chemical reactions in living organisms hundreds and even thousands of millions of times, it is evident that this enormous difference in the rate at which chains of reactions occur in living organisms and the rate at which changes in the environment occur, which are reflected in the reactions, plays a great role in the life of plants and animals. In the more highly organised animals, a special tissue develops whereby an organism’s responses increasingly anticipate external phenomena. It is the nervous system. An anticipatory reflection effected through the nervous system is called a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  However, we shall discuss reflexes further on.  At this point we shall merely note that modern scientific evidence reveals that changes which are only forthcoming but which are associated with existing facts can be reflected not only by man (as was mentioned earlier) but by the simplest animals and even plants.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflections which appear, are transmitted, stored, processed and retrieved are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;information&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Information is the amount of order in the reflecting object reproducing the amount of order in the object reflected, the former being the information carrier and the latter the information source, and is used in the process of control. As every living organism is a self-regulating system, reflection in this case represents information. This cannot be said of inorganic systems, in which self-regulation is not present. Information is transmitted from the regulated part of a living system, which is in immediate contact with the environment and receives stimuli from it, to the regulating part, in which information is stored and transformed into a change by which the organism must respond to the external stimulus in order to survive. This new information is then transmitted from the regulating to the regulated part which, being in direct contact with the environment, responds to the stimulus. Information not only circulates within a living organism but is passed on from generation to generation, thus ensuring transmission of qualities by heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the great scientific discoveries of the 20th century is that heredity operates through &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;molecules&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of which living cells consist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Since neither the emergence nor development of plants and animals is possible without natural selection, and thus without heredity, which depends on information transmission (i.e., reflection), the development of species is based entirely on biological reflective processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no reason to suppose that in plants, viruses, and the simplest unicellular animals, reflection is accompanied by sensation, still less, by emotion. In their case, only irritability is present but not mental activity, even of the most primitive kind. Rudiments of mental activity are found in more highly organised, multi-celled animals not possessing a backbone (invertebrates). Most of these (insects, shellfish, earthworms) have a centralised nervous system which regulates their responses to stimuli and co-ordinates their movements. Although it is sometimes possible to produce a conditioned reflex in such animals, their behaviour is, on the whole, automatic. Their actions depend on unconditioned reflexes, i.e., responses to specific stimuli, transmitted by heredity. Thus a female spider lays her eggs in a brood-cocoon which she carries about for 15-20 days. She continues to take care of the cocoon even if the eggs are, for some reason, dead. A female spider will stay in the egg-laying posture for as long as it usually takes to lay eggs, even if she does not lay any, and then will clip the edges of the empty cocoon and carry it about just the same. Similar behaviour is found among bees and wasps too.&lt;br /&gt;
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How does this essentially differ from irritability?&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already mentioned that, with the emergence of life, all phenomena come to be divided from the point of view of their effect on the preservation of life, which may be either good or bad. Reflection in living matter not endowed with mentality consists in the differentiation of phenomena as favourable and unfavourable to life and in the regulation of appropriate responses. Hundreds of millions of years of natural selection have resulted in the emergence of conscious experience. The latter represents reflections of the characteristics of what is going on in the external world, i.e., sensations, on the one hand, and motivations to attain desirable, and avoid harmful, objects, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Both sensation and motivation are subjective experiences classed as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mental activity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The subjective nature of experience (mental activity) lies in the fact that a sensation, feeling, etc., is experienced only by a specific individual (subject). Lenin noted this when he wrote that only “the usual &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;human&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensations familiar to all” exist and ridiculed the notion of “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ictitious sensations, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nobody&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’s sensations,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-66|66]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; which stresses the fact that every sensation must be somebody’s sensation. This refers to animals as well. With them, too, sensation is always a sensation experienced by a definite organism and non-existent outside it. We already know that sensations are reflections of external phenomena, for this reason, living beings of the same species, when exposed to the influence of the same external phenomenon, experience similar sensations. When an artist portrays objects as they appear to him, other people, as a rule, recognise their own perceptions in the portrayal. This reveals the content of sensations and notions, which does not depend on the reflecting subject (man), but on the external objects which are reflected. Similar sensations may, of course, be experienced only by beings whose sense-organs, by which the given phenomena are perceived, are similar.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mental activity is subjective also because it comprises not only reflections of the properties of external phenomena but also the subject’s attitude to them, the specific motivation.  In lower animals, it is confined to pleasure or pain, attraction or repulsion, while in highly organised beings it includes a wide range of needs and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
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It must, however, be remembered that neither the simplest motivations of a bee nor man’s most complex requirements and emotions are purely subjective. These motivations are reflections of the significance objectively attached, as far as individuals are concerned, to the things towards or away from which the motivation is directed. These mental phenomena, like sensations, have some objective content which is independent of the subject. For this reason, we can have an idea of what others may feel under various circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
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If sensations and motivations changed nothing in the connection between organism and environment, they would have been eliminated in the course of natural selection as useless.  I. M. Sechenov (1829-1905), a Russian physiologist, found that for living beings, sensation was of two-fold significance, serving to differentiate the conditions of an action and to guide the actions appropriate (i.e., expedient or adjustive) to these conditions. The enormous significance of sensation and motivation to the adjustment and behaviour of living organisms was also stressed by Sechenov’s follower, I. P. Pavlov (1849-1936).&lt;br /&gt;
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Changes in the environment, brought about by the vital activity of the creatures inhabiting it, depend on the particular features of both the living organisms and environment itself. Simultaneously, the changes which living organisms undergo under the impact of the environment also bear the imprint of the internal organisation of these organisms. The rabbits brought in the 15th century to the tiny Atlantic island of Porto Santo, in the absence of beasts of prey there, changed so much that a new species emerged, half the original size, with different colouring and habits. But if some other animals, e.g., foxes or wolves, had been brought to the island, they would have undergone quite a different sort of change.&lt;br /&gt;
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The environment exerts its influence on the animal only through the internal organisation of the latter. In the interrelationship of animals incapable of mental activity and their environment, the animals’ internal organisation plays a comparatively minor part, as compared to the environment. The addition of a new factor, i.e., mental activity (first, sensations and simple motivations and next, with more highly organised animals, perceptions, notions and emotions), essentially alters the interrelation of the organism and the environment. As animals develop a more complex mentality, they begin to influence their surroundings in more complex ways. Pavlov was the first to establish the presence in animals of the so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orientation reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby in any new situation threatening danger, all other kinds of behaviour are inhibited, and the animal performs actions based on the specific situation. When the action producing the needed result is found, this form of behaviour is fixed and conditioned reflex is established.&lt;br /&gt;
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As more and more highly organised animals appear, the significance of mental activity as a regulator of behaviour increases and so does the significance of the brain, the organ which controls uninherited forms of behaviour. A frog which has had the cerebral hemispheres excised continues to behave in the same way as before the operation. A pigeon, however, although it can still fly and keep its balance well after a similar operation, cannot properly react to stimuli and would not even feed. As for a dog, such an operation disables it completely. This shows that the brain plays an ever Greater part as the internal organisation of animals becomes more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Labour, Language and Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
Modern science has established that there is much in common between the nervous and mental activity of man and animals. Certainly, appreciable distinctions between them have also been found to exist. So what are the distinctive traits of human mentality, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;?&lt;br /&gt;
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Scientific data obtained in the 20th century conclusively confirm the truth of the Marxist proposition that man raised himself out of the animal world thanks to labour. Numerous excavations have yielded evidence that stone implements were fashioned back in the palaeolithic period (or the old stone age), when apeman evolved. That led to the transformation of the animal herd into a social community and the emergence of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At the close of the palaeolithic period, about a million years ago, primitive man, or Neanderthal man, appeared, Excavations at rock-shelters in which Neanderthalers lived have shown that they made stone adzes and pigmy tools from flint flakes. Later, in the middle palaeolithic period, when they began to hunt large animals together, Neanderthal men learned how to make flint spear tips, daggers, knives, scrapers and bone implements. The body proportions of this species and size of skull are similar to ours. But the vault of the skull is low, and the thigh and lower and upper arm bones are curved.  With the development of labour and implements in the later palaeolithic period, the primitive human herd of the Neanderthalers give way to the primitive communal society of Cro-Magnon men, who do not significantly differ physically from recent man and possess intellect of the simplest kind.&lt;br /&gt;
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An animal’s mode of life, habits and mentality are determined by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;natural&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions, i.e., by its own nature and by the environment.  Man, however, is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; being. His mode of life, activity and mentality are almost entirely determined by the kind of society in which he lives. Certainly, the emergence of labour, society and specifically human mentality (consciousness) was accompanied by essential changes in the structure and functions of the brain and nervous system in general, which, in man, have some distinctive qualities, not found in animals.  Still, an infant’s nervous system, though indispensable, is not yet a sufficient condition for Consciousness. The mentality of a child growing up in isolation from human society does not rise above an animal&#039;s, and will develop into consciousness only if the child interacts with other people, i.e., society.&lt;br /&gt;
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To be able to fashion and use implements and kill large animals, primitive men had to act jointly and circulate information of ever greater variety and scope. The advantage of common effort was two-fold. Not only did it make feasible that which was beyond the possibilities of single individuals, but it enabled the information picked up by single individuals to become accessible to all. Yet, to be accessible to all, information must be equally understandable to all. And, if it is of a multiple nature, then the signal conveying it must clearly be such as to indicate not unique but diverse phenomena that possess, at the same time, such common characteristics as must produce a uniform response in every member of the community. Then what information should such a signal convey? Different individuals may have more or less identical sensuous images and notions of similar things only if they have observed the latter under identical circumstances. If the circumstances of observation appreciably differ, so will the sensuous images differ with different individuals. The signal must, however, be common to a class of things, as well as to all those involved in a common effort. Hence, the information conveyed by a signal is not a sensuous image but a concept, a general idea; and the signal itself is a word by which the idea is expressed. Lenin wrote: “Every word (speech) already &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;niversalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-67|67]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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The concept of a tree, for instance, contains no reference to its height, girth, shape, foliage, vertical or horizontal position. To imagine a tree devoid of size, shape and position is impossible, for nobody has ever seen it. Only a word, which is uttered and perceived as a signal reflecting the characteristics common to trees in general, makes the concept possible.  No concepts or ideas could arise without the material phenomenon—a signal which, in the present instance, represents a combination of sounds, i.e., language. “Language is as old as consciousness.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-68|68]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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That concepts cannot be formed even by highest (Anthropoid) apes is obvious enough from the following example. By imitating people, a chimpanzee learned to get bananas surrounded by burning candles. He turned on the tap, filled a mug full of water and extinguished the candles. He could also cross a pond using a raft and pole. Once, when he was brought to the pond, there was a raft with a pole at the bank, while in the middle of the pond there was another raft with some bananas on it. All round the bananas were lighted Candles, and beside them stood the familiar mug. The chimpanzee got on the first raft and reached the other raft. Picking up the mug, he got back to the bank, ran up to the tap, turned it on, filled the mug and hurried back to the pond with it, intending to put out the candles with the tap water. He proved incapable of abstracting from the distinction between water running from the tap and water in the pond and form the image of water as such. Yet even a five-year-old, when it uses one word to describe that which runs from the tap, that which fills a pond and that which falls from the sky as rain, has the notion of water as such.&lt;br /&gt;
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Man’s capacity to think is one of the principal qualities distinguishing human consciousness from the mentality of animals.&lt;br /&gt;
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An animal pays attention only to such things in its surroundings which relate to the satisfaction of its needs. It is incapable of catching the varied interactions of objects, i.e., of grasping the laws to which the latter are subject.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is quite different with man. His ancestors could already use one object (unsuitable for immediate consumption, e.g., a stone) to act on another so as to obtain yet another object, an implement, which equally would not be able to satisfy a biological need. An implement cannot be fashioned from just any kind of stone but only from hard and durable stone, which must also be workable. The fashioning stone, too, must meet certain requirements.  The fashioning requires a specific technique, and the implement must be of a specific shape.  Haphazard strokes and just any shape would be to no purpose. To kill the game, the implement must be applied in a certain way. It is a chain in which every link is connected with its neighbours in a specific manner. So that they could work, our ancestors had to find out about these interconnections and relations.  Consequently, the latter had to be correctly reflected by the mind. Actions, both fruitful and fruitless, were repeated thousands of millions of times, and in the course of hundreds of millennia there gradually began to form the habit of relating the reflections of objects in the mind in the same way as they are related in nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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This habit involved not only sporadic phenomena, but also such as occur everywhere and always. For example, “if an object is harder than a second object and the latter is harder than a third, then the first object is harder than the third’. Or, “if an object is inside a second object and the latter is inside a third, then the first object is inside the third’. Thus, man learned to infer the unknown from the known, the unobserved from the observed, and that which is to be from that which is. Thanks to this capacity, engendered by labour, our ancestors arrived at this train of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reasoning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: if I bring one kind of stone to bear on another, I Shall obtain an object with which, by using it in a certain way, I shall be able to kill a certain kind of game.&lt;br /&gt;
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Animals’ activity consists in their adapting themselves to the environment. In doing so, the former certainly affect the latter. The destruction by starfish of more than 350 square kilometres of the Great Barrier Reef, off the north-east coast of Australia, from 1966 to 1969 is but one example of this. Nevertheless, such changes are unintentional and, as often as not, harmful to the animals that have brought them about. Human activity, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, on the other hand, consists in man’s adapting nature to himself by completely refashioning things, so as to make nature serve his own needs. This was reflected in the mind by way of a substantial remodelling of perceptions and notions, emergence of concepts, deductions—in short, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideas&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. To conclude, one of the principal qualities differentiating human consciousness from animal mentality, i.e., thought, owes its rise to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us note also that in human labour, unlike animal activity, the creation of a new object, e.g., an implement, is preceded by an image of it. To form such an image merely from the correlation of sense-perceptions and representations is impossible, as sensuous images reflect nothing but the objects previously observed. A new implement is, however, an object previously unobserved.&lt;br /&gt;
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Useful information acquired by a generation of animals is transmitted to the next only biologically, being embodied in the genetic code, i.e., by heredity. Hence the extremely slow evolution of animal species other than man. In human society, however, information is passed on from generation to generation with the help of language and is objectified in implements and other articles of material and Spiritual culture. And this enormously speeds up the rate of progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Subject and Object in Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
It has been shown by scientists in the Soviet Union and other countries that both the environment and the animal&#039;s physical condition, mental experience, reactions and their results, have an effect on the animal as an integral whole, an entity existing at each given point of time. In this entity, according to the observation of Henri Wallon (France), the ‘subjective and objective factors form an indivisible unity.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-69|69]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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As it does not single out either the environment or itself from this situation, the animal does not mentally reflect the relations between itself and the environment. Thus, “...the animal does not ‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’ itself to anything ... for the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-70|70]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Both the animal&#039;s orientation activity, aimed at finding the most suitable tactics, and retention of the method hit upon reflect merely the unity of the surroundings, the animal&#039;s state, its response and the end result in a definite situation, whereas man, in the process of labour, masters some connections of the external world, and some connections between his own and other workers’ efforts. Ever since our ancestors began to master those connections, the latter were reflected increasingly in man’s mind. The ability to discriminate between the reflections of the environment and of oneself (and so of the relation between oneself and the environment) was especially important in this respect. In its turn, the reflection of the environment became dissected into images of things, people, their actions and relations, the reflection of oneself—into images of one’s own body, its parts and their interactions, and, lastly, into images of one’s own conscious experience. Relations between these images, as they exist in the mind, reflect the relations between their prototypes, as they are in reality. In this way, the animal&#039;s mentality is transformed into human mentality, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. “Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;immediate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-71|71]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Man owes his capacity to detach himself from the environment to social relations above all. To be able to separate from the situation all that which belongs to him alone and become conscious of himself and his attitude to external existence, man must associate with his fellow-creatures, with whom he establishes relations in the process of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;If&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it is true that the consciousness of self and a conscious attitude to the external world is what fundamentally distinguishes human intelligence from the animal’s, it is no less true that man’s capacity to think about his own ideas, sensations, feelings, strivings, etc., is of equal significance. The ideal phenomena that occur in the mind itself are reflected in consciousness as well as what happens in the environment and man’s own body.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consciousness is capable of imaging itself, of being a “reflection of a reflection&amp;amp;quot;. As I recall the impression made on me by the snow which covered the top of a mountain I saw from a distance, I think of my own perception.  As I analyse the opinion I have formed of somebody I met yesterday, I think of my own thoughts. As I do it, I am aware that my perception is but an approximate reflection, and the snow may well be not such a pure white as it seemed to me from afar; and I realise that my judgement of the man I met yesterday is only an approximate reflection of what he may prove to be in fact. Man’s consciousness reflects not only relations existing in the external world and relations between himself and the external world, but also the relations between his own sensations, representations and concepts on the one hand, and the things whose reflections and copies all of these are, on the other. Man correlates the mental images he forms and their archetypes as copy and original.&lt;br /&gt;
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While acting under the influence of its needs and psychological responses, the animal is not aware Of the latter, as it has no mental capacity of ‘‘self-reflection’’. Man, too, may have motivations (e.g., attraction or repulsion) he is utterly unconscious of, although his behaviour may be greatly influenced by them. Still, man is aware of many of his needs and aspirations as goals which he sets himself and consciously pursues.&lt;br /&gt;
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In man, the capacity for reflection, which animals also possess, is carried to a much higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
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The formulation of a goal and elaboration of a suitable plan of action proceeds in the aforementioned way, whereby external objects and their relations, the conscious individual and his attitude to the objects are all reflected in the mind. These reflections represent a sort of substitute, or model, of objects and connections. Man can mentally use these substitutes (models) in much the same way as he would handle their material originals, had he to deal with the matter practically. Before taking any practical steps, which may or may not help him achieve his purpose, he can mentally rehearse his actions, as it were, so as to see what their results may be, and select the best plan of action.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Highest Known Form of Reflection ====&lt;br /&gt;
For all its peculiar character, reflection of the world in the human mind is merely another stage in the development of the forms of reflection existing even before man. Demonstrating that the higher animals’ behaviour shows the simplest forms of disintegration of an unfamiliar object into components (analysis), combination of things and actions to achieve a goal (synthesis), and what Pavlov was later to term orientation activity (a kind of experiment), Engels wrote: “The basic features of the method are the same and lead to the same results in man and animals, so long as both operate or make shift merely with these elementary methods. On the other hand, dialectical thought—precisely because it presupposes investigation of the nature of concepts themselves—is only possible for man....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-72|72]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, before human consciousness had evolved, its moderately developed prerequisites already existed in animals. Animals could form subjective images of the objective world (sensations, perceptions, representations) and have a fairly wide range of feelings long before men appeared. Therefore the separation of subject from object was nothing fortuitous. Man’s mind anticipates reality by years and decades. But anticipatory reflection, though extending over smaller periods, is what other organisms have too. Generally speaking, all characteristics of the human mind, i.e., consciousness, are due to society. But human society did not spring out of nothing either; it developed from the animal herd.&lt;br /&gt;
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All these facts must be borne in mind if we are to fathom—as Engels wrote—“the prehistory of the human mind, for tracing the various stages of its development, from the simple protoplasm ... of the lowest organisms right up to the thinking human brain. Without this prehistory, however, the existence of the thinking human brain remains a miracle.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-73|73]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Idealists maintain that consciousness is an inexplicable property of the mysterious immaterial “soul”. However, anthropology, neurophysiology, neuropathology, zoopsychology, and other sciences have shown that this contention has not a leg to stand on. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cybernetics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has been particularly effective in disproving the idealist conception of consciousness and  provides scientific evidence in support of the dialectical-materialist view. This science deals with automatic control and communication mechanisms in diverse systems, such as a machine, a complex of machines, an organism, a plant or animal species, man and, finally, society. On the basis of cybernetics, devices have been developed which can receive, store, analyse, retrieve and transmit information. Self-teaching systems, biomedical disease-diagnosing computers, etc., have been developed. Both the theoretical results of cybernetics and results obtained with the aid of computers prove the unity of the reflectory processes in animate and inanimate world, at premental and mental levels, in man’s nervous system and society&#039;s economic system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these scientific achievements of the 20th century forcefully confirm Lenin’s idea that, apart from the question as to whether the ideal or the material is primary, “the difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-74|74]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; For, besides the difference between them, the material and ideal phenomena are similar in that in both there occurs, as the result of the action of some material objects on other material objects, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the former in the latter, the reflection which lies at the very root of matter. Consciousness stands out merely as the highest of the known forms of reflection, as the supreme product of matter, as “a function of that particularly complex fragment of matter called the human brain&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-75|75]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. Laws of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Law? ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1911, Ernest Rutherford, a British physicist, calculated how alpha rays would be scattered by an atom of gold, should its nucleus be a point object, and how they would be scattered, should the nucleus be larger than that. Then he exposed a thin foil of gold to the action of alpha rays. The scattering indicated that the atomic nucleus has a diameter of roughly one thousand-millionth of a millimetre, i.e., that the atomic nucleus is a point object.  The discovery worked a revolution in the views on the structure of the atom. No doubt, Rutherford could repeat his experiment as many times as he liked. But his discovery, the connection between his calculations, experiments and conclusions, was absolutely unique. Rutherford could no more re-discover what he had once discovered than be born once again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the unconditioned reflex (e.g., the involuntary blinking of the eye when an object ap&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ears suddenly right in front of it) implies a relation repeated many times not only during the lifetime of any one person, but throughout hundreds of generations of men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, some relations occur only once and some are repeated. Moreover, they may be essential and inessential. For example, hydrogen and nitrogen combine to make ammonia only at definite pressures and temperatures and in the presence of a catalyst accelerating the reaction. The relation between them is essential to the making of ammonia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for inessential relations, it must be borne in mind that those which may be inessential in one respect may prove essential in some other, and vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There may also be chance and necessary relations. How long an animal may live depends on the circumstances of its birth and life. The relation can be multiform. It may be such that the animal will live merely a few hours or days, or it could be such that the animal will live several decades. These are relations which may or may not occur, depending on the circumstances, and, in this sense, we may call them chance relations. But whatever the circumstances of an animal&#039;s birth and life, it must die sooner or later. Death is inevitable, and in this sense, the relation between birth and death is a necessary one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different relations are of varying significance to the understanding of all that occurs both outside and within us, as well as to the success of our activities in any field. The most significant are those which are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (i.e., common to many things and processes), essential and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;necessary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Such relations are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  A law is a relation which persists as long as phenomena subject to it persist (regardless of any change they may undergo during that time).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of physics, chemistry, biology, history, political economy, and all scientific laws in general, are mental reflections of the laws governing the development of nature and society, which themselves are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring, essential and necessary relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the mind and discovered by men as they investigate nature, society and thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that, as it draws general conclusions from the findings of particular sciences and from scientific laws concerning separate aspects of reality, dialectical materialism arrives at the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;most general laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, called the laws of dialectics. Let us see now what they are.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#calibre_toc_53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== §2. The Law of Transition of Quantity into Quality&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus (530-470 B. C.), whom Lenin called one of the founders of dialectics, said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything is always changing and always moving.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; This is how he illustrated his idea. When you step into a river for the second time, water has already flowed downstream, so you are actually in different water. Hence, you cannot step into the same river twice. Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, went even further. He said that you cannot step into the same river even once, for even as you are immersed into the water it keeps flowing, and your foot is in different water every instant. Generally, said Cratylus, you cannot make a true statement about anything because even as you are uttering the words the thing you are talking about disappears, giving way to something else. Thus, whatever you may say can only be false.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At first sight, this statement seems a mere quibble. But a closer examination reveals that it follows naturally from a definite conception of change and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Cratylus, change is the disappearance of the old and appearance of the new.  From this standpoint, an impassable gulf lies between water that flowed downstream a moment ago and that which has taken its place.  How should change appear to a consistent adherent of this view? He should see a fantastic vision like this: a cloud floating before his eyes is displaced in a flash by a spreading oak, a sleeping kitten, a crag, a dancer, and so forth, all coming in quick succession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was, of course, an exaggeration. But the view on change as the fina&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; disappearance of some objects and sudden appearance of others essentially implies that every object exists but for a moment, perishing almost as soon as it has appeared. Could anyone say anything about such an object, which would be consistent with its real nature? Certainly not. Were change indeed as Cratylus conceived it, no true statements would be possible at all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it is not so in reality. Although material objects are in a process of change, they do not disappear at once but persist for varying lengths of time. Whereas a cloud’s existence is comparatively short, the age of a cliff runs into millions of years. The mass of water or ice particles we call the cloud does not spring out of nothing; it results from condensation of vapour. Nor does it turn into nothing when it disappears. And so it is whenever anything appears or disappears. Therefore, to think that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change implies the destruction of one object and the appearance of another can only be erroneous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The contrary view is that no changing object disappears. So, for instance, the Ganges, for all the changes it has undergone, is still the same great river of Hindustan as it was hundreds of thousands of years ago, and as it will be hundreds of thousands of years hence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take the view in direct opposition to Cratylus, i.e, that every change is a change in what was, is and will be, and check it against scientific evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By using a microfilm, the division of a living cell (which in the human body takes from one to two hours) can be observed. As it divides, the cell undergoes a number of vital changes such as the halving of chromosomes, fission of the content of the cell, etc., but the cell still retains its identity. There then comes a point where these gradual changes end. The old cell disappears and two new ones appear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with plants. Buds develop gradually, undergoing changes imperceptible to the eye, and up to a point they are still buds. Then the gradual development is interrupted. The buds break and the tree is suddenly covered with foliage. A seed is a living body in which metabolism and other processes go on all the time, and often for a very long time. Yet, regardless of all these changes, a seed remains a seed until the moment when a leap takes place. The seed coat breaks and the embryo begins to sprout. The seed is replaced by a plant which did not exist until then.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, it is erroneous to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in a plant or an animal implies the disappearance of something that did, and appearance of something that did not, exist before the change. It is, however, equally wrong to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in plants and animals is merely a change in what did, does and will exist. As a matter of fact, both kinds of changes occur—the change in what existed and continues to exist (it never stops) and the change which represents the destruction of old and appearance of new objects (i.e., a break in continuity, a leap).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Botanical and zoological evidence proves both Cratylus and those of the diametrically Opposite opinion to be wrong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, it is appropriate to recall the processes in inanimate nature already mentioned, which also present a unity of change in the old and the appearance of the new. No matter how one or more particles move about in space, these processes are still mechanical and reversible. But as soon as the number of chaotically moving particles attains a high enough level, a new form of motion appears, viz., heat processes, which are irreversible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This holds of society as well. Contrary to the reformists, who claim that capitalism may turn into socialism through a series of gradual changes, the latter merely prepare the ground for socialism which emerges only after a revolution, a break in continuity. Of course, exploitative capitalist society persists from the time the Capitalist productive relations become predominant till the moment they are abolished by a revolution. It undergoes continuous significant changes along with the growth of its productive forces, concentration of capital, etc. Nevertheless, this all serves to aggravate the contradictions inherent in capitalism and intensify the class struggle. Only a break in continuity, a revolutionary upheaval, dislodging the bourgeoisie from government and taking the principal means of production out of their hands, can end capitalism and bring forth a new society based on public ownership, in which power is taken by the working class led by its party, and exploitation of man by man is finally abolished.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already mentioned the valuable contributions to knowledge made by philosophy and the natural and social sciences in the last quarter of the 18th century, and especially the first half of the 19th century. Over that time, the findings of both the individual sciences and philosophy underwent appreciable change. But the middle of the last century was the turning point in mankind’s intellectual progress. Marx and Engels, who had critically refashioned and drawn general philosophical conclusions from knowledge already gained by mankind, evolved a new doctrine, quite different from all previous philosophical theories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a break in continuity, a revolution in the development of human thought, marked by the appearance of a philosophical doctrine unparalleled by anything in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in exactly the same way that the continuous change in the natural sciences had paved the way for a leap, a revolution in our views on nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, gradual change, whether in science or society, causes the destruction and disappearance of the old and an abrupt break in continuity, the appearance of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of the old and the appearance of the new are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;qualitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. All other changes, whereby different parts or aspects of an object become re-arranged, increase or diminish while the object retains its identity, are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Relative to all the changes suffered, for instance, by an animal during life, birth and death represent qualitative changes. And relative to an animal’s birth and death, all the changes it may undergo during life are quantitative, as all that time it remains itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qualitative changes may be of two forms: (1) “something did not exist, but now it does”, and (2) “‘something existed but now it does not’. Quantitative changes, on the other hand, are infinitely diverse, e.g., “larger—smaller&amp;amp;quot;, “more—less&amp;amp;quot;, “more often—more seldom”, “faster—slower”, &amp;amp;quot;warmer—colder”, “lighter—heavier”, &amp;amp;quot;worse—better”, &amp;amp;quot;poorer—richer”, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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Today, you would hardly find anybody sharing Cratylus’ point of view, but there are plenty of people sharing the diametrically opposite, if equally metaphysical, point of view. These people argue that it only seems to us that there occur breaks in the processes going on in the environment and in the mind, and that on thorough examination we must see that things never stop changing. For should a process be interrupted, it could not be resumed without outside assistance any more than a broken eggshell can become whole again, unless somebody comes along and glues its broken edges together.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us, for the moment, agree that change is always continuous. It will appear then that a growing poplar, for example, is in a state of continuous change. The poplar sprout turned into a mature tree continuously, just as the seed turned into a sprout, the flower into fruit and seed, and the bud into a flower. The transformation of a little into big poplar is undoubtedly a continuous change, for, big or little, it is still a poplar. But if the transformation of the seed into the little poplar also is a continuous process, then there must be a diminutive poplar in the seed; and if the transformation of the flower into fruit and seed is a continuous process, then there must be infinitesimal seeds, and so infinitesimal poplars, in the flower. Because, after all, a poplar may change continuously only while it exists, no matter what its size. The changeover from &amp;amp;quot;non-poplar” to “poplar” cannot be continuous because the disappearance of that from which the poplar sprout has formed, i.e., the seed, amounts to a break in its (the poplar’s) development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another argument advanced in support of the metaphysical view that gradual change knows no interruptions is this. All stages of motion are related as cause and effect and are therefore continuous. All motion is therefore continuous. If we accept that there is a break, a gap between stage A and stage B, we must admit that they are not connected, whereby stage B has no cause. Yet to accept that something may exist without cause is to believe in miracles. Hence, leaps or breaks in continuity are impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this, we must say first of all that interruptions of continuity, leaps, do not occur without any connection with the preceding stage of motion. A leap is always prepared and caused, i.e., causally determined, by previous continuous motion. Thus, the birth of a living being is prepared and caused by the essential changes in the embryo during pregnancy. A social revolution is prepared and caused by sharpening conflict and mounting class struggle. A revolution in science is caused by the accumulation of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, the leap itself determines the character of subsequent continuous motion. The character of all vital processes and the rate at which they proceed in the embryo and the newborn are utterly different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Diverse aspects of people’s life in society develop after a revolution in a manner quite different from that before the revolution. The trend and rate of the progress of knowledge before and after a revolution in science are altogether different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there is a close connection between a leap and what comes before and after it.  Continuous changes cause a break and that, again, causes continuous change.&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be noted that the leap does not occur at random but only when continuous change reaches a limit which is definite for every given process. How exact the moment is for a victorious revolution is sufficiently clear from Lenin’s letter of October 24 (November 6), 1917, which concerns the uprising.  Lenin wrote: “...the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night. History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk ... losing everything. ... To delay action is fatal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-76|76]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science also becomes ripe for a revolution at quite a definite point. As accumulated knowledge was leading up to the need to create relativity theory, both Poincaré and Langevin, independent of each other, were approaching the discovery. If Einstein, who realised the need for a thorough revision of some physical notions sooner and better than others, had not worked the revolution in science, it would have been brought about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps later and differently—by the efforts of other scientists, because it had become absolutely necessary. Einstein himself was actually of that opinion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, continuous change develops up to a limit determined by the nature of each process, after which a leap inevitably occurs. The limit beyond which continuous change is interrupted is described in philosophy as the measure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us see if a break in continuity does indeed imply a rift between adjacent stages of development, as metaphysicians would have it. Take an animal, a dog, for example.  The changes it undergoes during its life are continuous only with respect to two breaks, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., birth and death. In other respects, however, some breaks, or leaps, occur during the dog’s life as well. The first of them is the attainment of physiological maturity (at eighteen months to two-and-a-half years old). In turn, the changes a puppy undergoes in that period are continuous only with relation to two breaks between which the changes occur, i.e., between birth and physiological maturity. In other respects, there are breaks in that period too. Moreover, if we subject the animal&#039;s birth itself to a detailed examination, we shall see that this leap, this break, does not occur instantaneously but is of a certain duration and consists of a succession of continuous changes and leaps.  Each of the latter, lesser leaps, so to speak, consists of still other continuous changes and related leaps, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every continuous change in nature, society and thought is such only with respect to its “own” breaks or leaps. But at a deeper level, continuous change consists of special continua and special leaps. Equally, every leap is such only with respect to its “own” continuous changes. The leap itself has an infinitely complex structure. It comprises continua and leaps, which also comprise continua and leaps, and so on. Change is continuous only with respect to its “own” breaks, its own beginning and ending. But in other respects it contains breaks. In other words, there is no such thing as absolute, “pure&amp;amp;quot; continuity. A leap, or a break, is such only with respect to the change whose continuity is broken by it. In other respects, however, the break itself contains continuous changes. It is not an absolute, “pure” break, but an inexhaustibly complex process, all the stages of which are causally related.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectical tenet that continuous quantitative changes, upon attaining measure, cause abrupt qualitative changes which in their turn determine the character of the further continuous quantitative changes is called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of transition from quantity to quality and vice versa&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This law plays an essential role in man’s practical activity. Thus, it is known that engineers and chemists concentrated for a long time on evolving new methods of working diverse materials so as to make them meet the ever growing requirements of industry and everyday life. There came, however, a point where this continuous improvement of the methods of working natural materials, combined with other changes in science and technology, brought about a leap, a qualitative change in that particular sphere. Today, in the 20th century, especially in its latter half, whenever new demands are made on materials, engineers and chemists, rather than try to evolve new methods of processing available materials (which often would not answer the purpose anyway), develop synthetic materials with predesigned properties answering a specific need.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To quote an example from another sphere.  Guiding themselves by the law of the transition of quantity into quality, revolutionaries reject not only reformism, but the anarchism of adherents of the ultra-left, who fail to realise the utmost importance of continuous development of the revolutionary movement, involving an ever larger proportion of the masses and paving the way for the revolution which will take place, not at the will of a handful of people, but only where and when the necessary conditions mature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to ensure the success of any kind of activity, whether industrial, social or scientific, we must closely observe the processes we have to deal with, not miss the point where the continuous quantitative changes are superseded by a break in continuity, and be able to modify our proceedings accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. The Law of Negation of the Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The tender seedling sprouting from an acorn, a mere twig which anything, it seems, can easily destroy, grows, down the centuries, into a monumental tree inspiring awe at its great strength and the complex organisation of its root system, trunk, bark, branches, leaves and flowers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How puny, short-lived, fragile and primitive vis-a-vis their organisation and behaviour were the first unicellular animals which originated more than a thousand million years ago, and how much more complex and durable is the anatomy, physiology, psychology and behaviour of recent highly-organised mammals (e.g., dogs or monkeys).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar things may be observed at every turn. The helpless infant becomes a vigorous, intelligent person, an expert capable of tackling tasks of great complexity. And what a vast distance indeed there is between primitive society, almost entirely swayed by the forces of nature, and modern society which makes these forces, including atomic energy, serve man, and creates seas, forests and artificial Earth satellites.  Our far-reaching, all-embracing, fast-advancing knowledge, too, is a far cry from the primitive beliefs of our cave-dwelling ancestors. This progress from lower to higher forms consists, as we have seen already, in an endless succession of stages, essentially distinct from each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does one stage change into another?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exposure to a temperature of several thousand degrees Centigrade will cause the destruction (negation) of an amoeba. The next stage in its development will not take place, i.e., life will end and will give way to physico-chemical processes of inorganic nature. On the other hand, the method whereby the developmental stages replace one another (the method of negation), which is intrinsic to the amoeba, consists in division (which occurs under specific conditions) resulting in the emergence of two new amoebas in place of the original one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acorn, when consumed by an animal, is destroyed; although its negation contributes to the animal’s further growth, its own intrinsic development ends there. Had it been allowed to proceed stage by stage according to its intrinsic method, it would have turned into the sprout of an oak.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The succession of developmental stages proceeding in accordance with the laws inherent in the given object (but not such as results from the intervention of external forces destroying the given form of motion) is termed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does dialectical negation work? If you dig the ground under an oak seedling, you will find no acorn there. What has become of it?  Like most green plants, the oak builds its body from the substances it draws from the soil (via its roots) and from the air (through its leaves, which contain chlorophyll). When a new plant is about to emerge, there are yet neither roots nor leaves. The first little green leaves and roots are formed from the material contained in the acorn. The protective outer coating decomposes and has no part in the new plant, but the embryo and the food by which it is surrounded turn into a sprout. No sooner does a tiny root appear than it gets busy extracting from the soil the substances helping to build the plant while the first green parts of the shoot begin at once to assimilate from the air the substances which go to build the body of the sapling. Therefore the plant replacing the acorn contains both the substances that were contained in the acorn and the substances that were not contained in it. The same may be said of the oak which will grow from the sprout. The young oak will be like its parents in many respects, but owing to the unique circumstances under which it has formed and developed, it will not inherit some of the parents’ characteristics, while it will acquire some that the parents did not have. Dialectical negation con&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ists in the fact that something of the stage which is negated is lost, something becomes part of the new, negating, stage (although in a modified form), and something entirely new is added.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All three elements are also present when a breed of animals disappears and another breed appears in its place.&lt;br /&gt;
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In examining an enormous range of plant and animal species which replaced one another over hundreds of millions of years, palaeontologists have not discovered a single instance of re-emergence of an extinct species. In nature, nothing is ever completely repeated. Although later species possess some features of earlier, extinct species, they always lack some of their predecessors’ characteristics while possessing other features absent in their predecessors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific evidence utterly disproves the metaphysical view that development amounts to a repetition of identical cycles, always returning to the starting point, i.e., that development moves in a circle. An individual living organism does not develop in a circle. Certainly, when from an acorn there grows an oak of the same kind as its ancestors, that is, in some respects, a return to what already existed. But in some respects the new oak differs from its ancestors.  Indeed, should it be an exact repetition of them and should they, in their turn, have repeated every characteristic of the previous generations, oaks would exist forever. Yet it has been established beyond any possible doubt that there was a time when not only oaks but the species they have replaced did not exist. Some species disappear and other ones appear precisely because every organism, while it inherits much from its parents must also differ from them in some way. As such variations accumulate over long periods, old species are replaced by new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When a new stage in society&#039;s development comes, it does not mean that all the people, technology and science pertaining to the old formation have disappeared. If it were so, no new stage in society’s development would take place. In order that it can take place, it is necessary (1) to abolish the obsolete social order, together with both the state system which protected it, and the ideology which sanctified it; (2) to make the members of the old society part and parcel of the new society (the role of different classes being essentially changed) and utilise the industrial, technological and scientific advances of the previous stage; and (3) to create, on the basis of progress in science and technology and on the basis of a new ideology, qualitatively new relations of production and a new state system, and raise the productive forces to a new, higher, level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, no stages in the process of development are eternal; each stage disappears sooner or later, being negated by each following stage, and so on. Dialectical negation (i.e., a succession of stages of development, proceeding in accordance with the objective laws inherent in a given object or process) does not consist merely in the disappearance of some obsolete features of the stage which is negated, but implies, as well, the retention of some of the features of that stage and emergence of entirely new features which never existed previously.  For these reasons, the succession of developmental stages is progressive. Although no stage is ever completely repeated, some features of earlier stages necessarily recur—although in a different form—at later stages, in consequence of which development proceeds in a spiral. All the above-mentioned peculiarities of development are called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of negation of the negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, after throwing off the colonialist yoke, a country starts building the new life, its people must certainly abolish all vestiges of oppression, eliminate entirely the sorry aftermath of imperialist rule and sweep out all anti-popular practices and institutions holding back national development. Nevertheless it is certainly necessary to preserve the buildings, enterprises and educational establishments which were constructed under colonialist rule, and place at the service of the people that which formerly served its oppressors. It is necessary to preserve, build up and use for the people&#039;s benefit the scientific knowledge acquired under colonialism by a small proportion of the oppressed people. But, apart from that, a people having embarked on independent development must create in the social, public, economic and cultural spheres of their country’s life much that is entirely new, that was never heard of before. In this situation, therefore, all three features comprising the law of negation of the negation can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. The Law of Unity and Conflict of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;What causes a thing to move, to develop?  Why does it change?&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, for instance, is that nut rolling along the ground? It has been shaken off the branch by another branch which broke off and fell on it. The branch was broken off by a stone suddenly rolling down the hillside. The stone was tumbled from its place by a landslide which was started by a sudden gust of wind. This sequence could be prolonged indefinitely. Observations of this kind suggested to philosophers the idea which was formulated by Baruch (Benedictus) Spinoza, one of the most prominent materialist philosophers of the 17th century, who wrote that whether a body is in motion or at rest must be determined by another body, whose motion or rest is, in turn, determined by a third body, and that by yet another body, and so on to infinity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proposition that every object both begins to move and stops moving only under the impact of another object is closely associated with the one that opposite properties, characteristics and tendencies, e.g., motion and rest, cannot be combined in the same object at the Same time. A moving object cannot simultaneously be at rest. If it is at rest, it is clear that it is not moving.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These two propositions must be the sole intelligent explanation of the causes of motion, of development. Such was the conclusion arrived at by nearly all noted philosophers and Scientists of the 17th-18th centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, when we try to understand how different objects are organised, examining them “each one by itself, alongside and after each Other,&amp;amp;quot; we, as Engels observes, “do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-77|77]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally enough, when looking into the structure, qualities and specific characteristics of objects, scientists first of all discover contradictions between things rather than within individual things. Nevertheless, when they begin to investigate the processes going on in a body and the connections between it and the external world, they are confronted with an essentially different situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As they are examining a living organism, for instance, paying close attention to what is going on within it, scientists discover that it is continually assimilating substances from the environment and simultaneously excreting substance into it. Furthermore, these diametrically opposite processes are so closely interconnected that it is enough to prevent a living organism from assimilating certain substances from without for excretion to stop at the same moment, while as soon as an organism becomes unable to discharge certain substances into the environment, it stops assimilating substances from it at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An analogous situation can be observed in inorganic nature. As long as the atoms of different chemical elements were regarded alongside each other and people did not realise that atoms of one element can be transformed into those of another, opposite physical and chemical properties appeared to be distributed among the atoms of different elements while no opposites were thought to be present inside the atom itself. Since the beginning of research into radioactivity, which has to do with the transformation of atoms, the situation has changed.  The atomic nucleus, in which almost the whole of the mass of the atom is concentrated, was found to consist of particles carrying a positive charge, viz., protons. Although, as we know, Similarly charged objects repel each other, protons do not fly in different directions but are held together in the nucleus by diametrically opposite forces (so-called nuclear forces) by which the protons are attracted to one another.  These opposites, viz., proton attraction and repulsion, are so intimately interconnected that one does not exist without the other. It is precisely this contradiction, inherent in the atomic nucleus, which causes the transformation of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everybody knows that by sawing a magnetised bar in half, one does not get two separate poles. Each half will be a magnet with a North pole and a South pole. One can divide each piece into two again, and the result will be the same. One certainly may, if he likes, deprive the magnet of its North pole. For this, one must demagnetise the bar. But when one does this, the South pole will disappear simultaneously with the North pole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that a body appears to be either at rest or in motion only as long as we ignore the body’s inner workings and its relationship to the surrounding environment. When we take all that into account, we shall find that every resting body is in motion and every moving body is at rest; that rest and motion simultaneously and inseparably belong to one and the same body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The two laws of dialectics generalising our entire knowledge of nature, society and thought, which we have considered here, show that all motion is a unity of inseparable opposites, viz., quantitative and qualitative changes; continuous changes and breaks of continuity; disappearance of the properties of the stage which is negated and the retention of its properties; recurrence and uniqueness; stability and change. Being aware of the self-contradictory nature of all things and events makes it much easier to discover what causes every object to move and change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What causes, for instance, the peculiar form of motion we call life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An organism lives only as long as metabolism continues, which includes two opposite processes, viz., assimilation (i.e., transformation of food into body substance) and disintegration of body substance and excretion of the products of disintegration. When metabolism stops, life ceases. In any plant or animal, metabolism, as Engels wrote, “does not take place as the result of a process to which it is subjected from without.... On the contrary, life, the metabolism which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a self-implementing process...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-78|78]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , i.e., a process which is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inherent&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in a living body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the organism’s age, the work it has performed, its condition and numerous other factors, either constructive metabolism (assimilation) or destructive metabolism (excretion) may be predominant. Even where the two kinds of metabolism are at close enough levels of intensity (which may occur only for a time) the balance between them is not complete but approximate and relative, the opposition between them does not disappear but merely diminishes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, life is motion which is not due to any cause external to the organism. The cause that sets the organism in motion is internal. The source of this motion is the interaction of the opposites inherent in it, i.e., assimilation and excretion. Even partial, approximate equilibrium between these opposites is possible only for a limited space of time. They are never so completely balanced as to neutralise each other.  They are always opposed to each other, as long as there is life in general (and so its source&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the conflict of opposites). Hence, life is self-motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us look at a society in which the means of production are privately owned and which is divided into classes of the exploiters and the exploited. In the absence of the exploited, existence is impossible for the exploiters for whom would they exploit? And where there are no exploiters there can be no exploited. The struggle between these classes wherever private property predominates is the chief source of society’s progress from lower to higher stages, e.g., from slavery to feudalism, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism. Society is not set in motion by some external force. On the contrary, the force responsible for society’s development, i.e., the class struggle, is inherent in society. Therefore, human history is self-motion caused by the conflict of opposite classes in society itself. Even when their forces become more or less balanced, they can still never be completely so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to deny the role of external influences which may further or hinder one form of movement or another. Nevertheless, all movement takes its source from internal contradictions, so that the emergence of new contradictions gives rise to a new form of movement, while with their disappearance it gives place to another form of movement for which other contradictions are responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus every material or spiritual phenomenon or process is a unity of Opposites which inherently belong to it and are inseparable. The source of any object’s movement lies in the interaction (&amp;amp;quot;conflict&amp;amp;quot;) of opposites which are inherent in it. Therefore movement is self-movement. Opposites can attain only partial, relative equilibrium, and that only for a time; they can never become balanced completely. The disparity, the contradiction between them is always present in varying degrees, being as indestructible as motion itself. The unity, the equal effect of opposites, is temporary and relative, whereas their conflict is eternal and absolute. Such are the tenets of materialist dialectics which constitute the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity and con&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;lict of opposites&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The significance of this law to dialectics is such that Lenin wrote: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-79|79]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, both the law of transition from quantity to quality and that of negation of the negation may be regarded as particular instances of the law of the unity and conflict of opposites, which reveals the source of all development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is an example illustrating the Significance this law has to the working people’s struggle against capitalist oppression.  Advocates of the capitalist system allege that the conflict of internal contradictions, i.e, the class struggle, is not a source of the development of society but an obstacle in its way. According to them, strikes, demonstrations, etc., bring factories to a standstill, and so hold back the development of production and of society at large. They say that only with class peace and co-operation between employers and workers can technology advance and production develop rapidly. In fact, however, in all capitalist countries where the working class is well-organised, its economic struggle compels the capitalists to raise wages, reduce hours and improve conditions in one way or another. The capitalists thus have to improve plant, technologies and organisation of production. But, most important of all, the broader and more vigorous the people’s movement is, the sooner the revolution comes which abolishes capitalist oppression and raises production and the entire life of society to a new stage of development which capitalism cannot attain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. Categories of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Category? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Earth has a satellite, the Moon. Some other planets in the solar system also have satellites, and so do the planets revolving round other stars, besides the Sun. Saturn, for example, has nine satellites, the largest of which is Titan. Being a satellite of Saturn, Titan is thereby one of the satellites of planets in general which revolve round diverse stars. Satellites, in their turn, belong to solid cosmic objects which form merely a part of the cosmic bodies in general. Thus, as we pass from the most narrow to the more and more inclusive of the aforementioned concepts, we shall have a series of concepts in which every following concept is broader than the preceding one, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TITAN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF SATURN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SOLID COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take another concept, &amp;amp;quot;wheat&amp;amp;quot;.  Wheat is a cereal, and all cereals are covered-seeded plants having one seed leaf, which, along with the plants having two seed leaves, form the class of covered-seeded plants. The latter, along with the naked-seeded plants, belong to the seed plants, which, in their turn, belong to plants (to which seedless plants also belong). In this case, too, we have a series of concepts ranging from the specific to the more general, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
WHEAT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A CEREAL,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT HAVING ONE SEED LEAF,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AN ORGANISM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All concepts of material objects (e.g., the oak, the bee, the biplane) are links in similar series, and the series are linked with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since wheat is one of the cereals, all the attributes of the latter are included in the concept “wheat&amp;amp;quot;, which implies, besides, the particular attributes of wheat differentiating it from all other cereals. The concept “cereal&amp;amp;quot; implies all the attributes of the covered-seeded plants with one seed leaf, plus those which distinguish cereals from the rest of such plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with other concepts, the meaning of the more general concepts being implicit in the more restricted concept, while implicit in the latter also are the attributes whereby the given subclass is differentiated from the other subclasses of the class to which it belongs.  Therefore the attributes of an organism are implicit in the concepts of all plants (of which more than half a million species are known) and in the concepts of all animals (of which more than a million species are known). Yet the concept &amp;amp;quot;matter&amp;amp;quot; occupies a special place among the concepts of material objects. Being the most comprehensive, ultimate concept, it is implied in millions of diverse concepts of material objects, animate or inanimate, natural or manmade.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Matter is not the only ultimate concept embracing a vast multitude of narrower concepts.  Philosophy is concerned with the following ultimate concepts: matter and mind, motion and rest, the general and the particular, substance and phenomenon, quality and quantity, cause and effect, necessity and chance, possibility and reality, content and form, structure and function, and so on. These ultimate concepts are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each category embraces an enormous number of narrower concepts, while all categories combine to embrace all concepts at the command of human thought. And, as the content of a category is included in all the concepts brought under it, the apprehension of diverse phenomena and processes in nature, society and thoughts largely depends on what each category is intended to express.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The distinction between categories and other concepts was noted even in antiquity, and philosophers have been arguing about it ever since, advancing different doctrines of categories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us look at Kant’s account of categories.  Kant stresses that each category, as it unites a multitude of narrower concepts, thereby serves to bring together, reduce to order and synthesise our knowledge; therefore categories are exceedingly important to apprehension. The train of thought he pursued is as follows. When they first found a metal that would not oxidize, men formed the concept ‘gold’. The first voyages round the world produced the concept &amp;amp;quot;globe”. Navigators who had reached the Arctic Ocean for the first time, saw huge floating mountains of ice there. Thus, the notion “iceberg&amp;amp;quot; emerged. All ordinary concepts are the result of sense-perception of material things, i.e., they are derived from experience. Therefore they represent knowledge of phenomena of the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Categories, on the other hand, represent a different form of synthesis. Facing an unfamiliar thing, we immediately start looking for its cause and trying to see what is accidental and what is necessary in it, and so on. All contact with things, all experience necessarily involves these considerations. Even before we know the cause of the given phenomenon, we are sure that it must have a cause, as well as both chance and necessary attributes. Hence, according to Kant, we have the idea of necessity and chance, of cause and effect, in a word, of all categories, prior to contact with material things, i.e., prior to experience. From Kant’s point of view, categories are not derived from experience but are prior to it, are something, in fact, without which human experience would be impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kant held that so long as categories—unlike ordinary concepts—are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience, they contain no knowledge about the material world: there is nothing in objective reality corresponding to categories.  All categories—necessity and chance, cause and effect, and so on—are conceived merely in thought. It appears, then, that our major concepts, i.e., categories, do not depend on the material world at all, that thought is independent of matter. Proceeding from this idealist point of view, Kant held that categories do not emerge at all, but have been present in human consciousness ever since man appeared. Neither the number nor essence of the categories ever changes. There are as many categories today as there were thousands of years ago, and we understand them now just as they were understood then. Kant asserted further that as necessity is the opposite of chance, it follows that they are mutually exclusive because in combining them the mind would contradict itself, which is logically impossible. The relation of cause and effect and other categories are equally incompatible, being opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us look into this interpretation of categories which modern idealists are still using in one way or another. In our daily contact with material things, we have to resort to concepts, e.g., a pulley, an engine, a switch, electric current, a television set, industry, cost, efficiency, oxygen, a germ, the nervous system, and so on.  We never derived any of them from experience, having learned them from teachers or books. Moreover, with the exception of discoverers and researchers who may introduce a new concept on the basis of experience, nobody can claim to have derived from experience a concept previously not known. We receive all our concepts from other people. Does it follow from this that these concepts have not been derived from experience but are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience? Certainly not. Even though you and I derived no concepts from experience, others did a very long time ago, and later on still others, drawing on freshly gained experience, amplified, refined and developed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the fact that the concepts we apply in our daily lives have not been derived by ourselves does not in the least mean that they have been derived by nobody at all. If people use concepts already made, that does not prove their non-empirical origin, i.e., that they have not been acquired from experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dialectical materialism has weighty proofs of the empirical origin of all categories. If all categories were present in human thought ever Since it began, we should have also found them in the thought processes of primitive tribes. In fact, however, that is not the case. N. N. Miklukho-Maklai (1846-1888), a famous Russian traveller, anthropologist and ethnographer, established, for example, that the Papuans in New Guinea, who were familiar with some categories, e.g., causality, did not know other categories. When bartering their goods, they placed respective items opposite one another, as they did not know how to count. Not only were they ignorant of quantity as such but they had no notion of number. “Counting”, Engels wrote, “requires not only objects that can be counted, but also the ability to exclude all properties of the objects considered except their number—and this ability is the product of a long historical evolution based on experience.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-80|80]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Scientific investigations proved that many primitive tribes lacked both experience and the notion of number, let alone the knowledge of the categories of quantity or matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, if categories were inherent in the mind, i.e., prior to experience, they would be inherent also in the mind of a little child. As it is, a two-year-old, while possessing a variety of notions, has, nevertheless, no notion of number or quantity. These facts conclusively show that categories, like all other concepts, grow out of men’s experience as it progresses from one stage to another, some of them emerging earlier than others, so that their number is not invariable. Of course, a category takes much longer to arise than does a narrower concept.  Moreover, this process is still carrying on today. The categories of structure and function, for example, emerge after Kant. Our descendants will undoubtedly evolve new categories on the basis of experience yet to be gained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having disproved the idealist point of view that cause and effect, necessity and chance, quality and quantity just do not exist in the material world, and merely our notions of them exist in the mind prior to experience, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that all categories and concepts, “all ideas are taken from experience, are reflections ... of reality.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-81|81]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The ultimate concepts are different only in that the characteristics of objective reality they reflect belong not to some but to all things and events.  Hence the great significance of these key concepts to knowledge. Lenin wrote of them: &amp;amp;quot;Man is confronted with a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;web&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of national phenomena... categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-82|82]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disproving the metaphysical assertions that the categories are invariable both as to content and number, that they have no interconnections, and that opposite categories cannot coexist, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that categories develop, represent a unity of opposites, and that all categories are interconnected, as they reflect different characteristics and aspects of the external world and different processes going on in it. “...If &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; develops,” Lenin wrote, ‘does not that apply also to the most general &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-83|83]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; We shall concern ourselves here with only some of the categories of materialist dialectics, viz., cause and effect, and necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Cause and Effect ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 18th century, many scientists believed that the ability of bodies to burn was due to a special substance, &amp;amp;quot;phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;. The more phlogiston there was in a body, the more readily it burned, and a body that had given off all of its phlogiston could not burn. Phlogiston was invariably the cause of fire; fire was invariably the effect of phlogiston. From that point of view, phlogiston could not be the effect of fire, nor could fire be the cause of phlogiston. Another contemporary view was that heat was caused by a weightless substance, &amp;amp;quot;caloric&amp;amp;quot;. According to that view, a cold body became hot owing to caloric passing into it from a hot body contacting it. Textbooks on chemistry had listed caloric among chemical elements up to the mid-19th century. Caloric was considered to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of heat, and the latter to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of caloric. It seemed obvious that no contrary state of things, i.e., that heat phenomena should be the cause of caloric and caloric the effect of heat, was at all possible. All electric phenomena known at that time were ascribed to the action of invisible electrical fluids which produced electric current as they flowed from one body into another. These electrical fluids were believed then to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of electricity, and electricity to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of the electric fluids. Such conceptions of heat, electricity and other phenomena gave rise to the idea that once A was the cause of B, it could not possibly be the effect of B. This understanding of the relation of cause and effect boiled down to the undialectical, metaphysical view that opposites (such as cause and effect) cannot coexist in one and the same object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysical understanding of the categories of cause and effect has been upset by the further progress of knowledge which showed that the world is not an assemblage of final things but a totality of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today everybody knows that in a hydroelectric station the movement of the water stream is the cause of the electric current produced by the station. And in the case of a machine tool being switched on, the electric current is the cause of its mechanical motion. In the former instance electric current is the effect of mechanical motion; in the latter, it is the cause of mechanical motion. In the diesel locomotive, heat is the cause of the mechanical motion of the locomotive’s driving axles, and simultaneously the mechanical movement of its parts, their friction, causes them to become so hot as to make it necessary to install special cooling devices to prevent a fire. In other words, heat is simultaneously the cause and effect of mechanical motion. If we regard the links in the chain of causality as processes, we shall find that when process A, in acting on process B, causes a change in it, process B, in acting on process A in its turn, also causes changes in it, so that the chain looks like this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;⇌&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;B&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, every process, as it acts on another process, itself is acted on by the latter, which means that all relationships which exist in nature and society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interact&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and that the opposites (cause and effect) are comprised in one and the same thing or event.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On establishing the cause of a phenomenon, a scientist must necessarily find out what reverse effect the phenomenon has on its cause, which facet of the interaction is predominant and to what extent it is so, and what reasons are responsible for it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Influence of the effect on the cause from which it sprang has a particularly significant role in organic nature. When the controlling part of an organism is informed by the part under its control about some change occurring in the surroundings (e.g., the appearance of something of possible food value), it “orders” the controlled part to respond in a specific way (e.g., to try and get hold of the thing). The result may be either fortunate or otherwise. The thing may prove to be edible or obnoxious. The controlled part at once informs the controlling part which issues the next order. In the first instance the order will be to try and consume the thing; in the second, to withdraw as quickly as possible. This process, described as &amp;amp;quot;’feedback’, is widely applied in modern technology, especially in cybernetic devices. Feedback systems, whether natural or manmade, would be impossible if the effect (i.e., the system’s response to the action on it of an external object) were not the cause of its own cause (i.e., if the system’s response failed to cause changes in the external object which has provoked the response).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us consider the example of a developing nation retarded both economically and culturally after years of colonial misrule. To raise labour efficiency from its low level, such a nation must, quite obviously, push up the cultural and living standards in the first place. An ignorant, underfed worker cannot be very efficient, of course. So, the growth of cultural and living standards is the major cause of the growth of efficiency in a former colonial country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still, if we view the matter from a dialectical standpoint, we shall see that here too cause and effect interact and change places. For, clearly enough, higher cultural and living standards depend above all on higher labour efficiency, or, to put it differently, higher cultural and living standards are the effect of higher efficiency. The growth of labour efficiency is both the cause and the effect of the growth of living and cultural standards, just as the growth of living and cultural standards is both the cause and the effect of higher labour efficiency. In a striving to achieve national prosperity, one should be guided by a dialectical understanding of the categories of cause and effect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====  §3. Necessity and Chance ====&lt;br /&gt;
Chance is commonly taken to mean that which might or might not occur, or might occur in any way. Necessity, on the other hand, is understood as that which must occur and cannot but occur.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the interrelation of necessity and chance in the world around us?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the answers to this question may be: There is nothing that necessarily must occur and nothing that might not occur. Anything, any event, however incredible, may occur, and it may occur one way or any other way. From this standpoint, nothing is impossible. There is no such thing as necessity. Everything in the world is the outcome of chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The famous French author of the 16th century Francois Rabelais satirised this view in his book about a giant, Gargantua, who was brought into the world through his mother’s ear. Anticipating that his readers will not believe such a thing possible, Rabelais says that even though such strange nativity has not a semblance of truth in it, still nobody would dispute it that there is nothing impossible to god. And if god wished so, all women would henceforth deliver their babies through their ears.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those who deny necessity and believe that anything is possible (so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;indeterminists&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) would have to accept that although the stone on which he has just sat down is silent, it could well burst into song presently; that although the dog is a four-legged animal, it is nevertheless quite possible that a dog may have a puppy with twenty legs; that, so far, two by two is four, but it is quite possible that, by tonight, two by two will have become one....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The mere fact that indeterminists deny necessity and the laws of nature in word only but practically recognise both, is enough to show how vapid their doctrine is. Even the “fathers of the church”, who repeat that, as far as god is concerned, no necessity exists, that everything is possible for him, depart from their indeterminism at every step. Thomas Aquinas, a prominent theologian of the past, nowadays regarded as the principal authority of the Catholic church, had to admit that many spheres of reality were subject to necessity against which god “the omnipotent” himself was powerless.  E.g., god cannot abolish the past or alter the fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles or turn untruth into truth, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Opposing indeterminism are, among others, adherents of mechanistic determinism. Faith, they maintain, allows any violation of the laws of nature, any miracle. Science, on the other hand, demonstrates that everything is subject to the laws of nature and is ruled by inexorable necessity. Nothing can occur in any other way than it actually does occur. Assuming that an event might occur contrary to the positive law—an event that need not have happened, a chance event&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that event would be uncaused, i.e., it would be a miracle. And miracles do not happen, nor can they happen. Following this train of thought, Spinoza, the materialist philosopher already referred to, came to the conclusion that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nothing occurs by chance in nature, and everything is predetermined&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This point of view found corroboration in classical mechanics whose laws, which precisely determine the trajectory described by isolated bodies, enabled scientists to predict with striking accuracy where a body moving in space would be at any given point in time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, when science came to face more complex things than trajectories of individual bodies, it knocked the bottom out of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to the following example. In a society of commodity producers, writes Marx, price is “the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity’s value.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-84|84]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is a law. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the price offered by each buyer.  In every business transaction price is either higher or lower than cost. To give another example, the ideology of a class is determined by the place occupied by the latter in the given System of relations of production. In feudal times, noblemen regarded serfdom as being in the nature of things. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the views held by every single member of a class. Alexander Radishchev, the Decembrists and Alexander Herzen were all noblemen but at the same time were opposed to serfdom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the plant and animal kingdoms we see that no plant or animal lives forever—such is the law of nature. There are also laws which determine the maximum life-span for different &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;pecies. Oaks may live to an age of a thousand years, but many things may happen to an individual shoot. It may perish on the second or twentieth or two thousandth day of its life.  There is no law fixing the exact day and hour of the death of, let us say, the tree growing in front of your house. This holds of all plants and animals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By accepting that every event is inexorably determined and inevitable, we arrive at fatalism. It was in this way that Vulich, from Lermontov’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A Hero of Our Time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reasoned when, holding a pistol at his temple, he said: “If I am destined to die this moment, it will happen whether or not I fire; and if I am destined to stay alive today, then I shall stay alive whether or not I press the trigger.” Fatalism so obviously runs counter to ordinary experience that it was rejected even by the most prominent adherents of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet how one is to avoid becoming a fatalist after accepting that everything is inexorably predetermined was something none of them was able to explain, for fatalism necessarily follows from mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The all-important biological law of natural selection does not imply in the least that every creature less fit than others is doomed to sterility and early death or that every better-adjusted creature shall live long and have numerous progeny. A less-adjusted individual may happen to live to the utmost limit possible for its species, or it might die at birth, and so on. The law does not lay down the particular chance with which an individual is to meet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is much the same in inorganic nature.  According to the second law of thermodynamics, already referred to, a closed system tends to proceed towards less orderly forms of motion. In the last quarter of the 19th century, it was established that the law does not hold of every change in such a system, whose several parts may proceed towards either greater disorder or greater order. Increased disorder is, however, much more probable than increased order or greater order. Increased disorder is general direction in which a closed system tends to proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To quote another example, a soluble substance placed in a liquid at rest is diffused throughout the liquid. If we place a grain of potassium permanganate at the left wall of a vessel containing water, its molecules will begin scattering in the water. After some time, the concentration of the solution will be uniform throughout the vessel. Each molecule of permanganate is jostled by water molecules. If the impulses are sufficiently numerous, the number of impulses pushing permanganate molecules towards the place of smaller concentration (towards the right) will be roughly equal to the number of impulses tending towards the place of greater concentration (towards the left), because the water molecules are in a permanent condition of irregular motion, whereby the number of molecules moving in all directions (if sufficiently great) is approximately the same.  But if each permanganate molecule receives as many impulses to the left as to the right, then what about the law of the uniform distribution of soluble substances, which is possible only provided that many more permanganate molecules move from left to right than from right to left?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us mentally divide the water in the vessel into sections. Within the limits of each section the permanganate molecules will be distributed more or less evenly. But the closer to the left a section is, the more permanganate molecules it contains. Each molecule moves both to the right and to the left at a different rate of probability, but since in any two adjacent sections the one on the left always contains more permanganate molecules than the one on its right, more permanganate molecules cross the line from left to right than from right to left. This will go on until the concentration of permanganate in adjacent sections becomes equal, or, rather, approximately equal, for, to obtain an absolutely uniform solution, the number of molecules of both permanganate and water must be infinite. Yet, although the vessel contains but a finite number of molecules, it is still a very great number.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-85|85]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That is why in such experiments, the law takes effect with great precision, deviations being detectable only with the aid of highly sensitive measuring instruments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Seeing that indeterminism and mechanistic determinism lack justification, some philosophers choose the “golden mean”, saying that events may be either necessary or accidental: minor events refer to chance, and major—to necessity. Chance events&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;since they do not spring from necessity—are subject to no laws and are, from this standpoint, nothing short of miracles. As for necessary events, they are conceived as inexorably predetermined, so that all we have to do is go fatalist and, washing our hands of it all, dumbly wait for the blows of fate to fall. This “golden mean” attitude, as we see, combines the vices of both aforementioned views and, besides, leaves it up to anyone to categorise some events as miracles and attribute others to doom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, we can neither agree that all events occur by chance nor that all events are inevitable, nor that all events are divided into accidental and necessary. Adherents of these doctrines hold that every event is either absolutely necessary or absolutely fortuitous and that none may be a combination of necessity and chance. In fact, however, every event is a unity of these opposites. How does it come about?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The examples we have cited show that individual events occurring in the sphere regulated by a certain law essentially differ from one another. Then what about recurrence? And if there is no recurrence, then what happens to the law? Let us look at price formation involving hundreds of thousands of commodities over scores and hundreds of years. We shall see that, barring extraordinary cases in which regular price formation was prevented by unusual circumstances, the price of a commodity was determined, by and large, by its cost. This holds true of other economic laws as well. Each of them, as Engels pointed out, is valid merely as a tendency, an average. This applies equally to nature. Thus, the tendency for the survival of the fittest recurs in hundreds of thousands of plant and animal species.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That nothing recurs in identically the same Shape either in nature or society has already been mentioned in our discussion of the laws of dialectics. Nevertheless the recurrence of some relationships—which is not absolute but approximate—necessarily takes place. That is exactly how necessity expresses itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adducing the fact that there is an infinite multitude of possibilities for an isolated event, and that the realisation of one of these possibilities is a deviation from the law, indeterminists say that, so long as an event may deviate from the law to no matter what extent, i.e., contravene it, it means that there simply is no law, and anything whatever may occur. This would be difficult to counter if isolated events could indeed deviate from the law &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;without restriction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The point is, however, that while a law allows numerous possibilities for an isolated event, it also sets a limit to them, drawing the line between what is possible and what is not.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy imparted on impact by one molecule to another may vary infinitely. But the law sets a limit beyond which this cannot go. A molecule cannot impart more than its own energy.  Individual events can deviate from the law within certain limits, but no event can be in contradiction with the law. That is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Each of the vast number of events whose general result is a law constitutes a deviation from the law in one direction or degree or another, and in that sense it is an accident—but an accident by no means uncaused. In this, the law does not fail but is observed: chance is the form in which necessity finds expression. It is only through chance, if anything, that a law Operates, as it circumscribes the area within which straggling may occur. A law is hard to discover precisely because it expresses itself only in terms of its opposite, i.e., deviations from it, because the universal, necessary, recurrent connection it states reveals itself only in isolated contingent events with variable characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;p-p9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;g-fr&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Pictures/10000000000004630000031AFA5615A6C2A7295C.jpg|class=calibre5]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We sometimes come across the following reasoning: with respect to a mass of objects (e.g., molecules in a solution or microparticles in cosmic rays), necessity indeed manifests itself in chance, and the laws are operative on the whole, without determining all that may happen to any one molecule or particle. Yet, in the case of single objects subject to the laws of classical mechanics, pure necessity holds sway, leaving no room for chance. In this instance, the laws are absolutely definitive with respect to each single object. After all, do not the Earth, Mars and other planets repeat absolutely the same movements, exactly defined by the laws of classical mechanics, over thousands of millions of years? Yet, one could think so only as long as measurements were taken with instruments not so very precise. Applying more perfect instruments, 20th-century scientists have established that each revolution of the Earth round its axis is different from the last. The Earth’s movements round the sun are not identical either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examined in detail, the trajectory of any separate object is found to consist of millions of infinitesimal segments, each being a deviation from the regular course. Only their sum conforms to the law. This holds of every individual object. Each of them is the sum of numerous constituents contained in it at a deeper level. In other words, every single object amounts, at a deeper level, to a mass of objects, and the law to which it is subject is the sum of the irregularities occurring in the numerous elements constituting the object. Lenin wrote: “... social science (like science generally) usually deals with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mass&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; phenomena, not with individual cases.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-86|86]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; So, if the distinction between individual and mass objects is relative, so is the distinction between exact laws and such as formulate a certain general tendency. As Lenin put it, ”... law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-87|87]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A dialectical approach to the question is essential to technology as well as science. Electrical engineers, above all, are keenly aware of this, because nothing can be achieved in electronics without a dialectical conception of necessity and chance. In fields other than electrical engineering, too, the old mechanistic view will only do to design simple and crude mechanisms. To attempt to build a machine consisting of numerous more or less independent units and requiring a thousand times more accuracy than any high-precision lathe, in the expectation that everything will proceed in strict conformity to the laws, would be absolutely useless, for it would only need the minutest element to fail for the whole system to fail. The more precise and complex a mechanism, the less reliable it is. Thus, in 1962, the 18-million-dollar US rocket launched towards Venus had to be blown up in flight for no other reason than that a hyphen had been omitted from the computer programme. Recently developed devices are so designed that their elements may go wrong or even break down, but the total behaviour of all elements, nevertheless, ensures correct behaviour of the system as a whole.  Systems of high complexity and precision can be made more reliable only given a dialectical conception of the correlation of necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quantum mechanics, genetics and cybernetics, which developed in the 20th century, have yielded such strong evidence in support of this approach that the majority of leading scientists today have come to share the dialectical view on necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To conclude, categories, like all other concepts, are derived from experience and are mental reflections of certain characteristics of the real world. As fresh experience and knowledge are gained, the content of categories is modified and refined. A category reflects the external world correctly only when conceived as a unity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 9. P&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ractice, the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;R&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;oot&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt; and&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Y&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ardstick of&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; K&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Is the World Cognisable? ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now appropriate to look at the other aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy mentioned at the beginning of this book: Is consciousness capable of truthfully reflecting the material world? Is man capable of discovering the laws governing the development of nature and society, the essential properties and relations of external objects? And if he is, then is his knowledge complete, exhaustive and final or is it only partial? The sum total of the conceptions and doctrines offering answers to these questions constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;epistemology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;episteme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, knowledge, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;logos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, theory, account).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are all familiar with a wide variety of things and possess information the validity of which nobody would ever question. We know how to switch on electricity, solder a can, start a machine or look up a ‘phone number in the directory. This store of information tested by ordinary experience seems to put it beyond all possible doubt that our knowledge is true and authentic. Yet, what may at first sight seem absolutely indisputable very often proves untrue. Relying on their experience, men used to consider the Earth to be flat and stationary and believed that the Sun travelled up and down the sky. The notion of the atoms as the ultimate, non-divisible particles of which the universe is composed had persisted in science until the close of the 19th century. Today, however, every schoolchild knows that the Earth is shaped very nearly like a globe and is rotating round the Sun, and that not only are the atoms divisible, but the atomic nuclei too are divisible, being composed of elementary particles.  Such facts make us wonder if what we know is indeed true and indubitable. Suppose we wake up one day to find it was all wrong, as has happened more than once in science as well as everyday life? Is there a trustworthy method of cognition guaranteed against mistakes? Such doubts arose in philosophers’ minds early in antiquity. Whereas the old Greek materialist philosophers Democritus (c. 460-370 B. C.) and Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) were sure that the world is cognisable and our knowledge gives us a true idea of things and events, Cratylus, already referred to above, asserted that the world cannot be cognised because things change too quickly to be known.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, we find in the history of philosophy arguments both for and against the possibility of knowing the world. Therefore, it is not a question of filing isolated facts but rather of analysing the substance of cognition and ascertaining its main characteristics and objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different philosophical schools exercise different approaches to the problem of the world’s cognisability and offer different solutions. To understand the epistemology of dialectical materialism more thoroughly, one must have at least a general idea of the epistemological conceptions of its forerunners, as dialectical materialism did not spring out of nothing but is the result of a critical comprehension of the epistemological doctrines whose shortcomings and weak points were exposed in the course of history, thanks to the strides made by science, technology and other forms of human activity.  Dialectical materialism has, at the same time, absorbed all that was valuable in the conclusions about the nature, principles and yardsticks of knowledge evolved by the preceding philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Agnostic Epistemology ====&lt;br /&gt;
The doctrine which asserts that it is impossible to know the universe was called agnosticism (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;agnostos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, unknown, unknowable).  Accepting sense-perceptions to be the source of all knowledge, agnostics reason roughly as follows: so far as our sense-perceptions are consistent with reality, our knowledge is true; but so far as they are not at all like the objects as they are by themselves, outside sense-perception, it is false. But may we compare our perceptions of an object with the object itself? The English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) had this to say about it: “The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-88|88]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly, then, we have nothing with which to compare our perceptions, we have no means of verifying whether what they tell us is consistent with reality. Therefore we cannot say if they are true reflections of objects or if they are a fiction. It is possible that there are external objects endowed with the qualities such as we perceive. But it is quite possible also that nothing of the kind really exists. This, in agnostics’ view, is a problem men cannot solve.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As you may remember, Hume’s predecessor George Berkeley, the subjective idealist, also considered sensations to be the sole source of human knowledge. But while he held that all external objects are merely combinations of sensations, he simultaneously accepted the existence of god, whose being is independent of sensation. Berkeley was inconsistent on this point and contradicted himself as he claimed that the source of sensation (god) exists independently of the latter. Hume differs from Berkeley in following up more consistently the idea that sensations are the sole source of knowledge and denying the existence of god—although he was, of course, an idealist. This aspect of Hume’s agnosticism at first appealed to some scientists because it was spearheaded against theology. Nevertheless, the more clearsighted of them soon saw that agnosticism conflicts with science, for the chief aim of science is to know reality, and consistent agnosticism leads to a denial of the very possibility of knowing the objective world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ordinary experience—whether individual or general—tells us that sensations are indeed the source of our knowledge of the external world.  Most of what we learn in everyday life or in experimental science is based precisely on sense-perceptions. Both materialists and agnostics agree on this point. They begin to differ when it comes to the question of the role of sensations in cognition, and of their origin. The materialists maintain that sensations transmit and process information received by the brain from the environment. The agnostics deny that the material world exists and so deny the possibility of cognition. But that is not all. As they reduce all knowledge to sense-perception, the agnostics are unable to explain how certain ideas and concepts, irreducible to sensuous images and sensations, arise in man’s consciousness and especially in the system of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Agnosticism as an independent trend emerged when experimental natural sciences and mathematics made rapid strides, i.e., it is of recent origin. It coincided in particular with the period of high development of mathematical analysis, higher algebra, and so on. These branches of mathematics employ concepts like infinity, function, the infinitesimal, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;-space vector, etc., which cannot be constructed from or reduced to sensations. They are, nonetheless, conclusively established scientific realities, of practical as well as theoretical importance.  This fact spotlighted the deficiencies of agnosticism which was unable to explain the origin and significance of many basic concepts current in modern science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Rationalism and Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
Development of the theory of knowledge was appreciably influenced by philosophical rationalism (Lat. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ratio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reason). Assigning a subordinate role to sense-perceptions, rationalists held that the ultimate goal of cognition, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., the discovery of laws and basic qualities and relationships of objects, can be attained only by reason, on the ground of logical reasoning alone. However, every discourse must have a beginning, a starting point.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a starting point must be provided by certain major premises, “axioms” or “principles&amp;amp;quot; relating to the universe or its individual parts. But where do they spring from? Where do the laws and rules of logic spring from, which enable us gradually to deduce from the principles all valid knowledge? Adherents of religious rationalism believed that divine providence imparts them to philosophers and scientists at its will. Atheist rationalists, on the Other hand, maintained that the principles, axioms and laws may be discovered by thinkers who, by continually training their minds, become capable of conceiving by intuition all the necessary initial judgements which must be clear, definite and indisputable. Human reason is the highest authority, and once it finds no discrepancies in the concepts and theories of its making, there can be no better proof of their validity. This line of reasoning unmistakably reveals the influence of mathematics, especially of geometry. It was no coincidence that Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher, one of the founders of rationalism, was also the father of analytic geometry.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is known, Euclidean geometry was considered for centuries the model of logical arrangement of scientific material. What many thinkers found especially praiseworthy about Euclidean geometry was that it begins with the postulation of a limited number of axiomatic, i.e., supposedly self-evident, truths, from which, step by step, in accordance with the rules of logic and by rigorous demonstration, theorems are derived one after another. Rationalists, who put it above all that knowledge should be perfectly logical, made the axiomatic method their ideal.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, putting divine revelation aside, where do we take axioms from? Why is our intuition capable of furnishing distinct and clear knowledge of the real world, and how can we ascertain the connection between the immediate consequences of the axioms and the material objects, if sense-perceptions should be an unreliable source of information? Rationalism could supply no answer to these questions. It received a severe blow from science in the 19th century, when three mathematicians, Lobachevsky, Riemann and Bolyai, each independently showed that Euclid’s “axiom of parallels” (the fifth postulate of Euclidean geometry) was not self-evident and could be replaced. In the process, non-Euclidean geometries were developed, distinct and at the same time logically consistent.  Recently, especially after the discovery of the theory of relativity and numerous experiments, including those made possible by space flights, it has been shown that non-Euclidean geometries furnish a much clearer and truthful idea of the external world, compared with Euclid’s geometry. Thus the doctrine of rationalism which managed to explain some facts of scientific, above all, mathematical, knowledge, failed to grasp the connection between scientific laws and cognitive activity, on the one hand, and material phenomena, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Theory of Knowledge in Classical Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we saw, neither the agnostics nor the rationalists were able to provide a coherent theory of knowledge. By exaggerating the significance either of sense-perception or of reason and opposing them to each other, they lost sight of the fact that both sensory perception and reason are combined in the act of cognition. For example, a physicist watching (i.e., perceiving by sight) oscillations of the pointer on the scale of the measuring instrument, correlates them with changes in the electromagnetic field. He thus combines in one process logical inference and visual perception. Those, however, who divorce mind from reality and draw the line between the logical and sensuous aspects of the process of cognition oversimplify it, distorting the real, complex nature of cognitive activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant, the founder of German classical idealism, attempted to overcome the conflict of agnosticism and rationalism, bringing the theory of knowledge into line with the results of contemporary natural science and mathematics.  The natural sciences rely, of course, on observation and experiments. But, knowledge thus obtained grasps merely the changing and contingent external aspect of things. Behind things as we know them, or “phenomena” in Kant’s language, are concealed objectively existing material things, or “things-in-themselves&amp;amp;quot;.  Things-in-themselves generate phenomena. But between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself there is a gulf. We perceive the former through sensuous experience while the latter may be only apprehended by the mind. The mind itself moulds &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; categories, i.e., categories not derived from experience. There are twelve categories, including necessity, causality, etc. They play the main part in the formulation of scientific laws. Thus, according to Kant, sense-perception gives us no knowledge of things-in-themselves and leaves it open to question how we know that they exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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As was already mentioned, Kant also conceived time and space as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. These serve to bring into a system the empirical knowledge derived from sensuous experience. Kant is, however, unable to explain how and why the categories and other &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms may generally be applied to sense materials and what information the latter supply concerning the things-in-themselves, which are unknowable in principle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s philosophy is self-contradictory. On the one hand, making a concession to natural science, Kant acknowledged the existence of objective things-in-themselves and considered them to be the source of sensations. On the other, striving to pursue consistently the principles of rationalism, he denied that sensations and sense-perceptions provide a truthful enough reflection of the objective world and assigned the decisive role to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. Pointing out this contradiction in Kantian epistemology, the German philosopher Jacobi wrote that there was no entering Kant&#039;s Philosophy without the thing-in-itself, but to remain within that philosophy with the thing-in-itself was equally impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel, the noted German philosopher and exponent of the dialectical method, who strove to overcome the contradictions of Kantian philosophy and make it more consistent, finally rid the theory of knowledge of German Classical idealism of the thing-in-itself, throwing out, in the process, the elements of natural-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;cientific materialism. According to Hegel, human knowledge is continually developing, being driven by internal contradictions. The world is cognisable, but the deeper thought penetrates into the secrets of being, the clearer it becomes that, through the process of cognition, the Absolute Idea reveals its own objective laws in the real world. It turns out that to know the world is to know its spiritual, ideal essence. Although Hegel made a great contribution to the doctrine of the active and dialectical nature of human knowledge, his theory of knowledge was thoroughly idealistic and therefore met with disapproval from experimental natural science. Besides, Hegel was not always abreast of contemporary physics and mathematics, and his conclusions on the laws governing the development of nature were often at odds with the conceptions advanced by the greatest scientists of the 19th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealist philosophers failed to evolve a theory of knowledge matching the needs and results of theoretical and experimental natural science.  This was not done by the materialist philosophers either, many of whom were eminent thinkers. Despite the considerable popularity and the influence it exerted on science and culture, pre-Marxian materialism, too, was not free from some shortcomings vis-a-vis the conception of the cognitive process.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Theory of Knowledge in Metaphysical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 17th, 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, natural science pursued its inquiries by mechanistic methods. It was to this that the theory of knowledge evolved by metaphysical materialists owed its main characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The crucial principle on which this theory rested was that man is capable of forming a more or less correct idea of and cognising the external world. The basis of knowledge, the means of communication, as it were, between man and reality, are sense-perceptions. The sense-perceptions are images, ‘copies’, mirroring the external world. This view on the significance of sense-perceptions to the process of knowing was not merely expressive of the common-sense attitude naturally shared by every normal person, but was the earmark of contemporary natural science in general. It was this conception of sense-perception that subjective idealists and agnostics attacked with particular vehemence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The weak point in the theory of knowledge of metaphysical materialism was that it overemphasised passive contemplation, i.e., observation of objects, with no attempt to change them.  The contemplative character of pre-Marxian materialism was due to the generalisation of the principle current in natural science that the scientist’s role is, above all, to observe nature, not to alter it. This principle fitted that comparatively early stage in the history of experimental science where it accumulated facts, systematising and classifying them. Certainly, over the 17th-19th centuries, experimental methods involving an active influence on things examined kept improving and developing. But, exponents of metaphysical materialism still failed to grasp their full significance. Passive contemplation and underestimation of the active role of cognition were also due to the fact that metaphysical materialists underrated the importance of analysing the objective laws of thought.  And that, Marx noted, was the weakest point of the previous forms of materialism. Metaphysical materialists viewed cognition as passive observation of, rather than active intervention in, nature and society. The fact is, however, that genuine scientific knowledge becomes available only in the course of remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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While they acknowledged that our notions and sensations are images of material things and events, metaphysical materialists failed to explain the principles underlying the development of thought. They could not say how and why knowledge underwent change, as  they believed its basic methods and forms to be stable and immutable. It was this that rendered their doctrine vulnerable and incapable of answering many of the questions posed by the development of society and science. It was therefore necessary to evolve a fundamentally different approach to the problems associated with the investigation of men’s cognitive activity. This need was answered by the theory of knowledge advanced by dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Cognitive Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
For centuries, men wondered how celestial bodies had originated and what directed their movement, paying particular attention to the Earth’s natural satellite, the Moon. After the telescope was invented and men began to use intricate astronomical instruments, employing astrophotography, radar, etc., they learned a great deal about the Moon. All this information was the result of numerous observations. Even so, until quite recently astronomers and astro-physicists could give no adequate answers as to how the Moon originated, what its invisible side was like, whether the Moon‘s surface was hard or friable, and what was the origin of the lunar craters and “seas&amp;amp;quot;. By obtaining answers to these questions, men would be able to unravel many secrets of nature and form a clearer idea of the history of the solar system. Scientists advanced numerous hypotheses explaining more or less plausibly different facts. On every substantial point, several hypotheses were advanced, and for a long time it could not be decided which of them was correct. The French 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte, for instance, positively asserted that the reverse side of the Moon would ever remain a mystery to men. Nevertheless, the artificial satellites which made pictures of the Moon’s far side, as well as the exploration of the lunar topography by Moon robots and astronauts who brought back samples of moon rock made it possible to supply exact answers to the above questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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In considering this, we must note the following basic points. First, that observation, whether by means of the senses or instruments, is essential to knowing an object. Second, that men can cognise the essential properties of a thing and the laws governing it only by dynamically interacting with the phenomena under investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To observe external phenomena without intervening in their vital functions, without interacting with the processes examined, is to engage in passive contemplation. We can only derive some information about things and events from this but we learn nothing about their more intimate connections, basic qualities and relations.  Contemplating a tree, we can describe the colour and shape of its leaves, the shape of its crown, the peculiar qualities of its bark, the kind of soil its species prefer, and so on. However, to determine how old a tree is from the number of rings visible in the cross section of its trunk, we have to saw it up. To find out how plant cells are built or how biochemical reactions proceed in them, we have to use a microscope and chemical reagents. We have to create artificial surroundings for the tree or its parts, keeping it in the dark or in an atmosphere devoid of carbon dioxide or planting it in soil artificially deprived of one or another of the nutrients usually present in the soil, and so on.  We shall have to subject the tree to still more complex operations in order to find out the degree of hardness or pliability or the chemical composition of the timber; this means bending, breaking, applying chemicals to different portions of the trunk, the roots, branches and leaves dozens of times. This active interaction with the object is described as experimentation. We learn from the latter what we cannot possibly learn from passive contemplation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at the following conclusion: The cognitive act includes (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;object of cognition&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; (2) experimentation or man&#039;s action on the object performed with the aid of instruments, tools, etc.; and (3) &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a reflection of the object’s qualities and distinctive properties, discovered during experimentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now define the crucial difference between the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism and those of the previous philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever those systems were—materialist or idealist&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they all described the cognitive act as a dichotomy, or two-fold relation, of the objects concerned and knowledge. Experimentation, i.e., man’s active influence on the objects cognised, was disregarded. That is why both the materialist and the idealist philosophers failed to find an effective method to justify their solutions concerning the world’s cognisability. In other words, the previous philosophical systems lacked a yardstick by which their philosophical positions could be verified.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical materialism approached theory of knowledge from an entirely different standpoint, shifting the emphasis to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective yardstick&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of knowledge. Unlike the agnostics and the Kantians, the dialectical materialists affirmed that the world was cognisable. Rather than reason about how far sensations, representations and conceptions are consistent with the things-in-themselves they reflect, dialectical materialism concentrates on finding out how sensations, representations and conceptions appear and how knowledge contained in them enables man to act and find his bearings in the surroundings and so shape them to his needs. Engels wrote: “If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, ... making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable ‘thing-in-itself’.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-89|89]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The soft landing and recovery of the lunar probes, the long excursion of the lunar mobile laboratory, the successful manned flights to the Moon all verify our knowledge on the structure of the Moon’s surface. Artificial synthesis of a gene of yeast, accomplished in 1970, substantiates our knowledge of the physicochemical structure of genes, i.e., biological units of heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the cardinal position of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is this: Cognition of the external world stems from experimentation carried out by man with the aid of tools, instruments and other devices. If our knowledge of the most essential properties of the things involved in these experiments helps us to reproduce or produce certain material objects or work certain desirable changes, then it is regarded as valid.&lt;br /&gt;
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The experimentation in question is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;praxis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, doing, action). Let us now consider the characteristics and structure of practice, and the part it plays in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. The Basis and Yardstick of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
Practice is a word of many meanings. For undergraduates to have practice means to receive practical training (e.g., teaching practice) in the authentic working conditions of their chosen profession. For a doctor to have a large practice means to be sought after by patients. Now the philosophical conception of practice has a particular meaning of its own.&lt;br /&gt;
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Man is in contact with very many phenomena relating to nature, society and thought. To be able to find his bearings and act in the complex conditions of modern society, for instance, he must know the laws governing the development of society. Obviously, unlike natural objects, social formations, the class struggle, the development of culture cannot be studied with the aid of tools or instruments. Does it not mean perhaps that practice which we have only just described as the basis and yardstick of knowledge fails as soon as we come to more complex cognitive acts?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us not jump to conclusions. As a matter of fact, work and practice in general are social phenomena. In order to carry them out, men have to associate, maintaining some form of self-organisation, exchanging information, storing, passing on and extending experience.  Therefore we shall conceive practice, or, more broadly, social and production practice, as the sum total of processes and actions arising from man‘s purposeful influence upon objects, and shaping the conditions for this activity and its development. In this sense, the class struggle in antagonistic class society is a crucial element of social and production practice, for it springs from the development of productive forces and relations of production, and its progress and results are decisive for the advance of social production. During the class struggle, not only are various political doctrines advanced, but we also see how faithfully they express the interests of particular classes, how far their professed goals are consistent with the society&#039;s need to develop, and to what extent their proposed forms and methods of struggle are effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now divide man‘s entire activity into two closely associated kinds of activity—objective and subjective. Objective activity embraces the whole of man’s social and production practice, as it is carried on on the basis of laws which are independent of men’s subjective intentions and will. It is impossible, for instance, to forge water with a forging press or drive in nails with a turbo-drill designed for sinking holes in the ground. It is impossible to abolish class struggle in a society which rests on private ownership. In interacting with nature in the process of his productive labour activity, man relies first of all on the objective properties of the things and implements he has to deal with.  Of course, man sets himself a goal consciously and is conscious of his actions, but the main and decisive role belongs to the objective circumstances and the laws to which such actions are subject independently of man’s will and consciousness. The founders of dialectical materialism pointed out that initially the subjective, i.e., cognitive, activity is intertwined with the objective, practical activity. Only at a comparatively later stage of development does it become detached from the latter. In comparing the mode of thinking of a savage and of a child it is easy to see that the simplest habits of thought, the ability to observe and establish similarity or difference result from the handling of material objects. One must not assume, however, that it is enough to appeal to practice to have all the intricate problems of cognition finally solved. The desire to get final, immutable answers to all questions that may arise in science or everyday life is characteristic of the metaphysical approach to knowledge. Some of these answers seem to us indisputable and are indeed worth following within the limited sphere of everyday life, being sound common sense. “Only,” Engels remarks, “sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-90|90]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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The very way in which our knowledge undergoes change depends on the forms of practice. Wherever practice is stable, certain actions tending to be repeated over decades or even centuries, knowledge derived from it similarly appears to be stable and immutable. But as soon as any serious changes occur in practical activity, knowledge associated with them begins to change rapidly. Generally speaking, practice is extremely varied, there is an element of uncertainty in it, it possesses so wide a range of qualities, characteristics and individual features that it is actually impossible for us to know them once and for all. It is this uncertainty, mutability and mobility of practice that is a crucial factor in knowledge. Practice, Lenin said, is so indefinite that it won&#039;t let our knowledge ever stand still. But can it, then, be the yardstick of knowledge? We know that by carrying to its utmost limit the assertion about the changeability and mobility of external objects some philosophers arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to cognise the world because things change more quickly than they can be judged and described. Nevertheless, nothing disproves the idealist view on cognition better than practice, in which actions repeated scores and hundreds of times produce more or less similar results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that hundreds of artificial Earth satellites, for example, are moving round the Earth in scheduled orbits, that Moon probes land in a definite spot time and again proves best of all that practice, be it production activity or scientific experiment, serves to discover stable, recurrent characteristics and properties of material things and to derive true knowledge of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, we can draw the following three conclusions: (1) practice is the objective basis of cognition and simultaneously the yardstick showing to what extent knowledge of this or that thing is far-reaching and true; (2) practice is mobile, indefinite and changeable enough to prevent knowledge from freezing up, and is the chief factor in the progress of knowledge; (3) practice is definite enough to separate true from false knowledge, the materialist from the idealist approach, and to affirm the truth of the materialist theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §8. Knowledge and Truth ====&lt;br /&gt;
Knowing is a process in which subjective operations and procedures of thought are closely linked with objective experiments and forms of activity. Knowledge which is the product of this process bears the imprint of these interrelated aspects. Therefore, it is very important to ascertain what in our knowledge depends on objective, and what on subjective, factors.  Turning to the history of science, we may trace the development, for instance, of our knowledge of the cosmic bodies comprising the solar system, and in particular, the Moon. The rudimentary knowledge preserved since hoary antiquity appears, on closer examination, to consist of two different parts. Some of it depends on the structure of man’s sense-organs (e.g., the eye), on the place from which the observation is made, on the observer&#039;s skill, diligence, power of concentration, and so on. And some of it—this is the second part—depends neither on an individual person nor on mankind in general.  The fact that on different days of the month the Moon appears sometimes as a disk and sometimes as a sickle, depends partly on the observers position and partly on the objective position of the Moon and the Sun. However, the Shape of the Moon and the rate at which it revolves round the Earth, or the chemical composition of Moon rocks in no way depend on the observer’s position.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the means of observation are improved, Optical telescopes being replaced by radio telescopes, radars, lasers and space laboratories, our knowledge of the Moon is becoming more and more complex and varied. Simultaneously, that part of knowledge which does not depend either on the individual or on mankind in general but is determined by the objective factors accounts for a greater share of our knowledge of the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can we claim, however, that at some stage we have either attained or will attain a level of knowledge at which it will depend a hundred per cent on the objective factors, no longer containing anything dependent on man?&lt;br /&gt;
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The nature of the bulk of information available to modern science depends not only on the object investigated but also on the diverse instruments enabling the investigator and the object to interact. Although all such means of obtaining knowledge exist objectively, they are created by men and so must, to some extent, depend on the subjective factor. Moreover, we cannot exclude from the cognitive act the human brain, the nervous system, the observer&#039;s skill, capacity, the acuteness of his senses, and so on. Therefore, although that part of knowledge which does not depend on man tends to increase, the subjective element still remains, to a greater or lesser degree. The purpose of science is to increase continually the volume of that part of our knowledge which reflects the basic characteristics, properties and relations of objects and which does not depend on the individual man or mankind in general. Lenin defined this part of knowledge as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see from the above example one of the main characteristics of objective truth. It is that objective truth keeps changing, developing and increasing. Ancient philosophers, who gave much attention to astronomy, were fairly well informed about the planets as can be seen from the lunar calendars compiled in the remote past, records of the dark areas found on the bright lunar disk, the ability to calculate the periods of full Moon and to forecast eclipses of the Sun. All these are obvious elements of objective truth. Still, their proportion in the mass of fantastic mythological descriptions of the Moon was exceedingly small. Since the invention of the telescope three and a half centuries ago, the volume of objective information about the Earth’s natural satellite has been growing incessantly.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that at every single stage in the history of knowledge, objective truth ascended a step higher, ousting the subjective elements more and more. These stages in the development of objective truth are known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relative truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or the relative form of objective truth).&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, objective truth, influenced by Practical activity which keeps developing and becoming more complex, also continually develops and cannot be final, complete and immutable. On the contrary, it appears as a succession of relative truths concerning an object, each Successive stage in the development of truth being fuller and more far-reaching than the Preceding one. Lenin described this process as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectics of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Unlike Kant and his followers who held that the phenomena and the things-in-themselves were divided by a gulf dialectical materialist epistemology regards cognition as a succession of interconnected acts of arriving at relative truths which contain objective information about things, their properties and internal interrelations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can a process like that result in exhaustive, all-embracing knowledge of objects? If we recall that the material world and even individual fragments of it possess a practically endless number of properties, connections and relations, it will be obvious to us that to attain complete and ultimate knowledge embracing every aspect of the thing we study is impossible. This is all the more true as the things round us keep developing and changing, thus taking on new properties and new connections. Living organisms consisting of thousands of millions of interacting cells, economic systems comprising hundreds of enterprises, millions of workers, hundreds of thousands of machines and other tools for manufacturing different goods, are so complex that to know everything about them is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, full, exhaustive knowledge, also described as absolute truth, may be achieved only with respect to very simple objects, with relatively few constituents and connections. We find such objects in mathematics, for example, but even there a great deal of abstraction and restriction is needed to enable one to describe something as ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if we say that ultimate truth is unattainable, do we not thereby deny its objectivity?  Does it mean that the agnostics, who deny that the world is cognisable, are right? Such assumptions can hardly find justification. If we approach cognition dialectically, not as something that must have an end, but as incessant extension of our knowledge of the external world, we shall have to agree that the world is cognisable, not in the sense that we may cognise it once and for all, but rather that we can keep adding to and expanding the relative truths available to us, verifying and refining upon them with the help of practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, absolute truth and relative truth are, as it were, two forms of objective truth, while absolute truth itself may be regarded as the result of an endless succession of relative truths Superseding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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This ends our brief exposition of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. Having Surmounted the metaphysical opposition of sen&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;uous and rational knowledge, dialectical materialism posed in a new way, and, moreover, solved in a new way, the question of the world’s Cognisability. Knowledge was discussed for the first time in terms of social and production Practice as the basis and yardstick of the world’s cognisability. It made possible a new understanding of the relationship formed by sense-perception and logical thought in the process of cognitive activity. New light was thrown on a whole range of complex problems associated with the modern forms and methods of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 10. T&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;he Dialectical Path to Truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Origin of Sensation ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have been introduced to the principles of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.  Now we shall examine how cognition proceeds, the stages it passes through, how these are connected and the part they play in our knowledge of the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;amp;quot;... Suddenly ... I saw very clearly a quick and blinding black lightning . . . ,&amp;amp;quot; says one of Kuprin’s characters. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; still cannot understand the reason for that phenomenon. Was it an error of sight strained by the incessant play of lightning or was it an accidental disposition of the clouds, or was it some peculiarity of that nasty boggy depression?”&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar, if not quite so extraordinary, incidents occur to everyone. Our visual, auditory, tactile and other similar impressions usually permit us to adjust, yet often we do not trust them because impressions of this kind may occasionally be deceptive. Often the weather is cold for one person and hot for another. The surface that seems perfectly smooth to one person seems rough to another. Facts of this kind were often cited as evidence that our sense organs are unreliable and the sensations for which they are responsible, far from reflecting the properties of things, generally cannot be used as proof that the real world exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now what is sensation? How does it depend on the sense organs, and what produces it? In speaking of sensation we have to distinguish between two meanings of this term. Firstly, sensation may mean the interaction of the sense organs and the environment and the material process of transmission of information from one part of the nervous system to another. Secondly, this term is used to describe the result of the above-mentioned process, i.e., the image arising in the brain, which is already a fact of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for example, man’s visual perceptions which supply almost 90 per cent of all the external information he receives.&lt;br /&gt;
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Light falling on an object is partly absorbed and partly reflected and so received by the eye.  Light consists of electromagnetic waves of different length, and which of them will be reflected and which absorbed by the object depends on the physicochemical nature of the object’s surface. Hence, the very character of the waves that are reflected already contains unidentified information about the nature of the object. The first conversion of the light rays received by the eye occurs when they are refracted in passing through the transparent covering of the eye.  Then they are focused by the lens of the eye upon the retina. There, in accordance with the laws of geometrical optics, an image of the object is formed. The geometrical image is like one we can see on the opaque glass plate at the back wall of a photographer’s camera. A chemical procedure developed at the close of the 19th century has made it possible to fix the visual image formed on the retina, so that now we know that the image differs in many respects from the object. First, the image is flat (two-dimensional) while all material objects are three-dimensional. Second, it is much smaller than the object and is symmetrically inverted.  Third, the image formed on the retina only shows those details of the object which are big enough. This depends on how the object is lighted, as well as on its size and the distance between it and the eye.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that the image on the retina is a natural reflection which depends on the physical nature of the object, the eye and the light.  How does it initiate the sensation of vision?  The light waves reaching the retina start complex chemical and biochemical reactions in the cells, which serve, in fact, to code the information received by the eye. Every signal coming from without produces a definite bio-electrical impulse. When these reach the cells of a particular area in the brain, viz., the optic centre, a new transformation takes place there. It is decoding which initiates visual perception.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the process whereby visual perceptions are produced is of a material nature. It results from the interaction of such material systems as light waves and man’s optic system. It is a highly complex process including a range of successive transformations, whereby some kinds of energy are converted into some other kinds.  Nevertheless in all such transformations the principle is observed that every species of external stimuli is attended by definite and distinctive visual images. That is not all, however. Let us recall, for instance, the fact, already referred to, that all images formed on the retina are inverted. Yet everybody knows from experience that we do not see things upside down. It appears that the brain not only perceives images but actively intervenes in the process of perception. The optic centre in the brain adjusts the images consistently with man’s individual and social experience, on the basis of knowledge derived from social practice. Thus, while knowledge emerges on the basis of sensations, the latter form under the influence of knowledge previously acquired and confirmed by practice.  This is corroborated by the following experiment. A person puts on a contrivance which inverts al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; visible objects. In a dark room, against a black background, a candle is placed on an invisible support, which the person sees inverted, with the wick at the bottom. But when the candle is lighted, it is immediately perceived as being in a normal position. Why? We know from experience that a flame always points upwards, and so the brain automatically corrects the “mistake” of the experimental apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we see that visual perceptions, as a fact of consciousness, are far from simple. They must be related to the external world, but they do not simply mirror it. On the one hand, we cannot do without sensations, because with their help we receive sensuous images of the objects around us. On the other hand, we cannot fully rely on sensations as they often produce illusions, erroneous representations, and images conflicting partly or completely with experience and experiment. How do we overcome this contradiction? How far are sense-perceptions to be trusted and what part do they play in cognition?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before these questions can be answered, we must find out more exactly the extent to which sensations depend on the external object and on the percipient subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The organs of vision in man and animals are, of course, rather different. This tells on both &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;v&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isual sensations and resultant images. Under normal daylight modern man can distinguish several hundred basic colours and hues. At the same time, some animals, e.g., dogs, perceive objects only in black and white, distinguishing them by the intensity of the greys. Bees do not perceive red. They perceive only yellow, blue and violet and also ultraviolet rays. Consequently, other things being equal, one and the same object will be perceived differently by different optic systems, causing different sensations in them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Organs of vision, like other sense organs, appeared and developed during biological evolution. They helped living organisms adjust to the environment and were important factors in the struggle for survival. As the conditions of life affecting the different organisms inhabiting the Earth vary a great deal, the sense organs are very diverse. The “ultraviolet” vision of the bee, whose active life occurs in bright sunlight, enables it to receive a maximum of biologically useful information. That kind of vision would not do for rattlesnakes which are nocturnal animals. Therefore in their evolution they developed a special kind of “heat” vision. Snakes have several thousand nerve cells, located in small indentations just below the eyes, capable of perceiving infrared rays. This enables them, in absolute darkness, to hunt warm-blooded animals whose body temperature is at least a few degrees higher than the outside temperature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus sensation depends on the sense organs as well as on the nature of the object and conditions of perception. A sensation is an image of the objects which produce it. At the same time, it is a subjective image which depends not only on what is perceived and under what conditions, but also on the percipient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The cognising brain and the sense organs supplying information to it are not simply objects of external influence. Recognising the active interaction of the subject and object of cognition is the cornerstone of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. It is in this interrelation that the sense organs supplement and correct one another making it possible to form the necessary images of the external world we are to live in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike animals, whose activity is almost entirely determined by heredity which leaves comparatively little room for the development of individual habits, men have evolved, over hundreds of thousands of years, an immense capacity for adjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside society, the development of specifically human acts, including cognitive acts, proves to be impossible. A little child can perceive different colours and geometrical images of objects, but it develops the idea of distance, size, etc., only in the process of active movement in space, assisted by adults.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ability to make out colours, shape and distance is formed as a result of personal experience associated with sustained activity.  However, the character of sensations does not depend on individual experience alone but on culture as a whole, the level of society&#039;s development, and the social system to which the individual belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus a comparison of modern and of some historically retarded peoples’ spatial perception of things shows that the latter lack a perception of linear perspective. This fact does not depend on any national or racial characteristics but solely on the level of social production and living and cultural standards at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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To sum up. Sensations depend on (1) the properties and particular characteristics of material objects; (2) the conditions under which they act upon the sense organs; (3) the organisation and condition of the perceiving system, including the brain; (4) previous individual experience and knowledge; (5) the cultural level of society; (6) the character of practical activity carried out during perception. Consequently, sensations are images which, besides having the qualities and characteristics of the objects perceived, also bear the imprint of numerous other factors.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how do sensations pass into forms of knowledge which reflect and fix, more or less “purely”, the relations characteristic of real objects?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. The Significance of Language for Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
When two persons look at or touch the same object or hear the same tune they form certain sensuous images. In order to co-operate in production, in social and home life, people have to inform each other about what they have seen and heard, share their impressions and store and communicate varied knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sensations and the visual images based on them contain a certain amount of information about the surroundings. But we cannot pass &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n sensations, ‘extracting’ them from one head and putting them into another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then how is information transmitted in human society? What means of storing knowledge do men possess? It is language. Language is the means of transmitting and storing knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sense organs enable us to perceive material things. Using telescopes we can look at faraway heavenly bodies. With the aid of an oscillograph or a photographic plate one can see the trace made by an elementary particle.  But we cannot see or touch thought. After all thought is ideal in form. Man’s thought is not only the result of social progress. Mastering the immense wealth of thought, the treasures of science and culture, is a prerequisite of the further progress of mankind and the basis of allround development of the individual. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;,” Marx and Engels wrote, “is the immediate actuality of thought.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-91|91]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; They pointed out that thought, which is ideal in nature, finds its sole material expression in language, thanks to which it can be perceived by men. It is just because language is the material vehicle of thought that it is able to play a twofold role, being simultaneously the means of communication and of knowing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Language is a distinct sign system. Think of what is round you, look at the ordinary household things, look at what you come across in the street and at work, and what will you see?  You will see that the world is full of signs and systems of signs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The striped barrier by the railway crossing is not just a pole painted black and white&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it is a sign telling you to stop. A wedding ring or a white smock are not just a piece of metal or an article of clothing respectively, but signs of being married or belonging to the medical profession. Insofar as things not only serve a useful function in industry or in the home but communicate information, they are signs. Any sensible material object capable of communicating information is a sign. In this sense, signs are some times described as substitutes for other objects. Things other than those created by man can also be signs. The imprint left by a prehistoric reptile in a limestone block or the smoke rising over a distant wood are instances of so-called natural signs. The former is evidence of an extinct animal and the latter of a bonfire or a forest fire. A natural sign is the result of the interaction of two or more material objects, e.g., of the prehistoric animal and calcareous rock. They have a number of disadvantages which make them inconvenient for use in communicating and producing knowledge in human society. They are often impossible to transmit or store or reproduce perfectly (cf. the smoke or the rock just referred to). Besides, the information they communicate is about a single event. To describe a class of animals with the help of natural signs would take a thousand, perhaps a million, such signs. Even so, the description would be incomplete since all impressions left by an animal are bound to leave out of account many of its characteristics, traits, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a certain likeness between natural and manmade signs based on a similarity between the sign and the thing it stands for, e.g., a portrait, drawing, map or the plan of a machine or a building. These signs do not result from the immediate interaction of different material objects. They are made by people with the aid of implements. They are highly conventionalised. Quite perceptible in a portrait, it becomes paramount in an architectural plan or mechanical diagram. But, however conventionalised, there is a certain similarity between the signs of the kind described (i.e., a diagram of a lathe or a map) and the objects designated.  Soviet cosmonauts who circled the Earth many times confirmed that the continents’ outlines were like their representations on maps. Yet as we pass from a portrait to a map and from that to a technical drawing, the measure of conventionality increases. This makes it possible to designate aggregates rather than individual objects. This reveals an important characteristic of signs, viz., the more conventionalised a sign is, the more general it becomes thus making the number of objects it can designate greater. Nevertheless, the generalising capacity of this kind of sign is limited, because it must, to some extent at least, look like the object designated, in terms of geometrical form or colour or material or whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the distinctive features of human language is that it has none of the limitations of all the other sign systems. In this sense, it is a special sign system. The basic elements of language are words. They are formed from sounds or their combinations and are independent language units. With the emergence of writing systems, people learned to represent words with the help of graphic signs. The sound form, however, has always been the main element in all existing languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Linguistic signs, or words, are material phenomena. They act on our sense organs (the ears) and arouse auditory sensations in us. Yet, unlike other material phenomena, whether natural or manmade, words have no value in themselves but only as a means of producing, communicating and storing information. Words are utterly conventional and can under no circumstances be considered images of material things or events because they reflect neither any of their characteristics nor any of their relations to one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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But does it contradict the assertion that language serves to express and communicate knowledge which is, after all, a reflection of reality? Not at all. These notions are not the least contradictory.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand how language and words take part in reflecting reality (although they do not reflect it in themselves), we must consider more closely what words are. We know that the words of any language are conventional. The properties of words as special material phenomena are in no way connected with the phenomena they name. That is why identical objects or groups of objects are represented by different words in different languages. The totalities of things, events, states, mental experiences, social phenomena, etc., designated by a word, form its meaning. This meaning is not inherent in the word as such but is assigned to it depending on how it is used in practice, in human intercourse.  As language develops along with society, words gradually develop new meanings which usually coexist with the old, or they may come to express entirely different notions (e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, healthy, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, noise, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, a surgical instrument) so that it is not always possible to tell the precise meaning of a separate word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike other manmade signs, words possess an unlimited capacity for expressing general characteristics and relations between objects, just because they are not images but conventional signs (symbols).&lt;br /&gt;
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Every word&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;building&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;electron&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, progress—refers to a larger or smaller aggregate of things, rather than to individual things. Emphasising this distinctive quality of words, Lenin wrote that &amp;amp;quot;every word... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;universalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-92|92]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Natural signs (impressions or traces) convey the individual, singular characteristics of objects, and so are unsuitable to express general features and relationships. Manmade signs (maps, diagrams, etc.) are conventional and so suitable for unqualified generalisation. The words of a language are fully conventional, their capacity to generalise is infinite, yet one can express in them any information about individual objects. This shows the dialectics of the development of sign systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must see how a finite number of words form an infinite number of linguistic expressions which fix pieces of information. Language does not just consist of words. Every language also contains special rules, i.e., grammar. These rules help people make combinations of signs, i.e., assemble words into sentences. Not every sequence of words is a sentence. So that, “The Earth Sun the round revolves” is not a sentence and carries no information. On the other hand “The Earth revolves round the Sun” is a sentence communicating an astronomical fact. People are often unconscious of grammar rules and use them automatically, acquiring the appropriate habits from education and speech communication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Combinability is the thing that makes human language distinct from animal sounds. Animals also use sounds to transmit the simplest information. This ability is for the most part inherited. Even with gregarious animals like some birds, beavers and various mammals the capacity ‘to interact through sounds does not depend on the form of communication. An incubator chicken raised in solitude reacts to the sounds made by hens no worse than the chickens hatched by a hen. Some animals, e.g., dolphins, use several dozen sound signals to express anxiety, to call for aid, indicate the presence of food, challenge an adversary, call for attack.  and so on. Some investigators even talk of a dolphin language.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, neither the dolphins nor any other animals possess language in the sense in which we speak of human language. This is particularly clear from the absence of combinability which enables differentiated sound signals to be assembled into an infinite number of sentences. That is why all information accessible to the animals, which they are capable of passing on to each other, does not go beyond a comparatively limited assortment of sounds.  For this reason, the animals cannot develop the form of intellect which we term human thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasising the significance of language to the progress of knowledge and thought, Lenin wrote: “The senses show reality; thought and word—the universal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-93|93]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Language can express the universal in two senses. In the first place, words and sentences do not designate individual objects, properties and relations, but their totalities. In the second place, language is universal. Unlike sensations, words and sentences may be passed on from one person to another without having their sense and meaning distorted. Though some of the individual, subjective points of knowledge are partly lost, everything which is general and essential, and without which community life and common effort are impossible, is retained.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_002.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Abstraction and Concept Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The process by which we pass from sensation to verbal thinking is described as abstraction, and its results as abstractions or concepts. In ordinary life, an “abstraction” is often used to denote something hazy, vague, incoherent, detached from life. There is some reason for it, too. Some abstract notions, divorced from practical activity, are indeed recondite and of little use in everyday life. However, theory of knowledge is interested above all in far-reaching scientific abstractions without which one simply cannot understand the secrets of nature, bring out the true causes of social progress or formulate scientific laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, what are scientific abstractions? Where do they spring from? And what distinguishes profound and true from shallow and false abstractions? Many people think abstractions emerge simply as a result of the isolation of common characteristics of things and events, which are reflected in sensations. From this standpoint, minor or dissimilar features are simply neglected, while the features common to the totality are selected and fixed in the abstraction. The process of abstraction does, indeed, imply discarding what is dissimilar and singling out what is general, but that is far from being all.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for instance, the Scientific abstraction “four-dimensional space&amp;amp;quot;, fundamental to the special theory of relativity which plays a major role in modern physics.&lt;br /&gt;
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We already know that real material space is three-dimensional, and our sense organs, under no circumstances, permit us to discover phenomena such as occur in four-dimensional space. However, we often resort to the concepts of one- and two- as well as three-dimensional space.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see that these concepts are abstractions which result from isolating certain properties and characteristics of real bodies. The concept of a sphere (which is three-dimensional), for instance, is formed when we disregard the differences in the size, colour and material of various spheric bodies and isolate their geometric shape alone as their common characteristic. The linear, or one-dimensional concept is also an abstraction, whereby we neglect the size, geometric shape, etc., of bodies and isolate the distance between them as the sole characteristic.  The concept “two-dimensional space” is also an abstraction. Plane geometric figures (e.g., circles, ellipses, trapeziums and triangles) possess only two dimensions.&lt;br /&gt;
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These abstractions are more or less connected with sensations—sensuous images of objective things and events. We can imagine a sphere, a quadrangular building site, the line between point A and point B, etc., but to see or touch a four-dimensional cube or sphere or imagine an event occurring in four-dimensional space is something we are unable to do. For all that, not only does multi-dimensional geometry exist but there is also a physical theory describing material events with the aid of the abstraction “four-dimensional space”. From this, it follows that there is something in our concepts, in abstractions, which is not immediately present in sensations and which cannot be derived simply by omitting or selecting certain characteristics of the objective world which are fixed in sensation. Then how does correct abstraction proceed?&lt;br /&gt;
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Knowledge is not a mirror reflection of reality. Dialectical materialism, which considers consciousness, thought as secondary, states that once it has emerged, it follows its own laws, being marked by certain specific features. One of them is that the mind is capable of connecting, arranging and unifying elements of sense-perceptions not in the way they are connected or arranged in the immediate sensuous images.  Moreover, as he learned to isolate connections and relations, man improved this capacity, creating and inventing new connections and relations and bringing them together often in the most fanciful ways. That was how mythological and folk-tale monsters of half-men half-horses, ogres, and so on, appeared. Four-dimensional space is the child of scientific imagination. This abstraction was arrived at not by neglecting characteristics of reality but, contrariwise, by magnifying and projecting the old abstractions “two-” and “three-dimensional space.”&lt;br /&gt;
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From this, it follows that the process of abstraction is complex, dialectical, contradictory. Along with comparison, isolation of the general and omission of the particular, it involves imagination, the rearrangement of real connections and constituents. It must be noted that this occurs not only with respect to complex abstractions, like “infinity”, “four-dimensional space”, etc., but also with respect to comparatively simple and familiar concepts, like “circle” or “red colour.” We all learn at school that a circle is a plane closed curve, with all its points equidistant from a particular point in the plane, called the centre. The length of line bounding a circle is called the circumference. The abstractions “circle” and “circumference” result from the generalisation of the geometrical properties of familiar things such as a wheel, a round button, the visible disk of the full Moon, and so on. With the aid of modern grinding machines more and more precise disks can be made, with radii differing by no more than thousandths of a millimetre. The discrete structure of solids makes it, however, generally impossible to turn out a disk with absolutely equal radii. Therefore, strictly speaking, no wooden, stone or metal disk actually answers the geometrical description of a circle, and all we can do in practice is continue to improve precision standards. But if we are unable to beat the barrier erected by nature in practice, we can surmount it in imagination by projecting the process begun in practice beyond what is called the threshold and is fundamental to the formation of abstractions, though we are unconscious of it in everyday life. Comparing a poppy, a ripe tomato and blood, we can form the concept of red, Indeed, there are no real objects that are simply red&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they are always a certain shade of that colour. The concept “red&amp;amp;quot; isolates something general which allows us to apply one name to millions of similarly coloured objects, rather than use a million names.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we can isolate the main stages of abstraction. The first, the formation of the initial totality, consists in isolating a set of things, processes, phenomena, situations, etc. The second, the matching and comparison of the elements of the initial totality, includes two procedures, one to bring out similarity and the other disparity. The purpose of this stage is to isolate certain common properties, connections and relations characteristic of the elements of the given initial totality. The third stage is that of denotation and generalisation. It consists in naming the common characteristic, connection or relation selected at the preceding stage. The given characteristic is invested, so to speak, with linguistic, verbal shape. From this point on, we operate with signs, with all the consequences that this entails. A word or word combination becomes the expositor of the notion. The fourth stage is the threshold and the further determination of content. Certainly, the three last mentioned stages are seldom divided in time and usually proceed simultaneously, interlacing, interacting and supplementing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the content of an abstraction, or concept, is meant the sum of characteristics which may be regarded as the definition of the given concept. Let us recall, for example, the definition of a circle. The sum total of all the elements forms the sense of the concept, while the elements themselves form its meaning or, to put it more precisely, its initial meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the process of abstraction, we pass from the sensuous form of knowledge to abstract, verbal thinking. This transition is always connected with loss of perceivability. It is sometimes said that concepts may be perceivable and non-perceivable, and that one of the most important distinguishing features of modern science, as compared with classical science, consists in the changeover from perceivable to non-perceivable concepts. In truth, however, all concepts are non-perceivable. It is just that some of them are more ordinary and have a rather simple connection with perceivable, sensory representations, and others are less ordinary, with a long series of intermediate abstractions between them and sensuous images. We can easily call up the image of an acquaintance but we are unable to conceive the image of man as such, who is neither a man nor a woman, neither old nor young, neither a European nor an African.  Man as such is an abstraction which is no more perceivable than four-dimensional space or a mathematical infinity. Certainly, the concept “man” is closer to the sensible material phenomena than the concept “four-dimensional space.”  This explains why the latter is harder to comprehend. Loss of perceivability does not mean, nevertheless, that abstract notions stop being the reflections of reality. Of course, they are not its sensuous images like sensation and representation. It does not, however, follow that they are not images at all. The fact that concepts exist and are expressed by signs was repeatedly used by idealists as a reason for alleging that our notions were as conventional and symbolic as the signs themselves. But the dialectics of verbal thinking consists in the use of conventional signs, i.e., words thus representing the highest form in which reality is reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin said that our concepts are copies, images of reality. The proof of it is that with the aid of concepts—even the most abstract of them—we are able to recognise, interact with and remake sensible things.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must answer one more question, about the difference between scientific and unscientific abstractions. After all, in the process of abstraction, men, following their fancy, recombining connections, rejecting some and introducing other elements and relations, also created such concepts as god, mermaid, personal immortality, and so on. At this point, we should recall the yardstick of truth already discussed, i.e., practice. Abstractions do not exist in isolation, unconnected with other products of the mind. A number of specifically related concepts may form another concept, new knowledge, more concrete, more exact and full, giving a more comprehensive description of a thing or event. If immediate or mediate utilisation of these concepts enables us to observe the properties and relations they express, we can say that they correctly reflect the things observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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If on the basis of such concepts, having performed the actions prescribed by them, we attain the goal, we may be confident that our abstractions have stood the test of practice and are true and adequate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The yardstick of practice again reveals its cognitive significance, this time as a means of appreciating how far-reaching and adequate, how objective and scientific our abstractions are. For this reason, Lenin, as he gave a brief formula of the process of cognition in general, pointed out that it proceeds from living perception to abstract thought and from that to practice which is the start and finish of the total cognitive act. However, the transition from abstractions to practice is not simple. It comprises a number of intermediate steps, the most important of them being modelling and theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Model in Cognitive Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate aim of cognition is to produce knowledge allowing man to carry on some activity conducive to the satisfaction of his material or spiritual needs. This essentially requires the use of models. Like many other terms widely used in everyday life as well as in science, &amp;amp;quot;model&amp;amp;quot; is a word of many meanings.  One can speak of a new model of a lathe, anew dress model, an artist’s model, and so on. This term acquires a special meaning in the theory of knowledge. Supposing there are two objects, A and B. Object A is the model of object B if (1) A is in some respect simpler, more convenient or easier to study than B; (2) certain features, qualities or peculiarities of A are a reflection of the qualities, peculiarities or habits of B, which are being investigated; (3) in all other respects A is distinct from B (these distinctions may concern material, shape, size, etc.); (4) knowledge derived from the investigation of A may, with some adjustments, be further applied to B to explain one or another of its peculiar features, predict its behaviour, and s&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
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If A satisfies these conditions with reference to B, it is a model of B, and so we can use it in place of B with the same result. But why should we use a substitute rather than the object itself? The point is that often we either cannot use it for various reasons, or we can obtain the necessary result more quickly and cheaply with a model. In developing large hydro-engineering installations or complex assemblies, their simplified small-scale models are first made. On the bank of a small artificial pond, they build diminutive electric power stations one-hundredth or one-thousandth the normal size, reproducing all essential characteristics of the installation.  Experimenting with a model, one can weed out mistakes and introduce corrections in the design at comparatively little cost.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not all models are, however, simple copies of objects. The algebraic formula x&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; + y&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; = z&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; may be regarded, in a sense, as a model of the geometric circumference. Of course, a drawing on the blackboard is a more palpable representation which can also be viewed as a model, but the formula, without being representational, is, in some respects, better. Mathematical calculation, algebraic in particular, is more exact than measurement with compasses and a ruler can be. Besides, many complex processes generally cannot be visually represented. Such is the behaviour of biological and social systems with their millions and even billions of interacting elements. We cannot possibly have a visual representation of the interaction of all industrial establishments, communications, transport, shipment of raw materials and goods on a national scale, which we must know to be able to plan and scientifically manage the socialist economy. Still, all of it can be represented adequately enough by a system of mathematical equations. These equations will be models of the economic system. By putting in concrete figures instead of certain variables, we can calculate other variables very accurately. Intricate mathematical models are handled by computers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, there may be physical models, like mock-ups, simplified copies of things, or sign models, like mathematical equations, conventionalised diagrams, etc. Between these extremes, we find other types of models combining physical and symbolic features in varying proportions, e.g., the ordinary classroom glo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;b&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.&lt;br /&gt;
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One must, however, discriminate between sign models and other sign systems, e.g., language. Words are not images of objects but their significants. Nevertheless, all models (including sign models) are, in a sense, patterns of the phenomena examined.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the relation between abstraction and model-building? How are abstractions and models connected? As follows from the definition, models do not reproduce all characteristics of the object but only such as are essential to the research. Clearly enough, to be able to build or select a model, one should be informed about some properties and connections of the object or process concerned. This information, expressed in special concepts, precedes, therefore, the building of a model. The success of the model, its practical and scientific usefulness, depends on how correctly the abstractions underlying it had been elaborated, and how essential are the characteristics of the phenomena under investigation which they reflect. After the model is made and is used in the laboratory or in production, it helps fill up a gap in knowledge and elaborate new abstractions reflecting hitherto unknown characteristics of the structure and behaviour of the given phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The processes of abstraction and model-building are interrelated. The objectification of an abstraction in a model is described as its realisation or materialisation. Before launching the lunar probe &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lunokhod-1&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, scientists collected all available information about lunar topography and the physicochemical structure of the Moon&#039;s surface. Working from these data, they built several models of the automatic laboratory and tested them under conditions closely resembling lunar conditions. After the design of the probe was corrected and improved, the real probe was built and launched to the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus model-building proceeds through several stages. At the first stage, the main abstractions are elaborated, isolating the most essential of the object’s known characteristics. Simultaneously, the aim of the ensuing research is formulated. At the second stage, the model is designed and built. At the third stage, model experiments are conducted. At the fourth stage, the experimental data are applied to the object concerned. However, though important, modelling by itself does not yield the result sought.  Both to build a model and to apply the experimental data to the object, we need scientific theory. The revolutionary doctrine of scientific communism created by Marx and Engels and Darwin&#039;s teaching on biological evolution, classical and quantum mechanics, all are scientific theories. Theory is the highest form of cognition, integrating observation and abstraction, model-building and experimentation. Without theory, these important stages of cognition are limited and sterile. It was this that made the founders of dialectical materialism pay such great attention to theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Theoretical Level of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus published a new theory on the revolution of celestial bodies, which maintained that the Earth was not the centre of the universe round which the other planets and the Sun revolved. The Copernican theory conflicted with the Earth-centred system of the ancient Greek philosopher and astronomer Ptolemy, which was supported by the church. The Copernican theory not only undermined the prestige of the church and opposed Ptolemy, but appeared to contradict the obvious. Any observer can see that the Earth does not move while the Sun describes a regular arc in the sky, rising in the east and setting in the west. At night, one can see the Moon and planets moving in the sky in their various orbits.  These things were reflected in Ptolemy&#039;s doctrine, which was, strictly speaking, not a scientific theory but a description of what was observed. As the observable trajectories described by celestial bodies were highly complex, the geocentric system itself entailed extremely intricate constructions which nevertheless failed to explain some puzzling phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Copernican theory, however, which on the face of it, contradicted the observable facts, produced a momentous change in scientific thought and human culture in general. It explained, simply and accurately, the phenomena under observation, made it possible to predict new phenomena, and broke the ground for modern astronomic research.&lt;br /&gt;
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Explanation, prediction and definition of the character of scientific research, experimentation and observation are three cardinal functions of every scientific theory. This is brilliantly illustrated by Marx’s economic theory. Many facts on which Marx based himself in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; had been described by other investigators. Bourgeois thinkers were not ignorant of the class struggle, economic and political inequality, exploitation, pauperisation of working people, and so on.  Yet they were unable to explain them from a consistent viewpoint, predict from them the future course of history and define the main direction of revolutionary effort. Marx’s economic theory based on the law of the development of capitalist society formulated by him, alone explained the available facts and, moreover, accurately predicted the main stages and objective laws of the transition from capitalism to the new communist formation, which was subsequently affirmed by the entire process of the world revolutionary movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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What, then, makes a theory capable of performing its principal functions? Why can they not be performed merely on the basis of observation, of men’s immediate practical activity?&lt;br /&gt;
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We call a theory not just any totality of views but a specifically organised system of correlated scientific laws. Scientific laws, as we know, are reflections of objective laws to which the phenomena under investigation are subject. These phenomena comprise what is often called the substantive part of a theory. Scientific laws reflecting fundamental, stable, recurring and Necessary connections prevailing in the given substantive area, which are logically correlated, form a theory. Thus, Kepler&#039;s laws are a theory of planetary motion because they express stable necessary connections inherent in the planets.  Marx’s economic doctrine expounded in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; also is a theory in the strict sense of the word, as the laws contained in it reflect necessary economic relations and are connected according to the principles of dialectical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic, primary laws of a theory are often called principles or postulates, while in theories expressed in mathematical terms they are called axioms. These primary laws are not logically proved within the given theory, but all other laws are logically deduced from them, and so are considered proved. From this it does not, however, follow that the principles and postulates of a theory are indemonstrable. Nothing is taken on trust in science. The laws which are accepted without logical demonstration within a theory may be demonstrated within another, more general theory. Kepler’s laws, which appeared at first as postulates of the planetary motion theory, were subsequently demonstrated, i.e., deduced from the more general principles of Newton’s celestial mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary laws of every theory, if they are not deduced from more general principles, are accepted either because their truth immediately follows from practice or experiment or because the final consequences of these laws are consistent with experiment and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;bservation.  The latter is decisive to the evaluation of a theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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One should not think that the laws of any science are always obtained by generalising the results of observation. Should it be so, it would be relatively easy to discover new laws. Any trained expert could do it. What makes genuine scientific creative work so difficult is that formulation of a new law or principle often requires ingenuity, imagination and even a departure from the phenomena observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many recent scientific theories were formulated not in laboratories but at the writing desk in the scientist’s study because the development of new principles calls for complex abstractions and abstract theoretical thinking. Thus, the law of value which states that commodities possessing different useful qualities are exchangeable provided that equal amounts of socially necessary labour went into their making, could not be discovered from simple observation of the market, of isolated transactions. After all, the actual exchange of commodities is influenced by demand, supply and other factors which make the price either higher or lower than the average cost. Marx has to evolve a range of abstract notions, e.g., abstract labour, the amount of socially necessary labour, etc., to be able to rise above the chaotic commodity-money relations prevailing in capitalist society and formulate the law of value. This law, which at first glance appears to contradict obvious facts, made it possible to formulate and deduce a range of other laws of capitalist political economy, such as the laws of surplus value, capitalist profit, primitive accumulation of capital, and so on, which provided the basis for predicting the future of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A scientific theory therefore enables objective phenomena to be explained and predicted because it is a system of laws, not a description of isolated events or fragments of the material world. Laws, therefore, perform a twin function. On the one hand, they are the most far-reaching reflections of the objective, stable connections existing in the substantive part of a science; on the other hand, they appear as logical forms, essential for deducing other laws and so-called final consequences, i.e., statements containing information about individual events and phenomena. A law possesses a high degree of generalisation, being a concentrated reflection of the essential characteristics, basic properties and behaviour of the objects studied.  This is what ensures its particular role in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Purposeful human activity of any kind is all the more successful, if it rests firmly on scientific theory. This is of particular significance to the communist transformation of society. It is for this reason that the Soviet Communist Party pays such great attention to developing the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting from the distinctive characteristics of theory and the part it plays in scientific cognition, we can now view the role of abstraction in a new light.&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws of every scientific theory are always formulated by abstraction. They do not usually contain evidence of sensible things, as they do not have recourse to sensory representations and images but to the more general and abstract concepts. This poses before every scientist the problem of interpreting abstract laws in terms of observation. In other words, so that the laws and their corollaries should be applicable to sensible things and events and verifiable by experiment and observation, they must be translated, so to speak, from the language of abstractions into the language of sensuous images which we use in describing our sensations and notions. This is the focal point for the problems of the link between conception and sensation, of thought proceeding at different verbal levels, and of the interaction between theoretical and practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already mentioned several times that the emphasis on practice as the principal source of knowledge and the yardstick of truth is the basis of Marxist epistemology. Nevertheless, the general philosophical question of the connection between thought and practical human activity acquires a particular form with reference to scientific cognition. It is, in fact, the relationship between theory and experiment, between the theoretical and empirical levels of cognition because, whereas scientific theory &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s the highest form of knowing reality, scientific experiment is an essential part of social and production practice, indissolubly linked with the development and improvement of theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Empirical Level of Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
The wide use of experiment as a major means of cognition is the main distinguishing mark of modern natural science.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scientists and philosophers of the past, drawing on everyday experience, common sense and observation, accumulated, classified and passed on to us many valuable facts touching on diverse aspects of nature. The conjectures and hypotheses put forward by them, e.g., the atomistic hypothesis, continue to surprise us by their depth and keen insight. And yet, the spirit of experimental research was perfectly strange to science both in antiquity and the middle ages.  That was due, on the one hand, to the relatively low level and growth rate of the productive forces and to the widespread predominance (especially in medieval Europe) of philosophical idealism and utmost deference to the church, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rapid development of technology associated with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, gave a strong impetus to the new trend in scientific research and provided the material conditions and prerequisites for it. The change to experimental science, marking a turn from a passive, contemplative approach to nature to active intervention in its secrets, took place first of all in those branches of science which were more closely related to industry, navigation and weapons production.&lt;br /&gt;
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To cross the oceans steering by the stars, build steam-engines and railways, and produce synthetic materials, man had to learn to see nature with his own eyes, not as the Bible saw it. But to be able to do that, he had to revolutionise the very philosophical basis of his view on the world, to surmount idealism which held experiment in contempt and saw the ultimate proof of truth in the dogmas of the church, rather than in scientific evidence. That is why modern natural science was ushered in not only by mathematicians and other scientists but also by materialist philosophers who, following Francis Bacon, proclaimed observation and experiment to be the decisive factors in the cognition of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main principle of philosophical materialism in general consists in the recognition of the objective world existing independently of the human mind. Directly following from this is the demand that cognition should concentrate on studying the characteristics and objective laws of this world. Materialists have always held observation, furnishing immediate sensory data, to be the chief method of cognising matter. Nevertheless, as we know, it is not always Possible to explain complex phenomena from observation alone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Cognition of the essential properties of the objects investigated and of the laws they obey is often made easier by placing the objects in unusual, often artificial, conditions, by refashioning the surrounding medium with the aid of special devices.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experimental natural science emerged in the 17th century. In three centuries it achieved much more than science had achieved previously in almost two millennia. The success was due above all to extensive experimentation. The chief goal of classical experimental scientists was to cognise, to study the properties and laws concealed from the passive observer. Their efforts were a practical refutation of the Kantian thesis that there is an impassable gulf between the thing-in-itself and knowledge. Kant required that the investigator should proceed without introducing any changes in the object, so that it could be cognised in its pure, pristine state, undistorted by the investigator’s interference.&lt;br /&gt;
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But is this not a contradiction of the very idea of exper&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ment? Do we not demolish the natural integrity and qualities of things and processes as we pass high-tension current through them, subject them to monstrous pressures, place them in a vacuum and bring their temperature down to almost absolute zero? Certainly, such apprehensions are not altogether groundless. However, as they used instruments which extended the limits of our natural sensitivity and applied complex apparatus, experimental scientists always tried to reduce to a minimum the researcher&#039;s influence on the object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically, this was due to the fact that experimental science could not, right away, undertake complex experiments taking into account the role of the subjective factor. Another reason was that experimental methods developed in natural science in complete isolation from social life. Thirdly, it was determined by the philosophical standpoint shared by the majority of scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Research was conducted on the lines of spontaneous scientific materialism which&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;like pre-Marxian metaphysical materialism—viewed cognition of the world merely as its explanation.  That approach ignores man’s active, transforming, practical activity which dialectical materialism considers to be the heart of the theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The demand for the interaction between the cognising subject and the object to be considered and their interdependence and mutual influence to be reflected in the theoretical picture of the world was formulated by Marx in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Theses on Feuerbach&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and was later realised in the experimental practice of the recent natural sciences, technology and the social sciences. As quantum mechanics has demonstrated, the nature of the motion of micro-objects is such that the instruments we use in studying them appreciably affect some of their characteristics. Therefore, in quantum mechanics, the condition of the objects of experiment must be described, taking into account the instruments and th&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the subjective idealists’ view, this proves that the object does not exist without the subject, the latter playing the decisive part in the relationship. In point of fact, however, every level of the motion of matter obeys its own objective laws, calling for specific methods of experimental and theoretical research. The probable, statistical motion of elementary particles is objectively marked by uncertainty. Experimenters always have to bear that in mind. As they act on some of the characteristics of the micro-object, they also produce changes in other characteristics, so that a comprehensive picture of the process can be obtained only by taking into consideration the interaction of the experimental apparatus and the micro-objects under investigation. This indicates a deep insight into the objective laws of nature, rather than a subjective caprice.&lt;br /&gt;
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In modern technology, the need to examine objects together with the subject acting upon them and cognising their work is associated with the development of supercomplex machines, automatic systems, high-speed electronic computers, space laboratories, complex control systems, and so on. Take, for instance, the experiments connected with Soviet space flights.  The aim of the experiments was not merely to study the parameters of the spaceship and the effect of weightlessness, etc., on the cosmonauts.  The main thing was that these and many other parameters and characteristics were studied in the light of their interaction and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new type of experiments, where the object is cognised in its interaction with the subject, are extensively conducted on a sociological level as well. Thus, in the course of building communism, we encounter at every step diverse social experiments whereby various forms of organising production and management, education and upbringing, service and city planning are cognised and appreciated. In each case, the cognising individual appears both as the subject and the object of the experiment as he simultaneously acts on and is affected by diverse experimental factors.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, scientific experiment is a special kind of cognitive activity aimed at acquiring more knowledge of objects and processes in nature and society. It is realised with the aid of special apparatus, instruments and devices, under controlled conditions. The most essential requirements an experiment must satisfy are (1) that the apparatus should ensure the highest standard of precision of measurement and observation possible for the given class of appliances; (2) that the experiment can be repeated (this is essential because obtaining reliable results mostly requires a mass of experimental data allowing for statistical processing, which eliminates the influence of chance occurrences and disturbances); (3) that the experiment should be conducted in conformity with a set of methods worked out beforehand and ensuring control at every stage of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
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All experiments satisfying the aforementioned requirements and implying not only material objects but also material facilities and conditions are often called material experiments. Besides these, speculative experiments play a considerable role in modern science. A speculative experiment differs from a material experiment in that its objects and apparatus exist solely in the experimenter’s imagination.  A speculative experiment is a sort of a model of a material experiment, meeting all requirements the latter should satisfy, the only difference being that for some reason it cannot technically be carried out in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to their purpose, experiments are categorised under the three general headings of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discovery&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discover&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something new are exemplified by Edison’s search for a material suitable for the filament of the incandescent lamp. Almost six thousand experiments were made before the right material was found.  Research of this kind is sometimes described as the trial-and-error method which boils down to trying out a number of variants, the unsuccessful attempts being discarded. However, scientists usually prefer to conduct such experiments not at random but on the basis of a theory or hypothesis, thereby reducing the number of trials and errors to a minimum. The laws established as a result of generalising the data yielded by such experiments are called empirical.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second kind of experiments aimed at &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of something are made with a view to verifying a hypothesis. A hypothesis affirmed by experiment becomes a valid scientific theory while the one refuted by it is discarded and replaced by another. Such tests are of particular importance in choosing one out of a number of hypotheses. We have an example of it in the experimental discovery of new chemical elements. The Russian scientist D. I. Mendeleyev (1834-1907), having discovered that the elements show a periodic variation in most of their properties (the periodic law), hypothetically described some chemical elements not yet discovered in his day. His prediction was justified by subsequent investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the third kind of experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something are made in order to produce new objects which are then investigated or applied in practice. A few years ago, a group of Soviet scientists led by Academician Flerov synthesised a transuranium element which was named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Kurchatovium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in honour of the Soviet physicist Kurchatov. This element exists only in laboratory conditions and disintegrates very quickly. Nevertheless, its production, as well as the synthesis of other transuranium elements, is an important experimental achievement, facilitating a deeper study into the structure of substances.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, experiments may serve as the groundwork of new laws, hypotheses or theories or they may serve to verify them. However, experiments often play both parts simultaneously.  For this reason, our classification is only tentative and should not be regarded as absolute and final.&lt;br /&gt;
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Considering the significance of experiment to cognition, Lenin emphasised that experiment is a variety, a part of social and production practice. “An experiment,” he said, “is already practice.” Comparing the structure of experimentation and labour, it is easy to establish their similarity. In both there is an object of practical activity, implements and means whereby this activity is carried out, and, lastly, man. The difference is that the main purpose of labour is to produce material values, objects and conditions to satisfy various needs, whereas knowledge, acquired and accumulated in the process of production, plays a subordinate, albeit significant, part. The main purpose of experiment is, on the other hand, to produce new knowledge. Even so, there is no fundamental difference between scientific experimentation and production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
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The foregoing clearly shows the intimate connection between the two levels of knowledge—theoretical and empirical. Higher, theoretical knowledge is embodied in scientific principles, postulates and laws. Empirical knowledge results from immediate observation and experimental evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
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Both levels of knowledge supplement each other, and it is only in close unity that they produce a picture of the external world satisfying the requirements of objective truth.  Lenin’s formula, “From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice”, brings out the thoroughly dialectical character of the process of cognition, showing that it develops in a spiral. Empirical knowledge which arises out of living perception, out of scientific experiment, poses to us fresh problems, leading the mind to draw general theoretical conclusions. A scientific hypothesis derived from theoretical research requires experimental verification in the course of which new properties of the objects examined may be discovered. Every loop of the spiral not only reveals fresh relative truths but also provides the prerequisites for further advance. At the same time, the appearance of new forms and types of experimental research puts forward complex epistemological problems concerning the peculiarities of different varieties of theoretica&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and empirical knowledge. This interconnection of philosophical and scientific problems provides the basis for the fruitful co-operation of scientists and philosophers urged by Lenin fifty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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Investigation of the main problems and principles of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism not only reveals its essential difference from all other philosophical systems and demonstrates its perfect agreement with the results and methods of modern science, but also proves that study of this theory is a major condition of mastering Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Historical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 1. The Science of Historical Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. What Is Historical Materialism? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Mankind has existed for many millennia. It has travelled a long and arduous road, full of struggle with the primordial forces of nature, with want, hunger, oppression, devastating epidemics and bloody wars. Thrones crumbled, and mighty kingdoms fell. Civilisations came and went. Some of them vanished utterly, but others left an indelible mark on history. Famous war lords, mighty kings, heroic popular leaders left their names to posterity. But there were millions who remained nameless. They were the ones who made armies strong and kings mighty, whose blood flowed in times of popular unrest.  What part did they play in history? What can guide us through the tangled maze of events that form the body of history?&lt;br /&gt;
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Regimes that were, to all appearances, unshakable, were often shaken by popular revolutions. What are these revolutions? Are they disastrous accidents disrupting the regular march of history? Or are they the legitimate outcome of previous history, determining the future course of events? What impels people to rise against powerful forces? Where is the theory able to explain these things in keeping with the authentic historical facts?&lt;br /&gt;
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The current age is one of victorious popular revolutions, one in which peoples choose the path they would follow. What scientific theory explains the successes scored by the socialist countries, the mounting working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the liberation of many African, Asian and Latin American countries from colonial oppression, the rapid progress of science and technology, the active involvement of the masses in every part of the world in the making of history? What scientific theory explains, in a word, the very substance of the current epoch?&lt;br /&gt;
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No doubt, both present and past history may be explained in various ways. Or it may be left unexplained, and one may simply drift along, from day to day, ignoring theoretical problems.  Yet it is getting harder and harder to live like that, because every person&#039;s life, irrespective of his wishes, is becoming more closely linked with the general course of world history. This being so, everyone should obviously be aware of his place in the world and of the relationship between a person’s activities and the processes developing in the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Theories seeking to explain society have never been lacking. Many of them are long forgotten. Others sprang up quite recently and time alone will show if they will stay.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Marxist-Leninist science of society, historical materialism, is the only social theory which although founded over 125 years ago, has lost none of its vitality and continues to win support.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why is it so? It is so because historical materialism answers the questions posed by social history and meets the hopes of the millions. It is so because historical materialism is not a mass of frozen dogmas but a living, creative theory, capable of developing and enriching itself by general conclusions drawn from historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only does historical materialism explain the past and the present, but it enables us to foresee the future and take an active part in the process of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. The Subject Matter of Historical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
What sort of science is historical materialism?  What is its subject matter, what does it seek to learn about society? How does it relate to philosophy and the social sciences? Has it already explained every law of history? What does it say about the meaning of history and about man’s destination?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us first see what is the proper subject of historical materialism. Society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s investigated by many sciences, which is only natural, for society has diverse aspects. All social sciences study one object, viz., the life of society, but they each regard society from a particular angle, e.g., from the angle of economics, population, history, culture, and so on. The subject of a social science is thus one facet of society’s life, isolated for the purpose of investigation from the close-knit unity of interrelated social phenomena. What distinguishes historical materialism from other social sciences in that respect?&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with economic history, economic statistics, industrial economics, the economics of supply and distribution, the theory and history of finance, etc., political economy is a more general science as it elucidates more general characteristics of the economic life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Civil history is also a general social science, more general, for instance, than demography, the science of population. It seeks to explain particular features of the historical development of individual nations. Historians thus study the most concrete and specific manifestations of the general historical tendency of a nation. The tendency, which comes to light when the historical events are related, obeys the laws of society’s development. But how can we discover these laws?&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles of dialectical materialism refer to society as well as to nature. But as it deals with knowledge generalised to the maximum degree, i.e., with the most general laws of nature, society and thought, dialectical materialism has no special reference to society as distinct from nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Historical materialism is a philosophical science concerned with the specific laws o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; social development as distinct from the universal laws of being.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; The laws of historical materialism do not operate in nature but only in society. And as society is inseparable from men, social laws can manifest themselves only through human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historical materialism as a philosophical science considers the general aspects, tendencies and laws of social development. It always keeps in sight the relation of social being and social consciousness, of the object and subject of history. In historical materialism, every problem is examined and explained, taking account of the correlation of the objective and the subjective, of the circumstances and man, conditions and intentions, i.e., of the correlation of social being and social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we can state more specifically what historical materialism investigates and why it differs from the other social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, historical materialism studies the general objective laws governing the development of any human society. As these general laws of world history operate variously in different historical epochs or phases of mankind&#039;s development, historical materialism investigates the most general phases of world history, socio-economic formations and the objective causes of their appearance and disappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, historical materialism always considers the relations between social being and social consciousness. This enables it to explain the laws of history not as the effect of some mysterious forces lording it over men but as the effect of historical laws manifesting themselves through men’s activity, through their struggle to attain their goals which often have nothing in common with the general course of history but which nevertheless stand in organic relation to it. In a word, historical laws appear to the student as the real motive forces of and factors in history, i.e., they appear to him in the shape of the masses and specific historical figures.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a philosophical science, historical materialism has no pretensions to being an absolute theory able to explain every puzzle and turn of history, such as the old philosophical science was wont to assume. Every fact and turn of history require all-round scientific explanation while the philosophical elucidation of every fact consists in exercising a correct approach to its investigation, employing correct methods of research, comparing it with the general historical laws and tendencies, and applying to it the criteria of historical progress. Historical materialism provides such a method for investigating and evaluating diverse social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, historical materialism is more than a method of investigating social phenomena. It has a theory of its own, i.e., a theoretical substance of its own which explains the more general of historical tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historical materialism has found that history proceeds from lower to higher forms of social organisation and that the change to higher forms is inevitable because the old forms become outmoded and stand in the way of further progress. Historical materialism, basing itself on historical evidence, on the long experience of mankind, has proved that a society without exploitation and oppression, based on free labour, is not a dream or utopia, but the result of its intrinsic development, that the transition to such society, i.e., communist society, is as inevitable as transitions of society to higher forms were in the past. This crucial conclusion is supported by historical evidence, economic analysis and the experience of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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The successes scored by the revolutionary working-class movement demonstrate in practice how the progressive historical tendency presses forward.&lt;br /&gt;
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The October Revolution in Russia and socialist revolutions in other countries have given this tendency a global dimension and shown the peoples of the world where their future lies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historical materialism does not deal with all questions of the building of socialism and communism. Such questions are the field of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific communism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Being a philosophical science, historical materialism is the method of scientific communism, furnishing, in addition to historical and economic justification, also the most general, philosophic, justification of the inevitable change to communism and showing the revolutionary path of society&#039;s transition from capitalism to communism. For this reason, historical materialism is inseparable from the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The organic relation between historical materialism and the theory and practice of the struggle for communism is the expression of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; historical materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is the theoretical reflection of the needs and goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
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Bourgeois critics of Marxism strive to show that the connection of historical materialism and the interests of the working class and the communist ideas, which is openly proclaimed by Marxist philosophers, presumably indicates the class limitations of the Marxist-Leninist social science. They allege that to produce an authentic scientific theory one must rise above classes since, they insist, a class approach to science results in biased and narrow thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this really so? Can a person living in a class society rise above class interest? In a class society, no one is above class. To live in society and be free from it is impossible. An individual may imagine himself to be free in that sense, but in reality one cannot, in modern society, be free of class interest. The idea of such freedom is a bourgeois illusion, nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every philosopher, artist or writer, whether he intends it or not, always defends and expresses in his work the interests of a particular class.  In this sense everyone shares a party viewpoint whether or not he belongs to a party. This does not mean that the interests of a class can only be supported by its own members. An ideologist’s partisanship depends on what class he supports, rather than on what class he belongs to.&lt;br /&gt;
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Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and Proudhon were most indignant when Marx concluded that they were ideologists of the French petty bourgeoisie, which in their minds was tantamount to calling them “Paris shopkeepers.” Marx explained then that he had not referred to their calling, for that was quite beside the point. What he had meant was who they actually represented, whose interests they objectively reflected and supported.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, it must be borne in mind that in an exploitative society, where there is an impassable gulf between mental and manual labour, the classes whose lot is manual labour (workers and peasants) are unable, as a rule, to advance ideologists from their own midst. Their ideologists most often are members of other classes, who have enough time and money to get an education and at the same time are capable of understanding whether history is moving so that they go over from their own class to the progressive social classes. E.g., the 19th-century Revolutionary Democrats in Russia were ideologists of the revolutionary peasantry. None of them, however, was a peasant himself. Herzen was a nobleman by birth, and Chernyshevsky, Belinsky and Dobrolyubov were of the lower middle class. The ideologists of the working class, Marx and Engels were not workingmen themselves, but that did not prevent them from writing consistently on behalf of the working class and promoting its struggle, the aims and methods of which they elaborated scientifically.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hence, every thinker is a spokesman of a definite class. Does it make him narrow-minded? The answer cannot be a simple yes or no, for that depends entirely on the class. The bourgeoisie, as a class, has long been brought into conflict with the advancement of history. Today its interests do not merely clash with those of other classes but with the development of society at large. Therefore, a modern bourgeois ideologist, being true to the interests of his class, can’t help giving a garbled picture of society’s development, nor is he capable of producing an authentic scientific theory of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is fundamentally different with the ideologists of the working class, for the interests of the working class, unlike those of the bourgeoisie, reflect the historical tendency. The working class is a consistently revolutionary class. It has a stake in social progress and so has no need to falsify social history. Moreover, only from the standpoint of the working class, the exponent of social progress, could a genuine scientific theory of social development be produced.  Nor was it by chance that such a theory was evolved by the ideologists of the working class, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy does not imply that it is limited but that it is scientifically objective.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historical materialism is a theoretical generalisation of real human history, a generalisation of the evidence supplied by other social sciences. The scientific dialectical method by which historical materialism investigates the life of society, considering society in the process of its continuous development, implies that historical materialism itself keeps developing as it draws general conclusions from fresh historical experience and the findings of the social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2. Materialist Concept of History ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Emergence of Historical Materialism—a Revolution in the View of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Men began to ask themselves long ago what force governed the development of society.  Religion and the church told them that they, miserable sinners, were to turn their thoughts to god and hope for his kindness and forgiveness.  God the almighty held their destiny in his hands. “Man proposes, and God disposes”, the church taught. “Be humble, be meek, and trust in the divine providence.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Some thinkers rebelled against the authority of the church and appealed to reason. They saw in man’s rational creative activity the mainspring of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
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You will remember that at the beginning of this book it was mentioned that philosophers, depending on their answer to the fundamental question of philosophy&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i.e., what is primary, matter or consciousness—divided into two camps in explaining the world in general and elucidating the relation of spirit and nature—materialists and idealists. However, as soon as the pre-Marxian philosophers came to consider society, all of them, materialists and idealists alike, took an idealist attitude. That this attitude should have been shared by Hegel was not surprising, for Hegel was an objective idealist to whom society was a stage in the development of the absolute spirit. But then, the idealist attitude was also shared by philosophers who were part and parcel of the history of materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Ideologists of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie, the great 18th-century materialists Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius and others, seeking to understand the essence of society&#039;s development, maintained that men’s opinions were determined in every age by the predominant social conditions which themselves depended entirely on men’s own volition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last great materialist philosopher before Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, who passionately criticised idealism and religion, simultaneously held that religion was the groundwork of social history, that its forms determined the face of an age. In Feuerbach’s view, if society was bad, it was because its religion was bad. To make society good, its bad religion (e.g., Christianity) should be replaced by a good religion. With this end in mind, Feuerbach invented a new “perfect religion of love” in the belief that a society founded on such a religion should itself become perfect.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea that society is the outcome of the spirit, or a result of men’s spiritual (religious, political, legal, etc.) activity, held undivided sway in pre-Marxian philosophical, sociological and historical literature. The viewpoint had become a tradition. It pervaded fiction and was generally taken for granted.&lt;br /&gt;
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He had to be courageous indeed who not only called the idea in doubt but scientifically proved that it was untenable. It took a combination of scientific genius and supreme personal courage to do it. Karl Marx had both. For the first time in history he showed that before man could indulge in thought, science, philosophy, politics, religion, and so on, he had to eat, drink, to have shelter, and so on. In other words, man had to satisfy his material needs first. This idea, which now, many years after the emergence of Marxism, is considered to be self-evident, worked a revolution in views on society, signifying the birth of a new, materialist conception of history. Although apparently simple, Marx&#039;s idea has far-reaching implications. If, to be able to think, man must satisfy his material needs, it means, first of all, that at the basis of history is the production of all those things which go to satisfy man’s material needs, i.e., the production of food, clothing, houses, and so on. Therefore the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;production of material goods is the basis of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next conclusion: if history is based on the production of material goods, then the decisive role in history belongs to the producers of the material goods, i.e., the working people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The significance of the change Marx worked in ideas on society will become clearer if we consider the fact that sociologists before Marx examined at best only the ideological motives of human activity, usually neglecting the economic circumstances, which they treated as a side issue, inessential to history. Before Marx, all thinkers reduced history entirely to the doings of individual personalities, paying no attention to the masses. In their view, history was made not by the people but by heroes towering above the crowd.&lt;br /&gt;
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The materialist conception of history formulated by Marx and Engels showed that the people were the history-makers and producers of all material and spiritual values available to society. That was why Lenin wrote: “The discovery of the materialistic conception of history, or more correctly, the consistent continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social phenomena, removed the two chief shortcomings in earlier historical theories.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-94|94]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx proved, first, that history is based not on ideas but on material production; and, second, that it is made not by isolated heroes and military leaders but by the masses, the working people above all.&lt;br /&gt;
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Human society is a highly complex phenomenon comprising a maze of diverse relations and connections. People work or exploit others, they love, suffer, fight their enemies and die, they pray to god or damn him, and in doing all this they form widely varied relations with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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But history does not boil down to individual actions. It also embraces group and mass action.  Classes and nations fight one another fiercely, to the death; peoples rise against their oppressors; destructive wars and horrible epidemics devastate whole countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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This tangled maze of facts and events was extremely puzzling. For thousands of years eminent thinkers who took a keen interest in the destinies of mankind were unable to understand what governed history—this chaos of events and facts. Was it god? Was it the conflict of good and evil? A hero’s or an emperor’s will? Were there, after all, any laws that determined social development? Idealism which dominated the views on society, failed to supply a scientific answer to these questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The materialist conception of history was able to supply such an answer. The conclusion that material production was primary with relation to intellectual activity was in itself enough to suggest that preeminent among all complex social relations—family, religious, class, national, political, legal and others—were those formed by people engaged in material production or directly associated with it, which were primary and definitive.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fast thinkers were unable to extricate themselves from the tangle of events and facts because they had no yardstick to help them tell the substantial from the unsubstantial, the principal from the secondary things. Marx was the first to discover such a yardstick. Having selected the relations emerging among people in the process of production, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as principal and crucial to the life of society, Marx was able to apply to social phenomena the common scientific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;yardstick of recurrence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, without which the laws of social development cannot be discerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is known, no two countries are the same.  Every country has a different economic level and staple industries, different history, language, national culture, different customs, political institutions, and so on. But does this imply that different countries may have nothing in common? No, it does not. Having formulated the conception of the relations of production and examined them in different countries, each with its own conditions, Marx was able to find that which was common to all countries at the same stage of development (e.g., at the capitalist stage), and to evolve the concept “socio-economic formation” which expressed in a highly generalised form the prevailing situation in all such countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the preface to the first edition of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Marx, addressing German readers, wrote that if, upon reading &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which dwells for the most part on the development of capitalism in England, they would say that it had no reference to Germany, they would be quite wrong, as a more developed country merely presented a less developed one with the picture of its immediate future.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. History as an Objective Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
By entertaining a materialist conception of history and applying the yardstick of recurrence to society, Marx and Engels were able to discover the laws of social development and interpret human history not as the result of arbitrary individual action, nor as the result of divine activity, but as an objective natural process developing, like nature, independently of men’s intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels conclusively proved that society proceeds from lower to higher forms, through class contradictions and class struggle, to a classless communist society; and that communism was not a utopia but the necessary product of social development. The founders of Marxism not only showed why communism was inevitable but discovered in the working class the force which was to destroy capitalism and build a communist society. It was proved from the operation of the objective laws governing society&#039;s development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some bourgeois philosophers attempted to show that no such thing as social laws generally existed. With this purpose in mind, they advanced a theory to the effect that in society, unlike nature, nothing ever was or could be repeated because every historical occurrence was unique and without parallel.&lt;br /&gt;
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Indeed, no historical event occurs twice.  Every social phenomenon, as a sum of individual characteristics, is unique. Let us compare the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century and the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th century. The French revolution is associated with the storming of the Bastille, the guillotining of the French king and queen, with the names of Robespierre, Danton and Marat, with the common people thronging the streets of Paris, singing the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Marseillaise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Carmagnole&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The English bourgeois revolution involved the beheading of the king, Cromwell’s dictatorship, and at the end of it all, the bourgeois “glorious revolution”, the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, and the restoration of monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two events are apparently rather dissimilar. The countries are unlike, and so are the peoples, with their different customs and habits.  But what is the most essential thing about these two events? Is it the songs they sang then in London and Paris? Most probably not. Is it the method by which the respective kings lost their heads? Hardly so. What then is the principal meaning of the two events?&lt;br /&gt;
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The English bourgeois revolution set out, above all, to abolish the old feudal system and establish a new, capitalist system. And even though, owing to the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, this revolution failed to carry out its tasks consistently, it nevertheless cleared the path for capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principal aim of the French bourgeois revolution was to abolish the old feudal regime and establish new, capitalist relations. Hence, these two events have something in common, they have recurring characteristics. Besides, these characteristics were fundamental to both events, while the characteristics that did not recur were inessential to the course of history.  That common factor of the two events was reflected in the concept “bourgeois revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, historical events present a unity of the recurrent and the unique. It is usually their most substantial features that recur, while it is the inessential, minor features that are unique and particular and do not recur. But if there is regularity in social phenomena it means that society and history in general obey objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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An adult member of society finds in it fully formed social relations, relations of production, a state structure, etc. Although he may influence the circumstances to some extent by his activity, he cannot choose them. The laws operating in society are as objective and independent of individual will as are the laws of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet there are some distinctions between the laws of nature and the laws of history. The chief of these distinctions is that the laws of nature not only operate independently of human will and consciousness but are altogether independent of men. For them, man might simply not exist. They were just as effective when there were no people as they are now. Of course, having knowledge of natural laws, man can often accelerate their action or channel it in a direction useful to society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Knowing the laws of species formation, man learned to hasten it by artificial selection, producing new strains or races of useful plants and animals in a comparatively short time. But the laws of species formation, by themselves, operate independently of man. Natural selection was effective ever since living creatures had appeared, before man evolved at all. Moreover, man also, as a biological species, is the product of natural selection. Thus, the operation of laws of nature does not in the least require man’s participation.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is altogether different with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws of social development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Although they operate independently of man’s will and mind, they are always realised through men, through human activity. Therefore history is entirely the product of human activity. History is made by men, but they have to make it in accordance with the objective circumstances prevailing during the lifetime of each generation, and not just as their fancy takes them. Thus, human activity is one of the conditions necessary for the laws of history to operate. In fact, it is the main condition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rudolf Stammler, a bourgeois philosopher and one of the early critics of Marxism, maintained, as he tried to prove the &amp;amp;quot;unsoundness’”’ of Marxism, that if under the laws of nature an eclipse of the Sun were to occur, nobody would ever think of setting up a party for the promotion of the eclipse. Then why organise a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arty for the promotion of revolution”, if one regards the proletarian revolution as the inevitable effect of the laws of history? Since an eclipse of the Sun occurs without men’s participation, then the revolution, if it is inevitable, will also occur without their participation.&lt;br /&gt;
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An eclipse of the Sun, indeed, occurs without men’s intervention. That is true. But human activity is not found among the conditions which lead to an eclipse. Therefore the idea of setting up a ‘’party for the promotion of the eclipse of the Sun”, as Plekhanov justly observed, could only originate in a lunatic asylum.&lt;br /&gt;
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A revolution, however, is quite another thing. It is performed by men, there can be no revolution without them. Their activity is the main condition out of the whole sum of circumstances which make the revolution possible. And this being so, then it depends on people, on the degree of their organisation and political understanding and their eagerness to fight for their rights, whether or not the revolution will take place, and how soon. That is why the creation of a party that would purposely and methodically prepare the masses to perform a revolution is necessary and justified.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, the laws of social development manifest themselves in men’s activity. Nevertheless, even a fleeting glance at history shows us that as their activity developed people usually pursued goals which did not flow from these laws. The laws of social development were discovered by Marx and Engels only in the mid-19th century, and the masses became familiar with them later still, and not in every country at that. What were people guided by, then? After all, they are not animals but rational beings endowed with the faculty of thought. They consciously pursue certain ends and consciously select the means towards them.  That, however, does not yet imply that people co-ordinate their individual goals with the mainstream of history. This explains why they used to conceive history as a chaotic tangle of human strivings. Somewhere, opposing strivings clashed and cancelled each other out, somewhere else, strivings running in the same direction converged, and somewhere else again more complex combinations of forces emerged.  And the overall historic tendency pressed on through this chaos of chance occurrences, just as necessity in general presses through mass of chance events.&lt;br /&gt;
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But this means that history develops spontaneously, that people made history unconsciously, and that produced the false impression that history is made apart from people, without their participation. Under such conditions, human effort was wasted on a vast scale. This, among other things, explains the extremely slow pace of history in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the emergence of Marxism and the discovery of the laws governing the development of history, the character of society’s development changes. For the first time, the broadest sections of the people are able to take part consciously in the making of history.  As a result of the proletarian revolution, this possibility becomes a reality. Under the new conditions, the squandering of human effort is reduced to a minimum, as the chaotic clashes of individual intentions are superseded by the people’s single collective will directed at the building of a new, communist society. This single will is expressed in the Communist Party which organises the masses and directs their aspirations towards one goal. This makes social development proceed faster than ever before.&lt;br /&gt;
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The profound social changes which occurred in the Soviet Union after the victorious socialist revolution of October 1917 are a case in point. In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, L. I. Brezhnev said: “Within a historically short period of time, a huge backward country was transformed into a country with a highly developed industry and collectivized agriculture. It now takes only two and a half working days for our industry to produce as much as was produced in the whole of 1913.... Within the lifetime of a single generation, the Soviet land liberated itself completely and for ever from the onerous burden of illiteracy.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-95|95]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Historical Necessity and Human Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The following questions may be asked: if social development is governed by laws which are objective but are implemented through men’s activity, what role do men play in history? Are they not slaves of objective necessity? Can man be free? What is implied here is not political freedom, nor so-called civil liberties, but freedom in terms of the relation between man and the objective laws of history. This question was often pondered by eminent thinkers of the past.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many of them believed that man’s will was capable of making history. We had seen, however, that this view is unsound, as history proceeds according to objective laws. Others held that man is powerless in the face of historical necessity, being its slave. But is it true that nothing depends on men? Was it not men who produced society’s entire wealth? Was it not men who staged revolutions, sweeping away regimes believed to be unshakable? Inquisitive human thought kept seeking the answers to such questions. The great Dutch materialist philosopher, Spinoza, was the first to approach the correct conception of the relation of necessity and freedom, while Hegel produced its profound definition when he said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom was apprehended necessity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This definition, confining freedom to the domain of knowledge, may be satisfactory to Hegel but not to one who has a materialist conception of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the first time in the history of science, Marxism approached this question from a standpoint fundamentally different from Hegel&#039;s.  We are concerned not only with the problem of freedom with respect to knowledge but, above all, with the problem of the freedom of human activity, of man’s practical freedom. Is it enough for one to apprehend necessity to become free? If one knows that, for certain reasons, an undesirable event is bound to occur and, being able to counteract it, still does nothing but is content with just the knowledge of it, will such knowledge be worth much, and can one be considered free under such circumstances?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us assume that under capitalism all workers know the laws of capitalism’s emergence, development and decay and realise that capitalism must be superseded by socialism.  Will it be enough to end capitalism? Not likely.  The apprehension of necessity is certainly needed to make men really free. Necessity is blind and man is its slave as long as he fails to apprehend it. But even after he has apprehended it, man cannot be free. The knowledge of necessity is but the first requisite of actual freedom. The second is to translate knowledge into action, necessity into practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When workers have realised the historical necessity of the destruction of capitalism and the building of communism and proceed to act on this knowledge, capitalism will inevitably collapse and give way to communist society. The Marxist definition of freedom, therefore, is: “Freedom ... consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-96|96]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, Hegel’s idea is not rejected but thoroughly refashioned. Let us look into the Marxist definition of freedom given by Engels.  In its context, “‘control&amp;amp;quot; should on no account be understood to mean man’s arbitrary power over the external world. What it means in fact is that if necessity is not apprehended, man is its slave, but once it has been apprehended, man is its master.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of history, man was controlled by nature and was its slave. As man gained knowledge of the Jaws of nature and built strong productive forces, he released himself more and more from the grip of natural necessity. We mean man not as an individual but as a member of society. Man’s freedom both with respect to historical and to natural necessity depends on the kind of society he lives in. A wrongly organised society, founded on exploitation, makes its members slaves to historical necessity, and simultaneously prevents them from devoting sufficient effort to the remaking of nature. It is entirely different in the case of modern socialist society, rationally organised and developing in a planned fashion. Under socialism, historical necessity has been apprehended and the laws of history are applied in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the problem of human freedom is a social problem. People can enjoy a full measure of freedom only in a society in which the exploiting classes have been abolished and the productive forces serve to enrich the whole of society rather than a handful of capitalists, and are used for gaining and increasing control over nature. That was why the transition from capitalism to socialism may be described as a leap from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freedom implies no annihilation of objective necessity. The latter can never disappear. Once man has apprehended objective necessity, it stops being external to him. It becomes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;intrinsic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; content of his convictions. This being So, man can act freely, i.e., in accordance with his own convictions. At the same time, he becomes an instrument of histor&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al necessity. A fettered revolutionary, driven on foot to forced labour in Siberia, was free with relation to historical necessity, while the armed gendarmes escorting him were its slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, man becomes actually free once he has gained knowledge of objective necessity and learned to act in full consciousness of what he is doing. The question of men’s practical activity, of their conscious, active, free involvement in the making of history, is not an abstract theoretical problem. It is a practical problem. In a society building socialism and communism, the activity of every person, his creative participation in the effort of the whole people, has a particular meaning. The new society may be built only provided free participation of all members of society. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that every member of society should be informed about the laws of history and should act accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another side of this important question is that history must not be regarded as a fatalistic process whereby people carry out the one and only possible course of events, dictated by historical necessity. Historical necessity manifests itself in different ways, and not necessarily at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History is governed by laws, but its ways are not fatally determined. Their choice is decided in the struggle of social forces, as a result of which one of the possible variants of historical development is determined. And, certainly, reaction may temporarily triumph, the forces of progress may temporarily be defeated. But in the end, the forces of progress get the upper hand, That was what happened in People’s Hungary after World War II.  In this concrete case, historical necessity manifested its ultimate irresistible force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Material Conditions of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of every nation develops in a definite place, under definite natural conditions. These natural conditions (otherwise called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;geographical environment&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) vary. The area inhabited by a people may be covered with mountains and forests or it may be a desert or the tundra or it may be fertile. It may be situated in the cold Far North or in the hot South. And of course, the country’s nearness to trade routes and centres of civilisation is crucial. Availability of fertile soil, a mild climate, abundant mineral resources and neighbours who contribute to its historical progress by trade and cultural exchanges give advantages to a country, whereas their shortage puts it in a disadvantageous position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Favourable natural conditions may speed up the progress of society while unfavourable conditions may retard it. To get a concrete idea of the role played by natural conditions in the life of society, they must be divided into two groups, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the natural resources of the means of subsistence and the natural resources of the means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, The presence or absence of the reserves of wild edible plants, game, fish, etc., belong to the first-mentioned group, and minerals, natural communications, natural resources of energy, etc., belong to the second.  At the early stages, when material production was utterly primitive, the natural means of subsistence were of paramount importance, and the natural means of production had no role in the development of society, nor could they have any. At the modern stage, of course, the latter play a decisive part in the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, the influence of the geographical environment on society does not boil down to the natural means of subsistence and production. Great significance is also attached to the climate, availability of impassable terrain or an insular situation, all of which hinders links with other peoples. Geographical location facilitates or handicaps the protection of national frontiers from enemy attacks. For a long time, natural trade routes played a particularly important part. Large cities and towns were usually built on the banks of navigable rivers. Convenient sea routes were also vital. Running close to different countries, they promoted the development of crafts and trade in coastal areas, and later on of manufactures as well. When the sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and the East lay mainly across the Mediterranean, it promoted the rapid economic growth of Italian sea ports. Afterwards, when the sea routes shifted to the north of Europe and passed through the English Channel, it promoted the economic growth of the Netherlands, Flanders and England.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does this mean that the geographical environment determines historical development, as some people used to believe?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, the geographical environment cannot determine the development of society, if only because it remains relatively constant over millions of years, while social changes occur within much shorter periods. The natural conditions in France, for example, changed imperceptibly over thousands of years while French society underwent momentous change. The whole of French history, so rich in events, coincides with a period during which the geographical environment hardly changed at all. This holds true of the history of any other country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of human society, when the productive forces were puny, nature held sway Over man, who had neither knowledge nor any Means of protection against the blind forces of Nature, and who was her slave. Obviously, in those circumstances the influence of the geographical environment on the development of human society was far greater than later on.  As society developed, the productive forces grew and knowledge increased, man gradually escaped from his bondage to the elements. Consequently, with the progress of science and technology, the role of the geographical environment constantly decreases. Moreover, using the results of scientific and technological progress, man has gained the ability to influence nature on an ever-increasing scale. In the circumstances of private ownership and capitalist production in some countries, man’s impact on nature often entails irreparable harm to the environment and is fraught with grave dangers.  For nature is a finely balanced system capable of self-regulation, and depredation of the natural resources upsets it and impairs this capacity for self-regulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever the successes of scientific and technological progress, the effect of the natural environment on society will always be a positive quantity because, no matter how advanced, society will always exist in a specific geographical environment, in a definite set of natural conditions which influence, and will continue to influence, the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Well-considered, methodical use of the natural resources under the planned socialist economy and the socialist system based on common ownership open up great possibilities for conserving the environment. In the Soviet Union, for example, there are special laws and agencies concerned with preserving natural resources and protecting the environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, at the present rate of production growth and with increasing urbanisation, individual countries or even groups of countries can do little to prevent irreparable damage to nature. There is an urgent need for an international system of conservation measures involving all, or at least all the industrially advanced, countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress” L. I. Brezhnev said that among the problems facing mankind “there is the problem of protecting man from the many dangers with which further uncontrolled technological development threatens him, in other words, the conservation of nature.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-97|97]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size and density of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;population&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is another standard factor in society’s existence and development. This is obvious since history is made by people, who are its primary requisite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size, growth rate, density and other characteristics of population are essential to society’s development. Without a minimum number of people, society cannot function.  Nevertheless, although different demographic characteristics can influence society&#039;s development for better or worse, the population growth, density and composition are not what determines the development of society. For example, the succession of socio-economic formations cannot be explained by population growth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, when the Earth’s population is increasing at an ever faster rate, and is expected to mount, at the very least, to 6,000 million in the year 2000, bourgeois sociologists and economists are making much of the theory that the population grows in geometrical progression and the means of subsistence increase in arithmetical progression. Hence they view population growth as an eternal evil threatening innumerable calamities, such as famine, wars and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;so&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, overpopulation is not a law of nature. It does not appear because there are too many people but is due to the conditions of production under capitalism. Capitalism constantly produces a surplus-population. Economic crises, chronic unemployment, destitution are not at all the effects of overpopulation, but are, indeed, its causes. Bourgeois overpopulation theories are wrong because their authors regard the conditions, which are merely produced by capitalism, as absolute and eternal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In reality, the growth of labour productivity, made especially rapid by the technological revolution, provides for an abundance of goods unthought of in the past. However, the progress of science and technology encounters obstacles created by capitalism, whose interests have long come in conflict with the interest of the working people, of the bulk of world population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic lag in many countries which only recently rid themselves of colonialist exploitation is also due to capitalism which plundered the natural wealth of the colonial countries and so held back their economic progress.  It is because of this capitalist-bred economic lag that in some Asian and African countries, population grows faster than the productive forces. But that will not last. As they develop their economy and adjust birth rates to economic growth, the young independent nations shall achieve economic prosperity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the character of society and its progress, the change from one social system to another, do not depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;on either the geographical environment or the growth of population. The latter can only further or hamper social development, being themselves dependent on the mode of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History develops on the basis of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is its determining factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. Material Production as the Basis of Society’s Existence and Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The Mode of Production of the Material Goods ====&lt;br /&gt;
To ensure his subsistence man must provide himself with food, clothing, shelter and so on. He cannot get all these things ready-made from nature. Ever since man raised himself from the animal world, he has used more and more products of nature that need to be processed. Man cannot eat meat raw, it must be cooked first. Even primitive man, before he could wrap himself in an animal&#039;s skin, first had to kill the animal, skin it and cure the skin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to subsist, man has to produce material goods from objects found in nature. Material production has always been—and still is—the basis of human existence. As history marches on, production undergoes change and develops its forms and means. It makes up the basis of history. People produced food and clothing, built houses, and so on, in every age.  Stages of social history are differentiated not by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;what&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; men produce but by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;how&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;by what means&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, they produce the material goods necessary for subsistence. In other words, historical periods are differentiated, above all, by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modes of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on which they are founded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, at the basis of history are successive modes of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every mode of production has two aspects.  One of them expresses man’s relation to nature, i.e., the degree to which he controls it. This aspect of the mode of production constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;productive forces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of society. The more advanced the productive forces, the greater man’s control over nature, and vice versa. In primitive society, in which the productive forces were hardly developed, nature had control over man.  The further progress of productive forces through the ages has caused this relation to change. In socialist society, which has at its disposal up-to-date technology and is rapidly moving forward along the path of scientific and technological progress, man increasingly controls nature, subjugating its blind forces to the benefit of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other aspect of the mode of production consists in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. These express the relations among people, arising in the process of the production of material goods and determined by the level and character of the development of productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both aspects of the mode of production form an indissoluble unity and cannot exist separately since people, in processing various objects, i.e., interacting with nature, associate with other people taking part in the process of production, i.e., interact with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Besides the production of material goods, another area of material production is the production of man himself. It is performed by the family, whose forms also underwent changes in the course of history, while its influence on the historical process diminished as society developed further.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, it would be a mistake to regard the family merely as a link in the system of material production; it also plays a vital role in ethical, legal and other spiritual relations.  The family does not simply carry out the physical reproduction of man. It is a highly important sphere of the education of the new generation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For all that, the material functions of the family, associated with the reproduction of man, always were and continue to be essential to society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The productive forces of society are the foundation of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Society’s Productive Forces ====&lt;br /&gt;
The productive forces include people and the means of labour, i.e., the objects and instruments of labour. But objects of labour themselves must be either obtained or produced by man, and instruments are also results of man’s labour activity. Thus, the productive forces consist of living human labour or of labour already performed and embodied in the objects and instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these things become productive forces only if they are part of the process of production. Prospected mineral deposits which are not developed are not a productive force, although they may become one in future. The most up-to-date machine tools, kept under lock and key in the storeroom, are not a productive force; they become one only after being made part of the process of production. This holds of people as well. An able-bodied person who does not work cannot be considered as a productive force. Men and the instruments of labour belong to the productive forces only when associated in the production of material goods.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to reduce the productive forces to production technology alone, as some Western scholars do when they give their own, somewhat biased interpretation to Marx’s social doctrine. The instruments of labour by themselves, without man, cannot function productively. Therefore, the productive forces must include man who creates or operates the instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, society’s productive forces comprise two integral elements, viz., the implements of labour and people possessing industrial skills.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a rule, the productive forces develop progressively. The capacity of the instruments of production, such as energy sources, transmission mechanisms, tools, etc., keeps increasing. As a result, the working man also undergoes change: his production experience grows and new occupations appear and develop. In this way, man’s control over the natural properties of things, over the forces of nature, gradually extends. Man produces new objects with new properties not existing in nature. Thus, the level of the productive forces changes. But that is not all, for their character also changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The character of the productive forces coincides, by and large, with the character of labour, and may be individual (private) or collective (social). This differentiation depends on how men employ the implements of labour, whether they do it single-handed or in a group where effort is shared and co-ordinated. The process of labour—whether individual or social—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not depend&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on man’s choice. It is determined by the character of the implements of labour and, more specifically, by the instruments of production, the bone and muscle of the production process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, some instruments (practically all handicraftsman’s tools) may and must be employed individually while others can be used only by a group of workers. A machine, for instance, is an instrument of production which can be used only collectively for it requires raw materials, energy, half-finished products, and so on. Besides those who run the machine, it takes dozens, if not thousands, more workers to make it function productively. Ownership has nothing to do with it. Regardless of property relations, labour in mechanised production is collective, social. The steam-engine revolutionised capitalist production just because, by making production a social process, it created the major material precondition of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As long as man employed ready-made or primitively worked tools in production, he accumulated elementary knowledge in diverse fields of activity. The progress of production caused science to emerge and develop. Thus, astronomy emerged because people had to determine from the position of the stars and planets the seasons of the year, which was essential to agriculture and animal husbandry. Geometry arose from the needs of land surveying and construction. Geography owes its origin to the development of high-seas navigation and trade. Production does more to promote science than dozens of universities, wrote Engels. Hypotheses advanced on the strength of accumulated knowledge are tested by practice and, if confirmed, become scientific truths.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When primitive instruments of labour are Superseded by machines, science as a system of knowledge of the external world begins to play a far more important part in the development of production. That is but natural. Mechanised production requires detailed knowledge of the properties of things, of the forces of nature and of how they can be utilised. In turn, such knowledge is applied and embodied in instruments, mechanisms and production technologies. In this way science begins to turn into a direct production force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 19th century, owing to numerous important scientific discoveries, science played a much greater role in production than ever before. But its role today in the development of productive forces is even greater. As a result of the revolution in science and technology, applied sciences have become part and parcel of the productive forces. More and more scientific discoveries are being made, some of them directly contributing to material production. Scientific information is produced on a vast scale, doubling its volume approximately every ten years. The revolution in science and technology has brought about a situation where production is increasingly becoming a field of the technological application of science, the latter itself appearing as a direct productive force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whereas under capitalism, production as a whole, including the latest results of science, serves to enrich a handful of capitalists, while increasing automation breeds unemployment and causes much misery among working people, under socialism, the progress of science and technology is made to serve the whole of society, all working people. Under socialism, scientific and technological progress has practically no limits and can freely bear its fruits: larger and better-quality output, lighter work, more leisure, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The role of science as an immediate productive force is determined not only by its direct effect on the technological standards of production, on the progress of technology. Science also makes an immense contribution to the development of the producers of material goods, to improving their cultural standards and skills, and to perfecting the organisation of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The CPSU takes all necessary measures to promote the revolution in science and technology. As a result, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his report ‘“The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, &amp;amp;quot;never before has our country possessed such a huge economic, scientific and technical potential as today.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-98|98]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Speaking at the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev said: “The priority task is still to speed up scientific and technical progress.  Its significance, you will recall, was strongly emphasised at the 24th Congress of the CPSU.  We Communists proceed from the belief that the scientific and technical revolution acquires a true orientation consistent with the interests of man and society only under socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In turn, the end objectives of the social revolution, the building of a communist society, can only be attained on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-99|99]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet people is solving the task of combining the technological revolution with socialism, i.e., utilising socialism’s advantages over capitalism in order to ensure the growth of material production and an improvement in the people’s living standards.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Relations of Production ====&lt;br /&gt;
Not every relation formed by people in the process of production is a production relation.  Human relations are complex and many-sided.  Production relations are, above all, economic relations among people who get together for the purpose of producing material values. These relations are of a material character. This is not to say that they are material in the same way as a thing may be material (for they can be neither measured nor weighed), but that they are objective, that is, independent of man’s mind and will. Thus, production relations are economic relations of people engaged in material production, which shape and change independently of people’s consciousness and intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What are these relations in more specific terms? Basically, all production relations depend on who owns the: means of production.  In fact, the form of ownership of the means of production underlies all economic relations in any kind of society. Property is not a thing, nor is it a relation between man and a thing. It is, in the last resort, an economic relationship established through men’s relation to things, particularly to the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another essential aspect of production relations is the exchange of activities between men engaged in material production. People participate in production in various ways. They “exchange” the results of their efforts. Thus the Capitalists, who own the means of production, play the part of organisers of production while the workers, who sell their labour, are the immediate producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exchange of the results of human effort is not confined to capitalist society. It occurs in any society because there is always a division of labour, even under the primitive-communal system, where it was, of course, of the simplest kind. In socialist society, too, the results of labour are exchanged between two classes of working people (i.e., workers and farmers), different social strata and groups of professional workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, production relations are characterised by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;distribution of output&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Every class receives a part of the national income in a manner and quantity rigidly determined by the prevailing relations of property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief characteristics of production relations that we have enumerated are inseparably combined in material production. The unity of the three aspects of production relations is as objective as production relations themselves.  It means that production relations can change only as a system of three aspects, none of which can undergo serious qualitative change separately.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are several &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;types of production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; known in history: primitive-communal, slavery, feudal, capitalist and communist. Mankind is marching along a road which ascends from lower to higher forms of production relations. This road may wind or zigzag, for historical development does not proceed in a straight line. In some cases reactionaries managed to halt history. So, after the French bourgeois revolution an attempt was made to restore not only monarchy but feudalism as well. That attempt slowed down the development of France, but it failed all the same. It shows us the objective character of historical development. Despite all obstacles, society still arrives where it should under the objective laws of history.  These laws cannot be repealed. History may at times develop more slowly but sooner or later it will make headway.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Progressive development of society from lower to higher forms is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  It can be of two types. The first, progress in an exploiting, antagonistic society, is achieved at immense sacrifice, which is out of all proportion to the strides actually made. Marx figuratively described this type of historical development as an abominable idol that would drink nectar only from the skulls of the slain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second, progress under socialism, is of an entirely different character, as all classes and sections of society have a stake in it. The development of socialist society proceeds in a planned manner. It is guided and directed by a Communist or a workers’ party. Having cognised the laws to which society is subject, it leads the masses, directing the efforts of all working people towards a single goal and ensuring the best possible results of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The unity of productive forces and relations of production constitutes the mode of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In every historical epoch a particular mode of production was predominant, the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist modes of production succeeding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, in studying history it is easy to observe that at no time did a mode of production exist all by itself. The picture was always complicated because while a new mode of production took shape, some elements of the old mode persisted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current epoch has seen the emergence of the socialist mode of production which is steadily advancing on the capitalist mode of production in the world economy. Socialist integration within the framework of the socialist world economic system, the steady and rapid economic growth of the socialist countries, all foretell the inevitable triumph of the socialist world system in the economic race with capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Succession of Modes of Production Is a Law-Governed Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having discussed what a mode of production is, we can look at how they function and why they supersede one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the main, we can single out three principal laws to which the mode of production is subject.  They are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of contradiction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; between various aspects of the mode of production. These laws expose the workings and development of the modes of material production. And since production activity, in the final analysis, is the foundation on which every other social human activity rests, these laws are of immense social significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of the unity of the productive forces and production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; expresses the organic connection between various aspects of the mode of production. Every mode of production, at any period in its history, necessarily involves a complex interaction of the productive forces and relations of production. The productive forces are the content of material production, and the relations of production are its economic form.  The mode of production exists and functions in society as an integral whole, an active socioeconomic system in which material production, in any of its phases, is embodied in economic phenomena and cannot exist without them. E.g., the capitalist productive forces exist as constant and variable capital, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., as the means of production owned by the capitalist, and as labour which is a commodity bought by the capitalist. The productive forces of capitalism form and function only as long as the economic interaction of labour power and the instruments of labour (which are the major component of the means of production) takes place. Therefore, in society, the productive forces do not exist in a “pure” form but only in their economic form. They can only be separated from their economic form, i.e., from the relations of production, in the imagination, as a theoretical abstraction, to make their analysis more convenient.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The consequences of the law of unity of the productive forces and relations of production are of great significance to economic practice and development, as well as to the life and development of society in general. If the mode of production exists and functions as an integral whole, then clearly, every appreciable variation of any of its aspects will affect the entire mode of production. Thus, the more social the process of production becomes in modern capitalist enterprise, the more the material prerequisites of the socialist economic system mature in the womb of capitalism. Also, the higher the concentration of production and the centralisation of capital in the modern capitalist economy, the more manifest the economic need for replacing private by common ownership of the means of production. Therefore, it is a matter of replacing the mode of production as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then how do the different aspects of the mode of production interact? For an answer, we must look to the law of correspondence and the law of contradiction between the aspects of the mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of correspondence between production relations and the level and character of the productive &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orces &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was discovered by Marx, who drew general conclusions from numerous facts bearing on the economic history of society. To substantiate this law, Marx looked into the history of the division of labour and of the emergence and development of co-operative association, manufacturing and mechanised production. The results of his research are stated in the first volume of his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Here are some of Marx’s judgements on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The history of European economic development shows that the need for mass production destroyed the craft guild in which the master workman and his apprentices made a commodity entirely on their own, from beginning to end. The strong point of this method is that the article bears the stamp of the craftsman’s skill. The craftsman’s work in this case is creative, and he himself enjoys a respectable place in the social scale. Yet the craft guilds, typically medieval and preserved nowadays almost exclusively by the goldsmiths, crumbled under the impact of expanding commerce. A craftsman cannot, after all, produce artistically finished articles on a mass scale. Besides, the jealousy with which craftsmen guarded the secrets of the trade greatly hindered the progress of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Division of labour and the introduction of machines ruined the medieval craft guilds.  They were replaced first by co-operative asso&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;iation in which craftsmen’s work was shared and coordinated. Even this simple innovation was enough to boost enormously labour productivity and profit. On the other hand, the artisan’s work lost its creative quality. Now it was no longer an expression of the craftsman’s art, and the craftsman himself was no longer an artist. Creative work was replaced by monotonous drudgery, each worker performing some elementary operation over and over again. That spelled the birth of what Marx called ‘partial man”: the worker contributes only a part of the article, and his whole life becomes tied to this part, which, incidentally, cannot be marketed as such. Thus, through economic pressures, the craftsman whose art and its secrets had been a source of personal pride started in the co-operative association his slide into totally dependent production that later ended in the factory.  What happens next? Again, under economic pressures, viz., a growing demand for goods and a growing thirst for profit with a view to further investment in profitable enterprise, the machine finds its way into the co-operative association. Inventors of machines had in mind technical improvement of production as well as economic considerations. They sought to make work less arduous, increase labour efficiency and ensure a higher rate of profit. What effect it would have on the economy and society was something the inventors and organisers of production did not trouble their heads about.  &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having penetrated the co-operative association, the machine at once alters the character of economic relations among the co-operative artisans. Their former independence, already somewhat curtailed by division of labour, now completely disappears. The machine is not, as a rule, owned by the individual artisan; it is the property of the workshop owner and a means of exploiting the workers. The workers are no longer able to launch production on their own because the instruments of production have become very costly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There then appears a system of machines in the workshop and it becomes a real factory.  Yesterday&#039;s artisan and workers in the workshop become today’s proletarians. They possess no instruments of production; the sole commodity they own is their labour power and this they sell by hiring themselves out to a private employer. They have to do this in order to make a living for themselves and their families.  By his work, the worker not only covers the production costs but produces surplus value besides. And the capitalist appropriates this surplus value as profit.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Detailed examination of capitalist production led Marx to the conclusion that every change in production starts with the instruments of labour as men improve them, as they increase the speed of the machines and build up the capacity of the energy sources. New machines require new skills, and this causes change in the worker who handles the instruments of labour or controls machines. Besides mechanising production, men improve the latter by breaking it down into separate operations permanently assigned to separate workers or mechanisms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Technical improvements, the further division of labour, development of new skills—in a word, the modification of the productive forces—induce economic change, i.e., an adjustment in the production relations. This is the relationship expressed by the law of the correspondence of production relations with the productive forces, which operates as an economic tendency.  The law imposes no rigid mechanical dependence of production relations on the productive forces. It would therefore be inexact to describe it as a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of obligatory correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&amp;amp;quot; The law of correspondence operates as an economic tendency in the modern capitalist economic system as well. But the demands of the law of correspondence run up against the selfish economic ends of the monopolies and cannot be satisfied unless monopoly power is overcome.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, we inescapably come to the third law regulating material production, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Production relations, which correspond to the productive forces only by tendency, are usually in conflict with them. This conflict, inherent in the mode of production, is exactly what makes it develop.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where does the conflict spring from and what is it about? How does it develop and how is it resolved? These questions remained a puzzle to social scientists and economists before Marx.  And no wonder. For to answer them one had to get to the bottom of society&#039;s economic development and be a revolutionary as well, i.e., to combine an exact economic analysis with a social analysis of the interplay of the class forces and the way social revolutions tend to develop.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is manifested in three main ways. Firstly, the productive forces, as the most mobile element of the mode of production, outstrip (and this is the main tendency in world history) production relations which are usually more conservative and lag behind.  This is obvious because the relations of production change objectively according to the change undergone by the productive forces. This shows once again that the conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is a fundamental attribute of economic development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, at a certain stage, the internal conflict in the mode of production, under the private ownership of the means of production, develops into an antagonism, the productive forces and production relations being embodied in antagonistic social classes. For example, in the capitalist economy, the proletariat is the most important part and the living embodiment of the productive forces while the relations of production (capital, above all) are personified by the capitalists. Therefore the conflict in the mode of production must sooner or later, depending on the maturity of the economic system, be expressed as antagonism and conflict between these classes. The growth of such antagonism in the economic and social spheres inevitably brings about social revolution in bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conflict in the mode of production as it develops into antagonism, expressed in class conflict, is the socio-economic precondition of social revolution. The relations of production, having come in conflict with their productive forces, become a drag on economic and social progress. They twist it out of shape and slow down its growth rate. An obvious instance of this is modern state-monopoly capitalism which has distorted the development of material production in favour of militarism, promoting the war industries at the expense of culture and health. Militarisation of the economy is pushing the capitalist world into the abyss of another economic crisis. The capitalist relations of production hamper the development of the productive forces, retarding its growth. Comparison of the economic growth rates in the socialist and the capitalist countries dramatically demonstrates the advantages of the socialist economic system. Economic integration of the socialist countries further enhances these advantages and provides favourable conditions for their realisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outmoded production relations act as a brake on social and economic progress. Imperialism brings with it unemployment, racial hatred and police outrages, neocolonialism and suppression of democratic freedoms. The headlong chase for profit, attempts to prolong the life of capitalism—which is doomed by history—by aggressive wars and similar means, continuing plunder of the developing countries in the guise of aid, are all expressions of the current capitalist relations of production, of state-monopoly capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the conflict in the mode of production comes out in the fact that, even after becoming a brake on the progress of industry and society, the relations of production still remain the prime mover of production. We may ask ourselves: What makes material production function in the United States and other state-monopoly countries? It is still the headlong pursuit of profit. Under state-monopoly capitalism the big capitalist corporations can reap, with governments’ assistance, high monopoly profits, instead of average profits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, the modern capitalist relations of production have become self-contradictory.  While they are a stupendous roadblock to social progress, these relations of production—of which profit is part—still provide for the further development of the capitalist economic system.  This bears out the conclusion, made by Marxist-Leninists long ago, that capitalism will not collapse of itself. Only united action by all anti-monopoly forces will clear the road for the further progress of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. What Is a Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of material production operate throughout human history. But world history has gone through a succession of phases, viz., the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist systems, and has now entered a socialist and communist phase of development.  These phases, signifying stages in the progress of world history, are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;socio-economic formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept “‘socio-economic formation” was introduced by Marx and was widely employed by Engels and Lenin. According to Lenin’s definition, a socio-economic formation is an integral social organism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The skeleton or economic basis of each formation consists of the relations of production Which are predominant in it. They determine the economic tendencies and the character of the classes common to a particular formation, determining, in the long run, its social system, ideas and institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The flesh or body of a formation consists of the social classes existing within it, and the institutions they set up to protect their own vital interests. These are not merely the institutions of the ruling class, rooted in and serving the predominant relations of production, but also all other essential social institutions, many of which derive from the inner contradictions of the mode of production. Thus, socialist ideas under capitalism spring from the conflict between the social character of production and private appropriation. The same conflict is ultimately responsible for the emergence of the communist parties of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of key significance to the definition of a socio-economic formation is, however, the relation between its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant relations of production, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;superstructure&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant ideas and institutions. Formations may be rather similar as to their productive forces, but they are always distinguished by the specific character of the basis and superstructure which not only determine the pattern of a formation but, more important still, functionally depend on each other.  The basis produces the superstructure, and the superstructure ministers to the basis. But their functional connection is even more far-reaching. This connection alone makes it possible to see whether a social phenomenon belongs to the basis or to the superstructure. Let us take the state for example. Should we always refer to it as a superstructure? It depends. It cannot properly be called a superstructure in relation to the church, for instance. The state is a superstructure only relative to the predominant relations of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is the state to be regarded as a superstructure with respect to the productive forces? By no means. There are countries now that achieved more or less similar levels of the productive forces but differ greatly in bases and superstructures. This difference expresses the main contradiction between moribund capitalism, on the one hand, and socialism, which has become the decisive force of progress, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this holds true for the economic phenomena as well. They are of basic character only in case they are related to the ideas and institutions that are determined by these economic phenomena and work for them. But can we call production relations the basis from the point of view of their economic role in relation to the productive forces? The answer is no, because in that case the relations of production do not&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they—play the part of the basis with reference to the development of the productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are numerous things in society which have too many functions to be referred either to the basis or to the superstructure. Thus, language, the family, machines and the productive forces in general, the natural and technological sciences, the nation, and so on, should be referred neither to the basis nor to the superstructure. Certainly the basis and superstructure influence them a great deal and often turn them to account. But that does not alter the essential fact that they are social phenomena of a particular kind, not to be referred wholly either to the basis or to the superstructure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Therefore, although these social phenomena are part of the formation as an integral social organism, they do not serve to distinguish one formation from another. They may be&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and they usually are—similar or even identical in entirely different formations. Consequently, only phenomena which can be definitely referred to the basis or to the superstructure as belonging distinctly to a formation and stemming ultimately from the mode of production are the distinguishing marks of a formation. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Specific Laws of Socio-Economic Formations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Then what are the laws whereby the social Organism called the socio-economic formation springs forth, develops, matures and decays?  The laws of material production operate during the existence of a formation. They provide for the continuity of world history, investing it with a progressive general tendency and binding together widely different and even opposite phases of historical development and types of social structures. But do they provide for the emergence, development and collapse of specific social organisms such as socio-economic formations? Certainly not. Nor is it fortuitously that Lenin mentions that each socio-economic formation develops in conformity with certain laws specific to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; specific to each formation are the subject of political economy. For example, Marx&#039;s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a detailed exposition of the economic laws governing every stage in the development of capitalism. The chief one is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the production of surplus value&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the latter being seized by the capitalist as average or monopoly profit. Marx thoroughly investigated the operation of this law, tracing its immediate and indirect consequences and the way it interacted with other economic laws, and outlined the social development tendency resulting from this law. Thus, this law has a broad social meaning expressed in the tendency which social development has to pursue under the impact of the economic forces. The law of surplus value shows the position and role of the proletariat in the capitalist economic system, which, in fact, render the proletariat the grave-diggers of capitalism and builders of a new, socialist system. Hence, the proletariat’s world-historic revolutionary role is more profoundly substantiated if viewed from the standpoint of capitalism’s chief economic law. It was for this very reason that Marx said that his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was a shell fired at the head of the world bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However great the social significance of the economic laws of each particular formation, specific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, not immediately invested with economic content, are also essential to the life of a formation. For example, as he summed up historical experience, Marx established the general tendency of the class struggle throughout the period of capitalism. The class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists inevitably results in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the class struggle under capitalism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has, of course, economic antecedents, yet it does not itself refer to the economic sphere. It is a social law specific to a concrete formation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interaction of the economic and social laws specific to each formation and the common laws of human history determines the destiny of each formation. An all-round examination of the complex interaction of all social and economic forces with reference to the history and maturity of capitalism enabled Marx to arrive at the scientifically-founded conclusion on the communist tendency of world history in the epoch of the capitalist social formation, namely, that, as it goes onward, history must pass from moribund capitalism to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. The Communist Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism and communism are two phases or large periods in the life of a society resting on collective ownership of the basic means of production, in which the exploitation of man by man has been abolished. Socialism is the first phase of such a society. It comes into being as a result of the socialist revolution, handing over political power and the national wealth to the working people and giving them access to culture. The toilers become genuine masters of society. As this society moves closer to communism, its development takes new forms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism emerges from capitalism or even from some pre-capitalist social system. It cannot build its social and economic framework in the womb of the old society which rests on private ownership of the means of production.  The foundations of the old exploiting society must be destroyed by a social revolution. Communism, on the other hand, develops on its own social and economic base and does not need a social and political revolution or the class struggle to bring it into the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Progress of socialist society to communism is subject to certain objective social laws which extend to the main areas of the life of society comprising men’s economic, social, political, and intellectual activities. As a result of the operation of these laws, the material and technical base of communism is created, socialist relations are transformed into communist social relations, and people attain all-round development. The complex nature of the process of transition from socialism to communism follows from the very numerousness of the objective social laws involved in it. In the economic sphere, for instance, one can single out the high and stable growth rates of production development which is free from crises and unemployment and sufficient for the building of the material and technical base of communism; the growing role of progress in science and technology; integration of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of full-fledged socialism; development of socialist into communist labour, work becoming the prime vital requirement of everyone; a steady growth of efficiency; the drawing together of co-operative and public property, and their eventual transformation into communist property; growth of social consumption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws operating in the socio-political sphere in that period are, to name but a few: the gradual levelling out of living standards in town and country; the steady drawing together of the working class, collective farmers and intellectuals, and obliteration of class and social distinctions; integration of mental and physical work; the greatest possible growth of the social unity of society, the peoples thriving and drawing together still more; the gradual emergence of social uniformity and full social equality of all members of society; development of the socialist state of the whole people into communist public self-administration: the greatest possible unfoldment of socialist democracy; and the gradual refashioning of everyday life on communist principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The changes which the intellectual life of society undergoes in the period of transition from socialism to communism are equally complex.  We shall name merely a few, viz., the inculcation of a new attitude to work; getting rid of private-owner mentality and hangovers of the past; the further growth of socialist culture; all-round development of the individual; and the increasing dependence of the character and rate of social development on the spiritual qualities and constructive efforts of every man and woman.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4. Classes and Class Relations ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; a Class? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The word “class” derives from the Latin classis, a group called to arms, a division of the people. Tradition ascribes to Servius Tullius, a legendary Roman king (578-534 B. C.), a new division of Roman society into classes or orders.  At that time there appeared in ancient Rome an army into which all free citizens able to carry arms were enrolled. Servius Tullius divided the soldiers into five classes or orders according to their wealth, i.e., their ability to provide their own horses, armour, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Subsequently, the word “class&amp;amp;quot; was applied to large groups of people into which human Society came to be divided. But can any large group of people be regarded as a class? We are accustomed to apply this term to such large groups as the bourgeoisie, the working class, the peasants. Yet in modern society doctors also form a large group. There are almost 700,000 of them in the Soviet Union alone. Steel workers form a large group too, but are they a class?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many scholars tried in vain to define the concept “class”, although the fact that society was divided into classes and that a struggle was going on between them was observed long ago. So, even at the time of the Restoration in France there were historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet) who saw in the class struggle the key to French history. Nevertheless, the question what is a class, on what grounds people may be referred to one class or another, was still left open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some investigators claimed that the division into classes rested on the difference in intellectual standards: the more gifted and active, the more apt to command formed the ruling classes; the dull and stolid formed the oppressed classes.  Life and history demonstrated, however, that this was not so at all. There were too many ignorant fools and dolts among the ruling classes, while the oppressed classes advanced from their midst many people of undoubted talent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other people attempted to explain class division by income and property. Indeed, examination of the class structure of any society reveals a glaring disparity in the incomes of those of the ruling and the oppressed class. But the question is why—why this disparity, why is it that the ruling classes are rich and the oppressed poor?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, it was said that classes were distinguished by their position in society. Some classes were privileged, others, on the contrary, were underprivileged. But again, the question why it was so was left unanswered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great contribution of the Marxist-Leninist theory is that it has managed to solve this complex problem. Marx and Engels furnished brilliant examples of materialist study of the position of every class and each stratum within it, showing that the class struggle is entirely political. The most comprehensive, profound and complete definition of classes in Marxist-Leninist theory was given by Lenin in his work &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Great Beginning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin writes: “Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-100|100]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this definition Lenin points out four distinctive marks differentiating classes, viz., (1) their place in a historically determined system of social production; (2) their relation to the means of production; (3) their role in the social organisation of labour, and (4) the share of social wealth they get and the methods by which they get it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main indication was, in Lenin’s view, the relation of a class to the means of production that establishes a social group as a ruling class enjoying every privilege. Estrangement from the means of production turns a social group into an oppressed class whose lot is destitution and deprivation of rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin’s definition of classes, which sets forth the objective characteristics of a class, cut the ground from under the feet of those who defined classes from an idealist point of view, arbitrarily combining people into classes or, equally arbitrarily, excluding certain groups from concrete classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, Lenin isolated the fundamental, most typical features of all classes, thus furnishing the guide and key to the class structure of a socio-economic formation, which greatly facilitated the study of class society. In other words, Lenin’s definition of classes is of great theoretical significance to a correct understanding of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, Lenin defined classes in an exploiting society as groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Why Society Split Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now that we know what a class is, we must look at how classes came about. They emerged long ago, when systems of writing either did not yet exist or were only beginning to develop, so that we have scanty sources on those times.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, numerous scholars who painstakingly collected evidence about the life of ancient peoples in different parts of the world, have gathered enough information for us to trace the general outlines of the historical processes developing in the remote past.&lt;br /&gt;
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Excavations of ancient settlements and burial places and the implements, utensils, ornaments, bones of the animals which primitive men hunted, and other relics found by archaeologists help to reconstruct a picture of our remote ancestors, community life, their activities and way of life.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although the instruments of labour were very primitive at that time (they were usually made of stone or wood), men got food for themselves with their aid and successfully hunted big, strong beasts. How did they manage to do it?  Men lived in large communities, hunting animals and gathering wild plants together. Without mutual assistance, they could never have survived because they would have been helpless against predators lying in wait for them at every turn.&lt;br /&gt;
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Primitive society knew no division into classes, no subjection and oppression, no exploitation. People provided the means of subsistence for themselves by common effort and consumed them also in common.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing general conclusions from concrete research, Marxism supplies the general picture of society&#039;s division into classes. The first class division occurred when the primitive-communal system disintegrated.&lt;br /&gt;
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Disintegration of the primitive-communal system and the emergence of class society was a lengthy process which did not occur simultaneously everywhere. According to historical evidence, class society emerged in ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the 3rd millennia B. C.; in India and China, in the 3rd-2nd millennia B. C.; and in Greece and Rome, in the first millennium B. C.&lt;br /&gt;
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Economically, class division of society was based on the surplus product which turned, with the passage of time, into private property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under the primitive-communal system, the productive forces—and so labour productivity—were at an extremely low level. What little was produced was almost immediately consumed.&lt;br /&gt;
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In those circumstances there was no basis for social inequality. When, as a result of quarrels between clans or their individual members, prisoners were taken, it was a problem what to do with them. To keep them in the community was usually impossible as there was not enough food to go round as it was. Nor could the prisoners be made to work for the community as there were no implements to spare.&lt;br /&gt;
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So prisoners of war were either eaten up (while cannibalism was still practised) or allowed to return to their own clans after hostilities were over, or, circumstances permitting, were retained on an equal footing with the rest.&lt;br /&gt;
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This continued as long as society did not produce much. But as time went on, implements were improved and labour became more efficient. Finally, production reached a level where man began to produce more than merely his sustenance. There appeared the surplus product, something over and above bare necessity, which had momentous social consequences for mankind, bringing about social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
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The surplus product meant that means had become available for maintaining and employing extra labour. Whereas prisoners of war had earlier been killed, they now came to be prized as a source of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although all this happened very long ago, Similar facts are still observable in our own time among some peoples whose development has been retarded for concrete historical reasons. Thus there is ethnological evidence that the nomad tribe of Masai in East Africa killed their prisoners for want of means to maintain them. However their neighbours, the Wakamba, who engaged in agriculture, were able to use slave labour. As they disposed of the surplus product, they had food and implements to spare for extra labour. Therefore the Wakamba did not kill their prisoners but turned them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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War prisoners were not the only source of slave labour. Besides them, the class of slaves was formed of debtors who failed to pay their debts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Why, one may ask, did they not share out the surplus product equally among the clan or tribe? Why did social inequality replace the equal distribution of products which had been the rule for millennia? The point is that products are distributed and consumed depending on the way in which they are obtained. The old hunting and fishing peoples procured food for themselves in large groups. Their primitive implements did not allow them to get enough to keep body and soul together single-handed, without their kinsmen’s assistance. Thus, at the early stages of society’s development, social production took shape, and its necessary consequence was social consumption, when the bag was at once equally divided among the members of the group. That was determined in the first place by the economic mode of life of ancient peoples and tribes.&lt;br /&gt;
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They had no conception of storing supplies because it was hardly practicable. The meat from the animals they killed spoiled quickly.  Of course, if sold, it could fetch money that could be saved. But at that stage money did not yet exist. Hence, the economic circumstances did not encourage thrift.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another reason why they could not accumulate supplies was that as very little was produced, nothing was left over, and there was nothing left to save. Besides, hunting depends on luck. A hunter may kill a large beast today and share with the others, or he may come home empty-handed tomorrow and be given a share of the others’ kill. Plekhanov observed that the custom of sharing is a sort of mutual insurance without which hunting tribes could not possibly go on.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the collectivist rules of behaviour, customs and traditions of the primitive-communal system stem from the predominance of common ownership.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, even in the context of this primeval collectivism, as more and better implements were made, individual production gradually made headway. In primitive society, weapons, clothing, food, ornaments, etc., had already become personal property. These articles are fitted for personal consumption by their very nature. To handle a spear, a bow or a boomerang with adequate skill, the primitive huntsman had to adapt himself to the individual  article, as well as adjust it to himself.&lt;br /&gt;
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The growing use of individual implements told on the standards and customs of social consumption. It may be assumed that by custom the bag was divided depending on each member’s contribution to the success of the hunt.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar customs have been observed among peoples whose development has been retarded.  If the quarry is killed by two men, the skin goes to the man whose arrow struck nearer the heart; the one who strikes the last blow receives the best cut, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the spread of individual-type implements and individual production, the primitive commune began to disintegrate and socia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inequality set in. As the social division of labour progressed, the primitive commune finally disintegrated and the tribal system was destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first major division of labour was associated with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of cattle-breeding (pastoral) tribes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At that stage, the cattle-breeders, provided they had large enough herds, already enjoyed a surplus over their own consumption. Exchange, which was earlier merely accidental and concerned only what was left over by chance, now became regular between pastoral and agricultural tribes. As a result, social wealth increased and more slave labour was used.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second major social division of labour occurred when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;handicrafts separated of&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom agriculture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Exchange thus penetrated into the community. Economic inequality increased, and, besides the division into free men and slaves, there appeared distinctions between the rich and the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
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As more products were made specially for exchange, the latter became a vital social necessity, rather than a practice among individual producers.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next major social division of labour was the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of mental from manual work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby mental work was monopolised by a tiny minority, by the ruling classes which took the management of production and public affairs entirely into their own hands. And hard physical work became the lot of the vast majority.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those were the main causes and circumstances underlying the division of human society into large social groups, into hostile classes.  How did the classes form?&lt;br /&gt;
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They formed in two ways. Firstly, they formed as there emerged in the clan an exploiting elite initially consisting of the aristocracy, and as impoverished members of the clan were turned into slaves for their debts. Secondly, they derived from the enslavement of war prisoners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us begin with the first way. How did the exploiting elite come to stand apart from the more or less uniform commune? Primitive men enjoyed approximately equal living conditions while heads of families and communities enjoyed equal social status.&lt;br /&gt;
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Common interests were looked after by functionaries under the supervision of society. They were concerned with settling disputes, superintending water reservoirs and religious practice. The functionaries were invested with certain rudimentary powers of government, but by and large they were merely the servants of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the productive forces increased and communities joined into larger groupings, the division of labour proceeded further, and special bodies were set up to take care of common interests and settle disputes. These bodies, which acted on behalf of the society as a whole, were isolated from, and might even be hostile to, individual communities, and they gradually became more independent. Eventually, this independence of public offices with relation to society evolved into domination over it. The former servant became master. Individuals who had risen to power merged into whole ruling classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second way in which classes formed was thus. As production developed, extra labour was required. At first, neither the individual community nor the larger society could provide it. The source of extra labour was found in war.&lt;br /&gt;
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Conquerors became aware that it was more expedient to spare the prisoners and make them produce the surplus product. With time, however, community leaders, who had the surplus product in their control, began to enslave their fellow-tribesmen by legal means which they devised.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such are the two principal ways in which classes formed. Their common result was slavery which was the first form of exploitation, typical of antiquity. Slave-owning society comprised three classes. The first class—the slave-owners—included the ruling aristocratic elite and later, a larger section of the rich. The second class was composed of freemen—farmers, cattle-breeders and artisans who usually became dependent on slave-owners. The third class was composed of a heterogeneous mass of slaves of different nationalities and languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus was society divided into the classes of the exploited and exploiters, the oppressed and their rulers.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Class Antagonism ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of all antagonistic class societies since the disintegration of the primitive-communal system has been one of the struggle between classes. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, nobleman and serf, capitalist and workman, in short, oppressor and the oppressed, were forever in opposition to each other, Waging an incessant struggle, now secretly, now openly, which ended either in the revolutionary remaking of society or in the destruction of the warring classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is important in this respect to note the role of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working classes in social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The question has often been posed in the history of social sciences as to the relative worth or even necessity of different classes in society.  This question has no single answer for all ages.  There was a time when the landed aristocracy was a useful and indispensable element of society. Then the bourgeoisie, inexorably produced by history, launched out against the landed aristocracy, smashing its political rule and itself gaining political and economic supremacy. Yet never, ever since classes emerged, has there been a time when society could dispense with the working classes. The names and social position of these classes changed, the slave gave place to the serf, and he to the proletarian, who, although not a bondman, had nothing except his labour power. The history of all antagonistic class formations shows that whatever modifications the leisure classes may undergo, society cannot go on without the class of producers.&lt;br /&gt;
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As antagonistic class formations succeeded one another, the forms of exploitation were modified, but the labouring classes ever remained oppressed. The crudest forms of exploitation were practised under slavery. The slave was treated no better than a draught animal.  He was deprived of every right, he could not have a family, and in ancient Greece he could not have a human name, only a nickname.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In his treatise on agriculture, Varro, the Roman writer living in the 1st century B. C., mentions in a most natural way that agricultural implements are divided into three kinds, namely, the talking kind, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., the slaves, the kind making inarticulate noises, e.g., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;xen, and the mute kind, such as vehicles. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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The class structure of feudal society stems from the following features of the latter. Firstly, the feudal economy was natural, tending to be self-sufficient. Secondly, the means of exploitation under feudalism was binding the peasants to the soil. The feudal lord who owned the land allowed plots of land to the peasants so that they should work for him. To get the surplus product, he had to have on his land peasants who had plots, implements and animals. A peasant who has no plot, no horse, no farm, is not a suitable object of exploitation.  Thirdly, the peasant was personally dependent on the lord. As he had land, he only worked for the landlord under compulsion. The feudal economic system rests on extra-economic compulsion, serfdom, the peasants’ legal dependence on the landlord, and their underprivileged position.  &lt;br /&gt;
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Under capitalism. society&#039;s class structure underwent a change. The feudal lord and the serf were replaced by the capitalist and the worker. Compared with the slave, who was wholly dependent on the slave-owner, or with the underprivileged serf, the worker is legally free. Nevertheless, his dependence on the capitalist is as great, only its form is different. The worker is deprived of the means of production.  All he has is his labour power, and he may make his living by selling it. The only one who can buy and employ labour in capitalist society is the capitalist. So the worker has nothing for it but to sell himself into bondage to the capitalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slaves and slave-owners, serfs and landowners, workers and capitalists&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;these are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal classes of three antagonistic class formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, viz., slavery, feudalism and capitalism. It would, however, be a gross oversimplification to view the class pattern of a formation merely as the relationship of the basic classes, i.e., the classes which express the essence of the dominant relations of production. No “pure” socio-economic formation ever existed, for every formation included some elements of the previous stages of social development, as well as seeds of the future socio-economic formations.  Classes which are associated either with vestiges of earlier production relations or with those which are just beginning to develop are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;non-basic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus in slave-owning society there were nonbasic classes of free citizens preserved from the primitive-communal system, i.e., small peasants and handicraftsmen. As the slave-owning system developed, these social groups disintegrated and joined the ranks of the lumpen proletariat. Under feudalism there were the social strata of artisans and traders organised in guilds and companies. In the later middle ages there began to form the bourgeoisie and the working class which were to become the basic classes of the next socio-economic formation.  In many capitalist countries landlords and peasants continued for a long time as non-basic classes. Prominent among the non-basic classes of capitalist society is the petty bourgeoisie.  Non-basic classes and other social groups join the class struggle on the side of opposite basic classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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How irreconcilable the basic interests of the antagonistic classes are is witnessed by countless and incessant class battles, armed revolts and other sharp conflicts which abound in history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slave-owning society was shaken to its foundations by gigantic slave rebellions. The uprisings under Aristonicus in Asia Minor and Spartacus in Rome have gone down in the history of liberation struggles as major landmarks symbolising the slaves’ splendid courage and dedication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many peasant revolts under feudalism also have gone down in the history of liberation struggles. Let us recall the famous Jacquerie in 14th-century France, when Jacques Bonhomme—the contemptuous name by which French seigneurs called peasants—got the feudal lords, from the South of France to Paris, trembling in their boots. We may also recall the German peasants’ uprising in 1525, which Engels regarded as the cornerstone of German history, the famous Russian peasants’ uprisings under Ivan Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin und Yemelian Pugachev.&lt;br /&gt;
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Proletarian movements have also left a deep mark on history. The uprising of workers in Lyons (France) in 1830, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in the 1840s, workers’ active participation in the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune, the first socialist revolution—such were the stages of the proletariat’s struggle in the 19th century. These movements showed that the proletariat had become an independent force in society capable of becoming the vanguard of social progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the class struggle pervades all of the most substantial aspects of social life, it naturally develops in its every major sphere, such as economic, social and intellectual spheres. Having studied vast historical material, Marx and Engels established that in all antagonistic class societies the class struggle develops along three main lines, taking the form of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic, political and ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; struggle. Each is waged by different classes to protect and defend their interests, but the methods of such defence are, of course, different.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the course of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the capitalists guard their profits, going to al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lengths to multiply them, while the workers fight for human working conditions and social security in illness, disability and old age. Even in this struggle workers develop a sense of solidarity, an awareness of the unity of class interests, and the rudiments of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The workers’ economic struggle, even if it should develop spontaneously, can grow into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;political struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This occurs where the state with its instruments of power joins the struggle on the side of the ruling class. Dealing with the workers by legal and extra-legal means, unleashing police reprisals and sending regular troops to put down industrial or student unrest and “riots”, the exploiters’ state introduces violence into the struggle, which is, as a rule, armed violence. Then the revolutionary proletariat is obliged to spearhead its struggle against the political machinery of the exploiters’ power, i.e., against the bourgeois state. The first step in the direction of political struggle is the political strike. Let us recall, for instance, the Obukhov defence in Russia in 1901. Such instances of workers’ economic action turning into political struggle are not infrequent in our own times.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet political struggle may be of different kinds, depending on its general line and goals that are being fought for. Policy in the workers’ movement may be of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reformist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or trade-unionist, as Lenin referred to it) or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kind. Reformist policy does not aim at taking society beyond capitalism. It does not affect the basis of property but confines itself to a struggle for improving workers’ living standards and extending their rights within the existing social system. Revolutionary policy, on the contrary, is aimed precisely at overthrowing this system through the proletariat’s struggle. That is why revolutionary policy alon&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; furthers the political maturity of the proletariat and the masses led by it. Whereas the workers movement arrives at a reformist policy on its own or under trade union guidance, it must be brought to a revolutionary policy by the party of the working class. Only such a party can raise the political understanding of the proletariat and its allies enough to make them aware that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production and the conquest of power by the proletariat are urgent goals of the day-to-day political struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Efforts to elevate the workers’ movement to the level of conscious and well-organised revolutionary political struggle encounter obstacles put up by the right wing of social-democratic parties and within communist parties, by opportunists and revisionists who would revise the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism.  Petty bourgeois and nationalist revolutionists (the leftists in the workers’ movement) are only good at revolutionary phrases, but are useless when it comes to consistent revolutionary policy. True to their adventuristic spirit, they sooner or later lose contact with the masses and either substitute provocations for the revolutionary struggle or swing it towards nationalism, running counter to proletarian internationalism. Therefore, in guiding the workers’ political struggle, Marxist-Leninist parties have to fight on two fronts, both against right-wing opportunism and left “revolutionism.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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At present, the chief danger the international workers’ movement has to cope with is that of the “left&amp;amp;quot; deviation of which the policy pursued by the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most notorious expression. Having embarked on nationalism, richly flavoured with Chinese racialism, the CPC leaders have long broken off with Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was pointed out at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: “Now it is far too little to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teaching; they are directly hostile to it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-101|101]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Maoists are seeking to bring about a split in the world communist movement and undermine the unity of the world socialist system.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our discussion of the proletariat’s political struggle naturally brings us to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problems. The political and ideological forms of the class struggle are closely interrelated.  Through their ideologists, classes justify their policies, i.e., their aims and goals. Ultimately, any policy stems from material interests, but its theoretical justification (the justification of class aims, goals, strategy and tactics) rests with ideology. Ideology is a sort of political compass.  It may contain illusory ideas, fallacious goals, groundless “grounds”, pipe dreams and vain hopes. All such things are characteristic of the ideology of classes doomed by history and leaving the historical arena.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is only one ideology which does not deal in illusions. It is the scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology of the working class. It combines the highest level of scientific objectivity with the maximum proletarian revolutionism.  This is the source of its strength and ever-increasing prestige.&lt;br /&gt;
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Scientific socialist ideology is opposed by bourgeois ideology, which springs from capitalism. Some elements of bourgeois ideology persist even under socialism, especially at its initial stages, owing to the fact that consciousness lags behind being, whereby some vestiges of the old linger in the economy, everyday life and social relations, and also owing to the influence of alien views penetrating from the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated: &amp;amp;quot;The positive changes in world affairs and the detente create favourable opportunities for the broad spread of socialist ideas. But, on the other hand, the ideological contest between the two systems is becoming ever more acute, and imperialist propaganda ever more subtle.&lt;br /&gt;
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“There is no room for neutralism or compromise in the struggle between the two ideologies. Here there is a need for constant political vigilance, active, efficient and convincing propaganda, and timely rebuffs to hostile ideological subversion.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-102|102]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Under capitalism, a law operates, according to which all the three forms of the class struggle are objectively bound to grow.&lt;br /&gt;
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In every antagonistic formation, the class struggle&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;whether economic, political or ideological—is the driving force of social progress. Its significance increases considerably after the political struggle is joined by the working class, the most revolutionary class in history. It takes part in the revolutionary movement as the exponent of the interests of society at large. This puts the working class in the van of all working people exploited by capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Historical Destinies of Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and also the socialist revolutions which took place in some countries after World War II, have dramatically confirmed the proletariat’s capacity to realise its ideals and become the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
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The overthrow of bourgeois domination can be effected only by the working class because its very economic circumstances prepare it for the overthrow, giving it the opportunity and sufficient strength to do it. Capitalist society splits up and scatters the peasantry and other petty-bourgeois strata, whereas it consolidates and organises the proletariat. The proletariat is the only class whose economic role in large-scale production qualifies it for the leadership of all working people, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;exploited&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and oppressed by the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The bourgeoisie can be overthrown only when the proletariat becomes the ruling class, capable of suppressing the bourgeoisie’s inevitable resistance and organising all working people to build socialism. That was what made Marx insist that the class struggle necessarily results in the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt; the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Marx, Engels and Lenin were always highly ironic about sundry projects for equalising the classes, bringing about a “harmony of capital and labour.” Exploding these castles in the air, Marx wrote that it was not the logically impossible &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equalisation of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; but the historically necessary &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;abolition of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which was the true secret of the proletarian movement.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-103|103]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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What does “abolition of classes” mean? How can classes be abolished? Have they not continued for millennia?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin associated the abolition of classes with the elimination of class distinctions. He wrote: “The abolition of classes means placing all citizens on an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; footing with regard to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens equal opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-104|104]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Abolition of classes is a lengthy process which occupies a whole historical epoch following a socialist revolution. It passes through a whole range of stages ending in the disappearance of classes. The socialist revolution overthrows the government of the exploiters, which paves the way to the abolition of classes. But however necessary, it is still, in Lenin’s view, not the most difficult task involved in the abolition of classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next important stage in the process is the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. According to Lenin, two important problems are solved in this period. Firstly, private property is abolished, which puts an end to the capitalist class. Secondly, the individual petty economy based on peasants and artisans is reorganised into a large-scale social economy. On the basis of socialist co-operation, the main class distinctions between workers and peasants are obliterated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first phase of communist society, socialism, immense efforts are made to overcome the remaining class distinctions. How this proceeds is clear from the recent changes undergone by the class structure of Soviet socialist society. In 1939, wage and salary workers and their families accounted for 52.5 per cent, collective farmers—44.9, and individual farmers and artisans—2.6 per cent. Twenty years later, in 1959, wage and salary workers accounted for 68.3 per cent, collective farmers—31.4 per cent, and individual peasants and artisans—0.3 per cent. In 1976, wage and salary workers accounted for almost 83.6 per cent and collective farmers for about 16.4 per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In future, as the material and technical base of communism is built and essential distinctions between physical work and brainwork are obliterated, the boundaries between the working class, farmers and intellectuals will vanish. Ail will become members of a classless communist society in which everybody will enjoy full social equality and an equal relation to the means of production, and there will be equal conditions of work and distribution and an equal opportunity for everyone to take part in managing public affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5. The State ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. The State and the Division of Society Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists would always depict the state as a body responsible for maintaining public order and safeguarding the interests of all classes and social groups alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This point of view is also current in modern bourgeois sociological literature. It is often expressed by the ideologists of the petty-bourgeois strata who seek to represent the modern capitalist state as a body extending equal protection to the rights of capitalists, factory, office and professional workers, farmers, students, and so on. They allege that laws enacted by the modern bourgeois state are equally acceptable to capitalists and workers, to the well-to-do and the poor. This state allegedly makes no distinction between the poor and the rich, between employers and wage workers.  They describe it as the “welfare state” providing for “social harmony,” “universal well-being,” and so forth. Advocates of welfarism try to bolster up their theory with examples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us suppose, they say, that the workers of a factory have gone on strike. The trade union has put forward reasonable demands for higher wages, better conditions and other improvements. However, should these demands be granted, the employers’ profits will suffer.  For this reason, the negotiations between the strike committee and the employers run into difficulties. Neither side will make concessions, blaming and abusing each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us further suppose that in the heat of the quarrel, a management representative loses control of himself, snatches a revolver from his desk and starts shooting at the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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What will happen then? Quite obviously, say the “welfare state&amp;amp;quot; theorists, police will be summoned to the factory. The capitalist who fired at the workers will be arrested and put on trial. The court will sentence him under the laws of the country to whatever he should get for manslaughter or armed assault.&lt;br /&gt;
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The description is usually followed by a list of countries and addresses at which similar incidents occurred. The readers are invited to check the facts and make absolutely sure that every word of it is true. The suggestion is that if the state were to safeguard the interests of the employers alone, it would not have punished employers for killing workers—it would have paid no attention. But the facts prove that the bourgeois state protects both the employers and the workers, and that it is committed to class reconciliation and class harmony. So say the advocates of the “welfare state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some acquaintance with concrete facts showing how the state has evolved will be enough to blow their arguments sky-high.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First, we must note that the state has not always existed. It did not exist at the primitive-communal stage. Peoples whose development was retarded by concrete historical circumstances and who knew no division into classes had no state either. From this it follows that the state appears when society becomes divided into classes, i.e., with the appearance of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In primitive society, people lived in clans, dominated by tradition, customs, the prestige, respect and authority of the elders. At times, authority belonged to women, whose position then was not subordinate and oppressed as it is in antagonistic formations. Yet never under the primitive-communal system do we observe a particular order of people setting themselves over the rest of society as its rulers equipped with a machinery of coercion, such as armed forces, prisons and other enforcement organs.  In a word, under the primitive-communal system, the state proper did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, its absence did not disturb the social routine nor result in conflicts upsetting public order or the social system. The primitive-communal system was not threatened with chaos. Although there was no state, there were strong communal links among people, and society functioned normally. The force of custom and the elders’ prestige were quite enough to keep society going without any special enforcement machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the primitive-communal system all people were equal, nobody had any privileges, and the elders received no remuneration for their services. Their reward was universal respect and obedience. Primitive society knew nothing of class conflict and therefore needed no organ of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History demonstrates that the state emerged only with society’s division into classes, i.e, into groups of people one of which can systematically appropriate the labour of another or, in other words, exploit it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main and decisive characteristic of a state is public, or political, authority, which is always the dictatorship of the ruling class.  And dictatorship is a form of government relying on force, i.e., producing the legal basis of its own activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Next come the tools or organs of political power, which include the army, the courts, prisons, the police, intelligence and counter-intelligence. The government which controls them is itself an organ of political power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like power itself, its tools are unmistakably of a class nature. Take, for instance, the bourgeois army. So that an army recruited from the people (as it must be, for the time of regular mercenary armies has gone—although, of course, mercenaries are still used by imperialists) could be set over against the people and should, if need be, shoot at the people, soldiers are deprived of political rights, isolated from the people and inculcated with  anti-popular ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the organs of power to be able to carry out the will of the ruling class, there must be well-trained officials appreciative of their jobs in the government apparatus. Top government positions are filled exclusively by members of the ruling class. To maintain its apparatus, the state imposes all sorts of taxes on the population. Taxation in the bourgeois state is naturally geared to the interests of the capitalists. The working people have to bear the brunt of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, another characteristic of the state is division of the population over territorial units, which has superseded the division into tribes and clans. However, neither territory nor population separately are characteristics of the state. This is obvious since the state is not eternal. It emerged at a certain point in history, and it will inevitably wither away. Population and territory, on the other hand, were there before the state appeared and will be there after it has withered away. Only all characteristics taken together enable us to tell whether or not a social formation is a state.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, the state arose because some classes felt the need to keep other classes under their own control. It arose from the conflict of these classes and is the tool wielded by the economically dominant class which, with the aid of the state, becomes also dominant politically and acquires, therefore, more means to suppress and exploit the oppressed classes. When society was first divided into classes, special machinery was required to safeguard the privileges of the ruling class. Such machinery for oppressing working people was first found in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;slave-owning state&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It gave the slave-owners the power to exploit the slaves. At that time, the communication service maintained by the society and state was undoubtedly poor, and mountains, rivers and seas were enormous obstacles to intercourse.  States therefore often formed within narrow geographical bounds. The state machinery was comparatively primitive, but sufficed to keep slaves in slavery and maintain the foundations of the exploiting social system.&lt;br /&gt;
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The state has ever been the organ of oppression of one class by another. Thus, the ancient slave-owning state was the state of slave-owners, serving to keep the slaves in subjection, the feudal state was the nobility’s organ for oppressing serfs and villeins, and the modern bourgeois state is the instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. This regularity is clearly traceable throughout human history ever since society split into the antagonistic classes of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
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Were there no states which were above society and relatively independent of the opposing classes? Were there no exceptions from the general rule?&lt;br /&gt;
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An example of such an exception is provided by 17th-18th century absolute monarchy which kept the nobility and the bourgeoisie balanced against each other. Another instance is Bonapartism under the first and especially second French empires which set the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. It must be noted, however, that a situation of this kind emerges during particular historical periods when the warring classes reach an equilibrium which allows the state to become relatively independent of both classes and to act, to all appearances, as a go-between for them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; However, such a situation prevails but for a short time. As the alignment of the class forces becomes more definite and one class triumphs over the other which has to yield its leadership of society, the state machinery must also make its choice. More correctly, it does not choose but is chosen by the class which has established its own domination. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.g., the French absolute monarchy of the 17th-18th centuries manoeuvred long enough between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, making concessions alternately to the one or the other. Finally, however, the victorious bourgeoisie took the state machinery into its own hands. Engels wrote: ”...The state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap.”&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-105|105]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Historical Forms of the State ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; We learn from history that the state took numerous forms. Even in the epoch of slavery, in ancient Greece and Rome, advanced countries of their day, we encounter different forms of state. There appeared at that time &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;monarchy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;republic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;aristocracy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. Monarchy is rule by a single person. In a republic, all organs of power are elected by the citizens.  Aristocracy is government by a small privileged class. Democracy is people’s power (from the Greek &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;demos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the people, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;kratos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;strength).  Contemporary politicians clearly differentiated between these forms of state. Supporters of one or another of them engaged in a tense political struggle. Yet, whether they were monarchy, republic, aristocracy or democracy, they were all slave-owners’ states. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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As we look at the history of slave-owning society, we see that, for all their different forms of government, the common denominator of a monarchy and a republic was that slaves were not considered citizens enjoying civil rights and duties and, moreover, were regarded as less than human. The state and its law were for the slave-owners who alone were recognised as citizens enjoying full rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slave-owning republics were organised on different lines. Some republics were aristocratic, some democratic. In an aristocracy, only a small number of privileged slave-owners took part in political life. In a democracy, on the other hand, all citizens (i.e., all barring slaves) played a part. These facts are essential, for only by bearing them in mind can we understand what the state is.&lt;br /&gt;
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The slave-owning system was superseded by feudalism, which was also of great significance to the history of the state. Under feudalism, the state began to serve a new ruling class, the nobility. The peasants, then the largest class, were bound to the soil. Only lords and gentlemen enjoyed certain rights, but the peasants had none at all. Their position was little different from that of slaves. Still, the serf had a cottage, in which he lived with his family, and a plot of land on which he was allowed to work part of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the middle ages, serfdom predominated.  But even then the state assumed numerous forms and both monarchies and republics could be found, although the latter were less numerous than in the previous period. However, the feudal lords who owned land and serfs controlled the state no matter what form it took. Clearly, neither the slave-owning nor the feudal system, where the majority was ruled by a tiny minority, could do without coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
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As under slavery so under feudalism the oppressed classes rose against their exploiters time and again. In medieval Germany, numerous peasant revolts finally developed into a real civil war against the landlords.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless both slaves and serfs were crushed by the state machine for neither had a. historical future and so was incapable of setting up a social system under its own control. The famous Leyden papyrus describes a victorious slaves’ rebellion in ancient Egypt.  But what was the result? The slaves partly replaced the slave-owners, seizing their wealth and turning them into slaves in turn. Thus the foundations of slave-owning society remained just as they had been.&lt;br /&gt;
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To maintain and preserve their rule, the landlords had to have a machine for keeping great numbers of people in submission. When a feudal state was a monarchy, it was ruled by a single person; when it was a republic, it was ruled by elected representatives of the nobility. That did not change the essence of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next important stage in the development of the state was capitalism. It began to emerge towards the end of the middle ages when, after the discovery of America, world trade expanded, extraction of precious metals increased, gold and silver became means of exchange, and the turnover of money helped to build enormous fortunes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Society was reorganised. Its division into lords and serfs was ended. The laws were proclaimed to be the same for everyone. They extended equal protection to all and protected property from those who had none.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, despite the change, the state continued as a machine helping the capitalists to subjugate the workers and poorest peasants, who were, however, nominally free. The capitalist state promulgated universal suffrage while bourgeois ideologists loudly denied that the state had anything to do with classes, contending that it expressed the will of the people.  All such doctrines merely glossed over the essence of the capitalist state.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever the shape, so long as it is a bourgeois state, so long as it preserves private ownership of the land, factories and private capital and upholds wage slavery, it remains a tool of the ruling classes for oppressing the masses. The working class has a very clear idea what it must do with this state machine. It must wrench it from the bourgeoisie, break it and replace it with new machinery serving the working class and its allies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, our examination of concrete facts bearing on the state’s development through the ages enables us to draw some important conclusions. Firstly, we have seen that the state arises with the appearance of classes. Secondly, the state has always expressed the will and interests of the ruling class. It is a machine for the oppression of one class by another. Lastly, every form of state—and they are rather numerous—must be judged above all in a class context. We must find out which class uses the state to ensure its domination and which classes the state suppresses.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. The Bourgeois State ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what can we make of the example cited at the beginning of this chapter? The incident during negotiations between the strikers and the employers clearly shows that we are dealing, in this case, with a situation in which the bourgeois state takes the workers’ part. After all, who was punished? A capitalist, a member of the ruling class. Does it not prove that the state can be above classes, reconcile them, smooth over class conflicts?&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact is that in this case, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and advocates of reformism quote the example of an individual capitalist.  The thing to do, however, is to find out the real essence of the bourgeois state, to see whether it serves society as a whole or merely the bourgeoisie. Supposing we assume, for example, that the workers do not negotiate with the employers. The strike committee declares that the factory now belongs to the workers, and the employers are simply told they are no longer wanted. What will happen then?&lt;br /&gt;
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Police will arrive in force to deal with the situation. Should the workers prove too much for them, troops will be sent too. The bourgeois state will do everything to show the workers that the principle of private property is unshakable. In practice, the state will defend the interests of the capitalist class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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The bourgeois state defends the interests of an individual capitalist insofar as he belongs to the capitalist class. But should an individual employer commit actions detrimental to the capitalist class as a whole, he may be sacrificed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, we are dealing with a situation where an individual employer commits actions which may harm the capitalist class as a whole.  One can also imagine the following possibility.  The employer&#039;s firing and shooting to death a strike committee member could provoke a storm of indignation among the workers, a spontaneous workers’ rebellion. Such a spontaneous outburst could well infect other factories in the neighbourhood. To suppress the disturbances, troops and police would have to be sent, and, naturally, the capitalists will incur damage as many factories come to a standstill and property is destroyed during clashes between workers and police.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, the capitalists would also sustain great moral damage, as the bloody clash with the people would shatter the faith in the “popular” character of the bourgeois state, the belief that the capitalist system, as its ideologists argue, most closely corresponds to “human nature.”  Therefore the capitalist class as a whole and its state may, and often do, sacrifice individual employers and capitalists, if it pays the class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our everyday experience proves the truth of the Marxist doctrine which regards the bourgeois state as a machine of subjugation used by one class against another, as an instrument of class domination.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Its Forms and Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx considered his idea that the class struggle inevitably results in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to be one of his major contributions to the doctrine of classes and class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was advanced for the first time by Marx and Engels in 1848 in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which mentions the “proletariat organised into a ruling class.” As a term, the dictatorship of the proletariat was first used by Marx in his letter to J. Weidemeier of March 5, 1852.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they expressed the idea of the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx and Engels could not yet answer the question as to what forms the dictatorship of the proletariat might assume and what was to be done with the old state machinery, for history had as yet supplied no answers. The 1848 revolutions in France, Germany and Austro-Hungary made it clear that the proletariat could hardly use the old, bourgeois state machinery. Moreover, the old state, geared to the exploitation and oppression of the masses, is a strong weapon in the hands of counter-revolutionary forces. Therefore, as they generalised the experience of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, Marx and Engels arrived at the conclusion that the old bourgeois state machine must be smashed in the course of the proletarian revolution and replaced by a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was still not clear what concrete forms the dictatorship of the proletariat could assume. The answer was supplied by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Paris Commune&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which was the first state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviets&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; appeared in Russia during the revolutionary battles of 1905-1907, and triumphed in 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
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Subsequently, world history produced yet another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat-the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people’s democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which triumphed in some countries after World War II.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that as the masses in capitalist countries fight for the triumph of the proletarian revolution they will create more forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat which will subsequently be established.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Demonstrating the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx emphasised that without it the working class could not hold power, suppress bourgeois counterrevolution, reorganise the economy and alter people’s psychology, or go over to communist formation.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Critique of the Gotha Programme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Marx showed that between capitalism and socialism (the first phase of communism) there is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transitional period&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which cannot be circumvented. The purpose of this period is to extend and complete the socialist revolution and build an entirely different economic system, alter the social structure of society, ridding it of the exploiting classes, rear a new force of intelligentsia, work a revolution in people’s minds, and ensure the triumph of communist ideology.  The political organisation of society during the period of transition to communism must necessarily be the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did history bear out the truth of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitable nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is safe to say that the truth of this doctrine has been conclusively confirmed not only by the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia but by the experience of all other socialist revolutions of the 20th century. The sole path leading from capitalism to communism lies through a transitional period, through an epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a weapon of the socialist revolution are many. They include sustaining and consolidating the political power of the working class; ensuring political guidance of society by the working class and its Marxist political party: suppressing the resistance of the exploiting classes, overthrown but not yet completely abolished; putting an end to economic anarchy; nationalising the principal means of production and organising the economy on socialist lines in keeping with the chief aim of building a communist society; carrying out a cultural revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, these tasks have to be carried out in the context of the class struggle against the international bourgeoisie and against the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The leading and guiding force of the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the party of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Guided by the experience of the young Soviet Republic, Lenin named following five forms of class struggle: (1) suppression of the overthrown exploiters; (2) civil war; (3) neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie; (4) utilisation of bourgeois experts; (5) inculcation of a new labour discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the exception of civil war which need not necessarily accompany socialist revolution, these forms of class struggle proceeding under the dictatorship of the proletariat have universal significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is indispensable to the triumph of the socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie will not surrender its power without a struggle but will persistently try to use its political experience against the socialist government of workers and peasants. For this reason, the triumphant march of the socialist revolution is always accompanied by subversion, sabotage and political conspiracies by its enemies. The dictatorship of the proletariat suppresses resistance from the remnants of the overthrown exploiters, providing the requisites of a complete moral and political unity of society. Once it is achieved, the dictatorship of the proletariat need no longer suppress these remnants. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that, important as it was, suppression was not the chief function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A socialist society is one in which there are no irreconcilable differences and no struggle is waged between the workers and the peasants, and between these two classes and the people’s intelligentsia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;civil war&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a form of class struggle in the transitional period. In the case of the young Soviet Republic, it was imposed on working people by the exploiting classes and was a terrible calamity and a great handicap to the people’s progress to socialism. The peoples of China also suffered under the heavy burden of civil war. Bur there was no civil war in the European countries which took the socialist path. Civil war, therefore. is a form of class struggle which need not necessarily occur in all countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us consider the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This mainly implies the peasantry. It would be a mistake to consider such neutralisation as a line for isolating the petty bourgeoisie politically from the revolution. Actually, it is a question of skilfully paralysing the possible wavering of the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie (particularly the peasantry) towards counter-revolution, with a view to enlisting the peasants’ participation in the building of socialism. All slogans moved by the Party on the peasant question served this purpose. It was no accident that the triumphant advance of Soviet power was given overwhelming support by the middle peasants everywhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience derived by the CPSU from its successful effort in winning the peasants’ support for the socialist revolution is of immense international significance. It is of special importance today to the developing countries and the national liberation movement with its emphasis on the agrarian question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;utilisation of bourgeois experts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in the interests of the revolution and socialism was a controversial issue in the young Soviet Republic. Many “‘left&amp;amp;quot; revolutionaries would not hear of it, being morbidly suspicious of all such experts. Nevertheless, life soon proved them wrong. Today, all socialist countries employ old experts. It only has to be ensured that they do not obstruct the country’s political course or serve any anti-socialist ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Last but not least comes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inculcation of a new labour discipline&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin considered this form of class struggle particularly significant.  And no wonder, for it has to do with millions summoned by the revolution to smash the old way of life. It is therefore extremely important to direct the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses towards building the new society and to inculcate a new attitude to labour, the state, and discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A line must be drawn between the expressions of the last-mentioned form of struggle in the period of transition to socialism and that under socialism. Whereas in the transitional period, the ideological struggle inside the country is an acute form of the class struggle, under socialism, when society has attained moral and political unity, the social basis of such acute struggle disappears. There remains, as Lenin wrote, the systematic &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;guidance of all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; working people. That, according to Lenin, also is a struggle, but a struggle of a particular sort, the overcoming of definite, albeit entirely different, resistance, and a quite different sort of overcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now the struggle is waged no longer between classes or social groups but between integral society and individual exponents of survivals of the past among its members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dictatorship of the proletariat develops along with the whole of society. In conditions of full-fledged socialism it transforms into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;state of the whole people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet history may be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition from capitalism to socialism; (2) the period of development from the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the state of the whole people (1934-1960); and (3) the state of the whole people which is developing, as the building of communism advances, into communist public self-government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Concerning the first-mentioned period, one must take note of Lenin’s idea that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lies in constructive, educational and organising activity of the state building socialism for the first time in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state of proletarian dictatorship begins its transformation into a state of the whole people as soon as the building of socialism is completed. The best documentary proof of this process as it developed in the USSR was the adoption of the 1936 Constitution—the Constitution of triumphant socialism. It gave expression to new principles of democracy, embracing the whole people. Unequal election quotas for workers and peasants were abolished, and universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot was introduced. Development of democracy under socialism is an objective process. Socialism cannot advance unless it extends and improves its democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process whereby the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat has developed into the state of the whole people was completed in the early 1960s as the result of the complete and final triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union. The working-class dictatorship in the USSR was not abolished but gradually developed, as socialism advanced, into a state of the whole people. The leading role played by the working class in Soviet society and the state is further developed in the process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the building of communism advances, the state of the whole people undergoes a good deal of change. Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1977, to give legal expression to the establishment of the state of the whole people in the Soviet Union, proclaims the right of citizens to take part in the administration of the state and society, and in the discussion and adoption of laws and the decisions of national as well as local significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This article is of special importance in that it gives tangibility to the provisions of the Constitution on who has the plenitude of political power, and the right to participate in administering the state and society in the USSR. To declare that political power in a country is vested in the people is not enough. Al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; constitutions have proclaimed it, ever since the time of the Greek city-states. Yet, the fact remains that through the ages it was just as Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed: ‘Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” The purpose of Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution is to name the concrete things which make it possible for the people to take part in administering the state and society. What are these things?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, it is the people’s right to wield political power. Political power in the USSR is exercised through Soviets of the People’s Deputies which are to be found at every level, from the Supreme Soviet at the head of the country down to the local Soviet of the smallest settlement. What does it look like in terms of numbers? In 1977, there were altogether over two million elected Soviet deputies. Furthermore, every Soviet sets up some standing committees which enlist the assistance of public-minded citizens in carrying out their work. To quote 1977 figures again, there were almost thirty million such activists involved in the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to administer effectively the state and society, the working people should not only take part in political decision-making, but also see how decisions are carried out. In the Soviet Union, this is done through a major social institute known as People’s Control. Its bodies, elected by citizens, are to be found at every factory and office, supervising the work of the management. In 1977, the elected bodies of People’s Control comprised nine million citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the people cannot be said to have all political power, unless women take part in administering the state and society. In the Soviet Union, women currently account for 31 and 35 per cent respectively of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, and for 48 per cent of the deputies of the territorial, regional, district, city, town, and village Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 6. Social Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Types of Social Revolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
When discussing the material life of society we mentioned that one socio-economic formation usually passes into another only via a social revolution. That does not mean, of course, that we must search history for a ‘slaves’ revolution” which ruined and shattered the slave-owning system. No such revolution actually occurred. Nor did slavery perish at the hands of the slaves, although its foundations had been thoroughly shaken by slaves’ rebellions. Slavery became a blind alley in mankind’s road to progress. It owed its downfall to its disgust for labour which wasted it away.  A society which has no respect for labour, has no future. It was because the slave-owning Rome was rotten to its core that the warlike barbarians conquered it so easily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social revolutions were performed when feudalism had to give way to capitalism, and in the current epoch of people’s transition to socialism; they are accordingly of two types, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois or socialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In the first-mentioned case social and political revolutions are spaced in time. As the capitalist economic system forms in the womb of fully-developed feudalism, it comes into conflict with the old feudal superstructure, thus necessitating a political revolution which will crown the social change—already accomplished under feudalism—with a bourgeois superstructure. For this very reason, there is no special period of transition between feudalism and capitalism for it proceeds, as it were, in the bowels of feudal society, so that the bourgeois revolution merely has to put the finishing touches to it by changing authority. This is why purely political bourgeois revolutions are possible, leaving intact the economic and social patterns of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is quite a different thing. In this case, the social revolution does not precede the political revolution but, on the contrary, begins unfolding only after the political revolution has been performed by the proletariat. Whereas the bourgeois revolution ends in seizure of power, the proletarian revolution merely starts with it. Whereas the bourgeois revolution usually has no comprehensive social and economic programme to offer, the proletarian revolution has one, and terminates in the construction of socialism. Whereas progress towards capitalism requires no transitional period, it is indispensable in the changeover to socialism. Lastly, whereas the bourgeois revolution merely substitutes a different form of exploitation, the socialist revolution sets out to rid mankind of all exploitation. That is why the bourgeois revolution does not even mention scrapping the feudal state machinery—the bourgeoisie takes control of the old state machinery and makes it serve its own interests.  To the socialist revolution, on the other hand, demolishing the bourgeois state machinery is the key task essential for establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough analysis of the history of revolutions enabled the founders of Marxism-Leninism to discover the objective laws governing the progress and consummation of social revolutions. First of all, let it be noted that the fundamental question arising in any revolution-the conquest of power-is resolved by revolutionary violence alone. This is a law of social revolution, particularly effective with respect to the socialist revolution. No ruling class was ever willing, or moved by compunction, to surrender its power to another class. As regards the bourgeoisie, there is ample historical evidence to show that it fights the revolutionary proletariat tooth and nail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The founders of Marxism-Leninism have discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal law of the social revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. As a general rule, a revolution cannot take place in the absence of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary situation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., without a national revolutionary crisis which breaks out when the lower classes can no longer bear the old way of life and are ready to overthrow the hateful system even at the cost of their lives, while the upper classes are no longer able to rule in the old way. Ina revolutionary situation, no class or group remains neutral. All social forces join in the struggle either on behalf of or in opposition to the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, not every revolutionary situation resolves itself in a revolution. That was what happened in Russia in the early 1860s, when the revolution was baulked by the tsarist reform of 1861. There was another revolutionary situation in Russia in 1914, but its development was interrupted by the outbreak of world war. Consequently, a revolutionary situation is not enough for a revolution to occur. Besides objective social changes, which are the essence of a revolutionary situation, subjective factors must also be present, viz., the revolution needs a leader in the shape of a political party, and it needs a real force in the shape of an alliance of the classes comprising the revolutionary people. Only given these conditions can a revolution be born out of a revolutionary situation and succeed under true and wise leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is Lenin’s classical formulation of the principal law of revolution: “... For a revolution to take place it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realise the impossibility of living in the old way, and demand changes; for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘lower classes’ do not want&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to live in the old way and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the revolution can triumph. This truth can be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters). It follows that, for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that the majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers) should fully realise that revolution is necessary, and that they should be prepared to die for it; second, that the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics (symptomatic of any genuine revolution is a rapid, tenfold and hundred-fold increase in the size of the working and oppressed masses—hitherto apathetic&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;who are capable of waging the political struggle), weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to rapidly overthrow it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-106|106]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. How the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Is Established ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We now come to another important question: Can the dictatorship of the proletariat be established peacefully? This question was posed long ago by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Marx accepted the possibility of the proletariat taking power in a peaceful way in Britain, the United States &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and the Scandinavian countries where no strong military or police state apparatus existed in the middle of the 19th century. It must be noted that such a peaceful way of taking power would still be a revolution, and in such a peaceful revolution the conquest of power would still have to be effected by force. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no less important to draw a line between revolutionary violence and the armed method of carrying out a revolution. The former is a necessary attribute of any proletarian revolution while the latter depends on concrete circumstances. Power does not have to be won by the proletariat by force of arms any more than a proletarian revolution needs to be accompanied by civil war. Neither is unavoidable. The dictatorship of the proletariat can, as history attests, be established peacefully, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a socialist revolution can proceed by peaceful methods&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theoretical account of this possibility was given by Lenin in 1917, in his April Theses.  Lenin wrote that under dual power which emerged after the February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution in Russia not only could the socialist revolution advance peacefully under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets”, but it was the only possible path towards the dictatorship of the proletariat under the circumstances.  Lenin indignantly criticised those who, in April 1917, called for an armed insurrection against the Provisional Government, describing them as irresponsible adventurers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some may object that peaceful development of the socialist revolution in Russia was interrupted in July 1917, and the proletariat had, after all, to seize power by arms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is quite true. But, firstly, the socialist revolution in Russia had indeed developed peacefully until July 1917. Secondly, Lenin&#039;s theory on the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat by peaceful means was dramatically confirmed by the 1919 revolution in Hungary, where a people’s government was established by peaceful means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may further be argued that peaceful development of the revolution in Russia was due to the unique circumstances of dual power that prevailed in the spring and summer of 1917, and that the Hungarian revolution, too, was performed in singular historical circumstances.  That is true. Even so, who can warrant that circumstances favourable to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat may not occur in future?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, the programmes of most communist parties in the capitalist world state that in contemporary conditions the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution is a real possibility.  This certainly does not imply any renunciation or revision of the problem of seizing power by force or by military means: the latter may become necessary just as it happened in Russia 1n 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there are two ways of solving the problem of power involved in a socialist revolution, an armed way and a peaceful way. Both imply the use of the people’s revolutionary force. Which of them a revolution will take will depend on the circumstances prevailing in the country concerned. Communists consider it their sacred duty to prepare the masses for either contingency. The military path calls for special preparation. The peaceful path is not easy either, the communist party having to help the masses to acquire sufficient political understanding and experience to tackle problems arising in a socialist revolution. Both methods were brilliantly mastered by Lenin&#039;s Communist Party in Russia. Both stood the test of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Which method is preferable? The choice depends entirely on the situation. If the possibilities of the peaceful method have been exhausted or, perhaps, are altogether absent, nothing remains but the armed way, which becomes a necessity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Should the revolution develop peacefully, does it mean that the bourgeois state machinery need not be demolished? As we mentioned, in the mid-19th century Marx considered that, as an exception from the general rule, that might be the case in Britain, Scandinavia and the United States in which the army and police were not greatly developed. In the epoch of imperialism, Lenin came to the conclusion that in all capitalist countries, the military and police machinery had attained full development.  Therefore, no exceptions should be made, and the rule&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i.e., the scrapping of the bourgeois state machine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;should become universal. It should even be smashed in the case of a peaceful revolution. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution imply that the parliament and all parliamentary institutions should be retained?  That too is determined by the concrete circumstances. Evidently, in traditionally parliamentary countries there is no pressing need to abolish the parliament either during or after the revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat can exist and develop quite well as a parliamentary democratic republic as it can now rely on the world socialist system to safeguard it from bourgeois counter-revolution and restoration of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Chilean tragedy,” the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated, “has by no means invalidated the communist thesis about the possibility of different ways of revolution, including the peaceful way, if the necessary conditions for it exist. But it has been a forceful reminder that a revolution must know how to defend itself.  It is a lesson in vigilance against present-day fascism and the intrigues of foreign reaction, and a call for greater international solidarity with all those who take the road of freedom and progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-107|107]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Recognition that the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected peacefully is of immense tacti&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;al significance in current conditions, serving to extend the scope of the labour and communist movements, increase the political understanding of the masses, and refute the bourgeois slander about the revolutionary movement and revolutionary theory. This thesis, now adopted by the communist parties of bourgeois countries, is a reliable weapon in their ideological struggle against leftist, adventurist trends in the labour movement seeking to push the working class and its party onto the path of adventurism and sectarianism. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Combined experience in the development of the world socialist system, said L. I. Brezhnev, proves that today the power is still the central problem the revolution has to solve. Transition &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;t&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o socialism is only possible if the working class and its allies use political power to abolish the rule of exploiters. Socialism can be victorious only if the working class, led by its Party, organises the masses for the building of socialism. It can consolidate its position only where people’s government succeeds in defending the revolution from the internal and external class enemies. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of social revolutions to human history cannot be overestimated. It was not for nothing that Marx called them &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;locomotives of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Revolutions immensely speed up the march of history. They make new social and political forces essential to society’s progressive development mature faster, resolve the contradictions that have been accumulating over the ages, and thereby clear the way for the progress of history. Socialist revolutions play an especially prominent role. They carry out the historic mission of liberating mankind from exploitation, abolishing social antagonism, ending the previously inevitable anarchy of social development, and eliminating all forms of the individual’s estrangement from society and culture. It must be noted in this connection that Marxist-Leninist theory emphasises a key point in revolutionary practice, viz., the creative and constructive nature of socialist revolutions. They close the prehistory of mankind and inaugurate the history of emancipated mankind consciously building a communist society and an entirely different type of civilisation.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 7. The Role of the Masses and Individuals in History ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. What &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s the People? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Society is a complex formation usually comprising diverse classes and social groups, each playing a different role in society’s development.  Under feudalism, for example, the peasants and artisans have to do the hardest jobs—they cultivate the soil, tend the cattle, produce food and clothing, build houses and provide luxuries too.  The nobles, on the other hand, engage in court intrigues, manage political affairs, vie for power among themselves, declare war and conclude peace, shine at balls. Which plays a more important part in history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We already know that human history is based on the production of material goods, in which the decisive role belongs to those who are engaged in it, i.e., to working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All material values available to society are created by their work. No doubt, their daily labours are less conspicuous than the doings of kings or generals; nevertheless, they are the real foundation of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A logical materialist view on history consists in recognising the decisive role of material production in society’s development and, consequently, the working people’s key role as the makers of history and the chief force of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The working people, who are the overwhelming majority, are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the masses. However, at different stages in history, a people does not comprise toilers alone. Generally speaking, the social strata constituting the people vary from one age to another. Therefore, to form a correct idea of what a people is, one must examine concrete stages of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primitive society&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which knew no division into classes and in which everybody had to work, all members of society represented the people. This pattern changes with the division of society into classes and the appearance of toilers and exploiters. The people comes to consist mainly of toilers, but at different historical periods it also includes the exploiting classes. One may say that the conception of the people denotes the social classes and groups jointly tackling progressive tasks facing society.  That was why during the transition from feudalism to capitalism the people included the bourgeoisie, which had an interest in the destruction of feudalism, as well as the toilers, i.e., the peasants, artisans and workingmen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History abounds in situations where the people rise up in arms to drive out foreign invaders. At such times, the people’s role as the saviour of the nation becomes particularly prominent. It was so when the Russian people fought to cast off the Tartar yoke, when they resisted the Napoleonic invasion, and in all similar cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The peoples—the Soviet people above all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;barred the way to Nazism, destroying it and thereby saving world civilisation from the threat of destruction. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since in class society the people is composed of different—often opposite—classes, it would be a mistake to consider it as a uniform formation.  Lenin cautioned against using the word (the people) “‘to cover up failure to understand class antagonisms within the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-108|108]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois countries&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the people is composed of the workers, farmers, progressive intellectuals, the mass of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. In many newly-independent countries and those fighting for their emancipation, the people includes appreciable sections of the indigenous bourgeoisie taking part in the struggle for national interests. Nevertheless, not all the bourgeoisie in such countries are part of the people. The so-called “compradore bourgeoisie”, subservient to and collaborating with the colonial powers and betraying the vital interests of their peoples, must be excluded. The compradore bourgeoisie is quite plainly an anti-popular force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation under socialism is altogether different: the people includes the entire population. This is not surprising because all anti-popular forces have been destroyed and society consists of the friendly classes of workers and peasants which are joined by the working, essentially popular intelligentsia. Thus, as socialism is being built, the social forces are consolidated. An example of such consolidation is provided by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which has shaped as a new historical entity. Formed of different nationalities, of two friendly classes and the intelligentsia, it is cemented by the unity of its vital interests, political views and moral standards. This unity rules out the possibility of class struggle within the people. That is one of the greatest achievements of socialism in the USSR. The unity of the Soviet people rallying round the CPSU indicates how far developed socialism has advanced along the road to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. The People’s Role in History ====&lt;br /&gt;
To comprehend the people’s role in history, one needs to understand how it contributes to society&#039;s material and spiritual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know that the people is the producer of all material wealth, both the means of subsistence and of production being obtained by its efforts. Engels wrote that nature was the mother, and labour the father, of wealth. But whose labour is it? Who works on the objects of labour and remakes nature, compelling the natural properties of things, the forces of nature to serve man and even creating new qualities and forces not found as such in nature? It is men, the working people, who are the most honourable and important on Earth. The people alone creates all material wealth of society by its labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then, what part does the people&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the working people above all—play in the system of production? First of all, let us recall that the workers engaged in material production make up a part of the productive forces. They constitute living labour. Without it, dead labour stockpiled in the means of production cannot return to life. Although the character of the productive forces does not depend on men’s choice, it is still the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; who, in conjunction with the instruments of labour (which may be individual or social, based on a division of labour or otherwise, involving simple or complex cooperation) actually &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;determine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the character of production and so of the productive forces in general. And this is an essential characteristic of material production, determining to a great extent the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us look at the working people’s role in production relations. It would be incorrect to assume that in economic systems based on exploitation the relations of production are represented merely by the owners of means of production, i.e, by the exploiters, not the workers. No doubt, the most vivid embodiment of capital are the capitalists. Nevertheless, capital in its bourgeois form (unlike usury capital, for instance) exists only insofar as the workers’ labour power is a commodity which the capitalist can buy and which is consumed in the process of production organised on capitalist lines.  Labour power is as essential to the capitalist economy as capital itself. Its owners are the proletarians—a class which has a decisive role in history—and which constitutes, in our own age, the bulk of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The capitalist mode of production breeds the proletariat and helps it develop into a world revolutionary force. That is the key point of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.&lt;br /&gt;
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Bred by capitalist society, the proletariat is the exponent of new social relations and a force which is to destroy capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The proletariat, i.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;., the main body of working people in capitalist society, is the producer of the material goods essential to that society and of capitalist profit (and with it, of capital&#039;s might in general). Simultaneously, it is the exponent of future economic tendencies and embodies the social character of production and other material requisites of the socialist system of economy. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Holy Family&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, defined the proletariat’s role very exactly. To history.  they wrote, the intentions of an individual or even a class do not matter, even if it is a class as strong as the proletariat; what matters is what the proletariat is and what role it is to play owing to its place in the capitalist economy. The revolutionary role of the proletariat as the grave-digger of capitalism, liberator of society and builder of socialism has objective grounds. The proletariat’s revolutionary character necessarily results from the conditions of its existence, from its place in the capitalist economy, and from the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Apart &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom being the producer of all material wealth, the people is also the object and subject of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. The history of society is above all the history of the people, and in this sense the people is an object of history. At the same time, history is made by the people. It is the maker of history, its subject. It makes history not by a whim or caprice but in accordance with the objective laws of social development. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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The people is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;decisive force in all revolutionary change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Every revolution in history was performed by the people. Even revolutions at the top performed by a narrow group always drew on the people’s discontent with the existing social institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
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For many centuries, the exploiting classes tried to keep the people from taking an immediate part in historical development, although they did not always succeed. Inhuman oppression again and again compelled the masses to rise against their overlords. It was not until the victorious proletarian revolution that the masses had become an active constructive force in history. As socialist society progresses, the people’s role as the architect of history, as a force building a communist society, increases.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The people makes an immense contribution to human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The people creates language—a method of stating and communicating ideas—in the absence of which there could be no culture of any kind. Apart from making common effort possible, language furnished the foundations from which spiritual culture grew.  It also furnished the source of folklore, the starting point of every national literature. The people has created marvellous songs, dances, sculptures, paintings, buildings. These masterpieces are the sources on which professional writers and poets, painters and sculptors, composers and architects draw. From their labours, the people have amassed a vast store of information about the external world, from which science has grown.&lt;br /&gt;
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In primitive society, with brainwork not yet divided from manual work, the people’s role as creators of spiritual culture is obvious. After society divides into classes and brainwork and physical labour become separate, the ruling classes spare no effort to limit the people’s creative effort and, isolating it from spiritual culture, monopolise the latter. That naturally hindered the people’s spiritual activity but never stopped it. The people—that perpetual source of creative talent&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is the creator of spiritual values in class society too. All prominent figures in the field of spiritual culture always found in folk art an inexhaustible source of ideas and images for their own work.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. The Role of Outstanding Personalities ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Thus the people is the decisive force of historical development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Yet history has preserved numerous records of outstanding personalities.  In the past, historians and social scientists were convinced that great men were the prime-movers of history while the people was an inert mass only brought into motion by them. The entire world history was reduced to the doings of kings, military leaders, politicians, and so on. Books on history, as Plekhanov observed, looked like Lives of Great Men.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every class in every epoch had its own ideas about greatness. In the view of the feudal ruling class, great men had to be of noble, preferably royal, blood. Hence all kings, emperors.  and so on, were great. Some rulers were, indeed, people of more than ordinary ability, but they were very few. For the most part, kings and queens were not particularly gifted and ruled merely by hereditary right.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalism, which swept out feudal privilege, has made wealth the yardstick of greatness.  But does a fortune make one an outstanding personality? Obviously it does not. The proofs are not hard to find, if proof be needed.&lt;br /&gt;
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If, however, we put class prejudice aside and take a sober view of history, we shall have to acknowledge that there were a fair number of statesmen, politicians and generals who left their personal mark on some events.&lt;br /&gt;
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While it holds that the decisive role in history belongs to the masses, historical materialism is far from denying the prominent role played by great men. Historical materialism only asserts that history is made by the people, not by great men. Some of the latter realised it. In a speech made in 1869, the German “Iron Chancellor” von Bismarck, referring to his friends who extolled his influence on events, said: “My influence on events with which I have had to do is in effect overestimated; but even so nobody has yet expected me &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;to make&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; history.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Outstanding individuals are themselves a product of history, of definite social circumstances which enable such an individual to display his abilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Plekhanov justly observes, most of Napoleon’s marshals had been strangers to military art before the French bourgeois revolution. One of them had been a fencing master, another an actor, and another a barber. In feudal times nobody would have expected them to make a successful military career. Napoleon himself would have died an obscure general or colonel.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, in order to play a prominent role, an individual must possess outstanding abilities. Yet abilities as such only potentially make an outstanding personality. This potentiality may be realised only given favourable social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Men do not pursue their historical activities singly. Social actions are performed by a mass of people. When several classes are involved, one of them usually assumes the leading role.  Thus, in the struggle against feudalism the people was led by the bourgeoisie. In the changed conditions of imperialism the exploited people fighting against the bourgeoisie is led by the proletariat. To ensure success to the struggle, a vanguard must be organised, consisting of the better-aware members of the foremost class, i.e., a political party of this class must be organised. As it functions, this party advances the more experienced and gifted of its members—political leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To recognise the outstanding role of communist party leaders is to acknowledge their authority, experience and foresightedness. The strength of communist party leaders lies in their close contact with the masses and in their capacity to express and defend the basic interests of working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, the people is not an anonymous mass, but a vast number of individual personalities, living, active architects of history. Then what is man, and how is he related to society?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Man Is the Sum of the Social Relations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism has introduced an entirely new conception of the social nature of the individual, proceeding from his intimate association with his environment. Of course, attempts to interpret the individual in close association with the Social environment were made before Marx—for instance, by 18th-century materialists. However, the first authentic scientific interpretation of the individual was given in Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx evolved the classical formula disclosing the social essence of the individual. The human essence, according to Marx, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is the sum total of the social relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This formula shatters abstract anthropologism, whereby both materialists and idealists vainly tried to discover and classify the specific features allegedly inherent in human nature. For the most part, their man was nothing but a copy of the biblical Adam, complete with halo.&lt;br /&gt;
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If man is essentially the sum of the social relations, then it is clear that every man is a child of his age, an exponent of its industrial, class, family, national, political, legal, religious and other social relations. Is the individual just a vessel for the social relations? According to the Marxist-Leninist view, it is by no means so.  Man takes an active part in the historical process. As regards outstanding figures, they are the torches kindling others or lighting the way for them. Maxim Gorky thus depicted Danko holding aloft his burning heart to give his people light.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This social conception of human nature underlies the Marxist approach to the unfolding and fullness of the personality. An individual exists and develops in the context of the social relations, actively asserting himself through them. As to the fullness of personality, this depends on one’s contacts with other people.  The more varied and intensive they are, and the more actively pursued by the individual, the more developed one’s personality will be. We must note at once that these factors should not be regarded as external to the individual. For example, one’s life activity is a personal characteristic, but it has a social meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the early stages of social development—e.g., under the communal system&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the individual was more integrated compared with contemporary man. The reason for this, Marx explains, was that the individual had not yet fully developed his relations, so had not yet put them in opposition to himself as independent social forces. This alienation of the individual from the social forces opposing against him starts at the beginning of civilisation and proceeds, becoming ever more complicated, throughout the history of civilisation, up to developed communist society. What, then, are the stages in this process? The explanation of this problem, too, was given by Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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“The relations of personal dependence (at first entirely primordial) are the first forms of society in which human productivity develops merely to an insignificant extent and at isolated points. Personal independence which is based on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dependence is the second major form wherein a system of comprehensive communal metabolism, universal relationships, all-round needs and universal abilities is built for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal unfoldment of individuals and the subordination of their common collective productivity as their common property, is the third stage.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-109|109]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These three types of relations between society and the individual are stages in the formation and development of man’s social essence. Capitalism destroys personal relations among men, changing them into relations in the world of things. Things as commodities dominate men and determine their relations. The capitalist division of labour and mechanised production have produced a man able to fulfil partial industrial or social functions but unable to fulfil himself in society as a human being. Communism alone wipes out the products of man’s historical development which cripple his independent personality and moulds an integral and harmonious personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Individual in Communist Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what is an integral and harmonious personality?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The eminent French utopian Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and other utopian socialists sought to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of human nature applying the law of varied employment. Indeed, one who has mastered several complex skills becomes a different person, the one-sidedness and disunity of his personality being overcome to some extent.  Fourier hoped that, in this way, the complete personality of the medieval artisan could be revived. That, alas, was but a romantic dream, which very soon crumbled. In the age of mechanised production, changing the proletarian back into the medieval artisan is out of the question. Even were such a reversion at all possible, it would be a step backwards in the historical evolution of both the individual and the relations of society and the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, if it does afford some possible development of the individual, varied employment utterly fails to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of the individual. What, then, is the answer?&lt;br /&gt;
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Unable to solve the problem for the whole of the nation, bourgeois sociologists have divided society into a mass of drudges and a creative elite which, they claim, alone can hope to attain harmonious development. Yet, can society afford to make all working people slaves so that a small elite can devote itself exclusively to intellectual endeavour? Can the individual be fully developed in this way? Quite obviously, this is a utopia, but, unlike Fourier’s noble dream, it is a reactionary utopia.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then where can we find a realistic programme for the full and harmonious development of human nature? Why does Lenin repeat Fourier’s words that in the society of the future everyone will know how to do everything? Is such a thing possible? Men will certainly continue to professionalise labour. Then what about the development of the individual?&lt;br /&gt;
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Man can and must be creative with respect to the things that mainly fill his life. Therefore the key to the problem is not quantity (numerous skills) but quality, i.e, making work creative and man a creator, turning ordinary activity into creative work. Then labour will not be a mere economic necessity but an indispensable need felt by every able-bodied member of society. Then what about man’s all-round development?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Putting the utopian and elitist approach to the problem aside, man’s versatility should be considered from the viewpoint of his most vital functions. What are they? Man must be creative, highly moral, highly cultured and physically developed. The CPSU Programme formulates all these requirements in the context of the current stage in the building of communism in the USSR. Versatility, from this standpoint, implies that the individual, as far as his activity and conduct are concerned, behaves actively, creatively, as a collectivist, and this gives him the greatest satisfaction. Can it mean, perhaps, the sacrifice of individual interests at the altar of communist duty?&lt;br /&gt;
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The communist world outlook and communist duty are of great significance to the moral make-up of the individual. Even so, the programme for the comprehensive development of the individual cannot be considered a simple realisation of communist duty. Anatoly Lunacharsky (the first Commissar of Education) recalls a remark Lenin made in a conversation when it touched on his model attitude to his duties. Lenin said: &amp;amp;quot;Need you tell an apple tree that it does its duty bearing fruit? When communist duty has become ingrained in the individual, it stops being a duty and becomes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; vital need. It will be a vital need for every member of communist society.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 8. S&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ocial Consciousness and Social Being&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Forms of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Is it not an oversimplification to say that social consciousness reflects social being? Is not the spiritual life of mankind much too complex to be reduced to this formula? That is how anti-communists usually attack this Marxist proposition. In general, can one bring spiritual culture, multiform as it is, into a system and reduce it to different levels and forms? Let us look at these problems and see if we can isolate the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal forms of human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first thing we come up against is the complexity and many-sidedness of this particular sphere of the life of human society. It embraces folk songs, epics, poems of all kinds, numerous literary productions, music, sculptors’ and painters’ works, scientific discoveries and inventions, sayings, and so on. Still, this enormous diversity is neither chaotic nor capricious.  Many scholars long ago expressed the idea that spiritual culture reflects the economic conditions prevailing in society. Marxism alone, however, was able to scientifically formulate this idea.&lt;br /&gt;
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The notion of spiritual culture is itself a little vague. For this reason Marxists have replaced it by the more exact notion of social consciousness. In this way, they underline the fact that all products of spiritual culture are the result of the activity of man’s consciousness. And since man is not isolated from others but is connected with society at large, in a great many ways, his conscious life appears as social consciousness, and the aggregate consciousness of the members of the given society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxism is based on the philosophy of materialism. This means that the question of the relation between mind and matter, between material being and intellectual activity is decided by Marxism in favour of matter, which is considered to be primary, while consciousness is considered to be secondary. With reference to history, the interpretation of this general philosophical principle is that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social being is primary and social consciousness secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This means that social being, i.e., men’s economic activity, material production and the relations formed by people in the process of production are at the basis of men’s spiritual activity. Social consciousness, i.e., the spiritual, ideological life of society, people’s varied views and ideas, political, legal, moral and other doctrines, reflects social being.&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall try to examine social consciousness and select its main characteristics. The first thing which strikes us is the policy of different states, the more influential political parties, numerous political conceptions, theories and views. The varied and complex totality of political doctrines, conceptions, programmes, views, ideas constitute the political form of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Closely linked to it is another form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. It is the sum of principles and rules of human conduct endorsed by the state. Law is the expression of the will of the ruling class and is strictly enforced by the state through its extensive machinery of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are, however, principles of social behaviour which are dictated not necessarily and not only by the state. There are principles of conduct and criteria of good and bad, of right and wrong, which are observed and shared by tradition and are imposed by custom, public opinion and the authority of society as a whole or of a particular group. The totality of such principles of conduct and the ideas of what human conduct ought to be constitute the form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ethics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acquaintance with recent publications, paintings, films, plays, etc., is part and parcel of the life of a modern person. Books, pictures, films, plays arouse either pleasurable or negative emotions and stimulate thought. The varied activities comprised in this area of cultural life are the form of social consciousness called art.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor can the life of a modern person be imagined without such a form of social consciousness as science, without scientific notions of the multifarious world around us. We appeal to science and scientists, advocate a scientific approach to the investigation of nature, society and thought, fight against unscientific methods, and proudly state that we live in the age of the scientific and technological revolution. We discussed the role of science in society at some length earlier in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
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A particular form of social consciousness which seeks to give us a general conception, a general picture of the world, a knowledge of reality as an integral complex system and furnishes a methodology for studying the world has been named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Philosophy plays an immense role in society.  We only need recall that during the great French revolution the third estate advanced to victory under the slogans put forward by 18&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;th-&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;century materialists and Enlighteners. We may also note that Marxist-Leninist philosophy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s the theoretical basis of communism. This alone attests to the extraordinary significance philosophy has in the life of society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, sermons, divine services, quarrels between supporters of different religious trends, and so on play a certain role in the spiritual life of society. This form of social consciousness is known in Marxist philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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These are the main forms of men’s spiritual activity or, to put it differently, the main forms of social consciousness. We shall now examine their association with social being. Since in class society&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;such as modern society is—political views hold an important place, we shall start our inquiry with this particular form of social consciousness. Let us begin with an example drawn from history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Ancient Greek biographer Plutarch tells us that Alexander, the son of Philip of Macedon, anxiously followed his father’s military operations. Philip annexed to Macedon one Greek city after another. Some of them capitulated after a long siege and others were taken by storm. As often as not, Philip bribed citizens to open the city gates to him. The successful king liked to say that a donkey laden with gold could take any city.&lt;br /&gt;
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With Greece at his feet, Philip was now planning an expedition against Persia. His ambitious son, Alexander, said bitterly that his father would capture all and leave nothing great or illustrious for Alexander to do. Alexander himself dreamed of conquest and saw himself as the builder of a world empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet Philip was suddenly assassinated and Alexander got the opportunity to carry out his ambitious plans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 334 B. C., Alexander of Macedon, who was twenty at that time, moved his troops into Asia Minor. For nine years (the campaign lasted till 325 B. C.) the peoples of Asia Minor, Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Central Asia and Northern India were plunged into bloody battles.  Alexander executed his plans relentlessly. He showed no mercy to whoever was bold enough to resist him, killing or turning them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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Alexander built the empire of his dreams. He destroyed the Persian kingdom and annexed its territories, conquering much of Central Asia and establishing his rule over Egypt. True, the Alexandrian empire did not last. In 325 B. C., Alexander, yielding to the demand of his spent troops, ended his expedition. In 323 B. C. Alexander died of fever. His generals began squabbling for power even before he was buried.  And soon the apparently mighty empire broke up into several kingdoms under Alexander&#039;s associates.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now look at the matter from a different angle, as many historians and social scientists did. Philip of Macedon decided to unite Greece under Macedon, and he carried out his intention. Alexander the Great wanted to create a world empire. Plunging many peoples into bloody war, he created it.&lt;br /&gt;
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It seems that a leader gets an idea, proceeds to execute it and finally carries it out. Then the idea comes first and is followed by the action of the masses which causes change in social being.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, nothing can be simpler than to explain the development of world history from the doings of politicians and the influence of political views and theories. Thus, Plutarch associates the rise of Athens—one of the principal cities of ancient Greece—with the expedient policies of the legendary hero Theseus, and ascribes the foundation of Rome to another legendary hero, Romulus.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, on going deeper into world history and examining the causes which actuated the outstanding personalities, such explanations prove utterly superficial. Let us examine the concrete facts associated with the activities of Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander.&lt;br /&gt;
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Philip of Macedon has gone down in history as the king who unified Greece. But what were the circumstances of the unification? Greece was weakened by incessant wars between its city-states. During hostilities, vineyards and orchards were cut down, crops destroyed, cities and villages burned. Internecine wars devastated Greece. Many historians related that villages lay in ruins, blackened stumps were all that was left of olive groves, the fields were overgrown with weeds. That was one reason why Greece was weakened. But there was another reason, which lay in the very essence of slavery. As the internecine wars went on, the number of slaves kept growing and for that reason free artisans and farmers became ruined.  Because slaves were much cheaper to keep, owners of large workshops employing slave labour were able to undersell the farmers and artisans. So small workshops were closed one after another while large shops multiplied. Farmers became ruined and their land was bought up by rich people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The masses staged rebellions. History has preserved the memory of an extensive rebellion of the poor in Corinth. The rebels killed the rich in the streets and wrecked their houses. The rich, however, triumphed in the end, ruthlessly suppressing the rebellion. Aristotle relates that the rich took this oath: “I swear to be the people’s eternal enemy and to cause it as much harm as I can.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Frequent clashes of the rich and the poor also contributed to the weakening of ancient Greek cities.  Many rich slave-owners were willing to accept the control over slaves and the poor. Therefore they pinned their hopes on the Macedonian kingdom in their neighbourhood, which was waxing stronger.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this made it easier for Philip of Macedon to unify Greek cities under the aegis of Macedon.  He took advantage of the fact that ancient Greece had been weakened by the devastating wars between city-states, as well as of the fact that many Greek Slave-owners accepted his rule, prising their wealth more than the independence of their native cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to Philip’s son, Alexander. In his case, too, we find internal causes which lay in the very social being of ancient Greece and determined Alexander’s activities. In the 4th century B. C. it was increasingly felt that the internal sources of slavery in Greece were fizzling out. In order to develop further, slave-owning society had to be constantly supplied with slaves. Most of the free poor in Greece either had been enslaved or served in different armies as mercenary soldiers. Moving into the forefront were other sources providing slaves, viz., wars of conquest, subjugation of neighbouring and distant peoples and their enslavement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we look closely at the progress of hostilities conducted by Alexander, at the development of his military expedition, we shall observe this increasing tendency. Each time he won a battle, a great number of slaves were sent to Greece. For example, after his first triumph over the Persians, Alexander sent 60,000 slaves to Greece. After a second successful battle he sent 90,000 slaves. The number of slaves increased with every city taken.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough examination of concrete historical evidence, of political leaders’ views and goals shows that consciousness can never be anything else but realised being, and men’s being is the actual process of their life. We have tried to illustrate it by the examples of two prominent political leaders—Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. This approach to the analysis of different results of spiritual culture shows that in every sphere the results of the activity of consciousness are always a reflection of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But human culture is exceedingly rich and varied. Let us see whether it is corroborated by examples drawn from other spheres of spiritual culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Social Psychology and Ideology ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have considered but one part of man’s intellectual activity, i.e., his political views, political consciousness. It reflects definite aspects of social being, definite social needs. Yet, intellectual activity is highly complex and is not wholly reducible to politics. In human spiritual culture, we can isolate such areas or forms of social consciousness as morality, art, religion, science, philosophy and law. We know from experience that different principles of conduct, imposed by morality, works of art, religious beliefs, philosophical views, rules of conduct prescribed by law, and, lastly, science, play a great role in our life. The question is: Do these forms of social consciousness reflect social being as unavoidably as, we have found, political views do? Does the objective law of the reflection of social being hold equally in their case?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we must note that it is quite insufficient to analyse merely the more or less theoretically formalised views such as political conceptions, philosophical doctrines, complex ethical constructions, and so on. In human society, immense significance is attached to men’s moods and feelings. And it is very important to grasp the fact that all ideologies stem from one root, viz., the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the given age, characteristic of this particular age, the totality of its manners, customs, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every development stage of the productive forces necessarily presupposes definite human relations in the process of social production or, to put it differently, it presupposes a definite social pattern. The latter, in its turn, affects men’s psychology, their habits, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals which must necessarily become adapted to the prevailing way of life, to the means of gaining a livelihood. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Society’s psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; always ultimately matches its economic system, being determined by it.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To clarify this idea, let us look at some illustrations from the history of French art and literature. Many art critics quite justly call the outstanding French poet and novelist Victor Hugo, the talented artist Eugéne Delacroix and the brilliant composer Hector Berlioz a romantic trio. Yet, not only did each of them work in a different field of art, but they were in general quite far apart. At least, Hugo did not care for music and Delacroix despised romanticist musicians. Nevertheless, the productions of these men who were so unlike reflected the same social sentiments. Delacroix’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dante and Virgil&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is pervaded by the same mood which prompted Hugo to write his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hernani&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and inspired the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Symphonie Fantastique&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of Berlioz.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why should Hugo’s writings, Delacroix’s paintings and Berlioz’ music be psychologically similar? The psychology of French Romanticism will be clear to us only if we regard it as the predominant mood of a concrete class existing in concrete historical circumstances. We shall see why this movement in art, which was essentially bourgeois, should have taken so long to win acceptance from the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact was that the contemporary French bourgeoisie failed to understand much of what its own representatives sought to express in literature and art. Nor is such difference of Opinion at all unusual between ideologists and the class whose tastes and aspirations they express. It explains many features of mankind&#039;s intellectual and artistic development. In this particular instance, this difference of opinion resulted, incidentally, in the “refined elite” holding the “hidebound bourgeois” in great scorn which still continues to mislead many art historians, who are utterly incapable of understanding the supremely bourgeois character of French Romanticism. This intricate relation, the influence of social being on social psychology and, further, on more clearly defined areas of social consciousness must never be lost sight of.  Unless we pay attention to these interrelations, much in human culture will puzzle us. For instance, in classless primitive society, men’s conception of the world, their tastes, all their habits, customs, feelings, notions, strivings and ideas were directly influenced by their production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; But in a society divided into classes, the immediate impact of economic activities on the spirit and especially on ideology is much less obvious. While Australian aborigines have a dance representing herb-gathering by women, no dance popular among French aristocratic ladies in the 18th century can be linked in any way with production activities because they engaged in none. To be able to understand what the Australian dance is about, it is enough to know what role herb-gathering plays in the life of an Australian tribe. But to see what the minuet is about, it is not enough to be familiar with the 18th-century French economy. The minuet is one of the dances expressive of the psychology of the leisure class. This psychology underlies most of the customs and “polite manners’ of so-called high society. At first sight, the economic life, social being, seems to be ousted in this case by purely psychological factors. That, however, would be a superficia&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; judgement, for one must not forget that the very emergence of leisure classes in society is the result of its economic development. It means that in this case too, social being retains its predominant significance. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class regards the lower strata with profound disdain, so that it becomes distinctly characteristic of its psychology. Medieval French lords, for instance, relished verses representing peasants as most repulsive creatures:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Villeins are monsters one and all,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As ugly as anything,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing fifteen foot tall&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And misshapen withal—&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Humpchested and numpbacked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants’ social psychology was in an entirely different vein. Indignant at the aristocrats’ arrogance, they sang:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are just as human as they,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And we can suffer just as much as they.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants asked: “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a word, each of the two classes looked at things from its own point of view following from its own position in society. The position of classes, their antagonism tinged the psychology—the totality of sentiments and aspirations—of the opposite sides. The more tense the class struggle became, the more it influenced the psychology of the opposite classes. So, one who wants to know the history of ideology in a society divided into classes must reckon with this influence, otherwise much will escape his understanding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Morality as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to morality or ethics which is the totality of diverse principles of conduct imposed by public opinion and the traditions, habits and customs established in society. Everyone knows from experience the great significance attached to these principles on which human conduct depends. We speak of some acts as good and of others as bad. We consider one kind of behaviour to be nice or good and another shabby or bad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no law that you must say good morning to your friends. If you don’t, you won&#039;t be fined for it. Lack of common civility, churlishness or hardness are not punishable offences. Yet everybody would rather be polite, tactful and sympathetic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everyone knows that there is nothing pleasant in being considered rude or conceited or in earning public disapproval. That is why people try to conform—or at least seem to conform—to the commonly accepted principles of conduct or morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the oldest form of social consciousness. It appeared in primitive society much earlier than art and religion, also very old forms of social consciousness. One may say that morality appeared with the first human community. That is clear because no community, however small it may be, can exist without a system of morals. For this reason, historians have found no people without at least a primitive morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is evidence of peoples with no philosophy or science, no law and hardly any art.  It is still open to question whether some had or had not religion. But every people had morality of some kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact attracted the attention of historians and ideologists long ago. As they tried to explain the origin of morality, some of them ascribed it to god or other divine sources and maintained that morality was fundamentally immutable and in no way connected with what we call the material conditions of men’s life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet if we turn to the history of moral notions and principles, we shall see that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morals change along with living conditions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. They depend on the productive forces and when the relations of production change, morals also change.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Collectivistic production relations under the primitive-communal system bred collectivistic habits and traditions and a collectivistic morality. When, however, the productive forces advanced and it became more suitable for the purpose of production that people should privately appropriate some things, i.e., when the relations of production changed, people’s notions also changed. Having private possession of something, which had been considered previously rather unnatural and unusual if not altogether indecent, now was regarded as ordinary and quite consistent with the social interest.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the foregoing we can conclude that people, intentionally or unintentionally, ultimately derive their moral notions from economic practice.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examining &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;S&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one must always bear it in mind that the class pattern directly affects morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, if we look at developed capitalist European countries, we shall observe different moral conceptions some of which are rooted in their past history and some in their present mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall come across, first, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Christian-feudal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inherited from the past and preserving some moral views of the age of feudalism.  This Christian-feudal morality is divided, in the main, into Catholic and Protestant morality, and these are subdivided into a whole range of sects, from the Jesuit Catholic and Orthodox Protestant to liberal enlightener. Alongside such moral conceptions we find &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern bourgeois morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and next to it &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; projected into the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In countries following the socialist path, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., those having built socialist society and those in transition from capitalism to socialism, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; gains precedence. It is based on collectivist principles stemming from the domination of common ownership which corresponds to the development of modern production. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists often reproach Marxists for allegedly denying morality, and say that Marxism itself is amoral. Such allegations intentionally or unintentionally distort the essence. of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxists deny that there is any eternal morality resting on immutable dogmas. They repudiate all attempts to impose on men a moral dogma of any sort as eternal, final, immutable moral law, under the pretext that the realm of morality has principles of its own which exist forever. Marxists maintain that every moral theory, every totality of principles of conduct is, in the last analysis, the product of society&#039;s concrete economic conditions. In class society, morality is always of a class nature: it either justifies the domination of the ruling class or, as soon as the oppressed class becomes strong enough, expresses its indignation against the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the most resolute form of protest against the exploiters’ government.  It expresses the interest of the working class and all working people. Speaking about communist morality at the 3rd Congress of Komsomol, Lenin said that communist morality was that which helped to demolish the old exploiting society and to rally all working people round the proletariat building a new communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communist morality helps the proletariat in its efforts to win a happier future for mankind, to build communism. It musters working people against all exploitation, against private ownership which puts in the hands of an individual that which is produced by society’s common effort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Under the primitive-communal system, with its collectivist principles, morality was also collectivistic. In class society, change in the class pattern told most directly on the moral views of classes and individuals. In socialist society, communist morality begins to develop. In a word, in this sphere of man’s spiritual life, in this form of social consciousness, the rule that change in social being causes change in social consciousness also holds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Religion as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing on Plutarch, we can reconstruct one of ancient Roman’s religious customs. Imagine the sun-flooded streets of ancient Rome. A procession is slowly moving along accompanying a criminal to the place of execution. The armed lictors, full of official importance, step beside the man, while a little way behind citizens follow, exchanging their impressions of the trial and discussing the impending execution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doomed man does not seem to notice anything. He is plunged in thought and already far from the turmoil of life. But what is this sudden commotion? Why are the guards trying to push the man into a by-street? Why is he looking round with a renewed interest in life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another procession is moving towards them surrounding the chair in which a Vestal is carried, a priestess of Vesta, the Roman hearthgoddess. According to Roman custom, a condemned criminal who meets a Vestal on his way to execution is not executed. The Vestal has only to swear that the encounter was unpremeditated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, human laws had to give way to what they believed to be divine law. This illustration tells enough about the importance they attached to religion. One could quote numerous examples showing the role religion played in the life of other people, in other countries, in other times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us recall the crusades conducted in the middle ages. Apparently to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims, thousands of crusaders massacred Muslims. Let us recall the massacre of St. Bartholomew (1572) when 30,000 Huguenots were killed in Paris alone because of religious strife.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is religion, which can save a condemned criminal’s life and destroy hundreds of thousands of innocent people? How should revolutionaries approach this important social phenomenon? How are these questions answered in Marxism-Leninism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us hear first what representatives of religion have to say—the theologians, who are constantly dealing with religious problems and preaching religious principles. How do they define religion?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most Christian theologians derive the word “religion” from Latin &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reverence, which is connected with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religare&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to tie back. From the theological standpoint, religion is the link between man and god. Religion appears as a totality of statutes, dogmas, cults, rites and principles of conduct decreed by god and binding a believer to god.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar view is shared by non-Christian theologians. The Buddhists, for example, believe that religion boils down to the dogma on the attainment of salvation by Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhist religion, to the principles of conduct laid down by Buddha, which promise salvation and subsequent union with Buddha.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Muslims, followers of Allah, religion is embodied in the rules and principles of conduct written down by Allah in the sacred book of the Muslims, the Koran, which vouchsafe to the believer communion with Allah and salvation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up, theologians hold religion to be a bond between man and god. But first of all it is necessary to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;prove&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that god exists. The point is, however, that there are no means of proving it, nor can there be any.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is this so? To begin with, there were numerous gods whom men used to worship, but then it turned out that these gods did not exist. To mention but a few, they were Bel, Anu, Astarte, Osiris, Isis, Horus, Set, Zeus, Poseidon, Hades, Apollo, Athena, Hera, Artemis, Jupiter, Mars, Janus, Vesta. The list is endless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ancient peoples had implicit faith in their gods. When the ancient Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates dared question the existence of the Olympic gods and deride them, they were made to pay dearly for it. Anaxagoras owed his life to the intervention of Pericles, a leading Athenian statesman. All the same, he was banished from Athens. Socrates was condemned for &amp;amp;quot;neglect of the gods” and died by drinking a cup of hemlock, as was the rule in Athens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christian, Muslim and other theologians are convinced of the importance of religion to mankind because they think that the gods in which they believe really exist. Facts tell us, however, that religious beliefs also played a great role where the objects of worship were clearly mythological, i.e., imaginary. From this it follows that the theological conception of the role played by religion in the life of human society is plainly threadbare. What role does religion actually play?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, religion is a part of the spiritual culture of mankind. Whatever book on history we take, whether written by a theologian, a bourgeois scholar or a Marxist, we are sure to find a section on religious beliefs in the chapter devoted to the culture of a particular people or the culture of some historical epoch.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, we come across religion mostly in connection with culture and those spheres of life which are directly associated with spiritual culture. To be precise, religion is one of the principal forms of social consciousness, one of the major components of men’s intellectual activity, of spiritual world culture. As a form of social consciousness, it is, in a sense, comparable with such important areas of social consciousness as politics, law, morality, art, science and philosophy. After all, social consciousness does not merely reflect reality, social being. It shapes people’s conduct, leading them to act in the way they do. Each form of social consciousness does it in its own way. This equally applies to religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels and Lenin did much to elucidate the meaning of religion. We are already familiar with one constituent of the Marxist definition of religion, viz., that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religion is a form of social &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. That, however, is not all. Marxism also establishes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;specific nature of the reflection of the world in religion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While all other forms of social consciousness reflect reality more or less adequately, religion alone is the form of social consciousness which gives a distorted, fantastic picture of the external world. Marx said that religion “is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantastic realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the human essence”, that it is the people’s illusory happiness, a perverted view of a perverted world, “the general theory” of that perverted world, its encyclopaedic compendium, “its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-110|110]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Concerning the particular quality of religion as a distortion of reality, Engels wrote: &amp;amp;quot;All religion...is nothing but a fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which contro&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-111|111]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is how religion reflects the world. Nevertheless, religion does not boil down to a general world outlook, a general view of the world. It also comprises an emotional, sensuous element, a certain emotional reaction to the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religion should not be conceived merely as some kind of faith in the world being built on a certain pattern and being ruled by gods or other supernatural forces. Religion is not just a definite interpretation of reality, a peculiar theory of the world, however much distorted.  If it were so, it would have been shattered long ago, for it would be easy to prove that this conception of the world has no foundation in experience and to replace these fantastic notions by a scientific conception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, quite apart from other things, religion is a definite attitude to the world. One who has religious notions of the world conceives of himself as part of this fantastic world with which he associates certain hopes, illusions and expectations. This complex of feelings bred by religion makes the latter extremely tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious sentiments refer to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is of a dual nature being an expression of helplessness, weakness and fear on the one hand, and of hope on the other, which sometimes grows over into religious protest, ecstasy and fanaticism. Writing of this level of religion, Marx underlined that “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;protest&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; against real distress.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-112|112]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in Marxist theory two levels of religion are differentiated, viz., the world-view level and the emotional level. Religious notions and ideas constitute the so-called mythological (or worldview) element of religion—a body of myths dealing with the gods, legendary heroes and all sorts of spirits, with their relation to the world and man, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emotional level of religion—just as its ideological level~represents a twisted, distorted level of human consciousness. Religion distorts not only man’s consciousness, his world outlook, but his feelings, his emotional responses to reality as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would not, however, be enough to dwell on these two levels of religious consciousness alone. After all, we have stated that the forms of social consciousness influence and shape human conduct. The distorted conception and perception of the world, inherent in religion as a form of social consciousness, compel man to behave in a similarly distorted, perverse, inadequate manner. A believer worships his god in a definite fashion, performing different rites, offering sacrifices and prayers, kneeling, etc.  All this constitutes the ritualistic or cultic aspect of religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious activity is not, however, confined to worship. Groups, organisations and associations of believers, the churches adopt a definite attitude towards society and social issues, participating in the life of society, social conflicts, the class struggle, etc. These activities are marked by the religious conception and perception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that religion is a highly intricate social phenomenon comprising several levels some of which are related to consciousness, and some to practice. These levels are the result of the twisted, distorted, fantastic reflection and conception of reality. That was what led Marx, after evaluating and summing up all aspects of religion, to conclude that religion is “the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;opium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-113|113]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Lenin regarded this as the key Marxist proposition on religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Religion is a form of social consciousness. It is a distorted, fantastic reflection of the natural and social forces dominating men, a reflection in which earthly forces assume non-earthly, supernatural forms. It is a more or less compact body of mythological-philosophical notions, religious psychology and religious ritual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. Art ====&lt;br /&gt;
Speaking about art, Marx observed that its development does not always correspond to the general development of society, with the development of society&#039;s material basis, which is the skeleton, as it were, of society&#039;s organisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, an inquiry into the social role of art inevitably poses questions. Why did peoples (e.g., the ancient Greeks) far less advanced than the modern peoples attain such superb heights in art? How can we explain the fact that works of art produced long ago (e.g., under slavery) still continue to bring people aesthetic pleasure? These and other questions require concrete answers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all it must be understood that the art of a particular age is connected with definite forms of social development. We know that Greek art not only drew on Greek mythology but was rooted in it. And mythology is nothing but &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;folklore&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; giving an imaginative and fanciful interpretation of nature and the fundamental notions of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But is it possible, in our own age, for anyone to entertain notions of nature and society such as underlay Greek mythology, for instance?  How would Zeus the Thunderer compare with the lightning-conductor? Or the god of commerce, Hermes with the modern banking and credit system? Or the other gods of Olympus, with the modern transportation facilities, machines and especially robots?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet, the marvellous works of ancient Greek art continue to bring us aesthetic pleasure to this day. Why? To the modern man Greek art is, in a sense, the childhood of humanity. An adult person cannot be like a child. Still a child’s ingenuousness has a great fascination for him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is why the childhood of mankind continues to attract us as a peculiar and unique stage of social development. Marx remarked that there were unmannerly children and precocious children. Ancient Greeks were normal children. Therefore the peculiar charm of their art does not conflict with the rather primitive environment from which it sprang. On the contrary, those were the only circumstances in which it could possibly grow, and it is inseparable from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because it is rich and varied, ancient Greek art does not perhaps make a very lucid example. And yet, even in its case we can trace the effect of the objective law that social being shapes forms of social consciousness appropriate to it, leaving its mark on the very productions of the art of ancient Greece. Let us delve even deeper into history and look at the age in which human relations were much simpler and clearer and the connection with material production was immediately observable.  Will the period of the primitive-communal system supply us with examples corroborating the operation of the objective laws discovered by Marxism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First let us see how man’s notions of beauty developed. In different historical epochs different peoples had distinct, often opposing notions of beauty. Things that are considered beautiful in one age could be considered ugly in another. Why? How did notions of beauty form over the ages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scholars studying art in primitive society almost unanimously note that animals’ skins, claws and teeth are greatly valued by primitive peoples as ornaments. It was not that they found their colour and patterns particularly attractive. As he decorated himself with an animal&#039;s skin, a tiger’s claws or teeth, a bison’s skin or horns, primitive man was showing others that he was as quick and strong as the beast he had defeated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such conclusions are corroborated by ethnographic evidence concerning the notions of peoples which are still at one or another stage of the primitive-communal system. Students of the life of North American western tribes inform us, for instance, that some tribes like to wear ornaments made from the claws of the grizzly bear, the most savage of the wild beasts found in those parts. The red-skinned warrior believes that the fierceness and courage of the grizzly bear are communicated to him who decks himself with its claws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This example confirms conclusion that the aesthetic notions of beauty in the remote past were directly linked with peoples’ production activities and everyday life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now consider another example drawn from ethnography. Again, it must be remembered that in a certain respect ethnographic evidence gives us an idea of the primitive-communal epoch. Certainly, no existing tribe whose development has been retarded and which has remained at a certain stage in the primitive-communal system for a variety of historical reasons can be identified with peoples which lived in that epoch. Nevertheless, they have something in common, and these historical analogies enable us to form an idea of how our remote ancestors lived.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know, for instance, that women of many African tribes wear iron rings on their arms and legs. Wives of rich men may wear about ten kilograms of such ornaments. From our point of view, this is certainly very uncomfortable, yet the discomfort does not prevent many African women from wearing such “chains” of beauty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why does an African woman like to wear these “chains”? The reason is that they make her appear beautiful to herself and to others.  This results from a rather complex association of ideas. The passion for such ornaments is observed among the tribes which have but recently left behind the Iron Age, i.e., those among which iron is considered a precious metal. And everything precious seems beautiful because it is associated with the idea of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is another example illustrating the idea of the beautiful current among some African tribes. The Batokas who live in the upper reaches of the river Zambezi consider it ugly for a person not to have removed the upper incisors. Where does this odd notion spring from?  It is also due to a rather complex association of ideas. Batokas part with their upper incisors to imitate the ruminating animals. We may think it a somewhat peculiar desire, but the Batokas are a pastoral tribe with whom cattle spells wealth. Hence the idea that what is dear is beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have quoted examples of various notions of beauty held by some peoples. At first sight, these notions seem to have nothing in common.  But in fact they have. The notions of beauty shared by primitive and retarded peoples reflect certain aspects of their social being, of their mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hunting peoples consider the claws, teeth or skins of the animals they hunt to be beautiful.  What is hard to get is considered beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peoples familiar with wealth and social inequality associate the idea of beauty with wealth and social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pastoral peoples, whose life is most closely connected with cattle, associate their ideas of beauty with the most valuable thing they have, cattle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We find further proof of the inherent connection of art and social being in other kinds of art. Thus many African peoples have the keenest sense of rhythm, an oarsman singing in rhythm with the movements of the oars, porters singing in rhythm with their steps, and housewives singing in rhythm with their corn grinders. Basuto women, who wear metal bangles on their arms, which tinkle at every movement, often gather together to grind corn, accompanying the rhythmical movement of their arms by singing. The beat is the main thing in Basuto music, and the more rhythmical a song, the more beautiful it is considered. That was also characteristic of our remote ancestors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is the beat important? The answer is that primitive men chanted in rhythm with their work, and every kind of work had a chant adapted to its rhythm. As the productive forces advanced, the significance of rhythm in work decreased, although it is not lost altogether.  In some German villages, for instance, every season has particular noises associated with it, and every kind of work similarly has particular music associated with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Generalising these facts, students of primitive art point out the close similarity between the economic conditions of our primitive ancestors and contemporary retarded peoples whose life and art form the subject of ethnography. What makes many works of modern bourgeois art hard to appreciate is the absence of any direct connection between art and the methods of production in civilised society. We must see, however, that this is the result of nothing but the development itself of the social productive forces, which causes the division of social labour between different classes. The fact that society has become more complex, that the connection between art and social being has become more intricate, does not in the least disprove the materialist view of the history of art but, on the contrary, provides fresh and convincing evidence in its support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to French society in the 18th century. The class nature of this society directly affected the development of French art, and thus the drama. In medieval France, just as in Western Europe at large, the farce was predominant in the theatre. Farces were written and performed for the people. They were an expression of the popular views and sentiments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the reign of Louis XIII, the farce began to decline. It was considered to be only good enough for lackeys and not for persons of refined taste. The farce was supplanted by the tragedy. Yet the French tragedy had nothing to do with the ideas and sentiments of the masses.  It expressed the views, tastes and aspirations of the aristocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Time passed, and the aristocracy began to decline. The spirit of opposition steadily spread among the bourgeoisie and began to make itself felt in art as well. The growing third estate (the bourgeoisie) was dissatisfied with literature and the theatre which it would like to see more edifying. It was then that the bourgeois drama appeared, contrasting the virtuous bourgeois to the depraved aristocrat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, we see that this form of social consciousness, art, is directly affected by the changing life of society, changing social patterns and class relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We could quote more examples to show that other forms of social consciousness also reflect social being. There is, however, no need for it as we have already given many illustrations sufficiently corroborating the objective law governing the development of different forms of social consciousness, which was described in Marxist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. Revolutionary Theory and the Revolutionary Movement ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion we shall dwell on one more problem which is essential to the comprehension of the relation of social consciousness and social being. So far, we have stressed that social consciousness reflects social being, and that different products of social consciousness are, to one extent or another, reflections of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
May we conclude from this that social being is merely reflected in social consciousness, as in a mirror? No, such a conclusion would be quite incorrect. Precisely such a position on the passive nature of social consciousness, ideas and the spiritual life of mankind has been ascribed to Marxism by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, of the classes which are hostile to the working class and working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By establishing the fact that social consciousness depends on social being, that social consciousness reflects social being, Marxist-Leninist theory has by no means belittled the significance of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having given a correct definition of social consciousness, Marxist theory also indicates its place in the life of society. One cannot transform society by transforming ideas alone. To make society better, to make life truly human, it is necessary to reorganise social being. And social consciousness plays a highly important part in it. It gives man knowledge of the methods of transforming life. Seizing the masses, social consciousness urges them to work for the transformation of reality. That is why Marx stated that &amp;amp;quot;... theory... becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-114|114]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== 9. The Ideological Struggle and Human Rights&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the previous chapters we considered mainly the philosophical problems which make up the theoretical framework of the Marxist world outlook. But, however abstract its propositions, philosophy is never isolated from life. It always performs methodological and ideological functions, helping men to find their bearings in the complex social reality and the battle of ideas.  Dialectical and historical materialism is no exception in this respect. Let us take a look at the battle of ideas in the 20th century and the place of communist and bourgeois ideology in this battle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History has witnessed numerous coups, discoveries, wars and revolutions which left their imprint on subsequent developments. But whatever happened, the exploitation of man by man remained, and all development went on within the limits of exploitative society. The working people who performed revolutions saw their hopes crushed as one form of exploitation was replaced by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, historical progress was bought at too dear a price. Marx wrote that the progress of history in antagonistic society was like “that hideous pagan idol, whe would not drink the nectar but from the sculls of the slain.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-115|115]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia radically altered the course of history, translating into reality the dreams of the best minds of humanity. It destroyed exploiting society and created a new, equitable social system.  The triumph of the Revolution implied the triumph of the progressive new ideology of Marxism-Leninism which became predominant in a huge country occupying one-sixth of the globe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Two Ideologies ====&lt;br /&gt;
Adversaries of the working class like to say that there would be no ideological struggle if the Communists had not invented it. History, however, testifies to the contrary. It shows that ideological struggle has been going on ever since ideological relations started among men.  It was pursued in different ways and its intensity varied from one historical period to another, but no matter how its forms and pitch might change, it has always been there, expressing the interests of different, and often diametrically so, social classes at all stages in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the emergence of Marxism, ideological struggle becomes more intense. At a time when communism was yet a mere “spectre haunting Europe”, its founders wrote: “All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-116|116]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as Marxism emerged, all forces of the old world united against it ignoring their own ideological differences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle increased especially after the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution. From then on, the bourgeoisie’s &amp;amp;quot;righteous indignation” at communist ideology went hand in hand with its hatred for the Soviet system, giving rise to a combination of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle against the Soviet Union has always had an important role to play in the overall political strategy of imperialism.  For some time the imperialists hoped that their military superiority would enable them to get the upper hand in the ideological argument by sheer force of arms. That superiority was, however, but shortlived. As the balance of forces in the world changed, imperialism was faced with a historical situation, quite new to it, in which all expectations to resolve the ideological antagonisms by military means were doomed.  As a result, the global strategy of imperialism had to be thoroughly revised and the ideological struggle, whose outcome is to determine the direction in which history will move, was put in the forefront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the theories of “erosion of socialism”, “national communism” (or “regional Eurocommunism&amp;amp;quot;), and so on. Ideologists of imperialism seek above all to discredit Marxism-Leninism and real socialism, and sow discord in the developed socialist society, the world socialist system, and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today socialist ideology is a major factor determining the intellectual climate in the world. Not only is it dominant in the socialist countries, but it also has millions of supporters beyond their boundaries. This undermines the ideological positions of imperialism and causes bourgeois ideology increasingly to lose social support. Viewed from this angle, the development of history over the past sixty years has been marked by a series of setbacks sustained by bourgeois ideology, while Marxism-Leninism has gained new ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Anti-Communism—the Ideological Weapon of Imperialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, it would be wrong and dangerous to underestimate the possibilities of bourgeois ideology. While imperialism’s ideological positions were undermined, the monopoly bourgeoisie and its pundits were looking for new opportunities of counteracting socialism, brainwashing the masses and spreading anti-communism. The ideological stock-in-trade of imperialism was thus modified and updated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the political and military-strategic context imperialism has to reckon with the changed balance of forces in the world and, as it still hopes to crush socialism some day, is compelled to manoeuvre, stepping up ideological subversion against the socialist countries and trying to &amp;amp;quot;bore socialism from within.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adjusting to the new historical situation, bourgeois ideologists have changed their methods of fighting Marxism. In view of the immense popularity of socialist ideas, they can no longer pretend that there is no such thing as Marxism or abuse it to their heart’s content or indulge in vulgar anti-communism. Having to tread more warily, they increasingly turn to Marx, extracting isolated fragments from his works and adapting them to their own ends.  It comes as no surprise that the more the influence of Marxism grows, the more persistent are the attempts to revise it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In recent years bourgeois ideology united with revisionism. The mounting activity of revisionism, both right and “‘left&amp;amp;quot;, is supported by imperialism and plays an important part in ideological sabotage against socialism and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism was and continues to be the chief ideological weapon of imperialist reaction. The anti-communists would like nothing better than to see the socialist system split and become “polycentric&amp;amp;quot; and to see the “erosion of socialism&amp;amp;quot;. They think that growing contacts with the West will cause new value orientations to emerge in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, bringing about a sweeping degeneration of culture in them which will furnish a lever for remaking socialist society in the spirit desirable to the West.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism has become more active in the treatment of problems of political democracy and individual freedom. This has resulted in a campaign over the imaginary violation of human rights in the socialist countries, in which the present US Administration and government bodies in some NATO countries take an active part. In the course of the campaign, pluralistic bourgeois democracy is presented as a model while the inherent vices of capitalism—social inequality, exploitation, inflation and unemployment—are ignored. In spite of bourgeois propaganda, the masses are increasingly aware that socialist democracy alone can ensure freedom from exploitation and give the people a decisive part in government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that even notoriously reactionary writers are beginning to realise that the primitive anti-communism of some years ago with its myths and bankrupt doctrines can no longer help the imperialist countries to work out an effective policy. The article of Prof. A. Dallin of Columbia University “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR” is of interest in this respect. Prof. Dallin acknowledges that the Americans’ notions about the Soviet Union ever since 1917 have been full of ignorance and incomprehension, and that leading US statesmen and journalists are under the spell of the delusion and prejudice created by their own propaganda machine.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-117|117]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar to other forms of bourgeois ideology, anti-communism is not due to some politicians’ ill will, although there is no reason to deny it either. Bourgeois ideology in whatever form is nothing else but a distorted reflection in ideology of real developments occurring in the world and, above all, in the capitalist world. And if we want to understand and explain modern anti-communism, we must turn to capitalist reality in which lie the socio-economic and political roots of contemporary anti-communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The American Realities and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
The crisis of the 1970s has proved again that the socialist system has indisputable advantages over capitalism. It has confirmed the stability of the socialist economy and its inexhaustible capacity for satisfying, unlike capitalism, the fundamental rights and freedoms without which man cannot exist. Modern developments have, undoubtedly, served to increase further the prestige of the existing socialist society in the non-socialist world and enhance the attraction of the historical example set by the peoples having rid themselves of social oppression and exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These circumstances by themselves could explain the purpose of the propaganda campaign which is to convince peoples in the non-socialist countries that things are not so bad at all, divert their attention from their own deteriorating economic and social position to the problems of political democracy, and to slander socialism once again in the hope of making it less attractive to peoples of other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor is that all. This bourgeois campaign sets out to undermine the socialist system from within, seeking out malcontents and provoking conflicts in socialist countries. It is also designed to split the international communist movement, setting some communist parties against others under the false slogan of “national”, “regional”, and other brands of communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is nobody’s secret that this propaganda campaign has intensified after the new administration in Washington came into office, and that from then on certain American officials and government agencies have assumed the unseemly role of leaders and inspirers of this campaign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact, unprecedented for many years, certainly requires explanation. And it can be explained from the situation which had shaped in the United States by the time the present administration came into office. Yet, the roots of this situation lie in the American political history of the 1960s-1970s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The shots in Dallas which killed President J. F. Kennedy rang throughout America, ushering in an era of major political crimes. No doubt, the underlying social causes which led to the degradation of American politics had taken shape earlier and were engendered by the social and the state system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, however, not only the assassination of a president on whom different social groups pinned their hopes which, incidentally, were never realised, that shocked the United States.  It was also the disgraceful game the US official quarters described as investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; It&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; would be hard now to say exactly what caused the prestige of state authority in the United States to fall—whether it was the assassination itself or the sheer inability of a government spending astronomic sums on maintaining an intelligence service in the country to protect its own prestige and immunity. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This amazing impotence of authority and absolute impunity of the actual sponsors of the crime, doubtlessly, set off a series of assassinations each of which was declared to be the work of one individual or another. The authorities were not at all abashed by the fact that more and more such “individuals&amp;amp;quot; turned up.  Yet, each assassination as well as stereotyped “inquiry” made opinion increasingly suspicious of the government and doubtful of its ability to protect its citizens and uphold their rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this coincided with acute racial and national conflicts which aggravated the home situation still more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The war in Vietnam, which American journalists now describe as the dirtiest war in American history, was another fact which had disastrous consequences for the home political situation in the United States. Its impact on the domestic scene, although not fully unravelled yet, was immense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only that US servicemen were sent to die for what was incompatible with the genuine interests of the American people, which was the cause of mass desertion from the army and the reason why young men of call-up age fled the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor was it that thousands of American soldiers involved in massacres in Vietnam received lessons in moral degradation which no people can escape unscathed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, above all, that the Vietnam war itself was a flagrant violation of American law which states that the US Congress alone may declare war (Section 8, Art. I of the Constitution of the United States). And the US Congress never declared war on Vietnam. The war just went on, swallowing thousands of American lives, while presidents issued orders they had no right to issue under the Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus for several years while that undeclared war lasted, the US Government gave the people a memorable lesson in violation of law and civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, another unconstitutional process was developing during the Vietnam war. It was the concentration of power in the hands of the non-elective White House apparatus. Joseph C.  Harsch wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Christian Science Monitor&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 11, 1976: &amp;amp;quot;The seizure of the policymaking function by the White House and its concentration in the White House staff has been a process which began slowly and cautiously....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“... It began growing again under John F. Kennedy, and exploded in the Johnson and Nixon era.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harsch mentioned in the same article that the outsized President’s office numbered 1,831 persons including 61 special assistants to the President.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation in which government of the United States is carried out not by the heads of departments accountable to the Congress, but the White House personnel accountable to the President, is, according to Harsch, causing anxiety to the Congress which, he writes, has “lost its ability to get at and help control policymaking”. It is not accidental that James M.  Naughton wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 29, 1976, summing up, as it were, the presidencies of Nixon and Ford: “Six years of imperial Presidency and two of executive restraint worked in combination to alter the outlook, change the tone and, to some extent, restructure the shape of the executive branch.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The entire process is unconstitutional, whereby the Americans were given a lesson in autocratic disregard of the law for quite a number of years. Prof. Neustadt of Harvard University, whose opinions are often cited by the American press, considers in the light of these circumstances the institute of presidency as a “kingship” in the sense that it makes the Americans react to it emotionally just as other peoples respond to monarchy.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-118|118]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prof. Schlesinger writes in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Imperial Presidency&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Boston, 1973) that “‘the Presidency has got out of control” (p. X) and is hardly constitutional as it is, and that to keep “a strong President constitutional, in addition to checks and balances incorporated within his own breast” ... “the vigilance of the nation’ is also needed, or the Americans will have an imperial presidency (p. 418). How serious a problem of the “‘crisis of government institutes” in the United States has become is also witnessed by the conference held in Los Angeles in the autumn of 1974 (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Center Magazine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Vol. VII, No. 5, 1974, p. 31). The conference discussed the crisis in the contemporary presidency. One of the speakers at the conference was Senator Walter F. Mondale (now Vice-President), who said that it was necessary to raise the prestige of the legislative bodies and “curb any President’s illegal use of the most sensitive law-enforcement agencies of the government: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency.... They are ... instruments of great potential danger to our constitutional liberties.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Watergate was another important landmark &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n the chain of events which have resulted in the “crisis of confidence in the institutes of government” in the United States. The long inquiry, which revealed flagrant violation of elementary rights and liberties, and Nixon&#039;s eventual resignation showed once again that arbitrary rule had become routine in American society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To this should be added sensational exposures of the violation of civil rights and liberties by the American intelligence service agencies both at home and abroad, and of scandalous instances of corruption and tax dodging by American politicians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this has resulted in a powerful civil rights campaign in the United States spearheaded against race and national discrimination and the war in Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In that situation, the American propaganda machine tried to rehabilitate the “American way of life&amp;amp;quot;, “American system of values&amp;amp;quot;, etc., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n connection with the 200th anniversary of American Independence. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This campaign was not, however, much of a success, the festivities being overshadowed by the disgrace of the Vietnam war and Watergate. The general trend of American propaganda at the time is well illustrated by an article in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; devoted to Independence Day (July 4, 1976). It said among other things: “Two years after Watergate and four years after Vietnam, friends who were then ashamed of the United States seem to be saying now that they see America’s better values surviving.” Such was the cold comfort that bourgeois propaganda-mongers offered to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Add to it a series of scandalous exposures of immorality, corruption and tax dodging on the part of some Congressmen and prominent politicians, which equally attested to the breaches of the law by the powers that be. Obviously enough, in such circumstances the leading American statesmen have no reason to pose as champions of legality, civil rights and freedom.  The campaign “in defence of human rights” in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is regarded by the present US Administration as a major means of diverting the Americans’ attention from arbitrary rule and illegality in their own country, as well as a means of rehabilitating the American state system both in the eyes of the Americans and world opinion at somebody else’s expense, by harming the peoples whose socialist system provides an effective alternative to capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech, “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress&amp;amp;quot;, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the new Soviet Constitution &amp;amp;quot;gives further convincing proof that concepts of freedom, human rights, democracy and social justice become truly meaningful only under socialism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-119|119]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Mature Socialism and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels always viewed socialism as a social system under which free development of every individual is the condition of free development of all, of society at large.  Developed socialist society today gives each of its members a wide range of rights and freedoms. To illustrate, the 1977 Soviet Constitution ensures citizens such rights as the right to work, to housing, to education, the right to enjoy cultural benefits, the right to submit proposals to state bodies and criticise shortcomings in their work, freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work, the right to associate in public organisations, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is ensured by the socialist economic system, steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, free vocational and professional training, improvement of skills and training in new trades and professions. The right to work is not a new constitutional right, it was granted to Soviet citizens under the 1936 Constitution. Is it a mere reiteration of the previous Constitution or are there some new points here? Let us look into this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proclamation of a constitutional right is, of course, a very important thing. That every citizen should have the right to work and to equal pay for equal work, irrespective of social status, race, nationality, religion, sex, etc., is certainly of exceeding importance. No one would deny that the political and legal guarantees of this right are very important. Yet, they can be easily upset by the simple fact that there are not enough jobs in the country. Then labour exchanges will be overcrowded, newspapers will be full of advertisements placed by people looking for work, and there will be hundreds of thousands or even millions jobless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, the right to work has social and economic, as well as political and legal, guarantees. It means that the socio-economic structure of Soviet society (public ownership of the basic means of production, economic planning, crisis-free economic development) is such that since 1930 there has been no unemployment in the Soviet Union. All labour exchanges there closed in 1930 as nobody wanted them any more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in order to understand the full implication of the right to work in the Soviet Union it is not enough to know merely one, albeit essential, fact that unemployment was abolished there. The Soviet state provides employment for all of its citizens. The new Soviet Constitution considerably extends the content of the right to work, stating that at the current stage the Soviet state can do much more to provide favourable conditions for its implementation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today the Soviet state not only provides employment for all citizens, but also commits itself to make it possible for citizens to choose their trade or profession in accordance with their inclinations and be trained accordingly.  This is ensured by the wide network of state-run vocational schools with training free of charge. As for those who already have a trade or profession, the state gives them every opportunity to improve their skills or train for another occupation. Practically every enterprise—certainly every medium-sized or large one has numerous programmes for skill improvement and schools, including technical secondary schools, at which one can train in a new trade or greatly improve his qualifications without giving up his job. Many enterprises have technical higher schools. Training is, of course, gratuitous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of diverse political, legal, social and economic measures, including the abolition of unemployment, creation of new jobs on a mass scale and free vocational training throughout the country, demand for labour in the Soviet Union exceeds the supply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to housing&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a new constitutional right not to be confused with the article on the inviolability of the homes of citizens which can be found in nearly every constitution. What does this innovation in constitutional law mean?  Why was this right not mentioned in the previous Soviet Constitution? It was due above all to the fact that the available housing the Soviet Union inherited from the tsarist regime was insufficient. Although the Soviet Government did much even before the war for a fair redistribution of the available housing and launched the construction of new houses for working people, these measures were not yet enough. The Soviet Union lacked the industrial facilities for housing construction. Further, one must consider the fact that during the Second World War great damage was caused to the available housing, insufficient as it was. The Nazi invaders burned to the ground 92,000 villages and destroyed dwellings in 2,500 towns and townships. The Soviet state, naturally, had to spend time and effort to restore the ruined houses. For this reason it was unable for a long time to ensure its citizens the right to housing and had to limit itself to satisfying their elementary requirements in that respect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the strides made by the developed socialist economy, it recently became possible to launch the construction of houses by industrial methods. Let us see now how available housing has increased in the Soviet Union. The young Soviet state inherited from the tsarist regime altogether 180 million sq m of useful floor space in towns. This figure has by now been exceeded ten times, mounting to 1,860 million sq m. In the last decade alone, 34 million flats were constructed, which means that more than half the population and nearly three-quarters of the urban population live in new flats or houses. Since some people move into new flats and houses, those who remain in the old dwellings are less crowded, so the majority of working people have had their living conditions improved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Houses are built in the Soviet Union at an increasing rate. Whereas in forty-odd years, 1917-1959, only about 500 million sq m of floor space in state-owned houses could be built, 545-550 million sq m of floor space will be put into operation during the current five-year period alone (1976-1980). Such is one side of the problem, which is that at the current stage the Soviet state really can provide its citizens with comfortable dwellings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the problem is no less important. Rent in the Soviet Union is the lowest in the world, although it is paid for the use of modern dwellings with all conveniences.  Soviet citizens are astonished to hear foreign visitors complain that rent consumes more than a third of their earnings. In the Soviet Union, rent comes on average to 5-6 per cent of earnings. Since there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, and labour is in great demand, usually several members of a family have jobs and on this basis rent accounts at most for 2-3 per cent of the aggregate income of an average Soviet family. In many countries, as is known, apartment houses or tenements constitute a profitable industry. The Soviet state, however, has never regarded rent as an item of revenue. Both in the past and at the present time rent in the Soviet Union is expended on the maintenance and preservation of houses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great material possibilities for the construction of new houses and the social measures taken to ensure fair distribution of floor space at low rent thus make a real guarantee of the right of Soviet citizens to housing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was also granted under the previous Constitution. In this instance, too, the new feature consists in the much greater possibilities that now exist in the Soviet Union for the implementation of the right to education. In the 1930s, when the previous Constitution was adopted, the state could afford only four-year universal compulsory and free education and was just beginning to introduce universal seven-year education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At present, the shift to universal free ten-year education has been completed in the Soviet Union. Currently there are more than 167,000 general education schools, 4,300 technical secondary schools, and upwards of 850 higher schools. In 1977, there were altogether more than 99.5 million students in the Soviet Union, 49 million of them attending ten-year secondary schools. The total enrolment in technical secondary schools was in excess of 4.3 million, and at higher schools, five million. Education in the Soviet Union is free, and students of technical secondary and higher schools receive monthly government grants. Adults can get an education without leaving their jobs at any of the numerous night schools and night and correspondence technical secondary and higher schools and courses. Correspondence courses of higher schools and technical secondary schools have more than 1.5 and 1.2 million students respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The progress made by education in the Soviet Union stems from the development of socialist society, from the change in the life of the country which was launched by the Great October Revolution in 1917. They had built schools, colleges and universities and trained teachers in Russia before the Revolution as well. But they did it at a different rate. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Public Education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the official organ of the tsarist Ministry of Education, wrote shortly before the Revolution that it would take 180 years to abolish illiteracy among the male population of Central Russia, and 360 years to abolish it among the female population, also of Central Russia. As for the population of the fringes of the Russian Empire, the journal wrote, it would take 3,500 years to stamp out illiteracy among them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet government created an efficient system of public education which dealt with illiteracy within 19 years, and rapidly developed this system further in order to meet the growing cultural requirements of Soviet citizens.  Thus we see that the right to education is not only granted by the Constitution, but is also ensured by the effective education system that has been built under Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1977 Soviet Constitution grants citizens of the USSR the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to enjoy cultural benefits&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This is a new point in a constitutional law and a new constitutional right. It is not the customary article proclaiming the right to education which is to be found in almost all Constitutions round the world. This article goes far beyond mere education. It speaks of the opportunity to enjoy cultural benefits as of the right of every Soviet citizen, and of the guarantees of this right. After all, a well-educated person may remain culturally limited if he has no access to the treasures of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, treasures of national and world culture are accessible to all sections of the population. All museums and libraries are the property of the people, and the state of the whole people looks after their normal functioning and further growth. Before the October Socialist Revolution there were 76,000 libraries and only 180 museums in the country, and now there are 350,000 libraries and about 2,000 museums in the Soviet Union. Both libraries and museums are accessible to all. In tsarist Russia, however, more than two-thirds of the libraries and a great many museums were not open for the working classes. The Hermitage in Leningrad, for instance, which contains treasures putting it on a par with Louvres or the British Museum, was closed to ordinary folk for a long time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only were there few centres of culture and learning in tsarist Russia, but they were to be found mostly in the areas inhabited by Russians. Under Soviet government much was done to distribute them evenly throughout the country. To illustrate, there is an Academy of Sciences in every Union Republic, whereas previously there was only one Academy of Sciences, in the capital. There were 12 universities in tsarist Russia, situated mainly in the areas populated by Russians. At present, there are as many as 63 universities in the country, including Altai, Far Eastern, Bashkir, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Mari, Mordovian, Chuvash, and Yakut universities. The names alone show that in setting up these universities both territorial and national factors were taken into account, so as to ensure access to the benefits of culture in every area and to every Soviet people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 47 of the new Soviet Constitution reads: “Citizens of the USSR, in accordance with the aims of building communism, are guaranteed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This freedom is ensured by broadening scientific research, encouraging invention and innovation, and developing literature and the arts. The state provides the necessary material conditions for this and support for voluntary societies and unions of workers in the arts, organises introduction of inventions and innovations in production and other spheres of activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The rights of authors, inventors and innovators are protected by the state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we should like to call the reader’s attention to the fact that freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work is guaranteed to citizens “in accordance with the aims of building communism.” Why is the reference to the aims of building communism made in the Constitution? Is it not enough to proclaim a right and define it in purely legal terms? The point is that this is not an ordinary right which only needs to be exactly formulated. It is a right which is simultaneously a part of the main objectives of communist society. Many modern Constitutions grant this right as a mere formality, because today freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work is mentioned as a rule in important political documents. One finds it also in the Constitutions of states which cannot ensure their citizens even the right to education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is altogether different in the case of the Soviet Constitution. One of the major objectives of Soviet home policy is to build a communist society. The aim of communist society with respect to the individual is his all-round, harmonious development. And freedom of creative work is indispensable to the attainment of this aim. It is not enough to open wide the doors of secondary schools and universities and give a person a good education. Conditions must also be provided in which he will be not only a consumer, but also a producer of cultural benefits. And this is possible only when there is real freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work in society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much has been done in the Soviet Union over sixty years to enable citizens to exercise freedom of creative work. The workingman was barred from cultural benefits for millennia. He could not create them as he was illiterate and deprived. Even his consumption of cultural benefits was limited by the ruling classes to a pittance. Soviet government eliminated this historical injustice. It gave the workingman access to education, thereby giving him the opportunity to acquaint himself with the treasures of world culture. It also provided material conditions for spreading culture among the working people. It set up numerous educational and research centres belonging to the people, nationalised the theatres, art galleries, museums, conservatoires and philharmonic societies, and made them accessible to working people and their children. Freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work has a solid material foundation in the USSR. It currently has more than 850 higher schools; 350,000 libraries; 135,100 clubs; 154,000 film projecting units; almost 600 theatres; 94 circuses; 214 concert bureaux; about 2,000 museums; 149,000 amateur groups at trade union clubs. The new Soviet Constitution takes account of all this and sets the aim to provide ever better conditions for ensuring freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Western bourgeois press assiduously spreads the fiction that all public organisations except the Communist Party are banned in the Soviet Union. Practice as well as the relevant article of the Soviet Constitution on the right to associate in public organisations convincingly show that the allegation is groundless. Besides Communist Party branches, the Young Communist League and the trade unions, there are unions of writers, artists, actors and journalists, and numerous scientific, technical, medical, defence, athletic and other voluntary societies in the Soviet Union. We lack the space here merely to enumerate all Soviet public organisations. To name but a few, there are eight all-Union associations of workers in the arts, more than twenty all-Union scientific societies, thirty all-Union scientific medical societies, and numerous other public organisations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No wonder that there are so many public organisations in the Soviet Union. The life of modern society is complex and varied, and the interests, needs and aspirations of Soviet people are too diverse for any one organisation to cover them all. This explains why the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have been working ever since the Great October Socialist Revolution to provide and improve conditions for the function in a of numerous public organisations. It is not fortuitous that the new Soviet Constitution states: “Public organisations are guaranteed conditions for successfully performing the functions defined in their rules.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For illustration, let us take the All-Union society Znanie (Knowledge) which unites almost two million lecturers. It has a publishing house of its own, one of the largest in the Soviet Union, which brings out annually more than 400 different brochures and books to a total of over 25 million copies. The Soviet Writers’ Union, too, has everything it needs to carry on active creative work. Its central organ, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Literary Gazette&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, has a large circulation and enjoys great popularity. The Soviet Writers’ Union publishes numerous magazines, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Novi mir&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (New World), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Banner), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Druzhba narodov&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Peoples’ Friendship), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Voprosy literatury&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Problems of Literature), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Yunost&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Youth), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Koster&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Bonfire), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sovetish Heimland&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in Yiddish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet Literature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in English, German, Spanish and Polish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lettres Soviétiques&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in French), and so on. Besides these all-Union magazines, the Soviet Writers’ Union publishes magazines in the Union and autonomous republics, regions and territories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar facts can be quoted about numerous other public organisations functioning in the Soviet Union. Energetic, creative activity of diverse mass organisations is a feature of Soviet life. The new Soviet Constitution legalises and guarantees this characteristic of developed socialism. Thus practice shatters one of the fictions current in bourgeois propaganda and intended for people who know little or nothing about life in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, even a cursory glance at some of the rights granted and guaranteed under developed socialism shows that the prediction made by Marx and Engels about free development of all members of socialist society has been carried into practice. L. I. Brezhnev said: “The establishment of the principles of social equality and justice is one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolution. We have every right to say that no other society in the world has done or could have done as much for the masses, for the working people, as has been done by socialism! Every Soviet citizen enjoys in full the rights and freedoms enabling him to participate actively in political life. Every Soviet citizen has the possibility to choose a profession according with his inclinations and abilities, and to do work that is useful to his country and people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-120|120]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conclusion ==&lt;br /&gt;
The history of philosophical and socio-political thought is a record of hundreds of ideas and theories. Many old philosophers sincerely wished to point out the path to social justice and human happiness, as well as furnish people with knowledge of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, however sincerely they might try to help people, these philosophers remained alone or at best won a limited following. Whatever schemes for man’s happiness and welfare they devised, neither happiness nor justice materialised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the working class, at whose hands the world was to be transformed, had appeared in the world scene, it became urgently necessary to provide a doctrine showing how this historic mission could be accomplished. This doctrine was Marxism-Leninism which answered the practical questions posed by the class struggle of the proletariat, and not only explained the world but showed how to transform it. This doctrine, advanced in the late 1840s by Marx and Engels and carried forward in the epoch of imperialism by Lenin, has become today the world outlook of hundreds of millions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No romantic dreams or illusions, but rather the objective scientific analysis of reality which made it possible to determine goals for the struggle of the oppressed and exploited and the elaboration of concrete forms of this struggle have helped Marxism-Leninism to become an effective instrument for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The victorious socialist revolutions performed in a number of countries, the construction of socialism and the building of a communist society have become realities due to the fact that this titanic effort on the part of the masses has for its theoretical foundation the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which is the world outlook of the communist parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which was necessitated not only by the class struggle but by the progress of science, provides a truly scientific method of knowing the world and is the theoretical basis of scientifically building the new society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Born more than a century and a quarter ago, Marxism-Leninism has been going from strength to strength. It is strong because it is true, because it reflects the world correctly and gets to the root of things. This correct knowledge of the world owes much to Marxist philosophy. It is the profound philosophic justification of all fundamental propositions of Marxism-Leninism that distinguishes it from all previous theoretical conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was no accident that Marx, Engels and Lenin, who were great revolutionaries, politicians and economists and active members of the revolutionary movement, were also great philosophers who paid constant attention to the study and development of philosophy. That enabled them in times of social upheavals to find correct solutions and correctly determine the trend of social developments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy one can grasp the laws governing the development of the world, to understand, with their help, the intricate processes of social development, and to get a glimpse of the future, to foresee the course of human history.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= Notes =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-1|←1]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 1972, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-2|←2]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V, I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 287-88.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-3|←3]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 489.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-4|←4]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, edited by George Sampson, Vol. I, London, 1908, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-5|←5]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid. , p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-6|←6]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-7|←7]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 55.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-8|←8]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhaltnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, von E. Mach, Jena, 1906, pp. 8-9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-9|←9]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, London, 1956, pp. 195-96.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-10|←10]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1843, pp. 45-46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-11|←11]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-12|←12]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, London, 1931, p. 70.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-13|←13]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-14|←14]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-15|←15]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-16|←16]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-17|←17]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grohere Publikum tuber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, Berlin, 1801, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-18|←18]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 234.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-19|←19]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Science and Society, New York, Vol. If, Number 2, Spring 1938, p. 239.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-20|←20]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes in: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 1949, Evanston, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-21|←21]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1973, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-22|←22]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-23|←23]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-24|←24]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 348.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-25|←25]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1977, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-26|←26]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-27|←27]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, Moscow, 1972, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-28|←28]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-29|←29]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-30|←30]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-31|←31]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-32|←32]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-33|←33]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-D&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hring, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-34|←34]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-35|←35]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 262&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-36|←36]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-37|←37]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-38|←38]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 261, 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-39|←39]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 260-61.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-40|←40]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Louis de Broglie, Sur les sentiers de la science, Paris, 1960, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-41|←41]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Physics in My Generation. A Selection of Papers by Max Born, London and New York, 1956, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-42|←42]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-43|←43]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-44|←44]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-45|←45]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 285.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-46|←46]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Paul Labereune, L’origine des Mondes, Paris, 1953, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-47|←47]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Vorlesungen uber Naturphilosophie gehalten von Wilhelm Ostwald, Second edition, Leipzig, 1902, p. VIII.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-48|←48]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 270-71.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-49|←49]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, pp. 309, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-50|←50]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Evolution of Physics by Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, Cambridge, 1938, pp. 207-08.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-51|←51]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German, London, 1930, p. XLI.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-52|←52]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-53|←53]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-54|←54]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, historischkritisch dargestellt von Ernst Mach, Leipzig, 1897, p.  498.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-55|←55]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-56|←56]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Les Principes de la Philosophie, par René Descartes, Rouen, 1706, p. 92.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-57|←57]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: G. W. Leibniz, Ausgewahlte philosophische Schritten, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1915, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-58|←58]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-59|←59]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 69, 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-60|←60]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-61|←61]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-62|←62]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 245, 147.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-63|←63]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-64|←64]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-65|←65]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 69.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-66|←66]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-67|←67]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-68|←68]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-69|←69]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Henri Wallon, De a l’acte a la pensée, Paris, 1942, Pp. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-70|←70]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-71|←71]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-72|←72]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-73|←73]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-74|←74]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-75|←75]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 228,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-76|←76]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-77|←77]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 148.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-78|←78]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-79|←79]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-80|←80]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-81|←81]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-82|←82]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 93.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-83|←83]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-84|←84]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-85|←85]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: There are so many molecules in a glass of water that were it possible to mark them and pour the water into the ocean and allow sufficient time for the marked molecules to diffuse through all the oceans and seas, then, scooping up a glass of water from any sea or ocean, we should not fail to find about a hundred marked molecules in the glass.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-86|←86]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-87|←87]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 38, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-88|←88]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, Vol. II, Dublin, 1779, p. 163.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-89|←89]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-90|←90]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-91|←91]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 446.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-92|←92]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-93|←93]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-94|←94]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-95|←95]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-96|←96]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-97|←97]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, Pp. 12.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-98|←98]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-99|←99]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 56-57.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-100|←100]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-101|←101]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-102|←102]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, pp. 89-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-103|←103]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The General Council of the First International 1868-1870, Moscow, 1966, p. 311.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-104|←104]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, Pp. 146,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-105|←105]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, P. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-106|←106]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 84-85.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-107|←107]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, PP. 35-36.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-108|←108]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, pp. 111-112.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-109|←109]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Okonomische Manuskripte 1857-1858, Moscow, 1935, pp. 88-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-110|←110]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-111|←111]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-112|←112]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-113|←113]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See: K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-114|←114]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-115|←115]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1977, p. 499.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-116|←116]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-117|←117]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See A. Dallin, “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR”, Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 560-76.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-118|←118]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The New York Times, March 28. 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-119|←119]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-120|←120]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   L. I. Brezhnev, &amp;amp;quot;The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p- 6.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about Philosohy]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Progress Publishers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Philosophy]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:ABC_of_Dialectical_and_Historical_Materialism&amp;diff=59326</id>
		<title>Library:ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:ABC_of_Dialectical_and_Historical_Materialism&amp;diff=59326"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T19:12:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added initial upload&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;This book presents in a popular form the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy—dialectical and historical materialism. It is intended for the people who are studying philosophy and are trying to understand the problems of our day&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Foreword ==&lt;br /&gt;
Many people are trying their best to grasp the meaning of the rapid changes occurring before their eyes and to understand how they are affecting their own lives. They are trying to develop their own view of the world and thus determine their place in it. But it is not simple to form a view of the world without knowledge of existing doctrines and theories. There are diverse theories explaining, each in its own way, the events occurring in the world. And it is vital, though not at all easy, to choose among them the one that is nearest to the truth and that is borne out by life, by the development of science and the real course of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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The authors will consider their task rewarded if this book helps the reader to comprehend the phenomena and events in nature and society and to form a scientific, Marxist world outlook.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Dialectical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;1. The Fundamental Question of Philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. The Gist of the Question ====&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1881, a man jailed for his active Opposition to the tsarist autocracy sat over a sheet of paper in a solitary confinement cell in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg, now Leningrad. The death sentence had already been passed on N. I. Kibalchich, and the day of his execution was not far off. But it was not of his doom he was thinking: his mind was on a fascinating scientific problem to which he had only just, so shortly before his early death, found a solution. There, on the sheet of paper, was the scheme of a jet-propelled aircraft, the first in the history of science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Twenty-two years afterwards, in 1903, the eminent Russian scientist K. E. Tsiolkovsky, who had elaborated in detail the design of the jet-propulsion engine, laid the foundations of jet-propulsion theory and demonstrated that jet-propulsion engines could be used for interplanetary flights. Thirty years later, flying vehicles with jet engines were constructed and tested. Soon jet planes appeared, and in 1957, the first artificial earth satellite was launched in the USSR. Following a series of unmanned space flights, the first manned spaceship with the Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on board was successfully launched.&lt;br /&gt;
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That started a new age. Jet-propelled spaceships set off for the Moon, Venus and Mars.  It could never have happened had the human mind not conceived the principle of jet propulsion and developed relevant scientific theory, and had it not posed to men the task of penetrating space. All man-made cosmic bodies are the products of scientific thought. And as thought need not necessarily be unique to earth-dwellers and there may be other beings in the universe who may well be our intellectual superiors, it is natural to suppose that other cosmic bodies whose origin is so far not clear to us may also be products of thought. Then why not suppose that the Earth with everything there is on it is also a product of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
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One could indeed make such a supposition but would it tally with the evidence of science and experience?&lt;br /&gt;
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Light travels 9, 440, 000, 000 kilometres a year. This distance is called a light-year. The Milky Way&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a giant cluster of stars and other bodies, of which the solar system is a part—has a diameter of almost 100, 000 light-years.  It moves among other clusters of stars (galaxies) which are vastly removed from it. The part of the universe which scientists can observe with the aid of powerful optical and radio devices has a diameter of 26, 000, 000, 000 light-years. This vast area is puny, compared with all other areas of the universe as yet out of the range of the available means of observation.  And the Earth, with its continents and oceans, plants, animals and human beings, is an infinitesimal speck in the vast universe.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to scientific evidence, life on Earth has existed but a short time compared with the Earth’s existence, while the living organisms make up but an insignificant part of the sum total of bodies we call the Earth. As for the human race, it is relatively young, having appeared just a little over a million years ago.  Space flights and scientific research have conclusively established that between the Earth and its natural satellite, the Moon, no living organisms exist, let alone rational beings.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hence, although the universe evidently contains an infinite multitude of life forms, only a very small part of them possess the faculty of thought. Modern science confirms Engels’ observation that “the time of organic life and still more that of the life of beings conscious of nature and of themselves, is just as narrowly restricted as the space in which life and Self-consciousness come into operation….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-1|1]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern science suggests that thought is merely one of the numerous products of the universe. The supposition that the universe, which is infinite in space and time, is the product of thought is hardly tenable. Supporters of this view may argue that our scientific knowledge is anything but complete, there being still much that we do not know. That is true enough. Yet, ignorance &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; no argument.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have thus come to a point which merits close consideration. To form an idea of a science, one should, first of all, be informed of the basic problems it is concerned with. In chemistry, for instance, the question of how atoms join and separate and how, as a result, substances undergo changes of composition, is basic to all other questions. Knowing this, we can already form a basic idea of the science of chemistry. It is so with all other sciences. To know the fundamental question a science &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s concerned with, is to know what it is about.  Hence, in order to form an idea of what philosophy is, we must find out what its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fundamental question&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is.&lt;br /&gt;
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All bodies and the mechanical, physical, chemical and physiological processes they undergo are usually described as material phenomena, or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Pride, shame, joy, and all other feelings supplied by our five senses, as well as thoughts teeming in the mind are usually described as ideal, or spiritual phenomena or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It has long been observed that man’s capacity to distinguish colours, sounds and smells, as well as his feelings and his mind improve with age, as his body develops and as he learns to perform diverse jobs, handling different objects and associating with other people.  Some grave bodily diseases cause aberration or even loss of consciousness while with the destruction of the body sensations, thoughts cease altogether. These facts show that spiritual phenomena are based on material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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Other facts have also been noted. When we say that a boy has smashed a window without meaning to, the idea is that he did not intend to smash it. This does not, however, mean that the hand threw the stone of its own accord, irrespective of the boy’s intention. Clearly, his action was prompted by some emotion or idea.  He simply did not aim the stone well and it hit the wrong object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Man is not a machine but a creature that thinks and feels. All his actions—reasonable or otherwise—are prompted by his emotions or ideas. Before making a plough and tilling and sowing the field he &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;thinks over&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; how it should all be done.&lt;br /&gt;
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The desire for freedom and anger at social injustice long ago caused slaves to rise up and fight their oppressors. Love of their country moved men to fight invaders to the death. The immediate source from which such actions sprang were, again, men’s ideas and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflecting on these facts, one was naturally led to conclude that material phenomena were the products of spiritual phenomena which were, therefore, decisive to human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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This view spread particularly when society became divided into the antagonistic classes of toilers, who worked hard and lived in poverty, and masters who did no work and appropriated the wealth produced by others. Education, science and art became the exclusive privilege of a tiny minority—the ruling classes. Their will became law, regulating the behaviour of everyone. That made it seem as if consciousness were primary in relation to the material life of society. Hence the conclusion was made that even outside society, indeed in the whole world, spiritual phenomena dominated material ones.&lt;br /&gt;
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Which then derives from which? The material from the spiritual, or vice versa? Does matter originate from consciousness or consciousness from matter? Which is primary, spirit or nature? Philosophers began to argue about it back in antiquity. This problem is the key to all other philosophical problems. The philosophers divided into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;two camps&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: those who regarded nature, the material world, as the product of consciousness, of spirit, which they held to be independent of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; those who regarded consciousness, spirit, as the product of the material world, of nature, formed the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist camp&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Engels said that the question of the relation of consciousness to the material world was the great fundamental question of philosophy as a whole, observing that it also involved the question of whether consciousness was capable of truthfully reflecting the world. The views of various philosophers will be discussed here later. For the time being, let us look at the main question, the subject of long-standing dispute among philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Faith or Knowledge? ====&lt;br /&gt;
What is primary&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;spirit or nature? If you ask this question of a believer, you may be sure of the answer. For God, whom he believes to be the creator and ruler of the world, is also, to him, the spiritual source of all existence.  True, the believers are unable to prove it be cause, taking religious doctrines on trust as they do, they put faith above knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the middle ages, when the church had political as well as spiritual power, the clergy persecuted scientists, throwing them into dungeons, torturing them, and burning them at the stake. Today, clergymen no longer deny the importance of science. Moreover, they claim that science is quite compatible with faith, although, unlike the immutable, exact and infinite truth of religious faith (as they describe it) scientific knowledge is unstable, inexact and limited. ‘Science has its limits,&amp;amp;quot; wrote the Metropolitan Nicholas. “It has to do merely with what one can see, touch and hear and thereby infer. But there is another realm ...  the realm of faith. Besides the visible world, there is one which is invisible. Science cannot reach it, but faith can.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course there is much in microcosm and space that we cannot see. Yet, it was science and not religion, that penetrated into the “‘invisible world” with microscopes, telescopes and other instruments and helped obtain exact knowledge of what was going on there. And the theologists’ “invisible world” is still a mystery, like the invisible clothes of the naked king Hans Christian Andersen wrote about in one of his tales. Just as in the tale, faith in the ‘invisible’ is only for those who would not trust their eyes, their ears and their minds.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is it true that knowledge and faith are compatible? What is the difference between them?&lt;br /&gt;
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In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;L’ile des pingouins&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; by Anatole France we find the story of a man with a charge brought against him in the absence of any evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
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“That Pyrot had stolen the eighty thousand haycocks certainly no one hesitated to believe.  They never doubted it as their ignorance in the matter gave them no reason to doubt, and doubt is impossible without a reason, because one cannot doubt a thing for no reason the way one can believe a thing for no reason.”&lt;br /&gt;
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In Catholic educational institutions the fol lowing rule is effective to this day: ‘‘We must believe that what looks white to us is black if the hierarchic church should choose to describe it so,... persuading ourselves that all this is just, and abandoning with unquestioning obedience any judgements to the contrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Jean Bodin, an opponent of medieval obscurantism, wrote in the 16th century that a student of mathematics who believed a theorem suggested by the teacher, without understanding it, could be described as having faith without having knowledge. However, once he had understood the demonstration of the theorem and seen its truth for himself, thus achieving knowledge, his faith was lost.&lt;br /&gt;
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A scientific assumption may prove to be inexact or even erroneous. But it is still knowledge, not faith, because the assumption was based on evidence, even though this was insufficient. That does not mean we should reject any judgement the reasons for which we do not know. Having thought it over and checked it thoroughly, we must establish whether it may be considered true or untrue. Refusing to control one’s thoughts, blindly following a sudden hunch, common prejudices, or even books is a false path in knowledge. To quote an example, communism, Lenin pointed out, is not blind faith in conclusions picked up from books, but views at which one must arrive after weighing and thinking over thoroughly what one has read comparing the conclusions with the proofs and satisfying oneself that the conclusions have been proved beyond any possible doubt. Lenin wrote: ‘““Communism will become an empty word, a mere signboard, and a Communist a mere boaster, if all the knowledge he has acquired is not digested in his mind,” if he accepted pedantically “the cut-and-dried conclusions he had acquired, without putting in a great deal of serious and hard work and without understanding facts he should examine critically...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-2|2]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The building of socialism, Lenin wrote, required ‘‘the really enlightened elements for whom we can vouch that they will not take the word for the deed….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-3|3]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Let us assume that we put the fundamental question of philosophy to one who has never heard of it before, and let us assume that he will say at once: “Certainly, matter is primary and consciousness is secondary”. The important thing then is to see how that person will prove his assertion and disprove the opposite idea. If he fails, we shall have to admit that it is faith, and not knowledge, on his part. It may even seem to him that no arguments can generally be adduced in favour of idealism, so that there really is nothing to disprove, while the truth of materialism is so obvious that it needs no proof. Actually, however, every philosophical doctrine gives definite reasons for its conclusions. If one is seeking knowledge rather than faith, one needs to sort out the conclusions and arguments furnished by different philosophical trends.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Materialism vs. Subjective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Here is the substance of one such doctrine: We have merely three types of knowledge: (1) that which we hear, see, feel by touch, etc., i.e., our sensations; (2) that which we conceive by reason of memory or imagination, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., our conceptions; (3) we also know ourselves, having an awareness of “self”, of “spirit” which is capable of sensing, remembering, feeling and dreaming. We have a notion of objects solely because we see or smell or feel them, i.e., because we perceive them physically. Without this ability, we would know nothing about the external world. When we see something round, yellow-red on one side and dark-red on the other, feel a smooth rounded surface and perceive a specific smell, we know it is an apple.  The sensations are all we know about this particular object. Thus an apple is nothing but a combination of sensations. Likewise, all objects we observe in the room, street, field or woods, i.e., all external or material things, are combinations of visual, tactile and other sensations.  &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;All&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we know about such things are our impressions of them. These impressions exist only in the mind. Men, however, regard a visual or other sensation as a likeness or image of an external thing. What they proceed from is that unless we acknowledge the existence of sensible things outside us, it is impossible to explain how sensations arise. Yet, when we dream we feel sensations, although the things and events we are dreaming of exist only in the mind. Therefore, to explain sensations it is not at all necessary to assume that things have an objective existence. As we need not assume this to explain dreams, so we need not assume it to explain what we feel in our waking hours.&lt;br /&gt;
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This doctrine which holds that everything commonly regarded as material exists solely in the mind of the subject (man) is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;subjective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as distinct from &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective idealism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which holds that the primary source of being is not man’s consciousness but consciousness without man, some objective spirit independent of human consciousness. We have just stated the reasoning of the subjective idealist George Berkeley (1685-1753), who wrote: “...all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-4|4]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; His teaching boils down to two points: (1) outside consciousness there is nothing, and (2) to exist is to be perceived; what nobody perceives does not exist. This doctrine conflicts with the materialist proposition that (1) apart from and independent of the mind there are objects which produce sensory reactions in us, and that (2) sensible objects exist even when they are not perceived by the senses.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us see what Berkeley, the most significant exponent of subjective idealism, has to say further. Asserting that notions emerge and are dropped solely at man’s will, Berkeley wrote: ‘‘But ... the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will.  When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see no, or to determine what particular objects Shall present themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-5|5]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In this Berkeley was perfectly correct. But from his words it follows that outside the mind there exist things which, acting on our eyes, ears, etc., cause sensations. In other words, sensations (which are phenomena of consciousness) entirely depend on the objects which cause them and which exist independently of the mind, i.e., on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects. That it is indeed so has been established by natural science. Lenin wrote: “...outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves... which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour.  This is precisely how natural science regards it.... This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-6|6]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Thus scientific evidence and the facts which Berkeley himself has to acknowledge prove &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the truth of materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. But even after recognising the independent existence of the source of sensations Berkeley remains an opponent of materialism. Defending religion, he addresses the materialists thus: ‘’...I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without, in a being distinct from ourselves.... But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit, you Matter...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-7|7]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus to prop up faith in the primacy of spirit, Berkeley has to forego both logic and science and have recourse to god. Yet, while he asserts that god exists, he gives no proof of his existence&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;god is absent from the list of objects of knowledge with which Berkeley opens his discourse. After promising to present philosophical knowledge the truth of which has been demonstrated, he presents us with a proposition to be taken on trust.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, as he maintains that god is an independent source of sensations, Berkeley acknowledges by the same token that something which exists outside and independently of mind produces sensation; that the object producing the sensations exists whether or not it is perceived.  Thus, this philosopher does, in fact, unwittingly disprove subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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What then, according to Berkeley himself, made him accept that “without a mind” there is something whose existence does not depend on us, and this something produces sensations in us? It was, above all, the indisputable fact that sensations arise and disappear &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;independently&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of “the mind”, unlike notions which we can usually evoke in the mind just when we like.  This difference between sensations and notions is a fact which conflicts with subjective idealism. To be consistent, a subjective idealist would have to deny that sensation results from causes which are outside, and are independent of, the mind. That is just what many contemporary subjective idealists do. Rudolf Carnap, for instance, wrote that the line between sensations and notions is “rather arbitrary.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This assertion is contrary to fact. For example, I can &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;imagine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; myself, if I like, basking in the sun on the beach. But I cannot~however much I may like to-make my body &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;feel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; warm with the sun or make my eyes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;see&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the surf.  Transformation of that which we can conceive into that which we can see and feel does not depend on arbitrary choice. There is only one conclusion to be made from this, namely, that subjective idealism, which denies that the sensations we experience have a material source existing outside the mind, conflicts with the facts conclusively established both by science and experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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No one in his right mind would deny that illusion and reality are two different things.  How to tell dreams from reality, fact from fancy? The common way is to regard whatever exists solely in the mind as illusion; and whatever exists outside the mind (irrespective of whether or not it is perceived), as reality or fact. Berkeley rejects this method of telling between seeming and being and claims that the objects and events we observe when awake exist merely in the mind in just the same way as those we dream about. No one would subscribe to the view that fact and fancy are the same thing. So Berkeley declares that his philosophy, too, has a method of distinguishing illusion from reality~by comparing notes with other people. The sensation most of them regard as fact is fact, and the one regarded otherwise is illusion. Nevertheless Berkeley himself says that the majority may be in error and often are. Most people denied for thousands of years that the Earth is round and believed that the Sun moved round the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
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Surely opinion polls would not do as a method of differentiating between seeming and being. Still, neither Berkeley nor his successors found any other. Some of them even thought it quite unnecessary to make such surveys because, they said, there was practically no difference between illusion and reality. The subjective idealist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) cited the following: a pencil partly submerged under water seems broken, and this is called an illusion. But Mach was of a different opinion.  He wrote: “It makes practical, but not scientific, sense to speak of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;illusion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in such instances.  Nor does the oft-repeated question whether the world is real or whether we have merely dreamed it up, make any sense from the scientific point of view. Besides, the weirdest dream is a fact as good as any other.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-8|8]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What Mach means by a “‘scientific point of view” is utterly unacceptable to science because the object of science is to penetrate through what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;seems&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actually&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is. It is easy to imagine what will happen to a scientist (or anyone for that matter) who will take guidance from Mach’s doctrine, for he will fall into every pit scattered along the path of the rainbow-chaser and wishful thinker.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our sensations are all we know about an object, says Berkeley, and consequently “‘... the object and the sensation are the same thing”.  Thus the basic premise of Berkeley&#039;s subjective idealism rests on the assertion that we know nothing at all about things save through our sensations of them. Yet we know that a commodity has its value, which is, however, impossible to perceive by the senses. We know that light travels at a speed of 300,000 kilometres a second, which man can neither see nor even imagine. A radio transmitter emits waves whose properties have been thoroughly studied even though they cannot be perceived by the senses. And so &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ad infinitum&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Berkeley&#039;s doctrine leaves out a most important part of human knowledge&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or abstract ideas. Berkeley denied their existence, reducing knowledge entirely to sensations and notions. Such a theory, which rests on the denial of concepts, is incompatible with genuine science.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us presume that objects are merely combinations of sensations. Then the Earth, with everything and everybody on it, is a combination of sensations. It follows then that each of us is the only person in the world while all others are mere sensations. That is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;solipsism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  Berkeley and most of his successors concede that other people also exist, i.e., they reject solipsism. Bertrand Russell, the modern idealist philosopher, remarked: “As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician, this surprise surprised me.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-9|9]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And no wonder.  It is hardly logical for one who would be the sole being in the world to be surprised that nobody else should claim the distinction. Yet, another subjective idealist, Carnap, writes that the very question as to whether other people exist is impermissible in philosophy. Nor is it fortuitous, for subjective idealism immediately leads to solipsism. After all, there are but two possible answers. One may either acknowledge the truth of subjective idealism and agree that every one of us is the only person in existence; or one may acknowledge, with the materialists, that there are other people too and subjective idealism has not a leg to stand on. There is no third answer. Human experience and science alike prove that materialism is correct and knock the bottom out of subjective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Materialism vs. Objective Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
We find a different form of idealism in the teachings of its classical exponents, such as Plato (428/427-347 B. C.) in ancient Greece, and Hegel (1770-1831) in Germany. These philosophers recognise that nature exists independently of mind. According to their reasoning, we perceive with our senses individual objects of which the world consists, but sensory experience yields only superficial knowledge such as even little children can have. Sensory experience does not give us ultimate knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the essence of things. Man can have sensory experience of colour, smell or taste. Recollection of these perceptions will bring specific objects to his mind. Yet, that which is common to them and makes them what they are, i.e., their essence, can neither be perceived by the senses nor imagined.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in Plato’s time science was not confined to sense-data. After all, sensory experience and notions tell us merely what isolated, transient, accidental objects look like. Science, however, seeks to understand their essence. This requires that one should be aware of the common, stable and lasting qualities which are at the basis of and manifest themselves in isolated, contingent facts and things. Briefly, to conceive what the things the world consists of really are, one must form a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concept&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The object of sense-perception or representation is a specific individual thing, e.g., the isosceles triangle drawn in my notebook. The object of thought, on the other hand, is the essence (the essential, principal properties) of all triangles which have ever existed or will ever exist, fixed in the concept of “triangle.” It does not make the slightest difference to the nature of a triangle what material it is made from, what size or colour it is, and so on. The individual features differentiating the innumerable triangles there are in existence are equally of no significance. Yet every triangle must possess all the features of the triangle as such, constituting its essence which is always the same, whatever happens to its innumerable individual expressions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, all material things as perceived by the senses are external manifestations of the essence of the given things while their essence is the root, the inner source of phenomena&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that to which they owe their existence. Sensible material objects exist objectively, outside consciousness. Yet that is but the external aspect of reality. The basis of the material phenomena comprising the world is the eternal essences, which can neither be created nor destroyed, of individual external phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are these essences in Hegel’s view? The essence of a triangle does not depend on its material, size or colour. The essence of all triangles is what is common to all of them, viz., that every triangle is a closed straight-lined figure forming three angles. It is impossible to see or even imagine the essence of a triangle, since one can imagine only things which can be perceived by senses. The triangle I can imagine may be drawn in chalk on a blackboard or in pencil on white paper, but nobody can imagine a ‘“‘triangle in general’. It is not a material object, not even a visual representation, but an abstract idea, i.e., a concept. Essence (heat as such, plant as such, speed as such) becomes comprehensible through thought alone. Does this not suggest that at the basis of all reality there is thought which man can mentally perceive but which exists, without ever appearing or disappearing, independently of whether or not it has been grasped?&lt;br /&gt;
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From this Hegel drew the conclusion that the true basis of the world, which exists outside consciousness and which we investigate, is concepts or ideas, while all material objects and facts are products and manifestations of ideas.  Whose ideas? Since they embrace the whole world they must clearly be the ideas of some ‘spirit’ which Hegel calls “world spirit&amp;amp;quot; or the “absolute idea’. According to Hegel, the ‘’absolute idea&amp;amp;quot; and the world are identical. Nature is the “‘other-being of the absolute idea”, and ‘“‘we should ... speak of nature as a system of unconscious thought, as fossilised intelligence’ and of man as the ‘conscious idea” (unlike animals, let alone plants and minerals).&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-10|10]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Like every material object, man is a manifestation of the infinite spirit which is at the basis of the world, but a manifestation possessed of consciousness, of the “finite spirit&amp;amp;quot;, and able to think and grasp the essence of things, or concepts, and conceive the world as the thought process of the world spirit. Consequently, the “world spirit’ knows itself as a spirit, and the “world ideal” thinks of itself through man. Hegel wrote of his philosophy that it was a “‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;representation of God in his eternal being prior to the creation of nature and a finite mind&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-11|11]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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That is the gist of objective idealism which holds that the world is based on the impersonal spirit, the ‘“absolute idea’ rather than on man’s individual consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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The starting-point of objective idealism is that we know the material world outside the mind through thought, by forming concepts of the essence of things. Therefore thought is a means of knowing the essence of things, and this knowledge is the concept of their essence.  This is an obvious deduction. The objective idealists, however, say: If we know the essence of things by thinking and forming concepts, then the world outside the mind must consist of concepts, not of objects. But is that logical?  If our &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of things&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a concept, it does not follow at all that the essence of things is a concept. Concepts exist in the mind while both the essence of things and the things themselves exist independently of it.  Consequently, unlike concepts, which are ideal, the essence of things, as well as the things themselves, are material. The essence of the triangle existed when men knew nothing of it, and even when men were not there at all.  As for the concept of the triangle, it emerged when men had attained a high enough standard of knowledge. It is plain that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; essence of things is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; while the idea or the concept of it is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Consequently, logic attests the truth of materialism and the unsoundness of objective idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The objective idealists argue that the real world comprises isolated objects, each having a beginning and an end, while the ideal world comprises abstract concepts which have neither beginning nor end, i.e., are eternal. But while each thing is indeed finite, we cannot say this of the real world as a whole. Every material object springs from other objects (otherwise it would have to spring from nothing), It cannot disappear altogether—as it disappears itself, it gives rise to other material things. Consequently, the real world has neither a beginning nor an end, it is eternal. Certainly the world of concepts shares the fate of mankind which has evolved the concepts and is using them. Yet mankind came into being at a definite point of time, nor did Hegel himself allow it any eternal existence. We know when the concepts “patrician”, ‘fief’, ‘factory’, “electron”, etc., emerged and when the concepts “‘epicycle”, ‘phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;, etc., were dropped. Concepts are mutable and temporal. They emerge at particular stages in the progress of human knowledge and are refined and amplified. Nature, which is infinite, is primary, and its conscious reflection—the world of concepts, which are finite—is secondary.&lt;br /&gt;
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In objective idealism, the consciousness of the “infinite world spirit’, which existed prior to the creation of nature and of any ‘‘finite mind”, i.e., man, is considered to be at the basis of the world. But, first, although it is not at all unusual to observe a person without consciousness (e.g., in a dead faint, under ether, and so on), nobody has ever met consciousness without a person. Second, even granting the impossible and conceding that consciousness can exist separately from its material source, can it be allowed that nature is the product of this consciousness? The realisation of an idea indispensably requires the presence of certain material phenomena (present even before its realisation). Basically, it proceeds by way of transforming material phenomena into other such phenomena emerging in the process. Material phenomena are never a product of nothing. These are facts proved by science and experience. No objective idealist has ever been able to disprove them or produce a single piece of evidence to show that nature has been created out of nothing by a bodiless spirit. Only one who sets reason and science at naught can believe such things. ‘‘To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science’, to make it “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;actual knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that is what I have set before me,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-12|12]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hegel wrote. In truth, however, Hegel, like Berkeley, turns his back on scientific knowledge and embraces religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as there are subjective idealists who do not believe in god, so are there objective idealists who say god does not exist. But is it possible by deleting the word “god” from a philosophical doctrine to prevent idealism leading to religion? This is how Lenin answers the question: any form of idealism holds nature to be secondary, derived from intelligence. Yet, to produce nature, one must exist independently of it. ‘‘That means that something exists &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;outside&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; nature, something which moreover &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;produces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; nature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In plain language this is called God.  The idealist philosophers have always sought to change this latter name, to make it more abstract, more vague....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-13|13]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That, however, changes nothing. The idealist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy conflicts with scientific knowledge, with human reason and experience, and therefore &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idealist doctrine, even one whose supporters reject religion, objectively clears the way for religion.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is something else subjective and objective idealism have in common. All existence, Hegel taught, whether nature (‘fossilised&amp;amp;quot;, unconscious thought) or human  consciousness (thought knowing itself as thought), is thought.  The essence of objective idealism is the identification of being with thinking. And the subjective idealists hold all existence—both nature and man’s consciousness—to be the subjective experiences of the human spirit. Hence both the objective and subjective idealists are unanimous in reducing all existence—that commonly termed material and that commonly termed ideal—to consciousness or in identifying matter with thought. As a result, any form of idealism contravenes such patent facts as, for instance, that my thinking of a ticket for a performance at the theatre and the ticket itself are two different things. Hard as I may try to persuade the usher that the thought of a ticket and an actual ticket are the same thing, he will never let me in just for thinking of the ticket.&lt;br /&gt;
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In everyday life people start from the conviction that all their perceptions, notions, ideas and concepts of things depend on the things themselves, not the other way round. After all, things exist even when we have no notion of them. Hence people in their daily lives naturally share the materialist point of view. They do not usually, however, stop to think why they should share it; they take it for granted. What, then, is the difference between this practical materialism and philosophical materialism? By comparing the arguments for and against philosophical materialism we have learned that the materialist answer to the fundamental question of philosophy is no rash prejudgement but an inference that necessarily follows from all that science has found out about nature, about men and their thinking—in a word, from human experience as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall now examine two important scien&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;tific&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; proofs of the materialist answer to the fun&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;d&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;amental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Science of the Earth’s Past and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
No evidence of perception or thought ever being discovered in inanimate objects, science regards life as the first indispensable requisite of consciousness. When did life emerge on earth? Different sciences have helped find the answer to this question. Physicists, for instance, have found that by measuring the number of the first and last terms of the radioactive series of uranium, actino-uranium and thorium and the amount of helium present in minerals and rocks one can make a fairly accurate estimate of the age of geological deposits. Using this method geologists have established not only how old the earth’s crust is (almost 4,000 million years) but also the duration of individual geological epochs. By examining various layers of the crust, geologists and palaeontologists have found that no life, not even the simplest, existed before 3,000 million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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Microbiological research has shown that microorganisms which are the oldest living things on earth are incapable of sensation, let alone thought. They possess only irritability. The study of fossilised animals (palaeontology) shows that over hundreds of millions of years animals gradually became more complex until, in the Tertiary period (from sixty-nine million to one million years ago), mammals appeared, including the higher animals capable not only of sensation but also of perception and conception.  Nevertheless, consciousness, the ability to think, is found only among humans. And analysis of the products of radioactive decay found in the layers of the earth’s crust which contain the fossilised bones of the hominids, man’s immediate ancestors, attests that man’s separation from the animals took place from five to one million years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Earth with all that is on it is the product of sensations and ideas, then whose sensations and ideas were they during the thousand million years that there was yet no life on earth? The idealists fail to answer this question in the context of knowledge. “Natural science positively asserts,’ Lenin wrote, “that the Earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that ... matter is primary and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-14|14]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Thus the only alternative is either the modern natural science and materialism that necessarily follows from it or idealism and the consequent denial of the elementary truths firmly established by science.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. Physiology of the Brain and the Fundamental Question of Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to the physiology of the brain.  Investigation of higher nervous activity has proved that the cerebral cortex has specialised areas where sensations are produced when impulses resulting from the stimulation of sense organs (the eye, the ear, etc.) are transmitted to them by afferent nerves. If one of these areas (in the back of the head) is destroyed, the result is blindness, and if another area located at the temples is injured, the sense of hearing is lost. Destruction of certain areas in the cortex renders a person unable to perceive an object as a whole, although colours will still be perceived. There are areas (or, rather, points) in the cortex whose stimulation by electricity arouses vivid recollections, and so on. The brain Sharply reacts to oxygen deficiency. The slightest drop in the blood supply to the brain gravely affects its function, causing a sudden suspension of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Science has incontrovertibly proved that sensations and ideas depend on the normal functioning of an intricately organised material organ&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the brain. In other words, consciousness depends on particularly organised matter (the brain) which does not depend on consciousness.  Natural science “inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-15|15]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Subjective idealists, on the other hand, hold that any body, the brain as well, is a combination of sensations, from which it follows that the brain is a product of consciousness rather than consciousness the product of the brain. Therefore the subjective idealist Avenarius, just as Mach, openly rejects the findings of natural science, asserting that ‘the brain is not an organ of thought’ and that notions and sensations are not functions of the brain. By this token, Lenin observes, he “denies the most elementary truth of physiology&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-16|16]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Here again we must choose between the facts firmly established by physiology, and thus materialism, and idealism which makes one deny what has been proved in the physiology of the higher nervous activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. What, After All, Is Philosophy? ====&lt;br /&gt;
How does philosophical knowledge differ from other scientific knowledge? Before Marx, it was commonly believed that philosophy furnished exhaustive and final answers to literally every question concerning nature, men and thought. The German idealist philosopher Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814) wrote that philosophy “exhausts all human knowledge in its fundamentals.... Each investigation made resolves a question once and for all&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-17|17]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The philosophical systems of the German philosophers Leibniz, Kant and Hegel represent attempts to provide final solutions of all cardinal problems even where essential scientific evidence was not yet available.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels held a different view of philosophy and its goals. They argued that the problems and laws dealt with by chemistry, botany or any particular science concern merely one sphere or aspect of reality. Yet, there are general problems concerning every sphere, and general laws operating in every sphere of nature, society and thought. These general problems and laws are dealt with neither by chemistry nor botany nor any particular science.  They are investigated by philosophy. As we discussed the fundamental question of philosophy we Saw that its correct solution was a deduction from knowledge obtained by all sciences together. The same goes for all other philosophical problems. Philosophy examines and compares the facts and laws discovered by different sciences, sums up this material, and draws the general conclusions that necessarily follow from it. Consequently philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;science of the more general laws governing the development of nature, society and thought&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is the conclusion of all knowledge amassed by mankind.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every scientist, whatever his field, uses such general concepts as the material and the ideal, motion and rest, continuity and discontinuity, cause and effect, truth and error, and so on.  The meaning with which he invests them often seems to him self-evident. In fact, however, the meaning of these concepts intimately depends on a definite understanding of the general problems and laws philosophy is concerned with. In attaching certain meanings to the concepts, the scientist actually proceeds in his research from the solution of certain general problems although he may be unconscious of the fact. As they follow a certain conception of general laws, a certain solution of general problems, scientists, consciously or otherwise, take a definite philosophical stand. This does not prevent some of them being perfectly ignorant of the fact that their principles constitute a definite kind of philosophy, all too like Moliere’s M. Jourdain who had no idea he had been talking in prose all his life.&lt;br /&gt;
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The principles or method of research is what the scientist proceeds from, what guides him in his work. And that, as we have just seen, is actually the philosophy he shares. Consequently philosophy is both the conclusion of all sciences (and of the experience on which they rest) and the method of all science and experience.  &lt;br /&gt;
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Science does not stand still. Important discoveries often result In revolutionary upheavals in science, making it necessary to more narrowly specify and even revise earlier findings. Lenin wrote: “...natural science is progressing so fast and is undergoing such a profound revolutionary upheaval in all spheres that it cannot possibly dispense with philosophical deductions.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-18|18]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Hence there can be no final or exhaustive system of knowledge. Philosophy must be developed and refined as knowledge accumulated by different sciences extends. Thus science advances philosophy. And as the philosophy evolved from a higher level of science iS more true and exact, so is the scientific and practical activity following it more successful and fruitful. The noted English physiologist J.B.S. Haldane wrote: “...a good deal of my recently published research has been inspired by my gradually increasing knowledge of dialectical materialism. ...I find dialectical materialism a valuable tool in research…”’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-19|19]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The materialist philosophy thus advances particular sciences. As for idealist philosophy, it does science harm. Commenting on the harmful influence of idealist views on the work of the physicist Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein wrote: “This is an interesting example of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpretation of facts by philosophical prejudices.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-20|20]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Hence philosophy is knowledge such as is not found in any other science. Marxism rejects the view&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;which emerged in antiquity and is now advocated by the existentialists—that philosophy has allegedly nothing to do with knowledge of reality, and that by ignoring and despising scientific knowledge philosophy shows man that he should not depend on such knowledge but solely on his inner world in which he is sure to find the answers to his anxious questions about what he must aspire to, what eschew, and what he generally should and should not do.&lt;br /&gt;
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There exists another old view that, apart from knowledge of what occurs in nature, society and mind, nothing concerns philosophy.  “To look at things philosophically’ commonly means to judge things with supreme indifference, just looking on and never interfering in anything. If, on the other hand, a person actively pursues his ideals and fights what he believes to be wrong, people would say of him: “He has a practical, not a philosophical, turn of mind. He is a practical person whose ideals have nothing to do with philosophy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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This view of philosophy was utterly rejected by Marx, who wrote: ‘The philosophers have only &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interpreted&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it.&#039;’&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-21|21]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Philosophy does not merely answer the question as to what the world is but also what &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;attitude&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; we should take towards it, how we should remake it. It is not merely knowledge of what there is but a way of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;looking at&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; what there is, a definite view of the world, a world outlook which determines our aims and goals. Philosophy makes the scientific explanation of reality a means of transforming it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we encounter one more distinction between philosophy and all other sciences. The law, for instance, which states that “...capitalistic accumulation ...constantly produces...  a surplus-population”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-22|22]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; i.e., unemployment, is recognised by science not because Marx and other philosophers consider it just, but because it represents authentic knowledge of capitalism. Every science confines itself to seeking knowledge in its proper field. Objective knowledge does not depend on a scientist’s ideals, likes and dislikes. The questions about what we should aspire to and what attitude we should take towards the world are answered by philosophy. It gives expression to man’s practical attitude to the world, his world outlook. As man is a social being, so is his outlook a social phenomenon, and in class society it expresses the interests of a definite class. The opposition of two currents in philosophy, materialism and idealism, is, now as before, an expression of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Being either with one or with the other of these two opposite currents constitutes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship in philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opponents of Marxism take roughly the fol&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;owing line of argument: assuming that philosophy is true knowledge and its doctrines are true inasmuch as their authors have succeeded in learning the truth about the world, it does not matter whether the doctrines are to somebody’s advantage or disadvantage, for in the presence of truth interests are silent. Conversely, assuming that the aim of philosophy is to teach what benefits a certain class, it does not matter whether or not its teachings are true, for in that case they need not conform to truth but to the interest of that class. Therefore, they conclude, the statements “philosophy expresses authentic knowledge’ and “philosophy expresses class interests&amp;amp;quot; are mutually exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must, however, remember that philosophy emerged with the division of society into classes. In class society, in every age the decayed classes which must leave the scene along with the decayed regime under which they have ruled are opposed by other classes which have to crush the old regime and help society ascend to a higher stage. The reactionary classes think in terms of the past, for they fail to see that the existing order has run its course and is no longer serviceable. In a nutshell, they have a perverted view of the state of things. Furthermore, the reactionary classes are vitally interested in having everybody share this view for, so long as it prevails, the masses will believe that the existing order is immutable and will dumbly submit to it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The revolutionary classes, on the contrary, are objectively interested in making truth accessible to as many members of society as possible, because so long as the masses believe what the reactionaries tell them it is difficult to rouse them to a struggle against the existing order. It is only after they have learned the truth that they may be victorious in the revolutionary struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Does this mean that such a role in the life of society may belong to true and false statements bearing merely on what is happening in society? To see whether or not it is so, let us look at the bitter struggle that developed during the Renaissance between the supporters and opponents of Copernicus and his follower, Galileo. The ideological positions of the contending parties expressed antagonistic class interests. Although neither Copernicus nor Galileo ever concerned himself with social and political problems in his writings, many people were burned at the stake for supporting their ideas.  Nor would Copernicus and Galileo themselves have escaped the stake if Copernicus had not died just when his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was published in 1543, and if Galileo had not recanted. Nevertheless Galileo had to spend the remaining nine years of his life in confinement imposed on him by the Inquisition for, as the sentence runs, “having held... the doctrine that the Sun is the centre of the terrestrial orbit and does not move westward from the east whereas the Earth does so move….”&lt;br /&gt;
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Galileo was condemned because the scientific truths he defended overturned the prevailing unscientific conception of the world. Scientific comprehension of reality makes people approach everything they learn critically, checking it against experience and reason, which helps them learn the truth about what occurs in society. The unscientific world outlook suggests that people should rely neither on science nor on their own experience and intelligence but solely on what their leaders tell them. (“The Fuhrer thinks for you.&amp;amp;quot;) Therefore, even where scientists say nothing against the existing order of things, the knowledge they spread and the scientific outlook seizing the people’s minds helps them see things in their true light; they no longer blindly believe those who unduly extol the established order, and come to understand that the old system is on its way out and must make room for the new. Hence, the scientific world outlook, as it takes hold of the masses, promotes their interests, making them aware of the tasks before them and the way to accomplish them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Truth is the ideological weapon of the masses in the struggle against the existing order and reactionary classes which defend it. And falsehood, spread by the reactionary classes, makes the masses impotent and submissive slaves. For this reason the quest for truth, for knowledge, for science is the ideological expression of the class struggle. The materialist solution of the fundamental question of philosophy is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;true&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conception of reality and the idealist solution—a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;false&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one. Hence, the antagonism of the two camps in philosophy has always reflected the antagonism of class interests.  Today too, materialism serves the interest of the proletariat and other progressive classes, whereas idealism serves the capitalist and other exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin showed that idealism does not, however, spring from class interests alone. The process of cognition itself may breed idealism, as it is a process which “... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;includes in it&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transformation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantasy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;...&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-23|23]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Should the assertion that consciousness is primary be all that the idealist doctrines are about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in other words, should they be entirely false—their role would be merely reactionary and they would have nothing to offer us. However, in spite of their idealism, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and other philosophers did, in fact, make significant contributions to man’s quest for true scientific knowledge. Hegel elaborated the dialectical method.  It is a revolutionary method, although Hegel himself did not apply it to nature but only to the development of concepts.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whose class interests a philosophical doctrine will serve depends on the doctrine itself, not on its author’s intentions. In 1899, the German biologist Ernst Haeckel published a book, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Die Weltsratsel&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (The Riddle of the Universe) in which, by advocating the materialist outlook in natural science, he knocked the bottom out of idealism. For all that he was no revolutionary politically, the bourgeoisie of all countries fiercely turned on Haeckel, while in Russia the entire printing of his book in Russian translation was sentenced by a court to be burned.  Lenin observed that “this popular little book became a weapon in the class struggle”’,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-24|24]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; a weapon against the bourgeoisie, despite the author’s bourgeois political views. At the same time, the philosophical writings of Bogdanov (criticised by Lenin in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;), who set out to fight the bourgeoisie on behalf of the proletariat, actually promoted the interests of the former, as their author advocated idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marxist-Leninist philosophy is simultaneously the science of laws governing the development of nature, society and thought and the world outlook of the working class, affirming communist ideals and moral principles. In it, elucidation of truth and defence of class interests do not exclude but, on the contrary, necessarily imply each other. That is why the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is an instrument for the revolutionary remaking of society and a method of scientifically examining social phenomena which helps find the correct path towards the historical goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#calibre_toc_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_000.xhtml#anchor20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; I&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; P&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;hilosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Social and Historical Prerequisites of Marxist Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
When capitalism became entrenched in Western Europe, turning millions of peasants into wage workers whose lot was back-breaking toil and appalling poverty, many workers imagined that the source of their misery lay in the machines, in mechanised production, which had replaced manual work. The early 19th century was marked by a spontaneous mass movement of workmen destroying machines as a protest (the Luddites). Soon, however, the workers’ understanding increased and the first class battles were fought between them and their exploiters. The Chartist movement in England in the 1830s and 1840s, the French workers’ uprisings in 1831 and 1834, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, and subsequent strikes made it clear that a new class had emerged, destined to abolish capitalism and end the era of exploitation of man by man. To effect the drastic change, the proletariat had to understand the laws of society’s development much better, and to see how to employ them much more clearly, than the other revolutionary classes needed to, which carried out less stupendous social reforms. It took new ideo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ogical equipment, a new world outlook to accomplish tasks unprecedented in history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such were the material, socio-historical prerequisites of Marxist philosophy. Its emergence was prepared ideologically by preceding philosophy, natural science and the social sciences from which Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820-1895) proceeded.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Ancient Dialectics and Modern Metaphysics ====&lt;br /&gt;
One of the greatest achievements of philosophy before the emergence of Marxism was Hegel’s dialectics. What are dialectics? Two thousand five hundred years ago no particular sciences, e.g., physics, geography, botany, and SO on, were yet in existence. There was only one form of knowledge: philosophy (Greek for “love of wisdom&amp;amp;quot;) which embraced everything.  Philosophers concerned themselves with the earth and the sky, things and creatures, society and mind, seeking to grasp everything at once.  Proceeding in this way they could not fail to observe that all things are in state of perpetual motion, that they appear and disappear, are connected in one way or another and marked by inner contradictions. “This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world” is commonly called dialectical thinking or the dialectics of the ancients. ‘‘But this conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one separately. ..&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-25|25]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The structure and characteristics of celestial bodies, the Earth, minerals, plants and animals are studied by particular sciences. In antiquity there were no such sciences and knowledge was not specialised. There was pure speculation founded on simple observation without experimental proof.&lt;br /&gt;
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As time went on, particular sciences appeared one by one. For more than two thousand years, however, attempts to find out the truth about natural phenomena were more often based on pure speculation than on experimental research. It was not until the 16th-17th centuries that experimental natural science took shape. That epoch saw the emergence of classical mechanics which explained with remarkable accuracy very many terrestrial and astronomical phenomena and was broadly applied in industry. Physics vastly extended its knowledge of heat, light, magnetism and electricity.  The scientific basis of modern astronomy was laid. Voyages around the world and the geographical discoveries made at that time vastly increased men’s knowledge of continents, oceans, seas, mountains, deserts, rivers and lakes.  By the end of the 18th century, botanists and zoologists had studied and described some scores of thousands of plant varieties, and almost twenty thousand animal species. Human anatomy was investigated for the first time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Mechanics, however, outpaced all other sciences. Its success in a variety of fields, its experimental verification and mathematical precision inspired in scientists a belief that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the laws of mechanics were the key to all phenomena&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of inanimate and animate nature alike.  This &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mechanistic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; view prevailed among scientists in the 17th-18th centuries. From the principle of mechanics that ‘“‘every body remains in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled by external forces to change that state’ it was deduced that all motion is due to the application of an external force which compels a body to change its state.&lt;br /&gt;
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The natural scientists’ mechanistic views were fully shared by the 18th-century materialist philosophers.&lt;br /&gt;
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One thing about the discoveries made in astronomy in the 16th-17th centuries was that there was nothing to tell the astronomers whether the solar system had ever been different from what they observed. On the contrary, from the laws of classical mechanics it followed that the planets had always been moving in the same orbits and would continue in them forever. The geographical discoveries had yielded much new information but no evidence that there had been a time when the Earth’s surface was in a different condition. It followed then that the continents, oceans, mountains, rivers, deserts were just where they had always been.  In other words, the Earth’s surface would always be as it was since time began. Botanical and zoological data concerning many thousands of plant and animal species gave no indication that there had been a time when they did not exist. On the contrary, everything seemed to suggest that although individual plants and animals were born and died, the species went on indefinitely.&lt;br /&gt;
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Available scientific data suggested that although everything in nature was in a state of motion, that motion was merely a repetition of the same cycles and forms. And as the forms—being the most essential thing in any part of nature—were immutable, motion engendered nothing new, while nothing essential ever disappeared.&lt;br /&gt;
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That deduction was natural to science at that time. Before investigating the relationship &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; objects and their action on one another, and so the processes developing in them and the variation they underwent, the scientists needed enough information about the structure of the objects, which, however, they could only gain by abstracting from what actually happened to the objects (from their relationships, interaction and change). When viewed in such terms, the phenomena under examination emerged as a totality of immutable, fixed objects.  The differences and contradictions emerged and were viewed merely as existing between individual objects but never &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; them, the latter being considered altogether impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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This approach, which was necessary and effective at the beginning, became customary.  The connections and variations, temporarily disregarded, began to appear unimportant and then simply non-existent. As a result, a scientist engrossed in his particular field discovered in it innumerable characteristics which made it utterly unlike and apparently unconnected with any other sphere of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the conception was formed that movement was the repetition of the same forms which were always identical, permanent and unchangeable, that the world consisted of ready-made objects which could not be self-contradictory, and that connections between phenomena were superficial and inessential. This view focuses attention on only one aspect of the world, viz., on the inherent repetitiveness of motion and inherent stability of material bodies, and on contradictions &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;between&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things. Such a one-sided conception of the world, diametrically different from dialectics, is described as the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysical method&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thinking or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metaphysics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on contemporary scientific knowledge, 18th-century materialist philosophy adhered to the metaphysical method which was then prevalent. Like mechanicism, metaphysics played a progressive role in its day. Scientists amassed vast knowledge about the world by following this method. Yet, the metaphysical conception of motion, interconnection and contradiction is a step backwards, compared with ancient dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Hegel and Feuerbach ====&lt;br /&gt;
The weak points of 18th-century materialism were seized upon by the idealists who criticised its mechanistic and metaphysical approach. But proceeding from pure speculation and not, as a rule, from natural science, the idealists were unable to advance a more correct scientific interpretation of development, as they themselves largely reasoned on metaphysical lines. The change came with the appearance of Hegel’s doctrine which marked a turning point in the history of dialectics. Marx wrote that Hegel was ‘the first to present its (dialectical—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ed.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-26|26]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel&#039;s philosophy greatly influenced his contemporaries. In the ideological struggle which developed in Germany on the eve of the 1848 Revolution both the opponents and supporters of monarchy and religion (Young Hegelians and Old Hegelians respectively) adhered to Hegel&#039;s dialectical idealism. Later on, however, they went separate ways.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the Young Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), opposed Hegel’s philosophy, arguing that, like any idealist doctrine, it was actually a philosophical apology for religion.  By showing that religion and idealism were false and moreover played a reactionary role in the life of society, Feuerbach took a consistent materialist stand.&lt;br /&gt;
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His defence of materialism and atheism made a tremendous impression. Describing how warmly Marx welcomed the new opinion and how greatly he was influenced by it, Engels wrote: “Enthusiasm was general; we all became Feuerbachians at once.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-27|27]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1839, when Feuerbach became a materialist, Marx was twenty-one and Engels nineteen.  Both were Hegelians, but their militant atheism and revolutionary democratic views made it imminent that they should renounce idealism and adopt a materialist standpoint. Feuerbach’s work was a great encouragement to this transition. Engels wrote that of all the philosophers after Hegel, Feuerbach’s influence on Marx and himself was the greatest. However, it soon became clear to them that, as he shattered Hegel’s idealist philosophy, Feuerbach simultaneously discarded its rational content, dialectics. And thus, although he had advanced far ahead of 18th-century materialism, he still failed to cope with its major shortcomings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then what is the significance of Hegel&#039;s dialectics which Feuerbach overlooked and which Marx and Engels thought so highly of and used in evolving dialectical and historical materialism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It consists first of all in the teaching that, although there is repetition in movement, nothing&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;either separate objects or the stages and forms of development—is repeated completely.  The world contains no forms which eternally repeat themselves and are immutable. In general, there is nothing eternal in the world except the eternal change of forms and phenomena replacing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Hegel, all is interlinked in the world which is a single whole and every particle of which is involved in an endless multiplicity of relations. This is a very important point, not to be overlooked in scientific research.&lt;br /&gt;
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While Hegel’s dialectical method acknowledges that there are contradictions between things, it sees this as only one side of the matter; the other side is much more important, viz., “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;all things are contradictory in themselves&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;” and that inner contradiction “is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only insofar as something embodies a contradiction that it moves.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel&#039;s dialectical method disclosed the unsoundness of the metaphysical view which took into consideration merely the stability of real phenomena and our conceptions of them, and which therefore regarded the world as a totality of ready-made things, and thought as a totality of ready-made concepts. Such a view, Hegel argued, ignores the other, most important, aspect&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the eternal mutability of everything in the world, which is not a totality of finished things but of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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As he created his method, Hegel was the first to advance, formulate and work out in detail the main laws of dialectics which govern all development. He offered a dialectical interpretation of the most general concepts (categories) which play an exceedingly important role in science and experience. Lastly, Hegel, more amply and correctly than anybody before him, elucidated the complex and contradictory nature not only of thought but of the whole process of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much as they appreciated it, Marx and Engels nevertheless could not incorporate Hegel&#039;s dialectics into their doctrine because it was &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;idealist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and consequently had serious flaws.&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, Hegel deduced the laws of dialectics not from existence but from consciousness. He maintained that nature and human history must be subject to those laws because everything occurring in nature and society was merely a reflection of consciousness, of the Absolute Idea.  To Marx and Engels, however, it was not “a question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-28|28]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx and Engels worked out a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dialectic in which the dialectical laws emerge above all as those governing the development of the real world (nature and society), whereas the laws of thought are their peculiar reflection in men’s heads.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, although Hegel stated that development was infinite, the Absolute Idea in his philosophical system actually completed its development. Hence Hegel considered his philosophy to be final, all-embracing knowledge, while he considered the society in which it was evolved to be the crowning stage in the development of mankind. But a “system of natural and historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, is contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning&amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-29|29]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   and so is the “final” stage in society’s development. Hegel sacrificed to his idealist system the most important dialectical principle, the principle of development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, being an idealist, Hegel considered it somewhat degrading for the Absolute Idea to be embodied in matter, in nature. He attributed progressive dialectical development to nothing but the ‘conscious idea”, i.e., to men.  As for the “unconscious idea”, i.e., nature, it, according to Hegel, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not develop in time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was for this reason that Marx wrote that dialectics with Hegel “is standing on its head.  It must be turned right side up again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-30|30]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It was for Marx and Engels to evolve the materialist dialectical method which is diametrically opposite to Hegel’s idealist dialectics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Philosophical Generalisation of New Scientific Discoveries ====&lt;br /&gt;
Discriminating use of Feuerbach’s materialist ideas and Hegel’s dialectics is merely one aspect of the philosophical work of Marx and Engels which ensured continuity between their own doctrine and those of their philosophical predecessors. The other aspect of their theoretical work was the summing up of new &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the 19th century, the study of heat, magnetism, electricity and light revealed that even within the pale of physics reducing all to mechanical phenomena was out of the question. It was still less possible with relation to chemistry, botany and zoology. The progress of natural science cut the ground from under the feet of mechanism.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Hegel convincingly demonstrated the internally contradictory nature of consciousness, extensive research conducted in the 19th century in the natural and social sciences demonstrated no less convincingly the inherently contradictory nature of many natural and social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the 1840s, the universal &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conservation and transformation of energy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was discovered, in accordance with which energy neither disappears nor is created anew. This law, which states that mechanical, thermal, electrical, chemical energy is mutually convertible, led to the deduction that all phenomena in the universe are connected in some way, that the &amp;amp;quot;unity of all motion in nature is no longer a philosophical assertion, but a natural-scientific fact&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-31|31]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In the latter half of the 18th century, M. Lomonosov and J. Hutton suggested that the Earth’s surface was quite unlike what it was in the past. In the 19th century, so much evidence was accumulated about how substantially and recurrently the Earth’s appearance used to change that the science of geology was born.  Geologists found that none of the stages of the Earth’s development (e.g., the Archean, Proterozoic, Palaeozoic, Mesozoic, Cainozoic) had been a repetition of any of the previous stages.  The beginning of every new era meant the disappearance of a number of continents, islands, seas, mountains, etc., and the appearance of entirely new geological phenomena, as well as substantial climatic changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1755, Kant suggested that the solar system did not exist eternally but had naturally emerged at some time in the past, and he formulated a hypothesis, according to which the solar system originated and developed out of a nebula. The 18th-century scientists, in whose minds metaphysics reigned supreme, remained deaf to the call to stop regarding astronomic phenomena as unchangeable cycles eternally repeating themselves. In 1796, however, Kant’s hypothesis was supported and carried forward by Laplace, and in the middle of the 19th century it was substantiated mathematically. Although in the 20th century the Kant-Laplace hypothesis of the origin of the solar system was supplanted by others, it is now commonly accepted that the solar system appeared at some time in the past as a natural result of the development of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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There emerged comparative anatomy and the physiology of plants and animals, and it was revealed that there is an essential likeness and connection between rather distant species.  In the first half of the 19th century it was discovered that all plants and animals are built of cells which are built more or less on the same pattern and which feed and multiply in roughly the same way, whether they be the cells of a seaweed or a tree, of a minute infusorian or man. This signal discovery put it beyond all doubt that all living things are mutually connected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another new science, palaeontology, established that over hundreds of millions of years many plant and animal species had been replacing one another, some of them dying out and others appearing in their stead. It was found that nothing in nature was eternal, stages of development never repeating themselves but replacing one another in an eternal succession.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the mid-19th century the English scientist Charles Darwin discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of natural selection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; establishing the connection between all living beings and demonstrating that their development was no repetition of the old but the extinction of the old and emergence of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, as early as the first half of the 19th century natural science began to study the interconnections of objects and changes within and between them, rather than isolated objects; processes, rather than finished things. This led to the discovery of the intrinsically contradictory character of everything in nature and in society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The metaphysical mode of thinking thus came into conflict with scientific knowledge which testified to the “universal, all-sided, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; connection of everything with everything...”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-32|32]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Newly-obtained knowledge has made it clear that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nature contains nothing eternal besides the eternal succession of developmental stages, each of which disappears sooner or later to be replaced by an essentially different stage which shares the fate of its predecessors; that the world is not a totality of things but of processes, connections and relations, and that all phenomena are marked by inherent contradictions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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To draw such conclusions was to subject to a revision the dominant mechanistic and metaphysical views and prejudices which had got hold of scientists and philosophers. It took extraordinary power and boldness of mind to generalise scientific knowledge in terms of philosophy, as Marx and Engels did, and declare that ‘‘in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ast resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-33|33]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Role of Practice in Human Existence ====&lt;br /&gt;
While nature exists independently of man, his entire existence—both physical and spiritual&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depends on nature. A person lives or dies, and, if he lives, he is happy or miserable, all depending on the external world around him.  That world, acting on man’s sense-organs, produces sensations, emotions and ideas in him.  This was how the pre-Marxian materialists explained the dependence of the spirit on nature, of consciousness on matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx was the first to see and expose the onesidedness of that view which suggests that the external world alone is capable of affecting man while all man can do is passively perceive and reflect on the things and events around him.  But can a person merely gaze at things, listen to sounds and reflect and do nothing else? Not unless he is a paralytic unable to move hand or foot, and even then he must be looked after by others who certainly do more than just feel sensations and reflect.&lt;br /&gt;
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As Feuerbach quite rightly observed, in order to live, man must satisfy his needs. But Feuerbach went no further than that. Marx, on the other hand, showed that in order to have that without which man cannot live, i.e., food, clothing, shelter, the means of protecting himself from savage beasts, and so on, man has to act on the things round him so as to make them satisfy his needs. Unlike the old materialists’ imaginary man, real man does not merely look on, but acts; he does not passively suffer the influence of the external world but influences it himself. The external world changes man, but man changes the world too. Man’s activity whereby he changes the external world, i.e., nature and society, is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Practice implies influencing nature in order to gain one’s livelihood (work, production); influencing other people (social or public activity), and influencing nature so as to gain knowledge (scientific experimentation).&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels proved that practice, which the old materialists overlooked, was of immense significance to men.&lt;br /&gt;
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1. Practice as the production of the means of subsistence is the primary condition of human existence. Its significance is clear if only from the fact that man’s survival depends &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. Animals as well as men have to influence their natural environment to protect themselves against hunger, cold and enemies. There is, however, an essential difference between man’s work and animal behaviour. In order to sustain itself an animal tackles the object directly whereas man tackles objects with the aid of implements he manufactures himself, and forms certain relations with other men. These relations greatly affect man’s behaviour, moulding him as a social being. Work gave rise to human intelligence and transformed the primitive herd into human society with its morals, science and art. In a word, work is what makes us human, it is man’s essence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. Marx was the first to show that the progress of mankind from the lower to higher stages of civilisation is determined by the progress of commodity production which, in the long run, determines the course of history. Consequently practice has the decisive role in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. The old materialists’ error was that while they spoke of man’s dependence on the external world they overlooked the other side of the matter or the dependence of man’s environment on his influence. Men have changed the appearance of the Earth out of all recognition.  Vast forests have been felled, marshes drained, artificial rivers and seas created and soil, climate and the composition of the atmosphere greatly altered and new varieties of plants and animals developed by man. The crops and animals we raise have been bred by man. Our natural environment bears the stamp of men’s practical activity. Men themselves, the relations that have been established among them and the things they have created are all products of this activity. Hence, although it is true that material conditions influence man a great deal, it is also true that these conditions themselves are to a great extent products of the practical activity of generations. Therefore the influence of these conditions on man includes the influence on him of other people’s practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having thus exposed the unsoundness of contemplative materialism, Marx and Engels showed that practice plays the decisive role in men’s material and intellectual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until the mid-19th century nobody had managed to supply a materialist explanation of the history of human society. All philosophers—idealists and materialists alike—arrived at an idealist interpretation of society. Yet, by that time the progress of social relationships and the social sciences had prepared enough material for solving the problem. First, however, one had to examine the material thoroughly, draw general conclusions from it, make proper deductions and, overcoming the ingrained views which had dominated society for centuries, take a path yet untrodden by any thinker. That was what Marx did. Having demonstrated the unsoundness of the old materialists’ idealist view on history, Marx, using the latest information provided by the social sciences and subjecting the workings of modern society to a detailed and penetrating examination, was able to offer a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;materialist explanation of human history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to be dealt with further on in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote that Marx was “the founder of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which is immeasurably richer in content and incomparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism ...’.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-34|34]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The creation of Marxist philosophy sbelind the defeat of mechanism and metaphysics characteristic of the old materialism and the triumph of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism. Contemplation was exposed and the immense role played by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; elucidated. The idealist view of society was overcome and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;historical&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; materialism created. These changes were so extensive as to make the emergence of the Marxist doctrine a real &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 3. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Conception of Matter in Ancient Philosophy ====&lt;br /&gt;
A Hindu philosopher, Kapila, who lived 2,500 years ago, reasoned as follows. Nothing is eternal. Yet no thing can spring out of nothing nor can it be reduced to nothing, for when things are destroyed they do not disappear altogether but turn into stuff from which other things are made. Thus Kapila arrives at the conclusion that there exists some material which can be neither created nor destroyed, and of which all things are formed, namely, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other ancient philosophers similarly arrived at the idea of matter. Early Greek philosophers who lived at about the same time as Kapila sought matter among the bodies immediately observable in nature. Thales regarded water or moisture as the primary stuff or principle of things. Anaximenes identified primary matter with air. Heraclitus held that fire was primary. Empedocles believed that the universe was made up of particles of earth, water, air and fire. Democritus taught that matter consisted of eternal, indestructible and unchangeable bodies, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atoms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, so small that they cannot be diminished any further (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;atomos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, indivisible) or seen or touched. Atoms possess hardness, size, shape, weight and motion. Everything consists of atoms arranged in particular ways.  When a particular combination of atoms, a thing, breaks up, the thing is destroyed. Diversity of the real world, according to Democritus, is due to the diversity of atom combinations.  Subtle emanations of atoms, thrown off from the surface of an object, penetrate the sense-organs, producing sensations and then ideas, for which sensations are responsible. Both sensations and ideas are impressions left by the emanations of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Democritus taught that (1) matter is real and exists independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations; (3) sensations and ideas are impressions produced by matter; (4) matter has certain physical properties and is the stuff of which all things are made (it is the ultimate level of nature); (5) matter is immutable: atoms have always been as they are, and they will always be so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Revolution in Natural Science. Philosophical Controversy ====&lt;br /&gt;
The view that matter consists of atoms which are the immutable, ultimate level of nature governed by the laws of mechanics persisted to the end of the 19th century. In that century, however, the connection between electricity and magnetism was discovered. Shortly afterwards, electromagnetic fields, waves, charges and the electromagnetic nature of light were discovered and investigated, giving rise to electrodynamics, the science concerned with these phenomena. None of them was found to contain atoms. Some people expected that with time atoms would be found, after all, to be the basis of electromagnetic phenomena. Others, who saw that everything could not be reduced to atoms, began to think that along with bodies which consisted of atoms, i.e., along with matter as they understood it, there were natural phenomena of an essentially different kind, such as electromagnetism, which they considered to be immaterial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There were others still who held that electromagnetic fields, waves, charges, and so on, were not really natural phenomena but concepts invented by physicists to make it more convenient for them to describe their observations.  These people maintained that, unlike matter composed of atoms&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the reality of which they never questioned—electromagnetic fields, waves, etc., exist only in mind and not in reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Austrian physicist Ernst Mach took a different line. He argued that nothing (and not electromagnetism alone) existed outside consciousness. There is nothing but our sensations, he wrote, and to believe in atoms is not a whit better than to believe in witches. This subjective-idealist theory was rejected by all but a few natural scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the turn of the 20th century it was found that atoms of certain chemical elements are capable of changing into atoms of other chemical elements (e.g., an atom of radium changes into one of radon and then of lead); that the atom is a system of particles charged with electricity (electrons), and electromagnetic fields; that the mass of electrons, contrary to the laws of classical mechanics, alters with their velocity. That which scientists called matter (atoms) was reduced to electromagnetic phenomena, to what was termed electricity or energy and was regarded as immaterial. After these discoveries, the majority of scientists were inclined to think that matter does not consist of atoms but of electrons. Some scientists, however, who had earlier believed in the existence of atoms but denied the reality of electromagnetic phenomena, now held that since the atom itself presented fields, charges and waves, it meant that there was no matter; there were merely physical concepts. All views that had been commonly accepted in natural science now came under sharp criticism. Natural science reached a crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists were not slow to see their opportunity and claimed that the new discoveries apparently corroborated the idealist views.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was urgently necessary to disprove the new form of idealism, and by drawing philosophical conclusions from the new scientific discoveries, enrich Marxist philosophy and show the way out of the crisis in natural science.  That task was brilliantly carried out by Lenin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The New Concept of Matter Elaborated by Lenin ====&lt;br /&gt;
In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin showed that Mach’s “new” doctrine was actually the old doctrine of Berkeley, altogether inconsistent with science. Lenin wrote that the new discoveries had exposed the unsoundness of metaphysical materialism which held nature (atoms) to be immutable, infinite in extent but finite in depth, and saw everything as mechanical motion. Not only did the new scientific discoveries confirm dialectical materialism but they enabled it to be enriched by the philosophical deductions which Lenin made from them. He conclusively proved that nature is as infinite in depth as in extent that “the electron is as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inexhaustible&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as the atom, nature is infinite...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-35|35]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , it has no “ultimate&amp;amp;quot; level. Therefore, to declare that matter consisted of electrons rather than atoms would be to retain the metaphysical conception of matter. The whole point was that in the transition from one level of nature to another, deeper level, many properties of the former disappeared, being replaced by other properties, not present at the previous levels. There were no immutable things or properties, no immutable form of motion to which motion at all levels could be reduced.  The electromagnetic structure of the atom was not evidence of its ‘“dematerialisation”’ but of man’s deeper knowledge of the atom. The trouble with physicists was that they knew none but mechanistic and metaphysical materialism.  Therefore they took the collapse of the mechanistic method and metaphysics for the collapse of materialism. ‘“‘Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-36|36]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Natural science, Lenin wrote, “... will overcome all crises, but only by the indispensable replacement of metaphysical materialism by dialectical materialism”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-37|37]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and, above all, by the replacement of the narrow concept of matter (embracing the atoms alone) by a broad dialectical concept. Matter is “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it”; “...matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-38|38]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Such is Lenin’s definition of matter. It comprises three points, viz., (1) matter is that which exists apart from and independently of consciousness; (2) matter is that which produces sensations in us; (3) matter is that which our sensations and consciousness reflect in general.&lt;br /&gt;
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All that which produces sensations is real, but not all that is real produces sensations.  Thus, we cannot feel the ultraviolet rays, processes going on in the centre of the sun, or endless other phenomena. Important as the second and third characteristics of matter are, the main thing that distinguishes what is mater.  ial from what is immaterial is that the former exists outside consciousness. Lenin wrote: &amp;amp;quot;...the sole ‘property’ of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of existing outside the mind.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-39|39]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That precisely is the distinguishing feature of Lenin’s conception of matter. For Lenin, not only all that is real objectively exists, but all that objectively exists is real.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now you may ask: “Is shadow material? Is the absence of light rays reflected from a surface material?’ But their absence is just as much a reality independent of the mind as their presence is. Both these phenomena are thus equally material. If, besides, we take it into account that the world is no collection of finished things but a totality of processes and relationships, we shall see that the idea that material is corporeal, i.e., the metaphysical materialists’ view, must give way to another, which regards the gravitational field and electromagnetic wave propagation and all kinds of connections existing outside the mind (including social relationships) as material phenomena.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Modern scientific discoveries attest that Lenin’s conception of matter is true.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Early in the 20th century everything in nature was believed to consist either of discontinuous microparticles (substance) or of continuous electromagnetic fields. Both were taken, by and large, to be subject to the same laws which govern the objects possessing mass and velocity or macroobjects which we meet in ordinary experience. It seemed no less obvious that if discontinuous substance (in which case motion occurs along a definite line, receiving a definite impulse at each point of the line) is the opposite of the continuous field (in which case motion consists in wave propagation) then no object can be a substance and a field simultaneously.&lt;br /&gt;
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As scientists investigated such fields and particles with a mass of a billion-billionth of a gram, moving almost as fast as light, a wonderful world, the microcosm, opened up before them. In that strange world certain laws of classical mechanics lose their force and are replaced by other laws. Substance and field coincide in the same object and particles do not possess simultaneously a definite impulse and a definite position. In fact, the more definite a particle’s position, the less definite its impulse, and vice versa. When these and other unusual laws of the microcosm were discovered, scientists evolved, in the mid-20th century, a new branch of physics, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantum theory&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, the idealists hastened to take advantage of its unusual character and insisted that quantum objects and processes did not really exist, being merely concepts invented by scientists to explain their experiments. That was, however, rejected by leading physicists. One of the authors of the quantum theory, Louis de Broglie, wrote that whether he studied macro-objects or micro-objects a physicist was sure of their objective existence, for “it is doubtful that he would be able to pursue his research usefully, by abandoning all belief in objective reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-40|40]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Einstein pointed out time and again that the certainty of the external world existing independently of the researcher underlay the whole of natural science. Planck and Born, who made significant contributions to quantum theory, held the same view. Concerning micro-particles, Born wrote: “I maintain that we are justified in regarding these particles as real in a sense not essentially different from the usual meaning of the word.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-41|41]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; As for the ambivalent opinion accepting the reality of things of everyday experience (macrocosmic objects) while denying the reality of microcosmic objects, Born wrote that “there is a continuous transition.... Where does that crude reality, in which the experimentalist lives, end ... and where does the atomistic world, in which the idea of reality is illusion and anathema, begin?  There is, of course, no such border; if we are compelled to attribute reality to the ordinary things of everyday life including scientific instruments and materials used in experimenting, we cannot cease doing so for objects observable only with the help of instruments”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-42|42]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; And, Born concludes, quantum theory “calls for new ways of describing the physical world, but not the denial of its reality”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-43|43]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such is the view of leading contemporary physicists whose research results have induced them to arrive at certain propositions of dialectical materialism spontaneously, although they do not consciously support Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, many outstanding modern physicists have consciously accepted dialectical materialism as the only philosophy consistent with modern science. They are P. Langevin, F. Joliot-Curie, J.-P. Vigier, Sakata Shoichi, and others.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this confirms Lenin’s prediction that the spirit of materialism, which is inherent in natural science, will enable it to overcome every possible crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt; and Motion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;re Matter Without Motion? ====&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this question one must first clearly understand what matter is and what motion is. We have already discussed the nature of matter. As for motion, it was established as early as the 19th century that mechanical motion is merely one form of the motion of matter, which has different, if connected, forms.  Engels evolved the following basic principles of the Marxist conception of the forms of the motion of matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, the forms of the motion of matter are essentially different, none of them being reducible to another. For example, although chemical reactions play a major role in the processes occurring in the body of an animal and in the formation of species in the anima&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kingdom, it would be quite wrong to attempt to reduce animal life to a chemical form of motion. With the emergence of life, there come into effect biological laws, not operative in inanimate nature; life is a form of motion, essentially different from any other (although it is connected with other forms of motion).&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, under certain conditions some forms of motion turn into other forms. Thus, at a certain stage in the development of matter and the complication of chemical processes, life appeared as a new form of the motion of matter. At a certain stage in the development of the animal kingdom, man was singled out from it; there emerged a new form of the motion of matter, namely, social processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, complex forms of the motion of matter include relatively simple forms, by no means being merely their sum. All chemical reactions necessarily involve electromagnetic and other physical processes, although the de&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isive role here belongs to the laws of chemistry. All vital processes in plants or animals necessarily involve a great number of chemical reactions, though the decisive role is played by biological laws. All social processes necessarily involve biological processes occurring in man. But the decisive role in the social process is undoubtedly played by the laws of the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Engels advanced also the important idea that the classification of the forms of the motion of matter underlies the classification of sciences.  The further progress of science has fully confirmed these ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of modern scientific conceptions, the following groups of forms of the motion of matter may be isolated: (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;physical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or change of the position in space, velocity, mass, energy, electrical charge, temperature, volume and other characteristics of real objects; (2) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;chemical forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the conversion of substances, combination and recombination of atoms; (3) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;biological forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or life and changes occurring in plants and animals; (4) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social forms&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or the changes occurring in human society and peculiar to it alone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each of these forms of motion exists objectively, outside the mind, and is a material process. The motion of human feelings, moods and ideas, on the other hand, exists merely in man’s mind. Certainly emotions and ideas do not exist without their material seat, i.e., the brain. “But,” Lenin explained, “‘to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-44|44]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; While they are a social phenomenon, emotions and ideas are at the same time spiritual processes, and this distinguishes them from all other social phenomena, which are material processes.&lt;br /&gt;
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This shows the one&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sidedness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the mechanistic materialists’ view that motion presumably boils down to the movement of bodies in space, wholly explainable by the laws of mechanics, in the process of which bodies never change, always remaining the same. Hence, according to this conception, matter is immutable and motionless. Yet the deeper natural science penetrates into nature’s secrets, the more obvious it becomes that nature contains no immutable objects, and that the motion of matter is not confined to a single form of motion but comprises &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;any kind o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; change at all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then is nothing at rest in the world?&lt;br /&gt;
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When lava ejected from a volcano has solidified into rock, it seems to be at rest. Nevertheless, solid rock also undergoes constant change induced by temperature fluctuations, rain, wind, surf, electromagnetic processes, which sooner or later will cause the rock to crumble. Long as its rest may be, it is still of a transient nature. Lastly, the rock moves relative to the sun, just as the Earth does. In mechanics generally, two bodies which are at rest relative to each other are performing identical motions relative to a third body. Therefore every object which is at rest moves. It is only resting in a certain respect. It is clear that rest is a particular instance of motion.&lt;br /&gt;
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While rest is finite and relative, motion is infinite and absolute. In other words, it is uncaused and indestructible.&lt;br /&gt;
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For this reason, all attempts to interpret the laws of nature so as to show that motion is not indispensable to matter, that matter without motion is possible, have failed. The second law of thermodynamics is a case in point. It reads that in a closed system, in which no energy is received from outside or lost, all forms of energy tend to be converted into heat. As heat can only pass from a hot to a cold body, the temperature of every part of such a system must eventually become exactly the same, and the system must reach thermal balance, when no conversion of one form of energy into another occurs. Regarding the universe as a closed system, the physicists Clausius and Kelvin concluded that in some time all forms of motion except heat would disappear and a balance of heat or the “thermal death” of the universe would set in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet movement is indestructible in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. Becoming incapable of changing from one form into another, movement would be destroyed in that respect, should a thermal balance be established. Engels wrote that to believe in the “thermal death” of the universe was to believe that movement was not indestructible. Besides, the ‘thermal death” of the universe implies that movement has both an end and a beginning. If there is a point at which movement loses its ability to change into different forms, there must have been a point at which it acquired that ability. One who believes that the universe will reach thermal balance, must also believe that the ‘world clock has to be wound up, then it goes on running until it arrives at a state of equilibrium from which only a miracle can set it going again.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-45|45]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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If nothing but an external impulse, intervention by a preternatural force, i.e., a miracle, can pull the universe out of its impending balance, then, plainly, it could only be by a miracle that it has been put into its present rather restless state. Thus, Engels held, the idea that movement is destructible, which is implied in the theory of “thermal death”, leads to religion quite unavoidably. Indeed, in 1951, Pope Pius XII said: “The farther back we look, the richer we find matter to be in free energy.... Thus everything seems to indicate that the material universe, charged as it was with incredibly vast reserves of energy, received, at a certain point in time, a powerful initial impulse.... Hence, creation in time; and therefore, a Creator; and consequently, God.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-46|46]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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As he criticised the theory of “thermal death”, Engels expressed his confidence that the progress of science would refute it. As early as the 19th century the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann showed that the tendency towards changing all forms of movement into heat in a closed system is the tendency towards the changing of this system from a less probable to a more probable state. However, as was established in the mid-20th century, all states of a system comprising an infinite number of particles are equally probable. Assuming that the universe is a system of an infinite number of particles, one must accept that thermal equilibrium will never be its most probable state.  Nevertheless, in terms of the general theory of relativity, the conditions of the existence of the universe do not remain immutable. Therefore the universe is not a closed system, and even should it comprise a finite number of particles, it still would not reach thermal equilibrium.&lt;br /&gt;
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Modern natural science bears out the tenet of dialectical materialism that motion is an intrinsic property of matter, its mode of existence.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Does Motion Without Matter Exist? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Thermodynamics and electromagnetic theory, which emerged in the 19th century and covered a very wide range of natural phenomena, took no account of atoms. (Their connection with the electromagnetic phenomena was yet to be established.) Scientists almost unanimously believed that matter consisted of atoms, while everything else (energy, electromagnetism) was thought to be “energy”, not matter. Wilhelm Ostwald, a German chemist and physicist, reasoned that as thermodynamics and electrodynamics had solved a great number of problems of physics and chemistry, ignoring the existence of atoms, it might be presumed that all other problems of natural science could also be resolved without having to assume that atoms exist. Hence, the assumption was false, and atoms did not exist. Having made that deduction and never doubting that atoms alone were matter, Ostwald concluded that the ‘ultimate’ level of matter was not matter, which did not exist anyway, but motion. Everything in the world consisted of “pure motion.” That gave rise to ‘‘energism”, a philosophical concept according to which the world was based neither on matter nor spirit but on energy, which was identified with motion. Insisting that both materialism and idealism should be discarded and replaced by energism, Ostwald wrote: ‘The simple and natural removal of the old difficulties arising from the antithesis between the concepts of matter and spirit by subordinating both to the concept of energy appears to me to be a great improvement...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-47|47]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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In his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Materialism and Empirio-Criticism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Lenin exposed the erroneous nature of this theory.  To assert that both matter and spirit boil down to energy, he pointed out, is to contend that neither matter nor mind exists, and there is only movement. But no scientist has ever denied yet the existence of ideas. And no wonder, for how can one express ideas, while insisting that ideas do not exist? Moreover, the belief that ideas exist and matter does not is an idealist point of view with nothing new in it. Such is Lenin’s first argument against energism.&lt;br /&gt;
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His second argument is, briefly, this: &amp;amp;quot;Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word ‘energy’ ” and thought that in that way he ended the contradiction between materialism and idealism. If we designate as energy both movement outside consciousness (physical, chemical, physiological and other processes) and movement inside consciousness (varying sensations, strivings, ideas), “...&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;f we ‘subordinate’ both matter and mind to this concept, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verbal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; annihilation of the antithesis is beyond question...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-48|48]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; But, in reality, the question whether mind depends on matter or vice versa remains. So does the irreconcilable conflict between materialism and idealism, which offer opposite answers to this question.&lt;br /&gt;
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The discovery of the electromagnetic nature of atoms made it obvious that Ostwald was wrong and, in 1908, he acknowledged that the existence of atoms was beyond question. In the middle of the 20th century, scientists could see atoms for themselves, photographed by an electronic microscope.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even so, attempts were made relatively recently to revive the view which Ostwald himself had renounced. In 1948, Bertrand Russell wrote: “It is energy, not matter, that is fundamental in physics’ because “both relativity and quantum theory have had the effect of replacing the old conception of ‘mass’ by that of ‘energy’ &amp;amp;quot;,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-49|49]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; and if mass has taken the place of energy, the latter has taken the place of matter, as mass is, indeed, matter. Russell&#039;s reference to the theory of relativity here concerns the relationship between energy and mass, discovered by Einstein.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even supposing Einstein&#039;s discovery did mean that mass was replaced by energy, it does not follow that matter does not exist, since its place has been taken by energy. Its existence is really a question of whether the world contains anything besides ideas, emotions and sensations. The answer to this does not depend on whether real objects have the properties of inertia and gravitation, i.e., mass.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides, Einstein’s discovery does not imply any replacement of mass by energy. If we put a piece of iron on a hot stove, it will get hot as it receives energy from the stove, the latter losing the same amount of energy. According to classical mechanics, the weight of the piece of iron and of the stove does not change&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;their mass remains the same. Einstein’s discovery, however, discards this notion, and implies that when an object transfers its energy to another object, it also transfers a certain amount of mass, while every time mass is transferred from one object to another, some energy is also transferred. Einstein wrote: “...a piece of iron weighs more when red-hot than when cool; radiation ... emitted from the sun contains energy and therefore has mass; the sun and all radiating stars lose mass by emitting radiation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-50|50]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; When a piece of iron gets hot from the stove, the mass it thus acquires is practically negligible. But the sun, which radiates huge amounts of energy, is losing mass at a rate of 4,000,000 tons a second.&lt;br /&gt;
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So that attempt to revive energism was also unsuccessful. Now, another question arises.  Ideas, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. They exist only in men’s consciousness. Does it not follow, perhaps, that the succession of sensations, ideas, and so on, is motion without matter? In other words, while it is erroneous to think, as the energists do, that any kind of movement represents motion without matter, would it not be correct to say that in some instances, i.e., mental processes, it is a case of motion without matter?&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that conceptions, sensations and aspirations are not material facts. Yet they are always somebody’s conceptions, sensations and aspirations; they cannot exist without man.  And man is not immaterial. Therefore the succession of ideas, emotions, etc., is far from being motion without matter; it takes place in man, a material being. It is the idealists alone who, in the face of all the scientific and practical evidence, maintain that ideas may exist without a material expositor. In fact, however, whether apart from mind or within it, motion without matter is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5. Sp&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ace and Time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Can Matter Exist Outside Time and Space? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every material object has shape, is three-dimensional, occupies a certain place, is at a definite distance from other objects and at some angle to them. These relations of coexistence of material objects are known as spatial forms and relations or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;space&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The succession or simultaneous occurrence of material facts, the duration of each and the irreversible character of the succession of phenomena, which has but one dimension, one direction—from past to present—all these relations of material phenomena are called temporal relations or relations in time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can matter exist outside space and time?&lt;br /&gt;
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This question can occur only to those who acknowledge the existence of matter. The subjective idealists, who deny the existence of anything apart from mind, hold that space and time exist solely in man’s mind. All those, however, who never question the existence of matter as an objective reality take it for granted that all material phenomena exist in space and time, outside man’s consciousness, just as matter does.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question whether matter can exist outside space and time was posed in the 18th century by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;–&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;1804). He recognised that the objects around us exist apart from mind and independently of it. “...I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me...”, he wrote, “as I am that I myself exist....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-51|51]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Vis-a-vis time and space, Kant argued that, whereas spatial and temporal relations are inherent in things themselves, we can only learn about this through our contact with things, from experience, in the course of which “...objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions... .”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-52|52]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Experience is the source of our conception of things. It is impossible to observe all facts of a kind (for example, al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; instances of bodies submerged in liquids).  Therefore, no matter how many facts we have observed, we cannot deduce from that experience any universal rule admitting no exception.  We cannot, for instance, assert that all bodies immersed in a liquid are subject to pressure. We can only draw a partial conclusion from experience since there may be some bodies which do not undergo pressure. Consequently, “if... a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience...”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-53|53]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Our geometrical judgements about space (e.g., that a straight line is the shortest line between two points) are conceived as universal rules admitting of no exceptions.  Our judgements about time are equally assumed to be rules without exceptions. Hence, these judgements have not been derived from experience. And if our judgements about time and space are not founded on experience, then their source is clearly not outside the mind but within it. Consequently, the ideas of space and time are inherent in the mind as forms of contemplation which are present there before any actual contemplation, observation or experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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To prove his idea, Kant also adduced the following. Imagine that everything has disappeared: you will see empty space in your mind’s eye. But try to imagine that not only things but the very space they occupied has also disappeared, and you will find it impossible. One can imagine that no events occur.  But it is impossible to imagine that time itself has disappeared. Consequently, the notions of space and time are inherent in the mind and are so firmly fixed in it that, try as it might, it cannot get rid of them. In other words, notions of space and time are built into the mind, and are present there before and regardless of any observation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s contention that our notions of space and time have nothing corresponding to them in the real world, and that they do not indicate actual, objectively existing relations or properties of things but ideal relations existing only in the mind makes him a subjective idealist.  According to his thinking, the notions of space and time are a pair of glasses, as it were, through which we look at things. Outside our consciousness, there is neither time nor space.  Thus, Kant arrives at the conclusion that matter exists apart from time and space.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant is right in saying that universal judgements cannot be derived from experience, from contemplation. Nevertheless, experience is not merely passive contemplation; it also actively influences things, which makes it possible to substantiate judgements of a universal nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our mathematical judgements of space and time possess, according to Kant, universality not present in other scientific assumptions which Kant himself acknowledged as being derived from experience. But laws discovered in physics, chemistry and other sciences are also of a general character. Contrary to what Kant believed, there is no gulf between geometrical (and, generally, mathematical) and other scientific concepts. We imagine a point, for instance, as a tiny spot on a sheet of paper, a straight line, as a thin thread made taut by a weight hanging from it, and a plane, as the surface of a mirror. Our conceptions of space are visual images reproducing what we saw or felt.&lt;br /&gt;
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Evolving concepts of space, geometry singled out some properties and relations of physical objects, neglecting all their other properties and relations. Geometrical figures have neither stuff, colour nor temperature. The spatial characteristics themselves are reflected in geometrical concepts in a rather peculiar way.  In the classical work of the known Greek mathematician, Euclid (about 300 B. C.), a point is defined as something without dimensions, having position only; a line, as having but one dimension, length; a plane surface, as having two dimensions, length and breadth. As well as we may understand it, we cannot picture it.  These notions are represented in the mind by a spot, a thread or a mirror. Yet, although our notions of space are undoubtedly consistent with the actual spatial relations and properties of things, they are also distinct in that geometrical notions, like all other scientific notions, are more exhaustive and accurate than our notions.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, geometrical concepts, too, are only approximate reflections of actual spatial relations, being generalisations derived from previous experience. As geometrical concepts take into consideration but a small number of spatial properties and relations of things, disregarding all other properties and relations, one can deduce from the known properties of things hypotheses logically following from them. In sciences founded on experiment, every hypothesis needs to be made more exact and correct as new evidence is obtained. The same holds for geometry whose propositions do not express properties of bodies with absolute exactness, but only approximately and, like all other scientific theories, have to be refined as new knowledge is accumulated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The invention of new geometries by N. I. Lobachevsky (in 1826) and G. Riemann (in 1854) showed that geometrical judgements were indeed subject to improvement and correction, and that our judgements about space do not possess “universality admitting of no possible exception’. Thus, the postulate that only one straight line can be drawn through a point in a plane parallel to another straight line in the same plane (or, to put it differently, that there is only one line parallel to the given line through a fixed point) has no effect in Lobachevskian geometry. Meanwhile, physicists have found real objects to which this geometry conforms. In the 20th century, the theory of relativity has introduced even more drastic corrections to our notions of space and time. Clearly, such a fundamental change in our notions and judgements about space and time is due to the further accumulation of experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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This offers a most convincing refutation of Kant’s idea that these notions are not rooted in experience and, similarly, of his deduction that they originate in the mind and not in the real world. If the idea that things exist apart from us, which we derive from our contact with . things, reflects their objective existence (and Kant acknowledged it), then the notions of space and time, equally derived from contact with things, also reflect objectively existing spatial and temporal properties and relations of material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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Practice, which refutes the idealist conception of space and time, confirms the materialist understanding of them, according to which there are, besides the perception and conception of time and space, also spatial and temporal properties and relations existing outside man’s consciousness. Such relations are inherent in all material phenomena. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Time and spac&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; are universal forms of the existence of matter&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the basis of this materialist view?&lt;br /&gt;
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Firstly, perceptions occur independently of man’s will and mind. This, among other things, makes most philosophers, including Kant, acknowledge that perceptions are produced by objects existing outside consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, we derive the most authentic scientific knowledge of nature from research into changes which occur only in space and time.  What would geology be without data on the spatial disposition of the layers of the Earth’s crust, the location of the continents, etc., and the length of the successive geological epochs?  What would remain of electromagnetic theory if we took away the data on the spatial arrangement of the electromagnetic fields and the movement of electromagnetic waves in time and space? Natural science cannot exist without notions of space and time which faithfully reflect the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, the behaviour of animals demonstrates that they coordinate their actions with spatial and temporal relations in nature. Mach himself, who denied that time and space exist outside the mind, admitted that much. He wrote: “...time and space are systems of the sensations of orientation,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-54|54]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; providing for biologically expedient reactions of adaptation. This undoubtedly applies to men as well. “If the sensations of time and space can give man a biologically purposive orientation,’ Lenin wrote, “this can only be so on the condition that these sensations reflect an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective reality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; outside man: man could never have adapted himself biologically to the environment if his sensations had not given him an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objectively correct&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; idea of it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-55|55]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Fourthly, man (unlike animals) transforms the environment, adapting it to his own needs.  In doing so, he evolves and clarifies his ideas of space and time. If these ideas were not more or less correct reflections of the objectively existing relations between real things, any attempt to rely on them whilst changing reality would be doomed to failure.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Do Time and Space Exist Outside Matter? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Most philosophers who were convinced of the objective reality of space and time (from ancient philosophers to 18th-century philosophers) held that independently of atoms, there exists a limitless void in which they move; that—as the 17th-century French materialist Gassendi wrote&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;outside atoms there exists only time, which does not depend on things, for whether things exist or not, and whether they move or not, it always flows evenly, being subject to no change. Yet, the great Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B. C.), who recognised the objective reality of space and time, contended that spatial properties and relations were inseparable from things, having no existence outside matter, and that vacuum did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the middle ages, this idea of Aristotle&#039;s was thought to mean that “nature abhors a vacuum”. Until the 17th century, they saw a confirmation of this in the operation of a pump, in which liquid moves upwards, overcoming its own weight, to prevent vacuum (a clearance between the level of the liquid in the tube and the piston). The idea that space was inseparable from matter was supported by the eminent 17th-century philosophers Descartes and Leibniz. Arguing that vacuum could not possibly exist, Descartes wrote: “There is...  nothing but matter in the entire Universe&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-56|56]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; All adjacent bodies touched, transmitting further pressure or impact which instantaneously spread throughout the universe. Leibniz, too, wrote that “...there is no space in which there is no matter”.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-57|57]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, many scientists considered that vacuum really existed. The founder of classical mechanics, Isaac Newton, was one of them. He believed in the existence of absolute space—an absolutely immovable void, separating celestial bodies from one another; and of absolute time—a flow of continuity existing. separately from matter and not to be changed by any material processes or events. That conception of space and time was predominant in natural science till the beginning of the 20th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx and Engels expressed some very important ideas on whether space and time can exist without matter. Engels wrote that the idea of absolute time and space existing apart from and independently of matter was a graphic expression of metaphysical materialism. He criticised that view from the standpoint of dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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How is a concept formed? From a multiplicity of properties, relations and states of objects we select the most essential, discarding the rest. A concept is indeed a reflection in our consciousness of different things, phenomena and processes in terms of their more substantial characteristics. But the source of concepts which arose long ago may be forgotten, and then the characteristics of a real object which underlie the concept will begin to seem to exist independently. That is what happens to the concepts of space and time which have been formed by separating from real phenomena their relations in space and time. To regard the height, length and breadth of real objects, as well as the simultaneity, succession and duration of real processes, as existing separately from these objects and processes, is equivalent to accepting that viscosity exists somewhere apart from viscous substances, and independently of them, or that reason exists separately from men. “It is the old story,” wrote Engels. “First of all, one makes sensuous things into abstractions and then one wants to know them through the senses, to see time and smell space.... The two forms of existence of matter are naturally nothing without matter, empty concepts, abstractions which exist only in our minds.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-58|58]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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But if it is true that space and time are forms of the existence of matter, it is equally true that they do not exist apart from matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dialectical interpretation of space and time proposed by Engels clearly pointed in the direction in which the scientific investigation of these forms of existence of matter was to go. And 20th-century physics has indeed followed that direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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Drawing on discoveries made at the end of the 19th century, mainly that all interactions occur at a finite velocity, and that the velocity of light is independent of the inertial system to which it is referred, Albert Einstein (1879–1955) evolved the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of relativity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This theory ended the view that the properties of Space and time were independent of the motions of nearby matter. When asked to explain the gist of his theory in a few words, Einstein said: “They used to think that if all things in the world disappeared, space and time would remain; a&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;d in accordance with the theory of relativity, with the disappearance of all things, space and time too must disappear.”&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the Special Theory of Relativity, all material objects and processes exist in the integral form of space-time, of which the relations of space and time are different but inseparable aspects. Two events are separated by a space-time interval which is independent of the framework of reference. The time interval between events is but one aspect of their space-time characteristic; it varies depending on the system of reference. So does the space interval, the size of which depends on the reference system.&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the General Theory of Relativity, the local properties of both space and time are direct consequences of the existence of nearby matter. In turn, they have a causal influence on the motions of that matter. Let us note that the space-time pattern may change depending on circumstances. Thus in the cosmos it is different from ordinary experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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These discoveries have shown that the single absolute space-time form of matter’s existence is expressed in temporal relations and spatial relations which are relative; that not only are space and time inseparable from matter, but their pattern depends on the distribution, movement and interaction of masses of matter and has an impact on them; and that the common characteristics of space-time are expressed in different space-time patterns, depending on the nature and scale of the material phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists seek to interpret these discoveries to their own advantage. They contend that the dependence of a body’s length and of the time interval on the frame of reference presumably means that relations of space and time are not inherent in matter at all, but depend entirely on the observer&#039;s subjective qualities and reactions. Thus the idealists assert that a body&#039;s length and the time interval between events exist merely in our consciousness. Dingle, for instance, claims that this follows from the theory of relativity, which, he alleges, “declines all attempts to assign to matter any properties whatsoever’. ‘“Now this,&amp;amp;quot; commented Max Born, “is a misrepresentation of the theory of relativity, which has never abandoned the attempt to assign properties to matter, but has refined the methods of doing so...”&lt;br /&gt;
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To make it clearer, here is the example suggested by Max Born. Let us suppose that we cannot for some reason directly observe a cardboard circle but can see the shadows it casts on some screens placed at different angles to it. All the shadows will be different save that they will all be elliptical. On studying the axes of the elliptical shadows, we shall have enough evidence to show that they have been cast by a circle and to find its radius. The projections of the properties of the object concerned (the cardboard circle) relative to other objects, which play the part of reference systems (the screens), differ. But in each case the real properties of the object concerned (the circle) remain identical. Shadows of different size and shape are relative expressions of the absolute size and shape of the cardboard circle.  Similarly, bodies and time intervals of different length are relative expressions of the absolute length of the space-time interval, which is independent of the reference system. The shadows cast by the circle are as real as the circle and the screens. The different lengths of the bodies and time intervals in different reference systems are as real, as independent of consciousness, as the space-time interval (whose expressions they are) and the corresponding reference systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear that the interpretation given by the new theory to space and time is not only dialectical but also materialistic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such are the philosophical conclusions drawn from the latest achievements of natural science, that they have not only confirmed the dialectical-materialist proposition that space and time are inseparable from each other and from matter, but have also made it possible to refine and enrich that proposition.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 6. Consciousness ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Consciousness Is a Reflection of the Material World ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once there was a patient in a hospital who had lost the use of all his senses except hearing and sight. The doctors noticed that whenever he shut his eyes and covered his ears, he became unconscious. He regained consciousness only when his good sense-organs were functioning.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here is a more ordinary case. When sleeping “like the dead’’, without dreams, a dog-tired person loses consciousness. He has neither ideas nor feeling. He does not react to strong light or noise. But if his sense-organs are subjected to some unusually strong stimulation, he will react to it. If, for instance, a shot is fired at close quarters, he will hear the sound.  The sensation will be followed by notions, emotions and, finally, by ideas—he will regain consciousness. This shows that a person who experiences no sensations has neither notions nor thoughts. Thoughts may appear and exist only on the basis of sensations, perceptions and notions, as the result of their being processed.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is sensation, what is perception? When touching one thing we feel that it is a sphere, and touching another, we feel that it is a cube, our perceptions reflect the shape of these objects. When we recall how we felt these bodies, we have a representation of them in our mind.  It is clear that representations, just like sense-perceptions, are reflections of different aspects, characteristics and relations of material objects.  Ideas (notions, judgements, conclusions), as we saw, arise, in the final analysis, from sensations and perceptions, which are mental reflections of the external world. Hence, all our ideas are also mental reflections of the external world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every reflection is secondary to what is reflected. Therefore, consciousness is secondary to matter. In denying this, idealists stubbornly oppose the idea that consciousness, thought in particular, is a reflection of the real world.  How do they defend their view?&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that to err is human. What does an erroneous idea reflect, which has nothing corresponding to it in the real world? Goblins, brownies or mermaids do not really exist, yet the notions of goblin, brownie and mermaid do. But, say the idealists, if these notions do not reflect anything, then other notions and conceptions equally do not reflect reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealists also argue that while such notions as “eight”, ‘the square root of 81”, “a plane”, etc., are commonly accepted to be true, it becomes clear on analysis that there is no such thing as “eight in general’’ in the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world any more than there is a real life “square root of 81’ or any body which has length and breadth but no height. Hence, mathematical notions have no objects to correspond to them and therefore they are not reflections of anything at all.&lt;br /&gt;
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The idealists also assert that people have numerous notions of things that ceased to exist long ago. Palaeontology and history entirely comprise ideas of things that existed long ago and disappeared. On the other hand, man is capable of looking into the future. Tsiolkovsky, for example, predicted interplanetary flights at a time when they could only be dreamed of. What reality did his judgements reflect then?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us first take a look at the so-called false notions, such as “mermaid”, for instance. It implies a half-woman half-fish, fond of dancing and singing and given to enticing handsome young fellows to their ruin. Women, fish, dancers, singers and “cruel charmers” indeed exist.  The notion is false merely because it combines things which in reality are separate (woman and fish), and disjoins things which go together in a living being (the trunk is separated from the legs and the fish tail from the fish).  The idea of a mermaid is therefore a reflection of reality, but it is a distorted reflection.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly no “eight as such” or two-dimensional bodies exist in nature, but then there are no creatures with merely the general characteristics of the bee, eagle or elephant; they are all quite definite, individual animals. The fact, however, that the notion of an animal does not imply every possible characteristic of an elephant, and that the notion of fruit does not imply every possible characteristic of an apple, makes it no less certain that these notions reflect some characteristics of the elephant (and other animals as well), or some characteristics of the apple (and other fruit as well). The peculiar quality of a notion is just that it reflects only some, and not all, characteristics of an object. This also refers to the mathematical notions. The notion “‘eight’ implies merely the quantitative aspect of things, regardless of everything else. The notion “a plane” implies only two dimensions, regardless of the third dimension and all other characteristics of bodies. Yet this one-sidedness, so to speak, of mathematical notions does not alter in the least the fact that they are reflections of properties and relations which really exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us turn to situations where we think of what is no more or what is yet to be. From the metaphysical point of view, the world is a totality of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;final&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; things, and so the idea of a thing which does not exist at the moment does not reflect anything. And from the dialectical point of view, the world is a totality of processes, connections and relations, and so ideas reflect processes, connections and relations rather than final things. In its progress from the state in which it was a hundred million years ago to the state in which it is now, the Earth has passed through numerous intermediate stages. Learning the connections between these stages—the laws of geochemistry and geophysics, which exist now too—and starting from the present condition of the Earth, scientists mentally fathom the condition in which it was hundreds of millions of years ago. To quote some other examples. Having grasped the dialectical connections—physical laws which existed in his day too—Tsiolkovsky mentally traced the chain of events which would inevitably, and actually did (when men turned these laws to use), result in space travel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The historical process of capitalist society&#039;s development, which has resulted in a third of mankind embarking on socialism, also consists of definitely related stages. Having studied their relationships and starting from the state in which society was in the sixties and seventies of the 19th century, Marx mentally grasped the events that were to take place fifty or a hundred years later. In each instance, whether turned to the past or to the future, people’s ideas reflect, above all, the relationships existing at the present moment. So the argument supporting the view that thought is not reflection does not hold water either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, “our consciousness is only an image of the external world”, a reflection of it. Material phenomena exist outside us, while their reflections, ‘‘the images of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;external world&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, exist &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;within us&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-59|59]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then how does thought relate to the brain?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Carl Vogt, a 19th-century German scientist, answered this question by saying that thought was related to the brain in much the same way as bile to the liver. But bile is just as material as the liver which produces it. Vogt’s assertion implies that thought is as material as the brain producing it. In other words, consciousness is a variety of matter; it is matter. And matter, as we know, is that which exists outside consciousness. If we assume that consciousness &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s matter, we shall arrive at the statement: “Consciousness is that which exists outside human consciousness.” Now, that obviously makes no sense, This alone shows the absurdity of Vogt’s conclusion, which Engels called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;vulgar materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists also reduce the material world to Consciousness. What is the difference, then, between what they say and what Vogt says? It was not by chance that Lenin wrote that “to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-60|60]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the 17th-18th centuries, when they still knew very little about the essential distinctions between organic and inorganic nature and between man and animals, many materialist philosophers held that not only living creatures but inanimate things too were capable of thought or at least of sensation. It followed from this that even a stone was not insensible.  This doctrine, which draws no line between animate and inanimate things, and views transition from inorganic to organic nature not as the emergence of something new but merely as a variation of something old, is known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;hylozoism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin opposed the metaphysical notion held by hylozoists with the dialectical view that the transition from the inanimate to the animate does not merely involve a variation of old things but also the emergence of something altogether new, of sensation, which “is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way”,&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-61|61]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; whereas matter which is not so organised is incapable of sensation. As he rejected both the view equating mind and matter and the view underrating the contrast between them, Lenin stressed that the difference was absolute only within the bounds of the fundamental question of philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He insisted that it was not to be conceived metaphysically, as if there were nothing whatsoever in common between matter and consciousness. “...This contrast must not be made ‘excessive’, exaggerated, metaphysical ... the antithesis of matter and mind,” Lenin pointed out, “has absolute significance only within the bounds of ... the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis is indubitable.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-62|62]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Reflection Is a Property of Matter ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what do matter and mind have in common that makes the antithesis between them relative? In answering this question, Lenin suggested that we must “assert that all matter Possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection….”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-63|63]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The essence of this is that after passing through Some stages, material reflection, which is inherent in all nature, reaches one where it becomes something essentially new, turning into the mind, which, consequently, not merely differs from matter but is also linked with it by reflection, albeit of a highly peculiar nature.  This brilliant idea, put forward by Lenin in 1908, received conclusive scientific confirmation later on, especially in the second and third quarters of this century, thanks to the great strides made by neurophysiology and the emergence of information theory and cybernetics.  If a meteorite falls on to the ground at a speed not exceeding several hundred metres a second, it makes a hole not much larger than its own size. A meteorite which falls at a greater speed, breaking on impact together with the ground it falls on, makes a much larger hole than its own size. But when the speed reaches from two to four kilometres a second, both the meteorite and the ground it touches instantly turn into gas, and a huge crater is formed. Thus the trace left by a meteorite is something like the imprint of its characteristics&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of its size, shape and composition, the speed of its flight and the angle at which it fell. A meteorite will leave different traces in solid rock and in soft grass-covered ground.  But in either instance, the trace will reproduce the meteorite’s individual features. The trace left by a meteorite is its reflection resulting from its impact on the surface of the Earth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with every reflection. When one material object acts on another, the latter changes in such a way as to reproduce certain characteristics of the former. Reflection takes place when one material phenomenon reproduces the characteristics of another material phenomenon acting on it. Dialectics, which tells us that all things are interconnected, so that “everything affects and is affected by every other thing”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-64|64]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , sees interaction in every material process. That this is so follows most conclusively from modern physics which regards all natural processes as different kinds of material interaction. But interaction, the influence of material phenomena on one another, leads, as we saw, to the reflection of these phenomena in one another; and if interaction is inherent in all matter, so is reflection too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One most important feature of this relation is that ‘an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-65|65]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; It takes a falling meteorite to leave a trace on the ground; but then a meteorite may exist for a very long time without falling and leaving its trace.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reflection consists in the reproduction of peculiar characteristics of the object reflected.  The reverberation of an avalanche in the mountains, for example, is a process of reflection.  The noise of the avalanche is the thing reflected, the mountains are the reflecting objects, and the reverberation is the reflection. Both the noise and reverberation consist of sound waves or air vibrations of a similar pattern. In this instance, the reflection and that which is reflected are of an identical physical nature. That, however, need not always be the case. The main sources of information on the plants of the geologic past are plant fossils preserved in the rocks: leaves, roots, fruits, flowers, etc.  Fossil leaves, for instance, reproduce every single detail of a leaf’s surface. Here, the reflection—a piece of rock—has physically nothing in common with the thing reflected, i.e., a plant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why do we describe both the reverberation of an avalanche and plant fossils as  reflections? What is the connection between these widely different phenomena? It is the likeness between the reflection and the thing reflected. The phrase “reproduction of certain characteristics of the thing reflected” implies one-to-one correspondence between the reflection and its object, i.e., that every element or state and every relation between elements or states of a thing reflecting something corresponds to only one element or state or relation in the thing reflected. Moreover, every reflection is always limited. The impression of a leaf in the rock, for instance, reflects the spatial form of the leaf’s surface but not the cellular or molecular structure of the leaf.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the nature of the reflecting thing or process, images may be reproduced in diverse forms. But no matter how different the forms may be, they are identical in content, having the same organisation as the phenomenon reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such are some general characteristics of reflection both in organic and inorganic nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. From Irritability to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Mental&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
Every living organism is characterised above all by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;metabolism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., continued interchange of material with its surroundings. Another important characteristic is what we shall term here ‘‘survivability’’, meaning the capacity of a living organism to react to external influences in a way which increases the chances of its survival. Lastly, all living organisms are capable of growth and reproduction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Earlier, we mentioned the law stating that all material systems tend to proceed towards greater chaos, developing from complex forms of motion to simple chaotic heat motion of particles. At the same time, the processes of life such as the development of species show the preservation or even increase of order.  The reactions of a grown-up animal are more orderly than those of a newborn. Species of later origin are usually more highly organised compared with those long extinct. The capacity of living bodies to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;survive&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is of great importance to reflection. That is the main requirement which every variation in an organism must satisfy. When a ray of light, penetrating through a chink in the door of a dark cellar, falls on a green plant that has sprouted in the cellar, the stem begins to grow in the direction of the light which helps it obtain the carbon necessary for its growth. When roots strike an obstacle, they curve so as to bypass it.  Plants usually react to external influences rather slowly. But it is not always so. A pumpkin tendril, for instance, begins to curl up five minutes after being touched, and in twenty minutes coils up completely. Insectivorous plants respond even more quickly. And the simplest unicellular animals, like amoebae, infusoria, etc., react to some external stimuli very quickly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Irritability&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;—a quality which distinguishes living organisms from dead things, and which consists in a body’s capacity to react to the environment in a way which helps it survive—depends on the structure of the living organism’s body. The latter is such that, on being stimulated, (1) reflects those characteristics of the external phenomena which increase or decrease its chances of persisting in a living state, and (2) transforms the reflections into internal chemical and physical processes, enabling it to effect a response essential to self-preservation. This quality of living organisms emerged in the process of natural selection. Organisms that were built in such a way, that their reactions to the environment provided for their preservation, lived and multiplied, while all others died out. Thus, the structure of the body of a living organism is, in a way, a reflection of the conditions under which it exists.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the basis of the mechanism responsible for transforming external stimuli into responses in plants and the simplest animals (i.e., irritability) are chemical reactions induced in organisms by different stimuli. Let us take, for example, the chain of chemical reactions and corresponding movements with which a Venus’s fly-trap (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dionaea muscipula&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) responds to a chain of stimuli. As an insect alights on one of the leaves, a chemical reaction starts in the plant, which makes the leaf curl up. In response to the movements of the insect which Naturally tries to get away, a chemical reaction begins, causing the projections along the outer edge of the leaf to overlap, the leaf closing on the insect and pressing against it. In response to the insect’s frantic movements, another chemical reaction sets in—the numerous small bristles on the upper surface of the leaf begin secreting a digestive fluid. The insect’s body is disintegrated and the nutrients are absorbed by the leaf. Two series of events are present here, namely, a series of stimuli and a series of corresponding chemical reactions. As both were repeated thousands of millions of times, they finally became connected in a way which reflects the relationship between the events producing the given reactions. The chemical reaction causing the leaf to curl up began to induce the chemical reaction causing the outer projections on the leaf to bend and overlap, the latter reaction, in its turn, setting off the chemical process by which the digestive fluid is produced. As the reactions are greatly accelerated by enzymes (proteins), they follow one another more quickly than the stimuli, so that the plant gives all three responses (i.e., the leaf curls up, its projections bend and overlap, and the digestive fluid is produced) even to the first stimulus (the insect alighting on the leaf). The first stimulus is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;signal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the other two are to follow, and the plant responds in advance. An amoeba in pursuit of prey trying to escape behaves in a similar way.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As many proteins, acting as catalysts, accelerate chemical reactions in living organisms hundreds and even thousands of millions of times, it is evident that this enormous difference in the rate at which chains of reactions occur in living organisms and the rate at which changes in the environment occur, which are reflected in the reactions, plays a great role in the life of plants and animals. In the more highly organised animals, a special tissue develops whereby an organism’s responses increasingly anticipate external phenomena. It is the nervous system. An anticipatory reflection effected through the nervous system is called a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  However, we shall discuss reflexes further on.  At this point we shall merely note that modern scientific evidence reveals that changes which are only forthcoming but which are associated with existing facts can be reflected not only by man (as was mentioned earlier) but by the simplest animals and even plants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reflections which appear, are transmitted, stored, processed and retrieved are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;information&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Information is the amount of order in the reflecting object reproducing the amount of order in the object reflected, the former being the information carrier and the latter the information source, and is used in the process of control. As every living organism is a self-regulating system, reflection in this case represents information. This cannot be said of inorganic systems, in which self-regulation is not present. Information is transmitted from the regulated part of a living system, which is in immediate contact with the environment and receives stimuli from it, to the regulating part, in which information is stored and transformed into a change by which the organism must respond to the external stimulus in order to survive. This new information is then transmitted from the regulating to the regulated part which, being in direct contact with the environment, responds to the stimulus. Information not only circulates within a living organism but is passed on from generation to generation, thus ensuring transmission of qualities by heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One of the great scientific discoveries of the 20th century is that heredity operates through &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;molecules&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, of which living cells consist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since neither the emergence nor development of plants and animals is possible without natural selection, and thus without heredity, which depends on information transmission (i.e., reflection), the development of species is based entirely on biological reflective processes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason to suppose that in plants, viruses, and the simplest unicellular animals, reflection is accompanied by sensation, still less, by emotion. In their case, only irritability is present but not mental activity, even of the most primitive kind. Rudiments of mental activity are found in more highly organised, multi-celled animals not possessing a backbone (invertebrates). Most of these (insects, shellfish, earthworms) have a centralised nervous system which regulates their responses to stimuli and co-ordinates their movements. Although it is sometimes possible to produce a conditioned reflex in such animals, their behaviour is, on the whole, automatic. Their actions depend on unconditioned reflexes, i.e., responses to specific stimuli, transmitted by heredity. Thus a female spider lays her eggs in a brood-cocoon which she carries about for 15-20 days. She continues to take care of the cocoon even if the eggs are, for some reason, dead. A female spider will stay in the egg-laying posture for as long as it usually takes to lay eggs, even if she does not lay any, and then will clip the edges of the empty cocoon and carry it about just the same. Similar behaviour is found among bees and wasps too.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does this essentially differ from irritability?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that, with the emergence of life, all phenomena come to be divided from the point of view of their effect on the preservation of life, which may be either good or bad. Reflection in living matter not endowed with mentality consists in the differentiation of phenomena as favourable and unfavourable to life and in the regulation of appropriate responses. Hundreds of millions of years of natural selection have resulted in the emergence of conscious experience. The latter represents reflections of the characteristics of what is going on in the external world, i.e., sensations, on the one hand, and motivations to attain desirable, and avoid harmful, objects, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both sensation and motivation are subjective experiences classed as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mental activity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The subjective nature of experience (mental activity) lies in the fact that a sensation, feeling, etc., is experienced only by a specific individual (subject). Lenin noted this when he wrote that only “the usual &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;human&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensations familiar to all” exist and ridiculed the notion of “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ictitious sensations, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nobody&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’s sensations,”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-66|66]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; which stresses the fact that every sensation must be somebody’s sensation. This refers to animals as well. With them, too, sensation is always a sensation experienced by a definite organism and non-existent outside it. We already know that sensations are reflections of external phenomena, for this reason, living beings of the same species, when exposed to the influence of the same external phenomenon, experience similar sensations. When an artist portrays objects as they appear to him, other people, as a rule, recognise their own perceptions in the portrayal. This reveals the content of sensations and notions, which does not depend on the reflecting subject (man), but on the external objects which are reflected. Similar sensations may, of course, be experienced only by beings whose sense-organs, by which the given phenomena are perceived, are similar.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mental activity is subjective also because it comprises not only reflections of the properties of external phenomena but also the subject’s attitude to them, the specific motivation.  In lower animals, it is confined to pleasure or pain, attraction or repulsion, while in highly organised beings it includes a wide range of needs and emotions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must, however, be remembered that neither the simplest motivations of a bee nor man’s most complex requirements and emotions are purely subjective. These motivations are reflections of the significance objectively attached, as far as individuals are concerned, to the things towards or away from which the motivation is directed. These mental phenomena, like sensations, have some objective content which is independent of the subject. For this reason, we can have an idea of what others may feel under various circumstances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If sensations and motivations changed nothing in the connection between organism and environment, they would have been eliminated in the course of natural selection as useless.  I. M. Sechenov (1829-1905), a Russian physiologist, found that for living beings, sensation was of two-fold significance, serving to differentiate the conditions of an action and to guide the actions appropriate (i.e., expedient or adjustive) to these conditions. The enormous significance of sensation and motivation to the adjustment and behaviour of living organisms was also stressed by Sechenov’s follower, I. P. Pavlov (1849-1936).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Changes in the environment, brought about by the vital activity of the creatures inhabiting it, depend on the particular features of both the living organisms and environment itself. Simultaneously, the changes which living organisms undergo under the impact of the environment also bear the imprint of the internal organisation of these organisms. The rabbits brought in the 15th century to the tiny Atlantic island of Porto Santo, in the absence of beasts of prey there, changed so much that a new species emerged, half the original size, with different colouring and habits. But if some other animals, e.g., foxes or wolves, had been brought to the island, they would have undergone quite a different sort of change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The environment exerts its influence on the animal only through the internal organisation of the latter. In the interrelationship of animals incapable of mental activity and their environment, the animals’ internal organisation plays a comparatively minor part, as compared to the environment. The addition of a new factor, i.e., mental activity (first, sensations and simple motivations and next, with more highly organised animals, perceptions, notions and emotions), essentially alters the interrelation of the organism and the environment. As animals develop a more complex mentality, they begin to influence their surroundings in more complex ways. Pavlov was the first to establish the presence in animals of the so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orientation reflex&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby in any new situation threatening danger, all other kinds of behaviour are inhibited, and the animal performs actions based on the specific situation. When the action producing the needed result is found, this form of behaviour is fixed and conditioned reflex is established.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As more and more highly organised animals appear, the significance of mental activity as a regulator of behaviour increases and so does the significance of the brain, the organ which controls uninherited forms of behaviour. A frog which has had the cerebral hemispheres excised continues to behave in the same way as before the operation. A pigeon, however, although it can still fly and keep its balance well after a similar operation, cannot properly react to stimuli and would not even feed. As for a dog, such an operation disables it completely. This shows that the brain plays an ever Greater part as the internal organisation of animals becomes more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Labour, Language and Thought ====&lt;br /&gt;
Modern science has established that there is much in common between the nervous and mental activity of man and animals. Certainly, appreciable distinctions between them have also been found to exist. So what are the distinctive traits of human mentality, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific data obtained in the 20th century conclusively confirm the truth of the Marxist proposition that man raised himself out of the animal world thanks to labour. Numerous excavations have yielded evidence that stone implements were fashioned back in the palaeolithic period (or the old stone age), when apeman evolved. That led to the transformation of the animal herd into a social community and the emergence of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At the close of the palaeolithic period, about a million years ago, primitive man, or Neanderthal man, appeared, Excavations at rock-shelters in which Neanderthalers lived have shown that they made stone adzes and pigmy tools from flint flakes. Later, in the middle palaeolithic period, when they began to hunt large animals together, Neanderthal men learned how to make flint spear tips, daggers, knives, scrapers and bone implements. The body proportions of this species and size of skull are similar to ours. But the vault of the skull is low, and the thigh and lower and upper arm bones are curved.  With the development of labour and implements in the later palaeolithic period, the primitive human herd of the Neanderthalers give way to the primitive communal society of Cro-Magnon men, who do not significantly differ physically from recent man and possess intellect of the simplest kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An animal’s mode of life, habits and mentality are determined by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;natural&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions, i.e., by its own nature and by the environment.  Man, however, is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; being. His mode of life, activity and mentality are almost entirely determined by the kind of society in which he lives. Certainly, the emergence of labour, society and specifically human mentality (consciousness) was accompanied by essential changes in the structure and functions of the brain and nervous system in general, which, in man, have some distinctive qualities, not found in animals.  Still, an infant’s nervous system, though indispensable, is not yet a sufficient condition for Consciousness. The mentality of a child growing up in isolation from human society does not rise above an animal&#039;s, and will develop into consciousness only if the child interacts with other people, i.e., society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be able to fashion and use implements and kill large animals, primitive men had to act jointly and circulate information of ever greater variety and scope. The advantage of common effort was two-fold. Not only did it make feasible that which was beyond the possibilities of single individuals, but it enabled the information picked up by single individuals to become accessible to all. Yet, to be accessible to all, information must be equally understandable to all. And, if it is of a multiple nature, then the signal conveying it must clearly be such as to indicate not unique but diverse phenomena that possess, at the same time, such common characteristics as must produce a uniform response in every member of the community. Then what information should such a signal convey? Different individuals may have more or less identical sensuous images and notions of similar things only if they have observed the latter under identical circumstances. If the circumstances of observation appreciably differ, so will the sensuous images differ with different individuals. The signal must, however, be common to a class of things, as well as to all those involved in a common effort. Hence, the information conveyed by a signal is not a sensuous image but a concept, a general idea; and the signal itself is a word by which the idea is expressed. Lenin wrote: “Every word (speech) already &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;niversalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-67|67]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The concept of a tree, for instance, contains no reference to its height, girth, shape, foliage, vertical or horizontal position. To imagine a tree devoid of size, shape and position is impossible, for nobody has ever seen it. Only a word, which is uttered and perceived as a signal reflecting the characteristics common to trees in general, makes the concept possible.  No concepts or ideas could arise without the material phenomenon—a signal which, in the present instance, represents a combination of sounds, i.e., language. “Language is as old as consciousness.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-68|68]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That concepts cannot be formed even by highest (Anthropoid) apes is obvious enough from the following example. By imitating people, a chimpanzee learned to get bananas surrounded by burning candles. He turned on the tap, filled a mug full of water and extinguished the candles. He could also cross a pond using a raft and pole. Once, when he was brought to the pond, there was a raft with a pole at the bank, while in the middle of the pond there was another raft with some bananas on it. All round the bananas were lighted Candles, and beside them stood the familiar mug. The chimpanzee got on the first raft and reached the other raft. Picking up the mug, he got back to the bank, ran up to the tap, turned it on, filled the mug and hurried back to the pond with it, intending to put out the candles with the tap water. He proved incapable of abstracting from the distinction between water running from the tap and water in the pond and form the image of water as such. Yet even a five-year-old, when it uses one word to describe that which runs from the tap, that which fills a pond and that which falls from the sky as rain, has the notion of water as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man’s capacity to think is one of the principal qualities distinguishing human consciousness from the mentality of animals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An animal pays attention only to such things in its surroundings which relate to the satisfaction of its needs. It is incapable of catching the varied interactions of objects, i.e., of grasping the laws to which the latter are subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is quite different with man. His ancestors could already use one object (unsuitable for immediate consumption, e.g., a stone) to act on another so as to obtain yet another object, an implement, which equally would not be able to satisfy a biological need. An implement cannot be fashioned from just any kind of stone but only from hard and durable stone, which must also be workable. The fashioning stone, too, must meet certain requirements.  The fashioning requires a specific technique, and the implement must be of a specific shape.  Haphazard strokes and just any shape would be to no purpose. To kill the game, the implement must be applied in a certain way. It is a chain in which every link is connected with its neighbours in a specific manner. So that they could work, our ancestors had to find out about these interconnections and relations.  Consequently, the latter had to be correctly reflected by the mind. Actions, both fruitful and fruitless, were repeated thousands of millions of times, and in the course of hundreds of millennia there gradually began to form the habit of relating the reflections of objects in the mind in the same way as they are related in nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This habit involved not only sporadic phenomena, but also such as occur everywhere and always. For example, “if an object is harder than a second object and the latter is harder than a third, then the first object is harder than the third’. Or, “if an object is inside a second object and the latter is inside a third, then the first object is inside the third’. Thus, man learned to infer the unknown from the known, the unobserved from the observed, and that which is to be from that which is. Thanks to this capacity, engendered by labour, our ancestors arrived at this train of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reasoning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;: if I bring one kind of stone to bear on another, I Shall obtain an object with which, by using it in a certain way, I shall be able to kill a certain kind of game.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Animals’ activity consists in their adapting themselves to the environment. In doing so, the former certainly affect the latter. The destruction by starfish of more than 350 square kilometres of the Great Barrier Reef, off the north-east coast of Australia, from 1966 to 1969 is but one example of this. Nevertheless, such changes are unintentional and, as often as not, harmful to the animals that have brought them about. Human activity, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, on the other hand, consists in man’s adapting nature to himself by completely refashioning things, so as to make nature serve his own needs. This was reflected in the mind by way of a substantial remodelling of perceptions and notions, emergence of concepts, deductions—in short, of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideas&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. To conclude, one of the principal qualities differentiating human consciousness from animal mentality, i.e., thought, owes its rise to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;labour&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us note also that in human labour, unlike animal activity, the creation of a new object, e.g., an implement, is preceded by an image of it. To form such an image merely from the correlation of sense-perceptions and representations is impossible, as sensuous images reflect nothing but the objects previously observed. A new implement is, however, an object previously unobserved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Useful information acquired by a generation of animals is transmitted to the next only biologically, being embodied in the genetic code, i.e., by heredity. Hence the extremely slow evolution of animal species other than man. In human society, however, information is passed on from generation to generation with the help of language and is objectified in implements and other articles of material and Spiritual culture. And this enormously speeds up the rate of progress.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. Subject and Object in Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
It has been shown by scientists in the Soviet Union and other countries that both the environment and the animal&#039;s physical condition, mental experience, reactions and their results, have an effect on the animal as an integral whole, an entity existing at each given point of time. In this entity, according to the observation of Henri Wallon (France), the ‘subjective and objective factors form an indivisible unity.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-69|69]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As it does not single out either the environment or itself from this situation, the animal does not mentally reflect the relations between itself and the environment. Thus, “...the animal does not ‘&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’ itself to anything ... for the animal its relation to others does not exist as a relation.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-70|70]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Both the animal&#039;s orientation activity, aimed at finding the most suitable tactics, and retention of the method hit upon reflect merely the unity of the surroundings, the animal&#039;s state, its response and the end result in a definite situation, whereas man, in the process of labour, masters some connections of the external world, and some connections between his own and other workers’ efforts. Ever since our ancestors began to master those connections, the latter were reflected increasingly in man’s mind. The ability to discriminate between the reflections of the environment and of oneself (and so of the relation between oneself and the environment) was especially important in this respect. In its turn, the reflection of the environment became dissected into images of things, people, their actions and relations, the reflection of oneself—into images of one’s own body, its parts and their interactions, and, lastly, into images of one’s own conscious experience. Relations between these images, as they exist in the mind, reflect the relations between their prototypes, as they are in reality. In this way, the animal&#039;s mentality is transformed into human mentality, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. “Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;immediate&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-71|71]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man owes his capacity to detach himself from the environment to social relations above all. To be able to separate from the situation all that which belongs to him alone and become conscious of himself and his attitude to external existence, man must associate with his fellow-creatures, with whom he establishes relations in the process of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;If&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; it is true that the consciousness of self and a conscious attitude to the external world is what fundamentally distinguishes human intelligence from the animal’s, it is no less true that man’s capacity to think about his own ideas, sensations, feelings, strivings, etc., is of equal significance. The ideal phenomena that occur in the mind itself are reflected in consciousness as well as what happens in the environment and man’s own body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consciousness is capable of imaging itself, of being a “reflection of a reflection&amp;amp;quot;. As I recall the impression made on me by the snow which covered the top of a mountain I saw from a distance, I think of my own perception.  As I analyse the opinion I have formed of somebody I met yesterday, I think of my own thoughts. As I do it, I am aware that my perception is but an approximate reflection, and the snow may well be not such a pure white as it seemed to me from afar; and I realise that my judgement of the man I met yesterday is only an approximate reflection of what he may prove to be in fact. Man’s consciousness reflects not only relations existing in the external world and relations between himself and the external world, but also the relations between his own sensations, representations and concepts on the one hand, and the things whose reflections and copies all of these are, on the other. Man correlates the mental images he forms and their archetypes as copy and original.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While acting under the influence of its needs and psychological responses, the animal is not aware Of the latter, as it has no mental capacity of ‘‘self-reflection’’. Man, too, may have motivations (e.g., attraction or repulsion) he is utterly unconscious of, although his behaviour may be greatly influenced by them. Still, man is aware of many of his needs and aspirations as goals which he sets himself and consciously pursues.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In man, the capacity for reflection, which animals also possess, is carried to a much higher level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The formulation of a goal and elaboration of a suitable plan of action proceeds in the aforementioned way, whereby external objects and their relations, the conscious individual and his attitude to the objects are all reflected in the mind. These reflections represent a sort of substitute, or model, of objects and connections. Man can mentally use these substitutes (models) in much the same way as he would handle their material originals, had he to deal with the matter practically. Before taking any practical steps, which may or may not help him achieve his purpose, he can mentally rehearse his actions, as it were, so as to see what their results may be, and select the best plan of action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. The Highest Known Form of Reflection ====&lt;br /&gt;
For all its peculiar character, reflection of the world in the human mind is merely another stage in the development of the forms of reflection existing even before man. Demonstrating that the higher animals’ behaviour shows the simplest forms of disintegration of an unfamiliar object into components (analysis), combination of things and actions to achieve a goal (synthesis), and what Pavlov was later to term orientation activity (a kind of experiment), Engels wrote: “The basic features of the method are the same and lead to the same results in man and animals, so long as both operate or make shift merely with these elementary methods. On the other hand, dialectical thought—precisely because it presupposes investigation of the nature of concepts themselves—is only possible for man....”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-72|72]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, before human consciousness had evolved, its moderately developed prerequisites already existed in animals. Animals could form subjective images of the objective world (sensations, perceptions, representations) and have a fairly wide range of feelings long before men appeared. Therefore the separation of subject from object was nothing fortuitous. Man’s mind anticipates reality by years and decades. But anticipatory reflection, though extending over smaller periods, is what other organisms have too. Generally speaking, all characteristics of the human mind, i.e., consciousness, are due to society. But human society did not spring out of nothing either; it developed from the animal herd.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these facts must be borne in mind if we are to fathom—as Engels wrote—“the prehistory of the human mind, for tracing the various stages of its development, from the simple protoplasm ... of the lowest organisms right up to the thinking human brain. Without this prehistory, however, the existence of the thinking human brain remains a miracle.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-73|73]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Idealists maintain that consciousness is an inexplicable property of the mysterious immaterial “soul”. However, anthropology, neurophysiology, neuropathology, zoopsychology, and other sciences have shown that this contention has not a leg to stand on. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Cybernetics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has been particularly effective in disproving the idealist conception of consciousness and  provides scientific evidence in support of the dialectical-materialist view. This science deals with automatic control and communication mechanisms in diverse systems, such as a machine, a complex of machines, an organism, a plant or animal species, man and, finally, society. On the basis of cybernetics, devices have been developed which can receive, store, analyse, retrieve and transmit information. Self-teaching systems, biomedical disease-diagnosing computers, etc., have been developed. Both the theoretical results of cybernetics and results obtained with the aid of computers prove the unity of the reflectory processes in animate and inanimate world, at premental and mental levels, in man’s nervous system and society&#039;s economic system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All these scientific achievements of the 20th century forcefully confirm Lenin’s idea that, apart from the question as to whether the ideal or the material is primary, “the difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-74|74]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; For, besides the difference between them, the material and ideal phenomena are similar in that in both there occurs, as the result of the action of some material objects on other material objects, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reflection&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the former in the latter, the reflection which lies at the very root of matter. Consciousness stands out merely as the highest of the known forms of reflection, as the supreme product of matter, as “a function of that particularly complex fragment of matter called the human brain&amp;amp;quot;.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-75|75]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. Laws of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Law? ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1911, Ernest Rutherford, a British physicist, calculated how alpha rays would be scattered by an atom of gold, should its nucleus be a point object, and how they would be scattered, should the nucleus be larger than that. Then he exposed a thin foil of gold to the action of alpha rays. The scattering indicated that the atomic nucleus has a diameter of roughly one thousand-millionth of a millimetre, i.e., that the atomic nucleus is a point object.  The discovery worked a revolution in the views on the structure of the atom. No doubt, Rutherford could repeat his experiment as many times as he liked. But his discovery, the connection between his calculations, experiments and conclusions, was absolutely unique. Rutherford could no more re-discover what he had once discovered than be born once again.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the unconditioned reflex (e.g., the involuntary blinking of the eye when an object ap&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ears suddenly right in front of it) implies a relation repeated many times not only during the lifetime of any one person, but throughout hundreds of generations of men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, some relations occur only once and some are repeated. Moreover, they may be essential and inessential. For example, hydrogen and nitrogen combine to make ammonia only at definite pressures and temperatures and in the presence of a catalyst accelerating the reaction. The relation between them is essential to the making of ammonia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for inessential relations, it must be borne in mind that those which may be inessential in one respect may prove essential in some other, and vice versa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There may also be chance and necessary relations. How long an animal may live depends on the circumstances of its birth and life. The relation can be multiform. It may be such that the animal will live merely a few hours or days, or it could be such that the animal will live several decades. These are relations which may or may not occur, depending on the circumstances, and, in this sense, we may call them chance relations. But whatever the circumstances of an animal&#039;s birth and life, it must die sooner or later. Death is inevitable, and in this sense, the relation between birth and death is a necessary one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Different relations are of varying significance to the understanding of all that occurs both outside and within us, as well as to the success of our activities in any field. The most significant are those which are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (i.e., common to many things and processes), essential and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;necessary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Such relations are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  A law is a relation which persists as long as phenomena subject to it persist (regardless of any change they may undergo during that time).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of physics, chemistry, biology, history, political economy, and all scientific laws in general, are mental reflections of the laws governing the development of nature and society, which themselves are &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;recurring, essential and necessary relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; existing independently of the mind and discovered by men as they investigate nature, society and thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that, as it draws general conclusions from the findings of particular sciences and from scientific laws concerning separate aspects of reality, dialectical materialism arrives at the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;most general laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, called the laws of dialectics. Let us see now what they are.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#calibre_toc_53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== §2. The Law of Transition of Quantity into Quality&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_001.xhtml#anchor68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus (530-470 B. C.), whom Lenin called one of the founders of dialectics, said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything is always changing and always moving.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; This is how he illustrated his idea. When you step into a river for the second time, water has already flowed downstream, so you are actually in different water. Hence, you cannot step into the same river twice. Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus, went even further. He said that you cannot step into the same river even once, for even as you are immersed into the water it keeps flowing, and your foot is in different water every instant. Generally, said Cratylus, you cannot make a true statement about anything because even as you are uttering the words the thing you are talking about disappears, giving way to something else. Thus, whatever you may say can only be false.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At first sight, this statement seems a mere quibble. But a closer examination reveals that it follows naturally from a definite conception of change and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Cratylus, change is the disappearance of the old and appearance of the new.  From this standpoint, an impassable gulf lies between water that flowed downstream a moment ago and that which has taken its place.  How should change appear to a consistent adherent of this view? He should see a fantastic vision like this: a cloud floating before his eyes is displaced in a flash by a spreading oak, a sleeping kitten, a crag, a dancer, and so forth, all coming in quick succession.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That was, of course, an exaggeration. But the view on change as the fina&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; disappearance of some objects and sudden appearance of others essentially implies that every object exists but for a moment, perishing almost as soon as it has appeared. Could anyone say anything about such an object, which would be consistent with its real nature? Certainly not. Were change indeed as Cratylus conceived it, no true statements would be possible at all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it is not so in reality. Although material objects are in a process of change, they do not disappear at once but persist for varying lengths of time. Whereas a cloud’s existence is comparatively short, the age of a cliff runs into millions of years. The mass of water or ice particles we call the cloud does not spring out of nothing; it results from condensation of vapour. Nor does it turn into nothing when it disappears. And so it is whenever anything appears or disappears. Therefore, to think that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change implies the destruction of one object and the appearance of another can only be erroneous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The contrary view is that no changing object disappears. So, for instance, the Ganges, for all the changes it has undergone, is still the same great river of Hindustan as it was hundreds of thousands of years ago, and as it will be hundreds of thousands of years hence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take the view in direct opposition to Cratylus, i.e, that every change is a change in what was, is and will be, and check it against scientific evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By using a microfilm, the division of a living cell (which in the human body takes from one to two hours) can be observed. As it divides, the cell undergoes a number of vital changes such as the halving of chromosomes, fission of the content of the cell, etc., but the cell still retains its identity. There then comes a point where these gradual changes end. The old cell disappears and two new ones appear.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is the same with plants. Buds develop gradually, undergoing changes imperceptible to the eye, and up to a point they are still buds. Then the gradual development is interrupted. The buds break and the tree is suddenly covered with foliage. A seed is a living body in which metabolism and other processes go on all the time, and often for a very long time. Yet, regardless of all these changes, a seed remains a seed until the moment when a leap takes place. The seed coat breaks and the embryo begins to sprout. The seed is replaced by a plant which did not exist until then.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, it is erroneous to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in a plant or an animal implies the disappearance of something that did, and appearance of something that did not, exist before the change. It is, however, equally wrong to say that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;every&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; change in plants and animals is merely a change in what did, does and will exist. As a matter of fact, both kinds of changes occur—the change in what existed and continues to exist (it never stops) and the change which represents the destruction of old and appearance of new objects (i.e., a break in continuity, a leap).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Botanical and zoological evidence proves both Cratylus and those of the diametrically Opposite opinion to be wrong.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, it is appropriate to recall the processes in inanimate nature already mentioned, which also present a unity of change in the old and the appearance of the new. No matter how one or more particles move about in space, these processes are still mechanical and reversible. But as soon as the number of chaotically moving particles attains a high enough level, a new form of motion appears, viz., heat processes, which are irreversible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This holds of society as well. Contrary to the reformists, who claim that capitalism may turn into socialism through a series of gradual changes, the latter merely prepare the ground for socialism which emerges only after a revolution, a break in continuity. Of course, exploitative capitalist society persists from the time the Capitalist productive relations become predominant till the moment they are abolished by a revolution. It undergoes continuous significant changes along with the growth of its productive forces, concentration of capital, etc. Nevertheless, this all serves to aggravate the contradictions inherent in capitalism and intensify the class struggle. Only a break in continuity, a revolutionary upheaval, dislodging the bourgeoisie from government and taking the principal means of production out of their hands, can end capitalism and bring forth a new society based on public ownership, in which power is taken by the working class led by its party, and exploitation of man by man is finally abolished.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned the valuable contributions to knowledge made by philosophy and the natural and social sciences in the last quarter of the 18th century, and especially the first half of the 19th century. Over that time, the findings of both the individual sciences and philosophy underwent appreciable change. But the middle of the last century was the turning point in mankind’s intellectual progress. Marx and Engels, who had critically refashioned and drawn general philosophical conclusions from knowledge already gained by mankind, evolved a new doctrine, quite different from all previous philosophical theories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was a break in continuity, a revolution in the development of human thought, marked by the appearance of a philosophical doctrine unparalleled by anything in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was in exactly the same way that the continuous change in the natural sciences had paved the way for a leap, a revolution in our views on nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, gradual change, whether in science or society, causes the destruction and disappearance of the old and an abrupt break in continuity, the appearance of the new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The disappearance of the old and the appearance of the new are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;qualitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. All other changes, whereby different parts or aspects of an object become re-arranged, increase or diminish while the object retains its identity, are described in philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;quantitative changes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Relative to all the changes suffered, for instance, by an animal during life, birth and death represent qualitative changes. And relative to an animal’s birth and death, all the changes it may undergo during life are quantitative, as all that time it remains itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Qualitative changes may be of two forms: (1) “something did not exist, but now it does”, and (2) “‘something existed but now it does not’. Quantitative changes, on the other hand, are infinitely diverse, e.g., “larger—smaller&amp;amp;quot;, “more—less&amp;amp;quot;, “more often—more seldom”, “faster—slower”, &amp;amp;quot;warmer—colder”, “lighter—heavier”, &amp;amp;quot;worse—better”, &amp;amp;quot;poorer—richer”, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, you would hardly find anybody sharing Cratylus’ point of view, but there are plenty of people sharing the diametrically opposite, if equally metaphysical, point of view. These people argue that it only seems to us that there occur breaks in the processes going on in the environment and in the mind, and that on thorough examination we must see that things never stop changing. For should a process be interrupted, it could not be resumed without outside assistance any more than a broken eggshell can become whole again, unless somebody comes along and glues its broken edges together.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us, for the moment, agree that change is always continuous. It will appear then that a growing poplar, for example, is in a state of continuous change. The poplar sprout turned into a mature tree continuously, just as the seed turned into a sprout, the flower into fruit and seed, and the bud into a flower. The transformation of a little into big poplar is undoubtedly a continuous change, for, big or little, it is still a poplar. But if the transformation of the seed into the little poplar also is a continuous process, then there must be a diminutive poplar in the seed; and if the transformation of the flower into fruit and seed is a continuous process, then there must be infinitesimal seeds, and so infinitesimal poplars, in the flower. Because, after all, a poplar may change continuously only while it exists, no matter what its size. The changeover from &amp;amp;quot;non-poplar” to “poplar” cannot be continuous because the disappearance of that from which the poplar sprout has formed, i.e., the seed, amounts to a break in its (the poplar’s) development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another argument advanced in support of the metaphysical view that gradual change knows no interruptions is this. All stages of motion are related as cause and effect and are therefore continuous. All motion is therefore continuous. If we accept that there is a break, a gap between stage A and stage B, we must admit that they are not connected, whereby stage B has no cause. Yet to accept that something may exist without cause is to believe in miracles. Hence, leaps or breaks in continuity are impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To answer this, we must say first of all that interruptions of continuity, leaps, do not occur without any connection with the preceding stage of motion. A leap is always prepared and caused, i.e., causally determined, by previous continuous motion. Thus, the birth of a living being is prepared and caused by the essential changes in the embryo during pregnancy. A social revolution is prepared and caused by sharpening conflict and mounting class struggle. A revolution in science is caused by the accumulation of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, the leap itself determines the character of subsequent continuous motion. The character of all vital processes and the rate at which they proceed in the embryo and the newborn are utterly different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Diverse aspects of people’s life in society develop after a revolution in a manner quite different from that before the revolution. The trend and rate of the progress of knowledge before and after a revolution in science are altogether different.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there is a close connection between a leap and what comes before and after it.  Continuous changes cause a break and that, again, causes continuous change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be noted that the leap does not occur at random but only when continuous change reaches a limit which is definite for every given process. How exact the moment is for a victorious revolution is sufficiently clear from Lenin’s letter of October 24 (November 6), 1917, which concerns the uprising.  Lenin wrote: “...the matter must be decided without fail this very evening, or this very night. History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating when they could be victorious today (and they certainly will be victorious today), while they risk ... losing everything. ... To delay action is fatal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-76|76]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Science also becomes ripe for a revolution at quite a definite point. As accumulated knowledge was leading up to the need to create relativity theory, both Poincaré and Langevin, independent of each other, were approaching the discovery. If Einstein, who realised the need for a thorough revision of some physical notions sooner and better than others, had not worked the revolution in science, it would have been brought about&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps later and differently—by the efforts of other scientists, because it had become absolutely necessary. Einstein himself was actually of that opinion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, continuous change develops up to a limit determined by the nature of each process, after which a leap inevitably occurs. The limit beyond which continuous change is interrupted is described in philosophy as the measure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us see if a break in continuity does indeed imply a rift between adjacent stages of development, as metaphysicians would have it. Take an animal, a dog, for example.  The changes it undergoes during its life are continuous only with respect to two breaks, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., birth and death. In other respects, however, some breaks, or leaps, occur during the dog’s life as well. The first of them is the attainment of physiological maturity (at eighteen months to two-and-a-half years old). In turn, the changes a puppy undergoes in that period are continuous only with relation to two breaks between which the changes occur, i.e., between birth and physiological maturity. In other respects, there are breaks in that period too. Moreover, if we subject the animal&#039;s birth itself to a detailed examination, we shall see that this leap, this break, does not occur instantaneously but is of a certain duration and consists of a succession of continuous changes and leaps.  Each of the latter, lesser leaps, so to speak, consists of still other continuous changes and related leaps, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every continuous change in nature, society and thought is such only with respect to its “own” breaks or leaps. But at a deeper level, continuous change consists of special continua and special leaps. Equally, every leap is such only with respect to its “own” continuous changes. The leap itself has an infinitely complex structure. It comprises continua and leaps, which also comprise continua and leaps, and so on. Change is continuous only with respect to its “own” breaks, its own beginning and ending. But in other respects it contains breaks. In other words, there is no such thing as absolute, “pure&amp;amp;quot; continuity. A leap, or a break, is such only with respect to the change whose continuity is broken by it. In other respects, however, the break itself contains continuous changes. It is not an absolute, “pure” break, but an inexhaustibly complex process, all the stages of which are causally related.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectical tenet that continuous quantitative changes, upon attaining measure, cause abrupt qualitative changes which in their turn determine the character of the further continuous quantitative changes is called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of transition from quantity to quality and vice versa&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This law plays an essential role in man’s practical activity. Thus, it is known that engineers and chemists concentrated for a long time on evolving new methods of working diverse materials so as to make them meet the ever growing requirements of industry and everyday life. There came, however, a point where this continuous improvement of the methods of working natural materials, combined with other changes in science and technology, brought about a leap, a qualitative change in that particular sphere. Today, in the 20th century, especially in its latter half, whenever new demands are made on materials, engineers and chemists, rather than try to evolve new methods of processing available materials (which often would not answer the purpose anyway), develop synthetic materials with predesigned properties answering a specific need.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To quote an example from another sphere.  Guiding themselves by the law of the transition of quantity into quality, revolutionaries reject not only reformism, but the anarchism of adherents of the ultra-left, who fail to realise the utmost importance of continuous development of the revolutionary movement, involving an ever larger proportion of the masses and paving the way for the revolution which will take place, not at the will of a handful of people, but only where and when the necessary conditions mature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to ensure the success of any kind of activity, whether industrial, social or scientific, we must closely observe the processes we have to deal with, not miss the point where the continuous quantitative changes are superseded by a break in continuity, and be able to modify our proceedings accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The Law of Negation of the Negation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The tender seedling sprouting from an acorn, a mere twig which anything, it seems, can easily destroy, grows, down the centuries, into a monumental tree inspiring awe at its great strength and the complex organisation of its root system, trunk, bark, branches, leaves and flowers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How puny, short-lived, fragile and primitive vis-a-vis their organisation and behaviour were the first unicellular animals which originated more than a thousand million years ago, and how much more complex and durable is the anatomy, physiology, psychology and behaviour of recent highly-organised mammals (e.g., dogs or monkeys).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar things may be observed at every turn. The helpless infant becomes a vigorous, intelligent person, an expert capable of tackling tasks of great complexity. And what a vast distance indeed there is between primitive society, almost entirely swayed by the forces of nature, and modern society which makes these forces, including atomic energy, serve man, and creates seas, forests and artificial Earth satellites.  Our far-reaching, all-embracing, fast-advancing knowledge, too, is a far cry from the primitive beliefs of our cave-dwelling ancestors. This progress from lower to higher forms consists, as we have seen already, in an endless succession of stages, essentially distinct from each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How then does one stage change into another?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Exposure to a temperature of several thousand degrees Centigrade will cause the destruction (negation) of an amoeba. The next stage in its development will not take place, i.e., life will end and will give way to physico-chemical processes of inorganic nature. On the other hand, the method whereby the developmental stages replace one another (the method of negation), which is intrinsic to the amoeba, consists in division (which occurs under specific conditions) resulting in the emergence of two new amoebas in place of the original one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acorn, when consumed by an animal, is destroyed; although its negation contributes to the animal’s further growth, its own intrinsic development ends there. Had it been allowed to proceed stage by stage according to its intrinsic method, it would have turned into the sprout of an oak.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The succession of developmental stages proceeding in accordance with the laws inherent in the given object (but not such as results from the intervention of external forces destroying the given form of motion) is termed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectical negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does dialectical negation work? If you dig the ground under an oak seedling, you will find no acorn there. What has become of it?  Like most green plants, the oak builds its body from the substances it draws from the soil (via its roots) and from the air (through its leaves, which contain chlorophyll). When a new plant is about to emerge, there are yet neither roots nor leaves. The first little green leaves and roots are formed from the material contained in the acorn. The protective outer coating decomposes and has no part in the new plant, but the embryo and the food by which it is surrounded turn into a sprout. No sooner does a tiny root appear than it gets busy extracting from the soil the substances helping to build the plant while the first green parts of the shoot begin at once to assimilate from the air the substances which go to build the body of the sapling. Therefore the plant replacing the acorn contains both the substances that were contained in the acorn and the substances that were not contained in it. The same may be said of the oak which will grow from the sprout. The young oak will be like its parents in many respects, but owing to the unique circumstances under which it has formed and developed, it will not inherit some of the parents’ characteristics, while it will acquire some that the parents did not have. Dialectical negation con&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ists in the fact that something of the stage which is negated is lost, something becomes part of the new, negating, stage (although in a modified form), and something entirely new is added.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All three elements are also present when a breed of animals disappears and another breed appears in its place.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining an enormous range of plant and animal species which replaced one another over hundreds of millions of years, palaeontologists have not discovered a single instance of re-emergence of an extinct species. In nature, nothing is ever completely repeated. Although later species possess some features of earlier, extinct species, they always lack some of their predecessors’ characteristics while possessing other features absent in their predecessors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific evidence utterly disproves the metaphysical view that development amounts to a repetition of identical cycles, always returning to the starting point, i.e., that development moves in a circle. An individual living organism does not develop in a circle. Certainly, when from an acorn there grows an oak of the same kind as its ancestors, that is, in some respects, a return to what already existed. But in some respects the new oak differs from its ancestors.  Indeed, should it be an exact repetition of them and should they, in their turn, have repeated every characteristic of the previous generations, oaks would exist forever. Yet it has been established beyond any possible doubt that there was a time when not only oaks but the species they have replaced did not exist. Some species disappear and other ones appear precisely because every organism, while it inherits much from its parents must also differ from them in some way. As such variations accumulate over long periods, old species are replaced by new.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When a new stage in society&#039;s development comes, it does not mean that all the people, technology and science pertaining to the old formation have disappeared. If it were so, no new stage in society’s development would take place. In order that it can take place, it is necessary (1) to abolish the obsolete social order, together with both the state system which protected it, and the ideology which sanctified it; (2) to make the members of the old society part and parcel of the new society (the role of different classes being essentially changed) and utilise the industrial, technological and scientific advances of the previous stage; and (3) to create, on the basis of progress in science and technology and on the basis of a new ideology, qualitatively new relations of production and a new state system, and raise the productive forces to a new, higher, level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, no stages in the process of development are eternal; each stage disappears sooner or later, being negated by each following stage, and so on. Dialectical negation (i.e., a succession of stages of development, proceeding in accordance with the objective laws inherent in a given object or process) does not consist merely in the disappearance of some obsolete features of the stage which is negated, but implies, as well, the retention of some of the features of that stage and emergence of entirely new features which never existed previously.  For these reasons, the succession of developmental stages is progressive. Although no stage is ever completely repeated, some features of earlier stages necessarily recur—although in a different form—at later stages, in consequence of which development proceeds in a spiral. All the above-mentioned peculiarities of development are called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of negation of the negation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, after throwing off the colonialist yoke, a country starts building the new life, its people must certainly abolish all vestiges of oppression, eliminate entirely the sorry aftermath of imperialist rule and sweep out all anti-popular practices and institutions holding back national development. Nevertheless it is certainly necessary to preserve the buildings, enterprises and educational establishments which were constructed under colonialist rule, and place at the service of the people that which formerly served its oppressors. It is necessary to preserve, build up and use for the people&#039;s benefit the scientific knowledge acquired under colonialism by a small proportion of the oppressed people. But, apart from that, a people having embarked on independent development must create in the social, public, economic and cultural spheres of their country’s life much that is entirely new, that was never heard of before. In this situation, therefore, all three features comprising the law of negation of the negation can be found.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. The Law of Unity and Conflict of Opposites ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;What causes a thing to move, to develop?  Why does it change?&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, for instance, is that nut rolling along the ground? It has been shaken off the branch by another branch which broke off and fell on it. The branch was broken off by a stone suddenly rolling down the hillside. The stone was tumbled from its place by a landslide which was started by a sudden gust of wind. This sequence could be prolonged indefinitely. Observations of this kind suggested to philosophers the idea which was formulated by Baruch (Benedictus) Spinoza, one of the most prominent materialist philosophers of the 17th century, who wrote that whether a body is in motion or at rest must be determined by another body, whose motion or rest is, in turn, determined by a third body, and that by yet another body, and so on to infinity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proposition that every object both begins to move and stops moving only under the impact of another object is closely associated with the one that opposite properties, characteristics and tendencies, e.g., motion and rest, cannot be combined in the same object at the Same time. A moving object cannot simultaneously be at rest. If it is at rest, it is clear that it is not moving.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These two propositions must be the sole intelligent explanation of the causes of motion, of development. Such was the conclusion arrived at by nearly all noted philosophers and Scientists of the 17th-18th centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, when we try to understand how different objects are organised, examining them “each one by itself, alongside and after each Other,&amp;amp;quot; we, as Engels observes, “do not run up against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and therefore contain no contradiction within.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-77|77]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally enough, when looking into the structure, qualities and specific characteristics of objects, scientists first of all discover contradictions between things rather than within individual things. Nevertheless, when they begin to investigate the processes going on in a body and the connections between it and the external world, they are confronted with an essentially different situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As they are examining a living organism, for instance, paying close attention to what is going on within it, scientists discover that it is continually assimilating substances from the environment and simultaneously excreting substance into it. Furthermore, these diametrically opposite processes are so closely interconnected that it is enough to prevent a living organism from assimilating certain substances from without for excretion to stop at the same moment, while as soon as an organism becomes unable to discharge certain substances into the environment, it stops assimilating substances from it at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An analogous situation can be observed in inorganic nature. As long as the atoms of different chemical elements were regarded alongside each other and people did not realise that atoms of one element can be transformed into those of another, opposite physical and chemical properties appeared to be distributed among the atoms of different elements while no opposites were thought to be present inside the atom itself. Since the beginning of research into radioactivity, which has to do with the transformation of atoms, the situation has changed.  The atomic nucleus, in which almost the whole of the mass of the atom is concentrated, was found to consist of particles carrying a positive charge, viz., protons. Although, as we know, Similarly charged objects repel each other, protons do not fly in different directions but are held together in the nucleus by diametrically opposite forces (so-called nuclear forces) by which the protons are attracted to one another.  These opposites, viz., proton attraction and repulsion, are so intimately interconnected that one does not exist without the other. It is precisely this contradiction, inherent in the atomic nucleus, which causes the transformation of atoms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everybody knows that by sawing a magnetised bar in half, one does not get two separate poles. Each half will be a magnet with a North pole and a South pole. One can divide each piece into two again, and the result will be the same. One certainly may, if he likes, deprive the magnet of its North pole. For this, one must demagnetise the bar. But when one does this, the South pole will disappear simultaneously with the North pole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already mentioned that a body appears to be either at rest or in motion only as long as we ignore the body’s inner workings and its relationship to the surrounding environment. When we take all that into account, we shall find that every resting body is in motion and every moving body is at rest; that rest and motion simultaneously and inseparably belong to one and the same body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The two laws of dialectics generalising our entire knowledge of nature, society and thought, which we have considered here, show that all motion is a unity of inseparable opposites, viz., quantitative and qualitative changes; continuous changes and breaks of continuity; disappearance of the properties of the stage which is negated and the retention of its properties; recurrence and uniqueness; stability and change. Being aware of the self-contradictory nature of all things and events makes it much easier to discover what causes every object to move and change.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What causes, for instance, the peculiar form of motion we call life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An organism lives only as long as metabolism continues, which includes two opposite processes, viz., assimilation (i.e., transformation of food into body substance) and disintegration of body substance and excretion of the products of disintegration. When metabolism stops, life ceases. In any plant or animal, metabolism, as Engels wrote, “does not take place as the result of a process to which it is subjected from without.... On the contrary, life, the metabolism which takes place through nutrition and excretion, is a self-implementing process...&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-78|78]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; , i.e., a process which is &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inherent&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in a living body.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Depending on the organism’s age, the work it has performed, its condition and numerous other factors, either constructive metabolism (assimilation) or destructive metabolism (excretion) may be predominant. Even where the two kinds of metabolism are at close enough levels of intensity (which may occur only for a time) the balance between them is not complete but approximate and relative, the opposition between them does not disappear but merely diminishes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, life is motion which is not due to any cause external to the organism. The cause that sets the organism in motion is internal. The source of this motion is the interaction of the opposites inherent in it, i.e., assimilation and excretion. Even partial, approximate equilibrium between these opposites is possible only for a limited space of time. They are never so completely balanced as to neutralise each other.  They are always opposed to each other, as long as there is life in general (and so its source&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the conflict of opposites). Hence, life is self-motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us look at a society in which the means of production are privately owned and which is divided into classes of the exploiters and the exploited. In the absence of the exploited, existence is impossible for the exploiters for whom would they exploit? And where there are no exploiters there can be no exploited. The struggle between these classes wherever private property predominates is the chief source of society’s progress from lower to higher stages, e.g., from slavery to feudalism, from feudalism to capitalism, and from capitalism to socialism. Society is not set in motion by some external force. On the contrary, the force responsible for society’s development, i.e., the class struggle, is inherent in society. Therefore, human history is self-motion caused by the conflict of opposite classes in society itself. Even when their forces become more or less balanced, they can still never be completely so.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be a mistake to deny the role of external influences which may further or hinder one form of movement or another. Nevertheless, all movement takes its source from internal contradictions, so that the emergence of new contradictions gives rise to a new form of movement, while with their disappearance it gives place to another form of movement for which other contradictions are responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus every material or spiritual phenomenon or process is a unity of Opposites which inherently belong to it and are inseparable. The source of any object’s movement lies in the interaction (&amp;amp;quot;conflict&amp;amp;quot;) of opposites which are inherent in it. Therefore movement is self-movement. Opposites can attain only partial, relative equilibrium, and that only for a time; they can never become balanced completely. The disparity, the contradiction between them is always present in varying degrees, being as indestructible as motion itself. The unity, the equal effect of opposites, is temporary and relative, whereas their conflict is eternal and absolute. Such are the tenets of materialist dialectics which constitute the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity and con&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;lict of opposites&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The significance of this law to dialectics is such that Lenin wrote: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-79|79]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, both the law of transition from quantity to quality and that of negation of the negation may be regarded as particular instances of the law of the unity and conflict of opposites, which reveals the source of all development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The following is an example illustrating the Significance this law has to the working people’s struggle against capitalist oppression.  Advocates of the capitalist system allege that the conflict of internal contradictions, i.e, the class struggle, is not a source of the development of society but an obstacle in its way. According to them, strikes, demonstrations, etc., bring factories to a standstill, and so hold back the development of production and of society at large. They say that only with class peace and co-operation between employers and workers can technology advance and production develop rapidly. In fact, however, in all capitalist countries where the working class is well-organised, its economic struggle compels the capitalists to raise wages, reduce hours and improve conditions in one way or another. The capitalists thus have to improve plant, technologies and organisation of production. But, most important of all, the broader and more vigorous the people’s movement is, the sooner the revolution comes which abolishes capitalist oppression and raises production and the entire life of society to a new stage of development which capitalism cannot attain.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. Categories of Materialist Dialectics ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is a Category? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Earth has a satellite, the Moon. Some other planets in the solar system also have satellites, and so do the planets revolving round other stars, besides the Sun. Saturn, for example, has nine satellites, the largest of which is Titan. Being a satellite of Saturn, Titan is thereby one of the satellites of planets in general which revolve round diverse stars. Satellites, in their turn, belong to solid cosmic objects which form merely a part of the cosmic bodies in general. Thus, as we pass from the most narrow to the more and more inclusive of the aforementioned concepts, we shall have a series of concepts in which every following concept is broader than the preceding one, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
TITAN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF SATURN,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET IN THE SOLAR SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SATELLITE OF A PLANET,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SOLID COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COSMIC OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us take another concept, &amp;amp;quot;wheat&amp;amp;quot;.  Wheat is a cereal, and all cereals are covered-seeded plants having one seed leaf, which, along with the plants having two seed leaves, form the class of covered-seeded plants. The latter, along with the naked-seeded plants, belong to the seed plants, which, in their turn, belong to plants (to which seedless plants also belong). In this case, too, we have a series of concepts ranging from the specific to the more general, viz.,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
WHEAT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A CEREAL,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT HAVING ONE SEED LEAF,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A COVERED-SEEDED PLANT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
AN ORGANISM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A MATERIAL OBJECT,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
MATTER.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All concepts of material objects (e.g., the oak, the bee, the biplane) are links in similar series, and the series are linked with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since wheat is one of the cereals, all the attributes of the latter are included in the concept “wheat&amp;amp;quot;, which implies, besides, the particular attributes of wheat differentiating it from all other cereals. The concept “cereal&amp;amp;quot; implies all the attributes of the covered-seeded plants with one seed leaf, plus those which distinguish cereals from the rest of such plants.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is the same with other concepts, the meaning of the more general concepts being implicit in the more restricted concept, while implicit in the latter also are the attributes whereby the given subclass is differentiated from the other subclasses of the class to which it belongs.  Therefore the attributes of an organism are implicit in the concepts of all plants (of which more than half a million species are known) and in the concepts of all animals (of which more than a million species are known). Yet the concept &amp;amp;quot;matter&amp;amp;quot; occupies a special place among the concepts of material objects. Being the most comprehensive, ultimate concept, it is implied in millions of diverse concepts of material objects, animate or inanimate, natural or manmade.&lt;br /&gt;
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Matter is not the only ultimate concept embracing a vast multitude of narrower concepts.  Philosophy is concerned with the following ultimate concepts: matter and mind, motion and rest, the general and the particular, substance and phenomenon, quality and quantity, cause and effect, necessity and chance, possibility and reality, content and form, structure and function, and so on. These ultimate concepts are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each category embraces an enormous number of narrower concepts, while all categories combine to embrace all concepts at the command of human thought. And, as the content of a category is included in all the concepts brought under it, the apprehension of diverse phenomena and processes in nature, society and thoughts largely depends on what each category is intended to express.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The distinction between categories and other concepts was noted even in antiquity, and philosophers have been arguing about it ever since, advancing different doctrines of categories.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look at Kant’s account of categories.  Kant stresses that each category, as it unites a multitude of narrower concepts, thereby serves to bring together, reduce to order and synthesise our knowledge; therefore categories are exceedingly important to apprehension. The train of thought he pursued is as follows. When they first found a metal that would not oxidize, men formed the concept ‘gold’. The first voyages round the world produced the concept &amp;amp;quot;globe”. Navigators who had reached the Arctic Ocean for the first time, saw huge floating mountains of ice there. Thus, the notion “iceberg&amp;amp;quot; emerged. All ordinary concepts are the result of sense-perception of material things, i.e., they are derived from experience. Therefore they represent knowledge of phenomena of the materia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Categories, on the other hand, represent a different form of synthesis. Facing an unfamiliar thing, we immediately start looking for its cause and trying to see what is accidental and what is necessary in it, and so on. All contact with things, all experience necessarily involves these considerations. Even before we know the cause of the given phenomenon, we are sure that it must have a cause, as well as both chance and necessary attributes. Hence, according to Kant, we have the idea of necessity and chance, of cause and effect, in a word, of all categories, prior to contact with material things, i.e., prior to experience. From Kant’s point of view, categories are not derived from experience but are prior to it, are something, in fact, without which human experience would be impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant held that so long as categories—unlike ordinary concepts—are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience, they contain no knowledge about the material world: there is nothing in objective reality corresponding to categories.  All categories—necessity and chance, cause and effect, and so on—are conceived merely in thought. It appears, then, that our major concepts, i.e., categories, do not depend on the material world at all, that thought is independent of matter. Proceeding from this idealist point of view, Kant held that categories do not emerge at all, but have been present in human consciousness ever since man appeared. Neither the number nor essence of the categories ever changes. There are as many categories today as there were thousands of years ago, and we understand them now just as they were understood then. Kant asserted further that as necessity is the opposite of chance, it follows that they are mutually exclusive because in combining them the mind would contradict itself, which is logically impossible. The relation of cause and effect and other categories are equally incompatible, being opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us look into this interpretation of categories which modern idealists are still using in one way or another. In our daily contact with material things, we have to resort to concepts, e.g., a pulley, an engine, a switch, electric current, a television set, industry, cost, efficiency, oxygen, a germ, the nervous system, and so on.  We never derived any of them from experience, having learned them from teachers or books. Moreover, with the exception of discoverers and researchers who may introduce a new concept on the basis of experience, nobody can claim to have derived from experience a concept previously not known. We receive all our concepts from other people. Does it follow from this that these concepts have not been derived from experience but are inherent in the mind and are prior to experience? Certainly not. Even though you and I derived no concepts from experience, others did a very long time ago, and later on still others, drawing on freshly gained experience, amplified, refined and developed them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the fact that the concepts we apply in our daily lives have not been derived by ourselves does not in the least mean that they have been derived by nobody at all. If people use concepts already made, that does not prove their non-empirical origin, i.e., that they have not been acquired from experience.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical materialism has weighty proofs of the empirical origin of all categories. If all categories were present in human thought ever Since it began, we should have also found them in the thought processes of primitive tribes. In fact, however, that is not the case. N. N. Miklukho-Maklai (1846-1888), a famous Russian traveller, anthropologist and ethnographer, established, for example, that the Papuans in New Guinea, who were familiar with some categories, e.g., causality, did not know other categories. When bartering their goods, they placed respective items opposite one another, as they did not know how to count. Not only were they ignorant of quantity as such but they had no notion of number. “Counting”, Engels wrote, “requires not only objects that can be counted, but also the ability to exclude all properties of the objects considered except their number—and this ability is the product of a long historical evolution based on experience.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-80|80]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;   Scientific investigations proved that many primitive tribes lacked both experience and the notion of number, let alone the knowledge of the categories of quantity or matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, if categories were inherent in the mind, i.e., prior to experience, they would be inherent also in the mind of a little child. As it is, a two-year-old, while possessing a variety of notions, has, nevertheless, no notion of number or quantity. These facts conclusively show that categories, like all other concepts, grow out of men’s experience as it progresses from one stage to another, some of them emerging earlier than others, so that their number is not invariable. Of course, a category takes much longer to arise than does a narrower concept.  Moreover, this process is still carrying on today. The categories of structure and function, for example, emerge after Kant. Our descendants will undoubtedly evolve new categories on the basis of experience yet to be gained.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having disproved the idealist point of view that cause and effect, necessity and chance, quality and quantity just do not exist in the material world, and merely our notions of them exist in the mind prior to experience, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that all categories and concepts, “all ideas are taken from experience, are reflections ... of reality.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-81|81]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The ultimate concepts are different only in that the characteristics of objective reality they reflect belong not to some but to all things and events.  Hence the great significance of these key concepts to knowledge. Lenin wrote of them: &amp;amp;quot;Man is confronted with a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;web&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of national phenomena... categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-82|82]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disproving the metaphysical assertions that the categories are invariable both as to content and number, that they have no interconnections, and that opposite categories cannot coexist, dialectical materialism has demonstrated that categories develop, represent a unity of opposites, and that all categories are interconnected, as they reflect different characteristics and aspects of the external world and different processes going on in it. “...If &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;everything&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; develops,” Lenin wrote, ‘does not that apply also to the most general &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;concepts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;categories&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-83|83]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; We shall concern ourselves here with only some of the categories of materialist dialectics, viz., cause and effect, and necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Cause and Effect ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 18th century, many scientists believed that the ability of bodies to burn was due to a special substance, &amp;amp;quot;phlogiston&amp;amp;quot;. The more phlogiston there was in a body, the more readily it burned, and a body that had given off all of its phlogiston could not burn. Phlogiston was invariably the cause of fire; fire was invariably the effect of phlogiston. From that point of view, phlogiston could not be the effect of fire, nor could fire be the cause of phlogiston. Another contemporary view was that heat was caused by a weightless substance, &amp;amp;quot;caloric&amp;amp;quot;. According to that view, a cold body became hot owing to caloric passing into it from a hot body contacting it. Textbooks on chemistry had listed caloric among chemical elements up to the mid-19th century. Caloric was considered to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of heat, and the latter to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of caloric. It seemed obvious that no contrary state of things, i.e., that heat phenomena should be the cause of caloric and caloric the effect of heat, was at all possible. All electric phenomena known at that time were ascribed to the action of invisible electrical fluids which produced electric current as they flowed from one body into another. These electrical fluids were believed then to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the cause of electricity, and electricity to be &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;invariably&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the effect of the electric fluids. Such conceptions of heat, electricity and other phenomena gave rise to the idea that once A was the cause of B, it could not possibly be the effect of B. This understanding of the relation of cause and effect boiled down to the undialectical, metaphysical view that opposites (such as cause and effect) cannot coexist in one and the same object.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The metaphysical understanding of the categories of cause and effect has been upset by the further progress of knowledge which showed that the world is not an assemblage of final things but a totality of processes, connections and relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today everybody knows that in a hydroelectric station the movement of the water stream is the cause of the electric current produced by the station. And in the case of a machine tool being switched on, the electric current is the cause of its mechanical motion. In the former instance electric current is the effect of mechanical motion; in the latter, it is the cause of mechanical motion. In the diesel locomotive, heat is the cause of the mechanical motion of the locomotive’s driving axles, and simultaneously the mechanical movement of its parts, their friction, causes them to become so hot as to make it necessary to install special cooling devices to prevent a fire. In other words, heat is simultaneously the cause and effect of mechanical motion. If we regard the links in the chain of causality as processes, we shall find that when process A, in acting on process B, causes a change in it, process B, in acting on process A in its turn, also causes changes in it, so that the chain looks like this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;⇌&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;B&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, every process, as it acts on another process, itself is acted on by the latter, which means that all relationships which exist in nature and society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;interact&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and that the opposites (cause and effect) are comprised in one and the same thing or event.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On establishing the cause of a phenomenon, a scientist must necessarily find out what reverse effect the phenomenon has on its cause, which facet of the interaction is predominant and to what extent it is so, and what reasons are responsible for it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Influence of the effect on the cause from which it sprang has a particularly significant role in organic nature. When the controlling part of an organism is informed by the part under its control about some change occurring in the surroundings (e.g., the appearance of something of possible food value), it “orders” the controlled part to respond in a specific way (e.g., to try and get hold of the thing). The result may be either fortunate or otherwise. The thing may prove to be edible or obnoxious. The controlled part at once informs the controlling part which issues the next order. In the first instance the order will be to try and consume the thing; in the second, to withdraw as quickly as possible. This process, described as &amp;amp;quot;’feedback’, is widely applied in modern technology, especially in cybernetic devices. Feedback systems, whether natural or manmade, would be impossible if the effect (i.e., the system’s response to the action on it of an external object) were not the cause of its own cause (i.e., if the system’s response failed to cause changes in the external object which has provoked the response).&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let us consider the example of a developing nation retarded both economically and culturally after years of colonial misrule. To raise labour efficiency from its low level, such a nation must, quite obviously, push up the cultural and living standards in the first place. An ignorant, underfed worker cannot be very efficient, of course. So, the growth of cultural and living standards is the major cause of the growth of efficiency in a former colonial country.&lt;br /&gt;
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Still, if we view the matter from a dialectical standpoint, we shall see that here too cause and effect interact and change places. For, clearly enough, higher cultural and living standards depend above all on higher labour efficiency, or, to put it differently, higher cultural and living standards are the effect of higher efficiency. The growth of labour efficiency is both the cause and the effect of the growth of living and cultural standards, just as the growth of living and cultural standards is both the cause and the effect of higher labour efficiency. In a striving to achieve national prosperity, one should be guided by a dialectical understanding of the categories of cause and effect.&lt;br /&gt;
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====  §3. Necessity and Chance ====&lt;br /&gt;
Chance is commonly taken to mean that which might or might not occur, or might occur in any way. Necessity, on the other hand, is understood as that which must occur and cannot but occur.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is the interrelation of necessity and chance in the world around us?&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the answers to this question may be: There is nothing that necessarily must occur and nothing that might not occur. Anything, any event, however incredible, may occur, and it may occur one way or any other way. From this standpoint, nothing is impossible. There is no such thing as necessity. Everything in the world is the outcome of chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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The famous French author of the 16th century Francois Rabelais satirised this view in his book about a giant, Gargantua, who was brought into the world through his mother’s ear. Anticipating that his readers will not believe such a thing possible, Rabelais says that even though such strange nativity has not a semblance of truth in it, still nobody would dispute it that there is nothing impossible to god. And if god wished so, all women would henceforth deliver their babies through their ears.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those who deny necessity and believe that anything is possible (so-called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;indeterminists&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) would have to accept that although the stone on which he has just sat down is silent, it could well burst into song presently; that although the dog is a four-legged animal, it is nevertheless quite possible that a dog may have a puppy with twenty legs; that, so far, two by two is four, but it is quite possible that, by tonight, two by two will have become one....&lt;br /&gt;
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The mere fact that indeterminists deny necessity and the laws of nature in word only but practically recognise both, is enough to show how vapid their doctrine is. Even the “fathers of the church”, who repeat that, as far as god is concerned, no necessity exists, that everything is possible for him, depart from their indeterminism at every step. Thomas Aquinas, a prominent theologian of the past, nowadays regarded as the principal authority of the Catholic church, had to admit that many spheres of reality were subject to necessity against which god “the omnipotent” himself was powerless.  E.g., god cannot abolish the past or alter the fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles or turn untruth into truth, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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Opposing indeterminism are, among others, adherents of mechanistic determinism. Faith, they maintain, allows any violation of the laws of nature, any miracle. Science, on the other hand, demonstrates that everything is subject to the laws of nature and is ruled by inexorable necessity. Nothing can occur in any other way than it actually does occur. Assuming that an event might occur contrary to the positive law—an event that need not have happened, a chance event&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that event would be uncaused, i.e., it would be a miracle. And miracles do not happen, nor can they happen. Following this train of thought, Spinoza, the materialist philosopher already referred to, came to the conclusion that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nothing occurs by chance in nature, and everything is predetermined&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This point of view found corroboration in classical mechanics whose laws, which precisely determine the trajectory described by isolated bodies, enabled scientists to predict with striking accuracy where a body moving in space would be at any given point in time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, when science came to face more complex things than trajectories of individual bodies, it knocked the bottom out of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us turn to the following example. In a society of commodity producers, writes Marx, price is “the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity’s value.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-84|84]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is a law. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the price offered by each buyer.  In every business transaction price is either higher or lower than cost. To give another example, the ideology of a class is determined by the place occupied by the latter in the given System of relations of production. In feudal times, noblemen regarded serfdom as being in the nature of things. Nevertheless, this law does not predetermine the views held by every single member of a class. Alexander Radishchev, the Decembrists and Alexander Herzen were all noblemen but at the same time were opposed to serfdom.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the plant and animal kingdoms we see that no plant or animal lives forever—such is the law of nature. There are also laws which determine the maximum life-span for different &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;pecies. Oaks may live to an age of a thousand years, but many things may happen to an individual shoot. It may perish on the second or twentieth or two thousandth day of its life.  There is no law fixing the exact day and hour of the death of, let us say, the tree growing in front of your house. This holds of all plants and animals.&lt;br /&gt;
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By accepting that every event is inexorably determined and inevitable, we arrive at fatalism. It was in this way that Vulich, from Lermontov’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;A Hero of Our Time&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reasoned when, holding a pistol at his temple, he said: “If I am destined to die this moment, it will happen whether or not I fire; and if I am destined to stay alive today, then I shall stay alive whether or not I press the trigger.” Fatalism so obviously runs counter to ordinary experience that it was rejected even by the most prominent adherents of mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet how one is to avoid becoming a fatalist after accepting that everything is inexorably predetermined was something none of them was able to explain, for fatalism necessarily follows from mechanistic determinism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The all-important biological law of natural selection does not imply in the least that every creature less fit than others is doomed to sterility and early death or that every better-adjusted creature shall live long and have numerous progeny. A less-adjusted individual may happen to live to the utmost limit possible for its species, or it might die at birth, and so on. The law does not lay down the particular chance with which an individual is to meet.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is much the same in inorganic nature.  According to the second law of thermodynamics, already referred to, a closed system tends to proceed towards less orderly forms of motion. In the last quarter of the 19th century, it was established that the law does not hold of every change in such a system, whose several parts may proceed towards either greater disorder or greater order. Increased disorder is, however, much more probable than increased order or greater order. Increased disorder is general direction in which a closed system tends to proceed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To quote another example, a soluble substance placed in a liquid at rest is diffused throughout the liquid. If we place a grain of potassium permanganate at the left wall of a vessel containing water, its molecules will begin scattering in the water. After some time, the concentration of the solution will be uniform throughout the vessel. Each molecule of permanganate is jostled by water molecules. If the impulses are sufficiently numerous, the number of impulses pushing permanganate molecules towards the place of smaller concentration (towards the right) will be roughly equal to the number of impulses tending towards the place of greater concentration (towards the left), because the water molecules are in a permanent condition of irregular motion, whereby the number of molecules moving in all directions (if sufficiently great) is approximately the same.  But if each permanganate molecule receives as many impulses to the left as to the right, then what about the law of the uniform distribution of soluble substances, which is possible only provided that many more permanganate molecules move from left to right than from right to left?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us mentally divide the water in the vessel into sections. Within the limits of each section the permanganate molecules will be distributed more or less evenly. But the closer to the left a section is, the more permanganate molecules it contains. Each molecule moves both to the right and to the left at a different rate of probability, but since in any two adjacent sections the one on the left always contains more permanganate molecules than the one on its right, more permanganate molecules cross the line from left to right than from right to left. This will go on until the concentration of permanganate in adjacent sections becomes equal, or, rather, approximately equal, for, to obtain an absolutely uniform solution, the number of molecules of both permanganate and water must be infinite. Yet, although the vessel contains but a finite number of molecules, it is still a very great number.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-85|85]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; That is why in such experiments, the law takes effect with great precision, deviations being detectable only with the aid of highly sensitive measuring instruments.&lt;br /&gt;
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Seeing that indeterminism and mechanistic determinism lack justification, some philosophers choose the “golden mean”, saying that events may be either necessary or accidental: minor events refer to chance, and major—to necessity. Chance events&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;since they do not spring from necessity—are subject to no laws and are, from this standpoint, nothing short of miracles. As for necessary events, they are conceived as inexorably predetermined, so that all we have to do is go fatalist and, washing our hands of it all, dumbly wait for the blows of fate to fall. This “golden mean” attitude, as we see, combines the vices of both aforementioned views and, besides, leaves it up to anyone to categorise some events as miracles and attribute others to doom.&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, we can neither agree that all events occur by chance nor that all events are inevitable, nor that all events are divided into accidental and necessary. Adherents of these doctrines hold that every event is either absolutely necessary or absolutely fortuitous and that none may be a combination of necessity and chance. In fact, however, every event is a unity of these opposites. How does it come about?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The examples we have cited show that individual events occurring in the sphere regulated by a certain law essentially differ from one another. Then what about recurrence? And if there is no recurrence, then what happens to the law? Let us look at price formation involving hundreds of thousands of commodities over scores and hundreds of years. We shall see that, barring extraordinary cases in which regular price formation was prevented by unusual circumstances, the price of a commodity was determined, by and large, by its cost. This holds true of other economic laws as well. Each of them, as Engels pointed out, is valid merely as a tendency, an average. This applies equally to nature. Thus, the tendency for the survival of the fittest recurs in hundreds of thousands of plant and animal species.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That nothing recurs in identically the same Shape either in nature or society has already been mentioned in our discussion of the laws of dialectics. Nevertheless the recurrence of some relationships—which is not absolute but approximate—necessarily takes place. That is exactly how necessity expresses itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adducing the fact that there is an infinite multitude of possibilities for an isolated event, and that the realisation of one of these possibilities is a deviation from the law, indeterminists say that, so long as an event may deviate from the law to no matter what extent, i.e., contravene it, it means that there simply is no law, and anything whatever may occur. This would be difficult to counter if isolated events could indeed deviate from the law &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;without restriction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The point is, however, that while a law allows numerous possibilities for an isolated event, it also sets a limit to them, drawing the line between what is possible and what is not.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy imparted on impact by one molecule to another may vary infinitely. But the law sets a limit beyond which this cannot go. A molecule cannot impart more than its own energy.  Individual events can deviate from the law within certain limits, but no event can be in contradiction with the law. That is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Each of the vast number of events whose general result is a law constitutes a deviation from the law in one direction or degree or another, and in that sense it is an accident—but an accident by no means uncaused. In this, the law does not fail but is observed: chance is the form in which necessity finds expression. It is only through chance, if anything, that a law Operates, as it circumscribes the area within which straggling may occur. A law is hard to discover precisely because it expresses itself only in terms of its opposite, i.e., deviations from it, because the universal, necessary, recurrent connection it states reveals itself only in isolated contingent events with variable characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[File:Pictures/10000000000004630000031AFA5615A6C2A7295C.jpg|class=calibre5]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We sometimes come across the following reasoning: with respect to a mass of objects (e.g., molecules in a solution or microparticles in cosmic rays), necessity indeed manifests itself in chance, and the laws are operative on the whole, without determining all that may happen to any one molecule or particle. Yet, in the case of single objects subject to the laws of classical mechanics, pure necessity holds sway, leaving no room for chance. In this instance, the laws are absolutely definitive with respect to each single object. After all, do not the Earth, Mars and other planets repeat absolutely the same movements, exactly defined by the laws of classical mechanics, over thousands of millions of years? Yet, one could think so only as long as measurements were taken with instruments not so very precise. Applying more perfect instruments, 20th-century scientists have established that each revolution of the Earth round its axis is different from the last. The Earth’s movements round the sun are not identical either.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examined in detail, the trajectory of any separate object is found to consist of millions of infinitesimal segments, each being a deviation from the regular course. Only their sum conforms to the law. This holds of every individual object. Each of them is the sum of numerous constituents contained in it at a deeper level. In other words, every single object amounts, at a deeper level, to a mass of objects, and the law to which it is subject is the sum of the irregularities occurring in the numerous elements constituting the object. Lenin wrote: “... social science (like science generally) usually deals with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;mass&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; phenomena, not with individual cases.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-86|86]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; So, if the distinction between individual and mass objects is relative, so is the distinction between exact laws and such as formulate a certain general tendency. As Lenin put it, ”... law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-87|87]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A dialectical approach to the question is essential to technology as well as science. Electrical engineers, above all, are keenly aware of this, because nothing can be achieved in electronics without a dialectical conception of necessity and chance. In fields other than electrical engineering, too, the old mechanistic view will only do to design simple and crude mechanisms. To attempt to build a machine consisting of numerous more or less independent units and requiring a thousand times more accuracy than any high-precision lathe, in the expectation that everything will proceed in strict conformity to the laws, would be absolutely useless, for it would only need the minutest element to fail for the whole system to fail. The more precise and complex a mechanism, the less reliable it is. Thus, in 1962, the 18-million-dollar US rocket launched towards Venus had to be blown up in flight for no other reason than that a hyphen had been omitted from the computer programme. Recently developed devices are so designed that their elements may go wrong or even break down, but the total behaviour of all elements, nevertheless, ensures correct behaviour of the system as a whole.  Systems of high complexity and precision can be made more reliable only given a dialectical conception of the correlation of necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Quantum mechanics, genetics and cybernetics, which developed in the 20th century, have yielded such strong evidence in support of this approach that the majority of leading scientists today have come to share the dialectical view on necessity and chance.&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, categories, like all other concepts, are derived from experience and are mental reflections of certain characteristics of the real world. As fresh experience and knowledge are gained, the content of categories is modified and refined. A category reflects the external world correctly only when conceived as a unity of opposites.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 9. P&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ractice, the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;R&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;oot&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt; and&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Y&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ardstick of&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; K&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;nowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Is the World Cognisable? ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now appropriate to look at the other aspect of the fundamental question of philosophy mentioned at the beginning of this book: Is consciousness capable of truthfully reflecting the material world? Is man capable of discovering the laws governing the development of nature and society, the essential properties and relations of external objects? And if he is, then is his knowledge complete, exhaustive and final or is it only partial? The sum total of the conceptions and doctrines offering answers to these questions constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;theory of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;epistemology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;episteme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, knowledge, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;logos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, theory, account).&lt;br /&gt;
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We are all familiar with a wide variety of things and possess information the validity of which nobody would ever question. We know how to switch on electricity, solder a can, start a machine or look up a ‘phone number in the directory. This store of information tested by ordinary experience seems to put it beyond all possible doubt that our knowledge is true and authentic. Yet, what may at first sight seem absolutely indisputable very often proves untrue. Relying on their experience, men used to consider the Earth to be flat and stationary and believed that the Sun travelled up and down the sky. The notion of the atoms as the ultimate, non-divisible particles of which the universe is composed had persisted in science until the close of the 19th century. Today, however, every schoolchild knows that the Earth is shaped very nearly like a globe and is rotating round the Sun, and that not only are the atoms divisible, but the atomic nuclei too are divisible, being composed of elementary particles.  Such facts make us wonder if what we know is indeed true and indubitable. Suppose we wake up one day to find it was all wrong, as has happened more than once in science as well as everyday life? Is there a trustworthy method of cognition guaranteed against mistakes? Such doubts arose in philosophers’ minds early in antiquity. Whereas the old Greek materialist philosophers Democritus (c. 460-370 B. C.) and Epicurus (341-270 B. C.) were sure that the world is cognisable and our knowledge gives us a true idea of things and events, Cratylus, already referred to above, asserted that the world cannot be cognised because things change too quickly to be known.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, we find in the history of philosophy arguments both for and against the possibility of knowing the world. Therefore, it is not a question of filing isolated facts but rather of analysing the substance of cognition and ascertaining its main characteristics and objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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Different philosophical schools exercise different approaches to the problem of the world’s cognisability and offer different solutions. To understand the epistemology of dialectical materialism more thoroughly, one must have at least a general idea of the epistemological conceptions of its forerunners, as dialectical materialism did not spring out of nothing but is the result of a critical comprehension of the epistemological doctrines whose shortcomings and weak points were exposed in the course of history, thanks to the strides made by science, technology and other forms of human activity.  Dialectical materialism has, at the same time, absorbed all that was valuable in the conclusions about the nature, principles and yardsticks of knowledge evolved by the preceding philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Agnostic Epistemology ====&lt;br /&gt;
The doctrine which asserts that it is impossible to know the universe was called agnosticism (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;agnostos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, unknown, unknowable).  Accepting sense-perceptions to be the source of all knowledge, agnostics reason roughly as follows: so far as our sense-perceptions are consistent with reality, our knowledge is true; but so far as they are not at all like the objects as they are by themselves, outside sense-perception, it is false. But may we compare our perceptions of an object with the object itself? The English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) had this to say about it: “The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-88|88]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Clearly, then, we have nothing with which to compare our perceptions, we have no means of verifying whether what they tell us is consistent with reality. Therefore we cannot say if they are true reflections of objects or if they are a fiction. It is possible that there are external objects endowed with the qualities such as we perceive. But it is quite possible also that nothing of the kind really exists. This, in agnostics’ view, is a problem men cannot solve.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you may remember, Hume’s predecessor George Berkeley, the subjective idealist, also considered sensations to be the sole source of human knowledge. But while he held that all external objects are merely combinations of sensations, he simultaneously accepted the existence of god, whose being is independent of sensation. Berkeley was inconsistent on this point and contradicted himself as he claimed that the source of sensation (god) exists independently of the latter. Hume differs from Berkeley in following up more consistently the idea that sensations are the sole source of knowledge and denying the existence of god—although he was, of course, an idealist. This aspect of Hume’s agnosticism at first appealed to some scientists because it was spearheaded against theology. Nevertheless, the more clearsighted of them soon saw that agnosticism conflicts with science, for the chief aim of science is to know reality, and consistent agnosticism leads to a denial of the very possibility of knowing the objective world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Ordinary experience—whether individual or general—tells us that sensations are indeed the source of our knowledge of the external world.  Most of what we learn in everyday life or in experimental science is based precisely on sense-perceptions. Both materialists and agnostics agree on this point. They begin to differ when it comes to the question of the role of sensations in cognition, and of their origin. The materialists maintain that sensations transmit and process information received by the brain from the environment. The agnostics deny that the material world exists and so deny the possibility of cognition. But that is not all. As they reduce all knowledge to sense-perception, the agnostics are unable to explain how certain ideas and concepts, irreducible to sensuous images and sensations, arise in man’s consciousness and especially in the system of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Agnosticism as an independent trend emerged when experimental natural sciences and mathematics made rapid strides, i.e., it is of recent origin. It coincided in particular with the period of high development of mathematical analysis, higher algebra, and so on. These branches of mathematics employ concepts like infinity, function, the infinitesimal, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;-space vector, etc., which cannot be constructed from or reduced to sensations. They are, nonetheless, conclusively established scientific realities, of practical as well as theoretical importance.  This fact spotlighted the deficiencies of agnosticism which was unable to explain the origin and significance of many basic concepts current in modern science.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Rationalism and Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
Development of the theory of knowledge was appreciably influenced by philosophical rationalism (Lat. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ratio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reason). Assigning a subordinate role to sense-perceptions, rationalists held that the ultimate goal of cognition, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., the discovery of laws and basic qualities and relationships of objects, can be attained only by reason, on the ground of logical reasoning alone. However, every discourse must have a beginning, a starting point.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such a starting point must be provided by certain major premises, “axioms” or “principles&amp;amp;quot; relating to the universe or its individual parts. But where do they spring from? Where do the laws and rules of logic spring from, which enable us gradually to deduce from the principles all valid knowledge? Adherents of religious rationalism believed that divine providence imparts them to philosophers and scientists at its will. Atheist rationalists, on the Other hand, maintained that the principles, axioms and laws may be discovered by thinkers who, by continually training their minds, become capable of conceiving by intuition all the necessary initial judgements which must be clear, definite and indisputable. Human reason is the highest authority, and once it finds no discrepancies in the concepts and theories of its making, there can be no better proof of their validity. This line of reasoning unmistakably reveals the influence of mathematics, especially of geometry. It was no coincidence that Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher, one of the founders of rationalism, was also the father of analytic geometry.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is known, Euclidean geometry was considered for centuries the model of logical arrangement of scientific material. What many thinkers found especially praiseworthy about Euclidean geometry was that it begins with the postulation of a limited number of axiomatic, i.e., supposedly self-evident, truths, from which, step by step, in accordance with the rules of logic and by rigorous demonstration, theorems are derived one after another. Rationalists, who put it above all that knowledge should be perfectly logical, made the axiomatic method their ideal.&lt;br /&gt;
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But, putting divine revelation aside, where do we take axioms from? Why is our intuition capable of furnishing distinct and clear knowledge of the real world, and how can we ascertain the connection between the immediate consequences of the axioms and the material objects, if sense-perceptions should be an unreliable source of information? Rationalism could supply no answer to these questions. It received a severe blow from science in the 19th century, when three mathematicians, Lobachevsky, Riemann and Bolyai, each independently showed that Euclid’s “axiom of parallels” (the fifth postulate of Euclidean geometry) was not self-evident and could be replaced. In the process, non-Euclidean geometries were developed, distinct and at the same time logically consistent.  Recently, especially after the discovery of the theory of relativity and numerous experiments, including those made possible by space flights, it has been shown that non-Euclidean geometries furnish a much clearer and truthful idea of the external world, compared with Euclid’s geometry. Thus the doctrine of rationalism which managed to explain some facts of scientific, above all, mathematical, knowledge, failed to grasp the connection between scientific laws and cognitive activity, on the one hand, and material phenomena, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Theory of Knowledge in Classical Idealism ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we saw, neither the agnostics nor the rationalists were able to provide a coherent theory of knowledge. By exaggerating the significance either of sense-perception or of reason and opposing them to each other, they lost sight of the fact that both sensory perception and reason are combined in the act of cognition. For example, a physicist watching (i.e., perceiving by sight) oscillations of the pointer on the scale of the measuring instrument, correlates them with changes in the electromagnetic field. He thus combines in one process logical inference and visual perception. Those, however, who divorce mind from reality and draw the line between the logical and sensuous aspects of the process of cognition oversimplify it, distorting the real, complex nature of cognitive activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant, the founder of German classical idealism, attempted to overcome the conflict of agnosticism and rationalism, bringing the theory of knowledge into line with the results of contemporary natural science and mathematics.  The natural sciences rely, of course, on observation and experiments. But, knowledge thus obtained grasps merely the changing and contingent external aspect of things. Behind things as we know them, or “phenomena” in Kant’s language, are concealed objectively existing material things, or “things-in-themselves&amp;amp;quot;.  Things-in-themselves generate phenomena. But between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself there is a gulf. We perceive the former through sensuous experience while the latter may be only apprehended by the mind. The mind itself moulds &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; categories, i.e., categories not derived from experience. There are twelve categories, including necessity, causality, etc. They play the main part in the formulation of scientific laws. Thus, according to Kant, sense-perception gives us no knowledge of things-in-themselves and leaves it open to question how we know that they exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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As was already mentioned, Kant also conceived time and space as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. These serve to bring into a system the empirical knowledge derived from sensuous experience. Kant is, however, unable to explain how and why the categories and other &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms may generally be applied to sense materials and what information the latter supply concerning the things-in-themselves, which are unknowable in principle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Kant’s philosophy is self-contradictory. On the one hand, making a concession to natural science, Kant acknowledged the existence of objective things-in-themselves and considered them to be the source of sensations. On the other, striving to pursue consistently the principles of rationalism, he denied that sensations and sense-perceptions provide a truthful enough reflection of the objective world and assigned the decisive role to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a priori&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; forms of cognition. Pointing out this contradiction in Kantian epistemology, the German philosopher Jacobi wrote that there was no entering Kant&#039;s Philosophy without the thing-in-itself, but to remain within that philosophy with the thing-in-itself was equally impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel, the noted German philosopher and exponent of the dialectical method, who strove to overcome the contradictions of Kantian philosophy and make it more consistent, finally rid the theory of knowledge of German Classical idealism of the thing-in-itself, throwing out, in the process, the elements of natural-&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;cientific materialism. According to Hegel, human knowledge is continually developing, being driven by internal contradictions. The world is cognisable, but the deeper thought penetrates into the secrets of being, the clearer it becomes that, through the process of cognition, the Absolute Idea reveals its own objective laws in the real world. It turns out that to know the world is to know its spiritual, ideal essence. Although Hegel made a great contribution to the doctrine of the active and dialectical nature of human knowledge, his theory of knowledge was thoroughly idealistic and therefore met with disapproval from experimental natural science. Besides, Hegel was not always abreast of contemporary physics and mathematics, and his conclusions on the laws governing the development of nature were often at odds with the conceptions advanced by the greatest scientists of the 19th century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Idealist philosophers failed to evolve a theory of knowledge matching the needs and results of theoretical and experimental natural science.  This was not done by the materialist philosophers either, many of whom were eminent thinkers. Despite the considerable popularity and the influence it exerted on science and culture, pre-Marxian materialism, too, was not free from some shortcomings vis-a-vis the conception of the cognitive process.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. Theory of Knowledge in Metaphysical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the 17th, 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, natural science pursued its inquiries by mechanistic methods. It was to this that the theory of knowledge evolved by metaphysical materialists owed its main characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The crucial principle on which this theory rested was that man is capable of forming a more or less correct idea of and cognising the external world. The basis of knowledge, the means of communication, as it were, between man and reality, are sense-perceptions. The sense-perceptions are images, ‘copies’, mirroring the external world. This view on the significance of sense-perceptions to the process of knowing was not merely expressive of the common-sense attitude naturally shared by every normal person, but was the earmark of contemporary natural science in general. It was this conception of sense-perception that subjective idealists and agnostics attacked with particular vehemence.&lt;br /&gt;
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The weak point in the theory of knowledge of metaphysical materialism was that it overemphasised passive contemplation, i.e., observation of objects, with no attempt to change them.  The contemplative character of pre-Marxian materialism was due to the generalisation of the principle current in natural science that the scientist’s role is, above all, to observe nature, not to alter it. This principle fitted that comparatively early stage in the history of experimental science where it accumulated facts, systematising and classifying them. Certainly, over the 17th-19th centuries, experimental methods involving an active influence on things examined kept improving and developing. But, exponents of metaphysical materialism still failed to grasp their full significance. Passive contemplation and underestimation of the active role of cognition were also due to the fact that metaphysical materialists underrated the importance of analysing the objective laws of thought.  And that, Marx noted, was the weakest point of the previous forms of materialism. Metaphysical materialists viewed cognition as passive observation of, rather than active intervention in, nature and society. The fact is, however, that genuine scientific knowledge becomes available only in the course of remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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While they acknowledged that our notions and sensations are images of material things and events, metaphysical materialists failed to explain the principles underlying the development of thought. They could not say how and why knowledge underwent change, as  they believed its basic methods and forms to be stable and immutable. It was this that rendered their doctrine vulnerable and incapable of answering many of the questions posed by the development of society and science. It was therefore necessary to evolve a fundamentally different approach to the problems associated with the investigation of men’s cognitive activity. This need was answered by the theory of knowledge advanced by dialectical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Cognitive Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
For centuries, men wondered how celestial bodies had originated and what directed their movement, paying particular attention to the Earth’s natural satellite, the Moon. After the telescope was invented and men began to use intricate astronomical instruments, employing astrophotography, radar, etc., they learned a great deal about the Moon. All this information was the result of numerous observations. Even so, until quite recently astronomers and astro-physicists could give no adequate answers as to how the Moon originated, what its invisible side was like, whether the Moon‘s surface was hard or friable, and what was the origin of the lunar craters and “seas&amp;amp;quot;. By obtaining answers to these questions, men would be able to unravel many secrets of nature and form a clearer idea of the history of the solar system. Scientists advanced numerous hypotheses explaining more or less plausibly different facts. On every substantial point, several hypotheses were advanced, and for a long time it could not be decided which of them was correct. The French 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte, for instance, positively asserted that the reverse side of the Moon would ever remain a mystery to men. Nevertheless, the artificial satellites which made pictures of the Moon’s far side, as well as the exploration of the lunar topography by Moon robots and astronauts who brought back samples of moon rock made it possible to supply exact answers to the above questions.&lt;br /&gt;
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In considering this, we must note the following basic points. First, that observation, whether by means of the senses or instruments, is essential to knowing an object. Second, that men can cognise the essential properties of a thing and the laws governing it only by dynamically interacting with the phenomena under investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To observe external phenomena without intervening in their vital functions, without interacting with the processes examined, is to engage in passive contemplation. We can only derive some information about things and events from this but we learn nothing about their more intimate connections, basic qualities and relations.  Contemplating a tree, we can describe the colour and shape of its leaves, the shape of its crown, the peculiar qualities of its bark, the kind of soil its species prefer, and so on. However, to determine how old a tree is from the number of rings visible in the cross section of its trunk, we have to saw it up. To find out how plant cells are built or how biochemical reactions proceed in them, we have to use a microscope and chemical reagents. We have to create artificial surroundings for the tree or its parts, keeping it in the dark or in an atmosphere devoid of carbon dioxide or planting it in soil artificially deprived of one or another of the nutrients usually present in the soil, and so on.  We shall have to subject the tree to still more complex operations in order to find out the degree of hardness or pliability or the chemical composition of the timber; this means bending, breaking, applying chemicals to different portions of the trunk, the roots, branches and leaves dozens of times. This active interaction with the object is described as experimentation. We learn from the latter what we cannot possibly learn from passive contemplation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at the following conclusion: The cognitive act includes (1) the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;object of cognition&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;; (2) experimentation or man&#039;s action on the object performed with the aid of instruments, tools, etc.; and (3) &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a reflection of the object’s qualities and distinctive properties, discovered during experimentation.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now define the crucial difference between the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism and those of the previous philosophical systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whatever those systems were—materialist or idealist&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they all described the cognitive act as a dichotomy, or two-fold relation, of the objects concerned and knowledge. Experimentation, i.e., man’s active influence on the objects cognised, was disregarded. That is why both the materialist and the idealist philosophers failed to find an effective method to justify their solutions concerning the world’s cognisability. In other words, the previous philosophical systems lacked a yardstick by which their philosophical positions could be verified.&lt;br /&gt;
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Dialectical materialism approached theory of knowledge from an entirely different standpoint, shifting the emphasis to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective yardstick&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of knowledge. Unlike the agnostics and the Kantians, the dialectical materialists affirmed that the world was cognisable. Rather than reason about how far sensations, representations and conceptions are consistent with the things-in-themselves they reflect, dialectical materialism concentrates on finding out how sensations, representations and conceptions appear and how knowledge contained in them enables man to act and find his bearings in the surroundings and so shape them to his needs. Engels wrote: “If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, ... making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable ‘thing-in-itself’.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-89|89]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; The soft landing and recovery of the lunar probes, the long excursion of the lunar mobile laboratory, the successful manned flights to the Moon all verify our knowledge on the structure of the Moon’s surface. Artificial synthesis of a gene of yeast, accomplished in 1970, substantiates our knowledge of the physicochemical structure of genes, i.e., biological units of heredity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the cardinal position of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is this: Cognition of the external world stems from experimentation carried out by man with the aid of tools, instruments and other devices. If our knowledge of the most essential properties of the things involved in these experiments helps us to reproduce or produce certain material objects or work certain desirable changes, then it is regarded as valid.&lt;br /&gt;
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The experimentation in question is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;practice&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Greek &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;praxis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, doing, action). Let us now consider the characteristics and structure of practice, and the part it plays in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §7. The Basis and Yardstick of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
Practice is a word of many meanings. For undergraduates to have practice means to receive practical training (e.g., teaching practice) in the authentic working conditions of their chosen profession. For a doctor to have a large practice means to be sought after by patients. Now the philosophical conception of practice has a particular meaning of its own.&lt;br /&gt;
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Man is in contact with very many phenomena relating to nature, society and thought. To be able to find his bearings and act in the complex conditions of modern society, for instance, he must know the laws governing the development of society. Obviously, unlike natural objects, social formations, the class struggle, the development of culture cannot be studied with the aid of tools or instruments. Does it not mean perhaps that practice which we have only just described as the basis and yardstick of knowledge fails as soon as we come to more complex cognitive acts?&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us not jump to conclusions. As a matter of fact, work and practice in general are social phenomena. In order to carry them out, men have to associate, maintaining some form of self-organisation, exchanging information, storing, passing on and extending experience.  Therefore we shall conceive practice, or, more broadly, social and production practice, as the sum total of processes and actions arising from man‘s purposeful influence upon objects, and shaping the conditions for this activity and its development. In this sense, the class struggle in antagonistic class society is a crucial element of social and production practice, for it springs from the development of productive forces and relations of production, and its progress and results are decisive for the advance of social production. During the class struggle, not only are various political doctrines advanced, but we also see how faithfully they express the interests of particular classes, how far their professed goals are consistent with the society&#039;s need to develop, and to what extent their proposed forms and methods of struggle are effective.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now divide man‘s entire activity into two closely associated kinds of activity—objective and subjective. Objective activity embraces the whole of man’s social and production practice, as it is carried on on the basis of laws which are independent of men’s subjective intentions and will. It is impossible, for instance, to forge water with a forging press or drive in nails with a turbo-drill designed for sinking holes in the ground. It is impossible to abolish class struggle in a society which rests on private ownership. In interacting with nature in the process of his productive labour activity, man relies first of all on the objective properties of the things and implements he has to deal with.  Of course, man sets himself a goal consciously and is conscious of his actions, but the main and decisive role belongs to the objective circumstances and the laws to which such actions are subject independently of man’s will and consciousness. The founders of dialectical materialism pointed out that initially the subjective, i.e., cognitive, activity is intertwined with the objective, practical activity. Only at a comparatively later stage of development does it become detached from the latter. In comparing the mode of thinking of a savage and of a child it is easy to see that the simplest habits of thought, the ability to observe and establish similarity or difference result from the handling of material objects. One must not assume, however, that it is enough to appeal to practice to have all the intricate problems of cognition finally solved. The desire to get final, immutable answers to all questions that may arise in science or everyday life is characteristic of the metaphysical approach to knowledge. Some of these answers seem to us indisputable and are indeed worth following within the limited sphere of everyday life, being sound common sense. “Only,” Engels remarks, “sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-90|90]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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The very way in which our knowledge undergoes change depends on the forms of practice. Wherever practice is stable, certain actions tending to be repeated over decades or even centuries, knowledge derived from it similarly appears to be stable and immutable. But as soon as any serious changes occur in practical activity, knowledge associated with them begins to change rapidly. Generally speaking, practice is extremely varied, there is an element of uncertainty in it, it possesses so wide a range of qualities, characteristics and individual features that it is actually impossible for us to know them once and for all. It is this uncertainty, mutability and mobility of practice that is a crucial factor in knowledge. Practice, Lenin said, is so indefinite that it won&#039;t let our knowledge ever stand still. But can it, then, be the yardstick of knowledge? We know that by carrying to its utmost limit the assertion about the changeability and mobility of external objects some philosophers arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to cognise the world because things change more quickly than they can be judged and described. Nevertheless, nothing disproves the idealist view on cognition better than practice, in which actions repeated scores and hundreds of times produce more or less similar results.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that hundreds of artificial Earth satellites, for example, are moving round the Earth in scheduled orbits, that Moon probes land in a definite spot time and again proves best of all that practice, be it production activity or scientific experiment, serves to discover stable, recurrent characteristics and properties of material things and to derive true knowledge of them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, we can draw the following three conclusions: (1) practice is the objective basis of cognition and simultaneously the yardstick showing to what extent knowledge of this or that thing is far-reaching and true; (2) practice is mobile, indefinite and changeable enough to prevent knowledge from freezing up, and is the chief factor in the progress of knowledge; (3) practice is definite enough to separate true from false knowledge, the materialist from the idealist approach, and to affirm the truth of the materialist theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §8. Knowledge and Truth ====&lt;br /&gt;
Knowing is a process in which subjective operations and procedures of thought are closely linked with objective experiments and forms of activity. Knowledge which is the product of this process bears the imprint of these interrelated aspects. Therefore, it is very important to ascertain what in our knowledge depends on objective, and what on subjective, factors.  Turning to the history of science, we may trace the development, for instance, of our knowledge of the cosmic bodies comprising the solar system, and in particular, the Moon. The rudimentary knowledge preserved since hoary antiquity appears, on closer examination, to consist of two different parts. Some of it depends on the structure of man’s sense-organs (e.g., the eye), on the place from which the observation is made, on the observer&#039;s skill, diligence, power of concentration, and so on. And some of it—this is the second part—depends neither on an individual person nor on mankind in general.  The fact that on different days of the month the Moon appears sometimes as a disk and sometimes as a sickle, depends partly on the observers position and partly on the objective position of the Moon and the Sun. However, the Shape of the Moon and the rate at which it revolves round the Earth, or the chemical composition of Moon rocks in no way depend on the observer’s position.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the means of observation are improved, Optical telescopes being replaced by radio telescopes, radars, lasers and space laboratories, our knowledge of the Moon is becoming more and more complex and varied. Simultaneously, that part of knowledge which does not depend either on the individual or on mankind in general but is determined by the objective factors accounts for a greater share of our knowledge of the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can we claim, however, that at some stage we have either attained or will attain a level of knowledge at which it will depend a hundred per cent on the objective factors, no longer containing anything dependent on man?&lt;br /&gt;
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The nature of the bulk of information available to modern science depends not only on the object investigated but also on the diverse instruments enabling the investigator and the object to interact. Although all such means of obtaining knowledge exist objectively, they are created by men and so must, to some extent, depend on the subjective factor. Moreover, we cannot exclude from the cognitive act the human brain, the nervous system, the observer&#039;s skill, capacity, the acuteness of his senses, and so on. Therefore, although that part of knowledge which does not depend on man tends to increase, the subjective element still remains, to a greater or lesser degree. The purpose of science is to increase continually the volume of that part of our knowledge which reflects the basic characteristics, properties and relations of objects and which does not depend on the individual man or mankind in general. Lenin defined this part of knowledge as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see from the above example one of the main characteristics of objective truth. It is that objective truth keeps changing, developing and increasing. Ancient philosophers, who gave much attention to astronomy, were fairly well informed about the planets as can be seen from the lunar calendars compiled in the remote past, records of the dark areas found on the bright lunar disk, the ability to calculate the periods of full Moon and to forecast eclipses of the Sun. All these are obvious elements of objective truth. Still, their proportion in the mass of fantastic mythological descriptions of the Moon was exceedingly small. Since the invention of the telescope three and a half centuries ago, the volume of objective information about the Earth’s natural satellite has been growing incessantly.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that at every single stage in the history of knowledge, objective truth ascended a step higher, ousting the subjective elements more and more. These stages in the development of objective truth are known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relative truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or the relative form of objective truth).&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, objective truth, influenced by Practical activity which keeps developing and becoming more complex, also continually develops and cannot be final, complete and immutable. On the contrary, it appears as a succession of relative truths concerning an object, each Successive stage in the development of truth being fuller and more far-reaching than the Preceding one. Lenin described this process as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dialectics of knowledge&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Unlike Kant and his followers who held that the phenomena and the things-in-themselves were divided by a gulf dialectical materialist epistemology regards cognition as a succession of interconnected acts of arriving at relative truths which contain objective information about things, their properties and internal interrelations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Can a process like that result in exhaustive, all-embracing knowledge of objects? If we recall that the material world and even individual fragments of it possess a practically endless number of properties, connections and relations, it will be obvious to us that to attain complete and ultimate knowledge embracing every aspect of the thing we study is impossible. This is all the more true as the things round us keep developing and changing, thus taking on new properties and new connections. Living organisms consisting of thousands of millions of interacting cells, economic systems comprising hundreds of enterprises, millions of workers, hundreds of thousands of machines and other tools for manufacturing different goods, are so complex that to know everything about them is impossible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Consequently, full, exhaustive knowledge, also described as absolute truth, may be achieved only with respect to very simple objects, with relatively few constituents and connections. We find such objects in mathematics, for example, but even there a great deal of abstraction and restriction is needed to enable one to describe something as ultimate truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if we say that ultimate truth is unattainable, do we not thereby deny its objectivity?  Does it mean that the agnostics, who deny that the world is cognisable, are right? Such assumptions can hardly find justification. If we approach cognition dialectically, not as something that must have an end, but as incessant extension of our knowledge of the external world, we shall have to agree that the world is cognisable, not in the sense that we may cognise it once and for all, but rather that we can keep adding to and expanding the relative truths available to us, verifying and refining upon them with the help of practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, absolute truth and relative truth are, as it were, two forms of objective truth, while absolute truth itself may be regarded as the result of an endless succession of relative truths Superseding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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This ends our brief exposition of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. Having Surmounted the metaphysical opposition of sen&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;uous and rational knowledge, dialectical materialism posed in a new way, and, moreover, solved in a new way, the question of the world’s Cognisability. Knowledge was discussed for the first time in terms of social and production Practice as the basis and yardstick of the world’s cognisability. It made possible a new understanding of the relationship formed by sense-perception and logical thought in the process of cognitive activity. New light was thrown on a whole range of complex problems associated with the modern forms and methods of scientific knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 10. T&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;he Dialectical Path to Truth&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. Origin of Sensation ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have been introduced to the principles of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.  Now we shall examine how cognition proceeds, the stages it passes through, how these are connected and the part they play in our knowledge of the real world.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;amp;quot;... Suddenly ... I saw very clearly a quick and blinding black lightning . . . ,&amp;amp;quot; says one of Kuprin’s characters. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; still cannot understand the reason for that phenomenon. Was it an error of sight strained by the incessant play of lightning or was it an accidental disposition of the clouds, or was it some peculiarity of that nasty boggy depression?”&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar, if not quite so extraordinary, incidents occur to everyone. Our visual, auditory, tactile and other similar impressions usually permit us to adjust, yet often we do not trust them because impressions of this kind may occasionally be deceptive. Often the weather is cold for one person and hot for another. The surface that seems perfectly smooth to one person seems rough to another. Facts of this kind were often cited as evidence that our sense organs are unreliable and the sensations for which they are responsible, far from reflecting the properties of things, generally cannot be used as proof that the real world exists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now what is sensation? How does it depend on the sense organs, and what produces it? In speaking of sensation we have to distinguish between two meanings of this term. Firstly, sensation may mean the interaction of the sense organs and the environment and the material process of transmission of information from one part of the nervous system to another. Secondly, this term is used to describe the result of the above-mentioned process, i.e., the image arising in the brain, which is already a fact of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for example, man’s visual perceptions which supply almost 90 per cent of all the external information he receives.&lt;br /&gt;
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Light falling on an object is partly absorbed and partly reflected and so received by the eye.  Light consists of electromagnetic waves of different length, and which of them will be reflected and which absorbed by the object depends on the physicochemical nature of the object’s surface. Hence, the very character of the waves that are reflected already contains unidentified information about the nature of the object. The first conversion of the light rays received by the eye occurs when they are refracted in passing through the transparent covering of the eye.  Then they are focused by the lens of the eye upon the retina. There, in accordance with the laws of geometrical optics, an image of the object is formed. The geometrical image is like one we can see on the opaque glass plate at the back wall of a photographer’s camera. A chemical procedure developed at the close of the 19th century has made it possible to fix the visual image formed on the retina, so that now we know that the image differs in many respects from the object. First, the image is flat (two-dimensional) while all material objects are three-dimensional. Second, it is much smaller than the object and is symmetrically inverted.  Third, the image formed on the retina only shows those details of the object which are big enough. This depends on how the object is lighted, as well as on its size and the distance between it and the eye.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can say that the image on the retina is a natural reflection which depends on the physical nature of the object, the eye and the light.  How does it initiate the sensation of vision?  The light waves reaching the retina start complex chemical and biochemical reactions in the cells, which serve, in fact, to code the information received by the eye. Every signal coming from without produces a definite bio-electrical impulse. When these reach the cells of a particular area in the brain, viz., the optic centre, a new transformation takes place there. It is decoding which initiates visual perception.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus the process whereby visual perceptions are produced is of a material nature. It results from the interaction of such material systems as light waves and man’s optic system. It is a highly complex process including a range of successive transformations, whereby some kinds of energy are converted into some other kinds.  Nevertheless in all such transformations the principle is observed that every species of external stimuli is attended by definite and distinctive visual images. That is not all, however. Let us recall, for instance, the fact, already referred to, that all images formed on the retina are inverted. Yet everybody knows from experience that we do not see things upside down. It appears that the brain not only perceives images but actively intervenes in the process of perception. The optic centre in the brain adjusts the images consistently with man’s individual and social experience, on the basis of knowledge derived from social practice. Thus, while knowledge emerges on the basis of sensations, the latter form under the influence of knowledge previously acquired and confirmed by practice.  This is corroborated by the following experiment. A person puts on a contrivance which inverts al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; visible objects. In a dark room, against a black background, a candle is placed on an invisible support, which the person sees inverted, with the wick at the bottom. But when the candle is lighted, it is immediately perceived as being in a normal position. Why? We know from experience that a flame always points upwards, and so the brain automatically corrects the “mistake” of the experimental apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus we see that visual perceptions, as a fact of consciousness, are far from simple. They must be related to the external world, but they do not simply mirror it. On the one hand, we cannot do without sensations, because with their help we receive sensuous images of the objects around us. On the other hand, we cannot fully rely on sensations as they often produce illusions, erroneous representations, and images conflicting partly or completely with experience and experiment. How do we overcome this contradiction? How far are sense-perceptions to be trusted and what part do they play in cognition?&lt;br /&gt;
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Before these questions can be answered, we must find out more exactly the extent to which sensations depend on the external object and on the percipient subject.&lt;br /&gt;
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The organs of vision in man and animals are, of course, rather different. This tells on both &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;v&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;isual sensations and resultant images. Under normal daylight modern man can distinguish several hundred basic colours and hues. At the same time, some animals, e.g., dogs, perceive objects only in black and white, distinguishing them by the intensity of the greys. Bees do not perceive red. They perceive only yellow, blue and violet and also ultraviolet rays. Consequently, other things being equal, one and the same object will be perceived differently by different optic systems, causing different sensations in them.&lt;br /&gt;
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Organs of vision, like other sense organs, appeared and developed during biological evolution. They helped living organisms adjust to the environment and were important factors in the struggle for survival. As the conditions of life affecting the different organisms inhabiting the Earth vary a great deal, the sense organs are very diverse. The “ultraviolet” vision of the bee, whose active life occurs in bright sunlight, enables it to receive a maximum of biologically useful information. That kind of vision would not do for rattlesnakes which are nocturnal animals. Therefore in their evolution they developed a special kind of “heat” vision. Snakes have several thousand nerve cells, located in small indentations just below the eyes, capable of perceiving infrared rays. This enables them, in absolute darkness, to hunt warm-blooded animals whose body temperature is at least a few degrees higher than the outside temperature.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus sensation depends on the sense organs as well as on the nature of the object and conditions of perception. A sensation is an image of the objects which produce it. At the same time, it is a subjective image which depends not only on what is perceived and under what conditions, but also on the percipient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The cognising brain and the sense organs supplying information to it are not simply objects of external influence. Recognising the active interaction of the subject and object of cognition is the cornerstone of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. It is in this interrelation that the sense organs supplement and correct one another making it possible to form the necessary images of the external world we are to live in.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike animals, whose activity is almost entirely determined by heredity which leaves comparatively little room for the development of individual habits, men have evolved, over hundreds of thousands of years, an immense capacity for adjustment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside society, the development of specifically human acts, including cognitive acts, proves to be impossible. A little child can perceive different colours and geometrical images of objects, but it develops the idea of distance, size, etc., only in the process of active movement in space, assisted by adults.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ability to make out colours, shape and distance is formed as a result of personal experience associated with sustained activity.  However, the character of sensations does not depend on individual experience alone but on culture as a whole, the level of society&#039;s development, and the social system to which the individual belongs.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus a comparison of modern and of some historically retarded peoples’ spatial perception of things shows that the latter lack a perception of linear perspective. This fact does not depend on any national or racial characteristics but solely on the level of social production and living and cultural standards at large.&lt;br /&gt;
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To sum up. Sensations depend on (1) the properties and particular characteristics of material objects; (2) the conditions under which they act upon the sense organs; (3) the organisation and condition of the perceiving system, including the brain; (4) previous individual experience and knowledge; (5) the cultural level of society; (6) the character of practical activity carried out during perception. Consequently, sensations are images which, besides having the qualities and characteristics of the objects perceived, also bear the imprint of numerous other factors.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how do sensations pass into forms of knowledge which reflect and fix, more or less “purely”, the relations characteristic of real objects?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. The Significance of Language for Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
When two persons look at or touch the same object or hear the same tune they form certain sensuous images. In order to co-operate in production, in social and home life, people have to inform each other about what they have seen and heard, share their impressions and store and communicate varied knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sensations and the visual images based on them contain a certain amount of information about the surroundings. But we cannot pass &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;n sensations, ‘extracting’ them from one head and putting them into another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how is information transmitted in human society? What means of storing knowledge do men possess? It is language. Language is the means of transmitting and storing knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
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The sense organs enable us to perceive material things. Using telescopes we can look at faraway heavenly bodies. With the aid of an oscillograph or a photographic plate one can see the trace made by an elementary particle.  But we cannot see or touch thought. After all thought is ideal in form. Man’s thought is not only the result of social progress. Mastering the immense wealth of thought, the treasures of science and culture, is a prerequisite of the further progress of mankind and the basis of allround development of the individual. “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Language&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;,” Marx and Engels wrote, “is the immediate actuality of thought.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-91|91]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; They pointed out that thought, which is ideal in nature, finds its sole material expression in language, thanks to which it can be perceived by men. It is just because language is the material vehicle of thought that it is able to play a twofold role, being simultaneously the means of communication and of knowing reality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Language is a distinct sign system. Think of what is round you, look at the ordinary household things, look at what you come across in the street and at work, and what will you see?  You will see that the world is full of signs and systems of signs.&lt;br /&gt;
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The striped barrier by the railway crossing is not just a pole painted black and white&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it is a sign telling you to stop. A wedding ring or a white smock are not just a piece of metal or an article of clothing respectively, but signs of being married or belonging to the medical profession. Insofar as things not only serve a useful function in industry or in the home but communicate information, they are signs. Any sensible material object capable of communicating information is a sign. In this sense, signs are some times described as substitutes for other objects. Things other than those created by man can also be signs. The imprint left by a prehistoric reptile in a limestone block or the smoke rising over a distant wood are instances of so-called natural signs. The former is evidence of an extinct animal and the latter of a bonfire or a forest fire. A natural sign is the result of the interaction of two or more material objects, e.g., of the prehistoric animal and calcareous rock. They have a number of disadvantages which make them inconvenient for use in communicating and producing knowledge in human society. They are often impossible to transmit or store or reproduce perfectly (cf. the smoke or the rock just referred to). Besides, the information they communicate is about a single event. To describe a class of animals with the help of natural signs would take a thousand, perhaps a million, such signs. Even so, the description would be incomplete since all impressions left by an animal are bound to leave out of account many of its characteristics, traits, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is a certain likeness between natural and manmade signs based on a similarity between the sign and the thing it stands for, e.g., a portrait, drawing, map or the plan of a machine or a building. These signs do not result from the immediate interaction of different material objects. They are made by people with the aid of implements. They are highly conventionalised. Quite perceptible in a portrait, it becomes paramount in an architectural plan or mechanical diagram. But, however conventionalised, there is a certain similarity between the signs of the kind described (i.e., a diagram of a lathe or a map) and the objects designated.  Soviet cosmonauts who circled the Earth many times confirmed that the continents’ outlines were like their representations on maps. Yet as we pass from a portrait to a map and from that to a technical drawing, the measure of conventionality increases. This makes it possible to designate aggregates rather than individual objects. This reveals an important characteristic of signs, viz., the more conventionalised a sign is, the more general it becomes thus making the number of objects it can designate greater. Nevertheless, the generalising capacity of this kind of sign is limited, because it must, to some extent at least, look like the object designated, in terms of geometrical form or colour or material or whatever.&lt;br /&gt;
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One of the distinctive features of human language is that it has none of the limitations of all the other sign systems. In this sense, it is a special sign system. The basic elements of language are words. They are formed from sounds or their combinations and are independent language units. With the emergence of writing systems, people learned to represent words with the help of graphic signs. The sound form, however, has always been the main element in all existing languages.&lt;br /&gt;
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Linguistic signs, or words, are material phenomena. They act on our sense organs (the ears) and arouse auditory sensations in us. Yet, unlike other material phenomena, whether natural or manmade, words have no value in themselves but only as a means of producing, communicating and storing information. Words are utterly conventional and can under no circumstances be considered images of material things or events because they reflect neither any of their characteristics nor any of their relations to one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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But does it contradict the assertion that language serves to express and communicate knowledge which is, after all, a reflection of reality? Not at all. These notions are not the least contradictory.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand how language and words take part in reflecting reality (although they do not reflect it in themselves), we must consider more closely what words are. We know that the words of any language are conventional. The properties of words as special material phenomena are in no way connected with the phenomena they name. That is why identical objects or groups of objects are represented by different words in different languages. The totalities of things, events, states, mental experiences, social phenomena, etc., designated by a word, form its meaning. This meaning is not inherent in the word as such but is assigned to it depending on how it is used in practice, in human intercourse.  As language develops along with society, words gradually develop new meanings which usually coexist with the old, or they may come to express entirely different notions (e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, healthy, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, noise, and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;sound&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, a surgical instrument) so that it is not always possible to tell the precise meaning of a separate word.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unlike other manmade signs, words possess an unlimited capacity for expressing general characteristics and relations between objects, just because they are not images but conventional signs (symbols).&lt;br /&gt;
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Every word&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.g., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;building&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;electron&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, progress—refers to a larger or smaller aggregate of things, rather than to individual things. Emphasising this distinctive quality of words, Lenin wrote that &amp;amp;quot;every word... &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;universalises&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;….&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-92|92]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Natural signs (impressions or traces) convey the individual, singular characteristics of objects, and so are unsuitable to express general features and relationships. Manmade signs (maps, diagrams, etc.) are conventional and so suitable for unqualified generalisation. The words of a language are fully conventional, their capacity to generalise is infinite, yet one can express in them any information about individual objects. This shows the dialectics of the development of sign systems.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must see how a finite number of words form an infinite number of linguistic expressions which fix pieces of information. Language does not just consist of words. Every language also contains special rules, i.e., grammar. These rules help people make combinations of signs, i.e., assemble words into sentences. Not every sequence of words is a sentence. So that, “The Earth Sun the round revolves” is not a sentence and carries no information. On the other hand “The Earth revolves round the Sun” is a sentence communicating an astronomical fact. People are often unconscious of grammar rules and use them automatically, acquiring the appropriate habits from education and speech communication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Combinability is the thing that makes human language distinct from animal sounds. Animals also use sounds to transmit the simplest information. This ability is for the most part inherited. Even with gregarious animals like some birds, beavers and various mammals the capacity ‘to interact through sounds does not depend on the form of communication. An incubator chicken raised in solitude reacts to the sounds made by hens no worse than the chickens hatched by a hen. Some animals, e.g., dolphins, use several dozen sound signals to express anxiety, to call for aid, indicate the presence of food, challenge an adversary, call for attack.  and so on. Some investigators even talk of a dolphin language.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, neither the dolphins nor any other animals possess language in the sense in which we speak of human language. This is particularly clear from the absence of combinability which enables differentiated sound signals to be assembled into an infinite number of sentences. That is why all information accessible to the animals, which they are capable of passing on to each other, does not go beyond a comparatively limited assortment of sounds.  For this reason, the animals cannot develop the form of intellect which we term human thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
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Emphasising the significance of language to the progress of knowledge and thought, Lenin wrote: “The senses show reality; thought and word—the universal.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-93|93]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Language can express the universal in two senses. In the first place, words and sentences do not designate individual objects, properties and relations, but their totalities. In the second place, language is universal. Unlike sensations, words and sentences may be passed on from one person to another without having their sense and meaning distorted. Though some of the individual, subjective points of knowledge are partly lost, everything which is general and essential, and without which community life and common effort are impossible, is retained.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Abstraction and Concept Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The process by which we pass from sensation to verbal thinking is described as abstraction, and its results as abstractions or concepts. In ordinary life, an “abstraction” is often used to denote something hazy, vague, incoherent, detached from life. There is some reason for it, too. Some abstract notions, divorced from practical activity, are indeed recondite and of little use in everyday life. However, theory of knowledge is interested above all in far-reaching scientific abstractions without which one simply cannot understand the secrets of nature, bring out the true causes of social progress or formulate scientific laws.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, what are scientific abstractions? Where do they spring from? And what distinguishes profound and true from shallow and false abstractions? Many people think abstractions emerge simply as a result of the isolation of common characteristics of things and events, which are reflected in sensations. From this standpoint, minor or dissimilar features are simply neglected, while the features common to the totality are selected and fixed in the abstraction. The process of abstraction does, indeed, imply discarding what is dissimilar and singling out what is general, but that is far from being all.&lt;br /&gt;
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Take, for instance, the Scientific abstraction “four-dimensional space&amp;amp;quot;, fundamental to the special theory of relativity which plays a major role in modern physics.&lt;br /&gt;
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We already know that real material space is three-dimensional, and our sense organs, under no circumstances, permit us to discover phenomena such as occur in four-dimensional space. However, we often resort to the concepts of one- and two- as well as three-dimensional space.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is easy to see that these concepts are abstractions which result from isolating certain properties and characteristics of real bodies. The concept of a sphere (which is three-dimensional), for instance, is formed when we disregard the differences in the size, colour and material of various spheric bodies and isolate their geometric shape alone as their common characteristic. The linear, or one-dimensional concept is also an abstraction, whereby we neglect the size, geometric shape, etc., of bodies and isolate the distance between them as the sole characteristic.  The concept “two-dimensional space” is also an abstraction. Plane geometric figures (e.g., circles, ellipses, trapeziums and triangles) possess only two dimensions.&lt;br /&gt;
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These abstractions are more or less connected with sensations—sensuous images of objective things and events. We can imagine a sphere, a quadrangular building site, the line between point A and point B, etc., but to see or touch a four-dimensional cube or sphere or imagine an event occurring in four-dimensional space is something we are unable to do. For all that, not only does multi-dimensional geometry exist but there is also a physical theory describing material events with the aid of the abstraction “four-dimensional space”. From this, it follows that there is something in our concepts, in abstractions, which is not immediately present in sensations and which cannot be derived simply by omitting or selecting certain characteristics of the objective world which are fixed in sensation. Then how does correct abstraction proceed?&lt;br /&gt;
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Knowledge is not a mirror reflection of reality. Dialectical materialism, which considers consciousness, thought as secondary, states that once it has emerged, it follows its own laws, being marked by certain specific features. One of them is that the mind is capable of connecting, arranging and unifying elements of sense-perceptions not in the way they are connected or arranged in the immediate sensuous images.  Moreover, as he learned to isolate connections and relations, man improved this capacity, creating and inventing new connections and relations and bringing them together often in the most fanciful ways. That was how mythological and folk-tale monsters of half-men half-horses, ogres, and so on, appeared. Four-dimensional space is the child of scientific imagination. This abstraction was arrived at not by neglecting characteristics of reality but, contrariwise, by magnifying and projecting the old abstractions “two-” and “three-dimensional space.”&lt;br /&gt;
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From this, it follows that the process of abstraction is complex, dialectical, contradictory. Along with comparison, isolation of the general and omission of the particular, it involves imagination, the rearrangement of real connections and constituents. It must be noted that this occurs not only with respect to complex abstractions, like “infinity”, “four-dimensional space”, etc., but also with respect to comparatively simple and familiar concepts, like “circle” or “red colour.” We all learn at school that a circle is a plane closed curve, with all its points equidistant from a particular point in the plane, called the centre. The length of line bounding a circle is called the circumference. The abstractions “circle” and “circumference” result from the generalisation of the geometrical properties of familiar things such as a wheel, a round button, the visible disk of the full Moon, and so on. With the aid of modern grinding machines more and more precise disks can be made, with radii differing by no more than thousandths of a millimetre. The discrete structure of solids makes it, however, generally impossible to turn out a disk with absolutely equal radii. Therefore, strictly speaking, no wooden, stone or metal disk actually answers the geometrical description of a circle, and all we can do in practice is continue to improve precision standards. But if we are unable to beat the barrier erected by nature in practice, we can surmount it in imagination by projecting the process begun in practice beyond what is called the threshold and is fundamental to the formation of abstractions, though we are unconscious of it in everyday life. Comparing a poppy, a ripe tomato and blood, we can form the concept of red, Indeed, there are no real objects that are simply red&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they are always a certain shade of that colour. The concept “red&amp;amp;quot; isolates something general which allows us to apply one name to millions of similarly coloured objects, rather than use a million names.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we can isolate the main stages of abstraction. The first, the formation of the initial totality, consists in isolating a set of things, processes, phenomena, situations, etc. The second, the matching and comparison of the elements of the initial totality, includes two procedures, one to bring out similarity and the other disparity. The purpose of this stage is to isolate certain common properties, connections and relations characteristic of the elements of the given initial totality. The third stage is that of denotation and generalisation. It consists in naming the common characteristic, connection or relation selected at the preceding stage. The given characteristic is invested, so to speak, with linguistic, verbal shape. From this point on, we operate with signs, with all the consequences that this entails. A word or word combination becomes the expositor of the notion. The fourth stage is the threshold and the further determination of content. Certainly, the three last mentioned stages are seldom divided in time and usually proceed simultaneously, interlacing, interacting and supplementing one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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By the content of an abstraction, or concept, is meant the sum of characteristics which may be regarded as the definition of the given concept. Let us recall, for example, the definition of a circle. The sum total of all the elements forms the sense of the concept, while the elements themselves form its meaning or, to put it more precisely, its initial meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the process of abstraction, we pass from the sensuous form of knowledge to abstract, verbal thinking. This transition is always connected with loss of perceivability. It is sometimes said that concepts may be perceivable and non-perceivable, and that one of the most important distinguishing features of modern science, as compared with classical science, consists in the changeover from perceivable to non-perceivable concepts. In truth, however, all concepts are non-perceivable. It is just that some of them are more ordinary and have a rather simple connection with perceivable, sensory representations, and others are less ordinary, with a long series of intermediate abstractions between them and sensuous images. We can easily call up the image of an acquaintance but we are unable to conceive the image of man as such, who is neither a man nor a woman, neither old nor young, neither a European nor an African.  Man as such is an abstraction which is no more perceivable than four-dimensional space or a mathematical infinity. Certainly, the concept “man” is closer to the sensible material phenomena than the concept “four-dimensional space.”  This explains why the latter is harder to comprehend. Loss of perceivability does not mean, nevertheless, that abstract notions stop being the reflections of reality. Of course, they are not its sensuous images like sensation and representation. It does not, however, follow that they are not images at all. The fact that concepts exist and are expressed by signs was repeatedly used by idealists as a reason for alleging that our notions were as conventional and symbolic as the signs themselves. But the dialectics of verbal thinking consists in the use of conventional signs, i.e., words thus representing the highest form in which reality is reflected.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin said that our concepts are copies, images of reality. The proof of it is that with the aid of concepts—even the most abstract of them—we are able to recognise, interact with and remake sensible things.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now we must answer one more question, about the difference between scientific and unscientific abstractions. After all, in the process of abstraction, men, following their fancy, recombining connections, rejecting some and introducing other elements and relations, also created such concepts as god, mermaid, personal immortality, and so on. At this point, we should recall the yardstick of truth already discussed, i.e., practice. Abstractions do not exist in isolation, unconnected with other products of the mind. A number of specifically related concepts may form another concept, new knowledge, more concrete, more exact and full, giving a more comprehensive description of a thing or event. If immediate or mediate utilisation of these concepts enables us to observe the properties and relations they express, we can say that they correctly reflect the things observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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If on the basis of such concepts, having performed the actions prescribed by them, we attain the goal, we may be confident that our abstractions have stood the test of practice and are true and adequate.&lt;br /&gt;
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The yardstick of practice again reveals its cognitive significance, this time as a means of appreciating how far-reaching and adequate, how objective and scientific our abstractions are. For this reason, Lenin, as he gave a brief formula of the process of cognition in general, pointed out that it proceeds from living perception to abstract thought and from that to practice which is the start and finish of the total cognitive act. However, the transition from abstractions to practice is not simple. It comprises a number of intermediate steps, the most important of them being modelling and theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. The Model in Cognitive Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The ultimate aim of cognition is to produce knowledge allowing man to carry on some activity conducive to the satisfaction of his material or spiritual needs. This essentially requires the use of models. Like many other terms widely used in everyday life as well as in science, &amp;amp;quot;model&amp;amp;quot; is a word of many meanings.  One can speak of a new model of a lathe, anew dress model, an artist’s model, and so on. This term acquires a special meaning in the theory of knowledge. Supposing there are two objects, A and B. Object A is the model of object B if (1) A is in some respect simpler, more convenient or easier to study than B; (2) certain features, qualities or peculiarities of A are a reflection of the qualities, peculiarities or habits of B, which are being investigated; (3) in all other respects A is distinct from B (these distinctions may concern material, shape, size, etc.); (4) knowledge derived from the investigation of A may, with some adjustments, be further applied to B to explain one or another of its peculiar features, predict its behaviour, and s&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
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If A satisfies these conditions with reference to B, it is a model of B, and so we can use it in place of B with the same result. But why should we use a substitute rather than the object itself? The point is that often we either cannot use it for various reasons, or we can obtain the necessary result more quickly and cheaply with a model. In developing large hydro-engineering installations or complex assemblies, their simplified small-scale models are first made. On the bank of a small artificial pond, they build diminutive electric power stations one-hundredth or one-thousandth the normal size, reproducing all essential characteristics of the installation.  Experimenting with a model, one can weed out mistakes and introduce corrections in the design at comparatively little cost.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not all models are, however, simple copies of objects. The algebraic formula x&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; + y&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; = z&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; may be regarded, in a sense, as a model of the geometric circumference. Of course, a drawing on the blackboard is a more palpable representation which can also be viewed as a model, but the formula, without being representational, is, in some respects, better. Mathematical calculation, algebraic in particular, is more exact than measurement with compasses and a ruler can be. Besides, many complex processes generally cannot be visually represented. Such is the behaviour of biological and social systems with their millions and even billions of interacting elements. We cannot possibly have a visual representation of the interaction of all industrial establishments, communications, transport, shipment of raw materials and goods on a national scale, which we must know to be able to plan and scientifically manage the socialist economy. Still, all of it can be represented adequately enough by a system of mathematical equations. These equations will be models of the economic system. By putting in concrete figures instead of certain variables, we can calculate other variables very accurately. Intricate mathematical models are handled by computers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, there may be physical models, like mock-ups, simplified copies of things, or sign models, like mathematical equations, conventionalised diagrams, etc. Between these extremes, we find other types of models combining physical and symbolic features in varying proportions, e.g., the ordinary classroom glo&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;b&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;e.&lt;br /&gt;
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One must, however, discriminate between sign models and other sign systems, e.g., language. Words are not images of objects but their significants. Nevertheless, all models (including sign models) are, in a sense, patterns of the phenomena examined.&lt;br /&gt;
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What is the relation between abstraction and model-building? How are abstractions and models connected? As follows from the definition, models do not reproduce all characteristics of the object but only such as are essential to the research. Clearly enough, to be able to build or select a model, one should be informed about some properties and connections of the object or process concerned. This information, expressed in special concepts, precedes, therefore, the building of a model. The success of the model, its practical and scientific usefulness, depends on how correctly the abstractions underlying it had been elaborated, and how essential are the characteristics of the phenomena under investigation which they reflect. After the model is made and is used in the laboratory or in production, it helps fill up a gap in knowledge and elaborate new abstractions reflecting hitherto unknown characteristics of the structure and behaviour of the given phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The processes of abstraction and model-building are interrelated. The objectification of an abstraction in a model is described as its realisation or materialisation. Before launching the lunar probe &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lunokhod-1&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, scientists collected all available information about lunar topography and the physicochemical structure of the Moon&#039;s surface. Working from these data, they built several models of the automatic laboratory and tested them under conditions closely resembling lunar conditions. After the design of the probe was corrected and improved, the real probe was built and launched to the Moon.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus model-building proceeds through several stages. At the first stage, the main abstractions are elaborated, isolating the most essential of the object’s known characteristics. Simultaneously, the aim of the ensuing research is formulated. At the second stage, the model is designed and built. At the third stage, model experiments are conducted. At the fourth stage, the experimental data are applied to the object concerned. However, though important, modelling by itself does not yield the result sought.  Both to build a model and to apply the experimental data to the object, we need scientific theory. The revolutionary doctrine of scientific communism created by Marx and Engels and Darwin&#039;s teaching on biological evolution, classical and quantum mechanics, all are scientific theories. Theory is the highest form of cognition, integrating observation and abstraction, model-building and experimentation. Without theory, these important stages of cognition are limited and sterile. It was this that made the founders of dialectical materialism pay such great attention to theoretical thought.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. The Theoretical Level of Knowledge ====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus published a new theory on the revolution of celestial bodies, which maintained that the Earth was not the centre of the universe round which the other planets and the Sun revolved. The Copernican theory conflicted with the Earth-centred system of the ancient Greek philosopher and astronomer Ptolemy, which was supported by the church. The Copernican theory not only undermined the prestige of the church and opposed Ptolemy, but appeared to contradict the obvious. Any observer can see that the Earth does not move while the Sun describes a regular arc in the sky, rising in the east and setting in the west. At night, one can see the Moon and planets moving in the sky in their various orbits.  These things were reflected in Ptolemy&#039;s doctrine, which was, strictly speaking, not a scientific theory but a description of what was observed. As the observable trajectories described by celestial bodies were highly complex, the geocentric system itself entailed extremely intricate constructions which nevertheless failed to explain some puzzling phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Copernican theory, however, which on the face of it, contradicted the observable facts, produced a momentous change in scientific thought and human culture in general. It explained, simply and accurately, the phenomena under observation, made it possible to predict new phenomena, and broke the ground for modern astronomic research.&lt;br /&gt;
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Explanation, prediction and definition of the character of scientific research, experimentation and observation are three cardinal functions of every scientific theory. This is brilliantly illustrated by Marx’s economic theory. Many facts on which Marx based himself in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; had been described by other investigators. Bourgeois thinkers were not ignorant of the class struggle, economic and political inequality, exploitation, pauperisation of working people, and so on.  Yet they were unable to explain them from a consistent viewpoint, predict from them the future course of history and define the main direction of revolutionary effort. Marx’s economic theory based on the law of the development of capitalist society formulated by him, alone explained the available facts and, moreover, accurately predicted the main stages and objective laws of the transition from capitalism to the new communist formation, which was subsequently affirmed by the entire process of the world revolutionary movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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What, then, makes a theory capable of performing its principal functions? Why can they not be performed merely on the basis of observation, of men’s immediate practical activity?&lt;br /&gt;
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We call a theory not just any totality of views but a specifically organised system of correlated scientific laws. Scientific laws, as we know, are reflections of objective laws to which the phenomena under investigation are subject. These phenomena comprise what is often called the substantive part of a theory. Scientific laws reflecting fundamental, stable, recurring and Necessary connections prevailing in the given substantive area, which are logically correlated, form a theory. Thus, Kepler&#039;s laws are a theory of planetary motion because they express stable necessary connections inherent in the planets.  Marx’s economic doctrine expounded in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; also is a theory in the strict sense of the word, as the laws contained in it reflect necessary economic relations and are connected according to the principles of dialectical logic.&lt;br /&gt;
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The basic, primary laws of a theory are often called principles or postulates, while in theories expressed in mathematical terms they are called axioms. These primary laws are not logically proved within the given theory, but all other laws are logically deduced from them, and so are considered proved. From this it does not, however, follow that the principles and postulates of a theory are indemonstrable. Nothing is taken on trust in science. The laws which are accepted without logical demonstration within a theory may be demonstrated within another, more general theory. Kepler’s laws, which appeared at first as postulates of the planetary motion theory, were subsequently demonstrated, i.e., deduced from the more general principles of Newton’s celestial mechanics.&lt;br /&gt;
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The primary laws of every theory, if they are not deduced from more general principles, are accepted either because their truth immediately follows from practice or experiment or because the final consequences of these laws are consistent with experiment and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;bservation.  The latter is decisive to the evaluation of a theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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One should not think that the laws of any science are always obtained by generalising the results of observation. Should it be so, it would be relatively easy to discover new laws. Any trained expert could do it. What makes genuine scientific creative work so difficult is that formulation of a new law or principle often requires ingenuity, imagination and even a departure from the phenomena observed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many recent scientific theories were formulated not in laboratories but at the writing desk in the scientist’s study because the development of new principles calls for complex abstractions and abstract theoretical thinking. Thus, the law of value which states that commodities possessing different useful qualities are exchangeable provided that equal amounts of socially necessary labour went into their making, could not be discovered from simple observation of the market, of isolated transactions. After all, the actual exchange of commodities is influenced by demand, supply and other factors which make the price either higher or lower than the average cost. Marx has to evolve a range of abstract notions, e.g., abstract labour, the amount of socially necessary labour, etc., to be able to rise above the chaotic commodity-money relations prevailing in capitalist society and formulate the law of value. This law, which at first glance appears to contradict obvious facts, made it possible to formulate and deduce a range of other laws of capitalist political economy, such as the laws of surplus value, capitalist profit, primitive accumulation of capital, and so on, which provided the basis for predicting the future of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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A scientific theory therefore enables objective phenomena to be explained and predicted because it is a system of laws, not a description of isolated events or fragments of the material world. Laws, therefore, perform a twin function. On the one hand, they are the most far-reaching reflections of the objective, stable connections existing in the substantive part of a science; on the other hand, they appear as logical forms, essential for deducing other laws and so-called final consequences, i.e., statements containing information about individual events and phenomena. A law possesses a high degree of generalisation, being a concentrated reflection of the essential characteristics, basic properties and behaviour of the objects studied.  This is what ensures its particular role in cognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Purposeful human activity of any kind is all the more successful, if it rests firmly on scientific theory. This is of particular significance to the communist transformation of society. It is for this reason that the Soviet Communist Party pays such great attention to developing the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting from the distinctive characteristics of theory and the part it plays in scientific cognition, we can now view the role of abstraction in a new light.&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws of every scientific theory are always formulated by abstraction. They do not usually contain evidence of sensible things, as they do not have recourse to sensory representations and images but to the more general and abstract concepts. This poses before every scientist the problem of interpreting abstract laws in terms of observation. In other words, so that the laws and their corollaries should be applicable to sensible things and events and verifiable by experiment and observation, they must be translated, so to speak, from the language of abstractions into the language of sensuous images which we use in describing our sensations and notions. This is the focal point for the problems of the link between conception and sensation, of thought proceeding at different verbal levels, and of the interaction between theoretical and practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already mentioned several times that the emphasis on practice as the principal source of knowledge and the yardstick of truth is the basis of Marxist epistemology. Nevertheless, the general philosophical question of the connection between thought and practical human activity acquires a particular form with reference to scientific cognition. It is, in fact, the relationship between theory and experiment, between the theoretical and empirical levels of cognition because, whereas scientific theory &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s the highest form of knowing reality, scientific experiment is an essential part of social and production practice, indissolubly linked with the development and improvement of theory.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §6. The Empirical Level of Cognition ====&lt;br /&gt;
The wide use of experiment as a major means of cognition is the main distinguishing mark of modern natural science.&lt;br /&gt;
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The scientists and philosophers of the past, drawing on everyday experience, common sense and observation, accumulated, classified and passed on to us many valuable facts touching on diverse aspects of nature. The conjectures and hypotheses put forward by them, e.g., the atomistic hypothesis, continue to surprise us by their depth and keen insight. And yet, the spirit of experimental research was perfectly strange to science both in antiquity and the middle ages.  That was due, on the one hand, to the relatively low level and growth rate of the productive forces and to the widespread predominance (especially in medieval Europe) of philosophical idealism and utmost deference to the church, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rapid development of technology associated with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, gave a strong impetus to the new trend in scientific research and provided the material conditions and prerequisites for it. The change to experimental science, marking a turn from a passive, contemplative approach to nature to active intervention in its secrets, took place first of all in those branches of science which were more closely related to industry, navigation and weapons production.&lt;br /&gt;
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To cross the oceans steering by the stars, build steam-engines and railways, and produce synthetic materials, man had to learn to see nature with his own eyes, not as the Bible saw it. But to be able to do that, he had to revolutionise the very philosophical basis of his view on the world, to surmount idealism which held experiment in contempt and saw the ultimate proof of truth in the dogmas of the church, rather than in scientific evidence. That is why modern natural science was ushered in not only by mathematicians and other scientists but also by materialist philosophers who, following Francis Bacon, proclaimed observation and experiment to be the decisive factors in the cognition of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main principle of philosophical materialism in general consists in the recognition of the objective world existing independently of the human mind. Directly following from this is the demand that cognition should concentrate on studying the characteristics and objective laws of this world. Materialists have always held observation, furnishing immediate sensory data, to be the chief method of cognising matter. Nevertheless, as we know, it is not always Possible to explain complex phenomena from observation alone.&lt;br /&gt;
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Cognition of the essential properties of the objects investigated and of the laws they obey is often made easier by placing the objects in unusual, often artificial, conditions, by refashioning the surrounding medium with the aid of special devices.&lt;br /&gt;
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Experimental natural science emerged in the 17th century. In three centuries it achieved much more than science had achieved previously in almost two millennia. The success was due above all to extensive experimentation. The chief goal of classical experimental scientists was to cognise, to study the properties and laws concealed from the passive observer. Their efforts were a practical refutation of the Kantian thesis that there is an impassable gulf between the thing-in-itself and knowledge. Kant required that the investigator should proceed without introducing any changes in the object, so that it could be cognised in its pure, pristine state, undistorted by the investigator’s interference.&lt;br /&gt;
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But is this not a contradiction of the very idea of exper&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ment? Do we not demolish the natural integrity and qualities of things and processes as we pass high-tension current through them, subject them to monstrous pressures, place them in a vacuum and bring their temperature down to almost absolute zero? Certainly, such apprehensions are not altogether groundless. However, as they used instruments which extended the limits of our natural sensitivity and applied complex apparatus, experimental scientists always tried to reduce to a minimum the researcher&#039;s influence on the object.&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically, this was due to the fact that experimental science could not, right away, undertake complex experiments taking into account the role of the subjective factor. Another reason was that experimental methods developed in natural science in complete isolation from social life. Thirdly, it was determined by the philosophical standpoint shared by the majority of scientists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Research was conducted on the lines of spontaneous scientific materialism which&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;like pre-Marxian metaphysical materialism—viewed cognition of the world merely as its explanation.  That approach ignores man’s active, transforming, practical activity which dialectical materialism considers to be the heart of the theory of knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The demand for the interaction between the cognising subject and the object to be considered and their interdependence and mutual influence to be reflected in the theoretical picture of the world was formulated by Marx in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Theses on Feuerbach&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and was later realised in the experimental practice of the recent natural sciences, technology and the social sciences. As quantum mechanics has demonstrated, the nature of the motion of micro-objects is such that the instruments we use in studying them appreciably affect some of their characteristics. Therefore, in quantum mechanics, the condition of the objects of experiment must be described, taking into account the instruments and th&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; conditions of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the subjective idealists’ view, this proves that the object does not exist without the subject, the latter playing the decisive part in the relationship. In point of fact, however, every level of the motion of matter obeys its own objective laws, calling for specific methods of experimental and theoretical research. The probable, statistical motion of elementary particles is objectively marked by uncertainty. Experimenters always have to bear that in mind. As they act on some of the characteristics of the micro-object, they also produce changes in other characteristics, so that a comprehensive picture of the process can be obtained only by taking into consideration the interaction of the experimental apparatus and the micro-objects under investigation. This indicates a deep insight into the objective laws of nature, rather than a subjective caprice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In modern technology, the need to examine objects together with the subject acting upon them and cognising their work is associated with the development of supercomplex machines, automatic systems, high-speed electronic computers, space laboratories, complex control systems, and so on. Take, for instance, the experiments connected with Soviet space flights.  The aim of the experiments was not merely to study the parameters of the spaceship and the effect of weightlessness, etc., on the cosmonauts.  The main thing was that these and many other parameters and characteristics were studied in the light of their interaction and interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new type of experiments, where the object is cognised in its interaction with the subject, are extensively conducted on a sociological level as well. Thus, in the course of building communism, we encounter at every step diverse social experiments whereby various forms of organising production and management, education and upbringing, service and city planning are cognised and appreciated. In each case, the cognising individual appears both as the subject and the object of the experiment as he simultaneously acts on and is affected by diverse experimental factors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, scientific experiment is a special kind of cognitive activity aimed at acquiring more knowledge of objects and processes in nature and society. It is realised with the aid of special apparatus, instruments and devices, under controlled conditions. The most essential requirements an experiment must satisfy are (1) that the apparatus should ensure the highest standard of precision of measurement and observation possible for the given class of appliances; (2) that the experiment can be repeated (this is essential because obtaining reliable results mostly requires a mass of experimental data allowing for statistical processing, which eliminates the influence of chance occurrences and disturbances); (3) that the experiment should be conducted in conformity with a set of methods worked out beforehand and ensuring control at every stage of the experiment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All experiments satisfying the aforementioned requirements and implying not only material objects but also material facilities and conditions are often called material experiments. Besides these, speculative experiments play a considerable role in modern science. A speculative experiment differs from a material experiment in that its objects and apparatus exist solely in the experimenter’s imagination.  A speculative experiment is a sort of a model of a material experiment, meeting all requirements the latter should satisfy, the only difference being that for some reason it cannot technically be carried out in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to their purpose, experiments are categorised under the three general headings of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discovery&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;discover&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something new are exemplified by Edison’s search for a material suitable for the filament of the incandescent lamp. Almost six thousand experiments were made before the right material was found.  Research of this kind is sometimes described as the trial-and-error method which boils down to trying out a number of variants, the unsuccessful attempts being discarded. However, scientists usually prefer to conduct such experiments not at random but on the basis of a theory or hypothesis, thereby reducing the number of trials and errors to a minimum. The laws established as a result of generalising the data yielded by such experiments are called empirical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second kind of experiments aimed at &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;verification&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of something are made with a view to verifying a hypothesis. A hypothesis affirmed by experiment becomes a valid scientific theory while the one refuted by it is discarded and replaced by another. Such tests are of particular importance in choosing one out of a number of hypotheses. We have an example of it in the experimental discovery of new chemical elements. The Russian scientist D. I. Mendeleyev (1834-1907), having discovered that the elements show a periodic variation in most of their properties (the periodic law), hypothetically described some chemical elements not yet discovered in his day. His prediction was justified by subsequent investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the third kind of experiments seeking to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;realise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; something are made in order to produce new objects which are then investigated or applied in practice. A few years ago, a group of Soviet scientists led by Academician Flerov synthesised a transuranium element which was named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Kurchatovium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in honour of the Soviet physicist Kurchatov. This element exists only in laboratory conditions and disintegrates very quickly. Nevertheless, its production, as well as the synthesis of other transuranium elements, is an important experimental achievement, facilitating a deeper study into the structure of substances.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, experiments may serve as the groundwork of new laws, hypotheses or theories or they may serve to verify them. However, experiments often play both parts simultaneously.  For this reason, our classification is only tentative and should not be regarded as absolute and final.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Considering the significance of experiment to cognition, Lenin emphasised that experiment is a variety, a part of social and production practice. “An experiment,” he said, “is already practice.” Comparing the structure of experimentation and labour, it is easy to establish their similarity. In both there is an object of practical activity, implements and means whereby this activity is carried out, and, lastly, man. The difference is that the main purpose of labour is to produce material values, objects and conditions to satisfy various needs, whereas knowledge, acquired and accumulated in the process of production, plays a subordinate, albeit significant, part. The main purpose of experiment is, on the other hand, to produce new knowledge. Even so, there is no fundamental difference between scientific experimentation and production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The foregoing clearly shows the intimate connection between the two levels of knowledge—theoretical and empirical. Higher, theoretical knowledge is embodied in scientific principles, postulates and laws. Empirical knowledge results from immediate observation and experimental evidence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Both levels of knowledge supplement each other, and it is only in close unity that they produce a picture of the external world satisfying the requirements of objective truth.  Lenin’s formula, “From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice”, brings out the thoroughly dialectical character of the process of cognition, showing that it develops in a spiral. Empirical knowledge which arises out of living perception, out of scientific experiment, poses to us fresh problems, leading the mind to draw general theoretical conclusions. A scientific hypothesis derived from theoretical research requires experimental verification in the course of which new properties of the objects examined may be discovered. Every loop of the spiral not only reveals fresh relative truths but also provides the prerequisites for further advance. At the same time, the appearance of new forms and types of experimental research puts forward complex epistemological problems concerning the peculiarities of different varieties of theoretica&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and empirical knowledge. This interconnection of philosophical and scientific problems provides the basis for the fruitful co-operation of scientists and philosophers urged by Lenin fifty years ago.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Investigation of the main problems and principles of the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism not only reveals its essential difference from all other philosophical systems and demonstrates its perfect agreement with the results and methods of modern science, but also proves that study of this theory is a major condition of mastering Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Historical Materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 1. The Science of Historical Materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What Is Historical Materialism? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Mankind has existed for many millennia. It has travelled a long and arduous road, full of struggle with the primordial forces of nature, with want, hunger, oppression, devastating epidemics and bloody wars. Thrones crumbled, and mighty kingdoms fell. Civilisations came and went. Some of them vanished utterly, but others left an indelible mark on history. Famous war lords, mighty kings, heroic popular leaders left their names to posterity. But there were millions who remained nameless. They were the ones who made armies strong and kings mighty, whose blood flowed in times of popular unrest.  What part did they play in history? What can guide us through the tangled maze of events that form the body of history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regimes that were, to all appearances, unshakable, were often shaken by popular revolutions. What are these revolutions? Are they disastrous accidents disrupting the regular march of history? Or are they the legitimate outcome of previous history, determining the future course of events? What impels people to rise against powerful forces? Where is the theory able to explain these things in keeping with the authentic historical facts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The current age is one of victorious popular revolutions, one in which peoples choose the path they would follow. What scientific theory explains the successes scored by the socialist countries, the mounting working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the liberation of many African, Asian and Latin American countries from colonial oppression, the rapid progress of science and technology, the active involvement of the masses in every part of the world in the making of history? What scientific theory explains, in a word, the very substance of the current epoch?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No doubt, both present and past history may be explained in various ways. Or it may be left unexplained, and one may simply drift along, from day to day, ignoring theoretical problems.  Yet it is getting harder and harder to live like that, because every person&#039;s life, irrespective of his wishes, is becoming more closely linked with the general course of world history. This being so, everyone should obviously be aware of his place in the world and of the relationship between a person’s activities and the processes developing in the modern world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Theories seeking to explain society have never been lacking. Many of them are long forgotten. Others sprang up quite recently and time alone will show if they will stay.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Marxist-Leninist science of society, historical materialism, is the only social theory which although founded over 125 years ago, has lost none of its vitality and continues to win support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is it so? It is so because historical materialism answers the questions posed by social history and meets the hopes of the millions. It is so because historical materialism is not a mass of frozen dogmas but a living, creative theory, capable of developing and enriching itself by general conclusions drawn from historical experience.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only does historical materialism explain the past and the present, but it enables us to foresee the future and take an active part in the process of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. The Subject Matter of Historical Materialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
What sort of science is historical materialism?  What is its subject matter, what does it seek to learn about society? How does it relate to philosophy and the social sciences? Has it already explained every law of history? What does it say about the meaning of history and about man’s destination?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us first see what is the proper subject of historical materialism. Society &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s investigated by many sciences, which is only natural, for society has diverse aspects. All social sciences study one object, viz., the life of society, but they each regard society from a particular angle, e.g., from the angle of economics, population, history, culture, and so on. The subject of a social science is thus one facet of society’s life, isolated for the purpose of investigation from the close-knit unity of interrelated social phenomena. What distinguishes historical materialism from other social sciences in that respect?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with economic history, economic statistics, industrial economics, the economics of supply and distribution, the theory and history of finance, etc., political economy is a more general science as it elucidates more general characteristics of the economic life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Civil history is also a general social science, more general, for instance, than demography, the science of population. It seeks to explain particular features of the historical development of individual nations. Historians thus study the most concrete and specific manifestations of the general historical tendency of a nation. The tendency, which comes to light when the historical events are related, obeys the laws of society’s development. But how can we discover these laws?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principles of dialectical materialism refer to society as well as to nature. But as it deals with knowledge generalised to the maximum degree, i.e., with the most general laws of nature, society and thought, dialectical materialism has no special reference to society as distinct from nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Historical materialism is a philosophical science concerned with the specific laws o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; social development as distinct from the universal laws of being.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; The laws of historical materialism do not operate in nature but only in society. And as society is inseparable from men, social laws can manifest themselves only through human activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism as a philosophical science considers the general aspects, tendencies and laws of social development. It always keeps in sight the relation of social being and social consciousness, of the object and subject of history. In historical materialism, every problem is examined and explained, taking account of the correlation of the objective and the subjective, of the circumstances and man, conditions and intentions, i.e., of the correlation of social being and social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now we can state more specifically what historical materialism investigates and why it differs from the other social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Firstly, historical materialism studies the general objective laws governing the development of any human society. As these general laws of world history operate variously in different historical epochs or phases of mankind&#039;s development, historical materialism investigates the most general phases of world history, socio-economic formations and the objective causes of their appearance and disappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, historical materialism always considers the relations between social being and social consciousness. This enables it to explain the laws of history not as the effect of some mysterious forces lording it over men but as the effect of historical laws manifesting themselves through men’s activity, through their struggle to attain their goals which often have nothing in common with the general course of history but which nevertheless stand in organic relation to it. In a word, historical laws appear to the student as the real motive forces of and factors in history, i.e., they appear to him in the shape of the masses and specific historical figures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a philosophical science, historical materialism has no pretensions to being an absolute theory able to explain every puzzle and turn of history, such as the old philosophical science was wont to assume. Every fact and turn of history require all-round scientific explanation while the philosophical elucidation of every fact consists in exercising a correct approach to its investigation, employing correct methods of research, comparing it with the general historical laws and tendencies, and applying to it the criteria of historical progress. Historical materialism provides such a method for investigating and evaluating diverse social phenomena.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, historical materialism is more than a method of investigating social phenomena. It has a theory of its own, i.e., a theoretical substance of its own which explains the more general of historical tendencies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism has found that history proceeds from lower to higher forms of social organisation and that the change to higher forms is inevitable because the old forms become outmoded and stand in the way of further progress. Historical materialism, basing itself on historical evidence, on the long experience of mankind, has proved that a society without exploitation and oppression, based on free labour, is not a dream or utopia, but the result of its intrinsic development, that the transition to such society, i.e., communist society, is as inevitable as transitions of society to higher forms were in the past. This crucial conclusion is supported by historical evidence, economic analysis and the experience of the class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The successes scored by the revolutionary working-class movement demonstrate in practice how the progressive historical tendency presses forward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The October Revolution in Russia and socialist revolutions in other countries have given this tendency a global dimension and shown the peoples of the world where their future lies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism does not deal with all questions of the building of socialism and communism. Such questions are the field of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;scientific communism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Being a philosophical science, historical materialism is the method of scientific communism, furnishing, in addition to historical and economic justification, also the most general, philosophic, justification of the inevitable change to communism and showing the revolutionary path of society&#039;s transition from capitalism to communism. For this reason, historical materialism is inseparable from the theory of scientific communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The organic relation between historical materialism and the theory and practice of the struggle for communism is the expression of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;partisanship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; historical materialism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is the theoretical reflection of the needs and goals of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois critics of Marxism strive to show that the connection of historical materialism and the interests of the working class and the communist ideas, which is openly proclaimed by Marxist philosophers, presumably indicates the class limitations of the Marxist-Leninist social science. They allege that to produce an authentic scientific theory one must rise above classes since, they insist, a class approach to science results in biased and narrow thinking.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Is this really so? Can a person living in a class society rise above class interest? In a class society, no one is above class. To live in society and be free from it is impossible. An individual may imagine himself to be free in that sense, but in reality one cannot, in modern society, be free of class interest. The idea of such freedom is a bourgeois illusion, nothing more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every philosopher, artist or writer, whether he intends it or not, always defends and expresses in his work the interests of a particular class.  In this sense everyone shares a party viewpoint whether or not he belongs to a party. This does not mean that the interests of a class can only be supported by its own members. An ideologist’s partisanship depends on what class he supports, rather than on what class he belongs to.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin and Proudhon were most indignant when Marx concluded that they were ideologists of the French petty bourgeoisie, which in their minds was tantamount to calling them “Paris shopkeepers.” Marx explained then that he had not referred to their calling, for that was quite beside the point. What he had meant was who they actually represented, whose interests they objectively reflected and supported.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, it must be borne in mind that in an exploitative society, where there is an impassable gulf between mental and manual labour, the classes whose lot is manual labour (workers and peasants) are unable, as a rule, to advance ideologists from their own midst. Their ideologists most often are members of other classes, who have enough time and money to get an education and at the same time are capable of understanding whether history is moving so that they go over from their own class to the progressive social classes. E.g., the 19th-century Revolutionary Democrats in Russia were ideologists of the revolutionary peasantry. None of them, however, was a peasant himself. Herzen was a nobleman by birth, and Chernyshevsky, Belinsky and Dobrolyubov were of the lower middle class. The ideologists of the working class, Marx and Engels were not workingmen themselves, but that did not prevent them from writing consistently on behalf of the working class and promoting its struggle, the aims and methods of which they elaborated scientifically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, every thinker is a spokesman of a definite class. Does it make him narrow-minded? The answer cannot be a simple yes or no, for that depends entirely on the class. The bourgeoisie, as a class, has long been brought into conflict with the advancement of history. Today its interests do not merely clash with those of other classes but with the development of society at large. Therefore, a modern bourgeois ideologist, being true to the interests of his class, can’t help giving a garbled picture of society’s development, nor is he capable of producing an authentic scientific theory of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is fundamentally different with the ideologists of the working class, for the interests of the working class, unlike those of the bourgeoisie, reflect the historical tendency. The working class is a consistently revolutionary class. It has a stake in social progress and so has no need to falsify social history. Moreover, only from the standpoint of the working class, the exponent of social progress, could a genuine scientific theory of social development be produced.  Nor was it by chance that such a theory was evolved by the ideologists of the working class, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the partisanship of Marxist-Leninist philosophy does not imply that it is limited but that it is scientifically objective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historical materialism is a theoretical generalisation of real human history, a generalisation of the evidence supplied by other social sciences. The scientific dialectical method by which historical materialism investigates the life of society, considering society in the process of its continuous development, implies that historical materialism itself keeps developing as it draws general conclusions from fresh historical experience and the findings of the social sciences.&lt;br /&gt;
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 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 2. Materialist Concept of History ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Emergence of Historical Materialism—a Revolution in the View of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Men began to ask themselves long ago what force governed the development of society.  Religion and the church told them that they, miserable sinners, were to turn their thoughts to god and hope for his kindness and forgiveness.  God the almighty held their destiny in his hands. “Man proposes, and God disposes”, the church taught. “Be humble, be meek, and trust in the divine providence.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some thinkers rebelled against the authority of the church and appealed to reason. They saw in man’s rational creative activity the mainspring of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will remember that at the beginning of this book it was mentioned that philosophers, depending on their answer to the fundamental question of philosophy&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;i.e., what is primary, matter or consciousness—divided into two camps in explaining the world in general and elucidating the relation of spirit and nature—materialists and idealists. However, as soon as the pre-Marxian philosophers came to consider society, all of them, materialists and idealists alike, took an idealist attitude. That this attitude should have been shared by Hegel was not surprising, for Hegel was an objective idealist to whom society was a stage in the development of the absolute spirit. But then, the idealist attitude was also shared by philosophers who were part and parcel of the history of materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideologists of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie, the great 18th-century materialists Diderot, Holbach, Helvetius and others, seeking to understand the essence of society&#039;s development, maintained that men’s opinions were determined in every age by the predominant social conditions which themselves depended entirely on men’s own volition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The last great materialist philosopher before Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, who passionately criticised idealism and religion, simultaneously held that religion was the groundwork of social history, that its forms determined the face of an age. In Feuerbach’s view, if society was bad, it was because its religion was bad. To make society good, its bad religion (e.g., Christianity) should be replaced by a good religion. With this end in mind, Feuerbach invented a new “perfect religion of love” in the belief that a society founded on such a religion should itself become perfect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea that society is the outcome of the spirit, or a result of men’s spiritual (religious, political, legal, etc.) activity, held undivided sway in pre-Marxian philosophical, sociological and historical literature. The viewpoint had become a tradition. It pervaded fiction and was generally taken for granted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He had to be courageous indeed who not only called the idea in doubt but scientifically proved that it was untenable. It took a combination of scientific genius and supreme personal courage to do it. Karl Marx had both. For the first time in history he showed that before man could indulge in thought, science, philosophy, politics, religion, and so on, he had to eat, drink, to have shelter, and so on. In other words, man had to satisfy his material needs first. This idea, which now, many years after the emergence of Marxism, is considered to be self-evident, worked a revolution in views on society, signifying the birth of a new, materialist conception of history. Although apparently simple, Marx&#039;s idea has far-reaching implications. If, to be able to think, man must satisfy his material needs, it means, first of all, that at the basis of history is the production of all those things which go to satisfy man’s material needs, i.e., the production of food, clothing, houses, and so on. Therefore the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;production of material goods is the basis of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next conclusion: if history is based on the production of material goods, then the decisive role in history belongs to the producers of the material goods, i.e., the working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of the change Marx worked in ideas on society will become clearer if we consider the fact that sociologists before Marx examined at best only the ideological motives of human activity, usually neglecting the economic circumstances, which they treated as a side issue, inessential to history. Before Marx, all thinkers reduced history entirely to the doings of individual personalities, paying no attention to the masses. In their view, history was made not by the people but by heroes towering above the crowd.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist conception of history formulated by Marx and Engels showed that the people were the history-makers and producers of all material and spiritual values available to society. That was why Lenin wrote: “The discovery of the materialistic conception of history, or more correctly, the consistent continuation and extension of materialism into the domain of social phenomena, removed the two chief shortcomings in earlier historical theories.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-94|94]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Marx proved, first, that history is based not on ideas but on material production; and, second, that it is made not by isolated heroes and military leaders but by the masses, the working people above all.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Human society is a highly complex phenomenon comprising a maze of diverse relations and connections. People work or exploit others, they love, suffer, fight their enemies and die, they pray to god or damn him, and in doing all this they form widely varied relations with each other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But history does not boil down to individual actions. It also embraces group and mass action.  Classes and nations fight one another fiercely, to the death; peoples rise against their oppressors; destructive wars and horrible epidemics devastate whole countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This tangled maze of facts and events was extremely puzzling. For thousands of years eminent thinkers who took a keen interest in the destinies of mankind were unable to understand what governed history—this chaos of events and facts. Was it god? Was it the conflict of good and evil? A hero’s or an emperor’s will? Were there, after all, any laws that determined social development? Idealism which dominated the views on society, failed to supply a scientific answer to these questions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The materialist conception of history was able to supply such an answer. The conclusion that material production was primary with relation to intellectual activity was in itself enough to suggest that preeminent among all complex social relations—family, religious, class, national, political, legal and others—were those formed by people engaged in material production or directly associated with it, which were primary and definitive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fast thinkers were unable to extricate themselves from the tangle of events and facts because they had no yardstick to help them tell the substantial from the unsubstantial, the principal from the secondary things. Marx was the first to discover such a yardstick. Having selected the relations emerging among people in the process of production, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, as principal and crucial to the life of society, Marx was able to apply to social phenomena the common scientific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;yardstick of recurrence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, without which the laws of social development cannot be discerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As is known, no two countries are the same.  Every country has a different economic level and staple industries, different history, language, national culture, different customs, political institutions, and so on. But does this imply that different countries may have nothing in common? No, it does not. Having formulated the conception of the relations of production and examined them in different countries, each with its own conditions, Marx was able to find that which was common to all countries at the same stage of development (e.g., at the capitalist stage), and to evolve the concept “socio-economic formation” which expressed in a highly generalised form the prevailing situation in all such countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the preface to the first edition of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; Marx, addressing German readers, wrote that if, upon reading &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which dwells for the most part on the development of capitalism in England, they would say that it had no reference to Germany, they would be quite wrong, as a more developed country merely presented a less developed one with the picture of its immediate future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. History as an Objective Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
By entertaining a materialist conception of history and applying the yardstick of recurrence to society, Marx and Engels were able to discover the laws of social development and interpret human history not as the result of arbitrary individual action, nor as the result of divine activity, but as an objective natural process developing, like nature, independently of men’s intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels conclusively proved that society proceeds from lower to higher forms, through class contradictions and class struggle, to a classless communist society; and that communism was not a utopia but the necessary product of social development. The founders of Marxism not only showed why communism was inevitable but discovered in the working class the force which was to destroy capitalism and build a communist society. It was proved from the operation of the objective laws governing society&#039;s development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some bourgeois philosophers attempted to show that no such thing as social laws generally existed. With this purpose in mind, they advanced a theory to the effect that in society, unlike nature, nothing ever was or could be repeated because every historical occurrence was unique and without parallel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, no historical event occurs twice.  Every social phenomenon, as a sum of individual characteristics, is unique. Let us compare the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century and the English bourgeois revolution of the 17th century. The French revolution is associated with the storming of the Bastille, the guillotining of the French king and queen, with the names of Robespierre, Danton and Marat, with the common people thronging the streets of Paris, singing the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Marseillaise&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Carmagnole&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English bourgeois revolution involved the beheading of the king, Cromwell’s dictatorship, and at the end of it all, the bourgeois “glorious revolution”, the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, and the restoration of monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The two events are apparently rather dissimilar. The countries are unlike, and so are the peoples, with their different customs and habits.  But what is the most essential thing about these two events? Is it the songs they sang then in London and Paris? Most probably not. Is it the method by which the respective kings lost their heads? Hardly so. What then is the principal meaning of the two events?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English bourgeois revolution set out, above all, to abolish the old feudal system and establish a new, capitalist system. And even though, owing to the compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, this revolution failed to carry out its tasks consistently, it nevertheless cleared the path for capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The principal aim of the French bourgeois revolution was to abolish the old feudal regime and establish new, capitalist relations. Hence, these two events have something in common, they have recurring characteristics. Besides, these characteristics were fundamental to both events, while the characteristics that did not recur were inessential to the course of history.  That common factor of the two events was reflected in the concept “bourgeois revolution.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, historical events present a unity of the recurrent and the unique. It is usually their most substantial features that recur, while it is the inessential, minor features that are unique and particular and do not recur. But if there is regularity in social phenomena it means that society and history in general obey objective laws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An adult member of society finds in it fully formed social relations, relations of production, a state structure, etc. Although he may influence the circumstances to some extent by his activity, he cannot choose them. The laws operating in society are as objective and independent of individual will as are the laws of nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet there are some distinctions between the laws of nature and the laws of history. The chief of these distinctions is that the laws of nature not only operate independently of human will and consciousness but are altogether independent of men. For them, man might simply not exist. They were just as effective when there were no people as they are now. Of course, having knowledge of natural laws, man can often accelerate their action or channel it in a direction useful to society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Knowing the laws of species formation, man learned to hasten it by artificial selection, producing new strains or races of useful plants and animals in a comparatively short time. But the laws of species formation, by themselves, operate independently of man. Natural selection was effective ever since living creatures had appeared, before man evolved at all. Moreover, man also, as a biological species, is the product of natural selection. Thus, the operation of laws of nature does not in the least require man’s participation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is altogether different with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;laws of social development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Although they operate independently of man’s will and mind, they are always realised through men, through human activity. Therefore history is entirely the product of human activity. History is made by men, but they have to make it in accordance with the objective circumstances prevailing during the lifetime of each generation, and not just as their fancy takes them. Thus, human activity is one of the conditions necessary for the laws of history to operate. In fact, it is the main condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rudolf Stammler, a bourgeois philosopher and one of the early critics of Marxism, maintained, as he tried to prove the &amp;amp;quot;unsoundness’”’ of Marxism, that if under the laws of nature an eclipse of the Sun were to occur, nobody would ever think of setting up a party for the promotion of the eclipse. Then why organise a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;p&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arty for the promotion of revolution”, if one regards the proletarian revolution as the inevitable effect of the laws of history? Since an eclipse of the Sun occurs without men’s participation, then the revolution, if it is inevitable, will also occur without their participation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An eclipse of the Sun, indeed, occurs without men’s intervention. That is true. But human activity is not found among the conditions which lead to an eclipse. Therefore the idea of setting up a ‘’party for the promotion of the eclipse of the Sun”, as Plekhanov justly observed, could only originate in a lunatic asylum.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A revolution, however, is quite another thing. It is performed by men, there can be no revolution without them. Their activity is the main condition out of the whole sum of circumstances which make the revolution possible. And this being so, then it depends on people, on the degree of their organisation and political understanding and their eagerness to fight for their rights, whether or not the revolution will take place, and how soon. That is why the creation of a party that would purposely and methodically prepare the masses to perform a revolution is necessary and justified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So, the laws of social development manifest themselves in men’s activity. Nevertheless, even a fleeting glance at history shows us that as their activity developed people usually pursued goals which did not flow from these laws. The laws of social development were discovered by Marx and Engels only in the mid-19th century, and the masses became familiar with them later still, and not in every country at that. What were people guided by, then? After all, they are not animals but rational beings endowed with the faculty of thought. They consciously pursue certain ends and consciously select the means towards them.  That, however, does not yet imply that people co-ordinate their individual goals with the mainstream of history. This explains why they used to conceive history as a chaotic tangle of human strivings. Somewhere, opposing strivings clashed and cancelled each other out, somewhere else, strivings running in the same direction converged, and somewhere else again more complex combinations of forces emerged.  And the overall historic tendency pressed on through this chaos of chance occurrences, just as necessity in general presses through mass of chance events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But this means that history develops spontaneously, that people made history unconsciously, and that produced the false impression that history is made apart from people, without their participation. Under such conditions, human effort was wasted on a vast scale. This, among other things, explains the extremely slow pace of history in the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the emergence of Marxism and the discovery of the laws governing the development of history, the character of society’s development changes. For the first time, the broadest sections of the people are able to take part consciously in the making of history.  As a result of the proletarian revolution, this possibility becomes a reality. Under the new conditions, the squandering of human effort is reduced to a minimum, as the chaotic clashes of individual intentions are superseded by the people’s single collective will directed at the building of a new, communist society. This single will is expressed in the Communist Party which organises the masses and directs their aspirations towards one goal. This makes social development proceed faster than ever before.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The profound social changes which occurred in the Soviet Union after the victorious socialist revolution of October 1917 are a case in point. In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, L. I. Brezhnev said: “Within a historically short period of time, a huge backward country was transformed into a country with a highly developed industry and collectivized agriculture. It now takes only two and a half working days for our industry to produce as much as was produced in the whole of 1913.... Within the lifetime of a single generation, the Soviet land liberated itself completely and for ever from the onerous burden of illiteracy.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-95|95]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Historical Necessity and Human Activity ====&lt;br /&gt;
The following questions may be asked: if social development is governed by laws which are objective but are implemented through men’s activity, what role do men play in history? Are they not slaves of objective necessity? Can man be free? What is implied here is not political freedom, nor so-called civil liberties, but freedom in terms of the relation between man and the objective laws of history. This question was often pondered by eminent thinkers of the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many of them believed that man’s will was capable of making history. We had seen, however, that this view is unsound, as history proceeds according to objective laws. Others held that man is powerless in the face of historical necessity, being its slave. But is it true that nothing depends on men? Was it not men who produced society’s entire wealth? Was it not men who staged revolutions, sweeping away regimes believed to be unshakable? Inquisitive human thought kept seeking the answers to such questions. The great Dutch materialist philosopher, Spinoza, was the first to approach the correct conception of the relation of necessity and freedom, while Hegel produced its profound definition when he said that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom was apprehended necessity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This definition, confining freedom to the domain of knowledge, may be satisfactory to Hegel but not to one who has a materialist conception of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For the first time in the history of science, Marxism approached this question from a standpoint fundamentally different from Hegel&#039;s.  We are concerned not only with the problem of freedom with respect to knowledge but, above all, with the problem of the freedom of human activity, of man’s practical freedom. Is it enough for one to apprehend necessity to become free? If one knows that, for certain reasons, an undesirable event is bound to occur and, being able to counteract it, still does nothing but is content with just the knowledge of it, will such knowledge be worth much, and can one be considered free under such circumstances?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us assume that under capitalism all workers know the laws of capitalism’s emergence, development and decay and realise that capitalism must be superseded by socialism.  Will it be enough to end capitalism? Not likely.  The apprehension of necessity is certainly needed to make men really free. Necessity is blind and man is its slave as long as he fails to apprehend it. But even after he has apprehended it, man cannot be free. The knowledge of necessity is but the first requisite of actual freedom. The second is to translate knowledge into action, necessity into practical activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When workers have realised the historical necessity of the destruction of capitalism and the building of communism and proceed to act on this knowledge, capitalism will inevitably collapse and give way to communist society. The Marxist definition of freedom, therefore, is: “Freedom ... consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity....&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-96|96]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, Hegel’s idea is not rejected but thoroughly refashioned. Let us look into the Marxist definition of freedom given by Engels.  In its context, “‘control&amp;amp;quot; should on no account be understood to mean man’s arbitrary power over the external world. What it means in fact is that if necessity is not apprehended, man is its slave, but once it has been apprehended, man is its master.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of history, man was controlled by nature and was its slave. As man gained knowledge of the Jaws of nature and built strong productive forces, he released himself more and more from the grip of natural necessity. We mean man not as an individual but as a member of society. Man’s freedom both with respect to historical and to natural necessity depends on the kind of society he lives in. A wrongly organised society, founded on exploitation, makes its members slaves to historical necessity, and simultaneously prevents them from devoting sufficient effort to the remaking of nature. It is entirely different in the case of modern socialist society, rationally organised and developing in a planned fashion. Under socialism, historical necessity has been apprehended and the laws of history are applied in practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the problem of human freedom is a social problem. People can enjoy a full measure of freedom only in a society in which the exploiting classes have been abolished and the productive forces serve to enrich the whole of society rather than a handful of capitalists, and are used for gaining and increasing control over nature. That was why the transition from capitalism to socialism may be described as a leap from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freedom implies no annihilation of objective necessity. The latter can never disappear. Once man has apprehended objective necessity, it stops being external to him. It becomes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;intrinsic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; content of his convictions. This being So, man can act freely, i.e., in accordance with his own convictions. At the same time, he becomes an instrument of histor&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;al necessity. A fettered revolutionary, driven on foot to forced labour in Siberia, was free with relation to historical necessity, while the armed gendarmes escorting him were its slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, man becomes actually free once he has gained knowledge of objective necessity and learned to act in full consciousness of what he is doing. The question of men’s practical activity, of their conscious, active, free involvement in the making of history, is not an abstract theoretical problem. It is a practical problem. In a society building socialism and communism, the activity of every person, his creative participation in the effort of the whole people, has a particular meaning. The new society may be built only provided free participation of all members of society. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that every member of society should be informed about the laws of history and should act accordingly.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another side of this important question is that history must not be regarded as a fatalistic process whereby people carry out the one and only possible course of events, dictated by historical necessity. Historical necessity manifests itself in different ways, and not necessarily at once.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History is governed by laws, but its ways are not fatally determined. Their choice is decided in the struggle of social forces, as a result of which one of the possible variants of historical development is determined. And, certainly, reaction may temporarily triumph, the forces of progress may temporarily be defeated. But in the end, the forces of progress get the upper hand, That was what happened in People’s Hungary after World War II.  In this concrete case, historical necessity manifested its ultimate irresistible force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Material Conditions of Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of every nation develops in a definite place, under definite natural conditions. These natural conditions (otherwise called the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;geographical environment&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;) vary. The area inhabited by a people may be covered with mountains and forests or it may be a desert or the tundra or it may be fertile. It may be situated in the cold Far North or in the hot South. And of course, the country’s nearness to trade routes and centres of civilisation is crucial. Availability of fertile soil, a mild climate, abundant mineral resources and neighbours who contribute to its historical progress by trade and cultural exchanges give advantages to a country, whereas their shortage puts it in a disadvantageous position.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Favourable natural conditions may speed up the progress of society while unfavourable conditions may retard it. To get a concrete idea of the role played by natural conditions in the life of society, they must be divided into two groups, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the natural resources of the means of subsistence and the natural resources of the means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, The presence or absence of the reserves of wild edible plants, game, fish, etc., belong to the first-mentioned group, and minerals, natural communications, natural resources of energy, etc., belong to the second.  At the early stages, when material production was utterly primitive, the natural means of subsistence were of paramount importance, and the natural means of production had no role in the development of society, nor could they have any. At the modern stage, of course, the latter play a decisive part in the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, the influence of the geographical environment on society does not boil down to the natural means of subsistence and production. Great significance is also attached to the climate, availability of impassable terrain or an insular situation, all of which hinders links with other peoples. Geographical location facilitates or handicaps the protection of national frontiers from enemy attacks. For a long time, natural trade routes played a particularly important part. Large cities and towns were usually built on the banks of navigable rivers. Convenient sea routes were also vital. Running close to different countries, they promoted the development of crafts and trade in coastal areas, and later on of manufactures as well. When the sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and the East lay mainly across the Mediterranean, it promoted the rapid economic growth of Italian sea ports. Afterwards, when the sea routes shifted to the north of Europe and passed through the English Channel, it promoted the economic growth of the Netherlands, Flanders and England.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does this mean that the geographical environment determines historical development, as some people used to believe?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No, the geographical environment cannot determine the development of society, if only because it remains relatively constant over millions of years, while social changes occur within much shorter periods. The natural conditions in France, for example, changed imperceptibly over thousands of years while French society underwent momentous change. The whole of French history, so rich in events, coincides with a period during which the geographical environment hardly changed at all. This holds true of the history of any other country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the dawn of human society, when the productive forces were puny, nature held sway Over man, who had neither knowledge nor any Means of protection against the blind forces of Nature, and who was her slave. Obviously, in those circumstances the influence of the geographical environment on the development of human society was far greater than later on.  As society developed, the productive forces grew and knowledge increased, man gradually escaped from his bondage to the elements. Consequently, with the progress of science and technology, the role of the geographical environment constantly decreases. Moreover, using the results of scientific and technological progress, man has gained the ability to influence nature on an ever-increasing scale. In the circumstances of private ownership and capitalist production in some countries, man’s impact on nature often entails irreparable harm to the environment and is fraught with grave dangers.  For nature is a finely balanced system capable of self-regulation, and depredation of the natural resources upsets it and impairs this capacity for self-regulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever the successes of scientific and technological progress, the effect of the natural environment on society will always be a positive quantity because, no matter how advanced, society will always exist in a specific geographical environment, in a definite set of natural conditions which influence, and will continue to influence, the life of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Well-considered, methodical use of the natural resources under the planned socialist economy and the socialist system based on common ownership open up great possibilities for conserving the environment. In the Soviet Union, for example, there are special laws and agencies concerned with preserving natural resources and protecting the environment.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, at the present rate of production growth and with increasing urbanisation, individual countries or even groups of countries can do little to prevent irreparable damage to nature. There is an urgent need for an international system of conservation measures involving all, or at least all the industrially advanced, countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress” L. I. Brezhnev said that among the problems facing mankind “there is the problem of protecting man from the many dangers with which further uncontrolled technological development threatens him, in other words, the conservation of nature.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-97|97]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size and density of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;population&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is another standard factor in society’s existence and development. This is obvious since history is made by people, who are its primary requisite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The size, growth rate, density and other characteristics of population are essential to society’s development. Without a minimum number of people, society cannot function.  Nevertheless, although different demographic characteristics can influence society&#039;s development for better or worse, the population growth, density and composition are not what determines the development of society. For example, the succession of socio-economic formations cannot be explained by population growth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, when the Earth’s population is increasing at an ever faster rate, and is expected to mount, at the very least, to 6,000 million in the year 2000, bourgeois sociologists and economists are making much of the theory that the population grows in geometrical progression and the means of subsistence increase in arithmetical progression. Hence they view population growth as an eternal evil threatening innumerable calamities, such as famine, wars and &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;so&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, overpopulation is not a law of nature. It does not appear because there are too many people but is due to the conditions of production under capitalism. Capitalism constantly produces a surplus-population. Economic crises, chronic unemployment, destitution are not at all the effects of overpopulation, but are, indeed, its causes. Bourgeois overpopulation theories are wrong because their authors regard the conditions, which are merely produced by capitalism, as absolute and eternal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In reality, the growth of labour productivity, made especially rapid by the technological revolution, provides for an abundance of goods unthought of in the past. However, the progress of science and technology encounters obstacles created by capitalism, whose interests have long come in conflict with the interest of the working people, of the bulk of world population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The economic lag in many countries which only recently rid themselves of colonialist exploitation is also due to capitalism which plundered the natural wealth of the colonial countries and so held back their economic progress.  It is because of this capitalist-bred economic lag that in some Asian and African countries, population grows faster than the productive forces. But that will not last. As they develop their economy and adjust birth rates to economic growth, the young independent nations shall achieve economic prosperity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, the character of society and its progress, the change from one social system to another, do not depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they depend&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;on either the geographical environment or the growth of population. The latter can only further or hamper social development, being themselves dependent on the mode of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History develops on the basis of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is its determining factor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 3. Material Production as the Basis of Society’s Existence and Development ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. The Mode of Production of the Material Goods ====&lt;br /&gt;
To ensure his subsistence man must provide himself with food, clothing, shelter and so on. He cannot get all these things ready-made from nature. Ever since man raised himself from the animal world, he has used more and more products of nature that need to be processed. Man cannot eat meat raw, it must be cooked first. Even primitive man, before he could wrap himself in an animal&#039;s skin, first had to kill the animal, skin it and cure the skin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, to subsist, man has to produce material goods from objects found in nature. Material production has always been—and still is—the basis of human existence. As history marches on, production undergoes change and develops its forms and means. It makes up the basis of history. People produced food and clothing, built houses, and so on, in every age.  Stages of social history are differentiated not by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;what&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; men produce but by &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;how&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;by what means&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, they produce the material goods necessary for subsistence. In other words, historical periods are differentiated, above all, by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modes of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on which they are founded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, at the basis of history are successive modes of material production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every mode of production has two aspects.  One of them expresses man’s relation to nature, i.e., the degree to which he controls it. This aspect of the mode of production constitutes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;productive forces&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of society. The more advanced the productive forces, the greater man’s control over nature, and vice versa. In primitive society, in which the productive forces were hardly developed, nature had control over man.  The further progress of productive forces through the ages has caused this relation to change. In socialist society, which has at its disposal up-to-date technology and is rapidly moving forward along the path of scientific and technological progress, man increasingly controls nature, subjugating its blind forces to the benefit of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The other aspect of the mode of production consists in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;relations of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. These express the relations among people, arising in the process of the production of material goods and determined by the level and character of the development of productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
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Both aspects of the mode of production form an indissoluble unity and cannot exist separately since people, in processing various objects, i.e., interacting with nature, associate with other people taking part in the process of production, i.e., interact with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Besides the production of material goods, another area of material production is the production of man himself. It is performed by the family, whose forms also underwent changes in the course of history, while its influence on the historical process diminished as society developed further.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, it would be a mistake to regard the family merely as a link in the system of material production; it also plays a vital role in ethical, legal and other spiritual relations.  The family does not simply carry out the physical reproduction of man. It is a highly important sphere of the education of the new generation.&lt;br /&gt;
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For all that, the material functions of the family, associated with the reproduction of man, always were and continue to be essential to society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The productive forces of society are the foundation of the historical process.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Society’s Productive Forces ====&lt;br /&gt;
The productive forces include people and the means of labour, i.e., the objects and instruments of labour. But objects of labour themselves must be either obtained or produced by man, and instruments are also results of man’s labour activity. Thus, the productive forces consist of living human labour or of labour already performed and embodied in the objects and instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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All these things become productive forces only if they are part of the process of production. Prospected mineral deposits which are not developed are not a productive force, although they may become one in future. The most up-to-date machine tools, kept under lock and key in the storeroom, are not a productive force; they become one only after being made part of the process of production. This holds of people as well. An able-bodied person who does not work cannot be considered as a productive force. Men and the instruments of labour belong to the productive forces only when associated in the production of material goods.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a mistake to reduce the productive forces to production technology alone, as some Western scholars do when they give their own, somewhat biased interpretation to Marx’s social doctrine. The instruments of labour by themselves, without man, cannot function productively. Therefore, the productive forces must include man who creates or operates the instruments of labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus, society’s productive forces comprise two integral elements, viz., the implements of labour and people possessing industrial skills.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a rule, the productive forces develop progressively. The capacity of the instruments of production, such as energy sources, transmission mechanisms, tools, etc., keeps increasing. As a result, the working man also undergoes change: his production experience grows and new occupations appear and develop. In this way, man’s control over the natural properties of things, over the forces of nature, gradually extends. Man produces new objects with new properties not existing in nature. Thus, the level of the productive forces changes. But that is not all, for their character also changes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The character of the productive forces coincides, by and large, with the character of labour, and may be individual (private) or collective (social). This differentiation depends on how men employ the implements of labour, whether they do it single-handed or in a group where effort is shared and co-ordinated. The process of labour—whether individual or social—&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;does not depend&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; on man’s choice. It is determined by the character of the implements of labour and, more specifically, by the instruments of production, the bone and muscle of the production process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Indeed, some instruments (practically all handicraftsman’s tools) may and must be employed individually while others can be used only by a group of workers. A machine, for instance, is an instrument of production which can be used only collectively for it requires raw materials, energy, half-finished products, and so on. Besides those who run the machine, it takes dozens, if not thousands, more workers to make it function productively. Ownership has nothing to do with it. Regardless of property relations, labour in mechanised production is collective, social. The steam-engine revolutionised capitalist production just because, by making production a social process, it created the major material precondition of socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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As long as man employed ready-made or primitively worked tools in production, he accumulated elementary knowledge in diverse fields of activity. The progress of production caused science to emerge and develop. Thus, astronomy emerged because people had to determine from the position of the stars and planets the seasons of the year, which was essential to agriculture and animal husbandry. Geometry arose from the needs of land surveying and construction. Geography owes its origin to the development of high-seas navigation and trade. Production does more to promote science than dozens of universities, wrote Engels. Hypotheses advanced on the strength of accumulated knowledge are tested by practice and, if confirmed, become scientific truths.&lt;br /&gt;
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When primitive instruments of labour are Superseded by machines, science as a system of knowledge of the external world begins to play a far more important part in the development of production. That is but natural. Mechanised production requires detailed knowledge of the properties of things, of the forces of nature and of how they can be utilised. In turn, such knowledge is applied and embodied in instruments, mechanisms and production technologies. In this way science begins to turn into a direct production force.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the 19th century, owing to numerous important scientific discoveries, science played a much greater role in production than ever before. But its role today in the development of productive forces is even greater. As a result of the revolution in science and technology, applied sciences have become part and parcel of the productive forces. More and more scientific discoveries are being made, some of them directly contributing to material production. Scientific information is produced on a vast scale, doubling its volume approximately every ten years. The revolution in science and technology has brought about a situation where production is increasingly becoming a field of the technological application of science, the latter itself appearing as a direct productive force.&lt;br /&gt;
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Whereas under capitalism, production as a whole, including the latest results of science, serves to enrich a handful of capitalists, while increasing automation breeds unemployment and causes much misery among working people, under socialism, the progress of science and technology is made to serve the whole of society, all working people. Under socialism, scientific and technological progress has practically no limits and can freely bear its fruits: larger and better-quality output, lighter work, more leisure, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
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The role of science as an immediate productive force is determined not only by its direct effect on the technological standards of production, on the progress of technology. Science also makes an immense contribution to the development of the producers of material goods, to improving their cultural standards and skills, and to perfecting the organisation of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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The CPSU takes all necessary measures to promote the revolution in science and technology. As a result, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out in his report ‘“The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, &amp;amp;quot;never before has our country possessed such a huge economic, scientific and technical potential as today.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-98|98]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Speaking at the 25th CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev said: “The priority task is still to speed up scientific and technical progress.  Its significance, you will recall, was strongly emphasised at the 24th Congress of the CPSU.  We Communists proceed from the belief that the scientific and technical revolution acquires a true orientation consistent with the interests of man and society only under socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In turn, the end objectives of the social revolution, the building of a communist society, can only be attained on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-99|99]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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The Soviet people is solving the task of combining the technological revolution with socialism, i.e., utilising socialism’s advantages over capitalism in order to ensure the growth of material production and an improvement in the people’s living standards.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §3. Relations of Production ====&lt;br /&gt;
Not every relation formed by people in the process of production is a production relation.  Human relations are complex and many-sided.  Production relations are, above all, economic relations among people who get together for the purpose of producing material values. These relations are of a material character. This is not to say that they are material in the same way as a thing may be material (for they can be neither measured nor weighed), but that they are objective, that is, independent of man’s mind and will. Thus, production relations are economic relations of people engaged in material production, which shape and change independently of people’s consciousness and intentions.&lt;br /&gt;
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What are these relations in more specific terms? Basically, all production relations depend on who owns the: means of production.  In fact, the form of ownership of the means of production underlies all economic relations in any kind of society. Property is not a thing, nor is it a relation between man and a thing. It is, in the last resort, an economic relationship established through men’s relation to things, particularly to the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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Another essential aspect of production relations is the exchange of activities between men engaged in material production. People participate in production in various ways. They “exchange” the results of their efforts. Thus the Capitalists, who own the means of production, play the part of organisers of production while the workers, who sell their labour, are the immediate producers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Exchange of the results of human effort is not confined to capitalist society. It occurs in any society because there is always a division of labour, even under the primitive-communal system, where it was, of course, of the simplest kind. In socialist society, too, the results of labour are exchanged between two classes of working people (i.e., workers and farmers), different social strata and groups of professional workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, production relations are characterised by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;distribution of output&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Every class receives a part of the national income in a manner and quantity rigidly determined by the prevailing relations of property.&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief characteristics of production relations that we have enumerated are inseparably combined in material production. The unity of the three aspects of production relations is as objective as production relations themselves.  It means that production relations can change only as a system of three aspects, none of which can undergo serious qualitative change separately.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are several &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;types of production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; known in history: primitive-communal, slavery, feudal, capitalist and communist. Mankind is marching along a road which ascends from lower to higher forms of production relations. This road may wind or zigzag, for historical development does not proceed in a straight line. In some cases reactionaries managed to halt history. So, after the French bourgeois revolution an attempt was made to restore not only monarchy but feudalism as well. That attempt slowed down the development of France, but it failed all the same. It shows us the objective character of historical development. Despite all obstacles, society still arrives where it should under the objective laws of history.  These laws cannot be repealed. History may at times develop more slowly but sooner or later it will make headway.&lt;br /&gt;
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Progressive development of society from lower to higher forms is called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  It can be of two types. The first, progress in an exploiting, antagonistic society, is achieved at immense sacrifice, which is out of all proportion to the strides actually made. Marx figuratively described this type of historical development as an abominable idol that would drink nectar only from the skulls of the slain.&lt;br /&gt;
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The second, progress under socialism, is of an entirely different character, as all classes and sections of society have a stake in it. The development of socialist society proceeds in a planned manner. It is guided and directed by a Communist or a workers’ party. Having cognised the laws to which society is subject, it leads the masses, directing the efforts of all working people towards a single goal and ensuring the best possible results of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The unity of productive forces and relations of production constitutes the mode of material production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In every historical epoch a particular mode of production was predominant, the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist modes of production succeeding one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, in studying history it is easy to observe that at no time did a mode of production exist all by itself. The picture was always complicated because while a new mode of production took shape, some elements of the old mode persisted.&lt;br /&gt;
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The current epoch has seen the emergence of the socialist mode of production which is steadily advancing on the capitalist mode of production in the world economy. Socialist integration within the framework of the socialist world economic system, the steady and rapid economic growth of the socialist countries, all foretell the inevitable triumph of the socialist world system in the economic race with capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Succession of Modes of Production Is a Law-Governed Process ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having discussed what a mode of production is, we can look at how they function and why they supersede one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the main, we can single out three principal laws to which the mode of production is subject.  They are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of unity&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of contradiction&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; between various aspects of the mode of production. These laws expose the workings and development of the modes of material production. And since production activity, in the final analysis, is the foundation on which every other social human activity rests, these laws are of immense social significance.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of the unity of the productive forces and production relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; expresses the organic connection between various aspects of the mode of production. Every mode of production, at any period in its history, necessarily involves a complex interaction of the productive forces and relations of production. The productive forces are the content of material production, and the relations of production are its economic form.  The mode of production exists and functions in society as an integral whole, an active socioeconomic system in which material production, in any of its phases, is embodied in economic phenomena and cannot exist without them. E.g., the capitalist productive forces exist as constant and variable capital, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.e., as the means of production owned by the capitalist, and as labour which is a commodity bought by the capitalist. The productive forces of capitalism form and function only as long as the economic interaction of labour power and the instruments of labour (which are the major component of the means of production) takes place. Therefore, in society, the productive forces do not exist in a “pure” form but only in their economic form. They can only be separated from their economic form, i.e., from the relations of production, in the imagination, as a theoretical abstraction, to make their analysis more convenient.&lt;br /&gt;
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The consequences of the law of unity of the productive forces and relations of production are of great significance to economic practice and development, as well as to the life and development of society in general. If the mode of production exists and functions as an integral whole, then clearly, every appreciable variation of any of its aspects will affect the entire mode of production. Thus, the more social the process of production becomes in modern capitalist enterprise, the more the material prerequisites of the socialist economic system mature in the womb of capitalism. Also, the higher the concentration of production and the centralisation of capital in the modern capitalist economy, the more manifest the economic need for replacing private by common ownership of the means of production. Therefore, it is a matter of replacing the mode of production as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then how do the different aspects of the mode of production interact? For an answer, we must look to the law of correspondence and the law of contradiction between the aspects of the mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The law of correspondence between production relations and the level and character of the productive &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;orces &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was discovered by Marx, who drew general conclusions from numerous facts bearing on the economic history of society. To substantiate this law, Marx looked into the history of the division of labour and of the emergence and development of co-operative association, manufacturing and mechanised production. The results of his research are stated in the first volume of his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Here are some of Marx’s judgements on the matter.&lt;br /&gt;
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The history of European economic development shows that the need for mass production destroyed the craft guild in which the master workman and his apprentices made a commodity entirely on their own, from beginning to end. The strong point of this method is that the article bears the stamp of the craftsman’s skill. The craftsman’s work in this case is creative, and he himself enjoys a respectable place in the social scale. Yet the craft guilds, typically medieval and preserved nowadays almost exclusively by the goldsmiths, crumbled under the impact of expanding commerce. A craftsman cannot, after all, produce artistically finished articles on a mass scale. Besides, the jealousy with which craftsmen guarded the secrets of the trade greatly hindered the progress of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Division of labour and the introduction of machines ruined the medieval craft guilds.  They were replaced first by co-operative asso&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;iation in which craftsmen’s work was shared and coordinated. Even this simple innovation was enough to boost enormously labour productivity and profit. On the other hand, the artisan’s work lost its creative quality. Now it was no longer an expression of the craftsman’s art, and the craftsman himself was no longer an artist. Creative work was replaced by monotonous drudgery, each worker performing some elementary operation over and over again. That spelled the birth of what Marx called ‘partial man”: the worker contributes only a part of the article, and his whole life becomes tied to this part, which, incidentally, cannot be marketed as such. Thus, through economic pressures, the craftsman whose art and its secrets had been a source of personal pride started in the co-operative association his slide into totally dependent production that later ended in the factory.  What happens next? Again, under economic pressures, viz., a growing demand for goods and a growing thirst for profit with a view to further investment in profitable enterprise, the machine finds its way into the co-operative association. Inventors of machines had in mind technical improvement of production as well as economic considerations. They sought to make work less arduous, increase labour efficiency and ensure a higher rate of profit. What effect it would have on the economy and society was something the inventors and organisers of production did not trouble their heads about.  &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Having penetrated the co-operative association, the machine at once alters the character of economic relations among the co-operative artisans. Their former independence, already somewhat curtailed by division of labour, now completely disappears. The machine is not, as a rule, owned by the individual artisan; it is the property of the workshop owner and a means of exploiting the workers. The workers are no longer able to launch production on their own because the instruments of production have become very costly.&lt;br /&gt;
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There then appears a system of machines in the workshop and it becomes a real factory.  Yesterday&#039;s artisan and workers in the workshop become today’s proletarians. They possess no instruments of production; the sole commodity they own is their labour power and this they sell by hiring themselves out to a private employer. They have to do this in order to make a living for themselves and their families.  By his work, the worker not only covers the production costs but produces surplus value besides. And the capitalist appropriates this surplus value as profit.&lt;br /&gt;
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Detailed examination of capitalist production led Marx to the conclusion that every change in production starts with the instruments of labour as men improve them, as they increase the speed of the machines and build up the capacity of the energy sources. New machines require new skills, and this causes change in the worker who handles the instruments of labour or controls machines. Besides mechanising production, men improve the latter by breaking it down into separate operations permanently assigned to separate workers or mechanisms.&lt;br /&gt;
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Technical improvements, the further division of labour, development of new skills—in a word, the modification of the productive forces—induce economic change, i.e., an adjustment in the production relations. This is the relationship expressed by the law of the correspondence of production relations with the productive forces, which operates as an economic tendency.  The law imposes no rigid mechanical dependence of production relations on the productive forces. It would therefore be inexact to describe it as a “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of obligatory correspondence&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&amp;amp;quot; The law of correspondence operates as an economic tendency in the modern capitalist economic system as well. But the demands of the law of correspondence run up against the selfish economic ends of the monopolies and cannot be satisfied unless monopoly power is overcome.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, we inescapably come to the third law regulating material production, the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Production relations, which correspond to the productive forces only by tendency, are usually in conflict with them. This conflict, inherent in the mode of production, is exactly what makes it develop.&lt;br /&gt;
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Where does the conflict spring from and what is it about? How does it develop and how is it resolved? These questions remained a puzzle to social scientists and economists before Marx.  And no wonder. For to answer them one had to get to the bottom of society&#039;s economic development and be a revolutionary as well, i.e., to combine an exact economic analysis with a social analysis of the interplay of the class forces and the way social revolutions tend to develop.&lt;br /&gt;
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The law of conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is manifested in three main ways. Firstly, the productive forces, as the most mobile element of the mode of production, outstrip (and this is the main tendency in world history) production relations which are usually more conservative and lag behind.  This is obvious because the relations of production change objectively according to the change undergone by the productive forces. This shows once again that the conflict between different aspects of the mode of production is a fundamental attribute of economic development.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, at a certain stage, the internal conflict in the mode of production, under the private ownership of the means of production, develops into an antagonism, the productive forces and production relations being embodied in antagonistic social classes. For example, in the capitalist economy, the proletariat is the most important part and the living embodiment of the productive forces while the relations of production (capital, above all) are personified by the capitalists. Therefore the conflict in the mode of production must sooner or later, depending on the maturity of the economic system, be expressed as antagonism and conflict between these classes. The growth of such antagonism in the economic and social spheres inevitably brings about social revolution in bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The conflict in the mode of production as it develops into antagonism, expressed in class conflict, is the socio-economic precondition of social revolution. The relations of production, having come in conflict with their productive forces, become a drag on economic and social progress. They twist it out of shape and slow down its growth rate. An obvious instance of this is modern state-monopoly capitalism which has distorted the development of material production in favour of militarism, promoting the war industries at the expense of culture and health. Militarisation of the economy is pushing the capitalist world into the abyss of another economic crisis. The capitalist relations of production hamper the development of the productive forces, retarding its growth. Comparison of the economic growth rates in the socialist and the capitalist countries dramatically demonstrates the advantages of the socialist economic system. Economic integration of the socialist countries further enhances these advantages and provides favourable conditions for their realisation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outmoded production relations act as a brake on social and economic progress. Imperialism brings with it unemployment, racial hatred and police outrages, neocolonialism and suppression of democratic freedoms. The headlong chase for profit, attempts to prolong the life of capitalism—which is doomed by history—by aggressive wars and similar means, continuing plunder of the developing countries in the guise of aid, are all expressions of the current capitalist relations of production, of state-monopoly capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, the conflict in the mode of production comes out in the fact that, even after becoming a brake on the progress of industry and society, the relations of production still remain the prime mover of production. We may ask ourselves: What makes material production function in the United States and other state-monopoly countries? It is still the headlong pursuit of profit. Under state-monopoly capitalism the big capitalist corporations can reap, with governments’ assistance, high monopoly profits, instead of average profits.&lt;br /&gt;
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As we see, the modern capitalist relations of production have become self-contradictory.  While they are a stupendous roadblock to social progress, these relations of production—of which profit is part—still provide for the further development of the capitalist economic system.  This bears out the conclusion, made by Marxist-Leninists long ago, that capitalism will not collapse of itself. Only united action by all anti-monopoly forces will clear the road for the further progress of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §5. What Is a Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
The laws of material production operate throughout human history. But world history has gone through a succession of phases, viz., the primitive-communal, slavery, feudal and capitalist systems, and has now entered a socialist and communist phase of development.  These phases, signifying stages in the progress of world history, are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;socio-economic formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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The concept “‘socio-economic formation” was introduced by Marx and was widely employed by Engels and Lenin. According to Lenin’s definition, a socio-economic formation is an integral social organism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The skeleton or economic basis of each formation consists of the relations of production Which are predominant in it. They determine the economic tendencies and the character of the classes common to a particular formation, determining, in the long run, its social system, ideas and institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
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The flesh or body of a formation consists of the social classes existing within it, and the institutions they set up to protect their own vital interests. These are not merely the institutions of the ruling class, rooted in and serving the predominant relations of production, but also all other essential social institutions, many of which derive from the inner contradictions of the mode of production. Thus, socialist ideas under capitalism spring from the conflict between the social character of production and private appropriation. The same conflict is ultimately responsible for the emergence of the communist parties of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of key significance to the definition of a socio-economic formation is, however, the relation between its &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic basis&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant relations of production, and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;superstructure&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., the predominant ideas and institutions. Formations may be rather similar as to their productive forces, but they are always distinguished by the specific character of the basis and superstructure which not only determine the pattern of a formation but, more important still, functionally depend on each other.  The basis produces the superstructure, and the superstructure ministers to the basis. But their functional connection is even more far-reaching. This connection alone makes it possible to see whether a social phenomenon belongs to the basis or to the superstructure. Let us take the state for example. Should we always refer to it as a superstructure? It depends. It cannot properly be called a superstructure in relation to the church, for instance. The state is a superstructure only relative to the predominant relations of production.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is the state to be regarded as a superstructure with respect to the productive forces? By no means. There are countries now that achieved more or less similar levels of the productive forces but differ greatly in bases and superstructures. This difference expresses the main contradiction between moribund capitalism, on the one hand, and socialism, which has become the decisive force of progress, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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All this holds true for the economic phenomena as well. They are of basic character only in case they are related to the ideas and institutions that are determined by these economic phenomena and work for them. But can we call production relations the basis from the point of view of their economic role in relation to the productive forces? The answer is no, because in that case the relations of production do not&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nor can they—play the part of the basis with reference to the development of the productive forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are numerous things in society which have too many functions to be referred either to the basis or to the superstructure. Thus, language, the family, machines and the productive forces in general, the natural and technological sciences, the nation, and so on, should be referred neither to the basis nor to the superstructure. Certainly the basis and superstructure influence them a great deal and often turn them to account. But that does not alter the essential fact that they are social phenomena of a particular kind, not to be referred wholly either to the basis or to the superstructure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Therefore, although these social phenomena are part of the formation as an integral social organism, they do not serve to distinguish one formation from another. They may be&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and they usually are—similar or even identical in entirely different formations. Consequently, only phenomena which can be definitely referred to the basis or to the superstructure as belonging distinctly to a formation and stemming ultimately from the mode of production are the distinguishing marks of a formation. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. The Specific Laws of Socio-Economic Formations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Then what are the laws whereby the social Organism called the socio-economic formation springs forth, develops, matures and decays?  The laws of material production operate during the existence of a formation. They provide for the continuity of world history, investing it with a progressive general tendency and binding together widely different and even opposite phases of historical development and types of social structures. But do they provide for the emergence, development and collapse of specific social organisms such as socio-economic formations? Certainly not. Nor is it fortuitously that Lenin mentions that each socio-economic formation develops in conformity with certain laws specific to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; specific to each formation are the subject of political economy. For example, Marx&#039;s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a detailed exposition of the economic laws governing every stage in the development of capitalism. The chief one is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the production of surplus value&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the latter being seized by the capitalist as average or monopoly profit. Marx thoroughly investigated the operation of this law, tracing its immediate and indirect consequences and the way it interacted with other economic laws, and outlined the social development tendency resulting from this law. Thus, this law has a broad social meaning expressed in the tendency which social development has to pursue under the impact of the economic forces. The law of surplus value shows the position and role of the proletariat in the capitalist economic system, which, in fact, render the proletariat the grave-diggers of capitalism and builders of a new, socialist system. Hence, the proletariat’s world-historic revolutionary role is more profoundly substantiated if viewed from the standpoint of capitalism’s chief economic law. It was for this very reason that Marx said that his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Capital&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was a shell fired at the head of the world bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However great the social significance of the economic laws of each particular formation, specific &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social laws&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, not immediately invested with economic content, are also essential to the life of a formation. For example, as he summed up historical experience, Marx established the general tendency of the class struggle throughout the period of capitalism. The class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists inevitably results in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law of the class struggle under capitalism&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; has, of course, economic antecedents, yet it does not itself refer to the economic sphere. It is a social law specific to a concrete formation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Interaction of the economic and social laws specific to each formation and the common laws of human history determines the destiny of each formation. An all-round examination of the complex interaction of all social and economic forces with reference to the history and maturity of capitalism enabled Marx to arrive at the scientifically-founded conclusion on the communist tendency of world history in the epoch of the capitalist social formation, namely, that, as it goes onward, history must pass from moribund capitalism to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §7. The Communist Socio-Economic Formation ====&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism and communism are two phases or large periods in the life of a society resting on collective ownership of the basic means of production, in which the exploitation of man by man has been abolished. Socialism is the first phase of such a society. It comes into being as a result of the socialist revolution, handing over political power and the national wealth to the working people and giving them access to culture. The toilers become genuine masters of society. As this society moves closer to communism, its development takes new forms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Socialism emerges from capitalism or even from some pre-capitalist social system. It cannot build its social and economic framework in the womb of the old society which rests on private ownership of the means of production.  The foundations of the old exploiting society must be destroyed by a social revolution. Communism, on the other hand, develops on its own social and economic base and does not need a social and political revolution or the class struggle to bring it into the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Progress of socialist society to communism is subject to certain objective social laws which extend to the main areas of the life of society comprising men’s economic, social, political, and intellectual activities. As a result of the operation of these laws, the material and technical base of communism is created, socialist relations are transformed into communist social relations, and people attain all-round development. The complex nature of the process of transition from socialism to communism follows from the very numerousness of the objective social laws involved in it. In the economic sphere, for instance, one can single out the high and stable growth rates of production development which is free from crises and unemployment and sufficient for the building of the material and technical base of communism; the growing role of progress in science and technology; integration of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of full-fledged socialism; development of socialist into communist labour, work becoming the prime vital requirement of everyone; a steady growth of efficiency; the drawing together of co-operative and public property, and their eventual transformation into communist property; growth of social consumption.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws operating in the socio-political sphere in that period are, to name but a few: the gradual levelling out of living standards in town and country; the steady drawing together of the working class, collective farmers and intellectuals, and obliteration of class and social distinctions; integration of mental and physical work; the greatest possible growth of the social unity of society, the peoples thriving and drawing together still more; the gradual emergence of social uniformity and full social equality of all members of society; development of the socialist state of the whole people into communist public self-administration: the greatest possible unfoldment of socialist democracy; and the gradual refashioning of everyday life on communist principles.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The changes which the intellectual life of society undergoes in the period of transition from socialism to communism are equally complex.  We shall name merely a few, viz., the inculcation of a new attitude to work; getting rid of private-owner mentality and hangovers of the past; the further growth of socialist culture; all-round development of the individual; and the increasing dependence of the character and rate of social development on the spiritual qualities and constructive efforts of every man and woman.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 4. Classes and Class Relations ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; a Class? ====&lt;br /&gt;
The word “class” derives from the Latin classis, a group called to arms, a division of the people. Tradition ascribes to Servius Tullius, a legendary Roman king (578-534 B. C.), a new division of Roman society into classes or orders.  At that time there appeared in ancient Rome an army into which all free citizens able to carry arms were enrolled. Servius Tullius divided the soldiers into five classes or orders according to their wealth, i.e., their ability to provide their own horses, armour, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Subsequently, the word “class&amp;amp;quot; was applied to large groups of people into which human Society came to be divided. But can any large group of people be regarded as a class? We are accustomed to apply this term to such large groups as the bourgeoisie, the working class, the peasants. Yet in modern society doctors also form a large group. There are almost 700,000 of them in the Soviet Union alone. Steel workers form a large group too, but are they a class?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many scholars tried in vain to define the concept “class”, although the fact that society was divided into classes and that a struggle was going on between them was observed long ago. So, even at the time of the Restoration in France there were historians (Thierry, Guizot, Mignet) who saw in the class struggle the key to French history. Nevertheless, the question what is a class, on what grounds people may be referred to one class or another, was still left open.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some investigators claimed that the division into classes rested on the difference in intellectual standards: the more gifted and active, the more apt to command formed the ruling classes; the dull and stolid formed the oppressed classes.  Life and history demonstrated, however, that this was not so at all. There were too many ignorant fools and dolts among the ruling classes, while the oppressed classes advanced from their midst many people of undoubted talent.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Other people attempted to explain class division by income and property. Indeed, examination of the class structure of any society reveals a glaring disparity in the incomes of those of the ruling and the oppressed class. But the question is why—why this disparity, why is it that the ruling classes are rich and the oppressed poor?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, it was said that classes were distinguished by their position in society. Some classes were privileged, others, on the contrary, were underprivileged. But again, the question why it was so was left unanswered.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great contribution of the Marxist-Leninist theory is that it has managed to solve this complex problem. Marx and Engels furnished brilliant examples of materialist study of the position of every class and each stratum within it, showing that the class struggle is entirely political. The most comprehensive, profound and complete definition of classes in Marxist-Leninist theory was given by Lenin in his work &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Great Beginning&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin writes: “Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-100|100]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this definition Lenin points out four distinctive marks differentiating classes, viz., (1) their place in a historically determined system of social production; (2) their relation to the means of production; (3) their role in the social organisation of labour, and (4) the share of social wealth they get and the methods by which they get it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The main indication was, in Lenin’s view, the relation of a class to the means of production that establishes a social group as a ruling class enjoying every privilege. Estrangement from the means of production turns a social group into an oppressed class whose lot is destitution and deprivation of rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin’s definition of classes, which sets forth the objective characteristics of a class, cut the ground from under the feet of those who defined classes from an idealist point of view, arbitrarily combining people into classes or, equally arbitrarily, excluding certain groups from concrete classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, Lenin isolated the fundamental, most typical features of all classes, thus furnishing the guide and key to the class structure of a socio-economic formation, which greatly facilitated the study of class society. In other words, Lenin’s definition of classes is of great theoretical significance to a correct understanding of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, Lenin defined classes in an exploiting society as groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Why Society Split Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now that we know what a class is, we must look at how classes came about. They emerged long ago, when systems of writing either did not yet exist or were only beginning to develop, so that we have scanty sources on those times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Still, numerous scholars who painstakingly collected evidence about the life of ancient peoples in different parts of the world, have gathered enough information for us to trace the general outlines of the historical processes developing in the remote past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Excavations of ancient settlements and burial places and the implements, utensils, ornaments, bones of the animals which primitive men hunted, and other relics found by archaeologists help to reconstruct a picture of our remote ancestors, community life, their activities and way of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the instruments of labour were very primitive at that time (they were usually made of stone or wood), men got food for themselves with their aid and successfully hunted big, strong beasts. How did they manage to do it?  Men lived in large communities, hunting animals and gathering wild plants together. Without mutual assistance, they could never have survived because they would have been helpless against predators lying in wait for them at every turn.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Primitive society knew no division into classes, no subjection and oppression, no exploitation. People provided the means of subsistence for themselves by common effort and consumed them also in common.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing general conclusions from concrete research, Marxism supplies the general picture of society&#039;s division into classes. The first class division occurred when the primitive-communal system disintegrated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disintegration of the primitive-communal system and the emergence of class society was a lengthy process which did not occur simultaneously everywhere. According to historical evidence, class society emerged in ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia at the end of the fourth and the beginning of the 3rd millennia B. C.; in India and China, in the 3rd-2nd millennia B. C.; and in Greece and Rome, in the first millennium B. C.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Economically, class division of society was based on the surplus product which turned, with the passage of time, into private property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the primitive-communal system, the productive forces—and so labour productivity—were at an extremely low level. What little was produced was almost immediately consumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In those circumstances there was no basis for social inequality. When, as a result of quarrels between clans or their individual members, prisoners were taken, it was a problem what to do with them. To keep them in the community was usually impossible as there was not enough food to go round as it was. Nor could the prisoners be made to work for the community as there were no implements to spare.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So prisoners of war were either eaten up (while cannibalism was still practised) or allowed to return to their own clans after hostilities were over, or, circumstances permitting, were retained on an equal footing with the rest.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This continued as long as society did not produce much. But as time went on, implements were improved and labour became more efficient. Finally, production reached a level where man began to produce more than merely his sustenance. There appeared the surplus product, something over and above bare necessity, which had momentous social consequences for mankind, bringing about social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The surplus product meant that means had become available for maintaining and employing extra labour. Whereas prisoners of war had earlier been killed, they now came to be prized as a source of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although all this happened very long ago, Similar facts are still observable in our own time among some peoples whose development has been retarded for concrete historical reasons. Thus there is ethnological evidence that the nomad tribe of Masai in East Africa killed their prisoners for want of means to maintain them. However their neighbours, the Wakamba, who engaged in agriculture, were able to use slave labour. As they disposed of the surplus product, they had food and implements to spare for extra labour. Therefore the Wakamba did not kill their prisoners but turned them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War prisoners were not the only source of slave labour. Besides them, the class of slaves was formed of debtors who failed to pay their debts.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why, one may ask, did they not share out the surplus product equally among the clan or tribe? Why did social inequality replace the equal distribution of products which had been the rule for millennia? The point is that products are distributed and consumed depending on the way in which they are obtained. The old hunting and fishing peoples procured food for themselves in large groups. Their primitive implements did not allow them to get enough to keep body and soul together single-handed, without their kinsmen’s assistance. Thus, at the early stages of society’s development, social production took shape, and its necessary consequence was social consumption, when the bag was at once equally divided among the members of the group. That was determined in the first place by the economic mode of life of ancient peoples and tribes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They had no conception of storing supplies because it was hardly practicable. The meat from the animals they killed spoiled quickly.  Of course, if sold, it could fetch money that could be saved. But at that stage money did not yet exist. Hence, the economic circumstances did not encourage thrift.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another reason why they could not accumulate supplies was that as very little was produced, nothing was left over, and there was nothing left to save. Besides, hunting depends on luck. A hunter may kill a large beast today and share with the others, or he may come home empty-handed tomorrow and be given a share of the others’ kill. Plekhanov observed that the custom of sharing is a sort of mutual insurance without which hunting tribes could not possibly go on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the collectivist rules of behaviour, customs and traditions of the primitive-communal system stem from the predominance of common ownership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless, even in the context of this primeval collectivism, as more and better implements were made, individual production gradually made headway. In primitive society, weapons, clothing, food, ornaments, etc., had already become personal property. These articles are fitted for personal consumption by their very nature. To handle a spear, a bow or a boomerang with adequate skill, the primitive huntsman had to adapt himself to the individual  article, as well as adjust it to himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The growing use of individual implements told on the standards and customs of social consumption. It may be assumed that by custom the bag was divided depending on each member’s contribution to the success of the hunt.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar customs have been observed among peoples whose development has been retarded.  If the quarry is killed by two men, the skin goes to the man whose arrow struck nearer the heart; the one who strikes the last blow receives the best cut, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the spread of individual-type implements and individual production, the primitive commune began to disintegrate and socia&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inequality set in. As the social division of labour progressed, the primitive commune finally disintegrated and the tribal system was destroyed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major division of labour was associated with the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of cattle-breeding (pastoral) tribes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. At that stage, the cattle-breeders, provided they had large enough herds, already enjoyed a surplus over their own consumption. Exchange, which was earlier merely accidental and concerned only what was left over by chance, now became regular between pastoral and agricultural tribes. As a result, social wealth increased and more slave labour was used.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major social division of labour occurred when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;handicrafts separated of&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom agriculture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Exchange thus penetrated into the community. Economic inequality increased, and, besides the division into free men and slaves, there appeared distinctions between the rich and the poor.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As more products were made specially for exchange, the latter became a vital social necessity, rather than a practice among individual producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next major social division of labour was the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;separation of mental from manual work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, whereby mental work was monopolised by a tiny minority, by the ruling classes which took the management of production and public affairs entirely into their own hands. And hard physical work became the lot of the vast majority.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those were the main causes and circumstances underlying the division of human society into large social groups, into hostile classes.  How did the classes form?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They formed in two ways. Firstly, they formed as there emerged in the clan an exploiting elite initially consisting of the aristocracy, and as impoverished members of the clan were turned into slaves for their debts. Secondly, they derived from the enslavement of war prisoners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us begin with the first way. How did the exploiting elite come to stand apart from the more or less uniform commune? Primitive men enjoyed approximately equal living conditions while heads of families and communities enjoyed equal social status.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Common interests were looked after by functionaries under the supervision of society. They were concerned with settling disputes, superintending water reservoirs and religious practice. The functionaries were invested with certain rudimentary powers of government, but by and large they were merely the servants of the community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the productive forces increased and communities joined into larger groupings, the division of labour proceeded further, and special bodies were set up to take care of common interests and settle disputes. These bodies, which acted on behalf of the society as a whole, were isolated from, and might even be hostile to, individual communities, and they gradually became more independent. Eventually, this independence of public offices with relation to society evolved into domination over it. The former servant became master. Individuals who had risen to power merged into whole ruling classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second way in which classes formed was thus. As production developed, extra labour was required. At first, neither the individual community nor the larger society could provide it. The source of extra labour was found in war.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Conquerors became aware that it was more expedient to spare the prisoners and make them produce the surplus product. With time, however, community leaders, who had the surplus product in their control, began to enslave their fellow-tribesmen by legal means which they devised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such are the two principal ways in which classes formed. Their common result was slavery which was the first form of exploitation, typical of antiquity. Slave-owning society comprised three classes. The first class—the slave-owners—included the ruling aristocratic elite and later, a larger section of the rich. The second class was composed of freemen—farmers, cattle-breeders and artisans who usually became dependent on slave-owners. The third class was composed of a heterogeneous mass of slaves of different nationalities and languages.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus was society divided into the classes of the exploited and exploiters, the oppressed and their rulers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Class Antagonism ====&lt;br /&gt;
The history of all antagonistic class societies since the disintegration of the primitive-communal system has been one of the struggle between classes. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, nobleman and serf, capitalist and workman, in short, oppressor and the oppressed, were forever in opposition to each other, Waging an incessant struggle, now secretly, now openly, which ended either in the revolutionary remaking of society or in the destruction of the warring classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is important in this respect to note the role of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working classes in social progress&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  The question has often been posed in the history of social sciences as to the relative worth or even necessity of different classes in society.  This question has no single answer for all ages.  There was a time when the landed aristocracy was a useful and indispensable element of society. Then the bourgeoisie, inexorably produced by history, launched out against the landed aristocracy, smashing its political rule and itself gaining political and economic supremacy. Yet never, ever since classes emerged, has there been a time when society could dispense with the working classes. The names and social position of these classes changed, the slave gave place to the serf, and he to the proletarian, who, although not a bondman, had nothing except his labour power. The history of all antagonistic class formations shows that whatever modifications the leisure classes may undergo, society cannot go on without the class of producers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As antagonistic class formations succeeded one another, the forms of exploitation were modified, but the labouring classes ever remained oppressed. The crudest forms of exploitation were practised under slavery. The slave was treated no better than a draught animal.  He was deprived of every right, he could not have a family, and in ancient Greece he could not have a human name, only a nickname.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In his treatise on agriculture, Varro, the Roman writer living in the 1st century B. C., mentions in a most natural way that agricultural implements are divided into three kinds, namely, the talking kind, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., the slaves, the kind making inarticulate noises, e.g., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;xen, and the mute kind, such as vehicles. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The class structure of feudal society stems from the following features of the latter. Firstly, the feudal economy was natural, tending to be self-sufficient. Secondly, the means of exploitation under feudalism was binding the peasants to the soil. The feudal lord who owned the land allowed plots of land to the peasants so that they should work for him. To get the surplus product, he had to have on his land peasants who had plots, implements and animals. A peasant who has no plot, no horse, no farm, is not a suitable object of exploitation.  Thirdly, the peasant was personally dependent on the lord. As he had land, he only worked for the landlord under compulsion. The feudal economic system rests on extra-economic compulsion, serfdom, the peasants’ legal dependence on the landlord, and their underprivileged position.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under capitalism. society&#039;s class structure underwent a change. The feudal lord and the serf were replaced by the capitalist and the worker. Compared with the slave, who was wholly dependent on the slave-owner, or with the underprivileged serf, the worker is legally free. Nevertheless, his dependence on the capitalist is as great, only its form is different. The worker is deprived of the means of production.  All he has is his labour power, and he may make his living by selling it. The only one who can buy and employ labour in capitalist society is the capitalist. So the worker has nothing for it but to sell himself into bondage to the capitalist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slaves and slave-owners, serfs and landowners, workers and capitalists&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;these are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal classes of three antagonistic class formations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, viz., slavery, feudalism and capitalism. It would, however, be a gross oversimplification to view the class pattern of a formation merely as the relationship of the basic classes, i.e., the classes which express the essence of the dominant relations of production. No “pure” socio-economic formation ever existed, for every formation included some elements of the previous stages of social development, as well as seeds of the future socio-economic formations.  Classes which are associated either with vestiges of earlier production relations or with those which are just beginning to develop are called &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;non-basic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thus in slave-owning society there were nonbasic classes of free citizens preserved from the primitive-communal system, i.e., small peasants and handicraftsmen. As the slave-owning system developed, these social groups disintegrated and joined the ranks of the lumpen proletariat. Under feudalism there were the social strata of artisans and traders organised in guilds and companies. In the later middle ages there began to form the bourgeoisie and the working class which were to become the basic classes of the next socio-economic formation.  In many capitalist countries landlords and peasants continued for a long time as non-basic classes. Prominent among the non-basic classes of capitalist society is the petty bourgeoisie.  Non-basic classes and other social groups join the class struggle on the side of opposite basic classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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How irreconcilable the basic interests of the antagonistic classes are is witnessed by countless and incessant class battles, armed revolts and other sharp conflicts which abound in history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Slave-owning society was shaken to its foundations by gigantic slave rebellions. The uprisings under Aristonicus in Asia Minor and Spartacus in Rome have gone down in the history of liberation struggles as major landmarks symbolising the slaves’ splendid courage and dedication.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many peasant revolts under feudalism also have gone down in the history of liberation struggles. Let us recall the famous Jacquerie in 14th-century France, when Jacques Bonhomme—the contemptuous name by which French seigneurs called peasants—got the feudal lords, from the South of France to Paris, trembling in their boots. We may also recall the German peasants’ uprising in 1525, which Engels regarded as the cornerstone of German history, the famous Russian peasants’ uprisings under Ivan Bolotnikov, Stepan Razin und Yemelian Pugachev.&lt;br /&gt;
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Proletarian movements have also left a deep mark on history. The uprising of workers in Lyons (France) in 1830, the weavers’ uprising in Silesia (Germany) in the 1840s, workers’ active participation in the revolutions of 1848, and the Paris Commune, the first socialist revolution—such were the stages of the proletariat’s struggle in the 19th century. These movements showed that the proletariat had become an independent force in society capable of becoming the vanguard of social progress.&lt;br /&gt;
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As the class struggle pervades all of the most substantial aspects of social life, it naturally develops in its every major sphere, such as economic, social and intellectual spheres. Having studied vast historical material, Marx and Engels established that in all antagonistic class societies the class struggle develops along three main lines, taking the form of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic, political and ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; struggle. Each is waged by different classes to protect and defend their interests, but the methods of such defence are, of course, different.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the course of the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;economic struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the capitalists guard their profits, going to al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lengths to multiply them, while the workers fight for human working conditions and social security in illness, disability and old age. Even in this struggle workers develop a sense of solidarity, an awareness of the unity of class interests, and the rudiments of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The workers’ economic struggle, even if it should develop spontaneously, can grow into &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;political struggle&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This occurs where the state with its instruments of power joins the struggle on the side of the ruling class. Dealing with the workers by legal and extra-legal means, unleashing police reprisals and sending regular troops to put down industrial or student unrest and “riots”, the exploiters’ state introduces violence into the struggle, which is, as a rule, armed violence. Then the revolutionary proletariat is obliged to spearhead its struggle against the political machinery of the exploiters’ power, i.e., against the bourgeois state. The first step in the direction of political struggle is the political strike. Let us recall, for instance, the Obukhov defence in Russia in 1901. Such instances of workers’ economic action turning into political struggle are not infrequent in our own times.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet political struggle may be of different kinds, depending on its general line and goals that are being fought for. Policy in the workers’ movement may be of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;reformist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (or trade-unionist, as Lenin referred to it) or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; kind. Reformist policy does not aim at taking society beyond capitalism. It does not affect the basis of property but confines itself to a struggle for improving workers’ living standards and extending their rights within the existing social system. Revolutionary policy, on the contrary, is aimed precisely at overthrowing this system through the proletariat’s struggle. That is why revolutionary policy alon&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; furthers the political maturity of the proletariat and the masses led by it. Whereas the workers movement arrives at a reformist policy on its own or under trade union guidance, it must be brought to a revolutionary policy by the party of the working class. Only such a party can raise the political understanding of the proletariat and its allies enough to make them aware that the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production and the conquest of power by the proletariat are urgent goals of the day-to-day political struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
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Efforts to elevate the workers’ movement to the level of conscious and well-organised revolutionary political struggle encounter obstacles put up by the right wing of social-democratic parties and within communist parties, by opportunists and revisionists who would revise the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism.  Petty bourgeois and nationalist revolutionists (the leftists in the workers’ movement) are only good at revolutionary phrases, but are useless when it comes to consistent revolutionary policy. True to their adventuristic spirit, they sooner or later lose contact with the masses and either substitute provocations for the revolutionary struggle or swing it towards nationalism, running counter to proletarian internationalism. Therefore, in guiding the workers’ political struggle, Marxist-Leninist parties have to fight on two fronts, both against right-wing opportunism and left “revolutionism.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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At present, the chief danger the international workers’ movement has to cope with is that of the “left&amp;amp;quot; deviation of which the policy pursued by the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most notorious expression. Having embarked on nationalism, richly flavoured with Chinese racialism, the CPC leaders have long broken off with Marxism-Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was pointed out at the 25th Congress of the CPSU: “Now it is far too little to say that the Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist teaching; they are directly hostile to it.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-101|101]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Maoists are seeking to bring about a split in the world communist movement and undermine the unity of the world socialist system.&lt;br /&gt;
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Our discussion of the proletariat’s political struggle naturally brings us to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ideological&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; problems. The political and ideological forms of the class struggle are closely interrelated.  Through their ideologists, classes justify their policies, i.e., their aims and goals. Ultimately, any policy stems from material interests, but its theoretical justification (the justification of class aims, goals, strategy and tactics) rests with ideology. Ideology is a sort of political compass.  It may contain illusory ideas, fallacious goals, groundless “grounds”, pipe dreams and vain hopes. All such things are characteristic of the ideology of classes doomed by history and leaving the historical arena.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is only one ideology which does not deal in illusions. It is the scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology of the working class. It combines the highest level of scientific objectivity with the maximum proletarian revolutionism.  This is the source of its strength and ever-increasing prestige.&lt;br /&gt;
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Scientific socialist ideology is opposed by bourgeois ideology, which springs from capitalism. Some elements of bourgeois ideology persist even under socialism, especially at its initial stages, owing to the fact that consciousness lags behind being, whereby some vestiges of the old linger in the economy, everyday life and social relations, and also owing to the influence of alien views penetrating from the capitalist world.&lt;br /&gt;
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For these reasons the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated: &amp;amp;quot;The positive changes in world affairs and the detente create favourable opportunities for the broad spread of socialist ideas. But, on the other hand, the ideological contest between the two systems is becoming ever more acute, and imperialist propaganda ever more subtle.&lt;br /&gt;
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“There is no room for neutralism or compromise in the struggle between the two ideologies. Here there is a need for constant political vigilance, active, efficient and convincing propaganda, and timely rebuffs to hostile ideological subversion.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-102|102]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Under capitalism, a law operates, according to which all the three forms of the class struggle are objectively bound to grow.&lt;br /&gt;
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In every antagonistic formation, the class struggle&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;whether economic, political or ideological—is the driving force of social progress. Its significance increases considerably after the political struggle is joined by the working class, the most revolutionary class in history. It takes part in the revolutionary movement as the exponent of the interests of society at large. This puts the working class in the van of all working people exploited by capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §4. Historical Destinies of Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, and also the socialist revolutions which took place in some countries after World War II, have dramatically confirmed the proletariat’s capacity to realise its ideals and become the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
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The overthrow of bourgeois domination can be effected only by the working class because its very economic circumstances prepare it for the overthrow, giving it the opportunity and sufficient strength to do it. Capitalist society splits up and scatters the peasantry and other petty-bourgeois strata, whereas it consolidates and organises the proletariat. The proletariat is the only class whose economic role in large-scale production qualifies it for the leadership of all working people, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;exploited&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and oppressed by the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The bourgeoisie can be overthrown only when the proletariat becomes the ruling class, capable of suppressing the bourgeoisie’s inevitable resistance and organising all working people to build socialism. That was what made Marx insist that the class struggle necessarily results in the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship o&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt; the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Marx, Engels and Lenin were always highly ironic about sundry projects for equalising the classes, bringing about a “harmony of capital and labour.” Exploding these castles in the air, Marx wrote that it was not the logically impossible &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equalisation of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; but the historically necessary &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;abolition of classes&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which was the true secret of the proletarian movement.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-103|103]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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What does “abolition of classes” mean? How can classes be abolished? Have they not continued for millennia?&lt;br /&gt;
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Lenin associated the abolition of classes with the elimination of class distinctions. He wrote: “The abolition of classes means placing all citizens on an &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;equal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; footing with regard to the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;means of production&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens equal opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-104|104]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
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Abolition of classes is a lengthy process which occupies a whole historical epoch following a socialist revolution. It passes through a whole range of stages ending in the disappearance of classes. The socialist revolution overthrows the government of the exploiters, which paves the way to the abolition of classes. But however necessary, it is still, in Lenin’s view, not the most difficult task involved in the abolition of classes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The next important stage in the process is the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. According to Lenin, two important problems are solved in this period. Firstly, private property is abolished, which puts an end to the capitalist class. Secondly, the individual petty economy based on peasants and artisans is reorganised into a large-scale social economy. On the basis of socialist co-operation, the main class distinctions between workers and peasants are obliterated.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first phase of communist society, socialism, immense efforts are made to overcome the remaining class distinctions. How this proceeds is clear from the recent changes undergone by the class structure of Soviet socialist society. In 1939, wage and salary workers and their families accounted for 52.5 per cent, collective farmers—44.9, and individual farmers and artisans—2.6 per cent. Twenty years later, in 1959, wage and salary workers accounted for 68.3 per cent, collective farmers—31.4 per cent, and individual peasants and artisans—0.3 per cent. In 1976, wage and salary workers accounted for almost 83.6 per cent and collective farmers for about 16.4 per cent.&lt;br /&gt;
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In future, as the material and technical base of communism is built and essential distinctions between physical work and brainwork are obliterated, the boundaries between the working class, farmers and intellectuals will vanish. Ail will become members of a classless communist society in which everybody will enjoy full social equality and an equal relation to the means of production, and there will be equal conditions of work and distribution and an equal opportunity for everyone to take part in managing public affairs.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5. The State ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §1. The State and the Division of Society Into Classes ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists would always depict the state as a body responsible for maintaining public order and safeguarding the interests of all classes and social groups alike.&lt;br /&gt;
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This point of view is also current in modern bourgeois sociological literature. It is often expressed by the ideologists of the petty-bourgeois strata who seek to represent the modern capitalist state as a body extending equal protection to the rights of capitalists, factory, office and professional workers, farmers, students, and so on. They allege that laws enacted by the modern bourgeois state are equally acceptable to capitalists and workers, to the well-to-do and the poor. This state allegedly makes no distinction between the poor and the rich, between employers and wage workers.  They describe it as the “welfare state” providing for “social harmony,” “universal well-being,” and so forth. Advocates of welfarism try to bolster up their theory with examples.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us suppose, they say, that the workers of a factory have gone on strike. The trade union has put forward reasonable demands for higher wages, better conditions and other improvements. However, should these demands be granted, the employers’ profits will suffer.  For this reason, the negotiations between the strike committee and the employers run into difficulties. Neither side will make concessions, blaming and abusing each other.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us further suppose that in the heat of the quarrel, a management representative loses control of himself, snatches a revolver from his desk and starts shooting at the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
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What will happen then? Quite obviously, say the “welfare state&amp;amp;quot; theorists, police will be summoned to the factory. The capitalist who fired at the workers will be arrested and put on trial. The court will sentence him under the laws of the country to whatever he should get for manslaughter or armed assault.&lt;br /&gt;
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The description is usually followed by a list of countries and addresses at which similar incidents occurred. The readers are invited to check the facts and make absolutely sure that every word of it is true. The suggestion is that if the state were to safeguard the interests of the employers alone, it would not have punished employers for killing workers—it would have paid no attention. But the facts prove that the bourgeois state protects both the employers and the workers, and that it is committed to class reconciliation and class harmony. So say the advocates of the “welfare state.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Some acquaintance with concrete facts showing how the state has evolved will be enough to blow their arguments sky-high.&lt;br /&gt;
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First, we must note that the state has not always existed. It did not exist at the primitive-communal stage. Peoples whose development was retarded by concrete historical circumstances and who knew no division into classes had no state either. From this it follows that the state appears when society becomes divided into classes, i.e., with the appearance of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
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In primitive society, people lived in clans, dominated by tradition, customs, the prestige, respect and authority of the elders. At times, authority belonged to women, whose position then was not subordinate and oppressed as it is in antagonistic formations. Yet never under the primitive-communal system do we observe a particular order of people setting themselves over the rest of society as its rulers equipped with a machinery of coercion, such as armed forces, prisons and other enforcement organs.  In a word, under the primitive-communal system, the state proper did not exist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, its absence did not disturb the social routine nor result in conflicts upsetting public order or the social system. The primitive-communal system was not threatened with chaos. Although there was no state, there were strong communal links among people, and society functioned normally. The force of custom and the elders’ prestige were quite enough to keep society going without any special enforcement machinery.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under the primitive-communal system all people were equal, nobody had any privileges, and the elders received no remuneration for their services. Their reward was universal respect and obedience. Primitive society knew nothing of class conflict and therefore needed no organ of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
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History demonstrates that the state emerged only with society’s division into classes, i.e, into groups of people one of which can systematically appropriate the labour of another or, in other words, exploit it.&lt;br /&gt;
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The main and decisive characteristic of a state is public, or political, authority, which is always the dictatorship of the ruling class.  And dictatorship is a form of government relying on force, i.e., producing the legal basis of its own activity.&lt;br /&gt;
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Next come the tools or organs of political power, which include the army, the courts, prisons, the police, intelligence and counter-intelligence. The government which controls them is itself an organ of political power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like power itself, its tools are unmistakably of a class nature. Take, for instance, the bourgeois army. So that an army recruited from the people (as it must be, for the time of regular mercenary armies has gone—although, of course, mercenaries are still used by imperialists) could be set over against the people and should, if need be, shoot at the people, soldiers are deprived of political rights, isolated from the people and inculcated with  anti-popular ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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For the organs of power to be able to carry out the will of the ruling class, there must be well-trained officials appreciative of their jobs in the government apparatus. Top government positions are filled exclusively by members of the ruling class. To maintain its apparatus, the state imposes all sorts of taxes on the population. Taxation in the bourgeois state is naturally geared to the interests of the capitalists. The working people have to bear the brunt of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, another characteristic of the state is division of the population over territorial units, which has superseded the division into tribes and clans. However, neither territory nor population separately are characteristics of the state. This is obvious since the state is not eternal. It emerged at a certain point in history, and it will inevitably wither away. Population and territory, on the other hand, were there before the state appeared and will be there after it has withered away. Only all characteristics taken together enable us to tell whether or not a social formation is a state.&lt;br /&gt;
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So, the state arose because some classes felt the need to keep other classes under their own control. It arose from the conflict of these classes and is the tool wielded by the economically dominant class which, with the aid of the state, becomes also dominant politically and acquires, therefore, more means to suppress and exploit the oppressed classes. When society was first divided into classes, special machinery was required to safeguard the privileges of the ruling class. Such machinery for oppressing working people was first found in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;slave-owning state&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
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It gave the slave-owners the power to exploit the slaves. At that time, the communication service maintained by the society and state was undoubtedly poor, and mountains, rivers and seas were enormous obstacles to intercourse.  States therefore often formed within narrow geographical bounds. The state machinery was comparatively primitive, but sufficed to keep slaves in slavery and maintain the foundations of the exploiting social system.&lt;br /&gt;
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The state has ever been the organ of oppression of one class by another. Thus, the ancient slave-owning state was the state of slave-owners, serving to keep the slaves in subjection, the feudal state was the nobility’s organ for oppressing serfs and villeins, and the modern bourgeois state is the instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. This regularity is clearly traceable throughout human history ever since society split into the antagonistic classes of exploiters and the exploited.&lt;br /&gt;
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Were there no states which were above society and relatively independent of the opposing classes? Were there no exceptions from the general rule?&lt;br /&gt;
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An example of such an exception is provided by 17th-18th century absolute monarchy which kept the nobility and the bourgeoisie balanced against each other. Another instance is Bonapartism under the first and especially second French empires which set the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. It must be noted, however, that a situation of this kind emerges during particular historical periods when the warring classes reach an equilibrium which allows the state to become relatively independent of both classes and to act, to all appearances, as a go-between for them.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; However, such a situation prevails but for a short time. As the alignment of the class forces becomes more definite and one class triumphs over the other which has to yield its leadership of society, the state machinery must also make its choice. More correctly, it does not choose but is chosen by the class which has established its own domination. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;E&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.g., the French absolute monarchy of the 17th-18th centuries manoeuvred long enough between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, making concessions alternately to the one or the other. Finally, however, the victorious bourgeoisie took the state machinery into its own hands. Engels wrote: ”...The state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another, and indeed in the democratic republic no less than in the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap.”&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-105|105]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== §2. Historical Forms of the State ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; We learn from history that the state took numerous forms. Even in the epoch of slavery, in ancient Greece and Rome, advanced countries of their day, we encounter different forms of state. There appeared at that time &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;monarchy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;republic&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;aristocracy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. Monarchy is rule by a single person. In a republic, all organs of power are elected by the citizens.  Aristocracy is government by a small privileged class. Democracy is people’s power (from the Greek &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;demos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;the people, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;kratos&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;strength).  Contemporary politicians clearly differentiated between these forms of state. Supporters of one or another of them engaged in a tense political struggle. Yet, whether they were monarchy, republic, aristocracy or democracy, they were all slave-owners’ states. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we look at the history of slave-owning society, we see that, for all their different forms of government, the common denominator of a monarchy and a republic was that slaves were not considered citizens enjoying civil rights and duties and, moreover, were regarded as less than human. The state and its law were for the slave-owners who alone were recognised as citizens enjoying full rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Slave-owning republics were organised on different lines. Some republics were aristocratic, some democratic. In an aristocracy, only a small number of privileged slave-owners took part in political life. In a democracy, on the other hand, all citizens (i.e., all barring slaves) played a part. These facts are essential, for only by bearing them in mind can we understand what the state is.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The slave-owning system was superseded by feudalism, which was also of great significance to the history of the state. Under feudalism, the state began to serve a new ruling class, the nobility. The peasants, then the largest class, were bound to the soil. Only lords and gentlemen enjoyed certain rights, but the peasants had none at all. Their position was little different from that of slaves. Still, the serf had a cottage, in which he lived with his family, and a plot of land on which he was allowed to work part of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the middle ages, serfdom predominated.  But even then the state assumed numerous forms and both monarchies and republics could be found, although the latter were less numerous than in the previous period. However, the feudal lords who owned land and serfs controlled the state no matter what form it took. Clearly, neither the slave-owning nor the feudal system, where the majority was ruled by a tiny minority, could do without coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As under slavery so under feudalism the oppressed classes rose against their exploiters time and again. In medieval Germany, numerous peasant revolts finally developed into a real civil war against the landlords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nevertheless both slaves and serfs were crushed by the state machine for neither had a. historical future and so was incapable of setting up a social system under its own control. The famous Leyden papyrus describes a victorious slaves’ rebellion in ancient Egypt.  But what was the result? The slaves partly replaced the slave-owners, seizing their wealth and turning them into slaves in turn. Thus the foundations of slave-owning society remained just as they had been.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To maintain and preserve their rule, the landlords had to have a machine for keeping great numbers of people in submission. When a feudal state was a monarchy, it was ruled by a single person; when it was a republic, it was ruled by elected representatives of the nobility. That did not change the essence of the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The next important stage in the development of the state was capitalism. It began to emerge towards the end of the middle ages when, after the discovery of America, world trade expanded, extraction of precious metals increased, gold and silver became means of exchange, and the turnover of money helped to build enormous fortunes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Society was reorganised. Its division into lords and serfs was ended. The laws were proclaimed to be the same for everyone. They extended equal protection to all and protected property from those who had none.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, despite the change, the state continued as a machine helping the capitalists to subjugate the workers and poorest peasants, who were, however, nominally free. The capitalist state promulgated universal suffrage while bourgeois ideologists loudly denied that the state had anything to do with classes, contending that it expressed the will of the people.  All such doctrines merely glossed over the essence of the capitalist state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Whatever the shape, so long as it is a bourgeois state, so long as it preserves private ownership of the land, factories and private capital and upholds wage slavery, it remains a tool of the ruling classes for oppressing the masses. The working class has a very clear idea what it must do with this state machine. It must wrench it from the bourgeoisie, break it and replace it with new machinery serving the working class and its allies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, our examination of concrete facts bearing on the state’s development through the ages enables us to draw some important conclusions. Firstly, we have seen that the state arises with the appearance of classes. Secondly, the state has always expressed the will and interests of the ruling class. It is a machine for the oppression of one class by another. Lastly, every form of state—and they are rather numerous—must be judged above all in a class context. We must find out which class uses the state to ensure its domination and which classes the state suppresses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The Bourgeois State ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now, what can we make of the example cited at the beginning of this chapter? The incident during negotiations between the strikers and the employers clearly shows that we are dealing, in this case, with a situation in which the bourgeois state takes the workers’ part. After all, who was punished? A capitalist, a member of the ruling class. Does it not prove that the state can be above classes, reconcile them, smooth over class conflicts?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact is that in this case, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and advocates of reformism quote the example of an individual capitalist.  The thing to do, however, is to find out the real essence of the bourgeois state, to see whether it serves society as a whole or merely the bourgeoisie. Supposing we assume, for example, that the workers do not negotiate with the employers. The strike committee declares that the factory now belongs to the workers, and the employers are simply told they are no longer wanted. What will happen then?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Police will arrive in force to deal with the situation. Should the workers prove too much for them, troops will be sent too. The bourgeois state will do everything to show the workers that the principle of private property is unshakable. In practice, the state will defend the interests of the capitalist class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeois state defends the interests of an individual capitalist insofar as he belongs to the capitalist class. But should an individual employer commit actions detrimental to the capitalist class as a whole, he may be sacrificed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this case, we are dealing with a situation where an individual employer commits actions which may harm the capitalist class as a whole.  One can also imagine the following possibility.  The employer&#039;s firing and shooting to death a strike committee member could provoke a storm of indignation among the workers, a spontaneous workers’ rebellion. Such a spontaneous outburst could well infect other factories in the neighbourhood. To suppress the disturbances, troops and police would have to be sent, and, naturally, the capitalists will incur damage as many factories come to a standstill and property is destroyed during clashes between workers and police.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the capitalists would also sustain great moral damage, as the bloody clash with the people would shatter the faith in the “popular” character of the bourgeois state, the belief that the capitalist system, as its ideologists argue, most closely corresponds to “human nature.”  Therefore the capitalist class as a whole and its state may, and often do, sacrifice individual employers and capitalists, if it pays the class as a whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Our everyday experience proves the truth of the Marxist doctrine which regards the bourgeois state as a machine of subjugation used by one class against another, as an instrument of class domination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Its Forms and Development ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx considered his idea that the class struggle inevitably results in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to be one of his major contributions to the doctrine of classes and class struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was advanced for the first time by Marx and Engels in 1848 in the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist Manifesto&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which mentions the “proletariat organised into a ruling class.” As a term, the dictatorship of the proletariat was first used by Marx in his letter to J. Weidemeier of March 5, 1852.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When they expressed the idea of the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx and Engels could not yet answer the question as to what forms the dictatorship of the proletariat might assume and what was to be done with the old state machinery, for history had as yet supplied no answers. The 1848 revolutions in France, Germany and Austro-Hungary made it clear that the proletariat could hardly use the old, bourgeois state machinery. Moreover, the old state, geared to the exploitation and oppression of the masses, is a strong weapon in the hands of counter-revolutionary forces. Therefore, as they generalised the experience of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, Marx and Engels arrived at the conclusion that the old bourgeois state machine must be smashed in the course of the proletarian revolution and replaced by a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was still not clear what concrete forms the dictatorship of the proletariat could assume. The answer was supplied by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Paris Commune&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which was the first state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviets&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; appeared in Russia during the revolutionary battles of 1905-1907, and triumphed in 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Subsequently, world history produced yet another form of the dictatorship of the proletariat-the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people’s democracy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which triumphed in some countries after World War II.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that as the masses in capitalist countries fight for the triumph of the proletarian revolution they will create more forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat which will subsequently be established.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Demonstrating the historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marx emphasised that without it the working class could not hold power, suppress bourgeois counterrevolution, reorganise the economy and alter people’s psychology, or go over to communist formation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Critique of the Gotha Programme&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Marx showed that between capitalism and socialism (the first phase of communism) there is a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;transitional period&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which cannot be circumvented. The purpose of this period is to extend and complete the socialist revolution and build an entirely different economic system, alter the social structure of society, ridding it of the exploiting classes, rear a new force of intelligentsia, work a revolution in people’s minds, and ensure the triumph of communist ideology.  The political organisation of society during the period of transition to communism must necessarily be the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How did history bear out the truth of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the inevitable nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is safe to say that the truth of this doctrine has been conclusively confirmed not only by the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia but by the experience of all other socialist revolutions of the 20th century. The sole path leading from capitalism to communism lies through a transitional period, through an epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a weapon of the socialist revolution are many. They include sustaining and consolidating the political power of the working class; ensuring political guidance of society by the working class and its Marxist political party: suppressing the resistance of the exploiting classes, overthrown but not yet completely abolished; putting an end to economic anarchy; nationalising the principal means of production and organising the economy on socialist lines in keeping with the chief aim of building a communist society; carrying out a cultural revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, these tasks have to be carried out in the context of the class struggle against the international bourgeoisie and against the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The leading and guiding force of the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the party of the working class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Guided by the experience of the young Soviet Republic, Lenin named following five forms of class struggle: (1) suppression of the overthrown exploiters; (2) civil war; (3) neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie; (4) utilisation of bourgeois experts; (5) inculcation of a new labour discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the exception of civil war which need not necessarily accompany socialist revolution, these forms of class struggle proceeding under the dictatorship of the proletariat have universal significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Suppressing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is indispensable to the triumph of the socialist revolution. The bourgeoisie will not surrender its power without a struggle but will persistently try to use its political experience against the socialist government of workers and peasants. For this reason, the triumphant march of the socialist revolution is always accompanied by subversion, sabotage and political conspiracies by its enemies. The dictatorship of the proletariat suppresses resistance from the remnants of the overthrown exploiters, providing the requisites of a complete moral and political unity of society. Once it is achieved, the dictatorship of the proletariat need no longer suppress these remnants. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that, important as it was, suppression was not the chief function of the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A socialist society is one in which there are no irreconcilable differences and no struggle is waged between the workers and the peasants, and between these two classes and the people’s intelligentsia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;civil war&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; as a form of class struggle in the transitional period. In the case of the young Soviet Republic, it was imposed on working people by the exploiting classes and was a terrible calamity and a great handicap to the people’s progress to socialism. The peoples of China also suffered under the heavy burden of civil war. Bur there was no civil war in the European countries which took the socialist path. Civil war, therefore. is a form of class struggle which need not necessarily occur in all countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us consider the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;neutralisation of the petty bourgeoisie&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This mainly implies the peasantry. It would be a mistake to consider such neutralisation as a line for isolating the petty bourgeoisie politically from the revolution. Actually, it is a question of skilfully paralysing the possible wavering of the broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie (particularly the peasantry) towards counter-revolution, with a view to enlisting the peasants’ participation in the building of socialism. All slogans moved by the Party on the peasant question served this purpose. It was no accident that the triumphant advance of Soviet power was given overwhelming support by the middle peasants everywhere.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The experience derived by the CPSU from its successful effort in winning the peasants’ support for the socialist revolution is of immense international significance. It is of special importance today to the developing countries and the national liberation movement with its emphasis on the agrarian question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;utilisation of bourgeois experts&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; in the interests of the revolution and socialism was a controversial issue in the young Soviet Republic. Many “‘left&amp;amp;quot; revolutionaries would not hear of it, being morbidly suspicious of all such experts. Nevertheless, life soon proved them wrong. Today, all socialist countries employ old experts. It only has to be ensured that they do not obstruct the country’s political course or serve any anti-socialist ends.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Last but not least comes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;inculcation of a new labour discipline&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Lenin considered this form of class struggle particularly significant.  And no wonder, for it has to do with millions summoned by the revolution to smash the old way of life. It is therefore extremely important to direct the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses towards building the new society and to inculcate a new attitude to labour, the state, and discipline.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A line must be drawn between the expressions of the last-mentioned form of struggle in the period of transition to socialism and that under socialism. Whereas in the transitional period, the ideological struggle inside the country is an acute form of the class struggle, under socialism, when society has attained moral and political unity, the social basis of such acute struggle disappears. There remains, as Lenin wrote, the systematic &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;guidance of all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; working people. That, according to Lenin, also is a struggle, but a struggle of a particular sort, the overcoming of definite, albeit entirely different, resistance, and a quite different sort of overcoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now the struggle is waged no longer between classes or social groups but between integral society and individual exponents of survivals of the past among its members.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dictatorship of the proletariat develops along with the whole of society. In conditions of full-fledged socialism it transforms into a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;state of the whole people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet history may be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition from capitalism to socialism; (2) the period of development from the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the state of the whole people (1934-1960); and (3) the state of the whole people which is developing, as the building of communism advances, into communist public self-government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Concerning the first-mentioned period, one must take note of Lenin’s idea that the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; lies in constructive, educational and organising activity of the state building socialism for the first time in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The state of proletarian dictatorship begins its transformation into a state of the whole people as soon as the building of socialism is completed. The best documentary proof of this process as it developed in the USSR was the adoption of the 1936 Constitution—the Constitution of triumphant socialism. It gave expression to new principles of democracy, embracing the whole people. Unequal election quotas for workers and peasants were abolished, and universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot was introduced. Development of democracy under socialism is an objective process. Socialism cannot advance unless it extends and improves its democracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process whereby the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat has developed into the state of the whole people was completed in the early 1960s as the result of the complete and final triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union. The working-class dictatorship in the USSR was not abolished but gradually developed, as socialism advanced, into a state of the whole people. The leading role played by the working class in Soviet society and the state is further developed in the process.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the building of communism advances, the state of the whole people undergoes a good deal of change. Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution, adopted in 1977, to give legal expression to the establishment of the state of the whole people in the Soviet Union, proclaims the right of citizens to take part in the administration of the state and society, and in the discussion and adoption of laws and the decisions of national as well as local significance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This article is of special importance in that it gives tangibility to the provisions of the Constitution on who has the plenitude of political power, and the right to participate in administering the state and society in the USSR. To declare that political power in a country is vested in the people is not enough. Al&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; constitutions have proclaimed it, ever since the time of the Greek city-states. Yet, the fact remains that through the ages it was just as Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed: ‘Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” The purpose of Article 48 of the Soviet Constitution is to name the concrete things which make it possible for the people to take part in administering the state and society. What are these things?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, it is the people’s right to wield political power. Political power in the USSR is exercised through Soviets of the People’s Deputies which are to be found at every level, from the Supreme Soviet at the head of the country down to the local Soviet of the smallest settlement. What does it look like in terms of numbers? In 1977, there were altogether over two million elected Soviet deputies. Furthermore, every Soviet sets up some standing committees which enlist the assistance of public-minded citizens in carrying out their work. To quote 1977 figures again, there were almost thirty million such activists involved in the Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to administer effectively the state and society, the working people should not only take part in political decision-making, but also see how decisions are carried out. In the Soviet Union, this is done through a major social institute known as People’s Control. Its bodies, elected by citizens, are to be found at every factory and office, supervising the work of the management. In 1977, the elected bodies of People’s Control comprised nine million citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the people cannot be said to have all political power, unless women take part in administering the state and society. In the Soviet Union, women currently account for 31 and 35 per cent respectively of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, and for 48 per cent of the deputies of the territorial, regional, district, city, town, and village Soviets.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 6. Social Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Types of Social Revolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
When discussing the material life of society we mentioned that one socio-economic formation usually passes into another only via a social revolution. That does not mean, of course, that we must search history for a ‘slaves’ revolution” which ruined and shattered the slave-owning system. No such revolution actually occurred. Nor did slavery perish at the hands of the slaves, although its foundations had been thoroughly shaken by slaves’ rebellions. Slavery became a blind alley in mankind’s road to progress. It owed its downfall to its disgust for labour which wasted it away.  A society which has no respect for labour, has no future. It was because the slave-owning Rome was rotten to its core that the warlike barbarians conquered it so easily.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social revolutions were performed when feudalism had to give way to capitalism, and in the current epoch of people’s transition to socialism; they are accordingly of two types, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois or socialist&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. In the first-mentioned case social and political revolutions are spaced in time. As the capitalist economic system forms in the womb of fully-developed feudalism, it comes into conflict with the old feudal superstructure, thus necessitating a political revolution which will crown the social change—already accomplished under feudalism—with a bourgeois superstructure. For this very reason, there is no special period of transition between feudalism and capitalism for it proceeds, as it were, in the bowels of feudal society, so that the bourgeois revolution merely has to put the finishing touches to it by changing authority. This is why purely political bourgeois revolutions are possible, leaving intact the economic and social patterns of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is quite a different thing. In this case, the social revolution does not precede the political revolution but, on the contrary, begins unfolding only after the political revolution has been performed by the proletariat. Whereas the bourgeois revolution ends in seizure of power, the proletarian revolution merely starts with it. Whereas the bourgeois revolution usually has no comprehensive social and economic programme to offer, the proletarian revolution has one, and terminates in the construction of socialism. Whereas progress towards capitalism requires no transitional period, it is indispensable in the changeover to socialism. Lastly, whereas the bourgeois revolution merely substitutes a different form of exploitation, the socialist revolution sets out to rid mankind of all exploitation. That is why the bourgeois revolution does not even mention scrapping the feudal state machinery—the bourgeoisie takes control of the old state machinery and makes it serve its own interests.  To the socialist revolution, on the other hand, demolishing the bourgeois state machinery is the key task essential for establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough analysis of the history of revolutions enabled the founders of Marxism-Leninism to discover the objective laws governing the progress and consummation of social revolutions. First of all, let it be noted that the fundamental question arising in any revolution-the conquest of power-is resolved by revolutionary violence alone. This is a law of social revolution, particularly effective with respect to the socialist revolution. No ruling class was ever willing, or moved by compunction, to surrender its power to another class. As regards the bourgeoisie, there is ample historical evidence to show that it fights the revolutionary proletariat tooth and nail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The founders of Marxism-Leninism have discovered the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal law of the social revolution&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. As a general rule, a revolution cannot take place in the absence of a &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;revolutionary situation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, i.e., without a national revolutionary crisis which breaks out when the lower classes can no longer bear the old way of life and are ready to overthrow the hateful system even at the cost of their lives, while the upper classes are no longer able to rule in the old way. Ina revolutionary situation, no class or group remains neutral. All social forces join in the struggle either on behalf of or in opposition to the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, not every revolutionary situation resolves itself in a revolution. That was what happened in Russia in the early 1860s, when the revolution was baulked by the tsarist reform of 1861. There was another revolutionary situation in Russia in 1914, but its development was interrupted by the outbreak of world war. Consequently, a revolutionary situation is not enough for a revolution to occur. Besides objective social changes, which are the essence of a revolutionary situation, subjective factors must also be present, viz., the revolution needs a leader in the shape of a political party, and it needs a real force in the shape of an alliance of the classes comprising the revolutionary people. Only given these conditions can a revolution be born out of a revolutionary situation and succeed under true and wise leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is Lenin’s classical formulation of the principal law of revolution: “... For a revolution to take place it is not enough for the exploited and oppressed masses to realise the impossibility of living in the old way, and demand changes; for a revolution to take place it is essential that the exploiters should not be able to live and rule in the old way. It is only when the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘lower classes’ do not want&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; to live in the old way and the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that the revolution can triumph. This truth can be expressed in other words: revolution is impossible without a nation-wide crisis (affecting both the exploited and the exploiters). It follows that, for a revolution to take place, it is essential, first, that the majority of the workers (or at least a majority of the class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers) should fully realise that revolution is necessary, and that they should be prepared to die for it; second, that the ruling classes should be going through a governmental crisis, which draws even the most backward masses into politics (symptomatic of any genuine revolution is a rapid, tenfold and hundred-fold increase in the size of the working and oppressed masses—hitherto apathetic&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;who are capable of waging the political struggle), weakens the government, and makes it possible for the revolutionaries to rapidly overthrow it.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-106|106]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. How the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Is Established ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;We now come to another important question: Can the dictatorship of the proletariat be established peacefully? This question was posed long ago by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Marx accepted the possibility of the proletariat taking power in a peaceful way in Britain, the United States &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;and the Scandinavian countries where no strong military or police state apparatus existed in the middle of the 19th century. It must be noted that such a peaceful way of taking power would still be a revolution, and in such a peaceful revolution the conquest of power would still have to be effected by force. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no less important to draw a line between revolutionary violence and the armed method of carrying out a revolution. The former is a necessary attribute of any proletarian revolution while the latter depends on concrete circumstances. Power does not have to be won by the proletariat by force of arms any more than a proletarian revolution needs to be accompanied by civil war. Neither is unavoidable. The dictatorship of the proletariat can, as history attests, be established peacefully, i.e., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a socialist revolution can proceed by peaceful methods&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theoretical account of this possibility was given by Lenin in 1917, in his April Theses.  Lenin wrote that under dual power which emerged after the February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution in Russia not only could the socialist revolution advance peacefully under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets”, but it was the only possible path towards the dictatorship of the proletariat under the circumstances.  Lenin indignantly criticised those who, in April 1917, called for an armed insurrection against the Provisional Government, describing them as irresponsible adventurers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some may object that peaceful development of the socialist revolution in Russia was interrupted in July 1917, and the proletariat had, after all, to seize power by arms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is quite true. But, firstly, the socialist revolution in Russia had indeed developed peacefully until July 1917. Secondly, Lenin&#039;s theory on the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat by peaceful means was dramatically confirmed by the 1919 revolution in Hungary, where a people’s government was established by peaceful means.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It may further be argued that peaceful development of the revolution in Russia was due to the unique circumstances of dual power that prevailed in the spring and summer of 1917, and that the Hungarian revolution, too, was performed in singular historical circumstances.  That is true. Even so, who can warrant that circumstances favourable to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat may not occur in future?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, the programmes of most communist parties in the capitalist world state that in contemporary conditions the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution is a real possibility.  This certainly does not imply any renunciation or revision of the problem of seizing power by force or by military means: the latter may become necessary just as it happened in Russia 1n 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, there are two ways of solving the problem of power involved in a socialist revolution, an armed way and a peaceful way. Both imply the use of the people’s revolutionary force. Which of them a revolution will take will depend on the circumstances prevailing in the country concerned. Communists consider it their sacred duty to prepare the masses for either contingency. The military path calls for special preparation. The peaceful path is not easy either, the communist party having to help the masses to acquire sufficient political understanding and experience to tackle problems arising in a socialist revolution. Both methods were brilliantly mastered by Lenin&#039;s Communist Party in Russia. Both stood the test of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Which method is preferable? The choice depends entirely on the situation. If the possibilities of the peaceful method have been exhausted or, perhaps, are altogether absent, nothing remains but the armed way, which becomes a necessity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Should the revolution develop peacefully, does it mean that the bourgeois state machinery need not be demolished? As we mentioned, in the mid-19th century Marx considered that, as an exception from the general rule, that might be the case in Britain, Scandinavia and the United States in which the army and police were not greatly developed. In the epoch of imperialism, Lenin came to the conclusion that in all capitalist countries, the military and police machinery had attained full development.  Therefore, no exceptions should be made, and the rule&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i.e., the scrapping of the bourgeois state machine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;should become universal. It should even be smashed in the case of a peaceful revolution. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Does the peaceful performance of a socialist revolution imply that the parliament and all parliamentary institutions should be retained?  That too is determined by the concrete circumstances. Evidently, in traditionally parliamentary countries there is no pressing need to abolish the parliament either during or after the revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat can exist and develop quite well as a parliamentary democratic republic as it can now rely on the world socialist system to safeguard it from bourgeois counter-revolution and restoration of capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The Chilean tragedy,” the 25th Congress of the CPSU stated, “has by no means invalidated the communist thesis about the possibility of different ways of revolution, including the peaceful way, if the necessary conditions for it exist. But it has been a forceful reminder that a revolution must know how to defend itself.  It is a lesson in vigilance against present-day fascism and the intrigues of foreign reaction, and a call for greater international solidarity with all those who take the road of freedom and progress.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-107|107]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Recognition that the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected peacefully is of immense tacti&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;c&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;al significance in current conditions, serving to extend the scope of the labour and communist movements, increase the political understanding of the masses, and refute the bourgeois slander about the revolutionary movement and revolutionary theory. This thesis, now adopted by the communist parties of bourgeois countries, is a reliable weapon in their ideological struggle against leftist, adventurist trends in the labour movement seeking to push the working class and its party onto the path of adventurism and sectarianism. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Combined experience in the development of the world socialist system, said L. I. Brezhnev, proves that today the power is still the central problem the revolution has to solve. Transition &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;t&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;o socialism is only possible if the working class and its allies use political power to abolish the rule of exploiters. Socialism can be victorious only if the working class, led by its Party, organises the masses for the building of socialism. It can consolidate its position only where people’s government succeeds in defending the revolution from the internal and external class enemies. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The significance of social revolutions to human history cannot be overestimated. It was not for nothing that Marx called them &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;locomotives of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Revolutions immensely speed up the march of history. They make new social and political forces essential to society’s progressive development mature faster, resolve the contradictions that have been accumulating over the ages, and thereby clear the way for the progress of history. Socialist revolutions play an especially prominent role. They carry out the historic mission of liberating mankind from exploitation, abolishing social antagonism, ending the previously inevitable anarchy of social development, and eliminating all forms of the individual’s estrangement from society and culture. It must be noted in this connection that Marxist-Leninist theory emphasises a key point in revolutionary practice, viz., the creative and constructive nature of socialist revolutions. They close the prehistory of mankind and inaugurate the history of emancipated mankind consciously building a communist society and an entirely different type of civilisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 7. The Role of the Masses and Individuals in History ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. What &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;I&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;s the People? ====&lt;br /&gt;
Society is a complex formation usually comprising diverse classes and social groups, each playing a different role in society’s development.  Under feudalism, for example, the peasants and artisans have to do the hardest jobs—they cultivate the soil, tend the cattle, produce food and clothing, build houses and provide luxuries too.  The nobles, on the other hand, engage in court intrigues, manage political affairs, vie for power among themselves, declare war and conclude peace, shine at balls. Which plays a more important part in history?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We already know that human history is based on the production of material goods, in which the decisive role belongs to those who are engaged in it, i.e., to working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All material values available to society are created by their work. No doubt, their daily labours are less conspicuous than the doings of kings or generals; nevertheless, they are the real foundation of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A logical materialist view on history consists in recognising the decisive role of material production in society’s development and, consequently, the working people’s key role as the makers of history and the chief force of social development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The working people, who are the overwhelming majority, are the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the masses. However, at different stages in history, a people does not comprise toilers alone. Generally speaking, the social strata constituting the people vary from one age to another. Therefore, to form a correct idea of what a people is, one must examine concrete stages of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;primitive society&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, which knew no division into classes and in which everybody had to work, all members of society represented the people. This pattern changes with the division of society into classes and the appearance of toilers and exploiters. The people comes to consist mainly of toilers, but at different historical periods it also includes the exploiting classes. One may say that the conception of the people denotes the social classes and groups jointly tackling progressive tasks facing society.  That was why during the transition from feudalism to capitalism the people included the bourgeoisie, which had an interest in the destruction of feudalism, as well as the toilers, i.e., the peasants, artisans and workingmen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History abounds in situations where the people rise up in arms to drive out foreign invaders. At such times, the people’s role as the saviour of the nation becomes particularly prominent. It was so when the Russian people fought to cast off the Tartar yoke, when they resisted the Napoleonic invasion, and in all similar cases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The peoples—the Soviet people above all&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;barred the way to Nazism, destroying it and thereby saving world civilisation from the threat of destruction. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since in class society the people is composed of different—often opposite—classes, it would be a mistake to consider it as a uniform formation.  Lenin cautioned against using the word (the people) “‘to cover up failure to understand class antagonisms within the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-108|108]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;bourgeois countries&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the people is composed of the workers, farmers, progressive intellectuals, the mass of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie. In many newly-independent countries and those fighting for their emancipation, the people includes appreciable sections of the indigenous bourgeoisie taking part in the struggle for national interests. Nevertheless, not all the bourgeoisie in such countries are part of the people. The so-called “compradore bourgeoisie”, subservient to and collaborating with the colonial powers and betraying the vital interests of their peoples, must be excluded. The compradore bourgeoisie is quite plainly an anti-popular force.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation under socialism is altogether different: the people includes the entire population. This is not surprising because all anti-popular forces have been destroyed and society consists of the friendly classes of workers and peasants which are joined by the working, essentially popular intelligentsia. Thus, as socialism is being built, the social forces are consolidated. An example of such consolidation is provided by the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which has shaped as a new historical entity. Formed of different nationalities, of two friendly classes and the intelligentsia, it is cemented by the unity of its vital interests, political views and moral standards. This unity rules out the possibility of class struggle within the people. That is one of the greatest achievements of socialism in the USSR. The unity of the Soviet people rallying round the CPSU indicates how far developed socialism has advanced along the road to communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. The People’s Role in History ====&lt;br /&gt;
To comprehend the people’s role in history, one needs to understand how it contributes to society&#039;s material and spiritual life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know that the people is the producer of all material wealth, both the means of subsistence and of production being obtained by its efforts. Engels wrote that nature was the mother, and labour the father, of wealth. But whose labour is it? Who works on the objects of labour and remakes nature, compelling the natural properties of things, the forces of nature to serve man and even creating new qualities and forces not found as such in nature? It is men, the working people, who are the most honourable and important on Earth. The people alone creates all material wealth of society by its labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then, what part does the people&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the working people above all—play in the system of production? First of all, let us recall that the workers engaged in material production make up a part of the productive forces. They constitute living labour. Without it, dead labour stockpiled in the means of production cannot return to life. Although the character of the productive forces does not depend on men’s choice, it is still the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;working people&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; who, in conjunction with the instruments of labour (which may be individual or social, based on a division of labour or otherwise, involving simple or complex cooperation) actually &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;determine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; the character of production and so of the productive forces in general. And this is an essential characteristic of material production, determining to a great extent the development of society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us look at the working people’s role in production relations. It would be incorrect to assume that in economic systems based on exploitation the relations of production are represented merely by the owners of means of production, i.e, by the exploiters, not the workers. No doubt, the most vivid embodiment of capital are the capitalists. Nevertheless, capital in its bourgeois form (unlike usury capital, for instance) exists only insofar as the workers’ labour power is a commodity which the capitalist can buy and which is consumed in the process of production organised on capitalist lines.  Labour power is as essential to the capitalist economy as capital itself. Its owners are the proletarians—a class which has a decisive role in history—and which constitutes, in our own age, the bulk of the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The capitalist mode of production breeds the proletariat and helps it develop into a world revolutionary force. That is the key point of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bred by capitalist society, the proletariat is the exponent of new social relations and a force which is to destroy capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; The proletariat, i.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;e&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;., the main body of working people in capitalist society, is the producer of the material goods essential to that society and of capitalist profit (and with it, of capital&#039;s might in general). Simultaneously, it is the exponent of future economic tendencies and embodies the social character of production and other material requisites of the socialist system of economy. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels, in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Holy Family&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, defined the proletariat’s role very exactly. To history.  they wrote, the intentions of an individual or even a class do not matter, even if it is a class as strong as the proletariat; what matters is what the proletariat is and what role it is to play owing to its place in the capitalist economy. The revolutionary role of the proletariat as the grave-digger of capitalism, liberator of society and builder of socialism has objective grounds. The proletariat’s revolutionary character necessarily results from the conditions of its existence, from its place in the capitalist economy, and from the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Apart &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;f&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;rom being the producer of all material wealth, the people is also the object and subject of history&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;. The history of society is above all the history of the people, and in this sense the people is an object of history. At the same time, history is made by the people. It is the maker of history, its subject. It makes history not by a whim or caprice but in accordance with the objective laws of social development. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The people is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;decisive force in all revolutionary change&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Every revolution in history was performed by the people. Even revolutions at the top performed by a narrow group always drew on the people’s discontent with the existing social institutions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For many centuries, the exploiting classes tried to keep the people from taking an immediate part in historical development, although they did not always succeed. Inhuman oppression again and again compelled the masses to rise against their overlords. It was not until the victorious proletarian revolution that the masses had become an active constructive force in history. As socialist society progresses, the people’s role as the architect of history, as a force building a communist society, increases.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The people makes an immense contribution to human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. The people creates language—a method of stating and communicating ideas—in the absence of which there could be no culture of any kind. Apart from making common effort possible, language furnished the foundations from which spiritual culture grew.  It also furnished the source of folklore, the starting point of every national literature. The people has created marvellous songs, dances, sculptures, paintings, buildings. These masterpieces are the sources on which professional writers and poets, painters and sculptors, composers and architects draw. From their labours, the people have amassed a vast store of information about the external world, from which science has grown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In primitive society, with brainwork not yet divided from manual work, the people’s role as creators of spiritual culture is obvious. After society divides into classes and brainwork and physical labour become separate, the ruling classes spare no effort to limit the people’s creative effort and, isolating it from spiritual culture, monopolise the latter. That naturally hindered the people’s spiritual activity but never stopped it. The people—that perpetual source of creative talent&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is the creator of spiritual values in class society too. All prominent figures in the field of spiritual culture always found in folk art an inexhaustible source of ideas and images for their own work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The Role of Outstanding Personalities ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Thus the people is the decisive force of historical development&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. Yet history has preserved numerous records of outstanding personalities.  In the past, historians and social scientists were convinced that great men were the prime-movers of history while the people was an inert mass only brought into motion by them. The entire world history was reduced to the doings of kings, military leaders, politicians, and so on. Books on history, as Plekhanov observed, looked like Lives of Great Men.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every class in every epoch had its own ideas about greatness. In the view of the feudal ruling class, great men had to be of noble, preferably royal, blood. Hence all kings, emperors.  and so on, were great. Some rulers were, indeed, people of more than ordinary ability, but they were very few. For the most part, kings and queens were not particularly gifted and ruled merely by hereditary right.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Capitalism, which swept out feudal privilege, has made wealth the yardstick of greatness.  But does a fortune make one an outstanding personality? Obviously it does not. The proofs are not hard to find, if proof be needed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If, however, we put class prejudice aside and take a sober view of history, we shall have to acknowledge that there were a fair number of statesmen, politicians and generals who left their personal mark on some events.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it holds that the decisive role in history belongs to the masses, historical materialism is far from denying the prominent role played by great men. Historical materialism only asserts that history is made by the people, not by great men. Some of the latter realised it. In a speech made in 1869, the German “Iron Chancellor” von Bismarck, referring to his friends who extolled his influence on events, said: “My influence on events with which I have had to do is in effect overestimated; but even so nobody has yet expected me &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;to make&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; history.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outstanding individuals are themselves a product of history, of definite social circumstances which enable such an individual to display his abilities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Plekhanov justly observes, most of Napoleon’s marshals had been strangers to military art before the French bourgeois revolution. One of them had been a fencing master, another an actor, and another a barber. In feudal times nobody would have expected them to make a successful military career. Napoleon himself would have died an obscure general or colonel.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, in order to play a prominent role, an individual must possess outstanding abilities. Yet abilities as such only potentially make an outstanding personality. This potentiality may be realised only given favourable social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Men do not pursue their historical activities singly. Social actions are performed by a mass of people. When several classes are involved, one of them usually assumes the leading role.  Thus, in the struggle against feudalism the people was led by the bourgeoisie. In the changed conditions of imperialism the exploited people fighting against the bourgeoisie is led by the proletariat. To ensure success to the struggle, a vanguard must be organised, consisting of the better-aware members of the foremost class, i.e., a political party of this class must be organised. As it functions, this party advances the more experienced and gifted of its members—political leaders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To recognise the outstanding role of communist party leaders is to acknowledge their authority, experience and foresightedness. The strength of communist party leaders lies in their close contact with the masses and in their capacity to express and defend the basic interests of working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the same time, the people is not an anonymous mass, but a vast number of individual personalities, living, active architects of history. Then what is man, and how is he related to society?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Man Is the Sum of the Social Relations ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism has introduced an entirely new conception of the social nature of the individual, proceeding from his intimate association with his environment. Of course, attempts to interpret the individual in close association with the Social environment were made before Marx—for instance, by 18th-century materialists. However, the first authentic scientific interpretation of the individual was given in Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx evolved the classical formula disclosing the social essence of the individual. The human essence, according to Marx, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;is the sum total of the social relations&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This formula shatters abstract anthropologism, whereby both materialists and idealists vainly tried to discover and classify the specific features allegedly inherent in human nature. For the most part, their man was nothing but a copy of the biblical Adam, complete with halo.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If man is essentially the sum of the social relations, then it is clear that every man is a child of his age, an exponent of its industrial, class, family, national, political, legal, religious and other social relations. Is the individual just a vessel for the social relations? According to the Marxist-Leninist view, it is by no means so.  Man takes an active part in the historical process. As regards outstanding figures, they are the torches kindling others or lighting the way for them. Maxim Gorky thus depicted Danko holding aloft his burning heart to give his people light.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This social conception of human nature underlies the Marxist approach to the unfolding and fullness of the personality. An individual exists and develops in the context of the social relations, actively asserting himself through them. As to the fullness of personality, this depends on one’s contacts with other people.  The more varied and intensive they are, and the more actively pursued by the individual, the more developed one’s personality will be. We must note at once that these factors should not be regarded as external to the individual. For example, one’s life activity is a personal characteristic, but it has a social meaning.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the early stages of social development—e.g., under the communal system&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the individual was more integrated compared with contemporary man. The reason for this, Marx explains, was that the individual had not yet fully developed his relations, so had not yet put them in opposition to himself as independent social forces. This alienation of the individual from the social forces opposing against him starts at the beginning of civilisation and proceeds, becoming ever more complicated, throughout the history of civilisation, up to developed communist society. What, then, are the stages in this process? The explanation of this problem, too, was given by Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The relations of personal dependence (at first entirely primordial) are the first forms of society in which human productivity develops merely to an insignificant extent and at isolated points. Personal independence which is based on &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;objective&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; dependence is the second major form wherein a system of comprehensive communal metabolism, universal relationships, all-round needs and universal abilities is built for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal unfoldment of individuals and the subordination of their common collective productivity as their common property, is the third stage.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-109|109]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These three types of relations between society and the individual are stages in the formation and development of man’s social essence. Capitalism destroys personal relations among men, changing them into relations in the world of things. Things as commodities dominate men and determine their relations. The capitalist division of labour and mechanised production have produced a man able to fulfil partial industrial or social functions but unable to fulfil himself in society as a human being. Communism alone wipes out the products of man’s historical development which cripple his independent personality and moulds an integral and harmonious personality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. The Individual in Communist Society ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now what is an integral and harmonious personality?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The eminent French utopian Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and other utopian socialists sought to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of human nature applying the law of varied employment. Indeed, one who has mastered several complex skills becomes a different person, the one-sidedness and disunity of his personality being overcome to some extent.  Fourier hoped that, in this way, the complete personality of the medieval artisan could be revived. That, alas, was but a romantic dream, which very soon crumbled. In the age of mechanised production, changing the proletarian back into the medieval artisan is out of the question. Even were such a reversion at all possible, it would be a step backwards in the historical evolution of both the individual and the relations of society and the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Consequently, if it does afford some possible development of the individual, varied employment utterly fails to solve the problem of the full and harmonious development of the individual. What, then, is the answer?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unable to solve the problem for the whole of the nation, bourgeois sociologists have divided society into a mass of drudges and a creative elite which, they claim, alone can hope to attain harmonious development. Yet, can society afford to make all working people slaves so that a small elite can devote itself exclusively to intellectual endeavour? Can the individual be fully developed in this way? Quite obviously, this is a utopia, but, unlike Fourier’s noble dream, it is a reactionary utopia.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Then where can we find a realistic programme for the full and harmonious development of human nature? Why does Lenin repeat Fourier’s words that in the society of the future everyone will know how to do everything? Is such a thing possible? Men will certainly continue to professionalise labour. Then what about the development of the individual?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man can and must be creative with respect to the things that mainly fill his life. Therefore the key to the problem is not quantity (numerous skills) but quality, i.e, making work creative and man a creator, turning ordinary activity into creative work. Then labour will not be a mere economic necessity but an indispensable need felt by every able-bodied member of society. Then what about man’s all-round development?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Putting the utopian and elitist approach to the problem aside, man’s versatility should be considered from the viewpoint of his most vital functions. What are they? Man must be creative, highly moral, highly cultured and physically developed. The CPSU Programme formulates all these requirements in the context of the current stage in the building of communism in the USSR. Versatility, from this standpoint, implies that the individual, as far as his activity and conduct are concerned, behaves actively, creatively, as a collectivist, and this gives him the greatest satisfaction. Can it mean, perhaps, the sacrifice of individual interests at the altar of communist duty?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communist world outlook and communist duty are of great significance to the moral make-up of the individual. Even so, the programme for the comprehensive development of the individual cannot be considered a simple realisation of communist duty. Anatoly Lunacharsky (the first Commissar of Education) recalls a remark Lenin made in a conversation when it touched on his model attitude to his duties. Lenin said: &amp;amp;quot;Need you tell an apple tree that it does its duty bearing fruit? When communist duty has become ingrained in the individual, it stops being a duty and becomes &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;a&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; vital need. It will be a vital need for every member of communist society.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 8. S&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ocial Consciousness and Social Being&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Forms of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Is it not an oversimplification to say that social consciousness reflects social being? Is not the spiritual life of mankind much too complex to be reduced to this formula? That is how anti-communists usually attack this Marxist proposition. In general, can one bring spiritual culture, multiform as it is, into a system and reduce it to different levels and forms? Let us look at these problems and see if we can isolate the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;principal forms of human spiritual culture&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first thing we come up against is the complexity and many-sidedness of this particular sphere of the life of human society. It embraces folk songs, epics, poems of all kinds, numerous literary productions, music, sculptors’ and painters’ works, scientific discoveries and inventions, sayings, and so on. Still, this enormous diversity is neither chaotic nor capricious.  Many scholars long ago expressed the idea that spiritual culture reflects the economic conditions prevailing in society. Marxism alone, however, was able to scientifically formulate this idea.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The notion of spiritual culture is itself a little vague. For this reason Marxists have replaced it by the more exact notion of social consciousness. In this way, they underline the fact that all products of spiritual culture are the result of the activity of man’s consciousness. And since man is not isolated from others but is connected with society at large, in a great many ways, his conscious life appears as social consciousness, and the aggregate consciousness of the members of the given society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism is based on the philosophy of materialism. This means that the question of the relation between mind and matter, between material being and intellectual activity is decided by Marxism in favour of matter, which is considered to be primary, while consciousness is considered to be secondary. With reference to history, the interpretation of this general philosophical principle is that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;social being is primary and social consciousness secondary&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This means that social being, i.e., men’s economic activity, material production and the relations formed by people in the process of production are at the basis of men’s spiritual activity. Social consciousness, i.e., the spiritual, ideological life of society, people’s varied views and ideas, political, legal, moral and other doctrines, reflects social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall try to examine social consciousness and select its main characteristics. The first thing which strikes us is the policy of different states, the more influential political parties, numerous political conceptions, theories and views. The varied and complex totality of political doctrines, conceptions, programmes, views, ideas constitute the political form of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Closely linked to it is another form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;law&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. It is the sum of principles and rules of human conduct endorsed by the state. Law is the expression of the will of the ruling class and is strictly enforced by the state through its extensive machinery of coercion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There are, however, principles of social behaviour which are dictated not necessarily and not only by the state. There are principles of conduct and criteria of good and bad, of right and wrong, which are observed and shared by tradition and are imposed by custom, public opinion and the authority of society as a whole or of a particular group. The totality of such principles of conduct and the ideas of what human conduct ought to be constitute the form of social consciousness known as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;ethics&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; or &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An acquaintance with recent publications, paintings, films, plays, etc., is part and parcel of the life of a modern person. Books, pictures, films, plays arouse either pleasurable or negative emotions and stimulate thought. The varied activities comprised in this area of cultural life are the form of social consciousness called art.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor can the life of a modern person be imagined without such a form of social consciousness as science, without scientific notions of the multifarious world around us. We appeal to science and scientists, advocate a scientific approach to the investigation of nature, society and thought, fight against unscientific methods, and proudly state that we live in the age of the scientific and technological revolution. We discussed the role of science in society at some length earlier in this book.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A particular form of social consciousness which seeks to give us a general conception, a general picture of the world, a knowledge of reality as an integral complex system and furnishes a methodology for studying the world has been named &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;philosophy&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Philosophy plays an immense role in society.  We only need recall that during the great French revolution the third estate advanced to victory under the slogans put forward by 18&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;th-&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;century materialists and Enlighteners. We may also note that Marxist-Leninist philosophy &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;s the theoretical basis of communism. This alone attests to the extraordinary significance philosophy has in the life of society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, sermons, divine services, quarrels between supporters of different religious trends, and so on play a certain role in the spiritual life of society. This form of social consciousness is known in Marxist philosophy as &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are the main forms of men’s spiritual activity or, to put it differently, the main forms of social consciousness. We shall now examine their association with social being. Since in class society&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;—&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;such as modern society is—political views hold an important place, we shall start our inquiry with this particular form of social consciousness. Let us begin with an example drawn from history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Ancient Greek biographer Plutarch tells us that Alexander, the son of Philip of Macedon, anxiously followed his father’s military operations. Philip annexed to Macedon one Greek city after another. Some of them capitulated after a long siege and others were taken by storm. As often as not, Philip bribed citizens to open the city gates to him. The successful king liked to say that a donkey laden with gold could take any city.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Greece at his feet, Philip was now planning an expedition against Persia. His ambitious son, Alexander, said bitterly that his father would capture all and leave nothing great or illustrious for Alexander to do. Alexander himself dreamed of conquest and saw himself as the builder of a world empire.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet Philip was suddenly assassinated and Alexander got the opportunity to carry out his ambitious plans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 334 B. C., Alexander of Macedon, who was twenty at that time, moved his troops into Asia Minor. For nine years (the campaign lasted till 325 B. C.) the peoples of Asia Minor, Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates valley, Central Asia and Northern India were plunged into bloody battles.  Alexander executed his plans relentlessly. He showed no mercy to whoever was bold enough to resist him, killing or turning them into slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alexander built the empire of his dreams. He destroyed the Persian kingdom and annexed its territories, conquering much of Central Asia and establishing his rule over Egypt. True, the Alexandrian empire did not last. In 325 B. C., Alexander, yielding to the demand of his spent troops, ended his expedition. In 323 B. C. Alexander died of fever. His generals began squabbling for power even before he was buried.  And soon the apparently mighty empire broke up into several kingdoms under Alexander&#039;s associates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now look at the matter from a different angle, as many historians and social scientists did. Philip of Macedon decided to unite Greece under Macedon, and he carried out his intention. Alexander the Great wanted to create a world empire. Plunging many peoples into bloody war, he created it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It seems that a leader gets an idea, proceeds to execute it and finally carries it out. Then the idea comes first and is followed by the action of the masses which causes change in social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of course, nothing can be simpler than to explain the development of world history from the doings of politicians and the influence of political views and theories. Thus, Plutarch associates the rise of Athens—one of the principal cities of ancient Greece—with the expedient policies of the legendary hero Theseus, and ascribes the foundation of Rome to another legendary hero, Romulus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, on going deeper into world history and examining the causes which actuated the outstanding personalities, such explanations prove utterly superficial. Let us examine the concrete facts associated with the activities of Philip of Macedon and his son, Alexander.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Philip of Macedon has gone down in history as the king who unified Greece. But what were the circumstances of the unification? Greece was weakened by incessant wars between its city-states. During hostilities, vineyards and orchards were cut down, crops destroyed, cities and villages burned. Internecine wars devastated Greece. Many historians related that villages lay in ruins, blackened stumps were all that was left of olive groves, the fields were overgrown with weeds. That was one reason why Greece was weakened. But there was another reason, which lay in the very essence of slavery. As the internecine wars went on, the number of slaves kept growing and for that reason free artisans and farmers became ruined.  Because slaves were much cheaper to keep, owners of large workshops employing slave labour were able to undersell the farmers and artisans. So small workshops were closed one after another while large shops multiplied. Farmers became ruined and their land was bought up by rich people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The masses staged rebellions. History has preserved the memory of an extensive rebellion of the poor in Corinth. The rebels killed the rich in the streets and wrecked their houses. The rich, however, triumphed in the end, ruthlessly suppressing the rebellion. Aristotle relates that the rich took this oath: “I swear to be the people’s eternal enemy and to cause it as much harm as I can.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Frequent clashes of the rich and the poor also contributed to the weakening of ancient Greek cities.  Many rich slave-owners were willing to accept the control over slaves and the poor. Therefore they pinned their hopes on the Macedonian kingdom in their neighbourhood, which was waxing stronger.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this made it easier for Philip of Macedon to unify Greek cities under the aegis of Macedon.  He took advantage of the fact that ancient Greece had been weakened by the devastating wars between city-states, as well as of the fact that many Greek Slave-owners accepted his rule, prising their wealth more than the independence of their native cities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to Philip’s son, Alexander. In his case, too, we find internal causes which lay in the very social being of ancient Greece and determined Alexander’s activities. In the 4th century B. C. it was increasingly felt that the internal sources of slavery in Greece were fizzling out. In order to develop further, slave-owning society had to be constantly supplied with slaves. Most of the free poor in Greece either had been enslaved or served in different armies as mercenary soldiers. Moving into the forefront were other sources providing slaves, viz., wars of conquest, subjugation of neighbouring and distant peoples and their enslavement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we look closely at the progress of hostilities conducted by Alexander, at the development of his military expedition, we shall observe this increasing tendency. Each time he won a battle, a great number of slaves were sent to Greece. For example, after his first triumph over the Persians, Alexander sent 60,000 slaves to Greece. After a second successful battle he sent 90,000 slaves. The number of slaves increased with every city taken.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thorough examination of concrete historical evidence, of political leaders’ views and goals shows that consciousness can never be anything else but realised being, and men’s being is the actual process of their life. We have tried to illustrate it by the examples of two prominent political leaders—Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. This approach to the analysis of different results of spiritual culture shows that in every sphere the results of the activity of consciousness are always a reflection of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But human culture is exceedingly rich and varied. Let us see whether it is corroborated by examples drawn from other spheres of spiritual culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Social Psychology and Ideology ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have considered but one part of man’s intellectual activity, i.e., his political views, political consciousness. It reflects definite aspects of social being, definite social needs. Yet, intellectual activity is highly complex and is not wholly reducible to politics. In human spiritual culture, we can isolate such areas or forms of social consciousness as morality, art, religion, science, philosophy and law. We know from experience that different principles of conduct, imposed by morality, works of art, religious beliefs, philosophical views, rules of conduct prescribed by law, and, lastly, science, play a great role in our life. The question is: Do these forms of social consciousness reflect social being as unavoidably as, we have found, political views do? Does the objective law of the reflection of social being hold equally in their case?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we must note that it is quite insufficient to analyse merely the more or less theoretically formalised views such as political conceptions, philosophical doctrines, complex ethical constructions, and so on. In human society, immense significance is attached to men’s moods and feelings. And it is very important to grasp the fact that all ideologies stem from one root, viz., the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the given age, characteristic of this particular age, the totality of its manners, customs, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Every development stage of the productive forces necessarily presupposes definite human relations in the process of social production or, to put it differently, it presupposes a definite social pattern. The latter, in its turn, affects men’s psychology, their habits, morals, feelings, views, aspirations and ideals which must necessarily become adapted to the prevailing way of life, to the means of gaining a livelihood. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Society’s psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; always ultimately matches its economic system, being determined by it.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To clarify this idea, let us look at some illustrations from the history of French art and literature. Many art critics quite justly call the outstanding French poet and novelist Victor Hugo, the talented artist Eugéne Delacroix and the brilliant composer Hector Berlioz a romantic trio. Yet, not only did each of them work in a different field of art, but they were in general quite far apart. At least, Hugo did not care for music and Delacroix despised romanticist musicians. Nevertheless, the productions of these men who were so unlike reflected the same social sentiments. Delacroix’s &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Dante and Virgil&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is pervaded by the same mood which prompted Hugo to write his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Hernani&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; and inspired the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Symphonie Fantastique&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of Berlioz.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why should Hugo’s writings, Delacroix’s paintings and Berlioz’ music be psychologically similar? The psychology of French Romanticism will be clear to us only if we regard it as the predominant mood of a concrete class existing in concrete historical circumstances. We shall see why this movement in art, which was essentially bourgeois, should have taken so long to win acceptance from the bourgeoisie.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fact was that the contemporary French bourgeoisie failed to understand much of what its own representatives sought to express in literature and art. Nor is such difference of Opinion at all unusual between ideologists and the class whose tastes and aspirations they express. It explains many features of mankind&#039;s intellectual and artistic development. In this particular instance, this difference of opinion resulted, incidentally, in the “refined elite” holding the “hidebound bourgeois” in great scorn which still continues to mislead many art historians, who are utterly incapable of understanding the supremely bourgeois character of French Romanticism. This intricate relation, the influence of social being on social psychology and, further, on more clearly defined areas of social consciousness must never be lost sight of.  Unless we pay attention to these interrelations, much in human culture will puzzle us. For instance, in classless primitive society, men’s conception of the world, their tastes, all their habits, customs, feelings, notions, strivings and ideas were directly influenced by their production activities.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; But in a society divided into classes, the immediate impact of economic activities on the spirit and especially on ideology is much less obvious. While Australian aborigines have a dance representing herb-gathering by women, no dance popular among French aristocratic ladies in the 18th century can be linked in any way with production activities because they engaged in none. To be able to understand what the Australian dance is about, it is enough to know what role herb-gathering plays in the life of an Australian tribe. But to see what the minuet is about, it is not enough to be familiar with the 18th-century French economy. The minuet is one of the dances expressive of the psychology of the leisure class. This psychology underlies most of the customs and “polite manners’ of so-called high society. At first sight, the economic life, social being, seems to be ousted in this case by purely psychological factors. That, however, would be a superficia&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; judgement, for one must not forget that the very emergence of leisure classes in society is the result of its economic development. It means that in this case too, social being retains its predominant significance. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class regards the lower strata with profound disdain, so that it becomes distinctly characteristic of its psychology. Medieval French lords, for instance, relished verses representing peasants as most repulsive creatures:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Villeins are monsters one and all,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As ugly as anything,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Standing fifteen foot tall&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And misshapen withal—&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Humpchested and numpbacked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants’ social psychology was in an entirely different vein. Indignant at the aristocrats’ arrogance, they sang:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are just as human as they,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And we can suffer just as much as they.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The peasants asked: “When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In a word, each of the two classes looked at things from its own point of view following from its own position in society. The position of classes, their antagonism tinged the psychology—the totality of sentiments and aspirations—of the opposite sides. The more tense the class struggle became, the more it influenced the psychology of the opposite classes. So, one who wants to know the history of ideology in a society divided into classes must reckon with this influence, otherwise much will escape his understanding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. Morality as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Now let us turn to morality or ethics which is the totality of diverse principles of conduct imposed by public opinion and the traditions, habits and customs established in society. Everyone knows from experience the great significance attached to these principles on which human conduct depends. We speak of some acts as good and of others as bad. We consider one kind of behaviour to be nice or good and another shabby or bad.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no law that you must say good morning to your friends. If you don’t, you won&#039;t be fined for it. Lack of common civility, churlishness or hardness are not punishable offences. Yet everybody would rather be polite, tactful and sympathetic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Everyone knows that there is nothing pleasant in being considered rude or conceited or in earning public disapproval. That is why people try to conform—or at least seem to conform—to the commonly accepted principles of conduct or morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the oldest form of social consciousness. It appeared in primitive society much earlier than art and religion, also very old forms of social consciousness. One may say that morality appeared with the first human community. That is clear because no community, however small it may be, can exist without a system of morals. For this reason, historians have found no people without at least a primitive morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is evidence of peoples with no philosophy or science, no law and hardly any art.  It is still open to question whether some had or had not religion. But every people had morality of some kind.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact attracted the attention of historians and ideologists long ago. As they tried to explain the origin of morality, some of them ascribed it to god or other divine sources and maintained that morality was fundamentally immutable and in no way connected with what we call the material conditions of men’s life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet if we turn to the history of moral notions and principles, we shall see that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;morals change along with living conditions&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. They depend on the productive forces and when the relations of production change, morals also change.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Collectivistic production relations under the primitive-communal system bred collectivistic habits and traditions and a collectivistic morality. When, however, the productive forces advanced and it became more suitable for the purpose of production that people should privately appropriate some things, i.e., when the relations of production changed, people’s notions also changed. Having private possession of something, which had been considered previously rather unnatural and unusual if not altogether indecent, now was regarded as ordinary and quite consistent with the social interest.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From the foregoing we can conclude that people, intentionally or unintentionally, ultimately derive their moral notions from economic practice.  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When examining &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;S&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; one must always bear it in mind that the class pattern directly affects morality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, if we look at developed capitalist European countries, we shall observe different moral conceptions some of which are rooted in their past history and some in their present mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall come across, first, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Christian-feudal&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt; morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; inherited from the past and preserving some moral views of the age of feudalism.  This Christian-feudal morality is divided, in the main, into Catholic and Protestant morality, and these are subdivided into a whole range of sects, from the Jesuit Catholic and Orthodox Protestant to liberal enlightener. Alongside such moral conceptions we find &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;modern bourgeois morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, and next to it &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;proletarian morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; projected into the future.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In countries following the socialist path, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;.e., those having built socialist society and those in transition from capitalism to socialism, &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; gains precedence. It is based on collectivist principles stemming from the domination of common ownership which corresponds to the development of modern production. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bourgeois ideologists often reproach Marxists for allegedly denying morality, and say that Marxism itself is amoral. Such allegations intentionally or unintentionally distort the essence. of Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxists deny that there is any eternal morality resting on immutable dogmas. They repudiate all attempts to impose on men a moral dogma of any sort as eternal, final, immutable moral law, under the pretext that the realm of morality has principles of its own which exist forever. Marxists maintain that every moral theory, every totality of principles of conduct is, in the last analysis, the product of society&#039;s concrete economic conditions. In class society, morality is always of a class nature: it either justifies the domination of the ruling class or, as soon as the oppressed class becomes strong enough, expresses its indignation against the ruling class.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Communist morality&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is the most resolute form of protest against the exploiters’ government.  It expresses the interest of the working class and all working people. Speaking about communist morality at the 3rd Congress of Komsomol, Lenin said that communist morality was that which helped to demolish the old exploiting society and to rally all working people round the proletariat building a new communist society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Communist morality helps the proletariat in its efforts to win a happier future for mankind, to build communism. It musters working people against all exploitation, against private ownership which puts in the hands of an individual that which is produced by society’s common effort.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Under the primitive-communal system, with its collectivist principles, morality was also collectivistic. In class society, change in the class pattern told most directly on the moral views of classes and individuals. In socialist society, communist morality begins to develop. In a word, in this sphere of man’s spiritual life, in this form of social consciousness, the rule that change in social being causes change in social consciousness also holds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Religion as a Form of Social Consciousness ====&lt;br /&gt;
Drawing on Plutarch, we can reconstruct one of ancient Roman’s religious customs. Imagine the sun-flooded streets of ancient Rome. A procession is slowly moving along accompanying a criminal to the place of execution. The armed lictors, full of official importance, step beside the man, while a little way behind citizens follow, exchanging their impressions of the trial and discussing the impending execution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doomed man does not seem to notice anything. He is plunged in thought and already far from the turmoil of life. But what is this sudden commotion? Why are the guards trying to push the man into a by-street? Why is he looking round with a renewed interest in life?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Another procession is moving towards them surrounding the chair in which a Vestal is carried, a priestess of Vesta, the Roman hearthgoddess. According to Roman custom, a condemned criminal who meets a Vestal on his way to execution is not executed. The Vestal has only to swear that the encounter was unpremeditated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, human laws had to give way to what they believed to be divine law. This illustration tells enough about the importance they attached to religion. One could quote numerous examples showing the role religion played in the life of other people, in other countries, in other times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us recall the crusades conducted in the middle ages. Apparently to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims, thousands of crusaders massacred Muslims. Let us recall the massacre of St. Bartholomew (1572) when 30,000 Huguenots were killed in Paris alone because of religious strife.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is religion, which can save a condemned criminal’s life and destroy hundreds of thousands of innocent people? How should revolutionaries approach this important social phenomenon? How are these questions answered in Marxism-Leninism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us hear first what representatives of religion have to say—the theologians, who are constantly dealing with religious problems and preaching religious principles. How do they define religion?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Most Christian theologians derive the word “religion” from Latin &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religio&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, reverence, which is connected with &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religare&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, to tie back. From the theological standpoint, religion is the link between man and god. Religion appears as a totality of statutes, dogmas, cults, rites and principles of conduct decreed by god and binding a believer to god.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar view is shared by non-Christian theologians. The Buddhists, for example, believe that religion boils down to the dogma on the attainment of salvation by Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhist religion, to the principles of conduct laid down by Buddha, which promise salvation and subsequent union with Buddha.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To Muslims, followers of Allah, religion is embodied in the rules and principles of conduct written down by Allah in the sacred book of the Muslims, the Koran, which vouchsafe to the believer communion with Allah and salvation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up, theologians hold religion to be a bond between man and god. But first of all it is necessary to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;prove&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; that god exists. The point is, however, that there are no means of proving it, nor can there be any.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is this so? To begin with, there were numerous gods whom men used to worship, but then it turned out that these gods did not exist. To mention but a few, they were Bel, Anu, Astarte, Osiris, Isis, Horus, Set, Zeus, Poseidon, Hades, Apollo, Athena, Hera, Artemis, Jupiter, Mars, Janus, Vesta. The list is endless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ancient peoples had implicit faith in their gods. When the ancient Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates dared question the existence of the Olympic gods and deride them, they were made to pay dearly for it. Anaxagoras owed his life to the intervention of Pericles, a leading Athenian statesman. All the same, he was banished from Athens. Socrates was condemned for &amp;amp;quot;neglect of the gods” and died by drinking a cup of hemlock, as was the rule in Athens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Christian, Muslim and other theologians are convinced of the importance of religion to mankind because they think that the gods in which they believe really exist. Facts tell us, however, that religious beliefs also played a great role where the objects of worship were clearly mythological, i.e., imaginary. From this it follows that the theological conception of the role played by religion in the life of human society is plainly threadbare. What role does religion actually play?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, religion is a part of the spiritual culture of mankind. Whatever book on history we take, whether written by a theologian, a bourgeois scholar or a Marxist, we are sure to find a section on religious beliefs in the chapter devoted to the culture of a particular people or the culture of some historical epoch.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, we come across religion mostly in connection with culture and those spheres of life which are directly associated with spiritual culture. To be precise, religion is one of the principal forms of social consciousness, one of the major components of men’s intellectual activity, of spiritual world culture. As a form of social consciousness, it is, in a sense, comparable with such important areas of social consciousness as politics, law, morality, art, science and philosophy. After all, social consciousness does not merely reflect reality, social being. It shapes people’s conduct, leading them to act in the way they do. Each form of social consciousness does it in its own way. This equally applies to religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Engels and Lenin did much to elucidate the meaning of religion. We are already familiar with one constituent of the Marxist definition of religion, viz., that &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religion is a form of social &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;consciousness&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. That, however, is not all. Marxism also establishes the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;specific nature of the reflection of the world in religion&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While all other forms of social consciousness reflect reality more or less adequately, religion alone is the form of social consciousness which gives a distorted, fantastic picture of the external world. Marx said that religion “is the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;fantastic realisation&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the human essence”, that it is the people’s illusory happiness, a perverted view of a perverted world, “the general theory” of that perverted world, its encyclopaedic compendium, “its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-110|110]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Concerning the particular quality of religion as a distortion of reality, Engels wrote: &amp;amp;quot;All religion...is nothing but a fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which contro&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;l&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-111|111]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That is how religion reflects the world. Nevertheless, religion does not boil down to a general world outlook, a general view of the world. It also comprises an emotional, sensuous element, a certain emotional reaction to the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religion should not be conceived merely as some kind of faith in the world being built on a certain pattern and being ruled by gods or other supernatural forces. Religion is not just a definite interpretation of reality, a peculiar theory of the world, however much distorted.  If it were so, it would have been shattered long ago, for it would be easy to prove that this conception of the world has no foundation in experience and to replace these fantastic notions by a scientific conception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But, quite apart from other things, religion is a definite attitude to the world. One who has religious notions of the world conceives of himself as part of this fantastic world with which he associates certain hopes, illusions and expectations. This complex of feelings bred by religion makes the latter extremely tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious sentiments refer to &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious psychology&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; which is of a dual nature being an expression of helplessness, weakness and fear on the one hand, and of hope on the other, which sometimes grows over into religious protest, ecstasy and fanaticism. Writing of this level of religion, Marx underlined that “&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;religious&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;protest&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; against real distress.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-112|112]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus in Marxist theory two levels of religion are differentiated, viz., the world-view level and the emotional level. Religious notions and ideas constitute the so-called mythological (or worldview) element of religion—a body of myths dealing with the gods, legendary heroes and all sorts of spirits, with their relation to the world and man, and so on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The emotional level of religion—just as its ideological level~represents a twisted, distorted level of human consciousness. Religion distorts not only man’s consciousness, his world outlook, but his feelings, his emotional responses to reality as well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would not, however, be enough to dwell on these two levels of religious consciousness alone. After all, we have stated that the forms of social consciousness influence and shape human conduct. The distorted conception and perception of the world, inherent in religion as a form of social consciousness, compel man to behave in a similarly distorted, perverse, inadequate manner. A believer worships his god in a definite fashion, performing different rites, offering sacrifices and prayers, kneeling, etc.  All this constitutes the ritualistic or cultic aspect of religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Religious activity is not, however, confined to worship. Groups, organisations and associations of believers, the churches adopt a definite attitude towards society and social issues, participating in the life of society, social conflicts, the class struggle, etc. These activities are marked by the religious conception and perception of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus we see that religion is a highly intricate social phenomenon comprising several levels some of which are related to consciousness, and some to practice. These levels are the result of the twisted, distorted, fantastic reflection and conception of reality. That was what led Marx, after evaluating and summing up all aspects of religion, to conclude that religion is “the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;opium&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of the people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-113|113]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Lenin regarded this as the key Marxist proposition on religion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To sum up. Religion is a form of social consciousness. It is a distorted, fantastic reflection of the natural and social forces dominating men, a reflection in which earthly forces assume non-earthly, supernatural forms. It is a more or less compact body of mythological-philosophical notions, religious psychology and religious ritual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §5. Art ====&lt;br /&gt;
Speaking about art, Marx observed that its development does not always correspond to the general development of society, with the development of society&#039;s material basis, which is the skeleton, as it were, of society&#039;s organisation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, an inquiry into the social role of art inevitably poses questions. Why did peoples (e.g., the ancient Greeks) far less advanced than the modern peoples attain such superb heights in art? How can we explain the fact that works of art produced long ago (e.g., under slavery) still continue to bring people aesthetic pleasure? These and other questions require concrete answers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all it must be understood that the art of a particular age is connected with definite forms of social development. We know that Greek art not only drew on Greek mythology but was rooted in it. And mythology is nothing but &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;folklore&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; giving an imaginative and fanciful interpretation of nature and the fundamental notions of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But is it possible, in our own age, for anyone to entertain notions of nature and society such as underlay Greek mythology, for instance?  How would Zeus the Thunderer compare with the lightning-conductor? Or the god of commerce, Hermes with the modern banking and credit system? Or the other gods of Olympus, with the modern transportation facilities, machines and especially robots?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And yet, the marvellous works of ancient Greek art continue to bring us aesthetic pleasure to this day. Why? To the modern man Greek art is, in a sense, the childhood of humanity. An adult person cannot be like a child. Still a child’s ingenuousness has a great fascination for him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is why the childhood of mankind continues to attract us as a peculiar and unique stage of social development. Marx remarked that there were unmannerly children and precocious children. Ancient Greeks were normal children. Therefore the peculiar charm of their art does not conflict with the rather primitive environment from which it sprang. On the contrary, those were the only circumstances in which it could possibly grow, and it is inseparable from them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because it is rich and varied, ancient Greek art does not perhaps make a very lucid example. And yet, even in its case we can trace the effect of the objective law that social being shapes forms of social consciousness appropriate to it, leaving its mark on the very productions of the art of ancient Greece. Let us delve even deeper into history and look at the age in which human relations were much simpler and clearer and the connection with material production was immediately observable.  Will the period of the primitive-communal system supply us with examples corroborating the operation of the objective laws discovered by Marxism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First let us see how man’s notions of beauty developed. In different historical epochs different peoples had distinct, often opposing notions of beauty. Things that are considered beautiful in one age could be considered ugly in another. Why? How did notions of beauty form over the ages?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Scholars studying art in primitive society almost unanimously note that animals’ skins, claws and teeth are greatly valued by primitive peoples as ornaments. It was not that they found their colour and patterns particularly attractive. As he decorated himself with an animal&#039;s skin, a tiger’s claws or teeth, a bison’s skin or horns, primitive man was showing others that he was as quick and strong as the beast he had defeated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such conclusions are corroborated by ethnographic evidence concerning the notions of peoples which are still at one or another stage of the primitive-communal system. Students of the life of North American western tribes inform us, for instance, that some tribes like to wear ornaments made from the claws of the grizzly bear, the most savage of the wild beasts found in those parts. The red-skinned warrior believes that the fierceness and courage of the grizzly bear are communicated to him who decks himself with its claws.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This example confirms conclusion that the aesthetic notions of beauty in the remote past were directly linked with peoples’ production activities and everyday life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now consider another example drawn from ethnography. Again, it must be remembered that in a certain respect ethnographic evidence gives us an idea of the primitive-communal epoch. Certainly, no existing tribe whose development has been retarded and which has remained at a certain stage in the primitive-communal system for a variety of historical reasons can be identified with peoples which lived in that epoch. Nevertheless, they have something in common, and these historical analogies enable us to form an idea of how our remote ancestors lived.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know, for instance, that women of many African tribes wear iron rings on their arms and legs. Wives of rich men may wear about ten kilograms of such ornaments. From our point of view, this is certainly very uncomfortable, yet the discomfort does not prevent many African women from wearing such “chains” of beauty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why does an African woman like to wear these “chains”? The reason is that they make her appear beautiful to herself and to others.  This results from a rather complex association of ideas. The passion for such ornaments is observed among the tribes which have but recently left behind the Iron Age, i.e., those among which iron is considered a precious metal. And everything precious seems beautiful because it is associated with the idea of wealth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here is another example illustrating the idea of the beautiful current among some African tribes. The Batokas who live in the upper reaches of the river Zambezi consider it ugly for a person not to have removed the upper incisors. Where does this odd notion spring from?  It is also due to a rather complex association of ideas. Batokas part with their upper incisors to imitate the ruminating animals. We may think it a somewhat peculiar desire, but the Batokas are a pastoral tribe with whom cattle spells wealth. Hence the idea that what is dear is beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have quoted examples of various notions of beauty held by some peoples. At first sight, these notions seem to have nothing in common.  But in fact they have. The notions of beauty shared by primitive and retarded peoples reflect certain aspects of their social being, of their mode of life.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hunting peoples consider the claws, teeth or skins of the animals they hunt to be beautiful.  What is hard to get is considered beautiful.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peoples familiar with wealth and social inequality associate the idea of beauty with wealth and social inequality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Pastoral peoples, whose life is most closely connected with cattle, associate their ideas of beauty with the most valuable thing they have, cattle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We find further proof of the inherent connection of art and social being in other kinds of art. Thus many African peoples have the keenest sense of rhythm, an oarsman singing in rhythm with the movements of the oars, porters singing in rhythm with their steps, and housewives singing in rhythm with their corn grinders. Basuto women, who wear metal bangles on their arms, which tinkle at every movement, often gather together to grind corn, accompanying the rhythmical movement of their arms by singing. The beat is the main thing in Basuto music, and the more rhythmical a song, the more beautiful it is considered. That was also characteristic of our remote ancestors.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Why is the beat important? The answer is that primitive men chanted in rhythm with their work, and every kind of work had a chant adapted to its rhythm. As the productive forces advanced, the significance of rhythm in work decreased, although it is not lost altogether.  In some German villages, for instance, every season has particular noises associated with it, and every kind of work similarly has particular music associated with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Generalising these facts, students of primitive art point out the close similarity between the economic conditions of our primitive ancestors and contemporary retarded peoples whose life and art form the subject of ethnography. What makes many works of modern bourgeois art hard to appreciate is the absence of any direct connection between art and the methods of production in civilised society. We must see, however, that this is the result of nothing but the development itself of the social productive forces, which causes the division of social labour between different classes. The fact that society has become more complex, that the connection between art and social being has become more intricate, does not in the least disprove the materialist view of the history of art but, on the contrary, provides fresh and convincing evidence in its support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us turn to French society in the 18th century. The class nature of this society directly affected the development of French art, and thus the drama. In medieval France, just as in Western Europe at large, the farce was predominant in the theatre. Farces were written and performed for the people. They were an expression of the popular views and sentiments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the reign of Louis XIII, the farce began to decline. It was considered to be only good enough for lackeys and not for persons of refined taste. The farce was supplanted by the tragedy. Yet the French tragedy had nothing to do with the ideas and sentiments of the masses.  It expressed the views, tastes and aspirations of the aristocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Time passed, and the aristocracy began to decline. The spirit of opposition steadily spread among the bourgeoisie and began to make itself felt in art as well. The growing third estate (the bourgeoisie) was dissatisfied with literature and the theatre which it would like to see more edifying. It was then that the bourgeois drama appeared, contrasting the virtuous bourgeois to the depraved aristocrat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, we see that this form of social consciousness, art, is directly affected by the changing life of society, changing social patterns and class relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We could quote more examples to show that other forms of social consciousness also reflect social being. There is, however, no need for it as we have already given many illustrations sufficiently corroborating the objective law governing the development of different forms of social consciousness, which was described in Marxist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §6. Revolutionary Theory and the Revolutionary Movement ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion we shall dwell on one more problem which is essential to the comprehension of the relation of social consciousness and social being. So far, we have stressed that social consciousness reflects social being, and that different products of social consciousness are, to one extent or another, reflections of social being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
May we conclude from this that social being is merely reflected in social consciousness, as in a mirror? No, such a conclusion would be quite incorrect. Precisely such a position on the passive nature of social consciousness, ideas and the spiritual life of mankind has been ascribed to Marxism by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie, of the classes which are hostile to the working class and working people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By establishing the fact that social consciousness depends on social being, that social consciousness reflects social being, Marxist-Leninist theory has by no means belittled the significance of social consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having given a correct definition of social consciousness, Marxist theory also indicates its place in the life of society. One cannot transform society by transforming ideas alone. To make society better, to make life truly human, it is necessary to reorganise social being. And social consciousness plays a highly important part in it. It gives man knowledge of the methods of transforming life. Seizing the masses, social consciousness urges them to work for the transformation of reality. That is why Marx stated that &amp;amp;quot;... theory... becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-114|114]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
=== 9. The Ideological Struggle and Human Rights&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#anchor198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;s-t&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the previous chapters we considered mainly the philosophical problems which make up the theoretical framework of the Marxist world outlook. But, however abstract its propositions, philosophy is never isolated from life. It always performs methodological and ideological functions, helping men to find their bearings in the complex social reality and the battle of ideas.  Dialectical and historical materialism is no exception in this respect. Let us take a look at the battle of ideas in the 20th century and the place of communist and bourgeois ideology in this battle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
History has witnessed numerous coups, discoveries, wars and revolutions which left their imprint on subsequent developments. But whatever happened, the exploitation of man by man remained, and all development went on within the limits of exploitative society. The working people who performed revolutions saw their hopes crushed as one form of exploitation was replaced by another.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, historical progress was bought at too dear a price. Marx wrote that the progress of history in antagonistic society was like “that hideous pagan idol, whe would not drink the nectar but from the sculls of the slain.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-115|115]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia radically altered the course of history, translating into reality the dreams of the best minds of humanity. It destroyed exploiting society and created a new, equitable social system.  The triumph of the Revolution implied the triumph of the progressive new ideology of Marxism-Leninism which became predominant in a huge country occupying one-sixth of the globe.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §1. Two Ideologies ====&lt;br /&gt;
Adversaries of the working class like to say that there would be no ideological struggle if the Communists had not invented it. History, however, testifies to the contrary. It shows that ideological struggle has been going on ever since ideological relations started among men.  It was pursued in different ways and its intensity varied from one historical period to another, but no matter how its forms and pitch might change, it has always been there, expressing the interests of different, and often diametrically so, social classes at all stages in history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the emergence of Marxism, ideological struggle becomes more intense. At a time when communism was yet a mere “spectre haunting Europe”, its founders wrote: “All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-116|116]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as Marxism emerged, all forces of the old world united against it ignoring their own ideological differences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle increased especially after the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution. From then on, the bourgeoisie’s &amp;amp;quot;righteous indignation” at communist ideology went hand in hand with its hatred for the Soviet system, giving rise to a combination of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ideological struggle against the Soviet Union has always had an important role to play in the overall political strategy of imperialism.  For some time the imperialists hoped that their military superiority would enable them to get the upper hand in the ideological argument by sheer force of arms. That superiority was, however, but shortlived. As the balance of forces in the world changed, imperialism was faced with a historical situation, quite new to it, in which all expectations to resolve the ideological antagonisms by military means were doomed.  As a result, the global strategy of imperialism had to be thoroughly revised and the ideological struggle, whose outcome is to determine the direction in which history will move, was put in the forefront.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the theories of “erosion of socialism”, “national communism” (or “regional Eurocommunism&amp;amp;quot;), and so on. Ideologists of imperialism seek above all to discredit Marxism-Leninism and real socialism, and sow discord in the developed socialist society, the world socialist system, and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today socialist ideology is a major factor determining the intellectual climate in the world. Not only is it dominant in the socialist countries, but it also has millions of supporters beyond their boundaries. This undermines the ideological positions of imperialism and causes bourgeois ideology increasingly to lose social support. Viewed from this angle, the development of history over the past sixty years has been marked by a series of setbacks sustained by bourgeois ideology, while Marxism-Leninism has gained new ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §2. Anti-Communism—the Ideological Weapon of Imperialism ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even so, it would be wrong and dangerous to underestimate the possibilities of bourgeois ideology. While imperialism’s ideological positions were undermined, the monopoly bourgeoisie and its pundits were looking for new opportunities of counteracting socialism, brainwashing the masses and spreading anti-communism. The ideological stock-in-trade of imperialism was thus modified and updated.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the political and military-strategic context imperialism has to reckon with the changed balance of forces in the world and, as it still hopes to crush socialism some day, is compelled to manoeuvre, stepping up ideological subversion against the socialist countries and trying to &amp;amp;quot;bore socialism from within.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Adjusting to the new historical situation, bourgeois ideologists have changed their methods of fighting Marxism. In view of the immense popularity of socialist ideas, they can no longer pretend that there is no such thing as Marxism or abuse it to their heart’s content or indulge in vulgar anti-communism. Having to tread more warily, they increasingly turn to Marx, extracting isolated fragments from his works and adapting them to their own ends.  It comes as no surprise that the more the influence of Marxism grows, the more persistent are the attempts to revise it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In recent years bourgeois ideology united with revisionism. The mounting activity of revisionism, both right and “‘left&amp;amp;quot;, is supported by imperialism and plays an important part in ideological sabotage against socialism and the world communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism was and continues to be the chief ideological weapon of imperialist reaction. The anti-communists would like nothing better than to see the socialist system split and become “polycentric&amp;amp;quot; and to see the “erosion of socialism&amp;amp;quot;. They think that growing contacts with the West will cause new value orientations to emerge in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, bringing about a sweeping degeneration of culture in them which will furnish a lever for remaking socialist society in the spirit desirable to the West.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-communism has become more active in the treatment of problems of political democracy and individual freedom. This has resulted in a campaign over the imaginary violation of human rights in the socialist countries, in which the present US Administration and government bodies in some NATO countries take an active part. In the course of the campaign, pluralistic bourgeois democracy is presented as a model while the inherent vices of capitalism—social inequality, exploitation, inflation and unemployment—are ignored. In spite of bourgeois propaganda, the masses are increasingly aware that socialist democracy alone can ensure freedom from exploitation and give the people a decisive part in government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that even notoriously reactionary writers are beginning to realise that the primitive anti-communism of some years ago with its myths and bankrupt doctrines can no longer help the imperialist countries to work out an effective policy. The article of Prof. A. Dallin of Columbia University “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR” is of interest in this respect. Prof. Dallin acknowledges that the Americans’ notions about the Soviet Union ever since 1917 have been full of ignorance and incomprehension, and that leading US statesmen and journalists are under the spell of the delusion and prejudice created by their own propaganda machine.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-117|117]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar to other forms of bourgeois ideology, anti-communism is not due to some politicians’ ill will, although there is no reason to deny it either. Bourgeois ideology in whatever form is nothing else but a distorted reflection in ideology of real developments occurring in the world and, above all, in the capitalist world. And if we want to understand and explain modern anti-communism, we must turn to capitalist reality in which lie the socio-economic and political roots of contemporary anti-communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §3. The American Realities and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
The crisis of the 1970s has proved again that the socialist system has indisputable advantages over capitalism. It has confirmed the stability of the socialist economy and its inexhaustible capacity for satisfying, unlike capitalism, the fundamental rights and freedoms without which man cannot exist. Modern developments have, undoubtedly, served to increase further the prestige of the existing socialist society in the non-socialist world and enhance the attraction of the historical example set by the peoples having rid themselves of social oppression and exploitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These circumstances by themselves could explain the purpose of the propaganda campaign which is to convince peoples in the non-socialist countries that things are not so bad at all, divert their attention from their own deteriorating economic and social position to the problems of political democracy, and to slander socialism once again in the hope of making it less attractive to peoples of other countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor is that all. This bourgeois campaign sets out to undermine the socialist system from within, seeking out malcontents and provoking conflicts in socialist countries. It is also designed to split the international communist movement, setting some communist parties against others under the false slogan of “national”, “regional”, and other brands of communism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is nobody’s secret that this propaganda campaign has intensified after the new administration in Washington came into office, and that from then on certain American officials and government agencies have assumed the unseemly role of leaders and inspirers of this campaign.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fact, unprecedented for many years, certainly requires explanation. And it can be explained from the situation which had shaped in the United States by the time the present administration came into office. Yet, the roots of this situation lie in the American political history of the 1960s-1970s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The shots in Dallas which killed President J. F. Kennedy rang throughout America, ushering in an era of major political crimes. No doubt, the underlying social causes which led to the degradation of American politics had taken shape earlier and were engendered by the social and the state system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, however, not only the assassination of a president on whom different social groups pinned their hopes which, incidentally, were never realised, that shocked the United States.  It was also the disgraceful game the US official quarters described as investigation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; It&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; would be hard now to say exactly what caused the prestige of state authority in the United States to fall—whether it was the assassination itself or the sheer inability of a government spending astronomic sums on maintaining an intelligence service in the country to protect its own prestige and immunity. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This amazing impotence of authority and absolute impunity of the actual sponsors of the crime, doubtlessly, set off a series of assassinations each of which was declared to be the work of one individual or another. The authorities were not at all abashed by the fact that more and more such “individuals&amp;amp;quot; turned up.  Yet, each assassination as well as stereotyped “inquiry” made opinion increasingly suspicious of the government and doubtful of its ability to protect its citizens and uphold their rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this coincided with acute racial and national conflicts which aggravated the home situation still more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The war in Vietnam, which American journalists now describe as the dirtiest war in American history, was another fact which had disastrous consequences for the home political situation in the United States. Its impact on the domestic scene, although not fully unravelled yet, was immense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only that US servicemen were sent to die for what was incompatible with the genuine interests of the American people, which was the cause of mass desertion from the army and the reason why young men of call-up age fled the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nor was it that thousands of American soldiers involved in massacres in Vietnam received lessons in moral degradation which no people can escape unscathed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was, above all, that the Vietnam war itself was a flagrant violation of American law which states that the US Congress alone may declare war (Section 8, Art. I of the Constitution of the United States). And the US Congress never declared war on Vietnam. The war just went on, swallowing thousands of American lives, while presidents issued orders they had no right to issue under the Constitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus for several years while that undeclared war lasted, the US Government gave the people a memorable lesson in violation of law and civil rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, another unconstitutional process was developing during the Vietnam war. It was the concentration of power in the hands of the non-elective White House apparatus. Joseph C.  Harsch wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Christian Science Monitor&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 11, 1976: &amp;amp;quot;The seizure of the policymaking function by the White House and its concentration in the White House staff has been a process which began slowly and cautiously....&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“... It began growing again under John F. Kennedy, and exploded in the Johnson and Nixon era.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Harsch mentioned in the same article that the outsized President’s office numbered 1,831 persons including 61 special assistants to the President.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation in which government of the United States is carried out not by the heads of departments accountable to the Congress, but the White House personnel accountable to the President, is, according to Harsch, causing anxiety to the Congress which, he writes, has “lost its ability to get at and help control policymaking”. It is not accidental that James M.  Naughton wrote in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; of November 29, 1976, summing up, as it were, the presidencies of Nixon and Ford: “Six years of imperial Presidency and two of executive restraint worked in combination to alter the outlook, change the tone and, to some extent, restructure the shape of the executive branch.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The entire process is unconstitutional, whereby the Americans were given a lesson in autocratic disregard of the law for quite a number of years. Prof. Neustadt of Harvard University, whose opinions are often cited by the American press, considers in the light of these circumstances the institute of presidency as a “kingship” in the sense that it makes the Americans react to it emotionally just as other peoples respond to monarchy.&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-118|118]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prof. Schlesinger writes in his &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Imperial Presidency&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Boston, 1973) that “‘the Presidency has got out of control” (p. X) and is hardly constitutional as it is, and that to keep “a strong President constitutional, in addition to checks and balances incorporated within his own breast” ... “the vigilance of the nation’ is also needed, or the Americans will have an imperial presidency (p. 418). How serious a problem of the “‘crisis of government institutes” in the United States has become is also witnessed by the conference held in Los Angeles in the autumn of 1974 (&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The Center Magazine&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, Vol. VII, No. 5, 1974, p. 31). The conference discussed the crisis in the contemporary presidency. One of the speakers at the conference was Senator Walter F. Mondale (now Vice-President), who said that it was necessary to raise the prestige of the legislative bodies and “curb any President’s illegal use of the most sensitive law-enforcement agencies of the government: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency.... They are ... instruments of great potential danger to our constitutional liberties.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; Watergate was another important landmark &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n the chain of events which have resulted in the “crisis of confidence in the institutes of government” in the United States. The long inquiry, which revealed flagrant violation of elementary rights and liberties, and Nixon&#039;s eventual resignation showed once again that arbitrary rule had become routine in American society. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To this should be added sensational exposures of the violation of civil rights and liberties by the American intelligence service agencies both at home and abroad, and of scandalous instances of corruption and tax dodging by American politicians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All this has resulted in a powerful civil rights campaign in the United States spearheaded against race and national discrimination and the war in Vietnam.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt; In that situation, the American propaganda machine tried to rehabilitate the “American way of life&amp;amp;quot;, “American system of values&amp;amp;quot;, etc., &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;n connection with the 200th anniversary of American Independence. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This campaign was not, however, much of a success, the festivities being overshadowed by the disgrace of the Vietnam war and Watergate. The general trend of American propaganda at the time is well illustrated by an article in &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The New York Times&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; devoted to Independence Day (July 4, 1976). It said among other things: “Two years after Watergate and four years after Vietnam, friends who were then ashamed of the United States seem to be saying now that they see America’s better values surviving.” Such was the cold comfort that bourgeois propaganda-mongers offered to the people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Add to it a series of scandalous exposures of immorality, corruption and tax dodging on the part of some Congressmen and prominent politicians, which equally attested to the breaches of the law by the powers that be. Obviously enough, in such circumstances the leading American statesmen have no reason to pose as champions of legality, civil rights and freedom.  The campaign “in defence of human rights” in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is regarded by the present US Administration as a major means of diverting the Americans’ attention from arbitrary rule and illegality in their own country, as well as a means of rehabilitating the American state system both in the eyes of the Americans and world opinion at somebody else’s expense, by harming the peoples whose socialist system provides an effective alternative to capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his speech, “The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress&amp;amp;quot;, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the new Soviet Constitution &amp;amp;quot;gives further convincing proof that concepts of freedom, human rights, democracy and social justice become truly meaningful only under socialism.&amp;amp;quot;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-119|119]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== §4. Mature Socialism and Human Rights ====&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels always viewed socialism as a social system under which free development of every individual is the condition of free development of all, of society at large.  Developed socialist society today gives each of its members a wide range of rights and freedoms. To illustrate, the 1977 Soviet Constitution ensures citizens such rights as the right to work, to housing, to education, the right to enjoy cultural benefits, the right to submit proposals to state bodies and criticise shortcomings in their work, freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work, the right to associate in public organisations, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is ensured by the socialist economic system, steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, free vocational and professional training, improvement of skills and training in new trades and professions. The right to work is not a new constitutional right, it was granted to Soviet citizens under the 1936 Constitution. Is it a mere reiteration of the previous Constitution or are there some new points here? Let us look into this question.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Proclamation of a constitutional right is, of course, a very important thing. That every citizen should have the right to work and to equal pay for equal work, irrespective of social status, race, nationality, religion, sex, etc., is certainly of exceeding importance. No one would deny that the political and legal guarantees of this right are very important. Yet, they can be easily upset by the simple fact that there are not enough jobs in the country. Then labour exchanges will be overcrowded, newspapers will be full of advertisements placed by people looking for work, and there will be hundreds of thousands or even millions jobless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, the right to work has social and economic, as well as political and legal, guarantees. It means that the socio-economic structure of Soviet society (public ownership of the basic means of production, economic planning, crisis-free economic development) is such that since 1930 there has been no unemployment in the Soviet Union. All labour exchanges there closed in 1930 as nobody wanted them any more.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, in order to understand the full implication of the right to work in the Soviet Union it is not enough to know merely one, albeit essential, fact that unemployment was abolished there. The Soviet state provides employment for all of its citizens. The new Soviet Constitution considerably extends the content of the right to work, stating that at the current stage the Soviet state can do much more to provide favourable conditions for its implementation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Today the Soviet state not only provides employment for all citizens, but also commits itself to make it possible for citizens to choose their trade or profession in accordance with their inclinations and be trained accordingly.  This is ensured by the wide network of state-run vocational schools with training free of charge. As for those who already have a trade or profession, the state gives them every opportunity to improve their skills or train for another occupation. Practically every enterprise—certainly every medium-sized or large one has numerous programmes for skill improvement and schools, including technical secondary schools, at which one can train in a new trade or greatly improve his qualifications without giving up his job. Many enterprises have technical higher schools. Training is, of course, gratuitous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a result of diverse political, legal, social and economic measures, including the abolition of unemployment, creation of new jobs on a mass scale and free vocational training throughout the country, demand for labour in the Soviet Union exceeds the supply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to housing&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; is a new constitutional right not to be confused with the article on the inviolability of the homes of citizens which can be found in nearly every constitution. What does this innovation in constitutional law mean?  Why was this right not mentioned in the previous Soviet Constitution? It was due above all to the fact that the available housing the Soviet Union inherited from the tsarist regime was insufficient. Although the Soviet Government did much even before the war for a fair redistribution of the available housing and launched the construction of new houses for working people, these measures were not yet enough. The Soviet Union lacked the industrial facilities for housing construction. Further, one must consider the fact that during the Second World War great damage was caused to the available housing, insufficient as it was. The Nazi invaders burned to the ground 92,000 villages and destroyed dwellings in 2,500 towns and townships. The Soviet state, naturally, had to spend time and effort to restore the ruined houses. For this reason it was unable for a long time to ensure its citizens the right to housing and had to limit itself to satisfying their elementary requirements in that respect.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thanks to the strides made by the developed socialist economy, it recently became possible to launch the construction of houses by industrial methods. Let us see now how available housing has increased in the Soviet Union. The young Soviet state inherited from the tsarist regime altogether 180 million sq m of useful floor space in towns. This figure has by now been exceeded ten times, mounting to 1,860 million sq m. In the last decade alone, 34 million flats were constructed, which means that more than half the population and nearly three-quarters of the urban population live in new flats or houses. Since some people move into new flats and houses, those who remain in the old dwellings are less crowded, so the majority of working people have had their living conditions improved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Houses are built in the Soviet Union at an increasing rate. Whereas in forty-odd years, 1917-1959, only about 500 million sq m of floor space in state-owned houses could be built, 545-550 million sq m of floor space will be put into operation during the current five-year period alone (1976-1980). Such is one side of the problem, which is that at the current stage the Soviet state really can provide its citizens with comfortable dwellings.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the problem is no less important. Rent in the Soviet Union is the lowest in the world, although it is paid for the use of modern dwellings with all conveniences.  Soviet citizens are astonished to hear foreign visitors complain that rent consumes more than a third of their earnings. In the Soviet Union, rent comes on average to 5-6 per cent of earnings. Since there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, and labour is in great demand, usually several members of a family have jobs and on this basis rent accounts at most for 2-3 per cent of the aggregate income of an average Soviet family. In many countries, as is known, apartment houses or tenements constitute a profitable industry. The Soviet state, however, has never regarded rent as an item of revenue. Both in the past and at the present time rent in the Soviet Union is expended on the maintenance and preservation of houses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The great material possibilities for the construction of new houses and the social measures taken to ensure fair distribution of floor space at low rent thus make a real guarantee of the right of Soviet citizens to housing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; was also granted under the previous Constitution. In this instance, too, the new feature consists in the much greater possibilities that now exist in the Soviet Union for the implementation of the right to education. In the 1930s, when the previous Constitution was adopted, the state could afford only four-year universal compulsory and free education and was just beginning to introduce universal seven-year education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At present, the shift to universal free ten-year education has been completed in the Soviet Union. Currently there are more than 167,000 general education schools, 4,300 technical secondary schools, and upwards of 850 higher schools. In 1977, there were altogether more than 99.5 million students in the Soviet Union, 49 million of them attending ten-year secondary schools. The total enrolment in technical secondary schools was in excess of 4.3 million, and at higher schools, five million. Education in the Soviet Union is free, and students of technical secondary and higher schools receive monthly government grants. Adults can get an education without leaving their jobs at any of the numerous night schools and night and correspondence technical secondary and higher schools and courses. Correspondence courses of higher schools and technical secondary schools have more than 1.5 and 1.2 million students respectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The progress made by education in the Soviet Union stems from the development of socialist society, from the change in the life of the country which was launched by the Great October Revolution in 1917. They had built schools, colleges and universities and trained teachers in Russia before the Revolution as well. But they did it at a different rate. &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Public Education&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, the official organ of the tsarist Ministry of Education, wrote shortly before the Revolution that it would take 180 years to abolish illiteracy among the male population of Central Russia, and 360 years to abolish it among the female population, also of Central Russia. As for the population of the fringes of the Russian Empire, the journal wrote, it would take 3,500 years to stamp out illiteracy among them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soviet government created an efficient system of public education which dealt with illiteracy within 19 years, and rapidly developed this system further in order to meet the growing cultural requirements of Soviet citizens.  Thus we see that the right to education is not only granted by the Constitution, but is also ensured by the effective education system that has been built under Soviet government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The 1977 Soviet Constitution grants citizens of the USSR the &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;right to enjoy cultural benefits&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.  This is a new point in a constitutional law and a new constitutional right. It is not the customary article proclaiming the right to education which is to be found in almost all Constitutions round the world. This article goes far beyond mere education. It speaks of the opportunity to enjoy cultural benefits as of the right of every Soviet citizen, and of the guarantees of this right. After all, a well-educated person may remain culturally limited if he has no access to the treasures of culture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, treasures of national and world culture are accessible to all sections of the population. All museums and libraries are the property of the people, and the state of the whole people looks after their normal functioning and further growth. Before the October Socialist Revolution there were 76,000 libraries and only 180 museums in the country, and now there are 350,000 libraries and about 2,000 museums in the Soviet Union. Both libraries and museums are accessible to all. In tsarist Russia, however, more than two-thirds of the libraries and a great many museums were not open for the working classes. The Hermitage in Leningrad, for instance, which contains treasures putting it on a par with Louvres or the British Museum, was closed to ordinary folk for a long time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only were there few centres of culture and learning in tsarist Russia, but they were to be found mostly in the areas inhabited by Russians. Under Soviet government much was done to distribute them evenly throughout the country. To illustrate, there is an Academy of Sciences in every Union Republic, whereas previously there was only one Academy of Sciences, in the capital. There were 12 universities in tsarist Russia, situated mainly in the areas populated by Russians. At present, there are as many as 63 universities in the country, including Altai, Far Eastern, Bashkir, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Mari, Mordovian, Chuvash, and Yakut universities. The names alone show that in setting up these universities both territorial and national factors were taken into account, so as to ensure access to the benefits of culture in every area and to every Soviet people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Article 47 of the new Soviet Constitution reads: “Citizens of the USSR, in accordance with the aims of building communism, are guaranteed &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;. This freedom is ensured by broadening scientific research, encouraging invention and innovation, and developing literature and the arts. The state provides the necessary material conditions for this and support for voluntary societies and unions of workers in the arts, organises introduction of inventions and innovations in production and other spheres of activity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
“The rights of authors, inventors and innovators are protected by the state.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First of all, we should like to call the reader’s attention to the fact that freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work is guaranteed to citizens “in accordance with the aims of building communism.” Why is the reference to the aims of building communism made in the Constitution? Is it not enough to proclaim a right and define it in purely legal terms? The point is that this is not an ordinary right which only needs to be exactly formulated. It is a right which is simultaneously a part of the main objectives of communist society. Many modern Constitutions grant this right as a mere formality, because today freedom of scientific, technical and artistic work is mentioned as a rule in important political documents. One finds it also in the Constitutions of states which cannot ensure their citizens even the right to education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is altogether different in the case of the Soviet Constitution. One of the major objectives of Soviet home policy is to build a communist society. The aim of communist society with respect to the individual is his all-round, harmonious development. And freedom of creative work is indispensable to the attainment of this aim. It is not enough to open wide the doors of secondary schools and universities and give a person a good education. Conditions must also be provided in which he will be not only a consumer, but also a producer of cultural benefits. And this is possible only when there is real freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work in society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much has been done in the Soviet Union over sixty years to enable citizens to exercise freedom of creative work. The workingman was barred from cultural benefits for millennia. He could not create them as he was illiterate and deprived. Even his consumption of cultural benefits was limited by the ruling classes to a pittance. Soviet government eliminated this historical injustice. It gave the workingman access to education, thereby giving him the opportunity to acquaint himself with the treasures of world culture. It also provided material conditions for spreading culture among the working people. It set up numerous educational and research centres belonging to the people, nationalised the theatres, art galleries, museums, conservatoires and philharmonic societies, and made them accessible to working people and their children. Freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work has a solid material foundation in the USSR. It currently has more than 850 higher schools; 350,000 libraries; 135,100 clubs; 154,000 film projecting units; almost 600 theatres; 94 circuses; 214 concert bureaux; about 2,000 museums; 149,000 amateur groups at trade union clubs. The new Soviet Constitution takes account of all this and sets the aim to provide ever better conditions for ensuring freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Western bourgeois press assiduously spreads the fiction that all public organisations except the Communist Party are banned in the Soviet Union. Practice as well as the relevant article of the Soviet Constitution on the right to associate in public organisations convincingly show that the allegation is groundless. Besides Communist Party branches, the Young Communist League and the trade unions, there are unions of writers, artists, actors and journalists, and numerous scientific, technical, medical, defence, athletic and other voluntary societies in the Soviet Union. We lack the space here merely to enumerate all Soviet public organisations. To name but a few, there are eight all-Union associations of workers in the arts, more than twenty all-Union scientific societies, thirty all-Union scientific medical societies, and numerous other public organisations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No wonder that there are so many public organisations in the Soviet Union. The life of modern society is complex and varied, and the interests, needs and aspirations of Soviet people are too diverse for any one organisation to cover them all. This explains why the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have been working ever since the Great October Socialist Revolution to provide and improve conditions for the function in a of numerous public organisations. It is not fortuitous that the new Soviet Constitution states: “Public organisations are guaranteed conditions for successfully performing the functions defined in their rules.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For illustration, let us take the All-Union society Znanie (Knowledge) which unites almost two million lecturers. It has a publishing house of its own, one of the largest in the Soviet Union, which brings out annually more than 400 different brochures and books to a total of over 25 million copies. The Soviet Writers’ Union, too, has everything it needs to carry on active creative work. Its central organ, &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Literary Gazette&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, has a large circulation and enjoys great popularity. The Soviet Writers’ Union publishes numerous magazines, viz., &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Novi mir&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (New World), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;i&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Banner), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Druzhba narodov&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Peoples’ Friendship), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Voprosy literatury&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Problems of Literature), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Yunost&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Youth), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Koster&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (Bonfire), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Sovetish Heimland&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in Yiddish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Soviet Literature&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in English, German, Spanish and Polish), &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Lettres Soviétiques&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; (in French), and so on. Besides these all-Union magazines, the Soviet Writers’ Union publishes magazines in the Union and autonomous republics, regions and territories.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar facts can be quoted about numerous other public organisations functioning in the Soviet Union. Energetic, creative activity of diverse mass organisations is a feature of Soviet life. The new Soviet Constitution legalises and guarantees this characteristic of developed socialism. Thus practice shatters one of the fictions current in bourgeois propaganda and intended for people who know little or nothing about life in the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we see, even a cursory glance at some of the rights granted and guaranteed under developed socialism shows that the prediction made by Marx and Engels about free development of all members of socialist society has been carried into practice. L. I. Brezhnev said: “The establishment of the principles of social equality and justice is one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolution. We have every right to say that no other society in the world has done or could have done as much for the masses, for the working people, as has been done by socialism! Every Soviet citizen enjoys in full the rights and freedoms enabling him to participate actively in political life. Every Soviet citizen has the possibility to choose a profession according with his inclinations and abilities, and to do work that is useful to his country and people.”&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#footnote-120|120]]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conclusion ==&lt;br /&gt;
The history of philosophical and socio-political thought is a record of hundreds of ideas and theories. Many old philosophers sincerely wished to point out the path to social justice and human happiness, as well as furnish people with knowledge of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, however sincerely they might try to help people, these philosophers remained alone or at best won a limited following. Whatever schemes for man’s happiness and welfare they devised, neither happiness nor justice materialised.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the working class, at whose hands the world was to be transformed, had appeared in the world scene, it became urgently necessary to provide a doctrine showing how this historic mission could be accomplished. This doctrine was Marxism-Leninism which answered the practical questions posed by the class struggle of the proletariat, and not only explained the world but showed how to transform it. This doctrine, advanced in the late 1840s by Marx and Engels and carried forward in the epoch of imperialism by Lenin, has become today the world outlook of hundreds of millions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No romantic dreams or illusions, but rather the objective scientific analysis of reality which made it possible to determine goals for the struggle of the oppressed and exploited and the elaboration of concrete forms of this struggle have helped Marxism-Leninism to become an effective instrument for remaking the world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The victorious socialist revolutions performed in a number of countries, the construction of socialism and the building of a communist society have become realities due to the fact that this titanic effort on the part of the masses has for its theoretical foundation the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which is the world outlook of the communist parties.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which was necessitated not only by the class struggle but by the progress of science, provides a truly scientific method of knowing the world and is the theoretical basis of scientifically building the new society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Born more than a century and a quarter ago, Marxism-Leninism has been going from strength to strength. It is strong because it is true, because it reflects the world correctly and gets to the root of things. This correct knowledge of the world owes much to Marxist philosophy. It is the profound philosophic justification of all fundamental propositions of Marxism-Leninism that distinguishes it from all previous theoretical conceptions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was no accident that Marx, Engels and Lenin, who were great revolutionaries, politicians and economists and active members of the revolutionary movement, were also great philosophers who paid constant attention to the study and development of philosophy. That enabled them in times of social upheavals to find correct solutions and correctly determine the trend of social developments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy one can grasp the laws governing the development of the world, to understand, with their help, the intricate processes of social development, and to get a glimpse of the future, to foresee the course of human history.&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;index_split_003.xhtml#calibre_toc_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= Notes =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-1|←1]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 1972, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-2|←2]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V, I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 287-88.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-3|←3]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 33, p. 489.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-4|←4]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, edited by George Sampson, Vol. I, London, 1908, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-5|←5]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid. , p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-6|←6]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. 1, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-7|←7]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 55.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-8|←8]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhaltnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, von E. Mach, Jena, 1906, pp. 8-9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-9|←9]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, London, 1956, pp. 195-96.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-10|←10]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: See: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1843, pp. 45-46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-11|←11]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-12|←12]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, London, 1931, p. 70.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-13|←13]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-14|←14]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-15|←15]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-16|←16]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-17|←17]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grohere Publikum tuber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, Berlin, 1801, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-18|←18]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 234.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-19|←19]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Science and Society, New York, Vol. If, Number 2, Spring 1938, p. 239.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-20|←20]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes in: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 1949, Evanston, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-21|←21]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1973, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-22|←22]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-23|←23]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-24|←24]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 348.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-25|←25]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, 1977, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-26|←26]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-27|←27]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, Moscow, 1972, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-28|←28]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-29|←29]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-30|←30]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-31|←31]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-32|←32]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-33|←33]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-D&amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;calibre&amp;quot;&amp;gt;u&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hring, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-34|←34]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-35|←35]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 262&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-36|←36]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-37|←37]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-38|←38]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 261, 146.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-39|←39]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 260-61.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-40|←40]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Louis de Broglie, Sur les sentiers de la science, Paris, 1960, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-41|←41]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Physics in My Generation. A Selection of Papers by Max Born, London and New York, 1956, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-42|←42]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-43|←43]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-44|←44]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-45|←45]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 285.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-46|←46]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Paul Labereune, L’origine des Mondes, Paris, 1953, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-47|←47]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Vorlesungen uber Naturphilosophie gehalten von Wilhelm Ostwald, Second edition, Leipzig, 1902, p. VIII.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-48|←48]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 270-71.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-49|←49]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, pp. 309, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-50|←50]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: The Evolution of Physics by Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, Cambridge, 1938, pp. 207-08.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-51|←51]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, translated from the German, London, 1930, p. XLI.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-52|←52]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-53|←53]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Critique of Pure Reason, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-54|←54]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung, historischkritisch dargestellt von Ernst Mach, Leipzig, 1897, p.  498.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-55|←55]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-56|←56]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Les Principes de la Philosophie, par René Descartes, Rouen, 1706, p. 92.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-57|←57]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: G. W. Leibniz, Ausgewahlte philosophische Schritten, Vol. II, Leipzig, 1915, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_000.xhtml#citation-58|←58]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-59|←59]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, pp. 69, 90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-60|←60]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-61|←61]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-62|←62]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., pp. 245, 147.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-63|←63]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-64|←64]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-65|←65]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 69.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-66|←66]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-67|←67]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-68|←68]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-69|←69]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Henri Wallon, De a l’acte a la pensée, Paris, 1942, Pp. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-70|←70]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-71|←71]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-72|←72]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-73|←73]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-74|←74]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-75|←75]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 228,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-76|←76]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-77|←77]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 148.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-78|←78]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-79|←79]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 223.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-80|←80]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-81|←81]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-82|←82]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 93.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-83|←83]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-84|←84]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-85|←85]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: There are so many molecules in a glass of water that were it possible to mark them and pour the water into the ocean and allow sufficient time for the marked molecules to diffuse through all the oceans and seas, then, scooping up a glass of water from any sea or ocean, we should not fail to find about a hundred marked molecules in the glass.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-86|←86]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-87|←87]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Ibid., Vol. 38, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-88|←88]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, Vol. II, Dublin, 1779, p. 163.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-89|←89]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-90|←90]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-91|←91]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 446.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-92|←92]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 274.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_001.xhtml#citation-93|←93]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: &amp;lt;span class=&amp;quot;s-t14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ibid&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-94|←94]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-95|←95]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-96|←96]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-97|←97]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, Pp. 12.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-98|←98]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-99|←99]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 56-57.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-100|←100]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-101|←101]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-102|←102]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
: Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, pp. 89-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-103|←103]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The General Council of the First International 1868-1870, Moscow, 1966, p. 311.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-104|←104]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 20, Pp. 146,&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_002.xhtml#citation-105|←105]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973, P. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-106|←106]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31, pp. 84-85.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-107|←107]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, PP. 35-36.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-108|←108]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, pp. 111-112.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-109|←109]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Okonomische Manuskripte 1857-1858, Moscow, 1935, pp. 88-90.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-110|←110]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-111|←111]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-112|←112]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-113|←113]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See: K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 174.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-114|←114]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 181.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-115|←115]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in three volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1977, p. 499.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-116|←116]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-117|←117]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See A. Dallin, “Bias and Blunders in American Studies on the USSR”, Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1973, pp. 560-76.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-118|←118]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   See The New York Times, March 28. 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-119|←119]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
; [&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;[[#index_split_003.xhtml#citation-120|←120]] ] &lt;br /&gt;
:   L. I. Brezhnev, &amp;amp;quot;The Great October Revolution and Mankind’s Progress”, New Times, No. 45, November 1977, p- 6.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59324</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59324"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T18:36:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added lumpen, petite bourgeoisie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=8|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;small&amp;gt;[[Marxism|Read more]]&amp;lt;/small&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=3|border=no|align=center&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Getting started? ==&lt;br /&gt;
Check out our 1-month reading list for absolute beginners!&lt;br /&gt;
{{button|align=center|color=blue|width=100|link=:Category:Crit&#039;s absolute beginner reading list|text=Read now}}}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Base and superstructure]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Reserve army of labour]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Alienation]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Lumpenproletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Petty bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Cuban Revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag of the Soviet Union (1955-1991).svg}} [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Mongolian People&#039;s Republic Flag.png}} [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Yugoslav flag.png}} [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag of Albania (1946–1992).svg}} [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria flag.png}} [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag of Poland (1927–1980).svg}} [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag of Romania (1965–1989).png}} [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Czech flag.png}} [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag of Hungary (1949–1956).svg}} [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Democratic Republic of Yemen]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Mozambique]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag_of_the_People&#039;s_Republic_of_China.svg}} [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag_of_Cuba.svg}} [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag_of_the_DPRK.svg}} [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag_of_Vietnam.svg}} [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* {{flagicon|Flag_of_Laos.svg}} [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59300</id>
		<title>Library:Liberalism: A Counter-History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59300"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:49:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Remove contents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Library work|title=Liberalism: a counter-history|author=Domenico Losurdo|publisher=Verso Books|published_date=2014|type=Book|isbn=978-1-78168-166-4|source=http://library.lol/main/64e8f86a9a8046e29fd73af3ab6e46a2}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pagevii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgvii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How does this book differ from existing histories of liberalism, which continue to appear in growing numbers? Does it really succeed in making the innovation promised by the title? Once they have finished it, readers will be able to give their own answer. For now, the author can limit himself to a statement of intent. In formulating it, a great example can aid us. About to embark on the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France, de Tocqueville observed of studies of the eighteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e imagine we know all about the French social order of that time, for the good reason that its surface glitter holds our gaze and we are familiar not only with the life stories of its outstanding figures but also, thanks to the many brilliant critical studies now available, with the works of the great writers who adorned that age. But we have only vague, often quite wrong conceptions of the manner in which public business was transacted and institutions functioned; of the exact relations between the various classes in the social hierarchy; of the situation and sentiments of that section of the population which as yet could neither make itself heard nor seen; and, by the same token, of the ideas and mores basic to the social structure of eighteenth-century France.[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason not to apply the methodology so brilliantly indicated by de Tocqueville to the movement and society of which he was an integral and influential part. Solely because he intends to draw attention to aspects that he believes have hitherto been largely and unjustly ignored, the author refers in the book’s title to a ‘counter-history’. Otherwise, it is a history, whose subject-matter alone remains to be specified: not liberal thought in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pageviii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgviii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;concrete reality. As with any other major historical movement, this involves investigating the conceptual developments, but also—and primarily—the political and social relations it found expression in, as well as the more or less contradictory link that was established between these two dimensions of social reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, in commencing the investigation, we are forced to pose a preliminary question concerning the subject whose history we intend to reconstruct: What is liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1a|1]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg1&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;What Is Liberalism?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. A series of embarrassing questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The usual answer to this question admits of no doubt: liberalism is the tradition of thought whose central concern is the liberty of the individual, which is ignored or ridden roughshod over by organicist philosophies of various kinds. But if that is the case, how should we situate John C. Calhoun? This eminent statesman, vice president of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, burst into an impassioned ode to individual liberty, which, appealing to Locke, he vigorously defended against any abuse of power and any unwarranted interference by the state. And that is not all. Along with ‘absolute governments’ and the ‘concentration of power’, he unstintingly criticized and condemned fanaticism[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the spirit of ‘crusade’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] to which he opposed ‘compromise’ as the guiding principle of genuine ‘constitutional governments’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With equal eloquence Calhoun defended minority rights. It was not only a question of guaranteeing the alternation of the various parties in government through suffrage: unduly extensive power was unacceptable in any event, even if limited in duration and tempered by the promise or prospect of a periodic reversal of roles in the relationship between governors and governed.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unquestionably, we seem to have all the characteristics of the most mature and attractive liberal thought. On the other hand, however, disdaining the half-measures and timidity or fear of those who restricted themselves to accepting it as a necessary ‘evil’, Calhoun declared slavery to be ‘a positive good’ that civilization could not possibly renounce. Calhoun repeatedly denounced intolerance and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg2&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crusading spirit, not in order to challenge the enslavement of blacks or the ruthless hunting down of fugitive slaves, but exclusively to brand abolitionists as ‘blind fanatics’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who ‘consider themselves under the most sacred obligation to use every effort to destroy’ slavery, a form of property legitimized and guaranteed by the Constitution.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were not among the minorities defended with such vigour and legal erudition. In fact, in their case, tolerance and the spirit of compromise seem to turn into their opposite: if fanaticism actually succeeded in its mad project of abolishing slavery, what would follow would be ‘the extirpation of one or the other race’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, given the concrete balance of forces in the United States, it was not difficult to imagine which of the two would succumb: blacks could only survive on condition of being slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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So is Calhoun a liberal? No doubts on this score were harboured by Lord Acton, a prominent figure in liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, an advisor and friend of William Gladstone, one of the major figures in nineteenth-century England. In Acton’s view, Calhoun was a champion of the cause of the struggle against any form of absolutism, including ‘democratic absolutism’; the arguments he employed were ‘the very perfection of political truth’. In short, we are dealing with one of the major authors and great minds in the liberal tradition and pantheon.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Albeit in less emphatic language, the question has been answered in the affirmative by those who in our time celebrate Calhoun as ‘a strong individualist’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as a champion of the ‘defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or as a theorist of the sense of limits and the self-limitation that should characterize the majority.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no doubt is one US publishing house, committed to republishing in a neo-liberal key ‘Liberty Classics’, among which the eminent statesman and ideologue of the slaveholding South features prominently.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question we have posed does not only emerge from reconstructing the history of the United States. Prestigious scholars of the French Revolution, of firm liberal persuasion, have no hesitation in defining as ‘liberal’ those figures and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg3&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;circles that had the merit of opposing the Jacobin diversion, but who were firmly committed to the defence of colonial slavery. The reference is to Pierre-Victor Malouet and members of the Massiac Club, who were ‘all plantation-owners and slaveholders’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Is it possible to be a liberal and slaveholder at the same time? Such was not the opinion of John Stuart Mill, judging at least from his polemic against the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; British liberals (among them, perhaps, Acton and Gladstone), who, during the American Civil War, rallied en masse to ‘a furious pro-Southern partisanship’, or at any rate viewed the Union and Lincoln coolly and malevolently.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We face a dilemma. If we answer the question formulated above (Is Calhoun a liberal?) in the affirmative, we can no longer maintain the traditional (and edifying) image of liberalism as the thought and volition of liberty. If, on the other hand, we answer in the negative, we find ourselves confronting a new problem and new question, which is no less embarrassing than the first: Why should we continue to dignify John Locke with the title of father of liberalism? Calhoun refers to black slavery as a ‘positive good’. Yet without resorting to such brazen language, the English philosopher, to whom the US author explicitly appealed, regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formalization of the institution in Carolina. He took a hand in drafting the constitutional provision according to which ‘[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke was ‘the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this did not prevent him from inveighing against the political ‘slavery’ that absolute monarchy sought to impose.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in Calhoun the theorization of black slavery as a ‘positive good’ went hand in hand with warnings against a concentration of power that risked transforming ‘the governed’ into ‘the slaves of the rulers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Of course, the American statesman was a slave-owner, but the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg4&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;English philosopher also had sound investments in the slave trade.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the latter’s position proves even more compromising; for good or ill, in the slaveholding South of which Calhoun was the interpreter, there was no longer any place for the deportation of blacks from Africa, in a terrible voyage that condemned many of them to death before they landed in America.&lt;br /&gt;
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Do we want to bring historical distance to bear in order to distinguish the positions of the two authors being compared here, and exclude from the liberal tradition only Calhoun, who continued to justify or celebrate the institution of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century? The southern statesman would have reacted indignantly to such inconsistency of treatment: as regards the English liberal philosopher, he would perhaps have repeated, in slightly different language, the thesis formulated by him in connection with George Washington: ‘He was one of us—a slaveholder and a planter.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Contemporary with Calhoun was Francis Lieber, one of the most eminent intellectuals of his time. Sometimes saluted as a sort of Montesquieu redivivus, in correspondence and on respectful terms with de Tocqueville, he was doubtless a critic, if a cautious one, of the institution of slavery. He hoped it would wither away through its gradual transformation into a kind of servitude or semi-servitude on the autonomous initiative of the slaveholding states, whose right to self-government could not be questioned. That is why Lieber was also admired in the South, all the more so because he himself, albeit on a rather modest scale, owned and sometimes rented male and female slaves. When one of the latter died, following a mysterious pregnancy and subsequent abortion, he recorded in his diary the painful financial loss suffered: ‘fully one thousand dollars—the hard labor of a year’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New, painful economies were required to replace the deceased slave, because Lieber, unlike Calhoun, was not a planter and did not live off profits, but a university professor who essentially used slaves as domestic servants. Does this authorize us in including the first, rather than the second, in the liberal tradition? In any event, temporal distance plays no role here.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now take a contemporary of Locke’s. Andrew Fletcher was ‘a champion of liberty’ and, at the same time, ‘a champion of slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Politically, he &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg5&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;professed to be ‘a republican on principle’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and culturally was ‘a Scottish prophet of the Enlightenment’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He too fled to Holland in the wake of the anti-Jacobite and anti-absolutist conspiracy, exactly like Locke, with whom he was in correspondence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fletcher’s reputation crossed the Atlantic: Jefferson defined him as a ‘patriot’, whose merit was to have expressed the ‘political principles’ characteristic of ‘the purest periods of the British Constitution’—those that subsequently caught on and prospered in free America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing positions rather similar to Fletcher’s was his contemporary and fellow countryman James Burgh, who also enjoyed the respect of republican circles à la Jefferson,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was mentioned favourably by Thomas Paine in the most celebrated opuscule of the American Revolution (&#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, in contrast to the other authors—though like them characterized by a peculiar tangle of love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery—Fletcher and Burgh are virtually forgotten today, and no one seems to want to include them among exponents of the liberal tradition. The fact is that, in underlining the necessity of slavery, they were thinking primarily not of blacks in the colonies, but of the ‘vagrants’, the beggars, the odious, incorrigible rabble of the metropolis. Should they be regarded as illiberal for this reason? Were that to be the case, what would distinguish liberals from non-liberals would be not the condemnation of the institution of slavery, but only negative discrimination against peoples of colonial origin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Liberal England presents us with another, different case. Francis Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of some significance (he was the ‘never to be forgotten’ master of Adam Smith),[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the one hand expressed criticisms and reservations about the slavery to which blacks were indiscriminately subjected. On the other hand, he stressed that, especially when dealing with the ‘lower conditions’ of society, slavery could be a ‘useful punishment’: it should be the ‘ordinary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg6&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and their families by any useful labours’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an author who, while evincing unease at hereditary, racial slavery, demanded a sort of penal slavery for those who, regardless of their skin colour, were guilty of vagrancy. Was Hutcheson a liberal?&lt;br /&gt;
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Historically positioned between Locke and Calhoun, and with his focus precisely on the reality accepted by the two of them as obvious and indisputable, or even celebrated as a ‘positive good’, Adam Smith constructed an argument and expressed a position that warrants being cited at some length. Slavery could be more easily abolished under a ‘despotic government’ than a ‘free government’, with its representative bodies exclusively reserved in practice for white property-owners. In such circumstances, the condition of the black slaves was desperate: ‘every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves’. Hence ‘[t]he freedom of the free was the cause of the great oppression of the slaves … And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Can an author who, in at least one concrete instance, expressed his preference for ‘despotic government’ be regarded as liberal? Or, differently put, is Smith more liberal or are Locke and Calhoun, who, along with slavery, defended the representative bodies condemned by Smith as the prop, in a slaveholding society, of an infamous institution contrary to any sense of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, as the great economist had foreseen, slavery was abolished in the United States not thanks to local self-government, but by the iron fist of the Union’s army and the temporary military dictatorship imposed by it. For this Lincoln was accused by his opponents of despotism and Jacobinism. He resorted to ‘military government’ and ‘military commissions’ and interpreted ‘the word “law”‘ as ‘[t]he will of the President’ and habeas corpus as the ‘power of the President to imprison whom he pleases, as long as he pleases’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Together with representatives of the secessionist Confederacy, the drafters of this indictment were those who aspired to a compromise peace, for the purposes of returning to constitutional normality. And once again we are obliged to ask the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg7&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;question: Is it Lincoln who is more liberal, or his adversaries in the South, or his opponents in the North who came out in favour of compromise?&lt;br /&gt;
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We have seen Mill adopt a position in favour of the Union and condemn the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberals who cried scandal over the energy with which it conducted the war against the South and kept at bay those who, in the North itself, were inclined to tolerate the slaveholders’ secession. However, we shall see that, when he turned his attention to the colonies, the English liberal justified the West’s ‘despotism’ over ‘races’ that were still ‘under age’, and who were obliged to observe an ‘absolute obedience’ in order to be set on the path of progress. This is a formulation that would not have displeased Calhoun, who likewise legitimized slavery by reference to the backwardness and nonage of populations of African origin. It was only in America, and thanks to the paternal care of white masters, that the ‘black race’ succeeded in progressing and making the transition from its previous ‘low, degraded and savage condition’ to ‘its present comparatively civilized condition’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Mill’s view, ‘any means’ were licit for those who took on the task of educating ‘savage tribes’; ‘slavery’ was sometimes a mandatory stage for inducing them to work and making them useful to civilization and progress (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]). But this was also the opinion of Calhoun, for whom slavery was an unavoidable means if one wished to achieve the end of civilizing blacks. Certainly, by contrast with the permanent slavery which, according to the US theorist and politician, blacks must be subjected to, the pedagogical dictatorship Mill refers to was destined to disappear in the distant, uncertain future. But the other side of the coin is that now explicitly subjected to this condition of unfreedom was not a particular ethnic group (the fragment of Africa located at the heart of the United States), but all the peoples invested by the West’s colonial expansion and forced to endure political ‘despotism’ and servile or semi-servile forms of labour. Is demanding ‘absolute obedience’, for an indeterminate period of time, from the overwhelming majority of humanity compatible with the liberal profession of faith? Or is it synonymous with &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The American Revolution and the revelation of an embarrassing truth&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now clear that what primarily divides the authors mentioned up to this point is the problem of slavery. In one way or another, they all refer to the Britain deriving from the Glorious Revolution or the United States. These are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg8&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;two countries that for around a century were a single state entity and formed, as it were, a single political party. Prior to the crisis that led to the American Revolution, the British on both sides of the Atlantic felt themselves to be proud subjects or citizens of ‘[a] land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus Blackstone. To confirm his thesis, he referred to Montesquieu, who spoke of England as the ‘one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not even the French liberal doubted the fact that ‘England is currently the freest country in the world, not discounting any republic’: the ‘free nation’, the ‘free people’ par excellence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, no dark clouds seemed to threaten relations between the two shores of the Atlantic. There were no conflicts and, according to Montesquieu at least, there could not be, because even in its relationship with the colonies what characterized England was its love of liberty:&lt;br /&gt;
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If this nation sent colonies abroad, it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as this government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In these years, the English colonists in America proudly identified with Blackstone’s thesis that ‘our free constitution’, which ‘falls little short of perfection’, differed markedly ‘from the modern constitutions of other states’, from the political order of ‘the continent of Europe’ as a whole.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This was the ideology with which the Seven Years’ War was fought by the British Empire. The English colonists in America were the most determined in interpreting it as a clash between the ‘supporters of freedom in the world’—the British ‘sons of noble liberty’, or defenders of Protestantism—and a ‘cruel and oppressive’ France—despotic politically, and follower of ‘Roman bigotry’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg9&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Popery religiously. At the time, even the British Crown’s transatlantic subjects liked to repeat with Locke that ‘slavery’ was ‘directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation’; it was utterly inconceivable for an ‘Englishman’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French allegedly wanted to reduce the American colonists to a ‘slavish subjection’. Fortunately, however, arriving to foil this attempt was Great Britain, ‘[t]he Mistress of the Nations—the grand Support of Liberty, the Scourge of Oppression and Tyranny!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was an ideology that Edmund Burke sought to breathe new life into as late as 1775, in a desperate attempt to avoid the impending rupture. Presenting his motion of conciliation, he called upon people not to lose sight of, and not to sever, the ties that bound the American colonists to the mother country: what was at stake was a single ‘nation’ that shared ‘the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’, the faith in ‘liberty’. Largely unchallenged in countries like Spain or Prussia, slavery was ‘a weed that grows in every soil’ except the English. Accordingly, it was absurd to try to subdue the rebel colonists by force: ‘An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, the slavery referred to here is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other slavery, which shackles blacks, is passed over in silence. With the increasing inevitability of the revolution, or ‘civil war’ with all its ‘horrors’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—as loyalists faithful to the Crown and British politicians in favour of compromise and preserving the unity of the English ‘nation’ and ‘race’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] preferred to call it—the picture changed markedly. The element of continuity is clear. Each of the two contending parties accused the other of wanting to reintroduce despotism, or political ‘slavery’. The rebel colonists’ charges are well known: they tirelessly denounced the tyranny of the British Crown and parliament, and their mad project of subjecting residents in America to a condition of ‘perpetual bondage and slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the response was not slow in coming. As early as 1773, a loyalist from New York had issued a warning: hitherto they had been ‘watchful against &#039;&#039;external&#039;&#039; attacks on our freedom’ (the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg10&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;reference is to the Seven Years’ War), but now a much more insidious danger had emerged—that of ‘becom[ing] &#039;&#039;enslaved&#039;&#039; by tyrants within’. Again in New York, another loyalist repeated the point two years later: the rebels aspired ‘to make us worse than slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In polemicizing against one another, the two branches the liberal party had divided into adopted the ideology and rhetoric that had presided over the self-celebration of the English nation in its entirety, as the sworn enemy of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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The novel factor was that, in the wake of the exchange of accusations, the other slavery—the one both branches had repressed as a disruptive element in their proud self-consciousness as members of the people and party of liberty—burst into the polemics alongside political slavery. In the rebel colonists’ view, the London government, which in sovereign fashion imposed taxation on citizens or subjects not represented in the House of Commons, was behaving like a master towards his slaves. But—objected the others—if slavery is the issue, why not start to discuss the slavery that is manifested in brutal, unequivocal form precisely where liberty is so passionately lauded? As early as 1764, Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time to plead the colonists’ cause, had to face the sarcastic comments of his interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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You Americans make a great Clamour upon every little imaginary infringement of what you take to be your Liberties; and yet there are no People upon Earth such Enemies to Liberty, such absolute Tyrants, where you have the Opportunity, as you yourselves are.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The self-styled champions of liberty branded taxation imposed without their explicit consent as synonymous with despotism and slavery. But they had no scruples about exercising the most absolute and arbitrary power over their slaves. This was a paradox: ‘How is it’, Samuel Johnson asked, ‘that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’ Across the Atlantic, those who sought to contest the secession ironized in similar fashion. Thomas Hutchinson, royal governor of Massachusetts, rebuked the rebels for their inconsistency or hypocrisy: they denied Africans those rights that they claimed to be ‘absolutely inalienable’ in the most radical way imaginable.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Echoing him was an American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher), who, having taken refuge in England, revisited the events that forced him into exile and observed: ‘the most &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg11&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clamorous advocates for liberty were uniformly the harshest and worst masters of slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the people most directly involved in the polemical and political struggle who expressed themselves so harshly. The intervention of John Millar, prominent exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, was especially stinging:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It affords a curious spectacle to observe, that the same people who talk in a high strain of political liberty, and who consider the privilege of imposing their own taxes as one of the inalienable rights of mankind, should make no scruple of reducing a great proportion of their fellow-creatures into circumstances by which they are not only deprived of property, but almost of every species of right. Fortune perhaps never produced a situation more calculated to ridicule a liberal hypothesis, or to show how little the conduct of men is at the bottom directed by any philosophical principles.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Millar was a disciple of Adam Smith. The master seems to have seen things in the same way. When he declared that to a ‘free government’ controlled by slaveowners, he preferred a ‘despotic government’ capable of erasing the infamy of slavery, he made explicit reference to America. Translated into directly political terms, the great economist’s words signify: the despotism the Crown is criticized for is preferable to the liberty demanded by the slave-owners, from which only a small class of planters and absolute masters benefits.&lt;br /&gt;
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English abolitionists went even further, calling for the defence of British institutions threatened by ‘arbitrary and inhuman uses, which prevail in a distant land’. So arbitrary and inhuman that, as indicated by an advert in the &#039;&#039;New York Journal&#039;&#039;, a black woman and her three-year-old daughter could be sold on the market separately, as if they were a cow and a calf. And hence (concluded Granville Sharp in 1769) one should not be led astray by ‘theatrical bombast and ranting expressions in praise of liberty’ employed by the slaveholding rebels; free English institutions must be vigorously defended against them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The accused reacted in their turn by upbraiding England for its hypocrisy: it boasted of its virtue and love of liberty, but who promoted and continued to promote the slave trade? And who was it that transported and sold slaves? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg12&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Thus argued Franklin,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] advancing an argument that became central in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence elaborated by Jefferson. This is how, in the original version of that solemn document, the Britain derived from the Glorious Revolution and George III himself were charged. The latter&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical war, the opprobrium of &#039;&#039;infidel&#039;&#039; powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The role of slavery between the two Atlantic shores&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
What should we make of this furious, unexpected polemic? There is no doubt that the accusations against the rebels struck a weak point. Virginia played a central role in the American Revolution. Forty per cent of the country’s slaves were to be found there, but a majority of the authors of the rebellion unleashed in the name of liberty also came from there. For thirty-two of the United States’ first thirty-six years of existence, slave-owners from Virginia occupied the post of president. This colony or state, founded on slavery, supplied the country with its most illustrious statesmen. It is enough to think of George Washington (great military and political protagonist of the anti-British revolt) and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (authors, respectively, of the Declaration of Independence and the federal Constitution of 1787), all three of them slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Regardless of this or that state, the influence slavery exercised on the country as a whole is clear. Sixty years after its foundation, we see that ‘of the first sixteen presidential elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern slaveholder in the White House’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence the persistence of the anti-American polemic on this point is understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side, we are familiar with Franklin’s and Jefferson’s ironic remarks about the moralizing anti-slavery lectures offered by a country deeply &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg13&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved in the slave trade. Burke, theorist of ‘conciliation with the colonies’, likewise stressed this. In rejecting the proposal of those who urged ‘a general enfranchisement of their slaves’ to counter the rebellion of their masters and the colonists generally, he observed: ‘Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?’ All the more so if this nation insisted on practising the slave trade, clashing with colonies that wished to restrict or abolish it. In the eyes of slaves landed in or deported to America, this would represent a peculiar spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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An offer of freedom from England, would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Burke’s irony hits home. In addition to Britain’s role in the slave trade, slaves long continued to be present in the metropolis itself. It has been calculated that in the mid-eighteenth century there were around 100,000 of them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were British abolitionists horrified by the market in human flesh in the American colonies and New York? In Liverpool in 1766, eleven black slaves were put on sale and the market in ‘black cattle’ was still open in Dublin twelve years later, regularly advertised in the local press.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The role played in the country’s economy by the trade in slaves and their exploitation was sizeable: ‘The &#039;&#039;Liverpool Courier&#039;&#039;, 22 August 1832, estimated that three-quarters of Britain’s coffee, fifteen-sixteenths of its cotton, twenty-two twenty-thirds of its sugar, and thirty-four thirty-fifths of its tobacco were still produced by slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In sum, we should bear in mind the candid judgement of two eighteenth-century British witnesses. The first, Joshua Gee, acknowledged that ‘[a]ll this great increase in our treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of negroes in the plantations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The second, Malachy Postlethwayt, engaged as he was in defending the role of the Royal African Company—the company that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg14&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;controlled the slave trade—was even sharper: ‘The &#039;&#039;Negroe Trade&#039;&#039; and the natural Consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation’; they were ‘the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Empire as a whole was merely ‘a magnificent superstructure’ upon this commerce.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, there was the political influence of the institution of slavery. Although obviously inferior to what it was in the American colonies, it was certainly not nugatory in England: in the 1790 parliament, two or three dozen members sat who had interests in the West Indies.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exchange of accusations between rebel colonists and the mother country—that is, between two branches of the party that had hitherto proudly celebrated itself as the party of liberty—was a mutual, pitiless demystification. Not only did the England derived from the Glorious Revolution not challenge the slave trade, but on the contrary the latter experienced strong growth.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And one of the new liberal monarchy’s first acts of international policy was wresting a monopoly on the slave trade from Spain. On the other side, the revolution that broke out across the Atlantic in the name of liberty involved official consecration of the institution of slavery, and the conquest and prolonged exercise of political hegemony by slave-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Possibly the most articulate and pained intervention in this polemic was by Josiah Tucker, ‘who, though a parson and a Tory, was, apart from that, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He denounced England’s pre-eminent role in the slave trade: ‘We … the boasted Patrons of Liberty, and the professed Advocates for the natural Rights of Mankind, engage deeper in this murderous inhuman Traffic than any Nation whatever.’ But even more hypocritical was the behaviour of the rebel colonists: ‘the Advocates for Republicanism, and for the supposed Equality of Mankind, ought to have been foremost in suggesting some such humane System for abolishing the worst of all the Species of Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But instead …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Holland, England, America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg15&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;If, prior to constituting themselves as an independent state, the rebel colonies in America formed part of the British Empire, the latter assumed its liberal form with the ascent to the throne of William of Orange, who landed in England from Holland. On the other hand, while with his draft constitution for Carolina Locke referred to America, he wrote his first &#039;&#039;Letter Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039; in Holland, which was then ‘the centre of conspiracy’ against Stuart absolutism;[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Holland was also the birthplace of Bernard de Mandeville, unquestionably one of the more important figures in early liberalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not lose sight of the fact that the United Provinces, which emerged from the struggle against Philip II’s Spain, equipped themselves with a liberal type of set-up a century before England. This was a country that from a socio-economic point of view as well had left the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; behind. In the seventeenth century it had a per capita income one-and-a-half times that of England; whereas in the latter 60 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, the figure in Holland was 40 per cent. Moreover, the power structure was rather significant: in the country which emerged victorious from the clash with Philip II, ‘a bourgeois oligarchy that had broken decisively with the aristocratic landholding ethos’ was dominant.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was these enlightened, tolerant, liberal bourgeois who embarked on colonial expansion; and in this historical period the slave trade was an integral part of it:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he Dutch conducted the first serious slave trade in order to furnish the manpower for the sugar plantations; when they lost the plantations, they tried to remain in the field as slave traders, but by 1675, Dutch primacy ended, yielding place to the newly founded Royal African Company of the English.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company. But the history of the United Provinces leads to America as well as Britain. It would seem that it was a Dutch peddler who introduced African slaves into Virginia.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New Amsterdam, which the Dutch were forced to cede to the British and which became New York, had a population 20 per cent of which was composed of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg16&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;blacks, in large part slaves. In 1703 around 42 per cent of homeowners were also slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This represents the paradox already glimpsed in connection with Britain and the United States. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the country where the prologue to the successive liberal revolutions occurred—namely, Holland—had a ‘hold’ on the trade in slaves:[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of their [Dutch] possessions were slave or bound-labor societies.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, in one respect, it was synonymous with liberty at the time, in another, Holland was synonymous with slavery—and a particularly brutal form of it. In Voltaire’s &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; a severe blow is dealt to the protagonist’s naive optimism by the encounter in Surinam (‘where the Dutch are’) with a black slave, reduced to a ‘dreadful state’ by his Dutch master. The slave refers as follows to the working conditions to which he is forced to submit:&lt;br /&gt;
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When we’re working at the sugar-mill and catch our finger in the grinding-wheel, they cut off our hand. When we try to run away, they cut off a leg. I have been in both these situations. This is the price you pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Condorcet, launching his abolitionist campaign in 1781, in particular targeted England and Holland, where the institution of slavery seemed especially deep-rooted on account of ‘the general corruption of these nations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, it is worth citing the American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher) whom we have seen ironizing about the passion for liberty displayed by slave-owners engaged in the rebellion. In his view, ‘[d]espotic nations treated their slaves better than those under republics; the Spanish were the best masters while the Dutch were the worst.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The first country to embark on the liberal road is one that exhibited an especially tenacious attachment to the institution of slavery. It appears that colonists of Dutch origin offered the most determined resistance to the first abolitionist measures, those introduced in the northern United States during the Revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg17&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and in its wake.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As regards Holland itself, in 1791 the States-General formally declared that the slave trade was essential to the development of the colonies’ prosperity and commerce. Still in this period, clearly distinguishing itself from Britain, Holland recognized the right of slave-owners to transport and deposit their human chattels in the mother country before returning to the colonies. Finally, it is to be noted that Holland only abolished slavery in its colonies in 1863, when the secessionist and slaveholding Confederacy of the southern United States was going down to defeat.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Irish, the Indians and the inhabitants of Java&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The English colonists’ revolt in America was accompanied by another major controversy. For a long time, like that of the blacks, the Indians’ fate had not in the slightest unsettled the deep conviction of the English on either side of the Atlantic that they were the chosen people of liberty. In both cases, they appealed to Locke, for whom (as we shall see) the natives of the New World approximated to ‘wild beasts’. But with the eruption of the conflict between colonies and mother country, the exchange of accusations also encompassed the problem of the relationship with the Indians. England, Paine proclaimed in 1776, was ‘that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and the Negroes to destroy us’ or ‘to cut the throats of the freemen of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the Declaration of Independence berated George III for having not only ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’ by black slaves, but also ‘endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions’. In 1812, on the occasion of a new war between the two shores of the Atlantic, Madison condemned England for indiscriminately striking the civilian population with its fleet, not sparing women or children, and hence displaying a conduct similar to that of the red-skinned ‘savages’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having been accomplices of the barbarians, the English became barbarians themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the argument had begun much earlier, following the Crown proclamation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg18&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 1763 that sought to halt or contain expansion west of the Allegany Mountains. This was a measure that did not please the colonists and George Washington, who regarded it as ‘a temporary expedient’, destined to be rapidly superseded, but which should not be respected even in the immediate present: those ‘who neglect the present opportunity of hunting out good lands’ were foolish.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The future president of the United States was not one of these ‘fools’. In his new capacity, while declaring in official speeches that he wanted to bring the ‘blessings of civilization’ and ‘happiness’ to ‘an unenlightened race of men’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in private correspondence he identified the Indians as ‘savages’ and ‘wild beasts of the forest’. Given this, the British Crown’s pretension to block further expansion by the colonists was absurd and ultimately immoral: they (Washington declared in a letter of 1783) would force ‘the Savage [like] the Wolf to retire’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more extreme in this respect was Franklin, who in his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039; observed: ‘if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes who formerly inhabited the Seacoast.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The decimation or destruction of a people who worshipped ‘the Devil’ was part of a kind of divinely inspired eugenicist plan.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The de-humanization of the Indians was also subscribed to by those in Britain who supported reconciliation with the rebels. The Crown’s attempt to block the colonists’ expansionistic march seemed to Burke absurd and sacrilegious, for ‘attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil, the command and blessing of Providence, “Increase and multiply.”‘ Ultimately, it was an ill-fated ‘endeavour to keep as a lair of wild beasts, that earth, which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those on either side of the Atlantic who supported or justified the Crown’s policy of ‘conciliation’ not of the colonists, but of the Indians, mounted some resistance to this process of de-humanization. In this context, a particular mention should be made of the figure of the likeable American loyalist whom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg19&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we have encountered several times, in his capacity as a critic of the peculiar libertarian zeal displayed by the ‘harshest and wickedest slave masters’. To these same circles he attributed cruelty to the Indians. Sometimes they were killed and scalped with veritable religious fervour; they even became targets for shooting practice. They were branded savages and yet (objected Jonathan Boucher) they were no more savage ‘than our progenitors appeared to Julius Caesar or to Agricola’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We have seen Paine accuse the London government of seeking an alliance with Indian cut-throats. In reality, warned an English commander in 1783, it was precisely the now victorious colonists who ‘were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians’. The victors’ behaviour (added another officer) was ‘shocking to humanity’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an enduring controversy. In the later nineteenth century a historian descended from a family of loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada argued as follows: Did the rebels claim to be the descendants of those who had disembarked in America to escape intolerance and stay loyal to the cause of liberty? In fact, reversing the policy of the British Crown, which aimed at conversion, the Puritans had initiated a massacre of the Indians, assimilated to ‘Canaanites and Amalekites’—that is, stocks marked out by the Old Testament for erasure from the face of the earth. This was ‘one of the darkest pages in English colonial history’, which was followed by the even more repugnant one written during the American Revolution, when the rebel colonists engaged in ‘the entire destruction of the Six Indian Nations’ that had remained loyal to England: ‘by an order which, we believe, has no parallel in the annals of any civilized nation, [Congress] commands the complete destruction of those people as a nation … including women and children’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his private correspondence at least, Jefferson had no problem acknowledging the horror of the war against the Indians. But in his view responsibility for it resided with the London government, which had incited these savage, bloodthirsty ‘tribes’. This was a situation that ‘will oblige us now to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach’. The ‘confirmed brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America’ was to be laid at Britain’s door. As with the similar fate of ‘the same colored man in Asia’, as well as of the Irish—who for the English, whose skin ‘colour’ they shared, should be ‘brethren’—it was attributable to a policy committed to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sowing death and destruction ‘wherever … Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with human blood’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson was not wrong to compare the treatment suffered by the Indians with that reserved for the Irish. Just as, according to the loyalist accusation, Puritans and rebel colonists assimilated the Indians to ‘Amalekites’, so the Irish had already been compared to ‘Amalekites’ marked out for extermination, this time by the English conquerors.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The colonization of Ireland, with all its horrors, was the model for the subsequent colonization of North America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If the British Empire as a whole mainly swept away Irish and blacks,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indians and blacks were the principal victims of the territorial and commercial expansion first of the English colonies in America and then of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the black question, in the case of the Indians the exchange of accusations ended up taking the form of a mutual demystification. There is no doubt that, along with black enslavement and the black slave trade, the rise of the two liberal countries either side of the Atlantic involved a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar observations can be made of Holland. A senior English civil servant, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who during the Napoleonic Wars was deputy governor of Java for a time, stated that the previous administration was ‘one of the extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness’. It is clear that colonial rivalry played a role in this judgement. Marx reports it, but pools ‘Dutch colonial administration’ and the English administration in his condemnation. As regards Holland more specifically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men in Celebes, in order to get slaves for Java … The young people thus stolen were hidden in secret dungeons on Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: ‘This one town of Macassar, for example, is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families.’ … Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg21&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, numbered over 80,000 inhabitants in 1750 and only 18,000 in 1811. That is peaceful commerce![[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, processes of enslavement and practical genocide were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Grotius, Locke and the Founding Fathers: a comparative interpretation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the start of the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe underlined the ideological fraternity between the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution and the country which, a century earlier, had rebelled against Philip II and won ‘freedom’ and prosperity thanks to ‘Heaven and the Assistance of England’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century, liberal authors liked to contrast the ordered triumph of liberty that had occurred in Holland, England and the United States with a France in the grip of an interminable revolutionary cycle and Bonapartism.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It might therefore be useful to proceed to a brief comparative analysis of the texts and authors in which the liberal revolutions of these three countries found theoretical expression and consecration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Holland, we cannot but refer to Hugo Grotius, who dedicated two of his most important books (&#039;&#039;Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae&#039;&#039;) to the revolt against Philip II and the country that derived from it. Liberal Holland immediately engaged in overseas expansion and slave-trading, and it is interesting to observe the position Grotius adopted towards colonial peoples. Having condemned the superstitious and idolatrous character of the ‘religious rites’ peculiar to paganism, he added:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when offered … to an evil spirit, it is an act of falsehood and hypocrisy; nay, it is an act of absolute rebellion, whereby we not only deprive our legal sovereign of his just homage, but even transfer that homage to a base apostate and an open enemy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg22&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Targeted here were peoples with&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
modes of worship … of a nature little suited to a Being of goodness and of purity: Human sacrifices; naked races up and down the temples; games and dances replete with obscenity; instances whereof are seen even at this day among the savage natives of America and Africa, who are still lost in the thick clouds of Paganism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was peoples assailed by Europe’s colonial expansion who were guilty of rebellion against God, and who must be punished for such a crime:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some … are weak enough to imagine, that God, as a being of infinite goodness, will never be provoked to punish this rebellion; a spirit of revenge, say they, is wholly incompatible with the attribute of perfect goodness. A fatal and absurd idea this! The powers of Mercy must be limited, that her actions may be just; and when wickedness becomes excessive, punishment as it were unavoidably arises out of justice.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against peoples who, staining themselves with ‘[o]ffences that are committed against GOD’ and violating the most basic norms of natural law, took the form of ‘barbarians’ or ‘rather Beasts than men’, war was ‘natural’, regardless of state borders and geographical distance. Indeed, ‘the justest War is that which is undertaken against wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like Beasts [&#039;&#039;homines belluis similes&#039;&#039;].’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the ideology that presided over the conquest of the New World. The sin of idolatry was the first of the arguments prompting Sepúlveda to regard war on the Indians and their enslavement as ‘just’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Grotius, along with the implicit legitimation of the genocidal practices underway in America, an explicit and insistent justification of slavery emerges. Sometimes it was punishment for criminal behaviour. Answerable for the latter were not only single individuals: ‘a whole People may be brought into Subjection for a publick Crime’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As well as in their capacity as ‘rebels’ against the Lord of the Universe, the inhabitants of America and Africa could also succumb to slavery &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg23&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as a result of a ‘just war’ (&#039;&#039;bellum justum&#039;&#039;), conducted by a European power. The prisoners captured during an armed conflict, formally declared in the requisite forms by the supreme authority of a state, were legitimately slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And their descendants too were legitimate slaves: otherwise, what interest would the victor have in keeping the vanquished alive? As the slave of the one who had spared his life, the prisoner became part of the victor’s property, and such property could be transmitted hereditarily or be an object of sale, just like ‘the Property of Goods’ (&#039;&#039;rerum dominium&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, all this did not apply to ‘those Nations where this Right of Bondage over Captives is not practised’; it did not apply to ‘Christian’ countries, which limited themselves to exchanging prisoners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Banned in intra-European conflicts, slavery by right of war continued to be a reality as and when Christian, civilized Europe confronted colonial peoples, barbarians and pagans in what, by definition, was a ‘just’ war. On the other hand, regardless of their actual behaviour, the lesson of a great master should not be forgotten: ‘as &#039;&#039;Aristotle&#039;&#039; said, some Men are naturally Slaves, that is, turned for Slavery. And some Nations also are of such a Temper, that they know better how to obey than to command’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a truth also confirmed by Holy Scripture: ‘the Apostle St Paul’ called on individuals and peoples who had legitimately been reduced to slavery to put up with their lot and not escape it by rebellion or flight.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, Grotius paid homage to the ‘free People’ who in Holland had availed themselves of their right of resistance, legitimately shaking off the yoke of a despotic prince.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other, he had no difficulty justifying slavery and even the kind of ‘wild beast’ hunt against Indians underway in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now pass on to the Glorious Revolution and Locke. The &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; may be regarded as key moments in the ideological preparation and consecration of the event that marks the birth of liberal England. We are dealing with texts deeply impregnated with the pathos of liberty, the condemnation of absolute power, the appeal to rise up against the wicked ones who seek to deprive man of his liberty and reduce him to slavery. But every now and then frightening passages open up in this ode to liberty, where slavery in the colonies is legitimized. As ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the institution, Grotius adduced the example of the Germans who, according to Tacitus’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg24&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;testimony, ‘ventured their very Liberty upon the Cast of a Die’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Locke’s view, ‘captives taken in a just war’ (on the part of the victors) had ‘forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties’. They were slaves ‘subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to now the thinking applies to blacks deported from Africa. But the fate reserved for Indians was not manifestly better. In addition to having an interest in the slave trade as a shareholder in the Royal African Company, the liberal English philosopher was concerned with the white colonists’ expansionist march as secretary (in 1673–74) of the Council of Trade and Plantations. As has been justly observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That so many of the examples Locke uses in his &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; are American ones shows that his intention was to provide the settlers, for whom he had worked in so many other ways, with a powerful argument based in natural law rather than legislative decree to justify their depredations.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; makes repeated reference to the ‘wild Indian’, who moved around ‘insolent and injurious in the woods of America’ or the ‘vacant places of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ignorant of labour, which was the only thing that could confer property right, and occupying a land not ‘improv[ed] by labour’, or ‘great tracts of unused’ ground’, the Indian inhabited ‘unpossessed quarters’, &#039;&#039;in vacuis locis&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to labour and property, Indians were also ignorant of money. They thus not only proved alien to civilization, but were also ‘not … joined with the rest of mankind’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As a result of their behaviour, they were not solely subject to human condemnation. Unquestionably, ‘God commanded … labour’ and private property, and could certainly not want the world created by him to remain ‘common and uncultivated’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he sought to challenge the march of civilization, violently opposing exploitation through labour of the uncultivated land occupied by him, the Indian, along with any other criminal, could be equated with ‘one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security’, and who ‘therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger’. Locke never tired of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg25&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;insisting on the right possessed by any man to destroy those reduced to the level of ‘beasts of prey’, ‘savage beasts’; to the level of ‘a savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are phrases that remind us of those used by Grotius in connection with barbarous peoples and pagans in general, and by Washington in connection with the Indians. However, before coming to the Founding Fathers and the solemn documents that mark the birth of the United States, it is worth dwelling on another macroscopic exclusion clause that characterizes the celebration of liberty in Locke. ‘Papists’, declared the &#039;&#039;Essay Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039;, are ‘like serpents never [to] be prevailed on by kind usage to lay by their venom’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even more than to English Catholics, this harsh declaration was formulated with a view to Ireland, where at the time unregistered priests were branded with a red-hot iron, when they were not punished with more severe penalties or death.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Irish, in endemic, desperate revolt against spoliation and oppression by Anglican settlers, were contemptuously referred to by Locke as a population of ‘brigands’. As for the rest, he reiterated the point the men are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
forward to have compassion for sufferers and esteem for that religion as pure, and the professors of it as sincere, which can stand the test of persecution. But I think it is far otherwise with Catholics, who are less apt to be pitied than others because they receive no other usage than what they [by the] cruelty of their own principles and practices are known to deserve.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The warning against feelings of ‘compassion’ makes it clear that we are dealing with Ireland primarily. Locke seems to have had no objections of any kind to the ruthless repression suffered by the Irish, whose fate calls to mind that reserved for Indians across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can now move on to examine the documents that informed the third liberal revolution and the foundation of the United States. At first sight, the Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution seem inspired and pervaded by a universal pathos of liberty: ‘all men are created equal’—such is the solemn preamble to the first document; it is necessary to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’—such is the no less solemn preamble &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg26&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to the second. But it requires a scarcely more attentive reading to encounter, already in Article 1 of the Constitution, a contrast between ‘free Persons’ and ‘all other Persons’. The latter were, of course, slaves, whose number, reduced to three-fifths, had to be factored in and added to that of ‘free persons’ when it came to calculating the number of members in the House of Representatives to which slaveholding states were entitled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With recourse to various euphemisms, a whole series of other Articles refer to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Where initially it was concealed among ‘other persons’ (the part of the population not made up of ‘free persons’), now the relationship of slavery is modestly subsumed under the general category of persons ‘held to Service or Labour’. On the basis of the principles of self-government, each individual state has the right to regulate it as it sees fit, while every state’s obligation to return fugitive slaves is a moral obligation to guarantee a legitimate property-owner the services that ‘may be due’. In a further linguistic expedient, tinged with the same discretion, the black slave trade becomes ‘[t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit’. It was ‘not [to] be prohibited by Congress prior to the year [1808]’, and, pending that, could only be subjected to a fairly modest tax (‘not exceeding ten dollars for each person’ or slave). The articles requiring the Union to suppress insurrections or ‘domestic violence’—primarily, a possible dreaded slave revolt in some particular state[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—are formulated in similarly elliptical fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although repressed through a strict linguistic proscription, the institution of slavery proves to be a pervasive presence in the American Constitution. It is not even absent from the Declaration of Independence, where the accusation against George III of having appealed to black slaves takes the already noted form of having ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the transition from Grotius to Locke, and from them to the founding documents of the American Revolution, we observe a phenomenon worth reflecting upon: although regarded as legitimate in all three cases, the institution of slavery was theorized and affirmed without the least reticence solely by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg27&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Dutch author, whose life straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Locke, by contrast, at least in the case of the &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, which were written and published on the eve and at the end of the Glorious Revolution, legitimation of slavery tends to occur exclusively between the lines of the discourse celebrating English liberty. The reticence reaches its peak in the documents that consecrate the foundation of the United States as the most glorious chapter in the history of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it came to the relationship with the Indians, things were different: Grotius, Locke and Washington all referred to them as ‘wild beasts’. A document like the Declaration of Independence, which was addressed to international public opinion and which (as we know) included among George III’s most heinous crimes the fact that he had incited the ‘merciless Indian savages’ against the rebel colonists, was linguistically more cautious. But it remains the case that in all three liberal revolutions the demand for liberty and justification of the enslavement, as well as the decimation (or destruction), of barbarians, were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Vulgar historicism and repression of the paradox of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition—namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such—be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well-known, precisely because it is &#039;&#039;well-&#039;&#039;known, is not &#039;&#039;known&#039;&#039;. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well-known and to accept it as such’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throwing a widespread apologia into crisis, the paradoxical tangle we have encountered while historically reconstructing the origins of liberalism is disturbing. We can therefore understand the tendency to repression. After all, that was the gesture, in their own day, of Locke and, especially, the rebel American colonists, who liked to draw a more or less thick veil of silence over the institution of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg28&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The same result can be arrived at in other ways. According to Hannah Arendt, what characterized the American Revolution was the project of realizing a political order based on liberty, while the persistence of black slavery referred to a cultural tradition homogeneously diffused either side of the Atlantic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]his indifference, difficult for us to understand, was not peculiar to Americans and hence must [not] be blamed … on any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest … Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, disquiet about slavery was so strongly felt in the Europe of the time that prominent authors not infrequently proceeded to a sharp contrast between the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us attend to Condorcet:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American forgets that negroes are men; he has no moral relationship with them; for him they are simply objects of profit … and such is the excess of his stupid contempt for this unhappy species that, when back in Europe, he is indignant to see them dressed like men and placed alongside him.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
‘The American’ condemned here is the transatlantic colonist, whether French or English. In his turn, in 1771 Millar denounced ‘the shocking barbarity to which the negroes in our colonies are frequently exposed’. Fortunately, ‘the practice of slavery [has] been … generally abolished in Europe’. Where it survived, across the Atlantic, the practice poisoned the whole society: cruelty and sadism were ‘exhibited even by persons of the weaker sex, in an age distinguished for humanity and politeness’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also the opinion of Condorcet, who pointed out how ‘the young American woman witnesses’, and sometimes even ‘presides over’, the brutal ‘tortures’ inflicted on black slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thesis formulated by Arendt can even be inverted. In the late eighteenth century the institution of slavery began to be unacceptable in salons where the ideas of the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; circulated, and in churches influenced by the Quakers or other abolitionist sections of Christianity. Even as the Philadelphia Convention ratified the Constitution that sanctioned racial chattel slavery, a French defender of this institution bitterly noted his isolation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg29&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The extremely powerful empire of public opinion … now offers its support to those in France and England who attack black slavery and pursue its abolition. The most odious interpretations are reserved for those who dare to hold a contrary opinion.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, another French defender of slavery bemoaned the fact that ‘negrophilia’ had become a ‘fashionable oddity’, to the point of abolishing any sense of distance between the two races: ‘African blood circulates much too abundantly in the veins of the Parisians themselves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we start out from the presupposition of a general ‘indifference’ to the lot of black slaves in these years, we shall understand nothing of the American Revolution. The ‘last great philosopher’ to justify slavery—Locke—was quite the reverse of unchallenged; and it is interesting to note that he was criticized together with the ‘current American rebellion’, which he was regarded as having inspired.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, celebration of a tendentially republican liberty was bound up with legitimation of the institution of slavery. After having cited various passages from the philosopher that leave no room for doubt in this regard, Josiah Tucker commented: ‘[s]uch is the language of the humane Mr Locke! The great and glorious Assertor of the natural Rights and Liberties of Mankind’; here were ‘his real Sentiments concerning Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the American loyalist we have already encountered—Boucher—conjointly condemned the republican secession and Locke’s claim to confer on ‘every freeman of Carolina absolute power and property over his slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While English patriots and loyalists opposed to secession ironized about the flag of liberty waved by slave-owners, the rebel colonists reacted not by invoking the legitimacy of enslaving blacks, but by highlighting the British Crown’s massive involvement and principal responsibility in trafficking and trading human flesh. It is clear that the institution of slavery was now largely delegitimized. This explains the linguistic proscriptions that characterized the new state’s Constitution. As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention observed, his colleagues ‘anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious to the ears of Americans’, but were ‘willing to admit into their system those &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; which the &#039;&#039;expressions signified’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg30&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is that, from the start of the debate on the new constitutional order (pointed out another witness), people ‘had been ashamed to use the term “Slaves” &amp;amp;amp; had substituted a description’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Less scrupulous (observed Condorcet in 1781) were the slaves’ ‘owners’: they were ‘guided by a false consciousness [&#039;&#039;fausse conscience&#039;&#039;]’ that rendered them impervious to the ‘protests of the defenders of humanity’ and ‘made them act not against their own interests, but to their own advantage’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, notwithstanding Arendt’s contrary opinion, ‘class interests’—principally of those who owned large plantations and a considerable number of slaves—played an important role, which did not escape contemporary observers. The fact is that Arendt ultimately ends up identifying with the viewpoint of the rebel colonists, who retained a clear conscience as champions of the cause of liberty, repressing the macroscopic fact of slavery by means of their ingenious euphemisms: what takes the place of such euphemisms is now the ‘historicist’ explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Colonial expansions and the rebirth of slavery: the positions of Bodin, Grotius and Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Decidedly misleading as regards the American Revolution, might the ‘historicist’ approach be of some use in clarifying the reasons for the tangle of freedom and oppression that was already manifest in the two preceding liberal revolutions? Although contemporaries, in as much as both of them straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin expressed diametrically opposed positions on the issue of concern to us here. While the first justified slavery by appealing to the authority of the Bible and Aristotle, the second refuted both these arguments. Having observed that in the Hebrew world only gentiles could be subjected to perpetual slavery, and that Christians and Muslims observed similar norms and customs, Bodin concluded that ‘those who profess all these three religions only partially observe the law of God with regard to slaves’, as if the prohibition of this horrible institution only applied to blood relations, not humanity as a whole. If a distinction among the three monotheistic religions could be made, it was to the advantage of Islam, which had proved capable of expanding thanks to a courageous policy of emancipation.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg31&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bodin also rejected Aristotle’s thesis, adopted and even radicalized by Grotius, that some individuals and peoples are naturally slaves. As proof of this, the universal diffusion, temporal and spatial, of the institution of slavery was often cited. But (objected the French author) no less universally diffused were slave revolts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil, inclines for the most part to do that which is forbidden and chooses the evil, defying the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While it had long seemed obvious and been generally accepted, and still continued to be, the institution of slavery pertained not to nature but to history—more precisely, to a deplorable and execrable chapter of history, which must rapidly be closed once and for all. It made no sense to try to justify it on the basis of right of war (as did Grotius): ‘[W]hat charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some profit or pleasure from them as if they were cattle?’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, Grotius and Bodin were contemporaries. While the former was an expression of liberal Holland, the latter was a theorist of absolute monarchy. But it was he—not Grotius—who questioned the absolute power wielded by the master over his slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We arrive at a similar result when, rather than with Grotius, we compare Bodin with Locke, whom he predated by some decades. Whereas the English liberal, also justifying slavery with his gaze on the past, pointed to Spartacus as culpable of an ‘aggression’ against ‘property’ and legitimate power, Bodin expressed himself quite differently: ‘The Romans, who were so great and powerful … however many laws they made, could not prevent the revolt of sixty thousand slaves led by Spartacus, who defeated the Roman army in open battle three times’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the English liberal the universalistic charge present in Bodin has disappeared, just as there is no longer any trace of the unconditional &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg32&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery we can read in the French theorist of absolute monarchy. If we bear in mind ‘the homicides, the cruelties and barbarities inflicted on slaves by their masters, it was an unmitigated catastrophe that the institution was ever introduced, and then, that once it had been declared abolished, it should ever have been allowed to persist.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The quotation above refers to persistence. In fact, Bodin traced a brief history of slavery in the world or, more precisely, the West (and the geographical area dominated by it). Certainly, the institution had been vital in Greco-Roman antiquity. As late as the American Civil War, the theorists and defenders of the southern cause appealed to the example and model of that splendid civilization in order to condemn abolitionism. By contrast, Bodin drew a rather realistic picture of classical antiquity. It was based on the enslavement of a number of human beings that was significantly greater than the number of free citizens. Consequently, it lived under the constant menace of slave revolts and, in order to solve the problem, did not hesitate to resort to the most barbaric measures, as proved by the massacre of 30,000 helots in Sparta ‘in a single night’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Subsequently, as a result also of the influence of Christianity, things seemed to change: ‘Europe was freed of slavery after about 1250’, but ‘we see it today newly restored’. Following colonial expansion, it was ‘in the process of being renewed throughout the world’. There had been a massive restoration of slavery, and already Portugal ‘derives from it veritable herds as of beasts’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, far from being affected by vulgar historicism’s attempts at repression, the paradox that characterizes the American Revolution and early liberalism in general not only survives, but proves even more marked. We are in the presence of a political movement counter to the trend of authors who, centuries earlier, had pronounced an unequivocal condemnation of the institution of slavery. While Locke, champion of the struggle against absolute monarchy, justified the white master’s absolute power over the black slave, a theorist of monarchical absolutism—Bodin—condemned such power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In analyzing the relationship that the three liberal revolutions developed on the one hand with the blacks, and on the other with the Irish, Indians and natives, it is misleading to start out from the presupposition of a homogeneous historical time unmarked by fractures and flowing in unilinear fashion. Clearly predating Locke and Washington, and a contemporary of Grotius, was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg33&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Montaigne, in whom we find a memorable self-critical reflection on the West’s colonial expansion that we would seek in vain in them. Such a reflection can even be read as a prefigurative but timely critique of the attitude of Grotius, Locke and Washington towards non-European populations. Among them there was ‘nothing savage or barbarous’; the fact was that ‘every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to’. People took their own country as a model: ‘There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going back further, we encounter Las Casas and his critique of the arguments employed to de-humanize the Indian ‘barbarians’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the arguments that are more or less widely echoed by Grotius, Locke and Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be added that the ‘historicist’ explanation turns out to be unfounded not only as regards the relationship with colonial peoples. While Fletcher, a self-defined ‘republican on principle’, member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of the liberal political world derived from the Glorious Revolution, called for ‘mak[ing] slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bodin also condemned slavery for ‘vagrants and idlers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to the observation of a great historian, it was in ‘the period between 1660 and 1760’ (the decades of the rise of the liberal movement) that an attitude of unprecedented harshness spread in England towards wage-labourers and the unemployed, ‘which has no modern parallel except in the behaviour of the less reputable of white colonists towards coloured labour’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the radical character of the paradox we are examining, let us return to Bodin. He primarily attributed the return of slavery in the world to the ‘greed of merchants’, and then added: ‘If the princes do not set things in good order, it will soon be full of slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later. On the other hand, in recommending the conversion of beggars &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg34&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into slaves, Fletcher polemicized against the Church, which he rebuked for having promoted the abolition of slavery in classical antiquity and for opposing its reintroduction in the modern world, thus encouraging the sloth and dissipation of vagrants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, too, the institution of slavery was felt to be in contradiction not with the new social and political forces, but with a power that was pre-modern in origin. Such considerations can also be applied to Grotius, who likewise developed an argument, if not against Christianity as such, then against interpretations of it in an abolitionist register:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat the Apostles and antient Canons enjoin Slaves, of not leaving their Masters, is a general Maxim, and only opposed to the Error of those who rejected every Subjection, both private and publick, as a State inconsistent with the Liberty of Christians.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Virginian property-owners who prevented the baptism of slaves in the late seventeenth century, so as not to spoil the spirit of submission and to avoid the emergence of a sense of pride in them because they belonged to the same religious community as the masters, provoked complaints from Church and Crown alike.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, we see that it was the forces of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; which acted to check and contain the novelty represented by racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recourse to vulgar historicism to ‘explain’ or repress the surprising tangle of freedom and oppression that characterizes the three liberal revolutions we have referred to is fruitless. The paradox persists and awaits a genuine, less comforting explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn1a|1]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R.M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 529.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., pp. 528–31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., pp. 30–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., pp. 30–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 582.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., pp. 529, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn8a|8]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, vol. 1, pp. 240, 250; vol. 3, p. 593.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn9a|9]] C. Gordon Post, Introduction to John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;A Disquisition on Government&#039;&#039;, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. vii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn10a|10]] Ross M. Lence, Foreword to Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. xxiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn11a|11]] Giovanni Sartori, &#039;&#039;Democrazia e definizioni&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 151; Sartori, &#039;&#039;The Theory of Democracy Revisited&#039;&#039;, Chatham (NJ): Chatham House Publishers, 1987, pp. 239, 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn12a|12]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 120–1, 160–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn13a|13]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 21, p. 157; vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn14a|14]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wooton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn15a|15]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 45.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn16a|16]] See John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, bk 1, ch. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn17a|17]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn18a|18]] Maurice Cranston, &#039;&#039;John Locke&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, 1959, pp. 114–15; Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, pp. 199, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn19a|19]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn20a|20]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 278, 235–58.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn21a|21]] Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox’, &#039;&#039;Journal of American History&#039;&#039;, vol. LIX, no. 1, 1972, p. 11; cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn22a|22]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn23a|23]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn24a|24]] Henry R. Fox Bourne, &#039;&#039;The Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Aalen: Scientia, 1969, vol. 1, p. 481; John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, ed. Esmond S. De Beer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89, vols 5–7, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn25a|25]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1134 (letter to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn26a|26]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 382; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn27a|27]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, p. 45 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn28a|28]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 309 (letter to Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 374–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn30a|30]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 452–3, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn31a|31]] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ed., &#039;&#039;History of US Political Parties&#039;&#039;, New York and London: Chelsea House and Bawker, 1973, pp. 915–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn32a|32]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn33a|33]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn34a|34]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Roger Caillois, Paris: Gallimard, 1949–51, vol. 1, p. 884; Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 243, 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn36a|36]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 328–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn37a|37]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 122–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn38a|38]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn39a|39]] Janice Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 115–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn40a|40]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, pp. 123–4, 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn41a|41]] Boucher, quoted in Anne Y. Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn42a|42]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn43a|43]] Barry Alan Shain, &#039;&#039;The Myth of American Individualism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn44a|44]] Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 646–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn46a|46]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn47a|47]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn48a|48]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, p. 294.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn49a|49]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 272–3, 386–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn50a|50]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 648–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn51a|51]] Cf. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 273; Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn52a|52]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 5–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn53a|53]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn54a|54]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 67–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn55a|55]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn56a|56]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174 n. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 170 n. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn58a|58]] Gee, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn59a|59]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, p. 150; Eric R. Wolf, &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn60a|60]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn61a|61]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn62a|62]] Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn63a|63]] Marx’s characterization in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 926.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn64a|64]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn65a|65]] Bourne, &#039;&#039;Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn66a|66]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 203, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn67a|67]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 2, p. 52.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn68a|68]] Jennings, &#039;&#039;Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn69a|69]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn70a|70]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn71a|71]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn72a|72]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, trans. and intro. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992, p. 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn73a|73]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn74a|74]] Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn75a|75]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 165, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn76a|76]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 218, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn77a|77]] Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 35, 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn78a|78]] Henry S. Commager, ed., &#039;&#039;Documents of American History&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 208–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn79a|79]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joelle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, p. 39 (letter from Washington to his friend W. Crawford, 21 September 1767).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn80a|80]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 475–6 (presidential message, 25 October 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn81a|81]] Delanoë and Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2 (letter from Washington to J. Duane, 7 September 1783).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn82a|82]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1422.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn84a|84]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn85a|85]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn86a|86]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 278, 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn87a|87]] Egerton Ryerson, &#039;&#039;The Loyalists of America and Their Times&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Haskell House, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 297–8 and n.; vol. 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn88a|88]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1312–13 (letter to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn89a|89]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 16, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn90a|90]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 14–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn91a|91]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 164.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn92a|92]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 916; cf. Werner Sombart, &#039;&#039;Der moderne Kapitalismus&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Munich: DTV, 1987, vol. 1, pt II, p. 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn93a|93]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn94a|94]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. viii; François Guizot, ‘Discours sur l’histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre’, in &#039;&#039;Histoire d’Angleterre&#039;&#039;, Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1850, pp. 41–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn95a|95]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;On the Truth of Christianity&#039;&#039;, trans. Spencer Madan, London: J. Dodsby, 1782, pp. 195–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn96a|96]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 1027, 1024.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn97a|97]] Lewis Hanke, &#039;&#039;Aristotle and the American Indians&#039;&#039;, London: Hollis and Carter, 1959, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn98a|98]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 565.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn99a|99]] See ibid., vol. 1, ch. iii, §4; vol. 3, ch. iii, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., vol. 3, ch. vii, §§2, 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1496, 1372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn102a|102]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn103a|103]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xxii, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn104a|104]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xvi, §16; vol. 1, ch. iv, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn105a|105]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn106a|106]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn107a|107]] Anthony Pagden, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700’, in Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn108a|108]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 129, 162, 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., pp. 136, 139, 152, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn110a|110]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 133, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn113a|113]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 202.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn114a|114]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 1, pp. 296–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn115a|115]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn116a|116]] Cf. Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn117a|117]] Georg W.F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 20 vols, eds Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–79, vol. 3, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn118a|118]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;On Revolution&#039;&#039;, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1963, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn119a|119]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 647–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn120a|120]] Millar, &#039;&#039;Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, pp. 258, 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn121a|121]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 648.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn122a|122]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn123a|123]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 48, 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn124a|124]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn125a|125]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 103–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn126a|126]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 296.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn127a|127]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn128a|128]] Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn129a|129]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130a|130]] Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books of the Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, abridg. and trans. M.J. Tooley, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, n.d., pp. 18, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131a|131]] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133a|133]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 216; Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri dello Stato&#039;&#039;, trans. Margherita Isnardi Parente, Turin: UTET, 1988, vol. 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134a|134]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books&#039;&#039;, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135a|135]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 247–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136a|136]] Ibid., pp. 253, 238, 260.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137a|137]] Michel de Montaigne, &#039;&#039;The Complete Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138a|138]] Bartolomé de las Casas, &#039;&#039;La leggenda nera&#039;&#039;, trans. Alberto Pincherle, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981, ch. xii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139a|139]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 882–3 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140a|140]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 262 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141a|141]] R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, West&#039;&#039; Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 267. C.B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 227–8 and Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325 reach the same conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142a|142]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 260 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143a|143]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144a|144]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 561.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145a|145]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 332.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg35&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The limitation of power and the emergence of an unprecedented absolute power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To render it explicable, the paradox must first be expounded in all its radicalism. Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success: ‘The total slave population in the Americas reached around 330,000 in 1700, nearly three million by 1800, and finally peaked at over six million in the 1850s’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Contributing decisively to the rise of an institution synonymous with the absolute power of man over man was the liberal world. In the mid-eighteenth century, it was Great Britain that possessed the largest number of slaves (878,000). The fact is unexpected. Although its empire was far more extensive, Spain came well behind. Second position was held by Portugal, which possessed 700,000 slaves and was in fact a kind of semi-colony of Great Britain: much of the gold extracted by Brazilian slaves ended up in London.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence there is no doubt that absolutely pre-eminent in this field was the country at the head of the liberal movement, which had wrested primacy in the trading and ownership of black slaves precisely from the Glorious Revolution onwards. It was Pitt the Younger himself who, intervening in April 1792 in the House of Commons on the subject of slavery and the slave trade, acknowledged that ‘[n]o nation in Europe … has … plunged so deeply into this guilt as Great Britain.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg36&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;That is not all. To a greater or lesser extent, there survived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies ‘&#039;&#039;ancillary&#039;&#039; slavery’, which is to be distinguished from ‘&#039;&#039;systemic&#039;&#039; slavery, linked to plantations and commodity production’. And it was the latter type of slavery, established above all in the eighteenth century (starting from the liberal revolution of 1688–89) and clearly predominant in the British colonies, which most consummately expressed the de-humanization of those who were now mere instruments of labour and chattels, subject to regular sale on the market.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This did not even involve a return to the slavery peculiar to classical antiquity. Certainly, chattel slavery had been widespread in Rome. Yet the slave could reasonably hope that, if not he himself, then his children or grandchildren would be able to achieve freedom and even an eminent social position. Now, by contrast, his fate increasingly took the form of a cage from which it was impossible to escape. In the first half of the eighteenth century, numerous English colonies in America enacted laws that made the emancipation of slaves increasingly difficult.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Quakers lamented the advent of what seemed to them a new and repugnant system. Slavery for a determinate period of time, and the other forms of more or less servile labour hitherto in force, tended to give way to slavery in the strict sense, to a permanent, hereditary condemnation of a whole people, who were denied any prospect of change and improvement, any hope of freedom.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, in a statute of 1696, South Carolina declared that it could not prosper ‘without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The barrier separating service and slavery was as yet not well defined, and the institution of slavery had not yet appeared in all its harshness. But the process that increasingly reduced slaves to chattels, and established the racial character of the condition they were subjected to, was already underway. An unbridgeable gulf separated blacks from the free population. Ever stricter laws prohibited interracial sexual and marital relations, making them a crime. We are now dealing with a hereditary caste of slaves, defined and recognizable by the colour of their skin. In this sense, in John Wesley’s view, ‘American slavery’ was ‘the vilest that ever saw the sun’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg37&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The verdict of American Quakers and British abolitionists has been fully confirmed by contemporary historians. At the end of a ‘cycle of degradation’ of blacks, with the ignition of the white ‘engine of oppression’ and the conclusive soldering of ‘slavery and racial discrimination’, we see at work in the ‘colonies of the British empire’ in the late seventeenth century a ‘chattel racial slavery’ unknown in Elizabethan England (and also classical antiquity), but ‘familiar to men living in the nineteenth century’ and aware of the reality of the southern United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence slavery in its most radical form triumphed in the golden age of liberalism and at the heart of the liberal world. This was acknowledged by James Madison, slave-owner and liberal (like numerous protagonists of the American Revolution), who observed that ‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man’—power based on ‘mere distinction of colour’—was imposed ‘in the most enlightened period of time’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Correctly stated, in all its radicalism, the paradox we face consists in this: the rise of liberalism and the spread of racial chattel slavery are the product of a twin birth which, as we shall see, has rather unique characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The self-government of civil society and the triumph of large-scale property&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On its emergence, the paradox we are attempting to explain did not escape the most attentive observers. We have just seen Madison’s admission; and we are familiar with Samuel Johnson’s irony on the passionate love of liberty displayed by slave-owners; and Adam Smith’s observation on the nexus between the persistence and reinforcement of slavery, on the one hand, and the power of representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners, on the other. In this connection, however, we must also record other, no less significant interventions. In fighting for conciliation of the rebel colonies, Burke recognized the influence of slavery within them. But this did not impair the ‘spirit of freedom’. On the contrary, it was precisely here that freedom appeared ‘more noble and liberal’. Indeed, ‘these people of the southern colonies are more much more strongly … attached to liberty, than those to the northward’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is a consideration that we also encounter, some decades later, from a Barbadian planter: ‘you will … &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg38&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;find that no nations in the world have been more jealous of their liberties than those amongst whom the institution of slavery existed’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, in England, countering Burke and his policy of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Josiah Tucker pointed out how ‘the Champions for American Republicanism’ were simultaneously the promoters of the ‘absurd Tyranny’ they exercised over their slaves: this was ‘a &#039;&#039;republican Tyranny&#039;&#039;, the worst of all Tyrannies’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the authors cited here, there is a more or less clear awareness, accompanied by different value judgements, of the paradox we are examining. And perhaps precisely now it begins to lose its aura of impenetrability. Why should we be surprised that those demanding, or in the forefront of the demand for, self-government and ‘freedom’ from central political power were the major slave-owners? In 1839 an eminent representative of Virginia observed that the position of the slave-owner stimulated in him ‘a more liberal cast of character, more elevated principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and juster estimate of that liberty by which he is so highly distinguished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wealth and leisure it enjoyed, and the culture it thus managed to acquire, reinforced the proud self-consciousness of a class that became ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority. Shaking off these constraints, the planter and slave-owner developed a liberal spirit and a liberal mentality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming this phenomenon are the changes that occurred from the Middle Ages. Between 1263 and 1265, by means of the &#039;&#039;Siete partidas&#039;&#039;, Alfonso X of Castile regulated the institution of slavery, which he seemed to recognize reluctantly because it was always ‘unnatural’. What limited the property right in the first instance was religion: an unbeliever was not permitted to own Christian slaves and, in any event, the slave had to be guaranteed the possibility of living in conformity with Christian principles—whence the recognition of his right to establish a family and have the chastity and honour of his wife and daughters respected. Later, there were even cases of masters denounced to the Inquisition for their failure to respect the rights of their slaves. Further limiting the power of the property-owner was the state, profoundly influenced by religion. It was committed to disciplining and limiting the punishment inflicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg39&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by masters on slaves and variously sought to promote their emancipation (we are dealing with Christian subjects). Emancipation occurred from above when the slave performed a meritorious deed for the country; in such cases, the master deprived of his property was compensated by the state.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of modern property entailed the master’s ability to dispose of it as he saw fit. In the Virginia of the second half of the seventeenth century, a law was in force that sanctioned the effective impunity of a master even when he killed his slave. Such behaviour could not be considered a ‘felony’, since ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that prepense malice (which alone makes murder felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] First with the Glorious Revolution and then later, more completely, with the American Revolution, the assertion of self-government by civil society hegemonized by slaveholders involved the definitive liquidation of traditional forms of ‘interference’ by political and religious authority. Christian baptism and profession of faith were henceforth irrelevant. In Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, one could proceed ‘without the solemnities of jury’ to the execution of a slave guilty of a capital crime; marriage between slaves was no longer a sacrament, and even funerals lost their solemnity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Virginian jurist (George Tucker) could observe that the slave was positioned ‘below the rank of human beings, not only politically, but physically and morally’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conquest of self-government by civil society hegemonized by large-scale property involved an even more drastic deterioration in the condition of the indigenous population. The end of the control exercised by the London government swept away the last obstacles to the expansionistic march of the white colonists. Already harboured by Jefferson, and then explicitly and brutally formulated by the Monroe administration (the natives of the East must clear off the land, ‘whether or not they agree, whether or not they become civilized’), the idea of deporting the Indians became a tragic reality with the Jackson Presidency:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg40&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by ‘civilian volunteers,’ invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The ‘civilian volunteers’ appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the ‘trail of tears,’ as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: ‘Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The black slave and the white servant: from Grotius to Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While it stimulated the development of racial chattel slavery and created an unprecedented, unbridgeable gulf between whites and peoples of colour, the self-government of civil society triumphed, waving the flag of liberty and the struggle against despotism. Between these two elements, which emerged together during a unique twin birth, a relationship full of tensions and contradictions was established. Such a celebration of liberty, which was bound up with the reality of an unprecedented absolute power, can clearly be interpreted as an ideology. But however mystificatory it might be, ideology is never null. In fact, its mystificatory function cannot even be conceived without some incidence in concrete social reality. And still less can ideology be regarded as synonymous with conscious falsehood. Were that to be the case, it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence. The theorists and agents of the liberal revolutions and movements were moved by a powerful, convinced pathos of liberty; and precisely for that reason, they displayed embarrassment at the reality of slavery. Obviously, in a majority of cases, such embarrassment did not push them to the point of questioning the ‘property’ on which the wealth and social influence of the class protagonist in the struggle for the self-government of civil society were based. As regards England, the course was taken that removed slavery in the strict sense to a geographical area remote from the metropolis, situated at the edge of the civilized world, where, precisely on account of the proximity and pressure of barbarous circumstances, the spirit of liberty was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg41&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not manifested in all its purity, unlike in England proper—the true homeland, the promised land of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, this was a conclusion reached via a route marked by oscillations and contradictions of various kinds. In Grotius the colour barrier is not yet visible that separates the fate reserved for blacks from the condition to which the poorest layers of the white population can be subjected. We read: ‘perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his Life long, for Diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood, and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it. However, slavery was not the only form of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, but only the ‘most ignoble … Kind of Subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectionis species ignobilissima&#039;&#039;).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There was also &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039;, peculiar, among others, to serfs and &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, labour as such was subsumed under the category of ‘service’ (&#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;) or ‘subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectio&#039;&#039;). Obviously, there is a difference between the two forms of ‘service’ and ‘subjection’. While it violated ‘natural reason’ or ‘the Rules of full and compleat Justice’—i.e. the norms of morality—on the basis of the legislation in force in some countries the master could kill his slave with impunity and hence exercise a right of life and death over him.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was something not found in the sphere of &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; and the labour relationship that employed &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a particular &#039;&#039;species&#039;&#039; of the single &#039;&#039;genus&#039;&#039; that is service or subjection. The boundary between the various species is fluid. For example, of the ‘apprentices [&#039;&#039;apprenticii&#039;&#039;] in England’, it was to be noted that they ‘come nearest to the State of Slavery, during their Apprenticeship’—that is to say, to the condition of slaves proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, by way of atoning for a crime one could be condemned to labour and to render one’s services either as a slave or as an individual subjected to some form of ‘imperfect slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with Grotius, Locke was concerned to distinguish more rigorously between the various kinds of service. Elements of continuity are certainly not lacking. Speaking of wage-labour and the contract that establishes it, the English philosopher wrote: ‘a free man makes himself a servant to another’. As we can see, labour as such continues to be subsumed under the category of service. In fact, the contract introduces the wage-labourer ‘into the family &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg42&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof’. This discipline was in fact very different from the unlimited power that characterized the relationship of slavery and defined the ‘perfect condition of slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Grotius’ distinction between &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; reappears in broad outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Locke urges us not to confuse servant and slave. Grotius compared the slave to a &#039;&#039;‘perpetual Hireling’&#039;&#039;, or a wage-labourer bound for the duration of his natural term to the same master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Locke stressed that we are dealing with two different statuses. In addition to being ‘temporary’, the power exercised by the master over a servant ‘is no greater than what is contained in the contract between them’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, on the one hand, this made the condition of the servant better, on the other, it rendered that of the slave proper manifestly worse. Shaking off the moral inhibitions of Grotius, who called on the master to respect not only the life but also the specificity of his slave, Locke endlessly stressed that the master exercises over the slave an ‘absolute dominion’ and ‘absolute power’, a ‘legislative power of life and death’, an ‘arbitrary power’ encompassing ‘life’ itself.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the slave tends to lose his human characteristics and become reduced to a thing and a chattel, as emerges in particular from the reference to the planters of the East Indies who possess ‘slaves or horses’ on the basis of a regular ‘purchase’, and this ‘by bargain and money’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Without any hint of criticism, Locke engaged in a conjunction that signifies a firm, indignant denunciation in abolitionist literature. This applies to Mirabeau, who (as we shall see) compared the condition of American slaves with ‘our horses and our mules’; and to Marx, who observed in &#039;&#039;Capital:&#039;&#039; ‘The slave-owner buys his worker in the same way as he buys his horse.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke marks a turning point theoretically. Sometimes freed by their masters, blacks slaves were long subjected to a condition not markedly dissimilar from that of indentured servants—that is, temporary white semi-slaves on a contractual basis. And it is this ambiguity that finds expression in the text of Grotius, who can hence also apply the category of contract to &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039;. In Locke, by contrast, we can read the development which chattel slavery and racial &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg43&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery began to undergo from the late seventeenth century. A whole series of English colonies in America enacted laws intended to make it clear that the slave’s conversion did not entail his emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke expressed himself thus in 1660 when, referring to Paul of Tarsus, he asserted that ‘conversion did not dissolve any of those obligations they were tied in before … the gospel continued them in the same condition and under the same civil obligations [under which] it found them. The married were not to leave their consorts, nor the servant freed from his master.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In complete conformity with this theoretical position, in the draft Carolina Constitution Locke reiterated the irrelevance of possible conversion to Christianity for the condition of the slave. And, once again, the element of novelty emerges. Although rejecting an abolitionist interpretation of Christianity, Grotius repeatedly appealed to Christian literature to underscore the common humanity of servant and master, both of them subject to the Father in Heaven, and hence in a relationship with each another that was in some sense one of fraternity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; is concerned, instead, to make it clear that the principle of equality applies exclusively to ‘creatures of the same species and rank’, only if ‘the lord and master of them all should [not], by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were burdened by the curse which, according to the Old Testament story, Noah had uttered against Ham and his descendants. This ideological motif, often invoked by defenders of the institution of slavery, seems also to find some echo in Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt: the English liberal philosopher legitimized the racial slavery that was being established in the politico-social reality of the time. Subject to ever more onerous conditions, the practice of emancipation tended to disappear; while, together with the neutralization of religion and baptism, laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital relations sanctioned the insurmountable character of the boundary between whites and blacks. At this point the category of contract can serve to explain only the figure of the servant, while the slave is such as a result of right of war (more precisely, just war, of which Europeans engaged in colonial conquests are protagonists), or of a divine ‘manifest declaration’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg44&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In order to clarify the difference between ‘the perfect condition of slavery’ and that of the indentured servant, Locke referred to the Old Testament, which provides for permanent, hereditary slavery only for gentiles, excluding from it servants who are blood relations of the Hebrew master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Old Testament line of demarcation between Hebrews and gentiles is configured in Locke as the line of demarcation between whites and blacks: servants of European origin are not subject to ‘perfect slavery’, which is intended for blacks and repressed to the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The pathos of liberty and unease about the institution of slavery: the case of Montesquieu&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal unease over slavery found what is perhaps its most acute expression in Montesquieu, who devoted some memorable pages to a critique of the institution. The reasons traditionally adduced by ‘jurists’ in justification of slavery were ‘not sensible’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was pointless trying to find others: ‘If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would say: The peoples of Europe, having exterminated those of America, had to make slaves of those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ Yet this condemnation, so ringing and seemingly unequivocal, soon gave way to a much more ambiguous discourse: ‘There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement: slavery there runs less counter to reason’. In such cases, while not conforming to abstract reason, slavery was in accord with ‘natural reason’ (&#039;&#039;raison naturelle&#039;&#039;), which took account of climate and concrete circumstances.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] True, Montesquieu observed that ‘there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the tone is uncertain here, much clearer is the assertion that a distinction must be made between those countries where the climate can in some way be an element justifying slavery and those where ‘even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence it is necessary to take cognizance of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ and restrict &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg45&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘natural slavery [&#039;&#039;servitude naturelle&#039;&#039;] … to certain particular countries of the world’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the one hand, Montesquieu endlessly stressed that freedom is an attribute—in fact, a way of living and being—of Nordic peoples, while, on the other, slavery had been ‘naturalized … among the southern peoples’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A general law could be formulated: ‘one must not be surprised that the cowardice of the peoples of hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free. This is an effect that derives from its natural cause.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Prominent in Grotius and Locke, the contrast between metropolis and colonies also emerges in Montesquieu. It is not by chance that in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, rather than being introduced in the books devoted to analysing freedom, the considerations on slavery make their appearance in the context of the discourse on the relationship between climate and laws and customs. The transition from Books XI–XIII, whose subjects are the ‘Constitution’, ‘political freedom’ and ‘freedom’ as such, to Books XIV-XVI, which deal with ‘climate’, despotism and ‘domestic slavery’ (slavery proper), is, at the same time, the transition from Europe—in particular, England—to the non-European world and the colonies. For that very reason, in asserting a climatic justification of slavery, its supporters would have no difficulty in appealing to Montesquieu.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his argument the French philosopher targeted not the theorists of slavery as such, but those who held to the thesis that ‘it would be good if there were slaves among us’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the colonies, it was a question of seeing ‘what the laws ought to do in relation to slavery’. Rather than abolition, Montesquieu’s discourse focused on amending the institution: ‘whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Are those ‘civil laws’ the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; issued some years earlier by Louis XIV, which consecrated black slavery and, at the same time, proposed to regulate it? The language of that document suggests as much. While he reiterated his ‘power’, in the preamble the sovereign asserted his concern for black slaves, who lived in ‘climates infinitely remote from our habitual sojourn’. They were to be guaranteed food and adequate clothing (Articles 22 and 25). And such guarantees, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg46&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;together with any treatment that was necessary, also applied to ‘slaves who are infirm on account of old age, illness or other circumstances, regardless of whether the illness is curable’ (Article 27).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These are concerns that also find expression in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws:&#039;&#039; ‘The magistrate should see to it that the slave is nourished and clothed; this should be regulated by law.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Montesquieu went on to assert that the slave must not be left completely at the mercy of the master’s arbitrary power. The latter might impose a death penalty in his capacity as a ‘judge’, respecting legal ‘formalities’, not as a private person. The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; argued in analogous fashion, providing for sanctions for the master guilty of the arbitrary mutilation or killing of his slave (Articles 42–43).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039; counted the sexual exploitation of female slaves among the main ‘abuses of slavery’: ‘Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness. The laws of modesty are a part of natural right and should be felt by all the nations in the world.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In homage to the precepts of the ‘Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion’, the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; regarded as ‘valid marriages’ those contracted between slaves who professed this religion (Article 8). It banned the separate sale of individual members of the family thus constituted (Article 47) and sought to repress the sexual exploitation of female slaves. A free, single man who had had children by a slave was obliged to marry her and recognize the offspring, who were to be freed together with the mother (Article 9).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further confirming that he intended to amend, rather than abolish, slavery is the fact that Montesquieu, as well as to its ‘abuses’, called attention to the ‘dangers’ it entailed and the ‘precautions’ required to confront them. Particular attention must be paid to the ‘danger of a large number of slaves’ and that represented by ‘armed slaves’. This warranted a recommendation of a general kind: ‘In the moderate state, the humanity one has for slaves will be able to prevent the dangers one could fear from there being too many of them. Men grow accustomed to anything, even to servitude, provided the master is not harsher than the servitude.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his desire to temper colonial slavery, Montesquieu looked for inspiration to the norms promulgated by the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, which in fact had no influence in the English world admired by him. In any case, his condemnation of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg47&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery is sharp only when it also seeks to break in ‘among ourselves’, thereby throwing Europe’s proud self-consciousness about being the exclusive locus of liberty into crisis. Along with despotism, slavery was present in Turkey and the Islamic world, and in Russia (in the form of abject serfdom), and prevailed unchallenged in Africa. But there was no room for it in Europe, or, rather, on metropolitan territory. The discourse relating to the colonies was different and more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Somersett case and the delineation of liberal identity&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Blackstone’s position is close to Montesquieu’s. We are in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘the law of England abhors, and can not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation’; not even its humblest, most base members, not even ‘idle vagabonds’ could be subjected to slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘spirit of liberty’ (argued the great jurist) ‘is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil’ that it could not in any instance permit the presence or spectacle of a relationship that was the concentrated expression of absolute power.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[S]trict slavery’ existed in ‘old Rome’ and continued to flourish in ‘modern Barbary’, but was now incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the English nation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, among the rights enjoyed by free men was free, undisturbed enjoyment of property, including property in slaves, on condition that the latter remained banished to the colonial world. The relationship between master and slave—and this applied to all ‘sorts of servants’, including slaves—was one of the ‘great relations in private life’;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] political authority had no right to intervene in it. And thus, celebration of England as the land of liberty was not perceived by Blackstone as being in contradiction with his reassertion of the black slave’s duty to serve his master. That was a duty which, on the basis of the ‘general principles’ of the ‘laws of England’, did not come to an end even were the ‘heathen negro’ to be converted to Christianity. Not even in that case could the slave stake a claim to ‘liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although recognized, the institution of slavery was, as it were, repressed from the ‘soil’ of England, confined to the border zone between the civilized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg48&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;world and barbarism. But what happened when a white master brought one of his slaves with him from the colonies as movable property? This was the problem raised by an impassioned debate in England in 1772. Turning to the courts, a slave—James Somersett—succeeded in extricating himself from the master who attempted to take him with him, in his capacity as movable property, on his return journey to Virginia. The Chief Justice’s judgment did not challenge the institution of slavery; it limited itself to asserting that ‘colonial laws’ only applied ‘in the colonies’, and hence that slavery had no legal basis in England. Somersett’s counsel eloquently proclaimed: ‘The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.’ But from this principle he deduced the conclusion that it was necessary to avoid an influx of blacks from Africa or America into England. Somersett’s master was held responsible for an assault on the purity of the land of the free, who could not tolerate being confused and mixed up with slaves, rather than a violation of the liberty and dignity of a human being. Not by chance, the 1772 judgment provided the premises for the subsequent deportation to Sierra Leone of blacks who, as loyal subjects of the Crown, sought refuge in England after the victory of the rebel American colonists.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of liberal freedom are beginning to become clear. Authors like Burgh and Fletcher could still be regarded as champions of the cause of liberty by Jefferson, who lived in a situation where black slavery and widespread ownership of land (taken from the Indians) made the project of enslaving white vagrants purely academic. In Europe things were different, as emerges from the interventions of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Those who did not subscribe to the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ began to be regarded as foreign to the emerging liberal party. Starting with Montesquieu and then, more clearly, Blackstone and the judgment in the Somersett case, what characterized the emergent liberal party were two essential points: (1) condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government by civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law; (2) assertion of the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, or of the principle on whose basis England—and, prospectively, Europe—possessed ‘too pure’ an air to be able to tolerate the presence of slaves on its ‘soil’. The second point is no less essential than the first. The legitimation of ‘slavery among ourselves’ would involve the dispersion of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg49&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand for self-government by civil society, or the self-government of the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. ‘We won’t be their Negroes’: the colonists’ rebellion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But the metropolis/colonies opposition, with its tendential exclusion of the latter from the sacred space of civilization and liberty, was bound to provoke a reaction from the colonists. Independently of particular concrete political and social demands, what was wounded was their self-consciousness. The metropolis seemed to be assimilating the American colonies to the ‘modern Barbary’ denounced by Blackstone; it seemed to be degrading them to a sort of dustbin, where the metropolitan rejects or prison population were dumped. The inmates of the mother country’s prisons were deported across the Atlantic to supply, along with blacks from Africa, the more or less forced labour required by it. According to the observation of the English abolitionist David Ramsay, slavery continued to survive in the region of the confines of the civilized world—namely, the West—‘where [its] proper religion and laws are not deemed to be in full force; and where individuals too often think themselves loosened from ties, which are binding in the mother country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If it saved the metropolis’s honour as the privileged site of liberty, despite the persistence of slavery on its extreme periphery, this view was wrong in the colonists’ view, because it confounded and assimilated free Englishmen, prison rabble and people of colour. In this way, lamented James Otis, a prominent supporter of the liberal revolution underway, one forgot that the colonies had been founded not ‘with a compound mixture of &#039;&#039;English, Indian and Negro&#039;&#039;, but with freeborn &#039;&#039;British white&#039;&#039; subjects’. Even more swingeing was Washington, who warned that the American colonists felt ‘as miserably oppressed as our own blacks’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having repeated that the American colonists could boast a lineage not less noble and deserving of liberty than the metropolitan English, John Adams exclaimed with reference to the rulers in London: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’![[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Quite apart even from the problem of representation, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free was perceived as an intolerable exclusion. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#page50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#pg50&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the other hand, the colonists, in demanding equality with the dominant British class, widened the gulf that separated them from blacks and Indians. While in London the zone of civilization was distinguished from the zone of barbarism, the sacred space from the profane, primarily by opposing the metropolis to the colonies, the American colonists were led to identify the boundary line principally in ethnic identity and skin colour. On the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Act, only whites could become citizens of the United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from a spatial delimitation of the community of the free to an ethnic and racial one brought with it combined, contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and dis-emancipation. Whites, even the poorest among them, also came within the sacred space; they found themselves forming part of the community or race of the free, albeit situated at inferior levels. White slavery disappeared, condemned by New York polite society as ‘contrary to … the idea of liberty this country has so happily established’. But the tendential emancipation of poor whites was only the other side of the coin of further dis-emancipation of blacks. The condition of the black slave deteriorated by virtue of no longer being, as in colonial America, one of several systems of unfree labour.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Virginia (and other states) land and black slaves were given to veterans of the War of Independence, in recognition of their contribution to the cause of the struggle against despotism;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the tendential social rise of poor whites coincided with the consummate de-humanization of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Racial slavery and the further deterioration in the condition of the ‘free’ black&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only a question of slaves. The triumph of the ethnic delimitation of the community of the free was bound seriously to affect the condition of those blacks who were notionally free. They were now struck by a series of measures that tended to render the colour line, the demarcation between the race of the free and the race of slaves, inviolable. Blacks not subject to slavery began to be perceived as an anomaly that would sooner or later have to be rectified. Their condition at the end of the eighteenth century was summed up by one of them in Boston, referring both to strictly legal forms of oppression and to the insults &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg51&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and threats which, while not legal, were widely tolerated by authority: ‘we may truly be said to carry our lives in our hands, and the arrows of death are flying about our heads’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is a description that might seem unduly emotive. But we should attend to de Tocqueville:&lt;br /&gt;
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The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On close inspection, it can be said of ‘emancipated Negroes’ that ‘their situation with regard to the Europeans is not unlike that of the Indians’. In fact, in some respects, they were ‘still more to be pitied’. In any event, they were ‘deprived of their rights’ and ‘exposed to the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of the people’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condition of blacks not reduced to slavery was no different and no better as one moved from South to North. In fact (de Tocqueville pitilessly observed), ‘the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condition of the notionally free black was distinguished from that of the slave, but perhaps even more from that of the genuinely free white. Only thus can we explain the danger that constantly threatened him of being reduced to conditions of slavery, and the temptation that periodically emerged among whites—for example, in Virginia after the slave revolt or attempted revolt of 1831—to deport the entire population of free blacks to Africa or elsewhere. The latter were anyhow obliged to register, and could only change residence with the permission of the local authorities; they were presumed to be slaves and detained until they managed to prove otherwise. The despotism exercised over slaves was bound to affect, in one way or another, the population of colour as a whole. This was explained in 1801 by the postmaster general in the Jefferson administration, in a letter in which he recommended to a Georgian senator that blacks and men of colour be excluded from the postal service. ‘Everything which tends to increase their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg52&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain and line of intelligence’ was extremely dangerous. Even the communication of feelings and ideas must be blocked or impeded by all possible means. In fact, the situation in Virginia immediately after the 1831 revolt was described as follows by a traveller: ‘Military service [by white patrols] is performed night and day, Richmond resembles a town besieged … the negroes … will not venture to communicate with one another for fear of punishment.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Spatial and racial delimitation of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The American Revolution threw into crisis the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which seemed established within the liberal movement. Now, far from being confined to the colonies, slavery acquired a new visibility and centrality in a country with a culture, religion and language of European origin, which conversed with European countries as an equal and in fact claimed a kind of primacy in embodying the cause of liberty. Declared legally void in England in 1772, the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like ‘niggers’. There thus emerged a country characterized by ‘a fixed and direct tie between slave ownership and political power’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as strikingly revealed both by the Constitution and the number of slave-owners who acceded to its highest institutional office.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did the platform of the liberal party shape up in a country which, like late-eighteenth-century England, could also boast of having air ‘too pure’ for it to be breathed by slaves? In fact, in the United States as well the ambition to retrieve the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ continued to make itself heard. Albeit utterly fancifully, Jefferson harboured the idea of re-deporting the blacks to Africa. However, in the new situation that had been created, the project of transforming the North American republic into a land inhabited exclusively by freemen proved difficult to implement. It would be necessary seriously to infringe the right, possessed by genuinely free persons, to enjoy their property without external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg53&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;interference! So, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a movement (the American Colonization Society) emerged that contrived a new way out: it was proposed to persuade the owners, by appealing to their religious feelings and also employing economic incentives, to free or sell their slaves, who, along with all the other blacks, would be sent to Africa to colonize it and convert it to Christianity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, without infringing the property rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution, it would have been possible to transform the United States into a land inhabited exclusively by free (and white) men.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a project doomed to fail from the outset. For a start, the acquisition of the slaves by the Union presupposed mobilizing enormous financial resources, and hence the imposition of high taxes. Expelled from the door in the shape of enforced expropriation, imposed from above, of the human cattle owned by the colonists, the spectre of despotic interference with private property by political power ended up arrogantly breaking in through the window as the taxation required to induce owners willingly to surrender their slaves, through a profitable sales contract. Moreover, taken as a whole, the class of planters had no intention of abandoning the source not only of its wealth, but also of its power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation in the North was different. Here slaves were small in number and performed no essential economic function. Abolishing slavery, but at the same time adhering to the federal order that legitimized and guaranteed it in the South, the northern states seemed to want to give a new lease of life in the new situation to the compromise we have already encountered. Without being abolished, the institution whose presence constituted a kind of ironic counterpoint to the claim to be champions of the cause of liberty was banished to the deep South. In fact, four states (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Oregon) strictly prohibited access into their territories by blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They thus avoided being contaminated by the presence not only of slaves, but also of blacks as such. This ban was the equivalent of the measure whereby, in the aftermath of the Somersett case, England deported to Sierra Leone blacks who not only were free, but also had the merit of having fought against the rebel colonists on behalf of the Empire. Nevertheless, even in the North of the United States, although it had been abolished, slavery had achieved the recognition it lacked in England, as demonstrated in particular by the constitutional provision that required the return of escaped slaves to their legitimate owners, in an indirect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg54&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sanction of the institution of slavery in states which were formally free. This was a point to which a representative of the South smugly drew attention: ‘We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clearly, in the United States as a whole the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which was more than ever reiterated across the Atlantic, had fallen into crisis. How had such a result been arrived at? Let us return to Burke. In asserting that the ‘spirit of freedom’ and the ‘liberal’ vision found their most consummate embodiment in the slave-owners of the southern colonies, he added that the colonists formed an integral part of the nation ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, of ‘the chosen race and sons of England’: it was a question of ‘pedigree’, in the face of which ‘human art’ was powerless.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here, as we can see, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free, which is the principle on which late-eighteenth-century liberal England was based, seems to be on the point of transmuting into a racial delimitation. And hence, in Calhoun and ideologists of the slaveholding South in general, a tendency already present in Burke comes to fruition. Having been spatial, the line of demarcation of the community of the free ends up becoming racial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, there was no insurmountable barrier between the two types of delimitation. In 1845 John O’Sullivan, popular theorist of the providential ‘manifest destiny’ that put wind in the sails of US expansion, sought to assuage abolitionists’ concerns about the introduction of slavery into Texas (wrested from Mexico and on the point of being annexed to the Union) with a significant argument. It was precisely its temporary extension that created the conditions for abolition of the ‘the slavery of an inferior to a superior race’, and hence ‘furnished much probability of the ultimate disappearance of the negro race from our borders’. At the appropriate time, the ex-slaves would be driven further south, into the ‘only receptacle’ appropriate for them. In Latin America the population of mixed blood, which had formed following the fusion of the Spaniards with the natives, would easily be able to accommodate the blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The racial delimitation of the community would then give way to a territorial delimitation. The end of slavery would, at the same time, entail the end of the presence of blacks in the land of liberty. Despite the abolitionists’ cry of alarm, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg55&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the concentration of slaves in a zone immediately proximate to territories that were fundamentally foreign to the zone of civilization and liberty pushed in this direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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For some time Lincoln harboured the idea of deporting the blacks, likewise regarded by him as ultimately alien to the community of the free, from the United States to Latin America after their emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, having confronted one another for decades, what clashed during the Civil War were the causes not of liberty and slavery, but precisely two different delimitations of the community of the free: the opposed parties accused one another of not knowing how, or not wanting, to delimit the community of the free effectively. To those who brandished the spectre of racial contamination as an inevitable consequence of the abolition of slavery, Lincoln replied by emphasizing that in the United States the overwhelming majority of ‘mulattoes’ were the result of sexual relations between white masters and their black slaves: ‘slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation’. For the rest, he had ‘no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races’, or to recognize the right of blacks to participate in political life or hold public office or perform the role of jury member. Lincoln declared himself well aware, like any other white man, of the radical difference between the two races and the supremacy of the whites.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crisis took a decisive step towards breaking-point following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Dred Scott case in summer 1857: ‘like an ordinary article of merchandise and property’, a black slave’s legitimate owner had the right to take him with him in any part of the Union.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Lincoln’s reaction: the country could not remain permanently divided, ‘half &#039;&#039;slave&#039;&#039; and half &#039;&#039;free’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In contrast to the England of the Somersett case, the North of the United States could not pose as a land of the free whose air was ‘too pure’ to be breathed by a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from the spatial delimitation to the racial delimitation of the community of the free henceforth made it impossible to repress the reality of slavery. There was now no alternative to the condemnation of this institution except its explicit defence or celebration. As the conflict dividing the two sections of the Union emerged more clearly, the South’s ideologues all the more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg56&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;provocatively mocked the circumlocutions and linguistic interdictions that had facilitated the Philadelphia compromise of 1787. ‘Negro slavery’, declared John Randolph, was a reality that ‘the Constitution has vainly attempted to blink, by not using the term’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the lifting of this taboo, the legitimation of slavery lost the timidity that had previously characterized it, assuming a defiant tone. Having been a necessary evil, slavery became (in the words of Calhoun with which we are familiar) a ‘positive good’. It made no sense to try to repress it as something to be ashamed of; in reality, it was the very foundation of civilization. Throwing into crisis the pathos of liberty that had presided over the foundation of the United States, and in a way de-legitimizing the very War of Independence, this new attitude helped make the clash between North and South inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. The Civil War and the resumption of the controversy initiated with the American Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, while the abolitionists adopted the arguments used during the American War of Independence by the British and the loyalists in their polemic against the South, the theorists of the South used arguments deployed by the rebel colonists. We have seen O’Sullivan, a New York lawyer and journalist, regard the South, bordering as it was on Mexico and Latin America, as the best place to deposit the blacks temporarily, pending their emancipation and deportation from the United States. Hence the South was a territory by no means uncontaminated by the barbarism of the blacks who lived there as slaves. Cohabitation with blacks, and sexual contamination, attested by a high number of mulattos—the abolitionist Theodore Parker piled it on—had also left profound traces on southern whites; it was precisely the influence of the ‘African element’ that explained attachment to an institution contrary to the principles of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And just as pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America had done, so too the South protested against the tendential exclusion, of which it felt itself the victim, from the authentic community of the free. It was now no longer the American colonies in their entirety, but the southern states that considered themselves assimilated to the ‘modern Barbary’ mentioned by Blackstone.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg57&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Along with the one just noted, further aspects of the legal argument reappeared that had opposed the rebel colonists to England. In Calhoun’s view, the abolitionists of the North, who wanted to abolish slavery by a federal law, were riding roughshod over the right of each individual state to self-government, and seeking to found the Union on political slavery, on ‘the bond between master and slave’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Naturally, the North reacted by ironizing about this impassioned defence of liberty by the ‘democratic’, slaveholding South. To understand the latter’s subsequent response, we can return for a moment to Franklin. Replying to his English interlocutors, who scoffed at the flag of liberty waved by the rebel colonists and slave-owners, he did not limit himself to recalling the Crown’s interest and involvement in the slave trade. He also employed a second argument, drawing attention to the fact that slavery and servitude had not disappeared across the Atlantic. In particular, coalminers in Scotland were ‘absolute Slaves by your law’; they were ‘bought and sold with the Colliery, and have no more Liberty to leave it than our Negroes have to leave their Master’s Plantation’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The authors of the denunciation of black slavery were responsible for a white slavery that was certainly no better than the one they condemned so vehemently.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, on the occasion of the conflict which had been brewing for decades and reached breaking-point with the Civil War, the South retorted in two ways to the accusations against it. It stressed that the North and abolitionist Britain were not in a position to give lectures even on the way blacks (and peoples of colour in general) were treated; and it pointed out how much slavery survived in an industrial society notionally based on ‘free’ labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us focus for now on the first point. Already during the Philadelphia Convention, the slave-owners rejected the lectures given them in the name of morality, pointing out that the North derived major benefits from the institution of slavery, since its merchant shipping transported the slaves and the commodities produced by them.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1808 the ban on the ‘immigration or introduction’ of black slaves provided for by the federal Constitution had come into effect. But it remained the case (observed the ideologues of the South) that blacks in the North, in addition to suffering the poverty and oppression that were the lot of the poor in general there, were exposed to maltreatment and violence of every kind, as demonstrated by the periodic outbreak of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg58&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;veritable pogroms. Even more repugnant (stressed Calhoun, in particular, in the years leading up to the Civil War) was the hypocrisy of Britain (the country which, having abolished slavery in its colonies, had become the model for the American abolitionists).’[T]he greatest slave dealer on earth’, the country ‘more responsible than any other … for the extent of that form of servitude’ in the American continent, then engaged in waving the banner of abolitionism, with a view to attracting the lucrative production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and coffee to its colonies and ruining potential competitors.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, what results had the putative emancipation of the slaves produced in the English colonies? The condition of the blacks was in no wise improved; in their case, freedom was more of a mirage than ever, while ‘the supremacy of the European race’ continued to be undisputed.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Inevitably, when ‘two races of men, of different color’, and markedly unequal in terms of culture and civilization, tried to live together, the inferior race was destined for subjection.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The very country that elevated itself into champion of the struggle against slavery distinguished itself in completely the opposite direction: not only did it use the labour of ‘slaves’ in India and other colonies, but it ‘[held] in unlimited subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million human beings, dispersed over every part of the globe’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We find an even more explicit reference to the lot of the coolies in another eminent representative of the South, George Fitzhugh. Arraigned once again was Britain, which lauded itself for having abolished slavery in its colonies. In reality, the ‘temporary slaves’ from Asia who had taken the place of the blacks, ‘if not worked to death before their terms of service expire’, subsequently died of starvation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In its main lines, the controversy that developed on the eve and in the course of the Civil War reproduced and resumed the one that had occurred some decades earlier, during the clash between the two shores of the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Liberal system of policy’, ‘liberality of sentiment’ and the institution of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the spread of the political use of the term ‘liberal’ in its various senses, we must remember two reference points. The first is the proud self-consciousness &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg59&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that matured in the wake of the victory achieved during the Seven Years’ War over the France of monarchical and religious absolutism, which was subsequently reinforced in England by the outcome of the Somersett case. The second is the struggles that developed within the community of the free. When the controversy provoked by the agitation of the rebel colonists erupted, the various positions confronting one another all tended to define themselves as in some sense ‘liberal’. Burke sought to promote conciliation, calling upon ‘the liberal government of this free nation’ to evince a spirit of compromise.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Across the Atlantic, at the moment when the United States was founded, Washington emphasized ‘the benefits of a wise and liberal Government’, or a ‘liberal system of policy’, which asserted itself ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, and which had as its basis ‘the free cultivation of Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce’, or ‘liberal and free commerce’, ‘the progressive refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment’, with the prevalence of a ‘liberal sentiment’ of tolerance also regarding relations between ‘every political and religious denomination of men in this country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hitherto the term ‘liberal’ has occurred solely as an adjective. In other contexts, adjective and substantive are interchangeable: ‘every Liberal Briton’ (wrote the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039; in 1798) rejoiced at the problems facing revolutionary, tyrannical France, which had to confront the difficult situation created by the uprising of the black slaves in San Domingo.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, the term in question made its appearance as a noun: signing himself ‘A Liberal’ was the author (possibly Paine) of an article in the &#039;&#039;Pennsylvania Packet&#039;&#039; of 25 March 1780, which came out for the abolition of slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we have four interventions, which share a liberal profession of faith, but with orientations that are fairly diverse as regards black slavery. In Europe, while stances in favour of it were not wanting, a critical orientation was prevalent: a more or less clear distance tended to be taken from the institution that had had to be repressed to the colonies, in order to confer credibility on the self-consciousness developed by the community of the free. &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;—Adam Smith’s masterpiece, which appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson, a pre-eminent representative &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg60&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Virginia’s planters and slave-owners—observed that the ‘liberal reward of labour’, with the payment of a wage that the ‘free servant’ and ‘free man’ could freely dispose of, was the only thing likely to stimulate individual industry; while economic stagnation was the result of servile labour, whether serfdom or slavery proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Millar regarded the institution of slavery as in contradiction with ‘the liberal sentiments entertained in the latter part of the eighteenth century’, with the ‘more liberal views’ developed in the modern world.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going still further, the great economist’s disciple declared that credibility could be restored to the ‘liberal hypothesis’ only by avoiding its confusion with those who waved the flag of liberty while preserving and, in fact, developing the practice of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Across the Atlantic, by contrast, defence of that institution was much fiercer. Yet it would be mistaken to construct a clear-cut opposition. It is sufficient to reflect on the fact that the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South was, in the first instance, Burke. In 1832 an influential Virginian ideologue, Thomas R. Dew, lauded the advantages of slavery: ‘the menial and low offices’ were reserved for blacks, so that love of liberty and the ‘republican spirit’, peculiar to free, white citizens, flourished with a purity and vigour unknown in the rest of the United States, and had a precedent only in classical antiquity. But in saying this, Dew appealed to Burke and his thesis that, where slavery flourished, the spirit of liberty developed more abundantly.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, the theorist of the slaveholding South indirectly adopted and subscribed to the British Whig’s ‘liberal’ profession of faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In subsequent decades, during the struggle against the North, which was initially political and then military, the slaveholding South could count on many friends in liberal England. A few years before the Civil War, the arguments of the southern ideologues were explicitly echoed by Benjamin Disraeli. With the abolition of slavery in British and French colonies behind him, he characterized the abolition of slavery as ‘a narrative of ignorance, injustice, blundering, waste, and havoc, not easily paralleled in the history of mankind’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In America, if they mixed with the blacks, the whites ‘would become so deteriorated that their states would probably be reconquered and regained by the aborigines’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Would the abolition of slavery in the United States not encourage this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg61&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;admixture, imparting a novel dignity to it? Later, the secessionist Confederacy’s desperate struggle met with a profoundly sympathetic echo from prominent cultural and political representatives of liberal England, provoking the indignation of John Stuart Mill.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the occasion first of the Somersett case, then of the American Revolution and finally of the Civil War, the liberal world appeared profoundly divided over the problem of slavery. How are we to find our bearings in this seeming chaos?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. From the assertion of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ to the condemnation of slavery as such&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We are trying to answer the question we posed at the beginning: Can authors like Fletcher and Calhoun be considered liberals? In the liberal England derived from the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher could calmly demand the introduction of slavery for vagrants without being in any way isolated, just as Hutcheson and Burgh, who expressed more or less similar positions, were not isolated. While Hutcheson was the master of Smith, Fletcher was in correspondence with Locke and enjoyed, along with Burgh, the respect of Jefferson and the circles close to him. These were the years when, as Hume put it, ‘[s]ome passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty … cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution [slavery]’, which accounted for the grandeur of Athens and Rome.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, with the establishment of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, the positions expressed by Fletcher ceased to be, or ceased to be accepted as, liberal. It is true that they took a long time to die. As late as 1838, a German liberal reported the ‘advice, certainly more hinted at than clearly stated, which would wish to find a remedy for the serious danger [represented by an unprecedented and acute social question] in the introduction of veritable slavery for factory workers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it was a suggestion rejected with disdain: the line of demarcation of the liberal ‘party’ had been drawn for a while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar argument can be advanced in connection with Calhoun. In his view, it was the North that was guilty of betraying the liberal principles which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg62&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had inspired the American Revolution. In fact, ‘the defence of human liberty against the aggressions of despotic power had always been most efficient in States where domestic slavery was found to prevail’. Within the Union, it was the South that had ‘constantly inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was in the South that liberalism found its most authentic and mature expression. The term ‘liberal’ (warned John Randolph, sometimes defined as the ‘American Burke’), which originally meant ‘a man attached to enlarged and free principles—a votary of liberty’, would see its true meaning twisted if it had to be used to refer to those who flirted with abolitionism.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A contemporary liberal might be tempted to be shot of the unmanageable presence within the tradition of thought he refers to of an author like Burke, who celebrated the particular intensity of the liberal spirit and love of liberty among slave-owners; or of an author like Calhoun, who in the nineteenth century still hymned the ‘positive good’ that was slavery. And so both of them are officially included in the conservative party. However, such an operation immediately reveals its groundlessness. The category of conservatism is characterized by formalism, in the sense that it can subsume significantly different contents: it is a question of identifying what it is intended to conserve or guard. And there is no doubt that Burke and Calhoun aimed to be vigilant guardians of the social relations and political institutions which emerged, respectively, from the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—two eminently liberal revolutions. It would make no sense to regard Jefferson and Washington as liberals, but this is not the case with Burke—who, unlike them, was not a slaveowner and who, when he celebrated the ‘liberal spirit’ and ‘liberal’ emphasis of the slaveholding South, had in mind precisely figures like these two Virginian statesmen. As late as 1862 Lord Acton cited at length, and implicitly subscribed to, the passage by the British Whig who, far from excluding slave-owners, conferred on them a privileged position in the party of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be just as illogical to exclude from that party Calhoun, who tirelessly reiterated his attachment to representative bodies and the principle of the limitation of power. If, then, going beyond the merely formal meaning of the term, conservatism is to be understood as an uncritical attachment to a pre-modern, pre-industrial society, characterized by the cult of clod of earth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg63&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bell tower, such a category could hardly account for Calhoun’s positions. Once the rights of minorities had been guaranteed, he had no problem with extending the vote and even introducing male ‘universal suffrage’; and, along with representative bodies, he celebrated the development of ‘manufactures’, industry and free trade.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If to anyone, the category of conservatism might be applied to Jefferson. He identified cultivators of the land as ‘the chosen people of God’, assimilated ‘great cities’ to the ‘sores’ of a ‘human body’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1812, during the war with Britain, accused the latter of being an instrument of ‘Satan’ because it had compelled America to abandon the ‘paradise’ of agriculture and engage in ‘manufacturing’, in order to meet the test of arms (see [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). And the category of conservatism might also be applied to Washington. He too viewed with concern the prospect that the Americans might become ‘a manufacturing people’, rather than continuing to be ‘Cultivators’ of the land, thereby avoiding the scourge of the ‘tumultuous populace of large cities’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In particular, it is against Jefferson that Calhoun seems to be arguing when he rejects the thesis that manufacture ‘destroy[s] the moral and physical power of the people’. In reality, this was a concern rendered ever more obsolete by ‘the great perfection of machinery’ introduced into industry.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, if acceptance of free trade is an integral part of liberalism, it is clear that Calhoun can be included in such a tradition much more easily than his adversaries in the North, who were engaged in strict protectionist practices liable (according to the southern theorist’s denunciation) to ‘destroy the liberty of the country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Construed in the broadest sense of the term, the liberal party encompassed both Whigs and Tories. The former did not even necessarily represent the more advanced wing. Josiah Tucker was a Tory, who reprehended Locke and Burke for being followers of a ‘republicanism’ based, precisely, upon slavery and serfdom. For the rest, arguing with ‘Republican Zealots’, he liked to position himself among the true interpreters of ‘English constitutional Liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Disraeli was likewise a Tory, who, while on the one hand echoing the arguments of the slaveholding South, on the other significantly widened the social basis of British representative bodies, granting the vote to significant sections of the popular classes and anyway extending it much further than the Whigs had.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg64&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On the other hand, outside the liberal party even before the Civil War were those who, in their concern to save the institution of slavery and indignation at the weapons supplied by representative bodies to an increasingly threatening abolitionist agitation, spoke with Fitzhugh in the southern United States of the ‘collapse of liberal society’, or ironized with Carlyle in Europe itself over ruinous ‘anarchic–constitutional epochs’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although reiterating the absolute necessity of slavery as the foundation of civilization, both ended up challenging, at least on a theoretical level, the ethnic and spatial delimitations of the institution of slavery. For Fitzhugh, as was demonstrated by the examples of classical antiquity and confirmed by the reality of the modern world, work was inseparable from slavery, so that in one form or another ‘slavery, &#039;&#039;black or white&#039;&#039;, was right and necessary’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In justifying the slavery of the Afro-Americans across the Atlantic and branding the Irish ‘black’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carlyle, admired by Fitzhugh and other southerners, and in correspondence with some of them,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in his turn reached a general ‘conclusion’: ‘whether established by law, or by law abrogated, [slavery] exists very extensively in this world, in and out of the West Indies; and … you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the &#039;&#039;name&#039;&#039; of it, which is very little!’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Whether dealing with slaves, ‘servants hired for life’, or &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, it was still slavery. On the other hand, if the slave was a ‘servant hired for life’, why should one prefer the servant hired for a month or a day?[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spurred by the bitterness of the struggle underway, Fitzhugh and Carlyle ultimately returned to the positions of Fletcher, first marginalized and then regarded as alien to the liberal party. The transition from the liberal party’s first turn to the second can be summarized thus: following the defeat of the South, the emancipation of black slaves and amendments to the US Constitution to that effect, a transition was made from asserting the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ in Europe and the ‘free states’ of the northern United States to general condemnation, on both sides of the Atlantic, of slavery as such. Starting from this second result, the positions expressed by Calhoun were also rejected by the liberal party. But that is not a reason to expel him &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg65&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;retrospectively from the liberal tradition. Otherwise, the same fate would have to be meted out to Locke and a fair number of the protagonists of the American Revolution and the early decades of US history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In any event, with the end of the Civil War a historical cycle came to a close. Having emerged together from a unique twin birth, which saw them entwined in a relationship not without its tensions, liberalism as a whole now broke with slavery in the strict sense—with hereditary, racial slavery. But before examining these new courses, it is appropriate to extend our analysis of the society that was established on the two Atlantic shores up to the Civil War. We have hitherto focused attention on the problem of black slavery. But what relations were developing within the white community?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn1a|1]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1997, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn2a|2]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn3a|3]] Quoted in Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn4a|4]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn5a|5]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 123, 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn6a|6]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn7a|7]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn8a|8]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from John Wesley to William Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn9a|9]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn10a|10]] Max Farrand, ed., &#039;&#039;The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, vol. 1, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn11a|11]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn12a|12]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 199–200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn13a|13]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21, 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn14a|14]] Shearer Davis Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn15a|15]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 59–65; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 39 and &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn16a|16]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 38–9; Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 59.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn17a|17]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 49, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn18a|18]] Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn19a|19]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 557, 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn20a|20]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn21a|21]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §28; vol. 3, ch. xiv, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 562–3 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn23a|23]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn24a|24]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 157–8, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn25a|25]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1483.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn26a|26]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn27a|27]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §6; Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn29a|29]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 377.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn30a|30]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, pp. 84–93.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn31a|31]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Tracts on Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Philip Abrams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn32a|32]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn33a|33]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., p. 355.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn42a|42]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 394–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn43a|43]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn45a|45]] The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; is reproduced and commented on in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 89–203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn46a|46]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn49a|49]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 412.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 410–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn54a|54]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 37; David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 231, 472, 495–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn55a|55]] Ramsay, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 387.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn56a|56]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 92, 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn57a|57]] Adams, quoted in David B. Davis, ‘A Big Business’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 11 January 1998, p. 50 n. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn58a|58]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., pp. 19, 32; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn61a|61]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 16–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 367–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn65a|65]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn66a|66]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn67a|67]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 6ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn68a|68]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn69a|69]] Quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;An Imperfect Union&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn70a|70]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 66, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn71a|71]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, pp. 7–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn72a|72]] Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, pp. 254–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn73a|73]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 401, 511–12, 636.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn74a|74]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn75a|75]] Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 426.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn76a|76]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn77a|77]] Parker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 231–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn78a|78]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 436.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn79a|79]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 651.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn80a|80]] Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn81a|81]] Calhoun, quoted in Massimo L. Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà nel mondo moderno&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, pp. 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn82a|82]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn84a|84]] Calhoun, quoted in Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà&#039;&#039;, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn85a|85]] George Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, Richmond: Morris, 1854, pp. 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn86a|86]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn87a|87]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 242, 247, 242 (‘Circular to the States’, 4 June 1783), 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786), 545 (letter to the Hebrew Congregation, January 1790).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn88a|88]] Cf. David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 130.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn89a|89]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 132; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn90a|90]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 98–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn91a|91]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 296, 250.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn92a|92]] Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. II, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn93a|93]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95a|95]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96a|96]] Robert von Mohl, ‘Gwerbe- und Fabrikwesen’, in Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch, eds, &#039;&#039;Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97a|97]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 468, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98a|98]] Randolph, quoted in Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, pp. 63, 43 (for the characterization as ‘the American Burke’).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99a|99]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100a|100]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 35–6, 315.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101a|101]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 290–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102a|102]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, pp. 455 (‘Fragments of the First Discarded Inaugural Address’, April 1789), 554 (letter to La Fayette, 28 July 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103a|103]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 308.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105a|105]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. ix, 12, 96.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106a|106]] Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, ed. Michael K. Goldberg and Jules P. Seigel, Ottawa: Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1983, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107a|107]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, pp. 98, 225; cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12 &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039; and ch. 22, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108a|108]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109a|109]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, p. 286; Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110a|110]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 464–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER THREE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page66&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Franklin, Smith and ‘vestiges of slavery’ in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
First the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and then the South of the United States during the conflict that pitted it against the North, accused their opponents of hypocrisy. The latter waxed indignant over black slavery, but shut its eyes to the fact that what were essentially slave relations persisted within the society it held up as a model. As we know, Franklin compared the miners of Scotland to the blacks of the American plantations, and thus challenged the London government’s pretension to elevate itself into a champion of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, this was a polemical intervention, but one whose validity was confirmed by a rather authoritative witness. Although sharing the proud self-consciousness of his compatriots or the ruling class of his country, Adam Smith acknowledged the persistence in Great Britain of ‘vestiges of slavery’: a labour relationship not dissimilar from serfdom was in force in salt works and coalmines. Just as the &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, still very numerous in Eastern Europe, were forcibly bound to the land to be cultivated and sold at the same time as it, so in the country that had left behind the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; some decades earlier, the &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; were in a sense an integral part of the &#039;&#039;opus&#039;&#039; or works (the salt work or mine) and, when this was sold, passed together with their family into the service of the new master. Hence it was not a question of actual slavery, of chattel slavery, which allowed individual members of a family to be put on the market like any other commodity. The &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; could marry and lead a genuine family life; they could own a minimum of property; and, naturally, they did not risk being killed with impunity: ‘their lives are under the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protection of the laws of the land’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it remained the case that in Scotland workers in coalmines and salt works were obliged to wear a collar on which the name of their master was inscribed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the wake of the great economist, Millar too could not but ‘regret … that any species of slavery should still remain in Great Britain’; and it was to be hoped that parliament would intervene to remedy the situation, finally sanctioning ‘the freedom of the labouring people’ in Scottish mines and salt works.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Judging from Smith’s &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, these were ‘the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Does this mean that the other labour relations were based on freedom? Referring to England in the second half of the eighteenth century, Blackstone distinguished between three types of ‘servant’ in the strict sense (we ignore here personnel charged with overseeing and guarding the master’s property): ‘menial servants’ or ‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’, and finally ‘labourers’, who worked outside the master’s house. The most modern labour relation, least informed by feudal and servile echoes, would seem to be the last. In this connection, however, the great jurist indulged in celebrating ‘very good regulations’ on the basis of which, for example, ‘all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work’, while those who ‘leave or desert their work’ were punished. Over the domestic or apprentice, the master exercised a right of ‘corporal punishment’ that must not result in death or mutilation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what happened if this limit was exceeded? We can infer Smith’s answer: ‘The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon or with forethought and without provocation.’ It is difficult to regard such servants as free men even if, according to the great economist, they enjoyed ‘almost the same privileges with their master, liberty, wages, etca’. In fact, what creates a radical difference is the power of correction exercised by the one over the other. The same Smith included menial servants, together with slaves proper, in the master’s extended family.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Masters did not confine themselves to monitoring their servant’s industriousness. Let us attend to Hume’s evidence: ‘At present, all masters discourage &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg69&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the females, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their service.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The opportunity to have a family seems largely denied not only to the black slave, but also to the white domestic servant: the private lives of both were subject to the master’s power or will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it is to be noted that comparable to menial servants were ‘apprentices’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] whose condition, in England at any rate, had been regarded by Grotius as approximating closely enough to the slave’s. And such, basically, was also Blackstone’s opinion. He reiterated the slave’s obligation to provide service ‘for life’ with a rather eloquent argument: fundamentally, it was the same relationship that the apprentice had with his master, except that in the latter case there was a time limit (seven years and sometimes more).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has justly been observed, ‘[f]or most of human history the expression “free labor” was an oxymoron.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The unemployed, beggars and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As the controversy between the two sides of the Union became increasingly bitter, Calhoun positively contrasted the condition of American slaves with that of inmates of workhouses or poorhouses in England. The former were lovingly treated and cared for by the master or mistress during illness or old age, while the latter were reduced to a ‘forlorn and wretched condition’; the former continued to live among their family and friends, while the latter were uprooted from their environment and also separated from their loved ones.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The apologetic intention that governs the description or transfiguration of the institution of slavery is clear. Yet when it came to workhouses in England, Calhoun was not the only one to underscore the horror. In de Tocqueville’s view, they afforded ‘the most horrendous and repugnant [spectacle] of misery’: on the one hand, the infirm incapable of work and waiting to die; on the other, women and children massed pell-mell ‘like pigs in the mud of their sty; it is difficult not to trample over a semi-naked body’. Finally, there were the comparatively more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg70&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘fortunate’—those in a position to work: they earned little or nothing and fed off the leftovers of stately homes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But however horrible, poverty and degradation were not the most significant aspect of workhouses. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe favourably mentioned the example of the workhouse in Bristol, which ‘has been such a Terror to the Beggars that none of [them] will come near the City’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the workhouse was subsequently described by Engels as a total institution: ‘Paupers wear the uniform of the house and are subject to the will of the director without any protection whatsoever’; so that ‘the “morally degenerate” parents cannot influence their children, families are separated; the man is sent to one wing, the woman to another, the children to a third’. Families were broken up, but for the rest all were amassed sometimes to the tune of twelve or sixteen in a single room. Any kind of violence was inflicted on them, not even sparing the elderly and children, and involving particular attention to women. In practice, the inmates of workhouses were treated as ‘objects of disgust and horror placed outside the law and the human community’. Thus was explained the fact, underscored by Engels, that in order to escape the ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ (as they were popularly renamed), ‘inmates of work houses often deliberately make themselves guilty of any crime whatsoever in order to go to prison’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact (add contemporary historians), ‘many indigents preferred to die of hunger and illness’ rather than subject themselves to a workhouse.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the suicide that slaves often resorted to in order to escape their condition. Examined carefully, the 1834 law that shut up anyone requiring assistance in a workhouse in a sense vindicates Calhoun and those who pointed to slavery as the only possible solution to the problem of poverty. Fighting for the new legislation, its inspirer, Nassau William Senior, denounced the fatal contradiction in the rules hitherto in force, which allowed the poor person to enjoy a minimum of assistance for continuing a normal life: ‘The labourer is to be a free agent, but without the hazards of free agency; to be free from the coercion, but to enjoy the assured existence of the slave.’ But ‘unit[ing] the irreconcilable advantages of freedom and servitude’ was utterly absurd: a choice was required.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing thus, the influential economist and liberal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg71&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;theorist, interlocutor and correspondent of Tocqueville, ended up recognizing the substantially slave-like character of the relations obtaining in workhouses.&lt;br /&gt;
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Coming as it did in 1834, the new legislation coincided with the emancipation of blacks in the colonies. We can thus understand the irony, on the one hand, of the theorists of the slaveholding South in the United States and, on the other, of the English popular masses faced with a dominant class which, while it lauded itself for having abolished slavery in the colonies, reintroduced it in a different form in the metropolis itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Liberals, vagrants and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have mentioned the role played by Senior in the passing of the 1834 law. But what position did the liberal tradition as a whole adopt towards workhouses and, more generally, the policy of disciplining poverty? According to Locke, it was necessary to intervene thoroughly and drastically in an infected area of society that was constantly expanding. From the age of three, the children of families not in a position to feed them should be sent out to work.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Moreover, it was necessary to intervene with their parents. To discourage the idleness and dissoluteness of vagrants, it was appropriate to proceed in areas frequented by them to ‘the suppressing of superfluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Secondly, begging should be discouraged and restricted. Beggars were obliged to wear a ‘badge’; to oversee them, and prevent them practising their activity outside the permitted area and hours, a special body was provided, the ‘beadles of beggars’, who in their turn were to be controlled by ‘guardians’ so that they performed their task with the requisite diligence and severity. But the whole community was called upon to participate in the beggar hunt, starting with the inhabitants of the house where the wretches had requested charity.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Draconian penalties awaited vagrants who managed to escape this comprehensive control. It was right that those caught asking for alms outside their parish and near a sea port should be pressed into the navy: they were to be ‘punished as deserters’—i.e. with the death penalty—‘if they go on shore without leave; or, when sent on shore, if they either go further, or stay longer, than they have leave’. The other illegal beggars were to be interned in a normal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg72&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse or house of correction. The master ‘shall have no other consideration nor allowance but what their labour shall produce; whom therefore he shall have power to employ according to his discretion’. Once again, this arbitrary power summons up the spectre of slavery. As is confirmed by a further detail: that ‘whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the forgery for the first time that he is found guilty thereof; and the second time, that he shall be transported to the plantations, as in case of felony’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, in the nineteenth century the situation was different. With the 1834 reform, arriving in the workhouses were those who sought to escape death from starvation in some way: the workhouses must be made as odious as possible in order to reduce the number of those who sought refuge in them to a minimum. In this philosophy, which began to take shape with Malthus,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville likewise joined: ‘It is obvious that we must make assistance unpleasant, we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison and render our charity repugnant.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In denouncing this institution, Calhoun referred exclusively to Europe. Yet it was present, in one form or another, in the United States. De Tocqueville referred to it, significantly, in the context of his analysis of the ‘prison system’. Who were the inmates? The answer was clear: ‘The indigent who cannot earn their living by honest work, and those who do not want to.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was therefore understandable that workhouses became particularly crowded at times of crisis:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The fluctuations in industry attract, when favourable, a large number of workers who find themselves without work in times of crisis. Thus we see that vagrancy, which is born of idleness, and stealing, which is invariably the result of vagrancy, are the two crimes that are experiencing the most rapid increase in the current state of society.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The crime that led to internment was already identified with unemployment and poverty. Making the judicial decisions, for example in New York, was a functionary who could readily deprive of their liberty those who in his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg73&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;judgment ‘have no means of subsistence’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Protests were understandable: the poor person thus confined ‘regards himself as unfortunate, not culpable; he challenges society’s right violently to force him to do fruitless work and to deal with him against his will’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us return to England. John Stuart Mill was inclined to trivialize the horror of workhouses when he observed: ‘Even the labourer who loses his employment by idleness or negligence, has nothing worse to suffer, in the most unfavourable case, than the discipline of a workhouse’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the liberal philosopher’s opinion can be contrasted with that of modern scholars: once they had entered workhouses, the poor ‘ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’, because they lost ‘the civil right of personal liberty’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was a radical loss: the ‘guardians’ of the workhouses had the discretional power of inflicting the corporal punishment deemed most fitting on inmates.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bentham was decidedly enthusiastic. He tirelessly lauded the benefits of this institution, which he aimed further to perfect, locating the workhouse in a ‘panoptical’ building which allowed the director to exercise secret, total control—that is, to observe every single aspect of the behaviour of the unwitting inmates at any point in time:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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What hold can any other manufacturer have upon his workmen, equal to what my manufacturer would have upon his? What other master is there that can reduce his workmen, if idle, to a situation next to starving, without suffering them to go elsewhere? What other master is there, whose men can never get drunk unless he chooses that they should do so? and who, so far from being able to raise their wages by combination, are obliged to take whatever pittance he thinks it most for his interest to allow? … and what other master or manufacturer is there, who to appearance constantly, and in reality as much as he thinks proper, has every look and motion of each workman under his eye?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg74&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence the contribution to the development of national wealth by workhouses, intended to operate as ‘industry-houses’, would be enormous. They were to be spread over the whole national territory, confining up to 500,000 detainees, and in any event ‘all persons, able-bodied or otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of livelihood’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to this gigantic concentration-camp universe, where people would be interned without having committed any crime and without any control by the judiciary, it would be possible to perform the miracle of transforming the ‘dross’ that was the ‘refuse of the population’ into money.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was not all. Given the isolation it entailed, the workhouse made it possible to experiment, as we shall see, with producing a stock of especially industrious and conscientious labourers. Certainly, for such objectives to be achieved, rigorous discipline was required, which must be thoroughly internalized by the detainees in the workhouse:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Soldiers&#039;&#039; wear &#039;&#039;uniforms&#039;&#039;, why not paupers?—those who save the country, why not those who are saved by it? Not the &#039;&#039;permanent&#039;&#039; hands only, but likewise the &#039;&#039;coming-and-going&#039;&#039; hands should wear the uniform while in the house, for order, distinction, and recognition, as well as for tidiness …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The servant as soldier&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, it was Bentham who compared the condition of a workhouse inmate with that of the soldier. But it is appropriate to take a step back. During his residence in London, Franklin, discomfited by his English interlocutors mocking the flag of liberty waved by colonists who were often slave-owners, replied by highlighting, among other things, the persistence in England of slave-like relations even within the armed forces.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The reference was above all to the navy. Let us attend to historians of our day: ‘the men of the fleet were so ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-handled that it was impossible to obtain crews by free enlistment’. Many sought to escape this kind of sequestration, but Great Britain gave chase to them, without hesitating to search American ships and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg75&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;take by force deserters, including those who had become US citizens in the meantime. It was necessary to resort to drastic measures to ensure the functioning of ‘more than 700 warships in commission, with nearly 150,000 sailors and marines’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so, like Franklin before him, we have Calhoun denouncing ‘the slavery of impressed seamen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This was a common theme in the journalism of the time. In Britain itself, defenders of slavery stressed the analogy between this institution and being pressed into the navy. Both practices were justified by exceptional circumstances—namely, the need to maintain the colonies and the navy, respectively. On the other side, the abolitionist Sharp condemned both practices.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, William Wilberforce sought to make distinctions, and was accused of hypocrisy by his opponents:[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the pious pastor was moved by the condition of black slaves, but was indifferent to the no less grievous suffering of the kind of white slaves on whom the British Empire’s military power and glory were based. The argument was far from trivial. Sailors were ‘seized by press gangs from the streets of London and Liverpool’; and at a popular level no institution was more hated than the press gang.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conditions to which men were then subjected can be readily be inferred from Locke’s indirect comparison between the power of ‘the captain of a galley’ and that exercised by ‘a lord over his slave’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The capture of sailors in popular districts had something in common with the capture of blacks in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
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And it was not only the navy. A contemporary scholar summarizes the condition of those military ‘captives in uniform’ who were soldiers, called upon to defend a rapidly expanding empire in every corner of the world:&lt;br /&gt;
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They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk and culture of origin for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they might &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg76&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were apt to die prematurely anyway.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For the rest, the way Locke described ‘the common practice of martial discipline’ is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This above all calls to mind the ‘absolute power of life and death’ wielded by officers over their subordinates. It is the phrase Locke habitually used to define the essence of slavery. Is it a rhetorical exaggeration? Already in Grotius we find the observation that the condition of the slave is not very different from that of the soldier.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us concentrate on liberal England. The mortality rate of soldiers en route to India was comparable to that affecting black slaves during their deportation from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Moreover, British soldiers were subject to the punishment traditionally reserved for slaves—flogging—and, paradoxically, continued to be even when this form of discipline had been abolished for Indian troops.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Power relations in the army reproduced those existing in society. The figure of the soldier tended to coincide with that of the servant. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe observed: ‘any Man would carry a Musket rather than starve … ’tis Poverty makes Men Soldiers, and drives Crowds into the Armies’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At the end of the century, Townsend reiterated that ‘distress and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg77&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;poverty’ alone could impel ‘the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean, or in the field of battle’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, to put the point this time with Mandeville, ‘[t]he Hardships and Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the Brunt of every Thing’—namely, ‘the working slaving People’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the figure of the officer tended to coincide with that of the master, and the contempt officers/masters had for troops was professed and even ostentatious. Troops of the line (lamented an ordinary soldier) were ‘the lowest class of animals, and only fit to be ruled with the cat o’ nine tails’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—that is, with the whip capable of inflicting the most sadistic punishments, those usually reserved for disobedient slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The penal code, formation of a compulsory workforce, and the process of colonization&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of military recruitment is thus understandable: prisons were ‘rumag’d for Malefactors’; the profession of soldier (observed Defoe) above all devolved on ‘Men taken from the Gallows’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, there were plenty of them. From 1688 to 1820, the number of crimes carrying the death penalty increased from 50 to between 200 and 250, and they were almost always crimes against property. While attempted homicide was regarded as a petty crime until 1803, the theft of a shilling or handkerchief, or the illegal clipping of an ornamental bush, could entail hanging; and one could be consigned to the hangman even at the age of eleven.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, in some cases, even young children ran this risk: in 1833 the death penalty was pronounced on a pickpocket of nine, although the sentence was subsequently commuted.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more significant than the increase in penalties was the criminalization of behaviour that had hitherto been licit. The enclosure and private appropriation of common land underwent significant development; and the peasant or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg78&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;commoner who was late in appreciating the new situation became a thief, a criminal to be visited with all the force of the law. This might seem an arbitrary and brutal way to behave; but that is not what Locke thought. In legitimizing the colonists’ appropriation of land left uncultivated by the Indians, the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; simultaneously adopted a clear position in favour of enclosure in England. ‘[I]n the beginning, all the world was America’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and common land was a kind of vestige of this original, wild state, which work, private appropriation and money had subsequently overcome. It was a process that manifested itself on a large scale across the Atlantic, but which was not unknown in England: ‘even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’, until enclosure and private appropriation intervened positively.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with the despoliation of the Indians and English peasants, Locke also justified terroristic legislation in defence of property: it was ‘lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was only a petty crime in appearance. In reality, the guilty party, if only momentarily, had deprived his victim of his ‘right to liberty’ and had made him a ‘slave’. At this point, no one could exclude the possibility that theft would not be followed by homicide, since it was precisely the power of life and death that defined the relationship of slavery. This was synonymous with a state of war, and hence there was no reason why the thief should not be done to death, whatever the extent of the theft.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What Locke seems to be saying is that at stake is not only the shilling or handkerchief or whatever other rather minor stolen good: private property as such and, over and above it, liberty were in danger. Thus, what legitimized the pickpocket’s killing or execution is the same liberal pathos that had presided over the condemnation of monarchical despotism as the source of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to common land, even birds and wild animals became objects of private appropriation by the landed aristocracy. In this instance, it was not possible to appeal to Locke. In fact, on the basis of his theory, not having been transformed by labour, birds and wild animals should have been regarded as common property. And yet, in accordance with legislation enacted after the Glorious Revolution, while the peasant slid into the condition of thief, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg79&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hunter was transformed into poacher; and here too the terrorism of the penal code was called on to compel respect for the incursion.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the slavery and trading of blacks, the vulgar historicist explanation does not stand up when it comes to the expansion in crimes against property and the increased severity of the penalties provided for them. It is misleading to refer to the spirit of the times. ‘It is very doubtful whether any other country possessed a criminal code with anything like so many capital provisions as there were in this single statute.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruthless character of English legislation was already proverbial on its enactment. While Napoleon exercised his iron rule over France, a reformer like Sir Samuel Romilly felt compelled to offer a bitter observation: ‘there is probably no other country in the world in which so many and so great a variety of human actions are punishable with loss of life as in England’. [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel denounced the ‘draconian’ severity whereby ‘every thief in England [is] hanged’, in an absurd equation of life and property, of the two ‘qualitatively different’ crimes that were homicide and theft. The class origins of such ‘draconian’ severity were even identified: for peasants guilty of illegal hunting ‘the harshest and most disproportionate punishments’ were provided, because ‘those who made those laws and who are now sitting in the courts as magistrates and jurors’ were the aristocracy, the very class that held a monopoly on hunting.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to maintain law and order was only one aspect of the problem. Not infrequently, those sentenced to death (or even a long prison term) saw their sentence commuted to deportation to the colonies. Already in force for some time, from 1717 the practice of deportation assumed an official character and significant proportions.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So following the Glorious Revolution, we witness, on the one hand, the enactment of terroristic legislation and, on the other, the burgeoning phenomenon of deportation to remote colonies. Is there a link between the two events? It is difficult to deny that the formation of a large compulsory workforce through drastic harshening of the legal code ultimately made it possible to satisfy ‘the labor needs of the plantations’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, underlying this practice was a specific theory. Locke repeatedly demanded penal slavery for those who made an attempt on another person’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg80&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life or property. Already in the state of nature, ‘[t]he damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things were even clearer in the social state:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of the colonial war as just war (on the part of Europeans) and the theory of penal slavery legitimized and galvanized the deportation, respectively, of the black slaves and white semi-slaves required by colonial development. On the eve of the American Revolution, in Maryland alone there were 20,000 servants of criminal origin. To put the point with Samuel Johnson, they were ‘a race of convicts, and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging’. And that is how an inexhaustible source of forced labour was fed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Indentured servants&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This labour force proved precious for the purposes of populating and exploiting colonies as they were conquered. Initially, the flow of indentured servants went in the direction of America. Subsequently, supplanted and rendered superfluous by the massive introduction of black slaves, and in any event after the achievement of independence by the United States, white semi-slaves were diverted towards Australia, where they made an even more significant contribution to the process of exploiting the new colony. What were the characteristics of this labour relationship? Let us start with the journey of relocation or deportation from Britain. The horrors and mortality rate call to mind the famous ‘middle passage’ to which black slaves were subjected. Sometimes not even half the ‘passengers’ survived the voyage. Among them were to be found children between the ages of one and seven; they rarely escaped death. A witness related &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg81&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;having seen thirty-two children of tender years cast into the ocean in the course of a single voyage. Diseases continued to rage even after the crossing of the Atlantic; as a result, the new arrivals were often subjected to quarantine. There then intervened the moment of the market. In the papers commercial adverts of the following kind could be read: ‘Just arrived at Leedstown, the Ship &#039;&#039;Justitia&#039;&#039; with about one Hundred Healthy Servants. Men, Women and Boys, among which are many Tradesmen … The Sale will Commence on Tuesday, the 2nd of April’ (&#039;&#039;The Virginia Gazette&#039;&#039;, 28 March 1771). Husband and wife were often separated, and might be separated from their children, permanently or for a long period; children under the age of five were obliged to render service until they were twenty-one. Flogged by their masters in the event of indiscipline or disobedience, servants sometimes fled, and then a manhunt was unleashed. The local press provided an accurate physical description of the fugitives who, once taken, were punished and branded with the letter R (standing for ‘rogue’) or subjected to the excision of ears. Thus rendered immediately recognizable, they no longer had any escape.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, was the difference compared with slaves proper? Sometimes white semi-slaves bemoaned their lot: ‘Many blacks are treated better.’ In fact, unlike real slaves, servants could turn to the judiciary and hope to be accepted into the community of the free, and were indeed admitted ‘assuming they survived their period of labor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that death often intervened first. But we are dealing with a social relation that is different from hereditary racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was it a social relation marked by freedom? We have seen Locke on the one hand stress the contractual, and hence free, genesis of the figure of servant, and on the other let slip the admission that he was not really free. But on this point we should also attend to Sieyès’ opinion. Looking across the Atlantic, he argued thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The final class, composed of men who have only their hands, can have need of regulated &#039;&#039;slavery&#039;&#039; in order to escape the &#039;&#039;slavery of need&#039;&#039;. Why restrict natural liberty? I want to sell my time and my services of whatever kind (I do not say my life) for a &#039;&#039;year&#039;&#039;, two &#039;&#039;years&#039;&#039;, etc., as occurs in English America. The law is silent in this connection, and it should only speak to prevent abuses of the institution that endanger liberty. Thus it will be possible to hire oneself or serve [&#039;&#039;s’engager/s’asservir&#039;&#039;] for a maximum of five years.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg82&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Sieyès did not disguise the fact that what characterized the figure of the indentured servant was subservience, ‘servile engagement’ (&#039;&#039;engageance serve&#039;&#039;), or ‘legally regulated slavery’. However, especially after the outbreak of the French Revolution, apologetic concerns seem to have got the upper hand: in the new ideological and political climate, it was no longer possible to declare oneself in favour of an institution whose substantially slave-like character was acknowledged. And so we have Sieyès arguing against those for whom the indentured servant was a person who ‘loses some of his freedom’. No:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is more accurate to say that, at the point when the contract is drawn up, far from being impeded in his liberty, he exercises it in the way most opportune to him. Any convention is an exchange in which each likes what he receives more than what he gives up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is true that for the duration of the contract the servant could not exercise the liberty ceded by him. But it was a general rule that the liberty of an individual ‘never extends to the point of harming others’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, from the outset Sieyès upheld contractual servitude in the name of ‘natural liberty’, of the right possessed by every individual to draw up the contract that seemed most opportune to him. In other words, the key category of liberal thought (the category of contract), invoked by Grotius to legitimize slavery proper, was applied by Sieyès solely to the labour relation that binds the indentured servant to his master. This was not dissimilar from Locke, the difference being that the French author, prior to the Revolution at least, stressed the fundamentally slave-like character of the relationship. That is why he was concerned to stress the vigilance the law should be called on to exercise: public officials should control the master’s actions in order to prevent the ‘person’ of the servant ‘being harmed through unduly prolonged hire or during the hire’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sieyès seems to propose a kind of code for regulating this white semi-slavery, on the model of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; with which, in theory, the masters of black slaves should comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. ‘The extensive Herod-like kidnappings’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg83&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Among the compulsory labour force called on to ensure the development of the colonies were also youngsters of poor condition, deceived with honeyed words, abducted and deported across the Atlantic.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Alternatively, they arrived in America with their parents, who were often compelled to sell them, never seeing them again. The situation of children of popular extraction was not much better in England. Marx denounced ‘the extensive Herod-like kidnappings perpetrated in the early days of the factory system, when children were stolen from the work houses and orphanages, and capital thereby incorporated a mass of unresisting human material’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going beyond the use of orphanages as a source of low-cost and more or less compulsory labour, we can make a general observation here. If, in the proto-liberal theory and practice of the time, the wage-labourer was (as we shall soon see) the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; Burke mentions, or the ‘bipedal machine’ referred to by Sieyès, his children were ultimately &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;, destined to be used at the first opportunity precisely in their capacity as work tools and machines. Locke explicitly declared that poor children, who were to be sent to work from the age of three, must ‘be taken off their [parents’] hands’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over a century later, Bentham’s attitude was not dissimilar. He invited people to look for inspiration to ‘manufactures where children, down to four years old, earn something, and where children a few years older earn a subsistence, and that a comfortable one’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was permissible and beneficial to ‘tak[e] the children out of the hands of their parents as much as possible, and even, if possible, altogether’. There should be no hesitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Y]ou may even clap them up in an inspection-house, and then you make of them what you please. You need never grudge the parents &#039;&#039;a peep behind the curtain&#039;&#039; in the master’s lodge … you might keep up a sixteen or eighteen years separation between the male and female part of your young subjects …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The children of the poor were at the complete disposal of society. We are reminded of the fate reserved for slaves across the Atlantic. To end their presence on American soil, suggested Jefferson, one might at a moderate price, and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg84&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps even gratis, acquire newborn blacks, place them ‘under the guardianship of the State’, subject them to work as soon as possible, and thus largely recover the expenses required for their deportation to San Domingo, which should be set in train when convenient. Certainly, ‘[t]he separation of infants from their mothers … would produce some scruples of humanity’, but there was no need to be so fussy.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While he was motivated by economic calculations, rather than worries about racial purity, Bentham would have liked to proceed perhaps even more ruthlessly with the children of the poor in England: ‘An inspection-house, to which a set of children had been consigned from their birth, might afford experiments enough … What say you to a &#039;&#039;foundling-hospital&#039;&#039; upon this principle?’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall see that Bentham also envisaged experiments of a eugenic character. But for now we can reach a conclusion by attending to an English economist (Edward G. Wakefield), who in 1834 published a successful book devoted to the contrast between America and England: ‘it is the whole press of England, not I, that calls English children [of popular extraction] slaves’. The majority were compelled to work such long hours that they inadvertently fell asleep, only to be awoken and forced back to work with beatings and torments of every kind. As to foundlings, they were dispensed with rapidly enough: adverts were affixed to the doors of workhouses promoting their sale. In London the price of male and female children put on the market thus was significantly below that of black slaves in America; in rural regions, such commodities were even cheaper.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing down on this mass of wretches was legislation that was certainly not marked by the protection of civil liberties. One thinks of the blank warrants that allowed the police to arrest or search a person at will. Abolished by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, this ‘intolerable tool of oppression’ (to adopt the description of it given by the French liberal Laboulaye in 1866)[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] long continued to survive in England. Smith himself tended if not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg85&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to justify it, in any case to trivialize it. He was astonished that the ‘common people’, rather than fighting for the free circulation and buying and selling of labour power, exhibited all its indignation ‘against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The death penalty was imposed with great facility but also with some discretion. With the passing in 1723 of the Black Act—the ‘blacks’ were alleged deer rustlers—in some cases it was not necessary to resort to a formal process to provide for the death sentence, which consigned to the hangman even those who had in some way aided a thief (or alleged thief) to escape justice.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without betraying any disquiet, Mandeville recognized that ‘the Lives of Hundreds, if not Thousands, of Necessitous Wretches, that are daily hanged for Trifles’ were being snuffed out;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] execution often became a mass spectacle with pedagogical purposes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British liberal called upon magistrates not to be inhibited either by misplaced ‘compassion’ or by undue doubts and scruples. Certainly, thieves might have committed theft under the spur of necessity: ‘what they can get Honestly is not sufficient to keep them’. Yet ‘the Peace of the Society’ required that the guilty be hanged. Yes, ‘the Evidences perhaps want clearness or are otherwise insufficient’; and there was a risk that an innocent person might be put to death. But however ‘terrible’ that would be, the aim must be achieved that ‘not one Guilty Person [be] suffered to escape with Impunity’. It would be a serious thing if overly scrupulous judges prioritized their ‘Conscience’ over the ‘Advantage to a Nation’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The courts of the property-owner judges were called upon to operate as a kind of committee of public safety.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then conclude that, setting aside the colonies in their entirety (including Ireland), in Britain itself full enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by the law—the ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ liberty that Constant and Berlin, respectively, refer to[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—was the privilege of a small minority. The mass of people was subject to regulation and coercion that extended far beyond the workplace (or the place of punishment that was the prison, but also the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg86&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse and the army). While Locke proposed regulating the consumption of alcohol by the popular classes, Mandeville believed that, at least on Sunday, ‘every Amusement Abroad that might allure or draw them from’ attending church should be ‘prohibited’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the subject of alcohol, Burke argued differently: while it had no nutritional properties, it could alleviate hunger pangs in the poor person; moreover, ‘at all times, and in all countries’, alcohol, together with ‘opium’ and ‘tobacco’, had been turned to for the ‘moral consolations’ men sometimes needed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, even more than the disciplining of workers and vagrants as in Locke and Mandeville, the problem was that of dulling the consciousness and suffering of the starving in general. What remained constant was the tendency to govern the existence of the popular classes even in its smallest details. The reference to opium added a touch of cynicism. Reports by government committees of inquiry would subsequently denounce the catastrophe: in the poorest districts, opium consumption was spreading, and was becoming a means of feeding or a substitute for it. It was sometimes given to infants, who ‘ “shrank up into little old men”, or “wizened like little monkeys” ’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This detailed regulation obviously also included religious indoctrination. In Locke’s view, for poor children to start work from the age of three was a beneficial measure not only economically, but also morally: ‘Another advantage … of bringing poor children … to a working-school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday along with their school-masters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Mandeville demanded that Sunday attendance of church become ‘a Duty’ for the poor and illiterate. Appealing to spontaneous religious feelings was insufficient: ‘It is a Duty incumbent on all Magistrates to take particular Care’ of what happened on Sundays. ‘The Poor more especially and their Children should be made to go to Church on it both in the Fore and Afternoon’. Positive results would not be wanting: ‘Where this Care is taken by the Magistrates as far as it lies in their Power, Ministers of the Gospel may instill into the smallest Capacities’ devotion and the virtue of obedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Controlled in their private life, the popular classes were even more so in the public existence which, amid a host of difficulties, they sought: ‘Between 1793 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg87&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp; 1820, more than 60 acts directed at repression of working-class collective action were passed by Parliament.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More even than trade-union activity in the strict sense—that is, action aimed at raising wages and improving working conditions—the very attempt by servants to escape their isolation and communicate with one another was viewed with dismay. They (thundered Mandeville in alarm) ‘assemble when they please with Impunity’. They even developed relations of mutual solidarity; they sought to aid a colleague dismissed or flogged by his master. Simply by virtue of not confining themselves to the vertical, subaltern relationship with their superiors, but seeking to develop horizontal relations with one another, servants were to be considered culpable of unacceptable subversion: they were ‘daily incroaching upon Masters and Mistresses, and endeavouring to be more upon the Level with them’; they had already raised ‘the low Dignity of their Condition … from the Original Meanness which the publick Welfare requires it should always remain in’. Exceeding every limit, the servant posed as a gentleman; this was the ‘comedy’ of the ‘Gentleman Footman’, a comedy which in fact, in the absence of timely intervention, might turn into a ‘tragedy’ for the whole nation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant in this context was the position taken by Adam Smith. He acknowledged that ‘[w]e have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’ Besides, ‘[t]he masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily … Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’, or ‘to sink the wages of labour even below this rate’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence even were masters and workers to be treated identically in legislative terms, the former would always enjoy an advantageous situation. But they were also favoured by the precarious living conditions of the opposing party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they [the workers] have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg88&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;All this did not prevent Smith from recommending that the government act severely against working-class combinations. Certainly, ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. However, it was ‘impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which … would be consistent with liberty and justice’. But the government must forestall any working-class gathering, even the most casual and seemingly innocuous. For example, the requirement of bureaucratic registration for those who practice a specific profession ended up ‘connect[ing] individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another’. Utterly intolerable was any ‘regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, not only trade-union activity, but even a mutual aid society was to be considered illegal. Smith recognized that he was dealing with ‘desperate men’, who risked dying of starvation. And yet this consideration took second place to the need to avoid meetings, ‘conversations’ or gatherings that tended to be synonymous with a ‘conspiracy against the public’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to criminalize at birth any popular association, the dominant class in England resorted to yet more summary methods, which can be described in Constant’s words: ‘the horrendous expedient of sending spies to incite ignorant minds and suggest rebellion to them, so as then to be able to denounce them’. Results were not wanting: ‘The wretches captivated those who had the misfortune to listen to them and probably also accused those they did not succeed in captivating.’ And justice came crashing down on both.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. A whole with singular characteristics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mandeville call on judges to be summary in condemning to death those guilty or suspected of theft and pilferage, even at the cost of striking down some innocents. The priority was the need to safeguard ‘the peace of the society’ or ‘advantage to a nation’. Blackstone acknowledged that press-ganging men into the navy seemed dubious and detrimental to liberty. It was ‘only defensible for public necessity, to which all private considerations must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg89&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;give way’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Locke repeatedly called on people not to lose sight of ‘the public good’, ‘the good of the nation’, ‘the public weal’, or ‘the preservation of the whole’, ‘the whole commonwealth’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is so passionately invoked here is a Whole demanding the sacrifice, permanent not temporary, of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition was all the more tragic because any prospect of improvement seemed pretty remote. In fact, even to entertain projects tending towards such improvement was synonymous not only with abstract utopianism, but also and above all with dangerous subversion. According to Townsend, the ‘stock of human happiness is … much increased’ by the presence of ‘the poor’, who were compelled to perform the most arduous and painful work. The poor fully deserved their fate, were by definition wastrels and vagrants. But it would be a disaster for society if, by some chance, they were to mend their ways: ‘The fleets and armies of a state would soon be in want of soldiers and of sailors, if sobriety and diligence universally prevailed’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the country’s economy would find itself in difficulties. Mandeville reached the same conclusion: ‘To make the society … happy … it is requisite that great numbers … should be ignorant as well as poor’; ‘the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And let us now read Arthur Young: ‘every one but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and would not produce the ‘wealth of nations’ referred to by Smith. Later, in France, Destutt de Tracy arrived at the same conclusion: ‘In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally poor.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Why was the proposition, in its various forms, that society’s happiness and wealth depended on the hardship and deprivation of the poor, who formed a large majority of the population, not perceived as contradictory? It is Locke who explains the logic of this Whole with special characteristics: slaves ‘cannot … be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was also Algernon Sidney’s opinion: ‘a kingdom or city … is composed of freemen and equals: Servants may be in it, but are not members of it.’ Indeed, ‘no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth’; he is not even a member of the people, because ‘the people’ comprises &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg90&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all the freemen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The poor were the servile caste required by society; they were the subterranean foundation of the social edifice, those whom Nietzsche defined as ‘the blind moles of culture’. With society and civilization, the poor and the moles continued to have a relationship of estrangement.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Wage-labour and the categories of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades after Franklin, in transition from the first to the second great controversy in the liberal party, the governor of South Carolina, James Henry Hammond, likewise applied himself to emphasizing how much quasi-slavery persisted in Britain. He sent an open letter to Thomas Clarkson, the venerable patriarch of English abolitionism, putting his finger on the sore point of the workers’ condition in the country that boasted of having abolished slavery in its colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the world of Slavery? … If you are really humane, philanthropic, and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, reactions in Britain were indignant, insisting on the characteristic feature of the freeman that applied to even the most wretched wage-labourer. However, in defining him, the liberal tradition frequently had recourse to the same categories as were used in classical antiquity and across the Atlantic in relation to the black slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Locke’s view, not genuinely capable of intellectual and moral life was ‘the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living’. Wholly absorbed in ‘still[ing] the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children’, such people had no possibility of thinking about other things:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg91&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Locke had no hesitation in asserting that ‘there is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts’. To appreciate this, it was enough to contrast ‘Westminster-hall’ and the ‘Exchange’ with ‘Alms-Houses’ and ‘Bedlam’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The boundary separating the human world from the animal world was imperceptible and evanescent: ‘if we compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, Mandeville, condemning the spread of education to popular strata, compared the wage-labourer to a ‘horse’: ‘No Creatures submit contentedly to their Equals, and should a Horse know as much as a Man, I should not desire to be his Rider.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a metaphor that reappeared on the occasion of his polemic against the excessive generosity displayed by the rich master to the servant in England: ‘A Man may have Five and Twenty Horses in his Stables without being guilty of Folly, if it suits with the rest of his Circumstances, but if he keeps but one, and overfeeds it to shew his Wealth, he is a Fool for his Pains.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only English liberalism that argued in these terms. In fact, the process of de-humanization possibly reached its peak in Sieyès:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unfortunates devoted to arduous work, producers of other people’s enjoyments, who receive scarcely enough to sustain their suffering, needy bodies; this enormous crowd of bipedal tools, without liberty, without morality, without intellectual faculties, equipped solely with hands that earn little and a mind burdened with a thousand worries that serves them only to suffer … are these what you call men? They are deemed civilized [&#039;&#039;policés&#039;&#039;], but have we seen a single one of them who was capable of entering into society?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg92&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On other occasions, the process of de-humanization occurred in a different fashion. Adopting the distinction, peculiar to classical antiquity, between the various instruments of labour, Burke subsumed the wage-labourer under the category of &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Sieyès referred to the ‘majority of men’ defined, above all in private notes predating 1789, as ‘work machines’ (&#039;&#039;machines de travail&#039;&#039;), ‘instruments of labour’ (&#039;&#039;instruments de labeur&#039;&#039;), ‘human instruments of production’ (&#039;&#039;instruments humains de la production&#039;&#039;), or ‘bipedal tools’ (&#039;&#039;instruments bipèdes&#039;&#039;).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traces of this process of de-humanization can even be found in Smith. By dint of the duress and monotony of his work, a wage-labourer ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’, incapable of participating ‘in any rational conversation’ or ‘conceiving any generous … sentiment’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As across the Atlantic with black slaves and slaves in general, so in Europe the dominant class was separated from white servants by a gulf that had ethnic and racial connotations. In Locke’s view, ‘a day-labourer [is] no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural [i.e., an ignorant aborigine]’: neither had yet reached the level of ‘rational creatures and Christians’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Sieyès was of the opinion that the ‘human instruments of production’ pertained to a ‘people’ different from (and inferior to) that comprising ‘the heads of production’ or ‘intelligent persons’, ‘respectable folk’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further reason intervened to render the gulf separating the community of the free from servants and slaves unbridgeable. The latter were considered incapable of fully appreciating the humiliations, the frustrations, the sufferings, the pain, as well as all the other feelings characteristic of man’s spiritual existence. We have seen how Mandeville argued in relation to the mass of wretches in Europe. They were forced to suffer hardship and privations and often ended up on the gallows ‘for trifles’, which they made themselves guilty of in an attempt to escape hunger. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be happy is to be pleas’d, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more content he’ll be with his own … when a Man enjoys &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg93&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself, Laughs and Sings, and in his Gesture and Behaviour shews me all the tokens of Content and Satisfaction, I pronounce him happy …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On careful examination, the ‘greatest King’ could envy ‘the Peace of Mind’ of ‘the meanest and most unciviliz’d Peasant’ and his ‘Tranquillity of … Soul’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no less emphatic terms, the Virginian theorist we have already encountered, Thomas R. Dew, expressed himself on the subject of slaves: ‘we have no doubts that they form the happiest portion of our society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe, than the negro slave of the United States’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only is it very difficult to define the condition of white servants in Europe as free, but the image of them transmitted by the liberal thought of the time is not much different from the image of the black slave in the southern United States. So was the governor of South Carolina right to mock the abolitionists’ hypocrisy and credulity? That would be a hasty conclusion. In any event, we are obliged to reflect further on the characteristics of the society that was being formed either side of the Atlantic and on the categories best suited to understanding it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn1a|1]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn2a|2]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 437.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn3a|3]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn4a|4]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn5a|5]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 413–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn6a|6]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn7a|7]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn8a|8]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn9a|9]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn10a|10]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn13a|13]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms no Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn14a|14]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn15a|15]] Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, &#039;&#039;Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIX siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn16a|16]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1966, p. ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn17a|17]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wootton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 460.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn21a|21]] See Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 1, ch. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn22a|22]] Tocqueville, diary note of 4 February 1851, quoted in Hugh Brogan, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pt 2, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn23a|23]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn24a|24]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn25a|25]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, p. 71.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn28a|28]] T. H. Marshall, &#039;&#039;Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn30a|30]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 368–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 398; Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn33a|33]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 389.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn34a|34]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 652.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn35a|35]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 138.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn36a|36]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 291.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn37a|37]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 376, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn38a|38]] C. Duncan Rice, ‘The Missionary Context of the British Anti-Slavery Movement’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn39a|39]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 6; E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 88.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn40a|40]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn41a|41]] Linda Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, London: Random House, 2002, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn42a|42]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn43a|43]] See Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, ch. v, §28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn44a|44]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, pp. 314–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn45a|45]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn46a|46]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn47a|47]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, p. 119.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn48a|48]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn49a|49]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn50a|50]] E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 22–3; Anthony Arblaster, &#039;&#039;The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 172; Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn51a|51]] Ronald W. Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, London: Blandford Press, 1963, p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn52a|52]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 140.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn56a|56]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn57a|57]] Thus the legal historian Leon Radzinowicz, quoted in ibid., p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn58a|58]] Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn59a|59]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn60a|60]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn61a|61]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, p. 12; cf. Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn62a|62]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn64a|64]] Marcus W. Jernegan, &#039;&#039;Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America&#039;&#039;, Westport (CI): Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 77–9, and p. 48 (for the quotation from Dr Johnson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., pp. 50–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn66a|66]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn67a|67]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., pp. 89, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn70a|70]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 527 n. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn72a|72]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn73a|73]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 64–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn75a|75]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1450, 1485–7 (letters to Albert Gallatin, 26 December 1820, and Jared Sparks, 4 February 1824).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn76a|76]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn77a|77]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 347–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn78a|78]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 541–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn79a|79]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn80a|80]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn81a|81]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 273.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn82a|82]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn83a|83]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 272–3, 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn84a|84]] Benajmin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 309–28; Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Four Essays on Liberty&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118–72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn85a|85]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn86a|86]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 7, pp. 413–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn87a|87]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 522 and n. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn88a|88]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn89a|89]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 307–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn90a|90]] Karl Polanyi, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 3, p. 121 n. 333.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn91a|91]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn92a|92]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, pp. 83–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn95a|95]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 28 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn96a|96]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn97a|97]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3, 196–7, 205, 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn98a|98]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn99a|99]] Quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 765.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn100a|100]] Young, quoted in R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn101a|101]] Destutt de Tracy, quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 802.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn102a|102]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn103a|103]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 89, 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn104a|104]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105a|105]] Clarkson, quote in Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, pp. 233–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106a|106]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;An Essay Concerning Human Understanding&#039;&#039;, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 707, 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., p. 666.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108a|108]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110a|110]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111a|111]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112a|112]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113a|113]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 782.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114a|114]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Conduct of the Understanding&#039;&#039;, Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839, pp. 10, 12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115a|115]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 89, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 311–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117a|117]] Dew, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 318.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FOUR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page94&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg95&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The elusive liberalism of de Tocqueville’s America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How should we define the political regime which, following the Dutch prologue and starting from the liberal revolutions, was established first in Britain and then in the United States? As regards the latter, Washington was in no doubt. We have seen him immediately after the achievement of independence celebrating the ‘wise and liberal government’ his country had given itself. Some years later, on the eve of the ratification of the federal Constitution, which consecrated a strong executive power, the general-president coined a kind of advertising slogan, declaring himself in favour of a ‘liberal &amp;amp;amp; energetic’ government.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet if by liberalism is meant every individual’s equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by law—‘modern liberty’ or ‘negative liberty’—it is not difficult to perceive the rather problematic character of employing such a category. Even if we discount the problem of slavery, we know the condition of semi-slavery to which notionally free blacks were subjected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can ignore the population of colour in its entirety and still not thereby arrive at a different result. Those in the United States who were untainted by any crime, but interned in workhouses that were (as de Tocqueville himself acknowledged) an integral part of the ‘prison system’, did not exactly enjoy civil equality or modern liberty. And that is not all: such was the condition of the poor that, even in their capacity as witnesses, they were locked up in prison until the legal proceedings were over. And thus, ‘in the same country that the plaintiff is put in prison, the thief remains at liberty if he can pay a bail bond’. Of ‘three thousand examples’ which might be given, there was that of two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg96&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;young Irishmen ‘detained for a whole year while waiting for the judges to deign to hear their deposition’. We can now come to de Tocqueville’s unanticipated conclusion: we are dealing with laws consolidated by ‘customs’ and which yet can seem ‘monstrous’; they ‘have provided everything for the convenience of the wealthy and virtually nothing for the protection of the poor’, of whose liberty ‘they dispose cheaply’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us now pass over both populations of colonial origin and the poorest strata of the white community, who were denied not only political rights, but also ‘modern liberty’. Let us focus exclusively on the dominant class—i.e. on white, male property-owners. Did full civil and political equality obtain in this milieu? There are reasons to doubt it. One thinks of the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision on the basis of which, in calculating the number of seats due to the southern states, partial account was also taken of the number of slaves. Far from being a negligible detail, this clause played a significant role in the history of the United States: ‘four southern voters’ ended up exercising ‘more political power than ten northern voters’. Thus is explained the ‘Virginia dynasty’ that long succeeded in holding the country’s presidency.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was why Jefferson was branded the ‘black president’ by his opponents:[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he arrived in power thanks to the inclusion in the electoral result of blacks who remained his slaves. On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln proclaimed polemically: ‘It is a truth that cannot be denied, that in all the free States no white man is the equal of the white man of the slave States.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a thesis repeated in 1864 by a French liberal (Édouard Laboulaye). With the ‘three-fifths’ clause, it was as if the US Constitution was addressed to ‘the folks of the South’:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because you have slaves, you will be allowed to elect a representative with ten thousand votes, while the Yankees [of the North], who live off their own labour, will require thirty thousand votes. The conclusion for the folks of the South is that they constitute a particular, superior race, that they are great lords. The aristocratic spirit has been developed and strengthened by the Constitution.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg97&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Accused of breaching the principle of political equality within the dominant elite itself, the southern planters replied by declaring that, in actual fact, the principle of civil equality was infringed to their detriment. They regarded themselves as suffering negative discrimination, in as much as they were deprived of the freedom to transfer their human cattle to any part of the Union. They considered it inadmissible that owners of the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; should be treated worse than the owners of any other movable goods. As Jefferson Davis, president of the secessionist Confederacy, declared at the moment of abandoning the Union, the North was wrong to hamper in any way ‘property in slaves’, to act ‘to the prejudice, detriment or discouragement of the owners of that species of property’, which was ‘recognized in the Constitution’ and which, on that basis, should enjoy complete equality of treatment with other types of property.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This exchange of accusations played a far from subsidiary role in the conflict that issued in the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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===== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Absolute power and the community obligations of the slave-owners&#039;&#039;&#039; =====&lt;br /&gt;
From Constant onwards, modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property. But slave-owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations. There can be no doubt that the Glorious Revolution and then the American Revolution consecrated the self-government of a civil society composed of, and hegemonized by, slave-owners, who were more determined than ever not to tolerate interference by central political power and the Church. But it would be mistaken to equate the self-government of civil society, now freed from these fetters, with the free movement of the individual members composing it. Certainly, they could reduce the slaves they legitimately owned to chattels. In the New England of 1732, a master put up for sale a nineteen-year-old female slave along with her son of six months: they could be acquired (the advert announced) ‘together or separately’. There were no obstacles to bringing to market even adulterous offspring; a New Jersey master did this with the offspring of his relations with three black women whom he owned. Not by chance, slaves were frequently given names usually reserved for dogs and horses.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg98&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There can be no doubt that the slave-master wielded absolute power over his legitimate ‘property’, but not to the extent of being able freely to challenge the process of reification and commodification that had occurred. In this case, the community requirement prevailed of keeping the barrier between the race of masters and the race of servants clear and fixed. Let us attend to de Tocqueville: blacks had been ‘forbidden … under severe penalties, to be taught to read or write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The prohibition aimed to exclude the race of servants from any form of education, which was regarded as a serious source of danger not only because it was liable to fuel unacceptable hopes and claims, but also because it risked facilitating the communication of ideas and sentiments between blacks that was to be frustrated by any means. And yet, in the case of violation of such rules, to be struck in the first instance were white property-owners, who thus saw their negative liberty seriously restricted. The bans affecting slaves did not leave their masters unaffected. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, it became a crime in Georgia even to provide a slave with paper and writing materials.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Particularly significant was the legislation that banned interracial sexual relations and marriages. Later, in 1896, when upholding the constitutional legitimacy of provisions for racial segregation as a whole, the US Supreme Court conceded that the ban on ‘the intermarriage of the two races’ might, ‘in a technical sense’, breach freedom of contract, but extricated itself from an awkward situation by adding that the right of any individual state to legislate in this area was ‘universally recognized’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, opposition was not lacking. The provision made in Virginia at the start of the eighteenth century, according to which not only those directly responsible for the sexual or marital relation were to be punished, was significant: ‘extremely severe penalties’ were prescribed for the priest guilty of having consecrated the interracial family bond.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And hence, along with ‘freedom of contract’, religious freedom itself was in some sense affected.&lt;br /&gt;
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The absolute power exercised over black slaves ended up having negative and even dramatic consequences for whites. Take Pennsylvania in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The free black caught violating the ban on miscegenation (as it later came to be called)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] risked being sold as a slave. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg99&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved serious consequences for the white woman, who had to suffer forced separation from her partner and the terrible punishment inflicted on him. Let us now see what happened in colonial Virginia immediately after the Glorious Revolution. On the basis of a law of 1691, a free white woman who had had a child by a black man or mulatto could be sentenced to five years of servitude and, above all, be forced to surrender the child to the parish, which then sold him or her as a servant for a term of thirty years.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But there is more. Well-nigh insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of recognition of the offspring of a relationship between an owner and one of his slaves. The father faced a tragic alternative: either to suffer exile from Virginia with his de facto family; or to agree to the child being a slave together with the mother.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More summary was New York’s legislation, which automatically converted all children born of a slave mother into slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus find ourselves in the presence of a society that in fact exercised such severe duress over its privileged members, partly legal and partly social, as to choke even the most natural feelings. As has justly been noted, in enslaving ‘their children and their children’s children’, white people were in fact ‘enslaving themselves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Further to clarify the entanglement between the individual property-owner’s absolute power over his human livestock and his subservience to the ‘master race’ of which he was a member, we can offer a final consideration. We have already noted the law in force in Virginia whereby it was meaningless to define and treat the killing of a slave by his owner as a ‘felony’. Yet in not a few states, on the basis of legislation that survived even after the Second World War (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|§5]]), a white man who had sexual relations with a black woman was guilty of a ‘felony’. Thus, it was permissible for an owner to flog and beat his female slave to the point of killing her—property right was sacred; but so strong was the control exercised by the class of property-owners and the community of the free over their individual members that only by exposing himself to risks of various kinds could he have sexual relations with her. Other than by legal provisions, the ban on miscegenation was enforced by the intervention in the 1850s here and there of vigilante gangs, engaged in spying on, intimidating and attacking whites tempted by the fascination of their female slaves and women of colour in general.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg100&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While, in one respect, they were a form of property and a chattel completely at the disposal of their legitimate master, in another slaves represented the enemy within, against whom it was necessary to be constantly on guard. Certainly, to avert the threat recourse could be had to terror, ruthlessly and even sadistically striking at guilty individuals and transforming execution into a kind of terrifying educative spectacle for all the rest: the slaves in a particular area were obliged to witness the torment of two of their fellows, guilty of murder and condemned to be burnt alive.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But that was not sufficient. Once again, preservation of the institution of slavery required heavy sacrifices even on the part of the dominant class. In 1741, in New York, mysterious fires fanned fears of a slave revolt: condemned to death and burnt alive were two blacks whose lives the master had in vain sought to save, testifying that at the time of the fire they were at home. Some years later, in the environs of the same city, a black, having confessed to setting fire to a barn, suffered the same torment. There was only one difference: the crowd of white spectators contrived to ensure that the flames were not extinguished too quickly, so that the spectacle and sufferings of the rebel black lasted as long as possible; his cries were heard three miles away. In any case, the master heard them very clearly: he sobbed loudly, because his slave was dear to him. But he was powerless, and the most he could do was to see to it that the torture was not prolonged any further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Faced with the security requirements of the community they belonged to, individual slave-owners could not demand free disposal over their property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Given the circumstances, these security requirements were a permanent given. We can make a general observation:&lt;br /&gt;
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While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light; they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners (sometimes the law required publication of the code in the newspaper and that clergymen read it to their congregations). It was the white man who was &#039;&#039;required&#039;&#039; to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg101&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Specific penalties were provided for slave-owners who failed to inflict the punishments prescribed by law. According to a law in force in South Carolina, on her fourth attempt at flight a female slave was to be ‘severely whipped … branded on the left cheek with the letter R, and [have] her left ear cut off’. Until 1722, it was the slave-owners themselves who, directly or indirectly, had to provide for the execution of these operations.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In crisis situations the duty of vigilance made itself strongly felt. We have seen a ‘military service’ of whites patrolling day and night in Richmond in 1831. In such cases, observed Gustave de Beaumont during his journey in de Tocqueville’s company, ‘society arms itself with all its rigours’ and mobilizes ‘all social forces’, seeking in every possible way to encourage ‘informing’ and control; in South Carolina, along with the fugitive slave the death penalty awaited ‘any person who has helped him in his escape’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significant too were the results of the passage of laws on fugitive slaves in 1850. Subject to punishment was not only the citizen who sought to hide or help the black pursued or sought by his legitimate owners, but also those who did not collaborate in his capture. This was a legal provision which (as its critics put it) sought to compel ‘every freeborn American to become a manhunter’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as slave-owners, slave society ended up affecting the white community as a whole. Precisely because, in addition to being chattels, black slaves were also the enemy within, abolitionists were immediately suspected of treason, thus becoming the target of a series of more or less harsh repressive measures depending on the gravity of the impending danger. Severe restrictions were placed on the press: in 1800 the slave revolt in Virginia was often ignored by southern newspapers; there was the danger of spreading the contagion of subversion further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1836 the president of the United States (Andrew Jackson) permitted the postmaster general to block the circulation of all publications critical of the institution of slavery. Rounding off the gag placed on abolitionists, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution banning the examination of anti-slavery petitions.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Repression could take much more drastic forms. In 1805, denouncing writings liable to have an incendiary impact on slaves, South Carolina passed laws that provided for executing as traitors those who were in some way stained with the guilt of having stirred up a slave revolt or supported it. Georgia &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg102&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;proceeded similarly.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bound up with terror from above was terror from below. While it took less ruthless forms in the North (it aimed at preventing meetings and destroying the means of propaganda or the property of ‘agitators’), in the South violence against abolitionists took the form of a pogrom that did not hesitate to torture and physically eliminate traitors and their supporters, with complete impunity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The situation in the South in the years preceding the Civil War was described as follows by Joel R. Poinsett, an important political figure in the Union, in a letter written by him at the end of 1850:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We are both [i.e., Poinsett and his correspondent] heartily sick of this atmosphere redolent of insane violence … There is a strong party averse to violent men and violent measures, but they are frightened into submission—afraid even to exchange opinions with others who think like them, lest they should be betrayed.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the contemporary historian who cites this testimony concludes that, through recourse to lynching, violence and threats of every kind, the South succeeded in silencing not only any opposition, but also any mild dissent. In addition to abolitionists, those who wanted to distance themselves from this pitiless witch-hunt felt threatened, and were threatened. They were impelled by terror into ‘holding one’s tongue, killing one’s doubts, burying one’s reservations’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is no doubt about it: the terroristic power wielded by slave-owners over their blacks also ended up affecting, on a lasting basis, members and fractions of the dominant race and class.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Three legislations, three castes, one ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So how are we to define the political regime of the society we are examining? Are we dealing with a liberal society? The problem posed in connection with a figure like Calhoun is now presented in more general terms. At least until the Civil War, there were three different sets of legislation in the United States. In relation to slaves, things are immediately clear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass calculated that there were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg103&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;seventy-two crimes in Virginia which, when committed by a slave, carried the death penalty, whereas only two of them involved the same penalty for a whiteman.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But special laws also affected men of colour who were notionally free—and not only because, in different ways depending on diverse local realities and in different historical periods, they were excluded from certain professions, from the right to own land, from the possibility of testifying in courts against whites or forming part of the judicial panel. There was a still more revealing circumstance: even ignoring slaves, the same crime continued to have very different consequences depending on the skin colour of the person responsible for it. Obviously, only free people of colour ran the risk of being reduced to slavery. This was the fate that befell those in Pennsylvania, who, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, were caught breaking the ban on miscegenation, or if they were not able to pay the fine issued to them for having traded with other blacks without permission.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the situation in the North changed with the abolition of slavery that followed the Revolution. But the complete control whites had over the magistracy remained in place. This was something highlighted by de Tocqueville, and its consequences were spelt out in the North as follows by a particularly courageous judge from Ohio: ‘The white man may now plunder the Negro, he may abuse his person; he may take his life: He may do this in open daylight … and he must be acquitted, unless [there be] some white man present [prepared to give evidence against the culprit]’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clear and insuperable was the barrier separating whites, the dominant race, from people of colour as such. In the words of Beaumont, ‘[w]hether slaves or freemen, negroes everywhere form a different people from the whites.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an observation confirmed by de Tocqueville: ‘In Philadelphia blacks are not buried in the same cemetery as whites’. Segregation also obtained in prisons: ‘blacks were also separated from whites for meals’. And again: ‘in Maryland [a slaveholding state] free blacks pay taxes for schools just like whites, but cannot send their children to them’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And (we might add) in mid-nineteenth-century Virginia, the law denied notionally free blacks ‘the right to learn how to read and write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg104&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are in the presence of a racial state, articulated (according to the explicit declaration of its theorists and apologists in the South), into ‘three &#039;&#039;castes—&#039;&#039; … free whites, free colored, and slave colored population’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the caste model was also evoked by some observers of the North. Referring to their own society, where slavery had been abolished, they spoke of a division into ‘Brahmins and pariahs’, as demonstrated by the racial segregation that operated at every level, from public transport to theatres and from churches to cemeteries, and which allowed blacks to enter hotels, restaurants and meeting-places for the most part solely in the capacity of servants. Yes, acknowledged another observer, who proposed to banish blacks from Indiana in order to spare them a yet worse fate, they were treated like ‘a race legally and socially excommunicated, as the Helots of Sparta—as the Pariahs of India—disfranchised outcasts; a separate and degraded caste’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When we identify three castes in the post-bellum United States, we are obviously ignoring the Indians, who were regarded until the Dawes Act of 1887 as ‘domestic dependent nations’—that is, as a set of nations with their own particular identity, under the protectorate of Washington, and whose members did not form part of American society in the strict sense.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It should be added that the discourse of the three castes is not without a dubious ideological component: it tends to neglect the differences that remained within the white community, which could impact heavily not only on the material living conditions, but also on the civil rights, of the poorest strata. The Articles of the Confederacy, designed to regulate the new state that was being formed, explicitly excluded ‘paupers’ and ‘vagrants’ from the group of ‘free inhabitants’ (Article IV). But it is true that, when we examine the society as a whole, the main demarcations were colour lines and, within the black community, the line separating slaves proper from the rest—from ‘free’ blacks, who in fact lived the nightmare of being deported or enslaved in their turn. On the other side, the absolute centrality of the colour line galvanized (as the southern ideologue of the three castes pointed out) the ‘spirit of equality’ within the white community, with a fairly rapid disappearance of the most odious forms of discrimination.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg105&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In this sense we can speak of ‘castes’, as do distinguished historians of the institution of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But registration of the naturalistic and racial rigidity of the relations between social classes tells us little about the nature of the political regime in the society under examination. On the basis of the history of South Africa, reference has sometimes been made to ‘segregationist liberalism’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in order to explain the tangle of freedom (for whites) and oppression (of colonial populations). It is a category that completely excludes from the focus of attention the practices of expropriation, deportation and annihilation implemented against the native populations of southern Africa or the Amerindians. Even as regards blacks and other ethnic groups, such a category seems to refer only to the period subsequent to the abolition of slavery. Like the adjective, the substantive is misleading. On the one hand, the white community soon shook off censitary discrimination, long recommended and in fact regarded as insuperable by exponents of classical liberalism. On the other, the property-owner-citizens were subject to a series of obligations that it would be very difficult to integrate into the modern liberty theorized by Constant.&lt;br /&gt;
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On other occasions, rather than to ‘segregationist liberalism’, reference has been made to ‘aristocratic republicanism’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] explicitly in connection with the pre–Civil War United States. Such a definition completely obscures the character both of the dominant aristocracy and of the plebs oppressed by it, and the entanglement between social classes and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the substantive makes it possible to take a step forward: we are not dealing with property-owners interested solely in the enjoyment of their private sphere; they also led a rich political life. While far from being generally enjoyed, ‘modern liberty’ was scarcely the sole objective of the protagonists of the Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States. For Hamilton, the ‘distinction between freedom and slavery’ was clear: in the first case, ‘a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent’; in the second, ‘he is governed by the will of another’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, in Franklin’s words, submitting to taxation from a legislative body where one is not represented signifies being considered and treated as ‘a conquer’d People’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be excluded from political decisions, to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg106&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be subject to laws imposed from without, however reasonable and liberal, was synonymous with political slavery or, at any rate, represented the onset of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, Calhoun, the author with whom we began when we posed the crucial question—what is liberalism?—professed democracy even more than liberalism; he was an eminent member of the Democratic Party of the United States. The category of liberalism should unify the two Anglo-Saxon countries. But Calhoun defined the Constitution of his country as ‘democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy’, and hence in contradistinction to Great Britain, where ‘title[s] of nobility’ and other ‘artificial distinctions’ that had been abolished in the North American republic survived.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, it was not an unqualified democracy, as might appear from the title of de Tocqueville’s book, which (as we shall see), in expressing itself thus, thought it possible to ignore the condition of Indians and blacks. Still less was it the ‘frontier democracy’ to which an eminent US historian, inclined to hagiography, pays homage.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Apart from anything else, the definition suggested by him evokes, in reticent, uncritical fashion, only the gradual expansion of the white colonists to the West, and hence only the relationship between two of the ‘three races’ referred to (as we shall see) by &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Calhoun was concerned to distinguish the democracy whose theorist he aspired to be from ‘absolute democracy’, guilty of wanting to ride roughshod over the rights of states and slave-owners.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are at the antipodes of the ‘abolitionist democracy’ dear to an eminent US historian and passionate Afro-American activist.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But then how are we to define a democracy which, far from wanting to abolish or even simply repress or hide slavery, celebrated it as a ‘positive good’? Reference has sometimes been made to ‘Hellenic democracy, based on the work of non-European slaves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this definition too is inadequate. It overlooks, or does not accurately describe, the fate reserved for Indians. And it does not take account of another crucial element: absent from ancient Greece was the racial chattel slavery which, in the American case, was conjoined not with direct democracy but representative democracy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg107&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to the modernity of the mode of production was the modernity of the political regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference in particular to the English colonies, another distinguished black theorist and activist speaks interchangeably of ‘white plantocracy’ or ‘planter democracy’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, calling attention to but one narrow social caste, this definition commits the error of concentrating exclusively on the South, which was not in fact separated by any barrier from the North. This applies at an economic level: after land, slaves were the country’s largest property; in 1860 their value was three times greater than the share capital in manufacturing and the railway industry. The cotton grown in the South was far and away the most sizeable US export, and made a decisive contribution to financing the country’s imports and industrial development.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At a political—constitutional level, the obligation to take part in hunting down escaped slaves and returning them obviously also extended to the citizens of the North. Finally, on an ideological level, we must not forget the racial apartheid in force in the free states. If the process of expropriating and deporting Indians is added to this, it is clear that, albeit with obvious differences between its two parts, the racial discrimination practised in the United States played a decisive role at a national level. Finally, although more adequate than those cited above, even the category of ‘white democracy’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] has a limitation—that of not stressing the proud seigneurial self-consciousness of the community of the free and the explosive violence such a community could unleash against the excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following, then, the suggestion of distinguished US historians and sociologists, we should speak of a ‘&#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’—that is, a democracy which applied exclusively to the ‘master race’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The clear line of demarcation between whites, on the one hand, and blacks and Indians, on the other, was conducive to the development of relations of equality within the white community. The members of an aristocracy of class or race tended to celebrate themselves as ‘peers’; the manifest inequality imposed on the excluded was the other aspect of the relationship of parity established between those who enjoyed the power to exclude ‘inferiors’. It must be added that the equality in question was primarily a clear line of demarcation from the excluded. This is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg108&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;what was expressed by the slogan that presided over the American Revolution: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’! For the rest, conflicts and mutual charges of abuses of power and violations of the principle of equality were (as we know) not lacking within the community of freemen and masters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After all, it was Josiah Tucker who had already come close to understanding the true nature of the republicanism for which he reprehended Locke and the rebellious American colonists: ‘all Republicans ancient and modern … suggest no other Schemes but those of pulling down and leveling all Distinctions above them, and of tyrannizing over those miserable Beings, who are unfortunately placed below them.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again: ‘he that is a Tyrant over his Inferiors is, of Course, a Patriot, and a Leveller in respect to his Superiors.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Freemen, servants and slaves&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
However, if they can serve to analyse the society that emerged from the American Revolution, what help is the discourse of the three castes and the category of ‘master-race democracy’ when it comes to understanding the politico-social relations that obtained in England? At least until the abolition of slavery in the colonies, the situations on both sides of the Atlantic had not a few points in common—and not only because slaves and the slave market were far from absent from the metropolis itself. More important is the consideration that the British Empire should be analysed as a whole, without repressing the reality of the colonies. Its economic development and political and military rise owed much to the &#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;—that is, to a monopoly on the slave trade. At the same time, those who derived their wealth from trade and property in human cattle were well represented in the British parliament. Hence we see the caste of white freemen and that of slaves operative here as well. Certainly, viewed from the London observatory, the third caste—notionally free blacks—was completely irrelevant. An initial difference between the two shores of the Atlantic thus emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is another, more significant one, which concerns the bulk of the metropolitan population. Within the American white community itself, there were small sections to which legal equality and even negative liberty were denied. This emerges from the description of de Tocqueville, who comments that it was the legacy of the ‘civil laws’ of England, clearly weighted in favour of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg109&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rich.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States the group of whites denied these privileges was a rather small sector, which fairly rapidly disappeared. The very presence of blacks, whether slaves or semi-slaves, encouraged the spread of a sense of relative equality between members of the higher ‘caste’. The situation of the white community in England was very different. Here exclusion from the enjoyment of legal equality and negative liberty was much more widespread. Let us ignore Ireland, which even after the formation of the United Kingdom in fact continued to be a colony. Let us focus on England proper, starting with Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He made a sharp distinction between three groups: men ‘by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’, or subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who were the black slaves from Africa; then freemen; and finally, white servants who were blood relations of the freemen. A key paragraph of the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; clarifies this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power, for the master could not have power to kill him at any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Here Locke primarily had in mind the two figures of the black slave and the indentured white servant. As we know, even the second was subject to buying and selling, was in large measure a commodity, exported to America and regularly traded on the market where possible purchasers arrived alerted by adverts in the local press. It goes without saying that the master possessed an extensive right of punishment, even if not as unlimited as that wielded over the black slave. We can understand then the comparison with the servant in the Old Testament, who, although not subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’, experiences a condition that might by contrast be defined as ‘imperfect slavery’. This imperfect slavery was defined by Locke by the term of servitude or drudgery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg110&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Within the British Empire three different legal situations coexisted—the first marked by liberty, the second by servitude, and the third by slavery in the strict sense. Notwithstanding the racial abyss that was now open, and which separated black slave from white servant, in England the latter did not form part of the community of the free in the strict sense. Even if different from that wielded by ‘a lord over his slave’, the power of ‘a master over his servant’, who was subject to the ‘ordinary discipline’ applied by the master within his family, was indisputable.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, although he was concerned to distinguish between slave and servant, Locke sometimes also used the second term to refer to the figure of the slave proper. In the &#039;&#039;First Treatise of Government&#039;&#039;, we can read: ‘those who were rich in the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as purchasing of new, came to have large and numerous families’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As demonstrated by the reference to the property-owners of the West Indies and the property right they exercised over the offspring of ‘servants’, it is clear that the discourse here concerns hereditary slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tripartite division formulated by Locke also appears in Mandeville. In the first place, we have ‘the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa’ to America.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England, on the other hand, ‘Slaves are not allow’d’, but free men can avail themselves of ‘the Children of the Poor’, of ‘willing Hands for all the Drudgery and hard and dirty Labour’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again we encounter the three figures of the freeman, the servant and the slave. It is so difficult to confuse the second with the first that the similarities with the third leap to the eye: ‘the meanest Indigent part of the Nation’ is ‘the working slaving People’, which is eternally destined to perform ‘dirty slavish Work’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, let us turn to Blackstone. In celebrating England as the land of liberty, he stressed that there was no place in it for ‘proper slavery’, ‘strict slavery’, ‘absolute slavery’, wherein the master was endowed with absolute, unlimited power over the life and fate of the slave. This insistent clarification left room for forms of compulsory labour different from that to which blacks in the colonies were subjected. In the great jurist’s writings too an intermediate condition between liberty and slavery ends up emerging, a sort of non-‘absolute’ slavery, slavery not understood in the ‘strict’ sense. Along with slaves, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg111&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’ and ‘labourers’ were servants. We are dealing with ‘different types of servant’, each with its specific characteristics, but all brought together by the fact of being subject to servitude.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Active once again is the legacy of Grotius, for whom &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; was the general category for understanding and defining the character of work. In Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone what is new is the stress on the distinction between two types of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;—that in force in the metropolis and that operative in the colonies. Thus, we pass from Grotius’ bipartite division to a tripartite division.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. England and the three ‘castes’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But now, setting aside major authors, let us take a look at the social reality and ideology that characterized Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Far from the ‘vestiges of slavery’ referred to by Smith, the persistence of servile relations is very clear from the treatment of the poor and the possibility of disposing of their children as a &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039; in workhouses, in the army, in prisons, and in the recruitment of servants sent to settle the colonies. An economist we have already encountered, Wakefield, drew attention to ‘English slavery’ and ‘white slaves’ in 1834.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this time authors of the most varied political persuasion compared slaves across the Atlantic with suffering workers in England: anti-abolitionists who echoed Calhoun-type statements; more or less radical currents that aimed at a more general emancipation of labour; more detached observers who confined themselves to registering the fact, like the economist we have just cited. And the comparison was established not simply by focusing on the spectre of death from starvation that constantly haunted the English worker. Certainly, this is an aspect that cannot be ignored: the number of poor people who, in order to avoid starvation, committed some crime in the hope of being able to survive as deportees or ‘galley slaves’, was not negligible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But considerable attention was also paid to encroachments on a more specifically liberal freedom—namely, ‘modern liberty’. For this to emerge with greater clarity, let us leave behind the cities and industrial centres and move to the countryside to hear the rural labourers’ grievances:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg112&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Speaking generally, since all laws have their exceptions, the privileged classes of our rural districts take infinite pains to be abhorred by their poorest neighbours. They enclose commons. They stop footpaths. They wall in their parks. They set spring-guns and man-traps … They build jails, and fill them. They make new crimes and new punishments for the poor. They interfere with the marriages of the poor, compelling some, and forbidding others to come together. They shut up paupers in workhouses, separating husband and wife, in pounds by day and wards by night. They harness poor men to carts. They superintend alehouses, decry skittles, deprecate beer-shops, meddle with fairs, and otherwise curtail the already narrow amusements of the poor.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Around twenty years later, the popular and radical &#039;&#039;Reynold’s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, condemning the ‘slavery’ that existed in England, listed the flogging of soldiers and sailors, the separation of husbands and wives in workhouses, the obligation of rural servants to request permission from their masters before they could marry, and the systematic sexual abuse to which ‘the wives and daughters of the poorer orders’ were subject.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield reported the &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; deriving from the countryside and considered them incontrovertible. Writing on the immediate eve of the abolition of slavery in British colonies, he believed it possible to distinguish three figures—‘freeman’, ‘slave’ and ‘pauper’—within the empire as a whole.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are put in mind of the discourse of the three castes we have encountered in a theorist from the American South. In fact, in 1864 the &#039;&#039;Saturday Review&#039;&#039; (a periodical that circulated among the middle and upper classes) observed that the poor in England formed ‘a caste apart, a race’, placed in a social condition that underwent no alteration ‘from the cradle to the grave’, and which was divided from the rest of society by a barrier similar to that existing in America between whites and blacks. The respectable English periodical proceeded as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him. The relation in both instances is that of perpetual superior to perpetual inferior, of chief to dependant, and no amount of kindness or goodness is suffered to alter this relation.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg113&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are—it is important not to forget it—in 1864. Many decades had passed since the Glorious Revolution and the birth of liberal England. And yet, if the situation was unstable and tending to change as a result of popular struggles, the reality of a caste society continued to make itself felt. Already abolished thirty years earlier in the English colonies, the caste of slaves was on the point of disappearing in the United States as well. Having been three, the castes were becoming two in number on both sides of the Atlantic: corresponding to the black semi-slaves of the United States were the white servants of England. A more or less rigid barrier continued to separate both from the caste of genuine freemen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sort of social apartheid seems to correspond to the racial apartheid. In eighteenth-century England we find Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, having his coach preceded by outriders who were charged with clearing the road in order to spare the nobleman the annoyance of meeting with plebeian persons and glances.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even a century later, a kind of segregation existed between the different social classes in English churches.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the already noted &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; drawn up by rural labourers bemoaned the fact that even then the aristocracy resorted to a curtain to shield itself from any ‘vulgar gaze’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When Senior visited Naples, what made him angry was the mixing of ranks: ‘In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets’. Worse, they were so little removed from the upper classes that they lived in the cellars of seigneurial palaces. The result? ‘[Y]ou never are free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degeneration.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The reproduction of the servile caste and the beginnings of eugenics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How to ‘continue the race of journeymen and servants’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Smith’s phrase reveals that social mobility was limited or non-existent. The heaviest, worst-paid work was entrusted to a stratum that tended to be reproduced from one generation to the next, and hence to a kind of hereditary servile caste.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg114&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The reproduction of this caste or race was absolutely necessary. According to Mandeville, a decidedly beneficial role was played by war. If, with its periodic massacres, it did not provide a remedy for excess male births, women, sought after by too many aspiring, competitive males, would become a kind of rare commodity accessible only to the rich. Society would then lose its re-supply of ‘the Children of the Poor; the greatest and most extensive of all temporal Blessings’. The hereditary reproduction of the poor destined to perform ‘the Drudgery of hard and dirty Labour’ would prove difficult or impossible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The natural order, of which war was a part, spontaneously generated the race of semi-slaves that society could never do without. However, this supposedly spontaneous process must be encouraged by timely political interventions from above. According to Mandeville, access to education on the part of the ‘Labouring Poor’ was to be avoided at all costs: the ‘Proportion of the Society’ would be compromised by it.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The requisite cheap, docile and obedient labour force would risk disappearing. Other representatives of the liberal tradition invoked much more extensive intervention. For the purposes of generating a potentially perfect race of docile workers and instruments of labour, the concentration-camp universe of the ‘workhouses’ could prove useful. Locking up the children of delinquents and ‘suspects’ therein, one could (observed Bentham) produce an ‘indigenous class’ that would be distinguished for its industriousness and sense of discipline. If early marriage was promoted within this class, treating the offspring as apprentices until they attained their majority, the workhouses and society would dispose of an inexhaustible reserve of manpower of the highest quality. In other words, through the ‘gentlest of all revolutions’—a sexual revolution[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the ‘indigenous class’, propagating itself in hereditary fashion from one generation to the next, would be transformed into a kind of indigenous race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sieyès envisaged a similarly ‘gentle’ revolution, and likewise for the purposes of producing a class or race of labourers as docile as possible. Like Bentham, the French liberal indulged in a eugenicist utopia (or dystopia). He imagined a ‘cross’ (&#039;&#039;croisement&#039;&#039;) between monkeys and ‘blacks’ for creating domesticated beings adapted to servile work: ‘the new race of anthropomorphic monkeys’. In this way, whites, who remained at the top of the social hierarchy as directors of production, could dispose of blacks as auxiliary instruments of production, or slaves proper, who would precisely be the anthropomorphic monkeys:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg115&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However extraordinary, however immoral this idea might seem at first sight, I have reflected on it at length, and can find no other way in a great nation, especially in countries that are very hot or very cold, to reconcile the directors of works with the simple instruments of labour.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While, on the one hand, it was necessary to encourage the production and reproduction of a race of servants or actual slaves, on the other, it was necessary to limit, so far as possible, the unproductive, parasitic surplus population, the mass of poor who, far from creating wealth, devoured it like locusts. To maintain the demographic balance, Malthus called for a policy that postponed marriage and procreation among the popular classes; otherwise, nature would dispose of them with wars, famines and epidemics. In this respect the role of medicine was problematic. In 1764 Franklin wrote to a doctor: ‘Half the Lives you save are not worth saving, as being useless; and almost the other Half ought not to be sav’d, as being mischievous. Does your Conscience never hint to you the Impiety of being in constant Warfare against the Plans of Providence?’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville hoped that one could finally be shot of the ‘prison rabble’ like rats, maybe thanks to a massive fire.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Did the French liberal ‘dream of genocide’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The claim is exaggerated. But there remains his harsh polemic against a ‘bastard charity’ that threatened order: ‘It is the philanthropy of Paris that is killing us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A general conclusion is indicated. The eugenic temptation runs deep in the liberal tradition. Not by chance, the discipline that took this name had its baptism in Great Britain and experienced extraordinary success in the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The elusive liberalism of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, we are compelled to pose a crucial question in connection with Great Britain: Was it a liberal society? Even after the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg116&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;abolition of slavery in the colonies proper, we certainly cannot speak of generalized enjoyment of the quintessential liberal freedom—modern liberty—by the United Kingdom’s inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Irish certainly did not enjoy it, being as they were (acknowledged de Tocqueville) constantly subjected to ‘emergency measures’ and at the mercy of ‘military tribunals’ and a numerous, hateful gendarmerie. In Castlebar, on the basis of the Insurrection Act, ‘any man caught without a passport outdoors after sunset is deported’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the press of the time, the condition of the Irish was often compared with that of blacks across the Atlantic. According to the judgement in 1824 of a rich English merchant, who was a disciple of Smith and an ardent Quaker and abolitionist (James Cropper), the Irish found themselves in a worse situation than black slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, the Irish represented for Britain what the blacks were for the United States; they were ‘two phenomena of the same kind’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Beaumont’s opinion found indirect confirmation from de Tocqueville. From &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; we know of the complete deafness of the judiciary, monopolized by whites, to the legitimate complaints of blacks. A conclusion suggests itself, also indicated by evidence gathered in Maryland: ‘The white population and the black population are in a state of war. They never mix. One of them must give way to the other.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French liberal heard a similar observation in the island subjugated and colonized by Britain: ‘To tell the truth, there is no justice in Ireland. Virtually all the country’s magistrates are in open warfare with the population. So the population does not even have the idea of public justice.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases a cornerstone of the &#039;&#039;Rechtsstaat&#039;&#039;—the judiciary—was at war with a substantial part of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On both sides of the Atlantic, laws that prevented or hampered access to education and outlawed marriage with members of the higher caste served to prolong the oppression of the blacks and the Irish. In Ireland, too, miscegenation was a crime punished with great severity; on the basis of a law of 1725, a priest guilty of secretly celebrating a mixed marriage could even be condemned to death.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Ireland as well, attempts were made to obstruct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg117&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the native population’s access to education. We can conclude on this point by attending to the words of a nineteenth-century liberal Anglo-Irish historian: British legislation aimed to deprive the Irish of their ‘property’ and ‘industry’; it ‘was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1798, three years prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish numbered ‘about four and a half million—a third of the population of the British Isles’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, a higher percentage of people were to be deprived of their negative liberty than in the United States, where, at the time of independence, blacks made up one-fifth of the population. It must be added that, before and after the Glorious Revolution, Britain’s rulers treated the Irish, on the one hand, like Indians, to be deprived of their land and thinned out through more or less drastic measures; and on the other, like blacks whose forced labour might conveniently be used. Hence the oscillation between practices of enslavement and genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain itself the popular classes saw their negative liberty seriously infringed, to the extent that they were assimilated in the culture and press of the time to an inferior ‘caste’ or ‘race’. But now it is appropriate to concentrate on relations within the upper ‘caste’. As we know, the American colonists’ rebellion developed out of protests against the negative discrimination they suffered by dint of their exclusion from the legislative body. At the same time, we must not forget that in eighteenth-century Britain the right to representation was a privilege granted by the Crown, so that even large industrial towns were excluded from the House of Commons, where, by contrast, boroughs which had virtually been abandoned, but which had the right to be ‘represented’ in London mainly by local nobles, were present. Bearing in mind that the House of Lords was the hereditary preserve of the landed aristocracy, a conclusion is dictated: in the case of Britain itself, not even relations within the property-owning classes were stamped by equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality was further compromised by another circumstance: only the second electoral Reform Act, put through by Disraeli in 1867, ‘effected the full political emancipation of Non-conformists’. Until then, significant forms of religious discrimination were in force:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg118&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Persons, whether Protestant or Catholic, who would not take the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England, were still debarred from holding office either under the Crown or in the municipalities; the doors of Parliament were still closed to Roman Catholics, and the doors of the Universities to dissenters of every kind. [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, on closer inspection, the non-conformists (among whom must obviously be included the Jews)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] were deprived not only of political equality, but also of full legal equality. Only in 1871 did all universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, ‘throw open College Fellowships and University posts to persons of every, or of no, religious denomination’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The argument with which Macaulay criticized the exclusion of Jews from political rights in 1831 is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money; and money may make members of Parliament … That a Jew should be privy-councilor to a Christian king would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money-market, and the money-market may govern the world.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In a paradoxical argument against the forms of discrimination of which Jews were victims, Macaulay seems to echo anti-Jewish stereotypes, but in reality the meaning of his discourse is clear: it was absurd and inadmissible to seek to deny political and even civil equality to those who, economically at any rate, were already members of the dominant elite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, like the class that was the protagonist of the American Revolution and the establishment of a racial state, the English aristocracy in no way restricted itself to aspiring to a merely negative liberty. Some decades before Hamilton (and the American revolutionaries), in England Sidney had already declared that ‘nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another’, or upon a law to which he had not given his consent.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg119&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Locke did not formulate things very differently, when with political ‘slavery’ he contrasted ‘liberty’ understood as ‘be[ing] under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again it was Locke who stressed the equivalence between the English and Latin terms;[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the latter clearly implied the participation of the &#039;&#039;cives&#039;&#039; in public life. The English philosopher argued along similar lines to the American revolutionaries, who not by chance appealed to him: he who wants to decide on his own, excluding me from the process of forming laws, may legitimately be suspected of ‘hav[ing] a design to take away everything else’, not just political ‘liberty’; he ultimately aims to ‘make me a slave’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the position adopted by this or that theorist, the English aristocracy aimed to play, and really did play, a political role of the first order. In addition to the upper house, ‘the lower house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club’ until almost the end of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy exercised political power directly: ‘it was the landed elite, not a separate service elite, that was in control of public affairs’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a control that encompassed the judiciary and local government and which, above all in the countryside, was seamless. Virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the grandees and gentry were still the unchallenged authorities, responsible to no one but themselves.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the South of the United States, the uncontested power of a social class in England did not preclude the imposition of restrictions on its individual members. The titled property-owner was required to respect a series of obligations, sanctioned partly by law and partly by custom. One thinks of primogeniture and the inalienability of property, as well as the endogamy that was fairly widespread within the aristocracy—a practice that once again calls to mind the ban on miscegenation in the United States. The members of the nobility ‘were concerned with voluntary service to the state, both locally and nationally, as civilians and as military men’. While they enjoyed their property and their wealth, patrician officers adopted the pose of ‘chivalric heroes’ required, when the nation was in danger, to exhibit ‘spartan and stoical bravery’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg120&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How should we define the society we have been analysing? Once again, we encounter the problem that has dogged us since the beginning of this book: Can we speak of liberalism in connection with Calhoun’s thinking and the reality of the United States where he lived and worked? And can we speak of it in relation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Given the dominant representation of liberalism today, what sense would it make to define as liberal a society where a considerable part of the population was subject to military dictatorship, where the popular metropolitan classes were at least partially excluded from negative liberty, where this type of liberty was by no means the ideal of the possessing classes, and where the principle of civil and political equality was limited among the latter in various ways?&lt;br /&gt;
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A constitutive element of a liberal regime should be competition between various candidates. But what actually happened?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many elections saw no contest at all. In seven general elections from 1760 to 1800, less than a tenth of the country seats were contested. Of the boroughs, some were purely inert in that their owners sold the seats or appointed the members without question; some seats were as much a property as seats in the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Liberalism, ‘property-owning individualism’ and ‘aristocratic society’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In an attempt to overcome the difficulty encountered in defining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, reference has sometimes been made to ‘individualism’ rather than liberalism; and the history of the intellectual tradition being examined now seems profoundly stamped with a ‘property-owning individualism’ or ‘possessive individualism’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This definition has some legitimacy. In Locke, political power begins to be configured as tyranny, and hence violence, when it attacks private property (belonging to the dominant class); and it is then licit to resist such violence. The citizen, in fact the individual, takes back the power he already possessed in the state of nature, which consists in ‘us[ing] such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and Nature allows him’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of legality is the sphere of respect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg121&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for private property, while violence is defined in the first instance by its violation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On closer examination, however, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ proves completely inadequate. We are confronted with a society and intellectual tradition which, far from being inspired by a superstitious respect for property and property right in general, in fact promoted and legitimized massive expropriations of the Irish and Indians. It is true that a central chapter in the second of Locke’s &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; bears the title ‘Of Property’. But ‘Expropriation’ might have been more fitting, given that it aims to justify white colonists’ appropriation of land from idle Indians incapable of cultivating it. Ignoring the colonies and colonial populations, or populations of colonial origin, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ seems to focus attention exclusively on the white community in the capitalist metropolis, and on the conflict between property-owners and non-property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we confine our attention to the metropolis, we see that the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; justifies and demands the enclosure of common land in England, and hence the massive expropriation of peasants. Like the transatlantic territories occupied by the Indians, common land was not properly fertilized by labour; and hence in both cases there was as yet no legitimate owner. In classic authors of the liberal tradition, we find the assertion and detailed demonstration that the property claimed by natives, and by social groups in the metropolis assimilated to natives, was in reality &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paradoxically, despite its critical intentions, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ ends up crediting the ideological self-consciousness of the classes that arrived in power in England and America advancing the slogan of liberty and property. Marx argued quite differently. &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; denounced the ‘stoical peace of mind [of] the political economist’ and of liberal thinkers in the face of ‘the most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property”‘, and ‘the forcible expropriation of the people’, carried out in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, in order to speed up the enclosure process, brutal methods were sometimes employed without hesitation: entire villages were destroyed and razed to the ground, so as to force the peasants to flee and transform common land into private property and pasture in the service of the textile industry.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining the category of ‘property-owning individualism’, we have hitherto concentrated on the adjective. If we now turn our attention to the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg122&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;noun, we shall find that it too proves rather problematic. The excluded were likened by the dominant class to instruments of labour, bipedal machines. In other words, they saw their quality as human beings and individuals denied. Certainly, the privileged insisted strongly on this quality, which they attributed exclusively to themselves. But is this individualism? Here, too, we find the modern historian aligning himself with the ideological self-consciousness of a social class and political movement he intends to criticize.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than ‘property-owning individualism’, the categories applied to England by some leading liberal authors of the nineteenth century seem more apt. In Constant’s view, ‘England is, at bottom, simply a vast, opulent and vigorous aristocracy.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The judgement formulated by de Tocqueville in the 1830s was no different: ‘Not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly stable than ever, but the nation leaves the government, seemingly without any signs of disapproval, to a very small number of families’, an ‘aristocracy’ primarily based on ‘birth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are dealing with an ‘aristocratic community’ characterized by the domination of ‘a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Besides, it was Disraeli himself who criticized the Whig Party, which long dominated the country that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, for having aimed to establish an aristocracy and oligarchy on the Venetian model.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. ‘Master-race democracy’ between the United States and England&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A question remains unanswered: Albeit intrinsically aristocratic, was England nevertheless a liberal society? Constant was in no doubt: it was the country where ‘social differences are most respected’ (wholly to the advantage of the aristocracy), but where, at the same time, ‘the rights of each man are most guaranteed’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also de Tocqueville’s opinion, but only after 1848, once anxiety about the socialist and Bonapartist drift of France had eclipsed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg123&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;any other consideration. ‘[T]he aristocratic constitution of English society’ was incontestable, and yet it was still the ‘wealthiest and freest country’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to the fall of the July Monarchy, by contrast, de Tocqueville had his doubts and reservations. It was necessary to distinguish between ‘two different forms of liberty’. One should not confuse ‘the democratic and, dare I say it, correct conception of liberty’ with the ‘aristocratic conception of liberty’, understood not as ‘common right’ but as ‘privilege’. The latter prevailed in England, as in ‘aristocratic societies’ in general, with the result that there was no place for ‘general liberty’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; referred and subscribed to the observation of a US citizen who had journeyed extensively in Europe: ‘The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprises us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not that the pathos of liberty was absent among those who adopted the stance of absolute masters. On the contrary: ‘It can happen that the love of liberty is all the more alive among some the less one encounters guarantees of liberty for all. The rarer it is, the exception in such cases is all the more precious.’ This aristocratic conception of liberty produces, among those who have been thus educated, an exalted sense of their individual value and a passionate taste for independence.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the value judgement, which is the converse, we are put in mind of Burke’s well-known observation: freedom appears even ‘more noble and more liberal’ to slave-masters. Should we equate England with slaveholding Virginia? In fact, points in common were not wanting, as emerges from a reading of de Tocqueville. He observed that in the United States whites refused to recognize ‘the common features of humanity’ in blacks.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But in England, too, inequalities were so marked and insuperable that ‘each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race’; ‘general ideas’ were lacking, starting precisely with the idea of humanity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, de Tocqueville was concerned to distinguish American democracy from the aristocracy predominant in England. However, on several occasions his analysis ended up drawing attention to the similarities between the two societies. What took the form of class relations on one side of the Atlantic presented itself as race relations on the other. In the case of England, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg124&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we can speak of liberal society in the same way that Burke spoke of liberal society in connection with the Virginia and Poland of his time. An essential point remains: often excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights and negative liberty in England itself, the popular classes, by de Tocqueville’s indirect but all the more significant admission, continued to be separated from the upper class or caste by a gulf that calls to mind the one obtaining in a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, it can be said that for some time even the society which emerged in England from the Glorious Revolution was configured as a sort of ‘master-race democracy’, on condition that this category is not understood in a purely ethnic sense. On this side of the Atlantic, too, an insurmountable barrier separated the community of the free and masters from the mass of servants, not fortuitously compared by Locke to ‘natives’. And far from being satisfied with negative liberty, the dominant aristocracy cultivated the ideal of active participation in political life, cultivating ‘republican’ ideals. Several influential contemporary interpreters base their arguments on this, when referring to a ‘neo-Roman’ vision or ‘Machiavellian moment’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we face the danger of inadvertent transfiguration: these two categories highlight the pathos of free, egalitarian participation in public life, but end up passing in silence over the macroscopic exclusion clauses presupposed by such pathos. The ideal of a rich public life, of ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Machiavellian’ character, is indeed present in an author like Fletcher, who on the one hand declared himself ‘republican in principle’, while on the other he advocated slavery for vagrants. Locke can be assimilated to such a milieu. He declared in favour of black slavery in the colonies and ‘drudgery’ for wage-labourers in the metropolis. At the same time, with his focus on the aristocracy he developed a pathos of the Commonwealth and the &#039;&#039;civitas&#039;&#039;, which echoes the republican models of antiquity. This, at least, was the opinion of Josiah Tucker, who identified and denounced Locke as a ‘republican Whig’ and supporter of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But perhaps the author who in England best expressed the ideal of ‘master-race democracy’ was Sidney. His insistence on the equality of free men was very marked: ‘the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others do the like’. Definitive is his condemnation of political slavery, inherent not only in absolute monarchy, but also in any political regime that claimed to subject the freeman to laws decided without his consent. But this pathos of liberty implied the demand for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg125&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the master’s right to be ‘judge’ of his own servant without outside interference.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One should not lose sight of the fact that ‘in many places (even by the law of God) the master hath a power of life and death over his servant’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the base and effeminate Asiaticks and Africans’, incapable of understanding the value of ‘liberty’, were rightly regarded by Aristotle as &#039;&#039;‘slaves by nature’&#039;&#039; and ‘little different from beasts’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance—together with Locke, Fletcher and Burgh—Sidney was indicated by Jefferson as a leading authority for understanding ‘the general principles of liberty’ that inspired the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker also conjoined Locke and Sidney, but this time critically. He further pointed out that Sidney was an admirer of ‘Polish liberty’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and of a country where serfdom in its harshest form, to which peasants were subjected, was intertwined with the rich political life of the aristocracy that dominated the Diet), and paid homage to ‘republican liberty’ (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Also expressing himself in flattering terms about Poland, as well as the ‘southern colonies’ of America, was Burke, who not by chance became the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South. Admiration for a regime of republican liberty founded on the slavery or servitude of a considerable proportion of the population, for a ‘master-race democracy’, was well represented in English liberalism. The authors expressing such positions could in their turn count on widespread sympathy across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn1a|1]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonopartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn2a|2]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn3a|3]] Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 301.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn4a|4]] Garry Wills, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn5a|5]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 2, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn6a|6]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn7a|7]] Jefferson Davis, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 399–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn8a|8]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 10–11, 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn9a|9]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn10a|10]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn11a|11]] Plessy versus Ferguson, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Isssues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn12a|12]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 51, 234–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn13a|13]] The term was coined in late 1863: cf. Forrest G. Wood, &#039;&#039;Black Scare&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 53ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn14a|14]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn16a|16]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn17a|17]] Joel Williamson, &#039;&#039;New People&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn19a|19]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., pp. 19–22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn21a|21]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., p. 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn23a|23]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie, ou L’esclavage aux États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gosselin, 1840, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn24a|24]] Robert William Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Consent or Contract&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn25a|25]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn26a|26]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn27a|27]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn28a|28]] David Grimsted, &#039;&#039;American Mobbing, 1828–1861&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn31a|31]] Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July’, in Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., &#039;&#039;Masterpieces of Negro Eloquence, 1818–1913&#039;&#039;, Mineola (NY): Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn32a|32]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn34a|34]] Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn35a|35]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn36a|36]] Brenda Stevenson, &#039;&#039;Life in Black and White&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 275; David B. Davis, ‘White Wives and Slave Mothers’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 20 February 1997, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn37a|37]] Dew quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn38a|38]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 97, 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn39a|39]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joëlle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991, pp. 74–5, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn40a|40]] Dew, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 320.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn41a|41]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 6, 10; Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 62, 205, 425.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn42a|42]] Hosea Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, trans. Alda Carrer and Davide Danti, Milan: Jaca Book, 1997, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn43a|43]] Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Contract or Consent&#039;&#039;, p. 413.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn44a|44]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 405.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn46a|46]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn47a|47]] Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn48a|48]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 120, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn49a|49]] William E. B. Du Bois, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction in America&#039;&#039;, ed. David L. Lewis, New York: Athenaeum, 1992, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn50a|50]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn51a|51]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 95 and &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, pp. 394, 397.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn52a|52]] George M. Frederickson, ‘America’s Original Sin’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 25 March 2004, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn53a|53]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn54a|54]] Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism, passim&#039;&#039;; George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;; Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America, passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, p. 22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 326.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn58a|58]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn62a|62]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 119, 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn65a|65]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 411–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn66a|66]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 339, 343.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., p. 344.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn69a|69]] Douglas A. Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn70a|70]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 339.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn71a|71]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, pp. 101–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn72a|72]] John Cannon, &#039;&#039;Aristocratic Century&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn73a|73]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn74a|74]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn75a|75]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn76a|76]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn77a|77]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 258–9, 261–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn79a|79]] Bentham, quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, pp. 78–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn80a|80]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn81a|81]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 803 (letter to John Fothergill, 14 March 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn82a|82]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 173–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 22 November 1836).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn83a|83]] Michelle Perrot, Introduction to ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn85a|85]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 19, §1; ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn86a|86]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn87a|87]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 180, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn88a|88]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 2, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn89a|89]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94–5. De Tocqueville is reporting a conversation between two influential representatives of the English political world, Nassau William Senior and John Revans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn91a|91]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 2, pp. 371–3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 289.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn93a|93]] Thomas Pakenham, &#039;&#039;The Year of Liberty&#039;&#039;, New York: Random House, 1969, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn94a|94]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945, pp. 631, 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn95a|95]] Michael C. N. Salbstein, &#039;&#039;The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain&#039;&#039;, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn96a|96]] Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, p. 681.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn98a|98]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, p. 402.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn99a|99]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., p. 183.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn102a|102]] David Cannadine, &#039;&#039;The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 14, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn103a|103]] Ibid., p. 14&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., pp. 13, 74.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn105a|105]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn106a|106]] C. B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn107a|107]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn108a|108]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 889, 891.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn109a|109]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 327 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 4 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn111a|111]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn112a|112]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 323–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113a|113]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, pp. 155, 150–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 333 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 27 February 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116a|116]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117a|117]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118a|118]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120a|120]] Quentin Skinner, &#039;&#039;Liberty Before Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121a|121]] Tucker, quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 119, 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122a|122]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 548–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123a|123]] Ibid., p. 312.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124a|124]] Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125a|125]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 479.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126a|126]] Tucker, quoted in Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER FIVE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg127&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism either Side of the Atlantic&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto been concerned almost exclusively with England and the United States. The truth is that the liberal party in France betrayed its weakness fairly early on. And yet, several years before the appearance of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, Voltaire likewise proceeded to celebrate the country that embodied the cause of liberalism at the time: ‘Commerce, which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has developed commerce in its turn. By means of it the nation has grown great’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘[t]he English are the only people on earth who have managed to prescribe limits to the power of kings’; they alone were genuinely free.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More generally, given the difficulty they faced in dealing with comprehensive censorship, the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; hoped to escape this kind of cage and hence looked with sympathy across the Channel. Even Helvétius, whom Diderot rebuked for his indulgence towards enlightened despotism, was compelled to make a significant concession: ‘It is said that this century is the century of philosophy … Today, everyone seems occupied with the search for truth. But there is only one country where it can be published with impunity—and that is England.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The island happily &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg128&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rid of absolute monarchy exercised a powerful attraction. In the columns of the &#039;&#039;Encyclopédie&#039;&#039;, Diderot held up England as an example of ‘temperate monarchy’, where ‘the sovereign is repository solely of executive power’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A little less than ten years later, proposing to restrict representative bodies to ‘major property-owners’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he still viewed cross-Channel political institutions with great interest. In Condorcet’s view, too, they had the merit of having realized, albeit to an inadequate extent, the principles of the limitation of royal power, freedom of the press, habeas corpus and judicial independence.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, two years prior to the storming of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses on the political scene, the English model seemed to have triumphed in France as well. Supported by a wide popular consensus, the noble &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; challenged royal absolutism: ‘the anti-absolutism of the parlements’, or ‘aristocratic liberalism’, became the vehicle for widespread ‘liberal demands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Preserve of a nobility which, as a result also of the sale of offices, was open to the bourgeoisie, the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; for a while seemed destined to play godfather to the advent of a constitutional monarchy and to perform a role similar to that of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in England. Not by chance they appealed to Montesquieu, president of the Bordeaux &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; and a great admirer of the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Burke viewed this sensationally missed opportunity with regret, when he delivered his harsh indictment of a revolution that had degenerated rapidly and wickedly. Had it ended at the stage when the struggle was led by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, the French&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
would have shamed despotism from the earth [and] rendered the cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in every nation … You would have had a free constitution … a liberal order of commons to emulate and recruit that nobility …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg129&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unfortunately, this happy, auspicious moment had been short-lived; and people had started chasing after ‘a pure democracy’ that in fact secreted a tendency to a ‘party tyranny’ and ‘a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Reflections on the Revolution in France&#039;&#039; was published on 1 November 1790, but its basic arguments had already been set out with great clarity in a speech by Burke in the Commons on 9 February of that year. Jacobinism lay in the future. Rather than transforming the British Whig into the prophet of a catastrophe no one was in a position to predict at the time, we should examine the events that had occurred when he levelled his serious charges against the French Revolution. Revealing is the observation that, rather than striving to create a ‘bad constitution’ &#039;&#039;ex nihilo&#039;&#039;, the French should have engaged in further improving the ‘good one’, of which ‘[t]hey were in possession … the day the states met in separate orders’. The ruinous turn occurred when, in the course of the meeting of the Estates-General summoned by the King—at which the ‘good’ Constitution finally emerged or, rather, re-emerged—the tradition whereby the orders sat in separate chambers was abandoned and the transition to voting by head was decided, with the consequent transformation on 9 July of the Estates-General into a constituent National Assembly wherein the former Third Estate now possessed a majority. Thus burst onto the scene the ‘bad constitution’, which ‘melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass’. Everything else flowed from this: the attack on ‘the root of all property’ and ‘confiscat[ion] [of] all the possessions of the church’—the reference is to the night of 4 August 1789 and the abolition of feudal privileges (hunting rights, tithes, and so on)—and the promulgation on 26 August of the ‘mad declaration’ of the Rights of Man, that ‘sort of &#039;&#039;institute&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039; of anarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But everything began on 9 July. The French Revolution proved fatally degenerate even before the capture of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses—in a sense, even before its inception. And in fact Burke was concerned to stress that ‘the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England’ was in fact ‘a revolution, not made, but prevented’: William of Orange ‘was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its antient constitution, and not to level all distinctions’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as, alas, had happened in France. The latter had now gone beyond its fleeting liberal phase, which extended from the agitation of the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; to the summoning of the Estates-General.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg130&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The subsequent liberal tradition is inclined to extend the felicitous phase of the French Revolution somewhat, and identify the turning point in the tumultuous intervention of the popular masses, initially rural and then urban; thus de Tocqueville. But it is interesting to note that he, too, after 1848 at any rate, extolled the period when the movement was directed by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, all of them striving to reverse ‘the old absolute power’ and ‘the old arbitrary system’, and win ‘political liberty’, in a struggle promoted and led not by the ‘low classes’ but by the ‘higher’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, contrary to Burke, who tended to conceive the parliamentary agitation on the model of the so-called Glorious Revolution, de Tocqueville was prepared to stress that in this phase, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, an authentic revolution was underway:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should not be thought that the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; presented these principles as novelties. On the contrary, it derived them very industriously from the depths of the antiquity of the monarchy … It is a strange sight to see ideas that had hardly been born thus wrapped in ancient swaddling clothes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was ‘a very great revolution, but one that should rapidly have faded into the immensity of what happened and thus disappeared from the view of history’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only in a subsequent phase ‘was the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; no longer praised’ in the revolutionary movement, but ‘reviled, turning its liberalism against it’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruinous parabola of the French Revolution could be synthesized thus: ‘At the outset it was Montesquieu who was quoted and expounded; at the end people spoke exclusively of Rousseau.’ The turning point was described in terms similar to those we have noted in Burke: the rot set in when people rushed towards ‘pure democracy’ and laid claim to change ‘the very structure of society’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even closer to Burke was Guizot, who pointed to the eruption of the ‘Third Estate’s struggle against the nobility and the clergy’ as the moment when the French Revolution ceased to have ‘liberty’ as its goal and aimed exclusively at ‘power’, paving the way for the subsequent, interminable struggles—‘those of the poor against the rich, of the common people against the bourgeoisie, of the rabble against respectable folk [&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;]’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Parliaments, diets, the liberal aristocracy and serfdom&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg131&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;For Burke, the revolution in France should ultimately have confined itself to liberalizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. This was not an isolated, polemical idea. In stressing the particular attachment to liberty displayed by slave-owners, the discourse of reconciliation with the rebel colonists offered a general consideration:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]hese people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothick ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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No distinction is made here between slavery in the strict sense and the serfdom prevalent, in its harshest forms, in eastern Europe. In any event, the servile subjection of blacks or peasants, far from contradicting it, rendered the love of liberty by property-owners and freemen stronger and more credible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sidney too was an admirer of Poland. Along with other ‘northern nations’, it was inspired by a love of liberty. What demonstrated this was, among other things, the fact that the king derived from ‘popular elections’—in other words, appointment by the Diet of nobles.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, proudly asserting their condition as free, equal men in the face of the monarch were magnates who wielded absolute power over their serfs. But Sidney argued along the lines we have already encountered: as with slavery, liberalism was also compatible with serfdom. In fact, both institutions rendered the appreciation of liberty more profound and more jealous.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Burke there is complete consistency between the recognition granted Poland and that granted the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;. The latters’ agitation was quite the reverse of an isolated phenomenon: ‘In Sweden the years from 1719 to 1772 are known as the Age of Freedom, because at this time the Diet or Riksdag ruled without interference by the King. Indeed, these Swedish Whigs, after their revolution of 1719, had the works of John Locke translated into Swedish.’ In Hungary the nobles instead appealed above all to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while, in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg132&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even more ringing language, the Polish aristocracy paid homage to ‘republican liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[t]he diets, estates, parlements, and councils all stoutly defended liberty, and indeed stood for many genuine liberal ideas; but at the same time they palpably insisted on the maintenance or enlargement of their own privileges.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this context we can also situate Bismarck’s celebration some decades later of the ‘liberal caste sentiments’ (&#039;&#039;ständisch-liberale Stimmung&#039;&#039;) of the class he belonged to,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which was interested in extending the jurisdiction and powers of representative bodies also in order to reinforce control over servants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar observation can be made in connection with the agitation set off by the French &#039;&#039;parlements:&#039;&#039; guiding the ‘assault’ on royal absolutism was ‘one of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime’s&#039;&#039; most traditional institutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in addition to the English model, it was to this initial phase of the French Revolution—the one admired by Burke and de Tocqueville post-1848—that the liberal nobility of the Hapsburg Empire appealed to condemn Joseph II’s anti-feudal reforms, to reassert the role of diets and intermediate bodies, and hence ‘regain … control over their peasants’ and the ‘other political liberties’ they had lost.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sidney had already specified that a common feature of ‘northern nations’, which embodied the principle of liberty, was assignment of a decisive role to ‘lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The aristocratic liberalism represented in France by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; was thus widely diffused in Europe, especially central and eastern Europe. Certainly, unlike Burke, Montesquieu expressed a negative opinion of Poland, ‘where the peasants are slaves of the nobility’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Whig was well aware of these social relations. In fact, he started out from them to underscore the emphatic love of liberty displayed by slave-owners in Poland, as across the Atlantic. By contrast, Montesquieu saw liberty at work in the English colonies in America, but not in Poland. Does Burke demonstrate greater logical rigour? In reality, in accordance with his principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, Montesquieu did not identify with Poland, which could not invoke the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg133&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;justification or extenuation of a hot climate and where the zone of unfreedom lacked spatial as well as racial delimitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It remains the case that Burke’s attitude had deep roots in the philosophy of history of the liberal tradition, which from Montesquieu onwards tended to date the inception of the history of freedom and free, representative government from the ancient Germans. Among them, as we know from Grotius, the institution of slavery was very much present and yet (according to the author of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;), ‘the English have taken their idea of political government from the Germans’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such presuppositions, Madame de Staël celebrated the liberty enjoyed by old France, despite the heavy presence of serfdom,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Constant ‘the intermediate bodies’ and &#039;&#039;‘Parlements’&#039;&#039; wrongly weakened by royal despotism,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which played an important role in the initial phase of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The American Revolution and the crisis of the English model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the seemingly favourable initial prospects, the English model met with rapid defeat in Paris. In reality, it was already deeply tarnished when the crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; reached maturity in France. In the 1760s, while the colonists’ rebellion was brewing across the Atlantic, John Wilkes attacked ‘the whole organization of the British oligarchy’ in London and initiated a crisis of such gravity as to make the Italian Pietro Verri believe in the imminence of ‘civil war’. Persecuted at home, Wilkes for a time found refuge in Paris, where he formed relations with the group of &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the turning point in the process that threw the English model into crisis in France was represented by the American Revolution. The British Constitution now ceased to be celebrated, and criticisms of Montesquieu for having transfigured it were not lacking.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The increasingly bitter condemnation of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; derived comfort from transatlantic political and social developments. Although not refusing England acknowledgement of the merits earned with the liquidation of royal absolutism, Condorcet looked primarily to America, with its magnificent ‘spectacle of equality’, without any trace of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg134&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belief diffused, albeit to different degrees, on both sides of the Channel that nature had ‘divided the human race into three or four orders’, condemning only one of them to ‘work much and eat little’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now appeal was no longer made to the Glorious Revolution, from which a liberal but also aristocratic England had emerged, but to the ‘happy revolution’ across the Atlantic,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which had given birth to a markedly superior politico-social reality: ‘there is no distinction of orders’ and ‘there is nothing that confines one part of the human species to an abjectness consigning it to idiocy as well as misery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Diderot was even more swingeing. The new country, which offered ‘all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum from fanaticism and tyranny’, was an alternative model to the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that continued to be all the rage in the old continent as a whole, and where ‘the inept, the corrupt rich and the pernicious [are promoted] to the most important offices’. Adherence to the cause of the rebel colonists was, at the same time, a ruthless critique of the behaviour of British troops and against Britain as such. This emerges from celebration of the ‘brave Americans, who have preferred to see their women outraged, their children slain, their homes destroyed, their fields ruined, their cities burnt, and who have preferred to shed their blood and die, rather than lose the least part of their liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks also to the support furnished to the American revolutionaries by France, their arguments were bound to find a favourable echo in Paris, and they involved an unequivocal condemnation of the country that Paine in &#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039; (substantially translated immediately after its publication) branded as ‘British barbarity’, ‘the Royal Brute of Britain’, whose aristocratic character was already evident from ‘what is called the Magna Charta’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nor should we lose sight of the presence in Paris, in the decisive years of the revolutionary crisis, of Jefferson, who, a few weeks after the storming of the Bastille, advised France to keep its distance from England’s worst aspects (a form of representation that was quite the reverse of equal—in fact, ‘abominably partial’—as well as the ‘absolute’ power which the monarch continued to possess in reality thanks to the venality of parliamentarians).[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg135&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This was the intellectual climate in which Brissot and Clavière, two figures destined to play a central role in the French Revolution, published a book in 1787 dedicated ‘to the American Congress and the friends of the United States in the two worlds’, and marked throughout by admiration for ‘free Americans’ and ‘free America’, for its ‘free’ and ‘excellent’ Constitution and noble ‘republican customs’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The counterpoint to such celebration was, of course, condemnation of ‘London’s ministerial despotism’ and the ‘ferocity’ of its troops. The ‘English nation’ was now vainly seeking to remedy the ‘devastation of its cruel dementia’ and renew relations with the country born in the wake of the struggle against it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This division must be followed by an intellectual and political alliance between those who had struggled together against England—namely, the United States and France, which ‘with its arms helped assert the independence of free America’, and which was now summoned to take inspiration from the great new model embodied by the country thrown up by the revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On this basis, Brissot and Clavière set up the French–American Society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, two years later, the debate began that issued in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, not a few interventions appealed to the American example and the sort of synthetic proclamation of the rights of man contained in the Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to counter the revolution’s radicalization, Malouet, who became the spokesman for the interests of slave-owners in the colonies, drew attention to the radical differences between the United States and France. In the first case, there was a society ‘entirely composed of property-owners already accustomed to equality’. In the second, one witnessed the agitation of ‘an immense multitude of men without property’ in a daily struggle for survival and ‘placed by fate in a condition of dependency’: a gulf separated ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society’. This was where appeals to ‘democracy’ and the rights of man could have devastating consequences for the social order.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Stripped of its ideological caution and reticence, the meaning of the speech was clear. In America, thanks to expansion into territories occupied by the Indians and their expropriation, it was possible significantly to expand the ranks of property-owners who were European in origin. On the other hand, the ‘unfortunate classes’ were not in a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg136&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;position to do harm: they mainly comprised blacks reduced to slavery or relegated to a subaltern caste and subject to iron social control. Waved exclusively within the white community and the superior race, the flag of democracy and the rights of man had nothing subversive about it. But in France …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Malouet’s reasoning was not flawless. However, it was no longer possible to revert to the situation prior to the American Revolution. After the formation of significantly more democratic representative bodies at federal and state levels in the United States, little credibility could attach to the British parliament, which on the basis of a law of 1716 that remained in force for nearly two centuries (until 1911) was elected every seven years,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and monopolized by the landed aristocracy. Moreover, it was undermined by a corruption that had become proverbial in Europe and across the Atlantic, which seemed in France to be a repeat of the sale of offices—an essential element of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that was to be got rid of.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of their argument with London, the American revolutionaries had equated citizens deprived of the right of representation with slaves. But now this argument came to be applied in France by those who were opposed to censitary discrimination in the suffrage. This, thundered Robespierre, criticizing those inspired by the ‘example of England’, reduced the excluded to a condition similar to the slave: ‘liberty consists in obeying the laws one has given oneself and slavery in being forced to submit to an alien will’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, Babeuf argued in similar fashion: ‘citizens whose will is inactive—such men are slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These were declarations that could have come from the mouth of an American revolutionary; only now, pronounced in favour not of a narrow elite of gentlemen and property-owners, but of the mass of the dispossessed, they assumed a very different political and social value.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The transfiguration of American ‘master-race democracy’ in a universalistic key&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Focusing attention on the problem of slavery, the argument that developed on both sides of the Atlantic initially discredited England, protagonist of the slave trade, more than it did the rebel colonists: ‘staining the reputation of that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg137&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nation’ (observed Diderot in 1774) ‘is the fact that its blacks are the unhappiest of blacks’. Indeed, ‘the Englishman, enemy of tyranny at home, is the most ferocious despot abroad’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; reiterated the point: ‘The English, this people so jealous of their own liberty, have contempt for that of other men’. They did not hesitate to employ the most bestial methods and the most refined forms of torture to smother any hint of rebellion and any aspiration to freedom by their slaves; ‘it is to this excess of barbarism that the trading and slavery of blacks have necessarily led the usurpers’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, when it allied with the powers of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to fight revolutionary France, and refused to follow the latter’s example in abolishing slavery (decreed by the Jacobin Convention in February 1794, in the wake of the revolution by the black slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture), England was widely discredited in Europe. Robespierre was not alone in declaring that the island across the Channel could seem like a model of liberty only at a time when France groaned under monarchical absolutism. This was also Kant’s opinion: ‘England, which at one time could count on the sympathy of the best men in the world … has now completely lost that sympathy.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it provoked the crisis of the English model, the American Revolution prompted portrayals and hopes that were destined to prove completely unrealistic. At work was the illusion that the institution of slavery was destined rapidly to disappear in the republic produced by a great struggle for freedom. The founders of the French–American Society explicitly expressed themselves in such terms: ‘The most beautiful feature for which one honours the public spirit in the United States’ was ‘the emancipation of the blacks’. Thanks to the Quakers’ abolitionist campaigning, it ‘will soon be universal in all this part of the world’, so that only the Europeans, still committed to the slave trade and the oppression of blacks, would remain to blush at ‘their barbarism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet adopted a similar position: the rebel colonists were the ‘friends of universal liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, one could start from the presupposition that the stain of slavery would soon be washed away:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg138&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Slavery is universally regarded in the thirteen states as a crime of &#039;&#039;lèse-humanité&#039;&#039; … Now, given this opinion, it will be hard for the private interests of the slave-owners to prevail for long in a country where the press is free and where all measures of public authority, all the deliberations of the legislative body … are necessarily public acts.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This illusion is readily explicable: it involved a confusion between the abolition of the slave trade (effectively provided for by the US Constitution, which sanctioned its termination in 1808) and the abolition of slavery (which continued to flourish); and there was a sense that the process set in train in the North would shortly encompass the Union as a whole. More generally, the rebel colonists’ passionate denunciation of despotism and political slavery sounded like a declaration of war on any form of enslavement, and hence like the inception of black emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process of transfiguring events across the Atlantic sometimes became a total misunderstanding. Enthusiastically saluting the rebel colonists, Raynal advertised a prize for answers to the question whether ‘the discovery of America has been useful or harmful to the human race’. The four responses submitted concurred in denouncing the event as a harbinger of intolerance and slavery and pointing to the American Revolution as the remedy for such ills.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The rebellion that broke out in the name also of the right to untrammelled expansion into lands inhabited by savages was thus construed in the completely opposite sense!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The colonists of San Domingo, the American model and the second liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the outset, it was not understood in France that the independence secured by the white colonists strengthened their control over the Indians and blacks; and it was not realized that a similar dialectic was tending to develop in the French colonies. In the 1781 edition of the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039;, Diderot on the one hand evoked the figure of a ‘black Spartacus’, summoned to rise up against the slave-owners, but on the other, harking back to the example of the American Revolution, declared for the concession of self-government to San Domingo too, which would precisely have entailed the triumph of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg139&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slave-owners. The philosopher did not perceive the contradiction, and nor did Brissot, who took a similar position.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, self-government became the watchword of colonists interested in preserving the institution of slavery and shielding their property from the interference, whims and despotism attributed to central government. Among the first to make himself spokesman for these ideas and interests was Malouet, who in 1788 had already engaged in a sharp polemic against the abolitionists. Certainly, the institution of slavery was out of the question for a ‘free and proud nation’ like France. To tolerate it on metropolitan territory would risk erasing the boundary between liberty and slavery and inducing a ‘general enslavement’. Malouet was a liberal and admired England, where he took refuge following the failure of projects for establishing a monarchy on the English model in France. He appealed to the ‘wise Locke’ and his &#039;&#039;Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; to argue that slavery for ‘barbarous peoples … does not offend the right of nature’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence Malouet took care not to challenge the spatial and racial delimitation of slavery, as had his contemporary and fellow countryman Melon (against whom Montesquieu argued): slavery was inconceivable in the metropolis and, within the colonies, for the white race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to blacks, however, the discourse was very different: transported to America, they were providentially released from the ‘most absurd despotism’, which raged in Africa. It was true that they continued to suffer slavery, albeit of a decidedly milder variety than that prevalent in their countries of origin. However, much more so than the American slave, whose subsistence was guaranteed and who was protected by a series of laws, it was the European ‘worker’ (&#039;&#039;journalier&#039;&#039;) who was ‘subject to the &#039;&#039;absolute will’&#039;&#039;, the power of life and death, of his master, who, denying or ejecting him from work, could calmly condemn him to death. People cried scandal at the punishments inflicted on slaves, but what happened in Europe? A peasant who stole was hanged, a poacher was condemned to ‘forced labour’—a slavery much more pitiless than that typically existing across the Atlantic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, we encounter the arguments that would later receive more developed theoretical systematization particularly in Calhoun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg140&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Once the French Revolution had broken out, supporting the colonists’ interests and arguments was the Massiac Club, founded in Paris in August 1789, of which Malouet was a prominent member. Likewise aligned in defence of the colonists’ right to self-government and the undisturbed enjoyment of their property (plantations and slaves) was Antoine Barnave. We are dealing with an important author who expressed his liberal convictions not only in immediately political terms, but also at the level of the philosophy of history. In him too we find the dialectic we are already familiar with: ringing condemnation of political ‘slavery’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] did not prevent him from forcefully and skilfully defending the cause of the slaveholding colonists. The ‘spirit of liberty’ (he observed) increased and strengthened with the expansion of ‘industry’, ‘wealth’ and, above all, ‘movable wealth’. That was why, even prior to England with its splendid ‘Constitution’, it emerged in Holland, ‘the country where movable wealth has accumulated most’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Slaves were an integral part of this ‘movable property’, and had already been classified among the ‘movable’ goods in Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Massiac Club and Barnave were generally considered ‘Anglomanes’ and genuinely were, in the sense that they opposed the radicalization of the French Revolution and admired and envied the country across the Channel for its orderly rule of law and strict censitary discrimination, which consecrated the untrammelled, exclusive domination of the property-owning classes. However, in another respect they were led to appeal predominantly to the American model, with its pathos of the inviolable autonomy of representative bodies and states from central power and the guarantee that derived from it of the inviolability of the institution of slavery. In the face of central government, the colonies adopted the stance of the southern states. In March 1790 the colonists won a temporary victory:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The National Assembly declared that it had not the slightest intention of updating any branch of its trade with the colonies. It placed the colonists and their property under the special protection of the nation. It declared anyone who plotted to incite uprisings against them a criminal to the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg141&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a success that was repeated about a year later: ‘The National Assembly made it a constitutional rule that no law on the condition of unfree persons in the colonies could be made except at the formal, unsolicited request of the colonial Assemblies.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the whole discourse revolved around the problem of slavery, the relevant term did not appear: the articles of the US Constitution were imitated in substance and form alike. This was the French Revolution’s second liberal inception. Just as the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; expressed the desire for self-government by the liberal nobility in the metropolis, so the colonial Assemblies gave voice to the slave-owners’ desire for self-government in the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this second liberal inception was even more precarious than the first. Following the defeat suffered during the Seven Years’ War, France had lost virtually all its colonial empire in 1763. This had imparted to the critique of colonialism and the institution of slavery a diffusion and radicalism hampered, by contrast, in the English and American world by substantial material interests and a national, chauvinistic spirit understandably reinforced by victory. We can thus understand the split that immediately occurred in the French liberal party. Aspiring to a constitutional monarchy with the right to make war and peace reserved to the king, Mirabeau, like Malouet and Barnave, looked to England. Unlike them, however, he ended up rejecting the American model when it came to regulating the relations between central power, on the one hand, and colonies and colonists, on the other. In the Constituent Assembly the latter demanded that they be represented in proportion not only to their numbers, but also to the number of their slaves, in accordance with a criterion identical or similar to that adopted by the US Constitution. Here is Mirabeau’s stinging reply:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the colonists want the blacks and people of colour to be men, well then, emancipate them, so that all are electors and all can be elected. Otherwise, we beg them to note that, in proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have not taken into consideration the number of our horses and mules. The colonists’ claim to have twenty representatives is therefore utterly ridiculous.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was an argument that also applied in the United States, as is confirmed by a subsequent position of Mirabeau’s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg142&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I shall not debase either this assembly or myself by seeking to prove that the blacks have a right to liberty. You decided this question when you declared that all men are born and remain equal and free. And it is not on this side of the Atlantic that corrupt fallacies will dare to maintain that blacks are not men.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The condemnation of ideologies of slavery targeted both French colonists and the English colonists who had now constituted themselves as an independent state: the polemic against the former could not but encompass the latter; the initial ambiguity, which had led French abolitionists to attribute a completely imaginary universalistic impetus to the authors of the American Revolution, was dispelled—all the more so in that it was the very ideologues of slavery who drew attention to the vitality of that institution in the United States. Brissot had believed that the example of the Quakers of Pennsylvania would act as a model; in a sense adopting an observation already present in Smith, Malouet had pointed out in 1788 that the abolition of slavery decided by it affected a fairly limited number of people and certainly did not extend to the southern states, where the presence of slaves and blacks was much more pronounced.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1802 Baudry des Lozières’ sarcasm was stinging. Precisely where ‘Brissot locates perfection’, slavery not only flourished undisturbed, but manifested itself in particularly rigid form: ‘The North Americans, those lovers of liberty, those ardent republicans, who in their books celebrate their independence so much, buy and sell slaves.’ Moreover, ‘this country of liberty is very miserly in granting freedom’ and ‘those who are freed’ were treated ‘extremely harshly’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The crisis of the English and American models and the formation of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, figures were not lacking in the abolitionist camp who continued to harbour illusions about a possible restoration of the American model to its former splendour. The abolition of an institution whose stubborn survival was incomprehensible in a country so strongly attached to the cause of liberty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg143&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;would suffice. When in 1824 Lafayette visited the United States, where nearly fifty years earlier he had fought in the War of Independence, he cautiously tried to point out ‘the disadvantages of slavery’ in Ohio. However, his speech met with no success; in fact, his good intentions had an ironic objective accompaniment, since in various southern cities public notices warned ‘people of color’ to stay away from the ceremonies in honour of the illustrious guest.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Residual illusions were also evident in Grégoire. Demonstrating political naivety, in an attempt to convince Jefferson to abandon his racial prejudices, he referred to the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture to prove the ability of blacks to achieve a level of excellence![[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French abbot was unaware of his interlocutor’s efforts, in his capacity as US president, to reduce the republic born in the wake of the black slave revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture to hunger and force it to surrender (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|§8]]). Similarly, he did not know that in 1801 the latter was lamenting in his correspondence the fact that citizens of San Domingo were abducted by American corsairs and sold as slaves.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Leading the United States in 1801 was precisely Jefferson who, some years later, wrote to a friend in ironic terms about the French abolitionist abbot.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the predicted and desired emancipation of black slaves became an ever more problematic and remote prospect, bitter disappointment set in, as demonstrated in particular by Condorcet’s evolution. On the immediate eve of the French Revolution, when the Constitution consecrating slavery was in force across the Atlantic, he still continued to draw a rather optimistic picture. The various states of the new republic and the ‘common Senate that represents them’ were unanimous in desiring the abolition of slavery; it was an ‘act of justice’ dictated by ‘humanity’, but also by ‘honour’. A severe warning was already implicit in this final observation: ‘How, without blushing, can one dare to demand these declarations of rights, these inviolable bulwarks of the liberty and security of citizens, if every day one permits oneself to violate the most sacred articles?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, where once it had been implicit, the distancing became explicit, even if it continued to be cautiously phrased. Compared with the French Revolution, the American presented itself as ‘more peaceful’, but also as ‘slower’ and ‘more incomplete’. Sooner or later, it too would end up applying &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg144&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principle of liberty and equality in its universality. But for the time being there continued the ‘crimes whose avarice soils the shores of America, Africa or Asia’, the ‘bloody contempt for men of another colour’, the slave trade between the two shores of the Atlantic, the tragedy of Africa and the ‘shameful brigandage that has corrupted and depopulated it for two centuries’. By contrast, it was a merit of the more advanced French culture to treat as ‘&#039;&#039;friends …&#039;&#039; those blacks whom their stupid tyrants disdain to rank among men’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Condorcet denounce the ‘general corruption’ of Holland and England as slaveholding societies. This denunciation increasingly tended also to encompass the country that emerged from the third liberal revolution. The Terror was already hanging over Condorcet himself, who nevertheless identified revolutionary France as the country called upon to put an end to&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the cunning and false policy which, forgetting that all men have equal rights by virtue of their very nature, wanted on the one hand to measure the extent of the rights to be granted by the size of the territory, the climate, national character, the wealth of the people, the degree of perfection of trade and industry; and on the other to sub-divide these same rights unequally between different classes of men, assigning them to birth, wealth and profession, thus creating contrary interests and opposed powers, to then establish a balance between them that is rendered necessary solely by these institutions and which does not even correct their dangerous influences.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The United States no longer represented the genuine antithesis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, construed by Condorcet as a complex system of forms of discrimination and privilege that lacerated the unity of the human race. It was necessary to overcome once and for all a political order in which, intertwined with the hierarchization of peoples on the basis of climate, geographical location or differential economic development, there was a hierarchization within any individual people on the basis of birth or membership of an estate. While the first type of discrimination found concentrated expression across the Atlantic, the second had certainly not disappeared in England. The critical or scornful reference to the argument of ‘climate’ (a position prominent in Montesquieu and often used to justify the slavery of colonial peoples), and to the argument of the ‘balance’ of powers (often invoked in England to justify the privileges of the House of Lords and the landed aristocracy), demonstrates that Condorcet &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg145&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had become critical of the American and English models alike, and had ultimately broken with both fractions of the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fully to understand Condorcet’s mature view, it is important to take account of a peculiarity of the French Revolution. In the course of its development, the popular uprising in the metropolis against the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; was soon followed by the clash in the colonies between freemen and slaves and between blacks and whites. The two conflicts were all the more closely intertwined because sections of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, engaged against the process of radicalization underway in Paris, were sometimes simultaneously interested, as the owners of slaves in the colonies, in preventing their emancipation. Those on the opposite side were thus led to assimilate noble privilege and racial privilege, branding them conjointly as two different expressions of aristocratic arrogance. In 1791 the Jacobin Sonthonax pointed to the liberal and spokesman for the slaveholding colonies, Barnave, as the ‘protector of the aristocracy of the epidermis’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years before the outbreak of the July Revolution, although now ferociously critical of Jacobinism, Abbé Grégoire issued a firm denunciation, already encapsulated in the title of his little book, of the ‘nobility of the skin’. The analogy was now developed in all its aspects. The ban on interracial marriages in the United States was compared to the social obligation which, under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, required the aristocracy not to contaminate itself with elements alien to it, with commoners: at work in both cases was an insane concern to safeguard ‘the purity of the blood’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the nobility of the skin will suffer the same fate as the nobility of the scroll’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, the absolute power possessed by the slave-owner was certainly no more tolerable than that exercised by the monarch, and hence the ‘colonists’ were ‘similar to all despots’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this comparative perspective, the negative judgement on the United States was manifest: ‘Civilization is only dawning: five million Africans transported to America are still in chains there.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And if there was an encouraging example in the New World, it was not afforded by the ‘colonists’ and the country they had founded in North America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Simply by virtue of its existence, the republic of Haiti will be able to have a major influence on the destiny of Africans in the new world … A black &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg146&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;republic in the mid-Atlantic is a raised beacon to which the blushing oppressors and the sighing oppressed look. Seeing it, hope smiles on five million slaves scattered over the Antilles and the American continent.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the American model became even more explicit and bitter as those who wished to preserve slavery in the colonies appealed to it. Against the abolitionist projects or ambitions of Paris, the colonists invoked the spectre of a repeat of the American Revolution. They too would be forced into independence if they did not succeed in securing self-government, so as to be able to freely dispose of their slaves, without a ‘despotic’ power interfering with their legitimate property from without and above. Again, after the July Revolution, the French colonists declared themselves ready ‘to hand themselves over to the American Union if the metropolis did not permit them slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Making this observation in 1842 was Victor Schoelcher who, six years later, played a key role in the definitive abolition of slavery in the French colonies, which had been reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802. And we can then understand the bitterness of the polemic against the transatlantic republic. ‘Skin prejudices’ remained particularly ‘inveterate among the Americans’; they could be considered ‘the most ferocious masters on the earth’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] authors of ‘one of the most upsetting spectacles the world has ever offered’. Not only blacks, but also white abolitionists, were hit by the most savage violence. Lynching threatened anyone who dared to challenge the ‘iniquitous property’ and ‘demand freedom for all members of the human race’. ‘There is no cruelty of the most barbarous age that has not been committed by the slave states of North America.’ Hence the hope for a revolution from below: ‘I hope that these brusque lynchers will one day all be hung by rebellious slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance, Schoelcher, in condemning the crimes committed by ‘us other barbarians of the West’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] expressed his admiration for the ‘colossal revolution of S. Domingo’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and for the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture, to whom he devoted a sympathetic biography.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gulf separating the new political current forming in France from the two fractions of the liberal party is clear. Like Schoelcher, Brissot, who had played a significant part in founding the French–American Society, did not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg147&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hesitate to justify armed rebellion by black slaves and their right to revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this point the French–American Society was dead and buried. Between the July Revolution and the 1848 Revolution, manifestly in debate with French radicalism, de Tocqueville could once again present the United States as a model or source of inspiration only on condition of dropping the analogy between noble aristocracy and racial aristocracy, between monarchical despotism and slave despotism—the analogy on whose basis the North American republic was configured not as a model of liberty and democracy, but as a variant (and then not even the best) of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The liberal inception of the revolution in Latin America and its radical outcome&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the metropolis and colonies alike, the French Revolution was transformed in a radical direction. To clarify this process further, we must begin with the definition which, in the course of the struggle against Stuart absolutism, at the start of the English liberal movement, one of its exponents gave of the ‘true liberty’ dear to him: ‘we know by a certain law that our wives, our children, our servants, our goods, are our own, that we build, we plough, we sow, we reap, for ourselves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the event, ‘our servants’ did not passively endure assimilation to ‘our goods’ and, in opposition to the ‘true liberty’ cherished by the exponent of English proto-liberalism, demanded a quite different liberty, which required the intervention of political power to abolish servitude in its various forms and promote the emancipation of the subaltern classes. This is what occurred in France, thanks to the historically auspicious context already analysed. In the metropolis, the first liberal inception of the French Revolution was immediately followed by the revolt of the peasants (with the end, sealed on the night of 4 August 1789, of the feudal system), and then the agitation of the urban popular masses. The second liberal inception, which was to have consecrated self-government by slave-owners, ended up inciting the revolution of the slaves themselves. The latter achieved emancipation and later managed to frustrate the terrible war machine of Napoleonic France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar dialectic manifested itself in Latin America. Initially, the independence movement and revolution took the form of reactions against reform by the Spanish crown, which ‘reversed the old policy of segregating the Indians and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg148&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;urged them to assimilate by speaking Spanish and dressing in European style’. Such integrationist measures soon provoked the hostility of the Creole elite. The latter professed liberalism, and was liberal: it read Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith; it sometimes sought to enter into relations with Jefferson; it protested against central government interference and the obstacles it placed in the way of developing local industry; it aspired to emulate the example of the American Revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the English colonists in the North, so for the Latin American Creoles in the South, the slave, as the planter’s private property, did not pertain to the public sphere. In the various manifestos that signalled the start of the war of independence against Spain, no positions in favour of abolishing slavery were adopted.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where the English colonists had indignantly rejected London’s attempt to block their expansion beyond the Allegany Mountains, and proudly declared that they did not want to be treated ‘like negroes, the Latin American Creoles claimed equality with the peninsula’s ruling class and superiority to the Indians and, obviously, slaves deported from Africa. To this end they reminded Madrid that they were descendants of the conquistadores and, ultimately, artisans of the grandeur of the Spanish Empire. We are reminded of Franklin who, in the course of the controversy with the London government, had stressed the merits earned by the American colonists, ‘hazarding their Lives and Fortunes in subduing and settling new Countries, extending the Dominion and encreasing the Commerce of their Mother Nation’, enhancing the glory, ‘the Grandeur and Stability of the British Empire’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not long before the two roads diverged sharply. The fact is that in Spanish America, together with the Creole revolution but counter to it, an Indian revolution developed. In fact, the latter had announced itself decades earlier, as demonstrated by the series of revolts culminating in 1780–81 in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, which sought to win the blacks to its cause, liberating them too from the shackles of slavery. By contrast, the Creoles initially rose up with liberal slogans, demanding self-government, challenging interference by central power, aiming, like the North American colonists, to strengthen their control over the native populations and blacks. It was precisely this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg149&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political project that formed the main target of the struggle by the Latin American Indians. Their revolution brings to mind the one that later erupted in San Domingo, and which issued in the formation of a new country: Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt: it was San Domingo–Haiti that gave the Creole independence movement a decisive turn. To overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish troops, Simón Bolívar sought to secure the support of the rebel ex-slaves of the Caribbean state, which he personally visited. The president at the time was Alexandre Pétion, who immediately received the Latin American revolutionary. He promised him the aid he requested on condition that he freed the slaves in areas as they were wrested from Spanish control. Transcending the class and caste limits of the social group he belonged to, and demonstrating intellectual and political courage, Bolívar accepted. Seven ships, 6,000 men with arms and munitions, a printing press and numerous advisors set out from the island.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the beginning of the abolition of slavery in much of Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolívar started out as a liberal, appealing to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] underlining the need for ‘a liberal Constitution’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] with ‘eminently liberal provisions’, which were to sanction ‘the rights of man, the freedom to act, think, speak and write’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as well as ‘the division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience, a free press’—in short, ‘everything sublime that there is in politics’. He celebrated the ‘British Constitution’ and, above all, the American, the ‘most perfect of Constitutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, when he demanded not only liberty, but the ‘absolute freedom of the slaves’, Bolívar in fact took his distance from the United States, where, even in the North, blacks were confined to a caste which was not that of genuinely free men. And this distancing from the North American republic was confirmed by a further observation that ‘it is impossible to be free and slaves at the same time’. But especially significant was another element: the slave revolution from below, which in the United States represented a general nightmare, now became an object of explicit celebration. Bolívar not only appealed to the ‘history of the helots, Spartacus and Haiti’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] but in so doing defined Venezuelan and Latin American identity in a way that is worth reflecting on:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg150&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Let us bear in mind that our people is neither European nor North American. Rather than an emanation of Europe, it is a mixture of Africa and America because Spain itself ceased to be Europe on account of its African blood, its institutions and its character. It is impossible to determine exactly which human family we belong to. The majority of the indigenous population has been destroyed, the Europeans have mixed with Americans and Africans, and the latter with Indians and Europeans. All born from the breast of one and the same Mother, our fathers, different by origin and blood, are foreigners to one another and all visibly differ in their skin. Such diversity entails a consequence of the greatest importance. Thanks to the Constitution, interpreter of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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The countries formed out of the independence struggle against the Madrid government thus acquired a political, social and ethnic identity characterized by an admixture of black and Indian, and hence very different from US identity. While the North American colonists identified with the chosen people who sailed across the Atlantic to conquer the promised land, to be wrested from its unauthorized inhabitants and cleansed of their presence (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|§5]]), the Latin American revolutionaries, in the wake of their argument with Spain, tended to denounce the genocidal practices of the conquistadores, Spanish in particular and European in general. Here too the road had been indicated by the black slaves of San Domingo who, after having broken with Napoleonic France and defeated its attempts to re-conquer it and reintroduce slavery, had assumed the Indian name of Haiti. For Bolívar miscegenation—the mixing denounced in the United States, and sometimes with particular fervour by abolitionist circles—became a political project, which rejected any racial discrimination, and an essential element in a new, proud identity. However, precisely on account of its radicalism, this project found itself confronting almost insurmountable difficulties. Thanks to the politico-social homogeneity (strengthened by the availability of land and westward expansion) of its dominant class, and thanks also to the confinement of much of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery, the North American republic soon succeeded in achieving a stable structure. It took the form of a ‘master-race democracy’ and a racial state, based on the rule of law within the white community and among the chosen people. The situation in Latin America was very different: between liberal beginnings and radical outcomes, the revolution had mobilized a front stamped with profound social and ethnic contradictions. Thus two contrasting &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg151&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ideas of liberty confronted one another: one calls to mind the English gentleman determined to dispose freely of his servants; the other ultimately refers to the struggle that had put an end to black slavery in San Domingo—Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. The United States and San Domingo—Haiti: two antagonistic poles&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Around 1830 the American continent presented a rather telling picture. While it had disappeared in a considerable part of Latin America, slavery remained in force in the European colonies, including British and Dutch ones, and above all in the United States. We can say that from the slave revolution onwards there developed a pent-up confrontation, a kind of cold war, between San Domingo and the United States. On one side, we have a country that saw ex-slaves in power, authors of a revolution that was possibly unique in world history; on the other, a country almost always led in the early decades of its existence by slave-owning presidents. On one side, we have a country that sanctioned the principle of racial equality to the point where, at least when it was ruled by Toussaint L’Ouverture, whites could play a leading role in the plantations; on the other, a country that constituted the first historical example of a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the tension between those two poles is understandable. When, in 1826, Abbé Grégoire pointed to Haiti as the ‘beacon’ looked to by slaves, he clearly had in mind the island’s contribution to the abolition of slavery in Latin America. On the other side, with the emergence and advance of the slave revolution, the French colonists of San Domingo responded by entertaining the idea, and brandishing the threat, of secession from France and adhesion to the North American Union. Once the new revolutionary power had consolidated itself, it was a constant concern of the United States, where not a few ex-colonists took refuge, to overthrow or at least isolate it through a cordon sanitaire. It would be dangerous, observed Jefferson in 1799, to enter into commercial relations with San Domingo. That would result in ‘black crews’ disembarking in the United States, and these emancipated slaves could represent ‘combustion’ for the slaveholding South.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such concerns, South Carolina banned the entry into its territory of any ‘man of colour’ from San Domingo or any of the other French islands, which might in some way have been infected by the new, dangerous ideas of liberty and racial equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg152&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Regardless of commercial exchanges, stressed influential political figures in the North American republic, by its very example the island risked challenging the institution of slavery far beyond its borders. Its inhabitants would in fact be ‘dangerous neighbors to the Southern States, and an asylum for renegades from these parts’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro revolution to be exhibited among them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Jefferson’s support for Napoleon’s attempt to re-conquer the island and reintroduce slavery. The US president assured the representative of France that ‘nothing will be easier than to furnish your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having succeeded Jefferson, Madison was likewise in no doubt as to the position to adopt: France was ‘the sole sovereign of Saint Domingue’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the consolidation of black power and the emergence of Haiti, the conflict did not come to an end. It also extended to the Caribbean islands under British control. Unrest spread among the black slaves and the governor of Barbados was well aware of ‘the dangers of insurrection’. For this reason, projects to reform and moderate the institution of slavery were entertained in London. This was a prospect immediately opposed by the colonists of Jamaica, who, sheltering behind defence of ‘their undoubted and acknowledged rights’ to self-government, threatened revolt against royal despotism and secession and adhesion to the North American republic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the example of San Domingo—Haiti had its most profound influence on Latin America. In 1822 the president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, proceeded to the annexation (which proved short-lived) of the Spanish part of the island, with the consequent emancipation of several thousand blacks, who along with freedom experienced notable social ascent, becoming small landowners. Slaves and free blacks in Cuba, who secretly kept the image of the Haitian leader, hoped for something similar. On the opposite side, sensing the danger, slave-owners of a liberal persuasion had already made contact with the US consul in Havana a decade earlier and outlined a project for joining the United States, which elicited the interest of Madison and Jefferson. In Calhoun’s view the annexation desired by him was a sort of pre-emptive counter-revolution: it would put paid for ever to the danger of a Cuba ‘revolutionized by Negroes’, which would have increased or doubled the threat already posed by Haiti.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg153&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Later, while the island of black power helped spread black emancipation in much of Latin America, the United States reintroduced slavery in Texas, which had previously been taken from Mexico. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, an attempt was made to expand the territory of the North American republic and, with it, the institution of slavery into other parts of Mexico and, above all, Nicaragua. One participant in this adventure, which after initial successes ended in dramatic failure, was William Walker. He considered himself—and in his own way was—a liberal, who enjoyed significant support in the United States. He proposed to fight the despotic legacy of Spanish power and extend his country’s free institutions, but exclusively for the benefit of the authentic white community. For those alien to the ‘strong, haughty race, bred to liberty’ who were the custodians of ‘a mission to place Americans under the rule of free laws’, slavery was indicated. The decree of abolition promulgated in the wake of a movement that had found inspiration and support in Haiti was therefore cancelled.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only after the end of the Civil War did the United States agree to open diplomatic relations with Haiti. But it was a move bereft of any warmth, and in fact functional for a project of ethnic cleansing. The idea, also entertained by Lincoln, of depositing on the island of black power the ex-slaves, who were to be deported from the republic that continued to be inspired by the principle of white supremacy and purity, had not yet been abandoned.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Liberalism and the critique of abolitionist radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Hence a distinguished historian of slavery has appropriately warned against the tendency ‘to confuse liberal principles with antislavery commitment’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Let us examine the reaction of various authors and sections of the liberal movement to the conflict that issued in the Civil War. We shall set aside Calhoun and the other theorists of the slaveholding South. And we already know Disraeli’s denunciation of the catastrophe of abolishing slavery in English colonies. On the point of the Confederacy’s military collapse, Lord Acton wrote to the general who had commanded its army:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg154&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I saw in States Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy … Therefore I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of the liberalism embodied in the Confederacy weighed more than the victory won some decades earlier by liberal England over Napoleonic despotism. Why? On the outbreak of the Civil War, although acknowledging ‘all the horrors of American slavery’, Lord Acton had unhesitatingly rejected ‘the categorical prohibition of slavery’ demanded by the abolitionists, as informed by an ‘abstract, ideal absolutism’ quite contrary to ‘the English spirit’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and to the liberal spirit as such, characterized as it was by flexibility and practical common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years earlier, Lieber had expressed himself in similar terms. He condemned the abolitionists as ‘jacobins’, followers of the ‘fifth monarchy’, incorrigible visionaries and fanatics: ‘if people must have slaves it is their affair to keep them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were such a declaration to be interpreted literally, not only would the right of states to self-government be inviolable, but also the right of each individual citizen to choose the type of property he preferred: let us not forget that at the time Lieber was himself a slave-owner! And hence while Disraeli ironized about the naive, misinformed ‘philanthropy’ of ‘the pure abolitionists’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the American liberal took his distance from such circles even more clearly: ‘I am not an abolitionist.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lieber was on excellent terms with de Tocqueville, who in his turn declared: ‘I have never been an abolitionist in the ordinary sense of the term’; ‘I have always been strongly opposed to the abolitionist party’. What was meant by these declarations, contained in two letters from 1857? ‘I have never believed it possible to destroy slavery in old states’: the abolitionists’ error was to seek ‘to effect a premature, dangerous abolition of slavery in countries where this abominable institution has always existed’. We are dealing with a firm &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg155&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery at a theoretical level, but one without results on the practical level. The situation in the South could only be altered through an initiative from above and from the centre, thereby throwing ‘the great experiment of Self-Government’ into crisis. And so? Preservation of the status quo was appropriate. However regrettable, people must resign themselves to the continuation of slavery in the South for a long time. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to introduce it into new states, to spread this horrible plague over a large area of the earth that has hitherto been immune to it, to impose all the crimes and all the miseries that accompany slavery on millions of men of future generations (masters or slaves), who could avoid this, is a crime against the human race, and this seems to me horrendous and inexcusable.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, an expansion of the zone of slavery had already occurred at the time of the annexation to the Union of Texas, seized from Mexico. De Tocqueville seemed to be ready to accept a compromise even more favourable to the slaveholding South, as emerges from a letter of 13 April 1857, once again sent to a transatlantic interlocutor:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I agree with you about the fact that the greatest internal threat to the northern states today is not so much slavery as the corruption of democratic institutions … As for the policy permitting slavery to develop in a whole portion of the territory where it was hitherto unknown, I will concede, as you argue, that one can do nothing but tolerate this extension in the special, current interests of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this could not go on indefinitely. It was inadmissible that there ‘can be contained in the clauses of any contract the destruction of the right and duty of the present generation to prevent the spread of the most horrible of all social evils to millions and millions of men of future generations’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condemnation of slavery was passionate, but it was possibly necessary to tolerate the preservation and even the extension of the institution for some time. The reason emerges from a letter sent to the English economist Senior: dismemberment of the country which, more than any other, embodied the cause of liberty, ‘would inflict a serious wound on the whole human race, stoking up war in the heart of a great continent from which it has been banished for more than a century’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg156&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville was ready to sacrifice the cause of abolishing slavery to the objective of preserving the unity and stability of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although powerfully encouraged first by French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of many of its colonies, and then by the revolution in San Domingo, radical abolitionism was a short-lived affair in France itself. Immediately after Thermidor, and in fact even at the moment of its preparation, the colonists’ agitation in defence of the liberal principle of self-government (and white supremacy) resumed: it must be local assemblies that determined people’s status and hence the condition of the blacks in the colonies. As we know, this was the position of the liberal Massiac Club. Those who resisted the Thermidorian turn were immediately branded traitors and renegades to the white race (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|§12]]). The ‘Anglomane’ and pro-slaveholding Malouet returned to hold positions of power under Napoleon,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who reintroduced colonial slavery and the black slave trade.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal movement certainly did not respond to this restoration, terminated only by the revolution of February 1848, with united, decisive opposition. There were some (including Granier de Cassagnac) who defended the institution of slavery in the name of liberalism, who in fact (polemically observed an ardent abolitionist) even claimed ‘a monopoly on liberalism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be precise, along with ‘liberalism’, Cassagnac also professed himself a follower of ‘democracy’: positions no different from those maintained across the Atlantic by Calhoun, with the difference that the former regarded slavery as ‘a provisional and empirical means of creating order’ and ‘maintaining the blacks in the apprenticeship of Christianity, work and the family’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side of the scale it is to be noted that, at least in his opponents’ view, the French author was mistaken in having developed in justification of slavery a philosophy of history that did not maintain the spatial or racial delimitation of the institution, with a tendency hence to regress to positions à la Fletcher, who was now alien to the liberal movement. By contrast, an integral part of it was Thiers, who, drawing up a catastrophic balance sheet of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies, pointed to the ‘base and barbarous idleness [of] Negroes left to their own devices’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg157&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Guizot seemed more susceptible to abolitionist ideas. Nevertheless, he stressed their impracticality with an argument that is already familiar from US history: it would be necessary to compensate the owners of a legitimate form of property, but there were insufficient funds for this operation.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Le Courier de la Gironde&#039;&#039; came out in favour of a gradual abolitionism which, avoiding the ‘savage liberty’ of ‘brutalized beings’, would take the form of an extended phase of ‘liberal slavery’ (&#039;&#039;esclavage libéral&#039;&#039;)—i.e. a somewhat mitigated slavery.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise opposed to hasty measures was de Tocqueville. In May 1847, noting that the ‘Bey of Tunisia’ had already abolished the ‘odious institution’—which in Muslim countries, by the French liberal’s admission, took a ‘milder’ form—de Tocqueville expressed the opinion that ‘we should doubtless only proceed to the abolition of slavery with care and moderation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can conclude with a general consideration relating to the France of the July Monarchy: ‘Immediate and complete emancipation was not even considered as an abolitionist program until less than a year before the Revolution of 1848.’ In fact, the golden age of French liberalism, far from involving the abolition of slavery, saw its expansion: ‘as a result of the expanding French conquest of Algeria, there was far more territory with slaves under French sovereignty by the mid-1840s than there had been at the time of the July Revolution in 1830.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. The enduring effectiveness of the black revolution from below&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But if things stood thus, how was the abolition of slavery achieved? Although firmly opposed by a formidable international coalition and the liberal movement as a whole, the San Domingo revolution had a lasting influence, which proved all the stronger when conflicts within the community of the free and the white community as a whole intensified. We already know the decisive role played by the country governed by ex-slaves in propelling the independence movement in Latin America towards abolitionist positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outside the southern United States, slavery continued to be very much present in the European colonies in the Caribbean. However, here too Haiti’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg158&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;presence made itself felt. Proceeding in 1822 to annexation of the Spanish part of the island, the ex-slaves now in power delivered a further serious blow to the institution of slavery. The following year, the revolt of the black slaves in Demerara (today’s Guyana) erupted. This was a colony that had been affected by the upheavals which had reverberated in San Domingo from France. In 1794–95 a revolution exported and imposed by French forces had transformed Holland into the Batavian Republic and forced the Prince of Orange to flee to England. In the wake of events in Demerara, at the time under Dutch control, liberal agitation had developed, promoted by slave-owners who, witnessing the emergence of the prospect of black emancipation on the San Domingo model, had rapidly abandoned any sympathy for France and sought Britain’s intervention and protection.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the incorporation of Demerara into the British Empire did not extinguish the fire, which smouldered under the ashes. A black revolt broke out in 1823 and led to the death of three whites; martial law was proclaimed and 250 slaves were killed or executed. And yet, repressed in one place, revolts exploded again some years later and only a short distance away—this time in Jamaica, in 1831. In both cases Methodist and Baptist missionaries played a significant role. By converting the slaves to Christianity, they furnished them with a culture, consciousness and the possibility of meeting and communicating that clashed irreconcilably with the de-humanization and commodification of human livestock upon which the institution of slavery was based. The first revolt saw the death sentence for the Reverend John Smith, and his death in prison shortly before execution of the sentence and the arrival from London of a notice of pardon. The second became known as the ‘war of the Baptists’. In both cases, in addition to rebellious slaves, the repression by the white dominant class struck the Baptist and Methodist community. In Jamaica hundreds of black Christians were flogged, tortured or shot; and English missionaries also suffered arrest and humiliation of every kind. In fact, in neighbouring Barbados churches were sacked and destroyed and there were riots and attempted pogroms against the Methodist community. The colonists’ hatred of the non-conformist churches, accused of encouraging the slave revolt, could not be contained.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a danger that seemed all the more real and immediate because of Haiti’s proximity and the processes of emancipation underway in Latin America. Thanks to this geographical proximity, there now intervened in the struggle (wrote &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg159&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a white Jamaican to his governor) a ‘third party’ (in addition to the Crown, prompted in a reformist direction by Christian abolitionism, and the colonists, engaged in defence of self-government and their property). And this ‘third party’ comprised the slave, who ‘knows his strength, and will assert his claim to freedom’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the abolition of slavery in the colonies presented itself to the dominant class of liberal England as the requisite way out in the face of two challenges: the first consisted in the black slaves’ revolution from below; the second in the indignation that was widespread in the British Christian community which, with growing impatience, demanded decisive measures against the colonists, guilty of enslaving blacks and persecuting Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The role of Christian fundamentalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This second challenge brings us to a movement we have not hitherto been concerned with, and which cannot be confused with either the liberal tradition or French-style radicalism. While the crisis that soon led to the black revolution in San Domingo was deepening, at a time when the campaign to suppress the slave trade seemed to be at an impasse, the dying John Wesley wrote a heartfelt letter to William Wilberforce:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unless the Divine power has raised you up to be an Athanasius contra mundum, I see not how you can go through your glorious enterprise, in opposing that execrable villainy which is the scandal of religion, of England, and of human nature. Unless God has raised you up for this very thing, you will be worn out by the opposition of men and devils; but if God be for you who can be against you? Are all of them together stronger than God? Oh be not weary of well-doing. Go in the name of God, and in the power of His might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The recipient of this letter was unquestionably one of the major actors in the struggle that led to the abolition first of the slave trade and then of slavery as such. A fervent Christian, member of the House of Commons and on close &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg160&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terms with Pitt the Younger, while he received honorary French citizenship in 1792 for his anti-slavery campaign, he had nothing to do with the revolution of 1789 or, a fortiori, with radicalism. Far from welcoming the black slave revolt in San Domingo, he continued in his unwavering support for the British government, which, during the war against France, was the guarantor in the West Indies of the repression of slave revolts and the preservation of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if he identified with the England of the time and its dominant class, Wilberforce can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. Prior to directing his efforts against slavery, his religious zeal was engaged in the ‘reform of public manners’, to be advanced through the foundation of a new society intended as the ‘guardian of the religion and morals of the people’, which proposed to struggle ‘against Vice and Immorality’ and even aspired to the ‘suppression of Vice’. Hence the crusade launched against publications branded blasphemous and indecent, against rural feasts considered licentious, against the non-observance of the Sabbath among the popular classes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only subsequently did Christian fervour target the particular sin that was slavery—an institution completely unacceptable not only because of the obstacles it often put in the way of the spread of Christianity among slaves, but also because of the sexual libertinism in which it permitted their masters to indulge. Thus, another prominent supporter of English abolitionism (James Ramsay), along with slavery, called for an attack on ‘arbitrary divorces and bigamy’. Similarly, Granville Sharp combined abolitionist campaigning with a struggle against divorce legislation which, in flagrant violation of divine law, allowed the guilty couple to proceed to new weddings; and from this he moved on to announce that, together with those responsible for the slave trade and their accomplices, adulterers and those guilty of immorality would not escape divine punishment.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Sharp’s view, defenders of the institution of slavery were ‘refined modern Sadducees’. The Sadducees of Biblical fame had not hesitated to come to terms with Hellenistic and Roman culture, thereby contaminating Judaism and the word of God, and depriving them of their purity. Caught up in the enjoyment of wealth and the material world, they had forgotten or denied spiritual, otherworldly values. According to the English abolitionist, the modern Sadducees were no different. Ultimately, they were susceptible to the blandishments of the Demon, or the ‘Demon of Demons’. But the Bible must not be venerated in church, while remaining a dead letter in real life. On the contrary, it must serve as a guide in all political questions and the smallest problems of everyday &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg161&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life. All the more so in that the turning point was at hand: the times in which slavery continued to survive were the ‘latter days of Infidelity &amp;amp;amp; Deism’, representing the agony of the apocalyptic ‘Beast’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that here we have an attitude which, in contemporary terms, we would define as fundamentalist. It is a trait that was even more clearly exhibited in the United States. Here too Christian abolitionism had a programme which, along with slavery, wanted to attack vice and immorality as such. Theodore Parker denounced as contrary to the Scriptures and divine law (the only truly valid law) the ‘usury’ by which ‘banking capital’ was stained, the ‘brothels’ and bars that sold rum, and which the police not only did not target, but in fact frequented more assiduously than the ‘house of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with Britain, there was in fact a novel element. In the United States, where the law on the return of fugitive slaves required all citizens to be complicit with an institution that became ever more odious, a delicate dilemma of conscience emerged. The ‘higher laws’ of Holy Scripture must not be forgotten. For a true Christian, admonished the English abolitionist Sharp in an indignant letter to Franklin, the other laws were ‘so clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a &#039;&#039;crime&#039;&#039; to regard them as law’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with its fundamentalist character, the radicalism of Christian abolitionism was strengthened in the United States. ‘When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law that treads down the inalienable rights of man’, declared Parker, the Christian must know how to go to the limit: ‘I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice … I am not afraid of men. I can offend them. I care nothing for their hate or their esteem. But I should not dare to violate His laws, come what may come …’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sanctioned by Holy Scripture, divine, eternal, natural law was, in any event, inviolable: ‘To say that there is no law higher than what the State can make is practical atheism … If there is no God to make a law for me, then there is no God for me.’ The challenge to constituted authority was open and declared: ‘REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The federal Constitution, which obliged the Union as a whole to defend the slaveholding states against any potential slave revolution, seemed to William Garrison ‘An Agreement with Hell’ and a ‘Covenant with Death’. In 1845 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg162&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;another abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, drew attention to slave-owners’ purchase of the most important public offices and the tripling of slavery that had occurred since the ratification of the federal Constitution, which came to be branded as a ‘pro-Slavery Compact’. The coexistence of slaveholding states and free states was no longer licit, unless the latter wanted to become ‘partners in the guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Street demonstrations in which the American Constitution was burnt were understandable. In the years preceding the Civil War, when he briefly harboured the illusion that the South was on the point of giving in, Parker exulted in these terms: ‘The Devil is in great wrath because he knoweth that his time is short.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the basis of this view, no compromise was possible. And Garrison explicitly stated as much. His polemic against defenders of the institution of slavery and their accomplices assumed openly threatening tones. But also unequivocal was his condemnation of theorists of &#039;&#039;‘gradual&#039;&#039; abolition’ and ‘moderation’, and even of those in the North who displayed ‘apathy’ or limited enthusiasm for the ‘standard of emancipation’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the struggle against slavery, that ‘heinous crime in the sight of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Abolitionist radicalism and Christian fundamentalism were closely interwoven, as emerges from the summons to a crusade against ‘the governments of this world’, which ‘in their essential elements, and as present administered … are all Anti-Christ’. This involved achieving&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the emancipation of our whole race from the dominion of man, from the thraldom of self, from the government of brute force, from the bondage of sin—and bringing them under the dominion of God, the control of an inward spirit, the government of the law of love, and into the obedience and liberty of Christ …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamentalist character of such positions did not escape Calhoun. He thundered against ‘the rabid fanatics, who regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it, deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union’. For them abolition was a conscientious obligation; only thus did they conceive it possible to liberate &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg163&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;themselves from the agonizing sense of being accomplices of the unforgivable ‘sin’ allegedly represented by slavery, against which they then proclaimed a full-scale ‘crusade’, ‘a general crusade’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of southern theorists, these Christians blinded by abolitionist fury were alien to the liberal world and substantially akin to Jacobins. In fact, a movement similar to French radicalism tended to emerge in the United States, at various times and in various modes, but always on the basis of the crisis of the English and American models. The crisis of the first coincided with the rebellion against the London government. What provoked or intensified the crisis of the second was the progressive isolation of the North American republic as a slaveholding state, engaged not only in the defence of slavery but also its expansion, and which resisted unperturbed, despite the disappearance of that institution first in much of Latin America and subsequently in British and French colonies. At this point, the country that at its birth had celebrated itself as the land of liberty appeared as the champion of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There thus developed in the United States as well a radicalism that drew on Christianity. Such a ‘party’ no longer identified with either the English or the American model. It rejected both the spatial and the racial delimitation of the community of the free, and thus regarded the exclusion clauses that characterized the English and American models as unacceptable. And in order to change things, it did not preclude appeals to the revolutionary initiative of the excluded. This was the religious and political climate in which John Brown’s armed raid into Virginia in 1859 matured, intent on inciting a slave uprising and convinced that, without the shedding of blood, there was no remission of sins. The attempt failed miserably and ended with the protagonist being hanged, but Parker reiterated the slaves’ right to armed rebellion: sooner or later, ‘the Fire of Vengeance may be waked up even in an African’s heart’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. What is radicalism? The contrast with liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Formed in the wake of disappointment in the English and American models, how did ‘radicalism’ differ from liberalism? The answer is obvious, if we refer to authors like Locke and Calhoun, profoundly liberal and yet at the same time without any doubts as to the legitimacy of black slavery. The answer is not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg164&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even difficult if we draw a comparison with authors such as Burke, Jefferson and Acton who, notwithstanding reservations and criticisms of the institution, on various grounds represented ideological and political reference points for the slaveholding South, or even continued to defend it to the end. The line of demarcation also proves sufficiently clear if we compare authors like Blackstone and Montesquieu, who tended to contest ‘slavery among ourselves’ rather than slavery as such, with a radicalism committed to rejecting both the spatial delimitation (the English model until 1833) and the racial delimitation (the American model until 1865) of the community of the free. But how is de Tocqueville clearly distinguished from authors like Diderot, Condorcet and Schoelcher, whom I have included in the process of French radicalism’s formation and development? What sense does it make to situate in two different, even opposed formations de Tocqueville and Condorcet, who were, respectively, one of the great critics of the Terror and one of its most illustrious victims? Is it right to include in the same party French and American radicals who adopted such a different attitude towards Christianity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before answering these questions, it is worth lingering over something that characterized the liberal tradition from its outset. Let us take authors like Montesquieu, Smith and Millar. Although condemning slavery more or less sharply, all three continued to regard England—a country in the front rank in the slave trade—as a model. In no instance did criticism or condemnation of slavery involve exclusion of the beneficiaries or theorists of the institution from the community of the free and the liberal party. On more than one occasion, Burke distanced himself from the institution of slavery, but when the conflict between the two Atlantic shores erupted he not only celebrated the love of liberty which particularly animated southern colonies, but disdainfully rejected the idea that, in an attempt to suppress the rebellion, appeal might be made to ‘servile hands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, the British Whig continued to include slave-owners in the community of the free while excluding a priori their victims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the institution of slavery was clear and firm in Hume. But this did not prevent him from asserting that ‘European nations’ represented ‘that part of the globe [which] maintain[s] sentiments of liberty, honour, equity and valour superior to the rest of mankind’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, there was reason to believe that blacks were ‘naturally inferior to the whites’ and inferior to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg165&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the point of lacking any ‘symptoms’ of ‘ingenuity’ and free spirit.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So once again, despite the condemnation of slavery, it was its beneficiaries—not its victims—who formed an integral part of the community of the free and the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The boundaries of the community of the free could lose something of their naturalistic rigidity; but the rituals of self-celebration, and the enormous repression it was based on, persisted. In 1772 Arthur Young calculated that, out of 775 million global inhabitants, only 33 million enjoyed liberty; and they were concentrated in a fairly restricted zone of the planet, excluding Asia, Africa and virtually all of America, as well as the southern and eastern parts of Europe itself.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a theme subsequently taken up and eloquently developed by Adam Smith:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In similar vein, Millar contrasted ‘Great Britain, in which liberty is generally so well understood, and so highly valued’, with ‘all those tribes of barbarians, in different parts of the world, with which we have any correspondence’ and among whom ‘the practice of domestic slavery’ continued to rage.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Europe and the West were complacently depicted as a tiny island of liberty and civilization in a tempestuous ocean of tyranny, slavery and barbarism. In order to indulge in such self-celebration, Young, Smith and Millar were in fact obliged to overlook a far from trivial detail: the slave trade, which involved the most brutal form of slavery—chattel slavery—and in which western Europe, starting precisely with liberal England, was engaged for centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was not very different. When he published &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, there were few countries or colonies in the western hemisphere where slavery persisted, since it had been abolished in much of Latin America and the British colonies. In the interval between the publication of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg166&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;first and second volumes of the work, the United States introduced into Texas the institution that should have been synonymous with the absolute power of man over man. But this prompted no uncertainty in the French liberal when it came to identifying the American continent as the locus of liberty. Volume One of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; appeared shortly after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. But that would appear to have been an irrelevant event in the opinion of de Tocqueville, who, when it came to comparing England and the United States, had no doubt that the latter country most fully embodied the cause of liberty. And Jefferson, the president slave-owner and unyielding opponent of the country born out of a revolution by black slaves, seemed to the French liberal to be ‘the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln himself initially conducted the Civil War as a crusade against rebellion and separatism, not for the abolition of slavery, which could continue to survive in states loyal to central government. It was only later, with the recruitment of blacks into the Union army and hence with the direct intervention of slaves and ex-slaves in the conflict, that the civil war between whites was transformed into a revolution, conducted partly from above and partly from below, making the abolition of slavery inevitable. But in the first phase of the war the Union did not a priori exclude slave states from its bosom, just as liberal critics of the institution of slavery did not expel those who had a different and even contrary position on the problem from the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tendency we are examining finds fullest expression in Lieber. Cautious criticisms of the institution of slavery did not prevent him, even on the immediate eve of the Civil War, from attributing to the United States—the country that even more than England embodied the great cause of ‘liberal institutions’ and ‘self-government’—the ‘great mission’ of spreading liberty throughout the world. ‘[E]very American’ must always bear in mind the grandeur of the constitutional principles and texts of his country. Otherwise, they would resemble ‘the missionary that should proceed to convert the world without bible or prayer-book’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it was the sacred text of liberty for the liberal author, for the radicals Garrison and Phillips the US Constitution, which sanctioned slavery and the racial state, was an instrument of Satan. Over and above the very different significance assigned to the problem of slavery, here we have two opposed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg167&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;delimitations of political geography, of the camp of friends and enemies. Notwithstanding the argument and conflict over slavery, liberalism’s various exponents continued to recognize themselves as members of the same party and the same community of the free. By contrast, excluded from it were blacks, whom at an interval of decades Jefferson and Lincoln intended to deport from the Union and who, not by chance, after emancipation first in the North and then in the South did not come to enjoy either political or civil equality. Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, not to mention Lieber and Acton, could indeed criticize slavery, but it was understood that that their interlocutors were not black slaves but their masters. The latter were called upon to demonstrate moral sensitivity and political consistency and hence agree to expunge a stain that affected the credibility of the community of the free as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet’s attitude was very different. Here is how he addressed the black slaves in 1781:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dear friends, although I am not the same colour as you, I have always regarded you as my brothers. Nature has fashioned you to have the same spirit, the same reason and the same virtues as whites. I am only speaking here of whites in Europe, for when it comes to whites in the colonies, I shall not insult you by comparing them to you … Should one set off in search of a man in the islands of America, one would certainly not find him among the populations of white flesh.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The French philosopher was not yet aware of it, but the ruling group in the North American republic was on the point of being situated outside not only the party of liberty, but even the human race. What we have here is a political and ideological current different from liberalism—the radicalism that had been formed or was in the process of being formed. It might seem debatable to apply this category to an author who recommended extreme gradualism in the process of abolishing slavery. But that is not the main point. Marat himself, in 1791, proposed ‘gradually to prepare the transition from slavery to liberty’. And yet, already unequivocally condemning ‘the barbarism of the colonists’, it was not to them that he looked to make the desired change, and not even to the National Assembly which, coming to terms with the slaveholders, rode roughshod over the rights of man and ‘the sacred foundations of the Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The actual interlocutors tended to be the black slaves themselves, as would &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg168&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become clear in the course of Marat’s subsequent evolution. As for Condorcet, despite the gradualist character of his abolitionism, he deflected back onto slaveholding whites the de-humanizing drive they had mobilized against blacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was an attitude that could also develop on the basis of a profoundly Christian consciousness. Here is how Garrison expressed himself in 1841 on the subject of slave-owners:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No political, no religious copartnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the convicts at Botany Bay and New Zealand … We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But some decades earlier the English abolitionist Percival Stockdale had already declared: &#039;&#039;‘We&#039;&#039; are the savages; the Africans act like men; like beings endowed with rational and immortal minds’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, indignation at the treatment inflicted on the black slaves could even conduce to a de-humanization of the de-humanizers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regarding slaves as their interlocutors, radicals did not hesitate to appeal to a revolution from below by victims of the institution it was intended to abolish. Even prior to the revolution by San Domingo’s slaves, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; evoked a massive uprising, led by a black Spartacus, which might involve replacing the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in force by a &#039;&#039;‘Code blanc’&#039;&#039; that repaid the slaveholders for the injustices they had committed.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the liberal tradition, in Smith we can come across evocation of a dictatorship from above putting an end to the scandal of an institution that sullied the community of the free, but certainly not hopes for a revolution from below. We know the sympathy or admiration with which Grégoire and Schoelcher viewed Toussaint L’Ouverture and Haiti. These are two names that do not appear in de Tocqueville. In connection with San Domingo, he limited himself to mentioning the ‘bloody catastrophe that has put an end to its existence’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Paradoxically, the island ceased to exist the moment it put an end, for the first time in the Americas, to the institution of slavery!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg169&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Finally, Diderot reported an observation by Helvétius: ‘What is the cause of England’s extreme power? Its government.’ He followed up this assessment with a polemical question: ‘But what is the cause of the extreme poverty of Scotland and Ireland?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Judgement of the metropolis could not be separated from judgement of the colonies and semi-colonies. From the standpoint of authors like Diderot and Schoelcher, England and the United States, the holy sites of liberty in de Tocqueville’s view, were responsible for the most ferocious and barbarous despotism. Even when it criticized slavery, the liberal tradition did not question the identification of the West with civilization and of the colonial world with barbarism. Radicalism’s position was different: in the first instance, it identified and denounced barbarism in those responsible for, and complicit with, the most macroscopic violation of the rights and dignity of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels may be regarded as critical inheritors of radicalism. For the first in particular, not only was it epistemologically and politically arbitrary to ignore the politico-social reality of the colonies, but (as we shall see) those colonies were the requisite starting-point for understanding the ‘barbarism’ of bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. Liberalism, the self-celebration of the community of the free and repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The discourse developed by liberalism is profoundly marked by repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples. The self-celebration of the land of the free or the people of the free proved all the more persuasive in that it overlooked the slavery inflicted on colonial populations or populations of colonial origin. Only on this condition could Montesquieu, Blackstone and the American revolutionaries point to England or the United States as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This also applies to de Tocqueville. He lucidly and unsparingly described the inhuman treatment meted out to Indians and blacks. The former were forced to endure the ‘frightful sufferings’ attendant upon ‘forced migrations’ (the successive deportations imposed by the whites), and were even close to being wiped off the face of the earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the blacks, let us leave to one side the specifically slaveholding states of the South: What was the situation in the rest? Over and above harsh material living conditions, ‘a wretched and precarious &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg170&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;existence’, desperate poverty and a higher mortality rate than among slaves,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the notionally free black also weighed exclusion from the enjoyment of civil rights (as well as political rights): he was subjected to the ‘tyranny of the law’ and the ‘intolerance of customs’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|§7]]). And so, discounting the Far West and the South, even in the case of the free states we cannot speak of democracy or even strictly of the rule of law. But that was not the conclusion reached by de Tocqueville, who celebrated the democracy, ‘alive, active, triumphant’, he saw operative in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will see there a people among whom conditions are more equal than they have ever been among us; among whom the social structure, the customs, the laws, everything is democratic; among whom everything comes from the people and returns to it, and where, nevertheless, each individual enjoys an independence that is fuller, and a liberty that is greater, than in any other time or place on earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While he felt sympathy for the tragedy of the Indians and blacks, their fate had no epistemological relevance and in no way altered his overall political judgement. The programmatic declaration made by de Tocqueville at the start of the chapter devoted to the problem of ‘the three races that inhabit the territory of the United States’ is unequivocal: ‘The principal task that I had imposed upon myself is now performed: I have shown, as far as I was able, the laws and the customs of the American democracy. Here I might stop’. It was only in order to avoid possible disappointment on the reader’s part that de Tocqueville spoke of relations between the three ‘races’: ‘These topics are collaterally connected with my subject without forming a part of it; they are American without being democratic, and to portray democracy has been my principal aim.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Democracy could be defined and liberty lauded focusing exclusively on the white community. If, instead, we regard this abstraction as arbitrary, and bear in mind the entanglement of slavery and liberty revealed by authoritative US scholars, we cannot but be even more surprised by de Tocqueville’s epistemological than his political naivety. He celebrated as the locus of liberty one of the few countries in the New World where racial chattel slavery reigned and flourished and which, at the time of the French liberal’s journey, had as its president Andrew Jackson, slave-owner and protagonist of a policy of deporting and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;decimating the Indian; a president, moreover, who, blocking the circulation of abolitionist material by post, also struck at the freedom of expression of significant sections of the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such naivety reached its culmination in a French follower of de Tocqueville—namely, Édouard Laboulaye. He too contrasted the United States with a France plagued by constant revolutionary upheavals. In the former, he observed in 1849 in the inaugural lecture (published separately the following year) of a course devoted to US history, a Constitution characterized by extraordinary ‘wisdom’ and rejection of any ‘demagogic’ element made it possible to enjoy peace and, at the same time, the greatest liberty and ‘the most absolute political equality’—an equality that was ‘complete, absolute, in laws and customs alike’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the problem of the relations between the three races referred to by de Tocqueville, nothing remains in the text we are examining but the celebration of the remarkable successes achieved by ‘a nation of European race’, by this ‘strong race of emigrants’ or this ‘people of Puritans’—in other words, the ‘American race’. Even if it was a story that had unfolded across the Atlantic, it covered ‘our race’ (European and white) as a whole in glory.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a view reiterated ten years later, in an emotional essay published on the occasion of de Tocqueville’s death: the homage paid to the author of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; ended with homage to the ‘beautiful federal Constitution that has protected the liberty of the United States for seventy years’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are on the eve of the Civil War. But even its outbreak does not seem to have prompted any second thoughts in Laboulaye: it was understood that ‘complete, candid, sincere liberty’ reigned in the United States. The bloody conflict underway demonstrated the ‘courage’ of a ‘free people who sacrificed everything to maintain the unity’ of the country.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when reconstructing the history of America in the colonial period did Laboulaye feel obliged to confront the issue of slavery. Although mitigated by reference to ‘climate’ (which rendered work intolerable for whites but not blacks), historical circumstances (at the time it was at its height, ‘the slave trade was regarded as a pious undertaking’), and the particular characteristics of the people subjected to it (it involved a ‘race of eternal minors’),[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] condemnation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg172&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the institution was sharp. In the first volume, whose Preface is dated 1855, we read:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In half of the United States there are two societies established on the same soil: the one powerful, active, united and prudent; the other weak, disunited, indifferent and exploited like cattle. And yet this despised herd is a constant threat to America … The stain that soils this great society places it beneath Europe.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although sketching this realistic picture, the Preface continued to celebrate the United States indiscriminately as the privileged site of liberty, guaranteed and guarded by an ‘admirable Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However hard the lot of the blacks—silence persisted about the Indians—it was irrelevant when it came to formulating an overall judgement of the country under investigation. But there is more. Laboulaye acknowledged that slavery made its oppressive influence felt on the white master himself: he was denied the right to educate and emancipate his own slave, even if he or she was a child born from a relationship with a slave. He was required by law to inflict even the most drastic of punishments, including castration, on the guilty slave.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although criticized, these serious interferences with the individual freedom of white property-owners did not in the slightest darken the bright picture we already know.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1864 Laboulaye denounced the privilege granted by the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision to the ‘particular, superior race’ made up of the ‘great lords’ of the South who were the slave-owners (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). But if things stood thus, if inequality marked relations within the elite itself, if even within the white community there was a privileged ‘particular race’, what was the meaning of the claim that the United States was characterized by ‘the most absolute political equality’? Laboulaye felt no need to revise his positions. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to reiterate them in the Preface to the third volume, which continued to celebrate the American Revolution as the sole genuinely democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like colonies in the strict sense, Ireland continued to be ignored. In the course of his journey to the British Isles, de Tocqueville visited the unhappy island and described its desperate situation unsparingly. It was not simply that ‘the poverty is horrible’; denied here was liberal freedom itself, crushed by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg173&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘military tribunals’ and a ‘large gendarmerie hated by the people’. At this point a comparison between England and Ireland occurred: ‘The two aristocracies I have referred to have the same origin, the same customs and almost the same laws. Yet the one has for centuries given the English one of the best governments in the world, while the other has given the Irish one of the most detestable imaginable’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is an astonishing statement: not only are readers not informed that the aristocracy dominant in Ireland was itself British or of British origin, but they have the impression that they are dealing with two different countries, not two regions of a single state, subject to the authority of the same government and the same crown.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can then understand de Tocqueville’s admiring conclusion: ‘I see the Englishman secure under the protection of his laws’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, the Irish were not subsumed under the category of ‘English’, but such non-subsumption does not seem to be a problem, does not affect the laudatory judgement passed on the country visited and held up as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The colonial question and the differential development of radicalism in France, England and the United States&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has sometimes been made to ‘philosophic radicalism’ in connection with Bentham and his school.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theorist of utilitarianism adopted a debunking tone towards his country’s political, legal and ideological tradition. He did hesitate to denounce the ‘almost universal corruption’ that raged in England and the ill-starred role of a ‘corrupted and corrupting aristocracy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He did not even spare the Glorious Revolution, despite the religious aura habitually surrounding it: the &#039;&#039;‘original compact&#039;&#039;—the compact between king and people—was a fabulous one—the &#039;&#039;supervening&#039;&#039; compact—the compact between King, Lords, and Commons, was but too real a one’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and sanctioned the domination of an oligarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is sufficient to look at the attitude Bentham took towards the liberal tradition’s exclusion clauses to realize that we are very far removed from &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg174&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;radicalism in the sense specified here. Of the refuse and ‘dross’ and those confined in workhouses, we have already spoken. We must now concern ourselves with the condition of the blacks. Bentham included ‘the still unabrogated sanction given to domestic slavery on account of difference of colour’ among the ‘imperfections of detail’ to be found even in the ‘matchlessly felicitous system’ of the United States.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from this rather euphemistic description of the institution of slavery, the English liberal stressed that a project of emancipation must proceed with extreme gradualism, and be implemented exclusively from above. In a text from 1822, we come across a significant declaration: ‘The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are led to think of the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. But instead, as a note makes clear, the reference is to Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;!&lt;br /&gt;
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As for gradualism, this was necessary for the purposes not only of respecting ‘rights of property’ (which must be compensated for the loss suffered), but also of educating slaves for liberty.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bentham wanted an emancipation ‘lottery’ that might occur at the moment of hereditary transmission of this special property, and from which one-tenth of the slaves owned by the deceased could benefit. An appeal to masters to demonstrate flexibility was the counterpart of indignant condemnation of any initiative from below:&lt;br /&gt;
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The injustice and the calamity which have accompanied precipitate attempts, form the greatest objection against projects of emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This operation need not be suddenly carried into effect by a violent revolution, which, by displeasing every body, destroying all property, and placing all persons in situations for which they were not fitted, might produce evils a thousand times greater than all the benefits that can be expected from it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, the prime site of the formation of radicalism, in the sense I have defined it, was France. It is easy to see why. The country was favourably disposed to accommodate it following defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of a large number of colonies. Subsequently, the controversy that developed either side of the Atlantic on the occasion of the English colonists’ rebellion ended up discrediting both fractions of the liberal party. The American Revolution, with its development of relations of equality within the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg175&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;white community and clear demarcation from the world of feudal privilege, galvanized harsher criticism of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France and the crisis of the English model. Disenchantment with the non-abolition of slavery in America and the emergence of an unprecedented racial state also threw the American model into crisis. The roots of French radicalism lay in this dual crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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But what was its influence across the Channel and the Atlantic? The problem can be reformulated as follows. Liberal England, derived from the Glorious Revolution, and especially the American Revolution, made a powerful contribution to the ideological preparation of the French Revolution and subsequently, through the crisis of the two models, to the formation of radicalism. But why did the latter not seem to take deep root in the two classical countries of the liberal tradition? Obviously, the vexed course of the revolution and the explosion of the Terror immediately damaged France’s powers of attraction. A far from negligible role in frustrating the diffusion of radicalism was also played by repression. In England in 1794 habeas corpus was suspended for eight years; a further suspension followed in 1817; while two years later there occurred what has passed into history as the Peterloo Massacre or (to put it in the indignant words of an English paper of the time) the ‘slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, unprovoked and unnecessary’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Suffering deportation to Australia and meeting with a horrible fate, sometimes dying under the lashes of merciless flogging, were members of workers’ societies, clubs that were or more or less Jacobin in orientation, and Chartists engaged in the struggle to extend the suffrage, not to mention ‘Irish dissidents’ for whom ‘Australia was the official Siberia … at the turn of the century’. In total, ‘between 1800 and 1850 … about 1,800 were deported for political “crimes”. Among them were representatives of nearly every protest movement known to the British Government’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, the repression also struck circles that regarded violent revolution by black slaves as legitimate, or even invoked it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1798 the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in the United States, containing serious restrictions on constitutional liberties, granting the president a wide range of discretionary power and particularly hitting followers of ideas suspected of being influenced by the French Revolution. And we already know about the violence, predominantly from below, to which abolitionists were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, neither the Terror in France nor the repression in Britain and the United States suffice to explain the weakness of radicalism across the Channel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg176&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or the Atlantic. The analysis must be taken further. In England the outbreak of war made it possible for the dominant class to present as a patriotic duty the struggle against the revolutionary fanaticism raging in France, and which threatened to spread to Ireland, posing a mortal risk to the British Empire. As for the United States, it is interesting to observe the debate which, on the eve of the war against Britain that broke out in 1812, involved two prestigious representatives of the South. The first, Randolph, declared himself against the opening of hostilities. The situation was full of peril on the home front, where the ‘infernal principles of French liberty’ risked provoking a revolt by slaves; ‘[t]he French Revolution has polluted them.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Calhoun, by contrast, did not share these concerns. Certainly, attention should be paid to the slaves’ moods, but happily ‘more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So radicalism, with its recognition of the right of black slaves or Irish semi-slaves to take up arms against their masters, posed a serious threat to the stability of the United States and the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The lesser weight of the colonial question, or of populations of colonial origin, also helps explain the greater diffusion of radicalism in France. When the black revolution in San Domingo broke out, radical circles in Paris had no great difficulty recognizing and legitimating the fait accompli. Even if there was a risk of losing the remaining colonies, as anti-abolitionists never tired of warning, that would not be an irreparable tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation was different when it came to Britain and the United States. The black revolution in San Domingo provoked a wave of indignation in both countries. ‘A Black State in the Western Archipelago’, wrote &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, ‘is utterly incompatible with the system of all European colonisation.’ And hence ‘Europe will, of course, recover in that quarter the ascendancy and dominion which it justly claims from the superior wisdom and talents of its inhabitants’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The United States not only refused to recognize the country born of a black revolution, but did everything it could to isolate, weaken and overthrow it.&lt;br /&gt;
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Jefferson distinguished himself in this operation. At first sight he seems closest to radicalism. In January 1793, without allowing himself to be impressed by the charges against the Jacobins levelled by his former private secretary (referring to Paris, he spoke of ‘streets … literally red with blood’), he continued passionately to defend the ‘cause’ of the French Revolution: ‘rather than it &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg177&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam &amp;amp;amp; an Eve left in every country, &amp;amp;amp; left free, it would be better than it now is.’ Moreover, Jefferson positively contrasted France with the United States, where Anglophiles regarded the 1787 Constitution, with the very wide powers it conferred on the president and executive, as a first step towards the establishment of a monarchy.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the picture changed markedly following the black revolution in San Domingo. We know that Jefferson interpreted the principle of equality in radical fashion, but always within the ambit of the white community. He never believed in the possibility of whites and blacks coexisting on an equal basis: it would represent an unjustifiable challenge to ‘the real distinctions which nature has made’ and end in ‘the extermination of the one or the other race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the conflict between white owners and black slaves exploded on the Caribbean island, the North American statesman’s sympathy immediately went to the former; his anxiety about ‘the revolutionary storm now sweeping the globe’ was profound. Hence his support for the invading army sent by Napoleon, which did not cease even in the face of recourse to revolting practices, such as the introduction of trained dogs to tear blacks to pieces and the organization around such events of mass spectacles, at once thrilling and educative.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. The liberal ebb of Christian radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States radicalism took shape on a Christian basis. Interpretation of the conflict in religious terms in fact involved serious limitations. Scarce attention was paid to the humiliation and oppression blacks also suffered in the North: this was a condition which did not take the immediately obvious form of slavery and sin. With the end of the Civil War, the abolitionist movement soon split, and thus was not in a position to offer theoretical, and still less practical, resistance to the regime of terroristic white supremacy that asserted itself in the South after the (anti-black) compromise of 1877 between the two sections of the white community. The weight of racial prejudice was too strong, and only the massive, prolonged presence of Union troops could have &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#page178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#pg178&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;guaranteed blacks the enjoyment of political rights and full recognition of their civil rights. But all this would have involved too serious a violation of the liberal principle of self-government. Among the theorists of abolitionism, possibly the only one who was inclined to go the whole way on the road of imposing the principle of racial equality by force of arms was Wendell Phillips. But when in 1875 he sought to set out his reasons at an assembly in Boston, he was brusquely silenced. The previous year, a senator from the South had observed with satisfaction: &#039;&#039;‘Radicalism&#039;&#039; is dissolving—going to pieces’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, local self-government was reasserted, but radical democracy disappeared and the Calvary of the blacks resumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, what prompted Anglo-American Christian abolitionism to condemnation of the sin of slavery was sympathy for a people largely converted to Christianity, who regarded Christianity as an instrument with which to overcome the condition of total de-humanization and achieve a minimum of recognition. Liberated from an obsession with sin and complicity in sin thanks to the abolition of slavery, Parker believed that there was no political solution to the persistent problem of the discrimination and injustice suffered by blacks: one could only place hope in the matrimonial fusion of the two races or the beneficent effects of the infusion of ‘dreadful Anglo-saxon blood’ in black veins. In a sense, this was a radical perspective, strongly counter to the dominant ideology. However, rather than on organizing the oppressed blacks, attention focused on overcoming the prejudices on the part of the oppressors that cemented barriers of race and caste. Radicalism thus tended to be reabsorbed by liberalism. Things were even worse for the Indians, regarded as savages and pagans. Parker had no hesitation in justifying the policy of ‘continual aggression, invasion, and extermination’ pursued by the indomitable people that were the Anglo-Saxons.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the end of the Civil War gave new impetus to the march into the Far West. The influence of the colonial question once again intervenes to explain the weakness of American radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. Liberal socialism and radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Much more so than Bentham, it was Kant who came close to radicalism. His clear adoption of a position favourable to revolutionary France is not so significant. More relevant is the fact that, intervening in 1795, a year after the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, with clear critical reference to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg179&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;England, &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039; identified ‘the sugar cane islands’ as the ‘site of the cruellest slavery that has ever been imagined’. There were two further decisive elements. Like the French radicals—we must not forget that the colonial question weighed even less heavily on Germany than France—Kant problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism: it was England that now represented the cause of ‘slavery and barbarism’. Finally, quite unlike the liberals, he did not confine himself to criticizing Pitt, whom he said was rightly ‘hated as an enemy of the human race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The German philosopher’s radicalism did not escape his contemporaries: while Goethe regarded his attitude towards England as scarcely ‘liberal’, Wilhelm von Humboldt sharply distanced himself from the ‘democratism’ pervading &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, rather than Bentham, it was John Stuart Mill who approximated to radicalism, when he identified slavery as ‘the most flagrant of all possible violations’ of liberal principles and branded those who defended it ‘the powers of evil’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, along with ‘the noble body of Abolitionists’, Mill also celebrated John Brown, author of the failed attempt to get the slaves of the southern United States to rise up.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a text of 1824 the English philosopher expressed his sympathy for the cause of the blacks of San Domingo–Haiti, whom the Napoleonic expedition vainly sought half to ‘exterminate’ and half to reduce to conditions of slavery once again.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Putting clear distance between himself and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries, Mill did not seem to recoil in horror from the prospect of a revolution from below by black slaves. And yet, in another respect, he was the theorist of a new ‘slavery’, temporary and pedagogical in kind, for ‘savages’ (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English author asserted that the final stage of his development was characterized by gravitation towards ‘socialism’ and, at the same time, renewed distrust of ‘democracy’. What caused and justified the latter was ‘the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Already problematic in the metropolis, democracy proved decidedly dangerous and inadvisable when it came to the colonies and peoples of colonial origin (including Afro-Americans). Theorist of the planetary despotism of the West, Mill seems equally remote from radical, ‘abolitionist democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg180&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused. Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ can be envisaged restrictively for the ‘master race’ and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin. At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism, but without crossing it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference to Zionism, Arendt drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a peculiar tendency. It was characterized, on the one hand, by support for ‘chauvinist’ objectives and, on the other, by commitment to pursuing collectivist experiments and a ‘rigorous realization of social justice’ within its own community. Thus crystallized ‘a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach and revolutionary social reforms domestically, with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy’, and in the field of relations with colonial peoples.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, ‘master-race democracy’ can also go further and take the form of ‘master-race socialism’, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as ‘master race’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in 1860, during the Second Opium War, a Franco-British expedition destroyed the Summer Palace, it was Victor Hugo who proved to be the inheritor of radicalism with his denunciation of the barbarity committed by self-styled civilizers, while for Mill, as for the liberal culture of the time, there continued to be few doubts about the complete identity between the West and civilization (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|§3]] and [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn1a|1]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, trans. Ernest Dilworth, New York: Mineola, 2003, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn3a|3]] Claude-Adrien Helvétius, &#039;&#039;De l’homme&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vols 7–12, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–69, vol. 8, p. 86. For the criticism of Helvétius, cf. Denis Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘L’homme’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Laurent Versini, vol. 1, Paris: Laffont, 1994, p. 862.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn4a|4]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Paul Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1963, p. 41 (article on &#039;&#039;Représentants&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn6a|6]] Cf. Gabriel Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1931, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn7a|7]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 47, 49, 55.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn8a|8]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn9a|9]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 230–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn10a|10]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 47–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn13a|13]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 55–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn17a|17]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. 2–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn18a|18]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn19a|19]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 167, 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn20a|20]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, pp. 31, 106.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Manuskripte über die polnische Frage&#039;&#039;, ed. Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1961, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn22a|22]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn23a|23]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Gedanken und Erinnerungen&#039;&#039;, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1928, pp. 51–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn24a|24]] Furet and Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn25a|25]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 384–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn26a|26]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn27a|27]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn29a|29]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn30a|30]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, p. 1078.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn31a|31]] Franco Venturi, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90, vol. 3, pp. 383, 398–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn32a|32]] Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique&#039;&#039;, pp. 133ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn33a|33]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 8, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn36a|36]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Saggio sui regni di Claudio e di Nerone e sui costume e gli scritti di Seneca&#039;&#039;, trans. Secondo Carpanetto and Luciano Guerci, Palermo: Sellerio, 1987, pp. 327–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn37a|37]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, pp. 31, 34, 33; Bernard Faÿ, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1925, p. 62 (for the translation of substantial extracts in France).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn38a|38]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 957–8 (letter to Diodati, 3 August 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn39a|39]] Étienne Clavière and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1996, pp. 64, 95 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 340.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn42a|42]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn43a|43]] Cf. Joel H. Wiener, &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983, vol. 1, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn44a|44]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 7, pp. 162–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn45a|45]] François-Noël Babeuf, &#039;&#039;Écrits&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Mazauric, 1988, p. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn46a|46]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn48a|48]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant&#039;&#039;, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn49a|49]] Clavière and Brissot, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, pp. 324–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn50a|50]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn52a|52]] Fay, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire&#039;&#039;, pp. 132–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn53a|53]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française et la fin des colonies&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1988, pp. 189–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn54a|54]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 27, 33–4. Cf. Carminella Biondi, &#039;&#039;Mon frère, tu es mon esclave&#039;&#039;, Pisa: Libreria Goliardica, 1973, pp. 23–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn56a|56]] Antoine-P.-J. M. Barnave, &#039;&#039;Introduction à la révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Fernand Rude, Paris: Colin, 1960, pp. 13, 18, 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn58a|58]] See articles 44–46 of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 178–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn59a|59]] Jean-Pierre Biondi and François Zuccarelli, &#039;&#039;16 pluviôse an II&#039;&#039;, Paris: Denoël, 1989, pp. 48, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn60a|60]] Mirabeau, quoted in Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 86 n. 4 (speech in National Assembly, 3 July 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn61a|61]] Mirabeau, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn62a|62]] Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 43–4; Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 388.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn63a|63]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 82–3, 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn64a|64]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 47.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn65a|65]] See Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes&#039;&#039;, trans. David Bailie Warden, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1997, pp. 42–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn66a|66]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn67a|67]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn68a|68]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 471.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 194–202 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;, 239–40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn71a|71]] Sonthonax, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 82.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn72a|72]] Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau&#039;&#039;, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996, pp. 50–1, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., p. 83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., p. 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn77a|77]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Des colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998, p. 242 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., pp. 166, 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn80a|80]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Esclavage et colonisation&#039;&#039;, ed. Émile Tersen, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn82a|82]] Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution francaise&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn83a|83]] Sir Thomas Aston, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn84a|84]] Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 161–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn85a|85]] Richard Hocquellet, ‘Crise de la monarchie hispanique et question coloniale ‘, in Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny, eds, &#039;&#039;Rétablissement de l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn86a|86]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 407, 760.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn87a|87]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 345–7; Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn88a|88]] Simón Bolívar, &#039;&#039;Obras completas&#039;&#039;, ed. Vicente Lecuna, Caracas: Ministerio de Educación nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; vol. 3, p. 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 170.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 679.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 685, 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 694.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 682.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn94a|94]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 381.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn95a|95]] Michael Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn96a|96]] Albert Gallatin, quoted in Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Hart Benton, quoted in ibid., p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn98a|98]] Jefferson, quoted in Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn99a|99]] Madison, quoted in ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn100a|100]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 202, 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn101a|101]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 388, 395–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn102a|102]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 245–61, in particular p. 257 (for the quotation from Walker).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn103a|103]] Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 270.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn104a|104]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn105a|105]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, pp. xx–xxi (letter to Robert E. Lee).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn107a|107]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn108a|108]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 324, 327.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 125.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 189–90 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 10 January 1857), p. 193 (letter to E. V. Childe, 2 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 195–6 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 13 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 190 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 4 September 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn113a|113]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 260–3, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn114a|114]] Henri-Alexandre Wallon, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974, p. v.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn115a|115]] See the letter from Granier de Cassagnac published in &#039;&#039;Journal des Débats&#039;&#039;, 23 July 1841.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn116a|116]] Thiers, quoted in Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn117a|117]] Cf. ibid., pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn118a|118]] André-Jean Tudesq, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 842.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn119a|119]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn120a|120]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 163, 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn121a|121]] Emília Viotti da Costa, &#039;&#039;Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn122a|122]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 195–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn123a|123]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn124a|124]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from Wesley to Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn125a|125]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn126a|126]] Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 387, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn127a|127]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, Ibid., pp. 387–90, 395.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn128a|128]] Parker, quoted in Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1978, p. 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn129a|129]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn130a|130]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn131a|131]] Parker, quoted in ibid., pp. 208, 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn132a|132]] Phillips, quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 1–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn133a|133]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn134a|134]] Garrison, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn135a|135]] Garrison, quoted in Aileen S. Kraditor, &#039;&#039;Means and Ends in American Abolitionism&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn136a|136]] Garrison, quoted in ibid., p. 86.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn137a|137]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 528–31, 261–2, 469.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn138a|138]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn139a|139]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn140a|140]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 1, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn141a|141]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1987, p. 208 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn143a|143]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 451–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn144a|144]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289, 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn145a|145]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn146a|146]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 264, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn147a|147]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn148a|148]] Cf. &#039;&#039;L’Ami du peuple&#039;&#039;, 18 May 1791, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, pp. 120–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn149a|149]] Garrison, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn150a|150]] Stockdale, quoted in David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn151a|151]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn152a|152]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn153a|153]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn154a|154]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 339, 354–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368 and n. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn156a|156]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 174 (speech to the Constituent Assembly, 12 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn157a|157]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn158a|158]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;De la Constitution américaine et de l’utilité de son étude&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hennuyer, 1850, pp. 10–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., pp. 6, 9–10, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn160a|160]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;L’état et ses limites suivi d’essais politiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn161a|161]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. viii–ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn162a|162]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, pp. 420–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn163a|163]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 431.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn164a|164]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. vi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn165a|165]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 425–7, 430.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn166a|166]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94, 128, 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn167a|167]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn168a|168]] See Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn169a|169]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 3, p. 442.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn170a|170]] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn172a|172]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn173a|173]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn174a|174]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 346.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn175a|175]] The text, taken from &#039;&#039;Sherwin’s Weekly Political Register&#039;&#039;, 18 August 1819, is quoted in Paola Casana Testore and Narciso Nada, &#039;&#039;L’età della Restaurazione&#039;&#039;, Turin: Loescher, 1981, pp. 226–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn176a|176]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, pp. 181, 195.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn177a|177]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 325–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn178a|178]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn179a|179]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 293.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn180a|180]] Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn181a|181]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1004 (letter to William Short, 3 January 1793). On all this, see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, &#039;&#039;The Age of Federalism&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 316–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn182a|182]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn183a|183]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 386; Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, pp. 197, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn184a|184]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1989, pp. 554, 528.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn185a|185]] Slotkin, &#039;&#039;Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, pp. 232, 230.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186a|186]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso&#039;&#039;, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187a|187]] Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 177, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188a|188]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 1, pp. 266–7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189a|189]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190a|190]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 304–5.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191a|191]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192a|192]] Tocqueville mentions this critically in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193a|193]] Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, &#039;&#039;The Menorah Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 33, October 1945, pp. 171, 169, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER SIX ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The excluded and the struggle for recognition&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the liberal tradition is shot through with two macroscopic exclusion clauses. In reality, there is a third—that directed at women, which in fact presents peculiar characteristics. When they belonged to the upper classes, they formed part, albeit in a subordinate role, of the community of the free; one thinks, in particular, of female slave-owners. The women’s liberation movement was only able to acquire a mass social base later, when women previously confined to a position of slavery or restricted to the inferior levels of a caste society were able to participate in it. The development of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is explained, in the first instance, by the struggle waged by the bipedal machines of the metropolis, on the one hand, and slaves and colonial populations or populations of colonial origin, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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In both cases, even more than for the achievement of specific objectives, the excluded protested against the fact that the dignity of man was denied them. This was a struggle for recognition—in the sense specified by Hegel in a celebrated chapter of &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;. The shackled black depicted by abolitionist propaganda demanded freedom, stressing (in the text attached to the image) that he too was a ‘man’. In his turn, Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the San Domingo revolution, invoked ‘the absolute adoption of the principle that no man, whether red, black or white, can be the property of his fellow being’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similar accents could be heard in Paris immediately &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg182&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;following the July Revolution, when popular periodicals accused ‘bourgeois notables’ of insisting on viewing workers not as ‘men’ but ‘machines’, nothing but ‘machines’ called upon to produce exclusively for the ‘needs’ of their masters. After the revolution of February 1848, the achievement by proletarians of political rights demonstrated in their view that they too were finally beginning to be raised to the ‘rank of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Condorcet emphatically recognized this status in black slaves, but denied it to their white masters. Similarly, Engels, referring to the English workers whom he was ‘happy and proud’ to have known and who suffered a ‘slavery worse than that of the American negroes’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] exclaimed: ‘I have found you to be men, members of the great, universal family of humanity’ who proclaimed ‘the cause of humanity’, trampled underfoot by capitalists engaged in an ‘indirect trade in human flesh’, in a barely disguised slave trade.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Corresponding to the struggle of the excluded to be recognized in their dignity as men was the polemic against the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the other side. In the liberal camp the most celebrated intervention was Burke’s. His condemnation of this subversive theory was absolute: it paved the way for the political and social demands of ‘hair-dressers’ and ‘tallow-chandlers’, ‘to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments’, for the demands of the ‘swinish multitude’, or at any rate people whose ‘sordid mercenary occupation’ entailed ‘a mean contracted view of things’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Some decades later, in Bentham’s view the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was nothing but a pile of ‘anarchical fallacies’. It sanctioned &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; between all men? The English liberal’s comment was sarcastic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;All men&#039;&#039; (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) &#039;&#039;remain equal in rights&#039;&#039;. The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master; he has as much liberty with relation to the master, as the master has with relation to him; he has as much right to command and to punish him.&lt;br /&gt;
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And hence the ‘absurd principle of &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; can only please “fanatics” and the “ignorant multitude”‘. The Declaration referred to law as an expression of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg183&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘general will’? But it is clear that therewith censitary restrictions of the vote could not be justified. The very theorization of property right contained in this solemn text was suspect to Bentham: the concrete object of such right was not clearly specified, and hence it involved a right which, once again, belonged ‘to every individual, without any limit’, even the propertyless person suffering from hunger:&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, a universal property right is established—that is, everything is common to everyone. But because what belongs to everyone belongs to no one, what follows from it is that the effect of the Declaration is not to establish property but to destroy it. And that is how it was understood by Babeuf’s supporters, those true interpreters of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, who can be criticized for nothing but being consistent in applying the most false and absurd of principles.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Condemning these abstract ‘general principles’, for which Britain rightly displayed ‘extreme repugnance’ and which, when pronounced by ‘famished mouths’, could only result in catastrophe, Bentham referred to Malouet, one of the few in France to have attempted to dispel ‘the cloud of confused ideas’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, it was the Anglomanes who sought to block the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In appealing to ‘general principles’ and ‘metaphysical’ concepts, Malouet warned, people were playing with fire: they risked inciting the ‘immense multitude of propertyless men’, ‘the unfortunate classes of society’, ‘the men placed by fate in a condition of dependency’ and ‘lacking enlightenment and means’. They must be taught ‘just limits’, rather than the ‘extension of natural liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is significant that one of those to adopt a clear position against the category of rights of man was Malouet, who subsequently played a prominent part in the argument against abolitionism. It was this second aspect that played a central role in the United States, where within the white community the social question did not have the significance it possessed in France, but where the conflict over black slavery became increasingly impassioned. A particular target was the statement (contained in the Declaration of Independence) that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg184&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all men are created equal’, with the right to enjoy ‘certain unalienable Rights’. Present in it was the ‘metaphysical folly’ that subsequently found more concentrated expression in the French Revolution. This was the charge formulated by the ‘American Burke’—namely, Randolph—who in this context explicitly appealed to the British liberal.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Born in the wake of the revolt against the alleged ‘imprescriptible rights of the king’ invoked by the British Crown, the United States now risked succumbing to the folly of the ‘imprescriptible rights of black slaves’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In similar fashion, Calhoun drew attention to the ‘poisonous fruits’ of that ‘place in the declaration of our independence’ which claimed to confer ‘the same right to liberty and equality’ on all men. This was the abolitionists’ starting-point in the fanatical struggle they had unleashed against black slavery and ‘Southern institutions’ as ‘outrageous on the rights of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In England, it was with his focus mainly on the colonies that Disraeli characterized the ‘rights of man’ as ‘nonsense’ in 1880.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The struggle for recognition waged by colonial populations or populations of colonial origin proved particularly long and complex. It would only achieve decisive results in the twentieth century. For now we must turn our attention to the struggle waged by the bipedal machines in the capitalist metropolis and within the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The instrument of labour becomes a passive citizen&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The social and political milieus which, on either side of the Atlantic, celebrated themselves as the community of the free understood by liberty not only the undisturbed enjoyment of the private sphere. Exclusion from representative bodies and political life was also perceived as an expression of despotism. On the other hand, denial of political rights to those with no title to be recognized as members of the community of the free seemed self-evidently proper. How could the ‘horse’ or ‘beast of burden’ to which Locke and Mandeville compared the wage-labourer, or the ‘speaking instrument’, ‘bipedal instrument’ or ‘work machine’ that Burke and Sieyès referred to, claim to form part of it? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg185&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In other words, those who continued to be defined via the categories used by Aristotle to conceptualize the figure of the slave could not enjoy political citizenship. If they were men, they were members of a different, inferior people; they were barbarians (the quintessential slaves).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the French case at least, the picture began to change significantly with the revolution. For some time Sieyès spoke nonchalantly of wage-labourers as the set of ‘work machines’ and ‘bipedal machines’, or of the ‘always childlike multitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But after 14 July 1789, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed, he felt a new need—the need for greater ‘clarity of language’. Hence a distinction between ‘natural and civil rights’, or ‘passive rights’, on the one hand, and ‘political rights’, or ‘active rights’, on the other. The first, which included the protection of the ‘person’, ‘property’ and ‘liberty’, applied to every man. The former bipedal machine now saw his dignity not only as a man but also as a citizen recognized, albeit a ‘passive citizen’ excluded from participation in political life, like ‘women’, ‘children’ and ‘foreigners’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We are in the presence of a significant innovation. Just as ‘free labour’ had long been an oxymoron, because labour was in reality synonymous with &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, so the category of ‘passive citizen’ had long sounded like an oxymoron. He who was subject to the necessity of labour, and hence to &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, was by definition excluded from the group of freemen, who enjoyed liberty and citizenship to the full. For Locke it was meaningless to grant political rights to those who, as we have seen, were ‘made slaves’ by destitution, need, labour and the servitude implicit in this—and who did not form part of civil society, whose purpose was the defence of property. Blackstone argued in similar fashion: the right to vote could not be extended to ‘persons of indigent fortunes’, who by that token were ‘under the immediate domination of others’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, Constant resorted to the same justification when he excluded the wage-labourer from the enjoyment of political rights: he lacked ‘the necessary revenue to subsist independently of any external will’ and ‘property holders are the masters of his existence, since they may refuse him work.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is especially interesting to observe the development of the first major theorists of passive citizenship. In September 1789 Sieyès still did not hesitate to define as ‘forced’ the labour of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg186&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘uneducated multitude’, which was therefore ‘lacking freedom’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to pose the problem of conferring political liberty on someone destined to be deprived of liberty as such. On the contrary, it might be asked if it was not appropriate to transform the actually existing ‘slavery of need’ into a ‘legally sanctioned slavery’, in accordance with the model adopted in America for indentured white servants.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The French Revolution challenged the configuration of the servant as a mere instrument of labour. The figure now emerged of the purely passive citizen, which in fact had a long gestation period behind it. A significant role was played by an exigency internal to the community of the free, interested in imparting credibility to its discourse and self-celebration. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone on the one hand recognized and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, even highlighted the &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; to which the wage-labourer was—and must be—subject. On the other, they celebrated England as the land of the free, where there was no place for ‘perfect slavery’ (Locke), ‘slavery in the strict sense’ (Blackstone), or colonial slavery (Mandeveille). In the nineteenth century Burke observed that among the subaltern classes the ‘common blessing’ of liberty ‘may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is here an obvious concern to stress the liberty of the wage-labourer, who is called upon not to let himself be vexed and misled by the harshness of his material living conditions, but to identify with an order that, despite everything, guarantees him liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ideological dimension of this discourse clearly emerges from reading an eighteenth-century English author. Compared with legal coercion of the labourer–slave, Joseph Townsend regarded economic compulsion as more effective. It silently but unfailingly imposed obedience on servants, terrorized by the prospect of death from starvation. Taken for granted was the power exercised by ‘the more delicate’, who were excused work and ‘left at liberty, without interruption’, over those who, in one way or another, must be forced to perform ‘the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the transition from one condition to the other, coercion had not disappeared, but become more imperious. This did not prevent the English liberal pastor from painting an edifying picture of his country: even the poorest was a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg187&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘freeman’, who supplied ‘free service’ on the basis of ‘his own judgement and discretion’, without the ‘compulsion’ to which the ‘slave’ was subjected.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the figure of the passive citizen there is something more. It is the expression of an exigency internal to the community of the free, but also and above all a response to the struggle for recognition waged by servants in the metropolis. At least potentially, the idea of universal citizenship, even if merely passive in a majority of cases, called into question the caste ordering of society with which Townsend continued to identify. Precisely on account of its novelty, the category of citizen did not impose itself at a stroke on Sieyès, who compared non-property-owners to ‘foreigners’ and ‘children’: the slave too was a foreigner—in fact, the foreigner par excellence, the barbarian. Or he was a child, and as such formed part of the master’s extended family. In this sense, Constant was less shrewd than Sieyès, given that he continued to refer to non-property-owners excluded from political rights primarily as ‘foreigners’ and ‘minors’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The category of ‘passive citizenship’ possessed the further advantage of answering Rousseau’s objection, subsequently taken up by Robespierre. In a well-ordered state, the Genevan philosopher had stressed, no-one should be able to feel himself a ‘stranger’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly distancing himself from absolute monarchy and aristocracy, where a single individual or a few individuals could say they had a ‘homeland’, while everyone else was stateless, it was a question of constructing a society, a ‘democratic regime’, the Jacobin leader later reiterated, where ‘the state is genuinely the homeland of all individuals’, all of them admitted on an equal footing ‘to the rights of the citizen in full’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, if not exactly in the strict sense of the term, the proletarian was likewise a citizen, a member of the ‘nation’ dear to Sieyès that Boulainvilliers and the nobility had wrongly wanted to divide into an aristocratic people, descended from the victorious Franks, and a plebeian people, descended from the vanquished Gallo-Romans.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The invention of passive citizenship and negative liberty and the restriction of the political sphere&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg188&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Compelled by the struggle waged by the excluded to grant them at least passive citizenship, the community of the free now found itself facing a new challenge to its exclusivism. Already in June 1790, Marat had a representative of the ‘unlucky ones’ to whom political citizenship was denied argue thus against the ‘aristocracy of the rich’: ‘In your eyes we are still the rabble’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And we have seen Robespierre compare non-property-owners excluded from political rights to slaves: the concession of passive citizenship did not end the struggle for recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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Constant sought to answer the objections of the most radical currents that had emerged during the French Revolution. No, the non-property-owner excluded from the enjoyment of political rights could not be confused with the slave.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the latter, the former, in common with all other citizens, was protected by laws and enjoyed full liberty within his private sphere. And this was what modern liberty consisted in. During the conflict with the monarchy, the community of the free in England and America had demanded a very different liberty, since it was in no way prepared to renounce administering public affairs. But it is clear that this platform could not survive the emergence of a struggle by the popular masses, which protested against exclusion from political rights and at the same time sought to change their labour relations and material living conditions. The dominant elite now developed a very different discourse: participation in political life was not an essential element of liberty; and, in the second place, labour relations and material living conditions pertained to an eminently private sphere, so that it was absurd and illegitimate to seek to change them through political action.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new discourse did not impose itself at a stroke and wholly consistently. Constant let slip the admission that the provider of work was in fact ‘master’ of the worker’s ‘existence’. But even more significant is the oscillation we find in Macaulay. Fighting in 1831 for the political emancipation of Jews, the British liberal unhesitatingly rejected the thesis that a distinction should be made between civil rights and political rights, and that exclusion from the latter was not a factor of ‘mortification’ and discrimination. In reality, this was sophistry designed to justify ‘a system full of absurdity and injustice’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg189&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;polemic was incisive and effective, but the liberal author was careful not to intervene on behalf of the British popular masses as well as of property-owners whose religion was Judaism!&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar consideration applies to other exponents of the liberal tradition. In regarding the enjoyment of political rights as an essential element of liberty, the Jacobins argued no differently from the American revolutionaries. But in Burke the proposal of ‘conciliation’ of the rebel colonists, who with their demand for the right to representation had confirmed that they were worthy members of the community of the free, was followed by the proclamation of a crusade against a revolution led by the mob, which had demanded and wrested political rights. As to de Tocqueville, his notes on his travels in England were almost coeval with the publication of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;. But the warm appreciation of widespread political participation in the North American republic was certainly not matched by bitter denunciation of strict censitary discrimination in Britain, or the slightest support for the Chartist demand for an extension of the suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s intervention was especially significant as regards the second point in the new liberal ideological platform, which drastically restricted the political sphere. In a text of 1842 he observed: ‘Equality is everywhere extending its dominion, except in industry, which is daily organized in increasingly aristocratic form’. The wage-labourer found himself in a ‘strict dependency’ (&#039;&#039;étroite dépendance&#039;&#039;) on the provider of work. Despite the charming appearance of ‘great French society’ as a whole, ‘industrial society’ (&#039;&#039;société industrielle&#039;&#039;) in the strict sense continued to be characterized by a strict hierarchy, which left little room not only for equality, but also for the individual liberty of those placed on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The harshness of the relations obtaining in factories was further confirmed by de Tocqueville’s comparison between working conditions and prison conditions, even if it was made not to challenge the former but to reject naively philanthropic projects for reform of the latter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of free workers, who in France painfully earn a living, have no rest but that taken at meal times, and cannot understand why criminals punished by society arouse so lively an interest that it gives way to tenderhearted exclamations and is on the verge of shedding tears at the idea of inflicting on them a deprivation suffered by all honest labourers.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg190&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Besides, we should not forget that the panopticon theorized by Bentham, a building designed to achieve surveillance from which there was no escape, could serve as prison, workhouse or even factory.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the ‘immediate dominion’ or ‘forced labour’ to which Blackstone and Sieyès, respectively, refer. However, this coercive relationship was no longer explicitly highlighted to justify censitary discrimination in political rights (whose enjoyment belonged only to freemen in the full sense of the term). Instead, the condition that subjected the worker to a ‘strict dependency’ (de Tocqueville), compelled him to work in prison-like institutions (Bentham and de Tocqueville), and to sell his labour power to buyers who were ultimately the ‘masters of his existence’ (Constant), was now recognized reluctantly, declared to be without political relevance and hence not corrosive of negative liberty, from which no one in the metropolis was excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can read the notes written by de Tocqueville during his trips to England in 1833 and 1835. The picture that emerges is no less dramatic than the one Engels was to draw some years later. The industrial region of Manchester and the working-class districts appeared as an ‘infected labyrinth’, an ‘inferno’: the miserable little cottages were like&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the last asylum man can occupy between misery and death. Yet the unfortunate beings that inhabit such cubby-holes arouse the envy of their fellows. Under their wretched abodes one finds a row of cellars to which a semi-underground corridor leads. In each of these damp, repugnant places, ten or fifteen human creatures are massed higgledy-piggledy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The appalling mass poverty formed a shocking contrast to the opulence of a few: ‘the organized forces of a multitude produce for the benefit of a single one’. Such a spectacle elicited a significant exclamation: ‘Here the slave, there the master; here the wealth of some, there the poverty of the greatest number’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On another occasion, de Tocqueville even warned against the danger of ‘slave wars’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby indirectly comparing modern proletarians with ancient slaves. We thus encounter the reality of unfreedom, and of unfreedom in its most drastic form. Yet this realistic analysis disappears as if by magic when it comes to drawing up an overall political balance sheet. We are dealing with the country that France was called upon to regard as a model, if it wished to save ‘the future &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg191&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of free institutions’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] English liberal society realized liberty as such, regardless of the conditions of the kind of slavery had had to register in the inferno of the industrial regions. The fact is that this inferno had nothing to do with the political sphere proper. And once poverty or even a condition of tangible slavery had been confined to a sphere lacking political relevance (for pertaining to private life), in a sphere where it was not legitimate or possible to intervene politically, the initially slimy and repugnant portrait of Manchester turned into its opposite:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the external appearance of the city, everything attests to the individual power of man and nothing to the regulatory power of society. At every step, liberty reveals its capricious, creative force there. Nowhere is the slow, continuous action of the government to be seen.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. ‘Civil laws’ and ‘political laws’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The restriction of the political sphere is so radical as to seem paradoxical. Analysing the prison system in the United States, de Tocqueville drew attention to legislation that threw the poor into prison even for utterly insignificant debts. In Pennsylvania the number of individuals annually incarcerated for debt amounted to 7,000. If to this figure was added the number of those condemned for more serious crimes, it turned out that for every 144 inhabitants virtually one a year ended up in prison. But this was not the most important aspect. The French liberal was obliged to acknowledge the influence, direct as well as indirect, exercised by the wealthy over the administration of justice. The ‘vagrant’ or someone suspected of vagrancy was locked up in prison without having committed any offence. Worse, while awaiting legal proceedings, the poor witness or plaintiff lost his liberty, while the thief capable of standing bail retained his (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). Clearly, the very principle of equality before the law ended up being travestied. But this was not de Tocqueville’s conclusion: ‘Of all modern peoples, it is the English who have instilled the greatest liberty in their political laws and made most frequent use of prison in their civil laws’. In their turn, although having largely altered the ‘political laws’, Americans had ‘preserved most of the civil laws’ of England.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#page192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#pg192&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;With this distinction we have reached a key point. The liberal author formulated his judgement on the countries visited by him exclusively on the basis of their &#039;&#039;lois politiques&#039;&#039;, while the &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039; were by definition politically irrelevant. Not by chance, there is little trace in &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; of the data gathered in the course of the inquiry into the US prison system. It might be said that de Tocqueville’s most interesting pages are those that did not make it into the work which sealed his fame. The almost triumphant conclusion then becomes explicable: in the transatlantic republic liberty had been comprehensively diffused, and did not constitute a privilege. Accustomed as he was to very different &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039;, the traveller from France expressed his disappointment at legislation in the United States that seemed to him ‘monstrous’. But ‘the mass of [American] men of law’ found no fault with it and did not regard it as contradicting the ‘democratic constitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was precisely the standpoint de Tocqueville ended up adopting—though not without contradictions and embarrassment. We can glimpse the former if we give the French liberal the floor once again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be acknowledged that the American prison regime is severe. While US society affords the example of the most extensive liberty, this country’s prisons offer a spectacle of utter despotism. The citizens subject to the law are protected by it; they cease to be free only when they become felons.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, by de Tocqueville’s own admission, vagrants and poor witnesses also suffered ‘severe’ treatment in prisons, or workhouses similar to prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us observe the embarrassment. We have already encountered the protests of vagrants locked up in prison by a society that cannot solve the problem of unemployment in any other way. What was de Tocqueville’s reaction? Just as it did not come within his ‘tasks’ to investigate possible remedies for unemployment, so it did not fall to him ‘even to investigate to what extent the society is just that punishes the man who does not work and lacks work, and how it might furnish means of subsistence without putting him in prison’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of politics and ‘political laws’ was so narrowly defined as to exclude not only material living conditions and relations of dependency in factories, but even the censitary discrimination that pervaded the administration of justice in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The de-politicization and naturalization of economic and social relations&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg193&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Any expansion of the political was utterly intolerable to the liberal tradition, because it would involve relations that were not only private in character, but whose immutability was consecrated by nature or Providence. In Burke’s view it was at once mad and blasphemous to believe that among ‘the competence of government’ was ‘supply[ing] to the poor, those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them’. Poverty was the result of ‘Divine displeasure’ and the latter could certainly not be placated by challenging ‘the laws of commerce’, which were ‘the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville argued no differently. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, he noted with concern the behaviour of the ‘working classes’. They seemed calm, no longer ‘bedevilled by political passions’. Unfortunately, however, ‘where once they had been political, their passions have become social’. Rather than the make-up of this or that ministry, they tended to question property relations themselves and hence the natural order of ‘society’, tearing ‘to shreds the basis on which it rests’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the revolution broke out, the French liberal regarded it as socialist or infected with socialism as early as February, because prominent in it were ‘the economic and political theories’ which would have people ‘believe that human miseries are the work of the laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be abolished by changing the social order’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ranging beyond the political sphere, the ‘threat of change in the social constitution’ was configured as an attack on the ‘ancient, holy laws of property and family on which Christian civilization is based’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, on the one hand political economy was merged with theology, while on the other it tended to take its place, in the sense that ‘science’ was now called on to sanction and sanctify existing social relations. According to Malthus, it was wholly desirable that political economy be ‘taught to the common people’. Thanks to it, the poor would understand that they must attribute the cause of their privations to Mother Nature or their own improvidence. Indeed, ‘[p]olitical economy is perhaps the only science of which it may be said that the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg194&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great evil.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was also the opinion of de Tocqueville, who believed it necessary&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to diffuse among the working classes … some of the most elementary and certain notions of political economy, which would make them understand, for example, what is constant and necessary in the economic laws that govern the wage rate. Because such laws, being in some sense of divine law, in that they derive from the nature of man and the very structure of society, are situated beyond the reach of revolutions. [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While for Burke, ‘Divine displeasure’ explained the misery of the popular masses, for Malthus it was the immorality of their behaviour, the sexual incontinence that brought into the world beings whose subsistence people were not in a position to ensure. Referring to ‘Malthus’s principle of population’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville reprehended ‘all the excesses of intemperance’ widespread among ‘the lower classes’, their ‘improvidence’, or their tendency to live ‘as if there will be no tomorrow’, and above all ‘these early, imprudent marriages that seem to have no other purpose than multiplying the number of unfortunates on earth’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notwithstanding the radical attitudes he liked to adopt, Bentham did not reach very different conclusions: ‘with respect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws’; the poor man was like a ‘savage’ who had not succeeded in transcending the state of nature. Or, to put it in the words of a French disciple and collaborator of the English philosopher, ‘Poverty is not a result of the social order. So why rebuke it? It is a legacy of the state of nature’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing against natural law, the English philosopher waxed ironic about the recourse to nature to ground rights that only made sense in society. But now nature popped up again to remove responsibility for poverty from the politico-social order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this elevation of existing social relations to the status of nature, and to nature sanctioned by Providence, attempts to alter them could only be an expression of madness. Burke expressed his utter ‘horror’ at revolutionaries or hasty reformists, who did not hesitate ‘to hack that aged parent [their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg195&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;country] in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, for de Tocqueville the illusion that there was a political ‘cure for this hereditary, incurable ill of poverty and work’ provoked the incessant, ruinous &#039;&#039;expérimentations&#039;&#039; that characterized the French revolutionary cycle,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or ‘the great social revolution’ begun in 1789.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Liberalism and radicalism: two different phenomenologies of power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In pronouncing his judgement on England and the United States, de Tocqueville ignored, in addition to colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, material living conditions, labour relations and even ‘civil laws’. Extraneous to his research and analysis of democracy, he declared, was not only the oppression of blacks and Indians, but also the detention of white citizens (‘vagrants’ or poor people summoned to testify in a trial) who were not guilty of any offence. The cult of the &#039;&#039;‘holy&#039;&#039; thing’ that was liberty[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ignored the fate of the excluded in their entirety, whether they lived in the colonies or the metropolis. And, once again, the divergence between liberalism and radicalism—of which Marx and Engels were the critical heirs—is already apparent at an epistemological level. In England, observed Engels, the ‘aiding and abetting of the rich is explicitly recognized even in the law’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Analysing the English ‘civil laws’ inherited by the United States, de Tocqueville arrived at the same conclusion. But this fact had political relevance only for Engels. And like the authors of the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the French liberal compared the worker of the time to the slave, forced to suffer a ‘strict dependency’ inside the factory and a degrading, oppressive poverty outside it. But de Tocqueville considered all this foreign to the political sphere proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely the drastic restriction of the political, and the consequent exclusion from it of the most profound dimension of the social totality, that prompted Marx’s criticisms. From the standpoint of bourgeois society and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg196&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political theory, he observed in his early writings, social relations ‘have only a private significance, not any political significance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited itself ‘to closing its eyes and declaring that certain &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; oppositions do not have a &#039;&#039;political character&#039;&#039;, that these do not bother it’. While regarded as lacking political relevance, bourgeois social relations and power relations in the factory and society could develop without inhibition or external impediment.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above poverty, the reality of the factory (stressed the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;) highlighted the ‘despotism’ that hung over workers, ‘organised like soldiers’ and ‘[a]s privates of the industrial army … placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s conclusion was scarcely milder. But now the despotism identified and denounced was not this reality, but attempts by political power to change or alleviate it. Against demands to put ‘the prescience and wisdom of the state in the place of individual prescience and wisdom’, the French liberal proclaimed that ‘nothing authorizes the state to interfere in industry’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the famous speech of 12 September 1848, made to persuade the Constituent Assembly to reject demands for the ‘right to work’ that had already been drowned in blood in the June Days. De Tocqueville went so far as to attribute to ‘socialist doctrines’ the regulation and reduction of working hours (‘the twelve-hour day’), which therefore became an object of unequivocal condemnation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise dismissed as an expression of socialism and despotism was any legislative measure to alleviate the misery of the ‘lower classes’ through rent controls.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French liberal insisted on this intransigently. Immediately after the bloody June Days, he did not hesitate to accuse the Interior Minister of being inconsistent and soft: ‘While Cavaignac and Lamorcière fought socialism in the streets, Sénard supported socialist doctrine as regards the twelve-hour day’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some months later, in his draft electoral circular of May 1849, de Tocqueville advertised as a badge of merit the fact that he had voted, &#039;&#039;inter alia&#039;&#039;, ‘against the limit it was proposed to place on the working day, against progressive taxation, and finally against the abolition of military substitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The last point was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;no less significant than the others. In de Tocqueville’s view, the option the rich man had of hiring a poor man to replace him when it came to performing the duty of military service did not involve an inequality, based on wealth and sanctioned by law, even in the face of the danger of death. Rather, it was a contract between individuals, which pertained to the private sphere and hence did not infringe the principle of legal equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in his capacity as a historian, when reconstructing the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, de Tocqueville stuck to this restriction of the political sphere and this peculiar phenomenology of power, which identified dominion and oppression exclusively with the intervention of political power in a private sphere that had been unduly expanded. He drew a terrible picture of the conditions of the popular classes. ‘Beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ were sometimes proceeded against ‘in the most violent way’, with the arrest and condemnation of thousands of people to forced labour without trial. Not much better was the treatment reserved for peasants. While, materially and socially, they lived in an ‘abyss of misery and isolation’, in terms of civil rights they were deprived of any protection: they ‘were constantly arrested in connection with the levies of forced labour or the militia; for begging, for misdemeanours, and countless other minor offences’. In conclusion, the peasants were viewed rather like ‘the Negroes in our colonies’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Was the revolution therefore legitimate and necessary? Such was not de Tocqueville’s opinion. France, which with the economists radically criticized and readied itself to overthrow the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, ‘wanted not so much a recognition of the “rights of man” as reforms in the existing system’![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An organ of the titled aristocracy and hence jointly responsible for the degradation of the peasants to ‘negroes’, the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; were the body which, before unfortunately being dissolved by the revolution, embodied the whole cause of liberty. In the years preceding the fatal 1789, ‘our judicial institutions were still those of a free people.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The new self-representation of the community of the free as a community of individuals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To the revolutionary demand for the rights of man and the equal dignity of every individual, which risked grinding society ‘into the dust and powder of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’, Burke opposed the sacredness of a community: ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, in ‘the great primaeval contract of eternal society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thanks to a ‘relation in blood’ that united and founded in an indivisible unity ‘our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, as against the individualism reprehended in the French revolutionaries, the British liberal vindicated an emphatic organicism. Not by chance, the partnership celebrated by him subsequently became in German culture the &#039;&#039;Gemeinschaft&#039;&#039; that played such an important role in nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative and reactionary thinking.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the dissolvent charge contained in revolutionary individualism can also be found in de Tocqueville, who in 1843 observed: ‘For some years, doubt and individualism have made us such progressives that the nation will soon no longer offer any foothold for resistance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But already during the French Revolution a different attitude had begun to emerge. Barnave warned as follows against the demand for an extension of political rights to non-property-owners: ‘Another step on the road of equality would mean the destruction of liberty.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to Constant, too, the diffusion among the popular masses of the demand for political rights and stress on their enjoyment risked making people lose sight of the centrality of ‘private independence’ or ‘individual independence’, leading to the subjection of individual existence to the collective body.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albeit in a different idiom, Barnarve’s argument was reintroduced: the generalization of political rights had a levelling, homogenizing effect at the expense of individual liberty. Later, Guizot declared that to fight for a society where everything revolved around ‘order’, ‘well-being’ and the ‘equitable distribution … of the means of life’ meant forgetting ‘the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties’, and aspiring to an ‘ant-hill or bee-hive’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a theme that enjoyed enormous success after 1848. The more the struggle for recognition developed as a struggle for the conquest of political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg199&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rights and of economic and social rights, the more the popular and socialist movement was accused of not understanding the autonomous dignity of the individual, and in fact of wanting to trample it underfoot. Rejecting the social demands that issued from the February Revolution, de Tocqueville gave full vent to his disgust at the emergence on the horizon of the spectre of a ‘levelled society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a ‘society of bees and beavers’, composed ‘more of sapient animals than free, civilized men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so in his turn did John Stuart Mill: ‘At present individuals are lost in the crowd … The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence, in a reversal of positions compared with Burke, liberalism now rebuked the most radical currents not for their individualism, but for riding roughshod over the rights of the individual. De Tocqueville sought to provide this accusation with an epistemological foundation: conferring ‘a separate existence on the species [espèce]’, and expanding ‘the notion of genus [&#039;&#039;genre&#039;&#039;]’, radicalism and socialism were simply the application to politics of the ‘doctrine of the realists’ of scholastic fame. It entailed ‘contempt for particular rights’ and devaluation of the individual as such.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But what is the value of this theoretical construct? It is interesting to see how de Tocqueville rejects proposals for reforming the prison system promoted primarily by the radical and socialist movement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philanthropy elicits our pity for an isolated unfortunate, we must not forget to reserve a little of our sympathy for a yet greater interest—that of the whole society. Let us distrust these narrow, ungenerous views that notice the individual but never the mass of men and let us eternally remember this thought of a great philosopher: pity for the wicked is a great cruelty to the good … The social interest, which is nothing if not the interest of the honest mass, requires that the wicked be severely punished.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Even the troubled diagnosis of massification was made with an eye to the fate of ‘[t]he nation, taken as a whole’, which now risked turning out to be ‘less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was also in the name of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg200&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an emphatic (and chauvinist) idea of the nation that de Tocqueville invoked ‘terror’ against those who risked compromising the honour of France (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a concrete level, too, de Tocqueville was concerned to see what were for him the requirements of society prevail. In the years of the July Monarchy, faced with the spread of mass misery, he proposed nothing to prevent it except police measures gravely corrosive of the liberty of the individual (the poor individual): ‘Could we not prevent the rapid movement of the population, so that men do not abandon the earth and move to industry, except to the extent that the latter can readily meet their needs?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Restrictions on freedom of movement should also be imposed on ‘vagrants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although committed to denouncing the expansion of the state—‘the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power’—Mill did not hesitate to assert: ‘The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’; they were ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The view that any ‘interference’ in the procreation of human life was illegitimate was ‘a superstition which will one day be regarded with as much contempt, as any of the idiotic notions and practices of savages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can understand Proudhon’s irony in connection with the liberal school:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It, which in all circumstances and places professes &#039;&#039;laissez-faire, laissez-passer&#039;&#039;, which reprehends socialists for substituting their convictions for the laws of nature, which protests against any state intervention, and which demands liberty here, there and everywhere, nothing but liberty, does not hesitate when it comes to conjugal fertility to cry to the spouses: Stop there! What devil incites you![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the conflict between liberalism and its critics, an inversion of positions has occurred as regards laissez-faire for the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disgusted by the radicalism of the 1848 revolution and Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, de Tocqueville arrived at a bitter conclusion: ‘The revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg201&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in England was made solely with a view to liberty, while that in France was made principally with a view to equality.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The criticism also encompassed the Enlightenment culture that had prepared and promoted the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime:&#039;&#039; in it a sure ‘zeal for equality’ was matched by a rather ‘tepid’ ‘desire for liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we know, the first to counterpose liberty and equality and denounce the demand for political equality as an attack on liberty was Barnarve, who was nevertheless a defender of slavery. This institution continued to be alive and well in the United States when de Tocqueville held up the transatlantic republic, together with England, as the model country for love of liberty to a France devoured by the passion for equality. It was precisely here that slavery was justified and even celebrated by southern theorists as an instrument to ensure, along with their liberty, the equality of members of the white community. For confirmation of the problematic character of the opposition between liberty and equality, we might adduce the pre-1848 de Tocqueville, who criticized England for an erroneous conception of liberty in as much as it was based on ‘privilege’ (and inequality), and who attributed to the French Revolution the merit of having, in the name of equality, promoted the cause of the abolition of slavery and the freedom of the blacks (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]; below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|§7]]). At this time, far from being in opposition, liberty and equality were fully in accord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposition was represented, in significantly different form, in the work of another important representative of the liberal tradition. In Bentham we read: ‘When security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the very country held up by de Tocqueville as a model for its ability to understand the absolute priority of the value of liberty, we see that the reassertion of the subordinate value of equality occurs, in the first instance, in the name of the ‘security’ of society and the existing order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Economic and social rights, the socialist ‘ants’ nest’ and liberal ‘individualism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point it is appropriate to analyse nineteenth-century liberals’ individualist profession of faith at greater length. Especially after 1848, in the midst &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg202&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the massification they reprehended in socialism, they sometimes seemed to consider individualism a pre-modern reality, which had, alas, faded in the course of subsequent historical developments. According to Mill, ‘[i]n ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself’; he was not ‘lost in the crowd’ and the ‘masses’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville likewise paid homage to the ‘individualism of the Middle Ages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Manifestly, he did not take into consideration the fate of serfs, just as he did not take account of the fate of slaves and blacks in general when he pointed to the United States as the country where &#039;&#039;‘every&#039;&#039; individual’ enjoyed unprecedented ‘independence’. When he subsequently asserted that in colonized Algeria, ‘the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the motherland’, de Tocqueville ignored the Arabs, who, by his own admission, were often equated with the occupying forces to ‘evil beasts’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]; below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|§6]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus emerges the somewhat problematic character of the pathos of the individual, which was the flag waved by liberalism in its conflict with radicalism and socialism. Who was more individualist? Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the slave revolution? Or Calhoun, the great US theorist of the slaveholding South? Who demonstrated respect for the dignity of the individual as such? The black Jacobin who, taking the Declaration of the Rights of Man seriously, considered that it was always inadmissible to reduce a man to an object of ‘property’ of one of ‘his follow men’? Or Jefferson, who kept silent about his doubts about slavery out of a conviction of white superiority and his concern not to endanger the peace and stability of the South and the Union? Who expressed individualism better? Mill and his English and French followers, who considered the subjection and even slavery (albeit temporary) of colonial peoples beneficial and necessary? Or the French radicals who began to question colonial despotism as such (‘Let the colonies perish if they are to cost honour, freedom’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]])?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doubts are not dispelled even if we ignore the colonies and peoples of colonial origin. Prominent in the liberal tradition (for example, Laboulaye) is the polemic against the fanaticism of the French revolutionaries, who regarded access to the vote and representative office as a ‘natural, absolute right’ of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg203&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;every individual, rather than a ‘political function’ of society.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So which of the two positions better expressed individualism? On the other hand, if the generalization of political rights imperilled ‘individual independence’, as Constant seemed to believe, why direct such a reproof solely against French radicalism and not also against the American Revolution (which erupted in the wake of the demand for the colonists’ right to political representation)?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examined more closely, the cry of alarm at the danger of the disappearance of individuality, and the impeding ‘ants’ nest’, expressed the disquiet of the restricted community of the free first at the extension of political rights and then, increasingly, at the extension of economic and social rights. Yet it was de Tocqueville himself who compared the hungry man to a slave—that is, a man or an individual deprived of liberty and recognition. Compared with the liberal tradition, Nietzsche proved much more lucid and consistent. Although inspired by an implacable hatred of socialism and the social state demanded by it, and in fact precisely because inspired by such hatred, the brilliant reactionary thinker understood that, with its ‘individualistic agitation’, socialism aimed to ‘render many individuals possible’, raising them above their condition as instruments of labour and their herd-like relationship to the masters. With its universalistic charge, socialism issued in the recognition of every individual, independently of wealth, sex or race, as a subject endowed at a moral level with equal human dignity and possessor, politically, of inalienable rights. That was why Nietzsche indignantly condemned individualism and socialism. Albeit with a converse value judgement, Oscar Wilde also connected the two terms: ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming the ambiguous character of the liberal tradition’s individualism, it is worth noting that, in criticizing the French Revolution and the danger of subversion represented by the working-class and socialist movement, it liked positively to oppose the countryside to the city. This is readily intelligible in the case of the theorist of organicist ‘partnership’, Burke, who with utter consistency celebrated the ‘agricultural class’ that ‘of all others is the least inclined to sedition’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his attention still fixed on the French Revolution and the role in it played by Paris, Constant stressed the danger of ‘[a]rtisans, crowded into the towns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the theme of distrust or hostility towards the city, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg204&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the prime site for development of the individual, runs deep in the liberal tradition. In Mandeville’s view, ‘London is too big for the Country’, and it was precisely there that disturbing phenomena of social insubordination were emerging. Much more reassuring were rural areas, where it was possible to count on ‘the poor silly Country People’, who in fact were conspicuous for their ‘Innocence and Honesty’ and who, ‘from their very Infancy’, could be educated into obedience to authority and respect for customs and tradition.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain regret for this world can also be observed in de Tocqueville, when in 1834 he described the condition of the poor man in the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. Characterized by ‘limited’ desires and calm indifference to ‘a future that did not belong to him’, his lot ‘was less to be felt sorry for than that of men of the people of our days’. Accustomed to their condition from time immemorial, the poor under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; ‘enjoyed the kind of vegetative happiness whose attractiveness is so difficult for the civilized man to understand that he denies its existence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the resumption of revolution in France, against those who sought to ‘stir up the working population of the city’, Tocqueville called for reliance on ‘the inhabitants of the countryside, [who] are full of good sense and, thus far, of balance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The first person to take this recommendation to heart was de Tocqueville himself, who described how he organized the elections in his native village as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We all had to go to vote together in the village of Saint-Pierre, a league from our hamlet. The morning of the election, all the electors (that is, the whole male population over the age of twenty) met in front of the church, and all these men formed a queue in twos in alphabetical order … I reminded these good folk of the seriousness and importance of the act they were performing and recommended that they not allow themselves to be approached or led astray by those who, on our arrival in the village, might seek to mislead them, but instead proceed in a group and stay together, each in his place, until we had voted. ‘Let no one—I said—go home either to eat something or to dry himself (it rained that day) before he has done his duty’. They shouted that they would do this and did it. All the votes were cast at the same time, and I have reason to believe that virtually all of them were given to the same candidate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg205&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It is hard to regard as a manifestation of individualism the events narrated here by the French liberal, beneficiary of the plebiscitary vote of the village whose lord he remained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as the dichotomy between English love of liberty and French egalitarianism proves unfounded, so the opposition between the individualism of the liberal tradition (whose favoured site was England) and the anti-individualism of radicalism (whose centre was in France) does not withstand critical analysis. To the French revolutionaries, who with their Declaration of the Rights of Man aimed simply ‘to excite and keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of insurrection against all governments’, Bentham opposed his principle of social utility: ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the view condemned by Marx, who indignantly reported the reasons with which the prime minister, Palmerston, had once justified his distrust or hostility towards the demand for emancipation advanced by Irish Catholics: ‘because the legislature of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare of the whole’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Criticism of liberalism as anti-modern reaction?&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, we encounter a paradoxical phenomenon. While, on the one hand, it cultivated pre-modern nostalgia, on the other, liberalism contested the movement engaged in the demand for political rights and economic and social rights, accusing it of a basic inability to understand and accept modernity. The first to set off in this direction was Constant. Clinging to the idea of unanimous participation in political life and hence to ‘ancient liberty’, the Jacobins forgot that the latter was based on slavery, the institution that made it possible for freemen to enjoy the &#039;&#039;otium&#039;&#039; required for them to be genuinely active citizens in every respect.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was 1819 when the French liberal argued thus. At this time, in every country where modern liberty flourished, slavery continued in one form or another to be a living reality and, what is more, had assumed a harshness and naturalistic rigidity unknown in classical antiquity. Certainly, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg206&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;although it had not ceased to play a significant role, the institution was mostly isolated and concealed in the colonies. But that was not the case in the United States. There slavery was not only highly visible but, according to the analysis of not a few southern theorists (who took up and developed a suggestion of Burke’s), it encouraged the republican spirit of the free. In other words, ‘ancient liberty’ continued to survive in some sense in the United States, which was nevertheless pointed to by Constant as a ‘great example’ of the modern liberty dear to him.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, in stressing the invigorating function that the presence of slaves had on the spirit of liberty of free citizens, Burke explicitly referred to the example of the ‘ancient states’ (above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Hence Constant’s theoretical construct is based on a colossal repression, which is all the more amazing if we bear in mind the bitter struggles over slavery that developed in France. Abolished by the Jacobins, it had been restored by Napoleon, who arrived in power with the support not only of Sieyès, but also (as we shall see) of Constant himself.&lt;br /&gt;
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Rather than emulating a model from antiquity, the French Revolution and the most radical currents thrown up by it were sometimes accused of encouraging nostalgia for the Middle Ages. Spencer compared progressive taxation to a corvée (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|§4]]). This was a theme subsequently developed by him with the observation that ‘national charity’ (i.e. laws benefiting the poor) was merely a new version of the pre-modern ‘established church’. And just as the old dissenter had fought for respect for the spontaneity of authentic religious sentiment, so the new ‘dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary’. While the old dissenter denied any authority the right to dictate laws to his religious conscience, the new ‘dissenter from established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in between him and the &#039;&#039;exercise&#039;&#039; of his religion’, and indignantly rejected ‘the interference of the state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of [the] gospel’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the last analysis, the demand for economic and social rights, to be legally ratified in the name of moral and religious values such as compassion and human solidarity, were simply a claim to restore life to a state religion! And the prophets of this state religion likewise referred to a pre-modern world. From the French Revolution onwards, as we shall soon see, the liberal tradition was fond of equating trade unions with medieval corporations. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Lecky reproved trade unions and the working-class movement for aspiring to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg207&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an ‘industrial organization’ similar to that of the Middle Ages and the Tudor period.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Trade unions, Pareto stressed some years later, claimed to enjoy (and did enjoy) a kind of ‘Mediaeval immunity’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Lord Acton’s view, even more so than the demand by unions for alleged economic and social rights, it was that for universal suffrage that amounted to a pre-modern, regressive phenomenon. It was ‘absolutist and retrograde’, since it favoured the expansion of the state and of despotism that had happily been transcended by liberalism.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, rather than classical antiquity as for Constant, Jacobinism, socialism and sometimes democracy itself were now accused of cultivating nostalgia for the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, whether it was of the Middle Ages or absolute monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The latter theme found fullest expression in de Tocqueville, according to whom, with their statist pathos, radicalism, Jacobinism and socialism were in a line of continuity with the statism, ‘administrative centralization’ and ‘paternal government’ of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this was an argument which, albeit with timely variations, proved especially dear to defenders of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; themselves! In Berlin the &#039;&#039;Berliner politische Wochenblatt&#039;&#039; never tired of repeating that revolution and absolutism were ‘identical, when regarded from a higher viewpoint’. In citing Louis XIV’s motto (‘L’état c’est moi!’), the journal observed that ‘revolutionary freedom … is reconciled with this centralization, this bureaucratic despotism, with this tutelage through ministerial assistants of the provinces and the community, with this Hobbesian governmental omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville stressed the revolutionary role played, even before 1789, by the figure of the ‘intendant’ and ‘public administration’, which had in fact already expelled the nobility.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The periodical cited above arrived at the same conclusion, identifying and branding in the figure of the ‘civil servant’ the author of the cancellation of ‘local liberties’ and all intermediate bodies liable to overshadow ‘state power’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to de Tocqueville, ‘those peoples who are so constituted as to have the utmost difficulty in getting rid of despotic government for any considerable period are the ones in which aristocracy has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg208&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ceased to exist and can no longer exist’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was precisely the guiding thread of the condemnation of the French Revolution pronounced by the organ of the Prussian nobility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Immediately after the publication of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the Revolution&#039;&#039;, expressing his agreement and admiration, Lieber observed that the book as a whole was a historical running commentary on the analysis of ‘Gallican’ political tendencies he had already developed.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, a degree of boasting is not absent. Yet we should understand the German-American liberal’s point of view. In 1849 he had underlined the continuity between Louis XIV and the 1789 revolution, and between it and Napoleon Bonaparte and the 1848 Revolution. It was a history utterly pervaded by the ideal of ‘equality’ and the ‘concentration’ and ‘centralization of power’, the ‘organization’ and generalized ‘interference of public power’, with a consequent inevitable sacrifice of freedom, ‘individualism’ and the principle of the ‘limitation of government’. By contrast, the latter was at the heart of the concerns and aspirations of the ‘Britannic race’ or ‘Anglican race’—i.e. England and the United States.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are, I repeat, in 1849; and at this time de Tocqueville confined himself to an indictment of socialism. While ‘on many points’ it had a different orientation from the ‘&#039;&#039;ancien régime’&#039;&#039;, it had inherited ‘the opinion that the only wisdom lies in the state’. But the partial and limited continuity established here did not in any way include the French Revolution. In fact, in his anti-socialist polemic, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to refer to Robespierre:&lt;br /&gt;
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Flee … flee the old mania … of wanting to govern excessively; allow individuals, allow families the right freely to do anything that does not harm others; allow the communes the right to manage their own affairs; in a word, restore to the liberty of individuals everything that has illegitimately been taken from them, everything that does not of necessity pertain to the public authority.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, far from formulating the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution, de Tocqueville was refuting it in advance. Someone who did support it was Lieber, who was in a sense justified in claiming priority. In fact, it must be added that, by his own explicit admission, he had derived the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg209&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thesis from Niebuhr, whose disciple he considered himself to be,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and, more generally, from the German culture he had absorbed before leaving Prussia at the age of twenty-seven. In the first instance, the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution met with great success in the country where the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; proved most tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are clearly dealing with a rhetorical strategy: the revolutionary movement that claimed to be constructing a new world was branded as antiquated. Yet the strains are obvious. If we analyse the arguments of the various exponents of the liberal tradition, we see that the French Revolution and Jacobinism are variously situated in a line of continuity with classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and monarchical absolutism. The past to which the new is returned and reduced can assume the most diverse forms. Thus, the revolution was criticized with arguments that are difficult to reconcile with one another, and which are even opposed. On the one hand, it was accused of having destroyed the intermediate bodies that predated the advent of the absolute state; on the other, of wanting to preserve or reintroduce bodies, such as trade unions, that pertained to feudal particularism and that tended to take the form of a state within the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of subsequent historical experience, it is difficult to regard the demand for economic and social rights (in our day also ratified by the UN) as pre-modern and, contrariwise, the view, which was not foreign even to de Tocqueville, regarding mass poverty as a datum of nature pertaining to Providence, rather than determinate politico-social relations, as modern. And, still with reference to the French liberal, it is difficult to reconcile condemnation of Jacobinism and socialism as movements situated in the wake of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, with alarmist and apocalyptic denunciation of the ‘new race’ of delirious ideologues and agitators,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who menaced ‘European civilization’, in fact civilization as such, with an unprecedented danger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Individualism’ and the repression of working-class coalitions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg210&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In some instances, the individualist profession of faith played a manifestly repressive role. Together with the phenomenology of power and the restriction of the political sphere we are already familiar with, it operated to justify the proscription of working-class coalitions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mandeville expressed his utter consternation at a new, disturbing phenomenon:&lt;br /&gt;
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I am credibly inform’d that a parcel of Footmen are arriv’d to that height of Insolence as to have enter’d into a Society together, and made Laws by which they oblige themselves not to serve for less than such a Sum, nor carry Burdens or any Bundle or Parcel above a certain Weight, not exceeding Two or Three Pounds, with other Regulations directly opposite to the Interest of those they Serve, and altogether destructive to the Use they were design’d for.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What prompted the ban at this time was simply a refusal of recognition, as emerges from the contempt, in fact the disgust, provoked by the unheard of behaviour among servants. Organizing themselves autonomously, as if they were gentlemen, they pretended to raise themselves to the level of masters or even to usurp their rights (above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). The absence of recognition continued to play a role in Burke. Certainly, in regarding only contracts drawn up outside any ‘collusion or combination’ as valid [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the allusion to and support for the Combination Acts, which banned and penalized working-class coalitions in these years, are transparent—he appealed to the principle of freedom of trade, which did not tolerate impediments of any kind. But it is clear that the wage labourer, unrecognized in his autonomous subjectivity and dignity and degraded to an &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;, was to see himself denied the right of autonomous organization from below.&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith’s position was more tortured. He recognized that what led to the formation of workers’ coalitions was the desperate attempt to counter the de facto coalition whereby suppliers of work lowered wages, and to escape the threat of death from starvation. However, these ‘enlarged monopolies’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg211&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be prevented and repressed in order to assert the rights not only of the market, but also of the individual. It was necessary to ‘allow … every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice’;[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in accordance with ‘the system of natural liberty’, every man must be able to contribute and bring into competition ‘both his industry and his capital’, without any obstacles whatsoever.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case could ‘violations of natural liberty [and justice]’ be tolerated.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In its turn, the Le Chapelier law, which banned workers’ coalitions in France in 1791, was also said to be aimed at defending individual freedom. In the name of ‘alleged common interests’, such coalitions violated the freedom to work possessed by every individual.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And de Tocqueville referred to this law when, after 1848, he condemned the working-class and socialist movement thus: while ‘the revolution has swept away all the obstructions that impeded the liberty of the citizen, that is, corporations and craft associations [&#039;&#039;les maîtrises, les jurandes&#039;&#039;]’, the socialists proposed to reintroduce this junk, albeit ‘in a new form’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps Marx had in mind the liberalism of his time, as well as the French Revolution, when he criticized the Le Chapelier law for having banned ‘working-class associations of any kind’, on the pretext that they represented the ‘re-establishment of the mediaeval guilds’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theme, which stigmatized trade unions as a residue or reminiscence of the Middle Ages and the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, was widely diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century. In England, while Lecky condemned resumption of the ‘guilds’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more vehement: acting as new tyrants and taking the place of monarchical despotism, trade unions suffocated individual autonomy and liberty in every way. It was true that they could also be consenting, but this did not alter the terms of the problem: ‘If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The picture was the same across the Atlantic. Lieber condemned unions in the name of economics and morality alike: they were guilty of encouraging &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg212&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sloth and, ultimately, vice.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Laboulaye demonstrated an attitude of cautious openness,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while Mill continued to be fundamentally hostile. He targeted the ‘moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one’, exercised by the trade-union movement: ‘the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry’ tried to block ‘piecework’ and thus oppressed workers of ‘superior skill or industry’, who sought to earn more. In reality, the consequences of piecework had been described as follows by Smith some decades earlier: the workers subjected to it ‘are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years’; if they listened to ‘the dictates of reason and humanity’, it would be the masters themselves who restricted this type of remuneration. But philanthropic intervention from above was one thing. Quite another was intervention from below by organizations that trampled over individual rights and arbitrarily interfered in what Mill too continued to regard as ‘private concerns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While they sought to impose intervention from above on bourgeois government itself, workers promoted an autonomous movement of transformation from below. However, in the sphere sovereignly declared by it to be ‘private’, the liberal bourgeoisie did not tolerate the intervention of political power, or even that deriving from civil society. Theoretically legalized in England in 1825, following a phase of persecution that even saw culprits condemned to deportation, trade unions continued to be attacked by the judiciary, in as much as they were defined as corporations hampering free enterprise. They acquired full legitimacy in 1871. However, ‘what Gladstone’s government gave with one hand it took away with another.’ If not trade unions as such, it was individual workers who could be dragged before the courts on the basis of a new law: ‘ “Watching and besetting”, that is “picketing” workmen continuing at work during a strike, was made illegal even when done only by a single person.’ This law was repealed by Disraeli in 1875.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In France, the Le Chapelier law was only repealed in 1887. What lay behind full recognition of the legitimacy of workers’ coalitions and organizations was the gigantic struggles that culminated in the Paris Commune. Hence we are beyond 1870, the date that according to Hayek marks the beginning of ‘the decline of the liberal movement’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg213&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself thus is an author who, not by chance, seems to want to call everything back into question. In his view, by destroying ‘the competitive determination of the price’ of labour power, and claiming to interfere in the ‘game’ of the market, trade unions undermined the liberal system at its roots; and it was ‘the clear moral duty of government’ to prevent this happening.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Paris Commune was a watershed in Europe, but not across the Atlantic. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was ‘applied first and most effectively to labour’, which was guilty of combining in trade-union ‘monopolies’ that did not respect individual initiative and freedom. By contrast, so-called yellow-dog contracts were long considered perfectly respectful of the rules of the market and individual liberty: on the basis of them, when hired, workers and employees committed themselves (were forced to commit themselves) not to join any trade-union organization.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The demand for economic and social rights and the transition from paternalistic liberalism to social-Darwinist liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A social-Darwinist streak ran through liberal thought from the start. The arguments used by Joseph Townsend in England in the second half of the eighteenth century against any attempt to introduce legislation in favour of the poor are eloquent: it would only end up destroying the balance of nature, cancelling the ‘peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure’ that was hunger and encouraging the growth of an idle, redundant surplus population. Left to itself, without the artificial interference of law-makers moved by false compassion, nature would restore its own balance, just as occurred on an island inhabited solely by goats and dogs. The struggle for survival selected the strongest, most vital elements, condemning the rest to their fate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the outset, the tendency to naturalize social conflict, and to present the wealth and power of the dominant classes as the expression of an immutable natural law (in this sense Burke referred to a &#039;&#039;‘natural&#039;&#039; aristocracy’ consecrated by ‘Nature’),[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] contained a social-Darwinist element &#039;&#039;avant la lettre&#039;&#039;. We are familiar with Franklin’s criticisms of doctors &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg214&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for their commitment to saving lives ‘not worth saving’. The ‘disease’ such people suffered from was the manifestation of divine anger at ‘Intemperance, Sloth, and other Vices’; and it was fitting that all this met with the ‘punishment’ provided for by nature and Providence.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] God’s higher design must not be hindered, especially if colonial populations were the target. This applied not only to the Indians. The terrible famine that decimated an Irish population already severely tried by the British colonizers’ plundering and oppression in the mid-nineteenth century seemed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan—charged by the London government with following the situation—to be the expression of ‘omniscient Providence’, which thereby solved the problem of overpopulation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the social-Darwinist element was accentuated as the popular classes, shaking off their traditional subalternity, intervened directly on the political scene to assert their rights. In the United States, following the abolition of slavery, paternalism rapidly gave way to an explicitly violent attitude towards blacks, subject to the terror that threatened anyone who dared to challenge white supremacy. Something similar occurred in Europe. Large sections of the dominant class reacted to the new situation achieved by the struggle for recognition by brandishing the law of natural selection, which condemned the unfit to an early death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most conservative sections of the liberal movement responded to the demand for economic and social rights with a radical, uncompromising liberalism. The state must not in any way interfere with the kind of divine judgement, or struggle for existence, to which Spencer had referred before Darwin. The English political and economic liberal condemned any state interference in the economy with the argument that one should not frustrate that cosmic law which required the elimination of the unfit and life’s failures: ‘the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better’. All men were as if subject to a divine judgment: ‘If they are sufficiently complete to live, they &#039;&#039;do&#039;&#039; live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was necessary to respect ‘that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg215&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Distancing himself from attempts to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the popular classes, Lecky observed that, in reality, ‘in not a few cases’, infant mortality was ‘a blessing in disguise’. Indeed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sanitary reform is not wholly a good thing when it enables the diseased and feeble members of the community, who in another stage of society would have died in infancy, to grow up and become parent stocks, transmitting a weakened type or the taint of hereditary disease.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Arguing thus, Lecky aligned himself with eugenics, the new ‘science’ that had made its appearance in England and met with extraordinary success in the United States, where between 1907 and 1915 as many as thirteen states passed legislation for compulsory sterilization. According to the legislation of Indiana (the first state to move in this direction), subject to it were ‘habitual delinquents, idiots, imbeciles and rapists’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like eugenics, Spencer celebrated his greatest triumph in the transatlantic republic.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here William G. Sumner, often regarded as a kind of US Spencer, warned people not to forget the ‘struggle for existence’, as ‘poets and sentimentalists’ liked to.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Socialism’s mistake primarily consisted in its claim ‘to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of “the state”‘.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Anti-statism and Social Darwinism went hand in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Germany Heinrich von Treitschke drew attention to the example of the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine the most delectable common people in the world, that of New York. It is a set of rejects who have merged from all over the whole earth. Yet left to themselves, these corrupted elements are compelled to control themselves. Do you think there is a Prussian police capable of keeping them at bay in the same way that they are held at bay by the harsh law of necessity? All are well aware: nobody takes any notice if someone dies of hunger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg216&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Still in Germany, in August L. von Rochau’s view the United States had the merit of applying the principle that every individual must, in the first instance, know how to help himself, unlike revolutionary, centralist France, which delegated care of individual well-being to the state, transforming the latter into a ‘hospital’ for ‘sickly, deformed people’ (&#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039;). The country across the Atlantic also asserted its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in its foreign policy, taking territory after territory from Mexico or the Indians, the latter a people now doomed to an ‘unstoppable decline’, and thus the equivalent on the international plane of the &#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039; who demanded state aid.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It makes no sense to seek to exclude Treitschke and Rochau from the liberal tradition by looking forward to the Third Reich and presupposing a variety of infernal negative teleology at work in Germany. In reality, both authors, especially the first, viewed England and the United States with sympathy and admiration and, echoing a theme widely diffused in the liberal culture of the time, unstintingly denounced the statist and anti-individualist tradition that revolutionary, socialist and Bonapartist France had inherited from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. In particular, the presence in Treitschke of the influence of Constant and de Tocqueville is immediately obvious. One thinks of his condemnation of the ‘deification of the state’ and the subsequent expansion of the political sphere. From ‘semi-ancient concepts’ and ‘Rousseau’s enthusiasm for the civic sense of the ancients’ derived the ‘omnipotent state power’ constructed by the Jacobins, who were likewise oblivious of the cost of the unanimous participation of citizens in political life: ‘the civic splendour of Athens rested on a vast foundation of slavery’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This inability to understand modern liberty led to tragedy: from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to the revolution, from Napoleon I to Napoleon III, ‘under all the regimes, the state’s excessive activity has remained the hereditary disease of France’, whose ideal was ‘the state’s providential omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can understand why social Darwinism established itself above all in Britain, the United States and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, these were three countries on the crest of a wave of economic development and international influence and prestige. If the first two were able to boast powerful expansion overseas or continentally, the third was already engaged in a frenetic scramble for colonies. We shall see that all three regarded themselves &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg217&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as members of a single family or race which, setting out from Germany, had first crossed the Channel and then the Atlantic. And all three tended to regard Latins (not to mention colonial peoples) as failures, and to attribute their own success to the action of natural selection, which rewarded the best within any individual state, but especially at an international level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn1a|1]] L’Ouverture, quoted in Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn2a|2]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn3a|3]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 229, 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 230–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn5a|5]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, pp. 154, 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn6a|6]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Étienne Dumont, Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1840, vol. 1, pp. 509–21. The text quoted here was subsequently reprinted with alterations in Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 2, pp. 491ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn7a|7]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 524–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn8a|8]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 104–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn9a|9]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 63–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn10a|10]] Randolph, quoted in ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 568–9, 464.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn12a|12]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn13a|13]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn15a|15]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 165.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn16a|16]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn17a|17]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn19a|19]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn20a|20]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn21a|21]] Ibid., p. 24. On Townsend, cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 800–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn22a|22]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn23a|23]] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, vol. 3, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn24a|24]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 10, pp. 352–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn25a|25]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn26a|26]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn27a|27]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn28a|28]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, pp. 291–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn29a|29]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 3, pt 2, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn31a|31]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn32a|32]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 80–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn33a|33]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 2, p. 727.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn40a|40]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 404.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 750 (speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 27 January 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 92–4, 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 221, 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 2, p. 152 n. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn45a|45]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 241 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 283 (letter to L. von Thun, 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn48a|48]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 309; Étienne Dumont, Introduction to Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn49a|49]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn50a|50]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 240 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn53a|53]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 284.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 101, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn56a|56]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 179–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 November 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 182 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, pp. 155, 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn65a|65]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 79–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §1; ch. 7, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn68a|68]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn69a|69]] Barnarve, quoted in François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, p. 168.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn70a|70]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 316–17, 318–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn71a|71]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;General History of Civilisation in Europe&#039;&#039;, Oxford and London: D. A. Talboys, 1837, pp. 13–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn72a|72]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 12, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 544.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn74a|74]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1 (letter to H. Reeve, 3 February 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn80a|80]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 165, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn81a|81]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 20, p. 350.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn82a|82]] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, &#039;&#039;La giustizia nella rivoluzione e nella Chiesa&#039;&#039;, ed. Mario Albertini, Turin: UTET, 1968, p. 408.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn83a|83]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, p. 334.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn85a|85]] Bentham, quoted in Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn86a|86]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn87a|87]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn88a|88]] Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 85 n. (this is an assertion which, with some variations, can be found in Dupont de Nemours as well as Robespierre).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn89a|89]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn90a|90]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 33, §1 (for Nietzsche); Alain Laurent, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’individualismo&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, p. 66 (for Wilde’s &#039;&#039;The Soul of Man under Socialism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn91a|91]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn92a|92]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn93a|93]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 269, 306–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 121.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn95a|95]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 242 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 3 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn97a|97]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn98a|98]] Palmerston, quoted in Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston&#039;&#039;, ed. Lester Hutchinson, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn99a|99]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 309–28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn100a|100]] Ibid., p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn101a|101]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 197–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn102a|102]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, p. 218; vol. 2, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn103a|103]] Vilfredo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et ideologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1999, pp. 14, 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn104a|104]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 3, pp. 554–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 61, 70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn106a|106]] Wolfgang Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’ und die politische und soziale Revolution in Frankreich und England&#039;&#039;, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, pp. 74, 80–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn107a|107]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 214, 217, 220.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn108a|108]] Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’&#039;&#039;, p. 78.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn109a|109]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn110a|110]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, p. 259 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn111a|111]] Francis Lieber, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty’, &#039;&#039;New Individualist Review&#039;&#039;, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 718–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn112a|112]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 173; Robespierre &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 501–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn113a|113]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 51, 326; on his relations with Berthold Georg Niebuhr, cf. Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Erinnerungen aus meinem Zusammenleben mit Georg Berthold Niebuhr&#039;&#039;, trans. Karl Thibaut, Heidelberg: Winter, 1837.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 337 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 16 May 1858).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 292.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn117a|117]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn118a|118]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., p. 664.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., p. 687.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn121a|121]] Ibid., p. 530.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn122a|122]] The text of the Le Chapelier law is quoted in Jean-Pierre Potier, ‘L’Assemblé constituante et la question de la liberté du travail’, in Jean-Michel Servet, &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn123a|123]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn124a|124]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 31, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn125a|125]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn126a|126]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 512–13, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn127a|127]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn128a|128]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. 25–6, 310.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn129a|129]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 144; Smith, &#039;&#039;Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn130a|130]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn131a|131]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 146; Hayek, &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn133a|133]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 318; Valerie Jean Conner, &#039;&#039;The National War Labor Board&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134a|134]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 36–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135a|135]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136a|136]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 803 (letter to J. Fothergill, 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137a|137]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 5, §10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138a|138]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;Social Statics&#039;&#039;, New York: Appleton, 1877, pp. 414–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 32–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140a|140]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141a|141]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142a|142]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism in American Thought&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. 18–36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143a|143]] William Graham Sumner, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 187, 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144a|144]] Sumner, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145a|145]] Heinrich von Treitschke, &#039;&#039;Politik&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, vol. 2, p. 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146a|146]] Augus Ludwig von Rochau, &#039;&#039;Grundsätze der Realpolitik&#039;&#039;, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 150, 186, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147a|147]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886, pp. 9–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148a|148]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SEVEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg219&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Self-government by white communities and deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Asserting the principle of consent by the governed as a condition of the legitimacy of political power, liberalism galvanized national independence movements. This initially occurred with the American Revolution. And it immediately offered an example. Some years later, it was the French colonists of San Domingo, determined to defend their property in slaves against interference from central power, who entertained projects of independence or adhesion to the North American Union. However, the colonists’ agitation had an utterly unanticipated consequence, in the emergence on the American continent of a new independent state ruled by blacks and which was the first to abolish the institution of slavery. But San Domingo–Haiti was the exception—and an exception that filled the liberal world in its entirety with horror and scandal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The outcome of the war of independence against Spain also induced perplexity and unease. It was crowned with success thanks to the aid of the ex-slaves of San Domingo and, albeit amid bitter conflicts, witnessed the emergence of a new identity stamped by a restoration of pre-Columbian ancestry and a mixing of races. Giving vent to a widespread sentiment, at the start of the Latin American revolution a senator from South Carolina (Robert Y. Hayne) scornfully referred to its leaders as ‘men of color’, who were ‘looking to Hayti … with feelings of the strongest confraternity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They admired the island which, in Jefferson’s view, could serve only as a dumping ground where blacks could &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg220&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be deported and deposited. For the purposes of that operation—i.e. ‘the definitive disappearance of the black race from our borders’—John O’Sullivan, the theorist of ‘manifest destiny’, thought above all of the Latin American continent: ‘The Spanish-Indian-American population of Mexico, Central America and South America, afford the only receptacle capable of absorbing that race … [They are] themselves already of mixed and confused blood’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of Elam Lynds, ‘father of the prison system’ then in force and a prominent US figure, ‘whose practical talents are universally acknowledged’ (the characterization is de Tocqueville’s) ‘the Spanish of South America’ formed ‘a race closer to the ferocious beast and the savage than civilized man’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The category traditionally employed to define Indians was now also applied to the populations that had committed the error of mixing with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While white colonists in the British Commonwealth saw their right to self-government recognized, the Latin American peoples, excluded from the white community and the community of the free strictly defined, became part of the colonial world. This explains the Monroe Doctrine. Reinterpreted and radicalized in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, it conferred an ‘international police power’ on ‘civilized society’ in general, and the United States in particular, in relation to Latin America.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The white colonists of the British Empire encountered no serious difficulty achieving recognition. Having learnt the lesson implicit in the American Revolution, the London government decided to pursue the policy of ‘conciliation’ formerly suggested by Burke in its relationship with peoples ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. Thus, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa first achieved significant autonomy inside the Commonwealth and subsequently attained complete independence. It was a well-founded principle (observed John Stuart Mill in 1861) that, at least in domestic policy, the ‘colonies of European race’ were fully entitled to self-government.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, self-government by the colonists could entail a drastic deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, now subject to the exclusive, unhampered control of their direct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg221&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;oppressors. We are familiar with Smith’s observation about the catastrophic consequences that ‘free’ representative bodies monopolized or controlled by slave-owners could have for black slaves. Several decades later, in 1841, James Stephen, one of the actors in the struggle that had led to the abolition of slavery in British colonies, declared himself in favour of their firm control by the Crown: ‘popular franchises in the hands of a great body of owners of slaves were the worst instruments of tyranny which were ever yet forged for the oppression of mankind’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pertinence of this warning was tragically confirmed by subsequent developments. In 1864, referring to New Zealand, which for some years had been able to count on ‘responsible government’—that is, ultimately, self-government by the white community&#039;&#039;—The Times&#039;&#039; observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lost all imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Australia the extermination of the Aborigines had already begun some time earlier. But in this case too it was the de facto self-government which the colonists succeeded in exercising that pressed on the accelerator, whereas expressing concern in 1830 about the ‘indelible stain’ being imprinted ‘upon the character of the British Government’ was the Colonial Secretary.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, according to the observation made at the start of the twentieth century by an English liberal whose position was highly anomalous—namely, John Hobson—what was occurring was a kind of ‘private slaughter’, carried out by colonists who had wrested self-government or substantial freedom of action.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of South Africa, once the government had defeated the Boer settlers and subjected them to the Empire, it reassured them: ‘Your fate is in your own hands … the good sense of the British people will never tolerate any intermeddling in the purely domestic concerns of the people to whom it has conceded the fullest liberties of government.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Self-government by white &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg222&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;settlers involved the emergence of a racial state, which segregated blacks in a semi-servile condition and remained in place for almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Significantly, this regime took the South of the United States as its model.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There, following a brief interlude (so-called Reconstruction) immediately after the Civil War, when African Americans were genuinely able to enjoy civil and political rights, the reconciliation between the former enemies in 1877 reestablished in the southern states the self-government of whites, who subjected the recently emancipated slaves to a terroristic dictatorship based on the principle of white supremacy. As in South Africa with the compromise between the British and the Boers, in the United States the compromise between central government and the dominant class in the South, which re-acquired the right to self-government, paved the way for the reassertion of ‘master-race democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The abolition of slavery and the development of servile labour&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a question suggests itself. The military defeat of the South was clear and irreversible, but had the principle of the racial delimitation of the community of the free really been overcome? Scorning abolitionism, Calhoun summarized the change that had occurred in Britain’s colonies following the desired emancipation: blacks were ‘forced to labor, not by the authority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This statement dates from 1837. Laws against vagrancy forced the former slaves to work as ‘apprentices’. In what conditions? A year prior to the intervention of the theorist of the slaveholding South, a representative of the British colonial administration, inspired by evangelical sentiments, had observed in a letter to the governor of the island of Mauritius:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than that of slavery itself.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg223&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville would later observe that ‘having nominally abolished slavery, the British have reintroduced it under the rubric of apprenticeship for a certain period of time’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the apprenticeship only lasted a few years, even if much time had to pass before the ex-slaves could shake off the negative discriminations of every kind they continued to suffer. In any event, even before the abolition of slavery in its colonies, Britain was concerned to replace the blacks, importing indentured servants from Africa and Asia. Here we see at work Indian and Chinese coolies in particular. On their arrival in the British colonies, they were settled in the accommodation reserved for slaves. It is true that this involved indentured servants, but in fact many of them did not survive until the expiry of their contract. Even the sexual exploitation of women was not lacking. In the popular art of the time, the coolie was represented in chains, exactly like a slave. Obviously, there was no longer a hereditary transmission of the servile condition; in a sense, there was not even any need for it. British ships could continue to transport coolies from Asia in a voyage that resembled the classic slave trade. Conditions were harsh and the mortality rate high.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the losses could rapidly be made up. A distinguished American historian of the institution of slavery has offered a summary of the golden age of liberalism that is worth quoting:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, as in 1760, non-European compulsory labor was still the labor of choice for rational capitalists who chose to cultivate the vast undeveloped parts of the tropics … The 20 millions who left India alone, mostly as indentured servants, between the 1830s and the 1910s, amounted to twice the number of Africans forcibly landed in the Americas during the four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain in 1840 a political figure of the first importance—Lord John Russell—expressed his unease at the advent of a ‘new system of slavery’. Initially, it met with resistance from the abolitionist movement, which was still fairly strong. However, as a result of the already noted weakness of abolitionism inspired by Christianity, demands for the import from Africa and Asia of indentured servants, who in reality were a more or less compulsory labour force, soon got the upper hand.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg224&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;As well as in British colonies, this new servile labour force also made its appearance in the United States. Around 10,000 coolies imported from China were engaged in building inaccessible railroads, intended to consolidate the conquest of the Far West.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As Engels put it, this was an attempt to replace black slavery with the ‘disguised slavery of Indian and Chinese coolies’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was this confirmation of the thesis maintained by Calhoun of the inseparability of work and slavery? In North America, prior to being overshadowed and then definitively supplanted by more profitable black slavery, Indian slavery had long persisted here and there, even after the Glorious Revolution. In 1767 Sharp, the abolitionist we have already encountered, felt obliged to denounce it. In the case of Virginia it was only in 1808 that the Supreme Court definitively pronounced its illegality.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the American Revolution onwards, the indentured servant or temporary white slave was completely replaced by the black slave, who in turn, after the end of the Civil War, gave way to the coolie from China or India—another temporary slave, even if the skin colour was now yellow. In 1834, the same year as the abolition of slavery in British colonies, the liberal Wakefield acknowledged that ‘yellow slaves’ were beginning to take the place of ‘blacks’, just as the latter had taken over from ‘red’ (Indian) slaves.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, ‘red’ slavery or semi-slavery would have a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century in Texas and California, taken from Mexico (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|§2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, it can reasonably be objected to Calhoun that semi-slavery or slavery for a specified period of time is not the same thing as perpetual and hereditary slavery. But let us note the further development of the argument by the theorist of the slaveholding South. In any ‘wealthy and civilized society’, part of the population ‘live[s] on the labor of the other’. This was a manifestly conflictual relationship: the best way of regulating it was achieved when ‘the labor of the African race is, [as] among us, commanded by the European’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The expansion of Europe in the colonies and the diffusion of ‘master-race democracy’ in Europe&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg225&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Not even Mill had any doubts about the dominion the ‘European race’ was called upon to exercise over the rest of the world. Certainly, he declared for recognition of the right of self-government by the ‘colonies of European race’. But only for them. As for the rest,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear: freedom applied ‘only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’ and could not be demanded by minors or ‘those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No different was the position of Lecky, who at the start of the twentieth century celebrated the glory of the United Kingdom thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing in the history of the world is more wonderful than that under the flag of these two little islands there should have grown up the greatest and most beneficent despotism in the world, comprising nearly two hundred and thirty millions of inhabitants under direct British rule, and more than fifty millions under British protectorates …[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘despotism’ theorized here was certainly synonymous with slavery from the standpoint of Locke and the protagonists of the American Revolution, all the more so in that it seemed to know no limits. In Mill’s view, ‘a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Political ‘slavery’ could not be equated with slavery in the strict sense. Yet Mill went further. He demanded the barbarians’ ‘obedience’ for the purposes of their education for ‘continuous &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg226&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;labour’, which was the foundation of civilization. And, in this context, he did not hesitate to theorize a transitional phase of ‘slavery’ for ‘uncivilized races’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The point was forcefully reiterated: there were ‘savage tribes so averse from regular industry, that industrial life is scarcely able to introduce itself among them until they are … conquered and made slaves of’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the slave had no cause for complaint; he was ‘one step in advance of a savage’, and thanks to the conditions imposed on him had already achieved a certain progress. We are put in mind of Calhoun and the slaveholding South, all the more so when Mill refers to &#039;&#039;‘born&#039;&#039; slaves’ recalcitrant to work and discipline.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, despite his employment of the expression just noted, the English liberal envisaged a temporary slavery. This would in fact seem to hang over ‘the great majority of the human race’, which unfortunately was ‘in a savage or semi-savage state’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the condition dictating slavery. While, on the one hand, Mill sided decisively with the Union during the Civil War, on the other, he legitimized the practice of forced labour imposed by colonial powers on subject populations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the coin of this opposition between civilized, adult England and savage races of minors was the process whereby the barrier separating servants from masters in the metropolis tended to lose its caste rigidity. The attitude adopted in the mid-nineteenth century by Disraeli, champion of the colonial expansion of ‘superior’ races and major theorist of race as the ‘key to history’ (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|§10]]), was significant. He denied that it was possible to speak of the existence in England of ‘two nations’—‘the rich and the poor’—as the Chartists claimed. On the basis of his assertion of the unity that now characterized the ‘privileged, prosperous English people’, Disraeli promoted the Second Reform Act, which extended political rights to significant sections of the popular masses.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Class differences within the white community remained, but were being reduced even at a social level. The exploitation of Chinese coolies and other more or less servile labour forces created the possibility of ‘raising to the position of “independent gentlemen”‘, if not ‘whole white populations of the West’, as Hobson maintained,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] then at least a significant proportion of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg227&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The decisive barrier now lay elsewhere. The three ‘castes’ had become two—in the United States thanks to the abolition of slavery, and in Europe thanks to the reduction of differences within the white community, which was tending to develop more egalitarian internal relations than in the past, similar to those of the white community across the Atlantic. In this sense, ‘master-race democracy’ now characterized the overall relations between the West and the colonial world, whether internal or external.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Hobson could denounce the extreme expansion of ‘the area of British despotism’. The London government resorted to ‘distinctively autocratic methods’ in its relations with an enormous number of human beings:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the three hundred and sixty-seven millions of British subjects outside these isles, not more than eleven millions, or one in thirty-four, have any real self-government for purposes of legislation and administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political freedom, and civil freedom, so far as it rests upon the other, are simply non-existent for the overwhelming majority of British subjects.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Essentially, this was the same analysis as Mill’s (and Lecky’s), with the difference that ‘despotism’ now had a negative connotation. Suffering it (stressed Hobson) were populations coerced into forced labour. And here too we have a convergence with Mill as regards factual analysis, but a sharp contrast when it comes to value judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. De Tocqueville, Western supremacy and the danger of ‘miscegenation’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The model of ‘master-race democracy’ also had a clear influence on de Tocqueville. It is true that during the July Monarchy he stood for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. But how were the ex-slaves to be treated once they had been emancipated? It was necessary ‘to prevent the negroes of our colonies imitating those of the English colonies and, like them, abandoning the major industries to retire to a piece of fertile soil, which has been bought cheaply or grabbed’. Hence emancipated slaves could be permitted to choose their ‘master’, but not to ‘remain idle or to work exclusively for themselves’. That could not be tolerated:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg228&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In temporarily banning negroes from owning land, what are we doing? We are artificially placing them in the position in which the European labourer naturally finds himself. This is certainly not tyranny and the man this obstacle is imposed on when he escapes slavery would not seem to have any right to complain.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the measure suggested here was the one historically implemented in the colonies, making it possible to transform slavery proper into a semi-servile labour relationship. In any event, in addition to their political rights, notionally emancipated blacks were thus also deprived of civil rights, by its ‘artificially’ being made impossible for them to own a piece of land and freely choose their occupation. While he condemned legal regulation of working hours as ‘despotism’, de Tocqueville had nothing against the creation from above of a caste of wage-labour denied any possibility of social mobility. When he referred to workers from India or other parts of the world, called on by England to replace the emancipated black slaves, the French liberal also made indirect mention of the coolies.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, however, he ventured no critical remarks about a labour relationship construed even by influential representatives of the liberal world as a recreation of the institution of slavery in a different form. As in Mill, so in Tocqueville, the supremacy pertaining to Europeans was not only political, but also had direct consequences economically and socially. In any event, the gulf separating dominant and dominated was unbridgeable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European race has received from heaven, or acquired by its own efforts, such incontestable superiority over the other races which compose the great human family that the man placed by us, on account of his vices and ignorance, on the bottom rung of the social scale is still first among the savages.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was fitting that such colossally different races continued to remain clearly distinct. De Tocqueville referred with horror to the behaviour of some prisoners deported to Australia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The condemned have fled in large numbers into the woods. There they have formed companies of looters; they have allied with the savages, married their children and partially adopted their customs. Out of this crossbreeding, a race of half-castes has been born that is more barbarous than the Europeans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg229&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but more civilized than the savages, and whose hostility has constantly disturbed the colony and sometimes caused it to run the greatest dangers. [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This denunciation of miscegenation, which imperilled European or white supremacy, is a theme that takes us back to the United States and, above all, to the ideology that continued to inspire the South even after the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The ‘empty cradle’ and the ‘destiny’ of the Indians&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others ‘master-race democracy’, which was now on the point of becoming established on a planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. Leading the Union’s war against the secessionist states and promoting the abolition of slavery was a figure (Lincoln) who, like Jefferson before him, toyed with the idea of deporting the blacks to Africa or Latin America, and who was a veteran of the wars against the Indians, against ‘men, women, and children … mercilessly cut to pieces’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1871 General Francis C. Walker, commissioner for Indian affairs, proposed to treat ‘wild men’ no differently from ‘wild beasts’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison we have already encountered in Washington, and which presided over the substantial erasure of the Indians (and the natives of Australia and New Zealand) from the face of the earth, thus makes its reappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A genealogical myth derived from the Old Testament was called upon to legitimize these genocidal practices. A major modern historian, Arnold Toynbee, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated. Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent … [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg230&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This genealogical myth, which presided over the expropriation, deportation and decimation of the Irish and the Indians, was explicitly present in Lieber: ‘[God] has given [this great country] to us, as much as He gave Palestine to the Jews’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention was made of the Indians, even if they seem to be implicitly compared to the populations that occupied the Promised Land without authorization prior to the arrival of the chosen people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; seems to support this deadly genealogical myth. De Tocqueville underlined the religious fervour of New England’s founders, who regarded themselves as descendants from ‘Abraham’s stock’. In the writings and documents left behind by them, one sensed ‘the very savor of Gospel antiquity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was an aroma that in a way ended up turning the head of the French liberal himself. He uncritically adopted and subscribed to the description Nathaniel Morton, one of the colony’s founders and first leaders, gave of the Pilgrim Fathers’ arrival in America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[W]hat could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men? [A]nd what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not … the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, as in the Old Testament description of the unauthorized inhabitants of Canaan, those destined to be subjugated or wiped out by the chosen people—or, as de Tocqueville characterized it, ‘the germ of a great nation wafted by Providence to a predestined shore’—are completely confounded with nature.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This providential design is all the more clear because, ultimately, it involved a desert. It is a theme &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; returns to repeatedly: the Indian ‘has nothing to oppose to our perfection in the arts but the resources of the wilderness’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One phrase is especially significant: ‘the Indians were the sole inhabitants of the wilds whence they have since been expelled’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The desert ceased to be such, becoming a place inhabited by humans, only with the entry of the Europeans and the flight or deportation of the indigenous population. As we know, Locke and Montesquieu preferred to speak of ‘virgin &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg231&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;forests’. But even though the two metaphors are different, their meaning is identical: we are dealing with places where there is no human trace, an area that is (as Locke put it) ‘vacant’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When subsequently forced to register the presence of the Indians, de Tocqueville hastened to stress that they had no right to the land occupied by them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the vast country that I have been describing was inhabited by many indigenous tribes, it may justly be said, at the time of its discovery by Europeans, to have formed one great desert. The Indians occupied without possessing it. It is by agricultural labor that man appropriates the soil, and the early inhabitants of North America lived by the produce of the chase.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For Locke already, the sole possible foundation of property right was labour, of which a people dedicated exclusively to hunting were incapable. But an explicitly theological justification was added by de Tocqueville to seal the fate of the Indians:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; those wide and deep rivers; that inexhaustible valley of the Mississippi; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, de Tocqueville ended up legitimizing the policy of deportation implemented by Jackson, president of the transatlantic republic when the French liberal visited it. The argument of the ‘empty cradle’ was widespread in the US culture of the time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a ‘freethinker’ aligned with the liberals and a writer and intellectual who enjoyed undisputed prestige in Boston,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] had no doubts in interpreting God’s will. Only pending the arrival of a superior stock had the Indians been placed on American soil. Thereafter &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg232&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they were clearly marked out for ‘destruction’ or ‘extermination’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Franklin had not argued very differently, when he attributed to a providential design the devastating effect of alcohol on a population destined to be wiped off the face of the earth (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was more pained. He did not shut his eyes to the horrors that were occurring. Yet, however distressing, the tragedy of the Indians expressed both the progress of civilization and a providential design. In any event, it was ineluctable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their implacable prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction. The ruin of these tribes began from the day when Europeans landed on their shores; it has proceeded ever since, and we are now witnessing its completion.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
True, de Tocqueville expressed unease at the ‘cold egotism’, ‘utter insensitivity’ and ‘ruthless sentiment’ with which the white population of the United States, so attached to its morality and Christianity, viewed the fate of the Indians. Yet the French liberal’s description of the ‘savages’, more than ever recalcitrant to ‘civilization’, certainly did not conduce to the cause of their salvation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a general rule, their mouth was disproportionately large and their facial expression ignoble and wicked … Their physiognomy exhibited that deep depravity which can only derive from a long abuse of civilization, and yet they were still savages. Mixed with the vices they have adopted from us is something barbaric and uncivilized, making them a hundred times more repugnant … Their movements were rapid and uncoordinated, their voice shrill and tuneless, their glance worried and savage. On first contact, one would be tempted to regard them as nothing but a beast of the forest on which education has been able to confer a semblance of humanity, but which has nevertheless remained an animal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We can now understand the question de Tocqueville posed to his US interlocutors: ‘Do the Indians have an idea that sooner or later their race will be destroyed by ours?’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg233&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The Indians’ deportation and decimation made explicit the fact that the North American territory was an ‘empty cradle’, awaiting the white settler committed from the time of his arrival to ‘struggl[ing] against the obstacles that nature opposes to him’, against ‘the wilderness and savage life’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, what ends up emerging is the process of de-humanization of the natives, reduced, even more than to barbarism, to inanimate nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. De Tocqueville, Algeria and ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In de Tocqueville the American model asserted itself with particular clarity when he confronted the problem of Algeria. The letter sent to Francis Lieber on 22 July 1846 is revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time I am very concerned about our affairs in Africa, which assume greater importance with every passing day. For us &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; has become, and will remain, the secondary aspect as long we do not have quarrels in Europe. The principal aspect today is colonization, is how to attract a major &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; population of cultivators to Algeria and, above all, keep them there. We already have 100,000 &#039;&#039;Christians&#039;&#039; in Africa, not counting the army. But they have almost all settled in the towns, which are becoming large, beautiful cities, while the countryside remains a &#039;&#039;desert&#039;&#039;. It is impossible to consider colonization in Africa without thinking of the great examples furnished by the United States in this field. But how to study them? Have books or documents of any kind been published in the United States that can enlighten us on this point and tell us how things unfolded? Can this information be found in official or other kinds of reports? Anything you could provide in this connection would be received with great gratitude.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
I have highlighted four phrases in italics. Let us begin with the last of them. Like the lands inhabited or, rather, occupied without authorization by the Indians, Algeria was a desert prior to the arrival of the French or ‘Christians’. A sort of Biblical aroma begins to make itself felt in connection with the landing in North Africa of a civilized people, who likewise seem invested with a providential mission. It was a people at once European and Christian: the colonial war tended to assume a religious character. Certainly, expelling the Algerians &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg234&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from their ‘desert’ was an operation that met with fierce resistance, but de Tocqueville was careful in this instance not to speak of ‘war’. That was a category which could only be applied to armed conflicts in Europe and between civilized peoples. It somehow implied recognition of the enemy, which was something denied Arabs and Indians alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precisely because of this lack of recognition, the campaign of colonial conquest could resort to pitiless violence that did not spare the civilian population. On account of their brutal, indiscriminate character, the methods used to subjugate Algeria ended up eliciting reservations and disquiet in France. De Tocqueville was not among the ‘excellent philanthropists’ about whom Bugeaud, the general in charge of military operations,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ironized:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often heard in France men whom I respect, but do not support, consider it reprehensible that crops are burned, silos emptied, and lastly that unarmed men, women and children are seized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For me, this is a regrettable necessity, but one to which any people that wants to make war on the Arabs will have to submit.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
According to de Tocqueville, the head of military operations in Algeria had the merit of having understood all this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is the first who has known how to apply ubiquitously and simultaneously the kind of war which, in my view as in his, is the only kind of war that is feasible in Africa. He has pursued this system of war with incomparable energy and vigour.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This was a ‘new science’ that must be taken to heart.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In order to starve them, and confront them with the clear alternative of capitulation or death from starvation, Arabs who insisted on resisting must be deprived not only of their harvest, but also of the possibility of trading with neighbours: ‘They suffer greatly from being parked between our bayonets and the desert’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we are explicitly referred to the American model; this is how ‘the most barbaric Indian tribes’ were disciplined: ‘the tribe from which a robbery or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg235&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;murder has been committed’ was subjected to collective punishment, which excluded it from the trade with Europeans absolutely vital to it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the rebel Arabs must by all means be prevented from the possibility of combining or settling anywhere:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the passionate taste they display for a nomadic existence, they need settlements. It is of the utmost importance to prevent them being able to establish a single one. All expeditions whose aim is to occupy or destroy existing towns and emerging towns seem to me useful.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville had no hesitation in issuing a radical watchword:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To destroy anything that resembles a permanent gathering of population or, in other words, a town: I believe it is of the utmost importance not to allow any town to survive, or arise, in the regions controlled by Abd el-Kader [the leader of the resistance].[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the modality of the war. But what results was it intended to achieve? We know the model that inspired de Tocqueville. In May 1841, while visiting Philippeville, founded on land acquired at a derisory price from the indigenous inhabitants, he was pleased by the ‘American aspect of the city’, which was rapidly expanding.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expropriation and colonization were proceeding apace. Once the process had been completed, what kind of society should be built? What relations might be developed between the Arabs and the French? De Tocqueville was in no doubt:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fusion of these two peoples is a chimera that can be dreamt of only when one has not been on the spot. Hence it is possible and necessary that there be two clearly distinct sets of laws in Africa, because we are faced with two clearly separate societies. When one is dealing with Europeans, &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; nothing prevents us from treating them as if they were alone; the laws enacted for them must always be applied exclusively to them.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg236&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to scrupulous protection of the invaders’ civil liberties was a terroristic law of suspects directed at the indigenous population. During his visit to Philippeville, the French liberal was invited to lunch by a colonel in the occupying army, who painted an eloquent picture of the situation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir, only force and terror work with these people … The other day, a murder was committed in the street. An Arab was brought before me who was a suspect. I interrogated him and then had him beheaded. You will see his head on the gate of Constantine.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville seems to have betrayed no emotion. He repeated the idea of two sets of laws. As regards criminal trials of ‘natives’, ‘if it is thought that our forms are too slow (which I do not think), war tribunals could be set up for them’. And even for ‘civil trials’, the ‘emergency procedure’ already in force could be retained.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs must also be discriminated against economically, as well as legally: ‘Allow free entry into France of all produce from Algeria, especially that derived not from native industry but colonial industry’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only on these conditions would French settlers in North Africa genuinely be able to develop on the American model:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no easy thing to instil in Europeans the desire to abandon their country, because they are happy there and enjoy certain rights and certain goods that are dear to them. It is even more difficult to attract them to a country where from the outset they encounter a torrid, unhealthy climate and a formidable enemy, who incessantly hangs around you to take your property or your life. To get inhabitants to come to such a country, it is first of all necessary to give them great opportunities to make their fortune; in the second place, they must find social conditions that conform to their habits and tastes.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen de Tocqueville celebrate the unprecedented zone of liberty enjoyed by the individual in the United States (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]). But now something similar is to be found in the African space conquered by France: ‘The colonies of all the European peoples afford the same spectacle. Rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg237&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;than being smaller, the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the mother country. His freedom of action is less restricted’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, the other side of the coin was a drastic deterioration in the condition of the Arabs. De Tocqueville did not hide the fact: ‘We have decimated the population’ and the survivors were being exterminated by the starvation caused by the methods of war we have noted; ‘at this moment Abd el-Kader is &#039;&#039;literally&#039;&#039; dying of hunger’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It had to be admitted that ‘we have made Muslim society much more miserable, disorganised, ignorant and barbarous than it was before it knew us’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So what was to be done? The French liberal distanced himself from the attitude of not a few officers and soldiers of the French army: in their view, ‘the Arabs are like noxious beasts’ and ‘the death of each and every one of them seems a good thing’. No, ‘it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable to want to snuff out or exterminate the natives’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a second, de Tocqueville lets slip an admission: ‘At this time we are making war in much more barbarous fashion than the Arabs themselves. Currently, civilization is to be found on their side.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Immediately afterwards, however, we find the declaration we have already noted: there was no room for humanitarian scruples in a colonial war that directly targeted the civilian populations, who were denied means of subsistence and the possibility of combining. Or: ‘Once we have committed the major violence of the conquest, I believe we must not shrink from the minor forms of violence absolutely required to consolidate it.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the conquest had been completed, it was necessary to promote self-government by civil society (French and white). It was called on to free itself altogether of military control, which must continue to be deployed with the requisite firmness over the Arabs. The conflict across the Atlantic, which during the War of Independence against Britain and in subsequent decades saw local self-government reject any interference by central political power—be it in London or Washington—in the colonists’ expansion or slave-owners’ enjoyment of their legitimate property, also manifested itself in Algeria. On one side were the colonists, who demanded complete freedom of action and expropriation, and on the other the political and military authorities, called upon to administer a ruthless colonial conquest with a minimum of prudence. How &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg238&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;many colonists could Africa absorb and how far could the process of expropriation of the indigenous population be pushed? De Tocqueville criticized hesitations and doubts: ‘It is not correct to say that the introduction of European farmers is a measure whose implementation is impractical’, or feasible only to a limited extent. At issue was a territory over which ‘the indigenous population is fairly scarce or fairly dispersed’. In any event, ‘the common property of the tribe is not founded on any title’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The colonel encountered by de Tocqueville, who did not hesitate to have Arabs decapitated on the basis of mere suspicion, on the other hand expressed his contempt for the colonists, a ‘mass of scoundrels’ and ‘thieves’, for whom the army was nothing more than a tool for accumulating a ‘fortune’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The date is 30 May 1841. The previous year, Bugeaud had set out his policy to the Chamber of Deputies: ‘Wherever there is clean water and fertile soil, it is necessary to settle colonists, without worrying about whom the land belongs to. It must be distributed to them so that it is enjoyed as rightful property’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, in the previously cited article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039; on 25 December 1843, he observed that, although conducting the merciless war dictated by circumstances, his army demonstrated generosity towards the Arab who finally decided to surrender: ‘We return to him all his world and sometimes part of his herd’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This attitude seems to have prompted reservations in de Tocqueville, judging at any rate from his intervention in the Chamber in June 1846:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some localities, rather than reserving the most fertile land, the best irrigated and most adapted for government property for Europeans, we have given it to the natives … After betrayals and rebellions, the natives have often been received by us with singular magnanimity. There are some who, having indulged in soaking their hands in our blood, have had their goods, their honour and their power restored to them, thanks to our generosity. There is more. In many places where the civilized European population is mixed with the indigenous population, there are not unfounded complaints that in general it is the native who is better protected, while the European obtains justice with greater difficulty.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg239&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a letter from the same period, de Tocqueville even ended up ironizing about ‘the tenderness towards the Arabs that came over Monsieur Bugeaud at the point when he saw in it a powerful means of blocking the development of civilized colonization’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We seem to hear once again the laments and protests of the American colonists against the London government, or of the southern planters of the United States against the threat of interference by federal government. And, in fact, de Tocqueville elaborated on his indictment of the political and military authorities. At issue was not only the assignment of land:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lavished honorific distinctions on the Arab, which are intended to indicate the merit of our citizens … One is led to conclude that our government in Africa is taking softness towards the vanquished so far as to forget its conquering position … It is neither useful nor obligatory for us to permit exaggerated ideas of their own importance in our Muslim subjects, and not even to persuade them that we are obliged in any circumstances to treat them as if they were our co-citizens and equals. They know that we have a dominant position in Africa and they expect us to retain it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of human equality could not be extended to embrace ‘semi-civilized peoples’ located outside the West: it was absolutely vital to avoid occasioning ‘astonishment and confusion in their spirits, filling them with erroneous and dangerous ideas’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case was it permissible to lose sight of the objective of building a society based on the legally sanctioned domination of French, Christian and European colonists. The attainment of this objective was now close at hand: ‘The Arab element is ever more isolated and little by little is dissolving. The Muslim population is tending to decline relentlessly, while the Christian population is growing relentlessly’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed: ‘Our weapons have decimated some tribes … On the other hand, our cultivators willingly use native manpower. The European needs the Arab to make the most of his land; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high wage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville had not lost sight of the American model. The Algerians were part Indians, forced to suffer expropriation, and part blacks. In the latter guise, Arabs could not claim to enjoy the rights of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg240&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;citizenship either on a civil level or, still less, politically. Without being slaves, now deprived of land they could earn a living only by supplying ‘manpower’ to the new property-owners. The society hoped for here was not very different from the one that would be realized in the southern United States after the Civil War. In Algeria, French and Western supremacy took the place of ‘white supremacy’. For the rest, there continued to exist two sets of laws, separated by a racial barrier, and the prejudice, on a more or less accentuated racial basis, called upon to justify these relations. Already at the beginning of the conquest, writing to de Tocqueville, Kergolay (his cousin and a life-long friend) had spoken of the Arabs as an ‘infamous, despicable race’, to be kept under constant control ‘by force combined with simple, uncomplicated equity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The recipient of this letter seems not to have seen things very differently. After a notable interval of time, we find him using, in slightly different form, some of the expressions we have just noted: ‘semi-civilized peoples’ were only capable of understanding the discourse of ‘correct but strict justice’; hence France should beware of indulging in ‘magnanimity and leniency’—virtues that would be incomprehensible and, worse, might produce dangerous results.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, writing precisely to Kergolay, de Tocqueville denounced the ‘greed’ and ‘fanaticism’ of the Arabs,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who, by his own admission, were suffering the systematic expropriation carried out by occupying forces inclined to regard their enemies as ‘noxious beasts’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To complete this picture, it is appropriate to mention a final detail. There was a moment in 1833 when the French liberal thought of settling as a colonist in Algeria.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Identification with the regime of white or Western supremacy, or ‘master-race democracy’, seems to have been total.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn1a|1]] Hayne, quoted in Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn2a|2]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn3a|3]] Lynds, quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn4a|4]] Roosevelt, quoted in Jean-Pierre Martin and Daniel Royot, &#039;&#039;Histoire et civilisation des États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn5a|5]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn6a|6]] Stephen, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn7a|7]] Quoted in Henri Grimal, &#039;&#039;De l’Empire britannique au Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, Paris: Colin, 1999, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn8a|8]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 420.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn9a|9]] J. A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn10a|10]] Chamberlain, quoted in Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn12a|12]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lene, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn13a|13]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn14a|14]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 92, 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn15a|15]] Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 176–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn16a|16]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn17a|17]] Cf. Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. vii; Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn18a|18]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 246.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn19a|19]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 4, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn20a|20]] Almon Wheeler Lauber, &#039;&#039;Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States&#039;&#039;, Williamstown (MA): Corner House, 1979, pp. 306–7, 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn21a|21]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 473ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn22a|22]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn23a|23]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn24a|24]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn25a|25]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn28a|28]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn30a|30]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn31a|31]] Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., pp. 124, 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn33a|33]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 103, 105.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 271–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn37a|37]] Nevins and Commager, &#039;&#039;America&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn38a|38]] Walker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn39a|39]] A. J. Toynbee, &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 211–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn40a|40]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 317.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn41a|41]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 25, 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 335.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn45a|45]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 337.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn46a|46]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn47a|47]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn49a|49]] Vernon L. Parrington, &#039;&#039;Main Currents in American Thought&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn50a|50]] Thomas F. Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 243.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn51a|51]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn52a|52]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 73–6, 223–5; cf. pp. 343–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn53a|53]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 434.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54a|54]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (letter to Francis Lieber, 22 July 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55a|55]] In an article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039;, 25 December 1843: ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 226–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 316.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 280.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 323.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72a|72]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 226.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74a|74]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 304 (unpublished letter to C. L. L. J. de Lamorcière, 5 April 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 380–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77a|77]] Bugeaud, quoted in Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi and André Prenant, &#039;&#039;L’Algérie, passé et présent&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1960, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78a|78]] Bugeaud, quoted in Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80a|80]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 220 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2, 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84a|84]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 1, pp. 193, 199 (letters of 22 June and 8 July 1830).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86a|86]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87a|87]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 2, p. 86 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 23 May 1841).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88a|88]] Cf. Jean-Jacques Chevallier and André Jardin, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER EIGHT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg241&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Return to the question: What is liberalism? The well-born, the free and the liberals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having briefly reconstructed periods in the history of liberalism and the concrete politico-social relationships developed in its name, we must now return to our opening question. Use of the term ‘liberal’ is usually dated to the political struggles that developed in Spain in the wake of the 1812 revolution and the opposition that emerged between ‘liberals’, engaged in defending the constitution, and their opponents, whom they branded ‘servile’. Only now was the adjective transformed into a substantive. In fact, in revolutionary America the author of an article opposed to the institution of slavery had already signed himself ‘A Liberal’ (see [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|§10]]). But that is not the key point. When we come across a text from 1818 in which Constant sets out and supports the programme of the ‘liberal party’, it can be said that we are dealing with an adjective.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The political meaning of the term is clear; and implicit in it is the transition to the noun employed to define members of the party in question. On the other hand, there is not much difference between this stance in favour of the ‘liberal party’ and the stance in favour of the ‘liberal political system’ that we have seen make its appearance in a text by Washington as early as 1783. Hence the real problem is to identify the moment when, partly inheriting and partly transforming the meaning bequeathed by a long tradition, the term ‘liberal’ began to assume its modern political meaning. This was the precondition for the transition from the adjective to the substantive.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg242&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a semantic event that cannot be uncoupled from the actual history of the liberal movement and liberal revolutions. We can start with the Glorious Revolution. Arguing against Robert Filmer, defender of the thesis that the Almighty had conferred exclusive ownership of, and dominion over, the earth to Adam, the first absolute monarch, Locke objected that God had bestowed his blessings ‘with a liberal hand’. The hypothetical absolute property-owner or monarch who, rather than displaying ‘liberal allowance’, sought to exploit the needy situation of all other men in order to reduce them to ‘hard service’ or even the condition of a ‘vassal’, would be acting no differently from the bandit who threatened a man with death in order to reduce him to ‘slavery’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, ‘liberal’ is synonymous with generous here. However, God’s liberal generosity is in contradiction with the political slavery that Filmer would like to impose on all men. The, as it were, constitutional and liberal God presupposed here refutes the claims of absolute monarchy. The vile, miserable condition of the ‘vassal’, of the individual subjected to ‘hard service’, of the servant or ‘slave’, was incompatible with the mode of being and feeling, in the first instance, of an Englishman and ‘gentleman’, who scornfully rejected the servile view that ‘we are all born slaves’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Hume on the one hand used the term ‘liberal’ synonymously with ‘disinterested’ and ‘generous’, and on the other criticized as ‘illiberal’ the popular agitation and plebeian riots that characterized the first English revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Smith distinguished in the moral field between the ‘liberal’ view peculiar to the well-off classes, restive at overly rigid bans on ‘luxury’ and the other pleasures of life, and the ‘strict or austere’ view peculiar to poorer classes, who by force of circumstance could not indulge in ‘thoughtlessness and dissipation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the context of the ‘liberal’/‘servile’ opposition that was crystallizing, the ‘liberal’ attitude was defined by antithesis either to the absolute power of the monarch or the servile or even merely plebeian condition. The liberal/illiberal dichotomy referred to a difference and conflict between two world-views, but also between two social conditions. In the course of the American Revolution, adopting a position in favour of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Burke deplored the restrictions on individual liberty introduced in Britain on account of the war, and regretted the fact that ‘the liberal government of this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg243&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and vassals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the liberal profession of faith criticized the unwarranted expansion of the Crown’s power, on the one hand, and distanced itself from the subaltern classes, subjected to work and hence servile, on the other. We can now understand the British Whig’s scorn for those who, in the name of a so-called ‘indiscriminate’ freedom, wished to appeal to the servile hands of slaves or emancipated slaves to suppress the revolt of colonists who, precisely as slaveowners, nurtured with particular sincerity the love of liberty that must dwell in any non-servile soul. And we can also understand why as early as 1790, on account of the restructuring of the nobility’s political influence, the ‘liberty’ of the French seemed to the British statesman to be contaminated with ‘coarseness and vulgarity’: it ‘is not liberal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Opposed to anything vulgar and plebeian, ‘liberal’ tended to be synonymous with aristocratic. In fact, among Virginia’s slave-owners the ‘aristocratic spirit’ was intimately bound up with ‘a spirit of liberty’ distinguished by its ‘more noble and liberal’ character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While paying homage to the ‘liberal government of this free nation’, Burke declared himself a member of the ‘aristocratick Party’—the party ‘connected with the solid, permanent long possessed property of the Country’—and felt committed to fighting with all his energy for ‘aristocratick principles, and the aristocratick Interests connected with them’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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During the American Revolution, along with the celebration of the ‘liberal political system’ we have already noted, we find in Washington a celebration of patrons of the ‘liberal arts’, contrasted with ‘mechanics’, with immigrants of a modest social condition from Europe.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But particularly illuminating is the discourse of John Adams. For a well-ordered liberty to be achieved, it could not be ‘mechanics’ and the ‘common people’, ‘without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences’, who exercised power. Instead, it must be those who had ‘received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences’; and they were the ‘well-born and wealthy’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg244&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In France, too, the liberal party, which was in the process of being formed, defined itself during the polemic against the absolute monarchy but also, and possibly above all, against the popular masses and their vulgarity. Attention was turned to the Third Estate, to those circles where ‘a sort of affluence allows men to receive a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was Sieyès, who subsequently played an important role on the occasion of the 18th Brumaire in 1799. Sealing the coup d’état was the ‘proclamation of general-in-chief Bonaparte’, who announced the ‘disbandment of factions’—i.e. of popular and plebeian agitation—and the triumph of ‘conservative, tutelary, liberal ideas’ (&#039;&#039;idées conservatrices, tutélaires, libérales&#039;&#039;). This language was not the invention of a general, however brilliant: he enjoyed the support of the liberal circles of the time. The adjectival usage just noted refers to them. Constant, who later (as we know) declared himself a member of the ‘liberal party’, had already been recommended by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1797 as a man ‘passionate about liberty’ and as an ‘unshakeable, liberal republican’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The following year, Constant had underlined the Directory’s merit in having ‘proclaimed its unshakeable attachment to the conservative system’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, shortly after the coup d’état, he paid homage to ‘France’s tutelary genius which, from 9 Thermidor, has rescued it from so many dangers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ in Burke, ‘liberal’ was now synonymous with ‘conservative’ (and tutelary). For Constant (as for Madame de Staël), the cause of liberalism found expression in ‘respectable people’ (&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;),[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or (as Necker made clear in a letter to his daughter) well-off, ‘decent people’ (&#039;&#039;gens de bien:&#039;&#039; see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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As in England and America, so too in France it was the property-owning classes, proud of their non-servile condition and spirit, who tended to define themselves as liberals. This is further confirmed, even after the mid-nineteenth century, by de Tocqueville’s stance. Those genuinely capable of defending the cause of liberty against Louis Bonaparte’s ‘illiberal’ government were not ‘the people strictly speaking, with their incomplete education’, but the ‘property-owners’, the ‘bourgeoisie’, the ‘men of culture’—‘in a word, all those who have received a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg245&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Under the spur also of popular struggles, the liberal/servile dichotomy gradually tended to lose its class connotation and came to refer exclusively to political ideologies. But at moments of acute struggle the original meaning re-emerged with all its discriminatory charge. For de Tocqueville, as we shall see, anyone who wanted to endow the ideal of liberty with a social content was ‘made for serving’!&lt;br /&gt;
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Bitter conflicts could, and did, develop within the property-owning classes. Debating with Burke, who suspected wealth not rooted in the mother country’s land and soil of lacking in patriotism and even of subversive tendencies, Mackintosh declared that ‘[t]he commercial, or monied interest, has … been less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent, than the landed gentry.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in France, Sieyès saw ‘liberal education’ embodied in the Third Estate, and certainly not in an aristocracy used to pursuing ‘the favour of servitude’ at court.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Invitations not to discriminate, and create conflicts, between the different types of property were more frequent. In the view of the anti-Jacobin Jean-Joseph Mounier, in addition to the United States, the country that had diffused ‘in the France the idea of liberty’ was England, construed in fact as the country where ‘a liberal education without genealogical tests confers the quality of gentleman’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear that the term ‘liberal’ was generated by a proud self-consciousness, which had a simultaneously political, social and even ethnic connotation. We are dealing with a movement and party that intended to rally persons furnished with a ‘liberal education’ and genuinely free, or people who had the privilege of being free, the ‘chosen race’ (as Burke put it), the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of liberty circulates’. All this is not surprising. As has been made clear by distinguished scholars of the Indo-European languages, ‘freemen’ is a ‘collective notion’—a sign of distinction that applies to the ‘well-born’ and them alone. For this very reason, outside the community of the free and the well-born, not only was service or slavery not excluded, it was even presupposed. In Cicero’s view, at the head of the &#039;&#039;liberi populi&#039;&#039; was Rome, which engaged in the mass enslavement of defeated peoples considered unworthy of freedom.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in eighteenth-century liberal England what became a popular song (‘Rule Britannia’) lauded in these terms the empire that had just wrested the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg246&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;, a monopoly on the slave trade, from Spain: ‘This was the charter of the land, / And guardian angels sang this strain: / “Rule, Britannia! rule the waves: / Britons never will be slaves.”‘&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The pyramid of peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This was a self-proclamation that was simultaneously an act of exclusion. It was not only colonial peoples who were affected by it. Even before the American Revolution, Franklin had established a hierarchy of nations on the basis of skin colour, which claimed to classify the whole human race: ‘All &#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039; is black or tawny. &#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039; chiefly tawny.’ The same applied to pre-Columbian America; it was ‘wholly so’. The quantitative prevalence of peoples of colour was evident. In a way, their presence even made itself felt in Europe: ‘the &#039;&#039;Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Swedes&#039;&#039;, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion’. The inhabitants of Germany did not come off much better. Representing the highest form of humanity were the English settled on both shores of the Atlantic, ‘the Principal Body of White People’, of ‘purely white People’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the only community to embody the cause of liberty. The classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theme of the great chain of Being[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] becomes here the great chain of Colour. And it excluded the non-European peoples from the sacred space of civilization, relegating much of the West to its margins.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it rarely took such a naively naturalistic form, the pyramid dear to Franklin continued, in one shape or another, to be present in liberal culture. We find it again in Lieber. At its apex, obviously, was the ‘Anglican race’, which fully expressed authentic liberty, while forming the base were the colonial peoples (not only the blacks, but also the Chinese). In the middle we find jostling Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitans, who had hitherto proved incapable of elevating themselves to the principle of self-government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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John Stuart Mill employed a language that was scarcely different. The apex continued to be composed of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (to be precise, England and the United States), peerless champions of representative government and ‘the general improvement of mankind’, while at the base, in addition to more or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg247&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;less savage peoples,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we find the Chinese. It is true that the latter could boast a very ancient civilization. Yet ‘they have become stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland could be assimilated to the other colonies or semi-colonies. ‘[H]alf civilized’, in Bentham’s view,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland for Mill was not only incapable of self-government, but also in need of ‘a good stout despotism’, exactly like India.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not much better was the situation of Greece: situated as it was at the confines of Europe, it was still ‘too Oriental’ in many respects to be able to govern itself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, at the centre of the pyramid we have the people of ‘southern Europe’, whose ‘inactivity’ and ‘envy’ prevented the development of industrial society, the establishment of a strong ruling group and the orderly functioning of institutions. By comparison with them, too, the Anglo-Saxons proved superior, free as they were of those characteristics (‘submission’, ‘endurance’, statism) typical of the French and ‘continental nations’, all of them rendered gangrenous by ‘bureaucracy’ and an envious craving for equality.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the ‘continental nations’ were not some homogenous whole. With its geographical location close to Africa and an Arabic past behind it, Spain came out of things badly. In the list Mill drew up of ‘envy’ of grandeur and ‘inactivity’, its inhabitants came immediately after ‘Orientals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Visiting Spain in 1836, at a time when it was plunged in a civil war, Richard Cobden, rather than taking sides with one of the parties, reached a general conclusion about ‘barbarians beyond the Bay of Biscay’: Spain was ‘a nation of bigots, beggars and cut-throats with a government of whores and rogues’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Spanish of Latin America were not worth speaking about because, from the standpoint of the dominant ideology in the United States at any rate, they formed part of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg248&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;colonial world. Finally, distinguishing themselves negatively in Senior’s view were also the Neapolitans: ‘I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.’ Moreover, no barrier separated the plebs from the upper classes.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The community of the free and its dictatorship over peoples unworthy of liberty&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the charge of exclusion implicit in the self-proclamation of the community of the free displayed its full force in the relationship with colonial peoples. In most cases, far from being perceived as a contradiction, the theorization and practice of slavery at the expense of the excluded further strengthened the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free, who lauded themselves for their immunity from the servile spirit attributed to the barbarians subjugated by them. That was why Locke could set himself up as a champion of liberty and, at the same time, legitimize the absolute power the community of the free was called upon to exercise over black slaves. In 1809 Jefferson celebrated the United States as ‘an empire for liberty’, founded on a constitution that guaranteed ‘self government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was a slave-owner, who exercised power over his slaves brutally, if need be selling the individual members of the family of his property as separate pieces or chattels. And he indulged in this celebration in a letter sent to another slave-owner, who had just taken his place in the US presidency. The Constitution held up as a model consecrated the birth of the first racial state, while the self-government extolled here guaranteed southern slave-owners legitimate enjoyment of their property without interference by the federal government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from hereditary slavery to semi-slavery, still at the expense of colonial peoples, did not radically change the overall picture. Albeit in different forms, the phenomenon we are already familiar with emerged. Thus, major authors such as Mill, de Tocqueville and Lecky passionately denounced monarchical or Jacobin absolutism, and at the same time enthusiastically saluted despotism at the expense of colonial peoples. This was a power relationship which, for a whole historical period, far from being fought or contained, was to be extended and generalized. Given that a ‘vigorous despotism’ was the only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg249&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;method capable of raising backward peoples or ‘barbarians’ to a higher level, the interests of civilization and peace were served by colonial conquests, which must therefore be expanded to embrace the entire globe. Already ‘common’, ‘direct subjection’ of ‘backward populations’ by ‘the more advanced’ was becoming ‘universal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So proud and self-confident was the self-consciousness of the community of the free that it could face down possible refutations from the history or empirical analysis of society without difficulty. In the years of the July Monarchy, unperturbed, de Tocqueville registered a disconcerting fact: in the Islamic world and ‘the whole East’, slavery presented itself in a ‘milder’ form than in the West. Tunisia was engaged in abolishing this institution, which by contrast continued to survive in the colonies of liberal France (and democratic America).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The balance-sheet drawn up by Mill on the morrow of the American Civil War was significant. In the United States a ‘[h]opeless slavery’ that ‘brutifies the intellect’, and where ‘it was a highly penal offence to teach a slave to read’, had only just been abolished. Even worse, added the English liberal, was the situation at the time of the slave trade in ‘our slave colonies’, where slaves were in practice condemned to work themselves to death, to be rapidly replaced through the ‘importation’ of other unfortunates, who in their turn were soon doomed to be consumed. In the British colonies and the United States a form of slavery had prevailed with particularly repugnant characteristics, which was largely unknown ‘in the ancient world and the East’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here the phenomenon of the twin birth of liberalism and racial chattel slavery seems to be perceived or intuited. And yet, like de Tocqueville, Mill had no doubts about the complete coincidence of the West and the cause of liberty, or about the West’s right to exercise despotism over Islamic peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The English liberal had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and for liberty as such: ‘the prohibition of the importation of opium into China’ violated ‘the liberty … of the buyer’, rather than that of ‘the producer or seller’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The lesson taught to the Chinese ‘barbarians’ could only be salutary. This was not the time to split hairs over forms: ‘appeals to humanity and Christianity in favour of ruffians, &amp;amp;amp; to international law in favour of people who recognize &#039;&#039;no&#039;&#039; laws of war at all’, were ‘ridiculous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are in 1857–58: even if we pass over the lot of the coolies in silence, in these years &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg250&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Britain had stained itself with the ‘barbarism’ referred to by de Tocqueville in connection with the repression of the sepoys’ mutiny in India; in China it gave decisive support to the liquidation of the attempt by the Taiping to reverse the autocratic and decrepit Manchu dynasty; in Ireland a ferocious dominion continued to obtain (‘in no country have I ever seen so many gendarmes’, observed Engels);[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] finally, in the United States, Britain contributed to the wealth of the South, absorbing much of the cotton produced by the labour of black slaves. Yet Mill was in no doubt: his country promoted the cause of liberty in the world, imposing on China by force of arms the importation of opium produced in India on the initiative of the colonial power!&lt;br /&gt;
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When the sepoys’ revolt broke out in India, de Tocqueville did not conceal the fact that ‘massacres by the [Indian] barbarians’ were followed by ‘the barbarism of the civilized’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prevent him from arriving at a Manichaean conclusion: ‘these Hindus are beasts who are as brutal as they are ferocious’; their victory would mean ‘the restoration of barbarism’, the victory of ‘savages’ and the defeat of the ‘only surviving country of political liberty in Europe’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The aspiration of the Chinese or Indians to maintain or recover their national independence, the desire to liberate themselves from colonial domination, were not even taken into consideration. Precisely because it assumed the position of exclusive representative of the cause of liberty, the community of the free interpreted the challenges it occasionally had to confront as attacks on liberty, as expressions of the servile spirit as well as barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Macaulay acknowledged that the English colonists in India behaved like Spartans confronting helots: we are dealing with ‘a race of sovereigns’ or a ‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prompt any doubts about the right of free England to exercise dictatorship over the barbarians of the colonies. It was a dictatorship that could take the most ruthless forms. Macaulay powerfully describes how the governor of India, Warren Hastings, proceeded when, at a difficult moment for Britain, already engaged in the struggle against the American colonists and their French allies, he had to confront the colony’s native population:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg251&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;A reign of terror began, of terror heightened by mystery; for even that which was endured was less horrible than that which was anticipated. No man knew what was next to be expected from this strange tribunal … It consisted of judges not one of whom was familiar with the usages of the millions over whom they claimed boundless authority. Its records were kept in unknown characters; its sentences were pronounced in unknown sounds. It had already collected round itself an army of the worst part of the native population …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
A wave of arrests without any charge was unleashed, not even sparing the elderly of ‘the most venerable dignity’. There was an orgy of violence that did not respect sanctuaries and unchained the most bestial instincts. There were Indians who ‘shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women’. In conclusion: ‘All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the Supreme Court.’ And yet, despite this horrifying description, Macaulay concluded that, for having saved England and civilization, Hastings deserved ‘high admiration’ and to rank among ‘the most remarkable men in our history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. How to confront the barbarian threat in the metropolis in timely fashion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The challenge to the community of the free could arise in the metropolis as well as from the colonies. The status of the popular classes, whom the dominant elite often tended to assimilate to ‘savages’, long remained uncertain. The assimilation became a veritable identification on the occasion of rebellions and revolutions. And as in the case of external barbarism, the remedy for the internal variety was dictatorship. Montesquieu was in no doubt about the fact that ‘the usage of the freest peoples that ever lived on earth makes me believe that there are cases where a veil has to be drawn, for a moment, over liberty, as one hides the statues of the gods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is what occurred in a state of emergency: in facing it, it was necessary to take to heart the ‘admirable institution’ that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg252&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the Roman dictatorship.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However ‘terrible’, at the opportune moment it ‘violently return[ed] the state to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People argued no differently across the Atlantic. The &#039;&#039;Federalist&#039;&#039; maintained that, with the onset of a state of emergency, the powers granted to the federal authorities ‘ought to exist without limitation’ and without ‘constitutional shackles’. Hamilton pointed out that even the Roman republic did not hesitate ‘to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator’, when this was required to confront grave dangers and defend Rome against ‘the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘existence of all government’ mentioned by Hamilton took the form of ‘the public good’ in Locke. When it was imperilled, ‘prerogative’ legitimately enabled the ‘prince’ to safeguard it through ‘an arbitrary power’, or ‘discretion’, which could be exercised ‘without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In favour of granting emergency powers to General Cavaignac, during the crisis of 1848, was de Tocqueville (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is particularly interesting to note that what prompted an energetic reaction from the community of the free was not necessarily an actual revolt. An indirect, potential threat was enough. For Locke the right to employ force already existed in the event of the imposition of a tax not authorized by those directly affected: ‘the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if mediated by the intervention of the legislative power, the intrusion of non-property-owners in the sphere of property was always an act of illegality and plunder, of violence, and hence one that could legitimately be countered with violence by the person under attack. There is more: paving the way for unlawful interventions in property, any alteration in the composition of the legislative power, with the restructuring, for example, of the House of Lords or abolition of the hereditary transmission of its seats, betokened ‘the dissolution of government’ and hence the unavoidability of a test of arms.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Montesquieu was fairly explicit on the subject:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg253&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a state there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth or honors; but if they were mixed among the people and if they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions would be against them. Therefore, the part they have in legislation should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state, which will happen if they form a body that has the right to check the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to check theirs … The nobility should be hereditary.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While Montesquieu denounced any interference that abolished the hereditary privileges of the nobility as illiberal and despotic, Constant regarded any challenge to a property-owners’ monopoly on representative bodies as inadmissible. Since ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them are sure to be used for this purpose’; and political rights ‘will inevitably serve to encroach upon property’. It was sufficient for non-property-owners to be admitted into ‘representative assemblies’ for ‘[t]he wisest of laws’ to be ‘suspected and consequently disobeyed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicitly, the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas, having warned against the ‘fatal taxes’ that would inevitably be imposed by the legislative power once it was at the mercy or under the influence of non-property-owners, added: ‘A country governed by property-owners is in the social order; by contrast, one where non-property-owners govern is in the state of nature.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in a situation without a legal order and legal norms, arms obviously came to the fore.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Constant’s reasoning continued to resonate in de Tocqueville: ‘For various reasons, all governments can be led to maintain the poor at state expense, but the democratic form of government is led by its very &#039;&#039;nature&#039;&#039; to act in this way.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Encouraged by democracy more than by any other political regime, ‘legal charity’ (i.e. aid to the poor through the use of resources procured by the state through taxes on the wealthy) could only be synonymous with despoliation in the view of its victims: ‘The rich man whom the law, without consultation, strips of part of his surplus regards the poor man as nothing but a grasping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg254&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;foreigner summoned by the legislator for the division of his goods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In effect, this was an expropriation: if prolonged, laws in favour of the poor would end up transforming ‘proletarians’ into effective beneficiaries of the land and ‘property-owners’ into their mere ‘farm managers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mill fluctuated more. On the one hand, he reiterated positions we have already encountered: ‘any power of voting’ in the hands of those who did not pay taxes was ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of free government’; to assign political rights, and hence participation in legislative power, to poor citizens, not subject to taxation, ‘amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the English left-liberal expressed a more flexible position:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them … It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This is a distinction that would seem to pave the way for a policy of income redistribution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any such prospect was violently opposed by the most conservative wing of liberalism. According to Spencer, taxation aimed at income redistribution ultimately introduced a sort of ‘state &#039;&#039;corvée’&#039;&#039;, which was no less iniquitous and slave-like than the medieval one just because it imposed payment of a determinate sum of money, rather than the provision of free services to the master.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Lecky, having adopted the thesis already noted in Constant, according to which non-property-owners with political rights would inevitably be led to pursue ‘predatory and anarchic purposes’ and even ‘break up society’, defined the system that enabled non-property-owners to burden the well-off with taxes as ‘a system of veiled confiscation’. In this way, the latter would in fact end up being ‘completely disenfranchised’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The unwarranted political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg255&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;emancipation of the popular classes involved the dis-emancipation of the only classes qualified to run the country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The liberal tradition and its three theories of dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As well as averting the real or potential threat of the barbarians in the colonies or metropolis, dictatorship could also be useful and indispensable in confronting the most serious problems that the community of the freemen could not resolve by ordinary means. To abolish the institution of slavery, to which representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners proved stubbornly attached, Smith looked to ‘despotism’, which effectively took shape during the Civil War and in the early post-war years. The attitude adopted in these circumstances by Lieber was significant. In publishing his principal work, he certainly foresaw the possibility of recourse to ‘martial law’ to confront a possible state of emergency, but was concerned to specify that it would not be the executive power which declared it. But with the outbreak of hostilities, he discarded his previous constitutional scruples: the suspension of habeas corpus must be implemented in any event and as extensively and radically as possible. In silencing his critics, Lincoln declared: ‘Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?’ Lieber was not only in full agreement, but as early as January 1862 was amazed and angry at the fact that no traitor or spy had as yet been hanged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A theory of temporary modernizing dictatorship can also be found in de Tocqueville. Reconstructing the catastrophe of the French Revolution, he arrived at a conclusion: given the irreversible crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, the radical transformation of society was inevitable, but it would have been better if, ‘instead of being carried out by the masses on behalf of the sovereignty of the people, [it] had been the work of an enlightened autocrat’; indeed, ‘[a]n absolute monarch would have been a far less dangerous innovator.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He would have been able to exercise against the most reactionary feudal aristocracy the temporary dictatorship over slave-owners invoked by Smith. Modernizing dictatorship was not evoked by de Tocqueville solely with a view to the past. The French liberal asked himself, and one of his English interlocutors, whether a ‘temporary dictatorship, exercised in firm, enlightened fashion like that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg256&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire, is not the only way of saving Ireland’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The dictatorship hypothesized here is different from that theorized by Locke against ‘papists’, which was directly exercised by the British Protestant settlers, albeit with the support of central government. De Tocqueville seems to envisage a power imposed from London that would be above the parties (Catholic peasants and Anglo-Protestant property-owners), just as in Smith ‘dictatorship’ is called upon to situate itself above both property-owners and their slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, the position taken by Mill was more general in character: ‘I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.’ The dictator could, ‘for a time strictly limited’, ‘employ … the whole power he assumes in removing obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An integral part of the self-celebration of the community of the free (and the liberal tradition) was the opposition between intransigent, unconditional guardianship of the liberty it assigned itself and the inclination to despotism reprehended in opponents. In reality, we have seen three theories of dictatorship emerge: the dictatorship of civilized peoples over barbarians in the colonies; the dictatorship that suppresses popular subversion in the metropolis; and the dictatorship which, in a situation of stalemate, imposes the requisite reforms from above. A contrast with authors not within the liberal tradition, or even foreign to it, might prove useful. Mazzini invoked ‘a highly centralized dictatorial Power’, which proceeded to the ‘suspension’ of the bill of rights and finished its work only with the achievement of national independence and the final victory of the national revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Marx applied this perspective to the social revolution as well as the national revolution. In both cases a dictatorship is envisaged that emerges in the wake of a popular revolution from below. But for de Tocqueville (and the liberal tradition as a whole), it was precisely ‘revolutionary dictatorship’ from below that was ‘most hostile to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although not free of uncertainties, in Marx criticism of the pedagogical dictatorship that the community of the free claimed to exercise over barbarians was recurrent. In reality, it was precisely in the colonies that the ‘profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg257&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This also applied to Ireland: it groaned under ‘police terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘English terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a regime that kept the population under control ‘solely by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] resorting to summary executions and the most drastic war measures.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The ills of the community of the free: the psychopathology of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the central area of the pyramid of peoples, Mill also inserted the French. Likewise, along with the Spanish, Portuguese and Neopolitans despised by him, Lieber combined the people who more than any other embodied the spurious and wicked ‘Gallic’ or ‘Gallican’ freedom, which in reality was synonymous with extreme centralization and despotism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The combination is surprising. According to Burke, at the point when the Estates General was summoned France was already in possession of a good legal order. Rid of the absolute monarchy, it had become a full member of the community of the free. What had occurred in the intervening years to provoke such a ruinous descent and consequent confinement to the grey border area between civilization and barbarism?&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, Burke observed on 9 February 1790, with the transformation of the Estates General into a constituent National Assembly, and hence with the restructuring of the political influence of the nobility and clergy, the French had turned out to be infected with a ‘disease’. Passing from despotism to anarchical subversionism, they had proved that they were ‘a people, whose character knows no medium’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and (added the British Whig a year later) ‘[i]t is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.’ Lecky referred to this analysis some years later, repeating it: ‘It was … in the opinion of Burke a total mistake to suppose that political liberty of any kind can be, or ought to be, possessed by all nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg258&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The further radicalization of the revolution that had been sparked off in Paris confirmed this diagnosis. While the outbreak and manifestation of the disease could be variously dated, it was understood that the French lacked the ‘practical good sense’ that had enabled the Anglo-Americans and the United States in particular to avoid ‘revolutionary times’, the devastation and ‘adventure’ of civil war. This was a point tirelessly stressed by de Tocqueville and, in his wake, by Laboulaye and Guizot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, on inspection, it was not merely good sense and practical spirit that were wanting. In Anglo-Americans these qualities were a constitutive element in a more general mental disposition, whereby ‘a man by following his own interest, rightly understood, will be led to do what is just and good’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We know that, although de Tocqueville deplored it, the fate of Indians and blacks was irrelevant when it came to forming an overall judgement on the republic across the Atlantic. What promoted the undisturbed flourishing of liberty here was the mature personality of its inhabitants, who displayed manifest political and moral superiority to the French. De Tocqueville found the explanation suggested by his fellow countryman Victor Lanjuinais ‘profound and original’: ‘socialism is our natural disease’. And socialism was synonymous with abstraction, but also with something worse. The French were ‘afraid of isolation’ and harboured a ‘desire to be in the crowd’; they felt themselves members of a ‘nation that marches to the same step in perfect alignment’; they regarded liberty as ‘the least important of their possessions, and thus are always ready to offer it up with reason at moments of danger’. Hence a France irremediably ‘revolutionary and servile’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, having stressed that it was ‘contained in germ in the February revolution’, when ‘socialism had been seen to make its appearance’, de Tocqueville offered a kind of epitaph on the French nation: ‘It is incapable and, I say it certainly with regret, unworthy of being free’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The oscillation between anarchical revolutionism and submission to despotism, and an inclination to surrender to passing impulses and moods, confronted one with a people whose ‘basic characteristics are so constant that we can recognise the France we know in portraits made of it two or three &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg259&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousand years ago’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact that the process begun in 1789 or 1787 had finally issued in the establishment of the Bonapartist dictatorship, dragging the country down to the level of the ‘nations best made for servitude’, clarified everything. In France, ‘what at first seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant. But what a nation with a real instinct for freedom cannot endure is the feeling of not being its own master.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The closing chapters of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; are a bravura rhetorical performance. Rarely has the love of liberty been hymned in such impassioned terms. And the beauty and power of these passages prove all more the engaging if we bear in mind the polemic, allusive but transparent and courageous, against Napoleon III’s despotism. However, read more coolly, this hymn to liberty proves problematic and even disturbing, with the opposition it sets up between ‘peoples made to be free’ and ‘nations best made for servitude’. It was a divide reproduced within France at the level of social classes. The enlightened love of liberty, which had manifested itself at the start of the revolution, was rapidly overwhelmed by the blind passion for equality, from which the Terror and the equal enslavement of all to an unprecedented despotic power derived. How was this distortion to be explained? De Tocqueville had no doubts: it became ‘less startling when we remember that the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A disdainful warning was issued to the latter, intent on pursuing ‘material benefits’ and incapable of appreciating liberty in and for itself: ‘The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave.’ Once again we are presented with an opposition between those born for liberty and those born for servitude, between freemen and servants, between liberals and serviles. And for de Tocqueville it was futile to try to explain the presence or absence, or variable intensity, of the ‘desire’ for liberty by the level of historical development and material living conditions of particular peoples and social classes. It was ultimately of little use even to challenge the influence of erroneous theories; or rather, these referred to something more profound. The ‘lofty aspiration’ to liberty was a thing that some men are capable of feeling, while others are not: ‘[i]t is a privilege of noble minds which God has fitted to receive it, and it inspires them with a generous fervour.’ The discourse has hitherto focused on a few noble souls: ‘to meaner souls, untouched by the sacred flame, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg260&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it may well seem incomprehensible’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An original curse, which cannot be lifted, seems to hang over the men, classes or peoples who, on account of their vulgarity or coarseness, are excluded or expelled from the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, in its sad destiny France was not alone. Some years earlier—in September 1848, to be precise—de Tocqueville had seen the spectre of socialism lurking across the Alps and had not hesitated to conclude that the Italians ‘have likewise shown themselves unworthy of liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘Likewise’: which country is being alluded to? At this time, not yet invested by a coup d’état, France was still part of the community of the free. The reference is to Germany: as in much of Europe, there too the revolution continued to flare up and pursue radical objectives. The ambit of countries deserving of liberty thus risked being extremely restricted.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Interpretations of the interminable French Revolutionary cycle: from ‘disease’ to ‘race’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is not by chance that politico-social conflict came to be interpreted in a psychopathological register. Immediately after the February revolution, de Tocqueville was concerned to specify that ‘[i]t is not needs but ideas that have led to this great upheaval’ and made the French ‘so ill’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was madness that encouraged the socialist pretension to alter not only ‘political laws’, but even social and ‘civil laws’—in particular, relations of property and production consecrated by nature and Providence. In the course of his journey in England, de Tocqueville compared workers to slaves and drew attention to the relations of ‘strict dependency’ that were being established within the factory. On the basis of this analysis, the struggle to overcome or alleviate the condition of slavery or ‘strict dependency’ could be construed as a struggle for freedom. But, as we know, this was not how the French liberal argued, as he denounced the ‘despotism’ of those who sought to regulate working hours and the servile spirit of those who contaminated the ideal of liberty with economic and social demands. The community of the free claimed the merit of pursuing the ideal of liberty in all its purity and in any circumstances for itself. Hence it interpreted not only challenges from the colonial and barbaric world, but also challenges &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg261&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arising in the zone of civilization itself, as an attack on the ideal of liberty, which was lashed out at by those not in a position to appreciate its grandeur and beauty. Wholly understandable and, indeed, natural among savages, such deafness was construed as a pathological anomaly in a civilized people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, the resort to explaining conflict in a psychopathological register was immanent in the liberal tradition. Burke spoke of French ‘disease’ in the very first stages of the revolution. And it should be added that for a time it was in fact the ‘American inoculation’, and hence a disease from across the Atlantic, which was held responsible for the contraction and contagious spread of ideas marked by abstract, insane extremism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the disease and psychopathological diagnosis of the adversary could occur in the converse direction. As the abolitionist movement developed, it became a commonplace in the United States to condemn it as an expression of an illiberal spirit, fanaticism and madness. However, at the time of the British colonists’ revolt in America, we find Josiah Tucker inviting the London government to accept and even encourage the secession, so as to avoid the ‘contagion’ of a ‘mad, &#039;&#039;fanatical&#039;&#039; liberty’, which was sweeping through slaves or serfs, the contagion of a ‘republicanism’ that was indeed ‘American’, but which ultimately dated back to Locke and the ‘Lockian Sect’ and could count on the sympathy of Burke himself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After 1848, following the umpteenth return of revolution with yet more radical slogans, the tendency to warn against the disease raging in France dramatically intensified. Underlining the rootedness in the United States of the rule of law and liberal institutions, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; attributed much more weight to history and geography than &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;. Why had Napoleon Bonaparte’s military dictatorship been imposed on France?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government … If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg262&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The situation across the Atlantic was very different: ‘Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While we once again encounter the dubious assimilation of the Indians (and even Mexico) to a ‘wilderness’, we are far removed from the explanation that peremptorily and definitively opposes a ‘sublime desire’ for freedom to vulgar indifference to it, ‘noble souls’ to ‘mediocre souls’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By way of confirming the anthropological drift that manifested itself with 1848, we can adduce the long letter (a small essay) sent by de Tocqueville twenty years earlier to his friend de Beaumont. The history of Europe was conceived here in such a unitary way that the terminology became interchangeable: mention was made of the ‘Commons’ in the case of France and the ‘Third Estate’ in the case of England. In the two countries the victory of the bourgeoisie had been achieved in different ways, which were in fact the ‘forced result of the state of things’—that is, of the different configuration of power relations between the contending politico-social subjects.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were statism and despotism the hereditary disease of the country where Jacobinism and Bonapartism had made their appearance? In truth, England had not only succeeded in constructing a strong state and military apparatus before France, but at the time of the Tudors had suffered an unlimited despotism: ‘I know of no tyranny in history more complete than that of … Henry VIII’; the Commons, ‘which had denied the king’s will a man’s life’, now ended up ‘condemning without even giving a hearing’. A worse terror than the Jacobin version had manifested itself, as demonstrated by ‘ “bills of attainder”, a diabolical invention that not even the revolutionary Tribunal called into being’. Yet it was nonetheless a revolution that had played a positive role. It nurtured the ‘first fruit of civilization’ as a result of the fact that, albeit in its terrible absolutism, in England royal power attacked the ‘vices of the feudal system’ and subdued ‘oligarchical liberty’. This was a general tendency, though in no country did ‘despotism prove more terrible’. Was the island across the Channel, unlike France, characterized and blessed by a gradualism of historical evolution? The letter/essay we are examining explicitly argued against the thesis that the English Constitution had passed through ‘successive, regular stages, before reaching the point it has arrived at today’, so that it could be considered ‘a fruit which has matured over &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg263&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;successive centuries’. In truth, de Tocqueville observed, from Henry VIII onwards, ‘I see the English people change religion four times according to the will of their master’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, one might try to devalue the letter/essay of 1828 as ‘youthful’. However, even in subsequent years, if there was a contrast between France and England, it was often to the detriment of the latter, which continued to interpret liberty as a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘common right’, as occurred in the country that was the protagonist of the 1789 revolution (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]). In 1843, having compared slave-masters in the colonies with the ‘aristocracy’ overthrown by the French Revolution, de Tocqueville celebrated ‘the great principles’ of the revolution, ‘which was carried out entirely in the name of equality’, in the name of the equality of the ‘human race’, and which had the further merit of being first to abolish slavery.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from the 1848 revolution, under the impression made by the spectre of socialism, it was precisely the pathos of equality that defined the failure of the French Revolution and the disease of an entire people, who now prostrated themselves before Louis Napoleon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The psychopathological interpretation of developments in the French situation had the advantage of dispelling possible anxieties in the community of the free, which absolved itself of any responsibility for the Bonapartist outcome of the 1848 revolution. De Tocqueville might have drawn up a critical balance-sheet of the conduct of the liberal party and himself. After the dictatorship’s advent, with some exaggeration he denounced the limited resistance met with by Louis Napoleon in French society. Had the disappointment they experienced with the exclusion of three million Frenchmen from political rights contributed to the passivity of the popular masses? This was a measure the liberal bourgeoisie had been guilty of in 1850, thereby furnishing the dictator with the possibility of elevating himself into a champion of universal suffrage and the struggle against privilege and discrimination.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And what role in undermining the Second Republic had been played by intransigent liberalism à la de Tocqueville, who had branded the reduction of working hours and any intervention by political power in favour of the most deprived as intolerable ‘despotism’? The Bonapartist regime had its stronghold in the countryside: had it not been primarily the liberal bourgeoisie, with de Tocqueville’s active participation, which stirred it up against the city and mobilized it in the name &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg264&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the terrible threat that hung over civilization, dictating extraordinary measures commensurate with the situation? And again: Had the discrediting of institutions and the rule of law been aided by the supreme contempt for the Constitution displayed by de Tocqueville, when in his capacity as foreign minister he demanded ‘the right, in spite of our Constitution, to overthrow the Roman Republic’?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, a basic contradiction ran through the French liberal’s attitude. On the one hand, on an immediate political level, he vigorously condemned the Bonapartist regime; on the other, as an historian he regretted the fact that the requisite modernization of France had not been completed by an ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’, rather than a popular revolution (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|§5]]). But a modernizing ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’ is precisely what Napoleon I had wanted to be and what Napoleon III aspired to be! Rather than engage in an examination that was possibly too painful at a personal level, the author of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; preferred to come to blows with a mythical, eternal France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A not dissimilar evolution is found in Mill. In 1849 he vigorously defended the February Revolution of the previous year. Thereafter, he continued to make an important acknowledgement of ‘the heroic and calumniated Provisional Government of France’ for having promptly abolished slavery in the colonies, in an implicit contrast not only with the North American republic, but also with England, on whose history ‘a lasting blot’ was left by the support of ‘the leading portion of our higher and middle classes’ for the South’s pro-slavery secession from the United States.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, reminiscing about the debate that developed in Europe over the American Civil War, having denounced the ‘furious’ pro-Southern position of much of the English liberalism of the time, Mill added: ‘None of the Continental Liberals committed the same frightful mistake.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet in 1861 we have seen him inclined to exclude the French people and ‘continental nations’ in general from the community of the free in the strict sense. These were years when, not altogether in jest, people liked to say that ‘negroes begin in Calais’, just across the Channel.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, if not skin colour alone, ‘race’ was now called on to explain the differential development of European countries. What must not be overlooked, observed Lieber, still pointing a finger at France, was ‘the Celtic spirit of being &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg265&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swayed by masses’ and hence surrendering to political, religious and literary ‘centralization’. Absent there was ‘the original Teutonic spirit of individual independence’, which exhibited itself with particular vigour in the ‘Anglican race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. ‘Disease’ as a symptom of racial degeneration&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From ‘disease’ we have passed to ‘race’. Were these two interpretations of politico-social conflict compatible? Burke, who denounced the outbreak of ‘disease’ across the Channel, celebrated the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, the ‘chosen race of the sons of England’. It was a ‘nation’ and a ‘race’ possibly less vulnerable than others to the pathological manifestations raging in France. In other words, the question is whether the servile, herd spirit and inability to enjoy a regular, orderly liberty were a passing disturbance in the personality of a civilized people or possessed an ethnic origin that was yet to be identified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States, from the mid-nineteenth century the threat represented by the immigration of yellow skins—the coolies—was added to the traditional peril of miscegenation with blacks. The coastal region of the Pacific, warned Lieber, risked being ‘mongolized’ by Chinese, whose proliferation resembled that of ‘mice’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more drastic. Large-scale settlement by the Chinese (or Japanese) in America would result in catastrophe: ‘they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approximating to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid.’ The upshot would be individuals with a ‘chaotic constitution’ internally, as was sadly demonstrated by ‘the Eurasians in India, and the half-breeds in America’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hitherto we have been dealing with populations of colonial or semi-colonial origin, and hence extraneous to the West. And Lieber and Spencer’s agreement with legislation that prohibited non-whites from access to the land of liberty is not surprising. Although an enthusiastic expansionist, the former declared himself opposed to the annexation of any territory that involved a further incorporation of peoples of colour. But, as his biographer observes, he went further. He feared that an influx of immigrants from southern Europe &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg266&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belonging to the ‘Latin Race’ might also cause a ‘dilution of American blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, likewise focusing on the United States, another distinguished representative of liberalism—Lecky—drew attention to the effect of ‘the contamination of the immigrant vote’, since immigrants were often ‘revolutionary elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are concerns that were powerfully echoed by de Tocqueville. As the storm clouds gathered over the North American republic that would shortly lead to the Civil War, the French liberal posed an anxious question: How was the fading of the ‘practical good sense’ that had hitherto spared the transatlantic republic the catastrophe of France and continental Europe to be explained? What had provoked the crisis was the ‘rapid introduction into the United States of men alien to the English race’, who for that very reason caused America to run ‘the greatest danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Its inhabitants were now no longer so ‘united by … common opinions’ as to render a bloody division inconceivable, as &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; had believed.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville warned his US friends and interlocutors that ‘however great your capacity for assimilation, it is very difficult for so many foreign bodies to be digested’ with such rapidity as to avoid their disturbing ‘the economy and the health of your social body’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The looming civil war was put down to the new immigrants from southern or eastern Europe: they were configured as a pathogenic element, attacking from without a social organism that was in itself healthy. In the face of such a danger, de Tocqueville tirelessly warned his transatlantic friends and interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alas, every day brings you so many foreign elements that you will soon no longer be yourselves: all the arguments that could be made about your nature become ever more uncertain. In fact, mixed as you are today with so many races, who could now say what your nature is?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And again: ‘What frightens me is the prodigious number of foreigners that makes of you a new people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The waves of migration condemned here obviously involved the North of the United States. Did they lead to the emergence of radical abolitionism? In that case, de Tocqueville’s position would not be very different from that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg267&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the theorists of the South. They branded as fundamentally alien to America, and ultimately reducible to radicalism of a European (and French and Jacobin) variety, the positions of those who, to abolish slavery, did not even shrink at the prospect of a bloody conflict. At all events, de Tocqueville’s tendency in explaining the impending civil war is clear: he assigned responsibility for it to the growing presence of ethnic groups traditionally lacking in the political and moral qualities attributed to Anglo-Americans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This type of explanation obviously proves impossible when dealing with an ethnically homogenous country. Or should we assume that such homogeneity is merely apparent? To this question de Gobineau replied decisively in the affirmative. But let us observe his starting-point. He fully shared the pitiless psychopathological diagnosis of the French people made by de Tocqueville. It was necessary to register the raging of an age-old disease in France that rendered the functioning of ‘free institutions’ impossible and which, in the name of ‘public utility’ or the ‘monstrosity’ that was alleged ‘social right’, constantly promoted ‘the absorption of private rights into single state right’. We are dealing with ‘a people for whom absolute centralization is the height of good government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, the same ideological themes and even the same language we have heard in de Tocqueville, Lieber and Mill recur.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was in fact something new. The disease now had a specific ethnic base. The carriers of it in France and the rest of the world were non-Aryans. Given the importance of such an innovation, it is an exaggeration to claim that de Gobineau was ‘not so far removed from Alexis de Tocqueville, at one time his mentor and superior, as might be supposed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, there is no doubt they moved in a cultural and political circle with not a few points of contact and commonality. On close epistolary and intellectual terms, de Tocqueville and Lieber were in full agreement in their diagnosis of the disease raging in France and which, as a result of waves of migration, also risked having a harmful impact on the United States. Advancing further down the road of interpreting history in an ethnic key, Lieber counterposed to the herd and servile spirit of the ‘Celts’ the jealous sense of individuality peculiar to the ‘Teutons’. The latter were the vanguard of the West, or the ‘western Caucasian portion of humanity’. Perhaps, concluded Lieber, for brevity’s sake one could speak of ‘cis-Caucasians’, while the phrase ‘Japhetics’ had the drawback of being too broad.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, we are on the threshold of the Aryan mythology: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg268&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘Japhetics’ were the descendants of Japheth, by contrast with the progeny of Sem (‘Semites’) and Ham (‘Hamites’). And the American liberal expressed reservations about the category of Japhetics or Aryans solely because it referred to the mythical deeds of a people that had started out from India—in other words, a region foreign to the West. Hence the distance from de Gobineau was not great, even if the latter preferred to speak of Aryans, rather than employing what he regarded as the less rigorous categories of ‘Japhetics, Caucasians and Indo-Germans’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. De Gobineau, liberalism and the genealogical myths of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From the outset, the self-proclamation of the community of the free felt the need to resort to genealogical myths that endowed this distinguishing gesture with a foundation. Montesquieu pointed to ‘the forests’ inhabited by ‘the Germans’ as the birthplace of free, representative government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The origin was not accidental: if slavery was at home among ‘the peoples of the south’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|§4]]), by contrast ‘the peoples of the north have and will always have a spirit of independence and liberty that the peoples of the south do not’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘the peoples of the north’, who had demonstrated ‘remarkable wisdom against the Roman power’ they ultimately destroyed, were also distinguished by ‘good sense’, courage, ‘generous sentiment’, and ‘the strength of spirit necessary to guide one’s own conduct’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘northern nations’ were referred to in England by Sidney and Hume, who celebrated as ‘extremely free’ the ‘government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations’, which was established on the ‘ruins of Rome’ and its ‘military despotism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, for the Mill of 1861, the French were excluded from the community of the free because they were ‘essentially a southern people’, stamped by ‘the double education of despotism and Catholicism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Burke instead preferred to glory in descent from ‘our Gothic ancestors’, as well as in belonging to the English &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#page269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#pg269&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘chosen race’ of liberty, while Lieber worked ‘Teutonic’ ancestors into the coat of arms of the United States and the Anglican race.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the Teutonic genealogical myth met with great success. Notwithstanding the stabilization achieved with the Third Republic, the memory of the Paris Commune and of the interminable revolutionary cycle behind it influenced France’s image. The scourge of brigandage in the south, and the geographical location (not properly Nordic) especially of its southern regions, affected the image of Italy. The Second Reich, by contrast, seemed to stand unproblematically alongside England and the United States in enjoying representative bodies, a liberal order and economic development. These were the three countries now celebrated as the vanguard of the community of the free, or as the peoples who best embodied the cause of liberty. In England, as early as 1860 Lord Robert Cecil—future Marquis of Salisbury and prime minister—contrasted ‘the people of a southern climate’ with those of ‘Teutonic parentage’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1889 Joseph Chamberlain (the colonial secretary) officially called on the United States and Germany to form a ‘Teutonic’ alliance with his country.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a position shared across the Atlantic by Alfred T. Mahan, the great theorist of geopolitics, who likewise declared for the unity of the ‘Teutonic family’, of peoples belonging to the same Germanic ‘stock’. Mahan was on excellent terms with Theodore Roosevelt who, going still further in his celebration of ‘German’ and ‘Teutonic’ peoples, hymned the ‘war-like prowess of the stalwart sons of Odin’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideological climate prompted a reinterpretation of the category of Anglo-Saxons, which now tended to include Germany—the starting-point for the great adventure of the emigration of the descendants of liberty, praiseworthy for having rebelled against first Roman despotism and then Papal despotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Disraeli, de Gobineau and ‘race’ as the ‘key of history’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The cultural and political universe to which de Gobineau belonged is becoming clear. With him, the approach chosen by de Tocqueville to explain the crisis &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg270&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the United States became a key to understanding universal history. Why did ‘liberal institutions’ in the North American republic exhibit a vitality unimaginable in Latin America? Because in the latter Europeans had mixed with the defeated natives. And as for Europe, why had France suffered a catastrophe unknown to England? Because the mixing of races had been much more radical in the former than the latter, ‘that of all the countries of Europe where modifications of blood have been slowest and hitherto least varied’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And why was an unprecedented crisis impending in the United States? De Gobineau’s answer was substantially identical to de Tocqueville’s: as a result of massive waves of migration that were heterogeneous in origin, the original Anglo-Saxon element was on the point of losing its identity.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that in de Gobineau the anthropological explanation underwent such a naturalistic rigidification as to prompt de Tocqueville to ironize about the decisive role of ‘blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Must we then regard the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039; as foreign to the liberal tradition? In reality, even if we ignore the South of the United States, where the theory and practice reigned whereby a single drop of black blood was enough to exclude a person from the community of the free (and the enjoyment of political and civil rights), in Europe itself and, what is more, in the other classic country of the liberal tradition, voices echoed that were not very different from that just heard. Declaring himself in favour of a legal ban on miscegenation, Spencer stressed: ‘It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the inter-marriages of human races and by the inter-breeding of animals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But in this context the figure of Disraeli assumes particular prominence. The positions he adopted were clear: race was ‘the key of history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to speak of ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’: in reality, ‘[a]ll is race’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[a]ll is race; there is no other truth.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only thus could it be understood how, although fairly small in numbers, the Spanish conquistadores (or ‘Goths’, as Disraeli preferred to call them) had managed to triumph in America and the English in China.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was how the constant ravages devastating France &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg271&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;were to be explained: we were witnessing ‘the great revolt of the Celts’, or the ancient ‘conquered races’, against ‘the northern and western races’, who had assimilated ‘the Semitic principle’ (the Old and New Testaments) and embodied civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The principal and primary aspect of these processes was not culture: the ‘greatness’ of a race ‘results from its organisation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a physiological fact, and it was therefore necessary to ‘study physiology’, [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] so as to be able to orientate oneself correctly in the conflicts of the historical and political world: ‘Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which makes a race, and that is blood.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this blood mythology, Disraeli too insisted on the superiority of the ‘pure races of the Caucasus’, to which the Jewish race belonged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a purity to be jealously guarded: ‘that pernicious doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man’, the doctrine of ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ which led to mixing and contamination, was condemned out of hand; if really implemented, it ‘would deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the partial difference of idiom, we are not removed from the ideological universe of de Gobineau. The latter, who celebrated the Aryans in the first instance for their liberal and individualistic ‘traditions’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] not by chance dedicated his book ‘to His Majesty George V, King of Hanover’. Along with England, de Gobineau took the other classical country of the liberal tradition, the United States, as his model. It was an ‘essentially practical land’, as had been confirmed by the fact that, without allowing themselves to be fettered by the abstractions rampant in France, even the ‘abolitionist papers had acknowledged the correctness’ of the thesis of the natural inequality of races.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The celebration of racial purity was the celebration primarily of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, the branch of the ‘Aryan family’ that more than any other had resisted the general bastardization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg272&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There is no reason to include Disraeli in the liberal tradition while excluding the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039;, all the less so given that the latter drew considerable inspiration from the English writer and statesman.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If de Gobineau ceased to be a liberal, it was when, now discouraged, he ended up accommodating, in de Tocqueville’s harsh but accurate judgement, to the ‘government of the sabre, and even of the baton’—that is, to the dictatorship of Napoleon III.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should not be forgotten that in these same years Disraeli believed the ‘government of the sword’ and the ‘military camp’ inevitable and legitimate, for France and continental Europe (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]). In any event, as a theorist of race, admirer and collaborator of de Tocqueville, and follower of Disraeli, the author, disgusted by the French revolutionary cycle and statism, and filled with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon world and the ‘liberal traditions of the Aryans’, fitted into the milieu of liberalism without difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the Aryan mythology was explicitly present in other exponents of this intellectual tradition should not be overlooked. Here is how Lecky came to the defence of Ireland, from which he originated: while they were Celts, the Irish were nevertheless part of ‘the great Aryan race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer reached the same conclusion in the course of his visit to the United States: ‘descendants of the immigrant Irish lose their Celtic aspect, and become Americanised’; they had fused with the other ‘varieties of the Aryan race’ and, in this instance, the admixture had proved beneficial.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things stood differently in the case of France. What explained its defeat in the war with Prussia and the raging of the Paris Commune was ‘race’, which seemed to have remained stubbornly Celtic (unlike Lecky, Spencer considered the Celts wholly alien to the Aryan race).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the authors we have just cited might be added Renan, who also regarded himself as a liberal, was ‘in regular contact’ with de Gobineau,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was a no less passionate cantor (as we shall see) of the excellence of the Aryan race and, more generally, the ‘Aryan–Semitic races’. Finally, it should be noted that across the Atlantic the Aryan mythology was prominent, and in fact so widespread as to go beyond the circle of ideologies. In 1902 Arthur &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg273&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, demanded the United States’ right to dominion on the grounds that it belonged to the ‘magnificent Aryan people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The repression of conflict, the search for the pathogenic element, and conspiracy theory&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even if he rejected the facile Aryan solution, this did not make de Tocqueville any less obsessed than de Gobineau with the problem of identifying the pathogenic element attacking a social organism that was healthy in itself. After 1848 there was no doubt: the carrier of the ‘revolutionary disease’, the ‘permanent disease’, the ‘virus of a new and unknown kind’, which raged incessantly in France, was a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;): ‘we are always dealing with the same men, even if the circumstances vary’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is to be added that this ‘virus’ or ‘race’ was spreading alarmingly throughout the world. Having made their appearance in France, these ‘[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown breed came on the scene … They were the first of a new race of men who subsequently prospered and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What once again leaps to the eye is the transition from ‘disease’ or ‘virus’ to ‘race’. Likewise in Constant, ‘cold in their delirium’, subversive intellectuals, those ‘jugglers of sedition’ (&#039;&#039;jongleurs de sédition&#039;&#039;), never tired of undermining not just a particular society, but ‘the very foundations of the social order’. They were ‘beings of an unknown species’ (&#039;&#039;êtres d’une espèce inconnue&#039;&#039;) and in fact formed a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;), a ‘detestable race’ (&#039;&#039;déstestable race&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a crescendo, an anthropological type of explanation tends to become a racial type of explanation—the transition from the category of &#039;&#039;espèce&#039;&#039; to that of &#039;&#039;race&#039;&#039; is symptomatic. At this point the idea of a radical solution emerges. One could only hope for the ‘eradication’ of this ‘detestable race’ composed of pathogenic agents:[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] such was the precondition for restoring the health and safety of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The term ‘race’ does not possess a genuinely ethnic connotation in either Constant or de Tocqueville. Yet its recurrence is a symptom of a tendency to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg274&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;racialize the intellectuals who were carriers of the virus of subversion. Burke went significantly further. In addition to a clearly defined social stratum (non-property-owning intellectuals, who were not connected with the land and lacked roots), the ideological ‘intoxication’ of which radicalism was culpable[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] pertained to a social bloc that began to exhibit an ethnic dimension. What explained the catastrophe of the French Revolution was an alliance between two significantly different social strata: on the one hand, ‘political men of letters’ and, on the other, the ‘new monied interest’. The reasons for this alliance, at first sight so strange, were readily understandable. To begin with, the two parties shared a hatred of Christianity: ‘[t]he literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the irreligiousness and atheism of intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment were well-known, one should not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Jews in Change-alley’, already alien to Christianity for religious and ideological reasons, also had a material interest in undermining or destroying it: they were hoping for ‘a mortgage on the revenues belonging to the see of Canterbury’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attack on the Church was also an attack on ‘the landed property of ecclesiastical corporations’, on landed property as such. The revolutionaries’ programme was sinister: ‘Is the house of lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers[?]’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Intent on destroying a society whose pillars were Christianity and the landed aristocracy was an alliance between subversive intellectuals gathered in ‘the revolution society’ and ‘the pulpit of the Old Jewry’, or the ‘gentlemen of the Old Jewry’, engaged in distorting the real meaning of the Glorious Revolution and spreading ‘the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, Burke did not tire of stressing the role of the Jews. These two components of the revolutionary bloc were linked by multiple affinities. Over and above hatred of the Church and the agrarian, Christian nobility, an important role was also played by their fundamental foreignness to the nation. The intellectual stratum was itself stateless, because intellectuals displayed ‘attachment to their country’ only to the extent that it conduced to their ‘fleeting projects’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg275&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But whence did subversion draw its shock force? To overthrow the existing order, intellectuals and usurers were insufficient. In reality, an integral, albeit subaltern, part of the subversive attack was ‘the Tavern’, the inebriated, bloodthirsty rabble. How was the unnatural union repeatedly denounced by Burke as the social bloc between ‘Old Jewry’ and ‘the London Tavern’ formed and sealed?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Who enrolled the most desperate in the retinue and service of the wealthiest, and in fact of the most parasitic, repugnant wealth—the wealth which, rather than being based on the land and love of the land, pertained exclusively to speculation and usury? It was the intellectuals—more precisely, rootless intellectuals of humble origin. It was ‘feathered scoundrels’ [&#039;&#039;gueux plumées&#039;&#039;],[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] wretches like the scoundrels of the Tavern whom they were constantly inciting. Wanting in religion, faith and genuine ideals, they called on the scoundrels, of whom they were an integral part, to rise up against wealth, but only against the most respectable wealth—landed wealth—while financial (and Jewish) wealth was spared. In France these intellectuals ‘pretended to a great zeal for the poor … They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In their turn, the Jews were perfectly content to support the French rabble’s attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, on the pillars of Christianity. The revolutionary atrocities seemed to Burke ‘Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of the subversive social bloc were now clear. Thanks to the work of plebeian, subversive intellectuals, here were the propertyless in the retinue of the usurers, the Tavern in the service of Old Jewry, or ‘Jewish brokers contending with each other who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Jews were ultimately at the head of the variegated social bloc of subversion. It was enough to observe the development of the revolution in France: ‘The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will be always their fellows, sometimes their masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Levelling and homogenizing everything, the French Revolution ended up making a single ‘difference’ prevail, that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg276&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;constituted by ‘money’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and hence sanctioning the predominance of finance (largely controlled by Jews). If remedial action was not promptly taken, a ‘general earthquake’ threatened to flatten the social order and civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, we are dealing with the first organic theory of revolution as a Jewish conspiracy. The &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; and the denunciation of the infamous role of Old Jewry date from 1790. Only later did Abbé Barruel set himself to work. Exiled in England, he was received with honour by Burke, who warmly greeted him and the work that was taking shape: ‘The whole of the wonderful narrative is supported by documents and proofs with almost juridical regularity and exactness.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to chronological priority, another, more important characteristic highlights the novelty and perilousness of the conspiracy theory in Burke. While the &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; also referred to the disturbing role of Enlightenment ‘confederacies’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it was now no longer a question of pointing a finger at this or that sect or at freemasonry, as did Barruel, and exposing the role of Jews therein. Foremost among the charges against the latter was not hostility towards the dominant religion or throne and altar, as in the traditional Christian polemic. Burke, who was himself a mason,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] aimed to explain a new politico-social conflict that was destined to last a long time. In the British Whig’s view, we have on the one hand the countryside, as the site embodying the natural order of society and the values of attachment to the land, and a national community cemented (as we know) by a ‘relation in blood’; on the other, the city as the site of rootlessness and stateless subversion, jointly promoted by Jewish finance, abstract, revolutionary intellectuals and the rabble. For the first time, the Jews were accused of simultaneously operating through rapacious, parasitic finance and a plebeian movement inspired by blind, destructive fury.&lt;br /&gt;
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This motif reappeared in the liberal tradition after another major revolutionary upheaval. On the outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, Disraeli immediately put them down to the ‘manoeuvres’ of ‘secret associations’, which were ‘always vigilant and always prepared’ to take ‘society by surprise’ and ‘strik[e] at property and Christ’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, the English statesman of Jewish origin drew up a more sophisticated, highly surprising balance-sheet. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg277&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;account of ‘their accumulated wealth’, attachment to their religious tradition and proud racial self-consciousness, Jews tended to be hostile to ‘the doctrine of the equality of man’ and ‘conservative’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although shaking off oppression, they were not averse to the most unscrupulous operations and alliances: ‘you find the once loyal Hebrew invariably arrayed in the same ranks as the leveller and the latitudinarian’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There then spread the ‘destructive principle’ and ‘insurrection … against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property’. Fuelling all of this was an unexpected ethnic and social group: the destruction of Christianity, ‘the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them’. There was no doubt: ‘If the reader throws his eye over the provisional governments of Germany, and Italy, and even of France, formed at that period, he will recognise everywhere the Jewish element.’ Thus, ‘[t]he people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skilful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not difficult to hear in this discourse an echo of the resentment of the Jew at humiliations and persecution suffered. But it remains the case that we are once again dealing with a new conspiracy theory destined to enjoy fatal success in the twentieth century. What encouraged such a theory was the tendency, widespread in the liberal culture of the time, to repress the objectivity of politico-social conflict. The picture Disraeli paints of the great revolutionary wave of 1848 is eloquent. Had it not been for the occult Jewish leadership, ‘the uncalled for outbreak would not have ravaged Europe.’ Not objective social needs, but ‘the fiery energy and teeming resources of the children of Israel maintained for a long time the unnecessary and useless struggle’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, still within the ambit of the liberal tradition, the cry of alarm at ‘conspiracy’ also resounded during another great revolutionary upheaval. When Napoleonic France’s attempt to reintroduce slavery into San Domingo was defeated by the fierce resistance of the ex-slaves, Malouet warned against the ‘universal plot of the blacks’ who, with the complicity of the abolitionists, aspired to dominate and massacre the whites.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this theme was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg278&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;widely diffused in the South of the United States. Obsession with ‘conspiracy’ runs deep in the history of that country and both the contending alliances, in different forms, were constantly concerned to uncover and fight it. For example, in the years leading up to the Civil War, while the South denounced the North’s ‘abolitionist conspiracy’, the latter endlessly warned against the plot that aimed to impose slaveholding power at a federal level. For this reason, reference has been made to a widespread ‘paranoid style’ in connection with the history of the North American republic.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this mythology of the conspiracy, one element was especially significant and pregnant with consequences. The actor in the black, abolitionist plot, the anti-slavery militant, tended to be delineated in accordance with the model generally used to stigmatize the Jew: ‘Essentially weak and cowardly, he would pose no threat in a fair and open fight’; but this was where deception, intrigue and, precisely, conspiracy came in.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. The conflict of the two liberalisms, and mutual accusations of betrayal&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In confronting the challenges represented by the struggle for recognition waged by the excluded, obviously the community of the free did not always react as one. On more than a few occasions, there were internal clashes and divisions. In broad terms, we can distinguish two tendencies. One fraction more or less stubbornly identified with the positions of the representatives of English proto-liberalism, who equated ‘true liberty’ with untrammelled control by the master over &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; family, as well as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; servants and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; goods. By contrast, another fraction sought to come to terms with the idea of liberty originally mobilized by servants, who refused to let themselves be assimilated to the master’s belongings and pursued emancipation through intervention by political power on their behalf, be it existing political power or that formed in the wake of a revolution from below. The struggles waged by servants aggravated the sense of unease in some sections of the community of the free, who soon sought to acquire a good conscience by repressing slavery to the colonies and changing or masking the politico-social relations that most blatantly gave the lie to their proclaimed attachment to the cause of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entanglement of, and clash between, these two different ideas of liberty, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg279&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and of the politico-social subjects who appealed to them, explains the especially complex and tortuous character of the first English revolution and the French Revolution as such. Not even the United States was spared this conflict. In fact, it flared up there in the most violent and bloody way during the Civil War, in a clash between, on the one hand, the idea of liberty understood as self-government by the dominant class and race and, on the other, the idea of liberty that experienced increasing disquiet because of the persistence of the institution of slavery. Defeated militarily, in slightly different form, as a regime of terroristic white supremacy, the idea of liberty dear to the South ended up achieving a political success in the United States that lasted beyond the mid-twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two liberalisms we are referring to are to be construed in an ideal-typical sense: within the same author, it is possible to register fluctuation from one to the other. In condemning as contrary to liberty coalitions composed of ‘desperate men’, who sought to escape death from starvation, Smith clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the very wealthy. On the other hand, in calling for a ‘despotic government’ to abolish slavery, he was embracing a different theoretical paradigm, which identified liberty with the abolition of oppressive relations existing within civil society itself. And the great economist adhered to this second paradigm when he observed that in eastern Europe ‘serfdom’ continued to exist in ‘Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority’, and thus was not in a position to foil the resistance of feudal lords.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an observation which, albeit to a lesser extent, also applies to de Tocqueville. When he condemned the reduction of the working day in factories to twelve hours as an expression of despotism, he clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the bourgeoisie. But on other occasions the French liberal argued differently. In a letter of 1840 to an American correspondent, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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For me it is a rather melancholy reflection to think that your nation has incorporated slavery to such an extent that they expand together … In practice, there are no precedents for an abolition of slavery on the master’s initiative. It has only been abolished thanks to the power of a government that dominated master and slave alike. That is why, precisely because you are completely independent, slavery will last longer among you than anywhere else.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg280&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Rather than the locus of liberty, here self-government is the condition for the perpetuation of the evil of slavery. Only a strong government would be able to abolish it. More concerned about the stability of the United States than the freedom of blacks, de Tocqueville, unlike Smith, did not go so far as to come out in favour of a ‘despotic government’. But in the case of Ireland, the same French liberal harboured the idea of a temporary dictatorship that would put an end to the terrible ills visited on the native population by the self-government of Anglo-Irish, Protestant property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although convinced that ‘public education is salutary, above all in free countries’, Constant was firmly opposed to the introduction of compulsory schooling, since he considered unacceptable any form of ‘restriction’ that violated the ‘rights of individuals’, including ‘those of fathers over their children’. True, poverty meant that in poor families children were taken out of school and put to work early. Yet it was necessary to renounce any restrictions and wait for poverty to fade away.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of this logic, in addition to rejecting compulsory schooling, Constant did not even entertain the hypothesis of state intervention against the scourge of child labour. Some decades later, by contrast, declaring himself in favour of compulsory schooling, Mill argued against the ‘misplaced notions of liberty’ of parents and added: ‘The State … is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his [the individual’s] exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this different judgement, we see the transition from one theoretical paradigm to another; and the transition was also the result of the struggle of those who were excluded from liberty construed simply as self-government by civil society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reacting to the protests and challenge of the working-class movement, it was liberal England that regulated working hours and conditions in factories, abolishing or tempering the most odious aspects of what Marx and Engels branded as employers’ ‘despotism’. This aroused the protests of not a few liberal representatives and English capitalists themselves, who (observed &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;) ‘denounced the factory inspector as a species of revolutionary commissioner reminiscent of the [Jacobin] Convention’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Bismarck made a profession of liberalism and thundered against the ‘Royal Prussian Court Jacobin’, who claimed to interfere in the relationship between masters and servants and hence to ride roughshod over the principle of self-government by civil society, hegemonized in this instance by feudal property and not an aristocratic—bourgeois &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg281&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;coalition, as in the British case. And it was precisely the Prussian–German statesman who distinguished between two types of liberalism in this connection. The first was characterized by ‘repugnance at the power of bureaucracy’, on the basis of ‘liberal caste sentiments’ widely diffused among the Junkers and nobility of pre-revolutionary Prussia; the second, utterly odious in Bismarck’s view, was ‘Rhineland–French liberalism’, or the ‘liberalism of civil servants’ (&#039;&#039;Geheimratsliberalismus&#039;&#039;), inclined to incisive anti-feudal reforms from above, which inspired an oppressive, suffocating state bureaucracy with its ‘tendency … to levelling and centralization’ and even ‘bureaucratic omnipotence’ (&#039;&#039;geheimrätliche Allgewalt&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note that a similar distinction occurs in the young Marx. The &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; edited by him defined itself as a ‘liberal paper’, but was careful to specify that its liberalism was not in any way to be confused with ‘vulgar liberalism’ (&#039;&#039;gewöhnlicher Liberalismus&#039;&#039;). While the latter saw ‘all good on the part of representative bodies and all evil on the part of government’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039;, by contrast, was characterized by its attempt to analyse relations of domination and oppression in their concrete form, without hesitating in particular circumstances to underline ‘the general wisdom of the government against the private egotism of representative bodies’ (often monopolized by feudal strata and a narrow-minded, short-sighted big bourgeoisie). Contrary to ‘vulgar liberalism’, far from fighting ‘bureaucracy one-sidedly’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; had no difficulty acknowledging the merits of its struggle against the ‘romantic’ or ‘romantic–feudal’ current.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Despite the contrasting value judgements, in both Bismarck and Marx we witness a distinction between a liberalism inclined to consecrate the self-government of a civil society hegemonized by the feudal aristocracy or grand bourgeoisie, and a liberalism ready to intervene in the relations of domination and oppression that manifest themselves within civil society itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they are located in this historical and theoretical context, we can understand two significant turns that occurred in the course of the liberal tradition. We know that, initially, the liberal/servile dichotomy had a strong social and ethnic connotation. This connotation tended to weaken as the struggle for recognition intensified and the concessions that the community of the free was forced to make became more significant. We can then understand the attempt &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg282&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by some sections of the liberal movement to differentiate between political liberalism and economic liberalism, and thus distance themselves from those (economic-liberal) sections which, crying scandal at any state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, refused to question the relations of domination and oppression present within civil society, within the ‘private sphere’.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, with every significant concession that the community of the free (or its most advanced sectors) found itself obliged to make to the excluded, engaged in the struggle for recognition, there were denunciations of ‘betrayal’ from the most intransigent sectors, with a consequent laceration and division of the liberal movement. Clearly distancing himself from those who refused to follow him in the crusade against the French Revolution, in 1791 Burke, in the name of loyalty to the ‘Old Whigs’, authors of the Glorious Revolution, broke with the ‘new Whigs’, guilty of having derived ideas and ideals ‘from a French die, unknown to the impress of our fathers in the constitution’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, at the heart of the conflict was the idea of representation, which the French revolutionaries and their followers on British soil, in the name of the imaginary, ‘pretended rights of man’, interpreted in a merely quantitative sense, invoking the principle of calculating a majority by head, ignoring the special function of the aristocracy and trampling the healthy arrangement of society into estates underfoot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A century or so later, the struggle for recognition was continuing to develop in new, more advanced conditions. Over and above political citizenship, the ‘multitude’, previously branded ‘swinish’, demanded the right to health, education and a minimum of free time. It succeeded in wresting more or less sizeable concessions and enjoyed support from significant representatives of liberalism. In Britain this was true above all of T. H. Green, who theorized ‘freedom in the positive sense’ in controversy with the economic liberals of his time. They condemned state regulation of working hours in factories or of female and child labour, in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ and liberty understood exclusively as non-interference by political power in the private sphere of production and labour relations.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, responding to the attempts at adaptation and reconciliation by some sectors of liberalism were cries of scandal from the movement’s most intransigent sections. Spencer, Acton and Henry S. Maine were among the many to denounce the ‘betrayal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg283&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Spencer particularly stood out. Those who, under the pretence of improving popular living conditions, banned the employment of children under the age of twelve, forced parents to send their children to school, subjected factory work (especially female labour) to a whole variety of regulations, and introduced compulsory insurance for illness and old age had ceased to be liberals: they had arrived at a ‘New Toryism’. In effect, they were simply inflating the state, enlarging the zone of coercion and limiting that of freedom of contract and the autonomous development of the individual.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As in the case of Burke with the ‘new Whigs’, so Spencer branded the ‘New Toryism’: albeit in a different idiom, what was targeted was a spurious liberalism forgetful of its own noble past; a liberalism guilty of abandoning the cause of self-government by civil society (whether aristocratic or bourgeois) and of the spontaneity of the market, giving way to the blandishments of statism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Celebration of the spontaneity of the market, as if its historically determinate form was not the result of political action, was philosophically ingenuous enough. For centuries the market of the liberal West had involved the presence of chattel slavery and the buying and selling of indentured white servants. Even the borderline that separated commodities on the one hand, and the figure of the buyer/seller on the other, was the result of political and even military intervention, abhorred for centuries as being synonymous with artificial, violent constructivism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us ignore the peculiar ‘commodities’ long represented by slaves and indentured servants. When can the market be regarded as free of external disturbance, and hence such that the parties to any exchange find themselves in a position of liberty and equality? Locke regarded the truck-system, whereby workers were paid not in money but in commodities produced by the factory they worked in, as perfectly legitimate. In agreement with him was Frederick William III, who in 1832 silenced voices raised in protest against this system with the argument that the state did not have the right to intervene in a ‘relationship of private right’, trampling over ‘civil liberty’ or arbitrarily restricting it. For Smith, by contrast, ‘the law which obliges the masters … to pay their workmen in money and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the liberal philosopher and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg284&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prussian monarch, the great economist was of the opinion that the truck-system violated the principle of equality between the contracting parties and therefore justified legal intervention that would have seemed intolerable to Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much later liberal authors like Lecky and others condemned state regulation of working hours as an inadmissible interference in the market sphere.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In our times, by contrast, Hayek believed that the promulgation by the state of ‘general, equal, and known rules’, of ‘general conditions’ which must be fulfilled by any contract, was not in itself a violation of the principle of liberty. But the Austro-American author, who distinguished himself by thundering against any form of statism and constructivism, would have seemed statist and constructivist to Lecky, whom Hayek regarded as a classic proponent of liberalism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Potentially a traitor in the eyes of economic liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, Hayek elsewhere identified and denounced the betrayal of liberalism. Although in favour of the social state and hence aligning himself with Green, Hobhouse continued to profess himself a follower of that intellectual current. &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, read the title of his book, which in fact, according to Hayek, would more accurately have been entitled Socialism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years earlier, von Mises had reached the same conclusion: most British ‘liberals’ were ‘so in name only. In fact, they are rather moderate socialists.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The charges of treason against the wing of liberalism disposed to make concessions to colonial peoples were even more violent. In France, immediately after Thermidor, anyone who resisted the turn intended to re-establish if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy in the colonies, was branded ‘African’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States of the 1820s, arguing against abolitionist tendencies, Randolph declared that the term ‘liberal’ now risked becoming synonymous with ‘black alliance’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The polemic against the ‘black republicans’ subsequently became the guiding thread of the struggle against the abolitionist tendencies that were coagulating in Lincoln’s Republican Party, as emerges in particular from the debate which, a few years before the Civil War, pitted the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg285&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;future president against Senator Stephen A. Douglas.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In subsequent years, Lecky was among those crying treason. The brief period of interracial and multi-ethnic democracy experienced by the South—Reconstruction—was, in his view, the triumph of the ‘negro vote’ and the disappearance of ‘the influence of property and intelligence’; it was the advent, ‘under the protection of the Northern bayonets’, of ‘a hideous orgie of anarchy, violence, unrestrained corruption, undisguised, ostentatious, insulting robbery, such as the world had scarcely ever seen’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. The community of the free as a community of peace? Policing operations and colonial wars&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto concentrated on the challenges to the community of the free that might be mounted by the barbarians in the colonies or the metropolis, and on the acute crisis situations that could arise within an individual country. But what were the relations between the various countries into which the community of the free was divided? Precisely because it was inclined to repress the genesis of the conflict and situate it outside itself, it tended to present itself as the community of peace, deaf to the sirens of war and bellicose adventures, which were a pre-modern legacy, and as wholly absorbed in the production, exchange and peaceful enjoyment of the goods that constituted civilization. George Washington expressed the hope that the development of ‘free commerce’ and civilization, ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, would put a stop to ‘the devastations and horrors of war’, uniting humanity ‘like one great family in fraternal ties’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, repeated Constant, in ‘the age of commerce’ even ‘a successful war always costs more than it brings in’: having become obsolete as a tool for acquiring wealth, war was destined to disappear; ‘the uniform tendency is towards peace’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn194|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;194&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This ideal of perpetual peace, produced by freedom of industry and trade, was sometimes so deeply felt that it prompted harsh criticism of the realpolitik of war and conquest pursued, for example, by England. Thus authors like Cobden and Spencer, bitter critics of their country’s foreign and military policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg286&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In the mid-nineteenth century, the former exclaimed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been the most combative and aggressive community that has existed since the days of the Roman dominion. Since the Revolution of 1688 we have expended more than fifteen hundred millions of money upon wars, not one of which has been upon our own shores, or in defence of our hearths and homes … this pugnacious propensity has been invariably recognized by those who have studied our national character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn195|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;195&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the self-proclamation of the community of the free as a community of peace could generate a different line of argument. However pitiless, the struggle against the ‘savage beasts’ represented (in Washington’s view) by Indians was not an act of war, but a policing operation. This applied to conflicts with those peoples or, rather, those hordes that had not yet attained the stage of civilization and peace. Against barbaric pirates it was necessary to organize an expedition that ‘would crush them into non-existence’; sooner or later, it would be necessary to ‘exterminate those nests of Miscreants’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn196|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;196&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville likewise tended to liken conflict with barbarians to a policing operation. In September 1856 he expressed the fear that the clash between North and South in the United States would end up provoking ‘war in the heart of a great continent whence it has been banished for more than a century’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]). Clearly, subsumed under the category of war were neither the expeditions that had decimated and were decimating the Indians, nor the armed conflict that had involved a significant amputation of Mexican territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the growing colonial expansion of Europe, and primarily of Britain, which now also encompassed a country of ancient civilization like China, made resort to the category of policing operation problematic. On the other side, recognizing the reality of war might also play a positive role at the level of domestic policy, might serve to overshadow the worsening social conflict, and counter the vulgarly hedonistic ideology in whose wake radical and socialist agitation had developed. The ideal tension that presided over war was thus positively contrasted with the pettiness of material demands advanced by popular protest movements: ‘The masses want tranquillity and earnings’, and hence peace, but the merit of war precisely lay in throwing this philistine view of life &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg287&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into crisis, observed Burckhardt, who in this connection quoted Heraclitus’ motto (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn197|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;197&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For de Tocqueville war and ‘great events’ could form a useful antidote to ‘our mediocre democratic and bourgeois soup’, which was the breeding ground of sensualism and socialist hedonism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn198|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;198&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; forcefully asserted that ‘I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and elevates their character.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn199|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;199&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it involved an advance by the West, and hence by the cause of liberty, war revealed its true nobility and beauty. De Tocqueville expressed himself in lyrical terms on the first Opium War (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|§6]]), in a letter whose addressee was the English liberal Reeve. He in turn, on the occasion of the Crimean War (which saw England allied with Bonapartist France), expressed himself no less magniloquently in the course of correspondence with the French liberal:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We live at a time when it is necessary to know how to suffer and witness suffering. The sword of war cuts to the heart. But what a mighty influence this struggle has on the political and social body! What a unity of sentiment and endeavour it creates! What a reawakening of the forces which, after all, make up the greatness of a people. I willingly accept all the anguish and all the ills of war for what it brings morally even more than politically.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn200|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;200&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The proud self-consciousness of the community of the free and the emergence of ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
War against barbarians in the colonies, or against countries situated on the margins of civilization, had hitherto been a subject for appreciation or celebration. At first sight, no cloud seemed to trouble the unity of the community of the free. However, after having desired the extension to the entire planet of the enlightened ‘despotism’ of civilized countries, Mill continued as follows: the gigantic ‘federation’, albeit ‘unequal’, that was the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg288&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Backward populations had an interest in becoming part of the British Empire, in order to avoid ‘being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn201|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;201&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years of the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville had responded prematurely and indirectly to Mill’s claim to raise the British Empire to the status of unique, privileged representative of a universal cause. The English were characterized by&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
their constant commitment to seek to demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of a principle, or for the good of the natives, or even for the benefit of the sovereigns whom they subjugate; honest is their indignation at those who put up resistance; these are the procedures with which they always cover up violence.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn202|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;202&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
With the disappearance of the semblance of complete unity, rivalry emerged between the different countries that made up the community of the free—rivalry that became all the more intense as the liquidation of despotism and, more generally, the construction of a new political regime deemed more advanced reinforced the self-consciousness of the individual protagonists. This was soil wherein was rooted the celebration, dear to Burke, of the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. The most lucid exponents of liberalism were perfectly well aware of this. While it also made itself felt in the works of authors such as Constant and, above all, Spencer, in this intellectual tradition the illusion that the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; betokened the advent of perpetual peace did not play the role it had in the French Revolution and radicalism. A source of possible conflicts between the various countries, observed Hamilton, was not only the diversity of political orders and interests:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg289&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? … Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn203|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;203&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of the representative regime and the transfer of power from absolute monarchy to the nation were not in themselves an antidote to war. Holland and England, the first two nations to have equipped themselves with liberal orders, had turned out to be ‘frequently engaged in war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn204|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;204&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hamilton felt great admiration for Britain: ‘I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn205|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;205&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet on the level of international policy, Britain remained an enemy to be defeated. The American statesman rebuked Europe, which wanted ‘to plume herself as the Mistress of the World’ and tended ‘to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit’. This was a pretence that must be countered with force: ‘It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.’ Sooner or later, the new Union would be the one ‘able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn206|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;206&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the enemy was generically identified as Europe and the Old World, the particular reference was to Britain which at this time (1787), following France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, was the only great imperial power. Jefferson was more explicit. The ‘empire for liberty’ desired by him presupposed Britain’s defeat: not only was it called upon to be the most grand and glorious ‘since the creation’, and hence to outclass the British Empire, but it also presupposed the annexation of Canada (in addition to Cuba), ‘which would be of course in the first war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn207|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;207&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For de Tocqueville, too, shared membership of the community of the free by certain countries did not guarantee permanent relations of friendship and peace between them. In defining its foreign policy, France must not exclusively assert its ‘interest in developing the principles of liberty in the world’. Only the naive could believe that their spread meant the simultaneous disappearance of the threat of war:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg290&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Will anyone go so far as to claim that two peoples must necessarily live in peace with one another just because they have similar political institutions? That all the causes of ambition, rivalry, jealousy, all the bad memories have been abolished? Free institutions render these feelings even more vital.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn208|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;208&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; stressed that ‘[a]ll free nations are vainglorious’; the ‘restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people’ was self-evident. This was confirmed, in particular, by the transatlantic republic: ‘The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise … Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn209|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;209&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an excessive ‘national pride’, an ‘irritable patriotism’ (&#039;&#039;patriotisme irritable&#039;&#039;), which did not tolerate criticism of any kind.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn210|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;210&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a demand for primacy that sought utter exclusivity. If a foreigner admired the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by Americans, they would react by accepting the compliment, but immediately rendering it more emphatic and more exclusive: ‘few nations are worthy of it’. If a foreigner admired their ‘purity of morals’, the American interlocutor would react by denouncing ‘the corruption that prevails in other nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn211|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;211&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he turned to the international rivalry between the countries making up the community of the free and the West, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to speak harshly of the United States. Writing to an American interlocutor, and referring to attempts to expand southwards also made by ‘private’ adventurers (he was thinking of William Walker), the French liberal wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not without concern, I have seen this spirit of conquest, even of rapine, exhibited among you for some years. It is not a sign of good health in a people that already has more territory than it can fill. I confess that I could not but be sad if I came to learn that the [American] nation had embarked on an operation against Cuba or—even worse—entrusted it to its lost sons.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn212|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;212&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The American interlocutor might easily have retorted by recalling de Tocqueville’s enthusiastic support for France’s policy of ‘conquest’ and ‘rapine’ in Algeria. But the key point is different. Far from damping it down, the common waving of the flag of liberty further fuelled international rivalry. After &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg291&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the February Revolution, de Tocqueville declared that ‘starting from 1789’ France once again donned the ‘role’ of ‘saviour’ ‘of peoples whose liberty is in danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn213|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;213&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An ‘empire for liberty’ was thus evoked whose capital was Paris, and which tended to come into conflict with the ‘empire for liberty’ cherished by Jefferson.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. De Tocqueville’s ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The realism with which the most lucid representatives of the liberal tradition analysed the persistence of national rivalries, despite their shared reference to the ideal of liberty, had another aspect to it: the candid, avowed chauvinism presiding over the international policy programme. This applies to de Tocqueville in particular. The principle of consent by the governed as a criterion for legitimizing political power gave impetus to national movements in Europe as well. Prima facie, it would seem that the liberal world as a whole should have felt unequivocal sympathy for them. In this case, we are dealing not with colonial peoples, but with peoples regarded as more or less civilized, who primarily came into conflict with the Habsburg Empire—that is, a power which had remained foreign to liberal development. Yet de Tocqueville proved cool, or frankly hostile. A partial explanation of this attitude can be found in the social demands that contaminated such movements and imperilled the traditional liberal delimitation of the political sphere. The Mazzinian republic established in Rome was ‘the red republic’ and against it, and ‘the anarchical party in Rome and the rest of the world’, no blows should be spared. Ideological fury impelled the French liberal to speak of his political opponents in Italy as ‘a whole category of political criminals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn214|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;214&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville proved harsh and even cynical about one of the protagonists of the Hungarian national revolution: rather than agitating to save ‘Kossuth’s skin’, it might happily be made into a ‘drum’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn215|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;215&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above rejection of radicalism, what motivated this attitude was ‘irritable patriotism’, concerns of a chauvinistic kind, as emerges in particular from de Tocqueville’s furious polemic against ‘our imbecile agents’ in Germany, who were guilty of not countering the prospect of that country’s ‘political unification’ more firmly and effectively. Certainly, ‘the population’s passion for this idea seems sincere and profound’; but ‘nothing would be more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg292&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;frightful for us’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn216|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;216&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But did this not ride roughshod over the liberal principle of self-government and consent by the governed as a criterion of the legitimacy of any government? That was a problem de Tocqueville did not pose. He hoped for ‘the victory of the princes’ and the Prussian army to put paid to ‘excessive decentralization’ that encouraged the swarming of ‘revolutionary breeding grounds’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn217|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;217&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to Italy, chauvinistic concerns should have played a more modest role. Yet in September 1848, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville summarized his position as follows: ‘preservation of the old territories … and real, significant changes in institutions’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn218|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;218&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, there was no place for demands for national unity. And the principle of consent by the governed? Having invited the organization of ‘a &#039;&#039;Roman demonstration’&#039;&#039; in favour of restoring the Pope’s temporal power, de Tocqueville continued as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In my opinion, this is &#039;&#039;indispensable&#039;&#039;. And, in order to achieve this result, if we do not also have the reality, it is &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; necessary to produce at least the semblance. This is the only way to connect the expedition with one of the main objectives we have always assigned it and on which the National Assembly has always wished to stand firm—coming to the aid of the real will and hidden desires of the people of Rome.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn219|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;219&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage the roles of appearance and reality are reversed rapidly and inadvertently. The ‘semblance’ of a demonstration to be organized at all costs expressed the ‘hidden’ but nevertheless ‘real’ will of the Roman population, whose interpreter was the government of the occupying power. At this point it was also possible to resort to radical measures with a clear conscience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I cannot really understand why, in the twenty-four hours following the city’s capture, we did not, with utmost rapidity and energy, close the clubs, tear down the flag of the Republic, disarm the citizens and soldiers, arrest all those who, in their attitude, indicated that they disapproved of our presence [&#039;&#039;tous ceux qui faisaient mine de trouver mauvais notre présence&#039;&#039;]—in a word, strike our enemies with terror in order to conquer the terror that had gripped our friends.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn220|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;220&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg293&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;So here we have an invitation to make arrests even on the basis of mere suspicion. Not by chance, reference is made to terror. It is a term that recurs frequently; it amounts to a veritable watchword: ‘strike the demagogic party with terror and lift the liberal party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn221|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;221&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But another watchword was immediately added: ‘negate the rigours of the past, although leaving terror to waft over the future’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn222|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;222&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, European public opinion, which already felt ‘deep repulsion’ at France’s conduct, must not be unduly ruffled. Yet it was a question of ‘advancing and advancing with the most extreme rigour’; all the more so because the country’s honour was at stake. It found itself faced with a ‘terrible alternative’—a Hobson’s choice:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Either to deliver Rome over to all the horrors of war or to retreat shamefully, beaten by the same men who for eighteen months fled all the battlefields of Italy. The first would be a great misfortune, but the second would be a fearful disaster and, as far as I am concerned, I have no hesitation.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn223|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;223&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, chauvinism took priority over any other concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. The conflict of ideas of mission from the American Revolution to the First World War&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So we can understand the recurrent divisions that opened up in the community of the free. The one that occurred in the two decades preceding the foundation of the United States is illuminating. The Seven Years’ War was also experienced and fought by the English colonists in America, and in fact primarily by them, not only as a war for the defence of English liberty, but also (as the sermons of Protestant ministers never tired of repeating) as a holy war in which it was God himself who guided and saved England–Israel from the threat represented by France. The victory achieved over the enemies of Israel was proof of the ‘favourable providential presence of God with his people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;224&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years later, it was England’s turn to form the core of the alliance of the ‘enemies of God’, while the rebel American colonists continued to be ‘true Christians, good &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg294&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;soldiers of Jesus Christ’, called upon to cultivate ‘a martial spirit’ and ‘the art of war’, so as to accomplish ‘the work of the Lord’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;225&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the first major conflict to convulse the community of the free, and it spans the period that extends from the American Revolution to the war of 1812–15. As the latter was coming to an end, Jefferson expressed the opinion that Great Britain was no less despotic than Napoleon. Moreover, while the latter would take ‘his tyrannies’ to the grave with him, a whole ‘nation’ was seeking to impose its absolute domination over the seas; and it was an ‘insult to the human understanding’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;226&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Such was his ideological fury that the American statesman ended up declaring: ‘Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents from Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military and manufacturing one.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;227&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having heard the news of the end of hostilities, Jefferson wrote that it was ‘an armistice only’. So radical was the antagonism not only of interests, but also of principles, that the two countries were in fact engaged in an ‘eternal war’, which would terminate or was destined to end with the ‘extermination of the one or the other party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;228&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major conflict was the one that exploded with the American Civil War. The dialectic we have already encountered was on display once again. The fact that for decades the antagonists had regarded themselves as members of the chosen people of liberty, far from reducing the bitterness of the clash, accentuated it. Both sides were convinced that they were fighting a holy war; they appealed to Holy Scripture and half of their propaganda texts were written by ecclesiastics.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;229&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major conflict survived the second, which was eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century by the rising tide of chauvinism that invested the United States as a whole, without significant distinctions between North and South. In 1889 Kipling noted with disappointment that the 4 July celebrations in San Francisco were the occasion for official speeches against what the Americans defined as ‘our natural enemy’, represented by Great Britain ‘with her chain of fortresses across the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;230&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, this antagonism too was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg295&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;being damped down, because a completely new international situation was maturing. More than ever engaged in colonial expansion, and increasingly taken in by the idea of the freedom mission they assigned themselves in competition with one another, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the various national centres of the community of the free turned out to be on a collision course. This is the context in which we can situate the third major conflict in the history of liberalism. Starting with the First World War, in particular it saw ranged against one another Britain (and the United States) and Germany—the most recent and ambitious recruit to the community of the free, which at the end of the nineteenth century had likewise begun to cherish the idea of an empire for liberty, putting itself at the head of a crusade for the abolition of slavery in the colonies.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;231&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interpretation of the third major conflict suggested here might occasion astonishment. What obstructs an understanding of this event is the negative teleology that tends to interpret German history in its entirety as a series of stages leading inexorably to the horror of the Third Reich. In reality, on the eve of the First World War Germany was not obviously less ‘democratic’ than the United States, where racial oppression raged, or than Great Britain, which completely disregarded universal male suffrage (on which elections to the Reichstag were based), and exercised imperial domination on a global scale and even in Europe itself, at the expense of Ireland. Above all, it must not be forgotten that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in England and America, Germany was regarded as a full member of the exclusive club of free peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So the by now familiar dialectic emerges once again. Confronting one another in a total war, which required the mobilization of culture as well as armies, were antagonists who had previously congratulated one another on being members, or even especially influential members, of the community of the free—in this case, of the great Teutonic or Aryan family, united by a jealous custodianship of individual autonomy and love of self-government and liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn1a|1]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Recueil d’articles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Éphraim Harpaz, Geneva: Droz, 1972, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn2a|2]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 29–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn4a|4]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 6, p. 84; vol. 5, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn5a|5]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1981, p. 794.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn6a|6]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 155–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn8a|8]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn9a|9]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, ed. Thomas W. Copeland and John A. Woods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 7, pp. 52–3 (letter to William Weddell, 31 January 1792).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn10a|10]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 397 (letter to La Fayette, 28 May 1788), 455 (fragments of the discarded first inaugural address, April 1789)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn11a|11]] Adams, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn12a|12]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn13a|13]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., pp. 194–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn15a|15]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel de France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier&#039;&#039;, ed. Philippe Raynaud, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn16a|16]] Constant, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 183, 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn17a|17]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 7, pp. 144–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn18a|18]] James Mackintosh, &#039;&#039;Vindiciae gallicae&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Woodstock, 1989, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn19a|19]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn20a|20]] Jean-Joseph Mounier, &#039;&#039;De l’influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-maçons et aux illuminés sur la révolution de France&#039;&#039;, Tübingen: Cotta, 1801, pp. 31, 36–7, 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 33, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn22a|22]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn23a|23]] Arthur O. Lovejoy, &#039;&#039;The Great Chain of Being&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn24a|24]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn25a|25]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn27a|27]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn28a|28]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 12, p. 365 (letter to J. P. Nichol, 21 December 1837). On this see Eileen P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983, p. 606.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn29a|29]] Pasquale Villari, &#039;&#039;Dai cargeggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984, p. 151 (letter from Mill to Villari, 11 June 1862).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn30a|30]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn32a|32]] Cobden, quoted in Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 25–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn33a|33]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in Italy and France from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn34a|34]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. James Morton Smith, New York: Norton, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 1585–6 (letter to James Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn35a|35]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 382.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn36a|36]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn37a|37]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 245–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn38a|38]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn39a|39]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 21, p. 528 (letter to Edwin Chadwick, 13 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn40a|40]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 29, p. 26 (letter from Engels to Marx, 23 May 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 496 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 17 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 18, p. 424 (letter to A. de Circourt, 25 October 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn43a|43]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, London: Penguin, 1986, pp. 301–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 4, pp. 273–4, 266, 300–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn45a|45]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn48a|48]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, pp. 253, 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn49a|49]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 223, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., pp. 224, 242.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn52a|52]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn53a|53]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 215–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn54a|54]] Boissy d’Anglas, quoted in Georges Lefebvre, &#039;&#039;La France sous le Directoire&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1984, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn55a|55]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 2, p. 70 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 21 February 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn57a|57]] Ibid. vol. 4, pt 1, p. 321.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn58a|58]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 281.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn59a|59]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn60a|60]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Principles of Ethics&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Tibor R. Machan, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn61a|61]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 2, 21, 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn62a|62]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 309–19 (for the quotation from Lincoln, see p. 312).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn63a|63]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn64a|64]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 131.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn65a|65]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn66a|66]] Giuseppe Mazzini, &#039;&#039;Note autobiografiche&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Pertici, Milan: Rizzoli, 1986, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn67a|67]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 234 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn68a|68]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn69a|69]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 863.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn72a|72]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 11, p. 392 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn73a|73]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn74a|74]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 64; William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 5, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn76a|76]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 19 August and 14 October 1856); Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, p. xviii; and on Guizot, cf. Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 331–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn79a|79]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 437 (letter of 14 December 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn80a|80]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 101 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 10 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn86a|86]] François-Alphonse Aulard, &#039;&#039;Histoire politique de la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1977, p. 19 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn87a|87]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 4, pp. 65, 100, 140; vol. 5, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn88a|88]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 268–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn90a|90]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 57–8 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 5 October 1828).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 64, 67–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 124–5, 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn93a|93]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 15, pt 1, p. 342 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn95a|95]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 20, pp. 319–63; and vol. 2, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn97a|97]] Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Britannica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 2, p. 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn98a|98]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 55 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn99a|99]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn100a|100]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 322–3 (letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn101a|101]] Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, pp. 393–6, 409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn102a|102]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 78, 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn103a|103]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 229 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 6 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn104a|104]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 159 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 14 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 29 August and 14 October 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 272–4 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 29 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn108a|108]] Ernst Nolte, &#039;&#039;Three Faces of Fascism&#039;&#039;, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Mentor, 1969, p. 635 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 55 n. 1 and 22 n. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn110a|110]] Arthur de Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie de Paris, vol. 1, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn111a|111]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn113a|113]] Ibid., pp. 235, 234.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn114a|114]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 103, 167; Hume, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn115a|115]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn116a|116]] David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn117a|117]] Chamberlain, quoted in Henry Kissinger, &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1994, p. 186.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn118a|118]] Alfred Thayer Mahan, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Asia&#039;&#039;, New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 125–6; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, pp. 55–7, 48–50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn119a|119]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 41ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 536–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn121a|121]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn122a|122]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, p. 322 (letter to Kentaro Kaneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn123a|123]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn124a|124]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn125a|125]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1847, vol. 1, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn126a|126]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn127a|127]] Ibid., pp. 508–9, 553.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn128a|128]] Ibid., p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn129a|129]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn130a|130]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 361.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn131a|131]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, pp. 221, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn132a|132]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn133a|133]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn134a|134]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 260–1 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 20 March 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn135a|135]] See Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 520–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn136a|136]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The History of Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, Natalie Gerardie and Mirian Kochan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974–75, vol. 3, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn137a|137]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 280 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 24 January 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn138a|138]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, pp. 151–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn140a|140]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, pp. 154–5 (letter to E. Cazelles, 3 May 1871).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn141a|141]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 305 (letter of 21 March 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 20, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn143a|143]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 348–9; vol. 13, pt 2, pp. 337–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn144a|144]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn145a|145]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14, 84, 194; Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn146a|146]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn147a|147]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn148a|148]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn149a|149]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn150a|150]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 211, 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn151a|151]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 75, 50–51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn152a|152]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 169–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn153a|153]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn154a|154]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn156a|156]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn157a|157]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 102.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn158a|158]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 18–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn160a|160]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn161a|161]] Burke, quoted in Johannes Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These von der Verschwörung&#039;&#039;, Bern and Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1976, p. 111 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn162a|162]] See Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn163a|163]] Cf. Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These&#039;&#039;, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn164a|164]] Disraeli, quoted in George E. Buckle and William F. Monypenny, &#039;&#039;The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, New York: Macmillan, 1914–20, vol. 3, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn165a|165]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn166a|166]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn167a|167]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 497–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn168a|168]] Ibid., p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn169a|169]] Malouet, quoted in Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn170a|170]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 38 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn172a|172]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 455.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn173a|173]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 83 (letter to J. Sparks, 13 October 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn174a|174]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn175a|175]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 159–60, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn176a|176]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 396.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn177a|177]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Die großen Reden&#039;&#039;, ed. Lothar Gall, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1984, p. 137; Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Werke in Auswahl&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, ed. Gustave Adolf Rein, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, p. 354 (speeches in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 18 October 1849 and 14 February 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn178a|178]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 424.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn179a|179]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn180a|180]] See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 89, 248, 257, 220, 228.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn181a|181]] Thomas Hill Green, ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard L. Nettleship, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1973, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn182a|182]] George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classsics, 1981; Henry S. Maine, &#039;&#039;Popular Government&#039;&#039;, ed. George W. Carey, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn183a|183]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 5–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn184a|184]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 3, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn185a|185]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn186a|186]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 230, 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn187a|187]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Conceit&#039;&#039;, ed. William Warren Bartley III, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn188a|188]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. xviii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn189a|189]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 262–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn190a|190]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn191a|191]] Cf. Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 498–504 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn192a|192]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn193a|193]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, p. 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn194a|194]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn195a|195]] Cobden, quoted in Daniel Pick, &#039;&#039;War Machine&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn196a|196]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, p. 401 (letter to La Fayette, 19 June 1788).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn197a|197]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, pp. 150, 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn198a|198]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, p. 421 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 9 August 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn199a|199]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn200a|200]] Reeve, quoted in de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn201a|201]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn202a|202]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 505.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn203a|203]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn204a|204]] Ibid., p. 180.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn205a|205]] Hamilton, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, ed., &#039;&#039;Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn206a|206]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn207a|207]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1586 (letter to Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn208a|208]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn209a|209]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 225–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn210a|210]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn211a|211]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 225.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn212a|212]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 147 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 4 December 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn213a|213]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn214a|214]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 249, 277, 399 (letters to F. de Corcelle, 10 and 20 June and 12 September 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn215a|215]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 92 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 January 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn216a|216]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 29, 38 (letters to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August and 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn217a|217]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 133–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 18 May 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn218a|218]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn219a|219]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 276 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 20 June 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn220a|220]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn221a|221]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn222a|222]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 294 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 2 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn223a|223]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 293 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224a|224]] Ellis Sandoz, ed., &#039;&#039;Political Sermons of the American Founding Era&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991, pp. 216–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225a|225]] Ibid., pp. 623–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226a|226]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 1272–3 (letter to Madame de Staël, 24 May 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227a|227]] Ibid., p. 1357 (letter to William Short, 28 November 1814).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228a|228]] Ibid., p. 1366 (letter to La Fayette, 14 February 1815).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229a|229]] Eugene D. Genovese, ‘Religion in the Collapse of the American Union’, in Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds, &#039;&#039;Religion and the American Civil War&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 74–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230a|230]] Kipling, quoted in Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, p. 322.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231a|231]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 17, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER NINE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page296&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg297&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Historiography and hagiography&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Our history of liberalism ends with the outbreak of the First World War, when (according to Weber) even in countries with the most stable liberal tradition the state was assigned ‘ “legitimate” power over the life, death and liberty’ of individuals, and ‘unlimited disposition over all the economic goods accessible to it’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, as Furet puts it, ‘in virtually all of Europe, the canons of August 1914 literally and metaphorically buried liberty in the name of country’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is appropriate to take a look back from this watershed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following the prelude of the revolt against Philip II’s absolutism by the Netherlands, liberalism asserted itself in two counties so positioned that they were sheltered from the threats to which continental European states were exposed. It should be added that, not by chance, the Glorious Revolution succeeded England’s victory first over Spain and then over France, while the American colonists’ revolt only began with the defeat of France in the Seven Years’ War. Thus, the two liberal revolutions both presupposed a clear improvement in the geopolitical situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards continental Europe, we can distinguish two phases: after the defeat of Turkey at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and the fading of the Ottoman threat, criticism of absolutism became widespread. The second phase was the so-called hundred years’ peace, which extended from the end of the Napoleonic &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg298&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This was the period when liberalism also asserted itself at a concrete political level. And just as the institutions that emerged from the 1789 revolution did not survive the war which engulfed revolutionary France, from 1914 the liberal institutions that had flourished in continental Europe during the hundred years’ peace experienced a dramatic crisis. Taken as a whole, as well as enjoying a more or less high degree of peace and geopolitical security, the liberal countries had another characteristic in common: in the period under investigation here, they had marked possibilities of defusing politico-social conflict in the metropolis through colonial expansion, whether continentally or overseas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the epochal rupture of 1914 there erupted in all its horror the second Thirty Years’ War, as the two global conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, separated by a fragile armistice, have often been defined. What is the relationship between all this and the preceding historical period? Or are we to believe that there is no relationship and that the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; came to an unanticipated end, brought about exclusively by circumstances altogether foreign to the liberal West? This is the conclusion that seems to be suggested by an eminent English historian of the modern world, A. J. P. Taylor:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit … Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service … It left the adult citizen alone.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Citing this picture, already problematic enough in itself, a contemporary British liberal scholar elevates it into ‘the historical paradigm of a liberal civilization’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, a couple of pages later, Taylor himself observes that ‘[s]ome 50 million Africans and 250 million Indians were involved, without consultation, in a war of which they understood nothing’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us ignore the colonies, and even Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom and experienced such political and military oppression from the London government that it was (again in Taylor’s words) the protagonist of ‘the only national rebellion in any &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg299&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;European country during the First World War—an ironical comment on the British claim to be fighting for freedom’ and to represent the cause of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for England specifically, I do not know if Cobden ‘noticed’ the state that inspected his mail, but it was certainly on its guard against a citizen who was unquestionably ‘sensible and law-abiding’, but whose fault was to be suspected of Chartist sympathies.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the state even more readily ‘noticed’ the Chartism and the working-class movement in general, which faced repeated suspension of habeas corpus and recourse to the use of &#039;&#039;agents provocateurs&#039;&#039; who elicited horror not only in the liberal Constant, but also in a ‘statist’ like Hegel.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the England of the time, ‘a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers’ was at work.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even the contrast with the continent as regards military conscription is mistaken: this had already made its appearance some years earlier in the United States during the Civil War and, in order to impose it, Lincoln, putting down violent resistance, had no hesitation in having an army corps march on New York.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Military conscription was not a practice imposed on the liberal world from without, from the continent!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historiography tends to shade into hagiography. I use this term in a technical sense: it involves a discourse completely focused on what, for the community of the free, was the restricted sacred space. It is enough, however briefly, to introduce the profane space (slaves in the colonies and servants in the metropolis) into the analysis, to realize the inadequate, misleading character of the categories (absolute pre-eminence of individual liberty, anti-statism, individualism) generally used to trace the history of the liberal West. Was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain the land of religious freedom? Referring to Ireland, the liberal de Beaumont, who was de Tocqueville’s companion during his trip to America, spoke of ‘unimaginable religious oppression’. We are dealing with a people not only deprived of its ‘religious freedom’, but also forced, notwithstanding its poverty, to subsidize the wealthy Anglican Church that oppressed it with tithes. The vexations, humiliations and suffering inflicted by British ‘tyranny’ on this ‘slave people’ proved that ‘a degree of egotism and madness is present in human institutions whose limits cannot be defined’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg300&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But let us concentrate on the metropolis. Celebrating the individualism and anti-statism attributed to the liberal tradition, Hayek pays homage to Mandeville, for whom the ‘arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In truth, the author elevated into a model here was not only completely undisturbed by the spectacle of hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’, but invoked summary trials and an acceleration in death sentences—and demanded state intervention even in the private life of these poor people, on whom the observance of Sunday worship should be imposed from infancy (see above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). It is clear that what held Hayek’s attention was neither the colonies nor metropolitan servants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Things do not fall out right even if such neglect is regarded as innocuous. The experience of the British colonies in America that subsequently became the United States is particularly revealing. Servile, semi-servile and free labourpower came from across the Atlantic in ways and in accordance with rules fixed by the political authorities, which also played a decisive role in delimiting the area opened up to colonization from time to time. The slavery or marginalization and degradation imposed on blacks ended up impinging on the ‘modern liberty’ of the whites themselves—and so seriously that the wrong choice of sexual or marriage partner risked transforming the culprit into a ‘felon’, a traitor to his own country and race! The white population as a whole, and slave-owners themselves, were subject to a whole series of laws that gravely interfered in even the most intimate aspect of private life. The political authorities exercised comprehensive surveillance so that miscegenation and, above all, the potential fruit of such noxious mixing did not lead to emancipation and did not threaten the purity of the community of the free with its false presence. It was a crime to give or even merely furnish writing materials to slaves. The postal administration prevented the circulation of materials vaguely critical of the institution of slavery. In the South a climate of terror reigned over citizens suspected of harbouring abolitionist ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the race issue and the dark cloud it suspended over the civil rights of the white community itself. We can take a key state in the history of the North American revolution and republic: ‘Pennsylvania was … renowned in the nineteenth century for its stringent laws against blasphemy, profanity, and desecrating the sabbath’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Independently of the prohibition of miscegenation, which remained in force beyond the mid-twentieth century, sexual &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg301&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;freedom in the United States was restricted in ways that were largely foreign to the despised, ‘statist’ continental Europe. Here is the picture drawn in 2003 by a distinguished US newspaper:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All 50 states had laws banning sodomy until 1961 … The number had dwindled to 24 states by 1968 and stands at 13 today … Most of the remaining states with anti-sodomy laws forbid anal or oral sex among consenting adults no matter their sex or relationship.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
To this we must add the constitutional amendment of 1919 that sought to prevent the production and consumption of ‘intoxicating liquors’—a further intervention in the private life of citizens with few parallels in other Western countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the history of the English colonies in America and then of the United States—both classical countries of the liberal tradition are thus involved to differing degrees—is better explained by the complexity of the process of constructing and protecting the sacred space, than by the categories of anti-statism and individualism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The liberal revolution as a tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once the field of hagiography has been evacuated, in reconstructing the history of liberalism it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: ‘We won’t be their Negroes!’ On the one hand, the rebellion began by demanding equality, while on the other it reasserted inequality and further deepened it. The two demands were indissolubly linked: precisely because they established a marked superiority over blacks and Indians, the colonists felt themselves completely equal to gentlemen and property-owners residing in London, and demanded that such equality be recognized and consecrated at every level. The dialectic that issued in the Glorious Revolution was not very different. We have seen an exponent of English proto-liberalism demanding, in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of his own possessions and servants. Far from questioning it, ‘true liberty’ consecrated the existing relations of service (and, in the colonies, slavery) as belonging to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg302&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an inviolable private sphere. The equality property-owners demanded with the sovereign, who could now be nothing but &#039;&#039;primus inter pares&#039;&#039;, went hand in hand with the reification of servants, who tended to be likened to other objects of property. That is why liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we should analyse as a whole the three revolutions from which we started out. Of the first, which occurred in Holland, Huizinga observed that ‘the revolt against the Spanish government was a conservative revolution and could not have been otherwise’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same conclusion has been reached by other eminent historians. Philip II was concerned to ‘require that bishops be technically skilled (that is, theologians rather than sons of great lords)’ and was opposed to the nobility’s attempt to transform the Council of State into ‘an exclusively aristocratic executive body’. We can then understand that ‘large parts of the “Netherlands” nobility were suddenly afraid that the prince was not their &#039;&#039;agent&#039;&#039;, that his policies would in the short and medium run threaten their interests significantly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So, on the one hand, we have Philip II, who surrounded himself with ‘secretaries who were generally from modest origins, passive instruments of his will’; on the other, ‘an oligarchic princely republic of communal cities and feudal lordships’, a ‘grand aristocracy’, a ‘feudal oligarchy’ engaged in defending ‘privileges and customs’ that consecrated its power and prestige.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is as if the nobles of the Netherlands, like large English property-owners and the English colonists in America subsequently, declared: ‘We don’t want to be treated as your servants!’ In its initial stages, the revolt against Philip II was not very different from the contemporaneous agitation of the Fronde in France.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, what ignited the powder was the clash between the high nobility’s autonomist and in some sense liberal aspirations and the Crown’s centralizing tendencies—except that, in the second case, the influence of the struggle for national independence and the intervention of the popular masses in it profoundly altered the initial picture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen the impetus given by the Glorious Revolution to the slave trade and the development of racial slavery in the colonies. The aspect of dis-emancipation also emerges with clarity in Ireland. Systematic expropriation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg303&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the natives intensified; in 1688 Catholics still owned 22 per cent of Irish land, but the figure fell to ‘14 per cent in 1703 and a mere 5 per cent in 1778’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that is not all: ‘Catholics—the overwhelming majority of the Irish population—were excluded from all public offices and from the legal profession.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England itself, the Glorious Revolution swept away the obstacles that still stood in the way of enclosures. As Marx put it, having attained full control of power, land-owners and capitalists ‘inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale the thefts of state lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the extent that rural labourers had found an ear more or less attentive to their lamentations, it was from the Stuart monarchy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Up to 1688, by dint of the control over them exercised from above, Justices of the Peace had some autonomy from the landed aristocracy. They subsequently lost it, becoming ‘virtual dictators of local government’ and answering only to the members of their own class who sat in parliament.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, we must not lose sight of the incredible increase in the number of crimes against property that carried the death penalty, with the establishment of a regime of terror over the popular masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dimension of dis-emancipation is even more obvious in the American Revolution. The terms in which Theodore Roosevelt celebrated it at the start of the twentieth century are revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief factor in producing the Revolution, and later in producing the War of 1812, was the inability of the motherland country to understand that the freemen who went forth to conquer a continent should be encouraged in that work … The spread of the hardy, venturesome backwoodsmen was to most of the statesmen of London a matter of anxiety rather than of pride, and the famous Quebec Act of 1774 was in part designed with the purpose of keeping the English-speaking settlements permanently east of the Alleghanies, and preserving the mighty and beautiful valley of the Ohio as a hunting-ground for savages …[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg304&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Indians was dramatically hastened by the foundation of the United States.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Great Britain’s interests in its transatlantic possessions were commercial rather than territorial; and, as we know, it was loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada who accused the insurgents of a systematic policy of genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Indians gained nothing from the American Revolution, what about blacks? The foundation of the United States involved the advent of a racial state and an unprecedented consolidation of racial chattel slavery. It is true that, in line with the watchword of the struggle against (political) slavery advanced during the revolt against Britain, the Northern states abolished slavery in the strict sense. But blacks did not thereby acquire freedom, confined as they were to a ‘caste’ different from that of freemen. In any event, there is a fact that provides food for thought: Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1834, while it survived in the United States for another three decades. Even the condition of free blacks was worse there, for example, than in Canada. In that British colony between 1850 and 1860, 20,000 blacks found refuge who had abandoned the United States, where they feared that laws on the return of fugitive slaves to their legitimate owners might furnish pretexts for the enslavement even of free blacks. But already, some decades earlier, more than a thousand black slaves had sought refuge in Canada after their delegation had been benevolently received by the local authorities with a stinging polemic against the United States: ‘Tell the Republicans on your side of the line that we royalists do not know men by their colour. Should you come to us you will be entitled to all the privileges of the rest of His Majesty’s subjects.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this declaration was not free from an ideological, self-serving element. But it remains the case that blacks in the US looked to Canada as the promised land of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The most significant steps in the expansion of the United States simultaneously sealed the extension of the democracy and domination, in its harshest forms, of the ‘master race’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1803 Napoleon sold Louisiana. Although already in force, slavery had not yet assumed a clearly racial form. There were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg305&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;20,000 half-castes, who to all intents and purposes were free and sometimes engaged in the liberal professions. They might even be very wealthy, and thus form part of the dominant elite. Transfer to the United States involved the consecration of local self-government and the power, in the final analysis, of white property-owners (French and Anglo-American). The result was a deterioration in the conditions not only of slaves—emancipation became increasingly difficult—but, above all, of freemen of colour. Their numbers diminished in absolute terms, and even more appreciably in percentage terms (their immigration was discouraged, while that of whites was encouraged). Hit by a series of discriminatory measures, freemen of colour now began to form an intermediate caste closer to slaves than freemen proper. In Louisiana, annexed to the United States, the twin birth of free representative bodies and racial chattel slavery was also seen in due course.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new, considerable expansion of US territory occurred some decades later with the drastic amputation of Mexico. We already know about the introduction of slavery into Texas. But even more significant was the tragedy that struck the Indians in both Texas and California. Subjected to forced labour and a thinly disguised slavery, their children in effect became &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;. Particularly desirable were young girls because, as a local paper put it, they served the dual purpose of ‘work and lust’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was only one chapter in a horrific story: ‘The destruction and degradation of the California Indians is one of the sorriest blotches on the honor and intelligence of a nation. It was less a matter of war than of “sport”.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;and comparativism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Viewed comparatively and from the perspective of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, the American Revolution appears as the start of a long series of attempts by white colonists to rid themselves of the obstacle represented by central power, whether ecclesiastical or monarchical. In 1537 Pope Paul III declared that the sacraments must be forbidden to colonists who, denying the humanity of Indians, reduced them to slavery. ‘Moralistic interference’ was also carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Thus, a ‘continuing tension between slavery and Christian ideals’ made itself felt. But the colonists, for whom forced labour was an &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg306&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unavoidable necessity, responded by expelling the Jesuits from Brazil or provoking veritable ‘colonial insurrections’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the first rebellions by black slaves tended to appeal to the Crown and to look to central government for a counter-weight to the despotism of local masters.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As for British America, the revolt that developed in Virginia a century before the American Revolution, and which was led by Nathaniel Bacon, must be borne in mind. While on the one hand targeting the privileges of the governing faction, on the other the rebels ‘demanded land, without regard to the rights or needs of the border Indians’, who in fact were exterminated in some instances.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conflicts that subsequently emerged in the American Revolution are present here &#039;&#039;in nuce:&#039;&#039; on the one hand, the polemic against central government arrogance and interference; on the other, the demand for complete freedom vis-à-vis ‘savages’. And in fact, when we read in Bacon’s manifesto his denunciation of the collusion, in the course of the struggle against the champions of liberty, between the governor of Virginia and the ‘barbarous’, bloodthirsty Indians,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we are reminded of the Declaration of Independence.&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that the French and English colonists also waved the flag of self-government, independence and imitation of the US model against the policy of emancipating slaves, for which they criticized the central political power. But events in Southern Africa are especially significant. Here, too, whether the colonies were controlled by the Dutch or British, the development of self-government by civil society went hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of racial slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolts erupted which, in the name of liberty and the struggle against despotism, denounced interference by central government and its claim to limit the right of masters to punish their slaves.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The civil society referred to was, obviously, the white community. The natives were descendants of Ham, condemned to perpetual slavery by the Old Testament, or were assimilated to the inhabitants of Canaan, doomed to destruction by the chosen people, the Boer settlers who embodied the cause of liberty and self-government.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg307&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The crucial question posed by eminent US historians in connection with the English colonists’ revolt in America is thus wholly understandable: Was the ‘movement of political emancipation by a section of the white settlers against control from England’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] really a revolution? Or are we dealing with ‘a reactionary slaveholders’ rebellion’? In the case of the South at least, this was the principal aspect: ‘With the threat of British interference removed and a relatively weak central government to contend with, the road to regional power lay open before the slaveholders, who constituted the only class capable of treading it.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A not dissimilar conclusion has been reached on the basis of an analysis of the relationship the Union as a whole had with the Indians: the American Revolution ‘had some of the character of a white settlers’ revolt against imperial policy’, which afforded relative protection to the natives.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point we can draw a comparison between the role played by the ‘redskin question’ in the colonists’ rebellion that issued in the American Revolution and the part the ‘negro question’ played in the sparking off the Civil War:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he British authorities prior to 1776, by promulgating regulations restricting the colonists’ geographic expansion beyond the Appalachians, also alienated wealthy planters and merchants with speculative investments in western territory, as well as less affluent farmers who hoped for a new and inexpensive start on fresh lands … In 1860–61, when a newly elected Republican administration promised to prohibit the further westward expansion of slavery, the response from most white Southerners was another revolution for political autonomy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If this is the case, the history of the United States is characterized by two reactionary secessions (or secessions with more or less strong reactionary components), the one victorious, the other defeated. And, although defeated, the second would be situated in a line of substantial continuity with the first.&lt;br /&gt;
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The triumphal rise of the United States created an ideological climate in which, when reconstructing the American Revolution, historians tended to identify directly and naively with the rebel colonists’ arguments. But today it is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg308&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inadmissible to continue to ignore the voices of their opponents, in particular those (for example, Samuel Johnson and Josiah Tucker) who from the outset highlighted the significance of the black and Indian questions in the divisions that occurred between the two shores of the Atlantic. When the subsequent clash between the two sections of the Union loomed, claiming the legacy of the American Revolution were also, and perhaps primarily, the theorists of the South. Calhoun referred to Washington the ‘slave-owner’. An utterly instrumental attitude? It was in fact endorsed by the most radical currents in abolitionism, which had no hesitation in publicly burning a Constitution branded as intrinsically pro-slavery and hence, ultimately, satanic. In their interpretation of the American Revolution, Calhoun and Garrison in a way vindicated Johnson and Tucker. Just as the Declaration of Independence accused George III of seeking to incite black slaves against the colonists, so the Confederacy accused Lincoln of wanting to provoke a slave war in the South. In both cases the rebels criticized central political power for misunderstanding the self-government that was due to free, civilized men and for attempting to erase the boundary line between civilization and barbarism. Not by chance, the attempted secession could count on passionate support from prominent representatives of the liberal world and culture even in England. One thinks, in particular, of Lord Acton, who to the end believed he was supporting an authentic, great liberal revolution, just as the leaders of the secessionist, slaveholding South thought they were promoting an authentic, great liberal revolution (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further developing a comparative perspective and the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, it might be observed that in the twentieth century the process of decolonization was itself accompanied by secessionist movements, initiated by colonists who sought to maintain control over the natives and colonial populations in general, waving the flag of self-government and continuing to be inspired by the model of ‘master-race democracy’—one thinks, in particular, of South Africa and Rhodesia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039; and a comparative perspective that expose the reductive, misleading character of the view which conceives the American Revolution as a mere ‘reactionary rebellion’. To begin with, we are dealing with a more general problem. We find Marx defining the Glorious Revolution as a ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, thanks to which the English landed aristocracy succeeded in consolidating its domination over the unfortunate Irish (the Indians and blacks of the situation) and giving impetus to the enclosure of common land and the expulsion of the peasantry. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the other side of the coin. The conquest of self-government by civil society had a genuine revolutionary significance. Liberated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg309&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from an arbitrary power, the members of the class that had assumed power granted one another liberty and respect for the rules, with the construction of the constitutional state and the advent of the liberal rule of law. The first to achieve this novel phenomenon were precisely the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, which therefore cannot be put on the same level as subsequent historical movements inspired by them. In other words, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that characterized the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution subsequently saw the second aspect prevail ever more markedly.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Realization of the rule of law within the sacred space and the widening of the gulf with the profane space&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented in the metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘original capitalist accumulation’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Against monarchical despotism and central power, this class demanded self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law. We can then say that this liberalism was the intellectual tradition which most rigorously circumscribed a restricted sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power obtained. It was an intellectual tradition characterized more by celebration of the community of free individuals that defined the sacred space than by celebration of liberty or the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident, the classical countries of the liberal tradition were those where, through Puritanism, the Old Testament had the deepest impact. This already applies to the Dutch Revolution or, at least, to the Boers of Dutch origin, who identified themselves with the ‘chosen people’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it applies a fortiori to England. Especially from the Reformation, the English regarded themselves as the new Israel, ‘the people chosen by the Almighty for a special and at the same time a universal mission’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideology and missionary consciousness were diffused, in accentuated form, across the Atlantic. It is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg310&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enough to think of Jefferson, who suggested that the US coat of arms should represent the children of Israel guided by a ray of light.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the distinction between sacred space and profane space is seen in all its radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Old Testament beloved of the dominant elite, which liked to identify with the chosen people that conquered Canaan and destroyed its inhabitants, or which recruited its slaves from gentiles, two strict, drastic delimitations are operative. Anthropocentrism sharply separates from circumambient nature the human world, wherein an absolutely privileged and unique role is reserved for the ‘chosen people’. The sacred space, the tiny sacred island, is thus delimited with the utmost clarity from the infinite profane space. We might say that outside the chosen people everything tended to be reduced to deconsecrated nature, within whose orbit also came the populations condemned by Jehovah to be wiped off the face of the earth. The destruction fell upon ‘both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass’; or, in more pregnant terms, ‘all the souls’, ‘all that breathed’, ‘all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the specifically profane space, the distinction between man and nature does not seem to emerge, or does not play a prominent role.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the exclusive restriction of the sacred space also performs an enormously positive function. Among the chosen people specific rules are in force, so that there is room for servitude but not for slavery in the strict sense. Thousands of years later, this was the viewpoint of Locke who, explicitly appealing to the Old Testament, distinguished between the servitude of wage-labourers (in the metropolis) and slavery in the colonies. And the continuity turns out to be even more striking when we bear in mind that destined for slavery were blacks, whom the theology and ideology of the time regarded as the descendants of Ham and Canaan, condemned in perpetuity by Noah, according to Genesis, to wear chains.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at a paradoxical result, at least with respect to the dominant ideology. The West is at once the culture which most rigorously and effectively theorizes and practises the limitation of power, and which, with the greatest success and on the largest scale, is engaged in the development of chattel slavery—an institution that involves the full deployment of the master’s power over slaves reduced to chattels and ‘nature’. And this paradox is exhibited in especially striking fashion precisely in the countries with the most established liberal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg311&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Certainly, already within Judaism the exclusivist pathos of the sacred space tended to take the form of a universalism that relied sometimes on the subjugation (or destruction) of the profane, and sometimes on its co-option. As becomes apparent above all in post-exile Judaism, the absolute transcendence of Jehovah prompted a process of de-naturalization of the sacred space/profane space dichotomy. The mobility of borders, and hence the possibility of effecting co-options within the sacred space and civilization, applies a fortiori to the Puritans and the liberal tradition, which inherited Judaism filtered through Christianity. On the other hand, the albeit partial amplification of the sacred space was a necessary response to the struggles waged by the excluded, who often derived different motifs from the Old Testament opposed to those dear to the dominant elite. They were inspired by the story of the people reduced to slavery in a foreign land who finally managed to free themselves from the Pharaoh’s domination. This was the ideology that inspired the slave revolt which broke out in 1800 in Virginia, whose leader posed as a new Moses.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The slaves’ ability to derive justifications for rebellion from the dominant culture itself led property-owners to regard even religious education with suspicion.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. Delimitation of the sacred space and theorization of a planetary dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space. The element of regression in this is clear. A comparison will suffice to account for it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the most exalted texts of its culture, Europe long strove to maintain a lucid and self-critical view of itself, refusing to allow itself to be intoxicated and carried away by euphoria on account of the irresistible march begun with the discovery–conquest of America. And this approach continued to display its vitality in the Enlightenment and the culture that became part of the inheritance of French radicalism. Let us read Raynal and Diderot: ‘The conquistadores’ first steps were marked by rivers of blood … In the inebriation of their success, they took the decision to exterminate those they had robbed. Countless people vanished from the face of the earth on the arrival of these barbarians’, who took to ‘treating the brothers they had just discovered without remorse, as they treated the wild beasts of the old hemisphere’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg312&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;extermination of the Indians was rounded off with condemnation of the trade in slaves called upon to replace them as labour.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, it was not only in the New World that the ‘European barbarians’ stained themselves with genocide;[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the ‘unhappy Hottentots’ likewise suffered a ‘pitiless’ massacre.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to the colonial conquest, Louis-Sébastien Mercier drew attention to further dark pages in Europe’s history in the second half of the French eighteenth century. His utopian novel imagined a ‘singular monument’ in which ‘the nations represented … asked humanity’s pardon’ for the cruelty shown by them. Along with the genocide of the Indians, the expiatory monument recalled forced labour, or ‘the slow torture of so many unfortunates condemned to the mines’, and the subsequent black slave trade symbolized by ‘numerous mutilated slaves’. Incontestably responsible for all this were ‘the Europeans’, also charged with ‘the atrocity of the crusades’, ‘the horrible Saint Bartholomew’s night’ and the wars of religion.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, let us now observe the way Edgar Quinet argues. In 1845, sketching in broad outline the history of the West, the French liberal historian came to the Spanish conquest of America. He could not ignore the extermination of the indigenous populations, but hit upon an explanation that was simultaneously ingenuous and reassuring. True, it had been carried out by Spain, a country that was an integral part of the West. But at the time Spain had experienced a decisive influx of the culture and religion of Islam, which was thus the actual, if indirect, executioner of the Indians.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same line of argument was adopted for other black pages in the West’s history. Had not the Inquisition had its centre in a Spain widely influenced by barbarians? And as to the crusade that destroyed the Albigensian heretics, without distinction of age and sex, was it not perhaps prepared by the prayers of the Spaniard San Domenico di Guzmán?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Via Spain, all signs pointed to Islam, at whose door could be laid even the Crusades, which precisely had as their stated target the Muslim ‘infidels’. Quinet passed judgement: ‘In the Crusades the Catholic Church enacted the principle of Islamism: extermination.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg313&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But not only Islam was stigmatized as synonymous with barbarism. European high culture had long regarded China with curiosity and interest. Where were the wars of religion that had covered Europe with blood? They were prevented by a religion that shunned mystery and dogma, resolving itself into an ethics.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; it was easier to recognize themselves in the mandarins than the Catholic clergy or Protestant ministers. The importance of the role played by a layer of secular intellectuals in the great Asiatic country was confirmed by the fact that the highest administrative public offices were often allocated through public competition, rather than being the monopoly (as in France) of a titled aristocracy, allied and intertwined with the clergy. In any event, in China the secular, modern principle of merit prevailed over the obscurantist principle of privilege based on birth and blood. The Enlightenment’s sympathetic attention to non-European cultures, employed as a critical mirror of Europe, became a charge in the indictment drawn up by de Tocqueville: the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; had turned for a ‘model’ to China, ‘[t]hat unenlightened, barbarian government which lets itself be manipulated at will by a handful of Europeans’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The feudal aristocracy’s prevalence in Europe was also the prevalence of bellicose values, while China (observed Leibniz, an author already completely infused with the pathos of Enlightenment) was distinguished by its aversion to anything that ‘creates or nourishes ferocity in men’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby constituting a reference point for &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; engaged in criticizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;‘s privy wars. Thus the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; applauded the pacific spirit exhibited by Chinese culture.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this became off-key at the moment of the triumph of colonial expansionism. And so in de Tocqueville, corresponding to the celebration of war as an expression of the nation’s grandeur and an antidote to the socialist movement’s vulgar hedonism, we find an intensification of the indictment against China, also reproved for its unwarlike character. The French liberal displayed his contempt for a country whose army enjoyed ‘peacefully scraping a living’, overwhelmed as it was by the ‘general softness of ideas and desires’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, all this facilitated the conquest of China: ‘It would be &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg314&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;difficult for me to console myself if, before dying, I did not see China opened and the eye of Europe penetrate there with its arms’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now there was nothing to be learnt from non-European civilizations. In 1835 Macaulay declared that ‘a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, we can understand the indifference with which the destruction of the Summer Palace, in all its incomparable beauty, by English and French troops during the second Opium War was viewed. Expressing his indignation was Victor Hugo: ‘We Europeans are the civilized ones and for us the Chinese are barbarians. And here is what civilization has done to barbarism. In history’s eyes, one bandit will be called France, the other will be called England’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, on the occasion of the Commune, the good liberal Bagehot expressed his contempt for the behaviour of the rebels, whom he criticized for having wanted to destroy everything worth seeing and admiring in Paris, any testament to ‘culture’ and civilization.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus was credited the rumour, which subsequently proved unfounded, that the communards had destroyed the Louvre. But no mention was made here of the destruction of the Summer Palace in Peking, which actually occurred roughly ten years earlier, with the decisive participation of the country that for Bagehot was the privileged embodiment of the cause of liberty and civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Authors like Las Casas and Montaigne had problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism and made them fluid. In this perspective civilization advanced through exchanges between different cultures. Developing their thinking in the years when missionaries from Christian Europe were received with respect and benevolence in China, while in France Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and resumed persecution of the Huguenots, Bayle and Leibniz reached a radical conclusion. It was a pity that the relationship between China and European was marked by its one-sidedness; the presence of Chinese missionaries in Europe would definitely be beneficial![[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; assigned a black Spartacus the task of advancing the cause of freedom, breaking the chains of slavery and putting an end to the barbarism of which Europeans were the agents. But this attempt to cast a glance at &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg315&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Europe, as it were, from without, recognizing the contributions of different cultures to the cause of advancing civilization, did not survive the irresistible march of colonial expansionism. Having triumphed on a planetary scale, the liberal West saw fit to identify itself permanently with the cause of civilization and liberty. On the basis of this absolute and immutable pre-eminence, we see an exclusive elite—the restricted community of the free—explicitly formulate the claim, hitherto unknown and unheard of, to exercise a planetary dictatorship over the rest of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The triumph of colonial expansionism: liberalism as an ideology of war&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The celebration of civilization and liberty now took the form of an ideology of war. It was an ideology refuted by Raynal and Diderot who, addressing the ‘monsters’ or European conquistadores, expressed themselves as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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You are proud of your &#039;&#039;lumières&#039;&#039;, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot? … If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable to his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer’s lash.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This criticism is all the more apt if we bear in mind Washington’s characterization of the Indians as an ‘unenlightened race’ (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So exalted was the self-consciousness of the liberal West in the nineteenth century that sometimes it did not even feel the need to confer ideological legitimacy on its wars. Unlike John Stuart Mill, de Tocqueville did not present the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and liberty as such. For the French liberal the main cause for celebration was the West’s overwhelming power, and this power was also configured as a war machine ideologically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Here finally we have Europe’s mobility at grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, above all if one believes that it is merely the sequel, the latest step in a multiplicity of events of the same kind that are gradually impelling the European race beyond its borders and successively subjecting all the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg316&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;other races to its empire and influence. It is the enslavement of four-fifths of the world by the other fifth. Hence it is best not to be unduly despairing about our century and ourselves; the men are petty, but the events are great.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s attitude left de Gobineau puzzled. The first ridiculed the mythology of blood entertained by the second. There was in fact another side to the coin. Once adopted as the key to explaining universal history, racial contamination cast its fatal shadow over the West itself, which was likewise condemned to decadence. Hence for de Gobineau there was no insurmountable barrier between conquerors and colonial peoples. As for the economy, the latter would sooner or later manage to develop the textile industry (the key industry of the period) and defeat British and European competition in general.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Morally, there was no reason to idealize the conquerors: in Persia and the Middle East ‘their immorality and rapacity’ were manifest. If the natives ‘are rogues’, ‘in some respects they can be considered our cousins’; ‘this is how we will be tomorrow’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s criticism focused precisely on this point: ‘You say that one day we shall resemble the rabble you see before you: maybe. But before this happens, we shall have been its masters.’ As we can see, from the ‘rogues’ they were in de Gobineau, the peoples of the Middle East have now been transformed into a ‘rabble’, with this fully legitimizing the domination exercised over them by European ‘masters’. It is with reference to the latter that de Tocqueville employs the more indulgent term ‘rogues’: ‘If, as I agree, they are often great rogues, at least they are rogues to whom God has given strength and power and whom He has manifestly placed, for a certain period, at the head of the human race’. Faced with this, de Gobineau’s reservations about the ‘immorality’ and ‘rapacity’ of the conquerors, and the thesis of their basic kinship with subject peoples, seemed to lose any significance. De Tocqueville continued:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are in the heart of the Asiatic and Muslim world: I would be curious to know to what you attribute the rapid and seemingly unstoppable decadence of all the races you have seen passing through … Some millions of men who, a few centuries back, lived virtually without shelter, in the forests and marshes, will in less than one hundred years be the transformers of the globe they inhabit and the dominators of their whole species. Nothing is more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg317&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly preordained in the sight of Providence … Nothing will resist them on the surface of the earth. I have no doubt of it. I fear that all this might sound to you like a philosophical heresy. But if you have theory on your side, I am confident that I have the facts on mine—a not unimportant detail.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Gobineau, who regarded himself as a ‘citizen of the world’, refused to give in: ‘I take an extraordinary interest in my daily conversations with the natives, and am very far from having the bad opinion of them people are pleased to entertain in Europe’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not a viewpoint de Tocqueville could share. We already know his opinion that the ‘last’ member of the ‘European race’ was always ‘first next to the savages’—that is, in the last analysis, next to ‘all the other races’. Of his daughter, de Gobineau remarked: ‘She has made herself a true Turkoman, save for her colour, which is that of an Abyssinian’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville did not respond to this observation, but it should not be forgotten that for him it was precisely ‘half-breeds’ who represented the most serious threat to the West’s supremacy and civilization as such (see above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|§4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt about the greater intellectual and political subtlety of de Tocqueville who, criticizing the blood myth, distanced himself from the ideology increasingly prevalent in the South of the United States, where de Gobineau’s views about the natural and eternal inequality of races met with understandable success. Yet it is to be noted that, much more so than the latter, it was the former who created an unbridgeable gulf between the West and colonial peoples. How are we to explain this fact?&lt;br /&gt;
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Straddling the American Revolution, ‘[r]acism became an essential, an unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology’—that is, of the ideology which presided over the construction of ‘master-race democracy’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century this regime tended to characterize the relationship between the West as a whole and colonial peoples. Certainly, in order to impart credibility to its self-proclamation, the community of the free was ever more inclined in this period to abolish slavery in the strict sense—hereditary slavery—which was in fact replaced by other forms of forced labour. But the model of a ‘master-race democracy’ remained unchanged. The gradual abolition of censitary discrimination in the metropolis gave further impetus &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg318&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to colonial expansion, which now in fact enjoyed the consent of the popular classes in the metropolis. These, like the poor whites in the North American republic, aspired to be co-opted into the bloc of ‘masters’. And once again what explained and legitimized the barrier dividing masters and servants was a more or less marked, and more or less crude racial ideology, which was now pervasive. This was a trend that also made its influence felt on de Tocqueville.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having been asserted in countries (Holland, England and the United States) more involved than any others in the slave trade and colonial expansion (overseas in the case of the first two, continentally in that of the third), liberalism spread in the West at a time when it seemed destined by Providence itself to dominate the whole world and wipe out all other cultures. In these circumstances, the self-critical thinking and awareness of limits that had characterized the pre-eminent voices of European and Western culture tended to disappear. The inheritors of that tradition were French radicalism, and then Marx. The latter waxed ironic about the ‘civilizing wars’ of the colonial powers. In reality, during the Opium War, while China, ‘the semi-barbarian[,] remained faithful to the principles of the moral law’, the ‘civilized’ opposed to it the principle of free trade,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the principle so eloquently defended by Mill. But especially significant are the pages of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; devoted to original capitalist accumulation and denunciation of ‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population’, and the transformation of Africa into ‘a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a chapter of history that was extended in the subsequent colonial expansion.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Oscillations and limitations of the Marxian model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly distancing himself from the apologetics more dominant than ever today, Marx drew attention to the ‘conservative character of the English revolution’. While, on the one hand, it marked ‘the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy’, and promoted the development of industry and the bourgeoisie,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the other, it gave impetus to a gigantic, ruthlessly implemented expropriation of peasants. Examined closely, the Glorious Revolution emerged as ‘a parliamentary coup d’état for [the] transformation of [communal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg319&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;property] into private property’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus encounter a formula that in a way evokes the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation I have stressed: the mention, albeit vague, of parliament’s decisive role in this event draws attention to the disappearance of the absolute monarchy, while making clear reference to the tragedy of the peasantry. Someone who distinguished himself in the ideological legitimation of the colossal expropriation and ruthless repression that struck its victims was Locke. This ‘most particular supporter of the lash for vagrants and paupers’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was in fact, at the same time, the ‘father’ of ‘free-thinking’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the protagonist of the great ideological battle that deconsecrated absolute monarchy and stripped it of its Christian and Biblical cover. And once again, as in the Glorious Revolution, so in the liberal philosopher in whom it found theoretical expression, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation reveals itself. Finally, Marx recalled that corresponding to the advent of constitutional monarchy in England was a further intensification of the dictatorship exercised by English property-owners over Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above any particular country, what should especially be borne in mind are the general considerations offered by &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;. With the disappearance of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, corresponding to the dissolution of the ‘political existence’ of property was its ‘more potent existence’, which could now unfold ‘the full scale of its own existence’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, as &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; put it: ‘The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the &#039;&#039;appearance&#039;&#039; of a universal content.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx brought out the entanglement of emancipation and dis-emancipation. The ‘more potent existence’ injected into property was also the autonomization of property in human cattle from the controls, albeit vague, of the Church and Crown, with the consequent crystallization of racial chattel slavery. And it was also the disappearance of the restrictions placed by the Crown on the expansion of the colonists, who could now proceed unhindered, without being in any way concerned with the terrible human costs inflicted on the Indians. In England, enclosure of common land was followed by the new law of 1834 which, abolishing any other form of assistance, confronted the poor with a brutal alternative: death from starvation or internment in a total institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg320&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are not dealing with an autonomization of property as such. What corresponded to the ‘more potent existence’ of the colonists’ property was the death-agony of another form of property. It was a gigantic process of expropriation (justified and theorized by Locke and de Tocqueville alike), which unfolded at the expense not only of colonial peoples—in America or Ireland—but also of English peasants. The same reasons that led me to regard the category of ‘proprietorial individualism’ as inadequate and misleading now prompt me to seek to clarify Marx’s analysis. The process we are examining was the autonomization of the property of those who already enjoyed recognition, of those who aspired to form themselves into the community or caste of freemen. Liberated from the fetters of control by Crown and Church was not only bourgeois property, but also traditional noble property. In the England that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, the landed aristocracy consolidated its enjoyment of certain privileges (hunting, for example) and consecrated its political power in representative bodies—in the first instance, the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Marx we can say that ‘[t]he political revolution is the revolution of civil society.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should be added that civil society can be hegemonized by the bourgeoisie or the landed aristocracy, or can be characterized by a compromise between these two classes. And the liberal revolution consists in this political revolution. Up to this point we can only subscribe to Marx’s analysis and admire it for its acuteness. But he continues by opposing the ‘political revolution’ to the ‘social revolution’, or ‘political emancipation’, which is the objective of the first, to ‘social emancipation’ (the end of class domination), which is the objective of the second. The limitation of this conceptual couplet is that it does not take account of the fact that for some social or ethnic groups the liberal revolution did not involve any kind of emancipation, but in fact meant the reverse. Is it really correct to define the United States of 1844 (the year &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; was published) as ‘the country of complete political emancipation’?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the reference is to the rapid disappearance of censitary discrimination, which continued to be marked in France under the July Monarchy, and in Britain. However, what induced this differential development in the case of the North American republic was the availability of land (taken from the Indians) and the confinement of a large part of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery. In other words, the property barrier proved much weaker because the race barrier was much more rigid. Differently put, in the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg321&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States democracy emerged first because it emerged as a &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy, as a ‘master-race democracy’, and this specific form proved so tenacious that it survived the Civil War by many decades. It is highly problematic to regard &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy as complete political emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we restrict the comparison to New World countries, some questions are indicated: Was political emancipation more advanced in the North American republic, which saw slavery flourish in these years and which a little earlier had extended that institution to the Texas taken from Mexico? Or was political emancipation more advanced precisely in Mexico and those Latin American countries that had abolished the institution of slavery some decades before? In these years US leaders and ideologues liked positively to contrast the ban on miscegenation imposed by them with the cross-breeding that was spreading in Latin America: Where was political emancipation more advanced?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot even unreservedly endorse Marx’s thesis that ‘&#039;&#039;[p]olitical&#039;&#039; emancipation is certainly a big step forward.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We already know that the most tragic chapter in the history of the Indians began with the American Revolution, and that the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution witnessed the emergence of a racial chattel slavery of unprecedented harshness. In the case of Britain, it was Marx himself who drew attention to the far from positive consequences of the ‘coup d’état’ of 1688–89 for English peasants and the Irish population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more debatable is the subsequent identification of political revolution with bourgeois revolution. The latter category is at once too narrow and too broad. As regards the first aspect, it is difficult to subsume under the category of bourgeois revolution the Glorious Revolution and the parliamentary revolt that preceded the upheavals that began in France in 1789, not to mention the struggles against monarchical absolutism, explicitly led by the liberal nobility, which developed in Switzerland and other countries. On the other hand, the category of bourgeois revolution is too broad: it subsumes both the American Revolution that sealed the advent of a racial state and the French Revolution and the San Domingo Revolution, which involved complete emancipation of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model proposed here is different. It equates ‘political revolution’ qua ‘revolution of civil society’, referred to by Marx, with the liberal revolution in the strict sense. Certainly, in order to be able to promote its emancipation from absolute power, civil society had to have achieved a certain level of development. Analysed in their initial phases, the revolutions that occurred in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg322&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Netherlands, England, America, France and Latin America were not very different from one another: they were all liberal revolutions. What clearly differentiated them were three factors: the varying configurations of civil society; the social, political and ideological conflicts that developed within it (one thinks in the French case of the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie); and the irruption in the struggle of servants and slaves. With the emergence of the last factor, the struggle for the emancipation of civil society waged by the property-owning classes became entangled with the struggle waged against them by those who did not want to be regarded as objects of property and who sought to secure recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The secessionist revolt of the slaveholding South also presented itself as a liberal revolution: it was a new struggle for self-government by civil society, like the one that had sanctioned the independence of the United States. Was the Confederacy a liberal country? If we regard the country born from the War of Independence against England and long led by slave-owners as liberal, it is hard to see why such recognition should be denied to the Confederacy. Yet, rather than at a conceptual level, the solution to the problem is to be sought at a historical level. At the point when the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ was imposed in the liberal world, an author like Fletcher, who also recommended slavery for white vagrants, ceased to be a liberal. Almost a century after its first turn, the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery as such was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the racial state largely survived. And once again the question arises: Was the United States, where discrimination and oppression raged against blacks and genocidal practices against Indians, a liberal country? The principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The racial state continued to exist for some decades in South Africa. However, although historically inspired by Britain in the area of self-government and representative bodies, and by the southern United States in that of race relations, it was henceforth regarded as alien to the liberal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn1a|1]] Max Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968, p.276.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn2a|2]] François Furet, &#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione&#039;&#039;, ed. Marina Valensise, Milan: Mondadori, 1995, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn3a|3]] A. J. P. Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History 1914–1945&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn4a|4]] John Gray, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn5a|5]] Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn7a|7]] Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 111.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn8a|8]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn9a|9]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins, Harvill, 1987, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn10a|10]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn11a|11]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 1, p. 331; vol. 2, pp. 306, 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn12a|12]] Nathan Rosenberg, quoted in Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn13a|13]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn14a|14]] Joel Brinkley, ‘US Court Strikes Down Sodomy Ban’, &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, 27 June 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn15a|15]] Huizinga, quoted in Hans-Christoph Schröder, &#039;&#039;Die Revolutionen Englands im 17. Jahrundert&#039;&#039;, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn16a|16]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 1, pp. 203–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn17a|17]] Giorgio Spini, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’età moderna&#039;&#039;, Turin: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 272, 276–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn18a|18]] Charles Tilly, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1993, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn20a|20]] Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 884.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn22a|22]] Barrington Moore Jr, &#039;&#039;The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy&#039;&#039;, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn23a|23]] Hill, &#039;&#039;Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn24a|24]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;The Strenuous Life&#039;&#039;, New York: Century, 1901, pp. 246–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn25a|25]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn26a|26]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 249, 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn27a|27]] Reginald C. Stuart, &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 167ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn28a|28]] Ronald Creagh, &#039;&#039;Nos cousins d’Amérique&#039;&#039;, Paris: Payot, 1988, pp. 248–9; Joseph Zitomersky, ‘Culture, classe ou État?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson and de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001, pp. 77–84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn29a|29]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn30a|30]] Wilcomb E. Washburn, &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn31a|31]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165, 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn32a|32]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;From Rebellion to Revolution&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn33a|33]] Bernard Bailyn &#039;&#039;et al., The Great Republic&#039;&#039;, Lexington (MA): D. C. Heath, 1977, p. 149.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn34a|34]] Bacon, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 1, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn35a|35]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 40–6, 146–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn37a|37]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 77.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn38a|38]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;The World the Slaveholders Made&#039;&#039;, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn39a|39]] Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn40a|40]] Shearer David Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn41a|41]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 873ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn42a|42]] Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn43a|43]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard, London: Sussex University Press and Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn44a|44]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn45a|45]] Joshua 6, 25; 10, 35 and 40; Genesis 19, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn46a|46]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn49a|49]] Ibid., p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., pp. 54–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn51a|51]] Louis-Sébastien Mercier, &#039;&#039;L’An deux mille quatre cent quarante&#039;&#039;, ed. Raymond Trousson, Bordeaux: Ducros, 1971, pp. 201–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn52a|52]] Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Christianisme et la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1984, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 137 (Quinet had already expressed himself to this effect in the subtitles to the eighth lecture).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn55a|55]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 69, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn56a|56]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn57a|57]] Leibniz, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, Norton: New York, 1998, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn58a|58]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 19, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn59a|59]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 15, pt 2, p. 54 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 13 May 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 199 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn61a|61]] Quoted in Ramsay Muir, ed., &#039;&#039;The Making of British India 1756–1858&#039;&#039;, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn62a|62]] Hugo, quoted in Nora Wang, Xin Ye and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savantes, 2003, pp. 9–10 (letter to Captain Butler, 25 November 1861).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn63a|63]] Walter Bagehot, ‘The Destruction in Paris of What the World Goes to See in Paris’, in &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman St John-Stevas, vol. 8, London: The Economist, 1974, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn64a|64]] Cf. Giorgio Borsa, &#039;&#039;La nascita del mondo modern in Asia orientale&#039;&#039;, Milan: Rizzoli, 1977, pp. 84, 89; Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn65a|65]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn66a|66]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 58 (letter to Henry Reeve, 12 April 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 254–6 (letter of 15 January 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 243–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 241.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 231 (letter of 7 July 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn72a|72]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn73a|73]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 13, p. 516; vol. 12, p. 552.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn74a|74]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 915.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75a|75]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 209–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76a|76]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 886.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77a|77]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 510–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80a|80]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82a|82]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 352.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83a|83]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER TEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The struggle for recognition and coups d’état: the conflict in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The catastrophic crisis that struck Europe and the whole planet with the outbreak of the First World War was already maturing within the liberal world. To account for it, we must take stock of the situation on the eve of 1914. Let us deal with the metropolis first. There is no doubt that the struggle for recognition had achieved important successes. True, we are still a long way from the universal assertion of the principle ‘one person, one vote’—and not only because women continued to be excluded from the enjoyment of political rights. More or less conspicuous traces of censitary discrimination still survived. But the fact remains that the vote was no longer the exclusive privilege of wealth. Also largely defeated was the attempt to reintroduce through the back window the censitary discrimination that had been shown the door, in the shape of plural votes to be granted to the more ‘intelligent’ (this was a solution entertained above all by John Stuart Mill!). Here and there the first elements of a social state began to emerge; and if this involved fairly modest results, we should bear in mind the legalization of workers’ coalitions and trade unions, determined to wrest much more substantial concessions. Even in this milieu, the long road travelled by the former instruments of labour leaps to the eye![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it must immediately be added that this was quite the reverse of a pacific development. Each of its stages was marked not only by intense struggles, but also by profound divisions in the liberal alliance. While one &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg324&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wing of it was open to concessions, the other proved intransigent and sought confrontation. Thus, we witness a succession of coups d’état which, prior to issuing in the establishment of an open dictatorship at any rate, could count on the support or sympathy of distinguished representatives of the liberal world. Availing itself of Sieyès’ active participation, Napoleon’s 18th Brumaire elicited the ‘enthusiasm’ of Madame de Staël, as emerges from the letter her father sent her a few days later: ‘You paint for me in lively colours the part you take in the power and glory of your hero’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Constant too viewed the turn with confidence. Thirty years later, he recalled having on its eve been in daily contact with Sieyès, ‘the true author of the 18th Brumaire’, or the ‘main motor’ of the novelty that was already foreshadowed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As early as 1795, Constant had made it clear that it was necessary to go beyond Thermidor: the taxation that continued to weigh on property for the benefit of the poor, who were now turning into ‘a privileged caste’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was excessive. In fact, according to various pieces of evidence (including Madame de Staël’s), the combined effect of famine and inflation was reducing ‘the last class of society to the most wretched condition’, visiting ‘unheard of ills’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on it, up to and including ‘starvation’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, for the liberalism of the time there was no doubt: the risks run by property legitimized the coup d’état. After the homage already noted to ‘conservative, liberal, tutelary ideas’, in the days immediately afterwards the new government hastened to abolish any trace of progressive taxation. On 24 December 1799, the same day Bonaparte became First Consul, Constant entered the Tribunate. But Madame de Staël harboured the idea of an even more ambitious political career for him, in the shadow of the one who (wrote Necker to his daughter at the end of 1800) promised to be ‘the protector of all respectable’ and well-off folk, finally liberated—such was Constant and Madame de Staël’s sigh of relief—from the threat of the ‘riffraff’ (&#039;&#039;populace&#039;&#039;).[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The significance of the initial hopes and subsequent disappointment in liberal circles was clarified by Guizot in 1869. Acquitting the task of ‘putting an end to anarchy’, Napoleon’s ‘dictatorship’ was ‘natural, urgent’—in fact, ‘beneficial and glorious’. However, contrary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg325&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to expectations, ‘this accidental, temporary regime’ transformed itself into ‘a dogmatic and permanent system of government’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A not dissimilar dialectic emerged after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, greeted with ‘indecent haste’ (the phrase is Marx’s) by liberal England.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not opportunism: once the beneficent ‘traditionary influences’ had disappeared, wrote Disraeli in 1851, what checked anarchy and dissolution was ‘the government of the sword’. Indeed, ‘the state quits the senate and takes refuge in the camp’; only thus was it possible to avoid the catastrophe of the domination of ‘secret societies’ and a ‘convention’ of the Jacobin variety.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of France, setting aside a figure like Granier de Cassagnac, who declared himself a ‘liberal’ and openly sided with Louis Napoleon,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it is worth dwelling on de Tocqueville’s participation in the various stages of the ideological and political reaction that ended up de-legitimizing and then overthrowing the Second Republic. In the French liberal’s view, it was the product of a revolution—that of February 1848—which had developed in a socialist and hence despotic spirit, and which had unfolded throughout continental Europe. In Germany and Italy, de Tocqueville desired and promoted ‘the victory of the princes’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]). But was his attitude towards France very different? As early as March, even before the working-class revolt of June, de Tocqueville thundered against ‘this ultra-democratic revolution, which has extended the right to vote beyond all the limits known even in America’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While the clouds that presaged the June storm were gathering, the French liberal expressed his opinion that ‘the National Guard and the army will be without pity this time’. In order to achieve the objective of maintaining or restoring order and destroying the ‘anarchical party’, one should not hesitate to recruit into the police unscrupulous types and rabble—‘outlaws’, ‘thieves’, ‘scoundrels’ and all the ‘rejects of society’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Evoked with precision here is the politico-social formula that subsequently presided over Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, which was successful thanks to the support not only of the property-owning classes and traditional state apparatuses, but also of a sub-proletariat happy to perform the function of gang intimidation entrusted to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg326&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;After the outbreak of the workers’ revolt, de Tocqueville was not only in favour of conferring emergency powers on Cavaignac, but recommended shooting on sight anyone caught ‘in a posture of defence’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The bloody repression of the June Days was not enough to assuage anxiety; and so we have the invocation of an ‘energetic and definitive reaction on behalf of order’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] required to put an end to revolutionary and anarchic chaos not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. In any event, ‘France is among those who will restore order’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and terminate the ‘follies of 1848’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More than a year after the desperate working-class revolt, when pitiless repression seemed to have averted the Jacobin and socialist peril for good, the French liberal believed that an iron fist was still required: it was necessary to proceed ‘as far as reaction’; ‘palliatives’ would not do; to sweep away not only the Mountain, but also ‘all the surrounding hills’, it was necessary ‘courageously to take the lead of all those who want to re-establish order, whatever their complexion’. There should be no hesitation even over ‘a heroic … remedy’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What is indirectly suggested is the need for emergency measures with the suspension of constitutional liberties. If as a historian he tirelessly condemned the Jacobin Terror, as a politician de Tocqueville had no hesitation invoking ‘terror’ for the purposes of suppressing ‘the demagogic party’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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In these years, every so often a shudder ran through the liberal self-consciousness: perhaps there was a risk of the ruthless methods used to subjugate barbarians in the colonies spreading in Europe. Although warmly applauding the pitiless energy with which the conquest of Algeria was conducted, de Tocqueville let slip a sort of exclamation: ‘God spare us ever seeing France led by an officer of the army of Africa’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, Cavaignac, having implemented the ‘new science’ called on to liquidate Arab resistance at any cost, was subsequently the author of the bloody, ruthless repression that struck the barbarians of the metropolis, the Parisian workers who rose up demanding the right to work and life. Notwithstanding the preceding admonition, however, de Tocqueville offered him constant, unwavering support.&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, starting with the Paris Commune, there spread throughout the liberal West a tendency to challenge not only the democratic concessions wrested by the popular masses, but also the rule of law itself. In the United States &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg327&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Theodore Roosevelt stated an expeditious method for putting down strikes and social conflicts: ‘The sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be suppressed … by taking ten or a dozen of their leaders out, standing … them against a wall, and shooting them dead.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These tendencies underwent further radicalization after the October Revolution. We can now fully understand the fascist coup d’état in Italy in 1922. Numerous figures who professed themselves liberals, and who in fact claimed to be restoring genuine liberalism, supported it for a more or less extended period of time. This was true of Luigi Einaudi, who saluted the return of ‘classical liberalism’. For a while Croce likewise viewed the attempt to return to ‘pure liberalism’, not to be confused with insensate ‘democratic liberalism’, with sympathy. Even in 1929, implicitly endorsing Mussolini’s condemnation of any ‘demo-liberal regime’, Antonio Salandra defined himself as an ‘old liberal of the right (without the demo)’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As we can see, a benevolent attitude towards the fascist coup d’état is not explicable solely by the severe social and political crisis of the time. Instead, at issue was cancelling, or more or less drastically reducing, the democratic concessions won from liberal society by the popular movement. While the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; still persisted, in 1909 Einaudi had branded progressive taxation a kind of ‘organized brigandage to steal money from others through the state’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Mussolini hastened to put an end to such ‘brigandage’, thereby eliciting applause from not a few liberals. In the preceding decades Pareto had, as a liberal, developed a sharp polemic against the ‘myth’ of the social state, had agreed with the positions of Spencer and Maine, and had adhered, still as a liberal, to the Liberty and Property Defence League.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1922–23 he breathed a sigh of relief at the coup d’état that finally averted threats, if not to liberty, in any event to property.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, von Mises seemed to be referring exclusively to the state of emergency when, in 1927, he pointed to fascist &#039;&#039;squadrismo&#039;&#039; as ‘an emergency makeshift’ adequate to the task of saving ‘European civilization’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, five &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg328&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years earlier, having distanced himself from the democratic and even socialist contaminations liberalism had undergone in England, he had thundered against the ‘destructionism’, the ‘destructionist policy’ and ‘terrorism’ of the trade unions with their strikes.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to Mussolini, all this had ceased in Italy. The fact remains that, in a book whose very title is devoted to the celebration of liberalism, we can read an emphatic eulogy of the coup d’état which, albeit with rough and ready methods, had saved civilization: ‘The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The struggle for recognition by colonial peoples and threats of secession&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While the struggle for recognition waged by the servants in the metropolis was constantly countered by the threat or implementation of a coup d’état, the more intransigent sectors of the liberal and bourgeois world reacted to the struggle for recognition waged by colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin with the threat or implementation of secession. This is a dialectic we have already analysed in relation to San Domingo in the late eighteenth century and the British West Indies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville observed that the colonists, in rejecting any abolitionist project, were denying the French parliament and government ‘the right to take this great work in hand and carry it through’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, in this context the most striking case was the secession of the South of the United States, which effected advancing liberal slogans in defence of the natural right to self-government and the peaceful enjoyment of property. The North’s military victory did not terminate the conflict. Supporters of white supremacy immediately reacted to the fleeting advent of multiracial democracy not only with the lynchings and anti-black terrorism unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan, but by resorting to guerrilla warfare and armed violence. In 1874 an appeal circulated in the South to found a White League to foil by any means attempts by Congress to make black emancipation effective: ‘our war [will be] interminable and merciless’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[a]s surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865 to 1877, with all the more bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#page329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#pg329&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This second stage in the Civil War ended in a substantial victory for the South. While slavery in the strict sense was not reintroduced, a regime of terroristic white supremacy was imposed. Although formally emancipated, the Afro-Americans now embarked on one of the most tragic phases in their history. It might even be said that their condition touched a ‘nadir’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, racist ‘dogmas’ and ‘racial fundamentalism’ reached their zenith.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A sequence of events with notable similarities to the American Civil War unfolded in Great Britain. Here what was at stake was the emancipation not of the blacks but of the Irish. The dominant class in Ulster reacted to the London government’s decision to introduce Home Rule for the island as had the southern US to the challenge of central power, even when democratically elected. It threatened and prepared secession, arming a militia tens of thousands strong. While the planters across the Atlantic could not tolerate the loss of the domination guaranteed to them by the possession of human cattle, the Protestant property-owners in Ireland rejected with horror the prospect of being governed at a local level by Catholic ragamuffins. In both cases the self-government demanded was the self-government that the descendants of the settlers were summoned to enjoy, and which sanctioned white supremacy or Anglo-Protestant supremacy. In both cases the secessionists proclaimed that they were the true inheritors of the American Revolution and the Glorious Revolution, respectively. And only the outbreak of the First World War blocked an impending war of secession in Britain: in Northern Ireland thousands of men armed to the hilt and organized militarily were ready to go into action.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The de-humanization of colonial peoples and ‘social cannibalism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First World War, unlike that waged by the servants in the metropolis, the struggle for recognition by colonial servants or servants of colonial origin could boast very few successes. In fact, the advances made by the former on the road of emancipation were often used to widen still further the gulf that separated the dominant ‘European race’ from the rest. In the late nineteenth century, while a sign was displayed at the entrance to some public parks in the southern United States reading ‘No Dogs and Niggers Allowed’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg330&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Shanghai the French concession defended its purity by clearly drawing attention to the notice ‘No Entry for Dogs and Chinese’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What made the comparison between colonial populations and domestic animals more credible was certain collective punishments, like that provided for by the British government in India in 1919:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he most degrading measure was a ‘crawling order’ imposed on all Indians who passed a narrow lane in the city where a medical missionary, Miss Sherwood, had been assaulted during the disturbances. The humiliation of crawling on all fours to and from one’s home, for many lived in this lane, was not to be forgotten or forgiven by those who were subjected to this indignity, or indeed, by any sensitive Indian.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was only in 1920, after the First World War and the October Revolution, that the chapter of history involving the coolies was definitively concluded, in the wake of a movement of anti-colonial struggle which no longer intended to tolerate ‘the blot of indentured labour’ imprinted by that institution on the whole Indian race.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that, having played a central role in black enslavement and the black slave trade, and then in the promotion of the semi-slavery of the coolies, the liberal West presented itself as the champion of the struggle against slavery. It was precisely with this watchword that it promoted colonial expansion. But this is how a missionary described the work the indigenous population was forced to perform in the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo:&lt;br /&gt;
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Each town and district is forced to bring in a certain quantity to the headquarters of the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; every Sunday. It is collected by force; the soldiers drive the people into the bush. If they will not go, they are shot down, and their left hands cut off and taken as trophies to the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; … these hands, the hands of men, women and children [are] placed in rows before the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039;.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The imposition of forced labour was sometimes bound up with genocidal practices, while on other occasions it gave way to them. In the late nineteenth century Theodore Roosevelt issued a general warning to ‘inferior races’: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg331&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should one of them attack the ‘superior’ race, the latter would be entitled to react with ‘a war of extermination’, destined ‘to put to death man, woman and child, exactly as if they were crusaders’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, there were races whose disappearance was desired regardless of their actual behaviour. Franklin greeted as a providential design the slaughter that the rum diffused by the conquerors was wreaking among the Indians. However, according to the charge formulated by loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada, the rebel colonists proceeded directly to the annihilation of entire ethnic groups (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]). In 1851, while the hunt for individual Indians was raging, the governor of California pronounced judgement:&lt;br /&gt;
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That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the two races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected; while we cannot anticipate this result with but painful regret, the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power and wisdom of man to avert.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The programme set out by General Sherman was unambiguous: ‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of the case.’ In the course of his two expeditions against the Cheyenne and the Arapaho, a colonel ordered that even the new-born should be killed and scalped: ‘Nits make lice!’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this would not seem to have particularly disturbed Theodore Roosevelt: ‘I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians. But I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that this sinister ideology, in its variations and different gradations, caught on exclusively in the United States, where, for obvious historical reasons, the racial question was more acutely felt. Let us take a look at Europe. Lord Acton coldly observed: ‘The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There were races, Disraeli in turn believed, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg332&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;experienced ‘exterminat[ion] without persecution, by that irresistible law of Nature which is fatal to curs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, this was not a completely spontaneous process, as Disraeli ended up acknowledging, when he mentioned the tragic end of the ‘Aztecs’, ‘overthrown by Cortez and a handful of Goths’, in accordance with ‘the inexorable law of nature’ that sanctioned the complete victory of ‘a superior race’ and the irrevocable defeat of ‘an inferior’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicit was Burckhardt, for whom the ‘erasure or enslavement of the weakest races’ seemed to pertain to the ‘great economy of world history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Renan, an author who liked to situate himself among the ‘enlightened liberals’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and who was appreciated by Hayek for his ‘important’ contribution to this intellectual tradition),[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] reached the same conclusion: the ‘semi-savage races’ were destined to be subjugated or exterminated by the ‘great Aryan-Semitic family’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not even the greatest figures in the liberal tradition succeeded in mounting effective resistance to this view. This applies to de Tocqueville who, while he drew a decidedly repugnant picture of the Aborigines, was a passionate cantor of the motif of the ‘empty cradle’—that is, of the deadly genealogical myth dear to colonists. And, to a lesser extent, it applies to Mill. His discourse could hardly arouse a strongly sympathetic interest in the victims. The Indians seemed to belong to the ‘community’ whose state, ‘in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’. In any event, ‘[n]othing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention is made here of the fated disappearance, still less of the destruction, of the Indians; instead, a temporary pedagogical dictatorship is theorized. However, as emerges from the stance of another distinguished exponent of English liberalism, on the occasion of bitter conflicts the dictatorship over barbarians, having been pedagogical, risked turning exterminatory. After the rebellion that challenged the British Empire in India, Macaulay wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg333&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the Nation to a degree unprecedented within my memory. Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and societies for the reformation of criminals are silent. There is one terrible cry to revenge … The almost universal feeling is that not a single Sepoy within the walls of Delhi should be spared, and I own that is a feeling with which I cannot help sympathizing.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Expressing genuine dissent were unexpected representatives of the liberal tradition or figures who moved on its margins. While he interpreted the social conflict in the metropolis in a social-Darwinist register, Spencer protested against ‘the barbarous maxim’ that the strongest ‘have a lawful right to whatever territories they can conquer’. What followed the expropriation of the defeated was in fact their ‘extermination’. Paying the price were not only the ‘North American Indians’ and the ‘natives of Australia’; in India ‘whole regiments of [natives] have been put to death, for daring to disobey the tyrannical commands of their oppressors’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unfortunately, ‘we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker’; it could now indeed be said that ‘the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, Spencer pointed an accusing finger at the state ‘system of colonisation’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] at the statism that was now expanding at every level—as if this statism had not accompanied the history of the liberal West from the outset, and as if the terrible practices denounced by Spencer had not often actually been promoted in the name of the self-government and free disposal of property, and had not taken the form (to use Hobson’s phrase) of ‘private slaughter’! (See above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The ‘final and complete solution’ of the Indian and black questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely Hobson (an author close to the liberal circles branded ‘socialist’ by von Mises and Hayek) who effectively summed up the attitude to barbarians adopted by the West, and in the first instance the liberal West, which was in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg334&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the forefront of colonial expansion in the Far West and overseas. The populations that were susceptible to ‘profitable exploitation by the superior white settlers’ survived, while the rest ‘tend[ed] to disappear’ or be destroyed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, from the late nineteenth century the theme of the inevitable disappearance of savages and peoples who could not be used as forced labour became an obsession. Articulating it were often authors who at the same time saluted the triumph of liberal institutions and ideas in the civilized world. In 1885 a book by a Protestant minister, Josiah Strong, enjoyed extraordinary success. His celebration of ‘liberty’, of ‘self-government’, of ‘the right of the individual to himself’, was passionate.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He frequently appealed to Burke, de Tocqueville, Guizot, Macaulay and Spencer. Strong and emphatic was his assertion of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon world, which had the merit of quintessentially embodying both ‘love of liberty’ and a ‘genius for colonizing’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] that expanded the zone of freedom. But this expansion also entailed the inexorable ‘extinction of inferior races’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albert J. Beveridge, a Republican senator and prominent US political figure, argued in similar fashion at the start of the twentieth century. The homage paid to the ‘gospel of liberty’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the sons of liberty and, in particular, the United States as the country and people that were ‘leading the world to liberty’ went hand in hand with the assertion that ‘a part of the Almighty’s infinite plan [was] the disappearance of debased civilisations and decaying races before the higher civilisation of the nobler and more virile types of man’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A watchword even emerged that was to assume an unambiguously genocidal meaning in the twentieth century and know tragic success. While Strong invoked ‘God’s final and complete solution of the dark problem of heathenism among many inferior peoples’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in 1913 a book published in Boston evoked the ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘negro problem’ in its title. Even in this instance, it did not involve an author foreign to the liberal world, and not only because he lived and worked in the United States, advancing ideas diffused and echoed even by influential political figures of the time. Far from regretting the ‘abhorrent practice’ of slavery, he identified with the ‘comparatively few liberal and enlightened men’ or ‘liberal intellects’ who had wanted to abolish it when deliberating the ‘splendid instrument’ that was the Constitution of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg335&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United States, ‘the guiding star of the greatest temporal power in history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nevertheless, in the land of liberty there was no room for races intellectually incapable of participating in the superior ‘Caucasic civilization and culture’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reaching this conclusion, the author knew that he was situated in the wake of Franklin and Jefferson. Happily, nature and the law of the ‘survival of the fittest’ were already acting on their behalf: Afro-Americans were being wiped out by tuberculosis, pneumonia, venereal disease and other illnesses that confirmed the natural inferiority of this people. ‘[F]ew Negro children are born without scrofulous tendencies, rickets, blindness, or other transmitted evidence of ancestral infection’. The ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘Negro problem’ was in sight, and it would be a happy repeat of the already accomplished final solution of the Amerindian question.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the words of a southern senator who was on the same wavelength, ‘God’s law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, and the extinction of the unfit is operating’, and would bring about ‘a gradual whitening of the South’ and the United States as a whole[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the touch of white already dreamt of by Franklin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the Indians had largely been wiped off the face of the earth. In 1876, to celebrate its centenary as an independent country, the United States organized an exhibition in Philadelphia that drew the world’s attention to its extraordinary development. Along with marvels of industry and technology, sideshows exhibited ‘wild children from Borneo, a five-legged horse, and wax figures of famous Indian chiefs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In summer 1911, in a remote part of California, an Indian was discovered who could not communicate in English or Spanish. Ethnological experts subsequently verified that he was a survivor of the Yahi tribe, largely exterminated over the course of a generation. The unknown, who refused to give his name or recount the history of his destroyed family, was put in a museum, where he became an object of much amused curiosity on the part of adults and children, all the more so in that the local press drew attention to the ‘last aborigine’, the ‘wild man of California’, a ‘genuine survivor of Stone Age barbarism’. After his death, his brain was conveniently preserved for further study.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A great philosopher, Edmund Husserl, who was certainly liberal and democratic in orientation, observed twenty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg336&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years later, alas without any critical accent, that totally foreign to Europe and the West, the Indians (or rather the surviving ones) ‘are exhibited in fairground booths’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. From the nineteenth to the twentieth century&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the years leading up to the outbreak of the second Thirty Years’ War, we witness the accumulation of a mass of explosive material. At the end of the nineteenth century, corresponding to the formation of the Liberty and Property Defence League in England was the formation of the White Leagues (and the Ku Klux Klan) in the United States. At stake was halting or reversing the two struggles for recognition with which we are familiar. Across the Atlantic the restoration of white supremacy registered its triumph as early as 1877; in Europe the Liberty and Property Defence League would have to wait until 1922 to record its first victory, in Italy. The persistent unrest of servants or ex-servants in the metropolis, and of slaves or ex-slaves in the colonies or of colonial origin, and the increasing aggressiveness of the social and political circles that felt threatened by these two agitations, were compounded by contradictions within the community of the free and of Teutonic stock (previously celebrated in its entirety as the chosen people or race of liberty), which now tended to assume an antagonistic form. Moreover, these multiple conflicts were further exacerbated by an ideological climate marked by the assertion of trends—social Darwinism, a racial interpretation of history and conspiracy theory—present from the outset in the liberal tradition, but which now met with ever weaker resistance, rendering a rational understanding and limitation of the conflict impossible. Not by chance have we heard two deadly slogans echo: the first declared that ‘race is everything’; the second invoked the ‘ultimate solution’, or the ‘final and complete solution’, of the racial question!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The degree of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not escaped a whole series of scholars who cannot be suspected of preconceived hostility to the liberal world. While she generously overlooked the North American republic (which had had the merit of offering her refuge), Hannah Arendt explained the genesis of twentieth-century totalitarianism commencing with the colonies of the British Empire. It was here that ‘a new form of government’, ‘a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg337&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arbitrariness’ saw the light of day,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and where the temptation of ‘administrative massacres’ as an instrument for maintaining domination began to emerge.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But especially interesting in this context is the fact that not a few US scholars, in order to explain the history of their country, have turned to the category of ‘master-race democracy’ or &#039;&#039;‘Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’, in an eloquent linguistic admixture of English and German, and a German that in several respects refers to the history of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only the concentration-camp universe as a whole, but also the individual total institutions of the twentieth century, began to take shape well before the end of the supposed &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039;. We may begin with deportation. The successive bloody deportations of Indians, starting with the one implemented by Jackson’s America (held up as a model of democracy by de Tocqueville), recall the ‘horrors created by the Nazi handling of subject peoples’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Indians were not the only victims of this practice. The slave trade represented ‘the largest involuntary movement of human beings in all history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The deportees were subsequently forced to work in a slave plantation that bore some similarities to the concentration camp.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison does not seem exaggerated. Precisely in this context the process of de-humanization reached levels that were difficult to match. In Jamaica, in the liberal British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, we find a type of punishment at work that speaks volumes: ‘a slave was forced to defecate into the offending slave’s mouth, which was then wired shut for four or five hours’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even his completely innocent fellow slaves were forced to participate in the de-humanization of the victim and, with him, of the ethnic group. Should all this not seem sufficiently cruel, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, white supremacy was imposed in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notices of lynchings were printed in local papers, and extra cars added to trains for spectators from miles around, sometimes thousands of them. Schoolchildren might get a day off school to attend the lynching.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg338&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The spectacle could include castration, skinning, roasting, hanging, and shooting. Souvenirs for purchasers might include fingers, toes, teeth and bones, even genitals of the victim, as well as picture postcards of the event.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again we encounter a process of de-humanization difficult to emulate.&lt;br /&gt;
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First in the North and then, after the Civil War, in the South, notionally ‘free’ blacks suffered humiliation and persecution of every kind. In fact, stresses a historian in language that once again demands our attention, they became the target of veritable ‘pogroms’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carrying them out were gangs already active in the North in the 1820s and 1830s and which later, in the South, achieved consummate form in the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that seems to anticipate the ‘Blackshirts’ of Italian fascism and the ‘Brownshirts’ of German Nazism.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No less brutal than extra-legal violence was official justice: in the South blacks continued to be subject to a prison system so sadistic that it calls to mind ‘the prison camps of Nazi Germany’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, the two situations were united by the violence of racist ideology. Theodore Roosevelt can calmly be approximated to Hitler.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over and above individual figures, we must not lose sight of the general picture: ‘The effort to guarantee “race purity” in the American South anticipated aspects of the official Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.’ If we bear in mind the rule whereby a single drop of impure blood was enough for someone to be excluded from the white community in the South of the United States, a conclusion dictates itself: ‘the Nazi definition of a Jew was never as stringent as “the one-drop rule” that prevailed in the categorization of Negroes in the race-purity laws of the American South.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, two US scholars have recently referred to the ‘Nazi Connection’, or the ‘American legacy’ present in Nazism, to explain the parabola of eugenics, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg339&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘science’ born in liberal England and massively diffused in the other classic country of that intellectual tradition, which experienced its greatest triumphs in the Third Reich![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this connection we in fact encounter a paradox. Having disappeared together with Hitler’s Germany, eugenic measures continued to survive for some time in the United States. Let us observe the situation in 1952: ‘At the present time some thirty states in the Union legally forbid “interracial marriage.” In almost all these states miscegenation is a felony; in many a crime.’ Regarded as elements of contamination were not only ‘Negroes’ but also, in this or that state, ‘Mulattoes’, ‘Indians’, ‘Mongolians’, Koreans, ‘members of the Malay race’, Chinese, or ‘[any] person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation inclusive’, or even anyone ‘having one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood’, or even someone with ‘one-fourth or more’ ‘Kanak [Hawaiian] blood’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Reporting these facts is a US scholar who feels obliged to draw a bitter conclusion in respect of ‘racism’ (and Nazism): ‘The monster that has been let loose upon the world is to a large extent of our own making, and whether we are willing to face the fact or not we are, all of us, individually and collectively, responsible for the ghastly form which he has assumed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, genocide. An eminent scholar, Tzvetan Todorov, has defined the destruction of the Indians, whose final chapter was written in the English colonies in America and then in the United States, as ‘the greatest genocide in human history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the tragedy of the natives in America, Australia or the British colonies in general, other authors have referred, respectively, to the ‘American holocaust’ (or the ‘final solution’ of the Amerindian question), the ‘Australian holocaust’ and ‘late Victorian holocausts’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not to mention the ‘black holocaust’—the deportation and enslavement of the survivors, who numbered one in three or four—that Afro-Americans seek to draw attention to, and whose main protagonist was the liberal world. Finally, branded as the author of a tragedy to be regarded as the prototype of twentieth-century genocides, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg340&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principal official (Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan) of the British policy that led to the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Irish in the mid-nineteenth century has sometimes been defined as the ‘proto-Eichmann’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not the place to proceed to a comparative history of massacres, decimations and genocides, or to discuss the pertinence of the categories employed to describe them. But one point seems to me to be settled: it is banally ideological to characterize the catastrophe of the twentieth century as a kind of new barbarian invasion that unexpectedly attacked and overwhelmed a healthy, happy society. The horror of the twentieth century casts a shadow over the liberal world even if we ignore the fate reserved for peoples of colonial origin. ‘Totalitarian society’: thus has been defined the one that swallowed up deportees from Britain in Australia.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, with particular reference to the ‘development of industrial capitalism’ in England, it has been claimed that ‘the gulag is not a twentieth-century invention’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The usual hagiography proves unfounded even when, in reconstructing the liberal world, we restrict ourselves to analysing the metropolis and the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take an author celebrated by de Tocqueville as the apex of the liberal tradition. Jefferson raised the spectre of genocide in three very different contexts. He referred to ‘extermination’ in connection with the Indians as a process that was underway in the United States, could not be stopped, and was in fact to be attributed exclusively to the British. He pointed to the ‘extermination’ of the blacks as the inevitable outcome of the utopia of constructing a multiracial society. Finally, he experienced the clash with Britain as a total war, destined to issue in the ‘extermination’ of one of the contending parties (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]; [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|§14]]; and [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). As we can see, even a conflict completely internal to the community of the free provoked an ideological violence that might well bring to mind the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. After the catastrophe and beyond hagiography: the enduring legacy of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The horror of the twentieth century was not something that burst into a world of peaceful coexistence suddenly and from without. At the same time, being dissatisfied with the edifying picture of the habitual hagiography and situating oneself on the firm ground of reality, with its contradictions and conflicts, does &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg341&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not in any way mean denying the merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination. But we certainly must bid farewell once and for all to the myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Meanwhile, the presupposition of that discourse turns out to be wholly imaginary: the community of the free asserted itself demanding both negative and positive liberty, while excluding populations of colonial origin and metropolitan semi-slaves and servants from both. In addition, I would like to adduce a series of reasons, which I shall set out in ascending order of importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, it should not be forgotten that not only did the classics of the liberal tradition refer to democracy with coldness, hostility and sometimes frank contempt, but regarded its advent as an unlawful, intolerable rupture of the social contract and hence as a legitimate cause for the ‘appeal to Heaven’ (in Locke’s words) or to arms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the exclusion clauses were not overcome painlessly, but through violent upheavals of a sometimes quite unprecedented violence. The abolition of slavery in the wake of the Civil War cost the United States more victims than both world wars combined. As for censitary discrimination, a decisive contribution was made to its abolition by the French revolutionary cycle. Finally, in major countries like Russia, Germany and the United States the accession of women to political rights had behind it the war and revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, in addition to not being painless, the historical process that resulted in the advent of democracy was quite the reverse of unilinear. Emancipation—that is, the acquisition of rights previously not recognized or enjoyed—might well be followed by dis-emancipation—that is, deprivation of the rights whose recognition and enjoyment the excluded had won. Asserted in France in the wake of the February 1848 revolution, universal (male) suffrage was abolished two years later by the liberal bourgeoisie and was shortly afterwards reintroduced not as a result of the maturation of liberalism, but by the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon, who used it to stage the ritual of plebiscitary acclamation. In this context the most striking example is provided by the United States. The end of the Civil War inaugurated the happiest phase in the history of Afro-Americans, who now won civil and political rights and began to participate in representative bodies. But this was a kind of brief interlude in the tragedy. The 1877 compromise between the whites of the North and South involved the loss of political and, often, civil rights for blacks, as is attested by the regime of racial segregation and the savage violence of pogroms and lynching. This phase &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg342&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of dis-emancipation, which developed in a society that continued to define itself as liberal, lasted almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is then a fourth reason. The process of emancipation very often had a spur completely external to the liberal world. The abolition of slavery in British colonies cannot be understood without the black revolution in San Domingo, which was viewed with horror, and often combated, by the liberal world as a whole. Around thirty years afterwards, the institution of slavery had been abolished even in the United States. But we know that the most ardent abolitionists were accused by their opponents of being influenced or infected by French and Jacobin ideas. The brief experience of multiracial democracy was followed a long phase of dis-emancipation marked by a terroristic white supremacy. When was the turning point? In December 1952 the US Justice Secretary sent the Supreme Court, which was engaged in deliberating on the issue of integration in public schools, an eloquent letter: ‘Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.’ Washington, observes the American historian who has reconstructed this story, ran the risk of alienating the ‘colored races’ not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States. Even there communist propaganda met with considerable success in its attempt to win blacks to the ‘revolutionary cause’, making them lose ‘faith in American institutions’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On close examination, first slavery and then the terrorist regime of white supremacy were thrown into crisis by the San Domingo revolt and the October Revolution, respectively. The implementation of an essential principle, if not of liberalism then of liberal democracy (in the usual sense of the term), is inconceivable without the decisive contribution of two of the chapters of history most hated by the liberal culture of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fifth and final reason is the most important. I refer to the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that distinguishes the individual stages in the process of overcoming the exclusion clauses characteristic of the liberal tradition. In the United States the disappearance of censitary discrimination, and affirmation of the principle of political equality, were aided by the quantitative containment and political and social neutralization of the ‘dangerous classes’, thanks to the expropriation and deportation of Indians—which for a long time made it possible to enlarge the class of landowners—and the enslavement of blacks. In Europe extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg343&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;century proceeded in tandem with colonial expansion and the imposition of forced labour on peoples or ‘races’ deemed barbarous or childlike. This tangle sometimes presented itself in a decidedly tragic form. Subject to humiliation, discrimination and persecution of every kind in the South, Afro-Americans sought to win recognition by participating in the front line in the Union’s wars. And so in some circles homage began to be paid to the courage displayed by soldiers of colour in the Battle of Wounded Knee.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, blacks’ hopes for emancipation took the form—were obliged to take the form—of their active participation in destroying Indians!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is precisely from such historical reconstruction, remote from any apologetic, edifying tones, that the genuine merits and real strong points of liberalism emerge. Demonstrating an extraordinary flexibility, it constantly sought to react and rise to the challenges of the time. It is true that, far from being spontaneous and painless, such transformation was largely imposed from without, by political and social movements with which liberalism has repeatedly and fiercely clashed. But precisely in this resides its flexibility. Liberalism has proved capable of learning from its antagonist (the tradition of thinking that, starting with ‘radicalism’ and passing through Marx, issued in the revolutions which variously invoked him) to a far greater extent than its antagonist has proved capable of learning from it. Above all, the antagonist has proved incapable of learning what constitutes the second major strong point of liberalism. Certainly, liberalism’s learning process was quite the reverse of smooth, at least for those who wanted to overcome the exclusion clauses that run deep in this intellectual tradition. None has been as committed as it to thinking through the decisive problem of the limitation of power. However, historically, this limitation of power went hand in hand with the delimitation of a restricted sacred space: nurturing a proud, exclusivist self-consciousness, the community of the freemen inhabiting it was led to regard enslavement, or more or less explicit subjection, imposed on the great mass dispersed throughout the profane space, as legitimate. Sometimes they even arrived at decimation or annihilation. Has this dialectic on the basis of which liberalism was transformed into an ideology of domination, and even an ideology of war, wholly disappeared?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In economics, clearly distancing itself from an insipid ideology of social harmony miraculously lacking any element of contradiction, conflict and tension, liberal thought has vigorously insisted on the need for competition between individuals in the market, in order to develop social wealth and the productive forces. This is a further, major historical merit to be acknowledged. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg344&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, at this level, too, there emerged the awful exclusion clauses we are already familiar with. Far from being a site where all individuals freely meet as sellers and buyers of commodities, for centuries the liberal market was a site of exclusion, de-humanization and even terror. In the past the ancestors of today’s black citizens were commodities, not autonomous buyers and sellers. And for centuries the market functioned as an instrument of terror: even more than the lash, what imposed total obedience on the slave was the threat of being sold, like a commodity exchanged on the market, separately from other family members.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a long time indentured white servants were also bought and sold on the market, and thus condemned to a fate not very different from that of black slaves. And in the name of the market, workers’ coalitions were repressed and economic and social rights ignored and denied, with a consequent commodification of essential aspects of the human personality and human dignity (health, education, and so on). In extreme cases the superstitious cult of the Market sealed huge tragedies, like the one which in 1847 saw Britain condemn an enormous mass of actual (Irish) individuals to death from starvation. Is all this a definitively concluded chapter of history? Moreover, has liberalism definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, with the dangers of regression and restoration implicit in it? Or is this dialectic still alive and well, thanks to the malleability peculiar to this current of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet however difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task. On the other hand, liberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it. If one starts out from such a presupposition, the tragedy of peoples subjected to slavery or semi-slavery, or deported, decimated and destroyed, becomes utterly inexplicable. This was a tragedy which, far from being impeded or prevented by the liberal world, developed in close connection with it. Unfounded on a historiographical level, the habitual hagiography is also an insult to the memory of the victims. Only in opposition to the pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a ‘counter-history’: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn1a|1]] On all this, cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §7 (on the plural vote) and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn2a|2]] Necker, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant et Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn3a|3]] Constant, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 ibid., p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn4a|4]] Constant, quoted in ibid., pp. 76–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn5a|5]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, p. 347.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn6a|6]] According to the testimony of J. Mallet du Pan, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn7a|7]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël&#039;&#039;, pp. 8–19 and &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 29, 63n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn8a|8]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn9a|9]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 17, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn10a|10]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 554–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn11a|11]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, §1; ch. 3, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, (1951–), vol. 6, pt 2, p. 108 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn13a|13]] This emerges from a conversation of 25 May 1848 reported by Nassau William Senior: cf. ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 176.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 52 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 31 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn17a|17]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 143 (letter to Francis Lieber, 4 August 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 53 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn20a|20]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;La Seconda Repubblica&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, ch. 2, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn22a|22]] Einaudi, quoted in Paolo Favilli, &#039;&#039;Riformismo e sindicalismo&#039;&#039;, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1984, pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn23a|23]] See, especially, Vilfedo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et idéologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1966, pp. 224–5; Thomas Mackay, Introduction to George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. vii, xii (on Pareto’s adhesion to the League).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn24a|24]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn25a|25]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Die Gemeinwirtschaft&#039;&#039;, Jena: Fischer, 1922, pp. 469ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn26a|26]] Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn27a|27]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn28a|28]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 3, p. 43–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn29a|29]] John Hope Franklin, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 328.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn30a|30]] Rayford W. Logan, &#039;&#039;The Betrayal of the Negro&#039;&#039;, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, p. xxi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn31a|31]] Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 13, 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn32a|32]] Cf. Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Brittanica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 3, pp. 179–85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn34a|34]] Office d’Information, &#039;&#039;Les droits de l’homme en Chine&#039;&#039;, Beijing, 1991, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn35a|35]] Michael Brecher, &#039;&#039;Nehru&#039;&#039;, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn36a|36]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 364.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn37a|37]] Colm Tóibín, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May 2004, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn38a|38]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;Letters&#039;&#039;, ed. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum, 8 vols, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1951–54, vol. 1, p. 377 (letter to Charles Henry Pearson, 11 May 1894).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn39a|39]] Reginald Horsman, &#039;&#039;Race and Manifest Destiny&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn40a|40]] Dee Brown, &#039;&#039;Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee&#039;&#039;, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn41a|41]] Roosevelt, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn42a|42]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn43a|43]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn44a|44]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn45a|45]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn46a|46]] Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–, vol. 1, p. 443.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn47a|47]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 435 n. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn48a|48]] Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 585.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn49a|49]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 197, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn50a|50]] Macaulay, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn51a|51]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn52a|52]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 410 (letter to Moncure D. Conway, 17 July 1898).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn53a|53]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn54a|54]] J.A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1963, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., pp. 200, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn58a|58]] Albert J. Beveridge, &#039;&#039;The Meaning of the Times&#039;&#039;, Freeport (NY): Books for Libraries Press, 1968, pp. 50, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn60a|60]] Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn61a|61]] Edward Eggleston, &#039;&#039;The Ultimate Solution of the American Negro Problem&#039;&#039;, New York: AMS Press, 1973, pp. 133–5, 141–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., pp. 183–5, 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn64a|64]] John Sharp Williams, quoted in George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn65a|65]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn66a|66]] Clifford Geertz, ‘Morality Tale’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 7 October 2004, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn68a|68]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 186, 212–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., pp. 131, 133–4, 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn70a|70]] Thus William T. Hagan, quoted in agreement by Laurence M. Hauptman, &#039;&#039;Between Two Fires&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn71a|71]] Davis, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November 2004, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn72a|72]] Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn73a|73]] Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn74a|74]] C. Vann Woodward, ‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February 1998, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn75a|75]] Richard Maxwell Brown, &#039;&#039;Strain of Violence&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn76a|76]] Nancy MacLean, &#039;&#039;Behind the Mask of Chivalry&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn77a|77]] Fletcher M. Green, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn78a|78]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 13; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, p. xiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn79a|79]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;Racism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 2, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn80a|80]] Stefan Kühl, &#039;&#039;The Nazi Connection&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Edwin Black, &#039;&#039;War against the Weak&#039;&#039;, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003, pp. 385–409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn81a|81]] Ashley Montagu, &#039;&#039;Man’s Most Dangerous Myth&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966, pp. 302ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 265.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn83a|83]] Tzvetan Todorov, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn84a|84]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Philippe Jacquin, &#039;&#039;Storia degli indiani d’America&#039;&#039;, trans. Franco Moccia, Milan: Mondadori, 1976; Thomas Schmid, ‘Australiens Holocaust’, &#039;&#039;Die Zeit&#039;&#039;, 31 May 2000; Mike Davis, &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn85a|85]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalism al ‘comunismo critico’&#039;&#039;, Rome: Gamberetti, 1997, ch. 5, §§10, 13; Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, pp. 317–18 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn86a|86]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn87a|87]] Robert Castel, &#039;&#039;Les métamorphoses de la question sociale&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88a|88]] C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 131–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89a|89]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90a|90]] Walter Johnson, &#039;&#039;Soul by Soul&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 19, 22–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Sullivan, Eileen P., ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, transl. Stuart Gilbert, introd. Hugh Brogan, London: Fontana, 1966 [1856].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, introd. Alan Ryan, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994 [1835–40].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——&#039;&#039;‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886 [1861].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Politik. Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp;amp; Co., 1945.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, transl. and introd. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992 [1759].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, transl. Ernest Dilworth, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003 [1734].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Weber, Max, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften. Studiensausgabe&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968 [1917].&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Williams, Eric E., &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492–1969&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972 [1964].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990 [1942].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Williamson, Joel, &#039;&#039;New People: Miscegenation and Mulattos in the United States&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Woodward, C. Vann, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, 2nd edn, New York: OUP, 1966 [1955].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——&#039;&#039;‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February, 1998.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zilversmit, Arthur, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North&#039;&#039;, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969 [1967].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zimmer, Anne Y., &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher, Loyalist in Exile&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zitomersky, Joseph, ‘Culture, classe ou État? Comment interpréter les relations raciales dans la Grande Louisiane française avant et après 1803?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson et de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zuckerman, Michael, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People: Oblique Biographies in the American Grain&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Domenico Losurdo]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about Liberalism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59299</id>
		<title>Library:Liberalism: A Counter-History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59299"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:46:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added source&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;Contents&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Library work|title=Liberalism: a counter-history|author=Domenico Losurdo|publisher=Verso Books|published_date=2014|type=Book|isbn=978-1-78168-166-4|source=http://library.lol/main/64e8f86a9a8046e29fd73af3ab6e46a2}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html|&#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html|1 What Is Liberalism?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html|2 Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html|3 White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html|4 Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html|5 The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism Either Side of the Atlantic]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html|6 The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html|7 The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html|8 Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html|9 Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html|10 Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0015.html|&#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pagevii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgvii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How does this book differ from existing histories of liberalism, which continue to appear in growing numbers? Does it really succeed in making the innovation promised by the title? Once they have finished it, readers will be able to give their own answer. For now, the author can limit himself to a statement of intent. In formulating it, a great example can aid us. About to embark on the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France, de Tocqueville observed of studies of the eighteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e imagine we know all about the French social order of that time, for the good reason that its surface glitter holds our gaze and we are familiar not only with the life stories of its outstanding figures but also, thanks to the many brilliant critical studies now available, with the works of the great writers who adorned that age. But we have only vague, often quite wrong conceptions of the manner in which public business was transacted and institutions functioned; of the exact relations between the various classes in the social hierarchy; of the situation and sentiments of that section of the population which as yet could neither make itself heard nor seen; and, by the same token, of the ideas and mores basic to the social structure of eighteenth-century France.[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason not to apply the methodology so brilliantly indicated by de Tocqueville to the movement and society of which he was an integral and influential part. Solely because he intends to draw attention to aspects that he believes have hitherto been largely and unjustly ignored, the author refers in the book’s title to a ‘counter-history’. Otherwise, it is a history, whose subject-matter alone remains to be specified: not liberal thought in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pageviii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgviii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;concrete reality. As with any other major historical movement, this involves investigating the conceptual developments, but also—and primarily—the political and social relations it found expression in, as well as the more or less contradictory link that was established between these two dimensions of social reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, in commencing the investigation, we are forced to pose a preliminary question concerning the subject whose history we intend to reconstruct: What is liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1a|1]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg1&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;What Is Liberalism?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. A series of embarrassing questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The usual answer to this question admits of no doubt: liberalism is the tradition of thought whose central concern is the liberty of the individual, which is ignored or ridden roughshod over by organicist philosophies of various kinds. But if that is the case, how should we situate John C. Calhoun? This eminent statesman, vice president of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, burst into an impassioned ode to individual liberty, which, appealing to Locke, he vigorously defended against any abuse of power and any unwarranted interference by the state. And that is not all. Along with ‘absolute governments’ and the ‘concentration of power’, he unstintingly criticized and condemned fanaticism[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the spirit of ‘crusade’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] to which he opposed ‘compromise’ as the guiding principle of genuine ‘constitutional governments’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With equal eloquence Calhoun defended minority rights. It was not only a question of guaranteeing the alternation of the various parties in government through suffrage: unduly extensive power was unacceptable in any event, even if limited in duration and tempered by the promise or prospect of a periodic reversal of roles in the relationship between governors and governed.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unquestionably, we seem to have all the characteristics of the most mature and attractive liberal thought. On the other hand, however, disdaining the half-measures and timidity or fear of those who restricted themselves to accepting it as a necessary ‘evil’, Calhoun declared slavery to be ‘a positive good’ that civilization could not possibly renounce. Calhoun repeatedly denounced intolerance and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg2&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crusading spirit, not in order to challenge the enslavement of blacks or the ruthless hunting down of fugitive slaves, but exclusively to brand abolitionists as ‘blind fanatics’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who ‘consider themselves under the most sacred obligation to use every effort to destroy’ slavery, a form of property legitimized and guaranteed by the Constitution.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were not among the minorities defended with such vigour and legal erudition. In fact, in their case, tolerance and the spirit of compromise seem to turn into their opposite: if fanaticism actually succeeded in its mad project of abolishing slavery, what would follow would be ‘the extirpation of one or the other race’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, given the concrete balance of forces in the United States, it was not difficult to imagine which of the two would succumb: blacks could only survive on condition of being slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So is Calhoun a liberal? No doubts on this score were harboured by Lord Acton, a prominent figure in liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, an advisor and friend of William Gladstone, one of the major figures in nineteenth-century England. In Acton’s view, Calhoun was a champion of the cause of the struggle against any form of absolutism, including ‘democratic absolutism’; the arguments he employed were ‘the very perfection of political truth’. In short, we are dealing with one of the major authors and great minds in the liberal tradition and pantheon.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Albeit in less emphatic language, the question has been answered in the affirmative by those who in our time celebrate Calhoun as ‘a strong individualist’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as a champion of the ‘defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or as a theorist of the sense of limits and the self-limitation that should characterize the majority.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no doubt is one US publishing house, committed to republishing in a neo-liberal key ‘Liberty Classics’, among which the eminent statesman and ideologue of the slaveholding South features prominently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question we have posed does not only emerge from reconstructing the history of the United States. Prestigious scholars of the French Revolution, of firm liberal persuasion, have no hesitation in defining as ‘liberal’ those figures and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg3&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;circles that had the merit of opposing the Jacobin diversion, but who were firmly committed to the defence of colonial slavery. The reference is to Pierre-Victor Malouet and members of the Massiac Club, who were ‘all plantation-owners and slaveholders’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Is it possible to be a liberal and slaveholder at the same time? Such was not the opinion of John Stuart Mill, judging at least from his polemic against the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; British liberals (among them, perhaps, Acton and Gladstone), who, during the American Civil War, rallied en masse to ‘a furious pro-Southern partisanship’, or at any rate viewed the Union and Lincoln coolly and malevolently.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We face a dilemma. If we answer the question formulated above (Is Calhoun a liberal?) in the affirmative, we can no longer maintain the traditional (and edifying) image of liberalism as the thought and volition of liberty. If, on the other hand, we answer in the negative, we find ourselves confronting a new problem and new question, which is no less embarrassing than the first: Why should we continue to dignify John Locke with the title of father of liberalism? Calhoun refers to black slavery as a ‘positive good’. Yet without resorting to such brazen language, the English philosopher, to whom the US author explicitly appealed, regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formalization of the institution in Carolina. He took a hand in drafting the constitutional provision according to which ‘[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke was ‘the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this did not prevent him from inveighing against the political ‘slavery’ that absolute monarchy sought to impose.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in Calhoun the theorization of black slavery as a ‘positive good’ went hand in hand with warnings against a concentration of power that risked transforming ‘the governed’ into ‘the slaves of the rulers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Of course, the American statesman was a slave-owner, but the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg4&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;English philosopher also had sound investments in the slave trade.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the latter’s position proves even more compromising; for good or ill, in the slaveholding South of which Calhoun was the interpreter, there was no longer any place for the deportation of blacks from Africa, in a terrible voyage that condemned many of them to death before they landed in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do we want to bring historical distance to bear in order to distinguish the positions of the two authors being compared here, and exclude from the liberal tradition only Calhoun, who continued to justify or celebrate the institution of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century? The southern statesman would have reacted indignantly to such inconsistency of treatment: as regards the English liberal philosopher, he would perhaps have repeated, in slightly different language, the thesis formulated by him in connection with George Washington: ‘He was one of us—a slaveholder and a planter.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contemporary with Calhoun was Francis Lieber, one of the most eminent intellectuals of his time. Sometimes saluted as a sort of Montesquieu redivivus, in correspondence and on respectful terms with de Tocqueville, he was doubtless a critic, if a cautious one, of the institution of slavery. He hoped it would wither away through its gradual transformation into a kind of servitude or semi-servitude on the autonomous initiative of the slaveholding states, whose right to self-government could not be questioned. That is why Lieber was also admired in the South, all the more so because he himself, albeit on a rather modest scale, owned and sometimes rented male and female slaves. When one of the latter died, following a mysterious pregnancy and subsequent abortion, he recorded in his diary the painful financial loss suffered: ‘fully one thousand dollars—the hard labor of a year’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New, painful economies were required to replace the deceased slave, because Lieber, unlike Calhoun, was not a planter and did not live off profits, but a university professor who essentially used slaves as domestic servants. Does this authorize us in including the first, rather than the second, in the liberal tradition? In any event, temporal distance plays no role here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now take a contemporary of Locke’s. Andrew Fletcher was ‘a champion of liberty’ and, at the same time, ‘a champion of slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Politically, he &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg5&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;professed to be ‘a republican on principle’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and culturally was ‘a Scottish prophet of the Enlightenment’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He too fled to Holland in the wake of the anti-Jacobite and anti-absolutist conspiracy, exactly like Locke, with whom he was in correspondence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fletcher’s reputation crossed the Atlantic: Jefferson defined him as a ‘patriot’, whose merit was to have expressed the ‘political principles’ characteristic of ‘the purest periods of the British Constitution’—those that subsequently caught on and prospered in free America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing positions rather similar to Fletcher’s was his contemporary and fellow countryman James Burgh, who also enjoyed the respect of republican circles à la Jefferson,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was mentioned favourably by Thomas Paine in the most celebrated opuscule of the American Revolution (&#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, in contrast to the other authors—though like them characterized by a peculiar tangle of love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery—Fletcher and Burgh are virtually forgotten today, and no one seems to want to include them among exponents of the liberal tradition. The fact is that, in underlining the necessity of slavery, they were thinking primarily not of blacks in the colonies, but of the ‘vagrants’, the beggars, the odious, incorrigible rabble of the metropolis. Should they be regarded as illiberal for this reason? Were that to be the case, what would distinguish liberals from non-liberals would be not the condemnation of the institution of slavery, but only negative discrimination against peoples of colonial origin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal England presents us with another, different case. Francis Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of some significance (he was the ‘never to be forgotten’ master of Adam Smith),[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the one hand expressed criticisms and reservations about the slavery to which blacks were indiscriminately subjected. On the other hand, he stressed that, especially when dealing with the ‘lower conditions’ of society, slavery could be a ‘useful punishment’: it should be the ‘ordinary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg6&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and their families by any useful labours’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an author who, while evincing unease at hereditary, racial slavery, demanded a sort of penal slavery for those who, regardless of their skin colour, were guilty of vagrancy. Was Hutcheson a liberal?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically positioned between Locke and Calhoun, and with his focus precisely on the reality accepted by the two of them as obvious and indisputable, or even celebrated as a ‘positive good’, Adam Smith constructed an argument and expressed a position that warrants being cited at some length. Slavery could be more easily abolished under a ‘despotic government’ than a ‘free government’, with its representative bodies exclusively reserved in practice for white property-owners. In such circumstances, the condition of the black slaves was desperate: ‘every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves’. Hence ‘[t]he freedom of the free was the cause of the great oppression of the slaves … And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Can an author who, in at least one concrete instance, expressed his preference for ‘despotic government’ be regarded as liberal? Or, differently put, is Smith more liberal or are Locke and Calhoun, who, along with slavery, defended the representative bodies condemned by Smith as the prop, in a slaveholding society, of an infamous institution contrary to any sense of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, as the great economist had foreseen, slavery was abolished in the United States not thanks to local self-government, but by the iron fist of the Union’s army and the temporary military dictatorship imposed by it. For this Lincoln was accused by his opponents of despotism and Jacobinism. He resorted to ‘military government’ and ‘military commissions’ and interpreted ‘the word “law”‘ as ‘[t]he will of the President’ and habeas corpus as the ‘power of the President to imprison whom he pleases, as long as he pleases’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Together with representatives of the secessionist Confederacy, the drafters of this indictment were those who aspired to a compromise peace, for the purposes of returning to constitutional normality. And once again we are obliged to ask the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg7&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;question: Is it Lincoln who is more liberal, or his adversaries in the South, or his opponents in the North who came out in favour of compromise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mill adopt a position in favour of the Union and condemn the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberals who cried scandal over the energy with which it conducted the war against the South and kept at bay those who, in the North itself, were inclined to tolerate the slaveholders’ secession. However, we shall see that, when he turned his attention to the colonies, the English liberal justified the West’s ‘despotism’ over ‘races’ that were still ‘under age’, and who were obliged to observe an ‘absolute obedience’ in order to be set on the path of progress. This is a formulation that would not have displeased Calhoun, who likewise legitimized slavery by reference to the backwardness and nonage of populations of African origin. It was only in America, and thanks to the paternal care of white masters, that the ‘black race’ succeeded in progressing and making the transition from its previous ‘low, degraded and savage condition’ to ‘its present comparatively civilized condition’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Mill’s view, ‘any means’ were licit for those who took on the task of educating ‘savage tribes’; ‘slavery’ was sometimes a mandatory stage for inducing them to work and making them useful to civilization and progress (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]). But this was also the opinion of Calhoun, for whom slavery was an unavoidable means if one wished to achieve the end of civilizing blacks. Certainly, by contrast with the permanent slavery which, according to the US theorist and politician, blacks must be subjected to, the pedagogical dictatorship Mill refers to was destined to disappear in the distant, uncertain future. But the other side of the coin is that now explicitly subjected to this condition of unfreedom was not a particular ethnic group (the fragment of Africa located at the heart of the United States), but all the peoples invested by the West’s colonial expansion and forced to endure political ‘despotism’ and servile or semi-servile forms of labour. Is demanding ‘absolute obedience’, for an indeterminate period of time, from the overwhelming majority of humanity compatible with the liberal profession of faith? Or is it synonymous with &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The American Revolution and the revelation of an embarrassing truth&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now clear that what primarily divides the authors mentioned up to this point is the problem of slavery. In one way or another, they all refer to the Britain deriving from the Glorious Revolution or the United States. These are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg8&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;two countries that for around a century were a single state entity and formed, as it were, a single political party. Prior to the crisis that led to the American Revolution, the British on both sides of the Atlantic felt themselves to be proud subjects or citizens of ‘[a] land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus Blackstone. To confirm his thesis, he referred to Montesquieu, who spoke of England as the ‘one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not even the French liberal doubted the fact that ‘England is currently the freest country in the world, not discounting any republic’: the ‘free nation’, the ‘free people’ par excellence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, no dark clouds seemed to threaten relations between the two shores of the Atlantic. There were no conflicts and, according to Montesquieu at least, there could not be, because even in its relationship with the colonies what characterized England was its love of liberty:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this nation sent colonies abroad, it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as this government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, the English colonists in America proudly identified with Blackstone’s thesis that ‘our free constitution’, which ‘falls little short of perfection’, differed markedly ‘from the modern constitutions of other states’, from the political order of ‘the continent of Europe’ as a whole.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the ideology with which the Seven Years’ War was fought by the British Empire. The English colonists in America were the most determined in interpreting it as a clash between the ‘supporters of freedom in the world’—the British ‘sons of noble liberty’, or defenders of Protestantism—and a ‘cruel and oppressive’ France—despotic politically, and follower of ‘Roman bigotry’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg9&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Popery religiously. At the time, even the British Crown’s transatlantic subjects liked to repeat with Locke that ‘slavery’ was ‘directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation’; it was utterly inconceivable for an ‘Englishman’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French allegedly wanted to reduce the American colonists to a ‘slavish subjection’. Fortunately, however, arriving to foil this attempt was Great Britain, ‘[t]he Mistress of the Nations—the grand Support of Liberty, the Scourge of Oppression and Tyranny!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was an ideology that Edmund Burke sought to breathe new life into as late as 1775, in a desperate attempt to avoid the impending rupture. Presenting his motion of conciliation, he called upon people not to lose sight of, and not to sever, the ties that bound the American colonists to the mother country: what was at stake was a single ‘nation’ that shared ‘the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’, the faith in ‘liberty’. Largely unchallenged in countries like Spain or Prussia, slavery was ‘a weed that grows in every soil’ except the English. Accordingly, it was absurd to try to subdue the rebel colonists by force: ‘An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the slavery referred to here is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other slavery, which shackles blacks, is passed over in silence. With the increasing inevitability of the revolution, or ‘civil war’ with all its ‘horrors’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—as loyalists faithful to the Crown and British politicians in favour of compromise and preserving the unity of the English ‘nation’ and ‘race’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] preferred to call it—the picture changed markedly. The element of continuity is clear. Each of the two contending parties accused the other of wanting to reintroduce despotism, or political ‘slavery’. The rebel colonists’ charges are well known: they tirelessly denounced the tyranny of the British Crown and parliament, and their mad project of subjecting residents in America to a condition of ‘perpetual bondage and slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the response was not slow in coming. As early as 1773, a loyalist from New York had issued a warning: hitherto they had been ‘watchful against &#039;&#039;external&#039;&#039; attacks on our freedom’ (the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg10&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;reference is to the Seven Years’ War), but now a much more insidious danger had emerged—that of ‘becom[ing] &#039;&#039;enslaved&#039;&#039; by tyrants within’. Again in New York, another loyalist repeated the point two years later: the rebels aspired ‘to make us worse than slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In polemicizing against one another, the two branches the liberal party had divided into adopted the ideology and rhetoric that had presided over the self-celebration of the English nation in its entirety, as the sworn enemy of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The novel factor was that, in the wake of the exchange of accusations, the other slavery—the one both branches had repressed as a disruptive element in their proud self-consciousness as members of the people and party of liberty—burst into the polemics alongside political slavery. In the rebel colonists’ view, the London government, which in sovereign fashion imposed taxation on citizens or subjects not represented in the House of Commons, was behaving like a master towards his slaves. But—objected the others—if slavery is the issue, why not start to discuss the slavery that is manifested in brutal, unequivocal form precisely where liberty is so passionately lauded? As early as 1764, Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time to plead the colonists’ cause, had to face the sarcastic comments of his interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You Americans make a great Clamour upon every little imaginary infringement of what you take to be your Liberties; and yet there are no People upon Earth such Enemies to Liberty, such absolute Tyrants, where you have the Opportunity, as you yourselves are.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The self-styled champions of liberty branded taxation imposed without their explicit consent as synonymous with despotism and slavery. But they had no scruples about exercising the most absolute and arbitrary power over their slaves. This was a paradox: ‘How is it’, Samuel Johnson asked, ‘that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’ Across the Atlantic, those who sought to contest the secession ironized in similar fashion. Thomas Hutchinson, royal governor of Massachusetts, rebuked the rebels for their inconsistency or hypocrisy: they denied Africans those rights that they claimed to be ‘absolutely inalienable’ in the most radical way imaginable.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Echoing him was an American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher), who, having taken refuge in England, revisited the events that forced him into exile and observed: ‘the most &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg11&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clamorous advocates for liberty were uniformly the harshest and worst masters of slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the people most directly involved in the polemical and political struggle who expressed themselves so harshly. The intervention of John Millar, prominent exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, was especially stinging:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It affords a curious spectacle to observe, that the same people who talk in a high strain of political liberty, and who consider the privilege of imposing their own taxes as one of the inalienable rights of mankind, should make no scruple of reducing a great proportion of their fellow-creatures into circumstances by which they are not only deprived of property, but almost of every species of right. Fortune perhaps never produced a situation more calculated to ridicule a liberal hypothesis, or to show how little the conduct of men is at the bottom directed by any philosophical principles.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Millar was a disciple of Adam Smith. The master seems to have seen things in the same way. When he declared that to a ‘free government’ controlled by slaveowners, he preferred a ‘despotic government’ capable of erasing the infamy of slavery, he made explicit reference to America. Translated into directly political terms, the great economist’s words signify: the despotism the Crown is criticized for is preferable to the liberty demanded by the slave-owners, from which only a small class of planters and absolute masters benefits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
English abolitionists went even further, calling for the defence of British institutions threatened by ‘arbitrary and inhuman uses, which prevail in a distant land’. So arbitrary and inhuman that, as indicated by an advert in the &#039;&#039;New York Journal&#039;&#039;, a black woman and her three-year-old daughter could be sold on the market separately, as if they were a cow and a calf. And hence (concluded Granville Sharp in 1769) one should not be led astray by ‘theatrical bombast and ranting expressions in praise of liberty’ employed by the slaveholding rebels; free English institutions must be vigorously defended against them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The accused reacted in their turn by upbraiding England for its hypocrisy: it boasted of its virtue and love of liberty, but who promoted and continued to promote the slave trade? And who was it that transported and sold slaves? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg12&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Thus argued Franklin,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] advancing an argument that became central in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence elaborated by Jefferson. This is how, in the original version of that solemn document, the Britain derived from the Glorious Revolution and George III himself were charged. The latter&lt;br /&gt;
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has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical war, the opprobrium of &#039;&#039;infidel&#039;&#039; powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The role of slavery between the two Atlantic shores&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
What should we make of this furious, unexpected polemic? There is no doubt that the accusations against the rebels struck a weak point. Virginia played a central role in the American Revolution. Forty per cent of the country’s slaves were to be found there, but a majority of the authors of the rebellion unleashed in the name of liberty also came from there. For thirty-two of the United States’ first thirty-six years of existence, slave-owners from Virginia occupied the post of president. This colony or state, founded on slavery, supplied the country with its most illustrious statesmen. It is enough to think of George Washington (great military and political protagonist of the anti-British revolt) and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (authors, respectively, of the Declaration of Independence and the federal Constitution of 1787), all three of them slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Regardless of this or that state, the influence slavery exercised on the country as a whole is clear. Sixty years after its foundation, we see that ‘of the first sixteen presidential elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern slaveholder in the White House’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence the persistence of the anti-American polemic on this point is understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side, we are familiar with Franklin’s and Jefferson’s ironic remarks about the moralizing anti-slavery lectures offered by a country deeply &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg13&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved in the slave trade. Burke, theorist of ‘conciliation with the colonies’, likewise stressed this. In rejecting the proposal of those who urged ‘a general enfranchisement of their slaves’ to counter the rebellion of their masters and the colonists generally, he observed: ‘Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?’ All the more so if this nation insisted on practising the slave trade, clashing with colonies that wished to restrict or abolish it. In the eyes of slaves landed in or deported to America, this would represent a peculiar spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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An offer of freedom from England, would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke’s irony hits home. In addition to Britain’s role in the slave trade, slaves long continued to be present in the metropolis itself. It has been calculated that in the mid-eighteenth century there were around 100,000 of them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were British abolitionists horrified by the market in human flesh in the American colonies and New York? In Liverpool in 1766, eleven black slaves were put on sale and the market in ‘black cattle’ was still open in Dublin twelve years later, regularly advertised in the local press.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The role played in the country’s economy by the trade in slaves and their exploitation was sizeable: ‘The &#039;&#039;Liverpool Courier&#039;&#039;, 22 August 1832, estimated that three-quarters of Britain’s coffee, fifteen-sixteenths of its cotton, twenty-two twenty-thirds of its sugar, and thirty-four thirty-fifths of its tobacco were still produced by slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In sum, we should bear in mind the candid judgement of two eighteenth-century British witnesses. The first, Joshua Gee, acknowledged that ‘[a]ll this great increase in our treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of negroes in the plantations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The second, Malachy Postlethwayt, engaged as he was in defending the role of the Royal African Company—the company that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg14&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;controlled the slave trade—was even sharper: ‘The &#039;&#039;Negroe Trade&#039;&#039; and the natural Consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation’; they were ‘the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Empire as a whole was merely ‘a magnificent superstructure’ upon this commerce.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, there was the political influence of the institution of slavery. Although obviously inferior to what it was in the American colonies, it was certainly not nugatory in England: in the 1790 parliament, two or three dozen members sat who had interests in the West Indies.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exchange of accusations between rebel colonists and the mother country—that is, between two branches of the party that had hitherto proudly celebrated itself as the party of liberty—was a mutual, pitiless demystification. Not only did the England derived from the Glorious Revolution not challenge the slave trade, but on the contrary the latter experienced strong growth.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And one of the new liberal monarchy’s first acts of international policy was wresting a monopoly on the slave trade from Spain. On the other side, the revolution that broke out across the Atlantic in the name of liberty involved official consecration of the institution of slavery, and the conquest and prolonged exercise of political hegemony by slave-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Possibly the most articulate and pained intervention in this polemic was by Josiah Tucker, ‘who, though a parson and a Tory, was, apart from that, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He denounced England’s pre-eminent role in the slave trade: ‘We … the boasted Patrons of Liberty, and the professed Advocates for the natural Rights of Mankind, engage deeper in this murderous inhuman Traffic than any Nation whatever.’ But even more hypocritical was the behaviour of the rebel colonists: ‘the Advocates for Republicanism, and for the supposed Equality of Mankind, ought to have been foremost in suggesting some such humane System for abolishing the worst of all the Species of Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But instead …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Holland, England, America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg15&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;If, prior to constituting themselves as an independent state, the rebel colonies in America formed part of the British Empire, the latter assumed its liberal form with the ascent to the throne of William of Orange, who landed in England from Holland. On the other hand, while with his draft constitution for Carolina Locke referred to America, he wrote his first &#039;&#039;Letter Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039; in Holland, which was then ‘the centre of conspiracy’ against Stuart absolutism;[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Holland was also the birthplace of Bernard de Mandeville, unquestionably one of the more important figures in early liberalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not lose sight of the fact that the United Provinces, which emerged from the struggle against Philip II’s Spain, equipped themselves with a liberal type of set-up a century before England. This was a country that from a socio-economic point of view as well had left the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; behind. In the seventeenth century it had a per capita income one-and-a-half times that of England; whereas in the latter 60 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, the figure in Holland was 40 per cent. Moreover, the power structure was rather significant: in the country which emerged victorious from the clash with Philip II, ‘a bourgeois oligarchy that had broken decisively with the aristocratic landholding ethos’ was dominant.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was these enlightened, tolerant, liberal bourgeois who embarked on colonial expansion; and in this historical period the slave trade was an integral part of it:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he Dutch conducted the first serious slave trade in order to furnish the manpower for the sugar plantations; when they lost the plantations, they tried to remain in the field as slave traders, but by 1675, Dutch primacy ended, yielding place to the newly founded Royal African Company of the English.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company. But the history of the United Provinces leads to America as well as Britain. It would seem that it was a Dutch peddler who introduced African slaves into Virginia.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New Amsterdam, which the Dutch were forced to cede to the British and which became New York, had a population 20 per cent of which was composed of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg16&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;blacks, in large part slaves. In 1703 around 42 per cent of homeowners were also slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This represents the paradox already glimpsed in connection with Britain and the United States. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the country where the prologue to the successive liberal revolutions occurred—namely, Holland—had a ‘hold’ on the trade in slaves:[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of their [Dutch] possessions were slave or bound-labor societies.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, in one respect, it was synonymous with liberty at the time, in another, Holland was synonymous with slavery—and a particularly brutal form of it. In Voltaire’s &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; a severe blow is dealt to the protagonist’s naive optimism by the encounter in Surinam (‘where the Dutch are’) with a black slave, reduced to a ‘dreadful state’ by his Dutch master. The slave refers as follows to the working conditions to which he is forced to submit:&lt;br /&gt;
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When we’re working at the sugar-mill and catch our finger in the grinding-wheel, they cut off our hand. When we try to run away, they cut off a leg. I have been in both these situations. This is the price you pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Condorcet, launching his abolitionist campaign in 1781, in particular targeted England and Holland, where the institution of slavery seemed especially deep-rooted on account of ‘the general corruption of these nations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, it is worth citing the American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher) whom we have seen ironizing about the passion for liberty displayed by slave-owners engaged in the rebellion. In his view, ‘[d]espotic nations treated their slaves better than those under republics; the Spanish were the best masters while the Dutch were the worst.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The first country to embark on the liberal road is one that exhibited an especially tenacious attachment to the institution of slavery. It appears that colonists of Dutch origin offered the most determined resistance to the first abolitionist measures, those introduced in the northern United States during the Revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg17&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and in its wake.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As regards Holland itself, in 1791 the States-General formally declared that the slave trade was essential to the development of the colonies’ prosperity and commerce. Still in this period, clearly distinguishing itself from Britain, Holland recognized the right of slave-owners to transport and deposit their human chattels in the mother country before returning to the colonies. Finally, it is to be noted that Holland only abolished slavery in its colonies in 1863, when the secessionist and slaveholding Confederacy of the southern United States was going down to defeat.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Irish, the Indians and the inhabitants of Java&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The English colonists’ revolt in America was accompanied by another major controversy. For a long time, like that of the blacks, the Indians’ fate had not in the slightest unsettled the deep conviction of the English on either side of the Atlantic that they were the chosen people of liberty. In both cases, they appealed to Locke, for whom (as we shall see) the natives of the New World approximated to ‘wild beasts’. But with the eruption of the conflict between colonies and mother country, the exchange of accusations also encompassed the problem of the relationship with the Indians. England, Paine proclaimed in 1776, was ‘that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and the Negroes to destroy us’ or ‘to cut the throats of the freemen of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the Declaration of Independence berated George III for having not only ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’ by black slaves, but also ‘endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions’. In 1812, on the occasion of a new war between the two shores of the Atlantic, Madison condemned England for indiscriminately striking the civilian population with its fleet, not sparing women or children, and hence displaying a conduct similar to that of the red-skinned ‘savages’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having been accomplices of the barbarians, the English became barbarians themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the argument had begun much earlier, following the Crown proclamation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg18&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 1763 that sought to halt or contain expansion west of the Allegany Mountains. This was a measure that did not please the colonists and George Washington, who regarded it as ‘a temporary expedient’, destined to be rapidly superseded, but which should not be respected even in the immediate present: those ‘who neglect the present opportunity of hunting out good lands’ were foolish.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The future president of the United States was not one of these ‘fools’. In his new capacity, while declaring in official speeches that he wanted to bring the ‘blessings of civilization’ and ‘happiness’ to ‘an unenlightened race of men’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in private correspondence he identified the Indians as ‘savages’ and ‘wild beasts of the forest’. Given this, the British Crown’s pretension to block further expansion by the colonists was absurd and ultimately immoral: they (Washington declared in a letter of 1783) would force ‘the Savage [like] the Wolf to retire’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more extreme in this respect was Franklin, who in his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039; observed: ‘if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes who formerly inhabited the Seacoast.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The decimation or destruction of a people who worshipped ‘the Devil’ was part of a kind of divinely inspired eugenicist plan.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The de-humanization of the Indians was also subscribed to by those in Britain who supported reconciliation with the rebels. The Crown’s attempt to block the colonists’ expansionistic march seemed to Burke absurd and sacrilegious, for ‘attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil, the command and blessing of Providence, “Increase and multiply.”‘ Ultimately, it was an ill-fated ‘endeavour to keep as a lair of wild beasts, that earth, which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Those on either side of the Atlantic who supported or justified the Crown’s policy of ‘conciliation’ not of the colonists, but of the Indians, mounted some resistance to this process of de-humanization. In this context, a particular mention should be made of the figure of the likeable American loyalist whom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg19&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we have encountered several times, in his capacity as a critic of the peculiar libertarian zeal displayed by the ‘harshest and wickedest slave masters’. To these same circles he attributed cruelty to the Indians. Sometimes they were killed and scalped with veritable religious fervour; they even became targets for shooting practice. They were branded savages and yet (objected Jonathan Boucher) they were no more savage ‘than our progenitors appeared to Julius Caesar or to Agricola’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We have seen Paine accuse the London government of seeking an alliance with Indian cut-throats. In reality, warned an English commander in 1783, it was precisely the now victorious colonists who ‘were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians’. The victors’ behaviour (added another officer) was ‘shocking to humanity’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an enduring controversy. In the later nineteenth century a historian descended from a family of loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada argued as follows: Did the rebels claim to be the descendants of those who had disembarked in America to escape intolerance and stay loyal to the cause of liberty? In fact, reversing the policy of the British Crown, which aimed at conversion, the Puritans had initiated a massacre of the Indians, assimilated to ‘Canaanites and Amalekites’—that is, stocks marked out by the Old Testament for erasure from the face of the earth. This was ‘one of the darkest pages in English colonial history’, which was followed by the even more repugnant one written during the American Revolution, when the rebel colonists engaged in ‘the entire destruction of the Six Indian Nations’ that had remained loyal to England: ‘by an order which, we believe, has no parallel in the annals of any civilized nation, [Congress] commands the complete destruction of those people as a nation … including women and children’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his private correspondence at least, Jefferson had no problem acknowledging the horror of the war against the Indians. But in his view responsibility for it resided with the London government, which had incited these savage, bloodthirsty ‘tribes’. This was a situation that ‘will oblige us now to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach’. The ‘confirmed brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America’ was to be laid at Britain’s door. As with the similar fate of ‘the same colored man in Asia’, as well as of the Irish—who for the English, whose skin ‘colour’ they shared, should be ‘brethren’—it was attributable to a policy committed to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sowing death and destruction ‘wherever … Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with human blood’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Jefferson was not wrong to compare the treatment suffered by the Indians with that reserved for the Irish. Just as, according to the loyalist accusation, Puritans and rebel colonists assimilated the Indians to ‘Amalekites’, so the Irish had already been compared to ‘Amalekites’ marked out for extermination, this time by the English conquerors.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The colonization of Ireland, with all its horrors, was the model for the subsequent colonization of North America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If the British Empire as a whole mainly swept away Irish and blacks,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indians and blacks were the principal victims of the territorial and commercial expansion first of the English colonies in America and then of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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As with the black question, in the case of the Indians the exchange of accusations ended up taking the form of a mutual demystification. There is no doubt that, along with black enslavement and the black slave trade, the rise of the two liberal countries either side of the Atlantic involved a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar observations can be made of Holland. A senior English civil servant, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who during the Napoleonic Wars was deputy governor of Java for a time, stated that the previous administration was ‘one of the extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness’. It is clear that colonial rivalry played a role in this judgement. Marx reports it, but pools ‘Dutch colonial administration’ and the English administration in his condemnation. As regards Holland more specifically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men in Celebes, in order to get slaves for Java … The young people thus stolen were hidden in secret dungeons on Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: ‘This one town of Macassar, for example, is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families.’ … Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg21&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, numbered over 80,000 inhabitants in 1750 and only 18,000 in 1811. That is peaceful commerce![[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, processes of enslavement and practical genocide were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Grotius, Locke and the Founding Fathers: a comparative interpretation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the start of the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe underlined the ideological fraternity between the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution and the country which, a century earlier, had rebelled against Philip II and won ‘freedom’ and prosperity thanks to ‘Heaven and the Assistance of England’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century, liberal authors liked to contrast the ordered triumph of liberty that had occurred in Holland, England and the United States with a France in the grip of an interminable revolutionary cycle and Bonapartism.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It might therefore be useful to proceed to a brief comparative analysis of the texts and authors in which the liberal revolutions of these three countries found theoretical expression and consecration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Holland, we cannot but refer to Hugo Grotius, who dedicated two of his most important books (&#039;&#039;Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae&#039;&#039;) to the revolt against Philip II and the country that derived from it. Liberal Holland immediately engaged in overseas expansion and slave-trading, and it is interesting to observe the position Grotius adopted towards colonial peoples. Having condemned the superstitious and idolatrous character of the ‘religious rites’ peculiar to paganism, he added:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when offered … to an evil spirit, it is an act of falsehood and hypocrisy; nay, it is an act of absolute rebellion, whereby we not only deprive our legal sovereign of his just homage, but even transfer that homage to a base apostate and an open enemy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg22&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Targeted here were peoples with&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
modes of worship … of a nature little suited to a Being of goodness and of purity: Human sacrifices; naked races up and down the temples; games and dances replete with obscenity; instances whereof are seen even at this day among the savage natives of America and Africa, who are still lost in the thick clouds of Paganism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was peoples assailed by Europe’s colonial expansion who were guilty of rebellion against God, and who must be punished for such a crime:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some … are weak enough to imagine, that God, as a being of infinite goodness, will never be provoked to punish this rebellion; a spirit of revenge, say they, is wholly incompatible with the attribute of perfect goodness. A fatal and absurd idea this! The powers of Mercy must be limited, that her actions may be just; and when wickedness becomes excessive, punishment as it were unavoidably arises out of justice.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against peoples who, staining themselves with ‘[o]ffences that are committed against GOD’ and violating the most basic norms of natural law, took the form of ‘barbarians’ or ‘rather Beasts than men’, war was ‘natural’, regardless of state borders and geographical distance. Indeed, ‘the justest War is that which is undertaken against wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like Beasts [&#039;&#039;homines belluis similes&#039;&#039;].’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the ideology that presided over the conquest of the New World. The sin of idolatry was the first of the arguments prompting Sepúlveda to regard war on the Indians and their enslavement as ‘just’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Grotius, along with the implicit legitimation of the genocidal practices underway in America, an explicit and insistent justification of slavery emerges. Sometimes it was punishment for criminal behaviour. Answerable for the latter were not only single individuals: ‘a whole People may be brought into Subjection for a publick Crime’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As well as in their capacity as ‘rebels’ against the Lord of the Universe, the inhabitants of America and Africa could also succumb to slavery &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg23&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as a result of a ‘just war’ (&#039;&#039;bellum justum&#039;&#039;), conducted by a European power. The prisoners captured during an armed conflict, formally declared in the requisite forms by the supreme authority of a state, were legitimately slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And their descendants too were legitimate slaves: otherwise, what interest would the victor have in keeping the vanquished alive? As the slave of the one who had spared his life, the prisoner became part of the victor’s property, and such property could be transmitted hereditarily or be an object of sale, just like ‘the Property of Goods’ (&#039;&#039;rerum dominium&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, all this did not apply to ‘those Nations where this Right of Bondage over Captives is not practised’; it did not apply to ‘Christian’ countries, which limited themselves to exchanging prisoners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Banned in intra-European conflicts, slavery by right of war continued to be a reality as and when Christian, civilized Europe confronted colonial peoples, barbarians and pagans in what, by definition, was a ‘just’ war. On the other hand, regardless of their actual behaviour, the lesson of a great master should not be forgotten: ‘as &#039;&#039;Aristotle&#039;&#039; said, some Men are naturally Slaves, that is, turned for Slavery. And some Nations also are of such a Temper, that they know better how to obey than to command’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a truth also confirmed by Holy Scripture: ‘the Apostle St Paul’ called on individuals and peoples who had legitimately been reduced to slavery to put up with their lot and not escape it by rebellion or flight.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, Grotius paid homage to the ‘free People’ who in Holland had availed themselves of their right of resistance, legitimately shaking off the yoke of a despotic prince.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other, he had no difficulty justifying slavery and even the kind of ‘wild beast’ hunt against Indians underway in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now pass on to the Glorious Revolution and Locke. The &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; may be regarded as key moments in the ideological preparation and consecration of the event that marks the birth of liberal England. We are dealing with texts deeply impregnated with the pathos of liberty, the condemnation of absolute power, the appeal to rise up against the wicked ones who seek to deprive man of his liberty and reduce him to slavery. But every now and then frightening passages open up in this ode to liberty, where slavery in the colonies is legitimized. As ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the institution, Grotius adduced the example of the Germans who, according to Tacitus’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg24&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;testimony, ‘ventured their very Liberty upon the Cast of a Die’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Locke’s view, ‘captives taken in a just war’ (on the part of the victors) had ‘forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties’. They were slaves ‘subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to now the thinking applies to blacks deported from Africa. But the fate reserved for Indians was not manifestly better. In addition to having an interest in the slave trade as a shareholder in the Royal African Company, the liberal English philosopher was concerned with the white colonists’ expansionist march as secretary (in 1673–74) of the Council of Trade and Plantations. As has been justly observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That so many of the examples Locke uses in his &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; are American ones shows that his intention was to provide the settlers, for whom he had worked in so many other ways, with a powerful argument based in natural law rather than legislative decree to justify their depredations.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; makes repeated reference to the ‘wild Indian’, who moved around ‘insolent and injurious in the woods of America’ or the ‘vacant places of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ignorant of labour, which was the only thing that could confer property right, and occupying a land not ‘improv[ed] by labour’, or ‘great tracts of unused’ ground’, the Indian inhabited ‘unpossessed quarters’, &#039;&#039;in vacuis locis&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to labour and property, Indians were also ignorant of money. They thus not only proved alien to civilization, but were also ‘not … joined with the rest of mankind’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As a result of their behaviour, they were not solely subject to human condemnation. Unquestionably, ‘God commanded … labour’ and private property, and could certainly not want the world created by him to remain ‘common and uncultivated’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he sought to challenge the march of civilization, violently opposing exploitation through labour of the uncultivated land occupied by him, the Indian, along with any other criminal, could be equated with ‘one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security’, and who ‘therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger’. Locke never tired of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg25&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;insisting on the right possessed by any man to destroy those reduced to the level of ‘beasts of prey’, ‘savage beasts’; to the level of ‘a savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are phrases that remind us of those used by Grotius in connection with barbarous peoples and pagans in general, and by Washington in connection with the Indians. However, before coming to the Founding Fathers and the solemn documents that mark the birth of the United States, it is worth dwelling on another macroscopic exclusion clause that characterizes the celebration of liberty in Locke. ‘Papists’, declared the &#039;&#039;Essay Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039;, are ‘like serpents never [to] be prevailed on by kind usage to lay by their venom’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even more than to English Catholics, this harsh declaration was formulated with a view to Ireland, where at the time unregistered priests were branded with a red-hot iron, when they were not punished with more severe penalties or death.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Irish, in endemic, desperate revolt against spoliation and oppression by Anglican settlers, were contemptuously referred to by Locke as a population of ‘brigands’. As for the rest, he reiterated the point the men are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
forward to have compassion for sufferers and esteem for that religion as pure, and the professors of it as sincere, which can stand the test of persecution. But I think it is far otherwise with Catholics, who are less apt to be pitied than others because they receive no other usage than what they [by the] cruelty of their own principles and practices are known to deserve.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The warning against feelings of ‘compassion’ makes it clear that we are dealing with Ireland primarily. Locke seems to have had no objections of any kind to the ruthless repression suffered by the Irish, whose fate calls to mind that reserved for Indians across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can now move on to examine the documents that informed the third liberal revolution and the foundation of the United States. At first sight, the Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution seem inspired and pervaded by a universal pathos of liberty: ‘all men are created equal’—such is the solemn preamble to the first document; it is necessary to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’—such is the no less solemn preamble &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg26&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to the second. But it requires a scarcely more attentive reading to encounter, already in Article 1 of the Constitution, a contrast between ‘free Persons’ and ‘all other Persons’. The latter were, of course, slaves, whose number, reduced to three-fifths, had to be factored in and added to that of ‘free persons’ when it came to calculating the number of members in the House of Representatives to which slaveholding states were entitled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With recourse to various euphemisms, a whole series of other Articles refer to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Where initially it was concealed among ‘other persons’ (the part of the population not made up of ‘free persons’), now the relationship of slavery is modestly subsumed under the general category of persons ‘held to Service or Labour’. On the basis of the principles of self-government, each individual state has the right to regulate it as it sees fit, while every state’s obligation to return fugitive slaves is a moral obligation to guarantee a legitimate property-owner the services that ‘may be due’. In a further linguistic expedient, tinged with the same discretion, the black slave trade becomes ‘[t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit’. It was ‘not [to] be prohibited by Congress prior to the year [1808]’, and, pending that, could only be subjected to a fairly modest tax (‘not exceeding ten dollars for each person’ or slave). The articles requiring the Union to suppress insurrections or ‘domestic violence’—primarily, a possible dreaded slave revolt in some particular state[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—are formulated in similarly elliptical fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although repressed through a strict linguistic proscription, the institution of slavery proves to be a pervasive presence in the American Constitution. It is not even absent from the Declaration of Independence, where the accusation against George III of having appealed to black slaves takes the already noted form of having ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the transition from Grotius to Locke, and from them to the founding documents of the American Revolution, we observe a phenomenon worth reflecting upon: although regarded as legitimate in all three cases, the institution of slavery was theorized and affirmed without the least reticence solely by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg27&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Dutch author, whose life straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Locke, by contrast, at least in the case of the &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, which were written and published on the eve and at the end of the Glorious Revolution, legitimation of slavery tends to occur exclusively between the lines of the discourse celebrating English liberty. The reticence reaches its peak in the documents that consecrate the foundation of the United States as the most glorious chapter in the history of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it came to the relationship with the Indians, things were different: Grotius, Locke and Washington all referred to them as ‘wild beasts’. A document like the Declaration of Independence, which was addressed to international public opinion and which (as we know) included among George III’s most heinous crimes the fact that he had incited the ‘merciless Indian savages’ against the rebel colonists, was linguistically more cautious. But it remains the case that in all three liberal revolutions the demand for liberty and justification of the enslavement, as well as the decimation (or destruction), of barbarians, were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Vulgar historicism and repression of the paradox of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition—namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such—be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well-known, precisely because it is &#039;&#039;well-&#039;&#039;known, is not &#039;&#039;known&#039;&#039;. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well-known and to accept it as such’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throwing a widespread apologia into crisis, the paradoxical tangle we have encountered while historically reconstructing the origins of liberalism is disturbing. We can therefore understand the tendency to repression. After all, that was the gesture, in their own day, of Locke and, especially, the rebel American colonists, who liked to draw a more or less thick veil of silence over the institution of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg28&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The same result can be arrived at in other ways. According to Hannah Arendt, what characterized the American Revolution was the project of realizing a political order based on liberty, while the persistence of black slavery referred to a cultural tradition homogeneously diffused either side of the Atlantic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]his indifference, difficult for us to understand, was not peculiar to Americans and hence must [not] be blamed … on any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest … Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, disquiet about slavery was so strongly felt in the Europe of the time that prominent authors not infrequently proceeded to a sharp contrast between the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us attend to Condorcet:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American forgets that negroes are men; he has no moral relationship with them; for him they are simply objects of profit … and such is the excess of his stupid contempt for this unhappy species that, when back in Europe, he is indignant to see them dressed like men and placed alongside him.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
‘The American’ condemned here is the transatlantic colonist, whether French or English. In his turn, in 1771 Millar denounced ‘the shocking barbarity to which the negroes in our colonies are frequently exposed’. Fortunately, ‘the practice of slavery [has] been … generally abolished in Europe’. Where it survived, across the Atlantic, the practice poisoned the whole society: cruelty and sadism were ‘exhibited even by persons of the weaker sex, in an age distinguished for humanity and politeness’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also the opinion of Condorcet, who pointed out how ‘the young American woman witnesses’, and sometimes even ‘presides over’, the brutal ‘tortures’ inflicted on black slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thesis formulated by Arendt can even be inverted. In the late eighteenth century the institution of slavery began to be unacceptable in salons where the ideas of the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; circulated, and in churches influenced by the Quakers or other abolitionist sections of Christianity. Even as the Philadelphia Convention ratified the Constitution that sanctioned racial chattel slavery, a French defender of this institution bitterly noted his isolation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg29&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The extremely powerful empire of public opinion … now offers its support to those in France and England who attack black slavery and pursue its abolition. The most odious interpretations are reserved for those who dare to hold a contrary opinion.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, another French defender of slavery bemoaned the fact that ‘negrophilia’ had become a ‘fashionable oddity’, to the point of abolishing any sense of distance between the two races: ‘African blood circulates much too abundantly in the veins of the Parisians themselves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we start out from the presupposition of a general ‘indifference’ to the lot of black slaves in these years, we shall understand nothing of the American Revolution. The ‘last great philosopher’ to justify slavery—Locke—was quite the reverse of unchallenged; and it is interesting to note that he was criticized together with the ‘current American rebellion’, which he was regarded as having inspired.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, celebration of a tendentially republican liberty was bound up with legitimation of the institution of slavery. After having cited various passages from the philosopher that leave no room for doubt in this regard, Josiah Tucker commented: ‘[s]uch is the language of the humane Mr Locke! The great and glorious Assertor of the natural Rights and Liberties of Mankind’; here were ‘his real Sentiments concerning Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the American loyalist we have already encountered—Boucher—conjointly condemned the republican secession and Locke’s claim to confer on ‘every freeman of Carolina absolute power and property over his slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While English patriots and loyalists opposed to secession ironized about the flag of liberty waved by slave-owners, the rebel colonists reacted not by invoking the legitimacy of enslaving blacks, but by highlighting the British Crown’s massive involvement and principal responsibility in trafficking and trading human flesh. It is clear that the institution of slavery was now largely delegitimized. This explains the linguistic proscriptions that characterized the new state’s Constitution. As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention observed, his colleagues ‘anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious to the ears of Americans’, but were ‘willing to admit into their system those &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; which the &#039;&#039;expressions signified’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg30&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is that, from the start of the debate on the new constitutional order (pointed out another witness), people ‘had been ashamed to use the term “Slaves” &amp;amp;amp; had substituted a description’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Less scrupulous (observed Condorcet in 1781) were the slaves’ ‘owners’: they were ‘guided by a false consciousness [&#039;&#039;fausse conscience&#039;&#039;]’ that rendered them impervious to the ‘protests of the defenders of humanity’ and ‘made them act not against their own interests, but to their own advantage’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, notwithstanding Arendt’s contrary opinion, ‘class interests’—principally of those who owned large plantations and a considerable number of slaves—played an important role, which did not escape contemporary observers. The fact is that Arendt ultimately ends up identifying with the viewpoint of the rebel colonists, who retained a clear conscience as champions of the cause of liberty, repressing the macroscopic fact of slavery by means of their ingenious euphemisms: what takes the place of such euphemisms is now the ‘historicist’ explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Colonial expansions and the rebirth of slavery: the positions of Bodin, Grotius and Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Decidedly misleading as regards the American Revolution, might the ‘historicist’ approach be of some use in clarifying the reasons for the tangle of freedom and oppression that was already manifest in the two preceding liberal revolutions? Although contemporaries, in as much as both of them straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin expressed diametrically opposed positions on the issue of concern to us here. While the first justified slavery by appealing to the authority of the Bible and Aristotle, the second refuted both these arguments. Having observed that in the Hebrew world only gentiles could be subjected to perpetual slavery, and that Christians and Muslims observed similar norms and customs, Bodin concluded that ‘those who profess all these three religions only partially observe the law of God with regard to slaves’, as if the prohibition of this horrible institution only applied to blood relations, not humanity as a whole. If a distinction among the three monotheistic religions could be made, it was to the advantage of Islam, which had proved capable of expanding thanks to a courageous policy of emancipation.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg31&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bodin also rejected Aristotle’s thesis, adopted and even radicalized by Grotius, that some individuals and peoples are naturally slaves. As proof of this, the universal diffusion, temporal and spatial, of the institution of slavery was often cited. But (objected the French author) no less universally diffused were slave revolts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil, inclines for the most part to do that which is forbidden and chooses the evil, defying the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While it had long seemed obvious and been generally accepted, and still continued to be, the institution of slavery pertained not to nature but to history—more precisely, to a deplorable and execrable chapter of history, which must rapidly be closed once and for all. It made no sense to try to justify it on the basis of right of war (as did Grotius): ‘[W]hat charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some profit or pleasure from them as if they were cattle?’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, Grotius and Bodin were contemporaries. While the former was an expression of liberal Holland, the latter was a theorist of absolute monarchy. But it was he—not Grotius—who questioned the absolute power wielded by the master over his slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We arrive at a similar result when, rather than with Grotius, we compare Bodin with Locke, whom he predated by some decades. Whereas the English liberal, also justifying slavery with his gaze on the past, pointed to Spartacus as culpable of an ‘aggression’ against ‘property’ and legitimate power, Bodin expressed himself quite differently: ‘The Romans, who were so great and powerful … however many laws they made, could not prevent the revolt of sixty thousand slaves led by Spartacus, who defeated the Roman army in open battle three times’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the English liberal the universalistic charge present in Bodin has disappeared, just as there is no longer any trace of the unconditional &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg32&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery we can read in the French theorist of absolute monarchy. If we bear in mind ‘the homicides, the cruelties and barbarities inflicted on slaves by their masters, it was an unmitigated catastrophe that the institution was ever introduced, and then, that once it had been declared abolished, it should ever have been allowed to persist.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The quotation above refers to persistence. In fact, Bodin traced a brief history of slavery in the world or, more precisely, the West (and the geographical area dominated by it). Certainly, the institution had been vital in Greco-Roman antiquity. As late as the American Civil War, the theorists and defenders of the southern cause appealed to the example and model of that splendid civilization in order to condemn abolitionism. By contrast, Bodin drew a rather realistic picture of classical antiquity. It was based on the enslavement of a number of human beings that was significantly greater than the number of free citizens. Consequently, it lived under the constant menace of slave revolts and, in order to solve the problem, did not hesitate to resort to the most barbaric measures, as proved by the massacre of 30,000 helots in Sparta ‘in a single night’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Subsequently, as a result also of the influence of Christianity, things seemed to change: ‘Europe was freed of slavery after about 1250’, but ‘we see it today newly restored’. Following colonial expansion, it was ‘in the process of being renewed throughout the world’. There had been a massive restoration of slavery, and already Portugal ‘derives from it veritable herds as of beasts’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, far from being affected by vulgar historicism’s attempts at repression, the paradox that characterizes the American Revolution and early liberalism in general not only survives, but proves even more marked. We are in the presence of a political movement counter to the trend of authors who, centuries earlier, had pronounced an unequivocal condemnation of the institution of slavery. While Locke, champion of the struggle against absolute monarchy, justified the white master’s absolute power over the black slave, a theorist of monarchical absolutism—Bodin—condemned such power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In analyzing the relationship that the three liberal revolutions developed on the one hand with the blacks, and on the other with the Irish, Indians and natives, it is misleading to start out from the presupposition of a homogeneous historical time unmarked by fractures and flowing in unilinear fashion. Clearly predating Locke and Washington, and a contemporary of Grotius, was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg33&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Montaigne, in whom we find a memorable self-critical reflection on the West’s colonial expansion that we would seek in vain in them. Such a reflection can even be read as a prefigurative but timely critique of the attitude of Grotius, Locke and Washington towards non-European populations. Among them there was ‘nothing savage or barbarous’; the fact was that ‘every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to’. People took their own country as a model: ‘There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going back further, we encounter Las Casas and his critique of the arguments employed to de-humanize the Indian ‘barbarians’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the arguments that are more or less widely echoed by Grotius, Locke and Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be added that the ‘historicist’ explanation turns out to be unfounded not only as regards the relationship with colonial peoples. While Fletcher, a self-defined ‘republican on principle’, member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of the liberal political world derived from the Glorious Revolution, called for ‘mak[ing] slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bodin also condemned slavery for ‘vagrants and idlers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to the observation of a great historian, it was in ‘the period between 1660 and 1760’ (the decades of the rise of the liberal movement) that an attitude of unprecedented harshness spread in England towards wage-labourers and the unemployed, ‘which has no modern parallel except in the behaviour of the less reputable of white colonists towards coloured labour’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the radical character of the paradox we are examining, let us return to Bodin. He primarily attributed the return of slavery in the world to the ‘greed of merchants’, and then added: ‘If the princes do not set things in good order, it will soon be full of slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later. On the other hand, in recommending the conversion of beggars &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg34&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into slaves, Fletcher polemicized against the Church, which he rebuked for having promoted the abolition of slavery in classical antiquity and for opposing its reintroduction in the modern world, thus encouraging the sloth and dissipation of vagrants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, too, the institution of slavery was felt to be in contradiction not with the new social and political forces, but with a power that was pre-modern in origin. Such considerations can also be applied to Grotius, who likewise developed an argument, if not against Christianity as such, then against interpretations of it in an abolitionist register:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[W]hat the Apostles and antient Canons enjoin Slaves, of not leaving their Masters, is a general Maxim, and only opposed to the Error of those who rejected every Subjection, both private and publick, as a State inconsistent with the Liberty of Christians.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Virginian property-owners who prevented the baptism of slaves in the late seventeenth century, so as not to spoil the spirit of submission and to avoid the emergence of a sense of pride in them because they belonged to the same religious community as the masters, provoked complaints from Church and Crown alike.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, we see that it was the forces of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; which acted to check and contain the novelty represented by racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recourse to vulgar historicism to ‘explain’ or repress the surprising tangle of freedom and oppression that characterizes the three liberal revolutions we have referred to is fruitless. The paradox persists and awaits a genuine, less comforting explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn1a|1]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R.M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 529.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., pp. 528–31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., pp. 30–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., pp. 30–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 582.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., pp. 529, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn8a|8]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, vol. 1, pp. 240, 250; vol. 3, p. 593.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn9a|9]] C. Gordon Post, Introduction to John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;A Disquisition on Government&#039;&#039;, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. vii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn10a|10]] Ross M. Lence, Foreword to Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. xxiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn11a|11]] Giovanni Sartori, &#039;&#039;Democrazia e definizioni&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 151; Sartori, &#039;&#039;The Theory of Democracy Revisited&#039;&#039;, Chatham (NJ): Chatham House Publishers, 1987, pp. 239, 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn12a|12]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 120–1, 160–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn13a|13]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 21, p. 157; vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn14a|14]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wooton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn15a|15]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 45.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn16a|16]] See John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, bk 1, ch. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn17a|17]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn18a|18]] Maurice Cranston, &#039;&#039;John Locke&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, 1959, pp. 114–15; Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, pp. 199, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn19a|19]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn20a|20]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 278, 235–58.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn21a|21]] Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox’, &#039;&#039;Journal of American History&#039;&#039;, vol. LIX, no. 1, 1972, p. 11; cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn22a|22]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn23a|23]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn24a|24]] Henry R. Fox Bourne, &#039;&#039;The Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Aalen: Scientia, 1969, vol. 1, p. 481; John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, ed. Esmond S. De Beer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89, vols 5–7, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn25a|25]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1134 (letter to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn26a|26]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 382; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn27a|27]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, p. 45 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn28a|28]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 309 (letter to Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 374–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn30a|30]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 452–3, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn31a|31]] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ed., &#039;&#039;History of US Political Parties&#039;&#039;, New York and London: Chelsea House and Bawker, 1973, pp. 915–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn32a|32]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn33a|33]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn34a|34]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Roger Caillois, Paris: Gallimard, 1949–51, vol. 1, p. 884; Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 243, 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn36a|36]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 328–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn37a|37]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 122–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn38a|38]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn39a|39]] Janice Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 115–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn40a|40]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, pp. 123–4, 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn41a|41]] Boucher, quoted in Anne Y. Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn42a|42]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn43a|43]] Barry Alan Shain, &#039;&#039;The Myth of American Individualism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn44a|44]] Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 646–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn46a|46]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn47a|47]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn48a|48]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, p. 294.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn49a|49]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 272–3, 386–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn50a|50]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 648–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn51a|51]] Cf. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 273; Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn52a|52]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 5–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn53a|53]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn54a|54]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 67–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn55a|55]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn56a|56]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174 n. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 170 n. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn58a|58]] Gee, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn59a|59]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, p. 150; Eric R. Wolf, &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn60a|60]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn61a|61]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn62a|62]] Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn63a|63]] Marx’s characterization in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 926.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn64a|64]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn65a|65]] Bourne, &#039;&#039;Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn66a|66]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 203, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn67a|67]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 2, p. 52.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn68a|68]] Jennings, &#039;&#039;Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn69a|69]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn70a|70]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn71a|71]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn72a|72]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, trans. and intro. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992, p. 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn73a|73]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn74a|74]] Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn75a|75]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 165, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn76a|76]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 218, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn77a|77]] Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 35, 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn78a|78]] Henry S. Commager, ed., &#039;&#039;Documents of American History&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 208–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn79a|79]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joelle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, p. 39 (letter from Washington to his friend W. Crawford, 21 September 1767).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn80a|80]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 475–6 (presidential message, 25 October 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn81a|81]] Delanoë and Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2 (letter from Washington to J. Duane, 7 September 1783).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn82a|82]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1422.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn84a|84]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn85a|85]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn86a|86]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 278, 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn87a|87]] Egerton Ryerson, &#039;&#039;The Loyalists of America and Their Times&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Haskell House, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 297–8 and n.; vol. 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn88a|88]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1312–13 (letter to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn89a|89]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 16, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn90a|90]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 14–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn91a|91]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 164.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn92a|92]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 916; cf. Werner Sombart, &#039;&#039;Der moderne Kapitalismus&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Munich: DTV, 1987, vol. 1, pt II, p. 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn93a|93]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn94a|94]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. viii; François Guizot, ‘Discours sur l’histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre’, in &#039;&#039;Histoire d’Angleterre&#039;&#039;, Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1850, pp. 41–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn95a|95]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;On the Truth of Christianity&#039;&#039;, trans. Spencer Madan, London: J. Dodsby, 1782, pp. 195–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn96a|96]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 1027, 1024.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn97a|97]] Lewis Hanke, &#039;&#039;Aristotle and the American Indians&#039;&#039;, London: Hollis and Carter, 1959, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn98a|98]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 565.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn99a|99]] See ibid., vol. 1, ch. iii, §4; vol. 3, ch. iii, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., vol. 3, ch. vii, §§2, 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1496, 1372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn102a|102]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn103a|103]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xxii, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn104a|104]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xvi, §16; vol. 1, ch. iv, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn105a|105]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn106a|106]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn107a|107]] Anthony Pagden, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700’, in Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn108a|108]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 129, 162, 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., pp. 136, 139, 152, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn110a|110]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 133, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn113a|113]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 202.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn114a|114]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 1, pp. 296–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn115a|115]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn116a|116]] Cf. Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn117a|117]] Georg W.F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 20 vols, eds Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–79, vol. 3, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn118a|118]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;On Revolution&#039;&#039;, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1963, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn119a|119]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 647–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn120a|120]] Millar, &#039;&#039;Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, pp. 258, 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn121a|121]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 648.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn122a|122]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn123a|123]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 48, 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn124a|124]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn125a|125]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 103–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn126a|126]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 296.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn127a|127]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn128a|128]] Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn129a|129]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130a|130]] Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books of the Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, abridg. and trans. M.J. Tooley, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, n.d., pp. 18, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131a|131]] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133a|133]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 216; Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri dello Stato&#039;&#039;, trans. Margherita Isnardi Parente, Turin: UTET, 1988, vol. 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134a|134]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books&#039;&#039;, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135a|135]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 247–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136a|136]] Ibid., pp. 253, 238, 260.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137a|137]] Michel de Montaigne, &#039;&#039;The Complete Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138a|138]] Bartolomé de las Casas, &#039;&#039;La leggenda nera&#039;&#039;, trans. Alberto Pincherle, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981, ch. xii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139a|139]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 882–3 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140a|140]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 262 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141a|141]] R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, West&#039;&#039; Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 267. C.B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 227–8 and Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325 reach the same conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142a|142]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 260 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143a|143]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144a|144]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 561.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145a|145]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 332.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg35&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The limitation of power and the emergence of an unprecedented absolute power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To render it explicable, the paradox must first be expounded in all its radicalism. Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success: ‘The total slave population in the Americas reached around 330,000 in 1700, nearly three million by 1800, and finally peaked at over six million in the 1850s’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Contributing decisively to the rise of an institution synonymous with the absolute power of man over man was the liberal world. In the mid-eighteenth century, it was Great Britain that possessed the largest number of slaves (878,000). The fact is unexpected. Although its empire was far more extensive, Spain came well behind. Second position was held by Portugal, which possessed 700,000 slaves and was in fact a kind of semi-colony of Great Britain: much of the gold extracted by Brazilian slaves ended up in London.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence there is no doubt that absolutely pre-eminent in this field was the country at the head of the liberal movement, which had wrested primacy in the trading and ownership of black slaves precisely from the Glorious Revolution onwards. It was Pitt the Younger himself who, intervening in April 1792 in the House of Commons on the subject of slavery and the slave trade, acknowledged that ‘[n]o nation in Europe … has … plunged so deeply into this guilt as Great Britain.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg36&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;That is not all. To a greater or lesser extent, there survived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies ‘&#039;&#039;ancillary&#039;&#039; slavery’, which is to be distinguished from ‘&#039;&#039;systemic&#039;&#039; slavery, linked to plantations and commodity production’. And it was the latter type of slavery, established above all in the eighteenth century (starting from the liberal revolution of 1688–89) and clearly predominant in the British colonies, which most consummately expressed the de-humanization of those who were now mere instruments of labour and chattels, subject to regular sale on the market.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This did not even involve a return to the slavery peculiar to classical antiquity. Certainly, chattel slavery had been widespread in Rome. Yet the slave could reasonably hope that, if not he himself, then his children or grandchildren would be able to achieve freedom and even an eminent social position. Now, by contrast, his fate increasingly took the form of a cage from which it was impossible to escape. In the first half of the eighteenth century, numerous English colonies in America enacted laws that made the emancipation of slaves increasingly difficult.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Quakers lamented the advent of what seemed to them a new and repugnant system. Slavery for a determinate period of time, and the other forms of more or less servile labour hitherto in force, tended to give way to slavery in the strict sense, to a permanent, hereditary condemnation of a whole people, who were denied any prospect of change and improvement, any hope of freedom.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, in a statute of 1696, South Carolina declared that it could not prosper ‘without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The barrier separating service and slavery was as yet not well defined, and the institution of slavery had not yet appeared in all its harshness. But the process that increasingly reduced slaves to chattels, and established the racial character of the condition they were subjected to, was already underway. An unbridgeable gulf separated blacks from the free population. Ever stricter laws prohibited interracial sexual and marital relations, making them a crime. We are now dealing with a hereditary caste of slaves, defined and recognizable by the colour of their skin. In this sense, in John Wesley’s view, ‘American slavery’ was ‘the vilest that ever saw the sun’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg37&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The verdict of American Quakers and British abolitionists has been fully confirmed by contemporary historians. At the end of a ‘cycle of degradation’ of blacks, with the ignition of the white ‘engine of oppression’ and the conclusive soldering of ‘slavery and racial discrimination’, we see at work in the ‘colonies of the British empire’ in the late seventeenth century a ‘chattel racial slavery’ unknown in Elizabethan England (and also classical antiquity), but ‘familiar to men living in the nineteenth century’ and aware of the reality of the southern United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence slavery in its most radical form triumphed in the golden age of liberalism and at the heart of the liberal world. This was acknowledged by James Madison, slave-owner and liberal (like numerous protagonists of the American Revolution), who observed that ‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man’—power based on ‘mere distinction of colour’—was imposed ‘in the most enlightened period of time’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Correctly stated, in all its radicalism, the paradox we face consists in this: the rise of liberalism and the spread of racial chattel slavery are the product of a twin birth which, as we shall see, has rather unique characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The self-government of civil society and the triumph of large-scale property&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On its emergence, the paradox we are attempting to explain did not escape the most attentive observers. We have just seen Madison’s admission; and we are familiar with Samuel Johnson’s irony on the passionate love of liberty displayed by slave-owners; and Adam Smith’s observation on the nexus between the persistence and reinforcement of slavery, on the one hand, and the power of representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners, on the other. In this connection, however, we must also record other, no less significant interventions. In fighting for conciliation of the rebel colonies, Burke recognized the influence of slavery within them. But this did not impair the ‘spirit of freedom’. On the contrary, it was precisely here that freedom appeared ‘more noble and liberal’. Indeed, ‘these people of the southern colonies are more much more strongly … attached to liberty, than those to the northward’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is a consideration that we also encounter, some decades later, from a Barbadian planter: ‘you will … &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg38&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;find that no nations in the world have been more jealous of their liberties than those amongst whom the institution of slavery existed’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, in England, countering Burke and his policy of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Josiah Tucker pointed out how ‘the Champions for American Republicanism’ were simultaneously the promoters of the ‘absurd Tyranny’ they exercised over their slaves: this was ‘a &#039;&#039;republican Tyranny&#039;&#039;, the worst of all Tyrannies’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the authors cited here, there is a more or less clear awareness, accompanied by different value judgements, of the paradox we are examining. And perhaps precisely now it begins to lose its aura of impenetrability. Why should we be surprised that those demanding, or in the forefront of the demand for, self-government and ‘freedom’ from central political power were the major slave-owners? In 1839 an eminent representative of Virginia observed that the position of the slave-owner stimulated in him ‘a more liberal cast of character, more elevated principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and juster estimate of that liberty by which he is so highly distinguished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The wealth and leisure it enjoyed, and the culture it thus managed to acquire, reinforced the proud self-consciousness of a class that became ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority. Shaking off these constraints, the planter and slave-owner developed a liberal spirit and a liberal mentality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Confirming this phenomenon are the changes that occurred from the Middle Ages. Between 1263 and 1265, by means of the &#039;&#039;Siete partidas&#039;&#039;, Alfonso X of Castile regulated the institution of slavery, which he seemed to recognize reluctantly because it was always ‘unnatural’. What limited the property right in the first instance was religion: an unbeliever was not permitted to own Christian slaves and, in any event, the slave had to be guaranteed the possibility of living in conformity with Christian principles—whence the recognition of his right to establish a family and have the chastity and honour of his wife and daughters respected. Later, there were even cases of masters denounced to the Inquisition for their failure to respect the rights of their slaves. Further limiting the power of the property-owner was the state, profoundly influenced by religion. It was committed to disciplining and limiting the punishment inflicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg39&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by masters on slaves and variously sought to promote their emancipation (we are dealing with Christian subjects). Emancipation occurred from above when the slave performed a meritorious deed for the country; in such cases, the master deprived of his property was compensated by the state.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The advent of modern property entailed the master’s ability to dispose of it as he saw fit. In the Virginia of the second half of the seventeenth century, a law was in force that sanctioned the effective impunity of a master even when he killed his slave. Such behaviour could not be considered a ‘felony’, since ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that prepense malice (which alone makes murder felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] First with the Glorious Revolution and then later, more completely, with the American Revolution, the assertion of self-government by civil society hegemonized by slaveholders involved the definitive liquidation of traditional forms of ‘interference’ by political and religious authority. Christian baptism and profession of faith were henceforth irrelevant. In Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, one could proceed ‘without the solemnities of jury’ to the execution of a slave guilty of a capital crime; marriage between slaves was no longer a sacrament, and even funerals lost their solemnity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Virginian jurist (George Tucker) could observe that the slave was positioned ‘below the rank of human beings, not only politically, but physically and morally’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The conquest of self-government by civil society hegemonized by large-scale property involved an even more drastic deterioration in the condition of the indigenous population. The end of the control exercised by the London government swept away the last obstacles to the expansionistic march of the white colonists. Already harboured by Jefferson, and then explicitly and brutally formulated by the Monroe administration (the natives of the East must clear off the land, ‘whether or not they agree, whether or not they become civilized’), the idea of deporting the Indians became a tragic reality with the Jackson Presidency:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg40&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by ‘civilian volunteers,’ invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The ‘civilian volunteers’ appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the ‘trail of tears,’ as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: ‘Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The black slave and the white servant: from Grotius to Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While it stimulated the development of racial chattel slavery and created an unprecedented, unbridgeable gulf between whites and peoples of colour, the self-government of civil society triumphed, waving the flag of liberty and the struggle against despotism. Between these two elements, which emerged together during a unique twin birth, a relationship full of tensions and contradictions was established. Such a celebration of liberty, which was bound up with the reality of an unprecedented absolute power, can clearly be interpreted as an ideology. But however mystificatory it might be, ideology is never null. In fact, its mystificatory function cannot even be conceived without some incidence in concrete social reality. And still less can ideology be regarded as synonymous with conscious falsehood. Were that to be the case, it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence. The theorists and agents of the liberal revolutions and movements were moved by a powerful, convinced pathos of liberty; and precisely for that reason, they displayed embarrassment at the reality of slavery. Obviously, in a majority of cases, such embarrassment did not push them to the point of questioning the ‘property’ on which the wealth and social influence of the class protagonist in the struggle for the self-government of civil society were based. As regards England, the course was taken that removed slavery in the strict sense to a geographical area remote from the metropolis, situated at the edge of the civilized world, where, precisely on account of the proximity and pressure of barbarous circumstances, the spirit of liberty was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg41&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not manifested in all its purity, unlike in England proper—the true homeland, the promised land of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, this was a conclusion reached via a route marked by oscillations and contradictions of various kinds. In Grotius the colour barrier is not yet visible that separates the fate reserved for blacks from the condition to which the poorest layers of the white population can be subjected. We read: ‘perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his Life long, for Diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood, and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it. However, slavery was not the only form of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, but only the ‘most ignoble … Kind of Subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectionis species ignobilissima&#039;&#039;).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There was also &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039;, peculiar, among others, to serfs and &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, labour as such was subsumed under the category of ‘service’ (&#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;) or ‘subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectio&#039;&#039;). Obviously, there is a difference between the two forms of ‘service’ and ‘subjection’. While it violated ‘natural reason’ or ‘the Rules of full and compleat Justice’—i.e. the norms of morality—on the basis of the legislation in force in some countries the master could kill his slave with impunity and hence exercise a right of life and death over him.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was something not found in the sphere of &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; and the labour relationship that employed &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a particular &#039;&#039;species&#039;&#039; of the single &#039;&#039;genus&#039;&#039; that is service or subjection. The boundary between the various species is fluid. For example, of the ‘apprentices [&#039;&#039;apprenticii&#039;&#039;] in England’, it was to be noted that they ‘come nearest to the State of Slavery, during their Apprenticeship’—that is to say, to the condition of slaves proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, by way of atoning for a crime one could be condemned to labour and to render one’s services either as a slave or as an individual subjected to some form of ‘imperfect slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with Grotius, Locke was concerned to distinguish more rigorously between the various kinds of service. Elements of continuity are certainly not lacking. Speaking of wage-labour and the contract that establishes it, the English philosopher wrote: ‘a free man makes himself a servant to another’. As we can see, labour as such continues to be subsumed under the category of service. In fact, the contract introduces the wage-labourer ‘into the family &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg42&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof’. This discipline was in fact very different from the unlimited power that characterized the relationship of slavery and defined the ‘perfect condition of slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Grotius’ distinction between &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; reappears in broad outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Locke urges us not to confuse servant and slave. Grotius compared the slave to a &#039;&#039;‘perpetual Hireling’&#039;&#039;, or a wage-labourer bound for the duration of his natural term to the same master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Locke stressed that we are dealing with two different statuses. In addition to being ‘temporary’, the power exercised by the master over a servant ‘is no greater than what is contained in the contract between them’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, on the one hand, this made the condition of the servant better, on the other, it rendered that of the slave proper manifestly worse. Shaking off the moral inhibitions of Grotius, who called on the master to respect not only the life but also the specificity of his slave, Locke endlessly stressed that the master exercises over the slave an ‘absolute dominion’ and ‘absolute power’, a ‘legislative power of life and death’, an ‘arbitrary power’ encompassing ‘life’ itself.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the slave tends to lose his human characteristics and become reduced to a thing and a chattel, as emerges in particular from the reference to the planters of the East Indies who possess ‘slaves or horses’ on the basis of a regular ‘purchase’, and this ‘by bargain and money’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Without any hint of criticism, Locke engaged in a conjunction that signifies a firm, indignant denunciation in abolitionist literature. This applies to Mirabeau, who (as we shall see) compared the condition of American slaves with ‘our horses and our mules’; and to Marx, who observed in &#039;&#039;Capital:&#039;&#039; ‘The slave-owner buys his worker in the same way as he buys his horse.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke marks a turning point theoretically. Sometimes freed by their masters, blacks slaves were long subjected to a condition not markedly dissimilar from that of indentured servants—that is, temporary white semi-slaves on a contractual basis. And it is this ambiguity that finds expression in the text of Grotius, who can hence also apply the category of contract to &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039;. In Locke, by contrast, we can read the development which chattel slavery and racial &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg43&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery began to undergo from the late seventeenth century. A whole series of English colonies in America enacted laws intended to make it clear that the slave’s conversion did not entail his emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke expressed himself thus in 1660 when, referring to Paul of Tarsus, he asserted that ‘conversion did not dissolve any of those obligations they were tied in before … the gospel continued them in the same condition and under the same civil obligations [under which] it found them. The married were not to leave their consorts, nor the servant freed from his master.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In complete conformity with this theoretical position, in the draft Carolina Constitution Locke reiterated the irrelevance of possible conversion to Christianity for the condition of the slave. And, once again, the element of novelty emerges. Although rejecting an abolitionist interpretation of Christianity, Grotius repeatedly appealed to Christian literature to underscore the common humanity of servant and master, both of them subject to the Father in Heaven, and hence in a relationship with each another that was in some sense one of fraternity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; is concerned, instead, to make it clear that the principle of equality applies exclusively to ‘creatures of the same species and rank’, only if ‘the lord and master of them all should [not], by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were burdened by the curse which, according to the Old Testament story, Noah had uttered against Ham and his descendants. This ideological motif, often invoked by defenders of the institution of slavery, seems also to find some echo in Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt: the English liberal philosopher legitimized the racial slavery that was being established in the politico-social reality of the time. Subject to ever more onerous conditions, the practice of emancipation tended to disappear; while, together with the neutralization of religion and baptism, laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital relations sanctioned the insurmountable character of the boundary between whites and blacks. At this point the category of contract can serve to explain only the figure of the servant, while the slave is such as a result of right of war (more precisely, just war, of which Europeans engaged in colonial conquests are protagonists), or of a divine ‘manifest declaration’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg44&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In order to clarify the difference between ‘the perfect condition of slavery’ and that of the indentured servant, Locke referred to the Old Testament, which provides for permanent, hereditary slavery only for gentiles, excluding from it servants who are blood relations of the Hebrew master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Old Testament line of demarcation between Hebrews and gentiles is configured in Locke as the line of demarcation between whites and blacks: servants of European origin are not subject to ‘perfect slavery’, which is intended for blacks and repressed to the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The pathos of liberty and unease about the institution of slavery: the case of Montesquieu&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal unease over slavery found what is perhaps its most acute expression in Montesquieu, who devoted some memorable pages to a critique of the institution. The reasons traditionally adduced by ‘jurists’ in justification of slavery were ‘not sensible’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was pointless trying to find others: ‘If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would say: The peoples of Europe, having exterminated those of America, had to make slaves of those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ Yet this condemnation, so ringing and seemingly unequivocal, soon gave way to a much more ambiguous discourse: ‘There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement: slavery there runs less counter to reason’. In such cases, while not conforming to abstract reason, slavery was in accord with ‘natural reason’ (&#039;&#039;raison naturelle&#039;&#039;), which took account of climate and concrete circumstances.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] True, Montesquieu observed that ‘there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the tone is uncertain here, much clearer is the assertion that a distinction must be made between those countries where the climate can in some way be an element justifying slavery and those where ‘even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence it is necessary to take cognizance of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ and restrict &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg45&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘natural slavery [&#039;&#039;servitude naturelle&#039;&#039;] … to certain particular countries of the world’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the one hand, Montesquieu endlessly stressed that freedom is an attribute—in fact, a way of living and being—of Nordic peoples, while, on the other, slavery had been ‘naturalized … among the southern peoples’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A general law could be formulated: ‘one must not be surprised that the cowardice of the peoples of hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free. This is an effect that derives from its natural cause.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Prominent in Grotius and Locke, the contrast between metropolis and colonies also emerges in Montesquieu. It is not by chance that in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, rather than being introduced in the books devoted to analysing freedom, the considerations on slavery make their appearance in the context of the discourse on the relationship between climate and laws and customs. The transition from Books XI–XIII, whose subjects are the ‘Constitution’, ‘political freedom’ and ‘freedom’ as such, to Books XIV-XVI, which deal with ‘climate’, despotism and ‘domestic slavery’ (slavery proper), is, at the same time, the transition from Europe—in particular, England—to the non-European world and the colonies. For that very reason, in asserting a climatic justification of slavery, its supporters would have no difficulty in appealing to Montesquieu.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his argument the French philosopher targeted not the theorists of slavery as such, but those who held to the thesis that ‘it would be good if there were slaves among us’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the colonies, it was a question of seeing ‘what the laws ought to do in relation to slavery’. Rather than abolition, Montesquieu’s discourse focused on amending the institution: ‘whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Are those ‘civil laws’ the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; issued some years earlier by Louis XIV, which consecrated black slavery and, at the same time, proposed to regulate it? The language of that document suggests as much. While he reiterated his ‘power’, in the preamble the sovereign asserted his concern for black slaves, who lived in ‘climates infinitely remote from our habitual sojourn’. They were to be guaranteed food and adequate clothing (Articles 22 and 25). And such guarantees, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg46&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;together with any treatment that was necessary, also applied to ‘slaves who are infirm on account of old age, illness or other circumstances, regardless of whether the illness is curable’ (Article 27).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These are concerns that also find expression in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws:&#039;&#039; ‘The magistrate should see to it that the slave is nourished and clothed; this should be regulated by law.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Montesquieu went on to assert that the slave must not be left completely at the mercy of the master’s arbitrary power. The latter might impose a death penalty in his capacity as a ‘judge’, respecting legal ‘formalities’, not as a private person. The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; argued in analogous fashion, providing for sanctions for the master guilty of the arbitrary mutilation or killing of his slave (Articles 42–43).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039; counted the sexual exploitation of female slaves among the main ‘abuses of slavery’: ‘Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness. The laws of modesty are a part of natural right and should be felt by all the nations in the world.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In homage to the precepts of the ‘Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion’, the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; regarded as ‘valid marriages’ those contracted between slaves who professed this religion (Article 8). It banned the separate sale of individual members of the family thus constituted (Article 47) and sought to repress the sexual exploitation of female slaves. A free, single man who had had children by a slave was obliged to marry her and recognize the offspring, who were to be freed together with the mother (Article 9).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further confirming that he intended to amend, rather than abolish, slavery is the fact that Montesquieu, as well as to its ‘abuses’, called attention to the ‘dangers’ it entailed and the ‘precautions’ required to confront them. Particular attention must be paid to the ‘danger of a large number of slaves’ and that represented by ‘armed slaves’. This warranted a recommendation of a general kind: ‘In the moderate state, the humanity one has for slaves will be able to prevent the dangers one could fear from there being too many of them. Men grow accustomed to anything, even to servitude, provided the master is not harsher than the servitude.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his desire to temper colonial slavery, Montesquieu looked for inspiration to the norms promulgated by the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, which in fact had no influence in the English world admired by him. In any case, his condemnation of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg47&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery is sharp only when it also seeks to break in ‘among ourselves’, thereby throwing Europe’s proud self-consciousness about being the exclusive locus of liberty into crisis. Along with despotism, slavery was present in Turkey and the Islamic world, and in Russia (in the form of abject serfdom), and prevailed unchallenged in Africa. But there was no room for it in Europe, or, rather, on metropolitan territory. The discourse relating to the colonies was different and more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Somersett case and the delineation of liberal identity&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Blackstone’s position is close to Montesquieu’s. We are in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘the law of England abhors, and can not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation’; not even its humblest, most base members, not even ‘idle vagabonds’ could be subjected to slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘spirit of liberty’ (argued the great jurist) ‘is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil’ that it could not in any instance permit the presence or spectacle of a relationship that was the concentrated expression of absolute power.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[S]trict slavery’ existed in ‘old Rome’ and continued to flourish in ‘modern Barbary’, but was now incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the English nation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, among the rights enjoyed by free men was free, undisturbed enjoyment of property, including property in slaves, on condition that the latter remained banished to the colonial world. The relationship between master and slave—and this applied to all ‘sorts of servants’, including slaves—was one of the ‘great relations in private life’;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] political authority had no right to intervene in it. And thus, celebration of England as the land of liberty was not perceived by Blackstone as being in contradiction with his reassertion of the black slave’s duty to serve his master. That was a duty which, on the basis of the ‘general principles’ of the ‘laws of England’, did not come to an end even were the ‘heathen negro’ to be converted to Christianity. Not even in that case could the slave stake a claim to ‘liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although recognized, the institution of slavery was, as it were, repressed from the ‘soil’ of England, confined to the border zone between the civilized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg48&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;world and barbarism. But what happened when a white master brought one of his slaves with him from the colonies as movable property? This was the problem raised by an impassioned debate in England in 1772. Turning to the courts, a slave—James Somersett—succeeded in extricating himself from the master who attempted to take him with him, in his capacity as movable property, on his return journey to Virginia. The Chief Justice’s judgment did not challenge the institution of slavery; it limited itself to asserting that ‘colonial laws’ only applied ‘in the colonies’, and hence that slavery had no legal basis in England. Somersett’s counsel eloquently proclaimed: ‘The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.’ But from this principle he deduced the conclusion that it was necessary to avoid an influx of blacks from Africa or America into England. Somersett’s master was held responsible for an assault on the purity of the land of the free, who could not tolerate being confused and mixed up with slaves, rather than a violation of the liberty and dignity of a human being. Not by chance, the 1772 judgment provided the premises for the subsequent deportation to Sierra Leone of blacks who, as loyal subjects of the Crown, sought refuge in England after the victory of the rebel American colonists.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of liberal freedom are beginning to become clear. Authors like Burgh and Fletcher could still be regarded as champions of the cause of liberty by Jefferson, who lived in a situation where black slavery and widespread ownership of land (taken from the Indians) made the project of enslaving white vagrants purely academic. In Europe things were different, as emerges from the interventions of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Those who did not subscribe to the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ began to be regarded as foreign to the emerging liberal party. Starting with Montesquieu and then, more clearly, Blackstone and the judgment in the Somersett case, what characterized the emergent liberal party were two essential points: (1) condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government by civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law; (2) assertion of the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, or of the principle on whose basis England—and, prospectively, Europe—possessed ‘too pure’ an air to be able to tolerate the presence of slaves on its ‘soil’. The second point is no less essential than the first. The legitimation of ‘slavery among ourselves’ would involve the dispersion of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg49&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand for self-government by civil society, or the self-government of the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. ‘We won’t be their Negroes’: the colonists’ rebellion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But the metropolis/colonies opposition, with its tendential exclusion of the latter from the sacred space of civilization and liberty, was bound to provoke a reaction from the colonists. Independently of particular concrete political and social demands, what was wounded was their self-consciousness. The metropolis seemed to be assimilating the American colonies to the ‘modern Barbary’ denounced by Blackstone; it seemed to be degrading them to a sort of dustbin, where the metropolitan rejects or prison population were dumped. The inmates of the mother country’s prisons were deported across the Atlantic to supply, along with blacks from Africa, the more or less forced labour required by it. According to the observation of the English abolitionist David Ramsay, slavery continued to survive in the region of the confines of the civilized world—namely, the West—‘where [its] proper religion and laws are not deemed to be in full force; and where individuals too often think themselves loosened from ties, which are binding in the mother country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If it saved the metropolis’s honour as the privileged site of liberty, despite the persistence of slavery on its extreme periphery, this view was wrong in the colonists’ view, because it confounded and assimilated free Englishmen, prison rabble and people of colour. In this way, lamented James Otis, a prominent supporter of the liberal revolution underway, one forgot that the colonies had been founded not ‘with a compound mixture of &#039;&#039;English, Indian and Negro&#039;&#039;, but with freeborn &#039;&#039;British white&#039;&#039; subjects’. Even more swingeing was Washington, who warned that the American colonists felt ‘as miserably oppressed as our own blacks’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having repeated that the American colonists could boast a lineage not less noble and deserving of liberty than the metropolitan English, John Adams exclaimed with reference to the rulers in London: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’![[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Quite apart even from the problem of representation, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free was perceived as an intolerable exclusion. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#page50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#pg50&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the other hand, the colonists, in demanding equality with the dominant British class, widened the gulf that separated them from blacks and Indians. While in London the zone of civilization was distinguished from the zone of barbarism, the sacred space from the profane, primarily by opposing the metropolis to the colonies, the American colonists were led to identify the boundary line principally in ethnic identity and skin colour. On the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Act, only whites could become citizens of the United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from a spatial delimitation of the community of the free to an ethnic and racial one brought with it combined, contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and dis-emancipation. Whites, even the poorest among them, also came within the sacred space; they found themselves forming part of the community or race of the free, albeit situated at inferior levels. White slavery disappeared, condemned by New York polite society as ‘contrary to … the idea of liberty this country has so happily established’. But the tendential emancipation of poor whites was only the other side of the coin of further dis-emancipation of blacks. The condition of the black slave deteriorated by virtue of no longer being, as in colonial America, one of several systems of unfree labour.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Virginia (and other states) land and black slaves were given to veterans of the War of Independence, in recognition of their contribution to the cause of the struggle against despotism;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the tendential social rise of poor whites coincided with the consummate de-humanization of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Racial slavery and the further deterioration in the condition of the ‘free’ black&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only a question of slaves. The triumph of the ethnic delimitation of the community of the free was bound seriously to affect the condition of those blacks who were notionally free. They were now struck by a series of measures that tended to render the colour line, the demarcation between the race of the free and the race of slaves, inviolable. Blacks not subject to slavery began to be perceived as an anomaly that would sooner or later have to be rectified. Their condition at the end of the eighteenth century was summed up by one of them in Boston, referring both to strictly legal forms of oppression and to the insults &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg51&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and threats which, while not legal, were widely tolerated by authority: ‘we may truly be said to carry our lives in our hands, and the arrows of death are flying about our heads’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is a description that might seem unduly emotive. But we should attend to de Tocqueville:&lt;br /&gt;
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The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On close inspection, it can be said of ‘emancipated Negroes’ that ‘their situation with regard to the Europeans is not unlike that of the Indians’. In fact, in some respects, they were ‘still more to be pitied’. In any event, they were ‘deprived of their rights’ and ‘exposed to the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of the people’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condition of blacks not reduced to slavery was no different and no better as one moved from South to North. In fact (de Tocqueville pitilessly observed), ‘the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condition of the notionally free black was distinguished from that of the slave, but perhaps even more from that of the genuinely free white. Only thus can we explain the danger that constantly threatened him of being reduced to conditions of slavery, and the temptation that periodically emerged among whites—for example, in Virginia after the slave revolt or attempted revolt of 1831—to deport the entire population of free blacks to Africa or elsewhere. The latter were anyhow obliged to register, and could only change residence with the permission of the local authorities; they were presumed to be slaves and detained until they managed to prove otherwise. The despotism exercised over slaves was bound to affect, in one way or another, the population of colour as a whole. This was explained in 1801 by the postmaster general in the Jefferson administration, in a letter in which he recommended to a Georgian senator that blacks and men of colour be excluded from the postal service. ‘Everything which tends to increase their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg52&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain and line of intelligence’ was extremely dangerous. Even the communication of feelings and ideas must be blocked or impeded by all possible means. In fact, the situation in Virginia immediately after the 1831 revolt was described as follows by a traveller: ‘Military service [by white patrols] is performed night and day, Richmond resembles a town besieged … the negroes … will not venture to communicate with one another for fear of punishment.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Spatial and racial delimitation of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The American Revolution threw into crisis the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which seemed established within the liberal movement. Now, far from being confined to the colonies, slavery acquired a new visibility and centrality in a country with a culture, religion and language of European origin, which conversed with European countries as an equal and in fact claimed a kind of primacy in embodying the cause of liberty. Declared legally void in England in 1772, the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like ‘niggers’. There thus emerged a country characterized by ‘a fixed and direct tie between slave ownership and political power’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as strikingly revealed both by the Constitution and the number of slave-owners who acceded to its highest institutional office.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did the platform of the liberal party shape up in a country which, like late-eighteenth-century England, could also boast of having air ‘too pure’ for it to be breathed by slaves? In fact, in the United States as well the ambition to retrieve the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ continued to make itself heard. Albeit utterly fancifully, Jefferson harboured the idea of re-deporting the blacks to Africa. However, in the new situation that had been created, the project of transforming the North American republic into a land inhabited exclusively by freemen proved difficult to implement. It would be necessary seriously to infringe the right, possessed by genuinely free persons, to enjoy their property without external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg53&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;interference! So, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a movement (the American Colonization Society) emerged that contrived a new way out: it was proposed to persuade the owners, by appealing to their religious feelings and also employing economic incentives, to free or sell their slaves, who, along with all the other blacks, would be sent to Africa to colonize it and convert it to Christianity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, without infringing the property rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution, it would have been possible to transform the United States into a land inhabited exclusively by free (and white) men.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a project doomed to fail from the outset. For a start, the acquisition of the slaves by the Union presupposed mobilizing enormous financial resources, and hence the imposition of high taxes. Expelled from the door in the shape of enforced expropriation, imposed from above, of the human cattle owned by the colonists, the spectre of despotic interference with private property by political power ended up arrogantly breaking in through the window as the taxation required to induce owners willingly to surrender their slaves, through a profitable sales contract. Moreover, taken as a whole, the class of planters had no intention of abandoning the source not only of its wealth, but also of its power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation in the North was different. Here slaves were small in number and performed no essential economic function. Abolishing slavery, but at the same time adhering to the federal order that legitimized and guaranteed it in the South, the northern states seemed to want to give a new lease of life in the new situation to the compromise we have already encountered. Without being abolished, the institution whose presence constituted a kind of ironic counterpoint to the claim to be champions of the cause of liberty was banished to the deep South. In fact, four states (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Oregon) strictly prohibited access into their territories by blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They thus avoided being contaminated by the presence not only of slaves, but also of blacks as such. This ban was the equivalent of the measure whereby, in the aftermath of the Somersett case, England deported to Sierra Leone blacks who not only were free, but also had the merit of having fought against the rebel colonists on behalf of the Empire. Nevertheless, even in the North of the United States, although it had been abolished, slavery had achieved the recognition it lacked in England, as demonstrated in particular by the constitutional provision that required the return of escaped slaves to their legitimate owners, in an indirect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg54&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sanction of the institution of slavery in states which were formally free. This was a point to which a representative of the South smugly drew attention: ‘We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly, in the United States as a whole the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which was more than ever reiterated across the Atlantic, had fallen into crisis. How had such a result been arrived at? Let us return to Burke. In asserting that the ‘spirit of freedom’ and the ‘liberal’ vision found their most consummate embodiment in the slave-owners of the southern colonies, he added that the colonists formed an integral part of the nation ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, of ‘the chosen race and sons of England’: it was a question of ‘pedigree’, in the face of which ‘human art’ was powerless.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here, as we can see, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free, which is the principle on which late-eighteenth-century liberal England was based, seems to be on the point of transmuting into a racial delimitation. And hence, in Calhoun and ideologists of the slaveholding South in general, a tendency already present in Burke comes to fruition. Having been spatial, the line of demarcation of the community of the free ends up becoming racial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, there was no insurmountable barrier between the two types of delimitation. In 1845 John O’Sullivan, popular theorist of the providential ‘manifest destiny’ that put wind in the sails of US expansion, sought to assuage abolitionists’ concerns about the introduction of slavery into Texas (wrested from Mexico and on the point of being annexed to the Union) with a significant argument. It was precisely its temporary extension that created the conditions for abolition of the ‘the slavery of an inferior to a superior race’, and hence ‘furnished much probability of the ultimate disappearance of the negro race from our borders’. At the appropriate time, the ex-slaves would be driven further south, into the ‘only receptacle’ appropriate for them. In Latin America the population of mixed blood, which had formed following the fusion of the Spaniards with the natives, would easily be able to accommodate the blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The racial delimitation of the community would then give way to a territorial delimitation. The end of slavery would, at the same time, entail the end of the presence of blacks in the land of liberty. Despite the abolitionists’ cry of alarm, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg55&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the concentration of slaves in a zone immediately proximate to territories that were fundamentally foreign to the zone of civilization and liberty pushed in this direction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For some time Lincoln harboured the idea of deporting the blacks, likewise regarded by him as ultimately alien to the community of the free, from the United States to Latin America after their emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, having confronted one another for decades, what clashed during the Civil War were the causes not of liberty and slavery, but precisely two different delimitations of the community of the free: the opposed parties accused one another of not knowing how, or not wanting, to delimit the community of the free effectively. To those who brandished the spectre of racial contamination as an inevitable consequence of the abolition of slavery, Lincoln replied by emphasizing that in the United States the overwhelming majority of ‘mulattoes’ were the result of sexual relations between white masters and their black slaves: ‘slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation’. For the rest, he had ‘no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races’, or to recognize the right of blacks to participate in political life or hold public office or perform the role of jury member. Lincoln declared himself well aware, like any other white man, of the radical difference between the two races and the supremacy of the whites.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The crisis took a decisive step towards breaking-point following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Dred Scott case in summer 1857: ‘like an ordinary article of merchandise and property’, a black slave’s legitimate owner had the right to take him with him in any part of the Union.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Lincoln’s reaction: the country could not remain permanently divided, ‘half &#039;&#039;slave&#039;&#039; and half &#039;&#039;free’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In contrast to the England of the Somersett case, the North of the United States could not pose as a land of the free whose air was ‘too pure’ to be breathed by a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The transition from the spatial delimitation to the racial delimitation of the community of the free henceforth made it impossible to repress the reality of slavery. There was now no alternative to the condemnation of this institution except its explicit defence or celebration. As the conflict dividing the two sections of the Union emerged more clearly, the South’s ideologues all the more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg56&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;provocatively mocked the circumlocutions and linguistic interdictions that had facilitated the Philadelphia compromise of 1787. ‘Negro slavery’, declared John Randolph, was a reality that ‘the Constitution has vainly attempted to blink, by not using the term’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the lifting of this taboo, the legitimation of slavery lost the timidity that had previously characterized it, assuming a defiant tone. Having been a necessary evil, slavery became (in the words of Calhoun with which we are familiar) a ‘positive good’. It made no sense to try to repress it as something to be ashamed of; in reality, it was the very foundation of civilization. Throwing into crisis the pathos of liberty that had presided over the foundation of the United States, and in a way de-legitimizing the very War of Independence, this new attitude helped make the clash between North and South inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. The Civil War and the resumption of the controversy initiated with the American Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, while the abolitionists adopted the arguments used during the American War of Independence by the British and the loyalists in their polemic against the South, the theorists of the South used arguments deployed by the rebel colonists. We have seen O’Sullivan, a New York lawyer and journalist, regard the South, bordering as it was on Mexico and Latin America, as the best place to deposit the blacks temporarily, pending their emancipation and deportation from the United States. Hence the South was a territory by no means uncontaminated by the barbarism of the blacks who lived there as slaves. Cohabitation with blacks, and sexual contamination, attested by a high number of mulattos—the abolitionist Theodore Parker piled it on—had also left profound traces on southern whites; it was precisely the influence of the ‘African element’ that explained attachment to an institution contrary to the principles of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And just as pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America had done, so too the South protested against the tendential exclusion, of which it felt itself the victim, from the authentic community of the free. It was now no longer the American colonies in their entirety, but the southern states that considered themselves assimilated to the ‘modern Barbary’ mentioned by Blackstone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg57&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Along with the one just noted, further aspects of the legal argument reappeared that had opposed the rebel colonists to England. In Calhoun’s view, the abolitionists of the North, who wanted to abolish slavery by a federal law, were riding roughshod over the right of each individual state to self-government, and seeking to found the Union on political slavery, on ‘the bond between master and slave’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Naturally, the North reacted by ironizing about this impassioned defence of liberty by the ‘democratic’, slaveholding South. To understand the latter’s subsequent response, we can return for a moment to Franklin. Replying to his English interlocutors, who scoffed at the flag of liberty waved by the rebel colonists and slave-owners, he did not limit himself to recalling the Crown’s interest and involvement in the slave trade. He also employed a second argument, drawing attention to the fact that slavery and servitude had not disappeared across the Atlantic. In particular, coalminers in Scotland were ‘absolute Slaves by your law’; they were ‘bought and sold with the Colliery, and have no more Liberty to leave it than our Negroes have to leave their Master’s Plantation’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The authors of the denunciation of black slavery were responsible for a white slavery that was certainly no better than the one they condemned so vehemently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, on the occasion of the conflict which had been brewing for decades and reached breaking-point with the Civil War, the South retorted in two ways to the accusations against it. It stressed that the North and abolitionist Britain were not in a position to give lectures even on the way blacks (and peoples of colour in general) were treated; and it pointed out how much slavery survived in an industrial society notionally based on ‘free’ labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us focus for now on the first point. Already during the Philadelphia Convention, the slave-owners rejected the lectures given them in the name of morality, pointing out that the North derived major benefits from the institution of slavery, since its merchant shipping transported the slaves and the commodities produced by them.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1808 the ban on the ‘immigration or introduction’ of black slaves provided for by the federal Constitution had come into effect. But it remained the case (observed the ideologues of the South) that blacks in the North, in addition to suffering the poverty and oppression that were the lot of the poor in general there, were exposed to maltreatment and violence of every kind, as demonstrated by the periodic outbreak of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg58&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;veritable pogroms. Even more repugnant (stressed Calhoun, in particular, in the years leading up to the Civil War) was the hypocrisy of Britain (the country which, having abolished slavery in its colonies, had become the model for the American abolitionists).’[T]he greatest slave dealer on earth’, the country ‘more responsible than any other … for the extent of that form of servitude’ in the American continent, then engaged in waving the banner of abolitionism, with a view to attracting the lucrative production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and coffee to its colonies and ruining potential competitors.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, what results had the putative emancipation of the slaves produced in the English colonies? The condition of the blacks was in no wise improved; in their case, freedom was more of a mirage than ever, while ‘the supremacy of the European race’ continued to be undisputed.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Inevitably, when ‘two races of men, of different color’, and markedly unequal in terms of culture and civilization, tried to live together, the inferior race was destined for subjection.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The very country that elevated itself into champion of the struggle against slavery distinguished itself in completely the opposite direction: not only did it use the labour of ‘slaves’ in India and other colonies, but it ‘[held] in unlimited subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million human beings, dispersed over every part of the globe’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We find an even more explicit reference to the lot of the coolies in another eminent representative of the South, George Fitzhugh. Arraigned once again was Britain, which lauded itself for having abolished slavery in its colonies. In reality, the ‘temporary slaves’ from Asia who had taken the place of the blacks, ‘if not worked to death before their terms of service expire’, subsequently died of starvation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its main lines, the controversy that developed on the eve and in the course of the Civil War reproduced and resumed the one that had occurred some decades earlier, during the clash between the two shores of the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Liberal system of policy’, ‘liberality of sentiment’ and the institution of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the spread of the political use of the term ‘liberal’ in its various senses, we must remember two reference points. The first is the proud self-consciousness &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg59&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that matured in the wake of the victory achieved during the Seven Years’ War over the France of monarchical and religious absolutism, which was subsequently reinforced in England by the outcome of the Somersett case. The second is the struggles that developed within the community of the free. When the controversy provoked by the agitation of the rebel colonists erupted, the various positions confronting one another all tended to define themselves as in some sense ‘liberal’. Burke sought to promote conciliation, calling upon ‘the liberal government of this free nation’ to evince a spirit of compromise.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Across the Atlantic, at the moment when the United States was founded, Washington emphasized ‘the benefits of a wise and liberal Government’, or a ‘liberal system of policy’, which asserted itself ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, and which had as its basis ‘the free cultivation of Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce’, or ‘liberal and free commerce’, ‘the progressive refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment’, with the prevalence of a ‘liberal sentiment’ of tolerance also regarding relations between ‘every political and religious denomination of men in this country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hitherto the term ‘liberal’ has occurred solely as an adjective. In other contexts, adjective and substantive are interchangeable: ‘every Liberal Briton’ (wrote the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039; in 1798) rejoiced at the problems facing revolutionary, tyrannical France, which had to confront the difficult situation created by the uprising of the black slaves in San Domingo.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, the term in question made its appearance as a noun: signing himself ‘A Liberal’ was the author (possibly Paine) of an article in the &#039;&#039;Pennsylvania Packet&#039;&#039; of 25 March 1780, which came out for the abolition of slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here we have four interventions, which share a liberal profession of faith, but with orientations that are fairly diverse as regards black slavery. In Europe, while stances in favour of it were not wanting, a critical orientation was prevalent: a more or less clear distance tended to be taken from the institution that had had to be repressed to the colonies, in order to confer credibility on the self-consciousness developed by the community of the free. &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;—Adam Smith’s masterpiece, which appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson, a pre-eminent representative &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg60&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Virginia’s planters and slave-owners—observed that the ‘liberal reward of labour’, with the payment of a wage that the ‘free servant’ and ‘free man’ could freely dispose of, was the only thing likely to stimulate individual industry; while economic stagnation was the result of servile labour, whether serfdom or slavery proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Millar regarded the institution of slavery as in contradiction with ‘the liberal sentiments entertained in the latter part of the eighteenth century’, with the ‘more liberal views’ developed in the modern world.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going still further, the great economist’s disciple declared that credibility could be restored to the ‘liberal hypothesis’ only by avoiding its confusion with those who waved the flag of liberty while preserving and, in fact, developing the practice of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Across the Atlantic, by contrast, defence of that institution was much fiercer. Yet it would be mistaken to construct a clear-cut opposition. It is sufficient to reflect on the fact that the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South was, in the first instance, Burke. In 1832 an influential Virginian ideologue, Thomas R. Dew, lauded the advantages of slavery: ‘the menial and low offices’ were reserved for blacks, so that love of liberty and the ‘republican spirit’, peculiar to free, white citizens, flourished with a purity and vigour unknown in the rest of the United States, and had a precedent only in classical antiquity. But in saying this, Dew appealed to Burke and his thesis that, where slavery flourished, the spirit of liberty developed more abundantly.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, the theorist of the slaveholding South indirectly adopted and subscribed to the British Whig’s ‘liberal’ profession of faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In subsequent decades, during the struggle against the North, which was initially political and then military, the slaveholding South could count on many friends in liberal England. A few years before the Civil War, the arguments of the southern ideologues were explicitly echoed by Benjamin Disraeli. With the abolition of slavery in British and French colonies behind him, he characterized the abolition of slavery as ‘a narrative of ignorance, injustice, blundering, waste, and havoc, not easily paralleled in the history of mankind’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In America, if they mixed with the blacks, the whites ‘would become so deteriorated that their states would probably be reconquered and regained by the aborigines’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Would the abolition of slavery in the United States not encourage this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg61&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;admixture, imparting a novel dignity to it? Later, the secessionist Confederacy’s desperate struggle met with a profoundly sympathetic echo from prominent cultural and political representatives of liberal England, provoking the indignation of John Stuart Mill.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the occasion first of the Somersett case, then of the American Revolution and finally of the Civil War, the liberal world appeared profoundly divided over the problem of slavery. How are we to find our bearings in this seeming chaos?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. From the assertion of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ to the condemnation of slavery as such&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We are trying to answer the question we posed at the beginning: Can authors like Fletcher and Calhoun be considered liberals? In the liberal England derived from the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher could calmly demand the introduction of slavery for vagrants without being in any way isolated, just as Hutcheson and Burgh, who expressed more or less similar positions, were not isolated. While Hutcheson was the master of Smith, Fletcher was in correspondence with Locke and enjoyed, along with Burgh, the respect of Jefferson and the circles close to him. These were the years when, as Hume put it, ‘[s]ome passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty … cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution [slavery]’, which accounted for the grandeur of Athens and Rome.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, with the establishment of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, the positions expressed by Fletcher ceased to be, or ceased to be accepted as, liberal. It is true that they took a long time to die. As late as 1838, a German liberal reported the ‘advice, certainly more hinted at than clearly stated, which would wish to find a remedy for the serious danger [represented by an unprecedented and acute social question] in the introduction of veritable slavery for factory workers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it was a suggestion rejected with disdain: the line of demarcation of the liberal ‘party’ had been drawn for a while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar argument can be advanced in connection with Calhoun. In his view, it was the North that was guilty of betraying the liberal principles which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg62&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had inspired the American Revolution. In fact, ‘the defence of human liberty against the aggressions of despotic power had always been most efficient in States where domestic slavery was found to prevail’. Within the Union, it was the South that had ‘constantly inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was in the South that liberalism found its most authentic and mature expression. The term ‘liberal’ (warned John Randolph, sometimes defined as the ‘American Burke’), which originally meant ‘a man attached to enlarged and free principles—a votary of liberty’, would see its true meaning twisted if it had to be used to refer to those who flirted with abolitionism.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A contemporary liberal might be tempted to be shot of the unmanageable presence within the tradition of thought he refers to of an author like Burke, who celebrated the particular intensity of the liberal spirit and love of liberty among slave-owners; or of an author like Calhoun, who in the nineteenth century still hymned the ‘positive good’ that was slavery. And so both of them are officially included in the conservative party. However, such an operation immediately reveals its groundlessness. The category of conservatism is characterized by formalism, in the sense that it can subsume significantly different contents: it is a question of identifying what it is intended to conserve or guard. And there is no doubt that Burke and Calhoun aimed to be vigilant guardians of the social relations and political institutions which emerged, respectively, from the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—two eminently liberal revolutions. It would make no sense to regard Jefferson and Washington as liberals, but this is not the case with Burke—who, unlike them, was not a slaveowner and who, when he celebrated the ‘liberal spirit’ and ‘liberal’ emphasis of the slaveholding South, had in mind precisely figures like these two Virginian statesmen. As late as 1862 Lord Acton cited at length, and implicitly subscribed to, the passage by the British Whig who, far from excluding slave-owners, conferred on them a privileged position in the party of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be just as illogical to exclude from that party Calhoun, who tirelessly reiterated his attachment to representative bodies and the principle of the limitation of power. If, then, going beyond the merely formal meaning of the term, conservatism is to be understood as an uncritical attachment to a pre-modern, pre-industrial society, characterized by the cult of clod of earth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg63&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bell tower, such a category could hardly account for Calhoun’s positions. Once the rights of minorities had been guaranteed, he had no problem with extending the vote and even introducing male ‘universal suffrage’; and, along with representative bodies, he celebrated the development of ‘manufactures’, industry and free trade.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If to anyone, the category of conservatism might be applied to Jefferson. He identified cultivators of the land as ‘the chosen people of God’, assimilated ‘great cities’ to the ‘sores’ of a ‘human body’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1812, during the war with Britain, accused the latter of being an instrument of ‘Satan’ because it had compelled America to abandon the ‘paradise’ of agriculture and engage in ‘manufacturing’, in order to meet the test of arms (see [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). And the category of conservatism might also be applied to Washington. He too viewed with concern the prospect that the Americans might become ‘a manufacturing people’, rather than continuing to be ‘Cultivators’ of the land, thereby avoiding the scourge of the ‘tumultuous populace of large cities’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In particular, it is against Jefferson that Calhoun seems to be arguing when he rejects the thesis that manufacture ‘destroy[s] the moral and physical power of the people’. In reality, this was a concern rendered ever more obsolete by ‘the great perfection of machinery’ introduced into industry.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, if acceptance of free trade is an integral part of liberalism, it is clear that Calhoun can be included in such a tradition much more easily than his adversaries in the North, who were engaged in strict protectionist practices liable (according to the southern theorist’s denunciation) to ‘destroy the liberty of the country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Construed in the broadest sense of the term, the liberal party encompassed both Whigs and Tories. The former did not even necessarily represent the more advanced wing. Josiah Tucker was a Tory, who reprehended Locke and Burke for being followers of a ‘republicanism’ based, precisely, upon slavery and serfdom. For the rest, arguing with ‘Republican Zealots’, he liked to position himself among the true interpreters of ‘English constitutional Liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Disraeli was likewise a Tory, who, while on the one hand echoing the arguments of the slaveholding South, on the other significantly widened the social basis of British representative bodies, granting the vote to significant sections of the popular classes and anyway extending it much further than the Whigs had.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg64&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On the other hand, outside the liberal party even before the Civil War were those who, in their concern to save the institution of slavery and indignation at the weapons supplied by representative bodies to an increasingly threatening abolitionist agitation, spoke with Fitzhugh in the southern United States of the ‘collapse of liberal society’, or ironized with Carlyle in Europe itself over ruinous ‘anarchic–constitutional epochs’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although reiterating the absolute necessity of slavery as the foundation of civilization, both ended up challenging, at least on a theoretical level, the ethnic and spatial delimitations of the institution of slavery. For Fitzhugh, as was demonstrated by the examples of classical antiquity and confirmed by the reality of the modern world, work was inseparable from slavery, so that in one form or another ‘slavery, &#039;&#039;black or white&#039;&#039;, was right and necessary’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In justifying the slavery of the Afro-Americans across the Atlantic and branding the Irish ‘black’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carlyle, admired by Fitzhugh and other southerners, and in correspondence with some of them,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in his turn reached a general ‘conclusion’: ‘whether established by law, or by law abrogated, [slavery] exists very extensively in this world, in and out of the West Indies; and … you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the &#039;&#039;name&#039;&#039; of it, which is very little!’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Whether dealing with slaves, ‘servants hired for life’, or &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, it was still slavery. On the other hand, if the slave was a ‘servant hired for life’, why should one prefer the servant hired for a month or a day?[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spurred by the bitterness of the struggle underway, Fitzhugh and Carlyle ultimately returned to the positions of Fletcher, first marginalized and then regarded as alien to the liberal party. The transition from the liberal party’s first turn to the second can be summarized thus: following the defeat of the South, the emancipation of black slaves and amendments to the US Constitution to that effect, a transition was made from asserting the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ in Europe and the ‘free states’ of the northern United States to general condemnation, on both sides of the Atlantic, of slavery as such. Starting from this second result, the positions expressed by Calhoun were also rejected by the liberal party. But that is not a reason to expel him &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg65&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;retrospectively from the liberal tradition. Otherwise, the same fate would have to be meted out to Locke and a fair number of the protagonists of the American Revolution and the early decades of US history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In any event, with the end of the Civil War a historical cycle came to a close. Having emerged together from a unique twin birth, which saw them entwined in a relationship not without its tensions, liberalism as a whole now broke with slavery in the strict sense—with hereditary, racial slavery. But before examining these new courses, it is appropriate to extend our analysis of the society that was established on the two Atlantic shores up to the Civil War. We have hitherto focused attention on the problem of black slavery. But what relations were developing within the white community?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn1a|1]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1997, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn2a|2]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn3a|3]] Quoted in Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn4a|4]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn5a|5]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 123, 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn6a|6]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn7a|7]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn8a|8]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from John Wesley to William Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn9a|9]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn10a|10]] Max Farrand, ed., &#039;&#039;The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, vol. 1, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn11a|11]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn12a|12]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 199–200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn13a|13]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21, 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn14a|14]] Shearer Davis Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn15a|15]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 59–65; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 39 and &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn16a|16]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 38–9; Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 59.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn17a|17]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 49, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn18a|18]] Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn19a|19]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 557, 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn20a|20]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn21a|21]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §28; vol. 3, ch. xiv, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 562–3 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn23a|23]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn24a|24]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 157–8, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn25a|25]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1483.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn26a|26]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn27a|27]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §6; Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn29a|29]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 377.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn30a|30]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, pp. 84–93.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn31a|31]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Tracts on Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Philip Abrams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn32a|32]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn33a|33]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., p. 355.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn42a|42]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 394–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn43a|43]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn45a|45]] The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; is reproduced and commented on in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 89–203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn46a|46]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn49a|49]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 412.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 410–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn54a|54]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 37; David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 231, 472, 495–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn55a|55]] Ramsay, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 387.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn56a|56]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 92, 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn57a|57]] Adams, quoted in David B. Davis, ‘A Big Business’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 11 January 1998, p. 50 n. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn58a|58]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., pp. 19, 32; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn61a|61]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 16–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 367–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn65a|65]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn66a|66]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn67a|67]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 6ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn68a|68]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn69a|69]] Quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;An Imperfect Union&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn70a|70]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 66, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn71a|71]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, pp. 7–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn72a|72]] Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, pp. 254–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn73a|73]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 401, 511–12, 636.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn74a|74]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn75a|75]] Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 426.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn76a|76]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn77a|77]] Parker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 231–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn78a|78]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 436.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn79a|79]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 651.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn80a|80]] Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn81a|81]] Calhoun, quoted in Massimo L. Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà nel mondo moderno&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, pp. 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn82a|82]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn84a|84]] Calhoun, quoted in Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà&#039;&#039;, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn85a|85]] George Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, Richmond: Morris, 1854, pp. 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn86a|86]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn87a|87]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 242, 247, 242 (‘Circular to the States’, 4 June 1783), 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786), 545 (letter to the Hebrew Congregation, January 1790).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn88a|88]] Cf. David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 130.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn89a|89]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 132; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn90a|90]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 98–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn91a|91]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 296, 250.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn92a|92]] Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. II, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn93a|93]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95a|95]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96a|96]] Robert von Mohl, ‘Gwerbe- und Fabrikwesen’, in Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch, eds, &#039;&#039;Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97a|97]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 468, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98a|98]] Randolph, quoted in Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, pp. 63, 43 (for the characterization as ‘the American Burke’).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99a|99]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100a|100]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 35–6, 315.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101a|101]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 290–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102a|102]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, pp. 455 (‘Fragments of the First Discarded Inaugural Address’, April 1789), 554 (letter to La Fayette, 28 July 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103a|103]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 308.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105a|105]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. ix, 12, 96.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106a|106]] Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, ed. Michael K. Goldberg and Jules P. Seigel, Ottawa: Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1983, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107a|107]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, pp. 98, 225; cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12 &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039; and ch. 22, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108a|108]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109a|109]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, p. 286; Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110a|110]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 464–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER THREE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Franklin, Smith and ‘vestiges of slavery’ in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
First the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and then the South of the United States during the conflict that pitted it against the North, accused their opponents of hypocrisy. The latter waxed indignant over black slavery, but shut its eyes to the fact that what were essentially slave relations persisted within the society it held up as a model. As we know, Franklin compared the miners of Scotland to the blacks of the American plantations, and thus challenged the London government’s pretension to elevate itself into a champion of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, this was a polemical intervention, but one whose validity was confirmed by a rather authoritative witness. Although sharing the proud self-consciousness of his compatriots or the ruling class of his country, Adam Smith acknowledged the persistence in Great Britain of ‘vestiges of slavery’: a labour relationship not dissimilar from serfdom was in force in salt works and coalmines. Just as the &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, still very numerous in Eastern Europe, were forcibly bound to the land to be cultivated and sold at the same time as it, so in the country that had left behind the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; some decades earlier, the &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; were in a sense an integral part of the &#039;&#039;opus&#039;&#039; or works (the salt work or mine) and, when this was sold, passed together with their family into the service of the new master. Hence it was not a question of actual slavery, of chattel slavery, which allowed individual members of a family to be put on the market like any other commodity. The &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; could marry and lead a genuine family life; they could own a minimum of property; and, naturally, they did not risk being killed with impunity: ‘their lives are under the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protection of the laws of the land’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it remained the case that in Scotland workers in coalmines and salt works were obliged to wear a collar on which the name of their master was inscribed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the wake of the great economist, Millar too could not but ‘regret … that any species of slavery should still remain in Great Britain’; and it was to be hoped that parliament would intervene to remedy the situation, finally sanctioning ‘the freedom of the labouring people’ in Scottish mines and salt works.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Judging from Smith’s &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, these were ‘the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Does this mean that the other labour relations were based on freedom? Referring to England in the second half of the eighteenth century, Blackstone distinguished between three types of ‘servant’ in the strict sense (we ignore here personnel charged with overseeing and guarding the master’s property): ‘menial servants’ or ‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’, and finally ‘labourers’, who worked outside the master’s house. The most modern labour relation, least informed by feudal and servile echoes, would seem to be the last. In this connection, however, the great jurist indulged in celebrating ‘very good regulations’ on the basis of which, for example, ‘all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work’, while those who ‘leave or desert their work’ were punished. Over the domestic or apprentice, the master exercised a right of ‘corporal punishment’ that must not result in death or mutilation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what happened if this limit was exceeded? We can infer Smith’s answer: ‘The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon or with forethought and without provocation.’ It is difficult to regard such servants as free men even if, according to the great economist, they enjoyed ‘almost the same privileges with their master, liberty, wages, etca’. In fact, what creates a radical difference is the power of correction exercised by the one over the other. The same Smith included menial servants, together with slaves proper, in the master’s extended family.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Masters did not confine themselves to monitoring their servant’s industriousness. Let us attend to Hume’s evidence: ‘At present, all masters discourage &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg69&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the females, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their service.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The opportunity to have a family seems largely denied not only to the black slave, but also to the white domestic servant: the private lives of both were subject to the master’s power or will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it is to be noted that comparable to menial servants were ‘apprentices’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] whose condition, in England at any rate, had been regarded by Grotius as approximating closely enough to the slave’s. And such, basically, was also Blackstone’s opinion. He reiterated the slave’s obligation to provide service ‘for life’ with a rather eloquent argument: fundamentally, it was the same relationship that the apprentice had with his master, except that in the latter case there was a time limit (seven years and sometimes more).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has justly been observed, ‘[f]or most of human history the expression “free labor” was an oxymoron.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The unemployed, beggars and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As the controversy between the two sides of the Union became increasingly bitter, Calhoun positively contrasted the condition of American slaves with that of inmates of workhouses or poorhouses in England. The former were lovingly treated and cared for by the master or mistress during illness or old age, while the latter were reduced to a ‘forlorn and wretched condition’; the former continued to live among their family and friends, while the latter were uprooted from their environment and also separated from their loved ones.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The apologetic intention that governs the description or transfiguration of the institution of slavery is clear. Yet when it came to workhouses in England, Calhoun was not the only one to underscore the horror. In de Tocqueville’s view, they afforded ‘the most horrendous and repugnant [spectacle] of misery’: on the one hand, the infirm incapable of work and waiting to die; on the other, women and children massed pell-mell ‘like pigs in the mud of their sty; it is difficult not to trample over a semi-naked body’. Finally, there were the comparatively more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg70&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘fortunate’—those in a position to work: they earned little or nothing and fed off the leftovers of stately homes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But however horrible, poverty and degradation were not the most significant aspect of workhouses. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe favourably mentioned the example of the workhouse in Bristol, which ‘has been such a Terror to the Beggars that none of [them] will come near the City’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the workhouse was subsequently described by Engels as a total institution: ‘Paupers wear the uniform of the house and are subject to the will of the director without any protection whatsoever’; so that ‘the “morally degenerate” parents cannot influence their children, families are separated; the man is sent to one wing, the woman to another, the children to a third’. Families were broken up, but for the rest all were amassed sometimes to the tune of twelve or sixteen in a single room. Any kind of violence was inflicted on them, not even sparing the elderly and children, and involving particular attention to women. In practice, the inmates of workhouses were treated as ‘objects of disgust and horror placed outside the law and the human community’. Thus was explained the fact, underscored by Engels, that in order to escape the ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ (as they were popularly renamed), ‘inmates of work houses often deliberately make themselves guilty of any crime whatsoever in order to go to prison’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact (add contemporary historians), ‘many indigents preferred to die of hunger and illness’ rather than subject themselves to a workhouse.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the suicide that slaves often resorted to in order to escape their condition. Examined carefully, the 1834 law that shut up anyone requiring assistance in a workhouse in a sense vindicates Calhoun and those who pointed to slavery as the only possible solution to the problem of poverty. Fighting for the new legislation, its inspirer, Nassau William Senior, denounced the fatal contradiction in the rules hitherto in force, which allowed the poor person to enjoy a minimum of assistance for continuing a normal life: ‘The labourer is to be a free agent, but without the hazards of free agency; to be free from the coercion, but to enjoy the assured existence of the slave.’ But ‘unit[ing] the irreconcilable advantages of freedom and servitude’ was utterly absurd: a choice was required.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing thus, the influential economist and liberal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg71&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;theorist, interlocutor and correspondent of Tocqueville, ended up recognizing the substantially slave-like character of the relations obtaining in workhouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Coming as it did in 1834, the new legislation coincided with the emancipation of blacks in the colonies. We can thus understand the irony, on the one hand, of the theorists of the slaveholding South in the United States and, on the other, of the English popular masses faced with a dominant class which, while it lauded itself for having abolished slavery in the colonies, reintroduced it in a different form in the metropolis itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Liberals, vagrants and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have mentioned the role played by Senior in the passing of the 1834 law. But what position did the liberal tradition as a whole adopt towards workhouses and, more generally, the policy of disciplining poverty? According to Locke, it was necessary to intervene thoroughly and drastically in an infected area of society that was constantly expanding. From the age of three, the children of families not in a position to feed them should be sent out to work.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Moreover, it was necessary to intervene with their parents. To discourage the idleness and dissoluteness of vagrants, it was appropriate to proceed in areas frequented by them to ‘the suppressing of superfluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Secondly, begging should be discouraged and restricted. Beggars were obliged to wear a ‘badge’; to oversee them, and prevent them practising their activity outside the permitted area and hours, a special body was provided, the ‘beadles of beggars’, who in their turn were to be controlled by ‘guardians’ so that they performed their task with the requisite diligence and severity. But the whole community was called upon to participate in the beggar hunt, starting with the inhabitants of the house where the wretches had requested charity.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Draconian penalties awaited vagrants who managed to escape this comprehensive control. It was right that those caught asking for alms outside their parish and near a sea port should be pressed into the navy: they were to be ‘punished as deserters’—i.e. with the death penalty—‘if they go on shore without leave; or, when sent on shore, if they either go further, or stay longer, than they have leave’. The other illegal beggars were to be interned in a normal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg72&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse or house of correction. The master ‘shall have no other consideration nor allowance but what their labour shall produce; whom therefore he shall have power to employ according to his discretion’. Once again, this arbitrary power summons up the spectre of slavery. As is confirmed by a further detail: that ‘whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the forgery for the first time that he is found guilty thereof; and the second time, that he shall be transported to the plantations, as in case of felony’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, in the nineteenth century the situation was different. With the 1834 reform, arriving in the workhouses were those who sought to escape death from starvation in some way: the workhouses must be made as odious as possible in order to reduce the number of those who sought refuge in them to a minimum. In this philosophy, which began to take shape with Malthus,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville likewise joined: ‘It is obvious that we must make assistance unpleasant, we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison and render our charity repugnant.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In denouncing this institution, Calhoun referred exclusively to Europe. Yet it was present, in one form or another, in the United States. De Tocqueville referred to it, significantly, in the context of his analysis of the ‘prison system’. Who were the inmates? The answer was clear: ‘The indigent who cannot earn their living by honest work, and those who do not want to.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was therefore understandable that workhouses became particularly crowded at times of crisis:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The fluctuations in industry attract, when favourable, a large number of workers who find themselves without work in times of crisis. Thus we see that vagrancy, which is born of idleness, and stealing, which is invariably the result of vagrancy, are the two crimes that are experiencing the most rapid increase in the current state of society.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crime that led to internment was already identified with unemployment and poverty. Making the judicial decisions, for example in New York, was a functionary who could readily deprive of their liberty those who in his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg73&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;judgment ‘have no means of subsistence’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Protests were understandable: the poor person thus confined ‘regards himself as unfortunate, not culpable; he challenges society’s right violently to force him to do fruitless work and to deal with him against his will’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us return to England. John Stuart Mill was inclined to trivialize the horror of workhouses when he observed: ‘Even the labourer who loses his employment by idleness or negligence, has nothing worse to suffer, in the most unfavourable case, than the discipline of a workhouse’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the liberal philosopher’s opinion can be contrasted with that of modern scholars: once they had entered workhouses, the poor ‘ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’, because they lost ‘the civil right of personal liberty’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was a radical loss: the ‘guardians’ of the workhouses had the discretional power of inflicting the corporal punishment deemed most fitting on inmates.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bentham was decidedly enthusiastic. He tirelessly lauded the benefits of this institution, which he aimed further to perfect, locating the workhouse in a ‘panoptical’ building which allowed the director to exercise secret, total control—that is, to observe every single aspect of the behaviour of the unwitting inmates at any point in time:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What hold can any other manufacturer have upon his workmen, equal to what my manufacturer would have upon his? What other master is there that can reduce his workmen, if idle, to a situation next to starving, without suffering them to go elsewhere? What other master is there, whose men can never get drunk unless he chooses that they should do so? and who, so far from being able to raise their wages by combination, are obliged to take whatever pittance he thinks it most for his interest to allow? … and what other master or manufacturer is there, who to appearance constantly, and in reality as much as he thinks proper, has every look and motion of each workman under his eye?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg74&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence the contribution to the development of national wealth by workhouses, intended to operate as ‘industry-houses’, would be enormous. They were to be spread over the whole national territory, confining up to 500,000 detainees, and in any event ‘all persons, able-bodied or otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of livelihood’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to this gigantic concentration-camp universe, where people would be interned without having committed any crime and without any control by the judiciary, it would be possible to perform the miracle of transforming the ‘dross’ that was the ‘refuse of the population’ into money.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was not all. Given the isolation it entailed, the workhouse made it possible to experiment, as we shall see, with producing a stock of especially industrious and conscientious labourers. Certainly, for such objectives to be achieved, rigorous discipline was required, which must be thoroughly internalized by the detainees in the workhouse:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Soldiers&#039;&#039; wear &#039;&#039;uniforms&#039;&#039;, why not paupers?—those who save the country, why not those who are saved by it? Not the &#039;&#039;permanent&#039;&#039; hands only, but likewise the &#039;&#039;coming-and-going&#039;&#039; hands should wear the uniform while in the house, for order, distinction, and recognition, as well as for tidiness …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The servant as soldier&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, it was Bentham who compared the condition of a workhouse inmate with that of the soldier. But it is appropriate to take a step back. During his residence in London, Franklin, discomfited by his English interlocutors mocking the flag of liberty waved by colonists who were often slave-owners, replied by highlighting, among other things, the persistence in England of slave-like relations even within the armed forces.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The reference was above all to the navy. Let us attend to historians of our day: ‘the men of the fleet were so ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-handled that it was impossible to obtain crews by free enlistment’. Many sought to escape this kind of sequestration, but Great Britain gave chase to them, without hesitating to search American ships and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg75&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;take by force deserters, including those who had become US citizens in the meantime. It was necessary to resort to drastic measures to ensure the functioning of ‘more than 700 warships in commission, with nearly 150,000 sailors and marines’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so, like Franklin before him, we have Calhoun denouncing ‘the slavery of impressed seamen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a common theme in the journalism of the time. In Britain itself, defenders of slavery stressed the analogy between this institution and being pressed into the navy. Both practices were justified by exceptional circumstances—namely, the need to maintain the colonies and the navy, respectively. On the other side, the abolitionist Sharp condemned both practices.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, William Wilberforce sought to make distinctions, and was accused of hypocrisy by his opponents:[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the pious pastor was moved by the condition of black slaves, but was indifferent to the no less grievous suffering of the kind of white slaves on whom the British Empire’s military power and glory were based. The argument was far from trivial. Sailors were ‘seized by press gangs from the streets of London and Liverpool’; and at a popular level no institution was more hated than the press gang.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conditions to which men were then subjected can be readily be inferred from Locke’s indirect comparison between the power of ‘the captain of a galley’ and that exercised by ‘a lord over his slave’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The capture of sailors in popular districts had something in common with the capture of blacks in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it was not only the navy. A contemporary scholar summarizes the condition of those military ‘captives in uniform’ who were soldiers, called upon to defend a rapidly expanding empire in every corner of the world:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk and culture of origin for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they might &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg76&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were apt to die prematurely anyway.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For the rest, the way Locke described ‘the common practice of martial discipline’ is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]he preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This above all calls to mind the ‘absolute power of life and death’ wielded by officers over their subordinates. It is the phrase Locke habitually used to define the essence of slavery. Is it a rhetorical exaggeration? Already in Grotius we find the observation that the condition of the slave is not very different from that of the soldier.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us concentrate on liberal England. The mortality rate of soldiers en route to India was comparable to that affecting black slaves during their deportation from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Moreover, British soldiers were subject to the punishment traditionally reserved for slaves—flogging—and, paradoxically, continued to be even when this form of discipline had been abolished for Indian troops.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Power relations in the army reproduced those existing in society. The figure of the soldier tended to coincide with that of the servant. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe observed: ‘any Man would carry a Musket rather than starve … ’tis Poverty makes Men Soldiers, and drives Crowds into the Armies’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At the end of the century, Townsend reiterated that ‘distress and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg77&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;poverty’ alone could impel ‘the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean, or in the field of battle’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, to put the point this time with Mandeville, ‘[t]he Hardships and Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the Brunt of every Thing’—namely, ‘the working slaving People’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the figure of the officer tended to coincide with that of the master, and the contempt officers/masters had for troops was professed and even ostentatious. Troops of the line (lamented an ordinary soldier) were ‘the lowest class of animals, and only fit to be ruled with the cat o’ nine tails’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—that is, with the whip capable of inflicting the most sadistic punishments, those usually reserved for disobedient slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The penal code, formation of a compulsory workforce, and the process of colonization&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of military recruitment is thus understandable: prisons were ‘rumag’d for Malefactors’; the profession of soldier (observed Defoe) above all devolved on ‘Men taken from the Gallows’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, there were plenty of them. From 1688 to 1820, the number of crimes carrying the death penalty increased from 50 to between 200 and 250, and they were almost always crimes against property. While attempted homicide was regarded as a petty crime until 1803, the theft of a shilling or handkerchief, or the illegal clipping of an ornamental bush, could entail hanging; and one could be consigned to the hangman even at the age of eleven.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, in some cases, even young children ran this risk: in 1833 the death penalty was pronounced on a pickpocket of nine, although the sentence was subsequently commuted.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more significant than the increase in penalties was the criminalization of behaviour that had hitherto been licit. The enclosure and private appropriation of common land underwent significant development; and the peasant or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg78&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;commoner who was late in appreciating the new situation became a thief, a criminal to be visited with all the force of the law. This might seem an arbitrary and brutal way to behave; but that is not what Locke thought. In legitimizing the colonists’ appropriation of land left uncultivated by the Indians, the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; simultaneously adopted a clear position in favour of enclosure in England. ‘[I]n the beginning, all the world was America’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and common land was a kind of vestige of this original, wild state, which work, private appropriation and money had subsequently overcome. It was a process that manifested itself on a large scale across the Atlantic, but which was not unknown in England: ‘even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’, until enclosure and private appropriation intervened positively.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with the despoliation of the Indians and English peasants, Locke also justified terroristic legislation in defence of property: it was ‘lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was only a petty crime in appearance. In reality, the guilty party, if only momentarily, had deprived his victim of his ‘right to liberty’ and had made him a ‘slave’. At this point, no one could exclude the possibility that theft would not be followed by homicide, since it was precisely the power of life and death that defined the relationship of slavery. This was synonymous with a state of war, and hence there was no reason why the thief should not be done to death, whatever the extent of the theft.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What Locke seems to be saying is that at stake is not only the shilling or handkerchief or whatever other rather minor stolen good: private property as such and, over and above it, liberty were in danger. Thus, what legitimized the pickpocket’s killing or execution is the same liberal pathos that had presided over the condemnation of monarchical despotism as the source of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to common land, even birds and wild animals became objects of private appropriation by the landed aristocracy. In this instance, it was not possible to appeal to Locke. In fact, on the basis of his theory, not having been transformed by labour, birds and wild animals should have been regarded as common property. And yet, in accordance with legislation enacted after the Glorious Revolution, while the peasant slid into the condition of thief, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg79&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hunter was transformed into poacher; and here too the terrorism of the penal code was called on to compel respect for the incursion.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the slavery and trading of blacks, the vulgar historicist explanation does not stand up when it comes to the expansion in crimes against property and the increased severity of the penalties provided for them. It is misleading to refer to the spirit of the times. ‘It is very doubtful whether any other country possessed a criminal code with anything like so many capital provisions as there were in this single statute.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruthless character of English legislation was already proverbial on its enactment. While Napoleon exercised his iron rule over France, a reformer like Sir Samuel Romilly felt compelled to offer a bitter observation: ‘there is probably no other country in the world in which so many and so great a variety of human actions are punishable with loss of life as in England’. [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel denounced the ‘draconian’ severity whereby ‘every thief in England [is] hanged’, in an absurd equation of life and property, of the two ‘qualitatively different’ crimes that were homicide and theft. The class origins of such ‘draconian’ severity were even identified: for peasants guilty of illegal hunting ‘the harshest and most disproportionate punishments’ were provided, because ‘those who made those laws and who are now sitting in the courts as magistrates and jurors’ were the aristocracy, the very class that held a monopoly on hunting.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to maintain law and order was only one aspect of the problem. Not infrequently, those sentenced to death (or even a long prison term) saw their sentence commuted to deportation to the colonies. Already in force for some time, from 1717 the practice of deportation assumed an official character and significant proportions.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So following the Glorious Revolution, we witness, on the one hand, the enactment of terroristic legislation and, on the other, the burgeoning phenomenon of deportation to remote colonies. Is there a link between the two events? It is difficult to deny that the formation of a large compulsory workforce through drastic harshening of the legal code ultimately made it possible to satisfy ‘the labor needs of the plantations’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, underlying this practice was a specific theory. Locke repeatedly demanded penal slavery for those who made an attempt on another person’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg80&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life or property. Already in the state of nature, ‘[t]he damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things were even clearer in the social state:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of the colonial war as just war (on the part of Europeans) and the theory of penal slavery legitimized and galvanized the deportation, respectively, of the black slaves and white semi-slaves required by colonial development. On the eve of the American Revolution, in Maryland alone there were 20,000 servants of criminal origin. To put the point with Samuel Johnson, they were ‘a race of convicts, and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging’. And that is how an inexhaustible source of forced labour was fed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Indentured servants&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This labour force proved precious for the purposes of populating and exploiting colonies as they were conquered. Initially, the flow of indentured servants went in the direction of America. Subsequently, supplanted and rendered superfluous by the massive introduction of black slaves, and in any event after the achievement of independence by the United States, white semi-slaves were diverted towards Australia, where they made an even more significant contribution to the process of exploiting the new colony. What were the characteristics of this labour relationship? Let us start with the journey of relocation or deportation from Britain. The horrors and mortality rate call to mind the famous ‘middle passage’ to which black slaves were subjected. Sometimes not even half the ‘passengers’ survived the voyage. Among them were to be found children between the ages of one and seven; they rarely escaped death. A witness related &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg81&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;having seen thirty-two children of tender years cast into the ocean in the course of a single voyage. Diseases continued to rage even after the crossing of the Atlantic; as a result, the new arrivals were often subjected to quarantine. There then intervened the moment of the market. In the papers commercial adverts of the following kind could be read: ‘Just arrived at Leedstown, the Ship &#039;&#039;Justitia&#039;&#039; with about one Hundred Healthy Servants. Men, Women and Boys, among which are many Tradesmen … The Sale will Commence on Tuesday, the 2nd of April’ (&#039;&#039;The Virginia Gazette&#039;&#039;, 28 March 1771). Husband and wife were often separated, and might be separated from their children, permanently or for a long period; children under the age of five were obliged to render service until they were twenty-one. Flogged by their masters in the event of indiscipline or disobedience, servants sometimes fled, and then a manhunt was unleashed. The local press provided an accurate physical description of the fugitives who, once taken, were punished and branded with the letter R (standing for ‘rogue’) or subjected to the excision of ears. Thus rendered immediately recognizable, they no longer had any escape.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, was the difference compared with slaves proper? Sometimes white semi-slaves bemoaned their lot: ‘Many blacks are treated better.’ In fact, unlike real slaves, servants could turn to the judiciary and hope to be accepted into the community of the free, and were indeed admitted ‘assuming they survived their period of labor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that death often intervened first. But we are dealing with a social relation that is different from hereditary racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was it a social relation marked by freedom? We have seen Locke on the one hand stress the contractual, and hence free, genesis of the figure of servant, and on the other let slip the admission that he was not really free. But on this point we should also attend to Sieyès’ opinion. Looking across the Atlantic, he argued thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The final class, composed of men who have only their hands, can have need of regulated &#039;&#039;slavery&#039;&#039; in order to escape the &#039;&#039;slavery of need&#039;&#039;. Why restrict natural liberty? I want to sell my time and my services of whatever kind (I do not say my life) for a &#039;&#039;year&#039;&#039;, two &#039;&#039;years&#039;&#039;, etc., as occurs in English America. The law is silent in this connection, and it should only speak to prevent abuses of the institution that endanger liberty. Thus it will be possible to hire oneself or serve [&#039;&#039;s’engager/s’asservir&#039;&#039;] for a maximum of five years.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg82&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Sieyès did not disguise the fact that what characterized the figure of the indentured servant was subservience, ‘servile engagement’ (&#039;&#039;engageance serve&#039;&#039;), or ‘legally regulated slavery’. However, especially after the outbreak of the French Revolution, apologetic concerns seem to have got the upper hand: in the new ideological and political climate, it was no longer possible to declare oneself in favour of an institution whose substantially slave-like character was acknowledged. And so we have Sieyès arguing against those for whom the indentured servant was a person who ‘loses some of his freedom’. No:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is more accurate to say that, at the point when the contract is drawn up, far from being impeded in his liberty, he exercises it in the way most opportune to him. Any convention is an exchange in which each likes what he receives more than what he gives up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is true that for the duration of the contract the servant could not exercise the liberty ceded by him. But it was a general rule that the liberty of an individual ‘never extends to the point of harming others’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, from the outset Sieyès upheld contractual servitude in the name of ‘natural liberty’, of the right possessed by every individual to draw up the contract that seemed most opportune to him. In other words, the key category of liberal thought (the category of contract), invoked by Grotius to legitimize slavery proper, was applied by Sieyès solely to the labour relation that binds the indentured servant to his master. This was not dissimilar from Locke, the difference being that the French author, prior to the Revolution at least, stressed the fundamentally slave-like character of the relationship. That is why he was concerned to stress the vigilance the law should be called on to exercise: public officials should control the master’s actions in order to prevent the ‘person’ of the servant ‘being harmed through unduly prolonged hire or during the hire’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sieyès seems to propose a kind of code for regulating this white semi-slavery, on the model of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; with which, in theory, the masters of black slaves should comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. ‘The extensive Herod-like kidnappings’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg83&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Among the compulsory labour force called on to ensure the development of the colonies were also youngsters of poor condition, deceived with honeyed words, abducted and deported across the Atlantic.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Alternatively, they arrived in America with their parents, who were often compelled to sell them, never seeing them again. The situation of children of popular extraction was not much better in England. Marx denounced ‘the extensive Herod-like kidnappings perpetrated in the early days of the factory system, when children were stolen from the work houses and orphanages, and capital thereby incorporated a mass of unresisting human material’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going beyond the use of orphanages as a source of low-cost and more or less compulsory labour, we can make a general observation here. If, in the proto-liberal theory and practice of the time, the wage-labourer was (as we shall soon see) the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; Burke mentions, or the ‘bipedal machine’ referred to by Sieyès, his children were ultimately &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;, destined to be used at the first opportunity precisely in their capacity as work tools and machines. Locke explicitly declared that poor children, who were to be sent to work from the age of three, must ‘be taken off their [parents’] hands’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over a century later, Bentham’s attitude was not dissimilar. He invited people to look for inspiration to ‘manufactures where children, down to four years old, earn something, and where children a few years older earn a subsistence, and that a comfortable one’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was permissible and beneficial to ‘tak[e] the children out of the hands of their parents as much as possible, and even, if possible, altogether’. There should be no hesitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Y]ou may even clap them up in an inspection-house, and then you make of them what you please. You need never grudge the parents &#039;&#039;a peep behind the curtain&#039;&#039; in the master’s lodge … you might keep up a sixteen or eighteen years separation between the male and female part of your young subjects …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The children of the poor were at the complete disposal of society. We are reminded of the fate reserved for slaves across the Atlantic. To end their presence on American soil, suggested Jefferson, one might at a moderate price, and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg84&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps even gratis, acquire newborn blacks, place them ‘under the guardianship of the State’, subject them to work as soon as possible, and thus largely recover the expenses required for their deportation to San Domingo, which should be set in train when convenient. Certainly, ‘[t]he separation of infants from their mothers … would produce some scruples of humanity’, but there was no need to be so fussy.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While he was motivated by economic calculations, rather than worries about racial purity, Bentham would have liked to proceed perhaps even more ruthlessly with the children of the poor in England: ‘An inspection-house, to which a set of children had been consigned from their birth, might afford experiments enough … What say you to a &#039;&#039;foundling-hospital&#039;&#039; upon this principle?’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall see that Bentham also envisaged experiments of a eugenic character. But for now we can reach a conclusion by attending to an English economist (Edward G. Wakefield), who in 1834 published a successful book devoted to the contrast between America and England: ‘it is the whole press of England, not I, that calls English children [of popular extraction] slaves’. The majority were compelled to work such long hours that they inadvertently fell asleep, only to be awoken and forced back to work with beatings and torments of every kind. As to foundlings, they were dispensed with rapidly enough: adverts were affixed to the doors of workhouses promoting their sale. In London the price of male and female children put on the market thus was significantly below that of black slaves in America; in rural regions, such commodities were even cheaper.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing down on this mass of wretches was legislation that was certainly not marked by the protection of civil liberties. One thinks of the blank warrants that allowed the police to arrest or search a person at will. Abolished by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, this ‘intolerable tool of oppression’ (to adopt the description of it given by the French liberal Laboulaye in 1866)[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] long continued to survive in England. Smith himself tended if not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg85&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to justify it, in any case to trivialize it. He was astonished that the ‘common people’, rather than fighting for the free circulation and buying and selling of labour power, exhibited all its indignation ‘against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The death penalty was imposed with great facility but also with some discretion. With the passing in 1723 of the Black Act—the ‘blacks’ were alleged deer rustlers—in some cases it was not necessary to resort to a formal process to provide for the death sentence, which consigned to the hangman even those who had in some way aided a thief (or alleged thief) to escape justice.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without betraying any disquiet, Mandeville recognized that ‘the Lives of Hundreds, if not Thousands, of Necessitous Wretches, that are daily hanged for Trifles’ were being snuffed out;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] execution often became a mass spectacle with pedagogical purposes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British liberal called upon magistrates not to be inhibited either by misplaced ‘compassion’ or by undue doubts and scruples. Certainly, thieves might have committed theft under the spur of necessity: ‘what they can get Honestly is not sufficient to keep them’. Yet ‘the Peace of the Society’ required that the guilty be hanged. Yes, ‘the Evidences perhaps want clearness or are otherwise insufficient’; and there was a risk that an innocent person might be put to death. But however ‘terrible’ that would be, the aim must be achieved that ‘not one Guilty Person [be] suffered to escape with Impunity’. It would be a serious thing if overly scrupulous judges prioritized their ‘Conscience’ over the ‘Advantage to a Nation’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The courts of the property-owner judges were called upon to operate as a kind of committee of public safety.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then conclude that, setting aside the colonies in their entirety (including Ireland), in Britain itself full enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by the law—the ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ liberty that Constant and Berlin, respectively, refer to[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—was the privilege of a small minority. The mass of people was subject to regulation and coercion that extended far beyond the workplace (or the place of punishment that was the prison, but also the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg86&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse and the army). While Locke proposed regulating the consumption of alcohol by the popular classes, Mandeville believed that, at least on Sunday, ‘every Amusement Abroad that might allure or draw them from’ attending church should be ‘prohibited’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the subject of alcohol, Burke argued differently: while it had no nutritional properties, it could alleviate hunger pangs in the poor person; moreover, ‘at all times, and in all countries’, alcohol, together with ‘opium’ and ‘tobacco’, had been turned to for the ‘moral consolations’ men sometimes needed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, even more than the disciplining of workers and vagrants as in Locke and Mandeville, the problem was that of dulling the consciousness and suffering of the starving in general. What remained constant was the tendency to govern the existence of the popular classes even in its smallest details. The reference to opium added a touch of cynicism. Reports by government committees of inquiry would subsequently denounce the catastrophe: in the poorest districts, opium consumption was spreading, and was becoming a means of feeding or a substitute for it. It was sometimes given to infants, who ‘ “shrank up into little old men”, or “wizened like little monkeys” ’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This detailed regulation obviously also included religious indoctrination. In Locke’s view, for poor children to start work from the age of three was a beneficial measure not only economically, but also morally: ‘Another advantage … of bringing poor children … to a working-school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday along with their school-masters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Mandeville demanded that Sunday attendance of church become ‘a Duty’ for the poor and illiterate. Appealing to spontaneous religious feelings was insufficient: ‘It is a Duty incumbent on all Magistrates to take particular Care’ of what happened on Sundays. ‘The Poor more especially and their Children should be made to go to Church on it both in the Fore and Afternoon’. Positive results would not be wanting: ‘Where this Care is taken by the Magistrates as far as it lies in their Power, Ministers of the Gospel may instill into the smallest Capacities’ devotion and the virtue of obedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Controlled in their private life, the popular classes were even more so in the public existence which, amid a host of difficulties, they sought: ‘Between 1793 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg87&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp; 1820, more than 60 acts directed at repression of working-class collective action were passed by Parliament.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More even than trade-union activity in the strict sense—that is, action aimed at raising wages and improving working conditions—the very attempt by servants to escape their isolation and communicate with one another was viewed with dismay. They (thundered Mandeville in alarm) ‘assemble when they please with Impunity’. They even developed relations of mutual solidarity; they sought to aid a colleague dismissed or flogged by his master. Simply by virtue of not confining themselves to the vertical, subaltern relationship with their superiors, but seeking to develop horizontal relations with one another, servants were to be considered culpable of unacceptable subversion: they were ‘daily incroaching upon Masters and Mistresses, and endeavouring to be more upon the Level with them’; they had already raised ‘the low Dignity of their Condition … from the Original Meanness which the publick Welfare requires it should always remain in’. Exceeding every limit, the servant posed as a gentleman; this was the ‘comedy’ of the ‘Gentleman Footman’, a comedy which in fact, in the absence of timely intervention, might turn into a ‘tragedy’ for the whole nation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant in this context was the position taken by Adam Smith. He acknowledged that ‘[w]e have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’ Besides, ‘[t]he masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily … Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’, or ‘to sink the wages of labour even below this rate’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence even were masters and workers to be treated identically in legislative terms, the former would always enjoy an advantageous situation. But they were also favoured by the precarious living conditions of the opposing party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they [the workers] have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg88&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;All this did not prevent Smith from recommending that the government act severely against working-class combinations. Certainly, ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. However, it was ‘impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which … would be consistent with liberty and justice’. But the government must forestall any working-class gathering, even the most casual and seemingly innocuous. For example, the requirement of bureaucratic registration for those who practice a specific profession ended up ‘connect[ing] individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another’. Utterly intolerable was any ‘regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, not only trade-union activity, but even a mutual aid society was to be considered illegal. Smith recognized that he was dealing with ‘desperate men’, who risked dying of starvation. And yet this consideration took second place to the need to avoid meetings, ‘conversations’ or gatherings that tended to be synonymous with a ‘conspiracy against the public’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to criminalize at birth any popular association, the dominant class in England resorted to yet more summary methods, which can be described in Constant’s words: ‘the horrendous expedient of sending spies to incite ignorant minds and suggest rebellion to them, so as then to be able to denounce them’. Results were not wanting: ‘The wretches captivated those who had the misfortune to listen to them and probably also accused those they did not succeed in captivating.’ And justice came crashing down on both.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. A whole with singular characteristics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mandeville call on judges to be summary in condemning to death those guilty or suspected of theft and pilferage, even at the cost of striking down some innocents. The priority was the need to safeguard ‘the peace of the society’ or ‘advantage to a nation’. Blackstone acknowledged that press-ganging men into the navy seemed dubious and detrimental to liberty. It was ‘only defensible for public necessity, to which all private considerations must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg89&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;give way’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Locke repeatedly called on people not to lose sight of ‘the public good’, ‘the good of the nation’, ‘the public weal’, or ‘the preservation of the whole’, ‘the whole commonwealth’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is so passionately invoked here is a Whole demanding the sacrifice, permanent not temporary, of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition was all the more tragic because any prospect of improvement seemed pretty remote. In fact, even to entertain projects tending towards such improvement was synonymous not only with abstract utopianism, but also and above all with dangerous subversion. According to Townsend, the ‘stock of human happiness is … much increased’ by the presence of ‘the poor’, who were compelled to perform the most arduous and painful work. The poor fully deserved their fate, were by definition wastrels and vagrants. But it would be a disaster for society if, by some chance, they were to mend their ways: ‘The fleets and armies of a state would soon be in want of soldiers and of sailors, if sobriety and diligence universally prevailed’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the country’s economy would find itself in difficulties. Mandeville reached the same conclusion: ‘To make the society … happy … it is requisite that great numbers … should be ignorant as well as poor’; ‘the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And let us now read Arthur Young: ‘every one but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and would not produce the ‘wealth of nations’ referred to by Smith. Later, in France, Destutt de Tracy arrived at the same conclusion: ‘In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally poor.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Why was the proposition, in its various forms, that society’s happiness and wealth depended on the hardship and deprivation of the poor, who formed a large majority of the population, not perceived as contradictory? It is Locke who explains the logic of this Whole with special characteristics: slaves ‘cannot … be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was also Algernon Sidney’s opinion: ‘a kingdom or city … is composed of freemen and equals: Servants may be in it, but are not members of it.’ Indeed, ‘no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth’; he is not even a member of the people, because ‘the people’ comprises &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg90&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all the freemen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The poor were the servile caste required by society; they were the subterranean foundation of the social edifice, those whom Nietzsche defined as ‘the blind moles of culture’. With society and civilization, the poor and the moles continued to have a relationship of estrangement.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Wage-labour and the categories of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades after Franklin, in transition from the first to the second great controversy in the liberal party, the governor of South Carolina, James Henry Hammond, likewise applied himself to emphasizing how much quasi-slavery persisted in Britain. He sent an open letter to Thomas Clarkson, the venerable patriarch of English abolitionism, putting his finger on the sore point of the workers’ condition in the country that boasted of having abolished slavery in its colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the world of Slavery? … If you are really humane, philanthropic, and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, reactions in Britain were indignant, insisting on the characteristic feature of the freeman that applied to even the most wretched wage-labourer. However, in defining him, the liberal tradition frequently had recourse to the same categories as were used in classical antiquity and across the Atlantic in relation to the black slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Locke’s view, not genuinely capable of intellectual and moral life was ‘the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living’. Wholly absorbed in ‘still[ing] the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children’, such people had no possibility of thinking about other things:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg91&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Locke had no hesitation in asserting that ‘there is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts’. To appreciate this, it was enough to contrast ‘Westminster-hall’ and the ‘Exchange’ with ‘Alms-Houses’ and ‘Bedlam’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The boundary separating the human world from the animal world was imperceptible and evanescent: ‘if we compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, Mandeville, condemning the spread of education to popular strata, compared the wage-labourer to a ‘horse’: ‘No Creatures submit contentedly to their Equals, and should a Horse know as much as a Man, I should not desire to be his Rider.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a metaphor that reappeared on the occasion of his polemic against the excessive generosity displayed by the rich master to the servant in England: ‘A Man may have Five and Twenty Horses in his Stables without being guilty of Folly, if it suits with the rest of his Circumstances, but if he keeps but one, and overfeeds it to shew his Wealth, he is a Fool for his Pains.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only English liberalism that argued in these terms. In fact, the process of de-humanization possibly reached its peak in Sieyès:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unfortunates devoted to arduous work, producers of other people’s enjoyments, who receive scarcely enough to sustain their suffering, needy bodies; this enormous crowd of bipedal tools, without liberty, without morality, without intellectual faculties, equipped solely with hands that earn little and a mind burdened with a thousand worries that serves them only to suffer … are these what you call men? They are deemed civilized [&#039;&#039;policés&#039;&#039;], but have we seen a single one of them who was capable of entering into society?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg92&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On other occasions, the process of de-humanization occurred in a different fashion. Adopting the distinction, peculiar to classical antiquity, between the various instruments of labour, Burke subsumed the wage-labourer under the category of &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Sieyès referred to the ‘majority of men’ defined, above all in private notes predating 1789, as ‘work machines’ (&#039;&#039;machines de travail&#039;&#039;), ‘instruments of labour’ (&#039;&#039;instruments de labeur&#039;&#039;), ‘human instruments of production’ (&#039;&#039;instruments humains de la production&#039;&#039;), or ‘bipedal tools’ (&#039;&#039;instruments bipèdes&#039;&#039;).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traces of this process of de-humanization can even be found in Smith. By dint of the duress and monotony of his work, a wage-labourer ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’, incapable of participating ‘in any rational conversation’ or ‘conceiving any generous … sentiment’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As across the Atlantic with black slaves and slaves in general, so in Europe the dominant class was separated from white servants by a gulf that had ethnic and racial connotations. In Locke’s view, ‘a day-labourer [is] no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural [i.e., an ignorant aborigine]’: neither had yet reached the level of ‘rational creatures and Christians’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Sieyès was of the opinion that the ‘human instruments of production’ pertained to a ‘people’ different from (and inferior to) that comprising ‘the heads of production’ or ‘intelligent persons’, ‘respectable folk’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further reason intervened to render the gulf separating the community of the free from servants and slaves unbridgeable. The latter were considered incapable of fully appreciating the humiliations, the frustrations, the sufferings, the pain, as well as all the other feelings characteristic of man’s spiritual existence. We have seen how Mandeville argued in relation to the mass of wretches in Europe. They were forced to suffer hardship and privations and often ended up on the gallows ‘for trifles’, which they made themselves guilty of in an attempt to escape hunger. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be happy is to be pleas’d, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more content he’ll be with his own … when a Man enjoys &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg93&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself, Laughs and Sings, and in his Gesture and Behaviour shews me all the tokens of Content and Satisfaction, I pronounce him happy …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On careful examination, the ‘greatest King’ could envy ‘the Peace of Mind’ of ‘the meanest and most unciviliz’d Peasant’ and his ‘Tranquillity of … Soul’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no less emphatic terms, the Virginian theorist we have already encountered, Thomas R. Dew, expressed himself on the subject of slaves: ‘we have no doubts that they form the happiest portion of our society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe, than the negro slave of the United States’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only is it very difficult to define the condition of white servants in Europe as free, but the image of them transmitted by the liberal thought of the time is not much different from the image of the black slave in the southern United States. So was the governor of South Carolina right to mock the abolitionists’ hypocrisy and credulity? That would be a hasty conclusion. In any event, we are obliged to reflect further on the characteristics of the society that was being formed either side of the Atlantic and on the categories best suited to understanding it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn1a|1]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn2a|2]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 437.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn3a|3]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn4a|4]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn5a|5]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 413–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn6a|6]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn7a|7]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn8a|8]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn9a|9]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn10a|10]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn13a|13]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms no Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn14a|14]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn15a|15]] Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, &#039;&#039;Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIX siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn16a|16]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1966, p. ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn17a|17]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wootton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 460.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn21a|21]] See Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 1, ch. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn22a|22]] Tocqueville, diary note of 4 February 1851, quoted in Hugh Brogan, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pt 2, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn23a|23]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn24a|24]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn25a|25]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, p. 71.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn28a|28]] T. H. Marshall, &#039;&#039;Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn30a|30]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 368–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 398; Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn33a|33]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 389.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn34a|34]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 652.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn35a|35]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 138.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn36a|36]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 291.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn37a|37]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 376, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn38a|38]] C. Duncan Rice, ‘The Missionary Context of the British Anti-Slavery Movement’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn39a|39]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 6; E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 88.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn40a|40]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn41a|41]] Linda Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, London: Random House, 2002, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn42a|42]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn43a|43]] See Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, ch. v, §28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn44a|44]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, pp. 314–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn45a|45]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn46a|46]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn47a|47]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, p. 119.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn48a|48]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn49a|49]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn50a|50]] E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 22–3; Anthony Arblaster, &#039;&#039;The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 172; Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn51a|51]] Ronald W. Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, London: Blandford Press, 1963, p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn52a|52]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 140.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn56a|56]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn57a|57]] Thus the legal historian Leon Radzinowicz, quoted in ibid., p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn58a|58]] Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn59a|59]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn60a|60]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn61a|61]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, p. 12; cf. Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn62a|62]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn64a|64]] Marcus W. Jernegan, &#039;&#039;Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America&#039;&#039;, Westport (CI): Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 77–9, and p. 48 (for the quotation from Dr Johnson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., pp. 50–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn66a|66]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn67a|67]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., pp. 89, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn70a|70]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 527 n. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn72a|72]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn73a|73]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 64–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn75a|75]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1450, 1485–7 (letters to Albert Gallatin, 26 December 1820, and Jared Sparks, 4 February 1824).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn76a|76]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn77a|77]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 347–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn78a|78]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 541–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn79a|79]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn80a|80]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn81a|81]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 273.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn82a|82]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn83a|83]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 272–3, 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn84a|84]] Benajmin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 309–28; Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Four Essays on Liberty&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118–72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn85a|85]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn86a|86]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 7, pp. 413–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn87a|87]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 522 and n. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn88a|88]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn89a|89]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 307–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn90a|90]] Karl Polanyi, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 3, p. 121 n. 333.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn91a|91]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn92a|92]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, pp. 83–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn95a|95]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 28 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn96a|96]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn97a|97]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3, 196–7, 205, 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn98a|98]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn99a|99]] Quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 765.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn100a|100]] Young, quoted in R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn101a|101]] Destutt de Tracy, quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 802.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn102a|102]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn103a|103]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 89, 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn104a|104]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105a|105]] Clarkson, quote in Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, pp. 233–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106a|106]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;An Essay Concerning Human Understanding&#039;&#039;, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 707, 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., p. 666.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108a|108]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110a|110]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111a|111]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112a|112]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113a|113]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 782.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114a|114]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Conduct of the Understanding&#039;&#039;, Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839, pp. 10, 12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115a|115]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 89, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 311–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117a|117]] Dew, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 318.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FOUR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page94&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg95&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The elusive liberalism of de Tocqueville’s America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How should we define the political regime which, following the Dutch prologue and starting from the liberal revolutions, was established first in Britain and then in the United States? As regards the latter, Washington was in no doubt. We have seen him immediately after the achievement of independence celebrating the ‘wise and liberal government’ his country had given itself. Some years later, on the eve of the ratification of the federal Constitution, which consecrated a strong executive power, the general-president coined a kind of advertising slogan, declaring himself in favour of a ‘liberal &amp;amp;amp; energetic’ government.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet if by liberalism is meant every individual’s equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by law—‘modern liberty’ or ‘negative liberty’—it is not difficult to perceive the rather problematic character of employing such a category. Even if we discount the problem of slavery, we know the condition of semi-slavery to which notionally free blacks were subjected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can ignore the population of colour in its entirety and still not thereby arrive at a different result. Those in the United States who were untainted by any crime, but interned in workhouses that were (as de Tocqueville himself acknowledged) an integral part of the ‘prison system’, did not exactly enjoy civil equality or modern liberty. And that is not all: such was the condition of the poor that, even in their capacity as witnesses, they were locked up in prison until the legal proceedings were over. And thus, ‘in the same country that the plaintiff is put in prison, the thief remains at liberty if he can pay a bail bond’. Of ‘three thousand examples’ which might be given, there was that of two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg96&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;young Irishmen ‘detained for a whole year while waiting for the judges to deign to hear their deposition’. We can now come to de Tocqueville’s unanticipated conclusion: we are dealing with laws consolidated by ‘customs’ and which yet can seem ‘monstrous’; they ‘have provided everything for the convenience of the wealthy and virtually nothing for the protection of the poor’, of whose liberty ‘they dispose cheaply’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us now pass over both populations of colonial origin and the poorest strata of the white community, who were denied not only political rights, but also ‘modern liberty’. Let us focus exclusively on the dominant class—i.e. on white, male property-owners. Did full civil and political equality obtain in this milieu? There are reasons to doubt it. One thinks of the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision on the basis of which, in calculating the number of seats due to the southern states, partial account was also taken of the number of slaves. Far from being a negligible detail, this clause played a significant role in the history of the United States: ‘four southern voters’ ended up exercising ‘more political power than ten northern voters’. Thus is explained the ‘Virginia dynasty’ that long succeeded in holding the country’s presidency.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was why Jefferson was branded the ‘black president’ by his opponents:[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he arrived in power thanks to the inclusion in the electoral result of blacks who remained his slaves. On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln proclaimed polemically: ‘It is a truth that cannot be denied, that in all the free States no white man is the equal of the white man of the slave States.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a thesis repeated in 1864 by a French liberal (Édouard Laboulaye). With the ‘three-fifths’ clause, it was as if the US Constitution was addressed to ‘the folks of the South’:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because you have slaves, you will be allowed to elect a representative with ten thousand votes, while the Yankees [of the North], who live off their own labour, will require thirty thousand votes. The conclusion for the folks of the South is that they constitute a particular, superior race, that they are great lords. The aristocratic spirit has been developed and strengthened by the Constitution.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg97&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Accused of breaching the principle of political equality within the dominant elite itself, the southern planters replied by declaring that, in actual fact, the principle of civil equality was infringed to their detriment. They regarded themselves as suffering negative discrimination, in as much as they were deprived of the freedom to transfer their human cattle to any part of the Union. They considered it inadmissible that owners of the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; should be treated worse than the owners of any other movable goods. As Jefferson Davis, president of the secessionist Confederacy, declared at the moment of abandoning the Union, the North was wrong to hamper in any way ‘property in slaves’, to act ‘to the prejudice, detriment or discouragement of the owners of that species of property’, which was ‘recognized in the Constitution’ and which, on that basis, should enjoy complete equality of treatment with other types of property.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This exchange of accusations played a far from subsidiary role in the conflict that issued in the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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===== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Absolute power and the community obligations of the slave-owners&#039;&#039;&#039; =====&lt;br /&gt;
From Constant onwards, modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property. But slave-owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations. There can be no doubt that the Glorious Revolution and then the American Revolution consecrated the self-government of a civil society composed of, and hegemonized by, slave-owners, who were more determined than ever not to tolerate interference by central political power and the Church. But it would be mistaken to equate the self-government of civil society, now freed from these fetters, with the free movement of the individual members composing it. Certainly, they could reduce the slaves they legitimately owned to chattels. In the New England of 1732, a master put up for sale a nineteen-year-old female slave along with her son of six months: they could be acquired (the advert announced) ‘together or separately’. There were no obstacles to bringing to market even adulterous offspring; a New Jersey master did this with the offspring of his relations with three black women whom he owned. Not by chance, slaves were frequently given names usually reserved for dogs and horses.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg98&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There can be no doubt that the slave-master wielded absolute power over his legitimate ‘property’, but not to the extent of being able freely to challenge the process of reification and commodification that had occurred. In this case, the community requirement prevailed of keeping the barrier between the race of masters and the race of servants clear and fixed. Let us attend to de Tocqueville: blacks had been ‘forbidden … under severe penalties, to be taught to read or write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The prohibition aimed to exclude the race of servants from any form of education, which was regarded as a serious source of danger not only because it was liable to fuel unacceptable hopes and claims, but also because it risked facilitating the communication of ideas and sentiments between blacks that was to be frustrated by any means. And yet, in the case of violation of such rules, to be struck in the first instance were white property-owners, who thus saw their negative liberty seriously restricted. The bans affecting slaves did not leave their masters unaffected. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, it became a crime in Georgia even to provide a slave with paper and writing materials.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant was the legislation that banned interracial sexual relations and marriages. Later, in 1896, when upholding the constitutional legitimacy of provisions for racial segregation as a whole, the US Supreme Court conceded that the ban on ‘the intermarriage of the two races’ might, ‘in a technical sense’, breach freedom of contract, but extricated itself from an awkward situation by adding that the right of any individual state to legislate in this area was ‘universally recognized’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, opposition was not lacking. The provision made in Virginia at the start of the eighteenth century, according to which not only those directly responsible for the sexual or marital relation were to be punished, was significant: ‘extremely severe penalties’ were prescribed for the priest guilty of having consecrated the interracial family bond.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And hence, along with ‘freedom of contract’, religious freedom itself was in some sense affected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The absolute power exercised over black slaves ended up having negative and even dramatic consequences for whites. Take Pennsylvania in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The free black caught violating the ban on miscegenation (as it later came to be called)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] risked being sold as a slave. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg99&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved serious consequences for the white woman, who had to suffer forced separation from her partner and the terrible punishment inflicted on him. Let us now see what happened in colonial Virginia immediately after the Glorious Revolution. On the basis of a law of 1691, a free white woman who had had a child by a black man or mulatto could be sentenced to five years of servitude and, above all, be forced to surrender the child to the parish, which then sold him or her as a servant for a term of thirty years.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But there is more. Well-nigh insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of recognition of the offspring of a relationship between an owner and one of his slaves. The father faced a tragic alternative: either to suffer exile from Virginia with his de facto family; or to agree to the child being a slave together with the mother.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More summary was New York’s legislation, which automatically converted all children born of a slave mother into slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus find ourselves in the presence of a society that in fact exercised such severe duress over its privileged members, partly legal and partly social, as to choke even the most natural feelings. As has justly been noted, in enslaving ‘their children and their children’s children’, white people were in fact ‘enslaving themselves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further to clarify the entanglement between the individual property-owner’s absolute power over his human livestock and his subservience to the ‘master race’ of which he was a member, we can offer a final consideration. We have already noted the law in force in Virginia whereby it was meaningless to define and treat the killing of a slave by his owner as a ‘felony’. Yet in not a few states, on the basis of legislation that survived even after the Second World War (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|§5]]), a white man who had sexual relations with a black woman was guilty of a ‘felony’. Thus, it was permissible for an owner to flog and beat his female slave to the point of killing her—property right was sacred; but so strong was the control exercised by the class of property-owners and the community of the free over their individual members that only by exposing himself to risks of various kinds could he have sexual relations with her. Other than by legal provisions, the ban on miscegenation was enforced by the intervention in the 1850s here and there of vigilante gangs, engaged in spying on, intimidating and attacking whites tempted by the fascination of their female slaves and women of colour in general.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg100&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While, in one respect, they were a form of property and a chattel completely at the disposal of their legitimate master, in another slaves represented the enemy within, against whom it was necessary to be constantly on guard. Certainly, to avert the threat recourse could be had to terror, ruthlessly and even sadistically striking at guilty individuals and transforming execution into a kind of terrifying educative spectacle for all the rest: the slaves in a particular area were obliged to witness the torment of two of their fellows, guilty of murder and condemned to be burnt alive.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But that was not sufficient. Once again, preservation of the institution of slavery required heavy sacrifices even on the part of the dominant class. In 1741, in New York, mysterious fires fanned fears of a slave revolt: condemned to death and burnt alive were two blacks whose lives the master had in vain sought to save, testifying that at the time of the fire they were at home. Some years later, in the environs of the same city, a black, having confessed to setting fire to a barn, suffered the same torment. There was only one difference: the crowd of white spectators contrived to ensure that the flames were not extinguished too quickly, so that the spectacle and sufferings of the rebel black lasted as long as possible; his cries were heard three miles away. In any case, the master heard them very clearly: he sobbed loudly, because his slave was dear to him. But he was powerless, and the most he could do was to see to it that the torture was not prolonged any further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Faced with the security requirements of the community they belonged to, individual slave-owners could not demand free disposal over their property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given the circumstances, these security requirements were a permanent given. We can make a general observation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light; they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners (sometimes the law required publication of the code in the newspaper and that clergymen read it to their congregations). It was the white man who was &#039;&#039;required&#039;&#039; to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg101&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Specific penalties were provided for slave-owners who failed to inflict the punishments prescribed by law. According to a law in force in South Carolina, on her fourth attempt at flight a female slave was to be ‘severely whipped … branded on the left cheek with the letter R, and [have] her left ear cut off’. Until 1722, it was the slave-owners themselves who, directly or indirectly, had to provide for the execution of these operations.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In crisis situations the duty of vigilance made itself strongly felt. We have seen a ‘military service’ of whites patrolling day and night in Richmond in 1831. In such cases, observed Gustave de Beaumont during his journey in de Tocqueville’s company, ‘society arms itself with all its rigours’ and mobilizes ‘all social forces’, seeking in every possible way to encourage ‘informing’ and control; in South Carolina, along with the fugitive slave the death penalty awaited ‘any person who has helped him in his escape’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significant too were the results of the passage of laws on fugitive slaves in 1850. Subject to punishment was not only the citizen who sought to hide or help the black pursued or sought by his legitimate owners, but also those who did not collaborate in his capture. This was a legal provision which (as its critics put it) sought to compel ‘every freeborn American to become a manhunter’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as slave-owners, slave society ended up affecting the white community as a whole. Precisely because, in addition to being chattels, black slaves were also the enemy within, abolitionists were immediately suspected of treason, thus becoming the target of a series of more or less harsh repressive measures depending on the gravity of the impending danger. Severe restrictions were placed on the press: in 1800 the slave revolt in Virginia was often ignored by southern newspapers; there was the danger of spreading the contagion of subversion further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1836 the president of the United States (Andrew Jackson) permitted the postmaster general to block the circulation of all publications critical of the institution of slavery. Rounding off the gag placed on abolitionists, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution banning the examination of anti-slavery petitions.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Repression could take much more drastic forms. In 1805, denouncing writings liable to have an incendiary impact on slaves, South Carolina passed laws that provided for executing as traitors those who were in some way stained with the guilt of having stirred up a slave revolt or supported it. Georgia &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg102&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;proceeded similarly.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bound up with terror from above was terror from below. While it took less ruthless forms in the North (it aimed at preventing meetings and destroying the means of propaganda or the property of ‘agitators’), in the South violence against abolitionists took the form of a pogrom that did not hesitate to torture and physically eliminate traitors and their supporters, with complete impunity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The situation in the South in the years preceding the Civil War was described as follows by Joel R. Poinsett, an important political figure in the Union, in a letter written by him at the end of 1850:&lt;br /&gt;
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We are both [i.e., Poinsett and his correspondent] heartily sick of this atmosphere redolent of insane violence … There is a strong party averse to violent men and violent measures, but they are frightened into submission—afraid even to exchange opinions with others who think like them, lest they should be betrayed.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the contemporary historian who cites this testimony concludes that, through recourse to lynching, violence and threats of every kind, the South succeeded in silencing not only any opposition, but also any mild dissent. In addition to abolitionists, those who wanted to distance themselves from this pitiless witch-hunt felt threatened, and were threatened. They were impelled by terror into ‘holding one’s tongue, killing one’s doubts, burying one’s reservations’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is no doubt about it: the terroristic power wielded by slave-owners over their blacks also ended up affecting, on a lasting basis, members and fractions of the dominant race and class.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Three legislations, three castes, one ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So how are we to define the political regime of the society we are examining? Are we dealing with a liberal society? The problem posed in connection with a figure like Calhoun is now presented in more general terms. At least until the Civil War, there were three different sets of legislation in the United States. In relation to slaves, things are immediately clear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass calculated that there were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg103&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;seventy-two crimes in Virginia which, when committed by a slave, carried the death penalty, whereas only two of them involved the same penalty for a whiteman.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But special laws also affected men of colour who were notionally free—and not only because, in different ways depending on diverse local realities and in different historical periods, they were excluded from certain professions, from the right to own land, from the possibility of testifying in courts against whites or forming part of the judicial panel. There was a still more revealing circumstance: even ignoring slaves, the same crime continued to have very different consequences depending on the skin colour of the person responsible for it. Obviously, only free people of colour ran the risk of being reduced to slavery. This was the fate that befell those in Pennsylvania, who, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, were caught breaking the ban on miscegenation, or if they were not able to pay the fine issued to them for having traded with other blacks without permission.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the situation in the North changed with the abolition of slavery that followed the Revolution. But the complete control whites had over the magistracy remained in place. This was something highlighted by de Tocqueville, and its consequences were spelt out in the North as follows by a particularly courageous judge from Ohio: ‘The white man may now plunder the Negro, he may abuse his person; he may take his life: He may do this in open daylight … and he must be acquitted, unless [there be] some white man present [prepared to give evidence against the culprit]’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clear and insuperable was the barrier separating whites, the dominant race, from people of colour as such. In the words of Beaumont, ‘[w]hether slaves or freemen, negroes everywhere form a different people from the whites.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an observation confirmed by de Tocqueville: ‘In Philadelphia blacks are not buried in the same cemetery as whites’. Segregation also obtained in prisons: ‘blacks were also separated from whites for meals’. And again: ‘in Maryland [a slaveholding state] free blacks pay taxes for schools just like whites, but cannot send their children to them’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And (we might add) in mid-nineteenth-century Virginia, the law denied notionally free blacks ‘the right to learn how to read and write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg104&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are in the presence of a racial state, articulated (according to the explicit declaration of its theorists and apologists in the South), into ‘three &#039;&#039;castes—&#039;&#039; … free whites, free colored, and slave colored population’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the caste model was also evoked by some observers of the North. Referring to their own society, where slavery had been abolished, they spoke of a division into ‘Brahmins and pariahs’, as demonstrated by the racial segregation that operated at every level, from public transport to theatres and from churches to cemeteries, and which allowed blacks to enter hotels, restaurants and meeting-places for the most part solely in the capacity of servants. Yes, acknowledged another observer, who proposed to banish blacks from Indiana in order to spare them a yet worse fate, they were treated like ‘a race legally and socially excommunicated, as the Helots of Sparta—as the Pariahs of India—disfranchised outcasts; a separate and degraded caste’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When we identify three castes in the post-bellum United States, we are obviously ignoring the Indians, who were regarded until the Dawes Act of 1887 as ‘domestic dependent nations’—that is, as a set of nations with their own particular identity, under the protectorate of Washington, and whose members did not form part of American society in the strict sense.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It should be added that the discourse of the three castes is not without a dubious ideological component: it tends to neglect the differences that remained within the white community, which could impact heavily not only on the material living conditions, but also on the civil rights, of the poorest strata. The Articles of the Confederacy, designed to regulate the new state that was being formed, explicitly excluded ‘paupers’ and ‘vagrants’ from the group of ‘free inhabitants’ (Article IV). But it is true that, when we examine the society as a whole, the main demarcations were colour lines and, within the black community, the line separating slaves proper from the rest—from ‘free’ blacks, who in fact lived the nightmare of being deported or enslaved in their turn. On the other side, the absolute centrality of the colour line galvanized (as the southern ideologue of the three castes pointed out) the ‘spirit of equality’ within the white community, with a fairly rapid disappearance of the most odious forms of discrimination.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg105&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In this sense we can speak of ‘castes’, as do distinguished historians of the institution of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But registration of the naturalistic and racial rigidity of the relations between social classes tells us little about the nature of the political regime in the society under examination. On the basis of the history of South Africa, reference has sometimes been made to ‘segregationist liberalism’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in order to explain the tangle of freedom (for whites) and oppression (of colonial populations). It is a category that completely excludes from the focus of attention the practices of expropriation, deportation and annihilation implemented against the native populations of southern Africa or the Amerindians. Even as regards blacks and other ethnic groups, such a category seems to refer only to the period subsequent to the abolition of slavery. Like the adjective, the substantive is misleading. On the one hand, the white community soon shook off censitary discrimination, long recommended and in fact regarded as insuperable by exponents of classical liberalism. On the other, the property-owner-citizens were subject to a series of obligations that it would be very difficult to integrate into the modern liberty theorized by Constant.&lt;br /&gt;
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On other occasions, rather than to ‘segregationist liberalism’, reference has been made to ‘aristocratic republicanism’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] explicitly in connection with the pre–Civil War United States. Such a definition completely obscures the character both of the dominant aristocracy and of the plebs oppressed by it, and the entanglement between social classes and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the substantive makes it possible to take a step forward: we are not dealing with property-owners interested solely in the enjoyment of their private sphere; they also led a rich political life. While far from being generally enjoyed, ‘modern liberty’ was scarcely the sole objective of the protagonists of the Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States. For Hamilton, the ‘distinction between freedom and slavery’ was clear: in the first case, ‘a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent’; in the second, ‘he is governed by the will of another’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, in Franklin’s words, submitting to taxation from a legislative body where one is not represented signifies being considered and treated as ‘a conquer’d People’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be excluded from political decisions, to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg106&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be subject to laws imposed from without, however reasonable and liberal, was synonymous with political slavery or, at any rate, represented the onset of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, Calhoun, the author with whom we began when we posed the crucial question—what is liberalism?—professed democracy even more than liberalism; he was an eminent member of the Democratic Party of the United States. The category of liberalism should unify the two Anglo-Saxon countries. But Calhoun defined the Constitution of his country as ‘democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy’, and hence in contradistinction to Great Britain, where ‘title[s] of nobility’ and other ‘artificial distinctions’ that had been abolished in the North American republic survived.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, it was not an unqualified democracy, as might appear from the title of de Tocqueville’s book, which (as we shall see), in expressing itself thus, thought it possible to ignore the condition of Indians and blacks. Still less was it the ‘frontier democracy’ to which an eminent US historian, inclined to hagiography, pays homage.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Apart from anything else, the definition suggested by him evokes, in reticent, uncritical fashion, only the gradual expansion of the white colonists to the West, and hence only the relationship between two of the ‘three races’ referred to (as we shall see) by &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Calhoun was concerned to distinguish the democracy whose theorist he aspired to be from ‘absolute democracy’, guilty of wanting to ride roughshod over the rights of states and slave-owners.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are at the antipodes of the ‘abolitionist democracy’ dear to an eminent US historian and passionate Afro-American activist.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But then how are we to define a democracy which, far from wanting to abolish or even simply repress or hide slavery, celebrated it as a ‘positive good’? Reference has sometimes been made to ‘Hellenic democracy, based on the work of non-European slaves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this definition too is inadequate. It overlooks, or does not accurately describe, the fate reserved for Indians. And it does not take account of another crucial element: absent from ancient Greece was the racial chattel slavery which, in the American case, was conjoined not with direct democracy but representative democracy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg107&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to the modernity of the mode of production was the modernity of the political regime.&lt;br /&gt;
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With reference in particular to the English colonies, another distinguished black theorist and activist speaks interchangeably of ‘white plantocracy’ or ‘planter democracy’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, calling attention to but one narrow social caste, this definition commits the error of concentrating exclusively on the South, which was not in fact separated by any barrier from the North. This applies at an economic level: after land, slaves were the country’s largest property; in 1860 their value was three times greater than the share capital in manufacturing and the railway industry. The cotton grown in the South was far and away the most sizeable US export, and made a decisive contribution to financing the country’s imports and industrial development.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At a political—constitutional level, the obligation to take part in hunting down escaped slaves and returning them obviously also extended to the citizens of the North. Finally, on an ideological level, we must not forget the racial apartheid in force in the free states. If the process of expropriating and deporting Indians is added to this, it is clear that, albeit with obvious differences between its two parts, the racial discrimination practised in the United States played a decisive role at a national level. Finally, although more adequate than those cited above, even the category of ‘white democracy’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] has a limitation—that of not stressing the proud seigneurial self-consciousness of the community of the free and the explosive violence such a community could unleash against the excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Following, then, the suggestion of distinguished US historians and sociologists, we should speak of a ‘&#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’—that is, a democracy which applied exclusively to the ‘master race’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The clear line of demarcation between whites, on the one hand, and blacks and Indians, on the other, was conducive to the development of relations of equality within the white community. The members of an aristocracy of class or race tended to celebrate themselves as ‘peers’; the manifest inequality imposed on the excluded was the other aspect of the relationship of parity established between those who enjoyed the power to exclude ‘inferiors’. It must be added that the equality in question was primarily a clear line of demarcation from the excluded. This is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg108&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;what was expressed by the slogan that presided over the American Revolution: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’! For the rest, conflicts and mutual charges of abuses of power and violations of the principle of equality were (as we know) not lacking within the community of freemen and masters.&lt;br /&gt;
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After all, it was Josiah Tucker who had already come close to understanding the true nature of the republicanism for which he reprehended Locke and the rebellious American colonists: ‘all Republicans ancient and modern … suggest no other Schemes but those of pulling down and leveling all Distinctions above them, and of tyrannizing over those miserable Beings, who are unfortunately placed below them.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again: ‘he that is a Tyrant over his Inferiors is, of Course, a Patriot, and a Leveller in respect to his Superiors.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Freemen, servants and slaves&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
However, if they can serve to analyse the society that emerged from the American Revolution, what help is the discourse of the three castes and the category of ‘master-race democracy’ when it comes to understanding the politico-social relations that obtained in England? At least until the abolition of slavery in the colonies, the situations on both sides of the Atlantic had not a few points in common—and not only because slaves and the slave market were far from absent from the metropolis itself. More important is the consideration that the British Empire should be analysed as a whole, without repressing the reality of the colonies. Its economic development and political and military rise owed much to the &#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;—that is, to a monopoly on the slave trade. At the same time, those who derived their wealth from trade and property in human cattle were well represented in the British parliament. Hence we see the caste of white freemen and that of slaves operative here as well. Certainly, viewed from the London observatory, the third caste—notionally free blacks—was completely irrelevant. An initial difference between the two shores of the Atlantic thus emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is another, more significant one, which concerns the bulk of the metropolitan population. Within the American white community itself, there were small sections to which legal equality and even negative liberty were denied. This emerges from the description of de Tocqueville, who comments that it was the legacy of the ‘civil laws’ of England, clearly weighted in favour of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg109&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rich.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States the group of whites denied these privileges was a rather small sector, which fairly rapidly disappeared. The very presence of blacks, whether slaves or semi-slaves, encouraged the spread of a sense of relative equality between members of the higher ‘caste’. The situation of the white community in England was very different. Here exclusion from the enjoyment of legal equality and negative liberty was much more widespread. Let us ignore Ireland, which even after the formation of the United Kingdom in fact continued to be a colony. Let us focus on England proper, starting with Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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He made a sharp distinction between three groups: men ‘by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’, or subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who were the black slaves from Africa; then freemen; and finally, white servants who were blood relations of the freemen. A key paragraph of the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; clarifies this:&lt;br /&gt;
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[W]e find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power, for the master could not have power to kill him at any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Here Locke primarily had in mind the two figures of the black slave and the indentured white servant. As we know, even the second was subject to buying and selling, was in large measure a commodity, exported to America and regularly traded on the market where possible purchasers arrived alerted by adverts in the local press. It goes without saying that the master possessed an extensive right of punishment, even if not as unlimited as that wielded over the black slave. We can understand then the comparison with the servant in the Old Testament, who, although not subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’, experiences a condition that might by contrast be defined as ‘imperfect slavery’. This imperfect slavery was defined by Locke by the term of servitude or drudgery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg110&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Within the British Empire three different legal situations coexisted—the first marked by liberty, the second by servitude, and the third by slavery in the strict sense. Notwithstanding the racial abyss that was now open, and which separated black slave from white servant, in England the latter did not form part of the community of the free in the strict sense. Even if different from that wielded by ‘a lord over his slave’, the power of ‘a master over his servant’, who was subject to the ‘ordinary discipline’ applied by the master within his family, was indisputable.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, although he was concerned to distinguish between slave and servant, Locke sometimes also used the second term to refer to the figure of the slave proper. In the &#039;&#039;First Treatise of Government&#039;&#039;, we can read: ‘those who were rich in the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as purchasing of new, came to have large and numerous families’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As demonstrated by the reference to the property-owners of the West Indies and the property right they exercised over the offspring of ‘servants’, it is clear that the discourse here concerns hereditary slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tripartite division formulated by Locke also appears in Mandeville. In the first place, we have ‘the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa’ to America.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England, on the other hand, ‘Slaves are not allow’d’, but free men can avail themselves of ‘the Children of the Poor’, of ‘willing Hands for all the Drudgery and hard and dirty Labour’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again we encounter the three figures of the freeman, the servant and the slave. It is so difficult to confuse the second with the first that the similarities with the third leap to the eye: ‘the meanest Indigent part of the Nation’ is ‘the working slaving People’, which is eternally destined to perform ‘dirty slavish Work’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, let us turn to Blackstone. In celebrating England as the land of liberty, he stressed that there was no place in it for ‘proper slavery’, ‘strict slavery’, ‘absolute slavery’, wherein the master was endowed with absolute, unlimited power over the life and fate of the slave. This insistent clarification left room for forms of compulsory labour different from that to which blacks in the colonies were subjected. In the great jurist’s writings too an intermediate condition between liberty and slavery ends up emerging, a sort of non-‘absolute’ slavery, slavery not understood in the ‘strict’ sense. Along with slaves, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg111&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’ and ‘labourers’ were servants. We are dealing with ‘different types of servant’, each with its specific characteristics, but all brought together by the fact of being subject to servitude.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Active once again is the legacy of Grotius, for whom &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; was the general category for understanding and defining the character of work. In Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone what is new is the stress on the distinction between two types of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;—that in force in the metropolis and that operative in the colonies. Thus, we pass from Grotius’ bipartite division to a tripartite division.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. England and the three ‘castes’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But now, setting aside major authors, let us take a look at the social reality and ideology that characterized Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Far from the ‘vestiges of slavery’ referred to by Smith, the persistence of servile relations is very clear from the treatment of the poor and the possibility of disposing of their children as a &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039; in workhouses, in the army, in prisons, and in the recruitment of servants sent to settle the colonies. An economist we have already encountered, Wakefield, drew attention to ‘English slavery’ and ‘white slaves’ in 1834.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this time authors of the most varied political persuasion compared slaves across the Atlantic with suffering workers in England: anti-abolitionists who echoed Calhoun-type statements; more or less radical currents that aimed at a more general emancipation of labour; more detached observers who confined themselves to registering the fact, like the economist we have just cited. And the comparison was established not simply by focusing on the spectre of death from starvation that constantly haunted the English worker. Certainly, this is an aspect that cannot be ignored: the number of poor people who, in order to avoid starvation, committed some crime in the hope of being able to survive as deportees or ‘galley slaves’, was not negligible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But considerable attention was also paid to encroachments on a more specifically liberal freedom—namely, ‘modern liberty’. For this to emerge with greater clarity, let us leave behind the cities and industrial centres and move to the countryside to hear the rural labourers’ grievances:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg112&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Speaking generally, since all laws have their exceptions, the privileged classes of our rural districts take infinite pains to be abhorred by their poorest neighbours. They enclose commons. They stop footpaths. They wall in their parks. They set spring-guns and man-traps … They build jails, and fill them. They make new crimes and new punishments for the poor. They interfere with the marriages of the poor, compelling some, and forbidding others to come together. They shut up paupers in workhouses, separating husband and wife, in pounds by day and wards by night. They harness poor men to carts. They superintend alehouses, decry skittles, deprecate beer-shops, meddle with fairs, and otherwise curtail the already narrow amusements of the poor.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Around twenty years later, the popular and radical &#039;&#039;Reynold’s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, condemning the ‘slavery’ that existed in England, listed the flogging of soldiers and sailors, the separation of husbands and wives in workhouses, the obligation of rural servants to request permission from their masters before they could marry, and the systematic sexual abuse to which ‘the wives and daughters of the poorer orders’ were subject.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield reported the &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; deriving from the countryside and considered them incontrovertible. Writing on the immediate eve of the abolition of slavery in British colonies, he believed it possible to distinguish three figures—‘freeman’, ‘slave’ and ‘pauper’—within the empire as a whole.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are put in mind of the discourse of the three castes we have encountered in a theorist from the American South. In fact, in 1864 the &#039;&#039;Saturday Review&#039;&#039; (a periodical that circulated among the middle and upper classes) observed that the poor in England formed ‘a caste apart, a race’, placed in a social condition that underwent no alteration ‘from the cradle to the grave’, and which was divided from the rest of society by a barrier similar to that existing in America between whites and blacks. The respectable English periodical proceeded as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him. The relation in both instances is that of perpetual superior to perpetual inferior, of chief to dependant, and no amount of kindness or goodness is suffered to alter this relation.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg113&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are—it is important not to forget it—in 1864. Many decades had passed since the Glorious Revolution and the birth of liberal England. And yet, if the situation was unstable and tending to change as a result of popular struggles, the reality of a caste society continued to make itself felt. Already abolished thirty years earlier in the English colonies, the caste of slaves was on the point of disappearing in the United States as well. Having been three, the castes were becoming two in number on both sides of the Atlantic: corresponding to the black semi-slaves of the United States were the white servants of England. A more or less rigid barrier continued to separate both from the caste of genuine freemen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sort of social apartheid seems to correspond to the racial apartheid. In eighteenth-century England we find Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, having his coach preceded by outriders who were charged with clearing the road in order to spare the nobleman the annoyance of meeting with plebeian persons and glances.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even a century later, a kind of segregation existed between the different social classes in English churches.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the already noted &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; drawn up by rural labourers bemoaned the fact that even then the aristocracy resorted to a curtain to shield itself from any ‘vulgar gaze’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When Senior visited Naples, what made him angry was the mixing of ranks: ‘In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets’. Worse, they were so little removed from the upper classes that they lived in the cellars of seigneurial palaces. The result? ‘[Y]ou never are free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degeneration.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The reproduction of the servile caste and the beginnings of eugenics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How to ‘continue the race of journeymen and servants’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Smith’s phrase reveals that social mobility was limited or non-existent. The heaviest, worst-paid work was entrusted to a stratum that tended to be reproduced from one generation to the next, and hence to a kind of hereditary servile caste.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg114&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The reproduction of this caste or race was absolutely necessary. According to Mandeville, a decidedly beneficial role was played by war. If, with its periodic massacres, it did not provide a remedy for excess male births, women, sought after by too many aspiring, competitive males, would become a kind of rare commodity accessible only to the rich. Society would then lose its re-supply of ‘the Children of the Poor; the greatest and most extensive of all temporal Blessings’. The hereditary reproduction of the poor destined to perform ‘the Drudgery of hard and dirty Labour’ would prove difficult or impossible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The natural order, of which war was a part, spontaneously generated the race of semi-slaves that society could never do without. However, this supposedly spontaneous process must be encouraged by timely political interventions from above. According to Mandeville, access to education on the part of the ‘Labouring Poor’ was to be avoided at all costs: the ‘Proportion of the Society’ would be compromised by it.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The requisite cheap, docile and obedient labour force would risk disappearing. Other representatives of the liberal tradition invoked much more extensive intervention. For the purposes of generating a potentially perfect race of docile workers and instruments of labour, the concentration-camp universe of the ‘workhouses’ could prove useful. Locking up the children of delinquents and ‘suspects’ therein, one could (observed Bentham) produce an ‘indigenous class’ that would be distinguished for its industriousness and sense of discipline. If early marriage was promoted within this class, treating the offspring as apprentices until they attained their majority, the workhouses and society would dispose of an inexhaustible reserve of manpower of the highest quality. In other words, through the ‘gentlest of all revolutions’—a sexual revolution[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the ‘indigenous class’, propagating itself in hereditary fashion from one generation to the next, would be transformed into a kind of indigenous race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sieyès envisaged a similarly ‘gentle’ revolution, and likewise for the purposes of producing a class or race of labourers as docile as possible. Like Bentham, the French liberal indulged in a eugenicist utopia (or dystopia). He imagined a ‘cross’ (&#039;&#039;croisement&#039;&#039;) between monkeys and ‘blacks’ for creating domesticated beings adapted to servile work: ‘the new race of anthropomorphic monkeys’. In this way, whites, who remained at the top of the social hierarchy as directors of production, could dispose of blacks as auxiliary instruments of production, or slaves proper, who would precisely be the anthropomorphic monkeys:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg115&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However extraordinary, however immoral this idea might seem at first sight, I have reflected on it at length, and can find no other way in a great nation, especially in countries that are very hot or very cold, to reconcile the directors of works with the simple instruments of labour.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While, on the one hand, it was necessary to encourage the production and reproduction of a race of servants or actual slaves, on the other, it was necessary to limit, so far as possible, the unproductive, parasitic surplus population, the mass of poor who, far from creating wealth, devoured it like locusts. To maintain the demographic balance, Malthus called for a policy that postponed marriage and procreation among the popular classes; otherwise, nature would dispose of them with wars, famines and epidemics. In this respect the role of medicine was problematic. In 1764 Franklin wrote to a doctor: ‘Half the Lives you save are not worth saving, as being useless; and almost the other Half ought not to be sav’d, as being mischievous. Does your Conscience never hint to you the Impiety of being in constant Warfare against the Plans of Providence?’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville hoped that one could finally be shot of the ‘prison rabble’ like rats, maybe thanks to a massive fire.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Did the French liberal ‘dream of genocide’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The claim is exaggerated. But there remains his harsh polemic against a ‘bastard charity’ that threatened order: ‘It is the philanthropy of Paris that is killing us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A general conclusion is indicated. The eugenic temptation runs deep in the liberal tradition. Not by chance, the discipline that took this name had its baptism in Great Britain and experienced extraordinary success in the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The elusive liberalism of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, we are compelled to pose a crucial question in connection with Great Britain: Was it a liberal society? Even after the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg116&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;abolition of slavery in the colonies proper, we certainly cannot speak of generalized enjoyment of the quintessential liberal freedom—modern liberty—by the United Kingdom’s inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Irish certainly did not enjoy it, being as they were (acknowledged de Tocqueville) constantly subjected to ‘emergency measures’ and at the mercy of ‘military tribunals’ and a numerous, hateful gendarmerie. In Castlebar, on the basis of the Insurrection Act, ‘any man caught without a passport outdoors after sunset is deported’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the press of the time, the condition of the Irish was often compared with that of blacks across the Atlantic. According to the judgement in 1824 of a rich English merchant, who was a disciple of Smith and an ardent Quaker and abolitionist (James Cropper), the Irish found themselves in a worse situation than black slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, the Irish represented for Britain what the blacks were for the United States; they were ‘two phenomena of the same kind’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Beaumont’s opinion found indirect confirmation from de Tocqueville. From &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; we know of the complete deafness of the judiciary, monopolized by whites, to the legitimate complaints of blacks. A conclusion suggests itself, also indicated by evidence gathered in Maryland: ‘The white population and the black population are in a state of war. They never mix. One of them must give way to the other.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French liberal heard a similar observation in the island subjugated and colonized by Britain: ‘To tell the truth, there is no justice in Ireland. Virtually all the country’s magistrates are in open warfare with the population. So the population does not even have the idea of public justice.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases a cornerstone of the &#039;&#039;Rechtsstaat&#039;&#039;—the judiciary—was at war with a substantial part of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On both sides of the Atlantic, laws that prevented or hampered access to education and outlawed marriage with members of the higher caste served to prolong the oppression of the blacks and the Irish. In Ireland, too, miscegenation was a crime punished with great severity; on the basis of a law of 1725, a priest guilty of secretly celebrating a mixed marriage could even be condemned to death.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Ireland as well, attempts were made to obstruct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg117&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the native population’s access to education. We can conclude on this point by attending to the words of a nineteenth-century liberal Anglo-Irish historian: British legislation aimed to deprive the Irish of their ‘property’ and ‘industry’; it ‘was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1798, three years prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish numbered ‘about four and a half million—a third of the population of the British Isles’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, a higher percentage of people were to be deprived of their negative liberty than in the United States, where, at the time of independence, blacks made up one-fifth of the population. It must be added that, before and after the Glorious Revolution, Britain’s rulers treated the Irish, on the one hand, like Indians, to be deprived of their land and thinned out through more or less drastic measures; and on the other, like blacks whose forced labour might conveniently be used. Hence the oscillation between practices of enslavement and genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain itself the popular classes saw their negative liberty seriously infringed, to the extent that they were assimilated in the culture and press of the time to an inferior ‘caste’ or ‘race’. But now it is appropriate to concentrate on relations within the upper ‘caste’. As we know, the American colonists’ rebellion developed out of protests against the negative discrimination they suffered by dint of their exclusion from the legislative body. At the same time, we must not forget that in eighteenth-century Britain the right to representation was a privilege granted by the Crown, so that even large industrial towns were excluded from the House of Commons, where, by contrast, boroughs which had virtually been abandoned, but which had the right to be ‘represented’ in London mainly by local nobles, were present. Bearing in mind that the House of Lords was the hereditary preserve of the landed aristocracy, a conclusion is dictated: in the case of Britain itself, not even relations within the property-owning classes were stamped by equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality was further compromised by another circumstance: only the second electoral Reform Act, put through by Disraeli in 1867, ‘effected the full political emancipation of Non-conformists’. Until then, significant forms of religious discrimination were in force:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg118&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Persons, whether Protestant or Catholic, who would not take the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England, were still debarred from holding office either under the Crown or in the municipalities; the doors of Parliament were still closed to Roman Catholics, and the doors of the Universities to dissenters of every kind. [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, on closer inspection, the non-conformists (among whom must obviously be included the Jews)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] were deprived not only of political equality, but also of full legal equality. Only in 1871 did all universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, ‘throw open College Fellowships and University posts to persons of every, or of no, religious denomination’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The argument with which Macaulay criticized the exclusion of Jews from political rights in 1831 is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money; and money may make members of Parliament … That a Jew should be privy-councilor to a Christian king would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money-market, and the money-market may govern the world.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In a paradoxical argument against the forms of discrimination of which Jews were victims, Macaulay seems to echo anti-Jewish stereotypes, but in reality the meaning of his discourse is clear: it was absurd and inadmissible to seek to deny political and even civil equality to those who, economically at any rate, were already members of the dominant elite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, like the class that was the protagonist of the American Revolution and the establishment of a racial state, the English aristocracy in no way restricted itself to aspiring to a merely negative liberty. Some decades before Hamilton (and the American revolutionaries), in England Sidney had already declared that ‘nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another’, or upon a law to which he had not given his consent.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg119&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Locke did not formulate things very differently, when with political ‘slavery’ he contrasted ‘liberty’ understood as ‘be[ing] under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again it was Locke who stressed the equivalence between the English and Latin terms;[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the latter clearly implied the participation of the &#039;&#039;cives&#039;&#039; in public life. The English philosopher argued along similar lines to the American revolutionaries, who not by chance appealed to him: he who wants to decide on his own, excluding me from the process of forming laws, may legitimately be suspected of ‘hav[ing] a design to take away everything else’, not just political ‘liberty’; he ultimately aims to ‘make me a slave’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the position adopted by this or that theorist, the English aristocracy aimed to play, and really did play, a political role of the first order. In addition to the upper house, ‘the lower house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club’ until almost the end of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy exercised political power directly: ‘it was the landed elite, not a separate service elite, that was in control of public affairs’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a control that encompassed the judiciary and local government and which, above all in the countryside, was seamless. Virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the grandees and gentry were still the unchallenged authorities, responsible to no one but themselves.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the South of the United States, the uncontested power of a social class in England did not preclude the imposition of restrictions on its individual members. The titled property-owner was required to respect a series of obligations, sanctioned partly by law and partly by custom. One thinks of primogeniture and the inalienability of property, as well as the endogamy that was fairly widespread within the aristocracy—a practice that once again calls to mind the ban on miscegenation in the United States. The members of the nobility ‘were concerned with voluntary service to the state, both locally and nationally, as civilians and as military men’. While they enjoyed their property and their wealth, patrician officers adopted the pose of ‘chivalric heroes’ required, when the nation was in danger, to exhibit ‘spartan and stoical bravery’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg120&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How should we define the society we have been analysing? Once again, we encounter the problem that has dogged us since the beginning of this book: Can we speak of liberalism in connection with Calhoun’s thinking and the reality of the United States where he lived and worked? And can we speak of it in relation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Given the dominant representation of liberalism today, what sense would it make to define as liberal a society where a considerable part of the population was subject to military dictatorship, where the popular metropolitan classes were at least partially excluded from negative liberty, where this type of liberty was by no means the ideal of the possessing classes, and where the principle of civil and political equality was limited among the latter in various ways?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constitutive element of a liberal regime should be competition between various candidates. But what actually happened?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many elections saw no contest at all. In seven general elections from 1760 to 1800, less than a tenth of the country seats were contested. Of the boroughs, some were purely inert in that their owners sold the seats or appointed the members without question; some seats were as much a property as seats in the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Liberalism, ‘property-owning individualism’ and ‘aristocratic society’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In an attempt to overcome the difficulty encountered in defining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, reference has sometimes been made to ‘individualism’ rather than liberalism; and the history of the intellectual tradition being examined now seems profoundly stamped with a ‘property-owning individualism’ or ‘possessive individualism’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This definition has some legitimacy. In Locke, political power begins to be configured as tyranny, and hence violence, when it attacks private property (belonging to the dominant class); and it is then licit to resist such violence. The citizen, in fact the individual, takes back the power he already possessed in the state of nature, which consists in ‘us[ing] such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and Nature allows him’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of legality is the sphere of respect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg121&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for private property, while violence is defined in the first instance by its violation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On closer examination, however, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ proves completely inadequate. We are confronted with a society and intellectual tradition which, far from being inspired by a superstitious respect for property and property right in general, in fact promoted and legitimized massive expropriations of the Irish and Indians. It is true that a central chapter in the second of Locke’s &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; bears the title ‘Of Property’. But ‘Expropriation’ might have been more fitting, given that it aims to justify white colonists’ appropriation of land from idle Indians incapable of cultivating it. Ignoring the colonies and colonial populations, or populations of colonial origin, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ seems to focus attention exclusively on the white community in the capitalist metropolis, and on the conflict between property-owners and non-property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we confine our attention to the metropolis, we see that the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; justifies and demands the enclosure of common land in England, and hence the massive expropriation of peasants. Like the transatlantic territories occupied by the Indians, common land was not properly fertilized by labour; and hence in both cases there was as yet no legitimate owner. In classic authors of the liberal tradition, we find the assertion and detailed demonstration that the property claimed by natives, and by social groups in the metropolis assimilated to natives, was in reality &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paradoxically, despite its critical intentions, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ ends up crediting the ideological self-consciousness of the classes that arrived in power in England and America advancing the slogan of liberty and property. Marx argued quite differently. &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; denounced the ‘stoical peace of mind [of] the political economist’ and of liberal thinkers in the face of ‘the most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property”‘, and ‘the forcible expropriation of the people’, carried out in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, in order to speed up the enclosure process, brutal methods were sometimes employed without hesitation: entire villages were destroyed and razed to the ground, so as to force the peasants to flee and transform common land into private property and pasture in the service of the textile industry.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining the category of ‘property-owning individualism’, we have hitherto concentrated on the adjective. If we now turn our attention to the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg122&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;noun, we shall find that it too proves rather problematic. The excluded were likened by the dominant class to instruments of labour, bipedal machines. In other words, they saw their quality as human beings and individuals denied. Certainly, the privileged insisted strongly on this quality, which they attributed exclusively to themselves. But is this individualism? Here, too, we find the modern historian aligning himself with the ideological self-consciousness of a social class and political movement he intends to criticize.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than ‘property-owning individualism’, the categories applied to England by some leading liberal authors of the nineteenth century seem more apt. In Constant’s view, ‘England is, at bottom, simply a vast, opulent and vigorous aristocracy.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The judgement formulated by de Tocqueville in the 1830s was no different: ‘Not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly stable than ever, but the nation leaves the government, seemingly without any signs of disapproval, to a very small number of families’, an ‘aristocracy’ primarily based on ‘birth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are dealing with an ‘aristocratic community’ characterized by the domination of ‘a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Besides, it was Disraeli himself who criticized the Whig Party, which long dominated the country that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, for having aimed to establish an aristocracy and oligarchy on the Venetian model.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. ‘Master-race democracy’ between the United States and England&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A question remains unanswered: Albeit intrinsically aristocratic, was England nevertheless a liberal society? Constant was in no doubt: it was the country where ‘social differences are most respected’ (wholly to the advantage of the aristocracy), but where, at the same time, ‘the rights of each man are most guaranteed’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also de Tocqueville’s opinion, but only after 1848, once anxiety about the socialist and Bonapartist drift of France had eclipsed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg123&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;any other consideration. ‘[T]he aristocratic constitution of English society’ was incontestable, and yet it was still the ‘wealthiest and freest country’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to the fall of the July Monarchy, by contrast, de Tocqueville had his doubts and reservations. It was necessary to distinguish between ‘two different forms of liberty’. One should not confuse ‘the democratic and, dare I say it, correct conception of liberty’ with the ‘aristocratic conception of liberty’, understood not as ‘common right’ but as ‘privilege’. The latter prevailed in England, as in ‘aristocratic societies’ in general, with the result that there was no place for ‘general liberty’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; referred and subscribed to the observation of a US citizen who had journeyed extensively in Europe: ‘The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprises us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not that the pathos of liberty was absent among those who adopted the stance of absolute masters. On the contrary: ‘It can happen that the love of liberty is all the more alive among some the less one encounters guarantees of liberty for all. The rarer it is, the exception in such cases is all the more precious.’ This aristocratic conception of liberty produces, among those who have been thus educated, an exalted sense of their individual value and a passionate taste for independence.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the value judgement, which is the converse, we are put in mind of Burke’s well-known observation: freedom appears even ‘more noble and more liberal’ to slave-masters. Should we equate England with slaveholding Virginia? In fact, points in common were not wanting, as emerges from a reading of de Tocqueville. He observed that in the United States whites refused to recognize ‘the common features of humanity’ in blacks.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But in England, too, inequalities were so marked and insuperable that ‘each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race’; ‘general ideas’ were lacking, starting precisely with the idea of humanity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, de Tocqueville was concerned to distinguish American democracy from the aristocracy predominant in England. However, on several occasions his analysis ended up drawing attention to the similarities between the two societies. What took the form of class relations on one side of the Atlantic presented itself as race relations on the other. In the case of England, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg124&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we can speak of liberal society in the same way that Burke spoke of liberal society in connection with the Virginia and Poland of his time. An essential point remains: often excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights and negative liberty in England itself, the popular classes, by de Tocqueville’s indirect but all the more significant admission, continued to be separated from the upper class or caste by a gulf that calls to mind the one obtaining in a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, it can be said that for some time even the society which emerged in England from the Glorious Revolution was configured as a sort of ‘master-race democracy’, on condition that this category is not understood in a purely ethnic sense. On this side of the Atlantic, too, an insurmountable barrier separated the community of the free and masters from the mass of servants, not fortuitously compared by Locke to ‘natives’. And far from being satisfied with negative liberty, the dominant aristocracy cultivated the ideal of active participation in political life, cultivating ‘republican’ ideals. Several influential contemporary interpreters base their arguments on this, when referring to a ‘neo-Roman’ vision or ‘Machiavellian moment’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we face the danger of inadvertent transfiguration: these two categories highlight the pathos of free, egalitarian participation in public life, but end up passing in silence over the macroscopic exclusion clauses presupposed by such pathos. The ideal of a rich public life, of ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Machiavellian’ character, is indeed present in an author like Fletcher, who on the one hand declared himself ‘republican in principle’, while on the other he advocated slavery for vagrants. Locke can be assimilated to such a milieu. He declared in favour of black slavery in the colonies and ‘drudgery’ for wage-labourers in the metropolis. At the same time, with his focus on the aristocracy he developed a pathos of the Commonwealth and the &#039;&#039;civitas&#039;&#039;, which echoes the republican models of antiquity. This, at least, was the opinion of Josiah Tucker, who identified and denounced Locke as a ‘republican Whig’ and supporter of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But perhaps the author who in England best expressed the ideal of ‘master-race democracy’ was Sidney. His insistence on the equality of free men was very marked: ‘the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others do the like’. Definitive is his condemnation of political slavery, inherent not only in absolute monarchy, but also in any political regime that claimed to subject the freeman to laws decided without his consent. But this pathos of liberty implied the demand for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg125&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the master’s right to be ‘judge’ of his own servant without outside interference.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One should not lose sight of the fact that ‘in many places (even by the law of God) the master hath a power of life and death over his servant’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the base and effeminate Asiaticks and Africans’, incapable of understanding the value of ‘liberty’, were rightly regarded by Aristotle as &#039;&#039;‘slaves by nature’&#039;&#039; and ‘little different from beasts’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance—together with Locke, Fletcher and Burgh—Sidney was indicated by Jefferson as a leading authority for understanding ‘the general principles of liberty’ that inspired the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker also conjoined Locke and Sidney, but this time critically. He further pointed out that Sidney was an admirer of ‘Polish liberty’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and of a country where serfdom in its harshest form, to which peasants were subjected, was intertwined with the rich political life of the aristocracy that dominated the Diet), and paid homage to ‘republican liberty’ (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Also expressing himself in flattering terms about Poland, as well as the ‘southern colonies’ of America, was Burke, who not by chance became the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South. Admiration for a regime of republican liberty founded on the slavery or servitude of a considerable proportion of the population, for a ‘master-race democracy’, was well represented in English liberalism. The authors expressing such positions could in their turn count on widespread sympathy across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn1a|1]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonopartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn2a|2]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn3a|3]] Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 301.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn4a|4]] Garry Wills, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn5a|5]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 2, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn6a|6]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn7a|7]] Jefferson Davis, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 399–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn8a|8]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 10–11, 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn9a|9]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn10a|10]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn11a|11]] Plessy versus Ferguson, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Isssues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn12a|12]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 51, 234–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn13a|13]] The term was coined in late 1863: cf. Forrest G. Wood, &#039;&#039;Black Scare&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 53ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn14a|14]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn16a|16]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn17a|17]] Joel Williamson, &#039;&#039;New People&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn19a|19]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., pp. 19–22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn21a|21]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., p. 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn23a|23]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie, ou L’esclavage aux États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gosselin, 1840, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn24a|24]] Robert William Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Consent or Contract&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn25a|25]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn26a|26]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn27a|27]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn28a|28]] David Grimsted, &#039;&#039;American Mobbing, 1828–1861&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn31a|31]] Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July’, in Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., &#039;&#039;Masterpieces of Negro Eloquence, 1818–1913&#039;&#039;, Mineola (NY): Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn32a|32]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn34a|34]] Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn35a|35]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn36a|36]] Brenda Stevenson, &#039;&#039;Life in Black and White&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 275; David B. Davis, ‘White Wives and Slave Mothers’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 20 February 1997, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn37a|37]] Dew quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn38a|38]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 97, 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn39a|39]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joëlle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991, pp. 74–5, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn40a|40]] Dew, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 320.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn41a|41]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 6, 10; Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 62, 205, 425.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn42a|42]] Hosea Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, trans. Alda Carrer and Davide Danti, Milan: Jaca Book, 1997, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn43a|43]] Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Contract or Consent&#039;&#039;, p. 413.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn44a|44]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 405.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn46a|46]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn47a|47]] Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn48a|48]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 120, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn49a|49]] William E. B. Du Bois, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction in America&#039;&#039;, ed. David L. Lewis, New York: Athenaeum, 1992, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn50a|50]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn51a|51]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 95 and &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, pp. 394, 397.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn52a|52]] George M. Frederickson, ‘America’s Original Sin’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 25 March 2004, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn53a|53]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn54a|54]] Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism, passim&#039;&#039;; George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;; Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America, passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, p. 22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 326.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn58a|58]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn62a|62]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 119, 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn65a|65]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 411–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn66a|66]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 339, 343.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., p. 344.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn69a|69]] Douglas A. Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn70a|70]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 339.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn71a|71]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, pp. 101–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn72a|72]] John Cannon, &#039;&#039;Aristocratic Century&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn73a|73]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn74a|74]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn75a|75]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn76a|76]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn77a|77]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 258–9, 261–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn79a|79]] Bentham, quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, pp. 78–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn80a|80]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn81a|81]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 803 (letter to John Fothergill, 14 March 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn82a|82]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 173–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 22 November 1836).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn83a|83]] Michelle Perrot, Introduction to ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn85a|85]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 19, §1; ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn86a|86]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn87a|87]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 180, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn88a|88]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 2, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn89a|89]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94–5. De Tocqueville is reporting a conversation between two influential representatives of the English political world, Nassau William Senior and John Revans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn91a|91]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 2, pp. 371–3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 289.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn93a|93]] Thomas Pakenham, &#039;&#039;The Year of Liberty&#039;&#039;, New York: Random House, 1969, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn94a|94]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945, pp. 631, 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn95a|95]] Michael C. N. Salbstein, &#039;&#039;The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain&#039;&#039;, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn96a|96]] Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, p. 681.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn98a|98]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, p. 402.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn99a|99]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., p. 183.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn102a|102]] David Cannadine, &#039;&#039;The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 14, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn103a|103]] Ibid., p. 14&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., pp. 13, 74.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn105a|105]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn106a|106]] C. B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn107a|107]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn108a|108]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 889, 891.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn109a|109]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 327 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 4 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn111a|111]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn112a|112]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 323–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113a|113]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, pp. 155, 150–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 333 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 27 February 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116a|116]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117a|117]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118a|118]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120a|120]] Quentin Skinner, &#039;&#039;Liberty Before Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121a|121]] Tucker, quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 119, 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122a|122]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 548–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123a|123]] Ibid., p. 312.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124a|124]] Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125a|125]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 479.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126a|126]] Tucker, quoted in Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FIVE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg127&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism either Side of the Atlantic&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto been concerned almost exclusively with England and the United States. The truth is that the liberal party in France betrayed its weakness fairly early on. And yet, several years before the appearance of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, Voltaire likewise proceeded to celebrate the country that embodied the cause of liberalism at the time: ‘Commerce, which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has developed commerce in its turn. By means of it the nation has grown great’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘[t]he English are the only people on earth who have managed to prescribe limits to the power of kings’; they alone were genuinely free.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More generally, given the difficulty they faced in dealing with comprehensive censorship, the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; hoped to escape this kind of cage and hence looked with sympathy across the Channel. Even Helvétius, whom Diderot rebuked for his indulgence towards enlightened despotism, was compelled to make a significant concession: ‘It is said that this century is the century of philosophy … Today, everyone seems occupied with the search for truth. But there is only one country where it can be published with impunity—and that is England.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The island happily &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg128&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rid of absolute monarchy exercised a powerful attraction. In the columns of the &#039;&#039;Encyclopédie&#039;&#039;, Diderot held up England as an example of ‘temperate monarchy’, where ‘the sovereign is repository solely of executive power’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A little less than ten years later, proposing to restrict representative bodies to ‘major property-owners’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he still viewed cross-Channel political institutions with great interest. In Condorcet’s view, too, they had the merit of having realized, albeit to an inadequate extent, the principles of the limitation of royal power, freedom of the press, habeas corpus and judicial independence.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, two years prior to the storming of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses on the political scene, the English model seemed to have triumphed in France as well. Supported by a wide popular consensus, the noble &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; challenged royal absolutism: ‘the anti-absolutism of the parlements’, or ‘aristocratic liberalism’, became the vehicle for widespread ‘liberal demands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Preserve of a nobility which, as a result also of the sale of offices, was open to the bourgeoisie, the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; for a while seemed destined to play godfather to the advent of a constitutional monarchy and to perform a role similar to that of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in England. Not by chance they appealed to Montesquieu, president of the Bordeaux &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; and a great admirer of the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke viewed this sensationally missed opportunity with regret, when he delivered his harsh indictment of a revolution that had degenerated rapidly and wickedly. Had it ended at the stage when the struggle was led by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, the French&lt;br /&gt;
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would have shamed despotism from the earth [and] rendered the cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in every nation … You would have had a free constitution … a liberal order of commons to emulate and recruit that nobility …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg129&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unfortunately, this happy, auspicious moment had been short-lived; and people had started chasing after ‘a pure democracy’ that in fact secreted a tendency to a ‘party tyranny’ and ‘a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Reflections on the Revolution in France&#039;&#039; was published on 1 November 1790, but its basic arguments had already been set out with great clarity in a speech by Burke in the Commons on 9 February of that year. Jacobinism lay in the future. Rather than transforming the British Whig into the prophet of a catastrophe no one was in a position to predict at the time, we should examine the events that had occurred when he levelled his serious charges against the French Revolution. Revealing is the observation that, rather than striving to create a ‘bad constitution’ &#039;&#039;ex nihilo&#039;&#039;, the French should have engaged in further improving the ‘good one’, of which ‘[t]hey were in possession … the day the states met in separate orders’. The ruinous turn occurred when, in the course of the meeting of the Estates-General summoned by the King—at which the ‘good’ Constitution finally emerged or, rather, re-emerged—the tradition whereby the orders sat in separate chambers was abandoned and the transition to voting by head was decided, with the consequent transformation on 9 July of the Estates-General into a constituent National Assembly wherein the former Third Estate now possessed a majority. Thus burst onto the scene the ‘bad constitution’, which ‘melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass’. Everything else flowed from this: the attack on ‘the root of all property’ and ‘confiscat[ion] [of] all the possessions of the church’—the reference is to the night of 4 August 1789 and the abolition of feudal privileges (hunting rights, tithes, and so on)—and the promulgation on 26 August of the ‘mad declaration’ of the Rights of Man, that ‘sort of &#039;&#039;institute&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039; of anarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But everything began on 9 July. The French Revolution proved fatally degenerate even before the capture of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses—in a sense, even before its inception. And in fact Burke was concerned to stress that ‘the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England’ was in fact ‘a revolution, not made, but prevented’: William of Orange ‘was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its antient constitution, and not to level all distinctions’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as, alas, had happened in France. The latter had now gone beyond its fleeting liberal phase, which extended from the agitation of the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; to the summoning of the Estates-General.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg130&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The subsequent liberal tradition is inclined to extend the felicitous phase of the French Revolution somewhat, and identify the turning point in the tumultuous intervention of the popular masses, initially rural and then urban; thus de Tocqueville. But it is interesting to note that he, too, after 1848 at any rate, extolled the period when the movement was directed by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, all of them striving to reverse ‘the old absolute power’ and ‘the old arbitrary system’, and win ‘political liberty’, in a struggle promoted and led not by the ‘low classes’ but by the ‘higher’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, contrary to Burke, who tended to conceive the parliamentary agitation on the model of the so-called Glorious Revolution, de Tocqueville was prepared to stress that in this phase, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, an authentic revolution was underway:&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; presented these principles as novelties. On the contrary, it derived them very industriously from the depths of the antiquity of the monarchy … It is a strange sight to see ideas that had hardly been born thus wrapped in ancient swaddling clothes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was ‘a very great revolution, but one that should rapidly have faded into the immensity of what happened and thus disappeared from the view of history’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only in a subsequent phase ‘was the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; no longer praised’ in the revolutionary movement, but ‘reviled, turning its liberalism against it’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruinous parabola of the French Revolution could be synthesized thus: ‘At the outset it was Montesquieu who was quoted and expounded; at the end people spoke exclusively of Rousseau.’ The turning point was described in terms similar to those we have noted in Burke: the rot set in when people rushed towards ‘pure democracy’ and laid claim to change ‘the very structure of society’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even closer to Burke was Guizot, who pointed to the eruption of the ‘Third Estate’s struggle against the nobility and the clergy’ as the moment when the French Revolution ceased to have ‘liberty’ as its goal and aimed exclusively at ‘power’, paving the way for the subsequent, interminable struggles—‘those of the poor against the rich, of the common people against the bourgeoisie, of the rabble against respectable folk [&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;]’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Parliaments, diets, the liberal aristocracy and serfdom&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg131&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;For Burke, the revolution in France should ultimately have confined itself to liberalizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. This was not an isolated, polemical idea. In stressing the particular attachment to liberty displayed by slave-owners, the discourse of reconciliation with the rebel colonists offered a general consideration:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]hese people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothick ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No distinction is made here between slavery in the strict sense and the serfdom prevalent, in its harshest forms, in eastern Europe. In any event, the servile subjection of blacks or peasants, far from contradicting it, rendered the love of liberty by property-owners and freemen stronger and more credible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sidney too was an admirer of Poland. Along with other ‘northern nations’, it was inspired by a love of liberty. What demonstrated this was, among other things, the fact that the king derived from ‘popular elections’—in other words, appointment by the Diet of nobles.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, proudly asserting their condition as free, equal men in the face of the monarch were magnates who wielded absolute power over their serfs. But Sidney argued along the lines we have already encountered: as with slavery, liberalism was also compatible with serfdom. In fact, both institutions rendered the appreciation of liberty more profound and more jealous.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Burke there is complete consistency between the recognition granted Poland and that granted the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;. The latters’ agitation was quite the reverse of an isolated phenomenon: ‘In Sweden the years from 1719 to 1772 are known as the Age of Freedom, because at this time the Diet or Riksdag ruled without interference by the King. Indeed, these Swedish Whigs, after their revolution of 1719, had the works of John Locke translated into Swedish.’ In Hungary the nobles instead appealed above all to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while, in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg132&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even more ringing language, the Polish aristocracy paid homage to ‘republican liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[t]he diets, estates, parlements, and councils all stoutly defended liberty, and indeed stood for many genuine liberal ideas; but at the same time they palpably insisted on the maintenance or enlargement of their own privileges.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this context we can also situate Bismarck’s celebration some decades later of the ‘liberal caste sentiments’ (&#039;&#039;ständisch-liberale Stimmung&#039;&#039;) of the class he belonged to,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which was interested in extending the jurisdiction and powers of representative bodies also in order to reinforce control over servants.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar observation can be made in connection with the agitation set off by the French &#039;&#039;parlements:&#039;&#039; guiding the ‘assault’ on royal absolutism was ‘one of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime’s&#039;&#039; most traditional institutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in addition to the English model, it was to this initial phase of the French Revolution—the one admired by Burke and de Tocqueville post-1848—that the liberal nobility of the Hapsburg Empire appealed to condemn Joseph II’s anti-feudal reforms, to reassert the role of diets and intermediate bodies, and hence ‘regain … control over their peasants’ and the ‘other political liberties’ they had lost.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sidney had already specified that a common feature of ‘northern nations’, which embodied the principle of liberty, was assignment of a decisive role to ‘lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The aristocratic liberalism represented in France by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; was thus widely diffused in Europe, especially central and eastern Europe. Certainly, unlike Burke, Montesquieu expressed a negative opinion of Poland, ‘where the peasants are slaves of the nobility’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Whig was well aware of these social relations. In fact, he started out from them to underscore the emphatic love of liberty displayed by slave-owners in Poland, as across the Atlantic. By contrast, Montesquieu saw liberty at work in the English colonies in America, but not in Poland. Does Burke demonstrate greater logical rigour? In reality, in accordance with his principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, Montesquieu did not identify with Poland, which could not invoke the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg133&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;justification or extenuation of a hot climate and where the zone of unfreedom lacked spatial as well as racial delimitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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It remains the case that Burke’s attitude had deep roots in the philosophy of history of the liberal tradition, which from Montesquieu onwards tended to date the inception of the history of freedom and free, representative government from the ancient Germans. Among them, as we know from Grotius, the institution of slavery was very much present and yet (according to the author of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;), ‘the English have taken their idea of political government from the Germans’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such presuppositions, Madame de Staël celebrated the liberty enjoyed by old France, despite the heavy presence of serfdom,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Constant ‘the intermediate bodies’ and &#039;&#039;‘Parlements’&#039;&#039; wrongly weakened by royal despotism,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which played an important role in the initial phase of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The American Revolution and the crisis of the English model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the seemingly favourable initial prospects, the English model met with rapid defeat in Paris. In reality, it was already deeply tarnished when the crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; reached maturity in France. In the 1760s, while the colonists’ rebellion was brewing across the Atlantic, John Wilkes attacked ‘the whole organization of the British oligarchy’ in London and initiated a crisis of such gravity as to make the Italian Pietro Verri believe in the imminence of ‘civil war’. Persecuted at home, Wilkes for a time found refuge in Paris, where he formed relations with the group of &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the turning point in the process that threw the English model into crisis in France was represented by the American Revolution. The British Constitution now ceased to be celebrated, and criticisms of Montesquieu for having transfigured it were not lacking.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The increasingly bitter condemnation of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; derived comfort from transatlantic political and social developments. Although not refusing England acknowledgement of the merits earned with the liquidation of royal absolutism, Condorcet looked primarily to America, with its magnificent ‘spectacle of equality’, without any trace of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg134&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belief diffused, albeit to different degrees, on both sides of the Channel that nature had ‘divided the human race into three or four orders’, condemning only one of them to ‘work much and eat little’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now appeal was no longer made to the Glorious Revolution, from which a liberal but also aristocratic England had emerged, but to the ‘happy revolution’ across the Atlantic,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which had given birth to a markedly superior politico-social reality: ‘there is no distinction of orders’ and ‘there is nothing that confines one part of the human species to an abjectness consigning it to idiocy as well as misery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Diderot was even more swingeing. The new country, which offered ‘all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum from fanaticism and tyranny’, was an alternative model to the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that continued to be all the rage in the old continent as a whole, and where ‘the inept, the corrupt rich and the pernicious [are promoted] to the most important offices’. Adherence to the cause of the rebel colonists was, at the same time, a ruthless critique of the behaviour of British troops and against Britain as such. This emerges from celebration of the ‘brave Americans, who have preferred to see their women outraged, their children slain, their homes destroyed, their fields ruined, their cities burnt, and who have preferred to shed their blood and die, rather than lose the least part of their liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks also to the support furnished to the American revolutionaries by France, their arguments were bound to find a favourable echo in Paris, and they involved an unequivocal condemnation of the country that Paine in &#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039; (substantially translated immediately after its publication) branded as ‘British barbarity’, ‘the Royal Brute of Britain’, whose aristocratic character was already evident from ‘what is called the Magna Charta’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nor should we lose sight of the presence in Paris, in the decisive years of the revolutionary crisis, of Jefferson, who, a few weeks after the storming of the Bastille, advised France to keep its distance from England’s worst aspects (a form of representation that was quite the reverse of equal—in fact, ‘abominably partial’—as well as the ‘absolute’ power which the monarch continued to possess in reality thanks to the venality of parliamentarians).[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg135&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This was the intellectual climate in which Brissot and Clavière, two figures destined to play a central role in the French Revolution, published a book in 1787 dedicated ‘to the American Congress and the friends of the United States in the two worlds’, and marked throughout by admiration for ‘free Americans’ and ‘free America’, for its ‘free’ and ‘excellent’ Constitution and noble ‘republican customs’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The counterpoint to such celebration was, of course, condemnation of ‘London’s ministerial despotism’ and the ‘ferocity’ of its troops. The ‘English nation’ was now vainly seeking to remedy the ‘devastation of its cruel dementia’ and renew relations with the country born in the wake of the struggle against it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This division must be followed by an intellectual and political alliance between those who had struggled together against England—namely, the United States and France, which ‘with its arms helped assert the independence of free America’, and which was now summoned to take inspiration from the great new model embodied by the country thrown up by the revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On this basis, Brissot and Clavière set up the French–American Society.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, two years later, the debate began that issued in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, not a few interventions appealed to the American example and the sort of synthetic proclamation of the rights of man contained in the Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to counter the revolution’s radicalization, Malouet, who became the spokesman for the interests of slave-owners in the colonies, drew attention to the radical differences between the United States and France. In the first case, there was a society ‘entirely composed of property-owners already accustomed to equality’. In the second, one witnessed the agitation of ‘an immense multitude of men without property’ in a daily struggle for survival and ‘placed by fate in a condition of dependency’: a gulf separated ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society’. This was where appeals to ‘democracy’ and the rights of man could have devastating consequences for the social order.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Stripped of its ideological caution and reticence, the meaning of the speech was clear. In America, thanks to expansion into territories occupied by the Indians and their expropriation, it was possible significantly to expand the ranks of property-owners who were European in origin. On the other hand, the ‘unfortunate classes’ were not in a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg136&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;position to do harm: they mainly comprised blacks reduced to slavery or relegated to a subaltern caste and subject to iron social control. Waved exclusively within the white community and the superior race, the flag of democracy and the rights of man had nothing subversive about it. But in France …&lt;br /&gt;
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Malouet’s reasoning was not flawless. However, it was no longer possible to revert to the situation prior to the American Revolution. After the formation of significantly more democratic representative bodies at federal and state levels in the United States, little credibility could attach to the British parliament, which on the basis of a law of 1716 that remained in force for nearly two centuries (until 1911) was elected every seven years,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and monopolized by the landed aristocracy. Moreover, it was undermined by a corruption that had become proverbial in Europe and across the Atlantic, which seemed in France to be a repeat of the sale of offices—an essential element of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that was to be got rid of.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of their argument with London, the American revolutionaries had equated citizens deprived of the right of representation with slaves. But now this argument came to be applied in France by those who were opposed to censitary discrimination in the suffrage. This, thundered Robespierre, criticizing those inspired by the ‘example of England’, reduced the excluded to a condition similar to the slave: ‘liberty consists in obeying the laws one has given oneself and slavery in being forced to submit to an alien will’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, Babeuf argued in similar fashion: ‘citizens whose will is inactive—such men are slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These were declarations that could have come from the mouth of an American revolutionary; only now, pronounced in favour not of a narrow elite of gentlemen and property-owners, but of the mass of the dispossessed, they assumed a very different political and social value.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The transfiguration of American ‘master-race democracy’ in a universalistic key&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Focusing attention on the problem of slavery, the argument that developed on both sides of the Atlantic initially discredited England, protagonist of the slave trade, more than it did the rebel colonists: ‘staining the reputation of that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg137&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nation’ (observed Diderot in 1774) ‘is the fact that its blacks are the unhappiest of blacks’. Indeed, ‘the Englishman, enemy of tyranny at home, is the most ferocious despot abroad’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; reiterated the point: ‘The English, this people so jealous of their own liberty, have contempt for that of other men’. They did not hesitate to employ the most bestial methods and the most refined forms of torture to smother any hint of rebellion and any aspiration to freedom by their slaves; ‘it is to this excess of barbarism that the trading and slavery of blacks have necessarily led the usurpers’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, when it allied with the powers of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to fight revolutionary France, and refused to follow the latter’s example in abolishing slavery (decreed by the Jacobin Convention in February 1794, in the wake of the revolution by the black slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture), England was widely discredited in Europe. Robespierre was not alone in declaring that the island across the Channel could seem like a model of liberty only at a time when France groaned under monarchical absolutism. This was also Kant’s opinion: ‘England, which at one time could count on the sympathy of the best men in the world … has now completely lost that sympathy.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it provoked the crisis of the English model, the American Revolution prompted portrayals and hopes that were destined to prove completely unrealistic. At work was the illusion that the institution of slavery was destined rapidly to disappear in the republic produced by a great struggle for freedom. The founders of the French–American Society explicitly expressed themselves in such terms: ‘The most beautiful feature for which one honours the public spirit in the United States’ was ‘the emancipation of the blacks’. Thanks to the Quakers’ abolitionist campaigning, it ‘will soon be universal in all this part of the world’, so that only the Europeans, still committed to the slave trade and the oppression of blacks, would remain to blush at ‘their barbarism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet adopted a similar position: the rebel colonists were the ‘friends of universal liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, one could start from the presupposition that the stain of slavery would soon be washed away:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg138&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Slavery is universally regarded in the thirteen states as a crime of &#039;&#039;lèse-humanité&#039;&#039; … Now, given this opinion, it will be hard for the private interests of the slave-owners to prevail for long in a country where the press is free and where all measures of public authority, all the deliberations of the legislative body … are necessarily public acts.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This illusion is readily explicable: it involved a confusion between the abolition of the slave trade (effectively provided for by the US Constitution, which sanctioned its termination in 1808) and the abolition of slavery (which continued to flourish); and there was a sense that the process set in train in the North would shortly encompass the Union as a whole. More generally, the rebel colonists’ passionate denunciation of despotism and political slavery sounded like a declaration of war on any form of enslavement, and hence like the inception of black emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process of transfiguring events across the Atlantic sometimes became a total misunderstanding. Enthusiastically saluting the rebel colonists, Raynal advertised a prize for answers to the question whether ‘the discovery of America has been useful or harmful to the human race’. The four responses submitted concurred in denouncing the event as a harbinger of intolerance and slavery and pointing to the American Revolution as the remedy for such ills.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The rebellion that broke out in the name also of the right to untrammelled expansion into lands inhabited by savages was thus construed in the completely opposite sense!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The colonists of San Domingo, the American model and the second liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the outset, it was not understood in France that the independence secured by the white colonists strengthened their control over the Indians and blacks; and it was not realized that a similar dialectic was tending to develop in the French colonies. In the 1781 edition of the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039;, Diderot on the one hand evoked the figure of a ‘black Spartacus’, summoned to rise up against the slave-owners, but on the other, harking back to the example of the American Revolution, declared for the concession of self-government to San Domingo too, which would precisely have entailed the triumph of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg139&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slave-owners. The philosopher did not perceive the contradiction, and nor did Brissot, who took a similar position.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, self-government became the watchword of colonists interested in preserving the institution of slavery and shielding their property from the interference, whims and despotism attributed to central government. Among the first to make himself spokesman for these ideas and interests was Malouet, who in 1788 had already engaged in a sharp polemic against the abolitionists. Certainly, the institution of slavery was out of the question for a ‘free and proud nation’ like France. To tolerate it on metropolitan territory would risk erasing the boundary between liberty and slavery and inducing a ‘general enslavement’. Malouet was a liberal and admired England, where he took refuge following the failure of projects for establishing a monarchy on the English model in France. He appealed to the ‘wise Locke’ and his &#039;&#039;Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; to argue that slavery for ‘barbarous peoples … does not offend the right of nature’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence Malouet took care not to challenge the spatial and racial delimitation of slavery, as had his contemporary and fellow countryman Melon (against whom Montesquieu argued): slavery was inconceivable in the metropolis and, within the colonies, for the white race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to blacks, however, the discourse was very different: transported to America, they were providentially released from the ‘most absurd despotism’, which raged in Africa. It was true that they continued to suffer slavery, albeit of a decidedly milder variety than that prevalent in their countries of origin. However, much more so than the American slave, whose subsistence was guaranteed and who was protected by a series of laws, it was the European ‘worker’ (&#039;&#039;journalier&#039;&#039;) who was ‘subject to the &#039;&#039;absolute will’&#039;&#039;, the power of life and death, of his master, who, denying or ejecting him from work, could calmly condemn him to death. People cried scandal at the punishments inflicted on slaves, but what happened in Europe? A peasant who stole was hanged, a poacher was condemned to ‘forced labour’—a slavery much more pitiless than that typically existing across the Atlantic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, we encounter the arguments that would later receive more developed theoretical systematization particularly in Calhoun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg140&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Once the French Revolution had broken out, supporting the colonists’ interests and arguments was the Massiac Club, founded in Paris in August 1789, of which Malouet was a prominent member. Likewise aligned in defence of the colonists’ right to self-government and the undisturbed enjoyment of their property (plantations and slaves) was Antoine Barnave. We are dealing with an important author who expressed his liberal convictions not only in immediately political terms, but also at the level of the philosophy of history. In him too we find the dialectic we are already familiar with: ringing condemnation of political ‘slavery’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] did not prevent him from forcefully and skilfully defending the cause of the slaveholding colonists. The ‘spirit of liberty’ (he observed) increased and strengthened with the expansion of ‘industry’, ‘wealth’ and, above all, ‘movable wealth’. That was why, even prior to England with its splendid ‘Constitution’, it emerged in Holland, ‘the country where movable wealth has accumulated most’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Slaves were an integral part of this ‘movable property’, and had already been classified among the ‘movable’ goods in Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Massiac Club and Barnave were generally considered ‘Anglomanes’ and genuinely were, in the sense that they opposed the radicalization of the French Revolution and admired and envied the country across the Channel for its orderly rule of law and strict censitary discrimination, which consecrated the untrammelled, exclusive domination of the property-owning classes. However, in another respect they were led to appeal predominantly to the American model, with its pathos of the inviolable autonomy of representative bodies and states from central power and the guarantee that derived from it of the inviolability of the institution of slavery. In the face of central government, the colonies adopted the stance of the southern states. In March 1790 the colonists won a temporary victory:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The National Assembly declared that it had not the slightest intention of updating any branch of its trade with the colonies. It placed the colonists and their property under the special protection of the nation. It declared anyone who plotted to incite uprisings against them a criminal to the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg141&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a success that was repeated about a year later: ‘The National Assembly made it a constitutional rule that no law on the condition of unfree persons in the colonies could be made except at the formal, unsolicited request of the colonial Assemblies.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the whole discourse revolved around the problem of slavery, the relevant term did not appear: the articles of the US Constitution were imitated in substance and form alike. This was the French Revolution’s second liberal inception. Just as the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; expressed the desire for self-government by the liberal nobility in the metropolis, so the colonial Assemblies gave voice to the slave-owners’ desire for self-government in the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this second liberal inception was even more precarious than the first. Following the defeat suffered during the Seven Years’ War, France had lost virtually all its colonial empire in 1763. This had imparted to the critique of colonialism and the institution of slavery a diffusion and radicalism hampered, by contrast, in the English and American world by substantial material interests and a national, chauvinistic spirit understandably reinforced by victory. We can thus understand the split that immediately occurred in the French liberal party. Aspiring to a constitutional monarchy with the right to make war and peace reserved to the king, Mirabeau, like Malouet and Barnave, looked to England. Unlike them, however, he ended up rejecting the American model when it came to regulating the relations between central power, on the one hand, and colonies and colonists, on the other. In the Constituent Assembly the latter demanded that they be represented in proportion not only to their numbers, but also to the number of their slaves, in accordance with a criterion identical or similar to that adopted by the US Constitution. Here is Mirabeau’s stinging reply:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the colonists want the blacks and people of colour to be men, well then, emancipate them, so that all are electors and all can be elected. Otherwise, we beg them to note that, in proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have not taken into consideration the number of our horses and mules. The colonists’ claim to have twenty representatives is therefore utterly ridiculous.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was an argument that also applied in the United States, as is confirmed by a subsequent position of Mirabeau’s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg142&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I shall not debase either this assembly or myself by seeking to prove that the blacks have a right to liberty. You decided this question when you declared that all men are born and remain equal and free. And it is not on this side of the Atlantic that corrupt fallacies will dare to maintain that blacks are not men.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The condemnation of ideologies of slavery targeted both French colonists and the English colonists who had now constituted themselves as an independent state: the polemic against the former could not but encompass the latter; the initial ambiguity, which had led French abolitionists to attribute a completely imaginary universalistic impetus to the authors of the American Revolution, was dispelled—all the more so in that it was the very ideologues of slavery who drew attention to the vitality of that institution in the United States. Brissot had believed that the example of the Quakers of Pennsylvania would act as a model; in a sense adopting an observation already present in Smith, Malouet had pointed out in 1788 that the abolition of slavery decided by it affected a fairly limited number of people and certainly did not extend to the southern states, where the presence of slaves and blacks was much more pronounced.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1802 Baudry des Lozières’ sarcasm was stinging. Precisely where ‘Brissot locates perfection’, slavery not only flourished undisturbed, but manifested itself in particularly rigid form: ‘The North Americans, those lovers of liberty, those ardent republicans, who in their books celebrate their independence so much, buy and sell slaves.’ Moreover, ‘this country of liberty is very miserly in granting freedom’ and ‘those who are freed’ were treated ‘extremely harshly’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The crisis of the English and American models and the formation of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, figures were not lacking in the abolitionist camp who continued to harbour illusions about a possible restoration of the American model to its former splendour. The abolition of an institution whose stubborn survival was incomprehensible in a country so strongly attached to the cause of liberty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg143&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;would suffice. When in 1824 Lafayette visited the United States, where nearly fifty years earlier he had fought in the War of Independence, he cautiously tried to point out ‘the disadvantages of slavery’ in Ohio. However, his speech met with no success; in fact, his good intentions had an ironic objective accompaniment, since in various southern cities public notices warned ‘people of color’ to stay away from the ceremonies in honour of the illustrious guest.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Residual illusions were also evident in Grégoire. Demonstrating political naivety, in an attempt to convince Jefferson to abandon his racial prejudices, he referred to the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture to prove the ability of blacks to achieve a level of excellence![[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French abbot was unaware of his interlocutor’s efforts, in his capacity as US president, to reduce the republic born in the wake of the black slave revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture to hunger and force it to surrender (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|§8]]). Similarly, he did not know that in 1801 the latter was lamenting in his correspondence the fact that citizens of San Domingo were abducted by American corsairs and sold as slaves.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Leading the United States in 1801 was precisely Jefferson who, some years later, wrote to a friend in ironic terms about the French abolitionist abbot.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the predicted and desired emancipation of black slaves became an ever more problematic and remote prospect, bitter disappointment set in, as demonstrated in particular by Condorcet’s evolution. On the immediate eve of the French Revolution, when the Constitution consecrating slavery was in force across the Atlantic, he still continued to draw a rather optimistic picture. The various states of the new republic and the ‘common Senate that represents them’ were unanimous in desiring the abolition of slavery; it was an ‘act of justice’ dictated by ‘humanity’, but also by ‘honour’. A severe warning was already implicit in this final observation: ‘How, without blushing, can one dare to demand these declarations of rights, these inviolable bulwarks of the liberty and security of citizens, if every day one permits oneself to violate the most sacred articles?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, where once it had been implicit, the distancing became explicit, even if it continued to be cautiously phrased. Compared with the French Revolution, the American presented itself as ‘more peaceful’, but also as ‘slower’ and ‘more incomplete’. Sooner or later, it too would end up applying &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg144&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principle of liberty and equality in its universality. But for the time being there continued the ‘crimes whose avarice soils the shores of America, Africa or Asia’, the ‘bloody contempt for men of another colour’, the slave trade between the two shores of the Atlantic, the tragedy of Africa and the ‘shameful brigandage that has corrupted and depopulated it for two centuries’. By contrast, it was a merit of the more advanced French culture to treat as ‘&#039;&#039;friends …&#039;&#039; those blacks whom their stupid tyrants disdain to rank among men’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Condorcet denounce the ‘general corruption’ of Holland and England as slaveholding societies. This denunciation increasingly tended also to encompass the country that emerged from the third liberal revolution. The Terror was already hanging over Condorcet himself, who nevertheless identified revolutionary France as the country called upon to put an end to&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the cunning and false policy which, forgetting that all men have equal rights by virtue of their very nature, wanted on the one hand to measure the extent of the rights to be granted by the size of the territory, the climate, national character, the wealth of the people, the degree of perfection of trade and industry; and on the other to sub-divide these same rights unequally between different classes of men, assigning them to birth, wealth and profession, thus creating contrary interests and opposed powers, to then establish a balance between them that is rendered necessary solely by these institutions and which does not even correct their dangerous influences.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The United States no longer represented the genuine antithesis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, construed by Condorcet as a complex system of forms of discrimination and privilege that lacerated the unity of the human race. It was necessary to overcome once and for all a political order in which, intertwined with the hierarchization of peoples on the basis of climate, geographical location or differential economic development, there was a hierarchization within any individual people on the basis of birth or membership of an estate. While the first type of discrimination found concentrated expression across the Atlantic, the second had certainly not disappeared in England. The critical or scornful reference to the argument of ‘climate’ (a position prominent in Montesquieu and often used to justify the slavery of colonial peoples), and to the argument of the ‘balance’ of powers (often invoked in England to justify the privileges of the House of Lords and the landed aristocracy), demonstrates that Condorcet &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg145&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had become critical of the American and English models alike, and had ultimately broken with both fractions of the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fully to understand Condorcet’s mature view, it is important to take account of a peculiarity of the French Revolution. In the course of its development, the popular uprising in the metropolis against the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; was soon followed by the clash in the colonies between freemen and slaves and between blacks and whites. The two conflicts were all the more closely intertwined because sections of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, engaged against the process of radicalization underway in Paris, were sometimes simultaneously interested, as the owners of slaves in the colonies, in preventing their emancipation. Those on the opposite side were thus led to assimilate noble privilege and racial privilege, branding them conjointly as two different expressions of aristocratic arrogance. In 1791 the Jacobin Sonthonax pointed to the liberal and spokesman for the slaveholding colonies, Barnave, as the ‘protector of the aristocracy of the epidermis’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years before the outbreak of the July Revolution, although now ferociously critical of Jacobinism, Abbé Grégoire issued a firm denunciation, already encapsulated in the title of his little book, of the ‘nobility of the skin’. The analogy was now developed in all its aspects. The ban on interracial marriages in the United States was compared to the social obligation which, under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, required the aristocracy not to contaminate itself with elements alien to it, with commoners: at work in both cases was an insane concern to safeguard ‘the purity of the blood’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the nobility of the skin will suffer the same fate as the nobility of the scroll’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, the absolute power possessed by the slave-owner was certainly no more tolerable than that exercised by the monarch, and hence the ‘colonists’ were ‘similar to all despots’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this comparative perspective, the negative judgement on the United States was manifest: ‘Civilization is only dawning: five million Africans transported to America are still in chains there.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And if there was an encouraging example in the New World, it was not afforded by the ‘colonists’ and the country they had founded in North America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Simply by virtue of its existence, the republic of Haiti will be able to have a major influence on the destiny of Africans in the new world … A black &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg146&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;republic in the mid-Atlantic is a raised beacon to which the blushing oppressors and the sighing oppressed look. Seeing it, hope smiles on five million slaves scattered over the Antilles and the American continent.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the American model became even more explicit and bitter as those who wished to preserve slavery in the colonies appealed to it. Against the abolitionist projects or ambitions of Paris, the colonists invoked the spectre of a repeat of the American Revolution. They too would be forced into independence if they did not succeed in securing self-government, so as to be able to freely dispose of their slaves, without a ‘despotic’ power interfering with their legitimate property from without and above. Again, after the July Revolution, the French colonists declared themselves ready ‘to hand themselves over to the American Union if the metropolis did not permit them slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Making this observation in 1842 was Victor Schoelcher who, six years later, played a key role in the definitive abolition of slavery in the French colonies, which had been reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802. And we can then understand the bitterness of the polemic against the transatlantic republic. ‘Skin prejudices’ remained particularly ‘inveterate among the Americans’; they could be considered ‘the most ferocious masters on the earth’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] authors of ‘one of the most upsetting spectacles the world has ever offered’. Not only blacks, but also white abolitionists, were hit by the most savage violence. Lynching threatened anyone who dared to challenge the ‘iniquitous property’ and ‘demand freedom for all members of the human race’. ‘There is no cruelty of the most barbarous age that has not been committed by the slave states of North America.’ Hence the hope for a revolution from below: ‘I hope that these brusque lynchers will one day all be hung by rebellious slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance, Schoelcher, in condemning the crimes committed by ‘us other barbarians of the West’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] expressed his admiration for the ‘colossal revolution of S. Domingo’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and for the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture, to whom he devoted a sympathetic biography.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gulf separating the new political current forming in France from the two fractions of the liberal party is clear. Like Schoelcher, Brissot, who had played a significant part in founding the French–American Society, did not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg147&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hesitate to justify armed rebellion by black slaves and their right to revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this point the French–American Society was dead and buried. Between the July Revolution and the 1848 Revolution, manifestly in debate with French radicalism, de Tocqueville could once again present the United States as a model or source of inspiration only on condition of dropping the analogy between noble aristocracy and racial aristocracy, between monarchical despotism and slave despotism—the analogy on whose basis the North American republic was configured not as a model of liberty and democracy, but as a variant (and then not even the best) of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The liberal inception of the revolution in Latin America and its radical outcome&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the metropolis and colonies alike, the French Revolution was transformed in a radical direction. To clarify this process further, we must begin with the definition which, in the course of the struggle against Stuart absolutism, at the start of the English liberal movement, one of its exponents gave of the ‘true liberty’ dear to him: ‘we know by a certain law that our wives, our children, our servants, our goods, are our own, that we build, we plough, we sow, we reap, for ourselves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the event, ‘our servants’ did not passively endure assimilation to ‘our goods’ and, in opposition to the ‘true liberty’ cherished by the exponent of English proto-liberalism, demanded a quite different liberty, which required the intervention of political power to abolish servitude in its various forms and promote the emancipation of the subaltern classes. This is what occurred in France, thanks to the historically auspicious context already analysed. In the metropolis, the first liberal inception of the French Revolution was immediately followed by the revolt of the peasants (with the end, sealed on the night of 4 August 1789, of the feudal system), and then the agitation of the urban popular masses. The second liberal inception, which was to have consecrated self-government by slave-owners, ended up inciting the revolution of the slaves themselves. The latter achieved emancipation and later managed to frustrate the terrible war machine of Napoleonic France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar dialectic manifested itself in Latin America. Initially, the independence movement and revolution took the form of reactions against reform by the Spanish crown, which ‘reversed the old policy of segregating the Indians and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg148&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;urged them to assimilate by speaking Spanish and dressing in European style’. Such integrationist measures soon provoked the hostility of the Creole elite. The latter professed liberalism, and was liberal: it read Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith; it sometimes sought to enter into relations with Jefferson; it protested against central government interference and the obstacles it placed in the way of developing local industry; it aspired to emulate the example of the American Revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the English colonists in the North, so for the Latin American Creoles in the South, the slave, as the planter’s private property, did not pertain to the public sphere. In the various manifestos that signalled the start of the war of independence against Spain, no positions in favour of abolishing slavery were adopted.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where the English colonists had indignantly rejected London’s attempt to block their expansion beyond the Allegany Mountains, and proudly declared that they did not want to be treated ‘like negroes, the Latin American Creoles claimed equality with the peninsula’s ruling class and superiority to the Indians and, obviously, slaves deported from Africa. To this end they reminded Madrid that they were descendants of the conquistadores and, ultimately, artisans of the grandeur of the Spanish Empire. We are reminded of Franklin who, in the course of the controversy with the London government, had stressed the merits earned by the American colonists, ‘hazarding their Lives and Fortunes in subduing and settling new Countries, extending the Dominion and encreasing the Commerce of their Mother Nation’, enhancing the glory, ‘the Grandeur and Stability of the British Empire’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not long before the two roads diverged sharply. The fact is that in Spanish America, together with the Creole revolution but counter to it, an Indian revolution developed. In fact, the latter had announced itself decades earlier, as demonstrated by the series of revolts culminating in 1780–81 in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, which sought to win the blacks to its cause, liberating them too from the shackles of slavery. By contrast, the Creoles initially rose up with liberal slogans, demanding self-government, challenging interference by central power, aiming, like the North American colonists, to strengthen their control over the native populations and blacks. It was precisely this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg149&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political project that formed the main target of the struggle by the Latin American Indians. Their revolution brings to mind the one that later erupted in San Domingo, and which issued in the formation of a new country: Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt: it was San Domingo–Haiti that gave the Creole independence movement a decisive turn. To overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish troops, Simón Bolívar sought to secure the support of the rebel ex-slaves of the Caribbean state, which he personally visited. The president at the time was Alexandre Pétion, who immediately received the Latin American revolutionary. He promised him the aid he requested on condition that he freed the slaves in areas as they were wrested from Spanish control. Transcending the class and caste limits of the social group he belonged to, and demonstrating intellectual and political courage, Bolívar accepted. Seven ships, 6,000 men with arms and munitions, a printing press and numerous advisors set out from the island.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the beginning of the abolition of slavery in much of Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolívar started out as a liberal, appealing to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] underlining the need for ‘a liberal Constitution’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] with ‘eminently liberal provisions’, which were to sanction ‘the rights of man, the freedom to act, think, speak and write’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as well as ‘the division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience, a free press’—in short, ‘everything sublime that there is in politics’. He celebrated the ‘British Constitution’ and, above all, the American, the ‘most perfect of Constitutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, when he demanded not only liberty, but the ‘absolute freedom of the slaves’, Bolívar in fact took his distance from the United States, where, even in the North, blacks were confined to a caste which was not that of genuinely free men. And this distancing from the North American republic was confirmed by a further observation that ‘it is impossible to be free and slaves at the same time’. But especially significant was another element: the slave revolution from below, which in the United States represented a general nightmare, now became an object of explicit celebration. Bolívar not only appealed to the ‘history of the helots, Spartacus and Haiti’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] but in so doing defined Venezuelan and Latin American identity in a way that is worth reflecting on:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg150&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Let us bear in mind that our people is neither European nor North American. Rather than an emanation of Europe, it is a mixture of Africa and America because Spain itself ceased to be Europe on account of its African blood, its institutions and its character. It is impossible to determine exactly which human family we belong to. The majority of the indigenous population has been destroyed, the Europeans have mixed with Americans and Africans, and the latter with Indians and Europeans. All born from the breast of one and the same Mother, our fathers, different by origin and blood, are foreigners to one another and all visibly differ in their skin. Such diversity entails a consequence of the greatest importance. Thanks to the Constitution, interpreter of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The countries formed out of the independence struggle against the Madrid government thus acquired a political, social and ethnic identity characterized by an admixture of black and Indian, and hence very different from US identity. While the North American colonists identified with the chosen people who sailed across the Atlantic to conquer the promised land, to be wrested from its unauthorized inhabitants and cleansed of their presence (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|§5]]), the Latin American revolutionaries, in the wake of their argument with Spain, tended to denounce the genocidal practices of the conquistadores, Spanish in particular and European in general. Here too the road had been indicated by the black slaves of San Domingo who, after having broken with Napoleonic France and defeated its attempts to re-conquer it and reintroduce slavery, had assumed the Indian name of Haiti. For Bolívar miscegenation—the mixing denounced in the United States, and sometimes with particular fervour by abolitionist circles—became a political project, which rejected any racial discrimination, and an essential element in a new, proud identity. However, precisely on account of its radicalism, this project found itself confronting almost insurmountable difficulties. Thanks to the politico-social homogeneity (strengthened by the availability of land and westward expansion) of its dominant class, and thanks also to the confinement of much of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery, the North American republic soon succeeded in achieving a stable structure. It took the form of a ‘master-race democracy’ and a racial state, based on the rule of law within the white community and among the chosen people. The situation in Latin America was very different: between liberal beginnings and radical outcomes, the revolution had mobilized a front stamped with profound social and ethnic contradictions. Thus two contrasting &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg151&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ideas of liberty confronted one another: one calls to mind the English gentleman determined to dispose freely of his servants; the other ultimately refers to the struggle that had put an end to black slavery in San Domingo—Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. The United States and San Domingo—Haiti: two antagonistic poles&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Around 1830 the American continent presented a rather telling picture. While it had disappeared in a considerable part of Latin America, slavery remained in force in the European colonies, including British and Dutch ones, and above all in the United States. We can say that from the slave revolution onwards there developed a pent-up confrontation, a kind of cold war, between San Domingo and the United States. On one side, we have a country that saw ex-slaves in power, authors of a revolution that was possibly unique in world history; on the other, a country almost always led in the early decades of its existence by slave-owning presidents. On one side, we have a country that sanctioned the principle of racial equality to the point where, at least when it was ruled by Toussaint L’Ouverture, whites could play a leading role in the plantations; on the other, a country that constituted the first historical example of a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the tension between those two poles is understandable. When, in 1826, Abbé Grégoire pointed to Haiti as the ‘beacon’ looked to by slaves, he clearly had in mind the island’s contribution to the abolition of slavery in Latin America. On the other side, with the emergence and advance of the slave revolution, the French colonists of San Domingo responded by entertaining the idea, and brandishing the threat, of secession from France and adhesion to the North American Union. Once the new revolutionary power had consolidated itself, it was a constant concern of the United States, where not a few ex-colonists took refuge, to overthrow or at least isolate it through a cordon sanitaire. It would be dangerous, observed Jefferson in 1799, to enter into commercial relations with San Domingo. That would result in ‘black crews’ disembarking in the United States, and these emancipated slaves could represent ‘combustion’ for the slaveholding South.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such concerns, South Carolina banned the entry into its territory of any ‘man of colour’ from San Domingo or any of the other French islands, which might in some way have been infected by the new, dangerous ideas of liberty and racial equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg152&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Regardless of commercial exchanges, stressed influential political figures in the North American republic, by its very example the island risked challenging the institution of slavery far beyond its borders. Its inhabitants would in fact be ‘dangerous neighbors to the Southern States, and an asylum for renegades from these parts’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro revolution to be exhibited among them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Jefferson’s support for Napoleon’s attempt to re-conquer the island and reintroduce slavery. The US president assured the representative of France that ‘nothing will be easier than to furnish your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having succeeded Jefferson, Madison was likewise in no doubt as to the position to adopt: France was ‘the sole sovereign of Saint Domingue’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the consolidation of black power and the emergence of Haiti, the conflict did not come to an end. It also extended to the Caribbean islands under British control. Unrest spread among the black slaves and the governor of Barbados was well aware of ‘the dangers of insurrection’. For this reason, projects to reform and moderate the institution of slavery were entertained in London. This was a prospect immediately opposed by the colonists of Jamaica, who, sheltering behind defence of ‘their undoubted and acknowledged rights’ to self-government, threatened revolt against royal despotism and secession and adhesion to the North American republic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the example of San Domingo—Haiti had its most profound influence on Latin America. In 1822 the president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, proceeded to the annexation (which proved short-lived) of the Spanish part of the island, with the consequent emancipation of several thousand blacks, who along with freedom experienced notable social ascent, becoming small landowners. Slaves and free blacks in Cuba, who secretly kept the image of the Haitian leader, hoped for something similar. On the opposite side, sensing the danger, slave-owners of a liberal persuasion had already made contact with the US consul in Havana a decade earlier and outlined a project for joining the United States, which elicited the interest of Madison and Jefferson. In Calhoun’s view the annexation desired by him was a sort of pre-emptive counter-revolution: it would put paid for ever to the danger of a Cuba ‘revolutionized by Negroes’, which would have increased or doubled the threat already posed by Haiti.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg153&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Later, while the island of black power helped spread black emancipation in much of Latin America, the United States reintroduced slavery in Texas, which had previously been taken from Mexico. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, an attempt was made to expand the territory of the North American republic and, with it, the institution of slavery into other parts of Mexico and, above all, Nicaragua. One participant in this adventure, which after initial successes ended in dramatic failure, was William Walker. He considered himself—and in his own way was—a liberal, who enjoyed significant support in the United States. He proposed to fight the despotic legacy of Spanish power and extend his country’s free institutions, but exclusively for the benefit of the authentic white community. For those alien to the ‘strong, haughty race, bred to liberty’ who were the custodians of ‘a mission to place Americans under the rule of free laws’, slavery was indicated. The decree of abolition promulgated in the wake of a movement that had found inspiration and support in Haiti was therefore cancelled.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only after the end of the Civil War did the United States agree to open diplomatic relations with Haiti. But it was a move bereft of any warmth, and in fact functional for a project of ethnic cleansing. The idea, also entertained by Lincoln, of depositing on the island of black power the ex-slaves, who were to be deported from the republic that continued to be inspired by the principle of white supremacy and purity, had not yet been abandoned.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Liberalism and the critique of abolitionist radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Hence a distinguished historian of slavery has appropriately warned against the tendency ‘to confuse liberal principles with antislavery commitment’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Let us examine the reaction of various authors and sections of the liberal movement to the conflict that issued in the Civil War. We shall set aside Calhoun and the other theorists of the slaveholding South. And we already know Disraeli’s denunciation of the catastrophe of abolishing slavery in English colonies. On the point of the Confederacy’s military collapse, Lord Acton wrote to the general who had commanded its army:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg154&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I saw in States Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy … Therefore I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of the liberalism embodied in the Confederacy weighed more than the victory won some decades earlier by liberal England over Napoleonic despotism. Why? On the outbreak of the Civil War, although acknowledging ‘all the horrors of American slavery’, Lord Acton had unhesitatingly rejected ‘the categorical prohibition of slavery’ demanded by the abolitionists, as informed by an ‘abstract, ideal absolutism’ quite contrary to ‘the English spirit’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and to the liberal spirit as such, characterized as it was by flexibility and practical common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years earlier, Lieber had expressed himself in similar terms. He condemned the abolitionists as ‘jacobins’, followers of the ‘fifth monarchy’, incorrigible visionaries and fanatics: ‘if people must have slaves it is their affair to keep them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were such a declaration to be interpreted literally, not only would the right of states to self-government be inviolable, but also the right of each individual citizen to choose the type of property he preferred: let us not forget that at the time Lieber was himself a slave-owner! And hence while Disraeli ironized about the naive, misinformed ‘philanthropy’ of ‘the pure abolitionists’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the American liberal took his distance from such circles even more clearly: ‘I am not an abolitionist.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lieber was on excellent terms with de Tocqueville, who in his turn declared: ‘I have never been an abolitionist in the ordinary sense of the term’; ‘I have always been strongly opposed to the abolitionist party’. What was meant by these declarations, contained in two letters from 1857? ‘I have never believed it possible to destroy slavery in old states’: the abolitionists’ error was to seek ‘to effect a premature, dangerous abolition of slavery in countries where this abominable institution has always existed’. We are dealing with a firm &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg155&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery at a theoretical level, but one without results on the practical level. The situation in the South could only be altered through an initiative from above and from the centre, thereby throwing ‘the great experiment of Self-Government’ into crisis. And so? Preservation of the status quo was appropriate. However regrettable, people must resign themselves to the continuation of slavery in the South for a long time. However,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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to introduce it into new states, to spread this horrible plague over a large area of the earth that has hitherto been immune to it, to impose all the crimes and all the miseries that accompany slavery on millions of men of future generations (masters or slaves), who could avoid this, is a crime against the human race, and this seems to me horrendous and inexcusable.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, an expansion of the zone of slavery had already occurred at the time of the annexation to the Union of Texas, seized from Mexico. De Tocqueville seemed to be ready to accept a compromise even more favourable to the slaveholding South, as emerges from a letter of 13 April 1857, once again sent to a transatlantic interlocutor:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I agree with you about the fact that the greatest internal threat to the northern states today is not so much slavery as the corruption of democratic institutions … As for the policy permitting slavery to develop in a whole portion of the territory where it was hitherto unknown, I will concede, as you argue, that one can do nothing but tolerate this extension in the special, current interests of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this could not go on indefinitely. It was inadmissible that there ‘can be contained in the clauses of any contract the destruction of the right and duty of the present generation to prevent the spread of the most horrible of all social evils to millions and millions of men of future generations’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condemnation of slavery was passionate, but it was possibly necessary to tolerate the preservation and even the extension of the institution for some time. The reason emerges from a letter sent to the English economist Senior: dismemberment of the country which, more than any other, embodied the cause of liberty, ‘would inflict a serious wound on the whole human race, stoking up war in the heart of a great continent from which it has been banished for more than a century’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg156&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville was ready to sacrifice the cause of abolishing slavery to the objective of preserving the unity and stability of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although powerfully encouraged first by French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of many of its colonies, and then by the revolution in San Domingo, radical abolitionism was a short-lived affair in France itself. Immediately after Thermidor, and in fact even at the moment of its preparation, the colonists’ agitation in defence of the liberal principle of self-government (and white supremacy) resumed: it must be local assemblies that determined people’s status and hence the condition of the blacks in the colonies. As we know, this was the position of the liberal Massiac Club. Those who resisted the Thermidorian turn were immediately branded traitors and renegades to the white race (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|§12]]). The ‘Anglomane’ and pro-slaveholding Malouet returned to hold positions of power under Napoleon,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who reintroduced colonial slavery and the black slave trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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The liberal movement certainly did not respond to this restoration, terminated only by the revolution of February 1848, with united, decisive opposition. There were some (including Granier de Cassagnac) who defended the institution of slavery in the name of liberalism, who in fact (polemically observed an ardent abolitionist) even claimed ‘a monopoly on liberalism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be precise, along with ‘liberalism’, Cassagnac also professed himself a follower of ‘democracy’: positions no different from those maintained across the Atlantic by Calhoun, with the difference that the former regarded slavery as ‘a provisional and empirical means of creating order’ and ‘maintaining the blacks in the apprenticeship of Christianity, work and the family’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side of the scale it is to be noted that, at least in his opponents’ view, the French author was mistaken in having developed in justification of slavery a philosophy of history that did not maintain the spatial or racial delimitation of the institution, with a tendency hence to regress to positions à la Fletcher, who was now alien to the liberal movement. By contrast, an integral part of it was Thiers, who, drawing up a catastrophic balance sheet of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies, pointed to the ‘base and barbarous idleness [of] Negroes left to their own devices’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg157&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Guizot seemed more susceptible to abolitionist ideas. Nevertheless, he stressed their impracticality with an argument that is already familiar from US history: it would be necessary to compensate the owners of a legitimate form of property, but there were insufficient funds for this operation.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Le Courier de la Gironde&#039;&#039; came out in favour of a gradual abolitionism which, avoiding the ‘savage liberty’ of ‘brutalized beings’, would take the form of an extended phase of ‘liberal slavery’ (&#039;&#039;esclavage libéral&#039;&#039;)—i.e. a somewhat mitigated slavery.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise opposed to hasty measures was de Tocqueville. In May 1847, noting that the ‘Bey of Tunisia’ had already abolished the ‘odious institution’—which in Muslim countries, by the French liberal’s admission, took a ‘milder’ form—de Tocqueville expressed the opinion that ‘we should doubtless only proceed to the abolition of slavery with care and moderation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can conclude with a general consideration relating to the France of the July Monarchy: ‘Immediate and complete emancipation was not even considered as an abolitionist program until less than a year before the Revolution of 1848.’ In fact, the golden age of French liberalism, far from involving the abolition of slavery, saw its expansion: ‘as a result of the expanding French conquest of Algeria, there was far more territory with slaves under French sovereignty by the mid-1840s than there had been at the time of the July Revolution in 1830.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. The enduring effectiveness of the black revolution from below&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But if things stood thus, how was the abolition of slavery achieved? Although firmly opposed by a formidable international coalition and the liberal movement as a whole, the San Domingo revolution had a lasting influence, which proved all the stronger when conflicts within the community of the free and the white community as a whole intensified. We already know the decisive role played by the country governed by ex-slaves in propelling the independence movement in Latin America towards abolitionist positions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside the southern United States, slavery continued to be very much present in the European colonies in the Caribbean. However, here too Haiti’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg158&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;presence made itself felt. Proceeding in 1822 to annexation of the Spanish part of the island, the ex-slaves now in power delivered a further serious blow to the institution of slavery. The following year, the revolt of the black slaves in Demerara (today’s Guyana) erupted. This was a colony that had been affected by the upheavals which had reverberated in San Domingo from France. In 1794–95 a revolution exported and imposed by French forces had transformed Holland into the Batavian Republic and forced the Prince of Orange to flee to England. In the wake of events in Demerara, at the time under Dutch control, liberal agitation had developed, promoted by slave-owners who, witnessing the emergence of the prospect of black emancipation on the San Domingo model, had rapidly abandoned any sympathy for France and sought Britain’s intervention and protection.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But the incorporation of Demerara into the British Empire did not extinguish the fire, which smouldered under the ashes. A black revolt broke out in 1823 and led to the death of three whites; martial law was proclaimed and 250 slaves were killed or executed. And yet, repressed in one place, revolts exploded again some years later and only a short distance away—this time in Jamaica, in 1831. In both cases Methodist and Baptist missionaries played a significant role. By converting the slaves to Christianity, they furnished them with a culture, consciousness and the possibility of meeting and communicating that clashed irreconcilably with the de-humanization and commodification of human livestock upon which the institution of slavery was based. The first revolt saw the death sentence for the Reverend John Smith, and his death in prison shortly before execution of the sentence and the arrival from London of a notice of pardon. The second became known as the ‘war of the Baptists’. In both cases, in addition to rebellious slaves, the repression by the white dominant class struck the Baptist and Methodist community. In Jamaica hundreds of black Christians were flogged, tortured or shot; and English missionaries also suffered arrest and humiliation of every kind. In fact, in neighbouring Barbados churches were sacked and destroyed and there were riots and attempted pogroms against the Methodist community. The colonists’ hatred of the non-conformist churches, accused of encouraging the slave revolt, could not be contained.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a danger that seemed all the more real and immediate because of Haiti’s proximity and the processes of emancipation underway in Latin America. Thanks to this geographical proximity, there now intervened in the struggle (wrote &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg159&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a white Jamaican to his governor) a ‘third party’ (in addition to the Crown, prompted in a reformist direction by Christian abolitionism, and the colonists, engaged in defence of self-government and their property). And this ‘third party’ comprised the slave, who ‘knows his strength, and will assert his claim to freedom’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the abolition of slavery in the colonies presented itself to the dominant class of liberal England as the requisite way out in the face of two challenges: the first consisted in the black slaves’ revolution from below; the second in the indignation that was widespread in the British Christian community which, with growing impatience, demanded decisive measures against the colonists, guilty of enslaving blacks and persecuting Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The role of Christian fundamentalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This second challenge brings us to a movement we have not hitherto been concerned with, and which cannot be confused with either the liberal tradition or French-style radicalism. While the crisis that soon led to the black revolution in San Domingo was deepening, at a time when the campaign to suppress the slave trade seemed to be at an impasse, the dying John Wesley wrote a heartfelt letter to William Wilberforce:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unless the Divine power has raised you up to be an Athanasius contra mundum, I see not how you can go through your glorious enterprise, in opposing that execrable villainy which is the scandal of religion, of England, and of human nature. Unless God has raised you up for this very thing, you will be worn out by the opposition of men and devils; but if God be for you who can be against you? Are all of them together stronger than God? Oh be not weary of well-doing. Go in the name of God, and in the power of His might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The recipient of this letter was unquestionably one of the major actors in the struggle that led to the abolition first of the slave trade and then of slavery as such. A fervent Christian, member of the House of Commons and on close &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg160&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terms with Pitt the Younger, while he received honorary French citizenship in 1792 for his anti-slavery campaign, he had nothing to do with the revolution of 1789 or, a fortiori, with radicalism. Far from welcoming the black slave revolt in San Domingo, he continued in his unwavering support for the British government, which, during the war against France, was the guarantor in the West Indies of the repression of slave revolts and the preservation of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if he identified with the England of the time and its dominant class, Wilberforce can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. Prior to directing his efforts against slavery, his religious zeal was engaged in the ‘reform of public manners’, to be advanced through the foundation of a new society intended as the ‘guardian of the religion and morals of the people’, which proposed to struggle ‘against Vice and Immorality’ and even aspired to the ‘suppression of Vice’. Hence the crusade launched against publications branded blasphemous and indecent, against rural feasts considered licentious, against the non-observance of the Sabbath among the popular classes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only subsequently did Christian fervour target the particular sin that was slavery—an institution completely unacceptable not only because of the obstacles it often put in the way of the spread of Christianity among slaves, but also because of the sexual libertinism in which it permitted their masters to indulge. Thus, another prominent supporter of English abolitionism (James Ramsay), along with slavery, called for an attack on ‘arbitrary divorces and bigamy’. Similarly, Granville Sharp combined abolitionist campaigning with a struggle against divorce legislation which, in flagrant violation of divine law, allowed the guilty couple to proceed to new weddings; and from this he moved on to announce that, together with those responsible for the slave trade and their accomplices, adulterers and those guilty of immorality would not escape divine punishment.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Sharp’s view, defenders of the institution of slavery were ‘refined modern Sadducees’. The Sadducees of Biblical fame had not hesitated to come to terms with Hellenistic and Roman culture, thereby contaminating Judaism and the word of God, and depriving them of their purity. Caught up in the enjoyment of wealth and the material world, they had forgotten or denied spiritual, otherworldly values. According to the English abolitionist, the modern Sadducees were no different. Ultimately, they were susceptible to the blandishments of the Demon, or the ‘Demon of Demons’. But the Bible must not be venerated in church, while remaining a dead letter in real life. On the contrary, it must serve as a guide in all political questions and the smallest problems of everyday &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg161&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life. All the more so in that the turning point was at hand: the times in which slavery continued to survive were the ‘latter days of Infidelity &amp;amp;amp; Deism’, representing the agony of the apocalyptic ‘Beast’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt that here we have an attitude which, in contemporary terms, we would define as fundamentalist. It is a trait that was even more clearly exhibited in the United States. Here too Christian abolitionism had a programme which, along with slavery, wanted to attack vice and immorality as such. Theodore Parker denounced as contrary to the Scriptures and divine law (the only truly valid law) the ‘usury’ by which ‘banking capital’ was stained, the ‘brothels’ and bars that sold rum, and which the police not only did not target, but in fact frequented more assiduously than the ‘house of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with Britain, there was in fact a novel element. In the United States, where the law on the return of fugitive slaves required all citizens to be complicit with an institution that became ever more odious, a delicate dilemma of conscience emerged. The ‘higher laws’ of Holy Scripture must not be forgotten. For a true Christian, admonished the English abolitionist Sharp in an indignant letter to Franklin, the other laws were ‘so clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a &#039;&#039;crime&#039;&#039; to regard them as law’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with its fundamentalist character, the radicalism of Christian abolitionism was strengthened in the United States. ‘When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law that treads down the inalienable rights of man’, declared Parker, the Christian must know how to go to the limit: ‘I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice … I am not afraid of men. I can offend them. I care nothing for their hate or their esteem. But I should not dare to violate His laws, come what may come …’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sanctioned by Holy Scripture, divine, eternal, natural law was, in any event, inviolable: ‘To say that there is no law higher than what the State can make is practical atheism … If there is no God to make a law for me, then there is no God for me.’ The challenge to constituted authority was open and declared: ‘REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The federal Constitution, which obliged the Union as a whole to defend the slaveholding states against any potential slave revolution, seemed to William Garrison ‘An Agreement with Hell’ and a ‘Covenant with Death’. In 1845 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg162&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;another abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, drew attention to slave-owners’ purchase of the most important public offices and the tripling of slavery that had occurred since the ratification of the federal Constitution, which came to be branded as a ‘pro-Slavery Compact’. The coexistence of slaveholding states and free states was no longer licit, unless the latter wanted to become ‘partners in the guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Street demonstrations in which the American Constitution was burnt were understandable. In the years preceding the Civil War, when he briefly harboured the illusion that the South was on the point of giving in, Parker exulted in these terms: ‘The Devil is in great wrath because he knoweth that his time is short.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this view, no compromise was possible. And Garrison explicitly stated as much. His polemic against defenders of the institution of slavery and their accomplices assumed openly threatening tones. But also unequivocal was his condemnation of theorists of &#039;&#039;‘gradual&#039;&#039; abolition’ and ‘moderation’, and even of those in the North who displayed ‘apathy’ or limited enthusiasm for the ‘standard of emancipation’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the struggle against slavery, that ‘heinous crime in the sight of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Abolitionist radicalism and Christian fundamentalism were closely interwoven, as emerges from the summons to a crusade against ‘the governments of this world’, which ‘in their essential elements, and as present administered … are all Anti-Christ’. This involved achieving&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the emancipation of our whole race from the dominion of man, from the thraldom of self, from the government of brute force, from the bondage of sin—and bringing them under the dominion of God, the control of an inward spirit, the government of the law of love, and into the obedience and liberty of Christ …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamentalist character of such positions did not escape Calhoun. He thundered against ‘the rabid fanatics, who regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it, deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union’. For them abolition was a conscientious obligation; only thus did they conceive it possible to liberate &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg163&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;themselves from the agonizing sense of being accomplices of the unforgivable ‘sin’ allegedly represented by slavery, against which they then proclaimed a full-scale ‘crusade’, ‘a general crusade’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of southern theorists, these Christians blinded by abolitionist fury were alien to the liberal world and substantially akin to Jacobins. In fact, a movement similar to French radicalism tended to emerge in the United States, at various times and in various modes, but always on the basis of the crisis of the English and American models. The crisis of the first coincided with the rebellion against the London government. What provoked or intensified the crisis of the second was the progressive isolation of the North American republic as a slaveholding state, engaged not only in the defence of slavery but also its expansion, and which resisted unperturbed, despite the disappearance of that institution first in much of Latin America and subsequently in British and French colonies. At this point, the country that at its birth had celebrated itself as the land of liberty appeared as the champion of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There thus developed in the United States as well a radicalism that drew on Christianity. Such a ‘party’ no longer identified with either the English or the American model. It rejected both the spatial and the racial delimitation of the community of the free, and thus regarded the exclusion clauses that characterized the English and American models as unacceptable. And in order to change things, it did not preclude appeals to the revolutionary initiative of the excluded. This was the religious and political climate in which John Brown’s armed raid into Virginia in 1859 matured, intent on inciting a slave uprising and convinced that, without the shedding of blood, there was no remission of sins. The attempt failed miserably and ended with the protagonist being hanged, but Parker reiterated the slaves’ right to armed rebellion: sooner or later, ‘the Fire of Vengeance may be waked up even in an African’s heart’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. What is radicalism? The contrast with liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Formed in the wake of disappointment in the English and American models, how did ‘radicalism’ differ from liberalism? The answer is obvious, if we refer to authors like Locke and Calhoun, profoundly liberal and yet at the same time without any doubts as to the legitimacy of black slavery. The answer is not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg164&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even difficult if we draw a comparison with authors such as Burke, Jefferson and Acton who, notwithstanding reservations and criticisms of the institution, on various grounds represented ideological and political reference points for the slaveholding South, or even continued to defend it to the end. The line of demarcation also proves sufficiently clear if we compare authors like Blackstone and Montesquieu, who tended to contest ‘slavery among ourselves’ rather than slavery as such, with a radicalism committed to rejecting both the spatial delimitation (the English model until 1833) and the racial delimitation (the American model until 1865) of the community of the free. But how is de Tocqueville clearly distinguished from authors like Diderot, Condorcet and Schoelcher, whom I have included in the process of French radicalism’s formation and development? What sense does it make to situate in two different, even opposed formations de Tocqueville and Condorcet, who were, respectively, one of the great critics of the Terror and one of its most illustrious victims? Is it right to include in the same party French and American radicals who adopted such a different attitude towards Christianity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before answering these questions, it is worth lingering over something that characterized the liberal tradition from its outset. Let us take authors like Montesquieu, Smith and Millar. Although condemning slavery more or less sharply, all three continued to regard England—a country in the front rank in the slave trade—as a model. In no instance did criticism or condemnation of slavery involve exclusion of the beneficiaries or theorists of the institution from the community of the free and the liberal party. On more than one occasion, Burke distanced himself from the institution of slavery, but when the conflict between the two Atlantic shores erupted he not only celebrated the love of liberty which particularly animated southern colonies, but disdainfully rejected the idea that, in an attempt to suppress the rebellion, appeal might be made to ‘servile hands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, the British Whig continued to include slave-owners in the community of the free while excluding a priori their victims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the institution of slavery was clear and firm in Hume. But this did not prevent him from asserting that ‘European nations’ represented ‘that part of the globe [which] maintain[s] sentiments of liberty, honour, equity and valour superior to the rest of mankind’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, there was reason to believe that blacks were ‘naturally inferior to the whites’ and inferior to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg165&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the point of lacking any ‘symptoms’ of ‘ingenuity’ and free spirit.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So once again, despite the condemnation of slavery, it was its beneficiaries—not its victims—who formed an integral part of the community of the free and the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The boundaries of the community of the free could lose something of their naturalistic rigidity; but the rituals of self-celebration, and the enormous repression it was based on, persisted. In 1772 Arthur Young calculated that, out of 775 million global inhabitants, only 33 million enjoyed liberty; and they were concentrated in a fairly restricted zone of the planet, excluding Asia, Africa and virtually all of America, as well as the southern and eastern parts of Europe itself.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a theme subsequently taken up and eloquently developed by Adam Smith:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In similar vein, Millar contrasted ‘Great Britain, in which liberty is generally so well understood, and so highly valued’, with ‘all those tribes of barbarians, in different parts of the world, with which we have any correspondence’ and among whom ‘the practice of domestic slavery’ continued to rage.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Europe and the West were complacently depicted as a tiny island of liberty and civilization in a tempestuous ocean of tyranny, slavery and barbarism. In order to indulge in such self-celebration, Young, Smith and Millar were in fact obliged to overlook a far from trivial detail: the slave trade, which involved the most brutal form of slavery—chattel slavery—and in which western Europe, starting precisely with liberal England, was engaged for centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was not very different. When he published &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, there were few countries or colonies in the western hemisphere where slavery persisted, since it had been abolished in much of Latin America and the British colonies. In the interval between the publication of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg166&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;first and second volumes of the work, the United States introduced into Texas the institution that should have been synonymous with the absolute power of man over man. But this prompted no uncertainty in the French liberal when it came to identifying the American continent as the locus of liberty. Volume One of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; appeared shortly after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. But that would appear to have been an irrelevant event in the opinion of de Tocqueville, who, when it came to comparing England and the United States, had no doubt that the latter country most fully embodied the cause of liberty. And Jefferson, the president slave-owner and unyielding opponent of the country born out of a revolution by black slaves, seemed to the French liberal to be ‘the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln himself initially conducted the Civil War as a crusade against rebellion and separatism, not for the abolition of slavery, which could continue to survive in states loyal to central government. It was only later, with the recruitment of blacks into the Union army and hence with the direct intervention of slaves and ex-slaves in the conflict, that the civil war between whites was transformed into a revolution, conducted partly from above and partly from below, making the abolition of slavery inevitable. But in the first phase of the war the Union did not a priori exclude slave states from its bosom, just as liberal critics of the institution of slavery did not expel those who had a different and even contrary position on the problem from the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tendency we are examining finds fullest expression in Lieber. Cautious criticisms of the institution of slavery did not prevent him, even on the immediate eve of the Civil War, from attributing to the United States—the country that even more than England embodied the great cause of ‘liberal institutions’ and ‘self-government’—the ‘great mission’ of spreading liberty throughout the world. ‘[E]very American’ must always bear in mind the grandeur of the constitutional principles and texts of his country. Otherwise, they would resemble ‘the missionary that should proceed to convert the world without bible or prayer-book’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it was the sacred text of liberty for the liberal author, for the radicals Garrison and Phillips the US Constitution, which sanctioned slavery and the racial state, was an instrument of Satan. Over and above the very different significance assigned to the problem of slavery, here we have two opposed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg167&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;delimitations of political geography, of the camp of friends and enemies. Notwithstanding the argument and conflict over slavery, liberalism’s various exponents continued to recognize themselves as members of the same party and the same community of the free. By contrast, excluded from it were blacks, whom at an interval of decades Jefferson and Lincoln intended to deport from the Union and who, not by chance, after emancipation first in the North and then in the South did not come to enjoy either political or civil equality. Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, not to mention Lieber and Acton, could indeed criticize slavery, but it was understood that that their interlocutors were not black slaves but their masters. The latter were called upon to demonstrate moral sensitivity and political consistency and hence agree to expunge a stain that affected the credibility of the community of the free as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet’s attitude was very different. Here is how he addressed the black slaves in 1781:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dear friends, although I am not the same colour as you, I have always regarded you as my brothers. Nature has fashioned you to have the same spirit, the same reason and the same virtues as whites. I am only speaking here of whites in Europe, for when it comes to whites in the colonies, I shall not insult you by comparing them to you … Should one set off in search of a man in the islands of America, one would certainly not find him among the populations of white flesh.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The French philosopher was not yet aware of it, but the ruling group in the North American republic was on the point of being situated outside not only the party of liberty, but even the human race. What we have here is a political and ideological current different from liberalism—the radicalism that had been formed or was in the process of being formed. It might seem debatable to apply this category to an author who recommended extreme gradualism in the process of abolishing slavery. But that is not the main point. Marat himself, in 1791, proposed ‘gradually to prepare the transition from slavery to liberty’. And yet, already unequivocally condemning ‘the barbarism of the colonists’, it was not to them that he looked to make the desired change, and not even to the National Assembly which, coming to terms with the slaveholders, rode roughshod over the rights of man and ‘the sacred foundations of the Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The actual interlocutors tended to be the black slaves themselves, as would &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg168&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become clear in the course of Marat’s subsequent evolution. As for Condorcet, despite the gradualist character of his abolitionism, he deflected back onto slaveholding whites the de-humanizing drive they had mobilized against blacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was an attitude that could also develop on the basis of a profoundly Christian consciousness. Here is how Garrison expressed himself in 1841 on the subject of slave-owners:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No political, no religious copartnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the convicts at Botany Bay and New Zealand … We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But some decades earlier the English abolitionist Percival Stockdale had already declared: &#039;&#039;‘We&#039;&#039; are the savages; the Africans act like men; like beings endowed with rational and immortal minds’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, indignation at the treatment inflicted on the black slaves could even conduce to a de-humanization of the de-humanizers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regarding slaves as their interlocutors, radicals did not hesitate to appeal to a revolution from below by victims of the institution it was intended to abolish. Even prior to the revolution by San Domingo’s slaves, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; evoked a massive uprising, led by a black Spartacus, which might involve replacing the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in force by a &#039;&#039;‘Code blanc’&#039;&#039; that repaid the slaveholders for the injustices they had committed.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the liberal tradition, in Smith we can come across evocation of a dictatorship from above putting an end to the scandal of an institution that sullied the community of the free, but certainly not hopes for a revolution from below. We know the sympathy or admiration with which Grégoire and Schoelcher viewed Toussaint L’Ouverture and Haiti. These are two names that do not appear in de Tocqueville. In connection with San Domingo, he limited himself to mentioning the ‘bloody catastrophe that has put an end to its existence’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Paradoxically, the island ceased to exist the moment it put an end, for the first time in the Americas, to the institution of slavery!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg169&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Finally, Diderot reported an observation by Helvétius: ‘What is the cause of England’s extreme power? Its government.’ He followed up this assessment with a polemical question: ‘But what is the cause of the extreme poverty of Scotland and Ireland?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Judgement of the metropolis could not be separated from judgement of the colonies and semi-colonies. From the standpoint of authors like Diderot and Schoelcher, England and the United States, the holy sites of liberty in de Tocqueville’s view, were responsible for the most ferocious and barbarous despotism. Even when it criticized slavery, the liberal tradition did not question the identification of the West with civilization and of the colonial world with barbarism. Radicalism’s position was different: in the first instance, it identified and denounced barbarism in those responsible for, and complicit with, the most macroscopic violation of the rights and dignity of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels may be regarded as critical inheritors of radicalism. For the first in particular, not only was it epistemologically and politically arbitrary to ignore the politico-social reality of the colonies, but (as we shall see) those colonies were the requisite starting-point for understanding the ‘barbarism’ of bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. Liberalism, the self-celebration of the community of the free and repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The discourse developed by liberalism is profoundly marked by repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples. The self-celebration of the land of the free or the people of the free proved all the more persuasive in that it overlooked the slavery inflicted on colonial populations or populations of colonial origin. Only on this condition could Montesquieu, Blackstone and the American revolutionaries point to England or the United States as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This also applies to de Tocqueville. He lucidly and unsparingly described the inhuman treatment meted out to Indians and blacks. The former were forced to endure the ‘frightful sufferings’ attendant upon ‘forced migrations’ (the successive deportations imposed by the whites), and were even close to being wiped off the face of the earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the blacks, let us leave to one side the specifically slaveholding states of the South: What was the situation in the rest? Over and above harsh material living conditions, ‘a wretched and precarious &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg170&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;existence’, desperate poverty and a higher mortality rate than among slaves,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the notionally free black also weighed exclusion from the enjoyment of civil rights (as well as political rights): he was subjected to the ‘tyranny of the law’ and the ‘intolerance of customs’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|§7]]). And so, discounting the Far West and the South, even in the case of the free states we cannot speak of democracy or even strictly of the rule of law. But that was not the conclusion reached by de Tocqueville, who celebrated the democracy, ‘alive, active, triumphant’, he saw operative in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will see there a people among whom conditions are more equal than they have ever been among us; among whom the social structure, the customs, the laws, everything is democratic; among whom everything comes from the people and returns to it, and where, nevertheless, each individual enjoys an independence that is fuller, and a liberty that is greater, than in any other time or place on earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While he felt sympathy for the tragedy of the Indians and blacks, their fate had no epistemological relevance and in no way altered his overall political judgement. The programmatic declaration made by de Tocqueville at the start of the chapter devoted to the problem of ‘the three races that inhabit the territory of the United States’ is unequivocal: ‘The principal task that I had imposed upon myself is now performed: I have shown, as far as I was able, the laws and the customs of the American democracy. Here I might stop’. It was only in order to avoid possible disappointment on the reader’s part that de Tocqueville spoke of relations between the three ‘races’: ‘These topics are collaterally connected with my subject without forming a part of it; they are American without being democratic, and to portray democracy has been my principal aim.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Democracy could be defined and liberty lauded focusing exclusively on the white community. If, instead, we regard this abstraction as arbitrary, and bear in mind the entanglement of slavery and liberty revealed by authoritative US scholars, we cannot but be even more surprised by de Tocqueville’s epistemological than his political naivety. He celebrated as the locus of liberty one of the few countries in the New World where racial chattel slavery reigned and flourished and which, at the time of the French liberal’s journey, had as its president Andrew Jackson, slave-owner and protagonist of a policy of deporting and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;decimating the Indian; a president, moreover, who, blocking the circulation of abolitionist material by post, also struck at the freedom of expression of significant sections of the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such naivety reached its culmination in a French follower of de Tocqueville—namely, Édouard Laboulaye. He too contrasted the United States with a France plagued by constant revolutionary upheavals. In the former, he observed in 1849 in the inaugural lecture (published separately the following year) of a course devoted to US history, a Constitution characterized by extraordinary ‘wisdom’ and rejection of any ‘demagogic’ element made it possible to enjoy peace and, at the same time, the greatest liberty and ‘the most absolute political equality’—an equality that was ‘complete, absolute, in laws and customs alike’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the problem of the relations between the three races referred to by de Tocqueville, nothing remains in the text we are examining but the celebration of the remarkable successes achieved by ‘a nation of European race’, by this ‘strong race of emigrants’ or this ‘people of Puritans’—in other words, the ‘American race’. Even if it was a story that had unfolded across the Atlantic, it covered ‘our race’ (European and white) as a whole in glory.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a view reiterated ten years later, in an emotional essay published on the occasion of de Tocqueville’s death: the homage paid to the author of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; ended with homage to the ‘beautiful federal Constitution that has protected the liberty of the United States for seventy years’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are on the eve of the Civil War. But even its outbreak does not seem to have prompted any second thoughts in Laboulaye: it was understood that ‘complete, candid, sincere liberty’ reigned in the United States. The bloody conflict underway demonstrated the ‘courage’ of a ‘free people who sacrificed everything to maintain the unity’ of the country.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when reconstructing the history of America in the colonial period did Laboulaye feel obliged to confront the issue of slavery. Although mitigated by reference to ‘climate’ (which rendered work intolerable for whites but not blacks), historical circumstances (at the time it was at its height, ‘the slave trade was regarded as a pious undertaking’), and the particular characteristics of the people subjected to it (it involved a ‘race of eternal minors’),[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] condemnation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg172&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the institution was sharp. In the first volume, whose Preface is dated 1855, we read:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In half of the United States there are two societies established on the same soil: the one powerful, active, united and prudent; the other weak, disunited, indifferent and exploited like cattle. And yet this despised herd is a constant threat to America … The stain that soils this great society places it beneath Europe.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although sketching this realistic picture, the Preface continued to celebrate the United States indiscriminately as the privileged site of liberty, guaranteed and guarded by an ‘admirable Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However hard the lot of the blacks—silence persisted about the Indians—it was irrelevant when it came to formulating an overall judgement of the country under investigation. But there is more. Laboulaye acknowledged that slavery made its oppressive influence felt on the white master himself: he was denied the right to educate and emancipate his own slave, even if he or she was a child born from a relationship with a slave. He was required by law to inflict even the most drastic of punishments, including castration, on the guilty slave.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although criticized, these serious interferences with the individual freedom of white property-owners did not in the slightest darken the bright picture we already know.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1864 Laboulaye denounced the privilege granted by the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision to the ‘particular, superior race’ made up of the ‘great lords’ of the South who were the slave-owners (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). But if things stood thus, if inequality marked relations within the elite itself, if even within the white community there was a privileged ‘particular race’, what was the meaning of the claim that the United States was characterized by ‘the most absolute political equality’? Laboulaye felt no need to revise his positions. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to reiterate them in the Preface to the third volume, which continued to celebrate the American Revolution as the sole genuinely democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like colonies in the strict sense, Ireland continued to be ignored. In the course of his journey to the British Isles, de Tocqueville visited the unhappy island and described its desperate situation unsparingly. It was not simply that ‘the poverty is horrible’; denied here was liberal freedom itself, crushed by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg173&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘military tribunals’ and a ‘large gendarmerie hated by the people’. At this point a comparison between England and Ireland occurred: ‘The two aristocracies I have referred to have the same origin, the same customs and almost the same laws. Yet the one has for centuries given the English one of the best governments in the world, while the other has given the Irish one of the most detestable imaginable’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is an astonishing statement: not only are readers not informed that the aristocracy dominant in Ireland was itself British or of British origin, but they have the impression that they are dealing with two different countries, not two regions of a single state, subject to the authority of the same government and the same crown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then understand de Tocqueville’s admiring conclusion: ‘I see the Englishman secure under the protection of his laws’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, the Irish were not subsumed under the category of ‘English’, but such non-subsumption does not seem to be a problem, does not affect the laudatory judgement passed on the country visited and held up as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The colonial question and the differential development of radicalism in France, England and the United States&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has sometimes been made to ‘philosophic radicalism’ in connection with Bentham and his school.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theorist of utilitarianism adopted a debunking tone towards his country’s political, legal and ideological tradition. He did hesitate to denounce the ‘almost universal corruption’ that raged in England and the ill-starred role of a ‘corrupted and corrupting aristocracy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He did not even spare the Glorious Revolution, despite the religious aura habitually surrounding it: the &#039;&#039;‘original compact&#039;&#039;—the compact between king and people—was a fabulous one—the &#039;&#039;supervening&#039;&#039; compact—the compact between King, Lords, and Commons, was but too real a one’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and sanctioned the domination of an oligarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is sufficient to look at the attitude Bentham took towards the liberal tradition’s exclusion clauses to realize that we are very far removed from &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg174&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;radicalism in the sense specified here. Of the refuse and ‘dross’ and those confined in workhouses, we have already spoken. We must now concern ourselves with the condition of the blacks. Bentham included ‘the still unabrogated sanction given to domestic slavery on account of difference of colour’ among the ‘imperfections of detail’ to be found even in the ‘matchlessly felicitous system’ of the United States.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from this rather euphemistic description of the institution of slavery, the English liberal stressed that a project of emancipation must proceed with extreme gradualism, and be implemented exclusively from above. In a text from 1822, we come across a significant declaration: ‘The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are led to think of the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. But instead, as a note makes clear, the reference is to Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for gradualism, this was necessary for the purposes not only of respecting ‘rights of property’ (which must be compensated for the loss suffered), but also of educating slaves for liberty.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bentham wanted an emancipation ‘lottery’ that might occur at the moment of hereditary transmission of this special property, and from which one-tenth of the slaves owned by the deceased could benefit. An appeal to masters to demonstrate flexibility was the counterpart of indignant condemnation of any initiative from below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The injustice and the calamity which have accompanied precipitate attempts, form the greatest objection against projects of emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This operation need not be suddenly carried into effect by a violent revolution, which, by displeasing every body, destroying all property, and placing all persons in situations for which they were not fitted, might produce evils a thousand times greater than all the benefits that can be expected from it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Unquestionably, the prime site of the formation of radicalism, in the sense I have defined it, was France. It is easy to see why. The country was favourably disposed to accommodate it following defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of a large number of colonies. Subsequently, the controversy that developed either side of the Atlantic on the occasion of the English colonists’ rebellion ended up discrediting both fractions of the liberal party. The American Revolution, with its development of relations of equality within the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg175&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;white community and clear demarcation from the world of feudal privilege, galvanized harsher criticism of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France and the crisis of the English model. Disenchantment with the non-abolition of slavery in America and the emergence of an unprecedented racial state also threw the American model into crisis. The roots of French radicalism lay in this dual crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what was its influence across the Channel and the Atlantic? The problem can be reformulated as follows. Liberal England, derived from the Glorious Revolution, and especially the American Revolution, made a powerful contribution to the ideological preparation of the French Revolution and subsequently, through the crisis of the two models, to the formation of radicalism. But why did the latter not seem to take deep root in the two classical countries of the liberal tradition? Obviously, the vexed course of the revolution and the explosion of the Terror immediately damaged France’s powers of attraction. A far from negligible role in frustrating the diffusion of radicalism was also played by repression. In England in 1794 habeas corpus was suspended for eight years; a further suspension followed in 1817; while two years later there occurred what has passed into history as the Peterloo Massacre or (to put it in the indignant words of an English paper of the time) the ‘slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, unprovoked and unnecessary’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Suffering deportation to Australia and meeting with a horrible fate, sometimes dying under the lashes of merciless flogging, were members of workers’ societies, clubs that were or more or less Jacobin in orientation, and Chartists engaged in the struggle to extend the suffrage, not to mention ‘Irish dissidents’ for whom ‘Australia was the official Siberia … at the turn of the century’. In total, ‘between 1800 and 1850 … about 1,800 were deported for political “crimes”. Among them were representatives of nearly every protest movement known to the British Government’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, the repression also struck circles that regarded violent revolution by black slaves as legitimate, or even invoked it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1798 the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in the United States, containing serious restrictions on constitutional liberties, granting the president a wide range of discretionary power and particularly hitting followers of ideas suspected of being influenced by the French Revolution. And we already know about the violence, predominantly from below, to which abolitionists were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, neither the Terror in France nor the repression in Britain and the United States suffice to explain the weakness of radicalism across the Channel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg176&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or the Atlantic. The analysis must be taken further. In England the outbreak of war made it possible for the dominant class to present as a patriotic duty the struggle against the revolutionary fanaticism raging in France, and which threatened to spread to Ireland, posing a mortal risk to the British Empire. As for the United States, it is interesting to observe the debate which, on the eve of the war against Britain that broke out in 1812, involved two prestigious representatives of the South. The first, Randolph, declared himself against the opening of hostilities. The situation was full of peril on the home front, where the ‘infernal principles of French liberty’ risked provoking a revolt by slaves; ‘[t]he French Revolution has polluted them.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Calhoun, by contrast, did not share these concerns. Certainly, attention should be paid to the slaves’ moods, but happily ‘more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So radicalism, with its recognition of the right of black slaves or Irish semi-slaves to take up arms against their masters, posed a serious threat to the stability of the United States and the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The lesser weight of the colonial question, or of populations of colonial origin, also helps explain the greater diffusion of radicalism in France. When the black revolution in San Domingo broke out, radical circles in Paris had no great difficulty recognizing and legitimating the fait accompli. Even if there was a risk of losing the remaining colonies, as anti-abolitionists never tired of warning, that would not be an irreparable tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation was different when it came to Britain and the United States. The black revolution in San Domingo provoked a wave of indignation in both countries. ‘A Black State in the Western Archipelago’, wrote &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, ‘is utterly incompatible with the system of all European colonisation.’ And hence ‘Europe will, of course, recover in that quarter the ascendancy and dominion which it justly claims from the superior wisdom and talents of its inhabitants’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The United States not only refused to recognize the country born of a black revolution, but did everything it could to isolate, weaken and overthrow it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson distinguished himself in this operation. At first sight he seems closest to radicalism. In January 1793, without allowing himself to be impressed by the charges against the Jacobins levelled by his former private secretary (referring to Paris, he spoke of ‘streets … literally red with blood’), he continued passionately to defend the ‘cause’ of the French Revolution: ‘rather than it &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg177&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam &amp;amp;amp; an Eve left in every country, &amp;amp;amp; left free, it would be better than it now is.’ Moreover, Jefferson positively contrasted France with the United States, where Anglophiles regarded the 1787 Constitution, with the very wide powers it conferred on the president and executive, as a first step towards the establishment of a monarchy.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the picture changed markedly following the black revolution in San Domingo. We know that Jefferson interpreted the principle of equality in radical fashion, but always within the ambit of the white community. He never believed in the possibility of whites and blacks coexisting on an equal basis: it would represent an unjustifiable challenge to ‘the real distinctions which nature has made’ and end in ‘the extermination of the one or the other race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the conflict between white owners and black slaves exploded on the Caribbean island, the North American statesman’s sympathy immediately went to the former; his anxiety about ‘the revolutionary storm now sweeping the globe’ was profound. Hence his support for the invading army sent by Napoleon, which did not cease even in the face of recourse to revolting practices, such as the introduction of trained dogs to tear blacks to pieces and the organization around such events of mass spectacles, at once thrilling and educative.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. The liberal ebb of Christian radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States radicalism took shape on a Christian basis. Interpretation of the conflict in religious terms in fact involved serious limitations. Scarce attention was paid to the humiliation and oppression blacks also suffered in the North: this was a condition which did not take the immediately obvious form of slavery and sin. With the end of the Civil War, the abolitionist movement soon split, and thus was not in a position to offer theoretical, and still less practical, resistance to the regime of terroristic white supremacy that asserted itself in the South after the (anti-black) compromise of 1877 between the two sections of the white community. The weight of racial prejudice was too strong, and only the massive, prolonged presence of Union troops could have &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#page178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#pg178&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;guaranteed blacks the enjoyment of political rights and full recognition of their civil rights. But all this would have involved too serious a violation of the liberal principle of self-government. Among the theorists of abolitionism, possibly the only one who was inclined to go the whole way on the road of imposing the principle of racial equality by force of arms was Wendell Phillips. But when in 1875 he sought to set out his reasons at an assembly in Boston, he was brusquely silenced. The previous year, a senator from the South had observed with satisfaction: &#039;&#039;‘Radicalism&#039;&#039; is dissolving—going to pieces’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, local self-government was reasserted, but radical democracy disappeared and the Calvary of the blacks resumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, what prompted Anglo-American Christian abolitionism to condemnation of the sin of slavery was sympathy for a people largely converted to Christianity, who regarded Christianity as an instrument with which to overcome the condition of total de-humanization and achieve a minimum of recognition. Liberated from an obsession with sin and complicity in sin thanks to the abolition of slavery, Parker believed that there was no political solution to the persistent problem of the discrimination and injustice suffered by blacks: one could only place hope in the matrimonial fusion of the two races or the beneficent effects of the infusion of ‘dreadful Anglo-saxon blood’ in black veins. In a sense, this was a radical perspective, strongly counter to the dominant ideology. However, rather than on organizing the oppressed blacks, attention focused on overcoming the prejudices on the part of the oppressors that cemented barriers of race and caste. Radicalism thus tended to be reabsorbed by liberalism. Things were even worse for the Indians, regarded as savages and pagans. Parker had no hesitation in justifying the policy of ‘continual aggression, invasion, and extermination’ pursued by the indomitable people that were the Anglo-Saxons.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the end of the Civil War gave new impetus to the march into the Far West. The influence of the colonial question once again intervenes to explain the weakness of American radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. Liberal socialism and radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Much more so than Bentham, it was Kant who came close to radicalism. His clear adoption of a position favourable to revolutionary France is not so significant. More relevant is the fact that, intervening in 1795, a year after the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, with clear critical reference to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg179&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;England, &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039; identified ‘the sugar cane islands’ as the ‘site of the cruellest slavery that has ever been imagined’. There were two further decisive elements. Like the French radicals—we must not forget that the colonial question weighed even less heavily on Germany than France—Kant problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism: it was England that now represented the cause of ‘slavery and barbarism’. Finally, quite unlike the liberals, he did not confine himself to criticizing Pitt, whom he said was rightly ‘hated as an enemy of the human race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The German philosopher’s radicalism did not escape his contemporaries: while Goethe regarded his attitude towards England as scarcely ‘liberal’, Wilhelm von Humboldt sharply distanced himself from the ‘democratism’ pervading &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, rather than Bentham, it was John Stuart Mill who approximated to radicalism, when he identified slavery as ‘the most flagrant of all possible violations’ of liberal principles and branded those who defended it ‘the powers of evil’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, along with ‘the noble body of Abolitionists’, Mill also celebrated John Brown, author of the failed attempt to get the slaves of the southern United States to rise up.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a text of 1824 the English philosopher expressed his sympathy for the cause of the blacks of San Domingo–Haiti, whom the Napoleonic expedition vainly sought half to ‘exterminate’ and half to reduce to conditions of slavery once again.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Putting clear distance between himself and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries, Mill did not seem to recoil in horror from the prospect of a revolution from below by black slaves. And yet, in another respect, he was the theorist of a new ‘slavery’, temporary and pedagogical in kind, for ‘savages’ (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English author asserted that the final stage of his development was characterized by gravitation towards ‘socialism’ and, at the same time, renewed distrust of ‘democracy’. What caused and justified the latter was ‘the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Already problematic in the metropolis, democracy proved decidedly dangerous and inadvisable when it came to the colonies and peoples of colonial origin (including Afro-Americans). Theorist of the planetary despotism of the West, Mill seems equally remote from radical, ‘abolitionist democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg180&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused. Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ can be envisaged restrictively for the ‘master race’ and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin. At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism, but without crossing it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference to Zionism, Arendt drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a peculiar tendency. It was characterized, on the one hand, by support for ‘chauvinist’ objectives and, on the other, by commitment to pursuing collectivist experiments and a ‘rigorous realization of social justice’ within its own community. Thus crystallized ‘a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach and revolutionary social reforms domestically, with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy’, and in the field of relations with colonial peoples.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, ‘master-race democracy’ can also go further and take the form of ‘master-race socialism’, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as ‘master race’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in 1860, during the Second Opium War, a Franco-British expedition destroyed the Summer Palace, it was Victor Hugo who proved to be the inheritor of radicalism with his denunciation of the barbarity committed by self-styled civilizers, while for Mill, as for the liberal culture of the time, there continued to be few doubts about the complete identity between the West and civilization (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|§3]] and [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn1a|1]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, trans. Ernest Dilworth, New York: Mineola, 2003, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn3a|3]] Claude-Adrien Helvétius, &#039;&#039;De l’homme&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vols 7–12, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–69, vol. 8, p. 86. For the criticism of Helvétius, cf. Denis Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘L’homme’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Laurent Versini, vol. 1, Paris: Laffont, 1994, p. 862.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn4a|4]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Paul Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1963, p. 41 (article on &#039;&#039;Représentants&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn6a|6]] Cf. Gabriel Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1931, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn7a|7]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 47, 49, 55.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn8a|8]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn9a|9]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 230–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn10a|10]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 47–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn13a|13]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 55–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn17a|17]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. 2–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn18a|18]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn19a|19]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 167, 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn20a|20]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, pp. 31, 106.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Manuskripte über die polnische Frage&#039;&#039;, ed. Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1961, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn22a|22]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn23a|23]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Gedanken und Erinnerungen&#039;&#039;, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1928, pp. 51–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn24a|24]] Furet and Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn25a|25]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 384–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn26a|26]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn27a|27]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn29a|29]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn30a|30]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, p. 1078.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn31a|31]] Franco Venturi, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90, vol. 3, pp. 383, 398–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn32a|32]] Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique&#039;&#039;, pp. 133ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn33a|33]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 8, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn36a|36]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Saggio sui regni di Claudio e di Nerone e sui costume e gli scritti di Seneca&#039;&#039;, trans. Secondo Carpanetto and Luciano Guerci, Palermo: Sellerio, 1987, pp. 327–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn37a|37]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, pp. 31, 34, 33; Bernard Faÿ, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1925, p. 62 (for the translation of substantial extracts in France).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn38a|38]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 957–8 (letter to Diodati, 3 August 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn39a|39]] Étienne Clavière and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1996, pp. 64, 95 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 340.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn42a|42]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn43a|43]] Cf. Joel H. Wiener, &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983, vol. 1, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn44a|44]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 7, pp. 162–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn45a|45]] François-Noël Babeuf, &#039;&#039;Écrits&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Mazauric, 1988, p. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn46a|46]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn48a|48]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant&#039;&#039;, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn49a|49]] Clavière and Brissot, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, pp. 324–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn50a|50]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn52a|52]] Fay, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire&#039;&#039;, pp. 132–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn53a|53]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française et la fin des colonies&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1988, pp. 189–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn54a|54]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 27, 33–4. Cf. Carminella Biondi, &#039;&#039;Mon frère, tu es mon esclave&#039;&#039;, Pisa: Libreria Goliardica, 1973, pp. 23–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn56a|56]] Antoine-P.-J. M. Barnave, &#039;&#039;Introduction à la révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Fernand Rude, Paris: Colin, 1960, pp. 13, 18, 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn58a|58]] See articles 44–46 of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 178–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn59a|59]] Jean-Pierre Biondi and François Zuccarelli, &#039;&#039;16 pluviôse an II&#039;&#039;, Paris: Denoël, 1989, pp. 48, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn60a|60]] Mirabeau, quoted in Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 86 n. 4 (speech in National Assembly, 3 July 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn61a|61]] Mirabeau, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn62a|62]] Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 43–4; Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 388.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn63a|63]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 82–3, 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn64a|64]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 47.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn65a|65]] See Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes&#039;&#039;, trans. David Bailie Warden, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1997, pp. 42–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn66a|66]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn67a|67]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn68a|68]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 471.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 194–202 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;, 239–40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn71a|71]] Sonthonax, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 82.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn72a|72]] Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau&#039;&#039;, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996, pp. 50–1, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., p. 83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., p. 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn77a|77]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Des colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998, p. 242 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., pp. 166, 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn80a|80]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Esclavage et colonisation&#039;&#039;, ed. Émile Tersen, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn82a|82]] Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution francaise&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn83a|83]] Sir Thomas Aston, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn84a|84]] Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 161–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn85a|85]] Richard Hocquellet, ‘Crise de la monarchie hispanique et question coloniale ‘, in Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny, eds, &#039;&#039;Rétablissement de l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn86a|86]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 407, 760.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn87a|87]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 345–7; Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn88a|88]] Simón Bolívar, &#039;&#039;Obras completas&#039;&#039;, ed. Vicente Lecuna, Caracas: Ministerio de Educación nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; vol. 3, p. 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 170.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 679.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 685, 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 694.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 682.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn94a|94]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 381.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn95a|95]] Michael Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn96a|96]] Albert Gallatin, quoted in Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Hart Benton, quoted in ibid., p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn98a|98]] Jefferson, quoted in Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn99a|99]] Madison, quoted in ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn100a|100]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 202, 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn101a|101]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 388, 395–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn102a|102]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 245–61, in particular p. 257 (for the quotation from Walker).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn103a|103]] Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 270.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn104a|104]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn105a|105]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, pp. xx–xxi (letter to Robert E. Lee).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn107a|107]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn108a|108]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 324, 327.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 125.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 189–90 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 10 January 1857), p. 193 (letter to E. V. Childe, 2 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 195–6 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 13 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 190 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 4 September 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn113a|113]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 260–3, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn114a|114]] Henri-Alexandre Wallon, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974, p. v.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn115a|115]] See the letter from Granier de Cassagnac published in &#039;&#039;Journal des Débats&#039;&#039;, 23 July 1841.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn116a|116]] Thiers, quoted in Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn117a|117]] Cf. ibid., pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn118a|118]] André-Jean Tudesq, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 842.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn119a|119]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn120a|120]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 163, 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn121a|121]] Emília Viotti da Costa, &#039;&#039;Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn122a|122]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 195–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn123a|123]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn124a|124]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from Wesley to Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn125a|125]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn126a|126]] Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 387, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn127a|127]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, Ibid., pp. 387–90, 395.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn128a|128]] Parker, quoted in Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1978, p. 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn129a|129]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn130a|130]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn131a|131]] Parker, quoted in ibid., pp. 208, 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn132a|132]] Phillips, quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 1–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn133a|133]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn134a|134]] Garrison, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn135a|135]] Garrison, quoted in Aileen S. Kraditor, &#039;&#039;Means and Ends in American Abolitionism&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn136a|136]] Garrison, quoted in ibid., p. 86.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn137a|137]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 528–31, 261–2, 469.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn138a|138]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn139a|139]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn140a|140]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 1, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn141a|141]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1987, p. 208 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn143a|143]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 451–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn144a|144]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289, 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn145a|145]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn146a|146]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 264, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn147a|147]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn148a|148]] Cf. &#039;&#039;L’Ami du peuple&#039;&#039;, 18 May 1791, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, pp. 120–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn149a|149]] Garrison, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn150a|150]] Stockdale, quoted in David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn151a|151]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn152a|152]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn153a|153]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn154a|154]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 339, 354–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368 and n. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn156a|156]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 174 (speech to the Constituent Assembly, 12 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn157a|157]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn158a|158]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;De la Constitution américaine et de l’utilité de son étude&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hennuyer, 1850, pp. 10–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., pp. 6, 9–10, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn160a|160]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;L’état et ses limites suivi d’essais politiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn161a|161]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. viii–ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn162a|162]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, pp. 420–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn163a|163]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 431.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn164a|164]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. vi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn165a|165]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 425–7, 430.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn166a|166]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94, 128, 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn167a|167]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn168a|168]] See Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn169a|169]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 3, p. 442.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn170a|170]] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn172a|172]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn173a|173]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn174a|174]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 346.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn175a|175]] The text, taken from &#039;&#039;Sherwin’s Weekly Political Register&#039;&#039;, 18 August 1819, is quoted in Paola Casana Testore and Narciso Nada, &#039;&#039;L’età della Restaurazione&#039;&#039;, Turin: Loescher, 1981, pp. 226–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn176a|176]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, pp. 181, 195.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn177a|177]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 325–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn178a|178]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn179a|179]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 293.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn180a|180]] Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn181a|181]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1004 (letter to William Short, 3 January 1793). On all this, see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, &#039;&#039;The Age of Federalism&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 316–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn182a|182]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn183a|183]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 386; Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, pp. 197, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn184a|184]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1989, pp. 554, 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn185a|185]] Slotkin, &#039;&#039;Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, pp. 232, 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186a|186]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso&#039;&#039;, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187a|187]] Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 177, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188a|188]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 1, pp. 266–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189a|189]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190a|190]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 304–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191a|191]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192a|192]] Tocqueville mentions this critically in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193a|193]] Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, &#039;&#039;The Menorah Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 33, October 1945, pp. 171, 169, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SIX ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg181&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The excluded and the struggle for recognition&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the liberal tradition is shot through with two macroscopic exclusion clauses. In reality, there is a third—that directed at women, which in fact presents peculiar characteristics. When they belonged to the upper classes, they formed part, albeit in a subordinate role, of the community of the free; one thinks, in particular, of female slave-owners. The women’s liberation movement was only able to acquire a mass social base later, when women previously confined to a position of slavery or restricted to the inferior levels of a caste society were able to participate in it. The development of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is explained, in the first instance, by the struggle waged by the bipedal machines of the metropolis, on the one hand, and slaves and colonial populations or populations of colonial origin, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In both cases, even more than for the achievement of specific objectives, the excluded protested against the fact that the dignity of man was denied them. This was a struggle for recognition—in the sense specified by Hegel in a celebrated chapter of &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;. The shackled black depicted by abolitionist propaganda demanded freedom, stressing (in the text attached to the image) that he too was a ‘man’. In his turn, Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the San Domingo revolution, invoked ‘the absolute adoption of the principle that no man, whether red, black or white, can be the property of his fellow being’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similar accents could be heard in Paris immediately &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg182&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;following the July Revolution, when popular periodicals accused ‘bourgeois notables’ of insisting on viewing workers not as ‘men’ but ‘machines’, nothing but ‘machines’ called upon to produce exclusively for the ‘needs’ of their masters. After the revolution of February 1848, the achievement by proletarians of political rights demonstrated in their view that they too were finally beginning to be raised to the ‘rank of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Condorcet emphatically recognized this status in black slaves, but denied it to their white masters. Similarly, Engels, referring to the English workers whom he was ‘happy and proud’ to have known and who suffered a ‘slavery worse than that of the American negroes’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] exclaimed: ‘I have found you to be men, members of the great, universal family of humanity’ who proclaimed ‘the cause of humanity’, trampled underfoot by capitalists engaged in an ‘indirect trade in human flesh’, in a barely disguised slave trade.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corresponding to the struggle of the excluded to be recognized in their dignity as men was the polemic against the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the other side. In the liberal camp the most celebrated intervention was Burke’s. His condemnation of this subversive theory was absolute: it paved the way for the political and social demands of ‘hair-dressers’ and ‘tallow-chandlers’, ‘to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments’, for the demands of the ‘swinish multitude’, or at any rate people whose ‘sordid mercenary occupation’ entailed ‘a mean contracted view of things’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades later, in Bentham’s view the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was nothing but a pile of ‘anarchical fallacies’. It sanctioned &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; between all men? The English liberal’s comment was sarcastic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;All men&#039;&#039; (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) &#039;&#039;remain equal in rights&#039;&#039;. The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master; he has as much liberty with relation to the master, as the master has with relation to him; he has as much right to command and to punish him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And hence the ‘absurd principle of &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; can only please “fanatics” and the “ignorant multitude”‘. The Declaration referred to law as an expression of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg183&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘general will’? But it is clear that therewith censitary restrictions of the vote could not be justified. The very theorization of property right contained in this solemn text was suspect to Bentham: the concrete object of such right was not clearly specified, and hence it involved a right which, once again, belonged ‘to every individual, without any limit’, even the propertyless person suffering from hunger:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, a universal property right is established—that is, everything is common to everyone. But because what belongs to everyone belongs to no one, what follows from it is that the effect of the Declaration is not to establish property but to destroy it. And that is how it was understood by Babeuf’s supporters, those true interpreters of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, who can be criticized for nothing but being consistent in applying the most false and absurd of principles.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Condemning these abstract ‘general principles’, for which Britain rightly displayed ‘extreme repugnance’ and which, when pronounced by ‘famished mouths’, could only result in catastrophe, Bentham referred to Malouet, one of the few in France to have attempted to dispel ‘the cloud of confused ideas’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, it was the Anglomanes who sought to block the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In appealing to ‘general principles’ and ‘metaphysical’ concepts, Malouet warned, people were playing with fire: they risked inciting the ‘immense multitude of propertyless men’, ‘the unfortunate classes of society’, ‘the men placed by fate in a condition of dependency’ and ‘lacking enlightenment and means’. They must be taught ‘just limits’, rather than the ‘extension of natural liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that one of those to adopt a clear position against the category of rights of man was Malouet, who subsequently played a prominent part in the argument against abolitionism. It was this second aspect that played a central role in the United States, where within the white community the social question did not have the significance it possessed in France, but where the conflict over black slavery became increasingly impassioned. A particular target was the statement (contained in the Declaration of Independence) that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg184&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all men are created equal’, with the right to enjoy ‘certain unalienable Rights’. Present in it was the ‘metaphysical folly’ that subsequently found more concentrated expression in the French Revolution. This was the charge formulated by the ‘American Burke’—namely, Randolph—who in this context explicitly appealed to the British liberal.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Born in the wake of the revolt against the alleged ‘imprescriptible rights of the king’ invoked by the British Crown, the United States now risked succumbing to the folly of the ‘imprescriptible rights of black slaves’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In similar fashion, Calhoun drew attention to the ‘poisonous fruits’ of that ‘place in the declaration of our independence’ which claimed to confer ‘the same right to liberty and equality’ on all men. This was the abolitionists’ starting-point in the fanatical struggle they had unleashed against black slavery and ‘Southern institutions’ as ‘outrageous on the rights of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, it was with his focus mainly on the colonies that Disraeli characterized the ‘rights of man’ as ‘nonsense’ in 1880.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The struggle for recognition waged by colonial populations or populations of colonial origin proved particularly long and complex. It would only achieve decisive results in the twentieth century. For now we must turn our attention to the struggle waged by the bipedal machines in the capitalist metropolis and within the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The instrument of labour becomes a passive citizen&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The social and political milieus which, on either side of the Atlantic, celebrated themselves as the community of the free understood by liberty not only the undisturbed enjoyment of the private sphere. Exclusion from representative bodies and political life was also perceived as an expression of despotism. On the other hand, denial of political rights to those with no title to be recognized as members of the community of the free seemed self-evidently proper. How could the ‘horse’ or ‘beast of burden’ to which Locke and Mandeville compared the wage-labourer, or the ‘speaking instrument’, ‘bipedal instrument’ or ‘work machine’ that Burke and Sieyès referred to, claim to form part of it? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg185&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In other words, those who continued to be defined via the categories used by Aristotle to conceptualize the figure of the slave could not enjoy political citizenship. If they were men, they were members of a different, inferior people; they were barbarians (the quintessential slaves).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the French case at least, the picture began to change significantly with the revolution. For some time Sieyès spoke nonchalantly of wage-labourers as the set of ‘work machines’ and ‘bipedal machines’, or of the ‘always childlike multitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But after 14 July 1789, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed, he felt a new need—the need for greater ‘clarity of language’. Hence a distinction between ‘natural and civil rights’, or ‘passive rights’, on the one hand, and ‘political rights’, or ‘active rights’, on the other. The first, which included the protection of the ‘person’, ‘property’ and ‘liberty’, applied to every man. The former bipedal machine now saw his dignity not only as a man but also as a citizen recognized, albeit a ‘passive citizen’ excluded from participation in political life, like ‘women’, ‘children’ and ‘foreigners’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are in the presence of a significant innovation. Just as ‘free labour’ had long been an oxymoron, because labour was in reality synonymous with &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, so the category of ‘passive citizen’ had long sounded like an oxymoron. He who was subject to the necessity of labour, and hence to &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, was by definition excluded from the group of freemen, who enjoyed liberty and citizenship to the full. For Locke it was meaningless to grant political rights to those who, as we have seen, were ‘made slaves’ by destitution, need, labour and the servitude implicit in this—and who did not form part of civil society, whose purpose was the defence of property. Blackstone argued in similar fashion: the right to vote could not be extended to ‘persons of indigent fortunes’, who by that token were ‘under the immediate domination of others’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, Constant resorted to the same justification when he excluded the wage-labourer from the enjoyment of political rights: he lacked ‘the necessary revenue to subsist independently of any external will’ and ‘property holders are the masters of his existence, since they may refuse him work.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is especially interesting to observe the development of the first major theorists of passive citizenship. In September 1789 Sieyès still did not hesitate to define as ‘forced’ the labour of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg186&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘uneducated multitude’, which was therefore ‘lacking freedom’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to pose the problem of conferring political liberty on someone destined to be deprived of liberty as such. On the contrary, it might be asked if it was not appropriate to transform the actually existing ‘slavery of need’ into a ‘legally sanctioned slavery’, in accordance with the model adopted in America for indentured white servants.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French Revolution challenged the configuration of the servant as a mere instrument of labour. The figure now emerged of the purely passive citizen, which in fact had a long gestation period behind it. A significant role was played by an exigency internal to the community of the free, interested in imparting credibility to its discourse and self-celebration. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone on the one hand recognized and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, even highlighted the &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; to which the wage-labourer was—and must be—subject. On the other, they celebrated England as the land of the free, where there was no place for ‘perfect slavery’ (Locke), ‘slavery in the strict sense’ (Blackstone), or colonial slavery (Mandeveille). In the nineteenth century Burke observed that among the subaltern classes the ‘common blessing’ of liberty ‘may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is here an obvious concern to stress the liberty of the wage-labourer, who is called upon not to let himself be vexed and misled by the harshness of his material living conditions, but to identify with an order that, despite everything, guarantees him liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ideological dimension of this discourse clearly emerges from reading an eighteenth-century English author. Compared with legal coercion of the labourer–slave, Joseph Townsend regarded economic compulsion as more effective. It silently but unfailingly imposed obedience on servants, terrorized by the prospect of death from starvation. Taken for granted was the power exercised by ‘the more delicate’, who were excused work and ‘left at liberty, without interruption’, over those who, in one way or another, must be forced to perform ‘the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the transition from one condition to the other, coercion had not disappeared, but become more imperious. This did not prevent the English liberal pastor from painting an edifying picture of his country: even the poorest was a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg187&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘freeman’, who supplied ‘free service’ on the basis of ‘his own judgement and discretion’, without the ‘compulsion’ to which the ‘slave’ was subjected.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the figure of the passive citizen there is something more. It is the expression of an exigency internal to the community of the free, but also and above all a response to the struggle for recognition waged by servants in the metropolis. At least potentially, the idea of universal citizenship, even if merely passive in a majority of cases, called into question the caste ordering of society with which Townsend continued to identify. Precisely on account of its novelty, the category of citizen did not impose itself at a stroke on Sieyès, who compared non-property-owners to ‘foreigners’ and ‘children’: the slave too was a foreigner—in fact, the foreigner par excellence, the barbarian. Or he was a child, and as such formed part of the master’s extended family. In this sense, Constant was less shrewd than Sieyès, given that he continued to refer to non-property-owners excluded from political rights primarily as ‘foreigners’ and ‘minors’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The category of ‘passive citizenship’ possessed the further advantage of answering Rousseau’s objection, subsequently taken up by Robespierre. In a well-ordered state, the Genevan philosopher had stressed, no-one should be able to feel himself a ‘stranger’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly distancing himself from absolute monarchy and aristocracy, where a single individual or a few individuals could say they had a ‘homeland’, while everyone else was stateless, it was a question of constructing a society, a ‘democratic regime’, the Jacobin leader later reiterated, where ‘the state is genuinely the homeland of all individuals’, all of them admitted on an equal footing ‘to the rights of the citizen in full’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, if not exactly in the strict sense of the term, the proletarian was likewise a citizen, a member of the ‘nation’ dear to Sieyès that Boulainvilliers and the nobility had wrongly wanted to divide into an aristocratic people, descended from the victorious Franks, and a plebeian people, descended from the vanquished Gallo-Romans.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The invention of passive citizenship and negative liberty and the restriction of the political sphere&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg188&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Compelled by the struggle waged by the excluded to grant them at least passive citizenship, the community of the free now found itself facing a new challenge to its exclusivism. Already in June 1790, Marat had a representative of the ‘unlucky ones’ to whom political citizenship was denied argue thus against the ‘aristocracy of the rich’: ‘In your eyes we are still the rabble’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And we have seen Robespierre compare non-property-owners excluded from political rights to slaves: the concession of passive citizenship did not end the struggle for recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Constant sought to answer the objections of the most radical currents that had emerged during the French Revolution. No, the non-property-owner excluded from the enjoyment of political rights could not be confused with the slave.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the latter, the former, in common with all other citizens, was protected by laws and enjoyed full liberty within his private sphere. And this was what modern liberty consisted in. During the conflict with the monarchy, the community of the free in England and America had demanded a very different liberty, since it was in no way prepared to renounce administering public affairs. But it is clear that this platform could not survive the emergence of a struggle by the popular masses, which protested against exclusion from political rights and at the same time sought to change their labour relations and material living conditions. The dominant elite now developed a very different discourse: participation in political life was not an essential element of liberty; and, in the second place, labour relations and material living conditions pertained to an eminently private sphere, so that it was absurd and illegitimate to seek to change them through political action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new discourse did not impose itself at a stroke and wholly consistently. Constant let slip the admission that the provider of work was in fact ‘master’ of the worker’s ‘existence’. But even more significant is the oscillation we find in Macaulay. Fighting in 1831 for the political emancipation of Jews, the British liberal unhesitatingly rejected the thesis that a distinction should be made between civil rights and political rights, and that exclusion from the latter was not a factor of ‘mortification’ and discrimination. In reality, this was sophistry designed to justify ‘a system full of absurdity and injustice’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg189&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;polemic was incisive and effective, but the liberal author was careful not to intervene on behalf of the British popular masses as well as of property-owners whose religion was Judaism!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar consideration applies to other exponents of the liberal tradition. In regarding the enjoyment of political rights as an essential element of liberty, the Jacobins argued no differently from the American revolutionaries. But in Burke the proposal of ‘conciliation’ of the rebel colonists, who with their demand for the right to representation had confirmed that they were worthy members of the community of the free, was followed by the proclamation of a crusade against a revolution led by the mob, which had demanded and wrested political rights. As to de Tocqueville, his notes on his travels in England were almost coeval with the publication of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;. But the warm appreciation of widespread political participation in the North American republic was certainly not matched by bitter denunciation of strict censitary discrimination in Britain, or the slightest support for the Chartist demand for an extension of the suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s intervention was especially significant as regards the second point in the new liberal ideological platform, which drastically restricted the political sphere. In a text of 1842 he observed: ‘Equality is everywhere extending its dominion, except in industry, which is daily organized in increasingly aristocratic form’. The wage-labourer found himself in a ‘strict dependency’ (&#039;&#039;étroite dépendance&#039;&#039;) on the provider of work. Despite the charming appearance of ‘great French society’ as a whole, ‘industrial society’ (&#039;&#039;société industrielle&#039;&#039;) in the strict sense continued to be characterized by a strict hierarchy, which left little room not only for equality, but also for the individual liberty of those placed on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The harshness of the relations obtaining in factories was further confirmed by de Tocqueville’s comparison between working conditions and prison conditions, even if it was made not to challenge the former but to reject naively philanthropic projects for reform of the latter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of free workers, who in France painfully earn a living, have no rest but that taken at meal times, and cannot understand why criminals punished by society arouse so lively an interest that it gives way to tenderhearted exclamations and is on the verge of shedding tears at the idea of inflicting on them a deprivation suffered by all honest labourers.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg190&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Besides, we should not forget that the panopticon theorized by Bentham, a building designed to achieve surveillance from which there was no escape, could serve as prison, workhouse or even factory.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the ‘immediate dominion’ or ‘forced labour’ to which Blackstone and Sieyès, respectively, refer. However, this coercive relationship was no longer explicitly highlighted to justify censitary discrimination in political rights (whose enjoyment belonged only to freemen in the full sense of the term). Instead, the condition that subjected the worker to a ‘strict dependency’ (de Tocqueville), compelled him to work in prison-like institutions (Bentham and de Tocqueville), and to sell his labour power to buyers who were ultimately the ‘masters of his existence’ (Constant), was now recognized reluctantly, declared to be without political relevance and hence not corrosive of negative liberty, from which no one in the metropolis was excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can read the notes written by de Tocqueville during his trips to England in 1833 and 1835. The picture that emerges is no less dramatic than the one Engels was to draw some years later. The industrial region of Manchester and the working-class districts appeared as an ‘infected labyrinth’, an ‘inferno’: the miserable little cottages were like&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the last asylum man can occupy between misery and death. Yet the unfortunate beings that inhabit such cubby-holes arouse the envy of their fellows. Under their wretched abodes one finds a row of cellars to which a semi-underground corridor leads. In each of these damp, repugnant places, ten or fifteen human creatures are massed higgledy-piggledy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The appalling mass poverty formed a shocking contrast to the opulence of a few: ‘the organized forces of a multitude produce for the benefit of a single one’. Such a spectacle elicited a significant exclamation: ‘Here the slave, there the master; here the wealth of some, there the poverty of the greatest number’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On another occasion, de Tocqueville even warned against the danger of ‘slave wars’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby indirectly comparing modern proletarians with ancient slaves. We thus encounter the reality of unfreedom, and of unfreedom in its most drastic form. Yet this realistic analysis disappears as if by magic when it comes to drawing up an overall political balance sheet. We are dealing with the country that France was called upon to regard as a model, if it wished to save ‘the future &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg191&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of free institutions’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] English liberal society realized liberty as such, regardless of the conditions of the kind of slavery had had to register in the inferno of the industrial regions. The fact is that this inferno had nothing to do with the political sphere proper. And once poverty or even a condition of tangible slavery had been confined to a sphere lacking political relevance (for pertaining to private life), in a sphere where it was not legitimate or possible to intervene politically, the initially slimy and repugnant portrait of Manchester turned into its opposite:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the external appearance of the city, everything attests to the individual power of man and nothing to the regulatory power of society. At every step, liberty reveals its capricious, creative force there. Nowhere is the slow, continuous action of the government to be seen.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. ‘Civil laws’ and ‘political laws’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The restriction of the political sphere is so radical as to seem paradoxical. Analysing the prison system in the United States, de Tocqueville drew attention to legislation that threw the poor into prison even for utterly insignificant debts. In Pennsylvania the number of individuals annually incarcerated for debt amounted to 7,000. If to this figure was added the number of those condemned for more serious crimes, it turned out that for every 144 inhabitants virtually one a year ended up in prison. But this was not the most important aspect. The French liberal was obliged to acknowledge the influence, direct as well as indirect, exercised by the wealthy over the administration of justice. The ‘vagrant’ or someone suspected of vagrancy was locked up in prison without having committed any offence. Worse, while awaiting legal proceedings, the poor witness or plaintiff lost his liberty, while the thief capable of standing bail retained his (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). Clearly, the very principle of equality before the law ended up being travestied. But this was not de Tocqueville’s conclusion: ‘Of all modern peoples, it is the English who have instilled the greatest liberty in their political laws and made most frequent use of prison in their civil laws’. In their turn, although having largely altered the ‘political laws’, Americans had ‘preserved most of the civil laws’ of England.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#page192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#pg192&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;With this distinction we have reached a key point. The liberal author formulated his judgement on the countries visited by him exclusively on the basis of their &#039;&#039;lois politiques&#039;&#039;, while the &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039; were by definition politically irrelevant. Not by chance, there is little trace in &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; of the data gathered in the course of the inquiry into the US prison system. It might be said that de Tocqueville’s most interesting pages are those that did not make it into the work which sealed his fame. The almost triumphant conclusion then becomes explicable: in the transatlantic republic liberty had been comprehensively diffused, and did not constitute a privilege. Accustomed as he was to very different &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039;, the traveller from France expressed his disappointment at legislation in the United States that seemed to him ‘monstrous’. But ‘the mass of [American] men of law’ found no fault with it and did not regard it as contradicting the ‘democratic constitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was precisely the standpoint de Tocqueville ended up adopting—though not without contradictions and embarrassment. We can glimpse the former if we give the French liberal the floor once again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be acknowledged that the American prison regime is severe. While US society affords the example of the most extensive liberty, this country’s prisons offer a spectacle of utter despotism. The citizens subject to the law are protected by it; they cease to be free only when they become felons.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, by de Tocqueville’s own admission, vagrants and poor witnesses also suffered ‘severe’ treatment in prisons, or workhouses similar to prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us observe the embarrassment. We have already encountered the protests of vagrants locked up in prison by a society that cannot solve the problem of unemployment in any other way. What was de Tocqueville’s reaction? Just as it did not come within his ‘tasks’ to investigate possible remedies for unemployment, so it did not fall to him ‘even to investigate to what extent the society is just that punishes the man who does not work and lacks work, and how it might furnish means of subsistence without putting him in prison’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of politics and ‘political laws’ was so narrowly defined as to exclude not only material living conditions and relations of dependency in factories, but even the censitary discrimination that pervaded the administration of justice in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The de-politicization and naturalization of economic and social relations&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg193&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Any expansion of the political was utterly intolerable to the liberal tradition, because it would involve relations that were not only private in character, but whose immutability was consecrated by nature or Providence. In Burke’s view it was at once mad and blasphemous to believe that among ‘the competence of government’ was ‘supply[ing] to the poor, those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them’. Poverty was the result of ‘Divine displeasure’ and the latter could certainly not be placated by challenging ‘the laws of commerce’, which were ‘the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville argued no differently. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, he noted with concern the behaviour of the ‘working classes’. They seemed calm, no longer ‘bedevilled by political passions’. Unfortunately, however, ‘where once they had been political, their passions have become social’. Rather than the make-up of this or that ministry, they tended to question property relations themselves and hence the natural order of ‘society’, tearing ‘to shreds the basis on which it rests’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the revolution broke out, the French liberal regarded it as socialist or infected with socialism as early as February, because prominent in it were ‘the economic and political theories’ which would have people ‘believe that human miseries are the work of the laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be abolished by changing the social order’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ranging beyond the political sphere, the ‘threat of change in the social constitution’ was configured as an attack on the ‘ancient, holy laws of property and family on which Christian civilization is based’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, on the one hand political economy was merged with theology, while on the other it tended to take its place, in the sense that ‘science’ was now called on to sanction and sanctify existing social relations. According to Malthus, it was wholly desirable that political economy be ‘taught to the common people’. Thanks to it, the poor would understand that they must attribute the cause of their privations to Mother Nature or their own improvidence. Indeed, ‘[p]olitical economy is perhaps the only science of which it may be said that the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg194&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great evil.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was also the opinion of de Tocqueville, who believed it necessary&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to diffuse among the working classes … some of the most elementary and certain notions of political economy, which would make them understand, for example, what is constant and necessary in the economic laws that govern the wage rate. Because such laws, being in some sense of divine law, in that they derive from the nature of man and the very structure of society, are situated beyond the reach of revolutions. [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While for Burke, ‘Divine displeasure’ explained the misery of the popular masses, for Malthus it was the immorality of their behaviour, the sexual incontinence that brought into the world beings whose subsistence people were not in a position to ensure. Referring to ‘Malthus’s principle of population’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville reprehended ‘all the excesses of intemperance’ widespread among ‘the lower classes’, their ‘improvidence’, or their tendency to live ‘as if there will be no tomorrow’, and above all ‘these early, imprudent marriages that seem to have no other purpose than multiplying the number of unfortunates on earth’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notwithstanding the radical attitudes he liked to adopt, Bentham did not reach very different conclusions: ‘with respect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws’; the poor man was like a ‘savage’ who had not succeeded in transcending the state of nature. Or, to put it in the words of a French disciple and collaborator of the English philosopher, ‘Poverty is not a result of the social order. So why rebuke it? It is a legacy of the state of nature’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing against natural law, the English philosopher waxed ironic about the recourse to nature to ground rights that only made sense in society. But now nature popped up again to remove responsibility for poverty from the politico-social order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this elevation of existing social relations to the status of nature, and to nature sanctioned by Providence, attempts to alter them could only be an expression of madness. Burke expressed his utter ‘horror’ at revolutionaries or hasty reformists, who did not hesitate ‘to hack that aged parent [their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg195&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;country] in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, for de Tocqueville the illusion that there was a political ‘cure for this hereditary, incurable ill of poverty and work’ provoked the incessant, ruinous &#039;&#039;expérimentations&#039;&#039; that characterized the French revolutionary cycle,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or ‘the great social revolution’ begun in 1789.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Liberalism and radicalism: two different phenomenologies of power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In pronouncing his judgement on England and the United States, de Tocqueville ignored, in addition to colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, material living conditions, labour relations and even ‘civil laws’. Extraneous to his research and analysis of democracy, he declared, was not only the oppression of blacks and Indians, but also the detention of white citizens (‘vagrants’ or poor people summoned to testify in a trial) who were not guilty of any offence. The cult of the &#039;&#039;‘holy&#039;&#039; thing’ that was liberty[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ignored the fate of the excluded in their entirety, whether they lived in the colonies or the metropolis. And, once again, the divergence between liberalism and radicalism—of which Marx and Engels were the critical heirs—is already apparent at an epistemological level. In England, observed Engels, the ‘aiding and abetting of the rich is explicitly recognized even in the law’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Analysing the English ‘civil laws’ inherited by the United States, de Tocqueville arrived at the same conclusion. But this fact had political relevance only for Engels. And like the authors of the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the French liberal compared the worker of the time to the slave, forced to suffer a ‘strict dependency’ inside the factory and a degrading, oppressive poverty outside it. But de Tocqueville considered all this foreign to the political sphere proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely the drastic restriction of the political, and the consequent exclusion from it of the most profound dimension of the social totality, that prompted Marx’s criticisms. From the standpoint of bourgeois society and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg196&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political theory, he observed in his early writings, social relations ‘have only a private significance, not any political significance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited itself ‘to closing its eyes and declaring that certain &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; oppositions do not have a &#039;&#039;political character&#039;&#039;, that these do not bother it’. While regarded as lacking political relevance, bourgeois social relations and power relations in the factory and society could develop without inhibition or external impediment.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above poverty, the reality of the factory (stressed the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;) highlighted the ‘despotism’ that hung over workers, ‘organised like soldiers’ and ‘[a]s privates of the industrial army … placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s conclusion was scarcely milder. But now the despotism identified and denounced was not this reality, but attempts by political power to change or alleviate it. Against demands to put ‘the prescience and wisdom of the state in the place of individual prescience and wisdom’, the French liberal proclaimed that ‘nothing authorizes the state to interfere in industry’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the famous speech of 12 September 1848, made to persuade the Constituent Assembly to reject demands for the ‘right to work’ that had already been drowned in blood in the June Days. De Tocqueville went so far as to attribute to ‘socialist doctrines’ the regulation and reduction of working hours (‘the twelve-hour day’), which therefore became an object of unequivocal condemnation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise dismissed as an expression of socialism and despotism was any legislative measure to alleviate the misery of the ‘lower classes’ through rent controls.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French liberal insisted on this intransigently. Immediately after the bloody June Days, he did not hesitate to accuse the Interior Minister of being inconsistent and soft: ‘While Cavaignac and Lamorcière fought socialism in the streets, Sénard supported socialist doctrine as regards the twelve-hour day’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some months later, in his draft electoral circular of May 1849, de Tocqueville advertised as a badge of merit the fact that he had voted, &#039;&#039;inter alia&#039;&#039;, ‘against the limit it was proposed to place on the working day, against progressive taxation, and finally against the abolition of military substitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The last point was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;no less significant than the others. In de Tocqueville’s view, the option the rich man had of hiring a poor man to replace him when it came to performing the duty of military service did not involve an inequality, based on wealth and sanctioned by law, even in the face of the danger of death. Rather, it was a contract between individuals, which pertained to the private sphere and hence did not infringe the principle of legal equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in his capacity as a historian, when reconstructing the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, de Tocqueville stuck to this restriction of the political sphere and this peculiar phenomenology of power, which identified dominion and oppression exclusively with the intervention of political power in a private sphere that had been unduly expanded. He drew a terrible picture of the conditions of the popular classes. ‘Beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ were sometimes proceeded against ‘in the most violent way’, with the arrest and condemnation of thousands of people to forced labour without trial. Not much better was the treatment reserved for peasants. While, materially and socially, they lived in an ‘abyss of misery and isolation’, in terms of civil rights they were deprived of any protection: they ‘were constantly arrested in connection with the levies of forced labour or the militia; for begging, for misdemeanours, and countless other minor offences’. In conclusion, the peasants were viewed rather like ‘the Negroes in our colonies’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Was the revolution therefore legitimate and necessary? Such was not de Tocqueville’s opinion. France, which with the economists radically criticized and readied itself to overthrow the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, ‘wanted not so much a recognition of the “rights of man” as reforms in the existing system’![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An organ of the titled aristocracy and hence jointly responsible for the degradation of the peasants to ‘negroes’, the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; were the body which, before unfortunately being dissolved by the revolution, embodied the whole cause of liberty. In the years preceding the fatal 1789, ‘our judicial institutions were still those of a free people.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The new self-representation of the community of the free as a community of individuals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To the revolutionary demand for the rights of man and the equal dignity of every individual, which risked grinding society ‘into the dust and powder of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’, Burke opposed the sacredness of a community: ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, in ‘the great primaeval contract of eternal society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thanks to a ‘relation in blood’ that united and founded in an indivisible unity ‘our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, as against the individualism reprehended in the French revolutionaries, the British liberal vindicated an emphatic organicism. Not by chance, the partnership celebrated by him subsequently became in German culture the &#039;&#039;Gemeinschaft&#039;&#039; that played such an important role in nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative and reactionary thinking.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the dissolvent charge contained in revolutionary individualism can also be found in de Tocqueville, who in 1843 observed: ‘For some years, doubt and individualism have made us such progressives that the nation will soon no longer offer any foothold for resistance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But already during the French Revolution a different attitude had begun to emerge. Barnave warned as follows against the demand for an extension of political rights to non-property-owners: ‘Another step on the road of equality would mean the destruction of liberty.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to Constant, too, the diffusion among the popular masses of the demand for political rights and stress on their enjoyment risked making people lose sight of the centrality of ‘private independence’ or ‘individual independence’, leading to the subjection of individual existence to the collective body.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albeit in a different idiom, Barnarve’s argument was reintroduced: the generalization of political rights had a levelling, homogenizing effect at the expense of individual liberty. Later, Guizot declared that to fight for a society where everything revolved around ‘order’, ‘well-being’ and the ‘equitable distribution … of the means of life’ meant forgetting ‘the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties’, and aspiring to an ‘ant-hill or bee-hive’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a theme that enjoyed enormous success after 1848. The more the struggle for recognition developed as a struggle for the conquest of political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg199&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rights and of economic and social rights, the more the popular and socialist movement was accused of not understanding the autonomous dignity of the individual, and in fact of wanting to trample it underfoot. Rejecting the social demands that issued from the February Revolution, de Tocqueville gave full vent to his disgust at the emergence on the horizon of the spectre of a ‘levelled society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a ‘society of bees and beavers’, composed ‘more of sapient animals than free, civilized men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so in his turn did John Stuart Mill: ‘At present individuals are lost in the crowd … The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence, in a reversal of positions compared with Burke, liberalism now rebuked the most radical currents not for their individualism, but for riding roughshod over the rights of the individual. De Tocqueville sought to provide this accusation with an epistemological foundation: conferring ‘a separate existence on the species [espèce]’, and expanding ‘the notion of genus [&#039;&#039;genre&#039;&#039;]’, radicalism and socialism were simply the application to politics of the ‘doctrine of the realists’ of scholastic fame. It entailed ‘contempt for particular rights’ and devaluation of the individual as such.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But what is the value of this theoretical construct? It is interesting to see how de Tocqueville rejects proposals for reforming the prison system promoted primarily by the radical and socialist movement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philanthropy elicits our pity for an isolated unfortunate, we must not forget to reserve a little of our sympathy for a yet greater interest—that of the whole society. Let us distrust these narrow, ungenerous views that notice the individual but never the mass of men and let us eternally remember this thought of a great philosopher: pity for the wicked is a great cruelty to the good … The social interest, which is nothing if not the interest of the honest mass, requires that the wicked be severely punished.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Even the troubled diagnosis of massification was made with an eye to the fate of ‘[t]he nation, taken as a whole’, which now risked turning out to be ‘less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was also in the name of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg200&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an emphatic (and chauvinist) idea of the nation that de Tocqueville invoked ‘terror’ against those who risked compromising the honour of France (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a concrete level, too, de Tocqueville was concerned to see what were for him the requirements of society prevail. In the years of the July Monarchy, faced with the spread of mass misery, he proposed nothing to prevent it except police measures gravely corrosive of the liberty of the individual (the poor individual): ‘Could we not prevent the rapid movement of the population, so that men do not abandon the earth and move to industry, except to the extent that the latter can readily meet their needs?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Restrictions on freedom of movement should also be imposed on ‘vagrants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although committed to denouncing the expansion of the state—‘the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power’—Mill did not hesitate to assert: ‘The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’; they were ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The view that any ‘interference’ in the procreation of human life was illegitimate was ‘a superstition which will one day be regarded with as much contempt, as any of the idiotic notions and practices of savages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can understand Proudhon’s irony in connection with the liberal school:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It, which in all circumstances and places professes &#039;&#039;laissez-faire, laissez-passer&#039;&#039;, which reprehends socialists for substituting their convictions for the laws of nature, which protests against any state intervention, and which demands liberty here, there and everywhere, nothing but liberty, does not hesitate when it comes to conjugal fertility to cry to the spouses: Stop there! What devil incites you![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the conflict between liberalism and its critics, an inversion of positions has occurred as regards laissez-faire for the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disgusted by the radicalism of the 1848 revolution and Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, de Tocqueville arrived at a bitter conclusion: ‘The revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg201&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in England was made solely with a view to liberty, while that in France was made principally with a view to equality.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The criticism also encompassed the Enlightenment culture that had prepared and promoted the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime:&#039;&#039; in it a sure ‘zeal for equality’ was matched by a rather ‘tepid’ ‘desire for liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we know, the first to counterpose liberty and equality and denounce the demand for political equality as an attack on liberty was Barnarve, who was nevertheless a defender of slavery. This institution continued to be alive and well in the United States when de Tocqueville held up the transatlantic republic, together with England, as the model country for love of liberty to a France devoured by the passion for equality. It was precisely here that slavery was justified and even celebrated by southern theorists as an instrument to ensure, along with their liberty, the equality of members of the white community. For confirmation of the problematic character of the opposition between liberty and equality, we might adduce the pre-1848 de Tocqueville, who criticized England for an erroneous conception of liberty in as much as it was based on ‘privilege’ (and inequality), and who attributed to the French Revolution the merit of having, in the name of equality, promoted the cause of the abolition of slavery and the freedom of the blacks (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]; below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|§7]]). At this time, far from being in opposition, liberty and equality were fully in accord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposition was represented, in significantly different form, in the work of another important representative of the liberal tradition. In Bentham we read: ‘When security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the very country held up by de Tocqueville as a model for its ability to understand the absolute priority of the value of liberty, we see that the reassertion of the subordinate value of equality occurs, in the first instance, in the name of the ‘security’ of society and the existing order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Economic and social rights, the socialist ‘ants’ nest’ and liberal ‘individualism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point it is appropriate to analyse nineteenth-century liberals’ individualist profession of faith at greater length. Especially after 1848, in the midst &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg202&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the massification they reprehended in socialism, they sometimes seemed to consider individualism a pre-modern reality, which had, alas, faded in the course of subsequent historical developments. According to Mill, ‘[i]n ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself’; he was not ‘lost in the crowd’ and the ‘masses’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville likewise paid homage to the ‘individualism of the Middle Ages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Manifestly, he did not take into consideration the fate of serfs, just as he did not take account of the fate of slaves and blacks in general when he pointed to the United States as the country where &#039;&#039;‘every&#039;&#039; individual’ enjoyed unprecedented ‘independence’. When he subsequently asserted that in colonized Algeria, ‘the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the motherland’, de Tocqueville ignored the Arabs, who, by his own admission, were often equated with the occupying forces to ‘evil beasts’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]; below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|§6]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus emerges the somewhat problematic character of the pathos of the individual, which was the flag waved by liberalism in its conflict with radicalism and socialism. Who was more individualist? Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the slave revolution? Or Calhoun, the great US theorist of the slaveholding South? Who demonstrated respect for the dignity of the individual as such? The black Jacobin who, taking the Declaration of the Rights of Man seriously, considered that it was always inadmissible to reduce a man to an object of ‘property’ of one of ‘his follow men’? Or Jefferson, who kept silent about his doubts about slavery out of a conviction of white superiority and his concern not to endanger the peace and stability of the South and the Union? Who expressed individualism better? Mill and his English and French followers, who considered the subjection and even slavery (albeit temporary) of colonial peoples beneficial and necessary? Or the French radicals who began to question colonial despotism as such (‘Let the colonies perish if they are to cost honour, freedom’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]])?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doubts are not dispelled even if we ignore the colonies and peoples of colonial origin. Prominent in the liberal tradition (for example, Laboulaye) is the polemic against the fanaticism of the French revolutionaries, who regarded access to the vote and representative office as a ‘natural, absolute right’ of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg203&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;every individual, rather than a ‘political function’ of society.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So which of the two positions better expressed individualism? On the other hand, if the generalization of political rights imperilled ‘individual independence’, as Constant seemed to believe, why direct such a reproof solely against French radicalism and not also against the American Revolution (which erupted in the wake of the demand for the colonists’ right to political representation)?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examined more closely, the cry of alarm at the danger of the disappearance of individuality, and the impeding ‘ants’ nest’, expressed the disquiet of the restricted community of the free first at the extension of political rights and then, increasingly, at the extension of economic and social rights. Yet it was de Tocqueville himself who compared the hungry man to a slave—that is, a man or an individual deprived of liberty and recognition. Compared with the liberal tradition, Nietzsche proved much more lucid and consistent. Although inspired by an implacable hatred of socialism and the social state demanded by it, and in fact precisely because inspired by such hatred, the brilliant reactionary thinker understood that, with its ‘individualistic agitation’, socialism aimed to ‘render many individuals possible’, raising them above their condition as instruments of labour and their herd-like relationship to the masters. With its universalistic charge, socialism issued in the recognition of every individual, independently of wealth, sex or race, as a subject endowed at a moral level with equal human dignity and possessor, politically, of inalienable rights. That was why Nietzsche indignantly condemned individualism and socialism. Albeit with a converse value judgement, Oscar Wilde also connected the two terms: ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming the ambiguous character of the liberal tradition’s individualism, it is worth noting that, in criticizing the French Revolution and the danger of subversion represented by the working-class and socialist movement, it liked positively to oppose the countryside to the city. This is readily intelligible in the case of the theorist of organicist ‘partnership’, Burke, who with utter consistency celebrated the ‘agricultural class’ that ‘of all others is the least inclined to sedition’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his attention still fixed on the French Revolution and the role in it played by Paris, Constant stressed the danger of ‘[a]rtisans, crowded into the towns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the theme of distrust or hostility towards the city, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg204&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the prime site for development of the individual, runs deep in the liberal tradition. In Mandeville’s view, ‘London is too big for the Country’, and it was precisely there that disturbing phenomena of social insubordination were emerging. Much more reassuring were rural areas, where it was possible to count on ‘the poor silly Country People’, who in fact were conspicuous for their ‘Innocence and Honesty’ and who, ‘from their very Infancy’, could be educated into obedience to authority and respect for customs and tradition.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain regret for this world can also be observed in de Tocqueville, when in 1834 he described the condition of the poor man in the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. Characterized by ‘limited’ desires and calm indifference to ‘a future that did not belong to him’, his lot ‘was less to be felt sorry for than that of men of the people of our days’. Accustomed to their condition from time immemorial, the poor under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; ‘enjoyed the kind of vegetative happiness whose attractiveness is so difficult for the civilized man to understand that he denies its existence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the resumption of revolution in France, against those who sought to ‘stir up the working population of the city’, Tocqueville called for reliance on ‘the inhabitants of the countryside, [who] are full of good sense and, thus far, of balance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The first person to take this recommendation to heart was de Tocqueville himself, who described how he organized the elections in his native village as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We all had to go to vote together in the village of Saint-Pierre, a league from our hamlet. The morning of the election, all the electors (that is, the whole male population over the age of twenty) met in front of the church, and all these men formed a queue in twos in alphabetical order … I reminded these good folk of the seriousness and importance of the act they were performing and recommended that they not allow themselves to be approached or led astray by those who, on our arrival in the village, might seek to mislead them, but instead proceed in a group and stay together, each in his place, until we had voted. ‘Let no one—I said—go home either to eat something or to dry himself (it rained that day) before he has done his duty’. They shouted that they would do this and did it. All the votes were cast at the same time, and I have reason to believe that virtually all of them were given to the same candidate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg205&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It is hard to regard as a manifestation of individualism the events narrated here by the French liberal, beneficiary of the plebiscitary vote of the village whose lord he remained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as the dichotomy between English love of liberty and French egalitarianism proves unfounded, so the opposition between the individualism of the liberal tradition (whose favoured site was England) and the anti-individualism of radicalism (whose centre was in France) does not withstand critical analysis. To the French revolutionaries, who with their Declaration of the Rights of Man aimed simply ‘to excite and keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of insurrection against all governments’, Bentham opposed his principle of social utility: ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the view condemned by Marx, who indignantly reported the reasons with which the prime minister, Palmerston, had once justified his distrust or hostility towards the demand for emancipation advanced by Irish Catholics: ‘because the legislature of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare of the whole’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Criticism of liberalism as anti-modern reaction?&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, we encounter a paradoxical phenomenon. While, on the one hand, it cultivated pre-modern nostalgia, on the other, liberalism contested the movement engaged in the demand for political rights and economic and social rights, accusing it of a basic inability to understand and accept modernity. The first to set off in this direction was Constant. Clinging to the idea of unanimous participation in political life and hence to ‘ancient liberty’, the Jacobins forgot that the latter was based on slavery, the institution that made it possible for freemen to enjoy the &#039;&#039;otium&#039;&#039; required for them to be genuinely active citizens in every respect.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was 1819 when the French liberal argued thus. At this time, in every country where modern liberty flourished, slavery continued in one form or another to be a living reality and, what is more, had assumed a harshness and naturalistic rigidity unknown in classical antiquity. Certainly, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg206&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;although it had not ceased to play a significant role, the institution was mostly isolated and concealed in the colonies. But that was not the case in the United States. There slavery was not only highly visible but, according to the analysis of not a few southern theorists (who took up and developed a suggestion of Burke’s), it encouraged the republican spirit of the free. In other words, ‘ancient liberty’ continued to survive in some sense in the United States, which was nevertheless pointed to by Constant as a ‘great example’ of the modern liberty dear to him.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, in stressing the invigorating function that the presence of slaves had on the spirit of liberty of free citizens, Burke explicitly referred to the example of the ‘ancient states’ (above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Hence Constant’s theoretical construct is based on a colossal repression, which is all the more amazing if we bear in mind the bitter struggles over slavery that developed in France. Abolished by the Jacobins, it had been restored by Napoleon, who arrived in power with the support not only of Sieyès, but also (as we shall see) of Constant himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than emulating a model from antiquity, the French Revolution and the most radical currents thrown up by it were sometimes accused of encouraging nostalgia for the Middle Ages. Spencer compared progressive taxation to a corvée (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|§4]]). This was a theme subsequently developed by him with the observation that ‘national charity’ (i.e. laws benefiting the poor) was merely a new version of the pre-modern ‘established church’. And just as the old dissenter had fought for respect for the spontaneity of authentic religious sentiment, so the new ‘dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary’. While the old dissenter denied any authority the right to dictate laws to his religious conscience, the new ‘dissenter from established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in between him and the &#039;&#039;exercise&#039;&#039; of his religion’, and indignantly rejected ‘the interference of the state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of [the] gospel’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the last analysis, the demand for economic and social rights, to be legally ratified in the name of moral and religious values such as compassion and human solidarity, were simply a claim to restore life to a state religion! And the prophets of this state religion likewise referred to a pre-modern world. From the French Revolution onwards, as we shall soon see, the liberal tradition was fond of equating trade unions with medieval corporations. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Lecky reproved trade unions and the working-class movement for aspiring to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg207&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an ‘industrial organization’ similar to that of the Middle Ages and the Tudor period.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Trade unions, Pareto stressed some years later, claimed to enjoy (and did enjoy) a kind of ‘Mediaeval immunity’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Lord Acton’s view, even more so than the demand by unions for alleged economic and social rights, it was that for universal suffrage that amounted to a pre-modern, regressive phenomenon. It was ‘absolutist and retrograde’, since it favoured the expansion of the state and of despotism that had happily been transcended by liberalism.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, rather than classical antiquity as for Constant, Jacobinism, socialism and sometimes democracy itself were now accused of cultivating nostalgia for the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, whether it was of the Middle Ages or absolute monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The latter theme found fullest expression in de Tocqueville, according to whom, with their statist pathos, radicalism, Jacobinism and socialism were in a line of continuity with the statism, ‘administrative centralization’ and ‘paternal government’ of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this was an argument which, albeit with timely variations, proved especially dear to defenders of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; themselves! In Berlin the &#039;&#039;Berliner politische Wochenblatt&#039;&#039; never tired of repeating that revolution and absolutism were ‘identical, when regarded from a higher viewpoint’. In citing Louis XIV’s motto (‘L’état c’est moi!’), the journal observed that ‘revolutionary freedom … is reconciled with this centralization, this bureaucratic despotism, with this tutelage through ministerial assistants of the provinces and the community, with this Hobbesian governmental omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville stressed the revolutionary role played, even before 1789, by the figure of the ‘intendant’ and ‘public administration’, which had in fact already expelled the nobility.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The periodical cited above arrived at the same conclusion, identifying and branding in the figure of the ‘civil servant’ the author of the cancellation of ‘local liberties’ and all intermediate bodies liable to overshadow ‘state power’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to de Tocqueville, ‘those peoples who are so constituted as to have the utmost difficulty in getting rid of despotic government for any considerable period are the ones in which aristocracy has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg208&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ceased to exist and can no longer exist’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was precisely the guiding thread of the condemnation of the French Revolution pronounced by the organ of the Prussian nobility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after the publication of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the Revolution&#039;&#039;, expressing his agreement and admiration, Lieber observed that the book as a whole was a historical running commentary on the analysis of ‘Gallican’ political tendencies he had already developed.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, a degree of boasting is not absent. Yet we should understand the German-American liberal’s point of view. In 1849 he had underlined the continuity between Louis XIV and the 1789 revolution, and between it and Napoleon Bonaparte and the 1848 Revolution. It was a history utterly pervaded by the ideal of ‘equality’ and the ‘concentration’ and ‘centralization of power’, the ‘organization’ and generalized ‘interference of public power’, with a consequent inevitable sacrifice of freedom, ‘individualism’ and the principle of the ‘limitation of government’. By contrast, the latter was at the heart of the concerns and aspirations of the ‘Britannic race’ or ‘Anglican race’—i.e. England and the United States.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are, I repeat, in 1849; and at this time de Tocqueville confined himself to an indictment of socialism. While ‘on many points’ it had a different orientation from the ‘&#039;&#039;ancien régime’&#039;&#039;, it had inherited ‘the opinion that the only wisdom lies in the state’. But the partial and limited continuity established here did not in any way include the French Revolution. In fact, in his anti-socialist polemic, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to refer to Robespierre:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flee … flee the old mania … of wanting to govern excessively; allow individuals, allow families the right freely to do anything that does not harm others; allow the communes the right to manage their own affairs; in a word, restore to the liberty of individuals everything that has illegitimately been taken from them, everything that does not of necessity pertain to the public authority.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, far from formulating the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution, de Tocqueville was refuting it in advance. Someone who did support it was Lieber, who was in a sense justified in claiming priority. In fact, it must be added that, by his own explicit admission, he had derived the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg209&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thesis from Niebuhr, whose disciple he considered himself to be,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and, more generally, from the German culture he had absorbed before leaving Prussia at the age of twenty-seven. In the first instance, the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution met with great success in the country where the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; proved most tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are clearly dealing with a rhetorical strategy: the revolutionary movement that claimed to be constructing a new world was branded as antiquated. Yet the strains are obvious. If we analyse the arguments of the various exponents of the liberal tradition, we see that the French Revolution and Jacobinism are variously situated in a line of continuity with classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and monarchical absolutism. The past to which the new is returned and reduced can assume the most diverse forms. Thus, the revolution was criticized with arguments that are difficult to reconcile with one another, and which are even opposed. On the one hand, it was accused of having destroyed the intermediate bodies that predated the advent of the absolute state; on the other, of wanting to preserve or reintroduce bodies, such as trade unions, that pertained to feudal particularism and that tended to take the form of a state within the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the light of subsequent historical experience, it is difficult to regard the demand for economic and social rights (in our day also ratified by the UN) as pre-modern and, contrariwise, the view, which was not foreign even to de Tocqueville, regarding mass poverty as a datum of nature pertaining to Providence, rather than determinate politico-social relations, as modern. And, still with reference to the French liberal, it is difficult to reconcile condemnation of Jacobinism and socialism as movements situated in the wake of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, with alarmist and apocalyptic denunciation of the ‘new race’ of delirious ideologues and agitators,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who menaced ‘European civilization’, in fact civilization as such, with an unprecedented danger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Individualism’ and the repression of working-class coalitions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg210&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In some instances, the individualist profession of faith played a manifestly repressive role. Together with the phenomenology of power and the restriction of the political sphere we are already familiar with, it operated to justify the proscription of working-class coalitions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mandeville expressed his utter consternation at a new, disturbing phenomenon:&lt;br /&gt;
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I am credibly inform’d that a parcel of Footmen are arriv’d to that height of Insolence as to have enter’d into a Society together, and made Laws by which they oblige themselves not to serve for less than such a Sum, nor carry Burdens or any Bundle or Parcel above a certain Weight, not exceeding Two or Three Pounds, with other Regulations directly opposite to the Interest of those they Serve, and altogether destructive to the Use they were design’d for.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What prompted the ban at this time was simply a refusal of recognition, as emerges from the contempt, in fact the disgust, provoked by the unheard of behaviour among servants. Organizing themselves autonomously, as if they were gentlemen, they pretended to raise themselves to the level of masters or even to usurp their rights (above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). The absence of recognition continued to play a role in Burke. Certainly, in regarding only contracts drawn up outside any ‘collusion or combination’ as valid [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the allusion to and support for the Combination Acts, which banned and penalized working-class coalitions in these years, are transparent—he appealed to the principle of freedom of trade, which did not tolerate impediments of any kind. But it is clear that the wage labourer, unrecognized in his autonomous subjectivity and dignity and degraded to an &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;, was to see himself denied the right of autonomous organization from below.&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith’s position was more tortured. He recognized that what led to the formation of workers’ coalitions was the desperate attempt to counter the de facto coalition whereby suppliers of work lowered wages, and to escape the threat of death from starvation. However, these ‘enlarged monopolies’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg211&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be prevented and repressed in order to assert the rights not only of the market, but also of the individual. It was necessary to ‘allow … every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice’;[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in accordance with ‘the system of natural liberty’, every man must be able to contribute and bring into competition ‘both his industry and his capital’, without any obstacles whatsoever.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case could ‘violations of natural liberty [and justice]’ be tolerated.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, the Le Chapelier law, which banned workers’ coalitions in France in 1791, was also said to be aimed at defending individual freedom. In the name of ‘alleged common interests’, such coalitions violated the freedom to work possessed by every individual.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And de Tocqueville referred to this law when, after 1848, he condemned the working-class and socialist movement thus: while ‘the revolution has swept away all the obstructions that impeded the liberty of the citizen, that is, corporations and craft associations [&#039;&#039;les maîtrises, les jurandes&#039;&#039;]’, the socialists proposed to reintroduce this junk, albeit ‘in a new form’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps Marx had in mind the liberalism of his time, as well as the French Revolution, when he criticized the Le Chapelier law for having banned ‘working-class associations of any kind’, on the pretext that they represented the ‘re-establishment of the mediaeval guilds’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theme, which stigmatized trade unions as a residue or reminiscence of the Middle Ages and the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, was widely diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century. In England, while Lecky condemned resumption of the ‘guilds’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more vehement: acting as new tyrants and taking the place of monarchical despotism, trade unions suffocated individual autonomy and liberty in every way. It was true that they could also be consenting, but this did not alter the terms of the problem: ‘If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The picture was the same across the Atlantic. Lieber condemned unions in the name of economics and morality alike: they were guilty of encouraging &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg212&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sloth and, ultimately, vice.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Laboulaye demonstrated an attitude of cautious openness,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while Mill continued to be fundamentally hostile. He targeted the ‘moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one’, exercised by the trade-union movement: ‘the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry’ tried to block ‘piecework’ and thus oppressed workers of ‘superior skill or industry’, who sought to earn more. In reality, the consequences of piecework had been described as follows by Smith some decades earlier: the workers subjected to it ‘are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years’; if they listened to ‘the dictates of reason and humanity’, it would be the masters themselves who restricted this type of remuneration. But philanthropic intervention from above was one thing. Quite another was intervention from below by organizations that trampled over individual rights and arbitrarily interfered in what Mill too continued to regard as ‘private concerns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While they sought to impose intervention from above on bourgeois government itself, workers promoted an autonomous movement of transformation from below. However, in the sphere sovereignly declared by it to be ‘private’, the liberal bourgeoisie did not tolerate the intervention of political power, or even that deriving from civil society. Theoretically legalized in England in 1825, following a phase of persecution that even saw culprits condemned to deportation, trade unions continued to be attacked by the judiciary, in as much as they were defined as corporations hampering free enterprise. They acquired full legitimacy in 1871. However, ‘what Gladstone’s government gave with one hand it took away with another.’ If not trade unions as such, it was individual workers who could be dragged before the courts on the basis of a new law: ‘ “Watching and besetting”, that is “picketing” workmen continuing at work during a strike, was made illegal even when done only by a single person.’ This law was repealed by Disraeli in 1875.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In France, the Le Chapelier law was only repealed in 1887. What lay behind full recognition of the legitimacy of workers’ coalitions and organizations was the gigantic struggles that culminated in the Paris Commune. Hence we are beyond 1870, the date that according to Hayek marks the beginning of ‘the decline of the liberal movement’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg213&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself thus is an author who, not by chance, seems to want to call everything back into question. In his view, by destroying ‘the competitive determination of the price’ of labour power, and claiming to interfere in the ‘game’ of the market, trade unions undermined the liberal system at its roots; and it was ‘the clear moral duty of government’ to prevent this happening.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Paris Commune was a watershed in Europe, but not across the Atlantic. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was ‘applied first and most effectively to labour’, which was guilty of combining in trade-union ‘monopolies’ that did not respect individual initiative and freedom. By contrast, so-called yellow-dog contracts were long considered perfectly respectful of the rules of the market and individual liberty: on the basis of them, when hired, workers and employees committed themselves (were forced to commit themselves) not to join any trade-union organization.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The demand for economic and social rights and the transition from paternalistic liberalism to social-Darwinist liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A social-Darwinist streak ran through liberal thought from the start. The arguments used by Joseph Townsend in England in the second half of the eighteenth century against any attempt to introduce legislation in favour of the poor are eloquent: it would only end up destroying the balance of nature, cancelling the ‘peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure’ that was hunger and encouraging the growth of an idle, redundant surplus population. Left to itself, without the artificial interference of law-makers moved by false compassion, nature would restore its own balance, just as occurred on an island inhabited solely by goats and dogs. The struggle for survival selected the strongest, most vital elements, condemning the rest to their fate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the outset, the tendency to naturalize social conflict, and to present the wealth and power of the dominant classes as the expression of an immutable natural law (in this sense Burke referred to a &#039;&#039;‘natural&#039;&#039; aristocracy’ consecrated by ‘Nature’),[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] contained a social-Darwinist element &#039;&#039;avant la lettre&#039;&#039;. We are familiar with Franklin’s criticisms of doctors &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg214&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for their commitment to saving lives ‘not worth saving’. The ‘disease’ such people suffered from was the manifestation of divine anger at ‘Intemperance, Sloth, and other Vices’; and it was fitting that all this met with the ‘punishment’ provided for by nature and Providence.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] God’s higher design must not be hindered, especially if colonial populations were the target. This applied not only to the Indians. The terrible famine that decimated an Irish population already severely tried by the British colonizers’ plundering and oppression in the mid-nineteenth century seemed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan—charged by the London government with following the situation—to be the expression of ‘omniscient Providence’, which thereby solved the problem of overpopulation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the social-Darwinist element was accentuated as the popular classes, shaking off their traditional subalternity, intervened directly on the political scene to assert their rights. In the United States, following the abolition of slavery, paternalism rapidly gave way to an explicitly violent attitude towards blacks, subject to the terror that threatened anyone who dared to challenge white supremacy. Something similar occurred in Europe. Large sections of the dominant class reacted to the new situation achieved by the struggle for recognition by brandishing the law of natural selection, which condemned the unfit to an early death.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most conservative sections of the liberal movement responded to the demand for economic and social rights with a radical, uncompromising liberalism. The state must not in any way interfere with the kind of divine judgement, or struggle for existence, to which Spencer had referred before Darwin. The English political and economic liberal condemned any state interference in the economy with the argument that one should not frustrate that cosmic law which required the elimination of the unfit and life’s failures: ‘the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better’. All men were as if subject to a divine judgment: ‘If they are sufficiently complete to live, they &#039;&#039;do&#039;&#039; live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was necessary to respect ‘that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg215&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Distancing himself from attempts to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the popular classes, Lecky observed that, in reality, ‘in not a few cases’, infant mortality was ‘a blessing in disguise’. Indeed,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Sanitary reform is not wholly a good thing when it enables the diseased and feeble members of the community, who in another stage of society would have died in infancy, to grow up and become parent stocks, transmitting a weakened type or the taint of hereditary disease.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing thus, Lecky aligned himself with eugenics, the new ‘science’ that had made its appearance in England and met with extraordinary success in the United States, where between 1907 and 1915 as many as thirteen states passed legislation for compulsory sterilization. According to the legislation of Indiana (the first state to move in this direction), subject to it were ‘habitual delinquents, idiots, imbeciles and rapists’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like eugenics, Spencer celebrated his greatest triumph in the transatlantic republic.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here William G. Sumner, often regarded as a kind of US Spencer, warned people not to forget the ‘struggle for existence’, as ‘poets and sentimentalists’ liked to.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Socialism’s mistake primarily consisted in its claim ‘to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of “the state”‘.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Anti-statism and Social Darwinism went hand in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Germany Heinrich von Treitschke drew attention to the example of the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us examine the most delectable common people in the world, that of New York. It is a set of rejects who have merged from all over the whole earth. Yet left to themselves, these corrupted elements are compelled to control themselves. Do you think there is a Prussian police capable of keeping them at bay in the same way that they are held at bay by the harsh law of necessity? All are well aware: nobody takes any notice if someone dies of hunger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg216&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Still in Germany, in August L. von Rochau’s view the United States had the merit of applying the principle that every individual must, in the first instance, know how to help himself, unlike revolutionary, centralist France, which delegated care of individual well-being to the state, transforming the latter into a ‘hospital’ for ‘sickly, deformed people’ (&#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039;). The country across the Atlantic also asserted its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in its foreign policy, taking territory after territory from Mexico or the Indians, the latter a people now doomed to an ‘unstoppable decline’, and thus the equivalent on the international plane of the &#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039; who demanded state aid.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It makes no sense to seek to exclude Treitschke and Rochau from the liberal tradition by looking forward to the Third Reich and presupposing a variety of infernal negative teleology at work in Germany. In reality, both authors, especially the first, viewed England and the United States with sympathy and admiration and, echoing a theme widely diffused in the liberal culture of the time, unstintingly denounced the statist and anti-individualist tradition that revolutionary, socialist and Bonapartist France had inherited from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. In particular, the presence in Treitschke of the influence of Constant and de Tocqueville is immediately obvious. One thinks of his condemnation of the ‘deification of the state’ and the subsequent expansion of the political sphere. From ‘semi-ancient concepts’ and ‘Rousseau’s enthusiasm for the civic sense of the ancients’ derived the ‘omnipotent state power’ constructed by the Jacobins, who were likewise oblivious of the cost of the unanimous participation of citizens in political life: ‘the civic splendour of Athens rested on a vast foundation of slavery’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This inability to understand modern liberty led to tragedy: from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to the revolution, from Napoleon I to Napoleon III, ‘under all the regimes, the state’s excessive activity has remained the hereditary disease of France’, whose ideal was ‘the state’s providential omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can understand why social Darwinism established itself above all in Britain, the United States and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, these were three countries on the crest of a wave of economic development and international influence and prestige. If the first two were able to boast powerful expansion overseas or continentally, the third was already engaged in a frenetic scramble for colonies. We shall see that all three regarded themselves &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg217&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as members of a single family or race which, setting out from Germany, had first crossed the Channel and then the Atlantic. And all three tended to regard Latins (not to mention colonial peoples) as failures, and to attribute their own success to the action of natural selection, which rewarded the best within any individual state, but especially at an international level.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn1a|1]] L’Ouverture, quoted in Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn2a|2]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn3a|3]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 229, 400.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 230–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn5a|5]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, pp. 154, 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn6a|6]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Étienne Dumont, Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1840, vol. 1, pp. 509–21. The text quoted here was subsequently reprinted with alterations in Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 2, pp. 491ff.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn7a|7]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 524–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn8a|8]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 104–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn9a|9]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 63–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn10a|10]] Randolph, quoted in ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 568–9, 464.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn12a|12]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn13a|13]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn15a|15]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 165.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn16a|16]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn17a|17]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn19a|19]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn20a|20]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn21a|21]] Ibid., p. 24. On Townsend, cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 800–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn22a|22]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn23a|23]] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, vol. 3, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn24a|24]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 10, pp. 352–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn25a|25]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn26a|26]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn27a|27]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn28a|28]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, pp. 291–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn29a|29]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 3, pt 2, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn31a|31]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn32a|32]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 80–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn33a|33]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 2, p. 727.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn40a|40]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 404.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 750 (speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 27 January 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 92–4, 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 221, 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 2, p. 152 n. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn45a|45]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 241 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 283 (letter to L. von Thun, 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn48a|48]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 309; Étienne Dumont, Introduction to Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn49a|49]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn50a|50]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 240 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn53a|53]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 284.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 101, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn56a|56]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 179–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 November 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 182 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, pp. 155, 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn65a|65]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 79–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §1; ch. 7, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn68a|68]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn69a|69]] Barnarve, quoted in François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, p. 168.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn70a|70]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 316–17, 318–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn71a|71]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;General History of Civilisation in Europe&#039;&#039;, Oxford and London: D. A. Talboys, 1837, pp. 13–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn72a|72]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 12, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 544.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn74a|74]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1 (letter to H. Reeve, 3 February 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn80a|80]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 165, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn81a|81]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 20, p. 350.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn82a|82]] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, &#039;&#039;La giustizia nella rivoluzione e nella Chiesa&#039;&#039;, ed. Mario Albertini, Turin: UTET, 1968, p. 408.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn83a|83]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, p. 334.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn85a|85]] Bentham, quoted in Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn86a|86]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn87a|87]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn88a|88]] Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 85 n. (this is an assertion which, with some variations, can be found in Dupont de Nemours as well as Robespierre).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn89a|89]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn90a|90]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 33, §1 (for Nietzsche); Alain Laurent, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’individualismo&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, p. 66 (for Wilde’s &#039;&#039;The Soul of Man under Socialism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn91a|91]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn92a|92]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn93a|93]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 269, 306–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 121.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn95a|95]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 242 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 3 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn97a|97]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn98a|98]] Palmerston, quoted in Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston&#039;&#039;, ed. Lester Hutchinson, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn99a|99]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 309–28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn100a|100]] Ibid., p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn101a|101]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 197–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn102a|102]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, p. 218; vol. 2, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn103a|103]] Vilfredo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et ideologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1999, pp. 14, 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn104a|104]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 3, pp. 554–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 61, 70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn106a|106]] Wolfgang Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’ und die politische und soziale Revolution in Frankreich und England&#039;&#039;, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, pp. 74, 80–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn107a|107]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 214, 217, 220.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn108a|108]] Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’&#039;&#039;, p. 78.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn109a|109]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn110a|110]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, p. 259 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn111a|111]] Francis Lieber, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty’, &#039;&#039;New Individualist Review&#039;&#039;, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 718–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn112a|112]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 173; Robespierre &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 501–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn113a|113]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 51, 326; on his relations with Berthold Georg Niebuhr, cf. Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Erinnerungen aus meinem Zusammenleben mit Georg Berthold Niebuhr&#039;&#039;, trans. Karl Thibaut, Heidelberg: Winter, 1837.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 337 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 16 May 1858).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 292.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn117a|117]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn118a|118]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., p. 664.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., p. 687.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn121a|121]] Ibid., p. 530.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn122a|122]] The text of the Le Chapelier law is quoted in Jean-Pierre Potier, ‘L’Assemblé constituante et la question de la liberté du travail’, in Jean-Michel Servet, &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn123a|123]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn124a|124]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 31, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn125a|125]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn126a|126]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 512–13, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn127a|127]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn128a|128]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. 25–6, 310.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn129a|129]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 144; Smith, &#039;&#039;Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn130a|130]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn131a|131]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 146; Hayek, &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn133a|133]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 318; Valerie Jean Conner, &#039;&#039;The National War Labor Board&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134a|134]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 36–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135a|135]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136a|136]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 803 (letter to J. Fothergill, 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137a|137]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 5, §10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138a|138]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;Social Statics&#039;&#039;, New York: Appleton, 1877, pp. 414–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 32–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140a|140]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141a|141]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142a|142]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism in American Thought&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. 18–36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143a|143]] William Graham Sumner, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 187, 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144a|144]] Sumner, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145a|145]] Heinrich von Treitschke, &#039;&#039;Politik&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, vol. 2, p. 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146a|146]] Augus Ludwig von Rochau, &#039;&#039;Grundsätze der Realpolitik&#039;&#039;, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 150, 186, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147a|147]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886, pp. 9–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148a|148]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SEVEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg219&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Self-government by white communities and deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Asserting the principle of consent by the governed as a condition of the legitimacy of political power, liberalism galvanized national independence movements. This initially occurred with the American Revolution. And it immediately offered an example. Some years later, it was the French colonists of San Domingo, determined to defend their property in slaves against interference from central power, who entertained projects of independence or adhesion to the North American Union. However, the colonists’ agitation had an utterly unanticipated consequence, in the emergence on the American continent of a new independent state ruled by blacks and which was the first to abolish the institution of slavery. But San Domingo–Haiti was the exception—and an exception that filled the liberal world in its entirety with horror and scandal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The outcome of the war of independence against Spain also induced perplexity and unease. It was crowned with success thanks to the aid of the ex-slaves of San Domingo and, albeit amid bitter conflicts, witnessed the emergence of a new identity stamped by a restoration of pre-Columbian ancestry and a mixing of races. Giving vent to a widespread sentiment, at the start of the Latin American revolution a senator from South Carolina (Robert Y. Hayne) scornfully referred to its leaders as ‘men of color’, who were ‘looking to Hayti … with feelings of the strongest confraternity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They admired the island which, in Jefferson’s view, could serve only as a dumping ground where blacks could &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg220&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be deported and deposited. For the purposes of that operation—i.e. ‘the definitive disappearance of the black race from our borders’—John O’Sullivan, the theorist of ‘manifest destiny’, thought above all of the Latin American continent: ‘The Spanish-Indian-American population of Mexico, Central America and South America, afford the only receptacle capable of absorbing that race … [They are] themselves already of mixed and confused blood’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of Elam Lynds, ‘father of the prison system’ then in force and a prominent US figure, ‘whose practical talents are universally acknowledged’ (the characterization is de Tocqueville’s) ‘the Spanish of South America’ formed ‘a race closer to the ferocious beast and the savage than civilized man’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The category traditionally employed to define Indians was now also applied to the populations that had committed the error of mixing with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While white colonists in the British Commonwealth saw their right to self-government recognized, the Latin American peoples, excluded from the white community and the community of the free strictly defined, became part of the colonial world. This explains the Monroe Doctrine. Reinterpreted and radicalized in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, it conferred an ‘international police power’ on ‘civilized society’ in general, and the United States in particular, in relation to Latin America.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The white colonists of the British Empire encountered no serious difficulty achieving recognition. Having learnt the lesson implicit in the American Revolution, the London government decided to pursue the policy of ‘conciliation’ formerly suggested by Burke in its relationship with peoples ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. Thus, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa first achieved significant autonomy inside the Commonwealth and subsequently attained complete independence. It was a well-founded principle (observed John Stuart Mill in 1861) that, at least in domestic policy, the ‘colonies of European race’ were fully entitled to self-government.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, self-government by the colonists could entail a drastic deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, now subject to the exclusive, unhampered control of their direct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg221&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;oppressors. We are familiar with Smith’s observation about the catastrophic consequences that ‘free’ representative bodies monopolized or controlled by slave-owners could have for black slaves. Several decades later, in 1841, James Stephen, one of the actors in the struggle that had led to the abolition of slavery in British colonies, declared himself in favour of their firm control by the Crown: ‘popular franchises in the hands of a great body of owners of slaves were the worst instruments of tyranny which were ever yet forged for the oppression of mankind’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pertinence of this warning was tragically confirmed by subsequent developments. In 1864, referring to New Zealand, which for some years had been able to count on ‘responsible government’—that is, ultimately, self-government by the white community&#039;&#039;—The Times&#039;&#039; observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lost all imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Australia the extermination of the Aborigines had already begun some time earlier. But in this case too it was the de facto self-government which the colonists succeeded in exercising that pressed on the accelerator, whereas expressing concern in 1830 about the ‘indelible stain’ being imprinted ‘upon the character of the British Government’ was the Colonial Secretary.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, according to the observation made at the start of the twentieth century by an English liberal whose position was highly anomalous—namely, John Hobson—what was occurring was a kind of ‘private slaughter’, carried out by colonists who had wrested self-government or substantial freedom of action.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of South Africa, once the government had defeated the Boer settlers and subjected them to the Empire, it reassured them: ‘Your fate is in your own hands … the good sense of the British people will never tolerate any intermeddling in the purely domestic concerns of the people to whom it has conceded the fullest liberties of government.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Self-government by white &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg222&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;settlers involved the emergence of a racial state, which segregated blacks in a semi-servile condition and remained in place for almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Significantly, this regime took the South of the United States as its model.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There, following a brief interlude (so-called Reconstruction) immediately after the Civil War, when African Americans were genuinely able to enjoy civil and political rights, the reconciliation between the former enemies in 1877 reestablished in the southern states the self-government of whites, who subjected the recently emancipated slaves to a terroristic dictatorship based on the principle of white supremacy. As in South Africa with the compromise between the British and the Boers, in the United States the compromise between central government and the dominant class in the South, which re-acquired the right to self-government, paved the way for the reassertion of ‘master-race democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The abolition of slavery and the development of servile labour&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a question suggests itself. The military defeat of the South was clear and irreversible, but had the principle of the racial delimitation of the community of the free really been overcome? Scorning abolitionism, Calhoun summarized the change that had occurred in Britain’s colonies following the desired emancipation: blacks were ‘forced to labor, not by the authority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This statement dates from 1837. Laws against vagrancy forced the former slaves to work as ‘apprentices’. In what conditions? A year prior to the intervention of the theorist of the slaveholding South, a representative of the British colonial administration, inspired by evangelical sentiments, had observed in a letter to the governor of the island of Mauritius:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than that of slavery itself.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg223&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville would later observe that ‘having nominally abolished slavery, the British have reintroduced it under the rubric of apprenticeship for a certain period of time’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the apprenticeship only lasted a few years, even if much time had to pass before the ex-slaves could shake off the negative discriminations of every kind they continued to suffer. In any event, even before the abolition of slavery in its colonies, Britain was concerned to replace the blacks, importing indentured servants from Africa and Asia. Here we see at work Indian and Chinese coolies in particular. On their arrival in the British colonies, they were settled in the accommodation reserved for slaves. It is true that this involved indentured servants, but in fact many of them did not survive until the expiry of their contract. Even the sexual exploitation of women was not lacking. In the popular art of the time, the coolie was represented in chains, exactly like a slave. Obviously, there was no longer a hereditary transmission of the servile condition; in a sense, there was not even any need for it. British ships could continue to transport coolies from Asia in a voyage that resembled the classic slave trade. Conditions were harsh and the mortality rate high.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the losses could rapidly be made up. A distinguished American historian of the institution of slavery has offered a summary of the golden age of liberalism that is worth quoting:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, as in 1760, non-European compulsory labor was still the labor of choice for rational capitalists who chose to cultivate the vast undeveloped parts of the tropics … The 20 millions who left India alone, mostly as indentured servants, between the 1830s and the 1910s, amounted to twice the number of Africans forcibly landed in the Americas during the four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain in 1840 a political figure of the first importance—Lord John Russell—expressed his unease at the advent of a ‘new system of slavery’. Initially, it met with resistance from the abolitionist movement, which was still fairly strong. However, as a result of the already noted weakness of abolitionism inspired by Christianity, demands for the import from Africa and Asia of indentured servants, who in reality were a more or less compulsory labour force, soon got the upper hand.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg224&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;As well as in British colonies, this new servile labour force also made its appearance in the United States. Around 10,000 coolies imported from China were engaged in building inaccessible railroads, intended to consolidate the conquest of the Far West.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As Engels put it, this was an attempt to replace black slavery with the ‘disguised slavery of Indian and Chinese coolies’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was this confirmation of the thesis maintained by Calhoun of the inseparability of work and slavery? In North America, prior to being overshadowed and then definitively supplanted by more profitable black slavery, Indian slavery had long persisted here and there, even after the Glorious Revolution. In 1767 Sharp, the abolitionist we have already encountered, felt obliged to denounce it. In the case of Virginia it was only in 1808 that the Supreme Court definitively pronounced its illegality.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the American Revolution onwards, the indentured servant or temporary white slave was completely replaced by the black slave, who in turn, after the end of the Civil War, gave way to the coolie from China or India—another temporary slave, even if the skin colour was now yellow. In 1834, the same year as the abolition of slavery in British colonies, the liberal Wakefield acknowledged that ‘yellow slaves’ were beginning to take the place of ‘blacks’, just as the latter had taken over from ‘red’ (Indian) slaves.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, ‘red’ slavery or semi-slavery would have a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century in Texas and California, taken from Mexico (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|§2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, it can reasonably be objected to Calhoun that semi-slavery or slavery for a specified period of time is not the same thing as perpetual and hereditary slavery. But let us note the further development of the argument by the theorist of the slaveholding South. In any ‘wealthy and civilized society’, part of the population ‘live[s] on the labor of the other’. This was a manifestly conflictual relationship: the best way of regulating it was achieved when ‘the labor of the African race is, [as] among us, commanded by the European’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The expansion of Europe in the colonies and the diffusion of ‘master-race democracy’ in Europe&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg225&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Not even Mill had any doubts about the dominion the ‘European race’ was called upon to exercise over the rest of the world. Certainly, he declared for recognition of the right of self-government by the ‘colonies of European race’. But only for them. As for the rest,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear: freedom applied ‘only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’ and could not be demanded by minors or ‘those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No different was the position of Lecky, who at the start of the twentieth century celebrated the glory of the United Kingdom thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing in the history of the world is more wonderful than that under the flag of these two little islands there should have grown up the greatest and most beneficent despotism in the world, comprising nearly two hundred and thirty millions of inhabitants under direct British rule, and more than fifty millions under British protectorates …[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘despotism’ theorized here was certainly synonymous with slavery from the standpoint of Locke and the protagonists of the American Revolution, all the more so in that it seemed to know no limits. In Mill’s view, ‘a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Political ‘slavery’ could not be equated with slavery in the strict sense. Yet Mill went further. He demanded the barbarians’ ‘obedience’ for the purposes of their education for ‘continuous &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg226&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;labour’, which was the foundation of civilization. And, in this context, he did not hesitate to theorize a transitional phase of ‘slavery’ for ‘uncivilized races’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The point was forcefully reiterated: there were ‘savage tribes so averse from regular industry, that industrial life is scarcely able to introduce itself among them until they are … conquered and made slaves of’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the slave had no cause for complaint; he was ‘one step in advance of a savage’, and thanks to the conditions imposed on him had already achieved a certain progress. We are put in mind of Calhoun and the slaveholding South, all the more so when Mill refers to &#039;&#039;‘born&#039;&#039; slaves’ recalcitrant to work and discipline.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, despite his employment of the expression just noted, the English liberal envisaged a temporary slavery. This would in fact seem to hang over ‘the great majority of the human race’, which unfortunately was ‘in a savage or semi-savage state’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the condition dictating slavery. While, on the one hand, Mill sided decisively with the Union during the Civil War, on the other, he legitimized the practice of forced labour imposed by colonial powers on subject populations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the coin of this opposition between civilized, adult England and savage races of minors was the process whereby the barrier separating servants from masters in the metropolis tended to lose its caste rigidity. The attitude adopted in the mid-nineteenth century by Disraeli, champion of the colonial expansion of ‘superior’ races and major theorist of race as the ‘key to history’ (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|§10]]), was significant. He denied that it was possible to speak of the existence in England of ‘two nations’—‘the rich and the poor’—as the Chartists claimed. On the basis of his assertion of the unity that now characterized the ‘privileged, prosperous English people’, Disraeli promoted the Second Reform Act, which extended political rights to significant sections of the popular masses.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Class differences within the white community remained, but were being reduced even at a social level. The exploitation of Chinese coolies and other more or less servile labour forces created the possibility of ‘raising to the position of “independent gentlemen”‘, if not ‘whole white populations of the West’, as Hobson maintained,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] then at least a significant proportion of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg227&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The decisive barrier now lay elsewhere. The three ‘castes’ had become two—in the United States thanks to the abolition of slavery, and in Europe thanks to the reduction of differences within the white community, which was tending to develop more egalitarian internal relations than in the past, similar to those of the white community across the Atlantic. In this sense, ‘master-race democracy’ now characterized the overall relations between the West and the colonial world, whether internal or external.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Hobson could denounce the extreme expansion of ‘the area of British despotism’. The London government resorted to ‘distinctively autocratic methods’ in its relations with an enormous number of human beings:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the three hundred and sixty-seven millions of British subjects outside these isles, not more than eleven millions, or one in thirty-four, have any real self-government for purposes of legislation and administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political freedom, and civil freedom, so far as it rests upon the other, are simply non-existent for the overwhelming majority of British subjects.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Essentially, this was the same analysis as Mill’s (and Lecky’s), with the difference that ‘despotism’ now had a negative connotation. Suffering it (stressed Hobson) were populations coerced into forced labour. And here too we have a convergence with Mill as regards factual analysis, but a sharp contrast when it comes to value judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. De Tocqueville, Western supremacy and the danger of ‘miscegenation’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The model of ‘master-race democracy’ also had a clear influence on de Tocqueville. It is true that during the July Monarchy he stood for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. But how were the ex-slaves to be treated once they had been emancipated? It was necessary ‘to prevent the negroes of our colonies imitating those of the English colonies and, like them, abandoning the major industries to retire to a piece of fertile soil, which has been bought cheaply or grabbed’. Hence emancipated slaves could be permitted to choose their ‘master’, but not to ‘remain idle or to work exclusively for themselves’. That could not be tolerated:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg228&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In temporarily banning negroes from owning land, what are we doing? We are artificially placing them in the position in which the European labourer naturally finds himself. This is certainly not tyranny and the man this obstacle is imposed on when he escapes slavery would not seem to have any right to complain.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the measure suggested here was the one historically implemented in the colonies, making it possible to transform slavery proper into a semi-servile labour relationship. In any event, in addition to their political rights, notionally emancipated blacks were thus also deprived of civil rights, by its ‘artificially’ being made impossible for them to own a piece of land and freely choose their occupation. While he condemned legal regulation of working hours as ‘despotism’, de Tocqueville had nothing against the creation from above of a caste of wage-labour denied any possibility of social mobility. When he referred to workers from India or other parts of the world, called on by England to replace the emancipated black slaves, the French liberal also made indirect mention of the coolies.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, however, he ventured no critical remarks about a labour relationship construed even by influential representatives of the liberal world as a recreation of the institution of slavery in a different form. As in Mill, so in Tocqueville, the supremacy pertaining to Europeans was not only political, but also had direct consequences economically and socially. In any event, the gulf separating dominant and dominated was unbridgeable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European race has received from heaven, or acquired by its own efforts, such incontestable superiority over the other races which compose the great human family that the man placed by us, on account of his vices and ignorance, on the bottom rung of the social scale is still first among the savages.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was fitting that such colossally different races continued to remain clearly distinct. De Tocqueville referred with horror to the behaviour of some prisoners deported to Australia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The condemned have fled in large numbers into the woods. There they have formed companies of looters; they have allied with the savages, married their children and partially adopted their customs. Out of this crossbreeding, a race of half-castes has been born that is more barbarous than the Europeans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg229&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but more civilized than the savages, and whose hostility has constantly disturbed the colony and sometimes caused it to run the greatest dangers. [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This denunciation of miscegenation, which imperilled European or white supremacy, is a theme that takes us back to the United States and, above all, to the ideology that continued to inspire the South even after the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The ‘empty cradle’ and the ‘destiny’ of the Indians&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others ‘master-race democracy’, which was now on the point of becoming established on a planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. Leading the Union’s war against the secessionist states and promoting the abolition of slavery was a figure (Lincoln) who, like Jefferson before him, toyed with the idea of deporting the blacks to Africa or Latin America, and who was a veteran of the wars against the Indians, against ‘men, women, and children … mercilessly cut to pieces’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1871 General Francis C. Walker, commissioner for Indian affairs, proposed to treat ‘wild men’ no differently from ‘wild beasts’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison we have already encountered in Washington, and which presided over the substantial erasure of the Indians (and the natives of Australia and New Zealand) from the face of the earth, thus makes its reappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A genealogical myth derived from the Old Testament was called upon to legitimize these genocidal practices. A major modern historian, Arnold Toynbee, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated. Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent … [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg230&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This genealogical myth, which presided over the expropriation, deportation and decimation of the Irish and the Indians, was explicitly present in Lieber: ‘[God] has given [this great country] to us, as much as He gave Palestine to the Jews’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention was made of the Indians, even if they seem to be implicitly compared to the populations that occupied the Promised Land without authorization prior to the arrival of the chosen people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; seems to support this deadly genealogical myth. De Tocqueville underlined the religious fervour of New England’s founders, who regarded themselves as descendants from ‘Abraham’s stock’. In the writings and documents left behind by them, one sensed ‘the very savor of Gospel antiquity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was an aroma that in a way ended up turning the head of the French liberal himself. He uncritically adopted and subscribed to the description Nathaniel Morton, one of the colony’s founders and first leaders, gave of the Pilgrim Fathers’ arrival in America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men? [A]nd what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not … the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, as in the Old Testament description of the unauthorized inhabitants of Canaan, those destined to be subjugated or wiped out by the chosen people—or, as de Tocqueville characterized it, ‘the germ of a great nation wafted by Providence to a predestined shore’—are completely confounded with nature.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This providential design is all the more clear because, ultimately, it involved a desert. It is a theme &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; returns to repeatedly: the Indian ‘has nothing to oppose to our perfection in the arts but the resources of the wilderness’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One phrase is especially significant: ‘the Indians were the sole inhabitants of the wilds whence they have since been expelled’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The desert ceased to be such, becoming a place inhabited by humans, only with the entry of the Europeans and the flight or deportation of the indigenous population. As we know, Locke and Montesquieu preferred to speak of ‘virgin &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg231&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;forests’. But even though the two metaphors are different, their meaning is identical: we are dealing with places where there is no human trace, an area that is (as Locke put it) ‘vacant’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When subsequently forced to register the presence of the Indians, de Tocqueville hastened to stress that they had no right to the land occupied by them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the vast country that I have been describing was inhabited by many indigenous tribes, it may justly be said, at the time of its discovery by Europeans, to have formed one great desert. The Indians occupied without possessing it. It is by agricultural labor that man appropriates the soil, and the early inhabitants of North America lived by the produce of the chase.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For Locke already, the sole possible foundation of property right was labour, of which a people dedicated exclusively to hunting were incapable. But an explicitly theological justification was added by de Tocqueville to seal the fate of the Indians:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; those wide and deep rivers; that inexhaustible valley of the Mississippi; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, de Tocqueville ended up legitimizing the policy of deportation implemented by Jackson, president of the transatlantic republic when the French liberal visited it. The argument of the ‘empty cradle’ was widespread in the US culture of the time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a ‘freethinker’ aligned with the liberals and a writer and intellectual who enjoyed undisputed prestige in Boston,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] had no doubts in interpreting God’s will. Only pending the arrival of a superior stock had the Indians been placed on American soil. Thereafter &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg232&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they were clearly marked out for ‘destruction’ or ‘extermination’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Franklin had not argued very differently, when he attributed to a providential design the devastating effect of alcohol on a population destined to be wiped off the face of the earth (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was more pained. He did not shut his eyes to the horrors that were occurring. Yet, however distressing, the tragedy of the Indians expressed both the progress of civilization and a providential design. In any event, it was ineluctable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their implacable prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction. The ruin of these tribes began from the day when Europeans landed on their shores; it has proceeded ever since, and we are now witnessing its completion.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
True, de Tocqueville expressed unease at the ‘cold egotism’, ‘utter insensitivity’ and ‘ruthless sentiment’ with which the white population of the United States, so attached to its morality and Christianity, viewed the fate of the Indians. Yet the French liberal’s description of the ‘savages’, more than ever recalcitrant to ‘civilization’, certainly did not conduce to the cause of their salvation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a general rule, their mouth was disproportionately large and their facial expression ignoble and wicked … Their physiognomy exhibited that deep depravity which can only derive from a long abuse of civilization, and yet they were still savages. Mixed with the vices they have adopted from us is something barbaric and uncivilized, making them a hundred times more repugnant … Their movements were rapid and uncoordinated, their voice shrill and tuneless, their glance worried and savage. On first contact, one would be tempted to regard them as nothing but a beast of the forest on which education has been able to confer a semblance of humanity, but which has nevertheless remained an animal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We can now understand the question de Tocqueville posed to his US interlocutors: ‘Do the Indians have an idea that sooner or later their race will be destroyed by ours?’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg233&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The Indians’ deportation and decimation made explicit the fact that the North American territory was an ‘empty cradle’, awaiting the white settler committed from the time of his arrival to ‘struggl[ing] against the obstacles that nature opposes to him’, against ‘the wilderness and savage life’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, what ends up emerging is the process of de-humanization of the natives, reduced, even more than to barbarism, to inanimate nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. De Tocqueville, Algeria and ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In de Tocqueville the American model asserted itself with particular clarity when he confronted the problem of Algeria. The letter sent to Francis Lieber on 22 July 1846 is revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time I am very concerned about our affairs in Africa, which assume greater importance with every passing day. For us &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; has become, and will remain, the secondary aspect as long we do not have quarrels in Europe. The principal aspect today is colonization, is how to attract a major &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; population of cultivators to Algeria and, above all, keep them there. We already have 100,000 &#039;&#039;Christians&#039;&#039; in Africa, not counting the army. But they have almost all settled in the towns, which are becoming large, beautiful cities, while the countryside remains a &#039;&#039;desert&#039;&#039;. It is impossible to consider colonization in Africa without thinking of the great examples furnished by the United States in this field. But how to study them? Have books or documents of any kind been published in the United States that can enlighten us on this point and tell us how things unfolded? Can this information be found in official or other kinds of reports? Anything you could provide in this connection would be received with great gratitude.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
I have highlighted four phrases in italics. Let us begin with the last of them. Like the lands inhabited or, rather, occupied without authorization by the Indians, Algeria was a desert prior to the arrival of the French or ‘Christians’. A sort of Biblical aroma begins to make itself felt in connection with the landing in North Africa of a civilized people, who likewise seem invested with a providential mission. It was a people at once European and Christian: the colonial war tended to assume a religious character. Certainly, expelling the Algerians &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg234&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from their ‘desert’ was an operation that met with fierce resistance, but de Tocqueville was careful in this instance not to speak of ‘war’. That was a category which could only be applied to armed conflicts in Europe and between civilized peoples. It somehow implied recognition of the enemy, which was something denied Arabs and Indians alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precisely because of this lack of recognition, the campaign of colonial conquest could resort to pitiless violence that did not spare the civilian population. On account of their brutal, indiscriminate character, the methods used to subjugate Algeria ended up eliciting reservations and disquiet in France. De Tocqueville was not among the ‘excellent philanthropists’ about whom Bugeaud, the general in charge of military operations,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ironized:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often heard in France men whom I respect, but do not support, consider it reprehensible that crops are burned, silos emptied, and lastly that unarmed men, women and children are seized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For me, this is a regrettable necessity, but one to which any people that wants to make war on the Arabs will have to submit.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
According to de Tocqueville, the head of military operations in Algeria had the merit of having understood all this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is the first who has known how to apply ubiquitously and simultaneously the kind of war which, in my view as in his, is the only kind of war that is feasible in Africa. He has pursued this system of war with incomparable energy and vigour.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This was a ‘new science’ that must be taken to heart.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In order to starve them, and confront them with the clear alternative of capitulation or death from starvation, Arabs who insisted on resisting must be deprived not only of their harvest, but also of the possibility of trading with neighbours: ‘They suffer greatly from being parked between our bayonets and the desert’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we are explicitly referred to the American model; this is how ‘the most barbaric Indian tribes’ were disciplined: ‘the tribe from which a robbery or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg235&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;murder has been committed’ was subjected to collective punishment, which excluded it from the trade with Europeans absolutely vital to it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the rebel Arabs must by all means be prevented from the possibility of combining or settling anywhere:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the passionate taste they display for a nomadic existence, they need settlements. It is of the utmost importance to prevent them being able to establish a single one. All expeditions whose aim is to occupy or destroy existing towns and emerging towns seem to me useful.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville had no hesitation in issuing a radical watchword:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To destroy anything that resembles a permanent gathering of population or, in other words, a town: I believe it is of the utmost importance not to allow any town to survive, or arise, in the regions controlled by Abd el-Kader [the leader of the resistance].[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the modality of the war. But what results was it intended to achieve? We know the model that inspired de Tocqueville. In May 1841, while visiting Philippeville, founded on land acquired at a derisory price from the indigenous inhabitants, he was pleased by the ‘American aspect of the city’, which was rapidly expanding.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expropriation and colonization were proceeding apace. Once the process had been completed, what kind of society should be built? What relations might be developed between the Arabs and the French? De Tocqueville was in no doubt:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fusion of these two peoples is a chimera that can be dreamt of only when one has not been on the spot. Hence it is possible and necessary that there be two clearly distinct sets of laws in Africa, because we are faced with two clearly separate societies. When one is dealing with Europeans, &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; nothing prevents us from treating them as if they were alone; the laws enacted for them must always be applied exclusively to them.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg236&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to scrupulous protection of the invaders’ civil liberties was a terroristic law of suspects directed at the indigenous population. During his visit to Philippeville, the French liberal was invited to lunch by a colonel in the occupying army, who painted an eloquent picture of the situation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir, only force and terror work with these people … The other day, a murder was committed in the street. An Arab was brought before me who was a suspect. I interrogated him and then had him beheaded. You will see his head on the gate of Constantine.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville seems to have betrayed no emotion. He repeated the idea of two sets of laws. As regards criminal trials of ‘natives’, ‘if it is thought that our forms are too slow (which I do not think), war tribunals could be set up for them’. And even for ‘civil trials’, the ‘emergency procedure’ already in force could be retained.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs must also be discriminated against economically, as well as legally: ‘Allow free entry into France of all produce from Algeria, especially that derived not from native industry but colonial industry’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only on these conditions would French settlers in North Africa genuinely be able to develop on the American model:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no easy thing to instil in Europeans the desire to abandon their country, because they are happy there and enjoy certain rights and certain goods that are dear to them. It is even more difficult to attract them to a country where from the outset they encounter a torrid, unhealthy climate and a formidable enemy, who incessantly hangs around you to take your property or your life. To get inhabitants to come to such a country, it is first of all necessary to give them great opportunities to make their fortune; in the second place, they must find social conditions that conform to their habits and tastes.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen de Tocqueville celebrate the unprecedented zone of liberty enjoyed by the individual in the United States (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]). But now something similar is to be found in the African space conquered by France: ‘The colonies of all the European peoples afford the same spectacle. Rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg237&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;than being smaller, the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the mother country. His freedom of action is less restricted’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, the other side of the coin was a drastic deterioration in the condition of the Arabs. De Tocqueville did not hide the fact: ‘We have decimated the population’ and the survivors were being exterminated by the starvation caused by the methods of war we have noted; ‘at this moment Abd el-Kader is &#039;&#039;literally&#039;&#039; dying of hunger’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It had to be admitted that ‘we have made Muslim society much more miserable, disorganised, ignorant and barbarous than it was before it knew us’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So what was to be done? The French liberal distanced himself from the attitude of not a few officers and soldiers of the French army: in their view, ‘the Arabs are like noxious beasts’ and ‘the death of each and every one of them seems a good thing’. No, ‘it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable to want to snuff out or exterminate the natives’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a second, de Tocqueville lets slip an admission: ‘At this time we are making war in much more barbarous fashion than the Arabs themselves. Currently, civilization is to be found on their side.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Immediately afterwards, however, we find the declaration we have already noted: there was no room for humanitarian scruples in a colonial war that directly targeted the civilian populations, who were denied means of subsistence and the possibility of combining. Or: ‘Once we have committed the major violence of the conquest, I believe we must not shrink from the minor forms of violence absolutely required to consolidate it.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the conquest had been completed, it was necessary to promote self-government by civil society (French and white). It was called on to free itself altogether of military control, which must continue to be deployed with the requisite firmness over the Arabs. The conflict across the Atlantic, which during the War of Independence against Britain and in subsequent decades saw local self-government reject any interference by central political power—be it in London or Washington—in the colonists’ expansion or slave-owners’ enjoyment of their legitimate property, also manifested itself in Algeria. On one side were the colonists, who demanded complete freedom of action and expropriation, and on the other the political and military authorities, called upon to administer a ruthless colonial conquest with a minimum of prudence. How &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg238&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;many colonists could Africa absorb and how far could the process of expropriation of the indigenous population be pushed? De Tocqueville criticized hesitations and doubts: ‘It is not correct to say that the introduction of European farmers is a measure whose implementation is impractical’, or feasible only to a limited extent. At issue was a territory over which ‘the indigenous population is fairly scarce or fairly dispersed’. In any event, ‘the common property of the tribe is not founded on any title’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The colonel encountered by de Tocqueville, who did not hesitate to have Arabs decapitated on the basis of mere suspicion, on the other hand expressed his contempt for the colonists, a ‘mass of scoundrels’ and ‘thieves’, for whom the army was nothing more than a tool for accumulating a ‘fortune’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The date is 30 May 1841. The previous year, Bugeaud had set out his policy to the Chamber of Deputies: ‘Wherever there is clean water and fertile soil, it is necessary to settle colonists, without worrying about whom the land belongs to. It must be distributed to them so that it is enjoyed as rightful property’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, in the previously cited article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039; on 25 December 1843, he observed that, although conducting the merciless war dictated by circumstances, his army demonstrated generosity towards the Arab who finally decided to surrender: ‘We return to him all his world and sometimes part of his herd’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This attitude seems to have prompted reservations in de Tocqueville, judging at any rate from his intervention in the Chamber in June 1846:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some localities, rather than reserving the most fertile land, the best irrigated and most adapted for government property for Europeans, we have given it to the natives … After betrayals and rebellions, the natives have often been received by us with singular magnanimity. There are some who, having indulged in soaking their hands in our blood, have had their goods, their honour and their power restored to them, thanks to our generosity. There is more. In many places where the civilized European population is mixed with the indigenous population, there are not unfounded complaints that in general it is the native who is better protected, while the European obtains justice with greater difficulty.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg239&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a letter from the same period, de Tocqueville even ended up ironizing about ‘the tenderness towards the Arabs that came over Monsieur Bugeaud at the point when he saw in it a powerful means of blocking the development of civilized colonization’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We seem to hear once again the laments and protests of the American colonists against the London government, or of the southern planters of the United States against the threat of interference by federal government. And, in fact, de Tocqueville elaborated on his indictment of the political and military authorities. At issue was not only the assignment of land:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lavished honorific distinctions on the Arab, which are intended to indicate the merit of our citizens … One is led to conclude that our government in Africa is taking softness towards the vanquished so far as to forget its conquering position … It is neither useful nor obligatory for us to permit exaggerated ideas of their own importance in our Muslim subjects, and not even to persuade them that we are obliged in any circumstances to treat them as if they were our co-citizens and equals. They know that we have a dominant position in Africa and they expect us to retain it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of human equality could not be extended to embrace ‘semi-civilized peoples’ located outside the West: it was absolutely vital to avoid occasioning ‘astonishment and confusion in their spirits, filling them with erroneous and dangerous ideas’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case was it permissible to lose sight of the objective of building a society based on the legally sanctioned domination of French, Christian and European colonists. The attainment of this objective was now close at hand: ‘The Arab element is ever more isolated and little by little is dissolving. The Muslim population is tending to decline relentlessly, while the Christian population is growing relentlessly’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed: ‘Our weapons have decimated some tribes … On the other hand, our cultivators willingly use native manpower. The European needs the Arab to make the most of his land; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high wage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville had not lost sight of the American model. The Algerians were part Indians, forced to suffer expropriation, and part blacks. In the latter guise, Arabs could not claim to enjoy the rights of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg240&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;citizenship either on a civil level or, still less, politically. Without being slaves, now deprived of land they could earn a living only by supplying ‘manpower’ to the new property-owners. The society hoped for here was not very different from the one that would be realized in the southern United States after the Civil War. In Algeria, French and Western supremacy took the place of ‘white supremacy’. For the rest, there continued to exist two sets of laws, separated by a racial barrier, and the prejudice, on a more or less accentuated racial basis, called upon to justify these relations. Already at the beginning of the conquest, writing to de Tocqueville, Kergolay (his cousin and a life-long friend) had spoken of the Arabs as an ‘infamous, despicable race’, to be kept under constant control ‘by force combined with simple, uncomplicated equity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The recipient of this letter seems not to have seen things very differently. After a notable interval of time, we find him using, in slightly different form, some of the expressions we have just noted: ‘semi-civilized peoples’ were only capable of understanding the discourse of ‘correct but strict justice’; hence France should beware of indulging in ‘magnanimity and leniency’—virtues that would be incomprehensible and, worse, might produce dangerous results.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, writing precisely to Kergolay, de Tocqueville denounced the ‘greed’ and ‘fanaticism’ of the Arabs,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who, by his own admission, were suffering the systematic expropriation carried out by occupying forces inclined to regard their enemies as ‘noxious beasts’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To complete this picture, it is appropriate to mention a final detail. There was a moment in 1833 when the French liberal thought of settling as a colonist in Algeria.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Identification with the regime of white or Western supremacy, or ‘master-race democracy’, seems to have been total.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn1a|1]] Hayne, quoted in Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn2a|2]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn3a|3]] Lynds, quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn4a|4]] Roosevelt, quoted in Jean-Pierre Martin and Daniel Royot, &#039;&#039;Histoire et civilisation des États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn5a|5]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn6a|6]] Stephen, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn7a|7]] Quoted in Henri Grimal, &#039;&#039;De l’Empire britannique au Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, Paris: Colin, 1999, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn8a|8]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 420.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn9a|9]] J. A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn10a|10]] Chamberlain, quoted in Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn12a|12]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lene, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn13a|13]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn14a|14]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 92, 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn15a|15]] Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 176–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn16a|16]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn17a|17]] Cf. Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. vii; Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn18a|18]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 246.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn19a|19]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 4, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn20a|20]] Almon Wheeler Lauber, &#039;&#039;Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States&#039;&#039;, Williamstown (MA): Corner House, 1979, pp. 306–7, 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn21a|21]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 473ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn22a|22]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn23a|23]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn24a|24]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn25a|25]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn28a|28]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn30a|30]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn31a|31]] Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., pp. 124, 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn33a|33]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 103, 105.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 271–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn37a|37]] Nevins and Commager, &#039;&#039;America&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn38a|38]] Walker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn39a|39]] A. J. Toynbee, &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 211–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn40a|40]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 317.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn41a|41]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 25, 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 335.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn45a|45]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 337.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn46a|46]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn47a|47]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn49a|49]] Vernon L. Parrington, &#039;&#039;Main Currents in American Thought&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn50a|50]] Thomas F. Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 243.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn51a|51]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn52a|52]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 73–6, 223–5; cf. pp. 343–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn53a|53]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 434.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54a|54]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (letter to Francis Lieber, 22 July 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55a|55]] In an article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039;, 25 December 1843: ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 226–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 316.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 280.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 323.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72a|72]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 226.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74a|74]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 304 (unpublished letter to C. L. L. J. de Lamorcière, 5 April 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 380–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77a|77]] Bugeaud, quoted in Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi and André Prenant, &#039;&#039;L’Algérie, passé et présent&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1960, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78a|78]] Bugeaud, quoted in Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80a|80]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 220 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2, 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84a|84]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 1, pp. 193, 199 (letters of 22 June and 8 July 1830).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86a|86]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87a|87]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 2, p. 86 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 23 May 1841).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88a|88]] Cf. Jean-Jacques Chevallier and André Jardin, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER EIGHT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg241&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Return to the question: What is liberalism? The well-born, the free and the liberals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having briefly reconstructed periods in the history of liberalism and the concrete politico-social relationships developed in its name, we must now return to our opening question. Use of the term ‘liberal’ is usually dated to the political struggles that developed in Spain in the wake of the 1812 revolution and the opposition that emerged between ‘liberals’, engaged in defending the constitution, and their opponents, whom they branded ‘servile’. Only now was the adjective transformed into a substantive. In fact, in revolutionary America the author of an article opposed to the institution of slavery had already signed himself ‘A Liberal’ (see [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|§10]]). But that is not the key point. When we come across a text from 1818 in which Constant sets out and supports the programme of the ‘liberal party’, it can be said that we are dealing with an adjective.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The political meaning of the term is clear; and implicit in it is the transition to the noun employed to define members of the party in question. On the other hand, there is not much difference between this stance in favour of the ‘liberal party’ and the stance in favour of the ‘liberal political system’ that we have seen make its appearance in a text by Washington as early as 1783. Hence the real problem is to identify the moment when, partly inheriting and partly transforming the meaning bequeathed by a long tradition, the term ‘liberal’ began to assume its modern political meaning. This was the precondition for the transition from the adjective to the substantive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg242&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a semantic event that cannot be uncoupled from the actual history of the liberal movement and liberal revolutions. We can start with the Glorious Revolution. Arguing against Robert Filmer, defender of the thesis that the Almighty had conferred exclusive ownership of, and dominion over, the earth to Adam, the first absolute monarch, Locke objected that God had bestowed his blessings ‘with a liberal hand’. The hypothetical absolute property-owner or monarch who, rather than displaying ‘liberal allowance’, sought to exploit the needy situation of all other men in order to reduce them to ‘hard service’ or even the condition of a ‘vassal’, would be acting no differently from the bandit who threatened a man with death in order to reduce him to ‘slavery’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, ‘liberal’ is synonymous with generous here. However, God’s liberal generosity is in contradiction with the political slavery that Filmer would like to impose on all men. The, as it were, constitutional and liberal God presupposed here refutes the claims of absolute monarchy. The vile, miserable condition of the ‘vassal’, of the individual subjected to ‘hard service’, of the servant or ‘slave’, was incompatible with the mode of being and feeling, in the first instance, of an Englishman and ‘gentleman’, who scornfully rejected the servile view that ‘we are all born slaves’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his turn, Hume on the one hand used the term ‘liberal’ synonymously with ‘disinterested’ and ‘generous’, and on the other criticized as ‘illiberal’ the popular agitation and plebeian riots that characterized the first English revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Smith distinguished in the moral field between the ‘liberal’ view peculiar to the well-off classes, restive at overly rigid bans on ‘luxury’ and the other pleasures of life, and the ‘strict or austere’ view peculiar to poorer classes, who by force of circumstance could not indulge in ‘thoughtlessness and dissipation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the context of the ‘liberal’/‘servile’ opposition that was crystallizing, the ‘liberal’ attitude was defined by antithesis either to the absolute power of the monarch or the servile or even merely plebeian condition. The liberal/illiberal dichotomy referred to a difference and conflict between two world-views, but also between two social conditions. In the course of the American Revolution, adopting a position in favour of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Burke deplored the restrictions on individual liberty introduced in Britain on account of the war, and regretted the fact that ‘the liberal government of this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg243&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and vassals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the liberal profession of faith criticized the unwarranted expansion of the Crown’s power, on the one hand, and distanced itself from the subaltern classes, subjected to work and hence servile, on the other. We can now understand the British Whig’s scorn for those who, in the name of a so-called ‘indiscriminate’ freedom, wished to appeal to the servile hands of slaves or emancipated slaves to suppress the revolt of colonists who, precisely as slaveowners, nurtured with particular sincerity the love of liberty that must dwell in any non-servile soul. And we can also understand why as early as 1790, on account of the restructuring of the nobility’s political influence, the ‘liberty’ of the French seemed to the British statesman to be contaminated with ‘coarseness and vulgarity’: it ‘is not liberal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Opposed to anything vulgar and plebeian, ‘liberal’ tended to be synonymous with aristocratic. In fact, among Virginia’s slave-owners the ‘aristocratic spirit’ was intimately bound up with ‘a spirit of liberty’ distinguished by its ‘more noble and liberal’ character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While paying homage to the ‘liberal government of this free nation’, Burke declared himself a member of the ‘aristocratick Party’—the party ‘connected with the solid, permanent long possessed property of the Country’—and felt committed to fighting with all his energy for ‘aristocratick principles, and the aristocratick Interests connected with them’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the American Revolution, along with the celebration of the ‘liberal political system’ we have already noted, we find in Washington a celebration of patrons of the ‘liberal arts’, contrasted with ‘mechanics’, with immigrants of a modest social condition from Europe.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But particularly illuminating is the discourse of John Adams. For a well-ordered liberty to be achieved, it could not be ‘mechanics’ and the ‘common people’, ‘without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences’, who exercised power. Instead, it must be those who had ‘received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences’; and they were the ‘well-born and wealthy’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg244&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In France, too, the liberal party, which was in the process of being formed, defined itself during the polemic against the absolute monarchy but also, and possibly above all, against the popular masses and their vulgarity. Attention was turned to the Third Estate, to those circles where ‘a sort of affluence allows men to receive a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was Sieyès, who subsequently played an important role on the occasion of the 18th Brumaire in 1799. Sealing the coup d’état was the ‘proclamation of general-in-chief Bonaparte’, who announced the ‘disbandment of factions’—i.e. of popular and plebeian agitation—and the triumph of ‘conservative, tutelary, liberal ideas’ (&#039;&#039;idées conservatrices, tutélaires, libérales&#039;&#039;). This language was not the invention of a general, however brilliant: he enjoyed the support of the liberal circles of the time. The adjectival usage just noted refers to them. Constant, who later (as we know) declared himself a member of the ‘liberal party’, had already been recommended by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1797 as a man ‘passionate about liberty’ and as an ‘unshakeable, liberal republican’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The following year, Constant had underlined the Directory’s merit in having ‘proclaimed its unshakeable attachment to the conservative system’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, shortly after the coup d’état, he paid homage to ‘France’s tutelary genius which, from 9 Thermidor, has rescued it from so many dangers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ in Burke, ‘liberal’ was now synonymous with ‘conservative’ (and tutelary). For Constant (as for Madame de Staël), the cause of liberalism found expression in ‘respectable people’ (&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;),[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or (as Necker made clear in a letter to his daughter) well-off, ‘decent people’ (&#039;&#039;gens de bien:&#039;&#039; see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in England and America, so too in France it was the property-owning classes, proud of their non-servile condition and spirit, who tended to define themselves as liberals. This is further confirmed, even after the mid-nineteenth century, by de Tocqueville’s stance. Those genuinely capable of defending the cause of liberty against Louis Bonaparte’s ‘illiberal’ government were not ‘the people strictly speaking, with their incomplete education’, but the ‘property-owners’, the ‘bourgeoisie’, the ‘men of culture’—‘in a word, all those who have received a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg245&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Under the spur also of popular struggles, the liberal/servile dichotomy gradually tended to lose its class connotation and came to refer exclusively to political ideologies. But at moments of acute struggle the original meaning re-emerged with all its discriminatory charge. For de Tocqueville, as we shall see, anyone who wanted to endow the ideal of liberty with a social content was ‘made for serving’!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bitter conflicts could, and did, develop within the property-owning classes. Debating with Burke, who suspected wealth not rooted in the mother country’s land and soil of lacking in patriotism and even of subversive tendencies, Mackintosh declared that ‘[t]he commercial, or monied interest, has … been less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent, than the landed gentry.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in France, Sieyès saw ‘liberal education’ embodied in the Third Estate, and certainly not in an aristocracy used to pursuing ‘the favour of servitude’ at court.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Invitations not to discriminate, and create conflicts, between the different types of property were more frequent. In the view of the anti-Jacobin Jean-Joseph Mounier, in addition to the United States, the country that had diffused ‘in the France the idea of liberty’ was England, construed in fact as the country where ‘a liberal education without genealogical tests confers the quality of gentleman’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear that the term ‘liberal’ was generated by a proud self-consciousness, which had a simultaneously political, social and even ethnic connotation. We are dealing with a movement and party that intended to rally persons furnished with a ‘liberal education’ and genuinely free, or people who had the privilege of being free, the ‘chosen race’ (as Burke put it), the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of liberty circulates’. All this is not surprising. As has been made clear by distinguished scholars of the Indo-European languages, ‘freemen’ is a ‘collective notion’—a sign of distinction that applies to the ‘well-born’ and them alone. For this very reason, outside the community of the free and the well-born, not only was service or slavery not excluded, it was even presupposed. In Cicero’s view, at the head of the &#039;&#039;liberi populi&#039;&#039; was Rome, which engaged in the mass enslavement of defeated peoples considered unworthy of freedom.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in eighteenth-century liberal England what became a popular song (‘Rule Britannia’) lauded in these terms the empire that had just wrested the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg246&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;, a monopoly on the slave trade, from Spain: ‘This was the charter of the land, / And guardian angels sang this strain: / “Rule, Britannia! rule the waves: / Britons never will be slaves.”‘&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The pyramid of peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This was a self-proclamation that was simultaneously an act of exclusion. It was not only colonial peoples who were affected by it. Even before the American Revolution, Franklin had established a hierarchy of nations on the basis of skin colour, which claimed to classify the whole human race: ‘All &#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039; is black or tawny. &#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039; chiefly tawny.’ The same applied to pre-Columbian America; it was ‘wholly so’. The quantitative prevalence of peoples of colour was evident. In a way, their presence even made itself felt in Europe: ‘the &#039;&#039;Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Swedes&#039;&#039;, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion’. The inhabitants of Germany did not come off much better. Representing the highest form of humanity were the English settled on both shores of the Atlantic, ‘the Principal Body of White People’, of ‘purely white People’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the only community to embody the cause of liberty. The classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theme of the great chain of Being[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] becomes here the great chain of Colour. And it excluded the non-European peoples from the sacred space of civilization, relegating much of the West to its margins.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it rarely took such a naively naturalistic form, the pyramid dear to Franklin continued, in one shape or another, to be present in liberal culture. We find it again in Lieber. At its apex, obviously, was the ‘Anglican race’, which fully expressed authentic liberty, while forming the base were the colonial peoples (not only the blacks, but also the Chinese). In the middle we find jostling Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitans, who had hitherto proved incapable of elevating themselves to the principle of self-government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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John Stuart Mill employed a language that was scarcely different. The apex continued to be composed of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (to be precise, England and the United States), peerless champions of representative government and ‘the general improvement of mankind’, while at the base, in addition to more or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg247&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;less savage peoples,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we find the Chinese. It is true that the latter could boast a very ancient civilization. Yet ‘they have become stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland could be assimilated to the other colonies or semi-colonies. ‘[H]alf civilized’, in Bentham’s view,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland for Mill was not only incapable of self-government, but also in need of ‘a good stout despotism’, exactly like India.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not much better was the situation of Greece: situated as it was at the confines of Europe, it was still ‘too Oriental’ in many respects to be able to govern itself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, at the centre of the pyramid we have the people of ‘southern Europe’, whose ‘inactivity’ and ‘envy’ prevented the development of industrial society, the establishment of a strong ruling group and the orderly functioning of institutions. By comparison with them, too, the Anglo-Saxons proved superior, free as they were of those characteristics (‘submission’, ‘endurance’, statism) typical of the French and ‘continental nations’, all of them rendered gangrenous by ‘bureaucracy’ and an envious craving for equality.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the ‘continental nations’ were not some homogenous whole. With its geographical location close to Africa and an Arabic past behind it, Spain came out of things badly. In the list Mill drew up of ‘envy’ of grandeur and ‘inactivity’, its inhabitants came immediately after ‘Orientals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Visiting Spain in 1836, at a time when it was plunged in a civil war, Richard Cobden, rather than taking sides with one of the parties, reached a general conclusion about ‘barbarians beyond the Bay of Biscay’: Spain was ‘a nation of bigots, beggars and cut-throats with a government of whores and rogues’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Spanish of Latin America were not worth speaking about because, from the standpoint of the dominant ideology in the United States at any rate, they formed part of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg248&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;colonial world. Finally, distinguishing themselves negatively in Senior’s view were also the Neapolitans: ‘I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.’ Moreover, no barrier separated the plebs from the upper classes.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The community of the free and its dictatorship over peoples unworthy of liberty&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the charge of exclusion implicit in the self-proclamation of the community of the free displayed its full force in the relationship with colonial peoples. In most cases, far from being perceived as a contradiction, the theorization and practice of slavery at the expense of the excluded further strengthened the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free, who lauded themselves for their immunity from the servile spirit attributed to the barbarians subjugated by them. That was why Locke could set himself up as a champion of liberty and, at the same time, legitimize the absolute power the community of the free was called upon to exercise over black slaves. In 1809 Jefferson celebrated the United States as ‘an empire for liberty’, founded on a constitution that guaranteed ‘self government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was a slave-owner, who exercised power over his slaves brutally, if need be selling the individual members of the family of his property as separate pieces or chattels. And he indulged in this celebration in a letter sent to another slave-owner, who had just taken his place in the US presidency. The Constitution held up as a model consecrated the birth of the first racial state, while the self-government extolled here guaranteed southern slave-owners legitimate enjoyment of their property without interference by the federal government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from hereditary slavery to semi-slavery, still at the expense of colonial peoples, did not radically change the overall picture. Albeit in different forms, the phenomenon we are already familiar with emerged. Thus, major authors such as Mill, de Tocqueville and Lecky passionately denounced monarchical or Jacobin absolutism, and at the same time enthusiastically saluted despotism at the expense of colonial peoples. This was a power relationship which, for a whole historical period, far from being fought or contained, was to be extended and generalized. Given that a ‘vigorous despotism’ was the only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg249&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;method capable of raising backward peoples or ‘barbarians’ to a higher level, the interests of civilization and peace were served by colonial conquests, which must therefore be expanded to embrace the entire globe. Already ‘common’, ‘direct subjection’ of ‘backward populations’ by ‘the more advanced’ was becoming ‘universal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So proud and self-confident was the self-consciousness of the community of the free that it could face down possible refutations from the history or empirical analysis of society without difficulty. In the years of the July Monarchy, unperturbed, de Tocqueville registered a disconcerting fact: in the Islamic world and ‘the whole East’, slavery presented itself in a ‘milder’ form than in the West. Tunisia was engaged in abolishing this institution, which by contrast continued to survive in the colonies of liberal France (and democratic America).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The balance-sheet drawn up by Mill on the morrow of the American Civil War was significant. In the United States a ‘[h]opeless slavery’ that ‘brutifies the intellect’, and where ‘it was a highly penal offence to teach a slave to read’, had only just been abolished. Even worse, added the English liberal, was the situation at the time of the slave trade in ‘our slave colonies’, where slaves were in practice condemned to work themselves to death, to be rapidly replaced through the ‘importation’ of other unfortunates, who in their turn were soon doomed to be consumed. In the British colonies and the United States a form of slavery had prevailed with particularly repugnant characteristics, which was largely unknown ‘in the ancient world and the East’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here the phenomenon of the twin birth of liberalism and racial chattel slavery seems to be perceived or intuited. And yet, like de Tocqueville, Mill had no doubts about the complete coincidence of the West and the cause of liberty, or about the West’s right to exercise despotism over Islamic peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The English liberal had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and for liberty as such: ‘the prohibition of the importation of opium into China’ violated ‘the liberty … of the buyer’, rather than that of ‘the producer or seller’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The lesson taught to the Chinese ‘barbarians’ could only be salutary. This was not the time to split hairs over forms: ‘appeals to humanity and Christianity in favour of ruffians, &amp;amp;amp; to international law in favour of people who recognize &#039;&#039;no&#039;&#039; laws of war at all’, were ‘ridiculous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are in 1857–58: even if we pass over the lot of the coolies in silence, in these years &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg250&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Britain had stained itself with the ‘barbarism’ referred to by de Tocqueville in connection with the repression of the sepoys’ mutiny in India; in China it gave decisive support to the liquidation of the attempt by the Taiping to reverse the autocratic and decrepit Manchu dynasty; in Ireland a ferocious dominion continued to obtain (‘in no country have I ever seen so many gendarmes’, observed Engels);[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] finally, in the United States, Britain contributed to the wealth of the South, absorbing much of the cotton produced by the labour of black slaves. Yet Mill was in no doubt: his country promoted the cause of liberty in the world, imposing on China by force of arms the importation of opium produced in India on the initiative of the colonial power!&lt;br /&gt;
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When the sepoys’ revolt broke out in India, de Tocqueville did not conceal the fact that ‘massacres by the [Indian] barbarians’ were followed by ‘the barbarism of the civilized’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prevent him from arriving at a Manichaean conclusion: ‘these Hindus are beasts who are as brutal as they are ferocious’; their victory would mean ‘the restoration of barbarism’, the victory of ‘savages’ and the defeat of the ‘only surviving country of political liberty in Europe’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The aspiration of the Chinese or Indians to maintain or recover their national independence, the desire to liberate themselves from colonial domination, were not even taken into consideration. Precisely because it assumed the position of exclusive representative of the cause of liberty, the community of the free interpreted the challenges it occasionally had to confront as attacks on liberty, as expressions of the servile spirit as well as barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Macaulay acknowledged that the English colonists in India behaved like Spartans confronting helots: we are dealing with ‘a race of sovereigns’ or a ‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prompt any doubts about the right of free England to exercise dictatorship over the barbarians of the colonies. It was a dictatorship that could take the most ruthless forms. Macaulay powerfully describes how the governor of India, Warren Hastings, proceeded when, at a difficult moment for Britain, already engaged in the struggle against the American colonists and their French allies, he had to confront the colony’s native population:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg251&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;A reign of terror began, of terror heightened by mystery; for even that which was endured was less horrible than that which was anticipated. No man knew what was next to be expected from this strange tribunal … It consisted of judges not one of whom was familiar with the usages of the millions over whom they claimed boundless authority. Its records were kept in unknown characters; its sentences were pronounced in unknown sounds. It had already collected round itself an army of the worst part of the native population …&lt;br /&gt;
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A wave of arrests without any charge was unleashed, not even sparing the elderly of ‘the most venerable dignity’. There was an orgy of violence that did not respect sanctuaries and unchained the most bestial instincts. There were Indians who ‘shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women’. In conclusion: ‘All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the Supreme Court.’ And yet, despite this horrifying description, Macaulay concluded that, for having saved England and civilization, Hastings deserved ‘high admiration’ and to rank among ‘the most remarkable men in our history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. How to confront the barbarian threat in the metropolis in timely fashion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The challenge to the community of the free could arise in the metropolis as well as from the colonies. The status of the popular classes, whom the dominant elite often tended to assimilate to ‘savages’, long remained uncertain. The assimilation became a veritable identification on the occasion of rebellions and revolutions. And as in the case of external barbarism, the remedy for the internal variety was dictatorship. Montesquieu was in no doubt about the fact that ‘the usage of the freest peoples that ever lived on earth makes me believe that there are cases where a veil has to be drawn, for a moment, over liberty, as one hides the statues of the gods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is what occurred in a state of emergency: in facing it, it was necessary to take to heart the ‘admirable institution’ that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg252&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the Roman dictatorship.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However ‘terrible’, at the opportune moment it ‘violently return[ed] the state to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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People argued no differently across the Atlantic. The &#039;&#039;Federalist&#039;&#039; maintained that, with the onset of a state of emergency, the powers granted to the federal authorities ‘ought to exist without limitation’ and without ‘constitutional shackles’. Hamilton pointed out that even the Roman republic did not hesitate ‘to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator’, when this was required to confront grave dangers and defend Rome against ‘the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘existence of all government’ mentioned by Hamilton took the form of ‘the public good’ in Locke. When it was imperilled, ‘prerogative’ legitimately enabled the ‘prince’ to safeguard it through ‘an arbitrary power’, or ‘discretion’, which could be exercised ‘without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In favour of granting emergency powers to General Cavaignac, during the crisis of 1848, was de Tocqueville (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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It is particularly interesting to note that what prompted an energetic reaction from the community of the free was not necessarily an actual revolt. An indirect, potential threat was enough. For Locke the right to employ force already existed in the event of the imposition of a tax not authorized by those directly affected: ‘the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if mediated by the intervention of the legislative power, the intrusion of non-property-owners in the sphere of property was always an act of illegality and plunder, of violence, and hence one that could legitimately be countered with violence by the person under attack. There is more: paving the way for unlawful interventions in property, any alteration in the composition of the legislative power, with the restructuring, for example, of the House of Lords or abolition of the hereditary transmission of its seats, betokened ‘the dissolution of government’ and hence the unavoidability of a test of arms.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Montesquieu was fairly explicit on the subject:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg253&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a state there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth or honors; but if they were mixed among the people and if they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions would be against them. Therefore, the part they have in legislation should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state, which will happen if they form a body that has the right to check the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to check theirs … The nobility should be hereditary.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While Montesquieu denounced any interference that abolished the hereditary privileges of the nobility as illiberal and despotic, Constant regarded any challenge to a property-owners’ monopoly on representative bodies as inadmissible. Since ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them are sure to be used for this purpose’; and political rights ‘will inevitably serve to encroach upon property’. It was sufficient for non-property-owners to be admitted into ‘representative assemblies’ for ‘[t]he wisest of laws’ to be ‘suspected and consequently disobeyed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicitly, the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas, having warned against the ‘fatal taxes’ that would inevitably be imposed by the legislative power once it was at the mercy or under the influence of non-property-owners, added: ‘A country governed by property-owners is in the social order; by contrast, one where non-property-owners govern is in the state of nature.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in a situation without a legal order and legal norms, arms obviously came to the fore.&lt;br /&gt;
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Constant’s reasoning continued to resonate in de Tocqueville: ‘For various reasons, all governments can be led to maintain the poor at state expense, but the democratic form of government is led by its very &#039;&#039;nature&#039;&#039; to act in this way.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Encouraged by democracy more than by any other political regime, ‘legal charity’ (i.e. aid to the poor through the use of resources procured by the state through taxes on the wealthy) could only be synonymous with despoliation in the view of its victims: ‘The rich man whom the law, without consultation, strips of part of his surplus regards the poor man as nothing but a grasping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg254&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;foreigner summoned by the legislator for the division of his goods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In effect, this was an expropriation: if prolonged, laws in favour of the poor would end up transforming ‘proletarians’ into effective beneficiaries of the land and ‘property-owners’ into their mere ‘farm managers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Mill fluctuated more. On the one hand, he reiterated positions we have already encountered: ‘any power of voting’ in the hands of those who did not pay taxes was ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of free government’; to assign political rights, and hence participation in legislative power, to poor citizens, not subject to taxation, ‘amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the English left-liberal expressed a more flexible position:&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them … It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a distinction that would seem to pave the way for a policy of income redistribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any such prospect was violently opposed by the most conservative wing of liberalism. According to Spencer, taxation aimed at income redistribution ultimately introduced a sort of ‘state &#039;&#039;corvée’&#039;&#039;, which was no less iniquitous and slave-like than the medieval one just because it imposed payment of a determinate sum of money, rather than the provision of free services to the master.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Lecky, having adopted the thesis already noted in Constant, according to which non-property-owners with political rights would inevitably be led to pursue ‘predatory and anarchic purposes’ and even ‘break up society’, defined the system that enabled non-property-owners to burden the well-off with taxes as ‘a system of veiled confiscation’. In this way, the latter would in fact end up being ‘completely disenfranchised’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The unwarranted political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg255&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;emancipation of the popular classes involved the dis-emancipation of the only classes qualified to run the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The liberal tradition and its three theories of dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As well as averting the real or potential threat of the barbarians in the colonies or metropolis, dictatorship could also be useful and indispensable in confronting the most serious problems that the community of the freemen could not resolve by ordinary means. To abolish the institution of slavery, to which representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners proved stubbornly attached, Smith looked to ‘despotism’, which effectively took shape during the Civil War and in the early post-war years. The attitude adopted in these circumstances by Lieber was significant. In publishing his principal work, he certainly foresaw the possibility of recourse to ‘martial law’ to confront a possible state of emergency, but was concerned to specify that it would not be the executive power which declared it. But with the outbreak of hostilities, he discarded his previous constitutional scruples: the suspension of habeas corpus must be implemented in any event and as extensively and radically as possible. In silencing his critics, Lincoln declared: ‘Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?’ Lieber was not only in full agreement, but as early as January 1862 was amazed and angry at the fact that no traitor or spy had as yet been hanged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory of temporary modernizing dictatorship can also be found in de Tocqueville. Reconstructing the catastrophe of the French Revolution, he arrived at a conclusion: given the irreversible crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, the radical transformation of society was inevitable, but it would have been better if, ‘instead of being carried out by the masses on behalf of the sovereignty of the people, [it] had been the work of an enlightened autocrat’; indeed, ‘[a]n absolute monarch would have been a far less dangerous innovator.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He would have been able to exercise against the most reactionary feudal aristocracy the temporary dictatorship over slave-owners invoked by Smith. Modernizing dictatorship was not evoked by de Tocqueville solely with a view to the past. The French liberal asked himself, and one of his English interlocutors, whether a ‘temporary dictatorship, exercised in firm, enlightened fashion like that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg256&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire, is not the only way of saving Ireland’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The dictatorship hypothesized here is different from that theorized by Locke against ‘papists’, which was directly exercised by the British Protestant settlers, albeit with the support of central government. De Tocqueville seems to envisage a power imposed from London that would be above the parties (Catholic peasants and Anglo-Protestant property-owners), just as in Smith ‘dictatorship’ is called upon to situate itself above both property-owners and their slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, the position taken by Mill was more general in character: ‘I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.’ The dictator could, ‘for a time strictly limited’, ‘employ … the whole power he assumes in removing obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An integral part of the self-celebration of the community of the free (and the liberal tradition) was the opposition between intransigent, unconditional guardianship of the liberty it assigned itself and the inclination to despotism reprehended in opponents. In reality, we have seen three theories of dictatorship emerge: the dictatorship of civilized peoples over barbarians in the colonies; the dictatorship that suppresses popular subversion in the metropolis; and the dictatorship which, in a situation of stalemate, imposes the requisite reforms from above. A contrast with authors not within the liberal tradition, or even foreign to it, might prove useful. Mazzini invoked ‘a highly centralized dictatorial Power’, which proceeded to the ‘suspension’ of the bill of rights and finished its work only with the achievement of national independence and the final victory of the national revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Marx applied this perspective to the social revolution as well as the national revolution. In both cases a dictatorship is envisaged that emerges in the wake of a popular revolution from below. But for de Tocqueville (and the liberal tradition as a whole), it was precisely ‘revolutionary dictatorship’ from below that was ‘most hostile to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although not free of uncertainties, in Marx criticism of the pedagogical dictatorship that the community of the free claimed to exercise over barbarians was recurrent. In reality, it was precisely in the colonies that the ‘profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg257&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This also applied to Ireland: it groaned under ‘police terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘English terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a regime that kept the population under control ‘solely by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] resorting to summary executions and the most drastic war measures.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The ills of the community of the free: the psychopathology of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the central area of the pyramid of peoples, Mill also inserted the French. Likewise, along with the Spanish, Portuguese and Neopolitans despised by him, Lieber combined the people who more than any other embodied the spurious and wicked ‘Gallic’ or ‘Gallican’ freedom, which in reality was synonymous with extreme centralization and despotism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The combination is surprising. According to Burke, at the point when the Estates General was summoned France was already in possession of a good legal order. Rid of the absolute monarchy, it had become a full member of the community of the free. What had occurred in the intervening years to provoke such a ruinous descent and consequent confinement to the grey border area between civilization and barbarism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately, Burke observed on 9 February 1790, with the transformation of the Estates General into a constituent National Assembly, and hence with the restructuring of the political influence of the nobility and clergy, the French had turned out to be infected with a ‘disease’. Passing from despotism to anarchical subversionism, they had proved that they were ‘a people, whose character knows no medium’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and (added the British Whig a year later) ‘[i]t is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.’ Lecky referred to this analysis some years later, repeating it: ‘It was … in the opinion of Burke a total mistake to suppose that political liberty of any kind can be, or ought to be, possessed by all nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg258&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The further radicalization of the revolution that had been sparked off in Paris confirmed this diagnosis. While the outbreak and manifestation of the disease could be variously dated, it was understood that the French lacked the ‘practical good sense’ that had enabled the Anglo-Americans and the United States in particular to avoid ‘revolutionary times’, the devastation and ‘adventure’ of civil war. This was a point tirelessly stressed by de Tocqueville and, in his wake, by Laboulaye and Guizot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, on inspection, it was not merely good sense and practical spirit that were wanting. In Anglo-Americans these qualities were a constitutive element in a more general mental disposition, whereby ‘a man by following his own interest, rightly understood, will be led to do what is just and good’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We know that, although de Tocqueville deplored it, the fate of Indians and blacks was irrelevant when it came to forming an overall judgement on the republic across the Atlantic. What promoted the undisturbed flourishing of liberty here was the mature personality of its inhabitants, who displayed manifest political and moral superiority to the French. De Tocqueville found the explanation suggested by his fellow countryman Victor Lanjuinais ‘profound and original’: ‘socialism is our natural disease’. And socialism was synonymous with abstraction, but also with something worse. The French were ‘afraid of isolation’ and harboured a ‘desire to be in the crowd’; they felt themselves members of a ‘nation that marches to the same step in perfect alignment’; they regarded liberty as ‘the least important of their possessions, and thus are always ready to offer it up with reason at moments of danger’. Hence a France irremediably ‘revolutionary and servile’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, having stressed that it was ‘contained in germ in the February revolution’, when ‘socialism had been seen to make its appearance’, de Tocqueville offered a kind of epitaph on the French nation: ‘It is incapable and, I say it certainly with regret, unworthy of being free’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The oscillation between anarchical revolutionism and submission to despotism, and an inclination to surrender to passing impulses and moods, confronted one with a people whose ‘basic characteristics are so constant that we can recognise the France we know in portraits made of it two or three &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg259&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousand years ago’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact that the process begun in 1789 or 1787 had finally issued in the establishment of the Bonapartist dictatorship, dragging the country down to the level of the ‘nations best made for servitude’, clarified everything. In France, ‘what at first seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant. But what a nation with a real instinct for freedom cannot endure is the feeling of not being its own master.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The closing chapters of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; are a bravura rhetorical performance. Rarely has the love of liberty been hymned in such impassioned terms. And the beauty and power of these passages prove all more the engaging if we bear in mind the polemic, allusive but transparent and courageous, against Napoleon III’s despotism. However, read more coolly, this hymn to liberty proves problematic and even disturbing, with the opposition it sets up between ‘peoples made to be free’ and ‘nations best made for servitude’. It was a divide reproduced within France at the level of social classes. The enlightened love of liberty, which had manifested itself at the start of the revolution, was rapidly overwhelmed by the blind passion for equality, from which the Terror and the equal enslavement of all to an unprecedented despotic power derived. How was this distortion to be explained? De Tocqueville had no doubts: it became ‘less startling when we remember that the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A disdainful warning was issued to the latter, intent on pursuing ‘material benefits’ and incapable of appreciating liberty in and for itself: ‘The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave.’ Once again we are presented with an opposition between those born for liberty and those born for servitude, between freemen and servants, between liberals and serviles. And for de Tocqueville it was futile to try to explain the presence or absence, or variable intensity, of the ‘desire’ for liberty by the level of historical development and material living conditions of particular peoples and social classes. It was ultimately of little use even to challenge the influence of erroneous theories; or rather, these referred to something more profound. The ‘lofty aspiration’ to liberty was a thing that some men are capable of feeling, while others are not: ‘[i]t is a privilege of noble minds which God has fitted to receive it, and it inspires them with a generous fervour.’ The discourse has hitherto focused on a few noble souls: ‘to meaner souls, untouched by the sacred flame, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg260&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it may well seem incomprehensible’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An original curse, which cannot be lifted, seems to hang over the men, classes or peoples who, on account of their vulgarity or coarseness, are excluded or expelled from the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, in its sad destiny France was not alone. Some years earlier—in September 1848, to be precise—de Tocqueville had seen the spectre of socialism lurking across the Alps and had not hesitated to conclude that the Italians ‘have likewise shown themselves unworthy of liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘Likewise’: which country is being alluded to? At this time, not yet invested by a coup d’état, France was still part of the community of the free. The reference is to Germany: as in much of Europe, there too the revolution continued to flare up and pursue radical objectives. The ambit of countries deserving of liberty thus risked being extremely restricted.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Interpretations of the interminable French Revolutionary cycle: from ‘disease’ to ‘race’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is not by chance that politico-social conflict came to be interpreted in a psychopathological register. Immediately after the February revolution, de Tocqueville was concerned to specify that ‘[i]t is not needs but ideas that have led to this great upheaval’ and made the French ‘so ill’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was madness that encouraged the socialist pretension to alter not only ‘political laws’, but even social and ‘civil laws’—in particular, relations of property and production consecrated by nature and Providence. In the course of his journey in England, de Tocqueville compared workers to slaves and drew attention to the relations of ‘strict dependency’ that were being established within the factory. On the basis of this analysis, the struggle to overcome or alleviate the condition of slavery or ‘strict dependency’ could be construed as a struggle for freedom. But, as we know, this was not how the French liberal argued, as he denounced the ‘despotism’ of those who sought to regulate working hours and the servile spirit of those who contaminated the ideal of liberty with economic and social demands. The community of the free claimed the merit of pursuing the ideal of liberty in all its purity and in any circumstances for itself. Hence it interpreted not only challenges from the colonial and barbaric world, but also challenges &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg261&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arising in the zone of civilization itself, as an attack on the ideal of liberty, which was lashed out at by those not in a position to appreciate its grandeur and beauty. Wholly understandable and, indeed, natural among savages, such deafness was construed as a pathological anomaly in a civilized people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this sense, the resort to explaining conflict in a psychopathological register was immanent in the liberal tradition. Burke spoke of French ‘disease’ in the very first stages of the revolution. And it should be added that for a time it was in fact the ‘American inoculation’, and hence a disease from across the Atlantic, which was held responsible for the contraction and contagious spread of ideas marked by abstract, insane extremism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the disease and psychopathological diagnosis of the adversary could occur in the converse direction. As the abolitionist movement developed, it became a commonplace in the United States to condemn it as an expression of an illiberal spirit, fanaticism and madness. However, at the time of the British colonists’ revolt in America, we find Josiah Tucker inviting the London government to accept and even encourage the secession, so as to avoid the ‘contagion’ of a ‘mad, &#039;&#039;fanatical&#039;&#039; liberty’, which was sweeping through slaves or serfs, the contagion of a ‘republicanism’ that was indeed ‘American’, but which ultimately dated back to Locke and the ‘Lockian Sect’ and could count on the sympathy of Burke himself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After 1848, following the umpteenth return of revolution with yet more radical slogans, the tendency to warn against the disease raging in France dramatically intensified. Underlining the rootedness in the United States of the rule of law and liberal institutions, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; attributed much more weight to history and geography than &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;. Why had Napoleon Bonaparte’s military dictatorship been imposed on France?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government … If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg262&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The situation across the Atlantic was very different: ‘Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While we once again encounter the dubious assimilation of the Indians (and even Mexico) to a ‘wilderness’, we are far removed from the explanation that peremptorily and definitively opposes a ‘sublime desire’ for freedom to vulgar indifference to it, ‘noble souls’ to ‘mediocre souls’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By way of confirming the anthropological drift that manifested itself with 1848, we can adduce the long letter (a small essay) sent by de Tocqueville twenty years earlier to his friend de Beaumont. The history of Europe was conceived here in such a unitary way that the terminology became interchangeable: mention was made of the ‘Commons’ in the case of France and the ‘Third Estate’ in the case of England. In the two countries the victory of the bourgeoisie had been achieved in different ways, which were in fact the ‘forced result of the state of things’—that is, of the different configuration of power relations between the contending politico-social subjects.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were statism and despotism the hereditary disease of the country where Jacobinism and Bonapartism had made their appearance? In truth, England had not only succeeded in constructing a strong state and military apparatus before France, but at the time of the Tudors had suffered an unlimited despotism: ‘I know of no tyranny in history more complete than that of … Henry VIII’; the Commons, ‘which had denied the king’s will a man’s life’, now ended up ‘condemning without even giving a hearing’. A worse terror than the Jacobin version had manifested itself, as demonstrated by ‘ “bills of attainder”, a diabolical invention that not even the revolutionary Tribunal called into being’. Yet it was nonetheless a revolution that had played a positive role. It nurtured the ‘first fruit of civilization’ as a result of the fact that, albeit in its terrible absolutism, in England royal power attacked the ‘vices of the feudal system’ and subdued ‘oligarchical liberty’. This was a general tendency, though in no country did ‘despotism prove more terrible’. Was the island across the Channel, unlike France, characterized and blessed by a gradualism of historical evolution? The letter/essay we are examining explicitly argued against the thesis that the English Constitution had passed through ‘successive, regular stages, before reaching the point it has arrived at today’, so that it could be considered ‘a fruit which has matured over &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg263&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;successive centuries’. In truth, de Tocqueville observed, from Henry VIII onwards, ‘I see the English people change religion four times according to the will of their master’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, one might try to devalue the letter/essay of 1828 as ‘youthful’. However, even in subsequent years, if there was a contrast between France and England, it was often to the detriment of the latter, which continued to interpret liberty as a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘common right’, as occurred in the country that was the protagonist of the 1789 revolution (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]). In 1843, having compared slave-masters in the colonies with the ‘aristocracy’ overthrown by the French Revolution, de Tocqueville celebrated ‘the great principles’ of the revolution, ‘which was carried out entirely in the name of equality’, in the name of the equality of the ‘human race’, and which had the further merit of being first to abolish slavery.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from the 1848 revolution, under the impression made by the spectre of socialism, it was precisely the pathos of equality that defined the failure of the French Revolution and the disease of an entire people, who now prostrated themselves before Louis Napoleon.&lt;br /&gt;
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The psychopathological interpretation of developments in the French situation had the advantage of dispelling possible anxieties in the community of the free, which absolved itself of any responsibility for the Bonapartist outcome of the 1848 revolution. De Tocqueville might have drawn up a critical balance-sheet of the conduct of the liberal party and himself. After the dictatorship’s advent, with some exaggeration he denounced the limited resistance met with by Louis Napoleon in French society. Had the disappointment they experienced with the exclusion of three million Frenchmen from political rights contributed to the passivity of the popular masses? This was a measure the liberal bourgeoisie had been guilty of in 1850, thereby furnishing the dictator with the possibility of elevating himself into a champion of universal suffrage and the struggle against privilege and discrimination.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And what role in undermining the Second Republic had been played by intransigent liberalism à la de Tocqueville, who had branded the reduction of working hours and any intervention by political power in favour of the most deprived as intolerable ‘despotism’? The Bonapartist regime had its stronghold in the countryside: had it not been primarily the liberal bourgeoisie, with de Tocqueville’s active participation, which stirred it up against the city and mobilized it in the name &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg264&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the terrible threat that hung over civilization, dictating extraordinary measures commensurate with the situation? And again: Had the discrediting of institutions and the rule of law been aided by the supreme contempt for the Constitution displayed by de Tocqueville, when in his capacity as foreign minister he demanded ‘the right, in spite of our Constitution, to overthrow the Roman Republic’?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, a basic contradiction ran through the French liberal’s attitude. On the one hand, on an immediate political level, he vigorously condemned the Bonapartist regime; on the other, as an historian he regretted the fact that the requisite modernization of France had not been completed by an ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’, rather than a popular revolution (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|§5]]). But a modernizing ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’ is precisely what Napoleon I had wanted to be and what Napoleon III aspired to be! Rather than engage in an examination that was possibly too painful at a personal level, the author of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; preferred to come to blows with a mythical, eternal France.&lt;br /&gt;
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A not dissimilar evolution is found in Mill. In 1849 he vigorously defended the February Revolution of the previous year. Thereafter, he continued to make an important acknowledgement of ‘the heroic and calumniated Provisional Government of France’ for having promptly abolished slavery in the colonies, in an implicit contrast not only with the North American republic, but also with England, on whose history ‘a lasting blot’ was left by the support of ‘the leading portion of our higher and middle classes’ for the South’s pro-slavery secession from the United States.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, reminiscing about the debate that developed in Europe over the American Civil War, having denounced the ‘furious’ pro-Southern position of much of the English liberalism of the time, Mill added: ‘None of the Continental Liberals committed the same frightful mistake.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet in 1861 we have seen him inclined to exclude the French people and ‘continental nations’ in general from the community of the free in the strict sense. These were years when, not altogether in jest, people liked to say that ‘negroes begin in Calais’, just across the Channel.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, if not skin colour alone, ‘race’ was now called on to explain the differential development of European countries. What must not be overlooked, observed Lieber, still pointing a finger at France, was ‘the Celtic spirit of being &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg265&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swayed by masses’ and hence surrendering to political, religious and literary ‘centralization’. Absent there was ‘the original Teutonic spirit of individual independence’, which exhibited itself with particular vigour in the ‘Anglican race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. ‘Disease’ as a symptom of racial degeneration&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From ‘disease’ we have passed to ‘race’. Were these two interpretations of politico-social conflict compatible? Burke, who denounced the outbreak of ‘disease’ across the Channel, celebrated the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, the ‘chosen race of the sons of England’. It was a ‘nation’ and a ‘race’ possibly less vulnerable than others to the pathological manifestations raging in France. In other words, the question is whether the servile, herd spirit and inability to enjoy a regular, orderly liberty were a passing disturbance in the personality of a civilized people or possessed an ethnic origin that was yet to be identified.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the United States, from the mid-nineteenth century the threat represented by the immigration of yellow skins—the coolies—was added to the traditional peril of miscegenation with blacks. The coastal region of the Pacific, warned Lieber, risked being ‘mongolized’ by Chinese, whose proliferation resembled that of ‘mice’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more drastic. Large-scale settlement by the Chinese (or Japanese) in America would result in catastrophe: ‘they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approximating to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid.’ The upshot would be individuals with a ‘chaotic constitution’ internally, as was sadly demonstrated by ‘the Eurasians in India, and the half-breeds in America’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitherto we have been dealing with populations of colonial or semi-colonial origin, and hence extraneous to the West. And Lieber and Spencer’s agreement with legislation that prohibited non-whites from access to the land of liberty is not surprising. Although an enthusiastic expansionist, the former declared himself opposed to the annexation of any territory that involved a further incorporation of peoples of colour. But, as his biographer observes, he went further. He feared that an influx of immigrants from southern Europe &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg266&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belonging to the ‘Latin Race’ might also cause a ‘dilution of American blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, likewise focusing on the United States, another distinguished representative of liberalism—Lecky—drew attention to the effect of ‘the contamination of the immigrant vote’, since immigrants were often ‘revolutionary elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These are concerns that were powerfully echoed by de Tocqueville. As the storm clouds gathered over the North American republic that would shortly lead to the Civil War, the French liberal posed an anxious question: How was the fading of the ‘practical good sense’ that had hitherto spared the transatlantic republic the catastrophe of France and continental Europe to be explained? What had provoked the crisis was the ‘rapid introduction into the United States of men alien to the English race’, who for that very reason caused America to run ‘the greatest danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Its inhabitants were now no longer so ‘united by … common opinions’ as to render a bloody division inconceivable, as &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; had believed.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville warned his US friends and interlocutors that ‘however great your capacity for assimilation, it is very difficult for so many foreign bodies to be digested’ with such rapidity as to avoid their disturbing ‘the economy and the health of your social body’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The looming civil war was put down to the new immigrants from southern or eastern Europe: they were configured as a pathogenic element, attacking from without a social organism that was in itself healthy. In the face of such a danger, de Tocqueville tirelessly warned his transatlantic friends and interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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Alas, every day brings you so many foreign elements that you will soon no longer be yourselves: all the arguments that could be made about your nature become ever more uncertain. In fact, mixed as you are today with so many races, who could now say what your nature is?&lt;br /&gt;
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And again: ‘What frightens me is the prodigious number of foreigners that makes of you a new people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The waves of migration condemned here obviously involved the North of the United States. Did they lead to the emergence of radical abolitionism? In that case, de Tocqueville’s position would not be very different from that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg267&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the theorists of the South. They branded as fundamentally alien to America, and ultimately reducible to radicalism of a European (and French and Jacobin) variety, the positions of those who, to abolish slavery, did not even shrink at the prospect of a bloody conflict. At all events, de Tocqueville’s tendency in explaining the impending civil war is clear: he assigned responsibility for it to the growing presence of ethnic groups traditionally lacking in the political and moral qualities attributed to Anglo-Americans.&lt;br /&gt;
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This type of explanation obviously proves impossible when dealing with an ethnically homogenous country. Or should we assume that such homogeneity is merely apparent? To this question de Gobineau replied decisively in the affirmative. But let us observe his starting-point. He fully shared the pitiless psychopathological diagnosis of the French people made by de Tocqueville. It was necessary to register the raging of an age-old disease in France that rendered the functioning of ‘free institutions’ impossible and which, in the name of ‘public utility’ or the ‘monstrosity’ that was alleged ‘social right’, constantly promoted ‘the absorption of private rights into single state right’. We are dealing with ‘a people for whom absolute centralization is the height of good government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, the same ideological themes and even the same language we have heard in de Tocqueville, Lieber and Mill recur.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was in fact something new. The disease now had a specific ethnic base. The carriers of it in France and the rest of the world were non-Aryans. Given the importance of such an innovation, it is an exaggeration to claim that de Gobineau was ‘not so far removed from Alexis de Tocqueville, at one time his mentor and superior, as might be supposed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, there is no doubt they moved in a cultural and political circle with not a few points of contact and commonality. On close epistolary and intellectual terms, de Tocqueville and Lieber were in full agreement in their diagnosis of the disease raging in France and which, as a result of waves of migration, also risked having a harmful impact on the United States. Advancing further down the road of interpreting history in an ethnic key, Lieber counterposed to the herd and servile spirit of the ‘Celts’ the jealous sense of individuality peculiar to the ‘Teutons’. The latter were the vanguard of the West, or the ‘western Caucasian portion of humanity’. Perhaps, concluded Lieber, for brevity’s sake one could speak of ‘cis-Caucasians’, while the phrase ‘Japhetics’ had the drawback of being too broad.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, we are on the threshold of the Aryan mythology: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg268&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘Japhetics’ were the descendants of Japheth, by contrast with the progeny of Sem (‘Semites’) and Ham (‘Hamites’). And the American liberal expressed reservations about the category of Japhetics or Aryans solely because it referred to the mythical deeds of a people that had started out from India—in other words, a region foreign to the West. Hence the distance from de Gobineau was not great, even if the latter preferred to speak of Aryans, rather than employing what he regarded as the less rigorous categories of ‘Japhetics, Caucasians and Indo-Germans’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. De Gobineau, liberalism and the genealogical myths of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From the outset, the self-proclamation of the community of the free felt the need to resort to genealogical myths that endowed this distinguishing gesture with a foundation. Montesquieu pointed to ‘the forests’ inhabited by ‘the Germans’ as the birthplace of free, representative government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The origin was not accidental: if slavery was at home among ‘the peoples of the south’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|§4]]), by contrast ‘the peoples of the north have and will always have a spirit of independence and liberty that the peoples of the south do not’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘the peoples of the north’, who had demonstrated ‘remarkable wisdom against the Roman power’ they ultimately destroyed, were also distinguished by ‘good sense’, courage, ‘generous sentiment’, and ‘the strength of spirit necessary to guide one’s own conduct’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘northern nations’ were referred to in England by Sidney and Hume, who celebrated as ‘extremely free’ the ‘government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations’, which was established on the ‘ruins of Rome’ and its ‘military despotism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, for the Mill of 1861, the French were excluded from the community of the free because they were ‘essentially a southern people’, stamped by ‘the double education of despotism and Catholicism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Burke instead preferred to glory in descent from ‘our Gothic ancestors’, as well as in belonging to the English &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#page269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#pg269&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘chosen race’ of liberty, while Lieber worked ‘Teutonic’ ancestors into the coat of arms of the United States and the Anglican race.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the Teutonic genealogical myth met with great success. Notwithstanding the stabilization achieved with the Third Republic, the memory of the Paris Commune and of the interminable revolutionary cycle behind it influenced France’s image. The scourge of brigandage in the south, and the geographical location (not properly Nordic) especially of its southern regions, affected the image of Italy. The Second Reich, by contrast, seemed to stand unproblematically alongside England and the United States in enjoying representative bodies, a liberal order and economic development. These were the three countries now celebrated as the vanguard of the community of the free, or as the peoples who best embodied the cause of liberty. In England, as early as 1860 Lord Robert Cecil—future Marquis of Salisbury and prime minister—contrasted ‘the people of a southern climate’ with those of ‘Teutonic parentage’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1889 Joseph Chamberlain (the colonial secretary) officially called on the United States and Germany to form a ‘Teutonic’ alliance with his country.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a position shared across the Atlantic by Alfred T. Mahan, the great theorist of geopolitics, who likewise declared for the unity of the ‘Teutonic family’, of peoples belonging to the same Germanic ‘stock’. Mahan was on excellent terms with Theodore Roosevelt who, going still further in his celebration of ‘German’ and ‘Teutonic’ peoples, hymned the ‘war-like prowess of the stalwart sons of Odin’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideological climate prompted a reinterpretation of the category of Anglo-Saxons, which now tended to include Germany—the starting-point for the great adventure of the emigration of the descendants of liberty, praiseworthy for having rebelled against first Roman despotism and then Papal despotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Disraeli, de Gobineau and ‘race’ as the ‘key of history’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The cultural and political universe to which de Gobineau belonged is becoming clear. With him, the approach chosen by de Tocqueville to explain the crisis &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg270&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the United States became a key to understanding universal history. Why did ‘liberal institutions’ in the North American republic exhibit a vitality unimaginable in Latin America? Because in the latter Europeans had mixed with the defeated natives. And as for Europe, why had France suffered a catastrophe unknown to England? Because the mixing of races had been much more radical in the former than the latter, ‘that of all the countries of Europe where modifications of blood have been slowest and hitherto least varied’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And why was an unprecedented crisis impending in the United States? De Gobineau’s answer was substantially identical to de Tocqueville’s: as a result of massive waves of migration that were heterogeneous in origin, the original Anglo-Saxon element was on the point of losing its identity.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that in de Gobineau the anthropological explanation underwent such a naturalistic rigidification as to prompt de Tocqueville to ironize about the decisive role of ‘blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Must we then regard the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039; as foreign to the liberal tradition? In reality, even if we ignore the South of the United States, where the theory and practice reigned whereby a single drop of black blood was enough to exclude a person from the community of the free (and the enjoyment of political and civil rights), in Europe itself and, what is more, in the other classic country of the liberal tradition, voices echoed that were not very different from that just heard. Declaring himself in favour of a legal ban on miscegenation, Spencer stressed: ‘It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the inter-marriages of human races and by the inter-breeding of animals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But in this context the figure of Disraeli assumes particular prominence. The positions he adopted were clear: race was ‘the key of history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to speak of ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’: in reality, ‘[a]ll is race’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[a]ll is race; there is no other truth.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only thus could it be understood how, although fairly small in numbers, the Spanish conquistadores (or ‘Goths’, as Disraeli preferred to call them) had managed to triumph in America and the English in China.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was how the constant ravages devastating France &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg271&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;were to be explained: we were witnessing ‘the great revolt of the Celts’, or the ancient ‘conquered races’, against ‘the northern and western races’, who had assimilated ‘the Semitic principle’ (the Old and New Testaments) and embodied civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The principal and primary aspect of these processes was not culture: the ‘greatness’ of a race ‘results from its organisation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a physiological fact, and it was therefore necessary to ‘study physiology’, [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] so as to be able to orientate oneself correctly in the conflicts of the historical and political world: ‘Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which makes a race, and that is blood.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this blood mythology, Disraeli too insisted on the superiority of the ‘pure races of the Caucasus’, to which the Jewish race belonged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a purity to be jealously guarded: ‘that pernicious doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man’, the doctrine of ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ which led to mixing and contamination, was condemned out of hand; if really implemented, it ‘would deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the partial difference of idiom, we are not removed from the ideological universe of de Gobineau. The latter, who celebrated the Aryans in the first instance for their liberal and individualistic ‘traditions’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] not by chance dedicated his book ‘to His Majesty George V, King of Hanover’. Along with England, de Gobineau took the other classical country of the liberal tradition, the United States, as his model. It was an ‘essentially practical land’, as had been confirmed by the fact that, without allowing themselves to be fettered by the abstractions rampant in France, even the ‘abolitionist papers had acknowledged the correctness’ of the thesis of the natural inequality of races.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The celebration of racial purity was the celebration primarily of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, the branch of the ‘Aryan family’ that more than any other had resisted the general bastardization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg272&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There is no reason to include Disraeli in the liberal tradition while excluding the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039;, all the less so given that the latter drew considerable inspiration from the English writer and statesman.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If de Gobineau ceased to be a liberal, it was when, now discouraged, he ended up accommodating, in de Tocqueville’s harsh but accurate judgement, to the ‘government of the sabre, and even of the baton’—that is, to the dictatorship of Napoleon III.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should not be forgotten that in these same years Disraeli believed the ‘government of the sword’ and the ‘military camp’ inevitable and legitimate, for France and continental Europe (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]). In any event, as a theorist of race, admirer and collaborator of de Tocqueville, and follower of Disraeli, the author, disgusted by the French revolutionary cycle and statism, and filled with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon world and the ‘liberal traditions of the Aryans’, fitted into the milieu of liberalism without difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the Aryan mythology was explicitly present in other exponents of this intellectual tradition should not be overlooked. Here is how Lecky came to the defence of Ireland, from which he originated: while they were Celts, the Irish were nevertheless part of ‘the great Aryan race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer reached the same conclusion in the course of his visit to the United States: ‘descendants of the immigrant Irish lose their Celtic aspect, and become Americanised’; they had fused with the other ‘varieties of the Aryan race’ and, in this instance, the admixture had proved beneficial.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things stood differently in the case of France. What explained its defeat in the war with Prussia and the raging of the Paris Commune was ‘race’, which seemed to have remained stubbornly Celtic (unlike Lecky, Spencer considered the Celts wholly alien to the Aryan race).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the authors we have just cited might be added Renan, who also regarded himself as a liberal, was ‘in regular contact’ with de Gobineau,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was a no less passionate cantor (as we shall see) of the excellence of the Aryan race and, more generally, the ‘Aryan–Semitic races’. Finally, it should be noted that across the Atlantic the Aryan mythology was prominent, and in fact so widespread as to go beyond the circle of ideologies. In 1902 Arthur &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg273&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, demanded the United States’ right to dominion on the grounds that it belonged to the ‘magnificent Aryan people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The repression of conflict, the search for the pathogenic element, and conspiracy theory&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even if he rejected the facile Aryan solution, this did not make de Tocqueville any less obsessed than de Gobineau with the problem of identifying the pathogenic element attacking a social organism that was healthy in itself. After 1848 there was no doubt: the carrier of the ‘revolutionary disease’, the ‘permanent disease’, the ‘virus of a new and unknown kind’, which raged incessantly in France, was a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;): ‘we are always dealing with the same men, even if the circumstances vary’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is to be added that this ‘virus’ or ‘race’ was spreading alarmingly throughout the world. Having made their appearance in France, these ‘[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown breed came on the scene … They were the first of a new race of men who subsequently prospered and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What once again leaps to the eye is the transition from ‘disease’ or ‘virus’ to ‘race’. Likewise in Constant, ‘cold in their delirium’, subversive intellectuals, those ‘jugglers of sedition’ (&#039;&#039;jongleurs de sédition&#039;&#039;), never tired of undermining not just a particular society, but ‘the very foundations of the social order’. They were ‘beings of an unknown species’ (&#039;&#039;êtres d’une espèce inconnue&#039;&#039;) and in fact formed a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;), a ‘detestable race’ (&#039;&#039;déstestable race&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a crescendo, an anthropological type of explanation tends to become a racial type of explanation—the transition from the category of &#039;&#039;espèce&#039;&#039; to that of &#039;&#039;race&#039;&#039; is symptomatic. At this point the idea of a radical solution emerges. One could only hope for the ‘eradication’ of this ‘detestable race’ composed of pathogenic agents:[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] such was the precondition for restoring the health and safety of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The term ‘race’ does not possess a genuinely ethnic connotation in either Constant or de Tocqueville. Yet its recurrence is a symptom of a tendency to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg274&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;racialize the intellectuals who were carriers of the virus of subversion. Burke went significantly further. In addition to a clearly defined social stratum (non-property-owning intellectuals, who were not connected with the land and lacked roots), the ideological ‘intoxication’ of which radicalism was culpable[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] pertained to a social bloc that began to exhibit an ethnic dimension. What explained the catastrophe of the French Revolution was an alliance between two significantly different social strata: on the one hand, ‘political men of letters’ and, on the other, the ‘new monied interest’. The reasons for this alliance, at first sight so strange, were readily understandable. To begin with, the two parties shared a hatred of Christianity: ‘[t]he literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the irreligiousness and atheism of intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment were well-known, one should not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Jews in Change-alley’, already alien to Christianity for religious and ideological reasons, also had a material interest in undermining or destroying it: they were hoping for ‘a mortgage on the revenues belonging to the see of Canterbury’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attack on the Church was also an attack on ‘the landed property of ecclesiastical corporations’, on landed property as such. The revolutionaries’ programme was sinister: ‘Is the house of lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers[?]’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Intent on destroying a society whose pillars were Christianity and the landed aristocracy was an alliance between subversive intellectuals gathered in ‘the revolution society’ and ‘the pulpit of the Old Jewry’, or the ‘gentlemen of the Old Jewry’, engaged in distorting the real meaning of the Glorious Revolution and spreading ‘the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, Burke did not tire of stressing the role of the Jews. These two components of the revolutionary bloc were linked by multiple affinities. Over and above hatred of the Church and the agrarian, Christian nobility, an important role was also played by their fundamental foreignness to the nation. The intellectual stratum was itself stateless, because intellectuals displayed ‘attachment to their country’ only to the extent that it conduced to their ‘fleeting projects’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg275&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But whence did subversion draw its shock force? To overthrow the existing order, intellectuals and usurers were insufficient. In reality, an integral, albeit subaltern, part of the subversive attack was ‘the Tavern’, the inebriated, bloodthirsty rabble. How was the unnatural union repeatedly denounced by Burke as the social bloc between ‘Old Jewry’ and ‘the London Tavern’ formed and sealed?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Who enrolled the most desperate in the retinue and service of the wealthiest, and in fact of the most parasitic, repugnant wealth—the wealth which, rather than being based on the land and love of the land, pertained exclusively to speculation and usury? It was the intellectuals—more precisely, rootless intellectuals of humble origin. It was ‘feathered scoundrels’ [&#039;&#039;gueux plumées&#039;&#039;],[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] wretches like the scoundrels of the Tavern whom they were constantly inciting. Wanting in religion, faith and genuine ideals, they called on the scoundrels, of whom they were an integral part, to rise up against wealth, but only against the most respectable wealth—landed wealth—while financial (and Jewish) wealth was spared. In France these intellectuals ‘pretended to a great zeal for the poor … They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In their turn, the Jews were perfectly content to support the French rabble’s attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, on the pillars of Christianity. The revolutionary atrocities seemed to Burke ‘Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of the subversive social bloc were now clear. Thanks to the work of plebeian, subversive intellectuals, here were the propertyless in the retinue of the usurers, the Tavern in the service of Old Jewry, or ‘Jewish brokers contending with each other who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Jews were ultimately at the head of the variegated social bloc of subversion. It was enough to observe the development of the revolution in France: ‘The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will be always their fellows, sometimes their masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Levelling and homogenizing everything, the French Revolution ended up making a single ‘difference’ prevail, that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg276&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;constituted by ‘money’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and hence sanctioning the predominance of finance (largely controlled by Jews). If remedial action was not promptly taken, a ‘general earthquake’ threatened to flatten the social order and civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, we are dealing with the first organic theory of revolution as a Jewish conspiracy. The &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; and the denunciation of the infamous role of Old Jewry date from 1790. Only later did Abbé Barruel set himself to work. Exiled in England, he was received with honour by Burke, who warmly greeted him and the work that was taking shape: ‘The whole of the wonderful narrative is supported by documents and proofs with almost juridical regularity and exactness.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to chronological priority, another, more important characteristic highlights the novelty and perilousness of the conspiracy theory in Burke. While the &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; also referred to the disturbing role of Enlightenment ‘confederacies’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it was now no longer a question of pointing a finger at this or that sect or at freemasonry, as did Barruel, and exposing the role of Jews therein. Foremost among the charges against the latter was not hostility towards the dominant religion or throne and altar, as in the traditional Christian polemic. Burke, who was himself a mason,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] aimed to explain a new politico-social conflict that was destined to last a long time. In the British Whig’s view, we have on the one hand the countryside, as the site embodying the natural order of society and the values of attachment to the land, and a national community cemented (as we know) by a ‘relation in blood’; on the other, the city as the site of rootlessness and stateless subversion, jointly promoted by Jewish finance, abstract, revolutionary intellectuals and the rabble. For the first time, the Jews were accused of simultaneously operating through rapacious, parasitic finance and a plebeian movement inspired by blind, destructive fury.&lt;br /&gt;
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This motif reappeared in the liberal tradition after another major revolutionary upheaval. On the outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, Disraeli immediately put them down to the ‘manoeuvres’ of ‘secret associations’, which were ‘always vigilant and always prepared’ to take ‘society by surprise’ and ‘strik[e] at property and Christ’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, the English statesman of Jewish origin drew up a more sophisticated, highly surprising balance-sheet. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg277&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;account of ‘their accumulated wealth’, attachment to their religious tradition and proud racial self-consciousness, Jews tended to be hostile to ‘the doctrine of the equality of man’ and ‘conservative’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although shaking off oppression, they were not averse to the most unscrupulous operations and alliances: ‘you find the once loyal Hebrew invariably arrayed in the same ranks as the leveller and the latitudinarian’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There then spread the ‘destructive principle’ and ‘insurrection … against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property’. Fuelling all of this was an unexpected ethnic and social group: the destruction of Christianity, ‘the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them’. There was no doubt: ‘If the reader throws his eye over the provisional governments of Germany, and Italy, and even of France, formed at that period, he will recognise everywhere the Jewish element.’ Thus, ‘[t]he people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skilful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not difficult to hear in this discourse an echo of the resentment of the Jew at humiliations and persecution suffered. But it remains the case that we are once again dealing with a new conspiracy theory destined to enjoy fatal success in the twentieth century. What encouraged such a theory was the tendency, widespread in the liberal culture of the time, to repress the objectivity of politico-social conflict. The picture Disraeli paints of the great revolutionary wave of 1848 is eloquent. Had it not been for the occult Jewish leadership, ‘the uncalled for outbreak would not have ravaged Europe.’ Not objective social needs, but ‘the fiery energy and teeming resources of the children of Israel maintained for a long time the unnecessary and useless struggle’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, still within the ambit of the liberal tradition, the cry of alarm at ‘conspiracy’ also resounded during another great revolutionary upheaval. When Napoleonic France’s attempt to reintroduce slavery into San Domingo was defeated by the fierce resistance of the ex-slaves, Malouet warned against the ‘universal plot of the blacks’ who, with the complicity of the abolitionists, aspired to dominate and massacre the whites.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this theme was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg278&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;widely diffused in the South of the United States. Obsession with ‘conspiracy’ runs deep in the history of that country and both the contending alliances, in different forms, were constantly concerned to uncover and fight it. For example, in the years leading up to the Civil War, while the South denounced the North’s ‘abolitionist conspiracy’, the latter endlessly warned against the plot that aimed to impose slaveholding power at a federal level. For this reason, reference has been made to a widespread ‘paranoid style’ in connection with the history of the North American republic.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this mythology of the conspiracy, one element was especially significant and pregnant with consequences. The actor in the black, abolitionist plot, the anti-slavery militant, tended to be delineated in accordance with the model generally used to stigmatize the Jew: ‘Essentially weak and cowardly, he would pose no threat in a fair and open fight’; but this was where deception, intrigue and, precisely, conspiracy came in.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. The conflict of the two liberalisms, and mutual accusations of betrayal&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In confronting the challenges represented by the struggle for recognition waged by the excluded, obviously the community of the free did not always react as one. On more than a few occasions, there were internal clashes and divisions. In broad terms, we can distinguish two tendencies. One fraction more or less stubbornly identified with the positions of the representatives of English proto-liberalism, who equated ‘true liberty’ with untrammelled control by the master over &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; family, as well as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; servants and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; goods. By contrast, another fraction sought to come to terms with the idea of liberty originally mobilized by servants, who refused to let themselves be assimilated to the master’s belongings and pursued emancipation through intervention by political power on their behalf, be it existing political power or that formed in the wake of a revolution from below. The struggles waged by servants aggravated the sense of unease in some sections of the community of the free, who soon sought to acquire a good conscience by repressing slavery to the colonies and changing or masking the politico-social relations that most blatantly gave the lie to their proclaimed attachment to the cause of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entanglement of, and clash between, these two different ideas of liberty, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg279&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and of the politico-social subjects who appealed to them, explains the especially complex and tortuous character of the first English revolution and the French Revolution as such. Not even the United States was spared this conflict. In fact, it flared up there in the most violent and bloody way during the Civil War, in a clash between, on the one hand, the idea of liberty understood as self-government by the dominant class and race and, on the other, the idea of liberty that experienced increasing disquiet because of the persistence of the institution of slavery. Defeated militarily, in slightly different form, as a regime of terroristic white supremacy, the idea of liberty dear to the South ended up achieving a political success in the United States that lasted beyond the mid-twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two liberalisms we are referring to are to be construed in an ideal-typical sense: within the same author, it is possible to register fluctuation from one to the other. In condemning as contrary to liberty coalitions composed of ‘desperate men’, who sought to escape death from starvation, Smith clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the very wealthy. On the other hand, in calling for a ‘despotic government’ to abolish slavery, he was embracing a different theoretical paradigm, which identified liberty with the abolition of oppressive relations existing within civil society itself. And the great economist adhered to this second paradigm when he observed that in eastern Europe ‘serfdom’ continued to exist in ‘Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority’, and thus was not in a position to foil the resistance of feudal lords.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an observation which, albeit to a lesser extent, also applies to de Tocqueville. When he condemned the reduction of the working day in factories to twelve hours as an expression of despotism, he clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the bourgeoisie. But on other occasions the French liberal argued differently. In a letter of 1840 to an American correspondent, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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For me it is a rather melancholy reflection to think that your nation has incorporated slavery to such an extent that they expand together … In practice, there are no precedents for an abolition of slavery on the master’s initiative. It has only been abolished thanks to the power of a government that dominated master and slave alike. That is why, precisely because you are completely independent, slavery will last longer among you than anywhere else.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg280&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Rather than the locus of liberty, here self-government is the condition for the perpetuation of the evil of slavery. Only a strong government would be able to abolish it. More concerned about the stability of the United States than the freedom of blacks, de Tocqueville, unlike Smith, did not go so far as to come out in favour of a ‘despotic government’. But in the case of Ireland, the same French liberal harboured the idea of a temporary dictatorship that would put an end to the terrible ills visited on the native population by the self-government of Anglo-Irish, Protestant property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although convinced that ‘public education is salutary, above all in free countries’, Constant was firmly opposed to the introduction of compulsory schooling, since he considered unacceptable any form of ‘restriction’ that violated the ‘rights of individuals’, including ‘those of fathers over their children’. True, poverty meant that in poor families children were taken out of school and put to work early. Yet it was necessary to renounce any restrictions and wait for poverty to fade away.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of this logic, in addition to rejecting compulsory schooling, Constant did not even entertain the hypothesis of state intervention against the scourge of child labour. Some decades later, by contrast, declaring himself in favour of compulsory schooling, Mill argued against the ‘misplaced notions of liberty’ of parents and added: ‘The State … is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his [the individual’s] exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this different judgement, we see the transition from one theoretical paradigm to another; and the transition was also the result of the struggle of those who were excluded from liberty construed simply as self-government by civil society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reacting to the protests and challenge of the working-class movement, it was liberal England that regulated working hours and conditions in factories, abolishing or tempering the most odious aspects of what Marx and Engels branded as employers’ ‘despotism’. This aroused the protests of not a few liberal representatives and English capitalists themselves, who (observed &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;) ‘denounced the factory inspector as a species of revolutionary commissioner reminiscent of the [Jacobin] Convention’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Bismarck made a profession of liberalism and thundered against the ‘Royal Prussian Court Jacobin’, who claimed to interfere in the relationship between masters and servants and hence to ride roughshod over the principle of self-government by civil society, hegemonized in this instance by feudal property and not an aristocratic—bourgeois &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg281&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;coalition, as in the British case. And it was precisely the Prussian–German statesman who distinguished between two types of liberalism in this connection. The first was characterized by ‘repugnance at the power of bureaucracy’, on the basis of ‘liberal caste sentiments’ widely diffused among the Junkers and nobility of pre-revolutionary Prussia; the second, utterly odious in Bismarck’s view, was ‘Rhineland–French liberalism’, or the ‘liberalism of civil servants’ (&#039;&#039;Geheimratsliberalismus&#039;&#039;), inclined to incisive anti-feudal reforms from above, which inspired an oppressive, suffocating state bureaucracy with its ‘tendency … to levelling and centralization’ and even ‘bureaucratic omnipotence’ (&#039;&#039;geheimrätliche Allgewalt&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that a similar distinction occurs in the young Marx. The &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; edited by him defined itself as a ‘liberal paper’, but was careful to specify that its liberalism was not in any way to be confused with ‘vulgar liberalism’ (&#039;&#039;gewöhnlicher Liberalismus&#039;&#039;). While the latter saw ‘all good on the part of representative bodies and all evil on the part of government’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039;, by contrast, was characterized by its attempt to analyse relations of domination and oppression in their concrete form, without hesitating in particular circumstances to underline ‘the general wisdom of the government against the private egotism of representative bodies’ (often monopolized by feudal strata and a narrow-minded, short-sighted big bourgeoisie). Contrary to ‘vulgar liberalism’, far from fighting ‘bureaucracy one-sidedly’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; had no difficulty acknowledging the merits of its struggle against the ‘romantic’ or ‘romantic–feudal’ current.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Despite the contrasting value judgements, in both Bismarck and Marx we witness a distinction between a liberalism inclined to consecrate the self-government of a civil society hegemonized by the feudal aristocracy or grand bourgeoisie, and a liberalism ready to intervene in the relations of domination and oppression that manifest themselves within civil society itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they are located in this historical and theoretical context, we can understand two significant turns that occurred in the course of the liberal tradition. We know that, initially, the liberal/servile dichotomy had a strong social and ethnic connotation. This connotation tended to weaken as the struggle for recognition intensified and the concessions that the community of the free was forced to make became more significant. We can then understand the attempt &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg282&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by some sections of the liberal movement to differentiate between political liberalism and economic liberalism, and thus distance themselves from those (economic-liberal) sections which, crying scandal at any state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, refused to question the relations of domination and oppression present within civil society, within the ‘private sphere’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, with every significant concession that the community of the free (or its most advanced sectors) found itself obliged to make to the excluded, engaged in the struggle for recognition, there were denunciations of ‘betrayal’ from the most intransigent sectors, with a consequent laceration and division of the liberal movement. Clearly distancing himself from those who refused to follow him in the crusade against the French Revolution, in 1791 Burke, in the name of loyalty to the ‘Old Whigs’, authors of the Glorious Revolution, broke with the ‘new Whigs’, guilty of having derived ideas and ideals ‘from a French die, unknown to the impress of our fathers in the constitution’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, at the heart of the conflict was the idea of representation, which the French revolutionaries and their followers on British soil, in the name of the imaginary, ‘pretended rights of man’, interpreted in a merely quantitative sense, invoking the principle of calculating a majority by head, ignoring the special function of the aristocracy and trampling the healthy arrangement of society into estates underfoot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A century or so later, the struggle for recognition was continuing to develop in new, more advanced conditions. Over and above political citizenship, the ‘multitude’, previously branded ‘swinish’, demanded the right to health, education and a minimum of free time. It succeeded in wresting more or less sizeable concessions and enjoyed support from significant representatives of liberalism. In Britain this was true above all of T. H. Green, who theorized ‘freedom in the positive sense’ in controversy with the economic liberals of his time. They condemned state regulation of working hours in factories or of female and child labour, in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ and liberty understood exclusively as non-interference by political power in the private sphere of production and labour relations.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, responding to the attempts at adaptation and reconciliation by some sectors of liberalism were cries of scandal from the movement’s most intransigent sections. Spencer, Acton and Henry S. Maine were among the many to denounce the ‘betrayal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg283&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Spencer particularly stood out. Those who, under the pretence of improving popular living conditions, banned the employment of children under the age of twelve, forced parents to send their children to school, subjected factory work (especially female labour) to a whole variety of regulations, and introduced compulsory insurance for illness and old age had ceased to be liberals: they had arrived at a ‘New Toryism’. In effect, they were simply inflating the state, enlarging the zone of coercion and limiting that of freedom of contract and the autonomous development of the individual.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As in the case of Burke with the ‘new Whigs’, so Spencer branded the ‘New Toryism’: albeit in a different idiom, what was targeted was a spurious liberalism forgetful of its own noble past; a liberalism guilty of abandoning the cause of self-government by civil society (whether aristocratic or bourgeois) and of the spontaneity of the market, giving way to the blandishments of statism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Celebration of the spontaneity of the market, as if its historically determinate form was not the result of political action, was philosophically ingenuous enough. For centuries the market of the liberal West had involved the presence of chattel slavery and the buying and selling of indentured white servants. Even the borderline that separated commodities on the one hand, and the figure of the buyer/seller on the other, was the result of political and even military intervention, abhorred for centuries as being synonymous with artificial, violent constructivism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us ignore the peculiar ‘commodities’ long represented by slaves and indentured servants. When can the market be regarded as free of external disturbance, and hence such that the parties to any exchange find themselves in a position of liberty and equality? Locke regarded the truck-system, whereby workers were paid not in money but in commodities produced by the factory they worked in, as perfectly legitimate. In agreement with him was Frederick William III, who in 1832 silenced voices raised in protest against this system with the argument that the state did not have the right to intervene in a ‘relationship of private right’, trampling over ‘civil liberty’ or arbitrarily restricting it. For Smith, by contrast, ‘the law which obliges the masters … to pay their workmen in money and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the liberal philosopher and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg284&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prussian monarch, the great economist was of the opinion that the truck-system violated the principle of equality between the contracting parties and therefore justified legal intervention that would have seemed intolerable to Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much later liberal authors like Lecky and others condemned state regulation of working hours as an inadmissible interference in the market sphere.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In our times, by contrast, Hayek believed that the promulgation by the state of ‘general, equal, and known rules’, of ‘general conditions’ which must be fulfilled by any contract, was not in itself a violation of the principle of liberty. But the Austro-American author, who distinguished himself by thundering against any form of statism and constructivism, would have seemed statist and constructivist to Lecky, whom Hayek regarded as a classic proponent of liberalism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Potentially a traitor in the eyes of economic liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, Hayek elsewhere identified and denounced the betrayal of liberalism. Although in favour of the social state and hence aligning himself with Green, Hobhouse continued to profess himself a follower of that intellectual current. &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, read the title of his book, which in fact, according to Hayek, would more accurately have been entitled Socialism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years earlier, von Mises had reached the same conclusion: most British ‘liberals’ were ‘so in name only. In fact, they are rather moderate socialists.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The charges of treason against the wing of liberalism disposed to make concessions to colonial peoples were even more violent. In France, immediately after Thermidor, anyone who resisted the turn intended to re-establish if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy in the colonies, was branded ‘African’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States of the 1820s, arguing against abolitionist tendencies, Randolph declared that the term ‘liberal’ now risked becoming synonymous with ‘black alliance’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The polemic against the ‘black republicans’ subsequently became the guiding thread of the struggle against the abolitionist tendencies that were coagulating in Lincoln’s Republican Party, as emerges in particular from the debate which, a few years before the Civil War, pitted the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg285&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;future president against Senator Stephen A. Douglas.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In subsequent years, Lecky was among those crying treason. The brief period of interracial and multi-ethnic democracy experienced by the South—Reconstruction—was, in his view, the triumph of the ‘negro vote’ and the disappearance of ‘the influence of property and intelligence’; it was the advent, ‘under the protection of the Northern bayonets’, of ‘a hideous orgie of anarchy, violence, unrestrained corruption, undisguised, ostentatious, insulting robbery, such as the world had scarcely ever seen’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. The community of the free as a community of peace? Policing operations and colonial wars&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto concentrated on the challenges to the community of the free that might be mounted by the barbarians in the colonies or the metropolis, and on the acute crisis situations that could arise within an individual country. But what were the relations between the various countries into which the community of the free was divided? Precisely because it was inclined to repress the genesis of the conflict and situate it outside itself, it tended to present itself as the community of peace, deaf to the sirens of war and bellicose adventures, which were a pre-modern legacy, and as wholly absorbed in the production, exchange and peaceful enjoyment of the goods that constituted civilization. George Washington expressed the hope that the development of ‘free commerce’ and civilization, ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, would put a stop to ‘the devastations and horrors of war’, uniting humanity ‘like one great family in fraternal ties’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, repeated Constant, in ‘the age of commerce’ even ‘a successful war always costs more than it brings in’: having become obsolete as a tool for acquiring wealth, war was destined to disappear; ‘the uniform tendency is towards peace’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn194|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;194&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This ideal of perpetual peace, produced by freedom of industry and trade, was sometimes so deeply felt that it prompted harsh criticism of the realpolitik of war and conquest pursued, for example, by England. Thus authors like Cobden and Spencer, bitter critics of their country’s foreign and military policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg286&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In the mid-nineteenth century, the former exclaimed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been the most combative and aggressive community that has existed since the days of the Roman dominion. Since the Revolution of 1688 we have expended more than fifteen hundred millions of money upon wars, not one of which has been upon our own shores, or in defence of our hearths and homes … this pugnacious propensity has been invariably recognized by those who have studied our national character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn195|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;195&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the self-proclamation of the community of the free as a community of peace could generate a different line of argument. However pitiless, the struggle against the ‘savage beasts’ represented (in Washington’s view) by Indians was not an act of war, but a policing operation. This applied to conflicts with those peoples or, rather, those hordes that had not yet attained the stage of civilization and peace. Against barbaric pirates it was necessary to organize an expedition that ‘would crush them into non-existence’; sooner or later, it would be necessary to ‘exterminate those nests of Miscreants’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn196|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;196&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville likewise tended to liken conflict with barbarians to a policing operation. In September 1856 he expressed the fear that the clash between North and South in the United States would end up provoking ‘war in the heart of a great continent whence it has been banished for more than a century’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]). Clearly, subsumed under the category of war were neither the expeditions that had decimated and were decimating the Indians, nor the armed conflict that had involved a significant amputation of Mexican territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the growing colonial expansion of Europe, and primarily of Britain, which now also encompassed a country of ancient civilization like China, made resort to the category of policing operation problematic. On the other side, recognizing the reality of war might also play a positive role at the level of domestic policy, might serve to overshadow the worsening social conflict, and counter the vulgarly hedonistic ideology in whose wake radical and socialist agitation had developed. The ideal tension that presided over war was thus positively contrasted with the pettiness of material demands advanced by popular protest movements: ‘The masses want tranquillity and earnings’, and hence peace, but the merit of war precisely lay in throwing this philistine view of life &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg287&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into crisis, observed Burckhardt, who in this connection quoted Heraclitus’ motto (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn197|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;197&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For de Tocqueville war and ‘great events’ could form a useful antidote to ‘our mediocre democratic and bourgeois soup’, which was the breeding ground of sensualism and socialist hedonism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn198|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;198&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; forcefully asserted that ‘I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and elevates their character.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn199|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;199&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it involved an advance by the West, and hence by the cause of liberty, war revealed its true nobility and beauty. De Tocqueville expressed himself in lyrical terms on the first Opium War (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|§6]]), in a letter whose addressee was the English liberal Reeve. He in turn, on the occasion of the Crimean War (which saw England allied with Bonapartist France), expressed himself no less magniloquently in the course of correspondence with the French liberal:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We live at a time when it is necessary to know how to suffer and witness suffering. The sword of war cuts to the heart. But what a mighty influence this struggle has on the political and social body! What a unity of sentiment and endeavour it creates! What a reawakening of the forces which, after all, make up the greatness of a people. I willingly accept all the anguish and all the ills of war for what it brings morally even more than politically.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn200|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;200&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The proud self-consciousness of the community of the free and the emergence of ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
War against barbarians in the colonies, or against countries situated on the margins of civilization, had hitherto been a subject for appreciation or celebration. At first sight, no cloud seemed to trouble the unity of the community of the free. However, after having desired the extension to the entire planet of the enlightened ‘despotism’ of civilized countries, Mill continued as follows: the gigantic ‘federation’, albeit ‘unequal’, that was the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg288&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Backward populations had an interest in becoming part of the British Empire, in order to avoid ‘being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn201|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;201&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years of the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville had responded prematurely and indirectly to Mill’s claim to raise the British Empire to the status of unique, privileged representative of a universal cause. The English were characterized by&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
their constant commitment to seek to demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of a principle, or for the good of the natives, or even for the benefit of the sovereigns whom they subjugate; honest is their indignation at those who put up resistance; these are the procedures with which they always cover up violence.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn202|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;202&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
With the disappearance of the semblance of complete unity, rivalry emerged between the different countries that made up the community of the free—rivalry that became all the more intense as the liquidation of despotism and, more generally, the construction of a new political regime deemed more advanced reinforced the self-consciousness of the individual protagonists. This was soil wherein was rooted the celebration, dear to Burke, of the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. The most lucid exponents of liberalism were perfectly well aware of this. While it also made itself felt in the works of authors such as Constant and, above all, Spencer, in this intellectual tradition the illusion that the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; betokened the advent of perpetual peace did not play the role it had in the French Revolution and radicalism. A source of possible conflicts between the various countries, observed Hamilton, was not only the diversity of political orders and interests:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg289&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? … Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn203|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;203&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of the representative regime and the transfer of power from absolute monarchy to the nation were not in themselves an antidote to war. Holland and England, the first two nations to have equipped themselves with liberal orders, had turned out to be ‘frequently engaged in war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn204|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;204&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hamilton felt great admiration for Britain: ‘I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn205|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;205&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet on the level of international policy, Britain remained an enemy to be defeated. The American statesman rebuked Europe, which wanted ‘to plume herself as the Mistress of the World’ and tended ‘to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit’. This was a pretence that must be countered with force: ‘It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.’ Sooner or later, the new Union would be the one ‘able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn206|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;206&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the enemy was generically identified as Europe and the Old World, the particular reference was to Britain which at this time (1787), following France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, was the only great imperial power. Jefferson was more explicit. The ‘empire for liberty’ desired by him presupposed Britain’s defeat: not only was it called upon to be the most grand and glorious ‘since the creation’, and hence to outclass the British Empire, but it also presupposed the annexation of Canada (in addition to Cuba), ‘which would be of course in the first war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn207|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;207&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For de Tocqueville, too, shared membership of the community of the free by certain countries did not guarantee permanent relations of friendship and peace between them. In defining its foreign policy, France must not exclusively assert its ‘interest in developing the principles of liberty in the world’. Only the naive could believe that their spread meant the simultaneous disappearance of the threat of war:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg290&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Will anyone go so far as to claim that two peoples must necessarily live in peace with one another just because they have similar political institutions? That all the causes of ambition, rivalry, jealousy, all the bad memories have been abolished? Free institutions render these feelings even more vital.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn208|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;208&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; stressed that ‘[a]ll free nations are vainglorious’; the ‘restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people’ was self-evident. This was confirmed, in particular, by the transatlantic republic: ‘The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise … Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn209|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;209&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an excessive ‘national pride’, an ‘irritable patriotism’ (&#039;&#039;patriotisme irritable&#039;&#039;), which did not tolerate criticism of any kind.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn210|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;210&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a demand for primacy that sought utter exclusivity. If a foreigner admired the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by Americans, they would react by accepting the compliment, but immediately rendering it more emphatic and more exclusive: ‘few nations are worthy of it’. If a foreigner admired their ‘purity of morals’, the American interlocutor would react by denouncing ‘the corruption that prevails in other nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn211|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;211&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he turned to the international rivalry between the countries making up the community of the free and the West, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to speak harshly of the United States. Writing to an American interlocutor, and referring to attempts to expand southwards also made by ‘private’ adventurers (he was thinking of William Walker), the French liberal wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not without concern, I have seen this spirit of conquest, even of rapine, exhibited among you for some years. It is not a sign of good health in a people that already has more territory than it can fill. I confess that I could not but be sad if I came to learn that the [American] nation had embarked on an operation against Cuba or—even worse—entrusted it to its lost sons.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn212|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;212&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The American interlocutor might easily have retorted by recalling de Tocqueville’s enthusiastic support for France’s policy of ‘conquest’ and ‘rapine’ in Algeria. But the key point is different. Far from damping it down, the common waving of the flag of liberty further fuelled international rivalry. After &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg291&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the February Revolution, de Tocqueville declared that ‘starting from 1789’ France once again donned the ‘role’ of ‘saviour’ ‘of peoples whose liberty is in danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn213|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;213&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An ‘empire for liberty’ was thus evoked whose capital was Paris, and which tended to come into conflict with the ‘empire for liberty’ cherished by Jefferson.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. De Tocqueville’s ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The realism with which the most lucid representatives of the liberal tradition analysed the persistence of national rivalries, despite their shared reference to the ideal of liberty, had another aspect to it: the candid, avowed chauvinism presiding over the international policy programme. This applies to de Tocqueville in particular. The principle of consent by the governed as a criterion for legitimizing political power gave impetus to national movements in Europe as well. Prima facie, it would seem that the liberal world as a whole should have felt unequivocal sympathy for them. In this case, we are dealing not with colonial peoples, but with peoples regarded as more or less civilized, who primarily came into conflict with the Habsburg Empire—that is, a power which had remained foreign to liberal development. Yet de Tocqueville proved cool, or frankly hostile. A partial explanation of this attitude can be found in the social demands that contaminated such movements and imperilled the traditional liberal delimitation of the political sphere. The Mazzinian republic established in Rome was ‘the red republic’ and against it, and ‘the anarchical party in Rome and the rest of the world’, no blows should be spared. Ideological fury impelled the French liberal to speak of his political opponents in Italy as ‘a whole category of political criminals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn214|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;214&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville proved harsh and even cynical about one of the protagonists of the Hungarian national revolution: rather than agitating to save ‘Kossuth’s skin’, it might happily be made into a ‘drum’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn215|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;215&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above rejection of radicalism, what motivated this attitude was ‘irritable patriotism’, concerns of a chauvinistic kind, as emerges in particular from de Tocqueville’s furious polemic against ‘our imbecile agents’ in Germany, who were guilty of not countering the prospect of that country’s ‘political unification’ more firmly and effectively. Certainly, ‘the population’s passion for this idea seems sincere and profound’; but ‘nothing would be more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg292&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;frightful for us’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn216|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;216&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But did this not ride roughshod over the liberal principle of self-government and consent by the governed as a criterion of the legitimacy of any government? That was a problem de Tocqueville did not pose. He hoped for ‘the victory of the princes’ and the Prussian army to put paid to ‘excessive decentralization’ that encouraged the swarming of ‘revolutionary breeding grounds’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn217|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;217&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to Italy, chauvinistic concerns should have played a more modest role. Yet in September 1848, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville summarized his position as follows: ‘preservation of the old territories … and real, significant changes in institutions’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn218|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;218&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, there was no place for demands for national unity. And the principle of consent by the governed? Having invited the organization of ‘a &#039;&#039;Roman demonstration’&#039;&#039; in favour of restoring the Pope’s temporal power, de Tocqueville continued as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In my opinion, this is &#039;&#039;indispensable&#039;&#039;. And, in order to achieve this result, if we do not also have the reality, it is &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; necessary to produce at least the semblance. This is the only way to connect the expedition with one of the main objectives we have always assigned it and on which the National Assembly has always wished to stand firm—coming to the aid of the real will and hidden desires of the people of Rome.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn219|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;219&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage the roles of appearance and reality are reversed rapidly and inadvertently. The ‘semblance’ of a demonstration to be organized at all costs expressed the ‘hidden’ but nevertheless ‘real’ will of the Roman population, whose interpreter was the government of the occupying power. At this point it was also possible to resort to radical measures with a clear conscience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I cannot really understand why, in the twenty-four hours following the city’s capture, we did not, with utmost rapidity and energy, close the clubs, tear down the flag of the Republic, disarm the citizens and soldiers, arrest all those who, in their attitude, indicated that they disapproved of our presence [&#039;&#039;tous ceux qui faisaient mine de trouver mauvais notre présence&#039;&#039;]—in a word, strike our enemies with terror in order to conquer the terror that had gripped our friends.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn220|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;220&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg293&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;So here we have an invitation to make arrests even on the basis of mere suspicion. Not by chance, reference is made to terror. It is a term that recurs frequently; it amounts to a veritable watchword: ‘strike the demagogic party with terror and lift the liberal party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn221|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;221&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But another watchword was immediately added: ‘negate the rigours of the past, although leaving terror to waft over the future’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn222|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;222&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, European public opinion, which already felt ‘deep repulsion’ at France’s conduct, must not be unduly ruffled. Yet it was a question of ‘advancing and advancing with the most extreme rigour’; all the more so because the country’s honour was at stake. It found itself faced with a ‘terrible alternative’—a Hobson’s choice:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Either to deliver Rome over to all the horrors of war or to retreat shamefully, beaten by the same men who for eighteen months fled all the battlefields of Italy. The first would be a great misfortune, but the second would be a fearful disaster and, as far as I am concerned, I have no hesitation.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn223|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;223&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, chauvinism took priority over any other concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. The conflict of ideas of mission from the American Revolution to the First World War&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So we can understand the recurrent divisions that opened up in the community of the free. The one that occurred in the two decades preceding the foundation of the United States is illuminating. The Seven Years’ War was also experienced and fought by the English colonists in America, and in fact primarily by them, not only as a war for the defence of English liberty, but also (as the sermons of Protestant ministers never tired of repeating) as a holy war in which it was God himself who guided and saved England–Israel from the threat represented by France. The victory achieved over the enemies of Israel was proof of the ‘favourable providential presence of God with his people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;224&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years later, it was England’s turn to form the core of the alliance of the ‘enemies of God’, while the rebel American colonists continued to be ‘true Christians, good &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg294&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;soldiers of Jesus Christ’, called upon to cultivate ‘a martial spirit’ and ‘the art of war’, so as to accomplish ‘the work of the Lord’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;225&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the first major conflict to convulse the community of the free, and it spans the period that extends from the American Revolution to the war of 1812–15. As the latter was coming to an end, Jefferson expressed the opinion that Great Britain was no less despotic than Napoleon. Moreover, while the latter would take ‘his tyrannies’ to the grave with him, a whole ‘nation’ was seeking to impose its absolute domination over the seas; and it was an ‘insult to the human understanding’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;226&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Such was his ideological fury that the American statesman ended up declaring: ‘Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents from Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military and manufacturing one.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;227&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having heard the news of the end of hostilities, Jefferson wrote that it was ‘an armistice only’. So radical was the antagonism not only of interests, but also of principles, that the two countries were in fact engaged in an ‘eternal war’, which would terminate or was destined to end with the ‘extermination of the one or the other party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;228&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major conflict was the one that exploded with the American Civil War. The dialectic we have already encountered was on display once again. The fact that for decades the antagonists had regarded themselves as members of the chosen people of liberty, far from reducing the bitterness of the clash, accentuated it. Both sides were convinced that they were fighting a holy war; they appealed to Holy Scripture and half of their propaganda texts were written by ecclesiastics.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;229&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major conflict survived the second, which was eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century by the rising tide of chauvinism that invested the United States as a whole, without significant distinctions between North and South. In 1889 Kipling noted with disappointment that the 4 July celebrations in San Francisco were the occasion for official speeches against what the Americans defined as ‘our natural enemy’, represented by Great Britain ‘with her chain of fortresses across the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;230&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, this antagonism too was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg295&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;being damped down, because a completely new international situation was maturing. More than ever engaged in colonial expansion, and increasingly taken in by the idea of the freedom mission they assigned themselves in competition with one another, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the various national centres of the community of the free turned out to be on a collision course. This is the context in which we can situate the third major conflict in the history of liberalism. Starting with the First World War, in particular it saw ranged against one another Britain (and the United States) and Germany—the most recent and ambitious recruit to the community of the free, which at the end of the nineteenth century had likewise begun to cherish the idea of an empire for liberty, putting itself at the head of a crusade for the abolition of slavery in the colonies.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;231&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interpretation of the third major conflict suggested here might occasion astonishment. What obstructs an understanding of this event is the negative teleology that tends to interpret German history in its entirety as a series of stages leading inexorably to the horror of the Third Reich. In reality, on the eve of the First World War Germany was not obviously less ‘democratic’ than the United States, where racial oppression raged, or than Great Britain, which completely disregarded universal male suffrage (on which elections to the Reichstag were based), and exercised imperial domination on a global scale and even in Europe itself, at the expense of Ireland. Above all, it must not be forgotten that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in England and America, Germany was regarded as a full member of the exclusive club of free peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So the by now familiar dialectic emerges once again. Confronting one another in a total war, which required the mobilization of culture as well as armies, were antagonists who had previously congratulated one another on being members, or even especially influential members, of the community of the free—in this case, of the great Teutonic or Aryan family, united by a jealous custodianship of individual autonomy and love of self-government and liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn1a|1]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Recueil d’articles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Éphraim Harpaz, Geneva: Droz, 1972, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn2a|2]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 29–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn4a|4]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 6, p. 84; vol. 5, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn5a|5]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1981, p. 794.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn6a|6]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 155–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn8a|8]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn9a|9]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, ed. Thomas W. Copeland and John A. Woods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 7, pp. 52–3 (letter to William Weddell, 31 January 1792).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn10a|10]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 397 (letter to La Fayette, 28 May 1788), 455 (fragments of the discarded first inaugural address, April 1789)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn11a|11]] Adams, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn12a|12]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn13a|13]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., pp. 194–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn15a|15]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel de France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier&#039;&#039;, ed. Philippe Raynaud, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn16a|16]] Constant, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 183, 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn17a|17]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 7, pp. 144–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn18a|18]] James Mackintosh, &#039;&#039;Vindiciae gallicae&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Woodstock, 1989, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn19a|19]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn20a|20]] Jean-Joseph Mounier, &#039;&#039;De l’influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-maçons et aux illuminés sur la révolution de France&#039;&#039;, Tübingen: Cotta, 1801, pp. 31, 36–7, 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 33, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn22a|22]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn23a|23]] Arthur O. Lovejoy, &#039;&#039;The Great Chain of Being&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn24a|24]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn25a|25]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn27a|27]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn28a|28]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 12, p. 365 (letter to J. P. Nichol, 21 December 1837). On this see Eileen P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983, p. 606.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn29a|29]] Pasquale Villari, &#039;&#039;Dai cargeggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984, p. 151 (letter from Mill to Villari, 11 June 1862).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn30a|30]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn32a|32]] Cobden, quoted in Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 25–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn33a|33]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in Italy and France from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn34a|34]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. James Morton Smith, New York: Norton, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 1585–6 (letter to James Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn35a|35]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 382.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn36a|36]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn37a|37]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 245–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn38a|38]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn39a|39]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 21, p. 528 (letter to Edwin Chadwick, 13 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn40a|40]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 29, p. 26 (letter from Engels to Marx, 23 May 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 496 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 17 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 18, p. 424 (letter to A. de Circourt, 25 October 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn43a|43]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, London: Penguin, 1986, pp. 301–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 4, pp. 273–4, 266, 300–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn45a|45]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn48a|48]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, pp. 253, 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn49a|49]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 223, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., pp. 224, 242.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn52a|52]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn53a|53]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 215–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn54a|54]] Boissy d’Anglas, quoted in Georges Lefebvre, &#039;&#039;La France sous le Directoire&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1984, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn55a|55]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 2, p. 70 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 21 February 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn57a|57]] Ibid. vol. 4, pt 1, p. 321.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn58a|58]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 281.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn59a|59]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn60a|60]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Principles of Ethics&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Tibor R. Machan, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn61a|61]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 2, 21, 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn62a|62]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 309–19 (for the quotation from Lincoln, see p. 312).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn63a|63]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn64a|64]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 131.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn65a|65]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn66a|66]] Giuseppe Mazzini, &#039;&#039;Note autobiografiche&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Pertici, Milan: Rizzoli, 1986, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn67a|67]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 234 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn68a|68]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn69a|69]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 863.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn72a|72]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 11, p. 392 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn73a|73]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn74a|74]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 64; William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 5, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn76a|76]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 19 August and 14 October 1856); Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, p. xviii; and on Guizot, cf. Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 331–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn79a|79]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 437 (letter of 14 December 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn80a|80]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 101 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 10 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn86a|86]] François-Alphonse Aulard, &#039;&#039;Histoire politique de la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1977, p. 19 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn87a|87]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 4, pp. 65, 100, 140; vol. 5, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn88a|88]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 268–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn90a|90]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 57–8 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 5 October 1828).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 64, 67–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 124–5, 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn93a|93]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 15, pt 1, p. 342 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn95a|95]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 20, pp. 319–63; and vol. 2, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn97a|97]] Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Britannica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 2, p. 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn98a|98]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 55 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn99a|99]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn100a|100]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 322–3 (letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn101a|101]] Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, pp. 393–6, 409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn102a|102]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 78, 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn103a|103]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 229 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 6 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn104a|104]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 159 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 14 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 29 August and 14 October 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 272–4 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 29 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn108a|108]] Ernst Nolte, &#039;&#039;Three Faces of Fascism&#039;&#039;, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Mentor, 1969, p. 635 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 55 n. 1 and 22 n. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn110a|110]] Arthur de Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie de Paris, vol. 1, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn111a|111]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn113a|113]] Ibid., pp. 235, 234.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn114a|114]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 103, 167; Hume, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn115a|115]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn116a|116]] David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn117a|117]] Chamberlain, quoted in Henry Kissinger, &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1994, p. 186.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn118a|118]] Alfred Thayer Mahan, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Asia&#039;&#039;, New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 125–6; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, pp. 55–7, 48–50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn119a|119]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 41ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 536–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn121a|121]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn122a|122]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, p. 322 (letter to Kentaro Kaneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn123a|123]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn124a|124]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn125a|125]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1847, vol. 1, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn126a|126]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn127a|127]] Ibid., pp. 508–9, 553.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn128a|128]] Ibid., p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn129a|129]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn130a|130]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 361.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn131a|131]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, pp. 221, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn132a|132]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn133a|133]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn134a|134]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 260–1 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 20 March 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn135a|135]] See Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 520–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn136a|136]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The History of Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, Natalie Gerardie and Mirian Kochan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974–75, vol. 3, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn137a|137]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 280 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 24 January 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn138a|138]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, pp. 151–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn140a|140]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, pp. 154–5 (letter to E. Cazelles, 3 May 1871).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn141a|141]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 305 (letter of 21 March 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 20, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn143a|143]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 348–9; vol. 13, pt 2, pp. 337–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn144a|144]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn145a|145]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14, 84, 194; Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn146a|146]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn147a|147]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn148a|148]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn149a|149]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn150a|150]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 211, 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn151a|151]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 75, 50–51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn152a|152]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 169–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn153a|153]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn154a|154]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn156a|156]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn157a|157]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 102.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn158a|158]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 18–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn160a|160]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn161a|161]] Burke, quoted in Johannes Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These von der Verschwörung&#039;&#039;, Bern and Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1976, p. 111 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn162a|162]] See Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn163a|163]] Cf. Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These&#039;&#039;, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn164a|164]] Disraeli, quoted in George E. Buckle and William F. Monypenny, &#039;&#039;The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, New York: Macmillan, 1914–20, vol. 3, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn165a|165]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn166a|166]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn167a|167]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 497–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn168a|168]] Ibid., p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn169a|169]] Malouet, quoted in Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn170a|170]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 38 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn172a|172]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 455.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn173a|173]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 83 (letter to J. Sparks, 13 October 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn174a|174]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn175a|175]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 159–60, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn176a|176]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 396.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn177a|177]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Die großen Reden&#039;&#039;, ed. Lothar Gall, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1984, p. 137; Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Werke in Auswahl&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, ed. Gustave Adolf Rein, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, p. 354 (speeches in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 18 October 1849 and 14 February 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn178a|178]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 424.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn179a|179]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn180a|180]] See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 89, 248, 257, 220, 228.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn181a|181]] Thomas Hill Green, ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard L. Nettleship, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1973, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn182a|182]] George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classsics, 1981; Henry S. Maine, &#039;&#039;Popular Government&#039;&#039;, ed. George W. Carey, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn183a|183]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 5–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn184a|184]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 3, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn185a|185]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn186a|186]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 230, 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn187a|187]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Conceit&#039;&#039;, ed. William Warren Bartley III, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn188a|188]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. xviii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn189a|189]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 262–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn190a|190]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn191a|191]] Cf. Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 498–504 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn192a|192]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn193a|193]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, p. 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn194a|194]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn195a|195]] Cobden, quoted in Daniel Pick, &#039;&#039;War Machine&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn196a|196]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, p. 401 (letter to La Fayette, 19 June 1788).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn197a|197]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, pp. 150, 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn198a|198]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, p. 421 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 9 August 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn199a|199]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn200a|200]] Reeve, quoted in de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn201a|201]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn202a|202]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 505.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn203a|203]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn204a|204]] Ibid., p. 180.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn205a|205]] Hamilton, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, ed., &#039;&#039;Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn206a|206]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn207a|207]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1586 (letter to Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn208a|208]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn209a|209]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 225–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn210a|210]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn211a|211]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 225.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn212a|212]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 147 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 4 December 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn213a|213]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn214a|214]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 249, 277, 399 (letters to F. de Corcelle, 10 and 20 June and 12 September 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn215a|215]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 92 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 January 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn216a|216]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 29, 38 (letters to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August and 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn217a|217]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 133–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 18 May 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn218a|218]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn219a|219]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 276 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 20 June 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn220a|220]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn221a|221]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn222a|222]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 294 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 2 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn223a|223]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 293 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224a|224]] Ellis Sandoz, ed., &#039;&#039;Political Sermons of the American Founding Era&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991, pp. 216–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225a|225]] Ibid., pp. 623–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226a|226]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 1272–3 (letter to Madame de Staël, 24 May 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227a|227]] Ibid., p. 1357 (letter to William Short, 28 November 1814).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228a|228]] Ibid., p. 1366 (letter to La Fayette, 14 February 1815).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229a|229]] Eugene D. Genovese, ‘Religion in the Collapse of the American Union’, in Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds, &#039;&#039;Religion and the American Civil War&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 74–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230a|230]] Kipling, quoted in Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, p. 322.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231a|231]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 17, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER NINE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page296&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg297&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Historiography and hagiography&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Our history of liberalism ends with the outbreak of the First World War, when (according to Weber) even in countries with the most stable liberal tradition the state was assigned ‘ “legitimate” power over the life, death and liberty’ of individuals, and ‘unlimited disposition over all the economic goods accessible to it’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, as Furet puts it, ‘in virtually all of Europe, the canons of August 1914 literally and metaphorically buried liberty in the name of country’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is appropriate to take a look back from this watershed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following the prelude of the revolt against Philip II’s absolutism by the Netherlands, liberalism asserted itself in two counties so positioned that they were sheltered from the threats to which continental European states were exposed. It should be added that, not by chance, the Glorious Revolution succeeded England’s victory first over Spain and then over France, while the American colonists’ revolt only began with the defeat of France in the Seven Years’ War. Thus, the two liberal revolutions both presupposed a clear improvement in the geopolitical situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards continental Europe, we can distinguish two phases: after the defeat of Turkey at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and the fading of the Ottoman threat, criticism of absolutism became widespread. The second phase was the so-called hundred years’ peace, which extended from the end of the Napoleonic &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg298&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This was the period when liberalism also asserted itself at a concrete political level. And just as the institutions that emerged from the 1789 revolution did not survive the war which engulfed revolutionary France, from 1914 the liberal institutions that had flourished in continental Europe during the hundred years’ peace experienced a dramatic crisis. Taken as a whole, as well as enjoying a more or less high degree of peace and geopolitical security, the liberal countries had another characteristic in common: in the period under investigation here, they had marked possibilities of defusing politico-social conflict in the metropolis through colonial expansion, whether continentally or overseas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the epochal rupture of 1914 there erupted in all its horror the second Thirty Years’ War, as the two global conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, separated by a fragile armistice, have often been defined. What is the relationship between all this and the preceding historical period? Or are we to believe that there is no relationship and that the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; came to an unanticipated end, brought about exclusively by circumstances altogether foreign to the liberal West? This is the conclusion that seems to be suggested by an eminent English historian of the modern world, A. J. P. Taylor:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit … Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service … It left the adult citizen alone.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Citing this picture, already problematic enough in itself, a contemporary British liberal scholar elevates it into ‘the historical paradigm of a liberal civilization’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, a couple of pages later, Taylor himself observes that ‘[s]ome 50 million Africans and 250 million Indians were involved, without consultation, in a war of which they understood nothing’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us ignore the colonies, and even Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom and experienced such political and military oppression from the London government that it was (again in Taylor’s words) the protagonist of ‘the only national rebellion in any &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg299&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;European country during the First World War—an ironical comment on the British claim to be fighting for freedom’ and to represent the cause of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for England specifically, I do not know if Cobden ‘noticed’ the state that inspected his mail, but it was certainly on its guard against a citizen who was unquestionably ‘sensible and law-abiding’, but whose fault was to be suspected of Chartist sympathies.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the state even more readily ‘noticed’ the Chartism and the working-class movement in general, which faced repeated suspension of habeas corpus and recourse to the use of &#039;&#039;agents provocateurs&#039;&#039; who elicited horror not only in the liberal Constant, but also in a ‘statist’ like Hegel.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the England of the time, ‘a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers’ was at work.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even the contrast with the continent as regards military conscription is mistaken: this had already made its appearance some years earlier in the United States during the Civil War and, in order to impose it, Lincoln, putting down violent resistance, had no hesitation in having an army corps march on New York.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Military conscription was not a practice imposed on the liberal world from without, from the continent!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historiography tends to shade into hagiography. I use this term in a technical sense: it involves a discourse completely focused on what, for the community of the free, was the restricted sacred space. It is enough, however briefly, to introduce the profane space (slaves in the colonies and servants in the metropolis) into the analysis, to realize the inadequate, misleading character of the categories (absolute pre-eminence of individual liberty, anti-statism, individualism) generally used to trace the history of the liberal West. Was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain the land of religious freedom? Referring to Ireland, the liberal de Beaumont, who was de Tocqueville’s companion during his trip to America, spoke of ‘unimaginable religious oppression’. We are dealing with a people not only deprived of its ‘religious freedom’, but also forced, notwithstanding its poverty, to subsidize the wealthy Anglican Church that oppressed it with tithes. The vexations, humiliations and suffering inflicted by British ‘tyranny’ on this ‘slave people’ proved that ‘a degree of egotism and madness is present in human institutions whose limits cannot be defined’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg300&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But let us concentrate on the metropolis. Celebrating the individualism and anti-statism attributed to the liberal tradition, Hayek pays homage to Mandeville, for whom the ‘arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In truth, the author elevated into a model here was not only completely undisturbed by the spectacle of hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’, but invoked summary trials and an acceleration in death sentences—and demanded state intervention even in the private life of these poor people, on whom the observance of Sunday worship should be imposed from infancy (see above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). It is clear that what held Hayek’s attention was neither the colonies nor metropolitan servants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Things do not fall out right even if such neglect is regarded as innocuous. The experience of the British colonies in America that subsequently became the United States is particularly revealing. Servile, semi-servile and free labourpower came from across the Atlantic in ways and in accordance with rules fixed by the political authorities, which also played a decisive role in delimiting the area opened up to colonization from time to time. The slavery or marginalization and degradation imposed on blacks ended up impinging on the ‘modern liberty’ of the whites themselves—and so seriously that the wrong choice of sexual or marriage partner risked transforming the culprit into a ‘felon’, a traitor to his own country and race! The white population as a whole, and slave-owners themselves, were subject to a whole series of laws that gravely interfered in even the most intimate aspect of private life. The political authorities exercised comprehensive surveillance so that miscegenation and, above all, the potential fruit of such noxious mixing did not lead to emancipation and did not threaten the purity of the community of the free with its false presence. It was a crime to give or even merely furnish writing materials to slaves. The postal administration prevented the circulation of materials vaguely critical of the institution of slavery. In the South a climate of terror reigned over citizens suspected of harbouring abolitionist ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the race issue and the dark cloud it suspended over the civil rights of the white community itself. We can take a key state in the history of the North American revolution and republic: ‘Pennsylvania was … renowned in the nineteenth century for its stringent laws against blasphemy, profanity, and desecrating the sabbath’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Independently of the prohibition of miscegenation, which remained in force beyond the mid-twentieth century, sexual &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg301&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;freedom in the United States was restricted in ways that were largely foreign to the despised, ‘statist’ continental Europe. Here is the picture drawn in 2003 by a distinguished US newspaper:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All 50 states had laws banning sodomy until 1961 … The number had dwindled to 24 states by 1968 and stands at 13 today … Most of the remaining states with anti-sodomy laws forbid anal or oral sex among consenting adults no matter their sex or relationship.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
To this we must add the constitutional amendment of 1919 that sought to prevent the production and consumption of ‘intoxicating liquors’—a further intervention in the private life of citizens with few parallels in other Western countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the history of the English colonies in America and then of the United States—both classical countries of the liberal tradition are thus involved to differing degrees—is better explained by the complexity of the process of constructing and protecting the sacred space, than by the categories of anti-statism and individualism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The liberal revolution as a tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once the field of hagiography has been evacuated, in reconstructing the history of liberalism it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: ‘We won’t be their Negroes!’ On the one hand, the rebellion began by demanding equality, while on the other it reasserted inequality and further deepened it. The two demands were indissolubly linked: precisely because they established a marked superiority over blacks and Indians, the colonists felt themselves completely equal to gentlemen and property-owners residing in London, and demanded that such equality be recognized and consecrated at every level. The dialectic that issued in the Glorious Revolution was not very different. We have seen an exponent of English proto-liberalism demanding, in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of his own possessions and servants. Far from questioning it, ‘true liberty’ consecrated the existing relations of service (and, in the colonies, slavery) as belonging to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg302&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an inviolable private sphere. The equality property-owners demanded with the sovereign, who could now be nothing but &#039;&#039;primus inter pares&#039;&#039;, went hand in hand with the reification of servants, who tended to be likened to other objects of property. That is why liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we should analyse as a whole the three revolutions from which we started out. Of the first, which occurred in Holland, Huizinga observed that ‘the revolt against the Spanish government was a conservative revolution and could not have been otherwise’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same conclusion has been reached by other eminent historians. Philip II was concerned to ‘require that bishops be technically skilled (that is, theologians rather than sons of great lords)’ and was opposed to the nobility’s attempt to transform the Council of State into ‘an exclusively aristocratic executive body’. We can then understand that ‘large parts of the “Netherlands” nobility were suddenly afraid that the prince was not their &#039;&#039;agent&#039;&#039;, that his policies would in the short and medium run threaten their interests significantly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So, on the one hand, we have Philip II, who surrounded himself with ‘secretaries who were generally from modest origins, passive instruments of his will’; on the other, ‘an oligarchic princely republic of communal cities and feudal lordships’, a ‘grand aristocracy’, a ‘feudal oligarchy’ engaged in defending ‘privileges and customs’ that consecrated its power and prestige.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is as if the nobles of the Netherlands, like large English property-owners and the English colonists in America subsequently, declared: ‘We don’t want to be treated as your servants!’ In its initial stages, the revolt against Philip II was not very different from the contemporaneous agitation of the Fronde in France.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, what ignited the powder was the clash between the high nobility’s autonomist and in some sense liberal aspirations and the Crown’s centralizing tendencies—except that, in the second case, the influence of the struggle for national independence and the intervention of the popular masses in it profoundly altered the initial picture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen the impetus given by the Glorious Revolution to the slave trade and the development of racial slavery in the colonies. The aspect of dis-emancipation also emerges with clarity in Ireland. Systematic expropriation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg303&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the natives intensified; in 1688 Catholics still owned 22 per cent of Irish land, but the figure fell to ‘14 per cent in 1703 and a mere 5 per cent in 1778’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that is not all: ‘Catholics—the overwhelming majority of the Irish population—were excluded from all public offices and from the legal profession.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England itself, the Glorious Revolution swept away the obstacles that still stood in the way of enclosures. As Marx put it, having attained full control of power, land-owners and capitalists ‘inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale the thefts of state lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the extent that rural labourers had found an ear more or less attentive to their lamentations, it was from the Stuart monarchy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Up to 1688, by dint of the control over them exercised from above, Justices of the Peace had some autonomy from the landed aristocracy. They subsequently lost it, becoming ‘virtual dictators of local government’ and answering only to the members of their own class who sat in parliament.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, we must not lose sight of the incredible increase in the number of crimes against property that carried the death penalty, with the establishment of a regime of terror over the popular masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dimension of dis-emancipation is even more obvious in the American Revolution. The terms in which Theodore Roosevelt celebrated it at the start of the twentieth century are revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief factor in producing the Revolution, and later in producing the War of 1812, was the inability of the motherland country to understand that the freemen who went forth to conquer a continent should be encouraged in that work … The spread of the hardy, venturesome backwoodsmen was to most of the statesmen of London a matter of anxiety rather than of pride, and the famous Quebec Act of 1774 was in part designed with the purpose of keeping the English-speaking settlements permanently east of the Alleghanies, and preserving the mighty and beautiful valley of the Ohio as a hunting-ground for savages …[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg304&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Indians was dramatically hastened by the foundation of the United States.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Great Britain’s interests in its transatlantic possessions were commercial rather than territorial; and, as we know, it was loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada who accused the insurgents of a systematic policy of genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Indians gained nothing from the American Revolution, what about blacks? The foundation of the United States involved the advent of a racial state and an unprecedented consolidation of racial chattel slavery. It is true that, in line with the watchword of the struggle against (political) slavery advanced during the revolt against Britain, the Northern states abolished slavery in the strict sense. But blacks did not thereby acquire freedom, confined as they were to a ‘caste’ different from that of freemen. In any event, there is a fact that provides food for thought: Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1834, while it survived in the United States for another three decades. Even the condition of free blacks was worse there, for example, than in Canada. In that British colony between 1850 and 1860, 20,000 blacks found refuge who had abandoned the United States, where they feared that laws on the return of fugitive slaves to their legitimate owners might furnish pretexts for the enslavement even of free blacks. But already, some decades earlier, more than a thousand black slaves had sought refuge in Canada after their delegation had been benevolently received by the local authorities with a stinging polemic against the United States: ‘Tell the Republicans on your side of the line that we royalists do not know men by their colour. Should you come to us you will be entitled to all the privileges of the rest of His Majesty’s subjects.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this declaration was not free from an ideological, self-serving element. But it remains the case that blacks in the US looked to Canada as the promised land of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most significant steps in the expansion of the United States simultaneously sealed the extension of the democracy and domination, in its harshest forms, of the ‘master race’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1803 Napoleon sold Louisiana. Although already in force, slavery had not yet assumed a clearly racial form. There were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg305&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;20,000 half-castes, who to all intents and purposes were free and sometimes engaged in the liberal professions. They might even be very wealthy, and thus form part of the dominant elite. Transfer to the United States involved the consecration of local self-government and the power, in the final analysis, of white property-owners (French and Anglo-American). The result was a deterioration in the conditions not only of slaves—emancipation became increasingly difficult—but, above all, of freemen of colour. Their numbers diminished in absolute terms, and even more appreciably in percentage terms (their immigration was discouraged, while that of whites was encouraged). Hit by a series of discriminatory measures, freemen of colour now began to form an intermediate caste closer to slaves than freemen proper. In Louisiana, annexed to the United States, the twin birth of free representative bodies and racial chattel slavery was also seen in due course.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A new, considerable expansion of US territory occurred some decades later with the drastic amputation of Mexico. We already know about the introduction of slavery into Texas. But even more significant was the tragedy that struck the Indians in both Texas and California. Subjected to forced labour and a thinly disguised slavery, their children in effect became &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;. Particularly desirable were young girls because, as a local paper put it, they served the dual purpose of ‘work and lust’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was only one chapter in a horrific story: ‘The destruction and degradation of the California Indians is one of the sorriest blotches on the honor and intelligence of a nation. It was less a matter of war than of “sport”.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;and comparativism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Viewed comparatively and from the perspective of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, the American Revolution appears as the start of a long series of attempts by white colonists to rid themselves of the obstacle represented by central power, whether ecclesiastical or monarchical. In 1537 Pope Paul III declared that the sacraments must be forbidden to colonists who, denying the humanity of Indians, reduced them to slavery. ‘Moralistic interference’ was also carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Thus, a ‘continuing tension between slavery and Christian ideals’ made itself felt. But the colonists, for whom forced labour was an &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg306&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unavoidable necessity, responded by expelling the Jesuits from Brazil or provoking veritable ‘colonial insurrections’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the first rebellions by black slaves tended to appeal to the Crown and to look to central government for a counter-weight to the despotism of local masters.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for British America, the revolt that developed in Virginia a century before the American Revolution, and which was led by Nathaniel Bacon, must be borne in mind. While on the one hand targeting the privileges of the governing faction, on the other the rebels ‘demanded land, without regard to the rights or needs of the border Indians’, who in fact were exterminated in some instances.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conflicts that subsequently emerged in the American Revolution are present here &#039;&#039;in nuce:&#039;&#039; on the one hand, the polemic against central government arrogance and interference; on the other, the demand for complete freedom vis-à-vis ‘savages’. And in fact, when we read in Bacon’s manifesto his denunciation of the collusion, in the course of the struggle against the champions of liberty, between the governor of Virginia and the ‘barbarous’, bloodthirsty Indians,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we are reminded of the Declaration of Independence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know that the French and English colonists also waved the flag of self-government, independence and imitation of the US model against the policy of emancipating slaves, for which they criticized the central political power. But events in Southern Africa are especially significant. Here, too, whether the colonies were controlled by the Dutch or British, the development of self-government by civil society went hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of racial slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolts erupted which, in the name of liberty and the struggle against despotism, denounced interference by central government and its claim to limit the right of masters to punish their slaves.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The civil society referred to was, obviously, the white community. The natives were descendants of Ham, condemned to perpetual slavery by the Old Testament, or were assimilated to the inhabitants of Canaan, doomed to destruction by the chosen people, the Boer settlers who embodied the cause of liberty and self-government.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg307&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The crucial question posed by eminent US historians in connection with the English colonists’ revolt in America is thus wholly understandable: Was the ‘movement of political emancipation by a section of the white settlers against control from England’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] really a revolution? Or are we dealing with ‘a reactionary slaveholders’ rebellion’? In the case of the South at least, this was the principal aspect: ‘With the threat of British interference removed and a relatively weak central government to contend with, the road to regional power lay open before the slaveholders, who constituted the only class capable of treading it.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A not dissimilar conclusion has been reached on the basis of an analysis of the relationship the Union as a whole had with the Indians: the American Revolution ‘had some of the character of a white settlers’ revolt against imperial policy’, which afforded relative protection to the natives.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can draw a comparison between the role played by the ‘redskin question’ in the colonists’ rebellion that issued in the American Revolution and the part the ‘negro question’ played in the sparking off the Civil War:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]he British authorities prior to 1776, by promulgating regulations restricting the colonists’ geographic expansion beyond the Appalachians, also alienated wealthy planters and merchants with speculative investments in western territory, as well as less affluent farmers who hoped for a new and inexpensive start on fresh lands … In 1860–61, when a newly elected Republican administration promised to prohibit the further westward expansion of slavery, the response from most white Southerners was another revolution for political autonomy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If this is the case, the history of the United States is characterized by two reactionary secessions (or secessions with more or less strong reactionary components), the one victorious, the other defeated. And, although defeated, the second would be situated in a line of substantial continuity with the first.&lt;br /&gt;
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The triumphal rise of the United States created an ideological climate in which, when reconstructing the American Revolution, historians tended to identify directly and naively with the rebel colonists’ arguments. But today it is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg308&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inadmissible to continue to ignore the voices of their opponents, in particular those (for example, Samuel Johnson and Josiah Tucker) who from the outset highlighted the significance of the black and Indian questions in the divisions that occurred between the two shores of the Atlantic. When the subsequent clash between the two sections of the Union loomed, claiming the legacy of the American Revolution were also, and perhaps primarily, the theorists of the South. Calhoun referred to Washington the ‘slave-owner’. An utterly instrumental attitude? It was in fact endorsed by the most radical currents in abolitionism, which had no hesitation in publicly burning a Constitution branded as intrinsically pro-slavery and hence, ultimately, satanic. In their interpretation of the American Revolution, Calhoun and Garrison in a way vindicated Johnson and Tucker. Just as the Declaration of Independence accused George III of seeking to incite black slaves against the colonists, so the Confederacy accused Lincoln of wanting to provoke a slave war in the South. In both cases the rebels criticized central political power for misunderstanding the self-government that was due to free, civilized men and for attempting to erase the boundary line between civilization and barbarism. Not by chance, the attempted secession could count on passionate support from prominent representatives of the liberal world and culture even in England. One thinks, in particular, of Lord Acton, who to the end believed he was supporting an authentic, great liberal revolution, just as the leaders of the secessionist, slaveholding South thought they were promoting an authentic, great liberal revolution (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further developing a comparative perspective and the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, it might be observed that in the twentieth century the process of decolonization was itself accompanied by secessionist movements, initiated by colonists who sought to maintain control over the natives and colonial populations in general, waving the flag of self-government and continuing to be inspired by the model of ‘master-race democracy’—one thinks, in particular, of South Africa and Rhodesia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039; and a comparative perspective that expose the reductive, misleading character of the view which conceives the American Revolution as a mere ‘reactionary rebellion’. To begin with, we are dealing with a more general problem. We find Marx defining the Glorious Revolution as a ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, thanks to which the English landed aristocracy succeeded in consolidating its domination over the unfortunate Irish (the Indians and blacks of the situation) and giving impetus to the enclosure of common land and the expulsion of the peasantry. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the other side of the coin. The conquest of self-government by civil society had a genuine revolutionary significance. Liberated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg309&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from an arbitrary power, the members of the class that had assumed power granted one another liberty and respect for the rules, with the construction of the constitutional state and the advent of the liberal rule of law. The first to achieve this novel phenomenon were precisely the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, which therefore cannot be put on the same level as subsequent historical movements inspired by them. In other words, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that characterized the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution subsequently saw the second aspect prevail ever more markedly.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Realization of the rule of law within the sacred space and the widening of the gulf with the profane space&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented in the metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘original capitalist accumulation’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Against monarchical despotism and central power, this class demanded self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law. We can then say that this liberalism was the intellectual tradition which most rigorously circumscribed a restricted sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power obtained. It was an intellectual tradition characterized more by celebration of the community of free individuals that defined the sacred space than by celebration of liberty or the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident, the classical countries of the liberal tradition were those where, through Puritanism, the Old Testament had the deepest impact. This already applies to the Dutch Revolution or, at least, to the Boers of Dutch origin, who identified themselves with the ‘chosen people’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it applies a fortiori to England. Especially from the Reformation, the English regarded themselves as the new Israel, ‘the people chosen by the Almighty for a special and at the same time a universal mission’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideology and missionary consciousness were diffused, in accentuated form, across the Atlantic. It is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg310&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enough to think of Jefferson, who suggested that the US coat of arms should represent the children of Israel guided by a ray of light.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the distinction between sacred space and profane space is seen in all its radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Old Testament beloved of the dominant elite, which liked to identify with the chosen people that conquered Canaan and destroyed its inhabitants, or which recruited its slaves from gentiles, two strict, drastic delimitations are operative. Anthropocentrism sharply separates from circumambient nature the human world, wherein an absolutely privileged and unique role is reserved for the ‘chosen people’. The sacred space, the tiny sacred island, is thus delimited with the utmost clarity from the infinite profane space. We might say that outside the chosen people everything tended to be reduced to deconsecrated nature, within whose orbit also came the populations condemned by Jehovah to be wiped off the face of the earth. The destruction fell upon ‘both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass’; or, in more pregnant terms, ‘all the souls’, ‘all that breathed’, ‘all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the specifically profane space, the distinction between man and nature does not seem to emerge, or does not play a prominent role.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the exclusive restriction of the sacred space also performs an enormously positive function. Among the chosen people specific rules are in force, so that there is room for servitude but not for slavery in the strict sense. Thousands of years later, this was the viewpoint of Locke who, explicitly appealing to the Old Testament, distinguished between the servitude of wage-labourers (in the metropolis) and slavery in the colonies. And the continuity turns out to be even more striking when we bear in mind that destined for slavery were blacks, whom the theology and ideology of the time regarded as the descendants of Ham and Canaan, condemned in perpetuity by Noah, according to Genesis, to wear chains.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at a paradoxical result, at least with respect to the dominant ideology. The West is at once the culture which most rigorously and effectively theorizes and practises the limitation of power, and which, with the greatest success and on the largest scale, is engaged in the development of chattel slavery—an institution that involves the full deployment of the master’s power over slaves reduced to chattels and ‘nature’. And this paradox is exhibited in especially striking fashion precisely in the countries with the most established liberal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg311&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Certainly, already within Judaism the exclusivist pathos of the sacred space tended to take the form of a universalism that relied sometimes on the subjugation (or destruction) of the profane, and sometimes on its co-option. As becomes apparent above all in post-exile Judaism, the absolute transcendence of Jehovah prompted a process of de-naturalization of the sacred space/profane space dichotomy. The mobility of borders, and hence the possibility of effecting co-options within the sacred space and civilization, applies a fortiori to the Puritans and the liberal tradition, which inherited Judaism filtered through Christianity. On the other hand, the albeit partial amplification of the sacred space was a necessary response to the struggles waged by the excluded, who often derived different motifs from the Old Testament opposed to those dear to the dominant elite. They were inspired by the story of the people reduced to slavery in a foreign land who finally managed to free themselves from the Pharaoh’s domination. This was the ideology that inspired the slave revolt which broke out in 1800 in Virginia, whose leader posed as a new Moses.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The slaves’ ability to derive justifications for rebellion from the dominant culture itself led property-owners to regard even religious education with suspicion.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. Delimitation of the sacred space and theorization of a planetary dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space. The element of regression in this is clear. A comparison will suffice to account for it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the most exalted texts of its culture, Europe long strove to maintain a lucid and self-critical view of itself, refusing to allow itself to be intoxicated and carried away by euphoria on account of the irresistible march begun with the discovery–conquest of America. And this approach continued to display its vitality in the Enlightenment and the culture that became part of the inheritance of French radicalism. Let us read Raynal and Diderot: ‘The conquistadores’ first steps were marked by rivers of blood … In the inebriation of their success, they took the decision to exterminate those they had robbed. Countless people vanished from the face of the earth on the arrival of these barbarians’, who took to ‘treating the brothers they had just discovered without remorse, as they treated the wild beasts of the old hemisphere’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg312&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;extermination of the Indians was rounded off with condemnation of the trade in slaves called upon to replace them as labour.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, it was not only in the New World that the ‘European barbarians’ stained themselves with genocide;[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the ‘unhappy Hottentots’ likewise suffered a ‘pitiless’ massacre.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to the colonial conquest, Louis-Sébastien Mercier drew attention to further dark pages in Europe’s history in the second half of the French eighteenth century. His utopian novel imagined a ‘singular monument’ in which ‘the nations represented … asked humanity’s pardon’ for the cruelty shown by them. Along with the genocide of the Indians, the expiatory monument recalled forced labour, or ‘the slow torture of so many unfortunates condemned to the mines’, and the subsequent black slave trade symbolized by ‘numerous mutilated slaves’. Incontestably responsible for all this were ‘the Europeans’, also charged with ‘the atrocity of the crusades’, ‘the horrible Saint Bartholomew’s night’ and the wars of religion.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, let us now observe the way Edgar Quinet argues. In 1845, sketching in broad outline the history of the West, the French liberal historian came to the Spanish conquest of America. He could not ignore the extermination of the indigenous populations, but hit upon an explanation that was simultaneously ingenuous and reassuring. True, it had been carried out by Spain, a country that was an integral part of the West. But at the time Spain had experienced a decisive influx of the culture and religion of Islam, which was thus the actual, if indirect, executioner of the Indians.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same line of argument was adopted for other black pages in the West’s history. Had not the Inquisition had its centre in a Spain widely influenced by barbarians? And as to the crusade that destroyed the Albigensian heretics, without distinction of age and sex, was it not perhaps prepared by the prayers of the Spaniard San Domenico di Guzmán?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Via Spain, all signs pointed to Islam, at whose door could be laid even the Crusades, which precisely had as their stated target the Muslim ‘infidels’. Quinet passed judgement: ‘In the Crusades the Catholic Church enacted the principle of Islamism: extermination.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg313&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But not only Islam was stigmatized as synonymous with barbarism. European high culture had long regarded China with curiosity and interest. Where were the wars of religion that had covered Europe with blood? They were prevented by a religion that shunned mystery and dogma, resolving itself into an ethics.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; it was easier to recognize themselves in the mandarins than the Catholic clergy or Protestant ministers. The importance of the role played by a layer of secular intellectuals in the great Asiatic country was confirmed by the fact that the highest administrative public offices were often allocated through public competition, rather than being the monopoly (as in France) of a titled aristocracy, allied and intertwined with the clergy. In any event, in China the secular, modern principle of merit prevailed over the obscurantist principle of privilege based on birth and blood. The Enlightenment’s sympathetic attention to non-European cultures, employed as a critical mirror of Europe, became a charge in the indictment drawn up by de Tocqueville: the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; had turned for a ‘model’ to China, ‘[t]hat unenlightened, barbarian government which lets itself be manipulated at will by a handful of Europeans’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The feudal aristocracy’s prevalence in Europe was also the prevalence of bellicose values, while China (observed Leibniz, an author already completely infused with the pathos of Enlightenment) was distinguished by its aversion to anything that ‘creates or nourishes ferocity in men’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby constituting a reference point for &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; engaged in criticizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;‘s privy wars. Thus the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; applauded the pacific spirit exhibited by Chinese culture.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this became off-key at the moment of the triumph of colonial expansionism. And so in de Tocqueville, corresponding to the celebration of war as an expression of the nation’s grandeur and an antidote to the socialist movement’s vulgar hedonism, we find an intensification of the indictment against China, also reproved for its unwarlike character. The French liberal displayed his contempt for a country whose army enjoyed ‘peacefully scraping a living’, overwhelmed as it was by the ‘general softness of ideas and desires’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, all this facilitated the conquest of China: ‘It would be &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg314&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;difficult for me to console myself if, before dying, I did not see China opened and the eye of Europe penetrate there with its arms’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now there was nothing to be learnt from non-European civilizations. In 1835 Macaulay declared that ‘a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, we can understand the indifference with which the destruction of the Summer Palace, in all its incomparable beauty, by English and French troops during the second Opium War was viewed. Expressing his indignation was Victor Hugo: ‘We Europeans are the civilized ones and for us the Chinese are barbarians. And here is what civilization has done to barbarism. In history’s eyes, one bandit will be called France, the other will be called England’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, on the occasion of the Commune, the good liberal Bagehot expressed his contempt for the behaviour of the rebels, whom he criticized for having wanted to destroy everything worth seeing and admiring in Paris, any testament to ‘culture’ and civilization.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus was credited the rumour, which subsequently proved unfounded, that the communards had destroyed the Louvre. But no mention was made here of the destruction of the Summer Palace in Peking, which actually occurred roughly ten years earlier, with the decisive participation of the country that for Bagehot was the privileged embodiment of the cause of liberty and civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Authors like Las Casas and Montaigne had problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism and made them fluid. In this perspective civilization advanced through exchanges between different cultures. Developing their thinking in the years when missionaries from Christian Europe were received with respect and benevolence in China, while in France Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and resumed persecution of the Huguenots, Bayle and Leibniz reached a radical conclusion. It was a pity that the relationship between China and European was marked by its one-sidedness; the presence of Chinese missionaries in Europe would definitely be beneficial![[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; assigned a black Spartacus the task of advancing the cause of freedom, breaking the chains of slavery and putting an end to the barbarism of which Europeans were the agents. But this attempt to cast a glance at &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg315&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Europe, as it were, from without, recognizing the contributions of different cultures to the cause of advancing civilization, did not survive the irresistible march of colonial expansionism. Having triumphed on a planetary scale, the liberal West saw fit to identify itself permanently with the cause of civilization and liberty. On the basis of this absolute and immutable pre-eminence, we see an exclusive elite—the restricted community of the free—explicitly formulate the claim, hitherto unknown and unheard of, to exercise a planetary dictatorship over the rest of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The triumph of colonial expansionism: liberalism as an ideology of war&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The celebration of civilization and liberty now took the form of an ideology of war. It was an ideology refuted by Raynal and Diderot who, addressing the ‘monsters’ or European conquistadores, expressed themselves as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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You are proud of your &#039;&#039;lumières&#039;&#039;, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot? … If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable to his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer’s lash.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This criticism is all the more apt if we bear in mind Washington’s characterization of the Indians as an ‘unenlightened race’ (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So exalted was the self-consciousness of the liberal West in the nineteenth century that sometimes it did not even feel the need to confer ideological legitimacy on its wars. Unlike John Stuart Mill, de Tocqueville did not present the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and liberty as such. For the French liberal the main cause for celebration was the West’s overwhelming power, and this power was also configured as a war machine ideologically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Here finally we have Europe’s mobility at grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, above all if one believes that it is merely the sequel, the latest step in a multiplicity of events of the same kind that are gradually impelling the European race beyond its borders and successively subjecting all the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg316&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;other races to its empire and influence. It is the enslavement of four-fifths of the world by the other fifth. Hence it is best not to be unduly despairing about our century and ourselves; the men are petty, but the events are great.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s attitude left de Gobineau puzzled. The first ridiculed the mythology of blood entertained by the second. There was in fact another side to the coin. Once adopted as the key to explaining universal history, racial contamination cast its fatal shadow over the West itself, which was likewise condemned to decadence. Hence for de Gobineau there was no insurmountable barrier between conquerors and colonial peoples. As for the economy, the latter would sooner or later manage to develop the textile industry (the key industry of the period) and defeat British and European competition in general.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Morally, there was no reason to idealize the conquerors: in Persia and the Middle East ‘their immorality and rapacity’ were manifest. If the natives ‘are rogues’, ‘in some respects they can be considered our cousins’; ‘this is how we will be tomorrow’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s criticism focused precisely on this point: ‘You say that one day we shall resemble the rabble you see before you: maybe. But before this happens, we shall have been its masters.’ As we can see, from the ‘rogues’ they were in de Gobineau, the peoples of the Middle East have now been transformed into a ‘rabble’, with this fully legitimizing the domination exercised over them by European ‘masters’. It is with reference to the latter that de Tocqueville employs the more indulgent term ‘rogues’: ‘If, as I agree, they are often great rogues, at least they are rogues to whom God has given strength and power and whom He has manifestly placed, for a certain period, at the head of the human race’. Faced with this, de Gobineau’s reservations about the ‘immorality’ and ‘rapacity’ of the conquerors, and the thesis of their basic kinship with subject peoples, seemed to lose any significance. De Tocqueville continued:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are in the heart of the Asiatic and Muslim world: I would be curious to know to what you attribute the rapid and seemingly unstoppable decadence of all the races you have seen passing through … Some millions of men who, a few centuries back, lived virtually without shelter, in the forests and marshes, will in less than one hundred years be the transformers of the globe they inhabit and the dominators of their whole species. Nothing is more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg317&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly preordained in the sight of Providence … Nothing will resist them on the surface of the earth. I have no doubt of it. I fear that all this might sound to you like a philosophical heresy. But if you have theory on your side, I am confident that I have the facts on mine—a not unimportant detail.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Gobineau, who regarded himself as a ‘citizen of the world’, refused to give in: ‘I take an extraordinary interest in my daily conversations with the natives, and am very far from having the bad opinion of them people are pleased to entertain in Europe’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not a viewpoint de Tocqueville could share. We already know his opinion that the ‘last’ member of the ‘European race’ was always ‘first next to the savages’—that is, in the last analysis, next to ‘all the other races’. Of his daughter, de Gobineau remarked: ‘She has made herself a true Turkoman, save for her colour, which is that of an Abyssinian’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville did not respond to this observation, but it should not be forgotten that for him it was precisely ‘half-breeds’ who represented the most serious threat to the West’s supremacy and civilization as such (see above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|§4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt about the greater intellectual and political subtlety of de Tocqueville who, criticizing the blood myth, distanced himself from the ideology increasingly prevalent in the South of the United States, where de Gobineau’s views about the natural and eternal inequality of races met with understandable success. Yet it is to be noted that, much more so than the latter, it was the former who created an unbridgeable gulf between the West and colonial peoples. How are we to explain this fact?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Straddling the American Revolution, ‘[r]acism became an essential, an unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology’—that is, of the ideology which presided over the construction of ‘master-race democracy’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century this regime tended to characterize the relationship between the West as a whole and colonial peoples. Certainly, in order to impart credibility to its self-proclamation, the community of the free was ever more inclined in this period to abolish slavery in the strict sense—hereditary slavery—which was in fact replaced by other forms of forced labour. But the model of a ‘master-race democracy’ remained unchanged. The gradual abolition of censitary discrimination in the metropolis gave further impetus &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg318&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to colonial expansion, which now in fact enjoyed the consent of the popular classes in the metropolis. These, like the poor whites in the North American republic, aspired to be co-opted into the bloc of ‘masters’. And once again what explained and legitimized the barrier dividing masters and servants was a more or less marked, and more or less crude racial ideology, which was now pervasive. This was a trend that also made its influence felt on de Tocqueville.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having been asserted in countries (Holland, England and the United States) more involved than any others in the slave trade and colonial expansion (overseas in the case of the first two, continentally in that of the third), liberalism spread in the West at a time when it seemed destined by Providence itself to dominate the whole world and wipe out all other cultures. In these circumstances, the self-critical thinking and awareness of limits that had characterized the pre-eminent voices of European and Western culture tended to disappear. The inheritors of that tradition were French radicalism, and then Marx. The latter waxed ironic about the ‘civilizing wars’ of the colonial powers. In reality, during the Opium War, while China, ‘the semi-barbarian[,] remained faithful to the principles of the moral law’, the ‘civilized’ opposed to it the principle of free trade,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the principle so eloquently defended by Mill. But especially significant are the pages of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; devoted to original capitalist accumulation and denunciation of ‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population’, and the transformation of Africa into ‘a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a chapter of history that was extended in the subsequent colonial expansion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Oscillations and limitations of the Marxian model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly distancing himself from the apologetics more dominant than ever today, Marx drew attention to the ‘conservative character of the English revolution’. While, on the one hand, it marked ‘the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy’, and promoted the development of industry and the bourgeoisie,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the other, it gave impetus to a gigantic, ruthlessly implemented expropriation of peasants. Examined closely, the Glorious Revolution emerged as ‘a parliamentary coup d’état for [the] transformation of [communal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg319&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;property] into private property’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus encounter a formula that in a way evokes the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation I have stressed: the mention, albeit vague, of parliament’s decisive role in this event draws attention to the disappearance of the absolute monarchy, while making clear reference to the tragedy of the peasantry. Someone who distinguished himself in the ideological legitimation of the colossal expropriation and ruthless repression that struck its victims was Locke. This ‘most particular supporter of the lash for vagrants and paupers’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was in fact, at the same time, the ‘father’ of ‘free-thinking’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the protagonist of the great ideological battle that deconsecrated absolute monarchy and stripped it of its Christian and Biblical cover. And once again, as in the Glorious Revolution, so in the liberal philosopher in whom it found theoretical expression, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation reveals itself. Finally, Marx recalled that corresponding to the advent of constitutional monarchy in England was a further intensification of the dictatorship exercised by English property-owners over Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above any particular country, what should especially be borne in mind are the general considerations offered by &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;. With the disappearance of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, corresponding to the dissolution of the ‘political existence’ of property was its ‘more potent existence’, which could now unfold ‘the full scale of its own existence’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, as &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; put it: ‘The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the &#039;&#039;appearance&#039;&#039; of a universal content.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx brought out the entanglement of emancipation and dis-emancipation. The ‘more potent existence’ injected into property was also the autonomization of property in human cattle from the controls, albeit vague, of the Church and Crown, with the consequent crystallization of racial chattel slavery. And it was also the disappearance of the restrictions placed by the Crown on the expansion of the colonists, who could now proceed unhindered, without being in any way concerned with the terrible human costs inflicted on the Indians. In England, enclosure of common land was followed by the new law of 1834 which, abolishing any other form of assistance, confronted the poor with a brutal alternative: death from starvation or internment in a total institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg320&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are not dealing with an autonomization of property as such. What corresponded to the ‘more potent existence’ of the colonists’ property was the death-agony of another form of property. It was a gigantic process of expropriation (justified and theorized by Locke and de Tocqueville alike), which unfolded at the expense not only of colonial peoples—in America or Ireland—but also of English peasants. The same reasons that led me to regard the category of ‘proprietorial individualism’ as inadequate and misleading now prompt me to seek to clarify Marx’s analysis. The process we are examining was the autonomization of the property of those who already enjoyed recognition, of those who aspired to form themselves into the community or caste of freemen. Liberated from the fetters of control by Crown and Church was not only bourgeois property, but also traditional noble property. In the England that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, the landed aristocracy consolidated its enjoyment of certain privileges (hunting, for example) and consecrated its political power in representative bodies—in the first instance, the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Marx we can say that ‘[t]he political revolution is the revolution of civil society.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should be added that civil society can be hegemonized by the bourgeoisie or the landed aristocracy, or can be characterized by a compromise between these two classes. And the liberal revolution consists in this political revolution. Up to this point we can only subscribe to Marx’s analysis and admire it for its acuteness. But he continues by opposing the ‘political revolution’ to the ‘social revolution’, or ‘political emancipation’, which is the objective of the first, to ‘social emancipation’ (the end of class domination), which is the objective of the second. The limitation of this conceptual couplet is that it does not take account of the fact that for some social or ethnic groups the liberal revolution did not involve any kind of emancipation, but in fact meant the reverse. Is it really correct to define the United States of 1844 (the year &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; was published) as ‘the country of complete political emancipation’?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the reference is to the rapid disappearance of censitary discrimination, which continued to be marked in France under the July Monarchy, and in Britain. However, what induced this differential development in the case of the North American republic was the availability of land (taken from the Indians) and the confinement of a large part of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery. In other words, the property barrier proved much weaker because the race barrier was much more rigid. Differently put, in the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg321&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States democracy emerged first because it emerged as a &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy, as a ‘master-race democracy’, and this specific form proved so tenacious that it survived the Civil War by many decades. It is highly problematic to regard &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy as complete political emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we restrict the comparison to New World countries, some questions are indicated: Was political emancipation more advanced in the North American republic, which saw slavery flourish in these years and which a little earlier had extended that institution to the Texas taken from Mexico? Or was political emancipation more advanced precisely in Mexico and those Latin American countries that had abolished the institution of slavery some decades before? In these years US leaders and ideologues liked positively to contrast the ban on miscegenation imposed by them with the cross-breeding that was spreading in Latin America: Where was political emancipation more advanced?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot even unreservedly endorse Marx’s thesis that ‘&#039;&#039;[p]olitical&#039;&#039; emancipation is certainly a big step forward.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We already know that the most tragic chapter in the history of the Indians began with the American Revolution, and that the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution witnessed the emergence of a racial chattel slavery of unprecedented harshness. In the case of Britain, it was Marx himself who drew attention to the far from positive consequences of the ‘coup d’état’ of 1688–89 for English peasants and the Irish population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more debatable is the subsequent identification of political revolution with bourgeois revolution. The latter category is at once too narrow and too broad. As regards the first aspect, it is difficult to subsume under the category of bourgeois revolution the Glorious Revolution and the parliamentary revolt that preceded the upheavals that began in France in 1789, not to mention the struggles against monarchical absolutism, explicitly led by the liberal nobility, which developed in Switzerland and other countries. On the other hand, the category of bourgeois revolution is too broad: it subsumes both the American Revolution that sealed the advent of a racial state and the French Revolution and the San Domingo Revolution, which involved complete emancipation of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model proposed here is different. It equates ‘political revolution’ qua ‘revolution of civil society’, referred to by Marx, with the liberal revolution in the strict sense. Certainly, in order to be able to promote its emancipation from absolute power, civil society had to have achieved a certain level of development. Analysed in their initial phases, the revolutions that occurred in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg322&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Netherlands, England, America, France and Latin America were not very different from one another: they were all liberal revolutions. What clearly differentiated them were three factors: the varying configurations of civil society; the social, political and ideological conflicts that developed within it (one thinks in the French case of the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie); and the irruption in the struggle of servants and slaves. With the emergence of the last factor, the struggle for the emancipation of civil society waged by the property-owning classes became entangled with the struggle waged against them by those who did not want to be regarded as objects of property and who sought to secure recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The secessionist revolt of the slaveholding South also presented itself as a liberal revolution: it was a new struggle for self-government by civil society, like the one that had sanctioned the independence of the United States. Was the Confederacy a liberal country? If we regard the country born from the War of Independence against England and long led by slave-owners as liberal, it is hard to see why such recognition should be denied to the Confederacy. Yet, rather than at a conceptual level, the solution to the problem is to be sought at a historical level. At the point when the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ was imposed in the liberal world, an author like Fletcher, who also recommended slavery for white vagrants, ceased to be a liberal. Almost a century after its first turn, the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery as such was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the racial state largely survived. And once again the question arises: Was the United States, where discrimination and oppression raged against blacks and genocidal practices against Indians, a liberal country? The principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The racial state continued to exist for some decades in South Africa. However, although historically inspired by Britain in the area of self-government and representative bodies, and by the southern United States in that of race relations, it was henceforth regarded as alien to the liberal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn1a|1]] Max Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968, p.276.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn2a|2]] François Furet, &#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione&#039;&#039;, ed. Marina Valensise, Milan: Mondadori, 1995, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn3a|3]] A. J. P. Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History 1914–1945&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn4a|4]] John Gray, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn5a|5]] Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn7a|7]] Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 111.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn8a|8]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn9a|9]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins, Harvill, 1987, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn10a|10]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn11a|11]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 1, p. 331; vol. 2, pp. 306, 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn12a|12]] Nathan Rosenberg, quoted in Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn13a|13]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn14a|14]] Joel Brinkley, ‘US Court Strikes Down Sodomy Ban’, &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, 27 June 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn15a|15]] Huizinga, quoted in Hans-Christoph Schröder, &#039;&#039;Die Revolutionen Englands im 17. Jahrundert&#039;&#039;, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn16a|16]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 1, pp. 203–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn17a|17]] Giorgio Spini, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’età moderna&#039;&#039;, Turin: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 272, 276–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn18a|18]] Charles Tilly, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1993, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn20a|20]] Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 884.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn22a|22]] Barrington Moore Jr, &#039;&#039;The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy&#039;&#039;, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn23a|23]] Hill, &#039;&#039;Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn24a|24]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;The Strenuous Life&#039;&#039;, New York: Century, 1901, pp. 246–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn25a|25]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn26a|26]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 249, 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn27a|27]] Reginald C. Stuart, &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 167ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn28a|28]] Ronald Creagh, &#039;&#039;Nos cousins d’Amérique&#039;&#039;, Paris: Payot, 1988, pp. 248–9; Joseph Zitomersky, ‘Culture, classe ou État?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson and de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001, pp. 77–84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn29a|29]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn30a|30]] Wilcomb E. Washburn, &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn31a|31]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165, 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn32a|32]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;From Rebellion to Revolution&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn33a|33]] Bernard Bailyn &#039;&#039;et al., The Great Republic&#039;&#039;, Lexington (MA): D. C. Heath, 1977, p. 149.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn34a|34]] Bacon, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 1, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn35a|35]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 40–6, 146–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn37a|37]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 77.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn38a|38]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;The World the Slaveholders Made&#039;&#039;, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn39a|39]] Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn40a|40]] Shearer David Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn41a|41]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 873ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn42a|42]] Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn43a|43]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard, London: Sussex University Press and Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn44a|44]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn45a|45]] Joshua 6, 25; 10, 35 and 40; Genesis 19, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn46a|46]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn49a|49]] Ibid., p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., pp. 54–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn51a|51]] Louis-Sébastien Mercier, &#039;&#039;L’An deux mille quatre cent quarante&#039;&#039;, ed. Raymond Trousson, Bordeaux: Ducros, 1971, pp. 201–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn52a|52]] Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Christianisme et la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1984, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 137 (Quinet had already expressed himself to this effect in the subtitles to the eighth lecture).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn55a|55]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 69, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn56a|56]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn57a|57]] Leibniz, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, Norton: New York, 1998, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn58a|58]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 19, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn59a|59]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 15, pt 2, p. 54 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 13 May 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 199 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn61a|61]] Quoted in Ramsay Muir, ed., &#039;&#039;The Making of British India 1756–1858&#039;&#039;, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn62a|62]] Hugo, quoted in Nora Wang, Xin Ye and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savantes, 2003, pp. 9–10 (letter to Captain Butler, 25 November 1861).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn63a|63]] Walter Bagehot, ‘The Destruction in Paris of What the World Goes to See in Paris’, in &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman St John-Stevas, vol. 8, London: The Economist, 1974, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn64a|64]] Cf. Giorgio Borsa, &#039;&#039;La nascita del mondo modern in Asia orientale&#039;&#039;, Milan: Rizzoli, 1977, pp. 84, 89; Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn65a|65]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn66a|66]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 58 (letter to Henry Reeve, 12 April 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 254–6 (letter of 15 January 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 243–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 241.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 231 (letter of 7 July 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn72a|72]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn73a|73]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 13, p. 516; vol. 12, p. 552.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn74a|74]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 915.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75a|75]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 209–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76a|76]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 886.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77a|77]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 510–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80a|80]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82a|82]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 352.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83a|83]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER TEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The struggle for recognition and coups d’état: the conflict in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The catastrophic crisis that struck Europe and the whole planet with the outbreak of the First World War was already maturing within the liberal world. To account for it, we must take stock of the situation on the eve of 1914. Let us deal with the metropolis first. There is no doubt that the struggle for recognition had achieved important successes. True, we are still a long way from the universal assertion of the principle ‘one person, one vote’—and not only because women continued to be excluded from the enjoyment of political rights. More or less conspicuous traces of censitary discrimination still survived. But the fact remains that the vote was no longer the exclusive privilege of wealth. Also largely defeated was the attempt to reintroduce through the back window the censitary discrimination that had been shown the door, in the shape of plural votes to be granted to the more ‘intelligent’ (this was a solution entertained above all by John Stuart Mill!). Here and there the first elements of a social state began to emerge; and if this involved fairly modest results, we should bear in mind the legalization of workers’ coalitions and trade unions, determined to wrest much more substantial concessions. Even in this milieu, the long road travelled by the former instruments of labour leaps to the eye![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it must immediately be added that this was quite the reverse of a pacific development. Each of its stages was marked not only by intense struggles, but also by profound divisions in the liberal alliance. While one &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg324&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wing of it was open to concessions, the other proved intransigent and sought confrontation. Thus, we witness a succession of coups d’état which, prior to issuing in the establishment of an open dictatorship at any rate, could count on the support or sympathy of distinguished representatives of the liberal world. Availing itself of Sieyès’ active participation, Napoleon’s 18th Brumaire elicited the ‘enthusiasm’ of Madame de Staël, as emerges from the letter her father sent her a few days later: ‘You paint for me in lively colours the part you take in the power and glory of your hero’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Constant too viewed the turn with confidence. Thirty years later, he recalled having on its eve been in daily contact with Sieyès, ‘the true author of the 18th Brumaire’, or the ‘main motor’ of the novelty that was already foreshadowed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As early as 1795, Constant had made it clear that it was necessary to go beyond Thermidor: the taxation that continued to weigh on property for the benefit of the poor, who were now turning into ‘a privileged caste’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was excessive. In fact, according to various pieces of evidence (including Madame de Staël’s), the combined effect of famine and inflation was reducing ‘the last class of society to the most wretched condition’, visiting ‘unheard of ills’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on it, up to and including ‘starvation’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, for the liberalism of the time there was no doubt: the risks run by property legitimized the coup d’état. After the homage already noted to ‘conservative, liberal, tutelary ideas’, in the days immediately afterwards the new government hastened to abolish any trace of progressive taxation. On 24 December 1799, the same day Bonaparte became First Consul, Constant entered the Tribunate. But Madame de Staël harboured the idea of an even more ambitious political career for him, in the shadow of the one who (wrote Necker to his daughter at the end of 1800) promised to be ‘the protector of all respectable’ and well-off folk, finally liberated—such was Constant and Madame de Staël’s sigh of relief—from the threat of the ‘riffraff’ (&#039;&#039;populace&#039;&#039;).[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The significance of the initial hopes and subsequent disappointment in liberal circles was clarified by Guizot in 1869. Acquitting the task of ‘putting an end to anarchy’, Napoleon’s ‘dictatorship’ was ‘natural, urgent’—in fact, ‘beneficial and glorious’. However, contrary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg325&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to expectations, ‘this accidental, temporary regime’ transformed itself into ‘a dogmatic and permanent system of government’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A not dissimilar dialectic emerged after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, greeted with ‘indecent haste’ (the phrase is Marx’s) by liberal England.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not opportunism: once the beneficent ‘traditionary influences’ had disappeared, wrote Disraeli in 1851, what checked anarchy and dissolution was ‘the government of the sword’. Indeed, ‘the state quits the senate and takes refuge in the camp’; only thus was it possible to avoid the catastrophe of the domination of ‘secret societies’ and a ‘convention’ of the Jacobin variety.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of France, setting aside a figure like Granier de Cassagnac, who declared himself a ‘liberal’ and openly sided with Louis Napoleon,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it is worth dwelling on de Tocqueville’s participation in the various stages of the ideological and political reaction that ended up de-legitimizing and then overthrowing the Second Republic. In the French liberal’s view, it was the product of a revolution—that of February 1848—which had developed in a socialist and hence despotic spirit, and which had unfolded throughout continental Europe. In Germany and Italy, de Tocqueville desired and promoted ‘the victory of the princes’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]). But was his attitude towards France very different? As early as March, even before the working-class revolt of June, de Tocqueville thundered against ‘this ultra-democratic revolution, which has extended the right to vote beyond all the limits known even in America’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While the clouds that presaged the June storm were gathering, the French liberal expressed his opinion that ‘the National Guard and the army will be without pity this time’. In order to achieve the objective of maintaining or restoring order and destroying the ‘anarchical party’, one should not hesitate to recruit into the police unscrupulous types and rabble—‘outlaws’, ‘thieves’, ‘scoundrels’ and all the ‘rejects of society’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Evoked with precision here is the politico-social formula that subsequently presided over Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, which was successful thanks to the support not only of the property-owning classes and traditional state apparatuses, but also of a sub-proletariat happy to perform the function of gang intimidation entrusted to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg326&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;After the outbreak of the workers’ revolt, de Tocqueville was not only in favour of conferring emergency powers on Cavaignac, but recommended shooting on sight anyone caught ‘in a posture of defence’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The bloody repression of the June Days was not enough to assuage anxiety; and so we have the invocation of an ‘energetic and definitive reaction on behalf of order’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] required to put an end to revolutionary and anarchic chaos not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. In any event, ‘France is among those who will restore order’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and terminate the ‘follies of 1848’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More than a year after the desperate working-class revolt, when pitiless repression seemed to have averted the Jacobin and socialist peril for good, the French liberal believed that an iron fist was still required: it was necessary to proceed ‘as far as reaction’; ‘palliatives’ would not do; to sweep away not only the Mountain, but also ‘all the surrounding hills’, it was necessary ‘courageously to take the lead of all those who want to re-establish order, whatever their complexion’. There should be no hesitation even over ‘a heroic … remedy’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What is indirectly suggested is the need for emergency measures with the suspension of constitutional liberties. If as a historian he tirelessly condemned the Jacobin Terror, as a politician de Tocqueville had no hesitation invoking ‘terror’ for the purposes of suppressing ‘the demagogic party’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, every so often a shudder ran through the liberal self-consciousness: perhaps there was a risk of the ruthless methods used to subjugate barbarians in the colonies spreading in Europe. Although warmly applauding the pitiless energy with which the conquest of Algeria was conducted, de Tocqueville let slip a sort of exclamation: ‘God spare us ever seeing France led by an officer of the army of Africa’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, Cavaignac, having implemented the ‘new science’ called on to liquidate Arab resistance at any cost, was subsequently the author of the bloody, ruthless repression that struck the barbarians of the metropolis, the Parisian workers who rose up demanding the right to work and life. Notwithstanding the preceding admonition, however, de Tocqueville offered him constant, unwavering support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, starting with the Paris Commune, there spread throughout the liberal West a tendency to challenge not only the democratic concessions wrested by the popular masses, but also the rule of law itself. In the United States &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg327&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Theodore Roosevelt stated an expeditious method for putting down strikes and social conflicts: ‘The sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be suppressed … by taking ten or a dozen of their leaders out, standing … them against a wall, and shooting them dead.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These tendencies underwent further radicalization after the October Revolution. We can now fully understand the fascist coup d’état in Italy in 1922. Numerous figures who professed themselves liberals, and who in fact claimed to be restoring genuine liberalism, supported it for a more or less extended period of time. This was true of Luigi Einaudi, who saluted the return of ‘classical liberalism’. For a while Croce likewise viewed the attempt to return to ‘pure liberalism’, not to be confused with insensate ‘democratic liberalism’, with sympathy. Even in 1929, implicitly endorsing Mussolini’s condemnation of any ‘demo-liberal regime’, Antonio Salandra defined himself as an ‘old liberal of the right (without the demo)’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, a benevolent attitude towards the fascist coup d’état is not explicable solely by the severe social and political crisis of the time. Instead, at issue was cancelling, or more or less drastically reducing, the democratic concessions won from liberal society by the popular movement. While the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; still persisted, in 1909 Einaudi had branded progressive taxation a kind of ‘organized brigandage to steal money from others through the state’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Mussolini hastened to put an end to such ‘brigandage’, thereby eliciting applause from not a few liberals. In the preceding decades Pareto had, as a liberal, developed a sharp polemic against the ‘myth’ of the social state, had agreed with the positions of Spencer and Maine, and had adhered, still as a liberal, to the Liberty and Property Defence League.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1922–23 he breathed a sigh of relief at the coup d’état that finally averted threats, if not to liberty, in any event to property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, von Mises seemed to be referring exclusively to the state of emergency when, in 1927, he pointed to fascist &#039;&#039;squadrismo&#039;&#039; as ‘an emergency makeshift’ adequate to the task of saving ‘European civilization’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, five &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg328&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years earlier, having distanced himself from the democratic and even socialist contaminations liberalism had undergone in England, he had thundered against the ‘destructionism’, the ‘destructionist policy’ and ‘terrorism’ of the trade unions with their strikes.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to Mussolini, all this had ceased in Italy. The fact remains that, in a book whose very title is devoted to the celebration of liberalism, we can read an emphatic eulogy of the coup d’état which, albeit with rough and ready methods, had saved civilization: ‘The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The struggle for recognition by colonial peoples and threats of secession&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While the struggle for recognition waged by the servants in the metropolis was constantly countered by the threat or implementation of a coup d’état, the more intransigent sectors of the liberal and bourgeois world reacted to the struggle for recognition waged by colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin with the threat or implementation of secession. This is a dialectic we have already analysed in relation to San Domingo in the late eighteenth century and the British West Indies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville observed that the colonists, in rejecting any abolitionist project, were denying the French parliament and government ‘the right to take this great work in hand and carry it through’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, in this context the most striking case was the secession of the South of the United States, which effected advancing liberal slogans in defence of the natural right to self-government and the peaceful enjoyment of property. The North’s military victory did not terminate the conflict. Supporters of white supremacy immediately reacted to the fleeting advent of multiracial democracy not only with the lynchings and anti-black terrorism unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan, but by resorting to guerrilla warfare and armed violence. In 1874 an appeal circulated in the South to found a White League to foil by any means attempts by Congress to make black emancipation effective: ‘our war [will be] interminable and merciless’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[a]s surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865 to 1877, with all the more bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#page329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#pg329&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This second stage in the Civil War ended in a substantial victory for the South. While slavery in the strict sense was not reintroduced, a regime of terroristic white supremacy was imposed. Although formally emancipated, the Afro-Americans now embarked on one of the most tragic phases in their history. It might even be said that their condition touched a ‘nadir’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, racist ‘dogmas’ and ‘racial fundamentalism’ reached their zenith.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A sequence of events with notable similarities to the American Civil War unfolded in Great Britain. Here what was at stake was the emancipation not of the blacks but of the Irish. The dominant class in Ulster reacted to the London government’s decision to introduce Home Rule for the island as had the southern US to the challenge of central power, even when democratically elected. It threatened and prepared secession, arming a militia tens of thousands strong. While the planters across the Atlantic could not tolerate the loss of the domination guaranteed to them by the possession of human cattle, the Protestant property-owners in Ireland rejected with horror the prospect of being governed at a local level by Catholic ragamuffins. In both cases the self-government demanded was the self-government that the descendants of the settlers were summoned to enjoy, and which sanctioned white supremacy or Anglo-Protestant supremacy. In both cases the secessionists proclaimed that they were the true inheritors of the American Revolution and the Glorious Revolution, respectively. And only the outbreak of the First World War blocked an impending war of secession in Britain: in Northern Ireland thousands of men armed to the hilt and organized militarily were ready to go into action.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The de-humanization of colonial peoples and ‘social cannibalism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First World War, unlike that waged by the servants in the metropolis, the struggle for recognition by colonial servants or servants of colonial origin could boast very few successes. In fact, the advances made by the former on the road of emancipation were often used to widen still further the gulf that separated the dominant ‘European race’ from the rest. In the late nineteenth century, while a sign was displayed at the entrance to some public parks in the southern United States reading ‘No Dogs and Niggers Allowed’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg330&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Shanghai the French concession defended its purity by clearly drawing attention to the notice ‘No Entry for Dogs and Chinese’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What made the comparison between colonial populations and domestic animals more credible was certain collective punishments, like that provided for by the British government in India in 1919:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he most degrading measure was a ‘crawling order’ imposed on all Indians who passed a narrow lane in the city where a medical missionary, Miss Sherwood, had been assaulted during the disturbances. The humiliation of crawling on all fours to and from one’s home, for many lived in this lane, was not to be forgotten or forgiven by those who were subjected to this indignity, or indeed, by any sensitive Indian.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was only in 1920, after the First World War and the October Revolution, that the chapter of history involving the coolies was definitively concluded, in the wake of a movement of anti-colonial struggle which no longer intended to tolerate ‘the blot of indentured labour’ imprinted by that institution on the whole Indian race.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that, having played a central role in black enslavement and the black slave trade, and then in the promotion of the semi-slavery of the coolies, the liberal West presented itself as the champion of the struggle against slavery. It was precisely with this watchword that it promoted colonial expansion. But this is how a missionary described the work the indigenous population was forced to perform in the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Each town and district is forced to bring in a certain quantity to the headquarters of the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; every Sunday. It is collected by force; the soldiers drive the people into the bush. If they will not go, they are shot down, and their left hands cut off and taken as trophies to the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; … these hands, the hands of men, women and children [are] placed in rows before the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039;.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The imposition of forced labour was sometimes bound up with genocidal practices, while on other occasions it gave way to them. In the late nineteenth century Theodore Roosevelt issued a general warning to ‘inferior races’: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg331&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should one of them attack the ‘superior’ race, the latter would be entitled to react with ‘a war of extermination’, destined ‘to put to death man, woman and child, exactly as if they were crusaders’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, there were races whose disappearance was desired regardless of their actual behaviour. Franklin greeted as a providential design the slaughter that the rum diffused by the conquerors was wreaking among the Indians. However, according to the charge formulated by loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada, the rebel colonists proceeded directly to the annihilation of entire ethnic groups (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]). In 1851, while the hunt for individual Indians was raging, the governor of California pronounced judgement:&lt;br /&gt;
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That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the two races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected; while we cannot anticipate this result with but painful regret, the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power and wisdom of man to avert.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The programme set out by General Sherman was unambiguous: ‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of the case.’ In the course of his two expeditions against the Cheyenne and the Arapaho, a colonel ordered that even the new-born should be killed and scalped: ‘Nits make lice!’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this would not seem to have particularly disturbed Theodore Roosevelt: ‘I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians. But I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that this sinister ideology, in its variations and different gradations, caught on exclusively in the United States, where, for obvious historical reasons, the racial question was more acutely felt. Let us take a look at Europe. Lord Acton coldly observed: ‘The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There were races, Disraeli in turn believed, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg332&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;experienced ‘exterminat[ion] without persecution, by that irresistible law of Nature which is fatal to curs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, this was not a completely spontaneous process, as Disraeli ended up acknowledging, when he mentioned the tragic end of the ‘Aztecs’, ‘overthrown by Cortez and a handful of Goths’, in accordance with ‘the inexorable law of nature’ that sanctioned the complete victory of ‘a superior race’ and the irrevocable defeat of ‘an inferior’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicit was Burckhardt, for whom the ‘erasure or enslavement of the weakest races’ seemed to pertain to the ‘great economy of world history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Renan, an author who liked to situate himself among the ‘enlightened liberals’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and who was appreciated by Hayek for his ‘important’ contribution to this intellectual tradition),[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] reached the same conclusion: the ‘semi-savage races’ were destined to be subjugated or exterminated by the ‘great Aryan-Semitic family’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not even the greatest figures in the liberal tradition succeeded in mounting effective resistance to this view. This applies to de Tocqueville who, while he drew a decidedly repugnant picture of the Aborigines, was a passionate cantor of the motif of the ‘empty cradle’—that is, of the deadly genealogical myth dear to colonists. And, to a lesser extent, it applies to Mill. His discourse could hardly arouse a strongly sympathetic interest in the victims. The Indians seemed to belong to the ‘community’ whose state, ‘in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’. In any event, ‘[n]othing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention is made here of the fated disappearance, still less of the destruction, of the Indians; instead, a temporary pedagogical dictatorship is theorized. However, as emerges from the stance of another distinguished exponent of English liberalism, on the occasion of bitter conflicts the dictatorship over barbarians, having been pedagogical, risked turning exterminatory. After the rebellion that challenged the British Empire in India, Macaulay wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg333&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the Nation to a degree unprecedented within my memory. Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and societies for the reformation of criminals are silent. There is one terrible cry to revenge … The almost universal feeling is that not a single Sepoy within the walls of Delhi should be spared, and I own that is a feeling with which I cannot help sympathizing.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Expressing genuine dissent were unexpected representatives of the liberal tradition or figures who moved on its margins. While he interpreted the social conflict in the metropolis in a social-Darwinist register, Spencer protested against ‘the barbarous maxim’ that the strongest ‘have a lawful right to whatever territories they can conquer’. What followed the expropriation of the defeated was in fact their ‘extermination’. Paying the price were not only the ‘North American Indians’ and the ‘natives of Australia’; in India ‘whole regiments of [natives] have been put to death, for daring to disobey the tyrannical commands of their oppressors’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unfortunately, ‘we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker’; it could now indeed be said that ‘the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, Spencer pointed an accusing finger at the state ‘system of colonisation’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] at the statism that was now expanding at every level—as if this statism had not accompanied the history of the liberal West from the outset, and as if the terrible practices denounced by Spencer had not often actually been promoted in the name of the self-government and free disposal of property, and had not taken the form (to use Hobson’s phrase) of ‘private slaughter’! (See above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The ‘final and complete solution’ of the Indian and black questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely Hobson (an author close to the liberal circles branded ‘socialist’ by von Mises and Hayek) who effectively summed up the attitude to barbarians adopted by the West, and in the first instance the liberal West, which was in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg334&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the forefront of colonial expansion in the Far West and overseas. The populations that were susceptible to ‘profitable exploitation by the superior white settlers’ survived, while the rest ‘tend[ed] to disappear’ or be destroyed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, from the late nineteenth century the theme of the inevitable disappearance of savages and peoples who could not be used as forced labour became an obsession. Articulating it were often authors who at the same time saluted the triumph of liberal institutions and ideas in the civilized world. In 1885 a book by a Protestant minister, Josiah Strong, enjoyed extraordinary success. His celebration of ‘liberty’, of ‘self-government’, of ‘the right of the individual to himself’, was passionate.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He frequently appealed to Burke, de Tocqueville, Guizot, Macaulay and Spencer. Strong and emphatic was his assertion of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon world, which had the merit of quintessentially embodying both ‘love of liberty’ and a ‘genius for colonizing’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] that expanded the zone of freedom. But this expansion also entailed the inexorable ‘extinction of inferior races’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albert J. Beveridge, a Republican senator and prominent US political figure, argued in similar fashion at the start of the twentieth century. The homage paid to the ‘gospel of liberty’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the sons of liberty and, in particular, the United States as the country and people that were ‘leading the world to liberty’ went hand in hand with the assertion that ‘a part of the Almighty’s infinite plan [was] the disappearance of debased civilisations and decaying races before the higher civilisation of the nobler and more virile types of man’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A watchword even emerged that was to assume an unambiguously genocidal meaning in the twentieth century and know tragic success. While Strong invoked ‘God’s final and complete solution of the dark problem of heathenism among many inferior peoples’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in 1913 a book published in Boston evoked the ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘negro problem’ in its title. Even in this instance, it did not involve an author foreign to the liberal world, and not only because he lived and worked in the United States, advancing ideas diffused and echoed even by influential political figures of the time. Far from regretting the ‘abhorrent practice’ of slavery, he identified with the ‘comparatively few liberal and enlightened men’ or ‘liberal intellects’ who had wanted to abolish it when deliberating the ‘splendid instrument’ that was the Constitution of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg335&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United States, ‘the guiding star of the greatest temporal power in history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nevertheless, in the land of liberty there was no room for races intellectually incapable of participating in the superior ‘Caucasic civilization and culture’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reaching this conclusion, the author knew that he was situated in the wake of Franklin and Jefferson. Happily, nature and the law of the ‘survival of the fittest’ were already acting on their behalf: Afro-Americans were being wiped out by tuberculosis, pneumonia, venereal disease and other illnesses that confirmed the natural inferiority of this people. ‘[F]ew Negro children are born without scrofulous tendencies, rickets, blindness, or other transmitted evidence of ancestral infection’. The ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘Negro problem’ was in sight, and it would be a happy repeat of the already accomplished final solution of the Amerindian question.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the words of a southern senator who was on the same wavelength, ‘God’s law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, and the extinction of the unfit is operating’, and would bring about ‘a gradual whitening of the South’ and the United States as a whole[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the touch of white already dreamt of by Franklin.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the Indians had largely been wiped off the face of the earth. In 1876, to celebrate its centenary as an independent country, the United States organized an exhibition in Philadelphia that drew the world’s attention to its extraordinary development. Along with marvels of industry and technology, sideshows exhibited ‘wild children from Borneo, a five-legged horse, and wax figures of famous Indian chiefs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In summer 1911, in a remote part of California, an Indian was discovered who could not communicate in English or Spanish. Ethnological experts subsequently verified that he was a survivor of the Yahi tribe, largely exterminated over the course of a generation. The unknown, who refused to give his name or recount the history of his destroyed family, was put in a museum, where he became an object of much amused curiosity on the part of adults and children, all the more so in that the local press drew attention to the ‘last aborigine’, the ‘wild man of California’, a ‘genuine survivor of Stone Age barbarism’. After his death, his brain was conveniently preserved for further study.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A great philosopher, Edmund Husserl, who was certainly liberal and democratic in orientation, observed twenty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg336&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years later, alas without any critical accent, that totally foreign to Europe and the West, the Indians (or rather the surviving ones) ‘are exhibited in fairground booths’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. From the nineteenth to the twentieth century&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the years leading up to the outbreak of the second Thirty Years’ War, we witness the accumulation of a mass of explosive material. At the end of the nineteenth century, corresponding to the formation of the Liberty and Property Defence League in England was the formation of the White Leagues (and the Ku Klux Klan) in the United States. At stake was halting or reversing the two struggles for recognition with which we are familiar. Across the Atlantic the restoration of white supremacy registered its triumph as early as 1877; in Europe the Liberty and Property Defence League would have to wait until 1922 to record its first victory, in Italy. The persistent unrest of servants or ex-servants in the metropolis, and of slaves or ex-slaves in the colonies or of colonial origin, and the increasing aggressiveness of the social and political circles that felt threatened by these two agitations, were compounded by contradictions within the community of the free and of Teutonic stock (previously celebrated in its entirety as the chosen people or race of liberty), which now tended to assume an antagonistic form. Moreover, these multiple conflicts were further exacerbated by an ideological climate marked by the assertion of trends—social Darwinism, a racial interpretation of history and conspiracy theory—present from the outset in the liberal tradition, but which now met with ever weaker resistance, rendering a rational understanding and limitation of the conflict impossible. Not by chance have we heard two deadly slogans echo: the first declared that ‘race is everything’; the second invoked the ‘ultimate solution’, or the ‘final and complete solution’, of the racial question!&lt;br /&gt;
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The degree of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not escaped a whole series of scholars who cannot be suspected of preconceived hostility to the liberal world. While she generously overlooked the North American republic (which had had the merit of offering her refuge), Hannah Arendt explained the genesis of twentieth-century totalitarianism commencing with the colonies of the British Empire. It was here that ‘a new form of government’, ‘a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg337&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arbitrariness’ saw the light of day,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and where the temptation of ‘administrative massacres’ as an instrument for maintaining domination began to emerge.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But especially interesting in this context is the fact that not a few US scholars, in order to explain the history of their country, have turned to the category of ‘master-race democracy’ or &#039;&#039;‘Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’, in an eloquent linguistic admixture of English and German, and a German that in several respects refers to the history of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only the concentration-camp universe as a whole, but also the individual total institutions of the twentieth century, began to take shape well before the end of the supposed &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039;. We may begin with deportation. The successive bloody deportations of Indians, starting with the one implemented by Jackson’s America (held up as a model of democracy by de Tocqueville), recall the ‘horrors created by the Nazi handling of subject peoples’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Indians were not the only victims of this practice. The slave trade represented ‘the largest involuntary movement of human beings in all history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The deportees were subsequently forced to work in a slave plantation that bore some similarities to the concentration camp.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison does not seem exaggerated. Precisely in this context the process of de-humanization reached levels that were difficult to match. In Jamaica, in the liberal British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, we find a type of punishment at work that speaks volumes: ‘a slave was forced to defecate into the offending slave’s mouth, which was then wired shut for four or five hours’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even his completely innocent fellow slaves were forced to participate in the de-humanization of the victim and, with him, of the ethnic group. Should all this not seem sufficiently cruel, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, white supremacy was imposed in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
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Notices of lynchings were printed in local papers, and extra cars added to trains for spectators from miles around, sometimes thousands of them. Schoolchildren might get a day off school to attend the lynching.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg338&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The spectacle could include castration, skinning, roasting, hanging, and shooting. Souvenirs for purchasers might include fingers, toes, teeth and bones, even genitals of the victim, as well as picture postcards of the event.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again we encounter a process of de-humanization difficult to emulate.&lt;br /&gt;
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First in the North and then, after the Civil War, in the South, notionally ‘free’ blacks suffered humiliation and persecution of every kind. In fact, stresses a historian in language that once again demands our attention, they became the target of veritable ‘pogroms’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carrying them out were gangs already active in the North in the 1820s and 1830s and which later, in the South, achieved consummate form in the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that seems to anticipate the ‘Blackshirts’ of Italian fascism and the ‘Brownshirts’ of German Nazism.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No less brutal than extra-legal violence was official justice: in the South blacks continued to be subject to a prison system so sadistic that it calls to mind ‘the prison camps of Nazi Germany’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, the two situations were united by the violence of racist ideology. Theodore Roosevelt can calmly be approximated to Hitler.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over and above individual figures, we must not lose sight of the general picture: ‘The effort to guarantee “race purity” in the American South anticipated aspects of the official Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.’ If we bear in mind the rule whereby a single drop of impure blood was enough for someone to be excluded from the white community in the South of the United States, a conclusion dictates itself: ‘the Nazi definition of a Jew was never as stringent as “the one-drop rule” that prevailed in the categorization of Negroes in the race-purity laws of the American South.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, two US scholars have recently referred to the ‘Nazi Connection’, or the ‘American legacy’ present in Nazism, to explain the parabola of eugenics, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg339&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘science’ born in liberal England and massively diffused in the other classic country of that intellectual tradition, which experienced its greatest triumphs in the Third Reich![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this connection we in fact encounter a paradox. Having disappeared together with Hitler’s Germany, eugenic measures continued to survive for some time in the United States. Let us observe the situation in 1952: ‘At the present time some thirty states in the Union legally forbid “interracial marriage.” In almost all these states miscegenation is a felony; in many a crime.’ Regarded as elements of contamination were not only ‘Negroes’ but also, in this or that state, ‘Mulattoes’, ‘Indians’, ‘Mongolians’, Koreans, ‘members of the Malay race’, Chinese, or ‘[any] person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation inclusive’, or even anyone ‘having one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood’, or even someone with ‘one-fourth or more’ ‘Kanak [Hawaiian] blood’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Reporting these facts is a US scholar who feels obliged to draw a bitter conclusion in respect of ‘racism’ (and Nazism): ‘The monster that has been let loose upon the world is to a large extent of our own making, and whether we are willing to face the fact or not we are, all of us, individually and collectively, responsible for the ghastly form which he has assumed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, genocide. An eminent scholar, Tzvetan Todorov, has defined the destruction of the Indians, whose final chapter was written in the English colonies in America and then in the United States, as ‘the greatest genocide in human history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the tragedy of the natives in America, Australia or the British colonies in general, other authors have referred, respectively, to the ‘American holocaust’ (or the ‘final solution’ of the Amerindian question), the ‘Australian holocaust’ and ‘late Victorian holocausts’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not to mention the ‘black holocaust’—the deportation and enslavement of the survivors, who numbered one in three or four—that Afro-Americans seek to draw attention to, and whose main protagonist was the liberal world. Finally, branded as the author of a tragedy to be regarded as the prototype of twentieth-century genocides, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg340&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principal official (Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan) of the British policy that led to the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Irish in the mid-nineteenth century has sometimes been defined as the ‘proto-Eichmann’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not the place to proceed to a comparative history of massacres, decimations and genocides, or to discuss the pertinence of the categories employed to describe them. But one point seems to me to be settled: it is banally ideological to characterize the catastrophe of the twentieth century as a kind of new barbarian invasion that unexpectedly attacked and overwhelmed a healthy, happy society. The horror of the twentieth century casts a shadow over the liberal world even if we ignore the fate reserved for peoples of colonial origin. ‘Totalitarian society’: thus has been defined the one that swallowed up deportees from Britain in Australia.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, with particular reference to the ‘development of industrial capitalism’ in England, it has been claimed that ‘the gulag is not a twentieth-century invention’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The usual hagiography proves unfounded even when, in reconstructing the liberal world, we restrict ourselves to analysing the metropolis and the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take an author celebrated by de Tocqueville as the apex of the liberal tradition. Jefferson raised the spectre of genocide in three very different contexts. He referred to ‘extermination’ in connection with the Indians as a process that was underway in the United States, could not be stopped, and was in fact to be attributed exclusively to the British. He pointed to the ‘extermination’ of the blacks as the inevitable outcome of the utopia of constructing a multiracial society. Finally, he experienced the clash with Britain as a total war, destined to issue in the ‘extermination’ of one of the contending parties (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]; [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|§14]]; and [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). As we can see, even a conflict completely internal to the community of the free provoked an ideological violence that might well bring to mind the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. After the catastrophe and beyond hagiography: the enduring legacy of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The horror of the twentieth century was not something that burst into a world of peaceful coexistence suddenly and from without. At the same time, being dissatisfied with the edifying picture of the habitual hagiography and situating oneself on the firm ground of reality, with its contradictions and conflicts, does &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg341&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not in any way mean denying the merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination. But we certainly must bid farewell once and for all to the myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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Meanwhile, the presupposition of that discourse turns out to be wholly imaginary: the community of the free asserted itself demanding both negative and positive liberty, while excluding populations of colonial origin and metropolitan semi-slaves and servants from both. In addition, I would like to adduce a series of reasons, which I shall set out in ascending order of importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first place, it should not be forgotten that not only did the classics of the liberal tradition refer to democracy with coldness, hostility and sometimes frank contempt, but regarded its advent as an unlawful, intolerable rupture of the social contract and hence as a legitimate cause for the ‘appeal to Heaven’ (in Locke’s words) or to arms.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the exclusion clauses were not overcome painlessly, but through violent upheavals of a sometimes quite unprecedented violence. The abolition of slavery in the wake of the Civil War cost the United States more victims than both world wars combined. As for censitary discrimination, a decisive contribution was made to its abolition by the French revolutionary cycle. Finally, in major countries like Russia, Germany and the United States the accession of women to political rights had behind it the war and revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, in addition to not being painless, the historical process that resulted in the advent of democracy was quite the reverse of unilinear. Emancipation—that is, the acquisition of rights previously not recognized or enjoyed—might well be followed by dis-emancipation—that is, deprivation of the rights whose recognition and enjoyment the excluded had won. Asserted in France in the wake of the February 1848 revolution, universal (male) suffrage was abolished two years later by the liberal bourgeoisie and was shortly afterwards reintroduced not as a result of the maturation of liberalism, but by the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon, who used it to stage the ritual of plebiscitary acclamation. In this context the most striking example is provided by the United States. The end of the Civil War inaugurated the happiest phase in the history of Afro-Americans, who now won civil and political rights and began to participate in representative bodies. But this was a kind of brief interlude in the tragedy. The 1877 compromise between the whites of the North and South involved the loss of political and, often, civil rights for blacks, as is attested by the regime of racial segregation and the savage violence of pogroms and lynching. This phase &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg342&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of dis-emancipation, which developed in a society that continued to define itself as liberal, lasted almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is then a fourth reason. The process of emancipation very often had a spur completely external to the liberal world. The abolition of slavery in British colonies cannot be understood without the black revolution in San Domingo, which was viewed with horror, and often combated, by the liberal world as a whole. Around thirty years afterwards, the institution of slavery had been abolished even in the United States. But we know that the most ardent abolitionists were accused by their opponents of being influenced or infected by French and Jacobin ideas. The brief experience of multiracial democracy was followed a long phase of dis-emancipation marked by a terroristic white supremacy. When was the turning point? In December 1952 the US Justice Secretary sent the Supreme Court, which was engaged in deliberating on the issue of integration in public schools, an eloquent letter: ‘Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.’ Washington, observes the American historian who has reconstructed this story, ran the risk of alienating the ‘colored races’ not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States. Even there communist propaganda met with considerable success in its attempt to win blacks to the ‘revolutionary cause’, making them lose ‘faith in American institutions’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On close examination, first slavery and then the terrorist regime of white supremacy were thrown into crisis by the San Domingo revolt and the October Revolution, respectively. The implementation of an essential principle, if not of liberalism then of liberal democracy (in the usual sense of the term), is inconceivable without the decisive contribution of two of the chapters of history most hated by the liberal culture of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fifth and final reason is the most important. I refer to the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that distinguishes the individual stages in the process of overcoming the exclusion clauses characteristic of the liberal tradition. In the United States the disappearance of censitary discrimination, and affirmation of the principle of political equality, were aided by the quantitative containment and political and social neutralization of the ‘dangerous classes’, thanks to the expropriation and deportation of Indians—which for a long time made it possible to enlarge the class of landowners—and the enslavement of blacks. In Europe extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg343&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;century proceeded in tandem with colonial expansion and the imposition of forced labour on peoples or ‘races’ deemed barbarous or childlike. This tangle sometimes presented itself in a decidedly tragic form. Subject to humiliation, discrimination and persecution of every kind in the South, Afro-Americans sought to win recognition by participating in the front line in the Union’s wars. And so in some circles homage began to be paid to the courage displayed by soldiers of colour in the Battle of Wounded Knee.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, blacks’ hopes for emancipation took the form—were obliged to take the form—of their active participation in destroying Indians!&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely from such historical reconstruction, remote from any apologetic, edifying tones, that the genuine merits and real strong points of liberalism emerge. Demonstrating an extraordinary flexibility, it constantly sought to react and rise to the challenges of the time. It is true that, far from being spontaneous and painless, such transformation was largely imposed from without, by political and social movements with which liberalism has repeatedly and fiercely clashed. But precisely in this resides its flexibility. Liberalism has proved capable of learning from its antagonist (the tradition of thinking that, starting with ‘radicalism’ and passing through Marx, issued in the revolutions which variously invoked him) to a far greater extent than its antagonist has proved capable of learning from it. Above all, the antagonist has proved incapable of learning what constitutes the second major strong point of liberalism. Certainly, liberalism’s learning process was quite the reverse of smooth, at least for those who wanted to overcome the exclusion clauses that run deep in this intellectual tradition. None has been as committed as it to thinking through the decisive problem of the limitation of power. However, historically, this limitation of power went hand in hand with the delimitation of a restricted sacred space: nurturing a proud, exclusivist self-consciousness, the community of the freemen inhabiting it was led to regard enslavement, or more or less explicit subjection, imposed on the great mass dispersed throughout the profane space, as legitimate. Sometimes they even arrived at decimation or annihilation. Has this dialectic on the basis of which liberalism was transformed into an ideology of domination, and even an ideology of war, wholly disappeared?&lt;br /&gt;
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In economics, clearly distancing itself from an insipid ideology of social harmony miraculously lacking any element of contradiction, conflict and tension, liberal thought has vigorously insisted on the need for competition between individuals in the market, in order to develop social wealth and the productive forces. This is a further, major historical merit to be acknowledged. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg344&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, at this level, too, there emerged the awful exclusion clauses we are already familiar with. Far from being a site where all individuals freely meet as sellers and buyers of commodities, for centuries the liberal market was a site of exclusion, de-humanization and even terror. In the past the ancestors of today’s black citizens were commodities, not autonomous buyers and sellers. And for centuries the market functioned as an instrument of terror: even more than the lash, what imposed total obedience on the slave was the threat of being sold, like a commodity exchanged on the market, separately from other family members.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a long time indentured white servants were also bought and sold on the market, and thus condemned to a fate not very different from that of black slaves. And in the name of the market, workers’ coalitions were repressed and economic and social rights ignored and denied, with a consequent commodification of essential aspects of the human personality and human dignity (health, education, and so on). In extreme cases the superstitious cult of the Market sealed huge tragedies, like the one which in 1847 saw Britain condemn an enormous mass of actual (Irish) individuals to death from starvation. Is all this a definitively concluded chapter of history? Moreover, has liberalism definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, with the dangers of regression and restoration implicit in it? Or is this dialectic still alive and well, thanks to the malleability peculiar to this current of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet however difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task. On the other hand, liberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it. If one starts out from such a presupposition, the tragedy of peoples subjected to slavery or semi-slavery, or deported, decimated and destroyed, becomes utterly inexplicable. This was a tragedy which, far from being impeded or prevented by the liberal world, developed in close connection with it. Unfounded on a historiographical level, the habitual hagiography is also an insult to the memory of the victims. Only in opposition to the pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a ‘counter-history’: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn1a|1]] On all this, cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §7 (on the plural vote) and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn2a|2]] Necker, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant et Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn3a|3]] Constant, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 ibid., p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn4a|4]] Constant, quoted in ibid., pp. 76–7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn5a|5]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, p. 347.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn6a|6]] According to the testimony of J. Mallet du Pan, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn7a|7]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël&#039;&#039;, pp. 8–19 and &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 29, 63n.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn8a|8]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn9a|9]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 17, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn10a|10]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 554–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn11a|11]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, §1; ch. 3, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, (1951–), vol. 6, pt 2, p. 108 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn13a|13]] This emerges from a conversation of 25 May 1848 reported by Nassau William Senior: cf. ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 176.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 52 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 31 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn17a|17]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 143 (letter to Francis Lieber, 4 August 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 53 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn20a|20]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;La Seconda Repubblica&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, ch. 2, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn22a|22]] Einaudi, quoted in Paolo Favilli, &#039;&#039;Riformismo e sindicalismo&#039;&#039;, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1984, pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn23a|23]] See, especially, Vilfedo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et idéologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1966, pp. 224–5; Thomas Mackay, Introduction to George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. vii, xii (on Pareto’s adhesion to the League).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn24a|24]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn25a|25]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Die Gemeinwirtschaft&#039;&#039;, Jena: Fischer, 1922, pp. 469ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn26a|26]] Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn27a|27]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn28a|28]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 3, p. 43–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn29a|29]] John Hope Franklin, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 328.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn30a|30]] Rayford W. Logan, &#039;&#039;The Betrayal of the Negro&#039;&#039;, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, p. xxi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn31a|31]] Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 13, 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn32a|32]] Cf. Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Brittanica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 3, pp. 179–85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn34a|34]] Office d’Information, &#039;&#039;Les droits de l’homme en Chine&#039;&#039;, Beijing, 1991, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn35a|35]] Michael Brecher, &#039;&#039;Nehru&#039;&#039;, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn36a|36]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 364.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn37a|37]] Colm Tóibín, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May 2004, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn38a|38]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;Letters&#039;&#039;, ed. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum, 8 vols, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1951–54, vol. 1, p. 377 (letter to Charles Henry Pearson, 11 May 1894).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn39a|39]] Reginald Horsman, &#039;&#039;Race and Manifest Destiny&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn40a|40]] Dee Brown, &#039;&#039;Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee&#039;&#039;, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn41a|41]] Roosevelt, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn42a|42]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn43a|43]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn44a|44]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn45a|45]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn46a|46]] Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–, vol. 1, p. 443.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn47a|47]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 435 n. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn48a|48]] Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 585.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn49a|49]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 197, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn50a|50]] Macaulay, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn51a|51]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn52a|52]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 410 (letter to Moncure D. Conway, 17 July 1898).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn53a|53]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn54a|54]] J.A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1963, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., pp. 200, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn58a|58]] Albert J. Beveridge, &#039;&#039;The Meaning of the Times&#039;&#039;, Freeport (NY): Books for Libraries Press, 1968, pp. 50, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn60a|60]] Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn61a|61]] Edward Eggleston, &#039;&#039;The Ultimate Solution of the American Negro Problem&#039;&#039;, New York: AMS Press, 1973, pp. 133–5, 141–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., pp. 183–5, 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn64a|64]] John Sharp Williams, quoted in George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn65a|65]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn66a|66]] Clifford Geertz, ‘Morality Tale’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 7 October 2004, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn68a|68]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 186, 212–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., pp. 131, 133–4, 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn70a|70]] Thus William T. Hagan, quoted in agreement by Laurence M. Hauptman, &#039;&#039;Between Two Fires&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn71a|71]] Davis, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November 2004, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn72a|72]] Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn73a|73]] Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn74a|74]] C. Vann Woodward, ‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February 1998, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn75a|75]] Richard Maxwell Brown, &#039;&#039;Strain of Violence&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn76a|76]] Nancy MacLean, &#039;&#039;Behind the Mask of Chivalry&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn77a|77]] Fletcher M. Green, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn78a|78]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 13; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, p. xiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn79a|79]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;Racism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 2, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn80a|80]] Stefan Kühl, &#039;&#039;The Nazi Connection&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Edwin Black, &#039;&#039;War against the Weak&#039;&#039;, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003, pp. 385–409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn81a|81]] Ashley Montagu, &#039;&#039;Man’s Most Dangerous Myth&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966, pp. 302ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 265.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn83a|83]] Tzvetan Todorov, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn84a|84]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Philippe Jacquin, &#039;&#039;Storia degli indiani d’America&#039;&#039;, trans. Franco Moccia, Milan: Mondadori, 1976; Thomas Schmid, ‘Australiens Holocaust’, &#039;&#039;Die Zeit&#039;&#039;, 31 May 2000; Mike Davis, &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn85a|85]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalism al ‘comunismo critico’&#039;&#039;, Rome: Gamberetti, 1997, ch. 5, §§10, 13; Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, pp. 317–18 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn86a|86]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn87a|87]] Robert Castel, &#039;&#039;Les métamorphoses de la question sociale&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88a|88]] C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 131–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89a|89]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90a|90]] Walter Johnson, &#039;&#039;Soul by Soul&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 19, 22–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Domenico Losurdo]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about Liberalism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Stalin:_History_and_Critique_of_a_Black_Legend&amp;diff=59298</id>
		<title>Library:Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Stalin:_History_and_Critique_of_a_Black_Legend&amp;diff=59298"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:45:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added categories and template&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;titled-chapter&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Library work|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|author=Domenico Losurdo|published_date=2008|edition_date=2020|type=Book|source=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;Introduction: The Turning Point in the Historical Depiction of Stalin&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== From the Cold War to the Khrushchev Report ===&lt;br /&gt;
Impressive demonstrations of grief accompanied Stalin&#039;s passing. In his death throes, “millions of people crowded the center of Moscow to pay their last respects” to the dying leader. On March 5th, 1953, “millions of citizens cried over his loss as if they were mourning for a loved one.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1|1]] The same reaction took place in the most remote corners of this enormous country, for example, in a “small village” that, as soon as it learned of what had happened, fell into spontaneous and collective mourning.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn2|2]] The generalized consternation went beyond the borders of the USSR: “Many cried as they passed through the streets of Budapest and Prague.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thousands of kilometers away from the socialist camp, in Israel the sorrowful reaction was also widespread: “All members of MAPAM, without exception, cried”, and this was a party in which “all the veteran leaders” and “nearly all the ex-combatants” belonged to. The suffering was mixed with fear. “The sun has set” was the title of Al Hamishmar, the newspaper of the Kibbutz movement. For a certain amount of time, such sentiments were shared by leading figures of the state and military apparatus: “Ninety officers who had participated in the 1948 war, the great war of Jewish independence, joined a clandestine armed organization that was pro-Soviet and revolutionary. Of these, eleven later became generals and one became a government minister, and are now honored as the founding fathers of Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the West, it’s not just leaders and members of communist parties with ties to the Soviet Union who pay homage to the deceased leader. One historian (Isaac Deutscher) who was a fierce admirer of Trotsky, wrote an obituary full of acknowledgements:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;After three decades, the face of the Soviet Union has been completely transformed. What’s essential to Stalinism’s historical actions is this: it found a Russia that worked the land with wooden plows and left it as the owner of the atomic bomb. It elevated Russia to the rank of the second industrial power in the world, and it’s not merely a question of material progress and organization. A similar result could not have been achieved without a great cultural revolution in which an entire country has been sent to school to receive an extensive education.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, despite conditioned and in part disfigured by the Asiatic and despotic legacy of Tsarist Russia, in Stalin’s USSR “the socialist ideal has an innate and solid integrity.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this historical evaluation there was no longer a place for Trotsky’s harsh accusations directed at the deceased leader. What sense was there in condemning Stalin as a traitor to the ideals of world revolution and as the capitulationist theorist of socialism in one country, at a time in which the new social order had expanded in Europe and in Asia and had broken “its national shell”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn5|5]] Ridiculed by Trotsky as a “small provincial man thrust into great world events, as if by a joke of history”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn6|6]] in 1950 Stalin had become, in the opinion of an illustrious philosopher (Alexandre Kojève), the incarnation of the Hegelian spirit of the world and called upon to unify and lead humanity, resorting to energetic methods, in practice combining wisdom and tyranny.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn7|7]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outside communist circles, or the communist aligned left, despite the escalating Cold War and the continued hot war in Korea, Stalin’s death brought out largely “respectful” or “balanced” obituaries in the West. At that time, “he was still considered a relatively benign dictator and even a statesman, and in the popular consciousness the affectionate memory of “uncle Joe” persisted, the great war-time leader that had guided his people to victory over Hitler and had helped save Europe from Nazi barbarity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn8|8]] The ideas, impressions and emotions of the years of the Grand Alliance hadn’t yet vanished, when―Deutscher recalled in 1948―statesmen and foreign generals were won over by the exceptional competence with which Stalin managed all the details of his war machine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn9|9]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Included among the figures “won over” was the man who, in his time, supported military intervention against the country that emerged out of the October Revolution, namely Winston Churchill, who with regards to Stalin had repeatedly expressed himself in these terms: “I like that man.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn10|10]] On the occasion of the Tehran Conference in November, 1943, the British statesman had praised his Soviet counterpart as “Stalin the Great”: he was a worthy heir to Peter the Great; having saved his country, preparing it to defeat the invaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn11|11]] Certain aspects had also fascinated Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to Moscow between 1943 and 1946, who always positively painted the Soviet leader with regard to military matters: “He appears to me better informed than Roosevelt and more realistic than Hitler, to a certain degree he’s the most efficient war leader.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn12|12]] In 1944 Alcide De Gasperi had expressed himself in almost emphatic terms, having celebrated “the historic, secular and immense merit of the armies organized by the genius, Joseph Stalin.&amp;amp;quot; The recognition from the eminent Italian politician isn’t merely limited to the military sphere:&lt;br /&gt;
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When I see Hitler and Mussolini persecute men for their race, and invent that terrible anti-Jewish legislation that we’re familiar with, and when I see how the Russians, made up of 160 different races, seek their fusion, overcoming the existing differences between Asia and Europe, this attempt, this effort toward the unification of human society, let me just say that this is the work of a Christian, this is eminently universalistic in the Catholic sense.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No less powerful or uncommon was the prestige that Stalin had enjoyed, and continued enjoying, among the great intellectuals. Harold J. Laski, a prestigious supporter of the British Labour Party, speaking in the fall of 1945 with Norberto Bobbio, had declared himself an “admirer of the Soviet Union” and its leader, describing him as someone who is “very wise.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn14|14]] In that same year, Hannah Arendt wrote that the country led by Stalin distinguished itself for the “completely new and successful way of facing and solving national conflicts, of organizing different peoples on the basis of national equality”; it was a type of model, it was something “that every political and national movement should pay attention to.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For his part, writing just before and soon after the end of World War II, Benedetto Croce recognized Stalin’s merit in having promoted freedom not only at the international level, thanks to the contribution given to the struggle against Nazi-fascism, but also in his own country. Indeed, who led the USSR was “a man gifted with political genius”, who carried out an important and positive historical role overall; with respect to pre-revolutionary Russia, “Sovietism has been an advance for freedom,&#039;&#039; just as, “in relation to the feudal regime”, the absolute monarchy was also “an advance for freedom and resulted in the greater advances that followed.&amp;amp;quot; The liberal philosopher’s doubts were focused on the future of the Soviet Union; however, these same doubts, by contrast, further highlighted the greatness of Stalin: he had taken the place of Lenin, in such a way that a genius had been followed by another, but what sort of successors would be given to the USSR by “Providence”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn16|16]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Those that, with the beginning of the Great Alliance’s crisis, started drawing parallels between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany had been severely criticized by Thomas Mann. What characterized the Third Reich was the “racial megalomania” of the self-proclaimed “master race”, which had carried forth a “diabolical program of depopulation”, and before that the eradication of the culture of the conquered territories. Hitler stuck to Nietzsche’s maxim: “if one wants slaves, it’s foolish to educate them like masters.&amp;amp;quot; The orientation of “Russian socialism” was the precise opposite; massively expanding education and culture, it had demonstrated it didn’t want “slaves”, but instead “thinking men”, therefore placing them on the “path to freedom.&amp;amp;quot; Consequently, the comparison between the two regimes became unacceptable. Moreover, those that made such an argument could be suspected of complicity with the fascist ideology they sought to condemn:&lt;br /&gt;
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To place Russian communism and Nazi-fascism on the same moral place, in the measure that both are totalitarian, is superficial at best; fascism at worst. Anyone who insists on this comparison could very well be considered a democrat, but deep in their heart a fascist is already there, and naturally they will only fight fascism in a superficial and hypocritical way, while they save all their hatred for communism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn17|17]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After the outbreak of the Cold War, and upon publishing her book on totalitarianism, Arendt would do in 1961 that which was precisely denounced by Mann. And yet, almost at the same time, Kojève had pointed to Stalin as the protagonist of a decidedly progressive historical turning point of planetary dimensions. In other words, even in the West this new truth, or this new ideological motive in the two-sided struggle against the different manifestations of totalitarianism, had a hard time in asserting itself. In 1948, Laski had to some degree accentuated his expressed point of view from three years earlier. To define the USSR, he had again used a category utilized by another leading figure of British Labourism, Beatrice Webb, who as early as 1931, but also during the Second World War and up until her death, had referred to the Soviet nation as a “new civilization.&amp;amp;quot; Yes―Laski confirmed―with a formidable effort given to social promotion of the classes that for so long had been exploited and oppressed, and with the introduction into the factory and workplaces of new social relations, no longer rooted in the sovereign power of the owners over the means of production, the country led by Stalin emerged as the “pioneer of a new civilization.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, both were quick to make clear that “barbarian Russia” still weighed upon the “new civilization” that was emerging. It expressed itself in despotic ways, but―Laski in particular stressed―to formulate a correct judgement on the Soviet Union, it was necessary not to lose sight of an essential fact: “Its leaders came to power in a country accustomed to having a bloody tyrant” and they were forced to govern in a situation characterized by a more or less permanent “state of siege” and by a “potential or ongoing war.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, in situations of intense crisis, Britain and the United States had also limited traditional liberties in more or less drastic ways.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn18|18]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In relaying the admiration by Laski toward Stalin and the country led by him, Bobbio much later wrote: “After the victory against Hitler, to which the Soviets had made a decisive contribution with the battle of Stalingrad [such a declaration] doesn’t really surprise me.&amp;amp;quot; In truth, for the British Labourite intellectual, the acknowledgements made to the USSR and its leader went well beyond the military sphere. On the other hand, would the position of the Turinese philosopher be all that different at that time? In 1954, he published an essay that attributed to the Soviet Union (and the other socialist states) the merit of having “initiated a new phase of civil progress in politically backwards countries, introducing traditionally democratic institutions, from formal democracy, like universal suffrage and elected positions, as well as substantial democracy, like the collectivization of the means of production”; it was a matter then of pouring “a drop of [liberal] oil on the machinery of the now completed revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn19|19]] As you can see, the judgement formulated on the country that was still in mourning over Stalin’s death was by no means negative.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1954, the legacy of liberal socialism still resonates in Bobbio. Despite forcefully stressing the indispensable value of freedom and democracy during the years of the war in Spain, Carlo Rosselli had negatively compared the liberal countries (“the British government is on the side of Franco, starving Bilbao”) to the Soviet Union, committed to helping the Spanish Republic under attack by Nazi-fascism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn20|20]] Nor was it merely a matter of international politics. In a world characterized by the “era of fascism, of imperialist wars and capitalist decadence”, Carlo Rosselli raised the example of a country that, despite being far from the objective of a mature democratic socialism, had left capitalism behind and represented “a capital of invaluable experiences” for those who were committed to the construction of a better society: “Today, with the enormous Russian experience [...] we can make use of an immense volume of positive material. We all know what the socialist revolution and the socialist organization of production represent.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn21|21]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, for an entire historical period, in circles that went far beyond the communist movement, the country led by Stalin and Stalin himself could enjoy sympathetic curiosity, respect and, at times, even admiration. It’s true there was serious disappointment caused by the pact with Nazi Germany, but soon Stalingrad had managed to erase it. That is why in 1953, and in the years immediately following, homage to the deceased leader united the socialist camp, appeared to strengthen the communist movement―despite its earlier divisions―and to a certain extent was felt even in the liberal West, which was then engaged in a Cold War uncompromisingly carried out by both sides. It’s no coincidence that in the Fulton speech which officially started the Cold War, Churchill expressed himself as follows: “I have great admiration and respect for the courageous Russian people and for my war time companion, marshal Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn22|22]] There’s no doubt that, as the Cold War grew more intense, the rhetoric became increasingly hardened. However, in 1952, a great British historian who had worked in the Foreign Office, namely Arnold Toynbee, could still compare the Soviet leader to “a brilliant man: Peter the Great”; yes, “the test of battle ended up justifying the tyrannical drive toward technological westernization carried out by Stalin, just as it had happened earlier with Peter the Great.&amp;amp;quot; It continued being justified even after the defeat dealt to the Third Reich: after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Russia once again “needed a forced march to catch up with the West’s technological level” that had once again “leaped ahead.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn23|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Toward an Overall Comparison ===&lt;br /&gt;
Maybe even more than the Cold War, there’s another historical event that forces a radical turn in the history of Stalin’s image; Churchill’s speech from March 5th, 1946, has a less important role than another speech, the one given ten years later, on February 25th of 1956 to be exact, by Nikita Khrushchev during the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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That Report, which paints a picture of a mad and bloodthirsty dictator, who’s vain and either mediocre or completely laughable on the intellectual level, satisfied nearly everyone for more than three decades. It allowed for the USSR’s new leadership group to present themselves as the only source of revolutionary legitimacy within the country, the socialist camp and the international communist movement that saw Moscow as its center. Strengthened in their old convictions and with new arguments available to wage the Cold War, the West also had its motives to be satisfied (or enthusiastic). In the United States, sovietology had demonstrated its tendency to develop around the CIA and other military and intelligence agencies, early on removing the elements suspected of having sympathies to the homeland of the October Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn24|24]] A process took place which militarized a key-discipline for the conduct of the Cold War; in 1949, the president of the American Historical Association had declared: “we can’t allow ourselves to be anything but orthodox”, a “plurality of objectives and values” is not permitted. It’s necessary to accept “ample measures of enlistment” because the “total war, be it hot or cold, recruits every one of us and calls on every one of us to do their part. The historian is no more free of this obligation than the physicist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn25|25]] None of this ends in 1956, but now a more or less militarized sovietology can enjoy the accommodation and support coming from within the communist world itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true, rather than communism as such, the Khrushchev report pointed the finger at a single person, but in those years it was opportune, including from the point of view of Washington and its allies, not to expand the target too greatly, and instead concentrate fire on Stalin’s country. With the signing of the “Balkan Pact” of 1953, signed by Turkey and Greece, Yugoslavia became a type of external member of NATO, and nearly twenty years later China also made a de facto alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union. It was above all else a matter of isolating that superpower, which is forced into an increasingly radical “de-stalinization”, until leaving it without any form of identity and self-esteem, resigned to capitulation and its final dissolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, thanks to the “revelations” coming from Moscow, leading intellectuals could easily forget their interest, sympathy, and even the admiration that they had for Stalin’s USSR. Those intellectuals that had Trotsky as their reference point found particular comfort in those “revelations.&amp;amp;quot; For a long time it had been Trotsky who had embodied, in the eyes of the Soviet Union’s enemies, the infamy of communism, and he had particularly represented the “exterminations” or even the “Jewish extermination” (infra, ch. 5, § 15); as late as 1933, when he had already been in exile for several years, for Spengler, Trotsky continued to represent the “Bolshevik mass murderer” (Bolschewistischer Massenmörder).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn26|26]] Beginning with the turning point at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, it was only Stalin and his closest collaborators who should be confined to the museum of horrors. Making its influence felt far beyond Trotskyist circles, the Khrushchev Report played as especially comforting role for certain Marxist left groups, who felt exonerated of the painful task of rethinking the theory of the Teacher [Marx] and its concrete impact on history. Certainly, instead of withering away in the countries governed by communists, the State appeared to be excessively all encompassing; far from disappearing, national identities played an increasingly important role in the conflicts that would lead to the division and, finally, to the end of the socialist camp; no one could make out any sign of the dissolution of money or the market, which tended to expand with economic development. Yes, all of this is beyond debate, but it’s the fault...of Stalin or of “Stalinism”! Therefore, there was no reason to question the hopes and certainties that had accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution, or that had their origin in Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite opposing one another, those political-ideological fields developed their portraits of Stalin based on colossal and arbitrary abstractions. On the left, they proceed to the virtual elimination of the history of Bolshevism, and even more so the elimination of the history of Marxism, of the man who had for more time than any other exercised power in the country that emerged out of a revolution that was prepared and carried out according to the ideas of Marx and Engels. For their part, the anti-communists comfortably leave out both the history of Tsarist Russia as well as the history of the Second Thirty Years’ War, the context in which the tragic and contradictory development of Soviet Russia and the three decades of Stalin take place. And thus, each of the different political-ideological fields set off from Khrushchev’s speech to cultivate their own mythology, whether it’s the purity of the West or the purity of Marxism or Bolshevism. Stalinism was the terrible comparative term that allowed each of the antagonists to congratulate themselves, counterposing their own infinite moral and intellectual superiority.&lt;br /&gt;
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Based on their notably different abstractions, these readings still end up producing some methodological convergences. In examining the terror without paying too much attention to the objective situation, they reduce it to the initiative of a single individual or of a limited leadership class, determined to reassert their absolute power by any means necessary. Beginning with that assumption, if Stalin could be compared to another leading political figure, it could only be to Hitler; consequently, in the aim of comprehending Stalin’s USSR, the only possible comparison was with Nazi Germany. It’s a theme that already emerged toward the end of the 1930s with Trotsky, who repeatedly resorts to the category of “totalitarian dictatorship” and, in the context of this genus, on the one hand he highlights the “Stalinist” type, and on the other hand the “fascist” type (and the Hitlerian type especially),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn27|27]] resorting to a contextualization that later becomes the conventional thinking of the Cold War and the ruling ideology of today.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this line of argument convincing, or would it be better to turn to an overall comparison, without losing sight of either the history of Russia in its totality or the countries involved in the Second Thirty Years’ War? It’s true that this leads us to a comparison of countries and leaders that have very different characteristics among them; but is that diversity exclusively on account of their ideologies, or does the objective situation also play an important role, namely, the geopolitical location and past history of each country involved in the Second Thirty Years’ War? When we discuss Stalin, our thoughts immediately jump to the personalization of power, to the concentrationary universe, to the deportation of entire ethnic groups; but do these occurrences, aside from the USSR, only show themselves in Nazi Germany, or do they manifest themselves to different degrees―according to the greater or lesser severity of the state of emergency and its more or less prolonged duration―in other countries as well, including those with a more consolidated liberal tradition? Obviously, it’s necessary not to lose sight of the role of ideology; but can the ideology followed by Stalin really be compared to that which inspires Hitler? Or does the ideological comparison―when free of preconceptions―lead to completely unexpected results? Contrary to the theorists of purity, a political movement or a political regime can’t be judged based on the excellence of their declared motivating ideals; in the evaluation of these same ideals, we can’t ignore Wirkungsgeschichte, the “history of the effects” caused by them; but should that approach be applied to all sides, or only for the movement that found inspiration in Lenin and Marx?&lt;br /&gt;
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These questions appear superfluous and even deceiving to those that overlook the problem of the inconsistency of Stalin’s image, basing themselves on the belief that Khrushchev had finally brought to light the hidden truth. However, a historian would show a total lack of methodological rigor if they sought to find in 1956 the year of the definitive and final revelation, ignoring the conflicts and interests that had driven the de-stalinization campaign and its diverse aspects, and that even earlier had motivated the sovietology of the Cold War. The radical contrasts between the different images of Stalin should encourage the historian to not only not absolutize a single one, but rather, to scrutinize them all.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;1. How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A “Huge, Grim, Whimsical, Morbid, Human Monster” ===&lt;br /&gt;
If today we analyze On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences, read by Khrushchev at a closed door session during the Congress of the CPSU, and later hailed as the Secret Report, one detail immediately draws our attention: what’s before us is a condemnatory speech that intends to liquidate Stalin in all his aspects. The man guilty of so many horrendous crimes was an individual worthy of contempt both at the moral and intellectual level. Aside from being ruthless, the dictator was also an absurd figure: he learned about the country and the agricultural situation “only through movies”; films that, moreover, embellished reality to the point of making it unrecognizable.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn28|28]] Instead of being driven by political logic or Realpolitik, the bloody repression unleashed by him was dictated by his capriciousness and his pathological lust for power (libido dominandi). Thus emerged―Deutscher observes with satisfaction in June of 1956, astonished by Khrushchev’s “revelations” and having forgotten the respectful and at times admiring portrait of Stalin he himself made three years earlier―the depiction of “the huge, grim, whimsical, morbid, human monster.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn29|29]] The despot so lacked moral qualms that he was suspected of having plotted the assassination of the man who appeared to be his best friend, Kirov, in order to denounce and liquidate his real, potential or imaginary opponents one after another for that crime.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn30|30]] The merciless repression didn’t only fall upon individuals or political figures. Instead, it would include “the mass deportations of entire peoples”, arbitrarily accused and collectively condemned for connivance with the enemy. But at least Stalin had contributed to saving his country and the world from the horrors of the Third Reich? On the contrary―Khrushchev insisted―the Great Patriotic War was won despite the dictator’s madness: it was only because of his shortsightedness, his stubbornness, the blind trust he placed in Hitler, that the Third Reich’s troops had initially managed to enter deep into Soviet territory, causing death and destruction on a massive scale.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, it’s Stalin’s fault that the Soviet Union had been unprepared and poorly defended for the tragic encounter: “We had only started to modernize our military equipment on the eve of war [...]. At the start of the war we didn’t even have a sufficient number of rifles to arm all the soldiers called up.&amp;amp;quot; As if that wasn’t more than enough, “after the first defeats and first disasters on the frontlines”, the man responsible for all this had given into despair and even apathy. Overtaken by a sense of defeat (“we have forever lost all that Lenin had created”) and unable to react, “Stalin refrained from overseeing military operations and stopped dealing with anything.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn31|31]] It’s true that, after some time had passed, and finally ceding to pressure from other members of the Politburo, he returned to his post. If only he hadn’t! At the time when it faced a mortal threat, the man who had despotically ruled the Soviet Union had been such an incompetent dictator that he didn’t have “any familiarity with the conduct of military operations.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a charge that the Secret Report firmly insists on: “We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. Yes, comrades, he used to take a globe and trace the front line on it.&amp;amp;quot; Despite everything, the war had ended favorably, but still the bloody paranoia grew worse. Now the Secret Report&#039;s portrait of the “morbid, human monster”―according to Deutscher&#039;s observations―can be considered complete.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only three years had passed since the demonstrations of grief provoked by Stalin&#039;s death, and his popularity was still so solid that, at least in the USSR, the campaign launched by Khrushchev was initially met by “strong resistance”:&lt;br /&gt;
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On March 5th, 1956, students in Tbilisi took to the streets to place flowers at the monument to Stalin on the occasion of the third anniversary of his death, and that gesture in honor of Stalin turned into a protest against the deliberations of the Twentieth Congress. The demonstrations and assemblies continued for five days, until the afternoon of March 9th, when tanks were sent into the city to restore order.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That possibly explains the characteristics of the text we are examining. In the USSR and in the socialist camp, a hard political struggle was taking place, and the absurd depiction of Stalin would ideally serve to delegitimize the “Stalinists” who could overshadow the new leadership. The “cult of personality” that had reigned until that moment didn’t allow for nuanced judgments: it was necessary to cast a god into hell. Some decades earlier, during another political battle with different characteristics, but no less tough, Trotsky had also painted a picture of Stalin that sought not only to condemn him at the political and moral level, but also ridicule him at a personal level: he had been a “small provincial man”, an individual characterized from the beginning by an irredeemable mediocrity and pettiness, which he regularly demonstrated in the political, military and ideological fields, who was never able to overcome “his peasant rudeness.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, in 1913 he had published a work of undeniable theoretical value (Marxism and the National Question), but the true author was Lenin, and the man whose signature is on the text should be considered a “usurper” of the great revolutionary’s “intellectual rights.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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There was no lack of similarities between the two depictions. Khrushchev insinuated that the real instigator of Kirov’s assassination had been Stalin, and Stalin had been accused (or at least suspected) by Trotsky of having hastened Lenin’s death with his “Mongolian ferocity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn33|33]] The Secret Report denounced Stalin for the cowardly neglect of his responsibilities at the start of Hitler’s invasion, but already on September 2nd, 1939, while anticipating Operation Barbarossa, Trotsky wrote that “the new aristocracy” in power in Moscow was characterized, among other things, for “its inability to conduct a war”; the “ruling caste” in the Soviet Union was destined to assume the attitude “proper to all regimes destined to die: ‘after us, the deluge’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn34|34]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With great similarities between them, to what point do these two depictions withstand historical examination? It’s worthwhile to begin analyzing the Secret Report which, made official by a CPSU party congress and by the party’s top leadership, immediately imposed itself as a revelation of a long suppressed but now incontestable truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Great Patriotic War and Khrushchev’s Inventions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with Stalingrad and the defeat inflicted on the Third Reich (the latter with a might that had seemed unbeatable), Stalin acquired enormous prestige around the whole world. And, not by chance, does Khrushchev give particular attention to this matter. He describes in catastrophic terms the lack of military preparedness by the Soviet Union, whose army in some cases lacked the most basic armaments. Arguing against this is the overview that emerges from a study that appears to come from those connected to the Bundeswehr and makes ample use of their military archives. In it they speak of the “numerical superiority of the Red Army in armored cars, planes and artillery pieces.” Further, “the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union had reached such dimensions that they could supply the Soviet armed forces with an almost unimaginable amount of weaponry.&amp;amp;quot; It rises at an ever-increasing rate as Operation Barbarossa approached. One stat is particularly eloquent: while in 1940 the Soviet Union produces 358 advanced armored cars, measurably superior to those available to other armed forces, in the first half of the following year 1,503 are produced.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn35|35]] For their part, the documents from the Russian archives demonstrate that, at least during the two years before the Third Reich’s aggression, Stalin was literally obsessed with the problem of the “quantitative increase” and the “qualitative improvement of the entire military apparatus.&amp;amp;quot; Some data speaks for itself: while in the first five-year plan the defense budget reached 5.4% of total state spending, in 1941 the military budget increased to 43.4% of spending; “In September of 1939, by order of Stalin, the Politburo made the decision to construct in the year of 1941 nine new factories for the production of planes.&amp;amp;quot; By the time of the Nazi invasion, Soviet “industry had produced 2,700 modern planes and 4,300 armored cars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn36|36]] Judging by this data, we can say that the USSR arrived anything but unprepared for the tragic confrontation.&lt;br /&gt;
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A decade earlier, an American historian dealt a substantial blow to the myth of the despair and abandonment of responsibilities by the Soviet leader soon after the start of the Nazi invasion: “for however shocked he was, on the day of the attack Stalin had an eleven-hour meeting with leaders of the party,, government and military, and did the same the following day.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn37|37]] But now we have at our disposal the registry of those that visited Stalin in the Kremlin, discovered at the beginning of the 1990s: it appears that, in the hours immediately following the military aggression, the Soviet leader was immersed in a series of uninterrupted meetings and initiatives to organize the resistance. They are days and nights characterized as “strenuous” but organized. In any case, “the entire episode [narrated by Khrushchev] is a complete invention”, this “story is false.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn38|38]] In reality, from the start of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin not only makes challenging decisions, giving the order for the relocation of residents and industrial installations from the frontline areas, but “he controls everything in a meticulous way, from the size and shape of the bayonets, to the authors and titles of the articles in Pravda.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn39|39]] There is no sign of panic or hysteria. Dimitrov offers the following account in a diary entry: “At seven in the morning they urgently called me to the Kremlin. Germany has attacked the USSR. The war has started [...]. It’s surprisingly calm, with resolve and confidence in Stalin and all the others.” More impressive yet is the clarity of ideas. It’s not only a matter of carrying out “the general mobilization of our forces.” It’s necessary as well to define the political situation. Yes, “only communists can defeat the fascists,” and put an end to the apparently irresistible rise of the Third Reich, but it’s necessary not to lose sight of the real nature of the conflict: “The [communist] parties develop locally a movement in defense of the USSR; not putting forward the question of the socialist revolution. The Soviet people fight a patriotic war against fascist Germany. The question is the defeat of fascism, which enslaved a series of nations and tries to enslave other nations as well.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn40|40]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The political strategy that had presided over the Great Patriotic War is well defined. Already some years earlier Stalin had stressed that the expansionism carried out by the Third Reich “is in pursuit of the enslavement and submission of other nations.” These nations respond with just wars of resistance and national liberation. To those that academically counterpose patriotism and internationalism, the Communist International had responded once again before Hitler’s aggression, as is shown in the entry in Dimitrov’s diary from May 12th, 1941, that:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is necessary to develop a line of thought that combines wise nationalism, properly understood, with proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism should be based on the nationalism of individual countries [...], between that properly understood nationalism and proletarian internationalism there can be no contradiction. Nationless cosmopolitanism, which denies national sentiment and the idea of the nation, doesn’t have anything in common with proletarian internationalism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn41|41]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Far from being an improvised and desperate reaction to the situation created by the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the strategy of the Great Patriotic War expresses a theoretical orientation of a general character maturing for some time: internationalism and the international cause of the emancipation of nations led directly to the wave of wars of national liberation, made necessary by Hitler’s intention to seize and radicalize the colonial tradition, by first subjecting and enslaving the supposedly inferior races of Eastern Europe. These are the recurring themes in the speeches and statements delivered by Stalin during the war: they constituted “important cornerstones in the clarification of Soviet military strategy and its political objectives, and played an important role at the hour of restrengthening popular morale.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn42|42]] They took on international importance as well, as Goebbels observed to his own annoyance: [Stalin’s] radio speech on July 3rd, 1941 “earned enormous admiration in England and the United States.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn43|43]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Series of Disinformation Campaigns and Operation Barbarossa ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even in the strict realm of military conduct, the Secret Report has lost all credibility. According to Khrushchev, Stalin paid no attention to the “warnings” coming from many directions regarding the imminent invasion and went irresponsibly toward disaster. What is there to say about this accusation? Even the information coming from a friendly country can be wrong. For example, on June 17th, 1942, Franklin Delano Roosevelt warned Stalin of an imminent Japanese attack that never materialized.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn44|44]] Especially in the lead-up to Hitler’s aggression, the USSR was forced to navigate around enormous diversion and disinformation operations. The Third Reich was determined to make it appear that the gathering of troops in the East was aimed only at camouflaging the crossing of the English Channel, and this seemed very possible after the conquest of the island of Crete. “The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized”, Goebbels notes with satisfaction in his diary (May 31st, 1941), to stage the “first great round of misdirection” in Operation Barbarossa. Thus, “14 divisions are transported to the West.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn45|45]] On top of this, all the troops stationed on the Western front were placed on the highest state of alert.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn46|46]] Nearly two weeks later, the Berlin issue of Völkischer Beobachter published an article that indicated that the occupation of Crete was a model for the coming settling of accounts with England; a few hours later the journal was censored with the aim of giving the impression that it had betrayed secret information of great importance. Three days later Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The English radios announce that our maneuvers against Russia are only a bluff, that behind them we seek to hide our preparations for the invasion [of England].”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn47|47]] In addition to this disinformation campaign, Germany spread rumors according to which the military maneuvers in the East were aimed at pressuring the USSR, eventually resorting to an ultimatum so that Stalin agrees to the revision of the German-Soviet pact and to export greater quantities of grain, petroleum and coal which the Third Reich lacked, involved in a war with an unpredictable outcome. They therefore wanted to give the impression that the crisis could be resolved with new negotiations and additional concessions on Moscow’s part.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn48|48]] The British intelligence services arrived at that conclusion and the military, as late as May 22nd, warned the Minister of War: “Hitler still hasn’t decided to pursue his objectives [in the direction of USSR] either by persuasion or by force of arms.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn49|49]] On June 14th Goebbels writes with satisfaction in his diary: “Overall, they still believe in the bluff or in the attempted blackmail.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn50|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s also important not to underestimate the disinformation campaign carried out on the other side and initiated two years earlier. In November of 1939, the French press published a fabricated speech (supposedly delivered before the Politburo on August 19th of the same year) in which Stalin had revealed a plan to weaken Europe, encouraging a fratricidal war in order to Sovietize it later. There are no doubts about it: this was a forgery that sought to unravel the pact of German-Soviet non-aggression and redirect the Third Reich’s expansionist fury to the East.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn51|51]] According to a much circulated legend of history, on the eve of Hitler’s aggression, London had warned Stalin without success, for Stalin―as to be expected of a dictator―only trusted in his counterpart in Berlin. However, while Great Britain informs Moscow of information related to Operation Barbarossa, they spread rumors about an imminent USSR attack against either Germany or territories occupied by it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn52|52]] Their interest in making inevitable, or in precipitating as quickly as possible, the German-Soviet conflict is both evident and understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there’s the mysterious flight by Rudolf Hess to England, clearly motivated by the hope of reconstructing the West’s unity in the struggle against Bolshevism, and thereby putting into motion the program described in Mein Kampf of an alliance and solidarity between the Germanic nations in their civilizing mission. Soviet agents abroad inform the Kremlin that the number two in the Nazi regime took the initiative with the full agreement of the Führer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn53|53]] Moreover, personalities of particular importance in the Third Reich continued believing until the end the theory that Hess had acted at the encouragement of Hitler. In any case, Hitler felt the need to immediately send to Rome the minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop for the purpose of reassuring Mussolini that Germany wasn’t planning a separate peace with Great Britain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn54|54]] Obviously, even stronger is the concern in Moscow caused by this suspected stagecraft, especially as the British government’s attitude encourages it. It doesn’t exploit the “capture of the deputy-Führer” for the purposes of getting “the maximum propaganda value, something that both Hitler and Goebbels feared”; instead of this, the interrogation of Hess―as Stalin was told by the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maiski―is entrusted to a supporter of appeasement. While they left the door open to an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, the secret services of His Majesty concentrate on spreading rumors of a separate peace that is imminent between London and Berlin. All of this with the aim of adding pressure on the Soviet Union (that maybe had sought to prevent the feared alliance between Great Britain and the Third Reich with a preemptive attack by the Red Army against the Wehrmacht) and thereby strengthening England’s position.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn55|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Kremlin’s caution and distrust is well understood: the imminent threat of a second Munich on a larger and far more tragic scale. One can also raise the hypothesis that the campaign of disinformation promoted by the Third Reich had played a role, based on the transcripts found in the archives of the Soviet communist party. Expecting the imminent involvement of the USSR in the conflict, in his speech on May 5th, 1941, given to graduates of the military academy, Stalin stressed how historically Germany achieved victory when it was focused on only one front, while it suffered defeat when forced to simultaneously fight in the East and the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn56|56]] Yes, maybe Stalin had underestimated the possibility that Hitler was ready to attack the USSR. On the other hand, he knew very well that a premature total mobilization would have given the Third Reich a casus belli on a silver plate, as had happened at the start of World War I. In any case, one point is clear: even while acting with caution in a very complicated situation, the Soviet leader moved toward an “acceleration in war preparations.” In fact, “between May and June 800,000 reservists were called up, in mid-May, twenty-eight divisions are relocated to the western districts of the Soviet Union, while work on the border fortifications and the camouflaging of sensitive military objectives are accelerated. “On the night between the 21st and 22nd of June, that vast force is placed on alert and ordered to prepare for a surprise attack by the Germans.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn57|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To discredit Stalin, Khrushchev stresses the spectacular initial victories by the invading armies, but leaves out the predictions made at the time by the West. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the entrance of the Wehrmacht into Prague, Lord Halifax continued to reject the idea of a rapprochement between England and the USSR, resorting to the following argument: it didn’t make sense to ally with a country whose armed forces were “insignificant.” On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, or at the moment when its unleashed, the British secret services had calculated that the Soviet Union would be “liquidated in 8-10 weeks”; the advisor of U.S. Secretary of State (Henry L. Stimson) had predicted on June 23rd that it would all be over within one to three months.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn58|58]] Moreover, the lightning breakthrough by the Wehrmacht―as observed in our days by an illustrious scholar of military history―is easily explained by geography:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The width of the front―1,800 miles―and the absence of natural obstacles gave the aggressors immense advantages for penetration and maneuvers. Despite the colossal dimensions of the Red Army, the relation between its forces and the territory was so unfavorable that German mechanized units could easily find opportunities to indirectly maneuver into the adversary’s rear. In addition, remote cities where roads and railways converged offered the aggressors the possibility of targeting alternative objectives, leaving the enemy in the difficult situation of having to predict the advance&#039;s real direction and where to face one challenge after the next.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn59|59]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Quick Unraveling of the Blitzkrieg ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s important not to fall for appearances. Looking closely, the Third Reich’s project of repeating the Blitzkrieg&#039;s victory in the West, but this time in the East, started to show problems in the very first weeks of the gigantic confrontation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn60|60]] On this, the diaries of Joseph Goebbels are revealing. In the immediate lead-up to the assault he stresses the unstoppable might of the imminent German attack, “without a doubt the most powerful the world has ever known”; no one could seriously oppose “the strongest army in all of history.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn61|61]] Therefore, “we are before a triumphal march without precedent[...]. I consider the Russian military force to be very weak, even weaker than the Führer believes. If anything is a sure thing, it is this.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn62|62]] In fact, Hitler is no less confident, some months earlier with a Bulgarian diplomat he referred to the Soviet Army as but a “joke.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn63|63]]&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
However, from the start the invaders found, despite everything, unpleasant surprises. “On June 25th, during the first aerial attack on Moscow, the anti-aircraft defenses proved to be so effective that the Luftwaffe is forced to limit itself to a reduced amount of night raids.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn64|64]] It took only ten days of war for the pre-war assumptions to be shaken. On July 2nd, Goebbels writes in his diary: “overall, the fighting is hard and stubborn. We can in no way speak of a walk in the park. The red regime mobilized the people.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn65|65]] This course of events continued on and the mood of the Nazi leaders changed radically, as is repeatedly demonstrated in the diary written by Goebbels.&lt;br /&gt;
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July 24th:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We can have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that the Bolshevik regime, which has existed for nearly a quarter of a century, left its mark on the peoples of the Soviet Union [...]. Therefore, It would be right to announce and with great clarity, before the German people, the difficulty of the struggle that rages in the East. It’s necessary to say to the nation that this operation is very difficult, but that we can overcome it and that we will overcome it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn66|66]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 1st:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In the Führer’s headquarters [...] it’s also openly admitted that they were somewhat mistaken in their evaluation of the Soviet military force. The Bolsheviks reveal a greater resistance than we had suspected; in particular, the material resources available to them were greater than we thought.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn67|67]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 19th:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Privately, the Führer is very irritated with himself for having been misled to such an extent―regarding the strength of the Bolsheviks―by the reports [by German agents] coming from the Soviet Union. In particular, the underestimation of the enemy’s armored vehicles and planes caused us many problems. He suffers a lot because of this. We’re dealing with a grave crisis [...]. Put in comparison, the previous campaigns were like a walk in the park [...]. Regarding the West, the Führer has no reason to worry [...]. With rigor and objectivity, we Germans always overestimated the enemy, except in this case with the Bolsheviks.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn68|68]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;September 16th:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
“We have totally underestimated the strength of the Bolsheviks.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn69|69]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Scholars in military strategy stress the unforeseen difficulties that soon challenge that powerful war-machine, experienced and cloaked in the myth of invincibility upon its entry into the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn70|70]] ”The battle of Smolensk, in the second half of July 1941, is particularly significant for the success of the Eastern Front (up until now it has been overshadowed by research into other events).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn71|71]] The observation is from an illustrious German historian who passes on these eloquent entries from a diary written by general Fedor von Bock from the 20th and 26th of July:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The enemy seeks to recapture Smolensk at all costs and is constantly sending in new forces. The theory expressed by some that the enemy acts without plans is not reflected in the facts [...]. We’ve verified that the Russians have brought up across the front a new and compact deployment of forces. In many areas they seek to go on the offensive. It’s surprising for an adversary which suffered so many blows; they must possess an unbelievable amount of resources, in fact our troops still lament the power of the enemy artillery.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more worried, or even decidedly pessimistic, is admiral Wilhelm Canaris, leader of counter-espionage, who, in speaking with General von Bock on July 17th, says: “I see it as very bleak.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn72|72]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only does the Soviet army not break down in the first days and weeks of the assault but, to the contrary, it offers “tenacious resistance”, and is also well commanded, as revealed by, among other things, the “decision by Stalin at the time of halting the German advance at a point decided by him.” The results of this astute military command are revealed as well in the diplomatic sphere: it is precisely because it is “impressed by the fierce battle around Smolensk” that Japan, present there as an observer, decides to reject the request by the Third Reich for it to join the war against the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn73|73]] The analysis of the vehemently anti-communist German historian is fully confirmed by Russian scholars who distinguished themselves as champions in the struggle against “Stalinism” in the wake of the Khrushchev report: “The plans of the Blitzkrieg were already sunk by the middle of July.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn74|74]] In this context, in no way formal is the tribute paid to the Soviet army&#039;s &amp;amp;quot;splendid defense” by Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt on August 14th, 1941.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn75|75]] Even outside diplomatic and governing circles, in Great Britain―we are informed by a diary entry from Beatrice Webb―common citizens, including those of a conservative orientation, show “lively interest in their surprising courage and initiative, as well as the magnificent equipment of the Russian armed forces, the only sovereign state able to oppose the almost mythical power of Hitler’s Germany.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn76|76]] In Germany itself, just three weeks after the start of Operation Barbarossa, rumors start to circulate which deeply question the regime’s triumphalist line. It’s what appears in the diary of an eminent German intellectual of Jewish origin: judging by appearances, in the East “we suffer immense loses, we had underestimated the strength of the resistance by the Russians”, which “was inexhaustible in terms of men and military resources.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For a long time read as an example of political-military ignorance or even blind faith in the Third Reich, the extremely cautious approach by Stalin in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of hostilities now appears under new light: “The concentration of forces by the Wehrmacht along the entire front with the USSR, the violation of Soviet airspace, and another number of provocations had a single aim: attract the bulk of the Red Army as close as possible to the border. Hitler intended to win the war in a single, gigantic battle.” Even valiant generals were enticed by this trap, and expecting the onslaught of the enemy, insisted on a massive relocation of troops toward the border. “Stalin categorically rejected the request, insisting on the necessity of maintaining plenty of reserves at a considerable distance from the frontline.” Later, after reading the strategic plans by Operation Barbarossa’s architects, marshall Georgy K. Zhukov recognized the correctness of the line pursued by Stalin: “Hitler’s orders counted on the relocation of the bulk of our troops toward the border, with the intention of surrounding them and destroying them.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As a matter of fact, in the months following the invasion of the USSR, arguing with his generals, Hitler observed: “The problem of the Russian territory. The infinite width of the territory makes concentrating on decisive points necessary.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn79|79]] Later, in a conversation he clarified his thinking about the already initiated Operation Barbarossa: “In world history there had been until now only three battles of annihilation: Cannae, Sedan, and Tannenberg. We can be proud of the fact that two of them had been victoriously fought by German armies.” However, for Germany the third and greatest battle of annihilation and submission, which Hitler had longed for, is increasingly complicated, and one week later he sees himself obligated to recognize that Operation Barbarossa had seriously underestimated the enemy. “The military preparations by the Russians must be considered incredible.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn80|80]] The desire by the chess player to justify the failure of his forecasts is apparent here. However, the previously cited English military scholar reaches the same conclusions: the reason for the French defeat lies “not in the quantity or quality of their resources, but in their military doctrine”; further, an excessively advanced deployment of the army had a disastrous effect, because it “gravely compromised their strategic flexibility; a similar mistake was made in Poland as well, driven by “national pride and overconfidence in the soldiers.” None of this happened in the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn81|81]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More important than the individual battles is the overall picture. “The Stalinist system was able to mobilize the immense majority of the population and nearly all resources”; particularly “extraordinary” was “the Soviet ability”―in such a difficult situation as the one that arose in the first months of the war―“of evacuating and later reconverting to military production a considerable number of industries.” Yes, “created two days after the German invasion, the Evacuation Committee managed to move to the East 1,500 major industrial companies, after titanic operations of great logistic complexity.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn82|82]] Moreover, that process of relocation had already begun in the weeks or months before Hitler’s aggression (infra, pp. 235-236), which is another confirmation of the fanciful character of the accusation delivered by Khrushchev.&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s more. To some degree, The Soviet leadership understood the scenario of the war looming on the horizon as they were promoting the industrialization of the country. With a radical turn with respect to the previous situation, they identified “Asian Russia as a key point”, at a distance to and sheltered from possible aggressors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn83|83]] In fact, Stalin had insisted repeatedly and vigorously on this. On January 31st, 1931, he pushes forward the “creation of a new and well-equipped industrial base in the Ural Mountains, Siberia and Kazakhstan.” A few years later, the report read on January 26th, 1934, at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU had with satisfaction called attention to the powerful industrial development that has been achieved “in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, in the Tatar, Buryat and Bashkirian republics, in the Ural mountains, in Eastern and Western Siberia, in the Far-East, etc.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn84|84]] Trotsky didn’t miss the implications of all this a few years later while analyzing the dangers of war and the Soviet Union’s level of preparation, and in highlighting the results achieved by the “planned economy” in the “military” sphere, he observed: “The industrialization of remote regions, especially Siberia, gives the steppes and forest regions new importance.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn85|85]] Only now does the great territorial expanse assume its full value, making the lightning warfare traditionally favored and prepared for by the German high command more difficult than ever.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely in the field of the industrial apparatus built in preparation for the war where the Third Reich is confronted with even more bitter surprises, as shown in Hitler’s notes:&lt;br /&gt;
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November 29th, 1941:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How is it possible that such a primitive people can reach such technical objectives in such a short period of time?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn86|86]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 26th, 1942:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“With respect to Russia, it is incontestable that Stalin raised the standard of living. The Russian people don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t on the maps.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn87|87]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, it’s worthwhile to consult three scholars, each very different (one Russian and the two others Western). The first, who was director of the Soviet Institute of Military History and who participated in the militant anti-Stalinism of the Gorbachev years, appears motivated by the intention of furthering and radicalizing the investigations by the Khrushchev report. However, from the results of the study he feels obligated to formulate a much more nuanced judgment: without being an expert, much less the genius portrayed by official propaganda, even in the years before the start of the war, Stalin gives particular attention to issues of defense, the defense industry, and the war economy as a whole. Yes, at the strictly military level, only through effort and mistakes, including serious mistakes, and “thanks to the hard practice of daily military life,” he “gradually learns the principles of strategy.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn88|88]] In other fields, his thinking proves to be “more developed than many Soviet military leaders.” Thanks as well to the long experience of managing political power, Stalin never loses sight of the central role of the war economy and he contributed to strengthening the USSR’s resistance with the relocation of war industry to the interior: “it’s almost impossible to overestimate the importance of that enterprise.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn89|89]] Finally, the Soviet leader paid great attention to the moral-political dimension of the war. In that field, he “had totally unconventional ideas”, as shown by the “courageous military” decision “of celebrating the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7th of 1941, in a besieged Moscow harassed by the Nazi enemy.” In conclusion, one can say that, with respect to career military officers and his inner circle, “Stalin demonstrated his more universal mindset.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn90|90]] It is a mindset―we can add―that doesn’t neglect any of the smallest aspects of the life and morale of the soldiers: informed that they didn’t have cigarettes, and thanks as well to his ability to handle “an enormous workload”, “at a crucial moment in the battle of Stalingrad, [Stalin] found time to call Akaki Mgeladze, party chief in Abkhazia, the principal region for the production of tobacco: ‘Our soldiers can no longer smoke! Without cigarettes, the front won’t hold!’”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn91|91]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In their positive evaluation of Stalin as a military leader, two Western authors go further. While Khrushchev stresses the overwhelming initial successes of the Wehrmacht, the first of the aforementioned experts references these same facts in very different terms: it’s not shocking that the “largest invasion in military history” had achieved initial successes; the response of the Red Army after the devastating blows by the German invasion in June of 1941 was “the greatest feat of arms that the world had ever seen.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn92|92]] The second scholar, a professor at an American military academy, starting from the understanding of the conflict in terms of its long duration, the attention given to the rear and the front, its economic and political dimension, as well as the military aspect of the war, speaks of Stalin as a “great strategist”, and “the first true strategist of the twentieth century.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn93|93]] Obviously we can debate and qualify these flattering judgments; it’s true however, at least as it relates to the topic of war, that the evaluation made by Khrushchev loses all credibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more so because, at this crucial moment, the USSR proved itself quite prepared from another essential point of view. Let us again consult Goebbels, who upon explaining the unforeseen difficulties of Operation Barbarossa, points to another factor besides the enemy’s military power:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For our men of confidence and our spies, it was almost impossible to penetrate the Soviet interior. We couldn’t get a precise overview. The Bolsheviks made a great effort in fooling us. Of the kinds of arms that they possessed, especially heavy weapons, we didn’t have a clue. It was the exact opposite to what had taken place in France, where we knew everything in practice and couldn’t be surprised in any way.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn94|94]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Lacking “Common Sense” and “The Mass Deportations of Entire Populations” ===&lt;br /&gt;
As the author of a book in 1913 that would earn him recognition as a theorist on the national question, and as the people’s commissar for nationalities not long after the October Revolution, Stalin had earned the recognition from such a diverse set of personalities as Arendt and De Gasperi for the way in which he had done his job. His thoughts on the national question had finally led to an essay on linguistics aimed at demonstrating that, far from disappearing after a determined social class is overthrown, the language of a nation has notable stability, just as a nation using it enjoys notable stability. That essay would also contribute to consolidating Stalin’s reputation as a theorist of the national question. Even in 1965, despite in the context of a strong condemnation of Stalin, Louis Althusser will attribute to him the merit of having opposed the “madness” that sought “at all costs to turn language into an” ideological “superstructure”: thanks to these “simple pages”―the French philosopher will conclude―”we understand that the use of the class criterion wasn’t without its limits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn95|95]] In the 1956 campaign to delegitimize and liquidate him, Khrushchev couldn’t ignore Stalin as a theorist and politician who paid particular attention to the national question. In condemning the “mass deportations of entire nationalities”, the Secret Report declares:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s not necessary to be a Marxist-Leninist to understand that any common-sense person would ask how is it possible to make entire nations responsible for hostile acts, without exception for women, children, elderly, communists and members of the Komsomol [communist youth], reaching the point of enforcing a generalized repression against them, sending them into misery and suffering without any other motive but vengeance for some crime perpetrated by individuals or isolated groups.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn96|96]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The horror of collective punishment and deportation imposed on populations suspected of lacking patriotic loyalty is beyond question. Sadly, far from referencing the madness of a single individual, this practice deeply characterizes the Second Thirty Years’ War, starting with Tsarist Russia that, although allied to the liberal West, experiences “a wave of deportations” of “dimensions unknown in Europe” during the First World War, in which around a million people are caught up (especially those of Jewish or Germanic origin).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn97|97]] Of lesser dimensions, but much more significant, are the measures during the Second World War that affect Japanese Americans, deported and enclosed in concentration camps (infra, ch. 4, § 7).&lt;br /&gt;
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The expulsion and deportation of entire populations, aside from having the aim of removing a potential fifth column, could be pursued for the purpose of remaking or redefining political geography. During the first half of the twentieth century, this practice is widespread across the planet, from the Middle East, where Jews who had just escaped the “final solution” force Arabs and Palestinians to flee, to as far as Asia, where the partition of the British Empire’s crown jewel into India and Pakistan is achieved through the “century’s largest forced migration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn98|98]] Sticking to the Asian continent for now, it&#039;s worthwhile to look at what happened in a region administered by a figure, or in the name of a figure (the fourteenth Dalai Lama), who would later obtain the Nobel Peace prize and become synonymous with non-violence: “In July of 1949, all the Han residents [there for many generations] in Lhasa were expelled from Tibet”, with the aim both to “confront the possible activity of a ‘fifth column’”, as well as to make its demographic make-up more homogeneous.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn99|99]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us is a practice not only realized in the most varied of geographic and political-cultural locations, but supported theoretically in those years by leading political figures. In 1938, David Ben Gurion, the eventual founding father of Israel, declared: “I am in favor of the forced relocation [of Arab Palestinians]; I see nothing immoral in this.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn100|100]] In fact, coherent to that program, he will put into practice ten years later.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here it’s necessary to concentrate our attention on East-Central Europe, where a little discussed tragedy takes place, yet it’s among the largest of the twentieth century. In total, around sixteen and a half million Germans were forced to abandon their homes, and two and a half million of them didn’t survive this enormous ethnic cleansing―or counter ethnic cleansing― operation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn101|101]] In this case it’s possible to make a direct comparison between Stalin on the one hand, and the Western and pro-Western statesmen on the other. What position did the latter take in that situation? As always, we’ll analyze it by beginning with a historiography that can’t be suspected of sympathies toward the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Starting in 1942, it was the British government that encouraged a generalized transfer of populations from the eastern German territories and from the Sudetenland [...]. It was the deputy under-secretary who went further than anyone else, in requesting an investigation to determine “if Great Britain should encourage the transfer to Siberia of the Germans from East Prussia and Upper Silesia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn102|102]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Speaking in the House of Common on December 15th, 1944, on the planned “transfer of several million” Germans, Churchill clarified his thinking as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From what we are able to understand, expulsion is the most satisfactory and long lasting solution. There will no longer be a mixing of populations provoking endless disorder, as happened in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. A clean cut will be made. I’m not alarmed by the expected separation of populations, nor am I alarmed by the massive relocations, which in modern conditions are much easier than they were in the past.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn103|103]]&lt;br /&gt;
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F.D. Roosevelt later adhered to the deportations plans in June of 1943; “almost at the same time Stalin gave into pressure from Beneš to expel the Germans from the Sudetenland upon its restoration to Czechoslovakia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn104|104]] An American historian comes to the following conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In the end, on the question of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and post-war Poland, in practice there wasn’t any difference between communist and non-communist politicians; on this issue Beneš and Gottwald, Mikolajczyk and Bierut, Stalin and Churchill all spoke the same language.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This conclusion is already enough to refute the black and white position implicit in the Khrushchev report. In truth, at least with regard to the Germans of Eastern Europe, it wasn’t Stalin who took the initiative with respect to the “mass deportations of entire peoples”, the blame was not given out in an equal manner. The same American historian just cited ends up recognizing this. In Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk expressed his conviction according to which “the Germans don’t have a soul, and the words they best understand are the bursts of a machine gun.&amp;amp;quot; Nor is this a remotely isolated attitude: “Even the Czech Catholic church made its voice heard. Monsignor Bohumil Stašek, the priest of Vyšehrad, declared: “After a thousand years, the moment has arrived to settle matters with the Germans, who are evil and for whom the commandment to ‘love your neighbor’ doesn’t apply.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn106|106]] In those circumstances, a German witness recalls: “We often had to seek help from the Russians against the Czechs, which the Russians frequently offered, so long as it didn’t involve laying a hand on a woman.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn107|107]] There’s more, however. Again we turn to the American historian: “In the former Nazi-camp of Theresienstadt, the interned Germans asked themselves what would have happened to them if the local Russian commander hadn’t protected them from the Czechs.&amp;amp;quot; A secret report sent to the central committee of the communist party in Moscow relayed requests made for the Soviet soldiers to stay: “‘if the Red Army leaves, we are finished’. The demonstrations of hate toward the Germans are evident. [The Czechs] don’t kill them but they torment them as if they were wild animals. They consider them animals.&#039;&#039; In effect―the American historian cited here continues―”the horrible treatment by the Czechs lead them to desperation. According to Czech statistics, in 1946 alone, 5,558 Germans committed suicide.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn108|108]] Something similar happens in Poland. In conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Germans thought the Russian military personnel were much more humane and responsible than the local Czechs and Polish. On occasions, the Russians gave food to hungry German children, while the Czechs would let them die of starvation. Sometimes, the Soviet troops gave a ride in their vehicles to exhausted Germans on the long journey to leave the country, while the Czechs only looked at them with disdain or indifference.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The American historians speaks generally of “Czechs” and “Polish”, but isn’t completely correct in doing so, as emerges in his very own account:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The question of the Germans’ expulsion caused serious problems for the Czech communists―as well as for communists in other countries. During the war, the communist position, as articulated by Georgi Dimitrov in Moscow, was that the Germans responsible for the war and for its crimes should be put on trial and condemned, while the German workers and peasants should be reeducated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, “in Czechoslovakia it was the communists, upon taking power in February of 1948, who put an end to the persecution of the few ethnic minorities who had remained.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn111|111]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Contrary to what Khrushchev insinuates, in comparison to the bourgeois leaders of Western and East-Central Europe, at least in this case, Stalin and the communist movement led by him prove to be less lacking in “common sense.”&lt;br /&gt;
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That was not by chance. While toward the end of the war F.D. Roosevelt insists he’s “more thirsty than ever for German blood” because of the atrocities they committed, and even entertains the idea, for some time, of “castrating” such a perverse people, Stalin’s position is quite different; and just after Operation Barbarossa is unleashed he states that the Soviet resistance can count on the support of “all the best men in Germany” and even the “German people under the command of Hitler’s officers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn112|112]] The statement made in February of 1942 is particularly solemn:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It would be ridiculous to see in the Hitlerite clique the German people or the German state. Historical experience proves that Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state, remains. The strength of the Red Army resides in the fact that it doesn’t nurture, nor could it nurture, any hatred toward other people, and therefore couldn’t even nurture hatred for the German people; it is educated in the spirit of the equality of all peoples and all races, in the spirit of respect for the rights of other peoples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn113|113]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even an uncompromising anti-communist like Ernst Nolte is forced to recognize that the position taken by the Soviet Union in relation to the German people doesn’t carry those racist tones that are sometimes found in the Western powers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn114|114]] To finish this point: if not equally distributed, the lack of “common sense” was quite widespread among the political leaders of the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far I have concentrated on the deportations caused by war or by the risk of war, or by the reorganization and revision of political geography. At least until the forties, in the United States, the deportations carried out in urban centers are widespread, urban centers that seek to be for whites only, as the posters warn upon entry. Aside from African Americans, Mexicans are also targeted, reclassified as non-whites in the 1930 census; thus “thousands of workers and their families, including many Americans of Mexican origin,” are deported to Mexico. The expulsion and deportation measures in the cities that seek to be “for whites only”, or “for Caucasians only”, don’t even spare Jews.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn115|115]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Secret Report depicts Stalin as a tyrant so lacking a sense of reality that, in taking collective measures against determined ethnic groups, he didn’t hesitate in punishing the innocent or even party comrades. What comes to mind is the case of the German exiles (the majority of them declared enemies of Hitler) who, soon after the war begins with Germany, are collectively confined to French concentration camps (infra, ch. 4, § 7). But it’s useless to search for any effort at a comparative analysis in Khrushchev’s speech.&lt;br /&gt;
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His goal is to upend two themes that until that moment had been widespread not only in official propaganda, but also in journalism and international public opinion: to transform the great leader―who had decisively contributed to the destruction of the Third Reich―into a foolish amateur who has trouble figuring out a world map; that this eminent theorist of the national question is revealed to have lacked the most elementary “common sense” in that field. The acknowledgements previously given to Stalin are all blamed on a cult of personality that now must be eliminated once and for all.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
The denunciation of the cult of personality is Khrushchev’s principal argument. However, in his report the question that ought to seem obligatory doesn’t show up: are we faced with the vanity or narcissism of a single political leader, or with a phenomenon of a more general character that takes hold in a determined, objective context? It may be interesting to read the observations made by Bukharin while in the United States, as they finalized the preparations for their entry into the First World War:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;So that the state machinery was as prepared as possible for military affairs, it itself became a military organization, which is commanded by a dictator. This dictator is president Wilson. Emergency powers were given to him. He has nearly absolute power. And in the people they seek to encourage submissiveness toward the “great president”, like in the Byzantine Empire of old where they deified their monarch.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn116|116]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In situations of acute crisis, the personalization of power is often combined with the veneration of the leader who holds power. When he arrives in France in December of 1918, the victorious American president is hailed as the savior and his Fourteen Points speech is compared to the Sermon on the Mount.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn117|117]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The political developments that take place in the United States between the Great Depression and the Second World War are worth considering. Having ascended to the presidency on the promise of solving a deeply troubling social-economic situation, F.D. Roosevelt is elected for four consecutive terms (although he died at the start of the fourth term), a unique case in the history of his country. Aside from the long duration of this presidency, what’s unusual are the hopes and expectations placed on it. Leading figures speak of a “national dictator” and invite the new president to demonstrate all his strength: “Become a tyrant, a despot, a true monarch. During the Great War we took our constitution and put it aside until the end of the war.&amp;amp;quot; The continuation of the state of emergency demands we don’t allow ourselves to be impeded by excessive legal scruples. The nation’s new leader is called upon to be, and is soon defined as, an “individual of providence”, that is, in the words of cardinal O’Connell: “a man sent by God.&amp;amp;quot; The average person writes to and expresses themselves to F.D. Roosevelt in even more emphatic terms, declaring that they look to him “almost as if they were looking to God” and hope to one day place him “in the immortal Pantheon, alongside Jesus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn118|118]] Invited to behave as a dictator or a man of providence, the new president makes ample use of his executive power from the first hours of his mandate. In his inaugural message he demands “ample executive power [...] as great as that which would be conceded to me if we were really invaded by a foreign enemy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn119|119]] With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, even before Pearl Harbor, F.D. Roosevelt begins, on his own initiative, dragging the country toward war on the side of Britain; subsequently, with a unilateral executive order, he imposes the confinement of all Japanese American citizens in concentration camps, including the women and children. It’s a presidency that, while it enjoys widespread popular support, leads to warnings of the danger of “totalitarianism”: this happens during the Great Depression (it’s former president Hoover in particular who makes that accusation)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn120|120]] and it especially happens in the months that precede the entry into the Second World War (when senator Burton K. Wheeler accuses F.D. Roosevelt of exercising dictatorial power and of promoting a “totalitarian form of government”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn121|121]] At least from the point of view of the president’s adversaries, totalitarianism and the cult of personality had crossed over the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the phenomenon that we are investigating here (the personalization of power and the cult of personality linked to it) is present only in embryonic form in the American Republic, protected by the ocean from any attempted invasion and with a political tradition quite different from Russia’s. One must concentrate on that country. Let’s see what happens between February and October of 1917, therefore, before the Bolshevik ascension to power. Driven by his personal vanity, but also by his desire to stabilize the situation, we find Kerensky “taking Napoleon as a model.&amp;amp;quot; He inspects the troops “with a hand tucked into the front of his jacket”; meanwhile “on the desk in his office in the war ministry stood a bust of the Emperor of the French.&amp;amp;quot; The results from this performance don’t take long: poetry paying homage to Kerensky as the new Napoleon flourish.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn122|122]] In the lead-up to the summer offensive, that was supposed to reverse the fortunes of the Russian army, the cult dedicated to Kerensky (in certain circles) reaches its high point:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Everywhere he was proclaimed a hero, the soldiers lifted him on their shoulders, showered him with flowers, throwing them at his feet. A British nurse had the opportunity to witness it, surprised at the scene of army men “kissing him, his car and the ground he walked on. Many fell to their knees and prayed, others cried.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn123|123]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, it doesn’t make much sense to blame Stalin’s narcissism, as Khrushchev does, for the exalted state that the cult of personality reaches in the USSR after a certain amount of time. In fact, when Kaganovich suggests substituting the term Marxism-Leninism for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the leader to whom that tribute is directed responds: “you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn124|124]] At least when compared to Kerensky, Stalin appears more modest. It’s confirmed by the attitude he takes in concluding a war that’s actually been won, not in his imagination like in the case of the Menshevik leader, the lover of Napoleonic poses. Immediately after the victory parade, a group of marshals reach out to Molotov and Malenkov: they propose to them the commemoration of the victory achieved in the Great Patriotic War by offering the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” to Stalin, who nonetheless rejects the offer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn125|125]] The Soviet leader also sought to escape rhetorical excesses on the occasion of the Potsdam Conference: “Both Churchill and Truman took their time walking among Berlin’s ruins; Stalin showed no such interest. Without drawing attention, he arrived by train, and even ordered Zhukov to cancel any welcoming ceremony with a military band and an honor guard.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn126|126]] Four years later, on the eve of his seventieth birthday, a conversation took place in the Kremlin that’s worth sharing:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;He [Stalin] called in Malenkov and warned him: “Don’t even think about honoring me again with a ‘star’.&amp;amp;quot; “But comrade Stalin, on an anniversary like this? The people would not understand.” “It’s not up to the people. I don’t want to argue. No personal initiative! Understand me?” “Of course, comrade Stalin, but the politburo members think…” Stalin interrupted Malenkov and declared the discussion closed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, one can say that in the circumstances referred to here political calculation plays a more or less important role (and it would be extremely odd if it didn’t); it’s a fact, however, that personal vanity didn’t win out. And even less so when decisions of vital political character are at stake: over the course of the Second World War, Stalin invites his colleagues to express themselves frankly, he actively argues and even fights with Molotov, who for his part, despite being careful so as not to put the hierarchy in doubt, remains unchanged in his opinion. Judging by the testimony of admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, the supreme leader “particularly appreciated those comrades who thought for themselves and didn’t hesitate in frankly expressing their point of view.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn127|127]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Interested as he is in pointing to Stalin as the only one responsible for the catastrophes that struck the USSR, far from eliminating the cult of personality, Khrushchev only transforms it into a negative cult. The vision based upon in principio erat Stalin [in the beginning there was Stalin] remains unshaken. Further, in confronting the most tragic chapter of the Soviet Union’s history (the terror and the bloody purges that were widespread and didn’t even spare the communist party itself), the Secret Report has no doubt: it’s a horror to be exclusively blamed on a person with a thirst for power and possessed by bloody paranoia.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;2. The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Russian Revolution and the Dialectic of Saturn ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the eyes of Khrushchev, Stalin is tarnished by the horrendous crimes against comrades from his own party, having deviated from Leninism and Bolshevism and having betrayed the ideals of socialism. But it’s precisely the reciprocal accusations of betrayal that contributed in a very important way to the tragedies which struck Soviet Russia; accusations that hasten or deepen the internal divisions in the leadership group from October 1917. How to explain these divisions? The dialectic of “Saturn devouring her own children” is certainly not a trait exclusive to the October Revolution: the consensus that presides over the overthrow of an old regime rejected by the majority of the people can inevitably crumble or wither at the moment in which they try to determine how the new order should be constructed. This is also true for the English and American Revolutions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn128|128]] But this dialectic in Russia is felt in a particularly violent and prolonged way. Even at the time of the Czarist autocracy’s collapse, while the attempts to restore the monarchy or to establish a military dictatorship persist, there’s a painful decision imposed on those who are determined to avoid a return to the past: to concentrate on peace first or, as the Mensheviks argue, to continue or even intensify the war efforts, rallying Russia behind the slogan of democratic interventionism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The consolidation of the Bolshevik victory in no way ends the dialectic of Saturn, which gets further intensified, in fact. Lenin’s call for the conquest of power and the revolution’s transformation in a socialist direction is considered an intolerable deviation from Marxism in the eyes of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who alert the Mensheviks to the situation and therefore invite upon themselves the accusation of betrayal from the majority of the Bolshevik party. It’s a debate that extends beyond Russia’s borders and the communist movement itself. The social democrats are the first to cry out against the scandalous abandonment of orthodoxy, which excluded the possibility of a socialist revolution in a country that hadn’t yet passed through full capitalist development; while both Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg condemned Lenin’s embrace of the slogan “land to the peasantry” as an abandonment of the path toward socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here, however, it’s worth concentrating on the divisions that occur within the Bolshevik leadership group itself. The millenarian expectations that arise from a combination of circumstances, both objective and subjective, explains the particularly devastating strength demonstrated by the dialectic of Saturn. Fear and indignation, universally shared, caused by the unspeakable carnage and conflict between different states as if it they were Moloch, determined to sacrifice millions and millions of men on the altar of national defense, when in reality they are competing in an imperialist race for world hegemony, all of this strengthens the demand for a completely new political and social order: it’s a matter of once and for all ripping out the roots from from which all the horrors since 1914 had emerged. Nurtured by a world view (which with Marx and Engels appears to call for a future without national borders, market relations, a state apparatus, and even judicial coercion) and by an almost religious approach to the texts of the communist movement’s founders, that demand could only be a disappointment once the structure of the new order begins to take form.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, well before being central to Trotsky’s thoughts and the criticisms he made, and after having already manifested itself during the collapse of the Tsarist autocracy, the theme of the revolution betrayed looms like a shadow over the history that begins with the Bolshevik rise to power. The accusation or the suspicion of betrayal emerges at every turn of this particularly tortured revolution, driven by the government’s need to reconsider some of the original utopian motives, and in any case forced to moderate their grand ambitions given the extreme difficulties of the objective situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first challenges faced by the new political order is that represented by the dissolution of the state apparatus and by the continued widespread anarchy among the peasantry (who lack any state or national vision, and are therefore quite indifferent to the plight of the cities, which lack any sources of food) inclined to establish short lived “peasant republics”; anarchy was also present among deserters, already hostile to all forms of discipline (as is confirmed by the rise of a “Free Republic of Deserters” in a district of Bessarabia). In this case, it’s Trotsky who’s labeled a traitor, who as leader of the army is on the front line in the restoration of centralized power and the very existence of the State: at this time it’s the peasantry, the deserters (among them deserters from the Red Army) and outcasts who lay claim to the “authentic” socialism and the “true” soviets, and who long for Lenin (who had endorsed or encouraged the revolt against state power) and who consider Trotsky and the Jews to be vile usurpers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn129|129]] One can place in that same context the revolt in 1921 by sailors in Kronstadt. From what it appears, on this occasion Stalin had spoken in favor of a more cautious approach, that is, waiting for the depletion of fuel and food provisions available to the besieged fortress; but in a situation in which the danger of civil war and intervention by counter-revolutionary powers had not yet vanished, a quick military solution ends up being imposed. Again, it’s Trotsky, the “police officer” or marshall, who is considered the “defender of bureaucratic organization”, “dictator”, and, in the last analysis, traitor to the original spirit of the revolution. Trotsky, for his part, suspects Zinoviev of having for weeks encouraged the agitation that then turns into a revolt, demagogically wielding the banner of “worker democracy [...] like in 1917.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn130|130]] Judging from these events, the first accusation of “betrayal” is an inevitable step in all revolutions, but it’s especially painful when it’s a revolution carried out in the name of the state’s withering away, from the moment of the old regime’s overthrow up until the construction of the new order, from the “libertarian” phase up until the “authoritarian” phase. Naturally, the accusation or suspicion of “betrayal” is tied to personal ambitions and the struggle for power.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Foreign Ministry “Closes Up Shop” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The jingoistic rhetoric and national hatreds, in part “spontaneous”, in part intentionally fanned, led to the nightmare of imperialist war. The need to put an end to all this takes on an all consuming importance. Thus, a totally unrealistic internationalism emerges in certain parts of the communist movement, which tends to dismiss different national identities as mere prejudices. Let’s see in what terms, at the start of 1918, Bukharin opposes not only the peace of Brest-Litovsk, but any attempt on the part of Soviet power to exploit the contradictions among the various imperialist powers, whether by stipulating agreements or doing deals with one or the other: “What are we doing? We are turning the party into a dung heap [...]. We always said [...] that sooner or later the Russian Revolution would have to clash with international capital. That moment has now come.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s easy to understand the deception and unease of Bukharin who nearly two years earlier―against a war to the last drop of blood between the great capitalist powers and between different nation states, and against the chauvinist turn by social democracy―had supported a vision of humanity finally united in brotherhood thanks to the “social revolution of the international proletariat, that through arms toppled the dictatorship of financial capital.&amp;amp;quot; With the defeat of “the socialist epigones of Marxism” (guilty of having forgotten or repressed “the well known thesis from the Communist Manifesto”, according to which “the workers have no fatherland”), “thus ends the final way of limiting the proletariat&#039;s conception of the world: the limitations of its nation state and its patriotism”; “the slogan for the abolition of state borders and the convergence of the peoples into a single socialist family.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn132|132]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not a matter of a single person’s illusions. Upon taking the position as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky would declare: “I shall publish some revolutionary decrees to the peoples of the world, then I will close up shop.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn133|133]] With the arrival of a unified humanity across the world following the ruins of war and a wave of global revolution, the ministry that would prove to be superfluous is that which would normally handle relations between different states. Compared to this enthusiastic perspective, reality and the political project―as revealed by the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, with the return of state and national borders and even the return of the state’s raison d&#039;être―must appear mediocre and disappointing! It’s not a small number of Bolshevik members and leaders who experience that event as the fall, or even the vile abandonment and betrayal of an entire world of ideals and hopes. Certainly, it would not be easy to resist Wilhelm II’s armies, but to make concessions to German imperialism just because the Russian peasantry, self absorbed in their own interests and ignorant of the responsibilities imposed on them by world revolution, refuse to continue fighting? Is that not proof of the nascent “peasant degeneration within our party and Soviet power”? Toward the end of 1924 Bukharin describes the common sentiments among “the ‘pure blooded’ left communists” and the “circles that sympathized with comrade Trotsky” during the Brest-Litovsk period: “comrade Riazanov stood out in particular, who at the time quit the party because, in his opinion, we had lost revolutionary purity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn134|134]] Apart from individual figures, there are important party organizations that declare: “In the interest of the international revolution, we judge it opportune to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power, which has now become something purely formal.&amp;amp;quot; They are “strange and monstrous” words from Lenin’s perspective,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn135|135]] who’s suspected and accused of treason, and even becomes the target of a coup plot by Bukharin, however vague it may have been.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All of the prestige and energy of the great revolutionary leader is needed to overcome the crisis. But it emerges again some years later. With the defeat of the central powers and the outbreak of revolution in Germany, Austria, Hungary and its potential outbreak in other countries, the outlook the Bolsheviks were forced to abandon with Brest-Litovsk appears to again acquire new vitality and relevance. At the conclusion to the First Congress of the Communist International, it’s Lenin himself who declares: “The victory of the worldwide proletarian revolution is guaranteed. The founding of the International Soviet Republic draws near.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn137|137]] Therefore, the imminent defeat of capitalism around the world would have been rapidly followed by the fusion of different nations and different states into a single entity: again, the foreign ministry was about to become superfluous!&lt;br /&gt;
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The twilight of that illusion coincides with Lenin’s illness and death. The new crisis is even more serious because now, inside the Bolshevik party, there’s no indisputable authority. From the point of view of Trotsky, his allies, and his followers, there can be no doubt: what had dictated the choice of “socialism in one country” and the consequent neglect of the idea of world revolution, wasn’t political realism and a calculation of the balance of forces, but bureaucracy, opportunism, cowardice, and in the last analysis, betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first to face this accusation is Stalin, who from the start had dedicated special attention to the national question, looking toward the victory of the revolution at an international level, but thinking first of Russia. Between February and October of 1917, he had presented the proletarian revolution not only as the necessary instrument to build the new social order, but to also reaffirm Russia’s national independence. The Entente tried to force Russia, through all possible means, to continue fighting and bleeding, and similarly tried to transform it into some type of “colony of Britain, America and France”; worse yet, they behaved in Russia as if they were “in Central Africa”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn138|138]] complicit in this operation were the Mensheviks, who with their insistence on the war’s continuation, accepted the imperialist &#039;&#039;diktat&#039;&#039;, and were open to the “gradual sale of Russia to the foreign capitalists”, leading the country “to ruin” and revealing themselves, therefore, as the true “traitors” to the nation. Against all this, the completion of the revolution not only promoted the emancipation of the popular classes, but cleared “the way to the effective liberation of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After October, the counter-revolution, unleashed by the Whites and supported or encouraged by the Entente, was also defeated due to the appeal to the Russian people by the Bolsheviks to resist the invasion by the imperialist powers determined to reduce Russia to a colony or semi-colony of the West; it’s for that reason even officers from the nobility had given their support to the new Soviet order.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn140|140]] And Stalin had distinguished himself once again in promoting this line, describing the situation during the civil war as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A victory by Denikin and Kolchak means the loss of Russia’s independence, the transformation of Russia into a rich source of money for the Anglo-French capitalists. In that sense, the Denikin-Kolchak government is the most anti-popular and anti-national government. In that sense, the soviet government is the only popular and national government in the best meaning of this term, because it carries with it not only the liberation of the workers from capital, but also the liberation of all of Russia from the yoke of world imperialism, and the transformation of Russia from a colony into a free and independent country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn141|141]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the battlefield, “Russian officers who’ve sold out, who’ve forgotten Russia, who have lost their honor and are ready to switch to the side of the enemy of workers’ and peasants’ Russia” confront soldiers of the Red Army, who are aware that “they fight not for capitalist profit, but for the liberation of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn142|142]] From this perspective, the social struggle and the national struggle are interlinked: replacing “imperialist unity” (that’s to say the unity based on national oppression) with a unity founded on the recognition of the principle of equality between nations. The new Soviet Russia had put an end to the “disintegration” and the “complete ruin” represented by the old Tsarist Russia; at the same time, while increasing its “strength” and its “weight”, the new Soviet Russia had contributed to the weakening of imperialism and the victory of the revolution around the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn143|143]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, when the course of the civil war and the struggle against foreign intervention started to improve, illusions had taken hold about a rapid expansion of socialism in the wake of the Red Army’s successes, and its advance far beyond the borders established in Brest-Litovsk. Due to his realism and profound sensitivity to the national question, Stalin noted the dangers that would arise from entering far into Polish territory:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The rear of the Polish armies [...] differ notably to those of Kolchak and Denikin, to Poland’s great advantage. Different from the rearguard of Kolchak and Denikin, the Polish troops are homogeneous and have a single nationality. From there arises their unity and stability. “Patriotic sentiment” prevails in the spirit of their people, which reaches the frontlines in a number of ways, creating a sense of national unity and steadfastness among the troops.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, it was one thing to defeat in Russia an enemy discredited in national terms, but it was another matter to confront outside of Russia a nationally motivated enemy. Therefore, proclamations in favor of a “march on Warsaw”, and the declarations according to which one could “only accept a ‘red and soviet Warsaw’”, were expressions of empty “bluster” and a “self satisfaction damaging to the cause.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn144|144]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The failed attempt to export socialism to Poland, that until not long before had been part of the Tsarist empire, had strengthened Stalin’s convictions. In 1929, he pointed to a phenomenon in large part unexpected by the protagonists of the October Revolution: “the stability of nations is tremendously solid.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn145|145]] They appear destined to be a vital force for a long time in history. As a consequence, for a long period of time humanity would have to remain divided not only between different social systems, but also between different linguistic, cultural and national identities. What relations would have to be established between them? In 1936, in an interview with Roy Howard (of the Times), Stalin states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Exporting revolution is nonsense. Each country can have its revolution if it wishes, but if it doesn’t want it, there won’t be a revolution. Our country wanted to have a revolution and it did.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outraged, Trotsky comments:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We cite word by word. The theory of revolution in one country is the natural next step after the theory of socialism in one country [...]. We have proclaimed an infinite number of times that the proletariat in the country with the victorious revolution is morally obligated to help the revolting and oppressed classes, and not only in the realm of ideas, but also with weapons, if possible. And we haven’t limited ourselves to declaring it. We have defended with weapons the workers of Finland, Estonia and Georgia. We tried, by marching on Warsaw with the Red Army, to offer the Polish proletariat the opportunity to have an insurrection.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn146|146]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Having exhausted the vision of an “International Soviet Republic”, and with it the final disappearance of state and national borders, Stalin makes use of the principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. But this new principle, that was the result of a learning process and that guaranteed the Soviet Union the right to independence in a world that was hostile and militarily stronger, in the eyes of Trotsky appeared to be a betrayal of proletarian internationalism, as well as the abandonment of the duty of mutual and active solidarity between the oppressed and exploited around the whole world. His polemic against the political turn is unending, against the transformation of the initial “internationalist revolutionary” program into a “conservative-national” program; against “the national pacifist foreign policy of the Soviet government”; against ignoring the principle based on the idea that a single workers state should alone carry out the role of “leading the world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn147|147]] In any case, since the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism is impossible, “a socialist state can’t peacefully integrate and develop (&#039;&#039;hineinwashsen&#039;&#039;) within a world capitalist system.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a position that Trotsky stresses still in 1940: it would have been better not to have started the war against Finland, but once started, it should have been “seen through until the end, that is, until the sovietization of Finland.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The End of “the Money Economy” and “Market Morality” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectic of Saturn is demonstrated in a number of other political and social settings. Internally, how should equality be understood by the regime born out of the October Revolution and that was called upon to realize it? War and hardship had produced a “communism” founded on the more or less egalitarian distribution of quite miserable food rations. With respect to that practice and the ideology that had developed upon it, the NEP [New Economic Policy] was an upsetting shock, with the emergence of new and stark inequalities, made possible by the toleration of certain sectors of the capitalist economy. The sense of “betrayal” is a widespread phenomenon, and it heavily affects the Bolshevik party: “In 1921 and 1922, literally tens of thousands of Bolshevik workers ripped up their membership cards, so disgusted by the NEP they had renamed it the New Extortion of the Proletariat.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn149|149]] Outside of Soviet Russia, we see a French communist leader accept the radical change, but not without adding, while writing in &#039;&#039;L’Humanité&#039;&#039;: “The NEP has brought with it some of the capitalist rot that had completely disappeared during war communism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At times, one has the impression that it’s not specific aspects of the economic reality that are looked at with distrust or indignation, but that very reality as a whole. It’s necessary not to lose sight of the millenarian expectations that characterize revolution for the lower strata of the people, and which persist after a crisis of long duration. In France 1789, even before the storming of the Bastille, the meeting of the Estates General and the agitation by the third estate awaken “the popular spirit of the old millenarism, the anxious expectations for the revenge of the poor and the happiness of the humiliated: it will deeply permeate the revolutionary mentality.&amp;amp;quot; In Russia, driven by tsarist oppression and especially by the horrors of the First World War, millenarism had already demonstrated its strength during the February Revolution. Welcoming it as the Easter Resurrection, Christian circles and important sections of Russian society had expected a complete transformation, with the emergence of an intimately unified community and with the disappearance of the division between rich and poor, even theft, lies, gambling, blasphemy, and drunkenness.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn151|151]] Disillusioned with the Menshevik program and by the continuation of the war and its carnage, these millenarian expectations had ultimately brought no small number of supporters to the Bolshevik cause.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, that’s the case with Pierre Pascal, a French catholic who will later be deeply disappointed with the move toward NEP, although he had initially welcomed the events of October 1917 as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s the realization of Psalm Four from Sunday Vespers and the Magnificat: the powerful are toppled from their thrones and the poor are rescued from misery [...] There’s no longer any rich, only the poor and the very poor. Knowledge does not confer privilege or respect. The former worker promoted to manager gives orders to the engineers. The gap between higher and lower salaries is narrowed. The right to property is reduced to personal possessions. The judge is no longer obligated to apply the law if his sense of proletarian equality contradicts it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn152|152]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon reading this fragment Marx’s affirmation comes to mind, according to which there’s “nothing easier than to give Christian asceticism a socialist tinge.&amp;amp;quot; One shouldn’t think that this vision exists only within openly religious circles. As always, the Manifesto of the Communist Party notes that the “first proletariat movements” are often characterized by demands along the lines of “a universal asceticism and a rough egalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn153|153]] It’s what takes place in Russia after the catastrophe of the First World War. In the 1940s, a Bolshevik effectively describes the pervading spiritual climate in the period immediately following the October Revolution, having emerged from a war caused by imperialist competition to plunder the colonies, the drive to conquer new markets and natural resources, and by the capitalist search for profits and super profits:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We, communist youths, all grew up with the conviction that money would disappear once and for all [...]. If money returned, wouldn’t the rich also reappear? Would we not find ourselves on a slippery slope that leads us to capitalism?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a spiritual climate that’s also expressed in the work of eminent Western philosophers. In 1918, the young Bloch invites the Soviets to put an end not only to “all private economic activity”, but also the entire “money economy”, and with it the “market morality that blesses all the evil that there is in man.&amp;amp;quot; Only by liquidating such rottenness in its entirety was it possible to once and for all end the pursuit of wealth and domination, the conquest of colonies and hegemony, that lead to the catastrophe of war. On publishing in 1923 the second edition of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of Utopia&#039;&#039;, Bloch considers it opportune to remove those previously cited excerpts marked by millenarianism. However, the state of mind and the vision that had inspired them didn’t disappear, not in the Soviet Union or outside it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn155|155]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While on the one hand they attenuate it, this moral crisis is nonetheless reignited by the healing of the wounds opened by the First World War and the two civil wars (against the Whites and the kulaks), as well as by the economic recovery. Especially after the completion of the collectivization of agriculture and the consolidation of the new regime, it’s no longer possible to blame the remnants of capitalism or the danger of an immediate collapse to explain the continued differences in wages. Were they to be tolerated, and to what point?&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;, Hegel demonstrates the aporia contained in the idea of material equality that’s rooted in the demand for a “community of goods.&amp;amp;quot; When an equal satisfaction of the different needs of individuals is put into practice, it’s obvious that the result will be an inequality in relation to the “quota of participation”, in other words, the distribution of goods; if there’s an “equal distribution” of goods, however, then it’s obvious that the “satisfaction of necessities” for individuals become unequal (as needs are always different). In any case, the “community of goods” is unable to maintain the promise of material equality. Marx, who was quite familiar with &#039;&#039;Phenomenology&#039;&#039;, solves the problem (in the &#039;&#039;Critique of the Gotha Programme&#039;&#039;) by matching the two different approaches to rejecting “equality” (which always seemed partial and limited) to two different phases of development in the post-capitalist society: in the socialist phase distribution is according to “equal right”, in other words, redistribution according to the same measurement of work realized by each individual. It’s always different for each individual, producing an evident inequality in total redistribution and in income; in that sense, “equal right” is nothing else but the “right to inequality.&amp;amp;quot; In the communist phase, the equal satisfaction of different needs also brings with it an inequality in the distribution of resources, except that the enormous development of the productive forces, completely satisfying the needs of all, makes such inequalities lose their importance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn156|156]] In other words, in socialism material equality is not possible; in communism it no longer has any meaning. With the permanence of inequality in the distribution of resources, the transition from unequal satisfaction to equal satisfaction presupposes, aside from the overthrow of capitalism, the prodigious development of the productive forces, and this can be achieved solely through the affirmation, during the socialist stage, of the principle of redistribution to every individual based on the different work carried out by them. It’s here that Marx’s insistence arises on the fact that, once having seized power, the proletariat is called upon to commit themselves to the development of the productive forces, in addition to committing themselves to the transformation of social relations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn157|157]] On the other hand, however, in praising the Paris working class for confronting the French bourgeoisie, which enjoys its luxuries while it carries out a bloody repression, Marx highlights a measure approved by the Commune as a model : “public service had to be done at workman’s wage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn158|158]] In that case, redistributive and material equality becomes an objective of a socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not easy to reconcile those two perspectives, and their divergence will play a non-negligible role in irremediably dividing the Bolshevik party’s leaders. As it’s consolidated, Soviet power is forced to address the growing problem of economic development, for the purpose of establishing social consensus and achieving national legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people, as well as a means to defend “the homeland of socialism” from the threats growing on the horizon. Referring to the polemic already found in the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;, against “universal asceticism” and its “egalitarian tinge”, Stalin insists: “It’s time to understand that Marxism is the enemy of egalitarianism”, The equality achieved by socialism consists in the elimination of class exploitation, certainly not in the imposition of uniformity and equalization, which is what religious primitivism aspires to:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Leveling in the context of necessities and personal life is a reactionary and petty-bourgeois absurdity, worthy of any primitive ascetic sect, but not for a socialist society organized in the Marxist spirit, because one can’t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model [...]. In terms of equality, Marxism no longer understands it as leveling in the context of personal necessities and living standards, but as the elimination of classes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn159|159]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Religious primitivism can only be expressed through the aspiration for a communal life, in which individual differences are meant to disappear, with serious damage to the development of the productive forces as well:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The idealization of agricultural communes was encouraged at a certain time, going as far as to introduce workshops and factories into the communes, where skilled and unskilled workers, working each according to their vocation, had to put their salary in the common fund, and later divide it in equal parts. It’s well known how much damage was caused for our industry by these puerile exercises in leveling due to “left” bunglers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn160|160]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin’s long term objective is quite ambitious, both at the social and national level: “To make our Soviet society the society with the greatest standard of living”; to complete the “transformation of our country into the most advanced country”; but to achieve this result “it’s necessary that in our country labor productivity surpass the labor productivity of the most advanced capitalist countries”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn161|161]] which once again requires material incentives in addition to moral incentives, and therefore the need to overcome that egalitarianism, considered by the Soviet leader to be crude and mechanistic.&lt;br /&gt;
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And again, and more than ever, the religious primitivism makes itself felt, with its distrust not only in relation to difference in income, but above all else in relation to wealth as such: “if everyone becomes rich and the poor cease to exist, who will then have need of the Bolsheviks and our work?”: thus, according to Stalin, argue the “‘left’ bunglers who idealize the poor peasants as the eternal supporters of Bolshevism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn162|162]] This causes us to think of the critical observations developed by Hegel with regards to the evangelical commandment that obligates one to help the poor. Losing sight of the fact that it’s “a conditional rule”, and instead absolutizing it, Christians then end up absolutizing poverty, which alone can give meaning to the rule that demands aid to the poor. Instead, the quality of aid to the poor ought to be measured by the contribution given to overcoming poverty as such..[[footnotes.xhtml#fn163|163]] In the state of horror caused by capitalism’s butchery and by the &#039;&#039;auri sacra fames&#039;&#039;, a religious distrust for gold and wealth as such is created, and the idealization of misery, or at least of scarcity, understood and experienced as an expression of spiritual fulfillment or of revolutionary rigor. And Stalin feels obligated to stress a key point: “It would be stupid to think that socialism can be built on top of misery and deprivation, by reducing personal needs and everyone’s standard of living to that of the poor”; on the contrary, “socialism can be built only on the basis of a relentless development of society’s productive forces” and “on the basis of a comfortable life for the workers”, or better yet, “a comfortable and civilized life for all members of society.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn164|164]] Just like the Christian doctrine of helping the poor, the revolutionary doctrine, that insists that communist parties first place themselves among the exploited and the poor, is also “conditioned”, and it is only taken seriously once it is understood for its conditionality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, for Stalin it was necessary to intensify efforts with the aim of decisively increasing social wealth, adding “new energy” to “socialist emulation”; it would demand resorting to both material incentives (making use of the socialist principle of redistribution according to work) as well as moral incentives (for example, granting “the highest honor” to the most eminent Stakhanovites).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn165|165]] Both different and opposed is Trotsky’s orientation: in “restoring ranks and decorations” and in liquidating “socialist equality” as such, the bureaucracy also lays the groundwork for changes in “property relations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn166|166]] While Stalin explicitly makes reference to the polemic from the Manifesto against a socialism understood as synonymous with “universal asceticism” and “crude egalitarianism”, the left opposition knowingly and unknowingly makes use of the thesis found in &#039;&#039;The Civil War in France&#039;&#039;, according to which even the highest ranking leaders should be paid according to “workers salaries.&amp;amp;quot; Trotsky insists that, to justify their privileges, the bureaucracy and Stalin mistakenly reference the &#039;&#039;Critique of the Gotha Program&#039;&#039;: “Marx didn’t speak of creating a new inequality, but in the gradual elimination of inequalities in income, preferable to its abrupt elimination.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn167|167]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Based on that political line (the leveling of wages both in the factories and in the state apparatus), it was quite difficult to promote the development of the productive forces, and Stalin stressed that salary differentiation did not mean the restoration of capitalism. It was necessary not to confuse social differences that exist within the new regime with the old antagonism between exploiting classes and exploited classes. But from Trotsky’s perspective, it was a clumsy simplification: “the contrast between misery and luxury is all too apparent in the urban centers.&amp;amp;quot; In conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Whether “radical” or “superficial”, the differences between the worker aristocracy and the proletarian masses matter little from the perspective of Stalinist sociology; in any case, it’s this difference that gave birth in its time to the need to break with social democracy and to found the Third International.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn168|168]]&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Marx, socialism was also called upon to overcome the distinction between intellectual and manual labor. Here again the problem would reappear: how to achieve such an ambitious objective? And once again the Bolshevik leadership group is divided; in this case as well, the stance elaborated by Stalin in the thirties stands out for its caution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;There are some who think that the suppression of the antagonism between intellectual labor and physical labor can be achieved through a certain cultural and technical leveling of intellectual and manual workers, that it could be attained by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and specialists, of the intellectual workers, and even the level of moderately skilled workers. That is absolutely wrong.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn169|169]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Instead, it’s a matter of encouraging access to education for all social strata who had been excluded up until then. On the opposing side, Trotsky recognized that there had been a process of “training scientific cadre originating from the people”, and yet he claimed: “The social gap between manual and intellectual labor has increased during the last few years instead of decreasing.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn170|170]] The continuation of the division of labor and the continuation of social and economic inequalities were two sides of the same coin; in other words, it’s the return of capitalist exploitation and, therefore, of the complete betrayal of socialist ideals:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The new constitution, in declaring that “exploitation of man by man is abolished in the USSR”, says the opposite of the truth. The new social differentiation created the conditions for a rebirth of exploitation under the most barbaric forms, like the hiring of a man for another’s personal service. Servants are not counted in the census, having evidently been included under the category of “workers.&amp;amp;quot; The following questions are not made: does the Soviet citizen have servants and what kind (maid, cook, nurse, governess, driver)? Do you have an automobile? How many rooms do you have? Nor does it even speak of the amount of their salary! If the Soviet rule that deprived political rights to those who exploited the work of others was restored, you would suddenly see that the top leaders of Soviet society ought to be deprived of their constitutional rights! Fortunately, a complete equality has been established… between master and servant.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn171|171]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, the very presence of the “maid” as a social figure, and the servant in general, was synonymous not only with exploitation, but “exploitation under its most barbaric forms”; and how do you explain the continuation or the reemergence in the USSR of such relations, if not by the abandonment of an authentically socialist perspective, in other words, by betrayal?&lt;br /&gt;
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The long reach of millenarianism, certainly already implicit in Marx’s more utopian thinking, but frighteningly increased in reaction to the horrors of the First World War, continues to make itself felt. In his Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress of the CPSU (January 26th, 1934), Stalin feels it necessary to warn against “the leftist chatter, that in part exists among our militants, according to which Soviet commerce is a stage that’s been surpassed, and that money should soon be abolished.&amp;amp;quot; Those who make that argument, “with their haughty attitude toward Soviet commerce, don’t express a Bolshevik point of view, but a point of view belonging to decadent nobles, full of pretensions, but without a cent in their pocket.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn172|172]] While Trotsky doesn’t miss the opportunity to condemn the previously mentioned “economic adventurism” rejected by Stalin, he still mocks the “rehabilitation of the ruble” and the return of “bourgeois methods of distribution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn173|173]] In any case, he insists that they are destined to disappear under communism, together with the state, but also “money” and markets in all their forms.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn174|174]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “No More Distinctions Between Yours and Mine”: The Disappearance of the Family ===&lt;br /&gt;
Along with imperialism and capitalism, the October Revolution was called upon to put an end to the oppression of women. To make possible their equal participation in social and political life, it was necessary to liberate them by developing social services as much as possible, by freeing them from domestic reclusion and a division of labor that humiliated and hampered them; the criticism of traditional morality and its duplicity would then guarantee sexual emancipation for women as well, up until that time reserved―though in a partial and distorted form―to men alone. Following these grand transformations, would the family institution still have meaning, or was it destined to disappear? Alexandra Kollontai has no doubts: “the family is no longer necessary.&amp;amp;quot; It was thrown into crisis by women’s complete emancipation, and by the spontaneity and “fluidity” that now characterize sexual relations. The family, aside from inconvenient, also proves to be superfluous: “the raising of children passes gradually into the hands of society.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, there was no cause for despair: the family was a privileged place for the cultivation of egotism, going hand in hand with the attachment to private property. In conclusion: “The socially conscious mother will revolt to the point of no longer making a distinction between yours and mine and, therefore, remembering that there are only &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; children, the children of communist Russia and its workers.&amp;amp;quot; These ideas are strongly criticized by the Bolshevik leadership group in its entirety. In particular, in a speech in 1923, Trotsky wisely notes that such a vision ignored “the responsibility of the father and mother toward their child”, thus encouraging the neglect of children and, therefore, worsening a scourge that was already widespread in Moscow during those years.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn175|175]] However, in one form or another, those ideas were “quite popular within party circles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn176|176]] Even at the start of the 1930s, a close collaborator of Stalin’s, namely Kaganovich, is forced to confront them. We turn to his biographer:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Despite completely adhering to the principle of women’s liberation, Kaganovich vehemently charged against extremist positions that sought the elimination of individual kitchens and wanted forced cohabitation in communes. Sabsovich, one of the leftist planners, had even proposed ending all spaces of cohabitation between husband and wife, with the exception of a small bedroom at night. He pushed the idea of large beehive like structures for two thousand people with all the services shared to encourage the “communal spirit” and suppress the bourgeois family unit.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn177|177]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Kaganovich’s (and Stalin’s) position drew strong criticism from Trotsky, who at that time was the opposition’s leader: “The totally recent cult to the Soviet family did not fall from the sky. The privileges that can’t be bequeathed to children lose half their value. Now, the right to leave inheritance is inseparable from that of private property.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn178|178]] Therefore, the restoration of the family institution (and the rejection of the commune destined to absorb and dissolve them) meant the defense of the right to inheritance and the right to property, and consequently takes on a clear counter-revolutionary meaning. In fact, by a “divine coincidence”―Trotsky mocks―”the solemn rehabilitation of the family” takes place at the same time that money becomes respected again; “the family is reborn at the same time in which the coercive role of the ruble is reaffirmed.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn179|179]] The consecration of marital fidelity goes hand in hand with the consecration of private property: to put it in religious terms, “the Fifth Commandment comes back into force at the same time as the Seventh, without invoking divine authority, for now.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn180|180]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, when looking closely, that invocation already appears on the horizon. In his speech on the drafting of the Constitution of 1936, Stalin criticizes those who want “to prohibit the holding of religious ceremonies” and “deprive clergymen of their right to vote.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn181|181]] And again Trotsky intervenes to denounce that unacceptable retreat with respect to the initial project for the definitive liberation of society from the shackles of superstition: “The assault on the heavens has ceased [...]. Worried about their good reputation, the bureaucracy ordered the atheist youths to hand over their weapons and get on with reading. It’s only the start. A regime of ironic neutrality is being slowly instituted with regards to religion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn182|182]] Along with the family, the right to inheritance and to property, the opiate of the masses that Marx spoke of can’t be allowed to return.&lt;br /&gt;
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Behind this new chapter scrutinizing the revolution’s “betrayal” is the dialectic we came across earlier. Doing away with the bourgeois family, its ingrained prejudices, and its dead laws, the revolution would have allowed love, freedom, and spontaneity into a previously private space. And yet, it’s interesting to note that what causes Trotsky’s protests and anger was still the idea of a juridical regulation of family relations:&lt;br /&gt;
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The authentic socialist family, freed by society from the heavy and humiliating daily burdens, will not need any regulation, and the very idea of laws on divorce or abortion will be no more than the memory of houses of pleasure or of human sacrifice.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn183|183]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Condemnation of “Führerpolitik”, or the “Transformation of Power into Love” ===&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, more than the concept of family (and the right to inheritance and to property) and the religious consecration of power (of the family head and the property owner), Trotsky’s polemic attacks the question of society’s juridical organization as a whole, the question of the state. It’s the central question on which all the different questions previously analyzed converge: predicted by Marx after the overthrow of capitalism, when and under what conditions can the process of the state’s withering away begin? The victorious proletariat―&#039;&#039;The State and Revolution&#039;&#039; affirms on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution―”only has need of a State in the process of withering away”; however, carrying out an enormous wave of nationalizations, the new power gives an unprecedented impulse to the expansion of the state apparatus. In other words, as they move towards building a new society, Lenin is forced, whether consciously or not, to move increasingly further away from anarchism (and the positions he had initially taken). To better understand this, it’s enough to look at an important intervention―&#039;&#039;Better Fewer, but Better&#039;&#039;―published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; on March 4th, 1923. What immediately stands out are the new slogans: “to improve our state apparatus”, seriously committing to the “construction of the state”, “to construct a truly new apparatus that truly deserves the socialist and soviet name”, to improve “administrative work” and to do all this without hesitation, learning from “Western Europe’s best examples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn184|184]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But does massively expanding the state apparatus and focusing on the question of its improvement not mean, in fact, renouncing the ideal of the state’s withering away? Of course, the realization of that ideal can be delayed to a far distant future, but meanwhile, how should state owned property be managed, which had now experienced an enormous expansion, and what forms should state power take on in Soviet Russia as a whole? Even in &#039;&#039;The State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, written at a moment when Lenin was harsh, and couldn’t not be, in his denunciation of the representative regimes responsible for the war, we can read that even the most developed democracy can’t do without “representative institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn185|185]] Meanwhile, the expectation for the withering away of the state continues to fuel distrust in relation to the idea of representation, at the exact same time that the leaders of Soviet Russia increase the number of representative bodies (as the soviets undoubtedly are), not even neglecting a second and third level of representation: the soviets from a lower level elect their delegates to the soviet at the higher level. It would not take long for the controversy to break out.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of reestablishing order and the revitalization of the productive apparatus, with its recognized link to the principle of competency, is also raised in the factories: from the new regime’s beginning, social and political circles hesitant about the changes denounce the rise to power of “bourgeois specialists” and a “new bourgeoisie”, and again the target of their criticism is Trotsky, who at that time occupies a very prominent role in the leadership of the state-military apparatus.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn186|186]] It’s a controversy that extends beyond Russia. There’s significant criticism directed at Gramsci, who celebrated the new state that’s taking form in the birthplace of the October Revolution, and pays tribute to the Bolsheviks for being “an aristocracy of statesmen”, and Lenin for being “the greatest statesman in contemporary Europe.&amp;amp;quot; They knew how to put an end to the “profound abyss of misery, barbarity, anarchy, and disorder” created “by a long and disastrous war.&amp;amp;quot; But―an anarchist objects―”that apology, full of lyrical praise” for the state, “statolatry”, and the “authoritarian, legalistic, parliamentarian state socialism” is in contradiction with the Soviet constitution itself, committed to installing a regime under which “there will no longer be class divisions, &#039;&#039;nor state power&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn187|187]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only openly declared anarchist circles and authors who adopt a critical position. Even supporters of the international communist movement express their clear dissatisfaction, disappointment and dissension. Let’s turn to one of them, namely Pannekoek, who is no longer able to identify with the Bolshevik political program: “specialists and managers in the factories exercise a power greater than that which should be compatible with communist development [...]. From among the new managers and administrators emerges a new bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn188|188]] “The bureaucracy”, the Workers Opposition Platform in Russia insists in the following year, “is a direct negation of mass action”; unfortunately, it’s an “ailment” that “has now invaded the most intimate fibers of our party and our Soviet institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn189|189]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Beyond Russia, such criticisms are also directed at the West. They call for an end “to the bourgeois representative system, to parliamentarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn190|190]] More so than the Bolshevik dictatorship, the target of condemnation is the principle of representation. Yes, “that someone decides your destiny, that is the essence of bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn191|191]] The degeneration of Soviet Russia resides in the fact that a single person takes charge of a determined position: “individual management” is taking the place of “collective management” in the factories, and at all levels; and this “is a product of the individualistic mentality of the bourgeois class” and “fundamentally” expresses “an unlimited and remote free will, unbound by the collective.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn192|192]] Rather than “mass politics” (&#039;&#039;Massenpolitik&#039;&#039;), the Third International now “practices top-down politics” (&#039;&#039;Führerpolitik&#039;&#039;).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn193|193]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, the accusation of betrayal to the original ideals, more than being directed at abuse of power, is directed against the organs of power, founded on the distinction/opposition between leaders and those who are led, and therefore founded to the exclusion of direct action and “mass politics.&amp;amp;quot; While the soviets are not free of suspicion, explicit is the disgust directed toward parliament, unions, and parties, sometimes even the communist party that is itself based on the principle of representation, and therefore infected by the bureaucratic virus. Ultimately, more so than organs of powers, it is power itself that is the subject of criticism. “It’s the curse of workers power: having barely taken some ‘power’, it seeks to increase that power through unprincipled means.&amp;amp;quot; Thus, it ceases to be “pure”: it’s what happens to German social democracy, and it’s also what’s happening to the Third International.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn194|194]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can place the young Bloch in this context; apart from overcoming the market economy, the mercantile spirit and of money itself, he also hopes the revolution and the soviets “transform power into love.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn195|195]] While the German philosopher, in removing these lines and unrealistic expectations from the second edition of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of Utopia&#039;&#039;, distances himself from the most millenarian aspects of his thinking, there are none too few communists, in Soviet Russia and outside it, who ultimately cry out in outrage because the miracle of the “transformation of power into love” doesn’t take place.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first years of Soviet Russia, more so than with Stalin, the anti-”bureaucratic” polemic primarily attacks Lenin and even Trotsky, included among the most prominent “defenders and crusaders of the bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn196|196]] The situation noticeable changes in the following years. Before even considering its contents, the approval of the constitution of 1936 alone represents a radical change, just for the fact of breaking with anarchist notions stubbornly attached to the ideal of the withering away of the state, on the basis of which “laws are the opiate of the masses” and “the very idea of a constitution is bourgeois.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn197|197]] In Stalin’s words, the constitution of 1936 “does not stop at determining the formal rights of citizens, but shifts the focus toward guaranteeing these rights, toward the means of exercising these rights.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn198|198]] Although insufficient and not constituting its key aspect, the “formal” guarantee of rights doesn’t appear to be irrelevant here. With satisfaction, Stalin stresses the fact that the new constitution “guaranteed the application of universal suffrage, direct and equal, with secret ballot voting.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn199|199]] But it’s precisely this point that draws Trotsky’s criticism: in bourgeois society, the secret ballot is used to “shield the exploited from intimidation by the exploiters”; the reappearance of that institution in Soviet society is proof that even in the USSR the people must be protected from intimidation, if not from an authentic exploiting class, than from the bureaucracy at the very least.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn200|200]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To those that demanded that the question of the state’s withering away be addressed, Stalin responded in 1938 by encouraging them not to transform the lessons of Marx and Engels into an empty scholastic dogma; the setback in the ideal’s realization was explained by the permanent capitalist encirclement. However, in listing the functions of the socialist state, aside from the traditional ones of defense against the enemy class both internal and external, Stalin called attention to a “third function, namely, the work of economic organization and the cultural and educational work by our state organs”, a work carried out with the “aim of planting the seeds of the new socialist economy and of reeducating everyone in the spirit of socialism.&amp;amp;quot; It was a point on which the Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPSU strongly insisted: “Now, the fundamental task of our state, inside the country, consists of the peaceful work of economic organization, and a cultural and educational work.&amp;amp;quot; The theorization of this “third function” was already by itself an important breakthrough. But Stalin would go further, in declaring: “The repressive task has been substituted by the task of safeguarding socialist property against thieves and those who squander the people’s property.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn201|201]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, it’s a declaration that’s somewhat problematic, even mystifying: certainly it doesn’t concretely reflect the situation of the USSR in 1939, when the Terror rained havoc and the Gulag expanded monstrously. But here we are dealing with another aspect: is the thesis of the state’s withering away valid, and if so, up to what point? Will we also retain the state under communism? “Yes, it will be retained, if the capitalist encirclement is not eliminated, if the threat of foreign military aggression is not eliminated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn202|202]] Thus, the realization of communism in the Soviet Union or in a select number of countries would have meant the fading away of the first function of the socialist state (the defense against the danger of counter-revolution from within), although not the second function (the protect against external threats) that, with the presence of powerful capitalist countries, would have continued being vital even “in a communist era.&amp;amp;quot; But why would the third function―”economic and cultural work”, as well as the “safeguarding of socialist property from thieves and those who squander the people’s property”― have to end following the collapse of the capitalist encirclement and the absence of the second function? There’s no doubt that Stalin shows indecision and contradiction, likely driven by the necessity of moving with caution through a political minefield, where any deviation with respect to the classic thesis of the state’s withering away would expose him to the accusation of betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the start, The leadership group that takes power in October 1917 proves to be profoundly divided around the most important domestic and international political questions. That division, contained only while Lenin was still alive, becomes unbridgeable following the passing of the charismatic leader. Will the clash remain isolated to the political-ideological realm?&lt;br /&gt;
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Long gone are the times in which, with regards to the Sergei M. Kirov case (frontline leader of the CPSU, shot and killed at his office’s front door by a communist youth, Leonid Nikolaev, December 1st, 1934, in Leningrad), one could write that “there’s no doubt about the fact that the assassination was organized by Stalin and executed by his police agents.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn203|203]] The account and the insinuations contained in the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; had already raised strong doubts in the middle of the 1990s.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn204|204]] But now we can make use of the work by a Russian researcher, published in French by Stéphane Courtois and Nicolas Werth―the editors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;. We have before us research that is presented with the most anti-Stalinist credentials possible. And yet, while denying that there was a vast conspiracy behind the assassination, it rips apart the account contained or raised by the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev’s report proves to be somewhat “inexact” on a number of details; at the same time, its author “knew that he needed powerful arguments to provoke a psychological shock among the supporters of the ‘peoples’ father’”; thus, the theory of “Stalin’s plot against Kirov perfectly answered that need.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn205|205]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The truly cooperative and friendly relationship that exist between the leader and his colleague become apparent in the account written on Kirov by the Russian historian:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This open man had no love for intrigue, lies, or trickery. Stalin had to have appreciated these character traits that were the basis of their relationship. According to those who knew him at the time, Kirov was in fact capable of raising objections to Stalin, and softening his distrustful and rude spirit. Stalin sincerely cared for him and trusted him. Loving to fish and hunt, he often sent fresh fish and meat from animals he caught. Stalin had such trust in Kirov that he often invited him to the sauna, an “honor” that was conceded to only one another living man, general Vlassik, head of his personal guard.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn206|206]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Until the very end, nothing intervened to disturb that relationship, as is confirmed by the investigations of another Russian historian. In the archives there’s nothing to suggest a political split or a rivalry between the two. This theory is even more ridiculous for the fact that Kirov only participated irregularly “in the activities of the party’s highest organizational body”, the Politburo, in order to concentrate on the administration of Leningrad.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn207|207]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But while “the idea of a rivalry between Kirov and Stalin has no basis”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn208|208]] the reaction from Trotsky, on the other hand, raises questions:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The right-wing political turn on both the internal and external front couldn’t not alarm the most class conscious segments of the proletariat [...]. The youth are also overtaken by a profound unease, especially those that live close to the bureaucracy and observes its arbitrariness, its privileges, and its abuse of power. It’s in this atmosphere that Nikolaev’s gun was fired [...]. It’s extremely probable that he wanted to protest against the existing regime within the party, against an unaccountable bureaucracy and against the turn to the right.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn209|209]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The sympathy or understanding for the author of the attack is transparent, and the disdain and hatred for Kirov are explicit. Far from mourning him as a victim of the dictator in the Kremlin, Trotsky classifies him as the “skilled and unprincipled dictator of Leningrad, a typical personality in his organization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn210|210]] And he goes on to add: “Kirov, the brutal satrap, stirs no compassion in us.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn211|211]] The victim was an individual who, for sometime, inspired the wrath of the revolutionaries:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Those who resort to the new terrorism are neither the old ruling classes nor the kulaks. The terrorists in the past few years have been recruited exclusively among the Soviet youth, in the ranks of the communist party’s youth organization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn212|212]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At least at this time―between 1935 and 1936―the attack on Kirov is in no way discussed as a set-up. It’s stated, yes, that anything can be exploited by the “bureaucracy as a whole”, but at the same time it’s stressed, with some satisfaction, that “every bureaucrat trembles before the terrorism” arising from below.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn213|213]] Despite not having the “experience of the class struggle and the revolution”, these youths, who are inclined “to enter clandestine struggle, learning to fight and prepare themselves for the future”, give reason to hope.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn214|214]] Trotsky appeals to the Soviet youth, who have already started to spread fear among the members of the ruling elite, calling on them to join the new revolution that draws near. The bureaucratic regime has fought a “battle against the youth”, as has already been denounced in the title of a central paragraph in &#039;&#039;The Revolution Betrayed&#039;&#039;. Now, the oppressed will topple the oppressors:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Any revolutionary party will first find support from the ascendant class’s generation of youth. Political senility is expressed by the loss of their capacity to carry the youth [...]. The Mensheviks got their support from the higher and more mature strata of the working class, and for this reason they became haughty and looked down upon the Bolsheviks. Events ruthlessly demonstrated their errors: at the decisive moment, the youths dragged along the mature and even older men.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn215|215]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a dialectic destined to be repeated. However immature the initially forms may be, a revolt against oppression always has a positive value. After having made clear his disdain and hatred for Kirov, Trotsky adds:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We remain neutral in relation to the one who killed him only because we don’t know his motives. If we learned that Nikolaev consciously fired his gun with the intention of avenging the workers whose rights have been trampled on by Kirov, without reservations our sympathies would lie with the terrorist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like the “Irish terrorists” or those of other countries, the “Russian” terrorists also deserve respect.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn216|216]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Initially, the investigations by authorities centered on the “White Guards.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, in Paris these groups were well organized; they have had success in carrying out a “certain number of terrorist attacks in Soviet territory.&amp;amp;quot; In Belgrade similar groups operated: their monthly publication specified, in the November 1934 edition, that, in the aim of “toppling the leaders of the Soviet nation”, it’s worthwhile “to utilize the weapon of terrorism.&amp;amp;quot; Among the leaders to be assassinated was Kirov himself. However, those investigations were not making progress; Soviet authorities then began looking in the direction of the left opposition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn217|217]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As we have seen, it’s Trotsky who corroborates the new investigative lead, and he does not stop at highlighting the revolutionary fervor of the Soviet youth, but he also clarifies that those who resort to violence are not, and couldn&#039;t be, a definitively defeated class that’s close to surrender:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The history of individual terrorism in the USSR strongly characterizes the country’s general evolutionary stages. At the dawn of Soviet power, the Whites and the socialist revolutionaries organized terrorist attacks in the context of civil war. When the old property owning classes lost all hope for restoration, the terrorism stopped. The attacks by kulaks, that continued on until recently, had a local character; they fought an insurgency against the regime. The most recent terrorism does not get its support from either the old ruling classes or the rich peasantry. The latest generation of terrorists are drawn exclusively from the Soviet youth, from the communist youth wing and from the party, and frequently from the children of party leaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn218|218]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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While the old ruling classes, swept away by the October Revolution and later with the collectivization of agriculture, have given up, the same does not occur with the proletariat, the protagonists of the revolution, but which is momentarily obstructed and oppressed by the Stalinist bureaucracy. It’s the latter who should be afraid: the attack against Kirov and the increase in terrorism by the Soviet youth are symptomatic of the isolation and the “hostility” that surrounds and harasses the usurpers of Soviet power.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn219|219]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true that Trotsky is quick to clarify that individual terrorism is not really effective. But it’s a classification that’s not all that convincing, and possibly said without much conviction. Meanwhile, under the existing conditions in the USSR, it’s an inevitable phenomenon: “terrorism is the tragic outcome of Bonapartism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn220|220]] Moreover, while it’s not able to resolve the problem, “individual terrorism nevertheless has the importance of being a symptom, as it characterizes the severity of the antagonism between the bureaucracy and the vast popular masses, and particularly the youth.&amp;amp;quot; Regardless, the critical mass is rising for an “explosion”, that’s to say a “political cataclysm”, destined to inflict on the “Stalinist regime” the same fate suffered by the regime “led by Nicholas II.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn221|221]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Terrorism, Coups and Civil War ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Fall of the Romanov dynasty was preceded by a long series of attacks promoted by organizations which, despite heavy blows from repression, always managed to reconstitute themselves. In Trotsky’s opinion, a similar process was unfolding in the USSR in response to the ‘betrayal’ consummated by the bureaucracy. What threatens it aren’t individual acts of terrorism, but precursors of another great revolution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;All indications lead us to believe that events are headed toward a conflict between the popular forces, motivated by cultural promotion and the bureaucratic oligarchy. This crisis doesn’t allow for a peaceful solution [...]; the country is clearly headed toward a revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn222|222]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A decisive civil war appears on the horizon and, “in the atmosphere of civil war, the assassination of some oppressors is no longer a matter of individual terrorism”; in any case, “the Fourth International supports a struggle to the death against Stalinism”, destined to eliminate “a faction already condemned by history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn223|223]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the attack against Kirov evokes the spectre of civil war among the forces that had toppled the old regime. In reality, this spectre follows the history of Soviet Russia like a shadow from the moment it is established. To sabotage the peace of Brest-Litovsk, interpreted by Bukharin as a capitulation to German imperialism and a betrayal of proletarian internationalism, he harbors for a moment the idea of a type of coup d’état that would see removed from power, at least for some time, the man who was until that moment the undisputed leader of the Bolsheviks. If it was already out in the open while Lenin was still alive, despite his enormous prestige as a leader, the spectre of the division of the Bolshevik leadership group, and of civil war within that same revolutionary bloc, took complete form in the following years. It’s what unequivocally appears in the important testimony from within the anti-Stalinist opposition and from the deserters of the communist movement, in whom the old faith had transformed into unrelenting hatred. Let’s see how Boris Souvarine describes the situation created in the CPSU around ten years after the October Revolution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The opposition considers forming its own organization as a clandestine party within the one party, with its miniature hierarchy, its Politburo, its central committee, its regional and local agents, its groups on the ground, its participation quotas, its memos, and its code for correspondence.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn224|224]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The expectations were not just for a political clash, but a military one as well. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the memoirs of Ruth Fischer are published in the United States, at the time a leading figure within the German communist movement and member of the presidium of the Comintern from 1922 to 1924. In this memoir she explains the way in which, in her time, she participated in the “resistance” organization in the USSR against the “totalitarian regime” that had been installed in Moscow. This is in 1926. After breaking with Stalin the year before, Zinoviev and Kamenev drew close to Trotsky: they organize the “bloc” to win power. They then develop a clandestine network that reaches “as far as “Vladivostok” and the Far East: messengers distribute classified party and state documents, transmit coded messages, armed guards provide security to secret meetings. “The leaders of the bloc made preparations for definitive steps”; based on the assumption that the clash with Stalin could only be resolved with “violence”, they met in a forest in the outskirts of Moscow with the aim of analyzing in depth “the military aspect of their program,” starting with the “role of those army units” willing to support the “coup d’état.” Fischer continues:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It was a question that was mostly technical, which should be discussed between the two military leaders, Trotsky and Lashevich [vice-commissar for War, who died soon after, before the purges]. Since as vice-commissar of the Red Army he was still in a favorable legal position, Lashevich was tasked with planning the military action against Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn225|225]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The street demonstrations the following year, to mark the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, should be read in that context: from Moscow and Leningrad they extended to “other industrial centers” so as to “force the party hierarchy to give in.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn226|226]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In Europe during those years, it wasn’t a mystery to anyone the severity of the political battle that went on in Soviet Russia: “The history of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky is the history of the attempt by Trotsky to take power [...], it is the history of a failed coup d’état.&amp;amp;quot; The brilliant organizer of the Red Army, still enjoying “immense popularity”, certainly didn’t accept defeat: “His violent polemic and cynical and foolhardy pride made him a type of red Bonaparte backed by the army, the popular masses, and by the rebellious spirit of the young communists against the old Leninist guard and the high clergy of the party.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, “the high tide of sedition advances upon the Kremlin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn227|227]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The author, Curzio Malaparte, who was in Moscow and had interviewed figures at the highest level, gives a reading of the tensions of 1927 which is confirmed by Ruth Fischer, that’s to say, by an authorized representative of the anti-Stalinist opposition:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;On the eve of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the imprisonment of Trotsky would provoke an unpleasant reaction [...]. The occasion chosen by Trotsky to seize state power couldn’t be any better. Like the good tactician he is, he stayed in the shadows. To not appear as a tyrant, Stalin wouldn’t dare arrest him. When he would dare to, it would be too late, thought Trotsky. By the time the lights would go off on the tenth anniversary of the revolution, Stalin would no longer be in power.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn228|228]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As is already known, these plans fail and Trotsky, expelled from the party, sees himself obligated to transfer first to Alma Ata and later to Turkey. There “the Soviet consulate authorities” pay him $1,500 for ‘royalties’ as an author.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn229|229]] Although it’s a “ridiculous quantity”, as affirmed by a supporter, historian, and biographer of Trotsky,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn230|230]] the gesture could be read as an attempt to not sharpen the contradiction any further.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Conspiracy, Infiltration of the State Apparatus, and “Aesopian Language” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The exiled revolutionary didn’t renounce his plans. But how would he seek to carry them out? Malaparte writes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The acts of sabotage on the railways, power stations, telephone and telegraph lines increase every day. Everywhere Trotsky’s agents worm their way in. Screwing with the gears of the state’s technical organization, they provoke once in a while the partial paralyzation of sensitive agencies. They are the skirmishes that proceed the insurrection.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn231|231]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this a matter of mere illusions or the echo of the regime’s propaganda? The book cited here, after being published, circulated widely in Europe and the thesis within it did not appear to provoke contemptuous smiles or scandalized laughter. Just like with “terrorism”, so we must not lose sight of the particular history of Russia when it comes to “sabotage.&amp;amp;quot; In 1908, both the petroleum executives and Stalin repeatedly condemned, with obviously different motives, the certain tendencies within the working class to achieve their demands by resorting to “economic terrorism.&amp;amp;quot; Despite stressing that the ultimate cause of this phenomenon was capitalist exploitation, the Bolshevik leader had welcomed “the latest resolution by the strikers from the Mirzoiev [factory], directed against the fires and ‘economic’ assassinations”, and against “the old terroristic” and anarchist tendencies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn232|232]] By the start of the 1930s, had this tradition totally disappeared, or did it continue to manifest in new forms? In any case, we saw the White Guards take advantage of it. What of the left opposition?&lt;br /&gt;
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The “insurrectionary” plans that Malaparte mentions reveal an important confirmation, at the very least. Here Trotsky’s biographer describes the attitude his hero continued to maintain while in exile: “The instructions are simple: the opposition must take on a solid military training, with a serious commitment to the party and, once expelled from it, in the proletarian and soviet organizations in general, referring always to the International.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn233|233]] Here he turns against Soviet power the tradition of conspiracy which greatly contributed to its establishment. In &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; Lenin especially emphasizes that: We, the revolutionaries, “have to give maximum attention to propaganda and agitation among the soldiers and officers, and the creation of ‘military organizations’ belonging to our party.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn234|234]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Taking note of that lesson, the opposition organizes a clandestine network that gives particular attention to the military apparatus. The tortured process of its creation made the task of infiltrating it easier. What happened at the time the Cheka―the first political police force in Soviet Russia―was created is significant. On July 6th, 1918, an attack takes the life of the German ambassador: the perpetrator was Yakov G. Blumkin, a socialist revolutionary who sought to protest the Brest-Litovsk treaty and reopen the debate on it. When the chief of the Cheka, Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, went to the German embassy in Moscow to offer the apologies of the Soviet government, he is informed the authors of the attack appeared with the Cheka’s credentials. To discover the truth, he proceeds to the headquarters of that institution where he is then arrested by “Cheka dissidents”, themselves either members or close to the Revolutionary Socialist party. Later freed by the Red Guard, Dzerzhinsky then purges the political police and orders the execution of those responsible for the conspiracy and the mutiny. In conclusion, the first victims of the “purge” are members of the Cheka, although they formed part of the opposition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn235|235]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The perpetrator of the attack managed to flee, but doesn’t yet exit the scene: “Trotsky publicly recognized, toward the end of 1929, having received Blumkin as a guest, while still an agent of the intelligence services of the Red Army.” Lev Sedov, son and colleague of Trotsky, sought to make it appear as something casual, however a document archived in Stanford “shows that the contact between Trotsky and Blumkin didn’t come about by coincidence, but from an organized link within the USSR”; in this content “the secret agent evidently had an important role.&amp;amp;quot; It would be this link that pushes Stalin “to order Blumkin’s execution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn236|236]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the opposition “agents infiltrate everywhere.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn237|237]] Even “in the GPU” a “small nucleus of Trotsky’s loyalists” remain hidden for a time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn238|238]] According to a contemporary American historian, it’s possible that Genrikh G. Yagoda played a role as a double agent, the man who led the first phase of the Great Terror, before even he is consumed by it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn239|239]] According to the accounts of militant anti-Stalinists, it’s known that “some [opposition] documents were printed in the typography of the GPU”; looking closely, there’s “permanent tension within Russia’s [state] terrorist apparatus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn240|240]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The infiltration is made easier by the regime’s cautious opening. Upon calling for struggle against the “bureaucratic dictatorship”, Trotsky points out that “the new constitution offers at the same time a semi legal trench from which to fight against it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn241|241]] It is best fought with camouflage, disguising their intentions of seeking to undermine and topple state power. On this point, the leader of the opposition leaves no room for doubt: “the subversive work demands some conspiratorial precautions”; it’s necessary “to observe in the struggle [...] the rules of the conspiracy.&amp;amp;quot; Further:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This life and death struggle can’t be conceived without the cunning of war, in other words: without lies and deceptions. Could the German workers possibly avoid deceiving Hitler’s police? Would Soviet Bolsheviks be unethical in deceiving the GPU?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn242|242]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Again the Bolshevik conspiratorial tradition is turned against the regime that emerged out of the revolution. In 1920, Lenin had called for the revolutionaries’ attention to “the obligation of combining illegal forms of struggle with legal forms, with the obligatory participation in the most reactionary parliament and a certain number of other institutions under reactionary laws.&amp;amp;quot; And that’s not all: revolutionaries should know how to “face all sacrifices and―in case of necessity―resort to all sorts of tricks and illegal methods, and to silence and to hide the truth with the objective of infiltrating the unions and remaining in them, and realizing there, at whatever cost, the work of a communist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn243|243]] It’s exactly how the opposition conducts itself in relation to the political and social organizations of the hated “Thermidorian” regime. The conspirators follow a precise rule of conduct:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Carry out self criticism, recognize your “errors” and that they are generally corrected. Those called “two faced men” by the Stalinist press, or even the “left-right faction”, from this moment on seek contacts which would allow the broadening of the resistance front to Stalin’s policies. Meet up with other groups on this path...[[footnotes.xhtml#fn244|244]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s understandable then the obsession over “duplicity”, the obsession for which Khrushchev condemned Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn245|245]] Meanwhile, the abandonment of NEP culminates in the rupture with Bukharin. Due to the position assumed by the latter, it’s interesting to read the testimony of Humbert-Droz, leader of the Comintern who was expelled from the Communist Party of Switzerland in 1942 over his differences with Stalin. On a trip to the First Conference of the Revolutionary Labor Unions of Latin America in the spring of 1929, he meets with Bukharin and has a meeting with him, which he recalls in these words: “He got me up-to-date on the contacts his group made with the Zinoviev-Kamenev faction to coordinate the struggle against Stalin’s power”, that he anticipated the struggle including “individual terrorism”, whose central objective “was eliminating Stalin” and, to be clear, “eliminate him physically.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn246|246]] Three years later, it is another representative of the “right”, Martemyan N. Ryutin, who draws up and circulates a document that passes from hand to hand and which classifies Stalin as a “provocateur” who they must rid themselves of, resorting even to tyrannicide.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn247|247]] When Bukharin reveals his plans, Humbert-Droz objects that “the introduction of individual terrorism in the political struggles born out of the Russian Revolution would run the risk of turning against those that used it”, but Bukharin isn’t persuaded.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn248|248]] On the other hand, it would be difficult for the objection just seen to persuade a man who, as we now know―as he himself secretly revealed in 1936―harbored a profound “hatred” toward Stalin, in fact, the sort of “absolute” hatred that is reserved for a “demon.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn249|249]] While he expressed himself like this in private, Bukharin was in charge of &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, the newspaper of the Soviet government. Are we dealing with obvious incoherence? Not from the point of view of the Bolshevik leader, who continued to combine legal and illegal work, with the aim of toppling a regime that he considered detestable, and who valued another of Lenin’s lessons. In reference to Tsarist Russia, we can read in &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; that:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In a country ruled by an autocracy, with a completely enslaved press, in a period of desperate political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is persecuted, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the &#039;&#039;censored&#039;&#039; literature and, though expounded in aesopian language, is understood by all “interested” parties.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn250|250]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is exactly how Bukharin uses the Soviet government’s newspaper. The condemnation of the “all-seeing total state”, founded on “blind discipline”, “Jesuit obedience”, and on “the glorification of ‘leader’” pretends to alone make reference to Hitler’s Germany, but in fact points to the USSR as well. The “aesopian language” recommended by Lenin becomes immediately transparent when the denunciation refers to “cruel and uncultured provincialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn251|251]] It’s clearly the portrait of Stalin painted by the opposition. We saw Trotsky refer to him as a “small provincial man”, and in discussions behind closed doors it is Bukharin himself that expresses his disdain for the leader that has succeeded Lenin, despite not knowing any foreign languages.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn252|252]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Continuing on the effectiveness displayed in Tsarist Russia by the revolutionary message expressed in “aesopian language”, &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; proceeds as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Quite a considerable time elapsed (by our Russian standards) before the government realized what had happened and the unwieldy army of censors and gendarmes discovered the new enemy and flung itself upon him. Meanwhile, Marxists books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist; Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn253|253]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Bukharin and the opposition hoped that a similar phenomenon would create a climate favorable to Stalin’s overthrow. But Stalin also read &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; And knew the rules of Bolshevik conspiracy well. In conclusion, we witness a prolonged civil war. The clandestine network organizes itself, or seeks to reorganize itself despite successive rounds of repression that become increasingly unforgiving. According to the words of an active militant in the struggle against Stalin: “Despite being stomped on and annihilated, the opposition survived and grew; in the army, in the administration, in the party, in the cities, in the rural areas, every terrorist wave [from Stalin’s regime] brought forth a resistance movement.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn254|254]] The leading Bolshevik group now appears divided in a conflict that doesn’t exclude coups and that, at least in the expectations and hopes of Stalin’s enemies, from one moment to another could become open and generalized, involving the entire country. While the opposition turns to Lenin’s lessons and to the conspiratorial tradition of Bolshevism to weave their plans in the shadow, this double game provokes the outrage of Soviet power, which identifies in false friends the most dangerous and insidious enemy: the tragedy heads toward its conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Infiltration, Disinformation, and Calls for Insurrection ===&lt;br /&gt;
The “rules of the conspiracy” theorized by Trotsky, do they only imply the concealment of one’s own political identity, or could they include the recourse to false denouncements, in order to spread confusion and chaos in the enemy camp and to make more difficult the identification of the clandestine network struggling to topple Stalin’s regime? In other words, do the “rules of the conspiracy” include just the rigorous protection of private information, or do they also allow the use of disinformation? It’s not just the American journalist Anne Louise Strong, sympathetic to the government, who raises such suspicions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn255|255]] In the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; itself it speaks of false charges and “provocations” realized by “authentic Trotskyists”, thereby carrying out their “revenge”, but also “careerists without a conscience” willing to clear the way by using the most contemptible means.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn256|256]] Noteworthy is an episode that takes place when the assassination of Kirov is made public. Most reactions―according to Andrew Smith, who at the time worked in the Kuznecov Elektrozavod factory―are of shock and concern in relation to the future; but there’s also those who express regret that it wasn’t Stalin who was shot. Later an assembly is held, during which the workers are encouraged to denounce enemies or possible enemies of Soviet ruling.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Smith recalls his surprise at how, during the debate, the dissident group he was in contact with proved to be the most active in attacking the opposition and deviationists, and seeking the most severe measures against them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn257|257]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Indicative as well is an episode that occurs outside the USSR, but could help in understanding what occurs inside that country. When general Alexandr M. Orlov, a former high-level collaborator with the NKVD (and in 1938 sheltering in the United States), is accused by the journalist Louis Fischer of having participated in the liquidation of anti-Stalinist communists during the Spanish Civil War, he responds with the false revelation that it was his accuser, in fact, who was a spy in service to Moscow.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn258|258]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union of the 1930s, we have seen the opposition infiltrating the repressive apparatus at the highest levels: it would be very strange if, after having achieved this objective, it limited itself to obeying Stalin’s orders. Disinformation carries the double advantage of obstructing the machinery of repression and redirecting it against an especially hated enemy; it’s an integral part of war: and that’s what it’s about, at least judging by Trotsky’s argument in July of 1933, when he considers the counter-revolutionary civil war carried out by the “Stalinist bureaucracy” to be “already underway”, and which culminated in the “infamous annihilation of the Leninist-Bolsheviks.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore it’s necessary to be aware of the new situation. “The slogan for the reform of the CPSU” doesn’t make sense anymore. A head-on struggle is imposed: the party and the International led by Stalin, now on their last leg, “can only bring misfortune and nothing but misfortune” to the “world proletariat”; on the opposing side, the authentic revolutionaries certainly can’t be inspired in their actions by “petty bourgeois pacifists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn259|259]] There can be no doubt: “Only with &#039;&#039;violence&#039;&#039; can the bureaucracy be forced to return power to the hands of the proletarian vanguard.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn260|260]] Hitler’s rise to power for Trotsky doesn’t mean that unity is necessary, in the aim of confronting the enormous danger which looms, starting from Germany; it means that they can’t stop half-way in the struggle against a power, Stalinism, which had led to the defeat of the German and international proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, it’s the very leader of the opposition who speaks of “civil war” within the party that he in part led during the October Revolution and in the first years of Soviet Russia. Before us is the topic which constituted the starting thread of the investigation by a Russian historian who is a convinced and self-declared Trotskyist, author of a monumental and multi-volume work, dedicated precisely to the detailed reconstruction of this civil war. He speaks, regarding Soviet Russia, of a “preventive civil war” carried out by Stalin against those who had organized to topple him. Even outside the USSR, this civil war takes shape and at times intensifies within the front that fought against Franco; in fact, referencing Spain from 1936-1939, he speaks not of one, but “two civil wars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn261|261]] With great intellectual honesty and taking advantage of new and rich documentary material available thanks to the opening of Russian archives, the author cited here reaches this conclusion: “The Moscow trials weren’t a crime without motive nor in cold blood, but more accurately Stalin’s reaction during an acute political struggle.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn262|262]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In arguing against Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who paints the victims of the purges as a bunch of “rabbits”, the Russian Trotskyist historian cites a pamphlet which in the 1930s called for the Kremlin to be cleared of “the fascist dictator and his clique.&amp;amp;quot; He then comments: “including from the perspective of Russian legislation in force today, this pamphlet would be judged as a call for the violent overthrow of the government (the ruling elite to be more precise).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn263|263]] In conclusion, far from being an “irrational and senseless outbreak of violence”, the bloody terror carried out by Stalin is in fact the only way he could defeat the “resistance of the true communist forces.&amp;amp;quot; “The party of the executed”, is how he defined those targeted, “in an analogy to the expression used to identity the French Communist Party, the principal force of anti-fascist resistance and privileged target of Hitler’s terror.&amp;amp;quot;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn264|264]] Thus, Stalin is compared to Hitler; highlighting the fact that the communist and French partisans didn’t limit themselves to a passive or nonviolent resistance while opposing the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Civil War and International Maneuvers ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s no surprise that, from time to time, this or that superpower had sought to take advantage of the latent civil war in Soviet Russia. Who solicits or hopes to provoke foreign intervention is, sometimes, the defeated faction, which believes it has no other hope for success. Such a dynamic unfolds starting from the first months of Soviet Russia. Let’s return to the attack of July 6th of 1918. It is an integral part of a very ambitious project. On one end, the Left Revolutionary Socialists promote “counter-revolutionary uprisings in a number of urban centers against the Soviet government”, or rather “an insurrection in Moscow which hoped to topple the communist government”; on the other end, they also propose to “assassinate various German representatives” with the aim of provoking a military reaction from Germany and the subsequent resumption of the war. It would be confronted with a &#039;&#039;levée en masse&#039;&#039; by the Russian people, which would inflict a simultaneous defeat to the traitorous government and the enemy invader.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn265|265]] The perpetrator of the attack against the German ambassador is a sincere revolutionary: well before entering into contact with Trotskyist circles, he intends to emulate the Jacobins, protagonists of the most radical phase of the French Revolution and of the heroic mass resistance against the invasion by the counter-revolutionary powers. However, in the eyes of Soviet authority, Blumkin could very well be a provocateur: the success of his plan would have resulted in a new advance by the armies of Wilhelm II and, perhaps, the toppling of the authority born out of the October Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interaction between internal and international politics appears in all historical changes. Hitler’s rise to power, with the annihilation or decimation of the German section of the Communist International, represents a hard blow to the Soviet Union: what consequences would it have for internal political stability? On March 30th, 1933, Trotsky blames the ruling bureaucracy in the USSR for the defeat of the communists in Germany, and writes that “the liquidation of Stalin’s regime” is “absolutely inevitable and [...] isn’t far off.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn266|266]] In the summer of that same year, Daladier’s government in France allows Trotsky to visit: only a few months after the previous rejection by Herriot, and doubts arise about the reasons for this change. Ruth Fischer thinks that the French government did so on account of “Stalin’s weakened position”, the “reorganization of the opposition against him”, and Trotsky’s nearing return to Moscow with leading responsibilities at the highest level.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn267|267]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A new and dramatic turn of events arises with the outbreak of the Second World War. In the spring of 1940, the Soviet Union is still outside the gigantic conflict, and it even remains committed to the non-aggression pact with Germany. It is an intolerable situation for the countries already facing Hitler’s aggression; taking the Finno-Russian conflict as a pretext, they consider a plan to bombard the petroleum centers in Baku. It’s not just a matter of striking the Third Reich’s energy supply line: “the Franco-British military plans sought to break the military alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany through attacks against the oil industries in the Caucasus region and bringing a post-Stalinist regime to their side against Germany.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn268|268]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return for a moment to the attack against German ambassador Mirbach. The perpetrator certainly had in mind triggering a German attack, but not because he hopes for their victory: on the contrary, he hoped the assault would awaken Russia, leading it to a decisive response. Later we see Blumkin participating in the conspiracy led by Trotsky. And the latter, for his part, in clarifying his position, compares himself in 1927 to French Prime Minister Clemenceau who, during the First World War, assumed leadership of the country after denouncing the lack of military effectiveness by his predecessors, and therefore proposing himself as the only statesman capable of leading France to victory against Germany.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn269|269]] Of the many number of possible interpretations and reinterpretations for this analogy, only one thing was made clear: not even the invasion of the Soviet Union would have put an end to the attempts by the opposition to seize power. Even more disturbing is the already cited comparison of Stalin to Nicholas II: during the First World War, read and denounced as an imperialist war, the Bolsheviks had put forth the slogan of revolutionary defeatism and had identified the tsarist autocracy as the internal and principal enemy, that which they first sought to combat and defeat.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the years to follow, Trotsky goes way beyond evoking the spirit of Clemenceau: on April 22nd, 1939, he declares his support for “the liberation of so-called Soviet Ukraine from the Stalinist yoke.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn270|270]] Once independent, it would later be unified with western Ukraine upon being separated from Poland, and with Carpathian Ukraine, annexed earlier by Hungary. Let’s reflect on the moment in which this position is taken. The Third Reich had just carried out the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and rumors grow which indicate that the Soviet Union (and especially Ukraine) is Germany’s next objective. In these circumstances, in July of 1939, it is even Kerensky who takes a stand against Trotsky’s surprising project which, according to the Menshevik leader, only favors Hitler’s plans. “It’s the same opinion from the Kremlin” was the quick response from Trotsky who, on the other hand, in an article from April 22nd had written that with Ukraine’s independence “the Bonapartist clique will reap what they have sown”; it’s good for the “current Bonapartist caste to be undermined, shaken, destroyed and swept away”; only that way is the road paved for a real “defense of the Soviet Republic” and its “socialist future.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn271|271]] Soon after the invasion of Poland begins, Trotsky goes even further. In foreseeing the final ruin of the Third Reich, he adds: “However, before going to hell, Hitler could inflict such a defeat on the Soviet Union that it could cost the head of the oligarchy in the Kremlin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn272|272]] That prediction (or that desire) of the liquidation (physical as well) of the “Bonapartist clique” or “caste” carried out by a revolution from below, or even by a military invasion, couldn’t not be seen in the eyes of Stalin as confirmation of the suspicions about the convergence, at least the objective convergence, between the Nazi leadership and the Trotskyist opposition; both had an interest in provoking the collapse of the internal front in the USSR, even if the first saw that collapse as the precondition for the Slavic nation’s enslavement, and the second saw it as the precondition for the outbreak of a new revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also, it’s not a particularly ignominious suspicion: acting like the new Lenin, Trotsky aspired to use to his advantage the dialectic that had led to the defeat of the Russian army, the toppling of the tsarist autocracy and the victory of the October Revolution. Once again, the past history of Bolshevism is turned against Soviet power. Kerensky, who in 1917 had denounced the treason by the Bolsheviks, now warns of the treason by those who define themselves as “Bolshevik-Leninists.&amp;amp;quot; From Stalin’s point of view, there’s been a radical change with respect to the First World War: now it’s a matter of confronting a political party or faction which, at least with respect to the first phase of the conflict, hopes for the collapse of the country and the military victory of a Germany not yet depleted from three years of war, as was the case with Wilhelm II, but at the height of its power and explicitly dedicated to building its colonial empire in the East. Given this context, it’s certainly not surprising that the accusation of treason is raised. Let’s return to the article by Trotsky from April 22nd, 1939. In it there’s but a single affirmation which could have received Stalin’s agreement: “The impending war will create a favorable atmosphere for all sorts of adventurers, miracle-hunters and seekers of the golden fleece.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn273|273]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the flames of the Second World War burn ever higher, destined as well to reach the Soviet Union according to the same prediction by Trotsky, he continues making declarations and statements that are anything but reassuring. Let’s see a few of them: “Soviet patriotism can’t be separated from the irreconcilable struggle against the Stalinist clique” (June 8th, 1940); “The Fourth International has recognized for some time now the need to topple the bureaucracy [in power in Russia] through a revolutionary uprising by the workers” (September 25th, 1939); “Stalin and the oligarchy led by him represent the principal danger to the Soviet Union” (April 13th, 1940).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn274|274]] It is quite understandable that the “bureaucracy” or the “oligarchy”, branded as the “principal enemy”, is convinced that the opposition, if not at the direct service of the enemy, is in any case ready from the start to follow-up its actions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any government would have found organizations of this orientation to be a threat to national security. Only to fuel Stalin’s concerns and suspicions is the prediction by Trotsky (September 25th 1939), of an “imminent revolution in the Soviet Union”: only “a few years or perhaps months away from the inglorious collapse” of the Stalinist bureaucracy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn275|275]] Where does such certainty come from? Is it a prediction formulated while only taking into account the internal developments within the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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It becomes even more complicated upon analyzing the interplay between internal political conflict in Russia and international tensions; the suspicions and accusations are in fact encouraged by the existence of a fifth column and by disinformation operations carried out by Nazi Germany’s intelligence services. In April of 1939, Goebbels writes in his diary: “Our clandestine radio station in Eastern Prussia which broadcasts into Russia has caused an uproar. It operates in Trotsky’s name and causes trouble for Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn276|276]] Immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa, the leader of the Third Reich’s propaganda services is even more pleased: “now we are using three clandestine radio stations in Russia: the first is Trotskyist, the second separatist, the third Russian-nationalist, all are critical of the Stalinist regime.&amp;amp;quot; It’s an instrument the aggressors give great importance to: “We work with all methods, especially the three clandestine radio stations in Russia”; these “are a model of cunning and finesse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn277|277]] On the role of “Trotskyist” propaganda, the diary entry from July 14th is especially significant, which references the treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the joint statement by the two countries, it proceeds as follows: “This is an excellent occasion to show the compatibility between capitalism and Bolshevism [here a synonym for official Soviet authority]. The statement will find scarce acceptance among Leninist circles in Russia” (having in mind that Trotskyists like to define themselves as “Bolshevik-Leninists”), in contrast to the “Stalinists”, considered traitors to Leninism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn278|278]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, the intention by Stalin and his collaborators to collectively condemn the opposition as a den of enemy agents appears grotesque today, but it’s important not to lose sight of the historical context broadly presented here. It’s especially necessary to have in mind that similar suspicions and accusations were raised against the Stalinist leadership. After having labelled Stalin as a “fascist dictator”, the pamphlets which the Trotskyist network circulated in the Soviet Union added: “The leaders of the Politburo are either mentally ill or mercenaries of fascism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn279|279]] Even official documents of the opposition insinuated that Stalin could be the protagonist of a “gigantic and deliberate provocation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn280|280]] On both sides, instead of committing to an exhaustive analysis of the objective contradictions, and how political conflicts interrelate with them, they prefer to quickly resort to the category of treason and, in its extreme form, the traitor becomes a conscious and valuable agent for the enemy. Trotsky doesn’t tire in denouncing the “plot of the Stalinist bureaucracy against the working class”, and the plot is even more despicable because the “Stalinist bureaucracy” is nothing more than “imperialism’s transmission device.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn281|281]] It’s not necessary to say that Trotsky is on the receiving end as well: he laments at seeing himself described as an “agent of a foreign power”, but in turn labels Stalin as an “agent provocateur at Hitler’s service.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn282|282]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The most infamous accusations are exchanged by both sides; on closer examination, the most incredible are those coming from the opposition. The conflicted and tormented mood of its leader was carefully analyzed by a Russian historian not suspected of having Stalinist sympathies:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Trotsky didn’t want the defeat of the Soviet Union, but Stalin’s collapse. In his predictions on the imminent war, his unease is evident: the exile knew that only his country’s defeat could put an end to Stalin’s power [...]. He desired war, because in that war he saw the only possibility of toppling Stalin. But Trotsky didn’t want to admit this even to himself.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn283|283]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “Bonapartist Reaction”, “Coup d’Etats” and Disinformation: The Tukhachevsky Case ===&lt;br /&gt;
With a civil war (latent or in the open) within the new leadership group born out of the toppling of the old regime, with mutual accusations of betrayal and collaboration with the imperialist enemy and the extensive activities of their intelligence services, dedicated both to the recruitment of agents as well as to subversion, it’s in this context that we must place the events that in 1937 led to the prosecution and execution of marshal Tukhachevsky and a number of other leading officers in the Red Army.&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s a long history behind this case. Years earlier Lenin saw the Bonapartist danger threatening Soviet Russia and also expressed his concerns to Trotsky: would civil authority really be able to subordinate military authority? In 1920, Tukhachevsky seems to have wanted to make the decision regarding the march on Warsaw―a dream of his. There clearly emerges―a leading historian from our time observes―the possibility of the brilliant general “becoming the Bonaparte of the Bolshevik Revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn284|284]] Ten years later, Stalin is warned by the GPU about the schemes that are being forged by military elements opposed to him. Was there no cause for alarm?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn285|285]] In April of the following year, it was Trotsky who expresses his great doubts regarding Tukhachevsky, offering the following analysis of the situation created in the USSR after the political defeat of Bukharin and his allies on the “right”: the principal danger for socialism is represented not by “Thermidorian reaction”, which would formally conserve the country’s Soviet character and the communist character of the ruling party, but by “Bonapartist reaction”, that will take “the most open, ‘most mature’ form of the counter-revolution, that will be waged against the Soviet system and the Bolshevik party as a whole, unsheathing the saber in the name of bourgeois property.&amp;amp;quot; In such a case, “the most adventurous praetorian elements like Tukhachevsky” could play a role of great importance. Those opposing them “with weapons in hand” would be the “revolutionary elements” of the party, the state and―take note―”the army”, reunited around the working class and the “Bolshevik-Leninist faction” (that is, the Trotskyists).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn286|286]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This stance constitutes a new factor in the conflict between the Bolsheviks. Despite having “the armed forces under his control”, Stalin “was careful not to get them too closely involved in the controversies and intrigues that shook the party and the state”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn287|287]] now, clearly, the opposition seeks to gain entry or to consolidate its presence in the army in the name of the struggle against the Bonapartist threat; after all, only it would be able to meaningfully oppose it. However, not allowing himself to be intimidated by this Bonapartist threat, in 1935 Stalin grants Tukhachevsky and four other military officers the title of marshal. It’s a promotion made in the context of a reform that sees the army abandon its “predominantly territorial militia character”, becoming “a true standing army” and restoring “the old pre-revolutionary discipline.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn288|288]] On December 21st of the same year, together with other members at the apex of Soviet political and military leadership, the new marshall celebrates Stalin’s birthday at the latter’s home “until 5:30 in the morning!”, Dimitrov emphasizes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn289|289]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely that reform which draws Trotsky’s outrage, who, on the one hand, returns to the old denunciation: the Red Army “was not spared in the Soviet regime’s degeneration; on the contrary, that degeneration found in the army its highest expression.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, Trotsky takes on a new tone, mentioning the “formation of a new kind of opposition faction in the army”, which, from the left, laments the abandonment of the “focus on world revolution.&amp;amp;quot; And the text cited here, it somewhat suggests that this opposition could have lured in Tukhachevsky himself: a man who in 1921 had fought with “excessive zeal” for the formation of a “world high-command” could hardly have supported the abandonment of internationalism and the “cult to the status quo” that had taken hold in the USSR. What to say of this text? The agitation in the army continues and appears to be strengthening; only that now the approaching struggle doesn’t oppose a “Bolshevik-Leninist faction” against the Bonapartist generals, but a reliable part of the army and its leadership against the Thermidorian leaders and traitors in the Kremlin. The resistance by the Red Army, and its rebellion against state power, would be further justified by the fact that its new political course constituted a “double coup d’état” that, in breaking with the Bolshevik October, arbitrarily proceeded to the “elimination of the militias” and the “restoration of the officer caste, eighteen years after its revolutionary suppression”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn290|290]] rising up against Stalin, the Red Army would have, in fact, prevented the coup d’états he was planning and would have reestablished revolutionary legitimacy. As if all of that wasn’t enough, the Trotskyist &#039;&#039;Opposition Bulletin&#039;&#039; announces an imminent revolt by the army.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn291|291]] Perhaps a measure taken in Moscow some months before the trials aimed to confront that possible threat. “On March 29th, 1937, the Politburo debated the removal from the Red Army of all commanders and officers who had been expelled from the party for political motives, transferring them to the economic ministries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn292|292]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The rumors spread by White Russian exiles in Paris about a military coup d’etat that was being prepared in Moscow fueled even more the climate of suspicion and concern.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn293|293]] Finally, during the latter half of January 1937, the Czechoslovakian president, Edvard Beneš, receives intelligence about the secret “negotiations” underway between the Third Reich and “the anti-Stalinist clique in the USSR of marshal Tukhachevsky, Rykov and others”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn294|294]] was there some basis to the accusation, or was it all a set-up by German intelligence services? Yet early on in 1937, in speaking with his foreign minister, Konstantin von Neurath, Hitler rejects the idea of an improvement in relations with the USSR, but adds: “It would be different if things in Moscow developed in the direction of an absolute despotism under the control of the military. It that case it would be wrong to miss the opportunity to make our presence felt again in Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn295|295]] Beneš also keeps the French leaders up to date on those “negotiations”, thereby “notably weakening confidence in the French-Soviet pact.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn296|296]] Therefore it wasn’t Stalin alone who believed the information shared by the Czechoslovakian president. Moreover, even after the end of the Second World War, Churchill appears to confirm Moscow’s version, stressing, as we will see (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 7, § 2), that the purge struck the “pro-German elements”, adding: “Stalin felt he owed a great deal of gratitude to president Beneš.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn297|297]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At any rate, the question remains without an answer, and to conclusively answer it only a private conversation of Hitler’s in the summer of 1942 offers some assistance. Despite not mentioning a concrete military conspiracy, he observes that Stalin had serious reasons to fear being killed by Tukhachevsky’s inner circle.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn298|298]] If it had all been a set-up with Hitler’s direct supervision or approval,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn299|299]] he would have perhaps boasted of it at a time in which the memories were still fresh of the initial and unstoppable advances by the Wehrmacht.&lt;br /&gt;
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In asking the key question (“was there really a military conspiracy?”) about the then recent “trials” and executions, Trotsky gives an answer that raises more questions. “It all depends on what one considers to be a conspiracy. Any sign of discontent and any contact made among those who are disgruntled, any criticism and any consideration about what to do, or how to oppose the government’s shameful policies, all of this, from Stalin’s point of view, is a conspiracy. It’s a totalitarian regime, all opposition is undoubtedly the seed of a conspiracy”; in that sense, the “seed” was the generals’ aspirations to protect the army from the “demoralizing intrigues of the GPU.&amp;amp;quot; Is it his rejection of the conspiracy theory, or is it his corroboration of it, expressed in the “Aesopian language” imposed by circumstances? Who calls attention to that ambiguous declaration is the fervent Trotskyist and Russian historian we’ve already encountered (Rogowin), who ends up accepting the thesis of the “anti-Stalinist conspiracy” by Tukhachevsky, putting it in a “Bolshevik” political context rather than a bourgeois one.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn300|300]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, doubts remains, but it seems difficult to explain all that had happened with the usual &#039;&#039;deux ex machina&#039;&#039;, the power hungry and bloodthirsty dictator, eager to surround himself with puppets, blind and unconditional in their loyalty. This explanation is all the more fragile for the fact that in 1932 Stalin had no issues in attending, together with Molotov, classes by the commandant of the Military Academy, Boris M. Shaposhnikov; and Stalin gained a lot from these classes, given by a highly decorated strategist, yet who was not a member of the communist party.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn301|301]] Moreover, “military science was one of the few politically important fields in which Stalin favored originality and innovation”, to the extent that “the officer corps” could exercise considerable “spiritual independence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn302|302]] Taking the place of Tukhachevsky and his subordinates are generals who, far from being passive yes-men, frankly expressed their opinions and made arguments according to their own judgment,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn303|303]] not hesitating to contradict the supreme leader, who, moreover, encourages and sometimes rewards that attitude (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 6).&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Three Civil Wars ===&lt;br /&gt;
If we don’t want to be held prisoners to the caricatures of Stalin drawn by Trotsky and Khrushchev during two different but equally intense political struggles, it’s necessary not to lose sight of the fact that the events that began in October 1917 are marked by three civil wars. The first war saw the confrontation between the revolution on one side, and the coalition of its enemies on the other, supported by capitalist powers committed to containing the Bolshevik contagion by any means possible. The second war is more or less the collectivization of agriculture, which is driven by a revolution from above or from afar, despite in part being driven by the peasantry from below. The third is that which divided the Bolshevik leadership group.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last one is even more complex because it’s characterized by great mobility and by the dramatic shifts in its frontlines. We saw Bukharin, on the occasion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, momentarily flirt with the idea of a type of coup d’état against Lenin, who he condemns for wanting to transform “the party into a dung heap.&amp;amp;quot; While at that moment Bukharin’s position is similar to Trotsky’s, in the eyes of the latter he becomes, ten years later, the privileged incarnation of Thermidorian reaction and betrayal by the bureaucracy: “With Stalin against Bukharin? Yes. With Bukharin against Stalin? Never.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn304|304]] It’s a moment when Trotsky appears to predict Stalin’s turn against Bukharin: the latter would have immediately “toppled Stalin as a Trotskyist, exactly how Stalin had toppled Zinoviev.&amp;amp;quot; We are in 1928 and there’s already hints of the split between Stalin and Bukharin, who in fact, because of the abandonment of NEP, begins “privately describing Stalin as the representative of neo-Trotskyism” and as “an unprincipled schemer”; in the last analysis, as the worst and most dangerous enemy inside the party.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn305|305]] Thus, the former member of the duumvirate proceeds down the path that will unite him with Trotsky. Ultimately, the opposing sides form coalitions against the victor; it becomes clear that in the mortal conflict between the Bolsheviks, the alignments change rapidly until the very end.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fought in a country without a liberal tradition and characterized both by the prolonged state of emergency and by the persistence of an ideology prone to liquidating as merely “formal” the norms that govern the rule of law, the third civil wars take on the ferocity of a religious war. Trotsky, who “considers himself the only man able to lead the revolution”, is inclined to use “any means available to make the ‘false messiah’ fall from his throne.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn306|306]] A “zealous faith” inspires the opposing side as well (&#039;&#039;infra,&#039;&#039; ch. 4, § 4). And the more Stalin is determined to eliminate all conspiratorial threats, including the most unlikely, the more heavily loom the clouds of a war that threatens the very existence of Russia and the homeland of socialism, and which therefore represent a mortal threat both to the national cause as well as the social cause, two causes Stalin is determined to lead.&lt;br /&gt;
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While their distinctions are hard to make out (acts of terrorism and sabotage can be the expression of a counter-revolutionary project or of a new revolution), the three civil wars become tied up in the interventions by this or that great power. The entirety of these convoluted and tragic conflicts vanish in the differing accounts, described first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev, that tell simple fables and construct a monster who at his mere touch transforms gold into blood and dirt.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;3. Between the Twentieth Century and The Longue Durée, from the History of Marxism to the History of Russia: the Origins of &amp;amp;quot;Stalinism&amp;amp;quot;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Catastrophe in the Making ===&lt;br /&gt;
Up until now we have concentrated on the ideological, political and military contradictions in the revolutionary process and their interaction with international conflicts. But the picture wouldn’t be complete without the inclusion of another factor: the long history of Russia. The approaching catastrophe was noticed by observers from a broad range of political orientations, well before 1917 and even before the founding of the Bolshevik party. In 1811, in a Saint Petersburg still shaken by the peasant revolt led by Pugachev (illiterate, yet a figure of great political talent) that was crushed a few decades earlier at great difficulty, Joseph de Maistre expresses his concern that a new “European” kind of revolution could break out, led this time by an intellectual class of popular origin or sentiment, by a university educated Pugachev. By comparison, the disorder witnessed in France would be child’s play: “there’s no words to express what I fear could come to pass.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn307|307]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s skip ahead by half a century. An even more accurate prediction, and quite admirable for its foresight, can be read in an article on Russia by Marx published in an American newspaper (the New York Daily Tribune, January 17th, 1859): if the nobility continues to oppose the emancipation of the peasantry, a grand revolution will break out; and from it will arise a “reign of terror by these half-Asiatic serfs, unequaled in history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn308|308]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the revolution of 1905, it’s the prime minister himself, Sergei Witte, who stresses that the current situation in Russia was unsustainable and warns the tsar of the danger represented by the &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039;, the peasant revolt:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;One can not halt the forward march of humanity. If it doesn’t triumph through reform, the idea of human freedom will triumph by means of revolution. But in the latter case, it’ll be born from the ashes of a thousand years of calamities. The Russian &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039;, blind and unforgiving, will destroy all in its wake, it will reduce everything to ash [...]; the horrors of the Russian &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039; will surpass all those known in history.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn309|309]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it’s Witte himself who is involved in the ferocious repression that’s used to confront the revolution of 1905 and the often brutal jacqueries who take part in it. The interior minister, P. N. Durnovo, orders “the governors to ‘immediately proceed to the execution’ of the rebels, and to burn and level the villages where the disturbances originate from.&amp;amp;quot; It’s followed by “military courts”, “collective punishment”, death squads, and pogroms against Jews, blamed as the source of subversion. It’s a situation that continues on until the start of the First World War. It’s precisely the interior minister who warns: “The revolution in its most extreme form, and an irreversible state of anarchy, will be the only predictable outcome of an unfortunate conflict with the Kaiser.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn310|310]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s what will happen soon enough. Let’s look at Russia’s situation on the eve of the Bolsheviks rise to power. Soon shaken is the myth of a country that, after the overthrow of autocracy, would happily proceed in the direction of liberalism and democracy. It’s a myth encouraged by Churchill who, to justify his interventionist policy, accuses the Bolsheviks―sustained by “German gold”―of having violently overthrown the “Russian Republic” and the “Russian parliament.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn311|311]] It would be easy to accuse the British statesman of hypocrisy: he knew very well that between February and October London had continually supported coup attempts that sought to restore the tsarist autocracy or impose a military dictatorship. It’s Kerensky himself who points out that “the governments of France and Britain took advantage of every opportunity to sabotage the provisional government” of Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn312|312]] However, from his exile in the United States, the Menshevik leader never gives up cultivating this myth in question, accusing the Bolsheviks of a double treason, against the homeland and against the “recently born Russian democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn313|313]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the accusation of treason to the nation becomes obsolete with the end of the Second World War and the rise of the USSR as a superpower―Kerensky was one of the few defeated Menshevik leaders who clung to it―, still today the topic of the Bolshevik’s betrayal of democracy is commonplace, a betrayal that culminates in the Stalinist terror. But that general line of thinking doesn’t stand up to historical analysis. It’s not just a matter of the obstinacy of the leaders who arose out of the February days of the revolution (Kerensky especially), determined to remain in a bloodbath that the great majority of the people are determined to end; it’s a political line that can only be carried forth by resorting to terror and an iron-fist discipline on the frontlines and in the rear. And not even the repeated attempts to install a military dictatorship (attempts that Churchill is no stranger to) constitute the principal aspect. There’s much more: “The idea that the February Revolution had been a ‘bloodless revolution’ and that mass violence had only broken out with the October Revolution was a liberal myth.&amp;amp;quot; It’s ”one of the most stubborn myths around 1917”, but “has now lost all credibility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn314|314]] Let’s examine the real timeline of events: “The rebels took terrible revenge on the officials of the old regime. There was a hunt for police officers in order to lynch and kill them without mercy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn315|315]] In Saint Petersburg, “after a few days the death toll reached around 1,500”, with the ferocious lynching of the most hated representatives of the old regime; “the worst violence was to be committed by the Kronstadt sailors, who mutilated and killed hundreds of officers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn316|316]] Those who mutinied were the younger recruits; “the standard disciplinary norms didn’t apply” to them, and the officers took advantage of this to treat them “with a brutality even more sadistic than usual”; and now they have unleashed a vengeance of “unprecedented ferocity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn317|317]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Things worsen later in September, after the attempted coup d’état by general Lavr Kornilov. Executions and assassinations by crowds break out and are accompanied by “unprecedented violence.&amp;amp;quot; “The officers were tortured and mutilated before being killed (eyes and tongues ripped out, ears cut, nails driven into shoulders, in the place of epaulettes), hung upside-down, impaled. According to general Brusilov, a large number of young officers killed themselves to escape a horrible death.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn318|318]] Further, “the methods of killing their superiors were so brutal (the men under their command went as far as cutting off their victim’s limbs and genitals, or skinning them alive), that no one could really condemn such a suicide.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn319|319]] Moreover, the rage already made itself felt before October, and “In the resolutions by the soviets, then in large part dominated by the socialist revolutionaries, they branded as ‘enemies of the people the bloodthirsty capitalists, the bourgeoisie who drink the blood of the people’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn320|320]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, “the crisis in commerce between the city and the countryside, well before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks”, caused a new round of intense violence. In the tragic situation that had arisen after the catastrophe of the war, with the fall in agricultural production and the hoarding of what scarce food is available, the survival of urban residents depends on quite drastic measures: even before the October Revolution, a government minister, despite being a “prominent liberal economist”, argues in favor of requisition by “force of arms” should market incentives fail; the fact is that “the practice of requisition” is common to “all parties during war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn321|321]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The combination of these multiple contradictions causes a bloody state of anarchy with the “collapse of all authority and all administrative organization”, with an explosion of savage violence coming from below (in which millions of deserters or disbanded soldiers are the primary protagonists), and with a “militarization and an overall brutalization of social behavior and political practices.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn322|322]] It’s a “brutalization without possible means of comparison to that known in Western societies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn323|323]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand this tragedy, it’s necessary to keep in mind the “way in which social violence spreads; beginning in the areas where military violence takes place”, the &amp;amp;quot;rear is engulfed in the violence by peasant-army deserters outside the confines of the military&amp;amp;quot;, by the “millions of deserters from the crumbling Russian army”, by the fact that the “distinctions between the front and rear, between the civilian and military sphere”, become increasingly narrow. In conclusion, “the violence from the military zones spreads everywhere” and society as a whole not only falls into chaos and anarchy, but becomes hostage to an “unprecedented brutalization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn324|324]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, it’s a question that begins with the First World War and the crisis and breakdown of the Russian army. Perhaps it would even be better to go even further back. The exceptional level of violence that strikes twentieth century Russia is explained by shedding light on the two interlinked processes: “the grand &#039;&#039;Jacquerie&#039;&#039; of October 1917” that had been gathering force for centuries, and precisely for that reason unleashes a wave of blind and indiscriminate violence against the landowners, against their property, their homes, and their very lives; in addition to this, there’s powerful resentment toward the city itself. The second process is the “collapse of the tsarist military, the most numerous army in history, 95% of whom were peasants.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn325|325]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The oppression, exploitation and humiliation of an immense mass of peasantry by an exclusive, aristocratic elite, who considered themselves foreign in relation to their own people, considered a different and inferior race, were precursors to a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. Especially because the social conflict became even more acute with the outbreak of World War I, in which the noble officers on a daily basis exercised a true power of life and death over peasant soldiers; it’s no coincidence that at the first signs of crisis they sought to maintain discipline on the front and in the rear by resorting to the use of artillery.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn326|326]] The collapse of the old regime is the moment for revenge and vengeance, cultivated and sown over centuries. The prince G. E. Lvov self-critically recognizes this: “the vengeance of the peasant servants” was a settling of accounts with those who for centuries had refused to “treat the peasants as people, rather than as dogs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn327|327]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, precisely because it was a matter of vengeance, it took on forms not only brutal, but also purely destructive: “thousands of drunk workers and soldiers wandered through the cities, looting warehouses and shops, breaking into homes, beating and robbing peasants.&amp;amp;quot; Still worse is what would happen in the countryside: “near the front, large groups of deserters wandered through the countryside and engaged in banditry.&amp;amp;quot; The combined agitation of the disbanded soldiers and peasantry provokes throughout Russia a devastating fire, not only similar to the jacquerie (the homes of the nobles were burned and their owners were frequently killed), but to luddism as well (agrarian machinery was destroyed, machinery that in previous years reduced the need for wage labor), and included vandalism ( they destroy and ruin “anything that could hint of excessive wealth: paintings, books, and sculptures”). Indeed, “the peasantry destroyed noble homes, churches and schools. They set libraries and priceless works of art aflame.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn328|328]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Russian State Saved by Those Who Sought the &amp;amp;quot;Withering Away of the State&amp;amp;quot; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the situation created after the February Revolution and the fall of the old regime can be described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In short, Russia was enduring a process of Balkanization [...]. If 1917 proved anything, it was that Russian society wasn’t strong enough, nor was it sufficiently united, to sustain a democratic revolution. Without the state, there’s nothing to hold Russia together.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn329|329]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An irony of history, the state was restored by a party that worked for and desired the final extinction of the state! It requires ruthless energy to restore order to a world that, having been ruined through centuries of isolation and oppression, experiences a new period of anarchy and chaos which breaks out after the war and the collapse of the old regime. But it would be ideologically superficial to focus on the recourse to terrorist violence by only one of the actors. Let’s see how the new authority is challenged:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We’re dealing with a terrible, vengeful war against the communist regime. Thousands of Bolsheviks were brutally killed. Many of them victims of horrible (and symbolic) torture. Ears, tongues and eyes ripped out; limbs, heads and genitals cut off; stomachs emptied and filled with sand; foreheads and chests branded with crosses; people crucified upon trees, burnt alive, drowned in freezing water, buried up to their necks and fed upon by dogs and rats as a spectacle to joyous crowds of peasants. Police stations and courthouses were destroyed. Schools and propaganda centers trashed [...]. Simple banditry played a role as well. Nearly every gang attacked trains. In the Donbass, it is said that in the spring of 1921 these robberies were “almost daily.&amp;amp;quot; Incursions into town centers and sometimes even remote farms were another regular source for provisions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn330|330]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What caused this brutal violence? The policies carried out by the Bolsheviks? Only in part: in 1921 and 1922 “a terrible famine” ravaged the countryside, “directly caused by a year of drought and freezing temperatures.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn331|331]] Yet the peasant revolt was also a protest against “a state that took their sons and horses to the army, that prolonged the devastation caused by the civil war, that forcibly conscripted peasants into work crews, that looted their food supplies”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn332|332]] this was also a protest against a catastrophe that began in 1914.&lt;br /&gt;
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With respect to Bolshevik policies it’s necessary to know how to distinguish between measures that unreasonably struck against the peasantry, from those that had a completely different character. Let’s consider the collective farms that had already started in 1920, and were often formed by communist militants arriving from the city, driven not just by ideology but also by the hunger that ravaged the urban centers: “They ate and worked collectively. The women did the difficult field work alongside the men, and in certain cases nurseries were established to take care of the children. On top of this, there was a total absence of any religious observance.&amp;amp;quot; In this case as well, the hostility of the peasantry was insurmountable, given “that they were convinced that they [the communists] sought to collectivize not only the land and the tools, but also the women and daughters, and for all of them to sleep together under one big roof.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn333|333]] Still, more bitter was the experience of the populists who at the turn of the century were determined “to go to the people” and help them create cooperatives, but were quickly forced to abandon their idealistic image of the Russian peasantry. Here we see Mikhail Romas’s experience:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From the start, the peasants were suspicious of the cooperative, not being able to understand how the prices of the new company would be lower than other sellers. The more successful farmers connected to the merchants in the region started to harass Romas and his people with a series of acts meant to intimidate them: putting gunpowder in the firewood used for the fireplace, threatening poor farmers who showed some interest in the cooperative, until going as far as brutally killing a poor peasant from the cooperative, horrendously dismembering his body and then scattering it along the riverbank. Finally, they set fire to the kerosene deposit, making the cooperative (and part of the village) go up in flames.&lt;br /&gt;
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The naive populists were barely able to escape with their lives.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn334|334]] Once again, we see the extent of the violence that is unleashed in a Russia consumed by crisis. This is true as well for the horrific pogroms directed against Jews and Bolsheviks, the first especially, who are suspected of being behind the Bolsheviks, using them as puppets. Let’s again turn to the English historian previously quoted:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In some areas, in Chernobyl for example, the Jews were gathered in the synagogue that was then set on fire. In other towns, like in Cherkassy, hundreds of girls, not yet ten years old, were raped, many of whom were later found to have wounds in their vaginas from bayonets and swords [...]. The Cossacks from Terek tortured and mutilated hundreds of Jews, mostly women and children. Hundreds of bodies were discarded in the snow, food for the dogs and pigs. In this grim atmosphere, Cossack officers had a party at the post office, with dancing, evening wear, an orchestra, with the local magistrate in attendance, and a group of prostitutes brought from Cherson. And while the soldiers continued to massacre Jews for pure entertainment, officers and women spent the night drinking champagne and dancing.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding this, “the final report of an inquiry done in 1920 by the Jewish Agency in Soviet Russia speaks of ‘over one hundred and fifty thousand documented deaths’ and nearly three hundred thousand presumed victims, including the dead and injured.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn335|335]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-size: 1.33rem&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Stalin and the Conclusion of the Second “Time of Troubles”&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Russian Revolution is now seen under new light: “Without a doubt, the success of the Bolsheviks in the civil war was ultimately due to their extraordinary ability to ‘build the state’, an ability that their adversaries lacked.&amp;amp;quot;336 Those who called attention to this question were, in the Russia of 1918, some of the declared enemies of the Bolsheviks. Pavel Milyukov recognized their merit in having known how to “reestablish the state.&amp;amp;quot; Vasily Maklakov went further: “The new government has begun restoring the state apparatus, reestablishing order, and combating chaos. On this front the Bolsheviks have shown energy, and―I’ll add―undeniable skill.&amp;amp;quot;337 Three years later, in a conservative American newspaper, we can read that: “Lenin is the only man in Russia who has the power to maintain order. If he were toppled, only chaos would reign.&amp;amp;quot;338 &lt;br /&gt;
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The revolutionary dictatorship born out of the October Revolution performed a national function as well. Gramsci understood this well when, in July of 1919, he celebrates the Bolsheviks as protagonists of a great revolution, but also for having shown their revolutionary greatness in the form of a leadership group made up of excellent “statesmen”, capable therefore of saving the entire nation from the catastrophe caused by the old regime and the old ruling class. A year later, Lenin himself would indirectly reference this in a polemic against extremism, stressing that “the revolution isn’t possible without a crisis of the entire nation (which therefore implies exploited and exploiters)”; the political force that demonstrates its ability to resolve that conflict is the one which conquers hegemony and achieves victory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn339|339]] It&#039;s on these grounds that Aleksei Brusilov, a brilliant general of noble origin who tried in vain to save his officers driven to suicide by the savage violence of revolting peasant-soldiers, joins the side of Soviet Russia: “my sense of duty to my nation has often forced me to disobey my natural social inclinations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn340|340]] A few years later, in 1927, while offering an overview of Moscow, Walter Benjamin stressed “the strong national identity which Bolshevism has developed among all Russians, without exceptions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn341|341]] Soviet power had achieved a new identity and a new self-esteem for a nation not only terribly tested, but also in some ways lost and adrift, without any solid reference point.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the “crisis of the entire Russian nation” hadn’t truly ended. It had exploded with all its violence in 1914, but with a long period of incubation behind it, at times it is defined as a Second “Time of Troubles”, in an analogy to the crisis that raged in 17th century Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn342|342]] The struggle between claimants to the throne develops and combines with the economic crisis and peasant revolt, and with the intervention of foreign powers, it escalates in the 20th century to a conflict between a number of actors claiming political legitimacy. According to Weber’s classic “Tripartite”, traditional power follows the tsar’s family to the grave, even if this or that general desperately seeks to recover it; charismatic power, already weakened after the difficult conflict sparked by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, doesn’t survive Lenin’s death; finally, legal power finds great difficulty in asserting itself, after a revolution that triumphs with an ideology marked by the utopian idea of the state’s extinction in a country where the hatred of the peasants for their masters is traditionally expressed in violent, anti-statist terms.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the extent that a charismatic power was still possible, its most likely realization took shape in the figure of Trotsky, the great organizer of the Red Army, brilliant speaker and writer, who sought to embody the hopes for the victory of the world revolution, and thereby legitimize his aspirations of governing the party and the state. Stalin, however, embodied traditional-legal power which tried to solidify itself with great effort: different from Trotsky, who arrived late to Bolshevism, Stalin represented historical continuity for the party that led the revolution, and was therefore the holder of the new legality. Moreover, affirming that socialism could be achieved in one (large) country, Stalin gave new dignity and identity to the Russian nation, thus overcoming the frightening crisis―ideological but also economic―suffered after the defeat and chaos of the First World War, to find historical continuity at last. But for that very reason his adversaries denounced him for “treason”, while for Stalin and his supporters the traitors were those who, with their adventurism, facilitated the intervention of foreign powers, and in the last analysis, put in danger the survival of the Russian nation that was at this time the vanguard of the revolutionary cause. The clash between Stalin and Trotsky is the conflict not only between two political programs, but also between two forms of legitimacy.&lt;br /&gt;
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For all these reasons, the Second Time of Troubles ended not with the defeat of the supporters of the old regime, or with the defeat of the intervention by counter-revolutionary foreign powers as is often thought, but with the end of the third civil war (that which divided the Bolshevik ruling group itself), and also with the end of the conflict between the two opposing forms of legitimacy; therefore not in 1921, but in 1937. Despite the fact that the rise of the Romanov dynasty meant the end of the Time of Troubles, 17th century Russia found its definitive consolidation only with the crowning of Peter the Great; after having passed through its most acute phase in the years following the outbreak of the First World War until the end of the Entente’s intervention; the Second “Time of Troubles” ends with Stalin’s consolidation of power and the industrialization and “westernization” pushed forward by him in preparation for the approaching war.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Exalted Utopia and the Prolongation of the State of Emergency ===&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the long duration of the Second “Time of Troubles” isn’t just an objective fact. What role was played in its prolongation by the intelligentsia, politicians and the ideology which inspired them? One line of thought, with Arendt as its reference, dedicates itself to the search for the original ideological sin committed by the revolution that unfolded in the most tormented way. A different approach seems more fruitful to me, which is based on a comparative sociology of the political and intellectual classes. In the movements unleashed by a revolution, whether in France or in Russia, we see the “feathered scoundrels” in action, the &#039;&#039;Gueux Plumées&#039;&#039;, according to Burke’s definition, or the “Pugachev from university”, according to Maistre’s definition. In short, we’re dealing with non-propertied intellectuals, ridiculed as “abstract” by their adversaries. There’s no doubt that the propertied intellectuals already had real political experience, including experience in exercising political power by the time the old regime collapsed. In the United States, the slave-owners, from whose ranks came eminent intellectuals and statesmen (slave-owners are president during thirty of the first thirty-six years of the American Republic), not only enjoy their wealth as a “particular” type of private property, alongside the others; they simultaneously exercise executive, legislative and judicial power over their slaves. Similar considerations could be made with respect to England and the Glorious Revolution: landed property (from which intellectuals and liberal leaders often came) is very much present in the House of Lords and the House of Commons; and together with the gentry, they directly appoint judges, and therefore retain judicial power. Less prepared for taking power are the non-propertied intellectuals. Their abstraction contributed to making the process of consolidating the revolution more difficult and painful. But there’s another side to the coin: it’s exactly this “abstraction” and this distance to property which make it possible for these “feathered scoundrels” to support the abolition of slavery in the colonies, and for the “Pugachevs from university” to give their support to the process of decolonization that would later play out across the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
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Over the long duration of the Second “Time of Troubles”, the role played by ideology is beyond question. However, it’s necessary to then add that it’s not just a matter of Bolshevik ideology. We have seen the millenarian hopes that accompanied the fall of the tsarist autocracy, and we also know that the theme of the betrayed revolution goes beyond the borders of Russia and the communist movement. Just a few months or weeks after the October Revolution of 1917, without wasting any time, Kautsky stressed how the Bolsheviks haven’t kept―or are unable to keep―any of the promises made upon seizing power:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Soviet government has already seen itself forced into a number of compromises toward capital [...]. But even more so than with Russian capital, the Soviet Republic had to make concessions to German capital and recognize its demands. It’s still unclear when the Entente’s capital will be introduced into Russia; everything indicates that the dictatorship of the proletariat has liquidated Russian capital, only to give its place to German and American capital.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn343|343]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Bolsheviks had taken power promising “the spread of the revolution to the capitalist countries, under the impetus of the Russian experience.&amp;amp;quot; But what became of this “grandiose and unrealistic” perspective? It had been replaced by a program of an “immediate peace at any cost.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn344|344]] It is 1918 and, ironically, Kautsky’s critique of Brest-Litovsk isn’t very different from what we’ve already seen, from Bukharin in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from international relations, the record of the October Revolution within Russia itself is even more catastrophic from Kautsky’s perspective:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;By removing the remains of feudalism, it has given stronger and more definite expression to private property than the latter had previously. It has now made the peasants, who were formerly interested in the overthrow of landed private property―namely, the big estates―into the most energetic defenders of the newly created landed private property. It has strengthened private property in the means of production and in the production of commodities.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn345|345]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we are reminded of those, including within the Bolshevik party, who describe the persistence of landed private property and NEP as a shameful abandonment of the socialist course.&lt;br /&gt;
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The collectivization of agriculture later on doesn’t put an end to the denunciation of treason; which, in the middle of the 1930s, finds its organic expression in Trotsky’s book dedicated to the “Revolution Betrayed.&amp;amp;quot; It is interesting to observe how the fundamental charges of this accusation are in some form already present in Kautsky’s book from 1918. Let’s see how the eminent social democratic theorist makes his argument: if individual private property is also substituted by cooperative property, one must not forget that the latter is only “a new form of capitalism.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, the “state economy still isn’t socialism”, and not just for the fact that the market and commodity production continue to exist.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn346|346]] There’s something more: the liquidation of a determined form of capitalism doesn’t necessarily mean the liquidation of capitalism as such; the new power “could abolish many forms of capitalist property”, but this still isn’t the “establishment of socialist production.&amp;amp;quot; As a matter of fact, a new exploiting class emerged in the Soviet Union, or is emerging: “In the place of those who were until this moment capitalists, now transformed into workers, enter intellectuals or workers, now transformed into capitalists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn347|347]] While Trotsky, contrary to some of his more radical followers, prefers to speak of a “bureaucracy” instead of a new capitalist class, the similarities between these two discourses remain, even more so because in the Russian revolutionary’s analysis, the “Soviet bureaucracy” apparently seeks “to rival the Western bourgeoisie.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn348|348]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, there are differences. For Kautsky, it’s the Bolshevik leadership as such that has abandoned and betrayed the noble ideas of socialism in some form; more than a subjective and conscious decision or renunciation, this desertion is the expression of the “impotence of all revolutionary endeavors carried out without taking into consideration the objective social and economic conditions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn349|349]] In comparison to Trotsky, Kautsky’s reasoning appears more persuasive. He doesn’t commit the fallacy of explaining gigantic objective social processes (which, on top of Russia, affected a number of other countries) by railing against the betrayal by a limited political stratum or by a single individual―a single individual that plays the role of &#039;&#039;deus ex machina&#039;&#039;! However, there’s a moment in which the German social democratic leader also brings in the category of subjective and conscious betrayal. The Bolsheviks had committed it when, voluntarily ignoring the immaturity of the objective conditions, they deserted to the “cult of violence” which “Western Marxism strongly condemns.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn350|350]] It is but the initial choice of carrying out the October Revolution which is synonymous with the renunciation of the noble ideas of Marx and socialism; in this case, however, the accusation of betrayal includes Trotsky as much as Lenin and Stalin. It remains to be seen if Kautsky’s condemnation of the Bolsheviks’ “cult of violence” is compatible with the criticism he directed at them for having sought in Brest-Litovsk “an immediate peace at any cost.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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More important than the differences are the similarities that are shared between the two Marxist theorists under examination here. In both discourses, the millenarian vision of the future society opens up an abyss between the beauty of authentic socialism and communism on the one hand, and on the other hand the irredeemable mediocrity of what’s present and what’s real. They try to fill this abyss by resorting, in the case of Trotsky, to the category of betrayal and, in the case of Kautsky, to the category of the objective immaturity of Russia, which inevitably ends up provoking the disfiguration and betrayal of the original ideas. In the eyes of the German social democratic leader, given the “economic backwardness” of a country that “isn’t among the developed industrial states”, the failure of the socialist project was inevitable: “in reality, Russia is completing the last of the bourgeois revolutions, not the first socialist revolution. This is clearer by the day. The current Russian Revolution could only take on a socialist character when it coincides with the socialist revolution in western Europe.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn351|351]] Again we come across Trotsky’s desires and predictions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Indeed, having emerged from the February Revolution, the millenarian vision of the new society yet to be built ends up being defended, in different and contradictory ways, by quite a broad group of people. It’s a dialectic that manifests itself with particular clarity with the introduction of NEP. Those outraged aren’t just important sectors of the Bolshevik party, nor is the indignation always motivated by concerns over fidelity to Marxist orthodoxy. While the Christian Pierre Pascal laments the arrival of a new “aristocracy” and the emergence of a “counter-revolutionary” process, the great Joseph Roth speaks disappointingly of an “Americanization”, which sees Soviet Russia losing not only socialism, but its own soul as well, thus falling into a “spiritual vacuum.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn352|352]] The outraged cries caused by defrauded and betrayed millenarian hopes are met in turn by declarations of victory in the bourgeois camp for the fact that, with the introduction of NEP, even Lenin―so the argument goes―sees himself obligated to turn his back on Marx and socialism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn353|353]] Again we come across the category of betrayal, though this time met positively.&lt;br /&gt;
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Paradoxically, what in someway pushed the Bolsheviks toward another revolution was an unprecedented, ample and diverse front. The horrors of the war had led Pascal to apocalyptically predict in August of 1917 “a social and universal revolution” of unprecedented radicalness.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn354|354]] On the opposing side, adversaries and enemies of the October Revolution were ready to celebrate its failure every time plans were drawn up to move on from the phase of millenarian expectations, to the less enthusiastic but more realistic phase of building a new society. All of this could only strengthen the already existing tendency in the Bolshevik party, itself a consequence of the spiritual climate whipped up by the war, in favor of radicalizing the utopian themes found in Marx’s thinking. In that sense, the ideology which contributed to the prolongation of the Second “Time of Troubles” appears to be rooted in an objectively concrete situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From Abstract Universalism to the Accusation of Betrayal ===&lt;br /&gt;
Now let’s take an overall look at the charges involved in the accusation of “betrayal.&amp;amp;quot; Formulating the problem in philosophical terms, we find that despite being considerably different and despite arising out of quite different ideological and political positions, these accusations share a vision of universalism which requires further examination. Driven by the need to counter and surpass the domestic egoism of the bourgeois family, which concentrates its attention exclusively on its restricted unit while avoiding the tragedies that unfold all around it, Kollontai calls upon communists to cultivate a universal sense of responsibility; moving past, even with regard to children, the distinction between “yours” and “mine”, struggling alongside others for that which is common to all, for that which is “ours.&amp;amp;quot; We have seen Trotsky rightly point out the catastrophic consequences when parents ignore their &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; responsibilities toward their own children. In other words, bypassing the responsibilities within the immediate family unit, without starting first from a particular and unavoidable responsibility, universal responsibility proves to be empty, and even becomes a tool to avoid responsibility. In this sense, according to Lenin, Kollontai’s theory was “anti-social.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn355|355]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But while they appreciate it in relation to the family question, the Bolshevik leaders tend to forget the unity of the universal and the particular when confronting the national question. At the moment of its founding, the Third International starts from the assumption that a single party of the international proletariat is called upon to achieve the universal emancipation of humanity, without getting confused by “so-called ‘national interests’”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn356|356]] we have seen Kollontai in a similar way theorize a type of universal family where “mine” and “yours” seamlessly dissolve into “ours.&amp;amp;quot; Soon after, the Third International goes through a difficult learning process that would lead to Dimitrov’s report before its Seventh Congress in 1935, which denounces any kind of “national nihilism” as dangerous.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn357|357]] But isn’t the rediscovery of the nation a betrayal to internationalism? While for Kollontai the continuation of the family institution, and giving particular attention to one’s own children, are synonymous with egotistical pettiness and disinterest for the welfare of all children, for Trotsky “examining the perspectives of social revolution within the limits of a single nation” means ceding to or indulging in “social-patriotism” and social-chauvinism, responsible among other things for the bloodbath of the First World War. Also, “the idea of a socialist revolution that is carried out and completed in a single country” is a “point of view that is fundamentally national-reformist; it is neither revolutionary nor internationalist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn358|358]] These are statements from 1928; ten years later the Fourth International is founded, which takes up (and then radicalizes) the abstract universalism from earlier, and therefore defines itself as the “party of the world socialist revolution.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be easy to use against Trotsky his own argument from the polemic against Kollontai. Just as ignoring and avoiding personal responsibilities in relation to one’s own kids and relatives doesn’t represent a true overcoming of domestic responsibilities, neither is it synonymous with internationalism to lose sight of the fact that the concrete possibilities and tasks of revolutionary transformation are first centered in a determined national terrain. Distance and indifference to one’s own country can certainly have a non-progressive meaning: in Tsarist Russia, Herzen, an author dear to Lenin, observed that the aristocracy was much “more cosmopolitan than the revolution”; far from having a national base, their dominion was rooted in the denial of the very possibility of a national base, in the “deep division [...] between the civilized classes and the peasantry”; on one side, a restricted elite inclined to behaving themselves as a superior race, and the immense majority of the population on the other.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn359|359]] Without eliminating the racialization of the subaltern classes, and without upholding the ideas of the nation and national responsibility, one isn’t a revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin understands this well, as the speech delivered on February 4th, 1931 demonstrates. On this occasion, he presents himself as a revolutionary and internationalist leader, who is at the same time a statesman and Russian national leader, committed to resolving the problems that have held back the nation for some time: “we Bolsheviks, who have carried out three revolutions, who have emerged victorious from a hard civil war”, must also deal with the problem of overcoming Russia’s traditional industrial backwardness and military weakness. “In the past we had no nation, nor could we have one”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn360|360]] with the overthrow of the old regime and the arrival of Soviet power, national nihilism is more unwise than ever, the revolutionary cause is at the same time the cause of the nation. The emphasis now appears to shift from the class struggle (with its internationalist dimension) to the construction of the national economy. But more precisely, in the concrete political situation that’s been created, the class struggle becomes the task of achieving technological and economic development for the socialist country, putting it in the position of confronting the terrible challenge that’s approaching, and offering a real contribution to the emancipatory and internationalist cause. The class struggle not only takes on a national dimension, but it appears to configure itself in Soviet Russia as a banal and routine task: “in the period of reconstruction, expertise decides everything”; therefore, it is necessary “to learn skills” and become “masters of science.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, this new task is no less difficult and demanding than the storming of the Winter Palace: “We Bolsheviks must conquer science” and becomes “specialists”; it’s certainly not an easy objective to reach, but “there’s no fortress Bolsheviks can’t storm.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn361|361]] The policy during the Great Patriotic War finds its first expression in the years when Soviet Russia is committed to a colossal endeavor of industrialization and reinforcing national defense.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the lead-up to Nazi aggression, we have seen Stalin stress the need link “national sentiment and the idea of the nation” to “a healthy nationalism, correctly understood, with proletarian internationalism.&amp;amp;quot; In the concrete situation that arose following the Third Reich’s expansionist offensive, universalism’s advance passed through the concrete and individual struggles of the nations determined not to let themselves be reduced to slavery at the service of Hitler’s master race; truly advancing internationalism was the resistance by nations most directly threatened by the Nazi empire’s program of enslavement. Just three years earlier, as confirmation of the fact that we are in the middle of a learning process that’s encouraged or imposed by the concrete necessity of developing the struggles of national resistance against imperialism, Mao Zedong states: “To separate the content of internationalism from its national form is the habit of those who don’t understand anything about internationalism. With regards to us, however, we must closely link them together. Some of our worst errors were committed because of it, and they must be corrected with the utmost dedication.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn362|362]] Gramsci similarly distinguishes between “cosmopolitanism” and an “internationalism” which knows―and in fact must know―how to be “profoundly national” as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from the rejection of the nuclear family and the theorization of a type of collective parenthood (“our children”), at the general political level, abstract universalism is clearly seen in the proposal of a “collective management”, seen once again as the dissolution of personal responsibilities and duties taken on individually. It’s not a coincidence that Kollontai is for some time part of the Workers’ Opposition, whose slogans at the factory level and in the workplaces of the party, and in union and state administration, are “power to a collective organ”, “collective will”, “common deliberation”, “collective management.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn363|363]] The millenarian expectations for the disappearance of “mine” and “yours” again makes its appearance in the economic sphere, with the subsequent condemnation of more than just a determined system of production and distribution of wealth, but the condemnation of the “money economy”, the market as such, and private property, no matter how limited and restricted it may be. In all these cases, the universalism that’s aspired to is that which immediately appears in its uncontaminated purity, without being mediated by or interlinked with particular concerns. It is this cult of abstract universalism which yells treason every time particularity has its rights or power recognized.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Dialectic of the Revolution and the Genesis of Abstract Universalism ===&lt;br /&gt;
But how to explain the emergence of an outlook and a purism that, at first glance, is so naive and detached from reality? It wouldn’t be less naive or unrealistic to assign blame to one individual or another. In reality, there’s an objective dialectic at work here. In the wake of the struggle against inequality, privileges, discrimination, injustices―and against the oppression of the old regime and its particularisms and exclusivism, with the old ruling class condemned for its pettiness and egoism―the most radical revolutionaries are driven to express a strong, inspiring and high-sounding vision of the principles of equality and universality. It is a vision that, on the one hand, carries the energy and enthusiasm that facilitate the overthrow of the old social relations and the old political institutions; and on the other hand, it makes the construction of the new order more complex and difficult.&lt;br /&gt;
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Will the new order live up to the hopes, promises and ambitions which preceded its birth? Does it not run the risk of reproducing under a new form the injustices so passionately denounced under the old regime? This is an especially delicate question for the fact that the most radical revolutions cultivate ambitious projects of political and social transformation, while precisely because of this unfamiliarity and distance to the existing order they bring to power a leadership group without solid political experience behind them. Moreover, they need to construct and even invent not just a new political order, but a new social order as well. In these circumstances, the thin lines separating an ambitious political project from high-sounding yet empty rhetoric become evident; separating a concrete utopia (a certainly distant horizon, but which orients and stimulates the real process of transformation) from an abstract and deceptive utopia (in the last analysis, a synonym for escaping and avoiding reality).&lt;br /&gt;
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To be victorious, not only in the short term but in the long term as well, a revolution must be able to give concrete and lasting content to the ideals of equality and universality that have accompanied it in attaining power. And to do it, the new leadership group is called upon to let go of those naive ideas which they tended to hold on to in the moments of enthusiasm; and they are called upon to accomplish such a task not in a vacuum, but in a historically charged space where those ideas weigh upon economic and political limits, the relation of forces, and have their presence felt in the contradictions and the conflicts which inevitably emerge. It’s in journeying through this difficult passage where the revolutionary front, which up until this moment has at least appeared united, starts showing its first internal cracks and fractures, and where disillusionment, discontent and accusations of betrayal make their appearance.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a process and dialectic which Hegel analyzes with great clarity and depth with regards to the French Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn364|364]] It develops while waving the banner of the “universal subject”, “universal will” and “universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; In this phase, in the moment of the old regime’s destruction, one witnesses the “abolition of different spiritual masses and the limited lives of individuals”; “therefore all social strata are abolished, which are the spiritual essence in which Everything is articulated.&amp;amp;quot; It’s as if society, dissolved of all intermediary governing bodies, had broken down completely into a myriad of individuals who, rejecting all traditional authorities now left without legitimacy, demand not only liberty and equality, but also participation in public life and in all phases of decision-making. In the wake of this enthusiasm and exuberance, in a situation in which it is as if authority and power as such have been suspended into nothingness, emerges an anarchistic millenarianism, that demands “absolute liberty”, that is prepared to denounce as treason all contamination and restrictions, real or presumed, on universality.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new order assumes a reorganization of individuals within the “spiritual masses”, in social organizations, intermediary bodies, although constituted and organized according to new and different arrangements that respect the principles of the revolution. However, for the anarchistic millenarianism, society’s new formulation, whatever it may be, is seen as the negation of universality. In fact, “their activity and the personality’s state of being find themselves restricted to one subsection of Everything, limited to just one type of activity and state of being.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, “limited to the element of being, the personality would thus take on the meaning of a determined personality and would in truth cease to be a universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; It’s an analysis that sheds light on the dialectic that plays out for the duration of the French Revolution, but is even more clearly evident in the October Revolution, when the &#039;&#039;Pathos&#039;&#039; of universality is felt even more strongly, both in its more naive forms and in its more mature forms. In the situation of exalted universalism, which presides over the toppling of the old regime, all divisions of labor, no matter their form, become a synonym for exclusivity and the sequestering of “universal self-consciousness” and “universal will” by a bureaucratic and privileged minority.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is true for social relations as well as for political institutions. There’s no order that could satisfy anarchistic millenarianism’s aspiration for direct and unmediated realization of universality. The manner in which anarchistic millenarianism acts is clarified again in the memorable pages of &#039;&#039;Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Not to be fooled by either the comedy (&#039;&#039;Vorstellung&#039;&#039;) of obedience to laws that pretend to be the expression of self government, and to which are assigned only a part, or for the fact of enjoying representation in legislation and universal activities, self-consciousness won’t be deprived of the reality which consists of the writing of its own laws and its completion of not individual work, but more precisely a universal work. In fact, when found only in the form of representation and theatrical representation, the individual isn’t real; where there’s someone who is the representative of the individual, there is no individual.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We are reminded of the definition that The Workers’ Opposition gives to the bureaucracy in Soviet Russia: “someone else decides your destiny.&amp;amp;quot; Against this inadmissible expropriation, they demand a “leadership” that is “collective” in each phase of decision making, with the subsequent condemnation of all representative organization. Moreover, any drafting of a constitutional order and even juridical regulation is labeled &#039;&#039;a priori&#039;&#039; as an attempted confinement of or rupture with universality, and therefore as the expression of an old regime that’s hard to kill.&lt;br /&gt;
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To come into “action”, to become real and effective and to transform into the “true will”― Hegel continues―universality must find expression in concrete individuals, it must “place at the top an individual self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; Here millenarianism and anarchism cry out against that scandal: “In that approach, the remaining individuals are excluded from the totality of action and play only a limited role; therefore, the action wouldn’t be an action of effective universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; The tragedy of the French Revolution (but also, on a greater scale, the October Revolution) is this: if one wants to avoid reducing it to an empty phrase, the pathos of universality must be given a determined and concrete content, but it’s precisely this determined and concrete content that is seen as a betrayal. In fact, it’s particularity as such that is labeled as an element of contamination and negation of universality. While this vision prevails, the liquidation of the old regime can’t be followed by the construction of a new and solid order: “Universal liberty, therefore, can’t produce any work or any positive action, only negative action. Universal liberty is only the rush to erase.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Abstract Universalism and Terror in Soviet Russia ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Hegel’s analysis, to the degree that terror is the result not of the objective situation, but of an ideology, then it’s primarily the responsibility of anarchistic millenarianism and abstract universalism that, in their flight from any particular or determined elements, are only able to express themselves through their “rush to erase.&amp;amp;quot; With regard to the Bolshevik Revolution, one must not lose sight of the permanent state of emergency provoked by imperialist intervention and siege. Yet the most properly ideological component of the terror relates to the cult of universality and abstract utopia, which hinders the action of the new leadership group and ends up provoking its division. It’s interesting to see the way Trotsky, in the middle of the 1930s, casts aside his wise critiques of Kollontai and mocks Stalin’s rehabilitation of the family:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Since the State had been entrusted with the education of the younger generation, political power, far from concerning itself with supporting the authority of those who are older, the father and mother in particular, has instead concentrated in separating the children in order to isolate them from old customs. Also, done openly in the period of the first five-year plan, schools and the communist youth had frequently appealed to children with the aim of denouncing the drunk father and the religious mother, in order to shame them and to attempt to ‘reeducate them’. It’s another matter to know to what success. In any case, this method has shaken family authority itself.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn365|365]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In participating in the spread of the “old customs”, and therefore of the ideology and particularism of the old regime, the family is identified as one of the obstacles that the forward march of universality is called upon to strike at or topple. The denunciation of “family authority” causes not a reduction of violence, but an increase of it. The condemnation of the Constitution and of law as instruments of bourgeois domination has the same result. Working from these conclusions, it becomes impossible to put form to and even think of a socialist state and law. Naturally, there’s a contradiction between the reverence to the ideal of the withering away of the State and the appeal to the State to intervene as well in the sphere of family relations, but it’s a contradiction that invariably manifests itself in the anarchistic rhetoric of abstract universalism and the violent practices it ends up encouraging.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this moment, we are obligated to raise another consideration. This tendency, to see the particularities themselves as a disruptive element that contaminates the universal, manifests itself far beyond the Bolshevik leadership group. We can think of the distrust or the hostility with which Rosa Luxemburg generally viewed nationalist movements, whose neglect of the international cause of the proletariat is denounced. After the October Revolution, the great revolutionary, on the one hand, criticizes the Bolsheviks for their lack of respect for democracy and its liquidation, yet on the other hand, she encourages them to “to crush with an iron fist any nationalist tendencies” arising from the “peoples without history”, “rotten corpses that arise from their secular graves.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn366|366]]&lt;br /&gt;
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And now let’s see how Stalin describes the effects of the “socialist revolution” on the national question:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Shaking the lowest stratum of humanity and driving them into the political scene, it brings new life to a whole series of new nationalities, previously unknown or poorly known. Who could have thought that the old Czarist Russia represented nothing less than fifty nations and national groups? However, the October Revolution, in breaking the old chains and putting on stage a whole series of nationalities and forgotten peoples, gave them a new life and new development.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn367|367]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We now reach a paradoxical conclusion, at least from the point of view of the usual historical evaluations and the ideological stereotypes dominant nowadays. In relation to the peoples who “emerge from their secular graves”, according to Luxemburg’s wording, or the “forgotten peoples”, according to Stalin’s wording, it’s the first who reveals a much more threatening and repressive attitude. Naturally, with regards to the judgement on those who actually wielded power, it’s a matter of seeing if, and up to what point, praxis corresponded to theory. It remains true that Luxemburg’s abstract universalism is shown to be potentially more loaded with violence, for in the course of her evolution she has tended to read national demands as a deviation from the real path of internationalism and universalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will reach a similar conclusion, again on the topic of the national question, if this time we compare Stalin and Kautsky. Against the theory formulated by the German social democratic leader, on the basis of which, with the victory of socialism in a country or group of countries, and even just with the development of bourgeois democratic society, national differences and particularities would disappear, or tend to disappear. The former objects: Such a vision, that superficially ignores the “stability of nations”, ends up opening the door to a “war against national cultures”, national minorities, oppressed peoples, and to a “policy of assimilation” and “colonization”, to a policy desired, for example, by the “Germanizers” and “Russiafiers” of Poland.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn368|368]] In this case as well, it is a universalism unable to accept the particular that encourages violence and oppression. Still in the context of comparing different theories, this abstract universalism is closer to Kautsky than to Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar to the German social democratic leader, Luxemburg also strongly criticizes the Bolsheviks for their “petty-bourgeois” agrarian reform, which conceded land to the peasantry. To this outlook, one can counterpose Bukharin, according to whom, in the conditions of Russia at that time, with a monopoly on political power solidly in the hands of the Bolsheviks, it is precisely “private interests” and the drive of the peasantry and others to enrich themselves that could contribute to the development of the productive forces and, in the last analysis, to the cause of socialism and communism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn369|369]] A significant transformation occurred with Bukharin: if during Brest-Litovsk, with regard to the national question, he had shown an abstract universalism, here in relation to NEP and the agrarian question, the process of building universality must also advance through the opportune utilization of particular interests. We are witnessing a learning process and self-critical reflection of extraordinary interest, and that helps us understand what has happened in countries like China and Vietnam in our time. Bukharin goes on:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We imagined things in the following form: we take power, we take nearly everything into our grasp, we immediately put into motion a planned economy, it doesn’t matter if difficulties arise, some we eliminate, others we overcome, and the whole thing has a happy ending. Today we clearly see that the question is not solved this way.&lt;br /&gt;
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The aspiration to “organize production coercively, by way of orders”, leads to catastrophe. In overcoming that “caricature of socialism”, communists are obligated by experience to take into account the “enormous importance of private individual incentive” with the development of the productive forces in mind, and of course a “development of the productive forces that leads us to socialism and not to a full restoration of a so-called ‘healthy’ capitalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn370|370]] To protest, however, like Trotsky and the opposition would do, against the “degeneration” of Soviet Russia due to the persistence of the private economy in the rural areas and of a “class collaboration” by communists with the peasantry (and with the bourgeois strata tolerated under NEP), would have led to the end of “civil peace” and an enormous “Saint Bartholomew&#039;s night.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn371|371]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Was Bukharin’s defeat crucial only because of the need to accelerate the country’s industrialization as much as possible in preparation for war, or did the stubborn hostility to all forms of private property and the market economy also contribute to it? It’s a question that we will deal with later. For now, we can have one point of reference: the concentrationary universe reaches its peak during the forced collectivization of agriculture, and with an iron fist treatment of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies within the peasantry, generally members of the “peoples without history”, to use the unfortunate language that Luxemburg borrowed from Engels. Aside from the brutality of this or that political leader, there can be no doubt about the fatal role played by a universalism incapable of integrating and respecting the particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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The pages that we’ve used from Hegel (the author in whom Lenin identifies the “roots of historical materialism”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn372|372]] are like a refutation in advance of the explanation of “Stalinism” contained in the so-called “&#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;” of 1956, presented at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It would be, of course, dishonest to pretend that Khrushchev was at Hegel’s level, but it’s curious that the tragedy and the horror of Soviet Russia continued to be the responsibility of a single figure, in fact, of a single scapegoat, as if the extraordinary analysis that the &#039;&#039;Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039; dedicates to “absolute liberty” and the “terror” had never existed.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== What it Means to Govern: A Painful Learning Process ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s return to the Hegelian analysis of the French Revolution’s dialectic (and of the great revolutions in general). Starting from the concrete experience of the disastrous consequences to which the “rush to erase” leads, individuals understand the necessity of giving concrete and specific content to universalism, putting an end to universalism’s mad pursuit of immediate realization and purity. Renouncing absolute egalitarianism, individuals “again accept negation and difference”, that is “the organization of the spiritual masses in which the multitude of individual consciences express themselves.&amp;amp;quot; These, moreover, “return to a particular and limited work, but precisely for this, they return to their meaningful reality.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, it’s understood now the unproven and disastrous myth of a “universal will”, or to use language from someone other than Hegel (used by no small number of Russian revolutionaries): of direct democracy, of “collective leadership” that, without mediation and bureaucratic limitations, expresses itself directly and immediately in the factories, in work places, in political organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, aside from Jacobinism, the target of Hegel’s criticisms are anarchistic radicalism and millenarianism. This is confirmed by his reflections on the other great revolution, namely the puritan revolution that breaks out in the middle of the seventeenth century. Putting an end to an unsuccessful and pseudo-revolutionary period of religious exaltation, and offering a positive political conclusion to years of work, Cromwell demonstrates that “he knew very well what it means to govern.&amp;amp;quot; “Taking firm control of the reins of government, he dissolved the parliament that had been consumed by prayer and he commanded the throne with great splendor, as Protector.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn373|373]] To know how to govern means to be able to offer concrete content to the ideals of universalism that inspired the revolution, for example: distancing itself from the first English Revolution, from the followers of the “fifth monarchy”, the hollow utopia of a society that didn’t have or need juridical norms, for the fact that individuals are enlightened and allow themselves to be guided by grace. To the degree that he knew how to distance himself from a failed abstract utopia, Robespierre also showed that he in some ways knew the art of governing, or sought to learn it.&lt;br /&gt;
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After a great revolution, especially when its protagonists are from ideological and political strata deprived of property and the political experience connected to the enjoyment of property, to learn how to govern means to learn how to give concrete content to universality. But it’s above all else a process of learning by experience. With regard to the socialist revolution, that process doesn’t begin or end with Stalin. Rather, the most serious limitation of this statesman (but also, to a different degree, of other statesman of our time associated with socialism) is having left incomplete, or even gravely incomplete, that learning process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s take the national question. In Lenin, we can read the thesis according to which the “inevitable fusion of nations” and of “different nationalities”, including with regard to language, passes through a “transitory period” of full and free development of nations and their different languages, cultures and identities. At least in relation to the “transition period”, here it’s evident the awareness that the universal must know how to embrace the particular. A significant learning process had already begun: we are already past the abstract universalism that is expressed, for example, in Luxemburg, for whom the particular nationalities are in themselves a negation of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet Lenin, in speaking of the national question, appears to grasp the unity between the universal and the particular only in relation to the “transition period.&amp;amp;quot; Stalin is sometimes more radical:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Some, Kautsky for example, speak of creating a single language for all humanity under socialism and doing away with all other languages. I don’t really believe in this theory of a single language for all of humanity. In any case, experience doesn’t speak in its favor, but against this theory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn374|374]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by this passage, not even communism should be characterized by a “single language for all of humanity.&amp;amp;quot; It’s as if Stalin was afraid of his own courage. Moreover, he prefers to delay the “fusion of nations and national languages” to the moment in which socialism has triumphed on the world stage.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn375|375]] Maybe only in the last years of his life, when at that point he had indisputable authority within the international communist movement, does Stalin prove to be more daring. He doesn’t limit himself to stressing that “history shows a great stability and an enormous resistance by languages to forced assimilation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn376|376]] Now his theoretical elaboration goes yet further: “language is radically different from a superstructure”; it “isn’t created by any single class, but by a society as a whole, by all the classes of society, thanks to the efforts by hundreds of generations”; therefore, it’s absurd to speak of a “language’s ‘class nature’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn377|377]] But then why should national languages disappear? And why should the nations as such disappear, if it’s true that “the language community represents one of the most important signs of a distinct nation”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn378|378]] However, despite all this, orthodoxy ends up coming out on top: communism continues to be thought of as the triumph of the “common international language”, and ultimately as a single nationality.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn379|379]] At least with regard to that mythical final stage, the universal can again be thought of in its purity, free of the contamination of the particularities of languages and national identities. It’s not solely an abstract problem of theory. The attachment to orthodoxy certainly didn’t contribute to the understanding of the permanent contradictions between nations that aimed for socialism and considered themselves committed to the construction of communism. It’s these contradictions that played a primary role in the process of crisis and dissolution of the “socialist camp.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In other fields of social life we again see Stalin take part in a difficult struggle against an abstract utopia, but stopping half-way, to avoid compromising traditional orthodoxy. In 1952, therefore on the eve of his death, he feels obligated to criticize those that want to liquidate the “market economy” as such. In a polemic on this, Stalin wisely observes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“They say that market production in any condition must necessarily lead to capitalism. That’s not true. Not always, not in any condition! One cannot identify capitalist production with market production. They are two different things.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There could very well be “market production without capitalists.&amp;amp;quot; However, again in this case, orthodoxy proves to be an insurmountable barrier: the disappearance of the market economy is delayed until the moment in which “all the means of production” are completely collectivized, with the surpassing, therefore, of cooperative property itself.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn380|380]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At last, the problem that’s perhaps decisive. We saw Stalin theorize a “third function” in addition to repression and class struggle at the national and international level. A prominent jurist was right to point out that the report to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPSU had put before us “a radical change in the doctrine developed by Marx and Engels.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn381|381]] It was a change that Stalin had reached from his experience in government, from a concrete process of learning that had already left its traces in Lenin’s final thoughts and political decisions, but that had now taken another step forward. Trotsky had argued very differently. He had hoped to synthesize the positions of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the following form: “The generation that had conquered power, the old guard, began the liquidation of the State; the following generation will complete this task.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn382|382]] If this miracle did not come to pass, who could be blamed if not the traitorous Stalinist bureaucracy?&lt;br /&gt;
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It may seem misleading to use these philosophical categories to explain the history of Soviet Russia, but it’s Lenin himself who legitimizes this approach. He cites and supports the “excellent formula” in Hegelian logic, according to which the universal must be able to embrace “the richness of the particular.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn383|383]] In expressing himself in that way he’s thinking, above all else, of the revolutionary situation, that is always determined by and reaches its point of rupture at the weakest link, in a particular country. Nevertheless, this “excellent formula” was not considered for the phase following the seizure of power by either Lenin or the Bolshevik leadership group. When they are confronted with the problem of building a new society, these efforts to bring “the richness of the particular” into the universal run into the accusation of betrayal. It’s well understood that that accusation is aimed at Stalin in particular. Having governed the country born out of the October Revolution for more time than any other leader, it’s precisely from this experience in government that he realized the emptiness of the millenarian expectations for the disappearance of the state, nations, markets, and money; and he also directly experienced the paralyzing effect of a universalist vision that tends to classify as a contamination the attention given to the particular needs and interests of a state, a new nation, a family or a determined individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it’s true that ideology plays a significant role in the prolongation of the Second Time of Troubles, it’s necessary, then, to point out that Stalin’s antagonists are particularly guilty of this. Stalin, thanks also to his concrete experience in government, seriously committed himself to the learning process through which, according to Hegel’s teachings, the leadership group of a grand revolution is forced to pass through.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;4. The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From a New Attempt at “Soviet Democracy” to “Saint Bartholomew&#039;s Night” ===&lt;br /&gt;
In any case, It’s important to stress―as one of the authors of the &#039;&#039;Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039; ironically recognizes―the need for the “contextualization of Bolshevik political violence at first, and Stalin’s violence later on, within the ‘long duration’ of Russian history”: it’s important not to lose sight of “Stalinism’s ‘matrix’ which was the First World War, the revolutions of 1917, and the civil wars as a whole.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn384|384]] And therefore, emerging when no one could yet predict Stalin’s rise to power, and even before the Bolshevik Revolution, “Stalinism” isn’t the result of an ideology or an individual’s thirst for power, but more precisely the result of the permanent state of emergency which consumes Russia in 1914. As we’ve seen, from the start of the nineteenth century a number of very different personalities didn’t miss the troubling signs of a gathering storm over the country that sits between Europe and Asia; the storm manifests itself in all its violence with the outbreak of the First World War. One must start from here, and from the incredibly long duration of the Second Time of Troubles. It’s not by chance that we’re dealing with a phenomenon that unfolds in a totally non-linear manner: we see it ease in moments of relative normalization and we see it manifest in all its severity when the state of emergency reaches its zenith.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s start with a preliminary question: at what point could we refer to Soviet Russia as a personal and absolute dictatorship? Respectable historians appear to be in agreement on an essential point: “At the start of the 1930s Stalin was not yet an autocrat. He was not free from criticism, dissension, and authentic opposition within the communist party.&amp;amp;quot; The absolute power of a leader shielded by a cult of personality had not yet emerged: the Leninist tradition of the “dictatorship of the party” and oligarchic power persisted.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn385|385]] The historians cited here use the two terms interchangeably; by all measures the second poorly describes a regime that encourages an incredibly strong level of social mobility for the subaltern classes and that opens political and cultural life to social strata and ethnic groups that were totally marginalized up until then. It seems evident that, at least starting from 1937, and starting with the outbreak of the Great Terror, the dictatorship of the party gives way to autocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Should we then identify two phases within “Stalinism”? Despite questioning the traditionally “monolithic” interpretation, this periodization doesn’t represent a genuine step forward in the comprehension of those years. In any case, the transition from the first phase to the second, and the concrete configuration of both, require explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand the problem, let’s see what happened in the middle of the 1920s, at a time in which, having survived the severe crisis represented by foreign intervention and civil war, NEP has achieved significant results: not only is there no autocracy, but despite the communist party’s continued dictatorship, the management of power tends to become more “liberal.&amp;amp;quot; Bukharin appears to go as far as encouraging a rule of law, of sorts. “The peasantry should have before them Soviet order, Soviet rights, Soviet legality and not arbitrary Soviet authority moderated by a ‘complaints office’ whose location is unknown.&amp;amp;quot; “Solid legal norms” are required, obligatory for communists as well. The state must now commit itself to “peaceful organizing work” and the party, in its relations with the masses, must “apply persuasion and only persuasion.&amp;amp;quot; Terror no longer makes sense: “it now belongs to the past.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn386|386]] In its place, the task is making space for the “initiative of the masses”; in this context, it’s necessary to look positively on the flourishing of “popular associations” and “voluntary organizations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn387|387]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us are not merely personal opinions. These are the years of the “duumvirate.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn388|388]] Bukharin manages power alongside Stalin, who in 1925 constantly seeks the “liquidation of the remnants of war communism in the countryside” and condemns the “deviation” which denounces an imaginary “restoration of capitalism” and “risks inciting the class struggle in rural areas” and “civil war in our country”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn389|389]] they must realize that “we are in the phase of economic development.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn390|390]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The shift in emphasis from the class struggle to economic development carries important consequences for the political sphere as well: the primary responsibility for communist students is to “become masters of science.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn391|391]] Only this way can they aspire to carry out a leadership role: “competence” matters; “solid, practical management is now required.&amp;amp;quot; And therefore: “to truly lead it’s necessary to understand your own work, it’s necessary to study it conscientiously, patiently, and with perseverance.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn392|392]] The centrality of economic development, and therefore of competence, makes the party monopoly less rigid: “it’s critical that a communist act as an equal to those outside the party”, especially because “the control of party members” over the work of those “outside the party” could produce very positive results.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn393|393]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, a radical political change is unavoidable according to Stalin: “Today it’s no longer possible to lead through military methods”; “it’s not maximum pressure that’s needed now but maximum flexibility, both in policy and in organization, maximum flexibility in both policy direction as in organizational management”; what’s needed is dedication in receptively capturing “the aspirations and needs of the workers and peasants.&amp;amp;quot; And with respect to the peasants, who often prove to be more backward than the workers, the task of communists and cadres is “to learn how to convince them, sparing neither time nor effort for this purpose.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn394|394]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of embracing a more sophisticated political pedagogy. What’s necessary is doing away with merely formal elections conducted from above, and bad practices which included “lack of rigor, abuse of power, and arbitrary behavior by administrators.&amp;amp;quot; A radical shift is required: “the old electoral practices were a remnant of war communism which should be liquidated as a harmful practice, rotten from top to bottom.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn395|395]] Now it’s a matter of “reactivating the soviets, transforming the soviets into true elected bodies, and establishing in rural areas the principles of soviet democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn396|396]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even before October, the soviets had started to transform into “bureaucratic structures”, with an observable decrease in “the frequency and consistency of the assemblies”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn397|397]] but now, returned to their original function, the soviets are called upon to guarantee “the participation of the workers in the daily work of state administration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn398|398]] How does this take place?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It takes place through organisations based on mass initiative, all kinds of commissions and committees, conferences and delegate meetings that spring up around the Soviets; economic bodies, factory committees, cultural institutions, party organisations, youth league organisations, all kinds of co-operative associations, and so on and so forth. Our comrades sometimes fail to see that around the low units of our Party, Soviet, cultural, trade-union, educational, Y.C.L. and army organisations, around the departments for work among women and all other kinds of organisations, there are whole teeming ant-hills―organisations, commissions and conferences which have sprung up of their own accord and embrace millions of non-Party workers and peasants―ant-hills which, by their daily, inconspicuous, painstaking, quiet work, provide the basis and the life of the Soviets, the source of strength of the Soviet state.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn399|399]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For all these reasons, it’s wrong to “identify the party with the state.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, to do so “is a distortion of Lenin’s thinking.&amp;amp;quot; Further, once the position of the new state is consolidated, both internally and internationally, it’s necessary “to extend the Constitution to the entire population, including the bourgeoisie.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn400|400]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this moment, taking up some of the formulations used by Marx to celebrate the Paris Commune, Stalin takes an interest in the idea of the reduction and even the withering away of the state apparatus. The revitalization of the Soviets and political participation could be a step in that direction. It’s a matter of “transforming our state apparatus, linking it to the popular masses, and making it sound and honest, simple and inexpensive”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn401|401]] on top of this, associations that emerge from civil society should be encouraged: they “unite the soviets with the ‘rank and file’, they &#039;&#039;merge&#039;&#039; the state apparatus with the vast masses and, step by step, destroy everything that serves as a barrier between the state apparatus and the people.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn402|402]] In conclusion: “The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. The dictatorship is a means, a way of achieving socialism. But what is socialism? Socialism is the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to a stateless society.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn403|403]] What’s on the agenda is certainly not the end of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the party, but rather their evident moderation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This political openness shared by Bukharin and Stalin, but classified by the followers of Zinoviev as “Bolshevism of the middle peasantry”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn404|404]] was followed by the crisis which leads to the liquidation of NEP, the coerced collectivization of agriculture and industrialization in forced stages, with the subsequent expansion of the “univers concentrationnaire” (concentrationary universe). What determines the change isn’t, as is often claimed, the ideological zealotry of the leadership group; that is, the obsession with eliminating the market and all forms of private property. At the same time, one can’t underestimate the pressure from below; in not unimportant sectors of society, nostalgia for the egalitarianism from before the introduction of NEP remains strong. Moreover, another factor comes into play.&lt;br /&gt;
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As if wanting to respond to the sort of analysis that’s widespread today, on November 19th, 1928, Stalin states that the Soviet Union is led by “sober and calm people”, concerned with the problem of how to defend the “independence” of a country significantly more backward compared to the hostile powers that encircle it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn405|405]] Thus, they are driven by their concern over the international situation, an international situation seen as increasingly hostile. At the end of November 1925, the treaty of Locarno is signed. Drawing France and Germany closer together, it mended relations between the Western powers that had fought each other during the First World War, thus formalizing the USSR’s isolation: it’s not hard to find voices seeking “a European crusade against communism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn406|406]] And in Moscow, top-level figures like Zinoviev, Radek, and Kamenev dramatically stress the rising risk of an invasion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn407|407]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Months later, the coup d’état in Poland marks Pilsudski&#039;s rise to power, a declared enemy of the Soviet Union. In his office the painting of Napoleon Crossing the Alps is prominently displayed, but Pilsudski admires him for his invasion of Russia. That last endeavour had Polish participation; the new strong man in Warsaw recalls this with pride, and hopes to take Ukraine from the USSR in order to make it a subaltern and loyal ally.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn408|408]] On August 24th, 1926, Pilsudski rejected the proposal made by Moscow for a non-aggression treaty, and later the Soviet minister of foreign affairs denounces Polish plans aimed at acquiring a protectorate in the Baltics.&amp;amp;quot; The following year, the international situation became even more ominous: Great Britain cuts off commercial and diplomatic relations with the USSR and marshal Ferdinand Foch encouraged France to do the same; in Beijing, the USSR’s embassy suffers an attack by the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, egged on from London perhaps (at least according to Moscow), while in Warsaw the Soviet ambassador is assassinated by a white Russian emigre; finally, in Leningrad there’s an explosion at the headquarters of the communist party.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, it’s Tukhachevsky, the chief of staff of the armed forces, who sounds the alarm and demands a rapid modernization of the military. NEP no longer seems capable of solving the problem: yes, the economy shows signs of recovery and in 1926-1927 it returns to pre-war levels, but, with respect to industrial production and technology, the distance between the USSR and the most advanced capitalist countries remains the same. Incisive or even drastic measures are unavoidable.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn409|409]] And the military presses for similar measures in agriculture, with the aim of guaranteeing a regular food supply for the frontline. As you can see, the policy shift in 1929 isn’t the result of Stalin’s impulsiveness, who in fact must, if not contain, at least channel the pressure coming from the military: in rejecting the unrealistic objectives demanded mainly by Tukhachevsky, Stalin warns against “red militarism” which, in concentrating exclusively on the arms industry, would run the risk of jeopardizing economic development, and ultimately jeopardizing military modernization all together.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn410|410]] Nor is the policy shift the result of a rigid ideology: aside from the power of the communist party and the prevailing social relations within the USSR, what’s at stake is the existence of the nation: this is the opinion of a large part of the Soviet leadership group, beginning with Stalin, of course.&lt;br /&gt;
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The state of alarm appears all the more justified by the ominous international horizon, both in the diplomatic sphere and in the economic sphere (1929 is the year of the Great Depression), and on top of this there’s the “grain crisis” within Russia (the sudden fall in the quantity of grain put on the market by the peasantry): “lines to acquire food become widespread in the cities”, provoking a deterioration of the crisis. It was a situation that “could only work against Bukharin’s policy aims”―Bukharin’s biographer correctly observes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn411|411]] At this point the duumvirate&#039;s fate is sealed. The rupture isn’t just explained by the moral scruples of the defeated member of the duumvirate, who astutely foresees the “Saint Bartholomew’s night” caused by the forced collectivization of agriculture. What causes the internal split is chiefly another factor. Bukharin is also worried about the risk of war, but he doesn’t believe that a solution can be found just within the national context: “Socialism’s definitive victory in our country isn’t possible without the help of other countries and the world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn412|412]] The Bolshevik leader―who had previously condemned the Brest-Litovsk treaty as a cowardly and nationalistic desertion from the international struggle of the proletariat―remains loyal to that vision of internationalism:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;If we exaggerate our possibilities, there then could arise a tendency ... ‘to spit’ on the international revolution; such a tendency could give rise to its own special ideology, a peculiar ‘national Bolshevism’ or something else in this spirit. From here it is a few small steps to a number of even more harmful ideas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn413|413]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin, however, more realistically works off the premise that the capitalist world has stabilized: the defense of the USSR is primarily a national task. It’s not just a matter of advancing the country’s industrialization through forced stages. As the “grain crisis” showed, the flow of food from the countryside and to the cities and the army is by no means guaranteed. Especially sensitive to this problem was someone like Stalin who, beginning with his rich experience from the civil war, had often stressed the key importance (in a future war) of stability in the rear and of the food supplies coming from the countryside. Here are the conclusions found in a letter to Lenin and in an interview with &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, from summer and autumn of 1918: “the question of food supplies is naturally tied to the military question.&amp;amp;quot; In other words: “an army can’t sustain itself for very long without a stable rear. For the front to remain stable, it’s crucial that the army regularly receive supplies, military provisions and food from the rear.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn414|414]] In the lead-up to Hitler’s invasion, Stalin gives great attention to agriculture, considering it a central element of national defense.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn415|415]] One can then understand why, at the end of the 1920s, collectivization of agriculture seemed to be the mandatory route in order to significantly accelerate the country’s industrialization and to secure the stable supply of provisions needed by the cities and the army, all in preparation for war. In effect:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Putting aside the human costs, the economic results of the first five-year plan were stunning. Increasing industrial production by 250%, Soviet Russia took colossal steps in becoming a major industrial power [...]. Obviously, the “great leap forward” in Soviet Russia’s industrial economy brought with it a “great leap forward” for the arms industry, with military spending increasing by a factor of five between 1929 and 1940.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn416|416]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More modest are the results achieved in agriculture; nevertheless, centralization and the decline of subsistence farming create more favorable conditions for a large army’s regular provision.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From “Socialist Democracy” to the Great Terror ===&lt;br /&gt;
Having survived the “Saint Bartholomew’s night” that was the forced collectivization of agriculture, with the terrible social and human costs that come with it, the political relaxation that we previously encountered appears to reemerge. After the victory over the kulaks―Kaganovich observes in September of 1934―it’s necessary to “move completely toward legality” and “educate our people with socialist legal consciousness”; yes, without the massive education of “160 million people with the spirit and consciousness of the law” it won’t be possible to achieve “the consolidation of our legal system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn417|417]] All of this is even more necessary because―as Stalin emphasizes―in the USSR “there are no longer antagonistic classes.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn418|418]] Therefore, there’s no reason to delay the introduction of “universal suffrage, direct and equal, by secret ballot”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn419|419]] and “unrestricted universal suffrage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn420|420]] Therefore, the constitutional amendments which purpose “taking away electoral rights from the clergy, ex-White Guards, all the ‘exes’, as well as individuals who don’t carry out publicly useful work”, are rejected. Nor does it make sense wanting to give these groups “only the right vote, but not the right to be elected”; and it also makes sense to reject the proposal “prohibiting the holding of religious ceremonies.&amp;amp;quot; Now it’s possible to advance toward “socialist democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn421|421]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of propaganda, which certainly plays an important role. Before us is a political vision that provokes a fierce polemic by Trotsky, who identifies in it “Stalin’s liberalism”, the abandonment of “the council system” and the return of “bourgeois democracy”, in which class differences are eliminated and the subject is the “citizen” in the abstract. This policy turn is easily understood: “the primary concern of the Soviet aristocracy is ridding itself of the soviets of workers and soldiers of the Red Army.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn422|422]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The antithesis between the two perspectives is clear. Having avoided the danger posed to the country’s independence by a backwards countryside, dominated by Kulaks capable of blocking the flow of supplies to the city and the army, and with the dictatorship of the communist party secured, Stalin has no interest in further exacerbating the political and social conflict. It’s the drive to rapidly industrialize which compels him to seek the promotion of “non-party” elements to management posts in the factory and within society. It’s unacceptable to take a closed attitude toward them: “there’s nothing more stupid or reactionary”; “our policy doesn’t consist, in any way, of transforming our party into a closed caste”; what’s needed is to make every effort to win over specialists, engineers, and technicians from the “old school” to the cause of the country’s industrial and technological development.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn423|423]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, it’s not possible to promote industrial and technological development without also providing material incentives for the training of workers and specialized technicians; and here arises the polemic against “‘leftist’ leveling of salaries.&amp;amp;quot; Only by moving away from a crude, retributive leveling is it possible to introduce a more efficient “organization of work” and put an end to fluctuations in the workforce, especially among the most qualified who move from factory to factory in search of a comparatively better salary. Aside from egalitarianism and the low morale among the most qualified and productive workers, the policy of incentives should also put an end to the lack of collective responsibility and put in its place the principle of “personal responsibility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn424|424]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely at this moment when conditions mature for the outbreak of the third civil war, the one that will decimate the very ranks of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky’s position is very tough on what he defines as “neo-NEP.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the CPSU a “deviation to the right” is happening, increasingly apparent, with the favoring of the “higher strata of the people” and the counterattack by kulaks: the bureaucracy “is ready to make economic concessions to the peasantry, to their interests and their petty-bourgeois tendencies.&amp;amp;quot; More generally: also as a consequence of the “turn toward the market”, “monetary calculus” and the resulting increased cost of living, far from advancing toward socialism and the overcoming of inequality and class divisions, soviet society is increasingly characterized by “new processes of class stratification.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn425|425]] This internal retreat would be met, with respect to international politics, by the renouncing of all revolutionary and internationalist ambitions by the “conservative and petty-nationalist bureaucracy of the Soviet Union.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn426|426]] Now “the only guiding principle is the &#039;&#039;status quo!&#039;&#039;”, as confirmed by “the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn427|427]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, neither Stalin or Trotsky are oblivious to the deteriorating international situation, but their response to this problem is different and opposing. For Stalin, it’s a matter of concentrating on the industrial and technological development of Russia, mending as much as possible the divisions caused by the October Revolution and by collectivization in the countryside, and presenting the party as the guiding force for the nation as a whole. The stability that has been achieved internally could allow for, at the same time, the promotion of a policy of international alliances capable of guaranteeing the USSR’s security. In Trotsky’s opinion, however, as momentous as Soviet Russia’s industrialization may be, it can only defeat an assault by the more advanced imperialist countries if it has the support of the proletariat within the aggressor nations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn428|428]] Therefore, the accommodation with the bourgeoisie, both internally and internationally, not only constitutes a betrayal, but it prevents the homeland of the October Revolution from winning over the revolutionary international proletariat, the only force that can save it. The clash between these two perspectives is inevitable. Kirov is assassinated on December 1st, 1934; the French-Soviet pact is signed on May 2nd, 1935: between these two dates the above mentioned intervention by Trotsky takes place (“Where is the Stalinist bureaucracy taking the USSR?”), which is published on January 30th, 1935, and it’s a heavy indictment against the internal and international “neo-NEP.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From “Socialism without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” to the Cold War Clamp Down ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Great Terror, and the terrible purge that comes with it, was followed by the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat of the Third Reich, Stalin, who “predicts a great future for the great” anti-fascist “alliance” and who tries to avoid the outbreak of the Cold War,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn429|429]] repeatedly declares, including in confidential meetings with communist leaders from eastern Europe, that’s it’s not a question of introducing the Soviet political model: “it’s possible that if we didn’t have the war in the Soviet Union, the dictatorship of the proletariat would have taken on a different character.&amp;amp;quot; The situation created in Eastern Europe after 1945 is clearly more favorable: “In Poland the dictatorship of the proletariat doesn’t exist and you don’t need it”; “should Poland move toward the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat? No, it’s not obligated to do so, it’s not necessary.&amp;amp;quot; And to the Bulgarian communist leaders: it is possible “to achieve socialism in a new way, without the dictatorship of the proletariat”; “the situation has radically changed with respect to our revolution, what’s needed is to apply different methods and forms [...]. You shouldn’t fear accusations of opportunism. This isn’t opportunism, but the application of Marxism to the current situation.&amp;amp;quot; And to Tito: “in our time socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. The revolution is no longer necessary everywhere [...]. Yes, socialism is even possible under an English king.&amp;amp;quot; For his part, the historian who recorded these declarations adds: “As these observations show, Stalin was actively rethinking the universal validity of the Soviet model of revolution and socialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn430|430]] Maybe one can go further and say that he’s also reconsidering the general relationship between socialism and democracy, with even the Soviet Union in mind: to formulate the hypothesis of a socialism under an English king means to put up for discussion, in some form, if not the monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of the communist party, then at least the terrorist dictatorship and autocracy. The policy implemented in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany is instructive: “The Russians didn’t just promote socialist theater, ballet, opera, and cinema; they also promoted the bourgeois arts”, and this is done according to the program formulated in Moscow, “on the basis that the Soviet system wasn’t predestined for Germany, which should, on the contrary, be reorganized on the basis of broad, anti-fascist and democratic principles.&amp;amp;quot; Thus, “during the first three years after the war, there was no real cultural division in the capital, and the Soviet zone continued to play a vanguard role in the cultural field.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn431|431]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The start of the Cold War suddenly interrupts that experience and that reflection: the central problem now is the creation of a security cordon around a country brutalized by the Nazi invasion and occupation, with the aim of avoiding a repeat of the tragedies of the past. While “the question of the Gulag’s at least partial dismantlement is raised in the USSR even before Stalin’s passing”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn432|432]] a complete thaw becomes impossible. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union must concentrate on a new “forced march” to catch up with the new “Western technological revolution.&amp;amp;quot; It has liberated itself from “German occupation”, but it can’t “allow itself to rest”: a new terrible threat has emerged.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn433|433]] Especially because a few years later, on November 1st, 1952, the explosion of the first hydrogen bomb occurs, a thousand times more powerful than those dropped on the two Japanese cities:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When the United States government announced the results of the test, in other countries there were reactions of shock and terror. It’s obvious that a bomb of such extraordinary power couldn’t be used against military objectives. If it wasn’t a weapon of war, it could only be a weapon of genocide and political blackmail [...]. Stalin received a report on the American test in the middle of November, and it served only to confirm his conviction that the United States was seriously preparing itself for a war against the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn434|434]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not an unfounded concern if we consider January of 1952. To reverse the stalemate in military operations in Korea, Truman entertains a radical idea which he records in his diary: they could deliver an ultimatum to the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, clarifying in advance that failure to comply “means that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and all the industrial centers of China and the Soviet Union would be eliminated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn435|435]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the three decades of Soviet history led by Stalin, the principal aspect is not the transition from dictatorship of the party to autocracy, but more precisely the repeated attempts to transition from the state of emergency to a state of relative normality, attempts which fail for reasons both internal (abstract utopianism and millenarianism that prevent the recognition of what has been achieved) and international (the permanent threat that looms over the country that emerged out of the October Revolution), or better yet the combination of them. If millenarianism is, in part, an expression of tendencies intrinsic to Marxism, it’s also a reaction to the horror of the First World War, which even in circles and personalities distant to Marxism gives rise to the aspiration for a totally new world, unrelated to a reality capable of producing or reproducing such horrors. With the outbreak of the third civil war (within the ranks of the Bolsheviks) and with the approach of the Second World War (breaking out in Asia before Europe), this series of failures finally results in the arrival of autocracy, exercised by a leader who’s the object of a genuine cult of personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Bureaucracy or “Zealous Faith”? ===&lt;br /&gt;
What can we make of the leadership group that achieved victory during the third civil war and that sought to put an end to the Second Time of Troubles at the exact moment when new and colossal storms formed on the horizon? We saw that while Khrushchev, through tortured allusions, makes Kirov the victim of a plot organized by the Kremlin, Trotsky classifies him as an accomplice to the tyrant and a top flight defender of the hated usurper and parasitical bureaucracy―which is to be swept away once and for all by the next revolution. But is the man assassinated by Nikolaev really a bureaucrat? Let’s return to the Russian historian cited earlier, a critic of the myth of the assassination inspired by Stalin, to see how they describe the victim. So who was Kirov? He was a loyal leader, humble and devoted to the cause. And that’s not all: what characterized him was his attention to the most minor of problems in the daily lives of his colleagues, a great modesty, “tolerant of different opinions, and respectful toward cultures and traditions of other peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn436|436]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This flattering judgement ends up putting Kirov’s entire social group under a favorable light, and that ultimately puts Stalin in a favorable light, as the former was his intimate and trusted collaborator. This is absolutely not a bureaucratic elite without ideals, only interested in their careers:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Like many leaders of that era, Kirov genuinely believed in a bright future, for which he worked between eighteen and twenty hours a day: a convinced communist, like when he sang Stalin’s praises for strengthening the party and the Soviet Union, and for the country’s power and development. This zealous faith was perhaps the tragedy of an entire generation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn437|437]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any case, it’s the leadership group as a whole that demonstrates its work dedication and self-sacrifice. We previously learned of “the enormous workload” that the Soviet leader managed to take on:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[At least during the years of the war] Stalin worked fourteen or fifteen hours a day in the Kremlin or at the dacha [...]. In autumn of 1946, Stalin went to the south to enjoy a vacation for the first time since 1937 [...]. A few months before his death, and ignoring urgent recommendations from doctors, Stalin rejected the possibility of taking a break in the autumn or winter of 1952, despite the enormous amount of time and effort dedicated to organizing the XIX party congress in October.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn438|438]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar assessment can be made of one of Stalin’s close collaborators, Lazar M. Kaganovich, who displays “frenzied commitment” in overseeing the construction of the Moscow subway: “he went right down into the tunnels, including at night, to check on the conditions of the workers and to get an idea of the situation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn439|439]] To conclude, before us is a leadership group which demonstrates “practically superhuman dedication”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn440|440]] especially during the war years.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a “zealous faith” that drives them; that faith isn’t limited to that inner circle, nor is it limited to members of the communist party. “Average men and women” also demonstrated their “missionary zeal”; as a whole, “it was a period of genuine enthusiasm, of feverish effort and voluntary sacrifice.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn441|441]] You can easily understand this spiritual climate if you have in mind that the country was blowing through stages of industrial development and offering great possibilities of upward mobility for much of the population, precisely at a time when the capitalist world was in the middle of a devastating crisis. Let’s turn to another historian who makes use of an interesting memoir in his analysis:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The years of 1928-1931 were a period of enormous upward mobility for the working class. The promoters of socialist emulation and Stakhanovites not only substituted ‘unfit’ cadre, but occupied en masse the available posts in the administrative apparatus and in the learning institutions undergoing massive expansion. They were not passively promoted, but were active protagonists in their promotion (&#039;&#039;samovy dvizhentsy&#039;&#039;). They had “a clear and defined objective for the present and the future” and “sought to acquire the greatest amount of knowledge and practical experience, in order to be as useful as possible to the new society.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Stakhanovite movement and socialist emulation played an important role in the process of industrialization: they helped the political leadership accelerate the speed of that process; promoting industrial modernization; reorganizing factory management under a unified model; and selecting young, ambitious, competent, and politically trustworthy workers for promotion. The emergence of these workers as a political force had an enthusiastic effect over party, industrial and union leaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn442|442]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An authoritative account confirms and deepens the image sketched out above. In 1932, in Riga, capital of Latvia, a young American diplomat, destined later to become famous as the advocate for soviet &#039;&#039;containment&#039;&#039;, namely George Kennan, sends a cable to Washington which contains a very interesting analysis. First of all, he highlights that “in the Soviet Union life continues being administered in the interest of a doctrine”, that is, in the interest of communism. It’s a worldview that can count on a wide consensus; the “industrial proletariat” enjoys high social recognition, so much so that according to him it largely compensates for “material disadvantages” related to the accelerated program of economic development. The youth, or a “certain part of the youth”, appear “extremely enthusiastic and happy, as can only occur among human beings completely dedicated to tasks that have no relation to their personal lives”, that’s to say people completely immersed in the inspiring project of building a new society. In this sense, one can speak of “an unlimited self-confidence, and the happiness and mental health of the Russian youth.&amp;amp;quot; But then comes a warning that, in light of the subsequent historical experience, may be considered prescient: “From the most morally united country in the world, Russia can overnight become the worst moral chaos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn443|443]] Such a state of high moral tension could hardly withstand the passing of time, and the inevitable difficulties and failures in the project of building a new society; thus the situation could easily turn against them. But it remains true that in 1932, before Kirov’s assassination, Soviet Russia appears, in the eyes of the future advocate for &#039;&#039;containment&#039;&#039;, as “the most morally united country in the world.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, here Kennan is more familiar with the reality in the cities (where, despite the contradictions, the changes had, in fact, aroused the enthusiasm of a large part of the youth, intellectuals, and industrial workers)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn444|444]] than he is with the reality in the countryside. There the forced collectivization of agriculture had provoked, according to the far-sighted warning by Bukharin, “a ‘Saint Bartholomew’s night’ for the rich peasantry” and, more generally, for “an enormous number of peasants” often belonging to national minorities. A civil war had broken out, and it had been carried out in such a ruthless and terrible way on both sides that it drives a Soviet military officer to suicide, disturbed by an inspection during which he had repeatedly exclaimed that it wasn’t communism but “horror.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn445|445]] It was probably that “horror” that provoked Bukharin’s moral crisis, outraged by the large scale Saint Bartholomew’s night, against which he had warned in vain, and horrified by the colossal experiment in social engineering that continued on without “mercy”, without distinguishing “between a person and a scrap of wood.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn446|446]] And after the conclusion of collectivization, it’s not convincing to speak of the countryside as “morally united”, as if the memory of the civil war that fractured and bloodied it had totally disappeared.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, despite these necessary clarifications, Kennan’s insistence on the enthusiasm and the commitment to “doctrine” reminds us of the earlier references to “zealous faith” and “missionary zeal.&amp;amp;quot; Even with the outbreak of the Great Terror in 1937 the situation doesn’t change substantially, at least according to similar analysis by an American and a Russian historian. The first, while insisting on the manipulation of public opinion from above, nonetheless observes that Stalin in 1935 enjoyed great popularity: an eventual attempt to overthrow him would have faced wide resistance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn447|447]] With regard to the following year, the second historian (and militant anti-Stalinist) indicates that “the party and the soviet people remain confident in Stalin”; moreover, as a consequence of the fact that “urban and rural standards of living have improved considerably”, “a certain measure of popular enthusiasm” became widespread.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn448|448]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just rising living standards motivating such “enthusiasm.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: the “genuine development” of nations, nations until that moment marginalized; the conquest on the part of women of “legal equality with men, along with an improvement in their social status”; the emergence of a “solid social welfare system” which includes “pensions, medical assistance, protections for pregnant women, family pensions”; “the significant development of education and the intellectual sphere as a whole”, with the expansion of “the network of libraries and reading rooms” and the increasing “love for the arts and poetry”; it’s the chaotic and exhilarating arrival of modernity (urbanization, nuclear family, social mobility).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn449|449]] It has to do with processes that characterize the entire history of Soviet Russia, but that take off precisely during the Stalin years.&lt;br /&gt;
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The popular masses traditionally condemned to illiteracy burst into the schools and universities; they then become “a whole new generation of skilled workers, technicians, and expertly trained administrators”, quickly called upon to carry out a leadership role. “New cities are founded and old cities are rebuilt”; the opening of new and colossal industrial complexes goes hand in hand with the “upward mobility of skilled and ambitious citizens of working class or peasant origin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn450|450]] Ultimately, it’s referred to as “a mixture of brutal coercion, remarkable heroism, disastrous madness, and spectacular achievements.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn451|451]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Maybe it’s not even these results, and the consequent economic improvements, that constitute the principal aspect of the radical social transformation of the workplace during the transition from the old regime to the new regime.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[In Tsarist Russia] workers demanded more respectful treatment by their employers. They wanted them to call them by the polite “you” (vyi) instead of the familiar one (tyi), which they associated with the old serf regime. They wanted to be treated as “citizens.&amp;amp;quot; It was often this issue of respectful treatment, rather than the bread-and-butter question of wages, which fueled workers’ strikes and demonstrations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn452|452]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Long having sought after it in vain, the serfs obtained their recognition (in the Hegelian sense of the term) with the arrival of soviet power. And this is true not just for the workers, but for national minorities as well, as we shall see. It is this combination of “spectacular achievements” in economic development and the toppling of the old regime’s hierarchies (confirmed by the possibility of unprecedented social mobility) which encourages a sense of exaltation among the people: on top of the recognition achieved by workers is the recognition achieved by the Soviet people as a whole, a Soviet people now at the point of catching up with the most developed countries, ridding themselves of the traditional image of backwardness. This explains the feeling of exhilaration in participating in the construction of a new society and a new civilization, which advances despite the mistakes, sacrifices, and terror.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it’s interesting to reread the principal accusation made against the soviet bureaucracy’s leadership, formulated by Trotsky before the Great Terror. It’s as if suddenly the indictment gives way to acknowledgements that are so important that they turn the indictment on its head:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Gigantic achievements in industry, enormously promising beginnings in agriculture, an extraordinary growth of the old industrial cities and the building of new ones, a rapid increase in the numbers of workers, a rise in cultural level and cultural demands―such are the indubitable results of the October revolution, in which the prophets of the old world tried to see the grave of human civilization. With the bourgeois economists we have no longer anything to quarrel over. Socialism has demonstrated its right to victory, not on the pages of &#039;&#039;Das Kapital&#039;&#039;, but in an industrial arena comprising a sixth part of the earth’s surface [...]. thanks solely to a proletarian revolution a backward country has achieved in less than twenty years successes unexampled in history.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn453|453]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With economic development, not only new social strata but entire nations gain access to culture:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“In the schools of the Union, lessons are taught at present in no less than eighty languages. For a majority of them, it was necessary to compose new alphabets, or to replace the extremely aristocratic Asiatic alphabets with the more democratic Latin. Newspapers are published in the same number of languages ―papers which for the first time acquaint the peasants and nomadic shepherds with the elementary ideas of human culture. Within the far-flung boundaries of the tsar&#039;s empire, a native industry is arising. The old semi-clan culture is being destroyed by the tractor. Together with literacy, scientific agriculture and medicine are coming into existence. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this work of raising up new human strata.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn454|454]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In regards to the relationship with “backwards nationalities”, the hated bureaucracy in spite of everything carries out “a progressive work”; it is “laying down a bridge for them to the elementary benefits of bourgeois and even pre-bourgeois culture.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn455|455]] Based on this image, it remains a mystery how Trotsky could have thought the anti-bureaucratic revolution was just around the corner. But this is not of interest to us now. The acknowledgements, let slip by the opposition leader, are an indication of the prestige and consensus which the Soviet leadership still enjoyed. The spread of a “new Soviet patriotism” can’t be explained in any other way, It’s a sentiment that’s “certainly very deep, sincere, and dynamic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn456|456]]&lt;br /&gt;
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1937 and 1938 are the biennium of the Great Terror. Not even in “its worst phase” does Stalin’s regime lose its base of social consensus and its “enthusiastic supporters”, who continue to be motivated by both ideology as well as the opportunity for social advancement: it’s a “mistake” to read this permanent consensus “as merely an artifice of state censorship and repression.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn457|457]] A tragic and paradoxical interaction takes place: as a consequence of robust economic and cultural development, as well as the horrifying vacancies created by repression, “tens of thousands of Stakhanovites become factory managers”, and a similar upward mobility takes place in the armed forces.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn458|458]] In August of 1939, during the negotiations over the non-aggression pact, the chief-translator of the German foreign ministry visits Moscow and describes as follows the spectacle before him in Red Square and at the mausoleum dedicated to Lenin:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Before the mausoleum, a long line of Russian peasants waited patiently to see Stalin’s mummified predecessor in his glass tomb. Judging by their behavior and facial expression, the Russians gave me the impression of devout pilgrims. “Those who have been to Moscow and haven’t visited Lenin―an embassy staffer tells me―are worthless to the people of the Russian countryside.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn459|459]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The generalized veneration of “Stalin’s predecessor” was also an indication of the wide base of social consensus that the successor continued to enjoy. In any case, the deep divisions caused by the Great Terror are at least partially healed by the patriotic unity that takes hold during the resistance against the Nazi war of enslavement and annihilation. What’s certain is―and we cite once more a historian above suspicion of being an apologist for communism and “Stalinism”―“the victory brings about an unparalleled increase not only in the international prestige of the Soviet Union, but also in the regime’s authority within the country”, so that “Stalin’s popularity reached its apex in the years following the war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn460|460]] This “popularity” remained intact until his death, and was also felt outside the USSR, and to a certain extent, even felt outside the international communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Concentrationary Universe Full of Contradictions ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the terror, even the concentrationary universe produced by it doesn’t have a straightforward direction or an undifferentiated landscape: far from being a “static system”, it “continued to rotate like a spinning top”, and nevertheless “passed through relatively cruel and humane cycles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn461|461]] These are the opinions of an American historian who not only in the starkest terms describes the history that began in October 1917, but who also mocks the “Western statesmen” who let themselves be fooled by a “butcher”―albeit very shrewd as Stalin was, they felt a sense of respect for him.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn462|462]] Another book by a Russian historian committed to proving the similarity between Stalin’s USSR and the Third Reich makes a similar argument. Nevertheless, the two studies, to which I will make reference to in analyzing the concentrationary universe of Soviet Russia, tell a story very different to that intended by their authors. Indeed, the painting drawn by the American historian could here and there be confused with a product of Soviet propaganda, if it had not come from a fiercely anti-communist author! Let’s begin to examine it. In 1921, while the civil war rages on, for some time the Butyrka prison of Moscow operates as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The prisoners were allowed free run of the prison. They organized morning gymnastic sessions, founded an orchestra and a chorus, created a “club” supplied with foreign journals and a good library. According to tradition―dating back to pre-revolutionary days―every prisoner left behind his books after he was freed. A prisoners’ council assigned everyone cells, some of which were beautifully supplied with carpets on the floors and walls. Another prisoner remembered that “we strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards.” To Babina, prison life seemed unreal: “Can’t they even lock us up seriously?”&lt;br /&gt;
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Another socialist revolutionary, arrested in 1924 and sent to Savvatievo, is happily surprised to find herself in place that “didn’t resemble a prison at all.&amp;amp;quot; Not only can the political prisoners obtain abundant provisions of food and clothing thanks to their contacts, but they could turn their prison cell into the women’s branch of the socialist revolutionaries. Some years later, on the Solovetsky Islands, we see that the prisoners, many of them having been scientists in St. Petersburg, not only had access to a theater and a library with 30,000 volumes, but also had a botanical garden, including “a museum of flora, fauna, and of local art and history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn463|463]] It&#039;s true, the situation in the prison system at that moment in time was not uniform. However, the ones just stated are not isolated cases. However, even if they should be treated as isolated and happy islands, their existence in itself would be significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, there was no absence of protests, but it’s interesting to read the demands (partially accepted) made during a hunger strike by political prisoners (in large part Trotskyists):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Expand the library, include newspapers published in the USSR, at least with editions of the KI [Communist International], completely update the economics, politics and literature sections, and the sections with the works of minority languages. Allow the subscription to at least one foreign newspaper. Allow the enrollment in courses by correspondence. Organize for such purposes a special cultural fund, as happens even in criminal penitentiaries [...]. Allow the introduction into prison of all foreign publications permitted in the USSR, in particular the permitted foreign newspapers, including the bourgeois ones [...]. Allow the exchange of books between prisoners and guards [...]. Acquire paper in quantities of no less than ten notebooks per person each month.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn464|464]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in June of 1931, and the date is significant. While it brings with it a massive expansion of the concentrationary universe, Stalin’s rise to power and the campaign launched by him for the “liquidation of the Kulaks as a class” didn’t dramatically alter the situation existing within that universe. This is not just true for the political prisoners: “the beginning of the thirties [...] were almost ‘prosperous’ and even ‘liberal’ for prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; The management of the Gulag showed “a certain level of religious tolerance” and accepted the petition for a vegetarian diet put forward by the members of certain “religious sects.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn465|465]] What follows is an excerpt on the penal colonies in the far north at the start of the 1930s:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Needing hospitals, camp administrators built them, and introduced systems for training prisoner pharmacists and prisoner nurses. Needing food, they constructed their own collective farms, their own warehouses, and their own distribution systems. Needing electricity, they built power plants. Needing building materials, they built brick factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Needing educated workers, they trained the ones that they had. Much of the ex-kulak workforce turned out to be illiterate or semi-literate, which caused enormous problems when dealing with projects of relative technical sophistication. The camp’s administration therefore set up technical training schools, which required, in turn, more new buildings and new cadres: math and physics teachers, as well as “political instructors” to oversee their work. By the 1940s, Vorkuta―a city built in the permafrost, where roads had to be resurfaced and pipes had to be repaired every year―had acquired a geological institute and a university, theaters, puppet theaters, swimming pools, and nurseries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn466|466]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As strange as it may be, “the Gulag little by little brought ‘civilization’, if it can be called that, to remote uninhabited areas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn467|467]] Among the leaders and administrators, there were those that demonstrated humanity and intelligence:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Berzin seems to have very much approved of (or, at least, enthusiastically paid lip service to) Gorky’s ideas about prisoner reform. Glowing with paternalistic goodwill, Berzin provided his inmates with film theaters and discussion clubs, libraries and “restaurant-style” dining halls. He planted gardens, complete with fountains and a small zoological park. He also paid prisoners regular salaries, and operated the same policy of “early release for good work” as did the commanders of the White Sea Canal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn468|468]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, because of the famine, the need to increase the prisoners’ productivity, the lack of organization and often incompetence, and the rapacity of the local leaders, “tragedies abound.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn469|469]] Particularly atrocious is the tragedy that in 1933 hits the exiles who were supposed to cultivate the island of Nazino (Western Siberia). It’s a task that quickly proves desperate: lacking equipment, with medicine and food in large part used up during the journey, on a “completely virgin” island, “without any structures” or “homes”, the deportees sought to survive by eating the dead bodies or carrying out genuine acts of cannibalism. They are details taken from a letter sent by a local communist leader to Stalin and later passed on to all politburo members, who were noticeably upset by it: “the Nazino tragedy had a notable impact and was subject to investigation by a number of commissions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn470|470]] It’s evident that it wasn’t homicidal intention that caused the horror: we are dealing with “a significant example of how things could go badly due to a lack of planning.&amp;amp;quot; At least until 1937, in the Gulag “people would die by misfortune”, as a consequence of poor organization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn471|471]] What characterizes the Soviet concentrationary universe is, firstly, the fixation on development, and that fixation, if on the one hand provokes the infamy of Nazino, on the other hand has very different consequences. As in the society as a whole, they hope to encourage “socialist emulation” among the prisoners: those who stand out can enjoy “additional food” and “other privileges.&amp;amp;quot; And that’s not all:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Eventually, top performers were also released early: for every three days of work at 100 percent norm-fulfillment, each prisoner received a day off his sentence. When the [White Sea] canal was finally completed, on time, in August 1933, 12,484 prisoners were freed. Numerous others received medals and awards. One prisoner celebrated his early release at a ceremony complete with the traditional Russian presentation of bread and salt, as onlookers shouted, “Hooray for the Builders of the Canal!” In the heat of the moment, he began kissing an unknown woman. Together, they wound up spending the night on the banks of the canal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn472|472]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The pedagogical obsession is interlinked with a productive obsession, as shown by the presence in the camps of an “Educational-Cultural Department” (KVC), an institution in which “Moscovite leaders of the Gulag [...] truly believed in.&amp;amp;quot; Precisely for that reason they took “wall-newspapers very seriously.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, if we read them, we see that the biographies of the rehabilitated prisoners are written in “a language extraordinarily similar to those of good workers outside the colony”: they worked, studied, made “sacrifices and tried to improve.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn473|473]] The aim was to “reeducate” the prisoners, transforming them into “Stakhanovites”, among the first in line prepared to participate with patriotic enthusiasm in the development of the country. Let’s turn, then, to the American historian on the Gulag: “In the camps, as in the world outside, ‘socialist competitions continued to take place’, work competitions in which the detainees competed to see who could produce more. Moreover, they celebrated the Stakhanovite workers for their alleged capacity to triple or quadruple their quotas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn474|474]] It’s no coincidence that until 1937, the guard addressed the prisoner as “comrade.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn475|475]] Being confined to the concentration camp didn’t exclude the possibility of social promotion: “many prisoners ended up working as guards or camp administrators”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn476|476]] overall, as we’ve seen, no small number of them learned a profession to exercise following the moment of their release.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true that 1937 witnesses a brutal turn. While the third civil war rages and increasingly ominous clouds gather on the international horizon, the fifth column, real or assumed, becomes the objective of an increasingly obsessive hunt. In such circumstances the detainee is no longer a potential “comrade”, it’s then prohibited to refer to them as such; they are now called “citizen”, but it’s a citizen that is potentially an enemy of the people. Is it from this moment on that the Soviet concentration camp is driven by homicidal intent?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn477|477]] That is how the American researcher repeatedly cited here thinks, but yet again her research refutes her: “In the 1940s, in theory the KVC of each camp had an instructor, a small library, and a ‘circular’ where theatrical performances and concerts were organized, as well as political conferences and debates.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn478|478]] There’s more. While Hitler’s war of annihilation rages on and the country finds itself in an absolutely desperate situation, “time and money” are generously invested to strengthen and improve “the propaganda, manifestos, and the political indoctrination meetings” for the prisoners:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Within the records of the Gulag administration alone, there are hundreds and hundreds of documents testifying to the intensive work of the Cultural-Educational Department. In the first quarter of 1943, for example, at the height of the war, frantic telegrams were sent back and forth from the camps to Moscow, as camp commanders desperately tried to procure musical instruments for their prisoners. Meanwhile, the camps held a contest on the theme “The Great Motherland War of the Soviet People Against the German Fascist Occupiers”: fifty camp painters and eight sculptors participated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn479|479]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the very same year, the head of a camp with 13,000 detainees offered an important summary of their activity:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;He notes grandly that in the second half of that year, 762 political speeches were given, attended by 70,000 prisoners (presumably, many attended more than once). At the same time, the KVC held 444 political information sessions, attended by 82,400 prisoners; it printed 5,046 “wall newspapers”, read by 350,000 people; it put on 232 concerts and plays, showed 69 films, and organized 38 theatrical groups[[footnotes.xhtml#fn480|480]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, with the start of Hitler’s invasion, the detainees experience the dramatic consequences of the shortages, but that has nothing to do with the emergence of homicidal intention:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The high mortality rates in the concentration camps in certain years partly reflect the events taking place on the outside [...]. In the winter of 1941-1942, when a quarter of the Gulag population dies of hunger, maybe a million residents die of hunger in Leningrad, surrounded by the German blockade.&lt;br /&gt;
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And the shortages and malnutrition were widely felt across the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn481|481]] Yet even in such a desperate situation, in January of 1943, “the Soviet government created a ‘food fund’ specifically for the Gulag” and, at any rate, “the supply situation improved when the tide of the war turned in favor of the Soviet Union.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn482|482]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We are so far from the emergence of homicidal intention that the atmosphere of national unity brought out by the Great Patriotic War is felt even within the Gulag. In the meantime, it experiences a massive reduction in population as a result of a series of amnesties; we especially see ex-prisoners heroically take part in combat; they express their satisfaction and pride in the fact that they have access to technologically advanced weapons produced “thanks to the industrialization of the country” (which was marked by the first consistent expansion of the concentrationary universe), they have careers in the Red Army, are accepted into the communist party, and win honors and medals for their military courage.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn483|483]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With the alternation between relatively “prosperous” and “liberal” phases and clearly economically and juridically worse phases for the prisoners, the history of the Gulag reflects the history of Soviet society. The efforts to achieve “Soviet democracy” in the society as a whole, the “democratic socialism” and even a “socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat” correspond with the efforts to reestablish “socialist legality” or “revolutionary legality” in the Gulag. It’s for that reason that harsh denunciations of the Soviet concentrationary universe come from inside and from its top leadership. In 1930, it’s Yagoda who seeks to intervene in “the entire prison system, which is rotten to the core.&amp;amp;quot; In February of 1938, it’s Vinchinski himself, general prosecutor of the USSR, who denounces the “prison conditions [...] insufficient and, in some particular cases, almost completely intolerable”, that reduce men to “savage animals.&amp;amp;quot; Some months later it’s Lavrentiy Beria, chief of the secret police under Stalin, who supports a policy that encourages “severe punishment to the interrogators who consider beatings to be the principal method of investigation, and who cripple prisoners when they don’t have sufficient proof of their anti-Soviet activity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn484|484]] It’s not a question of ritual denunciations; when exposed, those guilty of “abuses” are severely punished, punishment that even includes death sentences; many are fired; there’s even conflict between magistrates and the repressive apparatus, which opposes the introduction of “rules” that seem to be “an extremely undesirable intrusion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn485|485]] With the aim of strengthening oversight, the submission of complaints and petitions by detainees is encouraged. Other times they seek to improve the situation by using amnesty and reducing overcrowding in the camps.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn486|486]] In the period between one denunciation and another, a real improvement is noticed―these are the “liberal” phases―hastened at times by the outbreak of new crises. But in the combination of objective circumstances and subjective responsibility, the Gulag, as well as society as a whole, is unable to overcome the state of emergency.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Tsarist Siberia, Liberal Britain’s “Siberia”, and the Soviet Gulag ===&lt;br /&gt;
Should we compare, or directly associate, the Soviet Gulag with the Nazi &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;? It’s a question that could be answered with another: why limit the comparison between just these two realities? In Tsarist Russia―Conquest declares (following Solzhenitsyn’s example)―the concentrationary universe was less crowded and less cruel than during Lenin’s time, and especially under Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn487|487]] It’s worthwhile to recall what Anton Chekhov had written in 1890:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We have allowed millions of people to rot in prisons, to rot for no purpose, without any consideration, and in a barbarous manner; we have driven people tens of thousands of versts through the cold in shackles, infected them with syphilis, perverted them, multiplied the number of criminals...but none of this has anything to do with us, it’s just not interesting.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn488|488]]&lt;br /&gt;
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During its centuries long duration, the Tsarist concentrationary universe (that at least starting with Peter the Great, in a way similar to the Gulag, seeks to acquire the labor force necessary to development the most desolate and least developed regions) has often shown signs of extreme cruelty. A &#039;&#039;painful trail&#039;&#039; led the condemned to exile or forced labor in Siberia: “aside from being beaten with batons, many suffered mutilations of hands, feet, ears, as well as the humiliation of being branded with fire.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the nineteenth century they sought to end “the most extreme and cruel practices”, but it’s a question of half-measures that in the majority of cases weren’t successful.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn489|489]]&lt;br /&gt;
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From all this emerges how fragile the effort is to diminish the importance of Tsarist Siberia, with the aim of isolating the Soviet Gulag and associating it to the Nazi &#039;&#039;konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;. Yet there&#039;s another consideration of greater importance: it’s methodologically incorrect to compare a situation of normality to a situation of acute emergency! Read with greater scrutiny, the comparison made by Conquest can lead to a result different from that proclaimed by him: It’s only in pre-revolutionary Russia that detention and deportation by administrative means are considered a normal practice, even in the absence of conflicts and specific dangers. In Soviet Russia, however, the state of emergency has a powerful effect on the genesis and configuration of the concentrationary universe, which becomes yet more brutal as it gets further away from conditions of normality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now it’s necessary to take one step further. Aside from (Tsarist and Soviet) Russia and Germany, it’s necessary to bring other countries into the comparison. A two part function is also inherent to liberal Britain’s concentrationary universe. With respect to the “Irish dissidents”, it was observed that “between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they had their official Siberia in Australia”, which at least up until 1868 consumed “representatives of nearly all the existing radical movements in Great-Britain.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn490|490]] That’s in relation to repression. But it’s necessary not to lose sight of the economic function of liberal Britain’s “Siberia.&amp;amp;quot; Soon after the Glorious Revolution, there’s a massive increase in the number of criminal acts subject to the death penalty. This even comes down upon those guilty of the theft of a shilling or a handkerchief, or on those responsible for cutting down a decorative plant; not even eleven year old boys are spared. This terrorist legislation, that with some attenuation lasts until the nineteenth century, offers an alternative: the ‘lucky ones’ will be placed in penal servitude, which forces them to work for a certain number of years in the underutilized and unexplored colonies, first in North America, and later in Australia. In other words, even in the economic sphere Australia became a “Siberia” for liberal Britain; its purpose diminished to the degree that labor came in, first with black slaves, and later with the Chinese and Indian &#039;&#039;coolies&#039;&#039;, as well as other colonial peoples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn491|491]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The British “Siberia” is no less cruel than the Tsarist one. On this “totalitarian society”, which is built in Australia while at the same time an extermination of the Aborigines is carried out, a summary is sketched out based on the available autobiographical literature and that proves to be especially frightening:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At unpredictable intervals, the detainees were gathered, counted, and subjected to a complete examination, with the inspection of the mouth and anus [...]. “The food was brought to the various crews on wooden plates or on tin trays and placed before them as if they were dogs or pigs, and like dogs and pigs they had to eat it” [...]. Discipline depended on the informant [...]. To not become a spy became, therefore, behavior that in itself was suspicious. A week wouldn’t pass without complex conspiracies being revealed, with lists of names, in a competition of accusations [...]. “That trafficking in human blood [...] was the only way to obtain absolution.&amp;amp;quot; The volume of information counted more than the content itself. The informants had their quotas of accusations to make and were “capable of any act of treachery or blood, it didn’t matter how vile or horrible” [...]. The normal relations between guilt and punishment became an uninterrupted story of sadism, whose only point was to continue the terror [...]. Authority was exercised in an absolute and capricious way [...]. [a punishment] of 200 lashes were divided up [over several days…]. Those doing the whipping were covered in blood just like us [...]. Suicide was the only way to make the suffering end for good.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, suicide was not only common, but was a practice that often implicated the whole community of prisoners: “Within a group of prisoners two men drew lots: it was up to the first to die, and the second the task of killing the first; for the rest, the roles of witnesses.&amp;amp;quot; In this way, during the few days of traveling and during the trial (which occurred in Sydney, some distances from “Siberia” itself), before being hanged, the murderer could enjoy the status of a normal prisoner (in truth, it was an indirect and delayed suicide). And this pause allowed the witnesses to catch their breath, before returning to hell and eventually attempting another lottery.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn492|492]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Concentrationary Universe in Soviet Russia and in the Third Reich ===&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the concentration camp explicitly emerges in the liberal West during the Second World War as well. On the other side of the Atlantic, Franklin D. Roosevelt orders citizens of Japanese origin, including women and children, to be interned in concentration camps. However, the United States is clearly in a more favorable geopolitical situation than the Soviet Union. In any case, after the battle of Midway, no longer could one speak of military and security concerns. Yet the Americans of Japanese origin continued to be confined to the concentration camps. Beginning gradually, their freedom is only completely obtained in the middle of 1946, nearly a year after the end of the war. Even slower is the return home of Latin American citizens of Japanese origin deported to the United States from thirteen Latin American countries. Only in 1948 were the last ones freed from the “internment camp”―or concentration camp―in Crystal City, Texas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn493|493]] Certainly it would be rash, at the very least, to explain this event not from the war and the state of emergency, but with the ideology of a president accused of “totalitarianism” by his adversaries due to his economic interventionism during the Great Depression and also the loose interpretation of the constitution used to drag a very reluctant country into war (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 6).&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we encounter another aspect that the usual historical comparison hides: the concentrationary universe that’s also developed in the liberal West during the twentieth century, taking on horrible forms at times. At the outbreak of the war, the German exiles who are confined to French concentration camps have the impression that they are destined to “burn.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn494|494]] Surely outrageous is the mistreatment, when the war had already ended, inflicted on German prisoners by the United States, as documented at the time by the Canadian historian James Bacque, and would be acknowledged by the official lawyers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, even if it was done against his will and with some hesitation. More recent research has brought other details to light. I will limit myself to citing just one of them. An American commission found that, at that time, of the 139 detainees examined, 137 had “their testicles permanently destroyed from the beatings they endured.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn495|495]] We’ll also see the horror of the concentration camps in which, at the start of the Cold War, the British confined communist suspects (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 4). To conclude, it’s necessary to recall the Gulag in Yugoslavia in which, starting in 1948 and after the split with the USSR, communists loyal to Stalin are imprisoned.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn496|496]] At least in this case, the “Stalinists” are no longer the authors, but the victims of the concentrationary universe, established by a communist country, yes, but at that time allied to the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if one sought to start from the basis of the exceptional scale and severity of the Soviet Gulag, the principal problem still remains unresolved: It’s always necessary to distinguish the role of ideology from the role of the objective conditions (the exceptional gravity of the threat and the general hardship that characterized the USSR). Compared to such complex analysis, far easier is the deductivism that traces everything back to ideology and the similarity of the concentrationary universes produced by the two “totalitarian” ideologies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in any case, let’s focus on Soviet Russia and the Third Reich. With regard to the first, the concentrationary universe arises while the Second Time of Troubles continued to rage. In the 1930s, political power didn’t exercise full control over its territory: “common criminality―itself caused by the serious fractures that occurred in the country, that had destroyed the traditional structures of social organization―had reached truly worrying levels.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn497|497]] Much more serious is the situation in the Far East regions, that are described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Insecure locations, poorly controlled by the authorities, where marginalized and lawless people are concentrated, where armed gangs attack the isolated kolkhozes and kill the few “representatives of Soviet power.&amp;amp;quot; Locations of arbitrary force and violence, where everyone is armed, human life has no value and the hunt of man, when it happens, substitutes the hunt of animals [...]. Locations in which the state, at least that defined by Max Weber as the “system that successfully exercises the right to legislate over a territory, while retaining a monopoly on the use of legitimate force”, is almost absent.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn498|498]]&lt;br /&gt;
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From the attack on the German ambassador in Moscow, carried out in July of 1918 “during the the session of the Fifth Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets” by a member of a party (Socialist Revolutionaries) that was part of the government, at least up until the assassination of Kirov by a young communist at his office’s front door, Soviet power is confronted by terrorism (a phenomenon with a long history in Russia) and it fears the infiltration of the state apparatus at all levels by an opposition determined to topple from power the “usurpers” and “traitors.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, only with the arrival of autocracy does Soviet power achieve full control over its territory and the state apparatus; and the terror is, firstly, a response to an unprecedented, acute and long lasting crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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Subsequently, the situation continues to be characterized by the interplay between contradictions (the worsening military threat at the international level, the latent internal civil war, industrialization in forced stages that is considered necessary for the country’s salvation, but provokes at the same time new conflicts and new tensions) that once again prolong the state of emergency. It’s precisely for that reason, as a recent study highlights, “the terror cannot be exclusively interpreted as a series of orders coming down from Stalin” and his collaborators. In fact, in it “popular elements” also operate, and there’s no lack of initiative “from below”; often it is the workers, driven by that “zealous faith” we’ve already encountered, who demand that “traitors” be sentenced to death and even denounce the “juridical rigor” of long and costly criminal trials.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn499|499]] And all of this takes place during a process of a limited democratization, yet nonetheless real, with the enhancement of popular participation in the management of power in workplaces, with the replacement of the secret ballot by the public vote, and the possibility of selecting from among a greater number of candidates in elections for labor union and factory leaders. And those newly elected often meaningfully commit to the improvement of working conditions and the reduction of workplace accidents.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn500|500]] Yes, “in the political psychology of Stalin and his followers, there’s no contradiction between repression and democracy”, and in that sense one can even speak of the “democratization of repression.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn501|501]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But it’s precisely that democratization that encourages an expansion of repression. Taking advantage of new opportunities in the factory, and in letters to the press that challenge corrupt and inefficient officials, this movement erupting from below tends to depict them as enemies of the people and identify the constant workplace accidents as a form of sabotage against this new society that they’re committed to building.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn502|502]] The awareness of the growing threat of the war, and the obsessive hunt of a fifth column that’s broadly spread out and well hidden, this generalized fear and hysteria transform the assemblies in the factories, labor unions and party into a “war of all against all.&amp;amp;quot; Sometimes, it’s Stalin and his closest collaborators who see themselves forced to intervene to contain and concentrate this rage, warning against the tendency to find traitors and saboteurs everywhere, and thus destroying party and labor union organizations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn503|503]] The Great Terror that ravages France in 1789 comes to mind, of the weeks and months immediately following the storming of the Bastille, with the excessive exaggeration of a threat that’s by no means imagined, and when “the peasant imagination sees mercenaries of the aristocratic conspiracy and foreign invasion everywhere.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn504|504]] In the USSR in the second half of the 1930s, the danger is real and of extreme gravity, but no less real is the hysteria.&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, in Soviet Russia the terror emerges in the period of time that stretches from the First World War, which initiates the Second Time of Troubles, to the Second World War, which threatens to inflict on the country and nation as a whole an even more gigantic catastrophe: the annihilation and enslavement clearly described in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;. And the terror arises during an industrialization in forced stages that aims to save the country and the nation, during which the large scale and ferocious repression combines with real processes of emancipation (the massive expansion of education and culture, the remarkable upward social mobility, the emergence of the welfare state, the tumultuous and contradictory protagonism of social classes until that time condemned to a completely subaltern status).&lt;br /&gt;
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There are sharp differences, then, in comparison to the Third Reich, that since its rise to power can count on the complete control of its territory and state apparatus, and with the longstanding efficiency of an extensive bureaucratic network. While in Russia ideology plays a secondary role in the state of emergency (having pre-dated the October Revolution of 1917, and eventually prolonged by revolutionary millenarianism, that received partial opposition from Stalin), in Germany, the state of emergency―and the concentrationary universe linked to it―is from the start the consequence of a very determined political project and a very determined ideological vision. Hitler comes to power with an explicit program of war and territorial expansion: with the aim of avoiding the collapse of the home front that took place during the First World War, he’s determined to make use of a more ruthless terror. Nazi Germany’s expansionism also aims at reasserting across the globe the supremacy of the white and Aryan race, and to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, applying it to Eastern Europe itself; from the beginning, the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039; has in mind the likely opponents to the war and to the colonial and racial empire that Hitler intends to conquer and build. Required for the success of that program is the neutralization of the Judeo-Bolshevik virus, that sows subversion and erodes the foundations of civilization, putting into question the natural hierarchy of peoples and races. Therefore, it’s necessary to liquidate the Jews, the communist “commissars” and cadre both in the territories to be conquered as well as in Germany itself. This is how the path is laid to treat the inferior races of Eastern Europe following the example of what happened to the Native Americans, that they must be exterminated to make room for the German settlers, and also to be slaves in the service of the white and Aryan master race.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Gulag, &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039; and the Absent Third ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with the invasion, first of Poland and later of the USSR, the Nazi concentrationary universe appears to carry on and further aggravate the most tragic episodes from the history of colonial slavery. When, thanks to the trafficking of African slaves, the availability of slaves was almost unlimited, the slave owners had no economic interest at all in sparing them; they could coldly condemn them to death from overwork and replace them with others and extract from each of them the maximum profit possible. That was how―observes a nineteenth century economist cited by Marx―the flourishing agriculture of the West Indies “consumed millions of men of the African race”; indeed, “the lives of blacks are sacrificed without any scruples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn505|505]] The war unleashed by Hitler in Eastern Europe represents the new and even more brutal form of the slave trade. Captured and exploited in masse, the enslaved &#039;&#039;Untermenschen&#039;&#039; (those that survived the Germanization of the territory) are forced to die from overwork, with the aim of building the civilization of the white master race and feeding its war machine; they suffer through conditions similar to those of blacks (in the Caribbean) to whom, moreover, the Führer explicitly compares them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The prison system reproduces the relations of the society in which it is expressed. In the USSR, inside and outside the Gulag, we fundamentally see in action a developmentalist dictatorship that seeks to mobilize and “reeducate” all forces, with the purpose of overcoming secular backwardness, becoming yet more urgent due to the approaching war that, by the explicit declaration of &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, is to be one of enslavement and annihilation. In this scenario, the terror in the USSR is combined with the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities, as well as a strong upward social mobility and with access to education, culture, and even to management and leadership positions by parts of the social strata that until that time had been totally marginalized. The pedagogical concern with production and the social mobility related to it is felt, for better or for worse, even inside the Gulag. The Nazi concentrationary universe reflects, on the contrary, a racial hierarchy that characterizes the racial State, by that time established, and the racial empire to be built. In this case, the concrete behavior of those imprisoned plays an irrelevant or largely marginal role. Therefore, pedagogical concerns would make no sense. To conclude, the prisoner in the Gulag is a potential “comrade” obligated to participate in particularly hard conditions in the strengthening of production inside the country and, after 1937, they are potential citizens, though having become unclear is the line of separation from being an enemy of the people and a member of the fifth column, whose neutralization had been imposed with the approaching total war; the prisoner in the Nazi &#039;&#039;Lager&#039;&#039; is firstly an &#039;&#039;Untermensch,&#039;&#039; forever marked by their nationality or racial degeneration.&lt;br /&gt;
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In seeking to find a precise analogy for the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;, it’s necessary to bring in the concentrationary universe that profoundly marked the colonial tradition (in whose wake Hitler explicitly intended to place himself) and which targets the colonial peoples or the people of colonial origin. It’s here we have the central omission of the comparison! In that sense, we can speak of the absent third in the comparison in vogue today. Two illustrious historians both defined as “extermination camps” the “militarized work camps” of colonial India of 1877, as well as the concentration camps in which the Libyans were locked up by liberal Italy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn506|506]] Even if one considers this classification exaggerated, the concentrationary universe of the Third Reich nonetheless reminds us of the racial logic and hierarchy that dominates the colonial empires of Italy and the West, as well as the concentration camps built by them.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are also forced to think of Nazism when we read the forms in which the “Canadian Holocaust” (or the “final solution to our indigenous question”) was perpetrated. The “Commission for the Truth about the Canadian Genocide” speaks of “death camps”, of “men, women and children” who are “deliberately exterminated”, of a “system whose objective is to destroy the greatest part possible of the native people through sickness, deportation, and murder itself.&amp;amp;quot; To achieve this, the champions of white supremacy don’t hesitate in hurting “innocent children”, who die “from beatings and torture, or after having been deliberately exposed to tuberculosis and other illnesses”; others go on to suffer forced sterilization. A small “minority of collaborators” will manage to survive, but only after having renounced their own language and identity and after having been made to serve their tormentors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn507|507]] In this case as well, one may assume that righteous indignation may have overstated the case; yet it remains evident that we are faced with practices identical or similar to those in force in the Third Reich, and their application arises out of a similar ideology, and that’s again similar to that which presides over the construction of Hitler’s racial State.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s move on now to the Southern United States. In the decades following the Civil War, black prisoners (the overwhelming majority of the prison population), often rented out to private companies, were crowded into “large wheeled cages that followed the encampments of construction and railroad tycoons.&amp;amp;quot; Even the official reports states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[...] “that the prisoners were excessively and at times cruelly punished; that they were poorly clothed and fed, that the sick were not treated because no hospital had been provided and they were closed in together with healthy patients.&amp;amp;quot; An examination done by the grand jury at the penitentiary hospital in Mississippi reported that all the patients showed “signs on their bodies of the most inhumane and brutal treatment. A great many of them have broken shoulders, with sores, scars and blisters, some with their skin cruelly ravaged from lashings [...] they lie there dying, and some of them on top of simple tables, so weak and emaciated that their bones were nearly visible beneath their skin, and many complained about the lack of food [...]. Aside from this, we see living parasites crawling across their faces, and their clothes and the little they have to sleep on are ragged and often filthy.&amp;amp;quot; In the mining camps of Arkansas and Alabama, those sentenced to forced labor were made to work all winter without shoes, with their feet in the water for long hours. In these two states a work system was in force according to which a crew of three were obligated to extract a certain quantity of coal per day under penalty of flagellation for the entire crew. Those condemned to forced work in Florida’s terebirth forests, with “their feet bound’’ and carrying “chains around their waists”, were obligated to work at a brisk pace.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn508|508]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We have before us a system that makes use of “chains, dogs, whips, and firearms” and that “creates a living hell for the prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; The mortality rate is very significant. Between 1877 and 1880, during the construction of the railroads of Greenwood and Augusta, “nearly 45%” of the forced laborers die there, “and they were youths in the prime of their lives.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn509|509]] Another statistic can be cited from the same time period: “In the first two years in which Alabama rented out its prisoners, nearly 20% died. In the following year the mortality rate jumped to 35%. In the fourth year nearly 45% died.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn510|510]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to mortality rates, a systematic statistical comparison of the concentration camps in the USSR and Third Reich would be interesting. Regarding the Gulag, it has been calculated that at the start of the 1930s, before the clampdown provoked by the attack on Kirov and by the growing threat of war, the annual mortality rate “corresponded more or less to an average of 4.8% of the camp population.&amp;amp;quot; That being said, this statistical data doesn’t include the gold mining camps around the Kolyma river. It’s also necessary to have in mind the “usual underestimations from the information by health departments”; however, even substantially inflating the official numbers, it seems difficult to approach the mortality rate we’ve just seen among African American inmates. Moreover, there’s significant reason to suspect “underestimations.&amp;amp;quot; There’s the fact that, in the USSR’s camps, “high mortality and escape rates could lead to severe punishment”; that “the health departments of the camps feared being accused of negligence and of being slow in achieving the patients’ recovery”; and that “the threat of inspections loomed constantly over camp leaders.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn511|511]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by the mortality rate of the rented out semi-slaves, it does not appear that there was a similar threat looming over the American businessmen who got rich with the construction of the Greenwood and Augusta railroad lines or with other ventures. At any rate, we should be clear about one essential point: in the Southern United States, black prisoners suffer horrible living and working conditions and die en masse during peacetime; the state of emergency doesn’t play any role, and concern with production is also either marginal or totally absent. The concentrationary universe of the Southern United States reproduces the racial hierarchy and the racial State that characterizes its society as a whole: the black prisoner is neither a potential “comrade” nor a potential “citizen”; he is an &#039;&#039;untermensch&#039;&#039;. The treatment inflicted on them by whites is the treatment that’s considered normal in relation to races removed from true civilization. And again we come across the ideology of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, there are eminent American historians who compare the prison system we just saw with the “prison camps of Nazi Germany.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn512|512]] And it’s no coincidence that the medical experiments―done to &#039;&#039;Untermenschen&#039;&#039; in Nazi Germany―in the United States have been carried out using blacks as guinea pigs.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn513|513]] Moreover, before doing it in their own territory, in the years of Wilhelm II, imperialist and colonialist Germany conducted their medical experiments in Africa at the expense of Africans; during this activity two doctors distinguish themselves and later become the teachers of Joseph Mengele,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn514|514]] who in Nazi Germany finishes the perversion of medicine and science that was already outlined in the (American and European) colonial tradition. Not only can one not separate the Third Reich from the history of the relations instituted by the West toward the colonial peoples and the people of colonial origin, but it must be added that that tradition continues to show signs of life well after the defeat of Hitler. In 1997 president Clinton felt obligated to ask forgiveness from the African American community: “In the 1960s more than 400 men of color from Alabama were used as human guinea pigs by the government. Those sick of Syphilis were not cured because the authorities wanted to study the effects of the disease on a ‘sample population’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn515|515]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The National Awakening in Eastern Europe and in the Colonies: Two Opposing Responses ===&lt;br /&gt;
Here it becomes evident the absurdity of a comparison of concentration camps based on the omission of the treatment reserved by the liberal West for the “inferior races”, and also in the separation between internal policy and foreign policy, between repressive practices and the ideologies with which they are established. If we take into consideration these elements and these often ignored connections, the usual association of the two totalitarian dictatorships turns into an antithesis. It was observed that “Stalin was very impressed” by the awakening of oppressed or marginalized nationalities within the Habsburg Empire. In reference to that, we turn to his observations made in 1921, at the tenth congress of the Russian communist party:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn516|516]] “fifty years ago all of Hungary’s cities had a German character, now they’ve been Magyarized”; the Czechs also experienced an “awakening.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a phenomenon that affects Europe as a whole: from the “German city” that it once was, Riga becomes a “Latvian city”; similarly, the cities of Ukraine are “inevitably Ukrainized”, the Russian element once predominant becoming secondary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn517|517]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As they become aware of that process, considering it progressive and irreversible, the Bolshevik party as a whole, and especially Stalin, commit themselves to a “new and fascinating experiment in governing a multiethnic State”, which can be described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Soviet Union was the first global empire founded on affirmative action. The new revolutionary government of Russia was the first among the old multiethnic European states to face the growing wave of nationalism and to respond to it by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many institutional forms typical for nation-states. The Bolshevik strategy was to assume leadership of that decolonization process that appeared inevitable, and they carry it out as a way to preserve the territorial integrity of the old Russian empire. To that end the Soviet state created not only a dozen republics of ample dimension, but also tens of thousands of national territories spread out over the length of the Soviet Union. New national elites were educated and promoted to leadership positions in the government, schools, and in the industrial companies of these recently created territories. In many cases this made necessary the creation of written languages where previously it hadn’t existed. The Soviet state financed the mass production of non-Russian language books, newspapers, magazines, movies, operas, museums, orchestras of popular music and other cultural products. Nothing similar had ever been attempted.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn518|518]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The novelty that this policy represents stands out even more if we compare it with the obsession for uniformity that in the middle of the twentieth century dominates the United States and Canada: forced to break ties with their birth community and with their very own family, native children must also renounce their dances and their “strange” clothing, they are forced to have short hair and, above all else, avoid the use of their tribal language as if it were the plague; breaking the rule that demands exclusive use of English carries severe punishment, and in Canada they are even subjected to electric shock.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn519|519]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to the USSR, there’s an essential point on which today there’s a type of consensus:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The republics received―some before others―a flag, an anthem, a language, a national academy, and in some cases even a commissar for foreign relations, and they retained the right, later utilized in 1991, to separate from the federation, although there hadn’t been a specified procedure.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn520|520]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, Hitler is also fixated on the Slavicization and the “erasing of the German element” underway in Eastern Europe. In his eyes, however, it is neither a progressive nor irreversible process; but only the most radical measures can halt it and roll it back. It’s not a matter of pushing forth a policy of assimilation and promoting “a Germanization of the Slavic element in Austria”; no, “one can carry out the Germanization of the land, but never the men.&amp;amp;quot; It would be absurd to want to make “a black or a Chinese person into a German, just because he learned German, or is prepared to speak German in the future and vote for a German political party.&amp;amp;quot; “Such Germanization would, in truth, be a degermanization”, it would mean “the beginning of a bastardization” and, therefore, of the “annihilation of the German element”, or the “annihilation of the very characteristics, in their time, that made it possible for the conquering people (&#039;&#039;Eroberervolk)&#039;&#039; to achieve their victory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn521|521]] to Germanize the soil without Germanizing the men is possible only following a very precise model: on the other side of the Atlantic, the white race expanded to the West, Americanizing the soil, certainly not the Native Americans: this approach allowed the United States to remain “a Nordo-Germanic state” without degenerating into a “international melting pot of peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn522|522]] That same model should be followed by Germany in Eastern Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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While the Bolsheviks are concerned with promoting in the Soviet republics the most diverse national elites and local political classes possible, Hitler’s announced program for the conquest of the East is the exact opposite: “all representatives of the Polish intelligentsia must be annihilated”; all means need to be used “to prevent a new intellectual class from forming.&amp;amp;quot; Only in this way can the colonial objectives be completed: the peoples destined to work as slaves in service to the master race should not forget that “there can only be one master, the German.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn523|523]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his usual speech at the tenth congress of the Russian communist party in 1921, Stalin calls attention to another element of change that is being witnessed in world history: “During the imperialist war, the belligerent imperialist powers had been forced to turn to the colonies, from which they had extracted the manpower for their armies” and this “could only advance the cause of freedom and the struggle by these people and these populations.&amp;amp;quot; The national awakening in Eastern Europe is joined by the one taking place in the colonial world: “In general, the advance of the national question in the colonies is no coincidence, from the point of view of history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn524|524]] While in Europe the national awakening is called upon to put an end to the policies of discrimination, denationalization, and the oppression of national minorities, in the colonies it’s destined to radically put into question the concentrationary universe built by the conquerors for those races considered inferior.&lt;br /&gt;
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The novelty of resorting to troops of color did not go unnoticed by Hitler, who doesn’t hesitate in denouncing this betrayal of the white race. France is especially guilty of this, where a process of “bastardization” and “negroization” is quickly and ruinously put into practice, and where one even witnesses the “rise of an African state on European soil.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn525|525]] Before us here are not “prejudices”, before us is a precise political program, which look on in horror at the use of colored troops and also at racial intermixing in the sphere of sexual relations and marriage; because these practices―in degrading the barrier that separates the master race from the servant race―put into crisis the dominion and the concentrationary universe that the master race must impose on the servant race in the superior interest of Civilization. From the point of view of the Nazi leader, the national awakening in Eastern Europe and the use of troops of color in the West’s internal conflicts (with the subsequent growth in consciousness of the colonial peoples) constitute a terrible global threat to civilization and to the white race. The construction of a racial state and empire, and the unleashing of the war in the East, similarly represent a response to that threat; with the flow into the Nazi concentrationary universe of an immense mass of slaves drawn from the “inferior races” and destined to work and die of overwork in service to the master race.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Nazi concentrationary universe is set up to devour millions upon millions of slaves or superfluous human beings that inevitably arise out of a program that aims for the constant Germanization of the soil, excluding a priori the natives who inhabit it from Germanization. And that project would have yet devoured an infinite number of more victims, if it had not been defeated by an opposing project, based on the recognition not only of existential rights, but also the cultural and national rights of the natives. By a series of both objective circumstances and subjective responsibility, that in no way should be dismissed, that second project also produced a concentrationary universe. But, even with its horrors, it can’t in any way be associated with the first, that explicitly presupposed the continuation of the genocidal practices already underway in the colonial world itself, and its even more brutal extension to the new colonies to be built in Eastern Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Totalitarianism or Developmentalist Dictatorship? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We are now able to understand the insufficient or deceptive character of the category of totalitarianism, widely invoked to establish the association between Stalin’s USSR to Hitler&#039;s Germany. A growing number of historians are questioning it or clearly rejecting it. To explain the history of the Soviet Union, some of them begin with Peter the Great and, going yet further back, with “Moscow under siege” and its extremely fragile geopolitical situation, as Genghis Khan’s invasion had demonstrated. Stalin, therefore, had felt himself called upon by history and geography to promote the most rapid economic development possible, with the aim of saving, at the same time, the nation and the new political and social order given to it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn526|526]] This is how a developmentalist dictatorship arises and imposes itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this in the context of a society that, on the one hand, presumably hasn’t completely forgotten the warning made by Lenin in 1905 (“Whoever wants to march toward socialism on a path that isn’t political democracy will inevitably arrive at absurd and reactionary conclusions, both from an economic and a political point of view”),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn527|527]] and on the other hand, is dragged from one state of emergency to another, from one civil war to another, as a result of both objective circumstances as well as intrinsic ideological weaknesses. We are therefore faced with a society characterized not by totalitarian uniformity and alignment, but by the permanent duration and omnipresence of the civil war, that manifests itself even within families, divided as a consequence of the contrary attitudes taken by its members in relation, for example, to the process of collectivization in rural areas: “a peasant woman, who belonged to a religious sect, hacked her husband to death as he slept because he, it seemed, was an activist in favor of the kolkhoz.&amp;amp;quot; Similar bloody crimes even stain the relationship between parents and children.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn528|528]] The conflict here takes on the ferocity of a religious war; and this is true not just for those who explicitly appeal to themes taken from Christianity, but also for the zealous followers of the new society, who themselves are driven by “zealous faith.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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An analysis of the relations of production would be very much enlightening. Let’s mentally enter a Soviet factory, or one of the many construction sites that flourish in the gigantic modernization program promoted by Stalin. Yet far from being uniformly determined from above, its location is decided after a complex decision making process made up of passionate and frequently fiery discussions: “contrary to the strict centralization of the tsarist era, the anti-colonialist rhetoric of the Soviet Union gave the regional &#039;&#039;lobbies&#039;&#039; power unimaginable during the old regime.&amp;amp;quot; Particularly strong is the power of those regions that, precisely due to their underdevelopment, pressure the regime to maintain its promises to end the inequalities and the “injustices of tsarist imperialism”, with the aim of promoting industrialization and modernization at the national level.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn529|529]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon entering the production site and workplace, we realize that there’s absolutely no rigid discipline and blind obedience enforced: on the contrary, there’s no lack of unrest or heated disputes. Meanwhile, the large fluctuations in the labor force won’t go unnoticed. Stalin is forced to tenaciously struggle against that phenomenon; moreover, by 1936 “more than 87% of industrial workers leave their job post.&amp;amp;quot; They’re encouraged by a policy of full employment and by the real possibility of upward social mobility, a counterweight to the power wielded by authorities in the factory or at the construction site. But that’s not all. Overall, we see a kind of tug of war with three participants: party and labor union leaders who are committed to increasing labor productivity; the workers, primarily concerned with an increase in their wage levels; the experts, who are often stuck in the middle and undecided about what to do. In most cases it’s the workers who win out, and quite often the experts disobey “the orders coming down from Moscow.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn530|530]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Furthermore, the working class itself is divided. While it brings out enthusiasm in some, the appeal to increase productivity and to truly commit to socialist competition―with the aim of developing the productive forces and catching or surpassing the most advanced countries of the West―provokes discontent, quiet resistance or open hostility from others. While the first are classified by the second as “the forces of the Antichrist”, the first have for the second “a sacred hatred for the enemies of the new socialist life”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn531|531]] with a language that brings us back once again to the “zealous faith” that inspires a whole generation.&lt;br /&gt;
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That which opposes supporters and adversaries of the new order is by no means the only conflict. We also see the confrontation between specialists, on one side, and the mass of workers on the other. The first often struggle against the Bolsheviks and on the side of the Whites: their qualifications are appealed to, but at the same time they seek to subject them to a form of oversight. But the newly trained experts and specialists, and even those trained under the old regime, also are motivated by patriotic sentiment to loyally collaborate with Soviet power; still, they must face the challenges arising from a new social stratum, the “vanguard workers.&amp;amp;quot; And this challenge is all the more frightening in a society where “the workers are called upon to judge their leaders”; thus, one can easily comprehend that frequently the “engineers strongly resisted workers control.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn532|532]] But it’s a resistance that’s anything but easy: the workers can make themselves heard and make their voice count by displaying manifestos in their workplaces and writing to the newspapers and to their party leaders; most often, it’s the experts and factory management itself who generally feel intimidated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn533|533]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin also refers to those conflicts when he addresses the Stakhanovite movement, that “began spontaneously, almost on its own, from below, without any kind of pressure from any part of the administration of our companies, and even doing so in opposition to them”; yes, at least at the start, the Stakhanovites are forced to do their experiments “hidden from company management, hidden away from oversight”; a worker dedicated to introducing “innovations” even runs the risk of being laid off, or stopped by the “intervention of a department chief.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn534|534]] In competition, and often in conflict with one another, we see in action a number of “industrial authorities”: from experts, administrators, political figures, to labor union officials (there’s also a distinction between “party and labor union” officials).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn535|535]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, in visiting a Soviet factory or construction site (including during the Stalin years), one doesn’t have the impression of entering in a “totalitarian” workplace. “Totalitarianism” was much more evident in the factory of Tsarist Russia, where an unmistakable rule was enforced: “the owner of the industrial establishment is sovereign and the absolute legislator who is bound by no legal limits”; in fact, he can even make use of the whip, in the case of more serious offenses.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn536|536]] Or take a country like the United States. Let’s consider the treatment reserved for prisoners (almost always African Americans), rented out, as we are familiar with, to private companies. These companies can enjoy “absolute control” in exchange for payment:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The guards had the power to chain the prisoners, to shoot at those who try to escape, to torture those who refused to submit and lash the disobedient, whether nude or dressed; an almost limitless power. For eight decades [from the seventies of the nineteenth century until the Second World War] there were almost no sentences against the buyers of these slaves for their mistreatment or their deaths.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn537|537]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly this related to prisoners, but remember that for African Americans of the south the charge of “vagrancy” was enough for them to be arrested, condemned, and to be rented out to businessmen who were determined to get rich. Other times, blacks were simply captured by landowners and made to provide forced labor. It’s no coincidence that in the title and subtitle of the book cited here, the author speaks of “slavery with another name”, and of “the reintroduction of slavery for African Americans from the Civil War to the World War II.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn538|538]] While the slaves or semi-slaves may constitute an evidently limited percentage of the total labor force, nevertheless the prolonged existence of slave or semi-slave labor relations in the workplace of American capitalist society demands reflection.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from this, it’s worthwhile to make a much more general consideration: looking closely, in the Soviet factory we see dynamics and relations at work that would be considered an intolerable lack of discipline in the capitalist factory found in the democratic countries. One well known work by Marx (&#039;&#039;The Poverty of Philosophy&#039;&#039;) can help to clarify that point:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While inside the modern factory the division of labor is meticulously managed by the businessman’s authority, modern society has no other rule, no other authority, to distribute labor, if not by free competition [...]. It can even be established, as a general principle, that the less state authority presides over the division of labor, the more the division of labor develops within the factory, and there it is subjected to just one authority. Thus, authority in the factory and authority in society, in relation to the division of labor, are in inverse proportion to one another.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn539|539]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be said that Soviet society produced, now and again, an inversion of the dialectic in capitalist society described by Marx: the absence of a rigid factory discipline (with the absence of the traditional boss’s more or less accentuated despotism) corresponded to the terror exercised by the State over civil society. But also in regard to this, it’s worthwhile to remain on guard against simplifications: we are dealing with a much more “chaotic and unorganized State” than one can imagine; “the center rarely spoke in one voice”; even the “ideological uniformity” was most often just a “facade.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn540|540]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The typical analysis of totalitarianism makes complete abstraction of the workplace, and just for this reason become unilateral and superficial. If we do away with that total and improper abstraction, totalitarianism as a category would be seen for all its inadequacy: it can’t in any way help us understand a society that in its final phase―with the disappearance of the “zealous faith”, unable to last forever as Kennan wisely predicted―is undermined by an authentic anarchy in the workplace, abandoned by its employees without impediment, who, even when present, appear to be carrying out a kind of “work to rule” slowdown, furthermore it’s tolerated; that is the impression formed, a bit perplexed and somewhat impressed, by the workers and labor union delegations visiting the USSR in its final years. In China, when it is beginning to abandon Maoism, in the public sector there continued to be in force practices that were described as followed by a Western journalist: “even the lowest employee [...] if they so wish, can decide to do absolutely nothing; stay at home for one or two years and continue to get their salary at the end of the month.&amp;amp;quot; This “culture of idleness” continued to make itself felt even in the private sector economy that was then emerging: “former state employees [...] arrived late, then read the newspaper, went to lunch half an hour early, and left the office half an hour early” and frequently missed work for family reasons: “because his wife was sick”, as just one example. And the managers and specialists who sought to introduce discipline and efficiency in the workplace are forced to confront not only the resistance and indignation of the workers (it’s an outrage to penalize a worker who misses work to take care of his wife!), but are often threatened and even face violence from below.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn541|541]] It’s very difficult to describe these relations using the category of “totalitarianism”; we are better instructed by sticking to the previously cited excerpt from Marx, &#039;&#039;The Poverty of Philosophy&#039;&#039;, which can help us understand a phenomenon that’s completely inexplicable by the theory of totalitarianism. In the USSR, in the countries of Eastern Europe and in China, the more or less radical dismantlement of the “totalitarian” system takes place alongside a drastic strengthening of discipline in the workplace; to give one example: only in 1993 does China approve a law that allows layoffs due to absenteeism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn542|542]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No doubt, especially in situations of acute crisis, workplaces are certainly not exempt from the terror in the USSR or in Maoist China; however, what characterizes daily life is a regime that’s far from totalitarianism. In summary, one could say that the usual recourse to that term is only persuasive by working off a double and arbitrary abstraction. The omission of operating relations in the workplace and in the places of production makes it possible to draw the communist dictatorship and the Nazi dictatorship closer together; the silence on the terror and the concentrationary universe that took place at the expense of the colonies and semi-colonies, as well as within the metropole itself at the expense of the peoples of colonial origin (like the Native Americans and African Americans), makes it possible to create an abyss separating the liberal West from the “totalitarian” states.&lt;br /&gt;
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In regard to the Soviet Union of Brezhnev and his successors, Stalin’s USSR presents different characteristics, but the central element that separates them is the exceptional ideological and political mobilization that, before deflating and losing all credibility, for a long period of time manages to offer an essential contribution to the functioning of the economic and productive apparatus. They are decades in which a developmentalist dictatorship is established: it has a pace that is both chaotic and ruthless, and is characterized by the “zealous faith” of which social and ethnic groups take advantage, seeing on opening toward substantial upward social mobility, and which brings the recognition that until that moment was stubbornly denied to them. It doesn’t make much sense to associate that tragic and contradictory experience to that of the Nazis, which is explicitly established for the purpose of war, colonial conquest and the reaffirmation of racial hierarchies, that from its beginning can make use of a state apparatus and a consolidated, efficient bureaucracy, and that can impose itself across all spheres of social life. Nevertheless, that association is now commonplace. It’s necessary to examine its genesis.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;5. The Distortion of History and the Construction of a Mythology: Stalin and Hitler as Twin Monsters&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cold War and the &#039;&#039;Reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; of the New Enemy ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the start of the Cold War, each antagonist seeks to classify the other as the heir to the Third Reich that had just been toppled by both sides. “No one”―observes Lukács―”would dare say today that Hitlerism, its ideology and its methods, belong completely to past history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn543|543]] Indeed, on this the two sides appear to agree without much trouble. It’s just that, while the communist philosopher makes use of the term imperialism to compare Truman and Hitler,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn544|544]] on the opposing side they resort to the term totalitarianism to unite Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two categories are wielded like weapons of war. The effort to associate the new enemy to the old one isn’t limited to the denunciation of imperialism or totalitarianism. After having described the ideological course that leads to the triumph of the Third Reich as the process of “reason’s destruction”, Lukács feels it necessary to also subsume in the category of irrationalism the ideology of the “free world” led by the United States. The task is not without its difficulties, and the Hungarian philosopher denounces the “new form of irrationalism hidden away under an apparent rationality.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the “new situation” that’s been created, “it’s completely natural that in philosophy it’s not a German type of irrationalism that’s dominant, but the Machian-pragmatic type”, whose representatives are, among others, Wittgenstein, Carnap and Dewey.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn545|545]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The difficulty of comparing the new enemy to the old is also felt on the opposing side. In sketching out &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, after having for quite some time insisted on the fatal role of imperialism, and in that sense having denounced Lord Cromer (who, by as late as the second post-war period, is included by Churchill among the heroes of the British Empire),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn546|546]] Arendt completes the comparison between Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union by referring, aside from totalitarianism, to the “pan-movements”, in such a way that another analogy emerges: the pan-Germanism of the first corresponded to the pan-Slavism of the second. This conclusion is the finish line of a &#039;&#039;tour de force,&#039;&#039; yet more foolhardy than the one seen in Lukács: we will see Churchill compare the communist movement to a church characterized by an expansionist universalism and “whose missionaries are in every country”, in every people; in any case, Stalin’s supposed pan-Slavism calls upon the peoples of the colonies to put an end to the rule of the master race, something considered natural and beneficial by the theorists of pan-Germanism.&lt;br /&gt;
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At that time, however, on both opposing sides, the principal concern is the construction of analogies and symmetries. We are forced to smile when we read in Arendt that what characterizes the “pan-movements” (and, therefore, Nazism and communism) is “the absolute pretension of having been chosen”: the celebration of the United States as God’s chosen people profoundly marks the American political tradition and continues to be heard today in the speeches by American presidents! The exigencies of the Cold War clearly take priority over any other consideration, as is confirmed by the argument made in 1950 by a prominent American historian. He would oppose Franklin D. Roosevelt and his policy of allying with the USSR; with the start of the Cold War, he felt encouraged to strengthen his thesis of the political and moral similarities between Hitler and Stalin, such that he intensely dedicates himself to the total comparison of the two dictators. The first insists on the “racial destiny of the Teutonic people”; the average reader could be reminded of the “manifest destiny” that, according to a long tradition, would oversee the unstoppable expansion of the United States; yet arguing and omitting in a similar way to Arendt, the historian cited here makes the Nazi theme of the “racial destiny of the Teutonic people” correspond to the “faith of Stalin and Lenin in the messianic role of the proletariat and the revolutionary international communist movement.&amp;amp;quot; Once again the celebration of the “master race” is central to Hitler’s ideology; the search for analogies and precedents for this ought to go in the direction of the regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; long enforced in the Southern United States, to which Nazism made reference and that, in some form, continued to exist in 1950, the year of the cited book’s publication. Yet nevertheless, the American historian discovers that similar to Hitler’s theory of the “master race” is that which is in action in Stalin’s Soviet Union, where nearly “every important discovery” is attributed to “some unknown or poorly known Russian”![[footnotes.xhtml#fn547|547]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; by the former allies also includes the accusation of genocide. Possibly the first to move in this direction is the political front over which the communist movement and the Soviet Union have hegemony. In 1951, in New York, the black lawyer William Patterson, leader of the Civil Rights Congress (an organization committed to the struggles against both McCarthyism and the regime of white supremacy) organizes the publication of a book that is also an appeal to the UN to make it aware of the tragedy affecting African Americans: in the United States (particularly in the South) the regime of racial discrimination, humiliation, oppression and social marginalization remains in force; the rapes, lynchings, and legal and extrajudicial executions haven’t ceased, and the police violence is getting worse (in 1963 Martin Luther King will speak of the “unspeakable horrors of police brutality”). In making this long list of injustices and suffering, he makes reference to the convention approved by the UN in December of 1948 against the crime of genocide, and making use of the fact that this genocide convention doesn’t necessarily mean the systematic annihilation of an entire ethnic group; the book carried the clearly provocative title: &#039;&#039;We Charge Genocide&#039;&#039;. Possibly motivated by the strong opposition faced by this convention in American politics, the denunciation is translated into a number of languages: in the USSR it appears with an introduction by Ilya Ehrenburg, an intellectual of Jewish origin, who compares the Third Reich and the US to the degree that both are affected by a racist and genocidal frenzy, or at least potentially genocidal. The book obviously provokes outrage in the United States, and they respond by returning the accusation. A member of the committee that approved the UN convention declares that: “in the communist countries it’s official policy to deport entire populations on the basis of racial or national origin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn548|548]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the start of the Cold War sees both antagonists classify the other as the new version of Nazism and its genocidal madness, with the approaching triumph of the West the game of analogies plays out exclusively to the favor of the victors. For the ruling ideology in particular, the absolutely identical comparison of Stalin and Hitler has become an obsession, reaching the point of presenting them as twin monsters.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Negative Cult of Heroes ===&lt;br /&gt;
How have we reached this outcome? While attention is fixed exclusively on the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, we will see Gandhi equate British imperialism and Nazi imperialism in his denunciation of colonial Britain and Nazi Germany. Researchers beyond suspicion of anti-Western bias have on repeated occasions compared the treatment of the colonial peoples, carried out but also justified by the liberal West, to the genocidal practices of the Third Reich. This comparison is made in relation to: the deportation of the Cherokees ordered by Andrew Jackson (the president of the United States visited and celebrated by Tocqueville); the attitude assumed by Theodore Roosevelt regarding the “inferior races” (who should be met with a “war of extermination” in case of rebellion against the “superior race”); the treatment by England inflicted on the Irish people (treated in a similar way to the Native Americans and condemned to die en masse of starvation, by as late as mid nineteenth century).&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s more. The keys words in our time used to describe the horrors of the twentieth century emerge from the studies done of the liberal world of the nineteenth century: in specific reference to the “development of industrial capitalism” in England, it’s been stated that “the Gulag is not an invention of the twentieth century”; defined as a “totalitarian society” is that which in Australia devours those deported from England (often the poor condemned over petty theft, driven to it by hunger); finally, in regard to the tragedy of the indigenous peoples in America, Australia or in British colonies in general, authoritative researchers in turn spoke of an “American Holocaust” (or of a “final solution” to the Native American question), of an “Australian Holocaust” and of a “Late Victorian Holocaust”, not to mention the “Black Holocaust” (the deportation and then the enslavement of the survivors, one in every three or four), to which African Americans seek to call attention; and finally the “Canadian Holocaust” that we’ve already come across.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in regard to the events that have taken place under our watch, in authoritative news organizations we can read that in Afghanistan, an American protectorate, the captured Taliban members are put in a place that “resembles the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz” and that in Guantanamo there is, according to the words of Amnesty International, a kind of “Gulag in our times.&amp;amp;quot; Finally, it’s worthwhile to observe that a more impartial American historiography didn’t hesitate in making a comparison between the Anglo-American annihilation by air of entire cities (Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki) on the one hand, and the genocide of Jews on the other.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn549|549]] But all of this magically disappears in the ruling ideology and historiography, just as it disappears the reality of the concentrationary universe that during the Second Thirty Years’ War arises even in the countries of a more consolidated liberal tradition, and that these countries, even after the defeat of the Third Reich, continued to operate for some time with anti-Soviet and anti-communist purposes, and that, at any rate, are expanded in the colonies or semi-colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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However colossal it may be, that omission isn’t enough to construct the myth of the twin monsters. Working from the comparison of the USSR and the Third Reich, they introduce the comparison of Stalin and Hitler, removing both from their respective historical contexts and political projects. Once the explosive contradictions that characterize them are removed―the Second Time of Troubles on the one hand, and the Second Thirty Years’ War on the other―the Stalinian terror appears as the expression of a gratuitous violence, motivated exclusively by totalitarian ideology, or directly motivated by the bloody paranoia of a single person.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly suppressed is Hitler’s historical contextualization. He was born at the end of the nineteenth century. The “most painful” century in human history has not yet ended, the “century of colonization”, and above all else the “century of races”, which had the merit of having refuted once and for all the naive “ideas of universal brotherhood from the eighteenth century” and the mythology of the common origin and unity of mankind, the ideological tool that the “socialists” pathetically cling to, despite their explicit rejection by history and science.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn550|550]] In 1898, it’s the Anglo-German author Houston S. Chamberlain who expresses that view, and he will later become particularly admired by Hitler, but at that time he’s acclaimed across the West. That is to say that, to comprehend Nazism it’s necessary to first study the political project that’s at its roots, and that political project isn’t just in reference to a single criminal or mad personality, but has various ties to other countries and political movements besides Germany and Nazism. In that sense, regardless of the artistic judgement of it, &#039;&#039;The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui&#039;&#039; by Bertolt Brecht is unconvincing. To illustrate Hitler’s personality he makes use of a literary genre (crime fiction) which leads to misconceptions. It starts from a moral judgment, which is in fact constructed a posteriori. Nazism takes hold in a historical period in which the “evidence” in its favor consists of a racial hierarchy and a colonial expansion that often contains genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, to inherit such a tradition at a time when it begins to be strongly challenged, and to radicalize it, going to the point of seeking to put it into action in Eastern Europe as well, is a terrible development of that tradition, but it’s precisely a question of its development, not something created out of nothing. In nineteenth century culture, there’s a widespread idea that racial “extermination”―Disraeli stresses―is the expression of “an irresistible natural law.&amp;amp;quot; At the end of the century Spencer laments that: “We we are entering into an era of social cannibalism, in which the strongest nations are devouring the weakest.&amp;amp;quot; In the United States between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it’s commonplace for there to be appeals for the “final solution”, and the “complete and final solution” to the respective indigenous and black questions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn551|551]] Also around the same time in Canada, an authoritative government figure proposes the “final solution to our indigenous question.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn552|552]] The horror and infamy of this radicalization remains the same, but it arises out of the experience of the failed attempt to build an overseas colonial empire, that at the outbreak of World War I is quickly eliminated by British naval superiority, which imposes on Germany a devastating and deadly naval blockade, even on the civilian population. Therefore they asked themselves: to continue being exposed to that terrible threat, or to build at all costs a continental empire, resorting to massacres and genocidal practices at the expense of the inferior races and following, at any rate, the classic and proven model of the West’s colonial expansion?&lt;br /&gt;
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When it comes to the ruling ideology, any political project whatsoever disappears; the atrocities of the Third Reich are also expressions of a terrible madness of mysterious origins, but its name is nevertheless “totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot; That is how they set up the comparison of Stalin and Hitler. They even make the superfluous (and perhaps embarrassing) analogy between pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, something that Arendt insisted upon, though today it doesn’t appear to enjoy any noteworthy success. Everything revolves around the two (sick and criminal) personalities, on which they even sometimes trace biographical parallels.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn553|553]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What stands out the most in these writings is the absence of history, and even politics in a certain sense. Colonialism, imperialism, world wars, national liberation struggles, different and opposing political projects, they all disappear. Nor do they even ask about the relations of the liberal West with fascism and Nazism (who consider themselves the most authentic and relevant champions of the West), and with the old Russian regime, whose contradictions have for a long time been moving towards the outbreak of an enormous catastrophe. Overall, all of this is left in the shadows due to the absolute centrality given to two creative personalities, albeit evil in their creativity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Theorem of the Elective Affinities Between Stalin and Hitler ===&lt;br /&gt;
These two personalities―so the story goes―are not only morally and politically similar, but are bound together by a type of mutual attraction. To prove this they reference the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression and the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence. In reality, this pact, on the one hand, puts an end to the &#039;&#039;Diktat&#039;&#039; of Brest-Litovsk; on the other hand, it’s just one phase in a contradictory process that demarcates the spheres of influence by the great powers, something which begins in Munich and (provisionally) concludes at Yalta.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn554|554]] In 1946, a few months after the conclusion of the Second World War, Ernest Bevin, a leading figure in the Labour Party and British foreign minister, saw the world basically divided “into three spheres of influence that could be described as three large Monroe doctrines”, demanded and agreed upon by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn555|555]] While the British Monroe doctrine quickly unravels, in 1961 during a summit in Vienna, John F. Kennedy, veteran of the infamous Bay of Pigs adventure, protests to Khrushchev over the success and dynamism of the Cuban Revolution: the United States can’t tolerate a regime that seeks to alter its hegemony in the “Western Hemisphere”, in one of the “areas of our vital interests”, just as the USSR couldn’t tolerate a challenge to its hegemony in its security zone, Eastern Europe.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn556|556]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One can consider especially odious the demarcation of spheres of influence based on the secret protocols of the German-Soviet pact, and point out the cynicism of the move that allows Stalin to gain both time and space; but it’s very difficult to reconcile such a condemnation with the thesis of the mutual attraction between the two dictators, by means of the theorem of elective affinities. In truth, immediately after the start of the war by Nazi Germany, Churchill eagerly welcomes the entrance of Soviet troops into Eastern Poland. Soon after, in addressing the leaders of Latvia, Stalin explains with great clarity the reasons for his policy toward the Baltic countries: “The Germans could attack. For six years, communists and German fascists have cursed each other. Now, in spite of history, an unexpected turn has happened, but we can’t put our trust in it. We must be prepared ahead of time. Those who were not prepared have faced the consequences.&amp;amp;quot; Starting from the need to avoid the Third Reich&#039;s maneuvers in the region, the military protectorate, which Moscow initially appears satisfied with, is gradually transformed into true and proper annexation:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn557|557]] so it was again put up for discussion the loss of territory suffered by Soviet Russia at the moment of its greatest weakness, while at the same time within the leadership group, there’s a growing tendency to carry on, without much limitations, the legacy of Tsarist Russia’s international policies.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the usual evaluation of the German-Soviet pact the questions that are essential for its comprehension are completely missing: what agreements were previously signed by the Third Reich? How to explain the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union less than two years later, and what does Nazi Germany’s number two man (Rudolf Hess) have in mind when he suddenly lands in Britain on the eve of Operation Barbarossa?&lt;br /&gt;
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In the race to reach an agreement or understanding with the newly installed regime in Berlin, Stalin clearly comes last. The Concordat between Germany and the Holy See happens on July 20th, 1933, and it guarantees the loyalty of German Catholics to the new “government formed in conformity with the Constitution” &#039;&#039;(verfassungmässig gebildete Regierung&#039;&#039;): a recognition that happens soon after the approval of the emergency laws, and with it the use of terror and the rise of the racial state, and the first measures against government employees of “non-Aryan origin.&amp;amp;quot; Two weeks earlier Zentrum was dissolved, the Catholic party whose militants had committed to “positive collaboration” in “the national front led by the Reich Chancellor.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn558|558]] With respect to the Protestant faith, one can’t forget that the Deutsche Christen lined up in support of Hitler immediately after his rise to power, and did so by adapting Christianity to the needs of the Third Reich, reinterpreting the Protestant Reformation according to Nazi and even racist perspectives, theorizing a Church founded within the German “popular community” and based on the “recognition of the differences of nations and races as ordained by God.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn559|559]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Zionist movement at the time shows a similar willingness to gain the new rulers’ favor. Their press organ, Jüdische Rundschau, largely immune to the wave of prohibitions and persecutions which hit the German press immediately after the Reichstag fire, on April 7th, 1933, encourages Zionists and Nazis to be “sincere partners.&amp;amp;quot; It all results in an agreement on the “transfer” of 20,000 Jews to Palestine, who are allowed to take with them nearly 30 million dollars, a strong contribution toward colonization and to the process that would later lead to the formation of the State of Israel.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn560|560]] Later, reacting to the “transfer” agreement, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem also seeks Hitler’s favor. Now let’s look to the opposition political parties. The speech by Social Democrat MP Otto Wels is “very weak”, during the Reichstag session that concedes emergency powers to Hitler.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn561|561]] It was the “Stalinist” communist party that first raised the alarm and organized resistance to the barbarism now in power.&lt;br /&gt;
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1935 is also the year in which the naval agreement between Great Britain and the Third Reich is signed. Occurring after the start of feverish rearmament and the reintroduction of the draft, the agreement raises Hitler&#039;s hopes that they could reach a strategic understanding, with the recognition of Great Britain’s naval superiority and mutual respect between the two great “Germanic” empires: the British overseas empire and the continental German empire, which would be built through the colonization and enslavement of Eastern Europe. It’s rightly described as a “cynical attitude” from the government in London, which gives the impression of endorsing an infamous program previously and clearly described in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn562|562]] It’s not shocking that there’s growing concern in Moscow, strong irritation in Paris,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn563|563]] and unrestrained joy from Hitler, who then celebrates this as his “happiest day.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn564|564]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more disturbing is Poland’s role. As has been observed, it becomes “totally subordinated to German policy” starting from the signing of the ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany on January 26th, 1934. The following year, foreign minister Beck declares to his subordinate: “There are two political entities undoubtedly condemned to disappear: Austria and Czechoslovakia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn565|565]] The alignment with Hitler’s program is obvious, and it’s not just a matter of words. “The ultimatum to Czechoslovakia in which Poland demanded the return of Teschen led Beneš―according to his own account―to abandon any idea of opposing the Munich arrangement. Poland until that moment had been Germany’s most useful ‘attack dog’ in the East, similar to Italy’s role in the Mediterranean.&amp;amp;quot; The Munich Conference doesn’t mark the end of the Warsaw government’s collaboration with the Third Reich: “If Hitler truly sought to enter into Ukraine, he ought to pass through Poland; and in the autumn of 1938 that idea didn’t appear to be a political fantasy at all.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn566|566]] It even appeared to have the encouragement of Warsaw. In January of the following year, during a conversation with Hitler, Beck states: “Poland doesn’t attach any significance to the so-called security system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn567|567]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin has every reason to be worried and distressed. Before the Munich Conference, the American ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, observed how important it was to isolate “Asian despotism”, thereby saving “European civilization” from a fratricidal war. After the victory achieved by Hitler, an English diplomat writes in his diary: “From being a fist aimed at the heart of Germany, Czechoslovakia now quickly became a fist aimed at the vital organs of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn568|568]] During the crisis caused by the Munich Conference, the USSR was the only country challenging the Third Reich and confirmed its support for the Prague government, putting more than seventy divisions on a high state of alert. Later on, after the Third Reich’s dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, Moscow delivers a strongly worded message of protest to Berlin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn569|569]] The reaction from other capitals was much more “restrained.&amp;amp;quot; As a result, the Nazi-fascist aggressors had successively devoured Ethiopia, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Albania and China thanks to the direct or passive complicity of the Western powers, inclined to direct the Third Reich’s sights and ambitions against the homeland of the October Revolution; to its east, the Soviet Union sees the pressure applied by Japan on its eastern borders. Thus emerges the danger of an invasion and war on two fronts: It’s only at this moment that Moscow begins moving toward a pact of non-aggression with Germany, noting the failure of the popular front strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Carried out by Stalin with conviction and decisiveness, the popular front strategy had its costs. It had strengthened the opposition and Trotskyite agitation, especially in the colonies: what credibility could an anti-colonialism have which spared―so the argument went―the leading colonial powers at that time, concentrating instead on a country, Germany, which at Versailles had lost what few colonies it previously had? For the colonized peoples themselves it was especially difficult to accept that adjustment. Britain was widely discredited. In the spring of 1919 it not only was responsible for the massacre at Amritsar, that cost the lives of hundreds of unarmed Indian civilians, but it also resorted to “public flogging” and forcing the residents of the city “to crawl on their hands and knees while entering or leaving their homes”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn570|570]] a dehumanizing collective punishment and a terrible racial and national humiliation. Later, while fighting the Second World War, the imperial government represses pro-independence demonstrations, using planes to fire upon them. These are the years when Gandhi asserts that “in India we have Hitlerian rule, however disguised it may be in softer terms”; “Hitler was ‘Great Britain’s sin’. Hitler is only the response to British imperialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn571|571]] With the war over, Gandhi will go as far as paying tribute to Subhas Chandra Bose, who to achieve independence had fought alongside the Axis: “Subhas was a great patriot and had given his life for the good of the country.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn572|572]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, it wasn’t easy for the USSR to switch to the idea that, despite appearances, for the colonized peoples as well the principal danger was the Nazi-fascist coalition, the German, Japanese and Italian axis, and particularly the Third Reich, determined to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, resorting to the most extreme methods. For countries like Britain and France, the popular front strategy brought very little costs, yet they still sabotaged it. At this point, the USSR had no other choice but to reach an understanding with Germany, a move that was described as “a dramatic improvisation at the last moment”, which Moscow resorted to for lack of alternatives “in the immediate lead-up to a new European war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn573|573]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A radical change of course takes place that is often evaluated from an exclusively European perspective. But there’s no reason to ignore the repercussions in Asia. Mao Zedong expresses his satisfaction: “The pact represents a blow to Japan and help to China” because it “more easily allows the Soviet Union” to support “China’s resistance against Japan.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn574|574]] It’s precisely for this reason that the Japanese consider Germany’s behavior to be “treacherous and unforgivable.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn575|575]] As a result, the flow of Russian arms and munitions to China proceeds at a steady pace. The West’s position is very different:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Europe and America’s indifference left its mark on history, demonstrating that they had no notion of reality, they refused to make the most minimal effort in deterring the fascists in Tokyo; but it’s not just that, even worse is that the United States continued to send Japan petroleum and gasoline almost right up until the big attack on Pearl Harbor.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn576|576]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s leave aside Asia for the moment to concentrate on Europe. The mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich and the preparation for open conflict never ceased, not even during the months following the non-aggression pact. Even before signing, speaking in Danzig with the high commissioner of the League of Nations, Hitler explains:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Everything I do is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid and blind to understand it, I’ll be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians and then defeat the West, so that after its defeat I can concentrate all possible forces on the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn577|577]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by these words, the Führer’s consistent objective is the construction of a western alliance, led by the Germans, to defeat the Soviet Union; if this alliance can’t be stipulated through a pact ahead of time, then there’s no choice but to impose it on the allies after their defeat; the temporary understanding with Moscow is just a means to achieve victory and thereby realize the necessary Western alliance for the definitive settling of accounts with Bolshevism. The pact of non-aggression is an instrument to achieve the Third Reich’s principal and permanent objective, which unleashes Operation Barbarossa and presents it as a crusade for Europe, calling upon on European countries and nations to participate, and they do participate, as a matter of fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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Did Stalin count on the long or eternal duration of the pact? In truth, from the start he is aware of the inevitability of the clash with Nazi Germany: “we will be spared from the war for a little while longer.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn578|578]] He takes advantage of this time to consolidate his country’s position. As early as November of 1939, from Hitler’s perspective, the country governed by communists appears determined to strengthen itself militarily, and it’s only willing to respect the pact according to circumstances and its own convenience.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn579|579]] It’s a point argued by the Führer two months later: Stalin is cautious, he’s very aware of the balance of forces, but he’s clearly waiting for a “difficult situation for Germany”; he doesn’t even lose track of the weather, acting “more brazen” than usual during the winter months, when he feels more protected from the Third Reich’s formidable war machine.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn580|580]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Führer’s concerns are anything but imaginary. Let’s see what Moscow’s stance was in late summer of 1940, at a time when, having completed the occupation of France, the Third Reich appears to be in the position of forcing Great Britain to surrender:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While Stalin relays to Hitler his confidence in a quick conclusion to the war, his diplomatic envoys and his agents abroad encourage all kinds of resistance to “the new order.&amp;amp;quot; The Moscow newspapers, that until then hadn’t spared the allies of ironic or scornful remarks, began taking on a more sympathetic tone toward Britain’s struggle, and encouraging French patriots in their struggle against Nazi domination. The German foreign minister was even forced to protest against anti-Nazi propaganda carried out by Mrs. Kollontai, representative of the Soviet Union in Sweden.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn581|581]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What’s revealing is the meeting that takes place in Moscow on November 25th, 1940, between two of Stalin’s closest collaborators:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Dimitrov: we will carry out a policy of bogging down the German occupation troops in various countries, and, without drawing attention, we want to take this work even further. Would this upset Soviet policy?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Molotov: Naturally, this must be done. We wouldn’t be communists if we didn’t follow this line. Only it must be done quietly.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn582|582]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin also agrees with this line;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn583|583]] he’s clearly committed to encouraging resistance to the Third Reich’s expansionism. Of course, this is heading towards a collision, and Stalin is aware of that, as shown by his observations and actions. November 7th, 1940: it’s necessary to be at the military level “of our enemies (and for us they are all capitalist states, including those who present themselves as our friends!).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn584|584]] On November 25th of the same year: “our relations with the Germans are marked by apparent courtesy, but between us there’s a lot of tension.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn585|585]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first months of 1941, the mask begins to fall off: “Currently the resistance against Hitler is encouraged [from Moscow] openly and from all parts.&amp;amp;quot; This is especially true with respect to the Balkans, where the dispute between the signatories of the non-aggression pact is increasingly intense. In the Kremlin, Stalin welcomes the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow and discusses with him the approach that should be used in opposing the Third Reich. Pleasantly surprised by this audacity toward those who aspire to rule the world, Belgrade’s representative puts forward a question: “And if the Germans, irritated, turn against you?.&amp;amp;quot; And the reply is quick: “Let them come!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn586|586]] The drafting of the friendship treaty on April 4th, 1941, between the USSR and Yugoslavia was immediately followed by Hitler’s invasion of the latter country. A few days later, in relaying the opinion of the Soviet leader, Dimitrov writes in his diary (April 18th, 1941): “The war of the Greek and Yugoslav peoples against imperialist aggression is a just war”, and on this “there’s no doubt.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn587|587]] The approaching clash with the Third Reich is increasingly apparent. May 5th, 1941, Stalin observes: “is the German army invincible, perhaps? No, it’s not invincible [...]. Germany now wages a war in the name of the enslavement and subjugation of other nations, in the name of hegemony. This is a great disadvantage for the German army.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn588|588]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the rapprochement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union had provoked notable discomfort within the Nazi ranks, and especially for Rosenberg (“I have this feeling that the Moscow Pact will haunt national-socialism sooner or later”), Operation Barbarossa brings about a sense of relief: “the stain to our honor” has been wiped away, Goebbels writes in his diary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn589|589]] The Führer himself writes to Mussolini: “I am at peace with myself”; the “agony” and the sense of “abandoning my origins, my thinking, and the work I set out on”, these feelings that came with the pact of non-aggression have disappeared. Hitler―a contemporary historian explains―finally arrives at the “fight that for nearly two decades has been a central element of his thinking” and even his “psyche.&amp;amp;quot; Longed for since the beginning, the annihilation of Asiatic and Eastern Bolshevism would have permitted, in the conditions imposed by Berlin, the restoration of unity within the West and the white race, in particular reaching a permanent agreement with the “British Empire”, that for the Führer continued being the “supreme model of domination and exploitation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn590|590]] Arendt’s affirmation, according to which Hitler “never had the intention of defending the ‘West from Bolshevism’”, but on the contrary “he had always been willing to ally with Stalin to destroy it”, is nothing more than her tribute to Cold War ideology.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn591|591]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, the leaders of the Third Reich were not mistaken in feeling relieved by the fact that, finally, with Operation Barbarossa, they could finally confront and eliminate (so they hoped) the true adversary, the eternal enemy. Even before Nazism took power, on August 12th, 1931, Stalin had described antisemitism as a type of “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot; Upon the establishment of the Third Reich, he had reacted, on January 26th, 1934, with a firm stance against fascism and against the “German version of fascism” specifically: “Again, like in 1914, the parties of warmongering imperialism and the parties of war and revanchism take center stage.&amp;amp;quot; The “new war” that appears on the horizon would be especially barbaric: it would be the war “organized by a ‘superior race’, that’s to say the German ‘race’, against the ‘inferior race’, and especially against the enslaved.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn592|592]] Stalin defended this concept later on November 25th, 1936, in the presentation of the new Soviet Constitution, which through its “profoundly internationalist” character opposed the “bourgeois constitutions [that] implicitly work from the assumption that nations and races can’t have equal rights.&amp;amp;quot; It’s true that here the speech was of a general character, as shown by the references to the “colonies” and to discrimination based on “differences in skin color”, but it’s clear that the principal target was Nazi Germany, which embraced racial ideology as a state doctrine. It’s not by chance that Stalin insisted on the principle of equality among nations “regardless of their strength or weakness”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn593|593]] at this time the Third Reich was the champion of social-Darwinism at the international level. Still a few months from the start of the war in Europe, on March 10th, 1939, in warning the Western powers that their “dangerous political game” of redirecting the Third Reich’s expansionist drive “to the East, against the Soviet Union”, could end in “serious failure” (in other words, with a non-aggression pact between Moscow and Berlin), Stalin had called for an end to &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039;, the policy which “made one concession after another to the aggressors”, demanding the formation of a common front against the instigators of war.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn594|594]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Totally rejecting the historical context briefly outlined here, Arendt describes the theorem of the elective affinity between Stalin and Hitler: the only man who the first trusted was the second, and the only man admired by the second was the first. After what we’ve seen, to speak of trust between the two sounds unintentionally comical, yet Arendt’s thesis of “Stalin’s pro-Hitler policy” is a mere tribute to Cold War ideology.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn595|595]] In Moscow in 1937―Feuchtwanger observes―“everyone is of the mindset that a future war is an absolute certainty”, they see the “German fascist” as the enemy. The reason is obvious: “Our prosperity, the Soviets say, is in such obvious contrast with fascist theories that the fascist states, if they wish to survive, must annihilate us.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn596|596]] Accurately predicted here is the war of annihilation that will be unleashed later by the Third Reich; far from easing up, the preparations for the war continue to intensify until becoming frantic during the months of the non-aggression pact.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s correct, however, that beginning with Operation Barbarossa, Hitler occasionally highlights the political and military competence of his great antagonist: is this confirmation of the theorem of elective affinities? During the Tehran Conference, while in friendly debate with Franklin D. Roosevelt (who tends to read Hitler in psychopathological terms), Stalin stresses however that their common enemy is “very capable” and only this can explain the extraordinary results initially achieved;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn597|597]] is this another confirmation of the thesis that’s commonplace today? In fact, the Soviet leader was right, not the American president! One must have a very primitive outlook on antagonism to think that authenticity requires ignorance of the enemy’s capabilities. Historians today are in agreement in admonishing the Führer for underestimating the USSR, yet Arendt works off her late and partial change of heart to construct a theorem of the elective affinities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitler, moreover, is cited in a one-sided way. It’s quite understandable his effort at explaining the unexpected failures and partial successes on the Eastern Front (which uncomfortably dismisses the myth of the invincibility of the Third Reich and the Wehrmacht) by detailing the unusual characteristics of the new enemy. But such characteristics aren’t always described in flattering terms. As early as July 14th, 1941, commenting on the ferocious resistance Operation Barbarossa was encountering, the Führer states: “our enemies are no longer human beings, but beasts.&amp;amp;quot; And echoing the opinions of their leader, one of his secretaries writes to a friend: “we are fighting against ferocious animals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn598|598]] Obviously Stalin is among these “beasts” and “ferocious animals”, who on another occasion is seen by Hitler as a creature from “hell” (&#039;&#039;unterwelt&#039;&#039;), confirming Bolshevism’s “satanic” character.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn599|599]] On the other end, we can note that both before and during the war, Stalin describes Hitler as the champion of antisemitic “cannibalism” and of “cannibalistic politics” based on “racial hatred.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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We can add that leading political figures of the liberal West also formulated a positive opinion of the Soviet leader, to whom Churchill also expresses a feeling of human sympathy. Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, when speaking of the “marvelous progress achieved by the Russian people”, indirectly pays tribute to the person who leads them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn600|600]] Finally, in our days leading historians stress Stalin’s extraordinary military and political capacity, without disparaging Hitler’s. Should we include all these individuals, despite their great differences, within the theorem of elective affinities? In truth, when they pronounce that theorem, Arendt and her followers abandon the field of philosophical and historical investigation, pursuing belles-lettres instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Ukrainian Holocaust as an Equivalent to the Jewish Holocaust ===&lt;br /&gt;
The two criminal personalities, mutually linked together by elective affinities, each create a concentrationary universe with great similarities between them―this is how the construction of the omnipresent political myth of our time proceeds. In truth, despite inaugurating this tradition, Arendt elaborated a more complex discourse. At one end, she mentions, although very briefly, the “totalitarian methods” of liberal Britain’s concentration camps where the Boers are confined, but also the totalitarian aspects present in the concentration camps that France’s Third Republic established “after the Spanish Civil War.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, in making the comparison between Stalin’s USSR and Hitler&#039;s Germany, Arendt points out some important distinctions: only in the second case does she speaks of “extermination camps.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: “in the USSR the guards were not like the SS, a type of elite force trained to commit crimes.&amp;amp;quot; As is confirmed by the analysis from a witness who passed through the tragic experience of both concentrationary universes: “The Russians [...] never showed the sadism of the Nazis [...]. Our Russian guards were good people and not sadists, but they scrupulously followed the rules of that inhuman system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn601|601]] In our time, however, the references to the liberal West, and the mere mention of different kinds of concentrationary universes in which the liberal West was implicated, have now disappeared; the entire discourse centers on the similarity between the Gulag and the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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For such a comparison to be persuasive, they must first inflate the numbers of the Stalinian terror. Recently, an American researcher calculated that the executions that actually took place reached a tenth of the usual estimates.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn602|602]] It’s clear, obviously, that the horror of that repression is always on a large scale. However, the audacity of certain historians and ideologues is significant. Nor do they limit themselves to inflating the numbers; in a political and historical void the construction of the monstrous twins can take it a step further: the Holocaust carried out by Nazi Germany against the Jews, especially starting from the stalemate on the Eastern Front, corresponds to the earlier holocaust (starting in the thirties); in this second case it was a matter of a planned “terror famine” that ended up becoming an “immense Bergen Belsen”, that’s to say an immense extermination camp.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn603|603]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was Robert Conquest who particularly distinguished himself in spreading this thesis. His critics accuse him of having worked as a disinformation agent for British intelligence services, and of having studied the Ukrainian case through the perspective of that profession.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn604|604]] Even his admirers recognize a point that doesn’t diminish in importance: Conquest is “a veteran of the Cold War” and wrote his book in the context of a “political-cultural operation” that was ultimately led by U.S. president Ronald Reagan and which achieved “numerous successes: on the one hand, significantly putting into the focus of international debate the value and limits of Gorbachev’s reforms, and on the other hand, it powerfully influenced the radicalization of separatist ambitions in Ukraine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn605|605]] In other words, the book was published in the atmosphere of a “political-cultural operation” that aimed to deliver the final and decisive blow to the Soviet Union, exposing it as responsible for shameful acts completely identical to those committed by the Third Reich, and encouraging its disintegration by making a people victimized in a “holocaust” become aware of it, thus making coexistence with their tormentors impossible. It’s necessary not to lose sight of the fact that, in the same period, together with the book on Ukraine, Conquest published another (in collaboration with a certain J. M. White), in which he gives advice to his fellow citizens about how to survive a possible (or imminent) invasion by the Soviet Union (&#039;&#039;What to Do When the Russians Come: A Survivalist’s Handbook&#039;&#039;).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn606|606]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, regardless of the underlying political motivations, a thesis must be analyzed based on the arguments it offers. And the thesis of the “terror famine” planned by Stalin to exterminate the Ukrainian people may prove to be more credible than the thesis that Reagan’s United States ran the risk of being invaded by Gorbachev’s USSR! Therefore, let’s concentrate our attention on Ukraine in the first years of the 1930s. In 1934, upon returning from a trip to the Soviet Union that had also taken him to Ukraine, the French prime minister, Édouard Herriot, denies not only its planned character, but also the extent and seriousness of the famine.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn607|607]] These declarations, made by a leader of a country that in the following year would sign an alliance treaty with the USSR, are generally considered unreliable. However, the testimony contained in the diplomatic reports by fascist Italy are beyond suspicion. Even in the period in which the repression of “counter-revolutionaries” is at its cruelest, it is combined with initiatives that go in a different and opposite direction: the soldiers “are sent to the rural areas to collaborate in the work in the fields” and “workers come to repair farming equipment”; together with “the effort to destroy any hint of Ukrainian separatism”, we witness a “policy of promoting the Ukrainian national character” which seeks to attract “the Ukrainians of Poland for a possible and sought after union with the USSR”; and this objective is pursued by favoring the free expression of the Ukrainian language, culture and tradition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn608|608]] Did Stalin seek to attract “the Ukrainians of Poland” into uniting with Soviet Ukrainians by exterminating the latter through starvation? From what we can tell, soon after the start of World War II, the Soviet troops who stormed into the Ukrainian territory until that moment occupied by Poland were warmly welcomed by the local population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn609|609]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let’s see the image that arises from the statements by Stalin’s other enemies, this time from within the communist movement. Trotsky, was born in Ukraine (as it is known), and who in the last years of his life repeatedly addressed the subject of his homeland, taking a position in favor of the pro-independence movement: he condemns the ferocity of the repression but, despite not sparing Stalin of accusations (in a number of occasions comparing him to Hitler), he makes no mentions of the so-called “holocaust of hunger” organized from Moscow.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn610|610]] Trotsky stresses that “the Ukrainian masses are driven by an irreconcilable hostility toward the Soviet bureaucracy”, but identifies the reason for such hostility in the “repression of Ukrainian independence.&amp;amp;quot; Judging by this thesis popular nowadays, the Holodomor had taken place at the start of the 1930s, however according to Trotsky “the Ukrainian problem has intensified at the start of this year”, that’s to say 1939.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn611|611]] Like Stalin, the leader of the anti-Stalinist opposition also wanted to unify all Ukrainians, although this time not within the USSR, but rather in an independent state. Would it have made sense to formulate that project while remaining totally silent on the genocide that had already taken place? In Trotsky’s opinion, the treachery of the Soviet bureaucracy consists of this: it erected monuments to the great national poet, Taras Shevchenko, but only to force the Ukrainian people to pay homage to their Moscovite oppressors in the language of their national poet.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn612|612]] As one can see, he does not speak of genocide, nor even ethnocide; for however strong the condemnation of the Stalinian regime may be, he doesn’t accuse it of either the physical or cultural destruction of the Ukrainian people. Whether inside or outside the communist movement, the enemies of Stalin converge on this essential acknowledgement.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fragility and the instrumentalization of the analogy between the Holodomor and the “final solution” is starting to become clear. Hitler and other Nazi leaders explicitly and repeatedly proclaimed that it’s necessary to proceed toward the annihilation of the Jews, compared to a bacteria, a virus, a pathogenic agent, whose extermination would allow for society to become healthy again. It would be useless to search for similar declarations by Soviet leaders with regards to the Ukrainian people (or Jewish people). It could be more interesting to compare the policy of Stalin’s USSR and Hitler’s Germany in relation, in both cases, to Ukraine. Hitler proclaimed on various occasions that Ukrainians, like all “subjugated peoples”, must be kept at the proper distance away from culture and education; it’s necessary to also destroy their historical memory; it would be good if they didn’t even know how to “read and write.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn613|613]] And that’s not all. One could “do well without” 80% to 90% of the local population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn614|614]] Above all else, one could totally do well without the intellectual classes. Their liquidation is the condition for transforming the subjugated people into a hereditary caste of slaves or semi-slaves, destined to work and die in service to the master race. The Nazi program is later clarified by Himmler. It’s a matter of immediately eliminating the Jews (whose presence is important with regard to the intellectual classes) and to reduce to a “minimum” the total Ukrainian population to clear the way for the “future German colonization.&amp;amp;quot; That is how―the historian cited here comments―in Ukraine as well the “construction of the Nazi empire” and the “Holocaust” go hand and hand; and in it those very same Ukrainian nationalists take part, and they constitute the principal sources for Conquest’s book and will later act as his principal propagandists.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn615|615]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Relative to the Third Reich, Soviet power moves in the precise opposite direction. We learned of the &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; policy, promoted by Soviet power in relation to national minorities and Ukrainian “brothers and comrades”, to take the words used by Stalin soon after the October Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn616|616]] In effect, who most decisively promotes “affirmative action” in favor of the Ukrainian people is precisely that figure who today is considered responsible for the Holodomor. In 1921 he rejects the notion of those for whom “the Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian nation were an invention of the Germans.&amp;amp;quot; No; “it’s evident that the Ukrainian nation exists and that communists should develop its culture.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn617|617]] Starting from that basis, they carry out the “Ukrainization” of culture, schools, the press, publishers, party cadre and the state apparatus. Lazar Kaganovich, who is a loyal associate to Stalin, and who in March of 1925 becomes party secretary in Ukraine, gives particular attention to that policy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn618|618]] The results don’t take very long: in 1931 the publication of books in Ukrainian “reaches its peak of 6,218 out of 8,086 titles, nearly 77%”, while “the percentage of Russians in the party, around 72% in 1922, had been reduced to 52%.&amp;amp;quot; It’s also necessary to have in mind the development of the Ukrainian industrial apparatus, Stalin again insisting on its importance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn619|619]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One can seek to minimize all of this, referring to the persistent monopoly on power exercised in Moscow by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, that policy of Ukrainization has such a strong impact that it is forced to confront resistance from Russians:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The former in any case were disillusioned with the solution given to the national question in the USSR. The equalization of Russia with the other federal republics shocked them, the rights extended to minorities within the Russian Republic irritated them, the anti-Russian rhetoric of the regime angered them [...] and it weighed upon them the fact that Russians were the only nationality of the federation that didn’t have a party of their own, nor a science academy of their own.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn620|620]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only does it not make sense to compare the Soviet policies to that of the Nazis, but the first, in fact, proves to be fully superior to that of the Whites (supported by the liberal West). Conquest himself ends up recognizing this against his will. Placing himself on a line of continuity in relation to Tsarist autocracy, Denikin “refused to admit the existence of Ukrainians.&amp;amp;quot; Precisely the opposite attitude of Stalin who praises “the Ukrainization of Ukrainian cities.&amp;amp;quot; After the success of this policy a new and especially positive page has been turned:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In April of 1923, at the XII Congress of the [communist] party, the policy of “Ukrainization” obtained full legal recognition. For the first time since the nineteenth century, a stable Ukrainian government included in its program the defense and development of the Ukrainian language and culture [...]. The Ukrainian cultural figures who returned to their country did it with the real hope that a Soviet Ukraine could also give life to its national rebirth. And in large part, for some years, they were right. Poetry and prose, linguistic and historical works had a wide and intense circulation among all classes, while all past literature was reprinted on a large scale.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn621|621]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We have seen that this policy is in force, and even in full development, in Ukraine at the start of the 1930s. Of course, soon a terrible conflict and famine will follow; however, it remains a mystery how over such a short period of time it can switch from radical affirmative action in favor of Ukrainians to planning their extermination. It’s good not to forget that Ukrainian nationalist circles played an important role in the elaboration and promotion of the &#039;&#039;Holodomor&#039;&#039; thesis, after having carried out “many pogroms” against Jews during the years of the civil war,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn622|622]] often times collaborating with the Nazi invaders, immersed in the realization of the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; After having simultaneously functioned as an instrument of demonization and of convenient self-absolution, the Holodomor thesis becomes a formidable ideological weapon in the final period of the Cold War and in the program for the Soviet Union’s dismemberment.&lt;br /&gt;
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A last consideration. During the twentieth century the “genocide” accusation and “Holocaust” denunciation were utilized in the most different ways. We’ve already seen a number of examples. One more should be added. On October 20th, 1941, the &#039;&#039;Chicago Tribune&#039;&#039; reports the passionate appeal led by Herbert Hoover for an end to the blockade imposed by Great Britain on Germany. A few months earlier the war of extermination was unleashed by the Third Reich against the Soviet Union, but on this the ex-president of the United States didn’t say a word. He concentrates on the terrible conditions of the civilian populations in the occupied countries (in Warsaw, the “child mortality rate is ten times higher than the birth rate”) and he called for an end to “this holocaust”, the blockade being useless in any case, given that it wasn’t able to halt the advance of the Wehrmacht.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn623|623]] It’s apparent that Hoover is interested in discrediting the country or countries on whose side F.D. Roosevelt is prepared to intervene; and it should be said that it has been lost from memory this supposed “holocaust” for which the champion of isolationism blamed London and in part Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Terror Famines in the History of the Liberal West ===&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, besides distorting history, what completely invalidates the discourse by “the Cold War veteran” is his silence. One can start with the debate that occurs in the House of Commons on October 28th, 1948: Churchill denounces the widening conflict between Hindus and Muslims and the “horrible holocaust” that is overtaking India after independence was conceded by the Labour government, and after the dismantlement of the British Empire. Then a Labour MP interrupted the speaker: “Why don’t you talk about the famine in India?” The former prime minister tries to avoid it but his interlocutor insists: “Why don’t you speak of the famine in India, that the previous conservative government had been responsible for?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn624|624]] The reference is to the famine, stubbornly denied by Churchill, that from 1943-1944 caused three million deaths in Bengal. Neither of the two sides remember, however, the famine that took place some decades earlier, also in colonial India: in this case, it’s twenty to thirty million people who lose their lives. Often forced to carry out “hard labor” with a diet inferior to that provided to the prisoners of the “infamous Buchenwald &#039;&#039;Lager&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot; On this occasion, the racist component was explicit and declared. The British bureaucrats said that it was “a mistake to spend so much money to save a lot of black fellows.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, according to the viceroy Sir Richard Temple, those who had lost their lives were mostly beggars without any real intention of working: “Nor will many be inclined to grieve much for the fate which they brought upon themselves, and which terminated lives of idleness and too often of crime.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn625|625]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With World War II over, Sir Victor Gollancz, a Jew who arrived in England after having fled antisemitic persecution in Germany, publishes &#039;&#039;The Ethics of Starvation&#039;&#039; in 1946 and &#039;&#039;In Darkest Germany&#039;&#039; a year later. The author denounces the policy of hunger that, after the defeat of the Third Reich, befalls prisoners and the German people, continually at risk of death by starvation. Infant mortality was ten times more elevated than in 1944, a year that was particularly tragic; the rations available to the Germans are dangerously close to those enforced in “Bergen Belsen.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn626|626]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the two cases just cited, it’s not Soviet Ukraine that is compared to a Nazi concentration camp, but the work camps of British subjugated India and the occupation regime imposed on those defeated by the liberal West. The latter accusation appears more persuasive, as is confirmed by the most recent and exhaustive book published on the topic: “The Germans were much better fed in the Soviet Zone.&amp;amp;quot; The country that had suffered the genocidal policy of the Third Reich, and because of that policy continued suffering shortages, was more generous. In effect, what led the liberal West to inflict death by starvation on those it defeated was not a lack of resources, but ideology: “Politicians and the military―like Sir Bernard Montgomery―insist that no food should be sent by Great Britain. Death by starvation was the punishment. Montgomery insisted that three quarters of all Germans were still Nazis.&amp;amp;quot; For exactly that reason fraternization was prohibited: it was necessary to not give a word and much less a smile to members of a people totally and irredeemably wicked. The American soldier was warned: “In heart, body, and soul, every German is Hitler.&amp;amp;quot; Even a young woman could prove deadly: “Don’t be like Samson with Delilah; she would love to cut your hair and then your throat.&amp;amp;quot; This hate campaign explicitly sought to remove all sense of compassion and therefore guarantee the success of the “ethics of punishment by starvation.&amp;amp;quot; American soldiers should also remain unmoved when faced with starving children: “in the blonde haired German child [...] lurks a Nazi.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn627|627]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the tragedies of Bengal and Ukraine are explained by the list of priorities dictated by the approach or the intensification of the Second World War, which imposes the concentration of limited resources on the struggle against a mortal enemy,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn628|628]] then one can speak accurately of a planned terror famine with regards to Germany immediately after the defeat of the Third Reich, where the lack of resources plays no role at all, but is instead influenced to a considerable degree by the racialization of a people, who F.D. Roosevelt for some period of time has the temptation of eliminating from the face of the earth by means of “castration.&amp;amp;quot; One could even say that it was the start of the Cold War that saved the Germans (and the Japanese), or at least noticeably lessened their suffering: in the struggle against the new enemy they could be useful and valuable cannon fodder, offering their experience to their former enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it is useless to search for any mention of the famine in British colonial India or of the West’s Bergen Belsen in Germany in the books by the “Cold War veteran”, dedicated to pushing through a scheme constructed &#039;&#039;a priori&#039;&#039; through historical revisionism: all the Nazi infamies are only the replica of communist infamies; therefore, the Hitlerian Bergen Belsen is modeled off the Bergen Belsen &#039;&#039;ante litteram&#039;&#039; for which Stalin is responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fully coherent with such a scheme, Conquest completely ignores the fact that hunger and the threat of death by starvation is a constant factor in the relations instituted by the West with barbarians, as well as with enemies that are compared to barbarians. After the Revolution in Saint-Domingue, fearing the political contagion from the first country in the Americas to abolish slavery, Jefferson declares that he’s ready to “subject Toussaint to death by starvation.&amp;amp;quot; Tocqueville demands that the crops be burnt and silos emptied should the Arabs dare to resist the French conquest in Algeria. Five decades later, with that same war tactic which condemns an entire people to hunger or death by starvation, the United States strangulates the resistance in the Philippines. Even when it’s not intentionally planned, a famine is an opportunity not to be wasted. In the time period in which Tocqueville seeks to create a desert around rebellious Arabs, a devastating disease destroys the potato harvest in Ireland and decimates a population already heavily strained by the looting and oppression by English colonizers. In the eyes of Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan (charged by the London of government with monitoring and dealing with the situation) the tragedy appears to be the expression of “divine providence”, that thus solves the problem of overpopulation (and also the endemic rebellion of a barbarian population). In this sense, British policy was, at times, classified as “proto-Eichmann”, protagonists of a tragedy that could be considered the prototype to the genocides of the twentieth century.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn629|629]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s focus on the twentieth century, however. The methods traditionally used at the expense of colonized peoples could also be useful in the struggle for hegemony between the great powers. With the outbreak of World War I, Britain subjects Germany to a criminal naval blockade, whose significance Churchill explains in these terms: “The British blockade treats all of Germany as a besieged fort and explicitly intends to reduce the entire population to starvation, thus forcing it into capitulation: men, women and children, old and young, the injured and healthy.&amp;amp;quot; The blockade continues in force for months even after the armistice, and once again it is Churchill who explains the need for the prolonged recourse to that “weapon of hunger and even starvation, that above all else impacts women and children, the elderly, the weak and the poor”; the defeated must fully accept the peace terms of the victors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn630|630]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But with the threatening emergence of Soviet Russia, there’s now a different enemy. If Jefferson feared the contagion from the Haitian Revolution, Wilson is worried about containing the Bolshevik Revolution. The methods remain the same. To prevent it possibly following the example of Soviet Russia, Austria―in the words of Gramsci―faces a “brigand’s blackmail”; “Either bourgeois order or hunger!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn631|631]] In effect, some time later it is Herbert Hoover, high representative of the Wilson administration and future US president, who warns Austrian authorities that “any disturbance of public order will make impossible the delivery of food supplies and leave Vienna facing absolute hunger.&amp;amp;quot; And later it will be the same American politician who offers this summary, in which he explicitly boasts: “fear of starving to death kept the Austrian people away from revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn632|632]] As you can see, it’s Jefferson and Hoover who explicitly theorize the very “terror famine” for which Conquest denounces Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are in the presence of a policy that continues unabated in our time. In June of 1996, an article by the director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights highlights the terrible consequences of the “collective punishment” inflicted on the Iraqi people through the embargo: “more than 500,0000 Iraqi children” have “died of hunger or illness.&amp;amp;quot; Many others were on the brink of suffering the same fate. An unofficial magazine of the State Department, &#039;&#039;Foreign Affairs&#039;&#039;, reaches a more general conclusion: after the overthrow of “real socialism”, in a world unified under the hegemony of the US, the embargo constitutes the weapon of mass destruction par excellence; officially imposed to prevent Saddam Hussein from gaining weapons of mass destruction, the embargo on Iraq “in the years following the Cold War, has caused more deaths than all weapons of mass destruction in history” combined. Therefore, it’s as if the Arab country has endured at the same time the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the mustard gas attacks by Wilhelm II and Benito Mussolini, and still yet other examples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn633|633]] In conclusion: the policy of “terror famine” for which Stalin is blamed is deeply embedded in the history of the West, and in the twentieth century is first put into practice against the country that emerged out of the October Revolution, and then finds its triumph after the overthrow of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Perfect Symmetries and Self-Absolution: Stalin’s Anti-Semitism? ===&lt;br /&gt;
For however sophisticated the game of analogies may be, the construction of the myth of the two twin monsters doesn’t appear to be completed quite yet. Despite the efforts to make the Ukrainian &#039;&#039;Holodomor&#039;&#039; correspond to the Jewish Holocaust, in the consciousness of our time the name Auschwitz causes an entirely unique horror. Maybe the association of Stalin to Hitler could be considered definitive if the former was affected by the madness that led to the Judeocide carried out by the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Khrushchev recalls that, towards the end of his life, Stalin had suspicions that the doctors who treated the country’s leaders were in fact participants in an imperialist conspiracy that aimed at decapitating the Soviet Union. The &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; doesn’t mention it, but there was no small number of Jews among the doctors under suspicion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn634|634]] And from there one can begin adding some depth to the portrait of the Soviet monster with a new and decisive detail: “the deep antisemitism of Stalin and his followers”, Medvedev declares, “was not a secret to anyone.&amp;amp;quot; On the “official antisemitism of the Soviet State”, Hobsbawm specifies, “there are undeniable vestiges since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948.&amp;amp;quot; The American historian on ethnic cleansing and racial hatred that we’ve already encountered goes a bit further back: “By the end of the war, Stalin had shared many aspects of Hitler’s antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot; Furet goes even further: “Since the start of Hitlerism, Stalin never showed the most minimal compassion for the Jews.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn635|635]] Naturally, Conquest is the most radical of them all: “always latent in Stalin’s spirit”, the antisemitism began to show in full force “starting from 1942-1943” till becoming “generalized” in 1948.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn636|636]] It’s at this point that the construction of the myth of the two twin monsters can be considered completed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before analyzing the extreme fragility of that construction, it ought to be noted that it’s simultaneously useful in repressing the West’s serious responsibility in the tragedy that the Jews suffer in the twentieth century. It’s a tragedy with three acts and a prologue. In 1911 Chamberlain’s book (&#039;&#039;The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century&#039;&#039;) is translated into English, entirely dedicated to reading world history from a racial perspective (Aryan and antisemitic). Now it can be truly understood the leading role played by the Anglo-German author as the &#039;&#039;maítre à penser&#039;&#039; of Nazism. Especially exalted in tone is Goebbels who, upon seeing him sick and bedridden, offers a prayer of sorts: “Good health to you, father of our spirit. Precursor, pioneer!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn637|637]] In no less inspired terms, Chamberlain, in turn, sees in Hitler a type of savior, and not just for Germany.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn638|638]] After seizing power, and while passionately absorbed in the task of leading the war that he has unleashed, the Führer warmly recalls the encouragement that Chamberlain offered to him during his time in prison.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn639|639]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So, how was this work which was crucial to the Nazi worldview and racial ideology received in the West? In Britain, the reaction from the press is enthusiastic, beginning with &#039;&#039;The Times,&#039;&#039; which endlessly applauds the masterpiece and praises it as “one of the rare books that has some importance.&amp;amp;quot; On the other side of the Atlantic, the review by an authoritative statesman like Theodore Roosevelt is overwhelmingly positive.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn640|640]] On the opposing side, it’s Kautsky who expresses his full disdain for Chamberlain and other “racial theorists”; at that time (before the start of the war) Kautsky is venerated as a maestro to the workers movement and the socialist movement as a whole, including by Stalin. The later in 1907 defines the German author as a “distinguished theorist of social democracy”, due in part to his contribution to the analysis and the denunciation of antisemitism and the “pogroms against Jews” in Tsarist Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn641|641]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s now turn to the first act of the tragedy. It unfolds in pre-revolutionary Russia, an ally of the Entente during World War I. Discriminated against and oppressed, the Jews are suspected of sympathizing with the enemy and the German invader. The Russian general-staff warns of their espionage activities. Some are kept as hostages and threatened with execution should the “Jewish community” show a lack of patriotic loyalty; alleged spies are executed.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn642|642]] That’s not all. At the start of 1915, in the areas attacked by the German army, a mass deportation is ordered. A representative in the Duma describes the details of the operation as follows: in Radom, at 11pm,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the population is informed that it must leave the city, under the threat that anyone found by dawn will be hanged [...]. Due to the lack of means of transportation, the elderly and the disabled must be carried out by hand. Police and soldiers treat the Jews as criminals. In one case, a train was completely sealed shut, and when it&#039;s finally reopened, most of those inside were dying. Of the half a million Jews subjected to deportation measures, one hundred thousand didn’t survive.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn643|643]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The October Revolution breaks out in the wake of the struggle against the war and the horrors that accompany it. It’s inspired by Marx and Engels, who had written in the middle of the nineteenth century: “the times of superstition have passed, when revolution was blamed on the subversion of a handful of agitators.&amp;amp;quot; Unfortunately, it’s a prediction that was catastrophically mistaken. The rise to power in Russia of a movement that’s inspired by “Marx, the Jew”, and has a strong Jewish presence in its leadership, inaugurates the age in which the conspiracy theory celebrates its triumph. In a Russia torn apart by civil war, pogroms and massacres against Jews―considered to be those controlling Bolshevism―are the order of the day. The new Soviet power is committed to stopping this horror: tough new laws are issued and Lenin demands the elimination “of hostility against Jews and the hatred of other nations” during a speech that’s recorded so that it can reach millions of illiterate people.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn644|644]] Britain, France, and the United States remained on the side of the Whites, and at times they actively participated in the bloody antisemitic agitation. In the summer of 1918, the British forces that land in Northern Russia distributed antisemitic flyers by air on a massive scale.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn645|645]] Some months later pogroms of a tremendous dimension take place in which around seventy-thousand Jews lost their lives. “They say that the allies, then concentrated on their invasion of Russia, had secretly supported the pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn646|646]] It’s a preview, authoritative historians observe, to the “crimes of Nazism” and the “extermination during World War II”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn647|647]] and it’s a preview that sees active British participation, leading the anti-Bolshevik crusade at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at the third act. Despite Western aid, the Whites are defeated by the Bolsheviks and emigrate to the West, bringing with them the denunciation of the October Revolution as a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy, and &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039; confirm that understanding beyond any doubt.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this doesn’t come without consequences. In England, the “official publishers of His Majesty” print the English edition of &#039;&#039;The Protocols&#039;&#039;, soon after cited by &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039; as the proof of a secret plot that was threatening the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn648|648]] It then develops into a campaign to which Winston Churchill is no stranger, who takes part in denouncing the role of Judaism not only in Russia, but in the whole cycle of subversion that, starting in the eighteenth century, had shaken the West:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This movement among Jews is not new. It has grown since the days of Spartakus Weishaupt [the Bavarian Illuminati] until the days of Karl Marx, and later Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany) and Emma Goldman (United States), this world conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the transformation of society into one based on restricted development, on a wicked jealousy and on an impossible equality. As has been wisely demonstrated by a contemporary author, Mr. Webster, [this movement] had a leading role in the tragedy of the French Revolution. It constituted the motor behind all subversive tendencies in the nineteenth century, and now that band of extraordinary personalities, coming from out of the slums of the major European and American cities, have grabbed the Russian people by the neck, and in practice, have become the undeniable masters of a powerful state.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn649|649]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As late as 1937, while expressing a positive opinion on Hitler, Churchill incessantly stresses the Jewish origins of a central leader of Bolshevik Russia, that is, “Trotsky, also known as Lev Bronstein.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, “he had always been a Jew. Nothing could wipe out that characteristic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn650|650]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side of the Atlantic, It’s Henry Ford who encourages the promotion of &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;. Ford declares: “The Russian Revolution has a racial origin, not a political one”, and it, in making use of humanitarian and socialist slogans, in reality expresses a “racial aspiration for world domination.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn651|651]] Aside from the American auto-industry tycoon, it’s the champions of white supremacy who stands out the most for their denunciation of the hidden Jewish control of the revolutionary movement that’s―after having overthrown the Tsarist regime―undermining the foundations of the West. Madison Grant warns of the “Semitic leadership” over “Bolshevism”, and Lothrop Stoddard classifies the “Bolshevik regime of Soviet Russia” as “largely Jewish.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn652|652]] Stoddard becomes the author of reference to two American presidents. (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 3).&lt;br /&gt;
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In this climate, voices arise in North American republic that call for radical measures with the aim of confronting “Jewish Imperialism, and its ultimate objective of establishing Jewish domination over the world.&amp;amp;quot; A hard fate―even more threatening voices rage―awaits the people responsible for this vile project: they suggest “massacres of Jews [...] such that were considered unthinkable until now”, therefore, “of an unprecedented scale in modern times.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn653|653]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Reading these recurring convictions in Churchill, Ford, and the other American authors cited above, we are led to think of the antisemitic agitation carried in even more inflammatory tones by the Nazis. From the anti-Bolshevik emigration they find not only ideas, but also the financial means, as well as an important number of militants and personnel[[footnotes.xhtml#fn654|654]] One only has to think of Rosenberg, one of the major figures who defines the October Revolution as a Jewish conspiracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, from its start, the tragedy of the Jewish people in the twentieth century has the active participation of the liberal West and both pre-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary Russia. All of that is wiped out by the accusation of antisemitism directed at the person who had for more time than any other led the country that emerged from the October Revolution, or the “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Antisemitism and Colonial Racism: The Churchill-Stalin Polemic ===&lt;br /&gt;
The black legend that we are analyzing also allows them to hide the colonial racism and the racism of colonial origin that still raged in the West during the twentieth century. In regards to that, the significance of the historic rupture represented by Lenin is summarized in these terms by Stalin:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Before, the colonial question was usually limited to a restricted group of problems that had to do with “civilized” nations: the Irish, Hungarians, Polish, Finnish, Serbs, and some other European nationalities. That was the group of peoples, deprived of equal rights, whose fate interested the heroes of the Second International. Dozens and hundreds of millions of men belonging to the peoples of Asia and Africa, who suffered national oppression in its most brutal and ferocious forms, were generally not taken into consideration. It was decided not to put whites and blacks on the same level, “civilized” and “uncivilized” [...]. Leninism has exposed this scandalous injustice; he toppled the wall that separated whites and blacks, Europeans and Asians, “civilized” and “uncivilized” slaves of imperialism, in that way linking the national question with the colonial question.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn655|655]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in 1924. These are in years in which an American author, Stoddard, enjoys great success on both sides of the Atlantic in denouncing the mortal threat to the West and the white race represented by the agitation of the colonial peoples (stimulated and encouraged by Bolsheviks), or the “growing tide of colored peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn656|656]] This tendency celebrating white supremacy continues to be vibrant in the following decades.&lt;br /&gt;
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While Stalin also condemns the process of racialization put in place by the West at the expense of the peoples of Asia, it’s interesting to analyze the ideology that manifests itself in the United States during the war against Japan. The press and the ever present propaganda warns against the “racial threat”: we are facing “a holy war, a racial war”, “an unending war between Eastern and Western ideas.&amp;amp;quot; There’s a recurring dehumanization of the enemy, reduced to subhumans or actual animals. And it&#039;s an ideology with which the leadership in the Roosevelt administration is not unfamiliar.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn657|657]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, colonial racism in some ways continues to manifest itself in the capitals of the West even after the collapse of the Empire of the Rising Sun and the Third Reich. In Fulton, in March of 1946, Churchill inaugurates the propaganda campaign for the Cold War, condemning not only an “Iron Curtain” and the “totalitarian control” imposed by the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe, but also celebrating, in opposition to all that, the “English speaking peoples” and the “English speaking world” as the champions of freedom and “Christian Civilization” that will lead the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn658|658]] It’s understandable then the angry response from Stalin: the British statesman is accused of having formulated a “racial theory” no different to the one embraced by Hitler; “only English speaking nations are authentic nations, called upon to decide the destiny of the whole world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn659|659]] The simplifications of the Cold War are evident in that response. However, there’s no lack of similarities between the celebration of the English speaking peoples and Aryan mythology. From a linguistic community it’s implied the unity of the race that speaks the language; and as evidence for the excellence of that race, they cite the cultural products of the Aryan languages or the English language. In his correspondence with Eisenhower, the language used by Churchill is even more unsettling: the “English speaking world” is synonymous with the “white English-speaking people.&amp;amp;quot; Its “unity” is absolutely necessary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn660|660]] The “differences between the races closely bound to Europe” must be liquidated once and for all, differences which have caused two world wars.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn661|661]] The threat arising from the colonial world and outside the West can be confronted only in that way. Thus, it’s understood the appeal made in 1953 by Churchill, primarily to the United States: It’s necessary to support Britain in its conflict with Egypt “with the aim of preventing a massacre of white people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn662|662]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only Arabs who are alien to the white race. The communist world, that encourages the revolt of the colonial peoples against the white man, is the expression of “an aggressive &#039;&#039;semi-Asiatic&#039;&#039; totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn663|663]] Clearly, the Cold War tends to be interpreted as a clash between the West, “Christian civilization”, and the white race―led by the “English speaking world” or by the “white English-speaking people”―on the one hand, and the barbarians of the colonial and communist world on the other. In this context, the celebration of both the “British Empire” as well as the “British race” fits perfectly.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn664|664]] And given that there will be no reference to the fact that the extermination of the Jews occurred in the heart of the West and the white world, and was perpetuated by one of the “races most closely related to Europe”, so nothing will be said of the continued oppression suffered by African Americans in the United States of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Eisenhower, the celebration of the “Western world” and ”Western morality”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn665|665]] also tends to assume racial connotations at times. Speaking with Hoover and Dulles in July of 1956, he observes that, with the nationalization of the Suez canal, Nasser aims to “topple the white man.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn666|666]] Still fresh is the memory of the Korean War, carried out by Washington―an American historian recognizes―with a disdainful attitude toward “an inferior nation” (the Chinese).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn667|667]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Trotsky and the Accusation of Anti-Semitism against Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s return, however, to the accusation of antisemitism made against Stalin. Endorsed by no small number of historians, it would seem irrefutable. Yet, despite the incontestable tone, the condemnations are difficult to square with one another, given they proceed from different and opposing reconstructions of the crimes whose origin is increasingly located further back in time: 1948, 1945, 1933, or in the years before the October Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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In attempting to orient ourselves, let’s ask a different question, that in any case is a preliminary one: when was the first time Stalin was accused or suspected of antisemitism? In that case, rather than Khrushchev, we must go back to Trotsky who, in 1937, together with the “Betrayal of the Revolution”, denounces the reemergence of the barbarism of antisemitism in the Soviet Union itself: “Until this point of history, there’s been no example of a reaction that has followed a revolutionary advance that’s not been accompanied by the most foul and chauvinistic passions, including antisemitism!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn668|668]] Rather than an empirical investigation, we are dealing with a syllogism constructed a priori: reaction, whose result is necessarily antisemitism, has unfortunately triumphed in the country ruled by Stalin, so therefore… In liquidating the Bolshevik conquests, Thermidor was reopening the doors to the horrors of the old regime: together with religious superstition, the cult to private property, inheritance, and the family; unavoidable was the reappearance of animosity between nations, and especially the hatred of Jews. It’s not by chance that this denunciation is found in a work that in its very title directly and tightly links &#039;&#039;Thermidor and Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The October Revolution put an end to the outcast status of Jews. But that doesn’t in any way mean that it has forever wiped out antisemitism. The long and continuous struggle against religion doesn’t prevent thousands and thousands of the faithful from filling the churches, mosques, and synagogues. The same situation dominates the field of national prejudices. Legislation alone doesn’t change men. Their thoughts, their sentiments, their visions depend on tradition, the material conditions of life, their cultural level, etc. The Soviet regime isn’t yet twenty years old. Half the population, the oldest, were education under Tsarism. The other half, the youngest, inherited much from the older half. Nevertheless, these general and historical conditions ought to allow each thinking man to recognize this fact: despite the exemplary legislation of the October Revolution, it’s impossible that national and chauvinistic prejudices, especially antisemitism, have not stubbornly survived among the most backward segments of the population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn669|669]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing in that way, Trotsky shifted his attention from the state to civil society, from the subjective level to the objective level, from the momentary character of political action to the long duration of historical processes. By definition, the weight of a secular tradition couldn’t miraculously disappear in the segments of the population that had not yet fully adopted modern and revolutionary culture. But what sense was there, then, in accusing a regime or leadership group, who had in no way altered the “exemplary legislation” approved by the Bolsheviks, and who, in committing to a colossal process of industrialization, expanding literacy and access to culture, had continuously restricted the social and geographic areas in which “national and chauvinistic prejudices, particularly antisemitism”, were deeply rooted? Was it not Trotsky himself who spoke of the unprecedented speed with which the USSR developed the economy, industry, urbanization and culture, and verified the rise of a “new Soviet patriotism”, a sentiment “certainly deep, sincere and dynamic”, shared by the various nationalities previously oppressed or incited against one another? (&#039;&#039;Supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 4, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the same year that Trotsky publishes his work on &#039;&#039;Thermidor and Antisemitism&#039;&#039;, a “travel report” was published in Moscow, written by a German writer who was fleeing the Third Reich because he was Jewish. The picture that he draws is eloquent in itself: finally resolved was “the old and apparently unsolvable Jewish question”, “there&#039;s a moving consensus in support for the new State among the Jews I&#039;ve met..&amp;amp;quot; And yet more: “Like all national languages, Yiddish is lovingly cared for in the Union. There’s schools and newspapers in that language, there’s literature, and congresses are held for the supervision of Yiddish, and the performances in this language enjoy the highest consideration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn670|670]] Even more significant is the reaction of the American Jewish community. An authoritative representative responds to Trotsky as follows: “If his other accusations are as baseless as his complaint against antisemitism, then he has absolutely nothing to say.&amp;amp;quot; Another leader states: “In relation to antisemitism, we are used to seeing in the Soviet Union our only glimmer of light [...]. Therefore, it’s unforgivable that Trotsky launches such baseless accusations against Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn671|671]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There&#039;s evident disappointment and unease in this reaction to that ridiculous effort by Trotsky, understood as an attempt to involve the international Jewish community in the power struggle that was underway in the CPSU. While in Germany the denunciation of the “Judeo-Bolshevism” that ravaged the Soviet Union became more frantic than ever, and the process that would lead to the “final solution” was quickly advancing, a strange campaign of insinuations was launched against the country that, as we shall see, more courageously than any other, classified Hitler’s antisemitism as “cannibalistic”; against the country that very often inspired those who in German territory resisted the wave of hatred against the Jews. Victor Klemperer emotionally described the insults and humiliations that wearing the Star of David meant. And yet:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A porter who has grown fond of me since the first two relocations [...] suddenly stands in front of me on Freiberger street, puts his arms around me and whispers, but in a way so that they can even hear him on the other side of the street: “so professor, don’t let them walk over you! Soon those damn Nazis will be finished!”&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jewish philologist with affectionate irony adds that those who defied the regime in such a way “were good people whose membership in the German Communist Party could be smelled from a mile away.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn672|672]] They were members or sympathizers of a party that, at the international level, had Stalin as their essential point of reference.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, if we move on from Germany to the United States, we see that communists are sometimes branded as (and persecuted both by state authorities as well as by civil society) Jews, who take advantage of the ignorance of blacks to turn them against the regime of white supremacy, tarnishing the idea of racial hierarchy and purity, and promoting the madness of equality and racial intermixing.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn673|673]] Therefore, on the other side of the Atlantic as well, anti-communism is fused with antisemitism (in addition to colonial racism), and that relation is even closer due the fact that in the (“Stalinist”) Communist Party of the United States there’s a strong Jewish presence.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn674|674]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, aside from disappointment and annoyance, in the American Jewish community’s reaction there’s also an element of profound concern. To understand it, let’s see how Trotsky’s line of argument develops:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;More than any other regime in the world, the Soviet regime needs a high number of state employees. The state employees come from the educated urban population. Naturally, Jews represent a very large percentage of the bureaucracy, especially at the lower and middle levels [...]. Now with this reflection as starting point, one must reach the conclusion that the hatred against the bureaucracy will have an antisemitic tone, at least where Jews constitute a significant percentage of the population and clearly stand out from the rural surroundings. In 1923, at the Bolshevik Party Conference, it was proposed that employees be obligated to speak and write the language of the local population where they worked. How many ironic observations came, especially from the Jewish intelligentsia, who spoke Russian and didn’t want to learn the Ukrainian language! Of course, on this aspect, the situation improved considerably. But the national composition of the bureaucracy has barely changed, and―what is immeasurably more important―the antagonism between the people and the bureaucracy has grown enormously in the last ten or twelve years.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn675|675]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As can be seen, he calls for the struggle against the bureaucracy, and at the same time stresses that Jewish people are widely represented in it, and who are often characterized by arrogance in relation to the language and culture of the people they govern. Of course, the analysis and the denunciation operate at both the political and social level; it remains clear that they, at least from the point of view of the Jewish community, run the risk of evoking and revitalizing the specter of antisemitism that they sought to exorcise.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin and the Condemnation of Tsarist and Nazi Anti-Semitism ===&lt;br /&gt;
The accusation of antisemitism directed at Stalin is all the more unique for the fact that he is committed to denouncing that scourge during practically his entire political evolution. As early as 1901, when he is still a young twenty year old Georgian revolutionary, we see him, in one of his very first written works, indicate that the struggle against the oppression of “nationalities and religious confessions” in Russia is among the most important tasks of the “social democratic party.&amp;amp;quot; Particularly targeted were “the Jews, continually persecuted and insulted, deprived of those miserable rights that other Russian subjects enjoyed: the right to move freely, the right to attend school, the right to occupy public job positions, etc.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn676|676]] A few years after the outbreak of the 1905 revolution, he writes: the Tsarist regime reacts by encouraging or unleashing pogroms. Stalin doesn’t waste any time in calling for the struggle against a policy that seeks to reinforce the autocracy “with the blood and corpses of its citizens.&amp;amp;quot; The conclusion is clear: “The only way to eradicate the pogroms is through the destruction of the Tsarist autocracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn677|677]] As one can see, the anti-Jewish persecution is one of the most important accusations made in the charges directed at the old regime, which the revolution is called upon to overthrow.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theme developed in the following years. On the eve of the First World War, Tsarist Russia’s “semi-Asiatic” character is demonstrated by the particularly vile persecution unleashed against the Jews; unfortunately, the recourse to pogroms is favored by the “general inclination to antisemitism by the common people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn678|678]] The collapse of Tsarist rule and the old “landed aristocracy”―Stalin later observes―between February and October of 1917, finally allows the elimination of a program of “national oppression” that “could assume, and effectively assumed, the most monstrous forms of massacres and pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn679|679]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Defeated in Russia, antisemitism becomes an ever more frightening threat in Germany. In raising the alarm, Stalin doesn’t wait for Hitler’s rise to power: in a declaration made on January 12th, 1931, to the American &#039;&#039;Jewish Telegraph Agency&#039;&#039;, he classifies “racial chauvinism” and antisemitism as a type of “cannibalism”, and the return to “the jungle”; it’s a stance that is republished in Russia, in Pravda on November 30th, 1936, at a time when it was a matter of warning governments and world opinion against the terrible threat that loomed over Europe and the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn680|680]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In that same context, one can put the stance taken by Kirov (whose wife is of Jewish origin) soon after Hitler’s rise to power: he denounces “German fascism, with its ideology of pogroms, its antisemitism, its vision of superior and inferior races”, as the successor to the Russian Black Hundreds.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn681|681]] That last observation is particularly significant. By now there’s a climate of war, the approaching clash increasingly led Soviet leaders to appeal to the history of the Russian people and its struggle against aggressors and invaders. It’s a tendency that is obviously strengthened with the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. However, on November 6th of 1941, Stalin doesn’t just put the emphasis on the “pogromist and reactionary nature” of Nazi Germany; he goes on to characterize the enemy then pressing at the gates of Moscow as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In its essence, Hitler’s regime is a copy of that reactionary regime that existed under Tsarism. It’s well known that the Nazis trampled on the rights of workers, the rights of intellectuals, and the rights of peoples, just as the Tsarist regime trampled over them, and that it unleashed medieval pogroms against the Jews, just as the Tsarist regime unleashed them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Nazi party is a party of the enemies of democratic freedoms, a party of medieval reaction and the most sinister pogroms.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn682|682]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, although he is launching an impassioned appeal for national unity against the invaders in the Great Patriotic War, just like Kirov, Stalin classifies the Nazi regime as the successor, in some essential aspects, to the Tsarism that was toppled by the October Revolution. That attitude deserves all the more attention, especially when compared to the position taken by the United States president and by his advisors, who “hesitated in publicly criticizing the German dictator’s antisemitic policies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn683|683]] Moreover, in 1922, F. D. Roosevelt himself declared his support for a reduction in Jewish attendance at Harvard and in American universities in general.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn684|684]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A statesman like Churchill would be even less able to make a public condemnation of the Third Reich’s persecution of Jews, as we saw him as late as 1937 stress the nefarious role of Judaism in Bolshevik agitation. In that same year the English statesman writes an article (that remained unpublished) that considers the Jews at least partly responsible for the hostility directed at them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn685|685]] Stalin’s position is the complete opposite; the Nazis continued to be classified, in the speech from November 6th of 1943, as the “champions of pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn686|686]] But especially significant is the speech delivered in the following year, again on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. In this case, the usual denunciation of the “fascist champions of pogroms”, from whose barbarity the Soviet people had the credit of saving “European civilization”, is inserted in a more general context that stresses the centrality of “racial theory” and “racial hatred” in the doctrine and practices of Nazism, that led to a “cannibalistic program.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn687|687]] The speech at the end of 1944, on the eve of the collapse of the Third Reich, again took up the theme already present in the interview given to the &#039;&#039;Jewish Telegraph Agency&#039;&#039; two years before Hitler’s rise to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitler in turn, beginning with the attack on the Soviet Union, not only more obsessively takes up the slogan against the Judeo-Bolshevik threat, but it appears as if he seeks to directly respond to the public denouncement, coming from Moscow, of the “pogromist and reactionary nature” of the Third Reich. There’s Stalin speech, which we’ve already encountered, from November 6th of 1941, the anniversary of the October Revolution; and two days later, in Munich, at an equally solemn occasion for the Nazi regime (the commemoration of the coup attempt of 1923), Hitler makes an equally public denunciation of the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The man that has, for the time being, become head of that state is nothing more than an instrument in the hands of the all powerful Jews; while Stalin stands on stage before the curtain, behind him are Kaganovich and that expansive network of Jews who control that enormous empire.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn688|688]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theory that’s repeated at a tableside conversation some time later: “The Jews are behind Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn689|689]] We are faced with what is a constant theme in Nazi propaganda: by 1938 Goebbels had praised a book &#039;&#039;(Juden hinter Stalin [the Jews behind Stalin]&#039;&#039;), that aimed at revealing the infamy of Judaism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn690|690]] On that basis, the war for the enslavement of the Soviet Union is, at the same time, the war for the annihilation of the Jews. The infamous &#039;&#039;Kommissarbefehl&#039;&#039;, that orders the immediate elimination of political commissars of the Red Army and the cadre of the party and the communist state, would inevitably strike with particular cruelty against the ethnic group suspected of providing the bulk of the cadre and commissars. In his speech from November 8th, 1941, Hitler speaks of power in the Soviet Union as “an enormous organization of Jewish commissars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn691|691]] That is also the conviction of the German soldiers who, on the front, speak of the “Jewish and Bolshevik cruelty”, and constantly refer to the “cursed Jews” and the “damned Bolsheviks.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, the “struggle against Bolshevism” is simultaneously the “struggle against Judaism”; it’s a matter of annihilating once and for all “the Jewish regime in Russia”, “the base for Judeo-Bolshevik agitators determined to make the world ‘happy’.&amp;amp;quot; Considered carefully, it’s a country where “internal leadership of all institutions” is in the hands of Jews and where the people are “under the whip of Judaism.&amp;amp;quot; The so-called “Soviet paradise” is, in reality, “a paradise for the Jews”, it’s a “Jewish system”, and, to be precise, it’s “the most satanic and criminal system of all time.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn692|692]] It’s very understandable, then, that the ethnic group especially targeted by the Third Reich’s genocidal fury had distinguished itself in the fight against their tormentors: “During the war, in relation to its population, Jews earned more medals than any other Soviet nationality.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn693|693]] But is that solemn and official recognition compatible with the theory of Stalin’s antisemitism?&lt;br /&gt;
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We already saw the American Jewish community take a clear stance against this legend in 1937. Five years later, Arendt goes further: she attributed to the Soviet Union the merit of having “simply eliminated antisemitism” through “a just and very modern solution to the national question.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn694|694]] This positive evaluation is even more significant for the fact that it’s precisely this exemplary resolution of the Jewish and national question in the country governed by Stalin which is cited by Arendt to refute the thesis by Jewish publications that tend to agitate against the specter of an internal antisemitism. Three years later, the eminent Jewish thinker argues that it’s to the Soviet Union’s merit that it knew how to “organize diverse populations [including the Jewish one] on the basis of national equality.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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At least until 1945, there doesn’t appear to be traces of antisemitism in the Soviet Union, in a country that, in the eyes of Hitler―especially after Operation Barbarossa―has proven itself to be “the greatest servant of Judaism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn695|695]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin and the Support to the Foundation and Consolidation of Israel ===&lt;br /&gt;
If the assertive claim by Furet―according to which Stalin since 1933 had shown indifference with respect to the tragedy of the Jews, or an antisemitism in its most explicit form―clearly lacks any basis, will the timeline proposed by an American historian previously cited, who identifies that madness in Stalin following the Second World War, prove to be more convincing? We’ve already encountered the irritated reaction by the American Jewish community to the accusation of antisemitism directed at Stalin by Trotsky in 1937. Eight years later and the situation still hadn’t changed. Rather, there are prominent social circles and figures in the American military hierarchy who are a cause for concern. Take the example of general George S. Patton. He dreams of an immediate war against the Soviets: “We will have to fight them sooner or later [...]. Why not now while our army is still intact and while we can push all those damn Russians all the way back to Moscow in three months? We could easily do it with the German troops that we have, just arm them and take them with us. They hate those bastards.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn696|696]] Unfortunately, according to the American general, it’s the Jews who oppose this project. Full of resentment toward Germany, they harbor sympathy for the USSR: the “evident Semitic influence in the press” aims “to promote communism.&amp;amp;quot; There clearly emerges a line of continuity with the Nazi understanding of communism as a subversive Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy: the enemies continue to be the communists, the Soviets and the Jews, the latter being “lower than animals.&amp;amp;quot; After particularly imprudent statements, general Patton was relieved of his command, but he was not alone in that line of thinking.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn697|697]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While being accused of having links to Judaism, the Soviet Union does, in fact, follow a largely sympathetic policy in relation to the people that survived a horrible persecution. In reconstructing this chapter in history, I will mostly use one book, despite it being dedicated in denouncing the “antisemitism” of the socialist camp led by the USSR. We start in Hungary. The structure of the communist regime that was established following the arrival of the Red Army is made up of “cadres who had lived for some time in Moscow, nearly all of them Jews.&amp;amp;quot; The fact of the matter is that “Stalin had no other choice, as he only trusted” them. “When the first elections to the central committee are held, a third of its members are Jews.&amp;amp;quot; The highest leadership also proves to be from the same ethnic background, starting with Rákosi, “the first Jewish king of Hungary.&amp;amp;quot; The author of that flattering description is one of Stalin’s closest collaborators, namely Beria (probably of Jewish background as well).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn698|698]] The situation in the rest of the socialist camp is not very different. We will limit ourselves to another pair of examples. In Poland, the “presence of Jews in the communist ranks, especially at the highest levels of the regime”, was significant. And that’s not all. “The branch of communist authority in which the appearance of Jews was greatest is noteworthy: the security apparatus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn699|699]] In Czechoslovakia, it’s not only Jews, but Zionists themselves who are “favored by the post-war government” and are present within it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn700|700]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar consideration could be made for Germany: “In the Russian zone, Jews usually receive the best positions.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, the man who leads cultural activity in the Soviet Zone is a brilliant art historian, colonel Alexander Dymshitz, also of Jewish origin. And the presence of the Jewish-German intelligentsia in Gotha is easily noticed in the cultural rebirth that begins to emerge amid the grief and ruins.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn701|701]] The situation certainly doesn’t change with the foundation of the German Democratic Republic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In communist Germany, officially born on October 7th of 1949, Jews initially enjoy favorable treatment, if not privileged treatment. As victims of persecution they have a right to special pensions for the elderly and for the sick or disabled; and the constitution guarantees them religious freedom. Peter Kirchner explains: “Pensions for Jews were much higher than for others. It had varied between 1,400 and 1,700 marks, when the average wasn’t more than 350” [...]. Jews therefore felt at ease with the policies of the new communist Germany in relation to them, especially because they were widely represented in its institutions. In the elections of 1950, fifteen Jews were elected to parliament in the lists of nearly all the parties, not counting the communist party. In addition, the minister of propaganda and information, Gerhart Eisler, the director of state information radio, Leo Bauer, the director of the communist paper “Neues Deutschland”, Rudolf Herrnstadt, and the person in charge of a branch of the health ministry, Leo Mandel, were all Jews.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn702|702]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s also for that reason that the Soviet Union enjoys great sympathy among “Zionists all over the world.&amp;amp;quot; They go as far as “admiring everything that is Russian.&amp;amp;quot; It’s Arendt who observes this, and who in 1948 expresses her disappointment toward the “pro-Soviet and anti-Western orientation” of the Zionist movement, inclined to condemn Great Britain as “antisemitic”, and the United States as “imperialist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn703|703]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude that’s being condemned here is very understandable. In Nuremberg, it was primarily the Soviet representatives in the prosecution who called attention to the horrors of the Judeocide and called attention to it with rhetorical emphasis, formulating a solidly intentionalist theory: “The fascist conspirators planned the extermination of the Jewish people throughout the world, to the last man, and they put it in action during the entire period of their plot, from 1933 onward” (in reality, the “final solution” begins to take form only with the deterioration of Operation Barbarossa). One of the most dramatic moments of the trial was the testimony, again promoted by the Soviet representatives in the prosecution, by four Jews, among whom one mother expressed herself as follows: “In the name of all the mothers of Europe who became mothers in the concentration camps, I ask German mothers: ‘where are our children now?’”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn704|704]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, these are the years in which the USSR strongly supports Zionism and the creation of Israel. Stalin plays a frontline role, and perhaps even a decisive role. Without him “the emergence of the Jewish state in Palestine would have been difficult”―a Russian historian goes as far as saying, using documents recently made public in his country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn705|705]] In any case, as another author (this time a Western one) observes, the speech in May of 1948 before the UN by the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Andrei A. Gromyko, appears “like something out of a Zionist propaganda manual”: the foundation of Israel is necessary for the fact that “in the territories occupied by the Nazis, the Jews suffered an almost complete annihilation”, while “no state of Western Europe was able to provide adequate assistance to the Jewish people in defense of their rights and their very existence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn706|706]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, in supporting Zionism, Stalin at times clashes with Great Britain. The latter makes use of the military forces of the former Republic of Salò and the Tenth Assault Vehicle Flotilla to bomb “a ship (perhaps it had been two ships) that, after the end of military operations, transported weapons from Yugoslavia to the Jews in Palestine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn707|707]] At this time, it’s the government in London that is considered to be “the principal enemy of the Jews”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn708|708]] the suspicion and accusation of antisemitism certainly weren’t thrust upon the Soviet Union, committed to militarily and diplomatically supporting the foundation of the State of Israel, but upon Great Britain, which in its effort to obstruct those plans, doesn’t hesitate to use political and military circles that, even within the Republic of Salò, had played an important role in the “final solution”!&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet a more general consideration can be made. After the end of the war, Stalin pursues “a fundamentally pro-Jewish policy on Palestine.&amp;amp;quot; Political and geopolitical calculations had, of course, contributed to pushing it: the desire to undermine British positions in the Middle East (an objective also pursued by Truman, whose support to the foundation of the State of Israel is no coincidence) and to gain the support or at least the sympathy of the American and European Jewish communities during the Cold War; with the added hope that the new state, founded with the decisive contribution of immigration coming from Eastern Europe and often of a left political orientation, would take a pro-Soviet attitude. It’s true that the military aid in 1945 offered to the Zionist movement through Yugoslavia was not an isolated gesture. Three years later, this time using the collaboration of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union supplied new arms to Israel, and in violating the UN Security Council Resolution of March 29th of 1948, it even organizes the influx of young Jews from Eastern Europe who reinforce the army of the Jewish State in the war with the neighboring Arab countries. Thanks as well to Moscow, in action is what was defined as the “Prague-Jerusalem axis.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, “the weapons wielded by the soldiers of the newly born State of Israel to fight their war of independence are made in Czechoslovakia [...]. Precisely when other governments refuse to sell weapons to the Jewish State, Czechoslovakia decided to continue selling them openly, even at preferential rates [...]. Thus in Czechoslovakian territory the Israeli air force was founded: the training of paratroopers was organized there.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn709|709]] A true air-bridge is established, which supplies the Zionist army with weapons, instructors and even volunteers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn710|710]] In October of the same year, the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, in Paris at the time, happily tells prime minister Ben Gurion that the Soviet delegates at the UN conference on the question of Palestine had behaved like Israel’s lawyers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn711|711]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At the very least, it can be said that Stalin’s Soviet Union contributed in a decisive way to the foundation and consolidation of the Jewish State. There are also some interesting aspects with respect to relations with Judaism and Jewish culture in general. In the middle of what was called the “campaign against antisemitism”, a “residential suburb of Moscow” took on the name “New Jerusalem.&amp;amp;quot; There Ilya Ehrenburg has his dacha; Ehrenburg is a Jewish intellectual who plays a grand and leading cultural and political role in the Soviet Union at that time, and who, not by chance, is offered the Stalin prize, a recognition achieved by other Jewish writers as well, and by “some Jewish musicians of international fame.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn712|712]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So, what sense is there to speak of “antisemitism” with regard to Stalin? The support given by him to the foundation and consolidation of the Jewish State is at the same time a contribution given to the &#039;&#039;Nakbah&#039;&#039;, that is the national “catastrophe” for the Palestinian people, who for decades continue to languish in refugee camps and in the territories subjected to a ruthless military occupation and a rampant process of colonization. If, for the purposes of being absurd, Stalin must be accused of “antisemitism”, he should be accused of “antisemitism” toward Arabs. With regard to that, it’s necessary to specify that the Soviet Union’s preference was for “a multi-national and independent state that respected the interests of both Jews as well as Arabs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn713|713]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cold War Turning Point and the Blackmail of the Rosenbergs ===&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of Stalin’s death, Kerensky, at that time in the United States, in a conversation with an Israeli historian, points out that the accusation of antisemitism directed at the Soviet Union in those years is just an invention of the Cold War.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn714|714]] Yes, this is the turning point, and to understand it, we ought to return to the atmosphere of those years. It&#039;s a Cold War that can turn into a nuclear holocaust at any moment, and that knows no limits in the ideological sphere. From both sides they exclaim that the other side is plagued by antisemitism. The trial and death sentences in the United States of the Rosenbergs, communists and Jews accused of treason and espionage in service to Moscow, happen almost simultaneously to the trials and death sentences that in the socialist camp strike against “Zionist” figures accused of treason and espionage in service to Tel Aviv and Washington. Suspected of disloyalty and called upon to provide clear proof of patriotism, in both cases the Jewish community is subjected to more or less explicit pressure and blackmail.&lt;br /&gt;
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The climate of suspicion was no less oppressive in the United States than in the USSR. It’s not easy to imagine that time nowadays, when everyone is aware of the special relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv, but at the start of the Cold War the situation was quite different: often the “whites only” or “Caucasian only” urban centers continued to exclude Jews as well, considered just as “stupid” as blacks. As late as 1959, the Anti-Defamation League felt it necessary to denounce the harassment suffered by Jews because of the persistence of that practice.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn715|715]] Overall, “the years of the 1940s and 1950s constituted a politically traumatic era for the Jewish minority.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn716|716]] Still active were the political circles that linked Judaism and communism, that considered Jews as foreigners on American soil and collaborators with the mortal Soviet enemy and that, alongside the writings by Henry Ford, even republished &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn717|717]] Certainly after Auschwitz, that is after the revelation of the horrors that antisemitism would lead to, this could no longer continue to enjoy the same sympathy as before. Nevertheless, “the threat represented by anti-Jewish prejudice was far from disappearing. In 1953, Jews constituted the majority of the laid-off employees, or those transferred to other positions, in the radar laboratories in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn718|718]]&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the French communist leader Jacques Duclos, active in denouncing the persecution endured by the Rosenbergs in the United States, antisemitism didn’t play any role in the trials that in Czechoslovakia accurately target “Zionist traitors” in service to the war policies of Washington.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn719|719]] Dramatically opposed is the version that the enemies of the Soviet Union are determined to spread. In rejecting the accusation of antisemitism launched by Duclos at the United States, the American Jewish Committee unhesitatingly pronounces itself in favor of the execution of the Rosenbergs and opposes any degree of clemency: everyone in the United States must know that “the American Jewish ranks feel only horror at the sight” of the spies and communist agitators (whether they be gentiles or Jews);[[footnotes.xhtml#fn720|720]] it’s not by chance that among McCarthy’s collaborators are two Jews, committed not just to fighting communism, but also in demonstrating the patriotic loyalty of their community.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn721|721]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of defending the United States from the accusation of antisemitism. The FBI elaborates a plan that is turned over to a Jewish lawyer; he is entrusted with a very specific task:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Win over the confidence of the Rosenbergs in prison and try to persuade them that, in truth, the USSR is an antisemitic power with intentions of exterminating the Jews. Once dispelled of their illusions toward the Soviet Union, the Rosenbergs could take advantage of clemency in exchange for an “appeal to Jews of all countries to quit the communist movement and seek to destroy it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn722|722]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Ineffective in the case of the two communist militants who courageously faced the electric chair on June 19th, 1953, the blackmail achieves the desired result on other occasions: “in the intimidating atmosphere of the Cold War, it isn’t that surprising that some of the most respected Jewish intellectuals in the nation, including some of those previously on the left, felt obligated to seek protection or even change sides”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn723|723]] no small number of them agreed to denounce Stalin’s and the Soviet Union’s “antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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However, before this black legend takes hold, it comes across a number of difficulties. Still in 1949, we see one of the Cold War paladins, Churchill, repeatedly make a remarkable comparison between Nazism and communism: the first was less dangerous, given that it could rely “only on &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; pride and antisemitic hatred”; that’s not the case with the second, which can count on “a church of communist faithful, whose missionaries are in every country” and in every people. Therefore, on one side we have the stoking of national and racial hatred, from which there’s the hatred directed at the Jewish people; on the other side, a denunciation of universalism, although it’s instrumentally exploited by an “expansionist, imperialist” design.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn724|724]] Maybe even more significant is the speech by Adorno in 1950. In publishing his research about the “authoritarian personality”, he highlights the “correlation between antisemitism and anti-communism” and then adds: “in recent years all propaganda organs in America were dedicated to developing anti-communism in the sense of an irrational ‘terror’, and probably few people―apart from the followers of the ‘party line’―are able to resist the incessant ideological pressure.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn725|725]] At this time, far from being directed at Stalin and his followers, the accusation of antisemitism continues to target the anti-communists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unbalanced from the start, the balance of forces between the two sides of the Cold War increasingly sees the West prevail both at the military level, as well as with respect to the ideological offensive and its multimedia firepower. Nowadays, only one of the two opposing accusations of antisemitism remains standing: the other has been lost even in memory. It must be added that, aside from Stalin, that accusation reaches his successors, starting with Khrushchev, who is also said to have shown signs―it’s not really known why―of “evident antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn726|726]] Nevertheless:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In 1973 Jews, who constituted 0.9% of the Soviet population, represented 1.9% of all university students in the country, 6.1% of all scientific personnel, and 8.8% of all scientists.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn727|727]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, a British historian who’s also determined to label Stalin as antisemitic, starting from at least the 1930s, not only recognized that the people frequented by the Soviet leader―and even “many” of his “most intimate associates”―were of “Jewish origin”, but adds that in 1937, “Jews formed the majority in the government” (or in the governmental apparatus). It’s very hard for these figures and this empirical research to be cited in support of the thesis of Stalin’s and Soviet antisemitism!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin, Israel, and the Jewish Community of Eastern Europe ===&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the Jewish community was not exempt from the conflicts that marked the history of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp overall. Let’s first focus on the situation created in Eastern Europe with the end of World War II and Israel’s establishment. We have seen the strong presence of Jews in the state apparatus and the government. Aside from the composition of the institutions, it’s necessary to have in mind the sense of gratitude shown by Jews, for example in Hungary, because―an authoritative witness states―”it was the Soviet soldiers who freed us from certain death and no anyone else.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn728|728]] However, the honeymoon that appeared to last for some time proved to be short lived. The conflict doesn’t take long in manifesting itself: for the Jews who had returned to Hungary, and who had been able to escape the genocidal program of the Third Reich and its henchmen, should they to commit to the reconstruction of a destroyed country, or emigrate to the Jewish state that was taking shape in the Middle East? Initially, the supporters of that second option operate undisturbed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Zionist staff [...] led the Hungarian branch of the American Jewish Joint Committee that in the post-war period donated enormous sums of money to the reconstruction of Jewish communities. That was the most important economic lifeline for the survivors. A Zionist supporter, doctor Fabbian Herkovitz, became the rabbi of the most prestigious synagogue in Budapest, on Dohány street; and there every week he offered speeches in favor of emigration to Israel [...]. It was said that the Zionists made use of a more extensive and effective organization than that of the Hungarian communists [...]. It’s calculated that nearly a fifth of the Jewish population picked the path of emigration.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn729|729]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That mass emigration, an authentic brain-drain especially in qualitative terms, that deprived the country of the personnel it desperately needed to recover from the ruins of war, could not be ignored by the government and the party (including the Jews who had rejected the Zionist option):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The communists [...] in 1948 not only blocked the exodus of Jews, but were also able to assert their very hegemony within the Jewish world. The Zionist leader Arie Yaari recalls: “For us it was very difficult to convince people to relocate to Palestine. Especially the oldest, who feared starting a whole new life, with a new language. The regime, for its part, offered them political positions that Jews had never had before. They could become judges, officials, enter the government. The communist movement was very weak and needed a lot of personnel. How could Jews resist the temptation?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn730|730]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, it makes no sense to speak of antisemitism. Not only are there no vestiges of negative discrimination at the expense of Jews, but they eventually enjoy preferential treatment when they decide to stay in Hungary. It must be added that, before it pits the Jewish community and the communist community against one another, the battle that’s being discussed divides the Jewish community itself. Defeated by the Jews who decided to integrate themselves in the country in which they are citizens, the Zionists, despite all their efforts, are unable to plant among Jews the idea of ethnic separation. When at the end of the 1940s the Zionist movement is declared illegal, the overwhelming majority of Jews showed they had in no way internalized the discourse around Jewish national identity. The idea that the Jewish community should define itself as a national minority was the last thing that passed through the minds of Jews, who once again orient themselves toward seeking a new level of assimilation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn731|731]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar crisis is witnessed in the Soviet Union; and in this case as well the conflict ends up taking place within the Jewish community. It’s Ilya Ehrenburg, a writer of Jewish origin, who warns against the danger posed by Zionism (blamed for impeding the reconstruction of a country devastated and martyred by the Nazi army, and reopening the Jewish question already happily resolved in the Soviet Union) in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;’s columns from September 21st, 1948;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn732|732]] the position taken against Zionism is linked to the condemnation of antisemitism, crucially described, according to the words of Stalin, as the expression of “racial chauvinism” and “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn733|733]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The conversation that takes place in Moscow in 1948 between Golda Meir and Ilya Ehrenburg is remarkable. The former expresses her displeasure over assimilated Jews (“it disgusts me to see Jews who don’t speak Hebrew or at least Yiddish”), the latter responds angrily: “you’re a servant of the United States.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn734|734]] In speaking with another interlocutor the Soviet writer states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The State of Israel must understand that in this country the Jewish question no longer exists, that the Jews of the USSR must be left in peace and that all attempts to induce them to Zionism and to repatriation must stop. It will be met with resistance not only by the [Soviet] authorities, but by Jews themselves.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn735|735]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s beyond any doubt, the colossal brain-drain that approached would open another point of contention in addition to the Cold War, especially for the fact that to achieve their objective, Israeli diplomatic representatives in Moscow went behind the backs of Soviet authorities and established direct contact with the Soviet Jewish community.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn736|736]] In any case, the point of contention had become more serious to the degree that Israel aligned more clearly with the West: numerous and valued Soviet scientists of Jewish origin were encouraged by Zionist propaganda to emigrate and join a bloc committed to crushing the country that made possible their emancipation and social promotion. However, “despite the growing fiction, authoritative representatives from the USSR had repeatedly guaranteed Soviet support to Israel, but they had made it dependent on the neutrality of the Israeli government within the confrontation between the West and the East.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn737|737]] Nevertheless, the last of Moscow’s illusions quickly vanish. The rupture with the Jewish state is also a frontal clash with Zionist circles still very active in the socialist camp and which would be ruthlessly repressed. In Czechoslovakia, Slánsky is imprisoned and sentenced to death because, according to the testimony of his daughter, “he had favored emigration to Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn738|738]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In Romania, Ana Pauker had better luck, she gets off with a few months in prison. However, we are faced with a similar situation: “For some time Zionism had been an ideology condemned by the regime, but this hadn’t impeded the flow of Romanian Jews to Israel until the expulsion of Pauker in 1952, who had discreetly kept open the path to the Promised Land”; thanks to her, “no less than one hundred thousand Jews left Romania to settle down in Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn739|739]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s then understandable Stalin’s growing distrust, to whom is attributed the statement according to which “every Jew that is a nationalist is an agent of American espionage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn740|740]] The change that happened in the behavior of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe must have made many communists recall the “betrayal” the German Social Democratic Party was criticized for at the start of World War I. Must we read the conflict that breaks out as “Stalin’s war against the Jews”? That’s what’s suggested in the very title of a book dedicated to the subject by a &#039;&#039;Jerusalem Post&#039;&#039; journalist. But will this reading be truly more convincing than that given by Stalin, who denounced “the war by Zionists against the Soviet Union and the socialist camp”? One historian (Conquest), despite being determined to reduce Bolshevism and communism to a criminal phenomenon, recognizes that in the Soviet Union “antisemitism as such was never an official doctrine”, that “the open persecution of Jews as Jews was prohibited” and that there hadn’t been any reference to “racial theory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn741|741]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Then what sense is there in comparing Stalin with Hitler? The historian just cited adds that the first “had hoped to use Israel against the West and had continued to accuse the West of antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn742|742]] But it doesn’t appear that the Nazi leader classified his enemies as anti-Semites! Conquest works off the assumption that the accusations of antisemitism made by Stalin about the West are totally ridiculous, but he doesn’t even raise the question of the validity of Western accusations of antisemitism directed at Stalin. In the end, why should it be instrumentalized by only one side? And why the country that had been described by Hitler (but also by other important segments of Western public opinion) as the incarnation of the “Judeo-Bolshevik plot” and the definitive confirmation of the validity and seriousness of the conspiracy revealed by the publication of &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;? In any case, numerous and prominent Israelis didn’t believe in the myth of “Stalin’s war against the Jews”; at the news of the Soviet leader’s death, they mourn him and pay tribute to him as the “sun” that “has set.&amp;amp;quot; (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, intro, § 1).&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Israel’s victory in the Six Day War and the worsening of the Palestinian tragedy further widens that gap that in Eastern Europe divides communist authorities from the Jewish community and the pro-Israeli and pro-Western circles that are organized with it. But must we speak of antisemitism? Trusting in the account by two historians of Jewish origin previously cited, we see what happens in Prague in 1967: “The sympathy of Czech students for Israel has [...] a very trivial motivation: the antipathy they nurture toward the thousands of Arab students enrolled there in university.&amp;amp;quot; Something similar happens in Warsaw: “Suddenly people remembered that many Jews that lived in Palestine had come from Poland.&amp;amp;quot; A taxi driver exclaims: “Our brave Polish Jews are teaching a lesson to those fucking Russian Arabs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn743|743]] In the clash that takes place with communist authorities, aligned with the Arab countries, who shows signs of racism? Are we faced with an anti-Jewish racism, or rather an anti-Arab racism?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Question of “Cosmopolitanism” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The “doctors plot” itself, widely used to confirm Stalin’s antisemitism, eventually demonstrates the opposite: after everything, and until the very end, he trusted Jews with taking care of his health. Moreover, only some of the doctors accused are Jews, and the “plot” as a whole is classified by Soviet leaders and the press as “more capitalist and imperialist than Zionist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn744|744]] Was the suspicion caused just by paranoia? One detail to consider: “The CIA became more friendly [in relation to the Jewish state] starting from the moment it which it gained use of Israeli intelligence sources in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. For example, Mossad agents were the first abroad to receive the complete text of Khrushchev’s secret speech on Stalin’s crimes”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn745|745]] and passed it onto the American intelligence services.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s necessary to remember that the “age of suspicion”, as it was correctly defined, encourages the witch hunts in both blocs, in obviously different ways.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn746|746]] Furthermore, it’s not a secret to anyone that American intelligence services were committed to the physical elimination of Stalin, as well as Castro, Lumumba, and other “mad dogs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn747|747]] How to reach the undisputed leader of the international communist movement if not by making use of the individuals close to him and susceptible of being recruited by Western intelligence services in the wake of a recent conflict, like the one unleashed following the foundation of the Jewish state and the program of Jewish immigration pursued by it? At the time when the “plot” was revealed, “at least one leading western diplomat present in Moscow, the British diplomat Sir A. (“Joe”) Gascoigne [...], had thought the Kremlin doctors were really guilty of political treason.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn748|748]] Furthermore, the suspicion toward doctors appears to be a recurring theme in Russian history: an Israeli historian of Russian origin attributed the death of Tsar Alexander III to the German doctors who had treated him. &#039;&#039;(infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 1).&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that a book recently published in the United States formulates a theory that it was medical “treatment” that caused the death of Zhdanov. Must we then conclude that Stalin’s concerns were baseless? Without presenting any proof and even recognizing that there’s no document that supports their theory, the authors of the book are quick to clarify that it wasn’t the enemies of the Soviet Union who manipulated the doctors, but the dictator in the Kremlin himself! Moreover, apart from a radiologist, none of the doctors who treated Zhdanov were Jewish![[footnotes.xhtml#fn749|749]] It’s now clear: we are in the field of mythology, and a mythology with an unsettling subtext: it’s permissible to be suspicious of doctors just for being Germans or “gentile” Russians! Let’s return, then, to the field of historical research: it must be kept in mind that Stalin himself could have been the one who suspended the investigation, aware perhaps of the mistake he had made..[[footnotes.xhtml#fn750|750]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Lacking other arguments, they cite Stalin’s condemnation of “cosmopolitanism” to cling to the theory of his antisemitism: who would be the cosmopolitans if not the Jews? In reality, the accusation of cosmopolitanism is inserted in the context of a sharp debate by both sides. Those that first decided to commit to the construction of socialism in the country born out of the October Revolution of 1917, renouncing the millenarian expectations of the arrival or the exporting of the revolution throughout the world, are accused of “national pettiness” and being “nationally confined”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn751|751]] as well as being provincial; while Stalin is the “small provincial man” with “peasant rudeness” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, preface § 1, and ch. 1, § 1), Molotov doesn’t come out any better in Trotsky’s opinion, as “he hadn’t visited any foreign country and didn’t know any foreign language.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn752|752]] Both of them have the same defect of remaining stubbornly attached, in a provincial and obscurantist way, to the “reactionary role of the nation state.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn753|753]] Those who are attacked in this way respond by defining their accusers as abstract cosmopolitans, incapable of building a truly new social order.&lt;br /&gt;
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To read the condemnation of “cosmopolitanism” in anti-Semitic terms means neglecting a problem that is at the center of all the great revolutions driven by a universalist charge. Rejecting the theory of exporting the revolution cherished by the supporters of the “Republic, one and universal”, or more precisely the “universal conflagration”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn754|754]] Robespierre clarifies that the new France would not contribute to the cause of the revolution by behaving like the “capital of the world”, from which would be sent “armed missionaries” for the conversion and the “conquest of the world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn755|755]] No, what puts the old regime in Europe in crisis won’t be the “exploits of war”, but the “wisdom of our laws.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn756|756]] In other words, revolutionary authority will play a real internationalist role to the degree that in knows how to complete its national task of building a new order in France.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a problem to which German idealism gave great consideration. In Kant’s opinion, writing in 1793-1794 and outlining in some form a philosophical and historical evaluation of the French Revolution, while patriotism runs the risk of slipping into exclusivism and losing sight of universalism, abstract love for men “loses its balance due to its excessively broad universalism.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a question then of reconciling “world patriotism” (&#039;&#039;Weltpatriotismus&#039;&#039;) with “local patriotism” &#039;&#039;(Localpatriotismus&#039;&#039;) or with “love for the homeland”; that which is authentically universalist “in its attachment to its own country must be inclined to promoting the well-being of the entire world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn757|757]] It’s a line of thought later developed by Hegel: after having celebrated as a great historic conquest the formulation of the concept of the universal man (possessor of rights “as a man and as a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc”), the &#039;&#039;Philosophy of Right&#039;&#039; (§ 209 A) adds that it must not lead to “cosmopolitanism” and indifference or opposition with respect to the “concrete state of life” in the country in which one is a citizen. &amp;amp;quot;The universal love for men&amp;amp;quot; risks becoming an &amp;amp;quot;empty universality&amp;amp;quot; and devoid of content (§ 126 Z): the individual contributes to the universal first by concretely engaging the specific circle (the family, the society, the nation) in which he lives. Otherwise, the acclaimed “universal love for men” is at best a declaration of noble intentions; at worst, it’s a way of evading the field of concrete responsibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a problem that, with its even more emphatic universalism, the October Revolution inherits in a more acute form from the French Revolution. Well before Stalin, Herzen, while exiled in Paris, shows great distrust and criticism toward a cosmopolitanism that doesn’t recognize the idea of the nation and national responsibility (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 3, § 5). It’s a controversy that goes beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. In rejecting the “accusations of nationalism” made against the CPSU majority, and primarily against Stalin,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn758|758]] Gramsci takes a clear position against a “so-called internationalism” that’s, in reality, similar to a “vague ‘cosmopolitanism’.&amp;amp;quot; The principal target here is Trotsky, criticized as “cosmopolitan” for being “superficially national”, and therefore incapable of “cleansing internationalism of every vague and purely ideological (in its negative sense) element”; and he’s opposed to Stalin and Lenin especially, who embody a mature internationalism precisely by proving to be “profoundly national” at the same time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn759|759]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the USSR, the criticism of cosmopolitanism becomes sharper to the degree that the threat represented by fascism and Nazism worsens. We know the passionate appeal, two years before Hitler’s rise to power, directed by Dimitrov to revolutionaries for them to reject “national nihilism.&amp;amp;quot; Cosmopolitanism is an internationalism that leads to national nihilism. We also saw Stalin, on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, stress that, contrary to a “cosmopolitanism” incapable of assuming its national responsibilities, internationalism must know how to be combined with patriotism. That means that, far from being synonymous with antisemitism, the criticism of cosmopolitanism is an essential element in the struggle against Nazi-fascism (and antisemitism). That critique becomes urgent again with the start of the Cold War, when a new terrible threat loomed over the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stronger yet is the critique of cosmopolitanism when the country immersed in revolution is engaged in a struggle for national survival. In China Sun Yat-sen writes: “The nations that make use of imperialism to conquer other peoples, and thereby try to strengthen their position as masters of the world, are in support of cosmopolitanism”, and they try by all means to discredit patriotism as “something petty and anti-liberal.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn760|760]] Mao aligns himself with that view, according to him internationalism doesn’t in any way make patriotism obsolete: “the universal truths of Marxism must be integrated with the concrete conditions of different countries, with the unity between internationalism and patriotism.&#039;&#039;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn761|761]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the USSR, did Jews make up the majority of “cosmopolitans”, and therefore anti-cosmopolitanism is only a camouflaged form of antisemitism? It’s worthwhile to observe that, in elaborating his polemic against cosmopolitanism, Sun Yat-sen encourages the Chinese people to take the Jews as their example because, despite millennia of oppress and exile, they never lost their sense of identity, and therefore of the obligation of reciprocal solidarity.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn762|762]] But let’s focus on the Soviet Union: the Jewish presence is numerous within the ranks of the CPSU majority. And among the first to throw the accusation of cosmopolitanism at the leader of the opposition is the German writer of Jewish origin (Feuchtwanger) who we have previously cited: “Trotsky was never a Russian patriot”, his only concern was the “world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn763|763]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, to use the hermeneutics found in the accusations targeting Stalin, not even Trotsky could escape the accusation of antisemitism. In developing his analysis of pre-revolutionary Russia, he highlights how the “market aristocracy” had “transformed the Tsar’s government into its financial vassal” which guaranteed “usurious profits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn764|764]] It must be added that “the dominion of the market” is represented “by Rothschild and Mendelssohn”, in fact, by the “Mendelssohn international”, that’s to say by individuals committed to respecting “the laws of Moses to the same extent as those of the markets.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn765|765]] As one can see, in this case the reference to the Jewish world is explicit. Must we then conclude that the polemic against the “market aristocracy” is in fact aimed at Jews as such, to the point that we find ourselves before the umpteenth manifestation of antisemitism? Such an argument would be absurd not only for Trotsky’s Jewish origins: more significant is the fact that, in the same text, he dedicates pages to the powerful description of the “bestial bacchanal” of blood spilled by the anti-Semitic gangs, tolerated and encouraged by the authorities and by “Nicolas Romanov, the Augustinian protector of the pogromists”, which fortunately faced the courageous and determined opposition of the revolutionary and socialist movement.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn766|766]] But no less resolute in condemning that anti-Semitic “cannibalism” is Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin in the Jewish “Court”, the Jews in Stalin’s “Court” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR is the “country that saved the greatest number of Jews.&amp;amp;quot; This observation is from a journalist and researcher of Trotskyist orientation who, as a “witness of those years”, thought it necessary to stand against the campaign underway today in the West. He continues as follows: “no country had anything comparable to the Red Army, with Jews in the highest military positions.&amp;amp;quot; That’s not all: “One of Stalin’s sons marries a Jew, and his daughter does the same.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn767|767]] It can be added that, within Stalin’s leadership group, Jews were well represented and at the highest levels until the very end. To remain standing, however weak and staggered, the theory of Stalin’s “antisemitism” requires the dejudification of the Jews who work closely with him. That’s precisely what happens. It’s true that “Yagoda, Kaganovich and many others in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe” played an important role alongside a ferocious dictator, but it’s a matter of “apostate Jews”: that’s the consideration from a Jewish intellectual, using language that clearly recalls the history of religions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn768|768]] Other times, the weight of religious tradition is noted in a more measured or involuntary way: there’s a journalist who denounces, in the most circulated Italian newspaper, the “renegade Jews in Stalin’s court.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn769|769]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In reality, the rhetoric regarding “apostates” and “renegades” (or regarding “court Jews”) constituted an implicit negation of the accusation of antisemitism; antisemitism that, as a form of racism, is directed against an ethnic group regardless of the religious and political conduct of its individual members. To recognize the presence of Jews in leadership positions in Stalin’s USSR, and the socialist camp led by him, means admitting that in those countries access to power and social and political stature were determined not by their immutable racial background, but by their mutable political conduct. But the dejudification of Jews (as “apostate”, “renegades”, “court” or inauthentic Jews) who are today considered politically embarrassing allows the transformation of antisemitism into a category capable of resisting any negation arising from empirical analysis, and therefore it’s applicable not only to Stalin, but to the whole history of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the October Revolution, the campaign against obscurantism denounced within different religions (including Judaism) is carried out with the participation of important Jewish circles in leading positions. Here’s the commentary by the previously cited journalist from &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039;: “it was Yevektia, of the Jewish branch of the CPSU, who fomented the new antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn770|770]] A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem makes a similar argument: “during the Bolshevik revolution [...] many Jewish Bolsheviks were so dedicated to the cause of revolutionary Russian nationalism that they became anti-Semites.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn771|771]] Already classified as “apostates” and “renegades”, the Jews of communist orientation now become “anti-Semitic” &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. At this time, apart from Stalin, the accusation of “antisemitism” reaches Lenin himself, the supreme leader of these “anti-Semitic” campaigns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, it’s the same Israeli historian just cited who writes: “Most likely, Lenin was always very skeptical of the organizational capacity of Russians. In one conversation with Gorky, he observes that there hadn’t been intelligent Russians who weren’t Jews, or at least had Jews among their ancestors and a little Jewish blood in their veins.&amp;amp;quot; The opinion of the Soviet leader is also the opinion of his interlocutor: “It would not have displeased Gorky if it had been Jews who had taken control over the Russian economy, and in 1916, he goes as far as writing that ‘the genius of Jews for their organization, their flexibility, and their indomitable energy must be taken properly into account in a country so poorly organized like our Russia’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn772|772]] Therefore, going by this text, Lenin and Gorky (who also adheres to the Communist Party), could eventually be accused of anti-Russian racism and not antisemitism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The leading role played by Jews isn’t limited to the overthrow of the old regime in Russia. The Jewish historian continues as follows: Lenin attributes to the “omnipresent Jewish minority” the role of being the “guardians of communism.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, “it wasn’t the Slavs, but the Jews that became the principal spearhead of the Russian advance in the international arena, and therefore against Europe and the rest of the world. Lenin showed great intuition in trusting the success of the revolution to them and other ethnic minorities.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn773|773]] As one can see, “anti-Semitic” Jews make an important contribution, maybe even a decisive contribution, to the expansion of communism; the Judeo-Bolshevik plot that the Nazis speak of is here understood as the unrest or plot orchestrated by Jews, yes, but by anti-Semitic Jews!&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a matter of upheaval or a plot with a long, long history. Again according to the historian previously cited, Lenin would have used the Jews who had broken with their community of origin, just as Christianity had done earlier.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn774|774]] And again emerge the similarities to the historical reading dear to Nazism, that had denounced the role of Jews in the destructive cycle that stretches from Christianity to Bolshevism. What’s new here is that the Jews who played that role, having adhered first to Christianity and later to Bolshevism, should ultimately be considered “apostates”, “renegades” and “anti-Semites.&amp;amp;quot; In trying to strike at the Soviet experience as a whole, together with Stalin, the accusation of antisemitism ends up reproducing, with some modest variations, the Nazi philosophy of history!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From Trotsky to Stalin, From the “Semite” Monster to the “Anti-Semitic” Monster ===&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of Stalin’s antisemitism proves unsustainable in light of conceptual and historical reflection. Whatever the date may be for the emergence of that sickness (whether identified in 1948, in 1945, or in 1879, the year of Stalin’s conception and birth), the diagnosis proves not only baseless, but also quite offensive to Jews, who in great numbers until the last moment continued to pay tribute to their supposed executioner. How is the origin of this black legend explained, then? Let’s return to the years immediately following the October Revolution. On October 4th of 1919, the &#039;&#039;Völkischer Beobachter&#039;&#039;, at that time not yet the official organ of the National-Socialist party (not yet founded), blames the Bolshevik horror on a “Jewish terrorist horde”, and on “circumcised Asians”, and to that end stresses that Jewish blood also runs through Lenin’s veins. Similar denunciations are also heard in Britain and in the West in general.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn775|775]] With this in mind, it’s understandable that, more so than Lenin, Trotsky is “the principal Mephisto-like subject of the anti-Bolshevik manifestos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn776|776]] A leaflet of anti-communist propaganda handed out during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 depicts him with anything but human-like features, with the Star of David around his neck, observing from on high a pile of bodies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn777|777]] “Trotsky or Bronstein”, that is the Bolshevik Jew par excellence, in 1919 is, in Goebbels opinion, the figure that “possibly has on his conscience the greatest number of crimes that a man has ever been responsible for.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn778|778]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, during the invasion of the Soviet Union, announced as crusade for the salvation of European and Western civilization from Bolshevik barbarism―Asiatic and Jewish―we saw Hitler depict Stalin as a puppet of international Judaism, as a Jew, if not by blood, then at least in spirit. During the years in which antisemitism was widespread or found ample support in the West, the monster par excellence couldn’t take on anything but Jewish features. The situation is different after the collapse of the Third Reich and the infamous revelation of the “final solution”: today, the monster that’s able to provoke horror, or at least more so than any other, tends to be the anti-Semitic monster. However, despite its variations, its continued flaws are evident, and the depiction of the anti-Semitic Stalin is not much more convincing than that which painted Trotsky openly wearing the Star of David and happily contemplating his immense pile of victims.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;6. Psychopathology, Morality, and History in the Reading of the Stalin Era&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Geopolitics, Terror, and Stalin&#039;s &amp;amp;quot;Paranoia&amp;amp;quot; ===&lt;br /&gt;
What approach would help us better understand the origin, characteristics, and meaning of Stalinism? According to Arendt, the obsession with the “objective enemy” had driven Stalinist totalitarianism (as well as Hitlerism) to always search for new objectives for their repressive apparatus: after “the descendants of the old ruling classes” it’s the kulaks’ turn, then the traitors within the party, the “Volga Germans”, etc.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn779|779]] To comprehend the futility of this formula, all that’s required is to reflect on the fact that it could easily be applied to the history of the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States participates in the celebration of the community of Germanic nations and races (U.S., Great Britain, Germany) as the vanguard of civilization; in the decades following its intervention in the First World War, the Germans (and Americans of German origin) become the enemy par excellence; it’s the period of the Grand Alliance with the Soviet Union. However, after the Third Reich’s overthrow, the USSR becomes the enemy par excellence, thus Americans of German (or Japanese origin) are no longer the subject of persecution, instead it’s those Americans suspected of sympathizing with communism; yet in the last stage of the Cold War, Washington makes use of both China’s collaboration and the Islamic &#039;&#039;freedom fighters&#039;&#039; who sustain the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan; but with the defeat of the Evil Empire, it’s the former allies who represent the new incarnation of Evil: the &#039;&#039;freedom fighters&#039;&#039; (and their sympathizers in United States territory and everywhere else in the world) are sent off to Guantanamo. There’s one detail that reveals the weakness of Arendt’s formula, the formula that blames the obsession with the “objective enemy” for the deportations of the “Volga Germans” during the Second World War: in reality, similar measures had been taken in 1915 by Tsarist Russia, at that time allied to the liberal West; also immediately after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt acts in a similar way toward the “objective enemy”, represented this time by American citizens of Japanese origin. If you want to take into consideration the geographic and military situation, the concern of the Soviet dictator appears more justified than that of the American president.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every so often, Arendt appears to realize the problematic nature of the category that she uses. The first edition of &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039; denounces the obsession with the “potential enemy”, but for as long as the Second Thirty Years’ War lasts, the Soviet people see themselves threatened by a mortal threat; being on the alert for a potential enemy could hardly be considered an expression of paranoia. The subsequent editions of the book then prefer to speak of the “objective enemy”, thus accentuating the psychological character of a behavior that continues to be attributed exclusively to totalitarian dictators.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn780|780]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But this linguistic alternation doesn’t at all change the terms of the problem. Despite unhesitatingly opposing Nazi Germany and sympathizing with the land of the Third Republic and the Great Revolution, at the moment of the Second World War’s outbreak Arendt suffered imprisonment in France in a concentration camp, and in the last analysis had suffered that fate of being a “potential enemy” or “objective enemy.&amp;amp;quot; We’ll soon see that this category is also at work in Churchill’s Britain and in F.D. Roosevelt’s United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, Arendt operates on a purely ideological level, without even raising the problem of a comparative analysis of the policies pursued by the leadership groups of different countries in situations of severe crisis. It would be beneficial to fill this gap. After the conclusion of the Second World War, Churchill offers this summary of the situation at the time of the lead-up to the gigantic military clash: “It was known at that time that there were twenty thousand organized Nazis in Britain; an acute danger of sabotage and crime, as a prelude to the outbreak of war, it would align with the procedure already applied in other friendly countries.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn781|781]] That&#039;s how the statesman justified the policy pursued by him during the conflict, when all those suspected of sympathizing with the enemy or their political system could be arrested: “‘To sympathize’ was the all inclusive term that allowed the government to arrest without trial, and for an undetermined amount of time, members not just of fascist organizations but also any group considered by the interior minister to be sympathetic to the Germans, including those that supported negotiations with Hitler.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn782|782]] Those persecuted are not responsible for deliberate and concrete actions, but are rather “potential” or “objective enemies.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Protected by the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as by a powerful navy, the U.S. ought not to feel particularly threatened. But F.D. Roosevelt warns: the enemy is not discouraged by the ocean, it’s necessary to take note of the “lesson from Norway, whose principal ports were captured thanks to a surprise treason prepared over a number of years.&amp;amp;quot; A similar threat looms over the American continent:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The first phase of the invasion of this hemisphere won’t be the landing of regular troops. The strategic and essential ports will be occupied by secret agents, by useful idiots at their service, and there are many of those here and in Latin America.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
So long as the aggressive nations maintain the offensive, it will be them and not us who choose the time, place, and method of their attack.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn783|783]]&lt;br /&gt;
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And that’s not all: It’s also necessary to confront the aggression carried out “by means of the secret diffusion of toxic propaganda by those who seek to destroy unity and promote division.&amp;amp;quot; It’s at this point that traitors or “objective” enemies tend to be those that already express opinions considered to be in opposition to the national interest, and resistance becomes a task that should be realized not only by the army but by the entire country. Both must demonstrate an unbreakable unity:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Those who are on our lines of defense and those in the rear who build these lines must have the energy and courage that arises out of an unbreakable faith in the way of life that they defend. The powerful action that we are calling for can’t be based on disrespect with regard to those things that we are fighting for.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn784|784]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To eliminate an omnipresent threat, that also makes its presence felt at the political level, requires a total mobilization that ends up affecting the political sphere as well. Starting on that basis they develop a “well orchestrated media campaign”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn785|785]] “When will Hitler invade the U.S.?”, a manifesto asks, with the image of Nazi paratroopers landing over undefended American cities, which are also vulnerable―a second manifesto insists―to a landing by sea. Even more serious is the dangerous fact that “Hitler’s army is already here.&amp;amp;quot; At least that is what a third manifesto thinks, it warns against “the fifth column in the United States.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn786|786]] Films and books that call attention to the seriousness of this threat achieve great success, while the committee that tracks “anti-American” activities calculates exactly 480,000 supporters of organizations ready to assist the invaders![[footnotes.xhtml#fn787|787]] And just like in Britain, in the United States the category of enemy agent or accomplice is also expanded to include even all those who seek to prevent the country’s involvement or entry into the war.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn788|788]] They are accused of being the “Nazi’s transmission belt”, the Third Reich’s “Trojan Horse”, or to cite the very words of F.D. Roosevelt, the “fifth column of appeasement.&amp;amp;quot; This last phrase is especially significant: what becomes synonymous with treason is a political outlook, and just for that those that embrace it became targets of denunciation, trials and intimidation; they are considered, in the last analysis, to be “potential” or “objective” enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
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A climate of fear and suspicion spreads across the country, quickly exploited by the authorities to “increase the powers of the FBI.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn789|789]] The president reveals to the press that pro-German elements have infiltrated “the Army and Navy” and have organized or tried to organize sabotage operations at “forty or fifty factories across the country.&amp;amp;quot; Even a balanced intellectual like William L. Shirer encourages everyone to prepare, with war around the corner, to confront the “sabotage carried out by thousands of Nazi agents from coast to coast.&amp;amp;quot; Everywhere they suspect or are on the lookout for the enemy’s actions. The fifth column carried out a fundamental role at times, weakening Belgium and France from within; and now―so the argument goes―the Nazi “termites” are operating inside the American Republic as well, which runs the risk of suffering the same fate.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn790|790]] Apparently there are “some attempts” on the part of the Third Reich’s agents to “encourage or take advantage of worker discontent in the factories and to obstruct the production of munitions for the allies”; according to the German consulate, these “acts of sabotage” are in fact “industrial accidents attributed by Roosevelt to the Nazis.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn791|791]] It’s not surprising, then, that “children of a tender age are sometimes frightened by the alarmist propaganda”, unrelenting in announcing and depicting in the most awful terms possible the imminent invasion by the Nazi hordes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn792|792]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once the United States officially entered the war, the atmosphere becomes even more tense. The wartime pronouncements against spies and loose talk (“control your tongue”, “silence means security”, Even “casual conversations” can kill) don’t let-up in their warnings, displaying the faces of youths who are soon to be orphans because of irresponsible chatter; against the acts of “sabotage” another pronouncement proclaims a new crime: that of the “poor use of work instruments”, and it shows the image of Mr. Tool Wrecker, charged and put in jail by a police officer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn793|793]] Obviously, this genuinely dangerous situation is combined with a deliberate distortion of reality. So concludes the American historian we’ll now turn to: “FDR well understood the value of national anxiety”; “FDR and his supporters went beyond the line that separates public concern from mass hysteria.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn794|794]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us are the fundamental elements of the Terror that takes hold in Russia. Without a doubt, the phenomenon analyzed with regards to Britain and the United States appears in a monstrously enlarged form in Russia; but do ideology, paranoia and the objective situation play a decisive role? Besides the mutable yet incessant civil war, we have geopolitics to take into account. In April of 1947, with the Cold War already brewing on the horizon, in a conversation with the Republican candidate Harold Stassen, Stalin will highlight, with a kind of envy, the extraordinarily favorable geopolitical situation of the United States, protected by two oceans and with only Canada and Mexico to its north and south, two weak countries that certainly don’t represent a threat.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn795|795]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Things are very different in Soviet Russia. One can ridicule Stalin’s “paranoia”, but we have seen Goebbels speak of the great success of German espionage in France and its total failure in the USSR. Moreover, the first to insist on the penetration of a German fifth column in Russia are the very enemies of Bolshevism. In Kerensky’s eyes, as demonstrated by the “Brest-Litovsk capitulation” and the signing of “traitorous separate peace”, the protagonists of October 1917 act in service to Wilhelm II, for which they are massively financed and aided; according to the Menshevik leader, the German secret services had already carried an important role in the pacifist agitation that had depleted the military strength of the country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn796|796]] Churchill makes a similar argument, stressing the weight of “German gold” in the disorder in Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn797|797]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In our time, going yet further back, an Israeli historian (originating from the Soviet Union in his time) discovered the fingerprints of Imperial Germany―determined to weaken in any way possible the strength of its neighbor and rival―in Alexander III’s premature death in 1894, “who died because the medical team (among whom the majority were Germans) had applied the wrong treatment to him”, as well as the 1911 assassination of Pyotr Stolypin, that happened with the “involvement” of “some pro-German higher officials”, and in the peculiar behavior of Nicholas II (his wife was a German princess).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn798|798]] In any case, with regards to the collapse of the tsarist regime, it’s important not to lose sight of the “effective German fifth column present in the Russian court and in the highest positions of the army”, therefore at the very center of power. Indeed, “in May of 1915, Moscow was the site of various pogroms against Germans”, however, “the German minority that occupied the highest levels of power were still intact.&amp;amp;quot; In conclusion: “The historians who have given exclusive attention to revolutionary voluntarism or liberal maneuvers have ignored other evidence, from which one can deduce that the revolutionary movement could have been in part provoked by pro-German sectors or by a direct intervention by German espionage in conformity with a plan designed by Brockdorff-Rantzau.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn799|799]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is the overview offered here plausible, or is it also affected by the paranoia generally attributed to Stalin? In any case, one can start with an assumption: while it may have been weakened for some time, the defeat of the Second Reich doesn’t eliminate the activity of its intelligence services within Russia, where, on the other hand, the dissolution of the old regime coincides with the reinforced presence at all levels of the great Western powers. Overall, it’s enough to read any history of the Cold War to understand that the birthplace of the October Revolution was especially exposed to the danger not just of military invasion, but also infiltration and espionage. In the 1920s, thanks to the collaboration of Russian exiles, Britain was able to decode the Soviet Union’s encrypted messages, which remains the principal target of their intelligence services even “in the middle of the 1930s.&amp;amp;quot; Meanwhile, the Third Reich has emerged, which, in preparing its aggression, can count on the proven ability of colonel Reinhard Gehlen, “a master of intelligence, subversion and deception”; later, immediately after the defeat of Hitler&#039;s Germany, Allen Dulles demonstrates “vision” in putting at the service of the recently created CIA the very man who “had played a great role in the German attack on Russia in 1941.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn800|800]] During the Cold War, aside from espionage, the activity of Western intelligence services also included “sabotage operations” and even support to insurrectionary movements.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn801|801]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More than twenty years after Stalin’s death, this outlook hadn’t changed. We can deduce this from an article in a prestigious American newspaper. The author is satisfied to report “how a computer sabotage operation by the CIA resulted [in 1974] in an enormous explosion in Siberia―all of it organized with precision by an economist named Gus Weiss―and it helped the United States win the Cold War.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn802|802]] If we then keep in mind that the use of sabotage also has a particular Russian tradition behind it, we can arrive at a conclusion: to understand what happened in the Stalin years, rather than resort to a single paranoid personality as a &#039;&#039;deus ex machina&#039;&#039;, it would be better to follow the approach raised by an illustrious eyewitness who, in Moscow of 1937, speaks of unquestionable “acts of sabotage”, and at the same time of a “psychosis of sabotage” that arises out of that reality.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn803|803]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The “Paranoia” of the Liberal West ===&lt;br /&gt;
However, while Arendt goes no further than the madness inherent to totalitarianism (Stalinian or Hitlerian), François Furet goes further: “The revolutionary needs to have hateful motives”: this is true for the Jacobins, but also for the Bolsheviks, and for Stalin in particular, for the latter “needs to invoke, in service to his miraculous objectives, the struggle against the saboteurs, the enemies, the imperialists and their agents.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn804|804]] The French historian speaks generally of the “revolutionary”, but in reality he has in mind only Russia and France and thus forgets to add that, aside from the Bolsheviks and the Jacobins (and Rousseau), the protagonists of the the Puritan Revolution are also subjected to a similar psychoanalytic approach, as well as the abolitionist “revolution” that does away with the institution of slavery, first in England and later in the United States. And Furet doesn’t even take into account the fact that, according to an eminent American historian, the “style of paranoia” profoundly marked the history of his country. The belief, shared by George Washington, in London’s intention to enslave the colonies on the other side of the Atlantic is a central element in the American Revolution; later, at the end of the eighteenth century, when sharp contradictions arise within the new leadership group, while Jefferson ends up being suspected of being an agent of France, Hamilton is described as a British agent. A similar dialectic is evident some decades later, on the occasion of the crisis that leads to the American Civil War, when both opposing sides exchange the accusation that the other has betrayed the legacy of the Founding Fathers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn805|805]] Not to mention the fact that, in Nietzsche’s opinion, a disturbed relationship with reality characterizes the entire revolutionary tradition, beginning with those “Christian agitators” who are the “Fathers of the Church”, and earlier, the Jewish prophets.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is Stalin’s personality characterized by particularly accentuated traces of illness? If we start from that assumption, the admiration that leading political figures of the West had for him would be inexplicable. In any case, one fact that gives us cause for consideration: Freud, who passed away in 1939, considered it relevant to conduct a psychoanalytic study, but not of Stalin, nor even Hitler, but of Wilson, putting him on the list of those dangerous “fanatics” who are convinced they “have a special and personal relationship with the divine”, and who thereby considered themselves charged with a providential mission of guiding and transforming the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn806|806]] And it certainly appears a little unusual that a statesman, in taking his country into the First World War, even after witnessing the reality of the carnage, and despite being motivated by very concrete material and geopolitical interests, celebrates the American intervention as a “holy war, more holy than all other wars”, and celebrates the American soldiers as crusaders, protagonists of a “transcendent mission.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn807|807]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But Furet concentrates on a psychopathological reading of the events that began in October 1917, and he especially concentrates on the thirty years governed by Stalin: does he not fear―as someone who is authentically paranoid―dangers, traps and plots everywhere? What would we have to say then of F.D. Roosevelt and his subordinates who, even being able to count on a clearly more favorable political and geopolitical situation, raise the alarm about the possibility of a German invasion of America in the months before the American entry into the Second World War, and who label anti-interventionism as synonymous with national treason, warning against industrial “sabotage” provoked by the enemy and by a fifth column that possibly includes a half a million people? For this reason Hitler accuses the American president of having a “wild” and sick “imagination”, the imagination of a man who’s “truly mentally ill.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn808|808]] As you can see, the accusation of paranoia or madness is not new, it can be thrown by the most unsuspecting people and can strike the most diverse targets.&lt;br /&gt;
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But another consideration is more important: the Bolsheviks played a strong role in the two conspiracy theories that have possibly had the greatest mark on the history of the first half of the twentieth century, yet not as the protagonists but as the targets; and those theories were elaborated and propagated with a decisive contribution by the United States. In September of 1918, Wilson authorizes the publication of documents that contain sensational revelations: not only was the October Revolution nothing more than a German conspiracy; but, even after the seizure of power, Lenin, Trotsky, and the other Bolshevik leaders continued to be at the (paid) service of Imperial Germany; there’s more, the apparently dramatic internal split that happens around Brest-Litovsk had been a complete masquerade with the aim of hiding the German military’s permanent control over Soviet Russia. All of this was demonstrated by the so-called Sisson Papers: taking the name of the Committee on Public Information’s representative in Russia, a committee created by Wilson as part of the plans for total mobilization, including the mobilization of information. The presumed authenticity of the documents (that are later revealed to be a complete fabrication) is notably supported by leading American historians who later justify themselves, making reference to the pressure put upon them “in the name of necessity in times of war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn809|809]] It’s something that is also repeated outside the United States. In “The Cry of the People”, Gramsci quips: “those two citizens in Russia who are named Lenin and Trotsky are imposters, fabricated in German scientific laboratories and who, made as they are by machine, can’t be killed by the gunshots of terrorists” (an allusion to the attack suffered by Lenin on August 30th, 1918).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn810|810]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, a second conspiracy theory arises to explain the October Revolution, but this time, aside from the usual Bolshevik suspects, it’s not the Germans who are blamed, but rather the Jews. After having great resonance in the United States, the denunciation of Judeo-Bolshevik intrigues, which spread sedition throughout the world and threaten order and civilization itself, will then play a principal role in the “final solution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “Immorality” or Moral Indignation? ===&lt;br /&gt;
If the psychopathological focus is misleading, the reading of Russia’s great historical crisis in the twentieth century that accuses the Bolsheviks, and Stalin in particular, of having developed a vision of the world that’s totally blind to moral and human reason is not much more convincing. Rather, if we begin with the years or decades that proceed October 1917, we see that the roles of accused and accusers can easily be inverted: it’s the protagonists of the revolutionary movement who see the world they intend to overthrow as responsible for the crimes which today are attributed to them. Communism leads to genocide? In the years of the First World War, the liberal and bourgeois society that they tried to overthrow was synonymous with genocide. While Stalin speaks of the “bloody massacre” and the “massive extermination of the living force of the peoples”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn811|811]] Bukharin describes it as a “horrible corpse factory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn812|812]] Terrible yet precise is the description that Rosa Luxemburg makes: the “mass extermination” and the “genocide” (&#039;&#039;Volkermord&#039;&#039;) that takes place is “something daily and boringly monotonous”, meanwhile in the rear “an atmosphere of ritual murder” takes hold. Karl Liebknecht will also call for a struggle against “genocide”, in fact, he speaks against the “triumph of genocide”, condemning as well the “glorification of brutal violence”, the “shipwreck” of “all that is noble in the world” and the spread of “moral barbarization”; while it leads him to welcome the October Revolution, his moral indignation over the horrors of the First World War leads Liebknecht to predict not only a “solid” state but also a “tough” state for Soviet Russia, at least a state able to prevent the tragic return of a system denounced even before the war for its lack of “moral scruples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn813|813]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, it’s worth citing Trotsky: “the Cainite labor of the ‘patriotic’ press” on both sides is “the irrefutable demonstration of the moral decadence of bourgeois society.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, one cannot help but speak of “moral decadence” when they see humanity fall back into a “blind and ruthless barbarity”: one witnesses the outbreak of “a mad and bloody competition” to utilize the most advanced technology for military means; it’s a “scientific barbarity”, which uses the great discoveries of humanity “only to destroy the basis for civilized social life and to annihilate mankind.&amp;amp;quot; All the good produced by civilization drowns in the blood and entrails of the trenches: “health, comfort, hygiene, everyday relations, the bonds of friendship, professional duties, and lastly, the apparently unshakable rules of morality.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn814|814]] The term “genocide” is also used with a small variation by Trotsky, who in 1934 warns of the possibility of a new world war, a new “recurse to genocide” (&#039;&#039;Volkermorden&#039;&#039;) that gathers on the horizon.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn815|815]] As late as August 31st, 1939, Molotov accuses France and Britain of having rejected the Soviet policy of collective security in the hope of pushing the Third Reich against the USSR, thus without a doubt provoking “a new large massacre, a new holocaust of the nations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn816|816]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s clearly moral indignation that inspires this denunciation of the horrors of war. A leading American statesman like Theodore Roosevelt has a completely different position on it. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century, he celebrates war in vitalizing terms, coming from a perspective that in some form seeks to move―you could say using Nietzsche―”beyond good and evil.&amp;amp;quot; We read: “All men that have within them the ability to enjoy battle know how it feels when the beast begins to enter their heart; he does not step back in horror at the sight of blood or thinks that the battle should stop; but enjoys the pain, the regret, the danger as if it adorns their triumph.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn817|817]] They are themes that, in their more attenuated forms, continue to resonate in Churchill who, in reference to the colonial expeditions, affirms that: “War is a game during which one should smile.&amp;amp;quot; The escalating carnage in Europe that starts in August of 1914 doesn’t diminish this outlook: “War is the greatest game in all of history, here we play with the greatest stakes”; war constitutes “the only meaning and purpose in our lives.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn818|818]] Moving on from the celebration of war in crudely vitalistic terms, to its translation into spiritualist terms, the First World War will be welcomed by Max Weber as “great and marvelous”, while Benedetto Croce hopes to get a “regeneration of current social life” out of it,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn819|819]] along with numerous other leading figures of the liberal West at the time. Among them we must also cite Herbert Hoover, a notable representative of the American administration and future president of the U.S., who immediately after the signing of the armistice attributes to the just concluded conflict the purpose of the “purification of men” and therefore the preparation of “a new golden age: we are proud to have taken part in this rebirth of humanity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn820|820]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet Lenin continues to stick to his moral-political condemnation of war; together with it he denounces the social-political system that, in his opinion, caused it. It is evident the moral pathos that inspires the Leninist analysis of capitalism and colonialism in particular. This is how the Italian war in Libya is described: that “typical colonial war by a twentieth century ‘civilized’ state”: we see “a civilized and constitutional nation” perform its “civilizational” work ”by means of bayonets, bullets, the noose, fire, rape”, even by means of “butchery.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, it’s “a massacre by civilized and refined men; a massacre of Arabs through the use of ‘the most modern’ of weapons [...]. ‘As punishment’ nearly 3,000 Arabs have been massacred, entire families have been robbed and massacred, children and women massacred.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn821|821]] The advent of the most advanced bourgeois republic doesn’t in any way put an end to this horror: “with no less cruelty the armies of ‘republican’ France [...] exterminate the African peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn822|822]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The denunciation of the genocidal practices of the West occupies a central role, especially in the overview given by Lenin in the &#039;&#039;Notebooks on Imperialism&#039;&#039;, which collects material extracted from liberal-bourgeois literature at the time. A year before the outbreak of the enormous conflict, in a book by a German author, one can read: “The struggle for existence becomes harder, the hostilities among Europeans escalate and lead to attempts at mutual annihilation.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, the policy of annihilation is already a reality in the colonies: in Africa the Hereros are “in large part annihilated” by Germany, which in repressing the “Hottentot uprising” can also count on the active collaboration of Britain. But let’s see how the leading country of the liberal West conducts itself in its colonies: “The British have exterminated the inhabitants of Tasmania to the very last man. But the Irish are not Tasmanians! It’s not simply possible to kill them all.&amp;amp;quot; Despite being subjected to merciless rule and repression, in South Africa blacks multiply to a concerning degree: “Some colonists openly desire an insurrection to halt the dangerous growth of the Kaffir population and to erase their rights, including to their land.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn823|823]] Cold and expressionless, these descriptions become charged with moral indignation in passing from bourgeois historians to Lenin, who notes: these are “the results of the colonial wars”; thanks to the expropriation and annihilation of the Hereros, the new arrivals can “steal the land and become landowners.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn824|824]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No less charged with moral indignation is the reading that Stalin makes of colonialism. But Theodore Roosevelt appears to preemptively respond to this denunciation of the enslavement and genocidal practices that take place in the colonies: “Quite fortunately, the tough and energetic politicians who were the pioneers of the difficult job of civilizing barbarian territories didn’t allow themselves to become overtaken by false sentimentalism”; those “sentimental philanthropists” who are moved by the fate of the colonized peoples should be considered worse than “professional criminals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn825|825]] The same can be said of General Bugeaud, considered by Tocqueville as a model of “energy” and “unequaled vigor” at the time of leading “the only type of war that can be waged in Africa.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn826|826]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In our days, is communism synonymous with the total state and with totalitarianism? In the years of the First World War, it was the capitalist countries, including those of liberal orientation, who incarnated all that. Lenin highlights the fact that what impedes “fraternization” on the frontlines is “a penal colony discipline”, and that even the rearguard posts have become “military prisons.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn827|827]] Civil society is subjected to the same iron-fist discipline; in referring to that, the Russian revolutionary highlights the relevance of the analysis made some decades earlier by Engels, according to whom the growing militarization and “the competition for greater conquest drives political power to the point that it threatens to consume the entire society, even the State.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn828|828]] Bukharin, for his part, in denouncing the “centralization of the garrison State” and the “iron heel of the militarist State”, spots on the horizon a “new Leviathan, to which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems like child’s play.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn829|829]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theme that is also found in Stalin, for whom war ends up mutilating or destroying “democracy” even where it appears to be more rooted: contrary to Russia, in Britain “national oppression” doesn’t generally assume “the monstrous forms of massacres and pogroms”, it was “less grave, less inhuman”; but with the outbreak of hostility the situation deteriorates drastically, as both Irish and Indians had to experience first hand.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn830|830]] Even the Western democracies tend not to differentiate themselves from a country characterized by a fierce and “inhumane autocracy.&amp;amp;quot; One can counterpose this language to “the frequent use in the writing of [Theodore] Roosevelt of words like ‘virile’, ‘imperial’, ‘able bodied’”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn831|831]] a prose that again transmits an attitude “beyond good and evil” and a cult to a will power lacking any moral limits.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the common place reading that likes to oppose the moral sense of the liberal bourgeois world to the communist movement’s Machiavellian lack of scruples doesn’t stand up to historical analysis. Immediately after the October Revolution, approvingly welcomed by him, the young Lukács sees in the “historic movement” for “socialism” a radical settling of accounts with &#039;&#039;Realpolitik&#039;&#039;;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn832|832]] for Benedetto Croce, however, the Bolsheviks and the “Russian revolutionaries” are the object of hatred and ridicule, who represent “moralistic politics.&amp;amp;quot; They “have opened a great courthouse of justice, calling everyone to be examined in the name of morality, about their war objectives, to scrutinize them, accepting the honest and excluding the dishonest; thus, proceeding in a moralistic way, they have made public all previous diplomatic treaties”, considered immoral for having planned the war with the aim of obtaining territorial conquests. But the liberal philosopher objects, it’s absurd to want “to make moral judgements on States” and “to treat politics like morality, in the place where politics (and that is the simple truth) is politics, and precisely politics, and nothing more than politics; and [...] their morality consists solely and entirely in being politically excellent.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to argue for “awarding rights to those who don’t know how to win them or don’t know how to defend them, placing limits and responsibilities on those who rightly, out of their own conviction and by shedding their own blood, don’t recognize any other limit or obligation outside those suggested or put in place by their own mind and strength.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn833|833]] One can say that Stalin has the ideal response to Croce on March 10th, 1939, at a time when the partition and tragedy of Czechoslovakia takes place, thanks to Munich and the complicity of the West, who refuse to condemn it and seek to contain the expansionist will power and vitality of the Third Reich, doing everything possible to direct it to the East: “It’s naive to lecture people who don’t recognize human morality. ‘Politics is politics’, as the old and experienced bourgeois diplomats say.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn834|834]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us concentrate on the First World War. It’s worthwhile to reread what Vilfredo Pareto wrote in 1920: before the conflagration, “the proletarians and especially the socialists” said they were ready to prevent it with a general strike or by still more radical means. “After such beautiful speeches the World War began. The general strike doesn’t happen; while in opposition in various parliaments, the socialists approved the funding for the war, or didn’t make too much opposition to it” so that “the principle of the teacher [Marx]: ‘workers of the world, unite!’ implicitly transformed into another: ‘workers of the world, kill yourselves’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn835|835]] Stalin appears to have preemptively responded to Pareto, who, at least at this time is a typical representative of the liberal-bourgeois world, and who doesn’t hide his cynicism and satisfaction over the bloody defeat of socialist internationalism; but the words of Stalin reverberate with moral indignation and, at the same time with hope (the February Revolution has started):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Three years have passed since the workers of the world―a day before still brothers, now dressed in uniforms―lined up to face each other as enemies, and who today injure and kill each other, to the enjoyment of the enemies of the proletariat [...]. The Russian Revolution is the first to open a breach in the wall that divides the workers against each other. At a time of general ‘patriotic’ intoxication, the Russian workers are the first to raise the forgotten slogan: “Workers of the world, Unite!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn836|836]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the new situation created in Russia (and around the world) it’s possible to resume the struggle to put an end to the massacre and to promote “mass confraternization on the fronts” and “new bonds of fraternity among the peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn837|837]] To achieve this result, however, it’s necessary to go beyond the February Revolution. “The life in the trenches, the true lives of the soldiers, created a new instrument of struggle: mass confraternization”, which the provisional government nevertheless opposes, calling for an “offensive” and for new bloodbaths,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn838|838]] and it threatens to send to military courts those “guilty” of “confraternization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn839|839]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true, in its clandestine period, the Bolshevik party and Stalin eventually carried out their struggle against the autocracy using violent methods (robberies of banks and vehicles transporting valuables), and historians committed to depicting Stalin as a gangster since his youth make use of that past. What is there to say of this approach? Let’s make a comparison with Churchill, five years older than Stalin. The future British statesman begins his career by fighting and sympathetically describing the wars of the British Empire, including the least glorious ones; while in Sudan they don’t take prisoners, in South Africa the conquerors create concentration camps, destined to become a tragic model. From these experiences, Churchill begins to distinguish himself as a political leader, passionately fighting for the defense of the “British race” and the white race in general. To achieve this outcome, it&#039;s not enough to strengthen control over the “colonial peoples”, it’s necessary to intervene in the metropole as well: they must proceed toward the forced sterilization of the “feeble-minded”, misfits, those presumed to be habitual delinquents; at the same time “idle vagabonds” should be locked away in work camps. Only this way could “a national and racial threat impossible to exaggerate” be adequately confronted. The author who cites these fragments comments: as the Home Secretary in 1911, Churchill was the author of “draconian measures” that had “conferred upon him an almost unlimited personal power over the lives of individuals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn840|840]] Are Churchill’s origins truly more inspiring than Stalin’s? Years later, while the latter―from a prison in which he was placed by the tsarist regime allied to Britain―dreams of the confraternization of soldiers and nations, the former is dedicated to carrying out until the very end a war that his view is destined to strengthen the hegemony of the British Empire and the “British race.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, for a historian who ends their work in October of 1917, it would very difficult to point to the Bolshevik party and to Stalin as the side in the struggle that ignores moral reasoning.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Reductio ad Hilterum and its Variants ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even more inconclusive prove to be the psychopathological and moral approaches for the fact that the tragedy that took place in Russia in the twentieth century was predicted decades or even centuries in advance by a number of different personalities; therefore it’s very hard to explain it by the psychology or by the moral deprivation of single individuals. Moreover, like the first approach, the second as well could be used to denounce the leader of the liberal West. One can start with the close support given by Great Britain to the attempted coup d’état by Kornilov, and the support later given to the Whites, at a time when they unleashed a vicious and bloody manhunt, that in some ways foreshadowed the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; To impose upon Russia its permanent participation in what the communists denounced as the “genocide” of World War I, the liberal West closed its eyes to other monstrous crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
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After military victory comes the moment to divide up the colonial booty. To Britain belongs, among others, Iraq, that nevertheless rebels in 1920. Here’s how one of the leading countries of the liberal West faces that situation: British troops initiated “cruel reprisals”, “they set fire to villages and committed other acts which today we’d judge to be excessively repressive, if not outright barbaric.&amp;amp;quot; It’s certainly not Churchill who puts a halt to it, he in fact encourages the air force to offer a severe lesson to the “recalcitrant natives”, using an “experimental method” by resorting to “toxic gas projectiles, especially mustard gas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn841|841]] In this case, we are forced to think not of the “final solution”, but of the colonial war unleashed by fascist Italy against Ethiopia, and carried out in a particularly barbaric way, resorting to weapons prohibited by international conventions. In this, Churchill appears as the precursor to Mussolini. Moreover, when it’s a matter of preserving or expanding the Empire, the crude methods of the British statesman are unchanging: in 1942, the pro-independence demonstrations in India are repressed by “resorting to extreme measures, like the use of the air force to strafe the multitudes of protesters”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn842|842]] in the following two years, Churchill is stubborn in denying and in neglecting the reality of the famine that decimated the population of Indian Bengal. Finally, to stick with the subject of the colonies and the peoples of colonial origin, to what degree does the “final solution of our indigenous question” in Canada, that until 1931 is part of the British Commonwealth, cast another shadow on an authoritative member of the British political class like Churchill? He, as prime minister from 1951 to 1955, must be considered responsible for the genocidal practices that the government in London resorts to in the effort to smash the Mau Mau rebellion. (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s return to the interwar period in Europe. After Hitler’s rise to power, the London government seeks by all means to redirect the Third Reich’s expansionist drive to the East, and primarily against the Soviet Union. Regarding this, two Canadian historians arrive at a conclusion that gives cause for consideration: “The responsibility for the tragedy of World War II, the Holocaust included, must fall in part on Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, and their closest allies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn843|843]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Great Britain was unable to avoid the clash with Nazi Germany and it faces it primarily by making use of indiscriminate terror bombings of German cities, with the consequent massacre of the civilian population; that led two American historians to make a comparison to the treatment inflicted by Nazism on the Jewish people (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 2). It’s the Soviet leadership that seeks to restrain it, as follows in a diary entry by Dimitrov from March 17th, 1945:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This evening with Stalin alongside Molotov, we discussed the questions regarding Germany. The British want to divide Germany (Bavaria, Austria, the Rhineland, etc). They try using all means to destroy their competitor. They furiously bombard German factories. We don’t let their aircraft pass over our area in Germany. But they try by all means to bombard there as well [...] It’s necessary for Germans to emerge who can act to save what can still be saved for the sake of the German people. To organize local government, restore economic life, etc, in the occupied territories and areas soon to be occupied by the Red Army. To create bodies for local administration from which can also emerge a German government.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn844|844]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All the more odious appears the hellfire unleashed by the British air force for the fact that two weeks after the start of the war, British Prime Minister Chamberlain had declared: “regardless of how far others may go, the government of His Majesty will never resort to deliberate attacks against women and children for merely terroristic aims.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn845|845]] In truth, the plans for indiscriminate and terroristic bombardments had begun taking shape during the First World War; while it dragged on without end, Churchill “had planned for 1919 an attack by a thousand bombers on Berlin.&amp;amp;quot; Those planned continued to be developed after their victory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn846|846]] In other words, one could say, imitating the careless form of argument used by the ideologues in fashion today, that the leading country of the liberal West at that time planned a new “genocide” as was coming to end the one that had been initiated in 1914. In any case, it’s precisely Britain who becomes the protagonist of the systematic destruction of German cities toward the very end of World War II (with Dresden particularly in mind), an organized destruction carried out with the declared objective of leaving no escape for the civilian population, pursued and consumed by the flames, obstructed in their attempt to flee the bombing by delayed explosions and often strafed from above.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those practices appear all the more sinister if we consider the statement made by Churchill in April of 1941: “There’s less than 70 million evil Huns. Some of them can be cured, others must die.&amp;amp;quot; If one doesn’t have in mind a pure and simple genocide, like Nolte thought, it’s clear that a massive thinning of the German population was being considered.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn847|847]] We can put the strategic bombing campaign in that context: “Between 1940-1945, Churchill annihilated the inhabitants of Cologne, Berlin, and Dresden as if they were the Huns.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn848|848]] The British prime minister proved to be no less cruel when it came to carving out London’s sphere of influence and systematically liquidating the partisan forces considered hostile or questionable. The orders given to the British expeditionary force in Greece are significant: “Don’t hesitate in acting as if you found yourselves in a conquered city in which a local revolt has broken out.&amp;amp;quot; In addition: “Certain things can’t be done half-way.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn849|849]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s move on to the Cold War. Some time ago, &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; revealed that between 1946 and 1948, Great Britain prepared camps in Germany in which were to be confined communists or elements suspected of communist sympathies, and real or presumed Soviet spies: “the photos showed the disheveled and tormented faces of the bone-thin youths, for months subjected to a lack of food and sleep, repeatedly beaten and exposed to very low temperatures. An inhumane treatment that sought the death of some of the prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; Imprisoned there as well were “dozens of women who weren’t spared from torture.&amp;amp;quot; In carrying out torture, they used instruments that had been inherited from the Gestapo; in fact, the camps were “worthy of the Nazi ‘lagers’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn850|850]] As one can see, the comparison between the practices used in the twentieth century by Great Britain and the practices dear to the Third Reich continually arises.&lt;br /&gt;
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When we concern ourselves with the United States, we reach results that are no different. In that case, the hypocrisy we saw characterize Chamberlain reaches its apex. Soon after the start of World War II, it’s Franklin D. Roosevelt who condemns the aerial bombardments targeting civilian populations for being against the sentiments of “every civilized man and woman” and “human consciousness”, and as the expression of “inhuman barbarity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn851|851]] Soon to demonstrate even more extreme “inhuman barbarity”, the United States war machine proceeds with the systematic and terroristic destruction of Japanese cities and actively participates in a similar operation carried out against German cities. Nor should it be underestimated the bombardment against Italy, which also aims to strike the civilian population and undermine their morale. It’s F.D. Roosevelt himself who provides evidence of that: “We will make it so the Italians experience an authentic bombardment, and I’m more than convinced that they won’t remain standing under this sort of pressure.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn852|852]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The terror bombing campaign culminates, under the Truman administration, in the use of nuclear weapons against a country already on its knees. To add a further gruesome detail: it’s been noted that the annihilation of the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was aimed, not at a Japan on the brink of surrender, but at the Soviet Union, delivered as a serious warning.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn853|853]] We have before us, then, two acts of terrorism on a grand scale; and moreover, they serve multiple purposes: tens upon tens of thousands of unarmed civilians of the old enemy (or better yet, the former enemy who’s to be transformed into an ally) are massacred with the aim of terrorizing an ally, now picked out as the new enemy and the new target of the genocidal practices that had just been tested!&lt;br /&gt;
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The war in Asia, however, lends itself to further considerations. It’s now widely accepted in the United States the theory according to which the attack on Pearl Harbor was easily foreseen (and in fact provoked with an oil embargo that had left Japan with very few alternatives). Once the attack took place, however, the war is carried out by Washington and inspired by a sense of moral indignation that in light of what we now know is certainly hypocritical, yet much more lethal. It’s not just the destruction of cities. Consider the mutilation of bodies and even the mutilation of enemies moments away from their deaths in order to extract some kind of souvenir, a souvenir then calmly and proudly flaunted. Especially significant is the ideology that presides over these practices: the Japanese are classified as “subhumans”, resorting to a term central to Nazi discourse.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn854|854]] And we are again directed to that discourse when we witness F.D. Roosevelt flirt with the idea of forcing “castration” upon the Germans. After the end of the war, they are confined to concentration camps where, out of pure sadism or vengeance, they are forced to endure hunger, thirst, and all kinds of deprivations and humiliations, while across the entire defeated nation looms the specter of death by starvation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To continue with the statesman who is considered, above all others, to be the champion of freedom: Roosevelt didn’t alter the policy traditionally followed by Washington in Latin America, and in 1937 a bloody dictator, Anastasio Somoza, comes to power in Nicaragua, thanks to the National Guard trained by the United States.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn855|855]] Within the United States, cities built under the F.D. Roosevelt administration continued to explicitly discriminate against African Americans; moreover, “the residencies for workers involved in national defense, either built or financed by the government during World War II, were deliberately subjected to a more rigid segregation than even that enforced in the neighboring communities.&amp;amp;quot; In addition, “the armed forces also maintained a rigid segregation during the war.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: despite pressure from the Republican Party, “the president never put forth legislative proposals against lynchings”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn856|856]] which continue to be carried out in the South as a spectacle for crowds of men, women and children who enjoy the sight of the humiliation and the most sadistic torture inflicted upon the victim―a slow torment, unending and made to last as long as possible (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, after having celebrated in January of 1941 the United States as a country that has continually evolved in a peaceful manner, “without concentration camps”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn857|857]] soon after the outbreak of war, F.D. Roosevelt resorts to that very institution to deprive the Japanese American community of their freedom, without distinctions for age or sex.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays, it’s almost obvious to compare Stalin to Hitler, but it may be interesting to read an evaluation of the strategic bombing of Germany that a German author made regarding the flames that consumed Dresden and its residents:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The fate of the bodies reflected the means of execution. The victim of an act of extermination does not have their own grave, nor their own death, because they have not been given the right to live [...], the deaths of thousands of children beneath the age of ten is not a punishment. The bombardier Harris [leader of the air campaign against German cities] didn’t assign them any blame. Churchill only stated that for him they had no rights of any value. Perhaps they still had some in the First World War, but not anymore in the Second. Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt had taken them away.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn858|858]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, the comparison of these three figures is marked by a polemical overstatement that seems to reflect a mindset widespread in Germany immediately following the war, in a ruined Germany that is isolated by the ban against fraternization and taken to the brink of starvation by the liberal West. A conversation was recorded that, in the zone occupied by the US, takes place between two desperate citizens:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Yes, Hitler was bad, our war was unjust, but now they are committing the same injustices against us, they are the same, there’s no difference, they seek to enslave Germany in the same way Hitler sought to enslave the Polish, now we are the Jews, the ‘inferior race’.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn859|859]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the first of these two cited passages makes a partial comparison between Hitler, Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt, the second arrives at their total assimilation. The ruling ideology today, however, associates Stalin and Hitler, but that’s just as rash as the comparison made by the two German citizens frustrated by hunger and humiliation: ‘There’s no difference’!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Tragic Conflicts and Moral Dilemmas ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even in wanting to fixate on its specifically moral dimension, the comparison between the protagonists of the grand anti-fascist alliance certainly has its contrasts. But how to explain, then, the current Manichean opposition? Let’s return to the secular process behind the catastrophe that explodes with the collapse of the tsarist autocracy. Sadly, while accepted when it comes to historical reconstruction, the long-term perspective disappears like magic when it comes to the formulation of a moral judgement: everything is reduced to the demonization of the period that began with October 1917, and with Stalin in particular. Are those who for a long time supported a regime characterized by such violent social relations―and so violently dehumanizing that the catastrophe was foreseen by such different personalities (Maistre, Marx, Witte)―blameless? Is there nothing to censure in those who unleashed World War I, and that in the West, with the aim of forcing Russia to participate in it until the end, didn’t hesitate in arming and propping up even the most ferocious reactionary groups? If, as sustained by one of the authors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;, “Stalinism” began taking form in 1914, why doesn’t the bench for the accused have those that were responsible for the slaughter, but only those that sought to prevent or hasten its conclusion?&lt;br /&gt;
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At least with regard to the origin and the unfolding of the Second World War, the problematic character of the moral judgement to be formulated on the Western and liberal statesmen didn’t go unnoticed by the more attentive authors. We saw two Canadian historians attribute to the British protagonists of appeasement―in truth, the redirection of Nazi expansionism to the East―shared responsibility “for the tragedy of World War II, including Holocaust.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there’s the problem of how the war was conducted by the liberal West once it began. Of course, in this case as well the ruling ideology gets off easy. A successful historian and journalist, whose articles are also found in the New York Times, and who has very little doubts “about the timing and moral righteousness” of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, goes as far as stating that to not use it “would have been illogical and completely irresponsible.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly a massacre of an innocent civilian population took place, but “those who died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were victims not of American technology, but of a paralyzed system of government, devoted to a twisted ideology that had eliminated not only absolute moral values, but reason itself.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn860|860]] These firmly held certainties rest on a very simple assumption: the responsibility for a horrible action does not necessarily belong to the material author of that action. It’s something that has been similarly argued by the leaders of the USSR: having obviously recognized the horrors that took place at crucial moments in the history of the country, but having attributed its responsibility to “imperialist encirclement” and the aggressive policies of the great capitalist powers. It must be noted, however, that the journalist-historian, who is published and praised by the most prominent press organizations, applies his criteria only to the liberal and Anglo-Saxon West. But to only apply a criteria to one’s own side is the very definition of dogmatism at the theoretical level and it’s hypocrisy at the moral level.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fortunately, it’s possible to hear less simplistic opinions on Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An illustrious American philosopher, Michael Walzer, observes that, for the then victorious American side, to resort to the atomic bomb and “to kill and terrorize civilians”, without even attempting a real negotiation with the Japanese, were “two crimes in one.&amp;amp;quot; Walzer reaches a similar conclusion with regard to the destruction of Dresden and other German and Japanese cities, carried out “when the war had already been virtually won.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn861|861]] The question is put differently during the years in which the triumph of the Third Reich appeared to be taking place, when Great Britain begins its strategic bombing campaign that in Germany systematically and ruthlessly targets the civilian population. It’s a tragic moment and the British rulers find themselves in a terrible moral dilemma that can be formulated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Can soldiers and statesmen trample over the rights of innocent people to save their own political community? I would be inclined to respond in the affirmative to that question, although not without hesitation and concern. What other choice would be available to them? They can sacrifice themselves for the purpose of defending moral law, but they can’t sacrifice their own countrymen. Faced with an endless and horrible situation, the options in front of them are exhausted, they will do what is necessary to save their own people.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn862|862]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The danger of a victory by the Third Reich, “the personification of evil in the world”, dictates a “supreme emergency”, a “state of necessity”; so it’s then necessary to observe that “necessity knows no limits.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, bombing campaigns that aim aim to kill and terrorize the civilian population of an enemy country are a crime, however, “I dare say that our history would be wiped out, our future put in jeopardy, if I didn’t accept assuming the burden of the criminal act here and now.&amp;amp;quot; The young Lukács makes a similar argument when, driven by the butchery of World War I, his revolutionary orientation matures. In affirming the inevitability of “guilt” and appealing to “seriousness”, “consciousness”, and a “sense of moral responsibility”, he exclaims paraphrasing Hebbel: “And if God, between me and the task that’s been assigned to me, had placed sin, who am I to be allowed to escape that choice?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn863|863]] Presumably later, with that same state of mind, as the threat posed by the Third Reich grows ever more imminent, the Hungarian philosopher faced the years of Stalin&#039;s terror.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now turn our sights to the Soviet Union. It’s worthwhile to observe the thesis formulated by Toynbee, according to which Stalingrad was made possible by the journey taken by Stalin’s USSR “from 1928 to 1941”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn864|864]] is today confirmed by no small number of historians and experts on military strategy: it’s quite possible that, without the abandonment of the NEP, without the collectivization of agriculture (with the steady flow of food products from the countryside to the city and the front) and the rushed industrialization (with the development of the arms industry and with the rise of new industrial centers in the eastern regions, at a safe distance from the invading army), it would have been impossible to successfully oppose Hitler’s aggression: “The unequaled and incontestable contribution by Soviet Russia to the defeat of Nazi Germany is closely linked to the stubborn Second Revolution by Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn865|865]] Moreover, in Churchill’s judgement, even the trial against Tukhachevsky and the Great Terror as a whole had played a positive and even an important role in the defeat of Operation Barbarossa. Must we then justify the concentrationary universe that made it possible to avoid “a horror without end” for the Soviet people and for all of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
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Walzer rightly subjects his stated principle to rigorous conditions: it can only be considered valid if, aside from being “truly rare and dire”, the danger is also “imminent.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn866|866]] One could possibly say that the second condition is absent in the Soviet Union: Stalin begins coerced collectivization of agriculture and rushed industrialization―which ends up provoking a horrible expansion of the concentrationary universe―when the threat of war is still remote and Hitler hadn’t even seized power. One could also argue in response that Great Britain also promoted its plan for the construction of an air fleet suited to future strategic bombing campaigns at least two decades before the rise of its “supreme emergency.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, that plan began taking shape during the First World War and, therefore, what motivated it was the competition for hegemony underway since at least the end of the nineteenth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The context is very different for the country that is born out of the October Revolution. Widespread in Europe at the time, the analysis offered by General Foch, among others, soon after the signing of the Versailles Treaty (“it’s not a peace, it’s but an armistice for twenty years”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn867|867]] is well known to Stalin, who warns about the urgency of the task of tackling the backwardness demonstrated by Russia during the First World War. With regard to the Eastern Front, that conflict was continuously understood by Wilhelm II as a racial war in which the very existence of the nations in battle was at stake, the “to be or not to be of the Germanic race in Europe.&amp;amp;quot; It was a fight that excluded any reconciliation or mutual recognition: peace “is in no way possible between Slavs and Germans.&amp;amp;quot; Specifically starting with Brest-Litovsk, voices had emerged in Wilhelm’s Reich that looked to the East in search of a solution for the problem of living-space, and who had in mind an understanding with Britain with the aim of carrying out the dismemberment of Russia and “creating the conditions for Germany’s position in the world as an enormous continental power.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn868|868]] A few years later, in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, Hitler clearly described his program for the construction of a continental German empire to be built primarily over the ruins of the Soviet Union. It’s not hard to identify the line that leads from Brest-Litovsk to Operation Barbarossa, and that’s enough to explain Stalin’s concerns. In any case, the imminence of the threat is anything but unambiguous; there’s no great way of measuring its distance in time; the threat is imminent enough that no delays can be permitted for it to be adequately handled. Moreover, if we understand “imminence” not only with respect to time, but also with respect to location, the Soviet Union was clearly exposed to a more “imminent” threat. Lastly, while the systematic killing of a civilian population by aerial bombardment &#039;&#039;is a crime in itself&#039;&#039;, the collectivization of agricultural and rushed industrialization end up leading to a series of crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those who only contemplate the moral dilemmas of the Anglo-Saxon statesmen demonstrate dogmatism and hypocrisy. Yet, even if we affirm alongside Walzer that when faced with the “supreme emergency” a statesman must know how to assume “the burden of the crime here and now”, it becomes difficult to move on from the general to the particular.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When we read about the terrible suffering individuals held in the Gulag went through, disturbed by a horrible experience of which they are unable to comprehend either its origin or its reason, we are led to exclaim alongside Petrarch “Povera et nuda vai philosophia” (Rimas, VII, 10). But a similar consideration holds true for the victims of strategic bombing campaigns. Can the “supreme emergency” really justify that which is described in written accounts? “The first round of bombs fell at nine in the morning on streets full of people lined up to shop, and it killed seven hundred people, nearly all of them women and children. Later the warplanes pursued and struck the citizens fleeing to the east, to the forest.&amp;amp;quot; In other places “the warplanes started strafing pedestrians, cyclists, train passengers, farmers working in the fields.&amp;amp;quot; “The funerals take place under low altitude attacks; lacking coffins, bed sheets were used.&amp;amp;quot; “The bombs smash through houses, remaining stuck in the ceiling, they explode ten days later, during the light of day or in the dark of night: they knock down walls, and kill residents while they sleep.&amp;amp;quot; “People had to flee through the flames and thereby rushed to their deaths; there were even those who took their own lives or threw themselves into the flames.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn869|869]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any case, criminal at a time when the defeat of the Third Reich was already becoming evident, are these actions justified while the supreme emergency is in effect? It’s once again evident the difficulty in moving from the general to the particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Soviet Katyn and the American and South Korean “Katyn” ===&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to the collectivization of agriculture and the rushed industrialization, the massacre of Polish officers, ordered by the Soviet leadership and carried out in Katyn in March and April of 1940, is a crime in itself. The challenge posed by Finland continued to linger; after the unsuccessful attempt to arrange an agreed-upon exchange of territory, undertaken by Stalin with the aim of providing a minimal of territorial depth to the defense of Leningrad (a city that is later protagonist of an epic resistance against the Nazi invasion), now the war appears to be widening and becoming generalized. In such a case, what would be the reaction from the captured Polish officers following the dismemberment of Poland? For Moscow’s part, they try in vain to dissuade them from their stubborn anti-Soviet positions, the legacy of the conflict that began with the collapse of the tsarist empire and that therefore tended to take on the brutal characteristics of a civil war. The situation became very difficult. There was the danger of the USSR itself being consumed by the war, and there were Western circles that were considering an overthrow of Stalin’s regime (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, § 9). That is the “grave security problem” that precipitated the “appalling decision” that Stalin must have later “bitterly lamented due to the troubles and complications that followed.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn870|870]] In other words, in the case of the Katyn executions, the moral dilemmas that Walzer brought up are also present. However, it would be wrong in this case to invoke the “supreme emergency”, further expanding a criteria that inherently runs the risk of becoming excessively broad.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although it’s unjustifiable, the crime we are dealing with doesn’t involve characteristics that are specific to Stalin’s personality or the regime led by him. Let’s consider the crime that stains United States general Patton; upon landing in Sicily, he orders the massacre of Italian soldiers who surrendered after fierce resistance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn871|871]] Although it’s an atrocity smaller in scope, it’s necessary to have in mind that there’s no real security concerns for the country that provoked it, but rather the spirit of vengeance or maybe even racial contempt. In other words, in this case it’s a matter of a crime of abject motives.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, if we want to find a real analogy to Katyn, we must reference other tragedies and other horrors. Ten years after the Soviet Katyn, that which we can define as the United States and South Korean “Katyn” took place. The Korean War is underway. From the savagely bombarded North, a mass of refugees heads to the South. How are they received? “The United States army had a policy of killing civilians that approached South Korea”; the victims were “mostly women and children”, but they had feared that North Korean infiltrators had been among them, although in researching one of the more documented cases (the killings that occurred in No Gun Ri), “there didn’t appear to be any proof of enemy infiltrators”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn872|872]] Here it’s not a question of orders from a single, albeit high profile, general or marshal like Patton, but rather a policy approved at the highest military (and political) levels in the United States. And it’s that exact situation that makes us think of Katyn, especially because security is at stake in the two cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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To guarantee security, the United States and its allies don’t stop at killing refugees. They considered it necessary to also eliminate the potential fifth column. For example, “in the city of Taejon, in July of 1950, the police order 1,700 Koreans, accused of being communists, to dig their graves, then they were put to the firing squad.” A witness explains:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;On a Sunday morning, at dawn, in the apparently deserted city of Chochiwon, I saw a procession of men and women, bound to one another with their hands behind their backs, beaten and bashed, while they are led from the police station to the trucks they’re forced to climb into. They were later put to the firing squad, left unburied one or two miles away.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn873|873]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In a cobalt mine near Daegu, in the south of the country, researchers have so far found the remains of 240 people. It’s just a fraction of the presumed 3,500 prisoners or suspected communists grabbed from their cells or homes between July and September of 1950, and later put to the firing squad and tossed to the bottom of the mine.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sometimes the victims of “summary executions” also included “women and children”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn874|874]] one could say in such cases that not even the family of the suspected communist was spared. The obsession with security doesn’t only strike the military rear, but the captured or recaptured cities as well. Here’s what happened in one of them: “they told us to light our cigarettes. Then they started to unload with their rifles and machine guns. After a pause, one officer shouted: ‘those of you still alive, you can get up and go home’. Those that did were again fired upon.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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How many victims in total were there from these two practices of killing refugees and eliminating those suspected of being communists? In truth, it still hasn’t been fully determined the extension of that which “the relatives of the victims call the Korean death camps.&amp;amp;quot; For now a provisional figure can be reached: “The researchers have so far investigated 1,222 cases of mass executions [...]. The cases included 215 incidents in which the survivors claim American ground troops and planes killed unarmed refugees.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn875|875]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The American and South Korean “Katyn” doesn’t appear to be smaller in scale than the Soviet one, and in addition it shows a greater lack of scruples (for a war carried out thousands of kilometers away by a country whose leaders in Washington couldn’t in any way claim a “supreme emergency”). But here it’s not a question of establishing a hierarchy between the two crimes, both are unjustifiable; it’s instead a question of noting the inadequacy of the moral-Manichaean approach to understanding Stalin and the country led by him.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Inevitability and Complexity of the Moral Judgement ===&lt;br /&gt;
In a certain way, while inevitable, the moral judgement would be superficial and hypocritical if it was formulated by abstracting the historical context. From there arises its complexity and difficulty. At the same time, it’s necessary to have in mind and to unravel the objective circumstances and subjective responsibilities and, with respect to the latter, it’s necessary to distinguish between the responsibilities of the leadership group as a whole and those that belong to single individuals. With respect to the leadership group of Soviet Russia, it comes to power at a time when―to use the words of a Christian witness sympathetic to the changes brought by October 1917―”pity was killed by the omnipresence of death”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn876|876]] and it is forced to face a prolonged state of emergency, in a situation characterized―to again use the analysis by one of the authors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;―by an “unparalleled brutality”, generalized and “without possible terms of comparison to that known by Western societies.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, while the major figures of the twentieth century were forced to confront the devastating conflicts and moral dilemmas that characterized the Second Thirty Years’ War, Stalin had to also face the conflicts and moral dilemmas particular to Russian history and the Second Time of Troubles. One could say the shadow of the “supreme emergency” dominated the thirty years when he exercised power.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s necessary, however, not to lose sight of the fact that it’s not only the objective conditions that create serious obstacles or make the transition from the state of emergency to a state of normality impossible. Millenarianism also contributed to that, though certainly in great measure sparked by the horrors of World War I, yet it’s intrinsic to a vision that expects the disappearance of the market, money, the state and juridical order. The disappointment and outrage that none of that had come to pass encourages more conflict, and a conflict that can’t be managed by purely formal juridical norms, as they too are destined to disappear. From this arises a level of violence that isn’t possible to justify by resorting to the state of emergency or the “supreme emergency.&amp;amp;quot; In that sense, the moral judgement coincides with the political judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
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This holds true for the liberal West as well. With regard to the commander of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, it was observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When he was a young pilot, Harris had bombed rebellious Indian civilians. The psychological shock they experienced was a cultural shock above all else. The primitive tribes that lived in villages with huts made of reeds threw themselves down in awe at the feet of the colonial empire and its industrial arsenal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn877|877]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it was Churchill more than anyone else who promoted that kind of warfare, who as we already saw suggests striking “recalcitrant natives” in Iraq with bombs using “chemical weapons and especially mustard gas”, and elsewhere compares the Germans to “evil Huns.&amp;amp;quot; We also encountered the weight of racial ideology in the American war against Japan (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 4), that, not by chance, goes on to suffer the atomic bombings. Again a level of violence appears that can’t be justified by the “supreme emergency”, but instead relates to the colonial ideology shared by the liberal West and Germany. While the Third Reich compares the “indigenous people” of Eastern Europe to the decimated Native Americans and enslaved blacks, Britain and the United States end up treating the Germans and the Japanese the same way as colonial peoples are treated, needing a lesson in obedience.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin, Peter the Great and the New Lincoln ===&lt;br /&gt;
In specific reference to the role played by him in the Second Time of Troubles, no small number of historians―taking up a theme that we already saw Churchill use―compare Stalin to Peter the Great.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn878|878]] Even the objection raised in regards to it (“Peter, contrary to Stalin, looked to the West and opened up his state to it”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn879|879]] doesn’t seem persuasive. The condemnation of the “Asiatic dispositions”, the “barbaric, Asiatic measures”, and the “Asiatic methods”, for which the government and bourgeoisie of Tsarist Russia are responsible, is a crucial moment in Stalin’s revolutionary agitation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn880|880]] At least until October 1917, he had no doubt that his country was more backwards at all levels in relation to the Western democracies, where bloody pogroms against the Jews don’t take place, pogroms that rage in a “semi-Asiatic country” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 9). After the seizure of power, Stalin not only insists on the need to embrace Western technology, but also declares that, if they really want to live up to the “principles of Leninism”, the Bolshevik cadre must know how to combine “the Russian revolutionary impetus” with “the practical American spirit.&amp;amp;quot; In 1932, still referring to the United States, he expresses his appreciation for their “industrial and productive traditions”: they are “somewhat democratic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn881|881]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The reference to Peter the Great seems to be yet more persuasive in explaining the history of Soviet Russia for the fact that Lenin makes explicit reference to it (by May of 1918); and it’s referenced by Stalin as well, who once in a while appears to take up the figure of the great tsar as a model.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn882|882]] Trotsky himself, even while denouncing the “betrayal” of the revolution, writes: “In comparison to other various regions and nationalities, [Stalin’s] regime largely realizes the historic work that Peter I and his comrades realized for old Moscow; he just does it on a much vaster scale and at a much quicker pace.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn883|883]] It’s interesting as well to observe that, at the end of his trip to the Soviet Union in 1927, a great philosopher like Benjamin sympathetically shares the thesis by some “literati [...] who see in Bolshevism the coronation of Peter the Great’s work.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn884|884]] Lastly, one could go further back and recall a prediction by Marx: After having mentioned the violent and unprecedented disturbances provoked by the secular contradictions of Tsarist Russia, he concludes: “The Russian 1793 [...] will be the second turning point in Russian history and will introduce a real and generalized civilization in place of the false, deceptive civilization introduced by Peter the Great.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn885|885]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All that said, while it can in part serve to illuminate the relation between Russian history and the Second Time of Troubles, the comparison in question leaves out the Second Thirty Years’ War and the extraordinary influence exercised by Stalin at the global level. The condemnation in 1924 of the “outrageous disparity” between nations, theorized and imposed by imperialism, and the call to topple “the wall that separated whites and blacks”, nations considered “civilized” and peoples excluded from that recognition (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 7); the approval of a “profoundly internationalist” constitution―as Stalin stresses while presenting his project―and based on the “principle that all nations and races have equal rights”, regardless of the “color of their skin”, their language, and their respective level of economic and military development: all this could not fail to arouse a deep echo not only in the colonies but also in the peoples of colonial origin located in the very heart of the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn886|886]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Southern United States, where the regime of white supremacy still rages on, a new atmosphere takes hold; they look to the Soviet Union with hope and to Stalin as the “new Lincoln”, the Lincoln who would put an end, this time concretely and definitively, to the enslavement of blacks, and to the oppression, degradation, humiliation, violence and lynchings that they continue to endure.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn887|887]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While it advances toward autocracy, Stalin’s USSR has a powerful influence on the struggle by African Americans (and the colonial peoples) against racial despotism. In the South of the United States, a phenomenon is witnessed that is worrying from the point of view of the ruling caste: it’s the growing “imprudence” of black youths. Thanks to the communists, they finally begin to receive that which was stubbornly denied to them: an education that goes further than the basic education traditionally given to all those destined to carry out semi-servile labor for the master race. Now, however, in the schools organized by the communist party in the North of the United States, or in the schools of Moscow in Stalin’s USSR, blacks embrace the study of economics, politics, and world history; they also explore these disciplines to understand the reasons for the hard fate reserved to them in a country that carries itself as the champion of freedom. Those who attend those schools go through a profound change: the “imprudence” they’re condemned for by white supremacy is, in truth, their self esteem, up until that time forbidden and crushed. A black woman, and delegate to the International Congress of Women against War and Fascism that takes place in Paris in 1934, is extremely impressed by the equality and fraternity there, despite the linguistic and racial differences between those participating in that initiative promoted by the communists: “It was paradise on earth.&amp;amp;quot; Those who arrive in Moscow―observes a contemporary American historian―”experience a sense of freedom unheard of in the South.&amp;amp;quot; A black man falls in love with a white Soviet woman and they get married, even if later, in returning back home, he can’t bring her with him, knowing the destiny that awaits in the South for those that are found guilty of the crime of &#039;&#039;miscegenation&#039;&#039; and racial bastardization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn888|888]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The hopes of African Americans placed in the “new Lincoln” are not as naive as they may seem. Let’s reflect on the times and the modalities that characterize the end of the regime of white supremacy. In December of 1952, the United States Attorney General sends a revealing letter to the Supreme Court as it debated the question of integrating public schools: “Racial discrimination carries water for communist propaganda and raises doubts even among friendly nations about the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.&amp;amp;quot; Washington―observes an American historian retracing those events―would run the risk of alienating “the colored races” not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States: here too communist propaganda has achieved considerable success in attempting to win blacks over to the “revolutionary cause”, undermining their “faith in American institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn889|889]] There is no doubt: on these events, the concern over the challenge objectively represented by the USSR, and by the influence exercised by it on the colonial peoples and the peoples of colonial origin, played an essential role.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin doesn’t just indirectly influence democracy in the West with the push in some way given to the process of African American emancipation. The speech presenting the proposed new constitution totally condemns the three great discriminations that characterized the history of the liberal West: “it’s not income, national origin or sex” that must determine political and social placement, but only “the personal capacity and work of each citizen.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn890|890]] At the time in which he expressed himself in that way, the three great discriminations are still present in different forms and intensities in this or that country in the liberal West. Lastly, in pronouncing himself in favor of the overcoming of the three great discriminations, Stalin also declares that the new constitution is destined to guarantee “the right to work, the right to rest, the right to an education” and to assure the “best material and cultural conditions”, all within the realization of “socialist democratism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn891|891]] It is the theorization of the “social and economic rights” that, according to Hayek, represents the ruinous legacy of the “Marxist Russian Revolution” and that profoundly influences the demands for the welfare state in the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn892|892]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return to Russia. The reader must have noticed that, in speaking of “Stalinism”, I make use of quotation marks. The term is used by the present day followers of Trotsky in relation to the most distinct political realities; for example, to classify the leadership of post-Maoist China. But in even wanting to exclusively refer to the USSR, the term “Stalinism” is not persuasive; it appears to presuppose a homogeneous collection of doctrines and methods that don’t exist. In the three decades in which he exercised power, we see Stalin make an effort in elaborating and putting into practice a program of government, making note of the disappearance of the hopes for the worldwide triumph of the socialist revolution and clarifying the difference between utopia (that is the legacy of both Marx’s theory and the millenarianism for a totally new world provoked by the horrors of World War I) and the state of emergency (that in Russia takes on an exceptionally long duration and acuteness because of the convergence of the two gigantic crises: The Second Time of Troubles and the Second Thirty Years’ War). Making clear his intention of not putting the communist party’s monopoly on power up for discussion, Stalin repeatedly seeks to move on from the state of emergency to a state of relative normality, with the realization of a “Soviet democracy”, of a “socialist democratism”, and a society “without the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;amp;quot; But those attempts failed. It’s significant how the question of succession is “handled” soon after Stalin’s death: the elimination of Beria is a type of mafia style settling of accounts, it’s a personal violence that doesn’t make reference to any state or juridical order, nor to party statutes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The comparison between Stalin and Peter the Great now becomes totally unworkable. Looking closely, the Second Time of Troubles doesn’t even end with the arrival of autocracy. Its arrival coincides with the start of a new and prolonged state of emergency, that expands first with a dreadful new world war, and later with a Cold War at risk of transforming into a nuclear apocalypse at any moment. One could say that the Second Time of Troubles ends, in fact, with the overthrow of the USSR. Like the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks are unable to adjust to the disappearance or the attenuation of the state of emergency, and they therefore end up seeming obsolete and superficial to the majority of the population. After having managed to overcome the “crisis of the entire Russian nation”, the Bolsheviks in the end were defeated by the arrival of that relative state of normality, that is itself an outcome of their efforts.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s at the international level, however, that the influence of the October Revolution, and the man who led Soviet Russia for three decades, prove to be more solid. One can ridicule the pompous language of a constitution that never came into force, but it’s necessary to have in mind that even purely abstract declarations of principles have an impact on history. We can fall back in horror at a scenario that sees democracy (with the collapse of racist and colonialist despotism and the three great discriminations), and especially social democracy, advance in the wake of the challenge being offered by a dictatorial regime prone to using terror; but to give in to that sort of reaction means, in the last analysis, escaping from the complexity of its historical process. Those who would prefer to have before them a simpler scenario would do well to reflect on an observation by Marx: “It&#039;s the bad side that produces the movement that makes history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn893|893]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;7. The Depiction of Stalin between History and Mythology&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Various Historical Sources in the Current Depiction of Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
However, it’s difficult for the current historiography to distance itself from the depiction of Stalin as an “enormous, shadowy, capricious and degenerate monster of man”―in addition, so lacking in intellectual and political capacity that he becomes the object of ridicule. With regard to mythology, it’s also necessary to search for its historical origin. It’s worthwhile to start with the author (Deutscher) who was just cited, who in other circumstances and in a different period of time observes: “In contrast to the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks don’t execute their Girondins”, namely, the Mensheviks, who were “permitted” and even “encouraged to leave Russia and set up their political center abroad.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn894|894]] From there a harsh campaign is developed against the country first led by Lenin and later, for a longer period of time, by Stalin. Deutscher continues as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s correct that Stalin meditated at length about the terrible French precedent and for a few years that dissuaded him from resorting to more drastic means of repression. More than once Stalin had expressed himself in that sense [...]. In 1929, he decided to exile Trotsky from Russia. One couldn’t yet imagine that Trotsky was to be captured, and much less put before an execution squad.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn895|895]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With the opposition leader’s arrival in Istanbul, a new and more committed political center is formed, this time dedicated exclusively to exposing and denouncing all aspects of Stalin’s personality and actions. Fugitives like General Orlov can be put in that same context; fugitives who, in reaching the West, dedicate themselves to revealing the “Kremlin’s secrets”, earning a “enormous amount of money”, and presumably it’s a sum that’s greater for however much more sensational the revealed secrets are. Beginning with the Gorbachev years, these revelations are eagerly welcomed in the Soviet Union and are still today “one of the most important sources” for Western sovietology―these revelations, however, are a web of “lies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn896|896]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, we must not overlook the fact that the anti-Stalin campaign has its political center in the West. Its motivations had been previously clarified by Lloyd George, who, in the summer of 1919, observed that a united Russia, whether Bolshevik or not, constituted a threat to the British Empire.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn897|897]] In other words, a wide part of public opinion (first British and later American) identify Stalin as the incarnation of a double threat, that represented communist agitation in the capitalist metropole, and especially in the colonies, and that represented a great power, now all the more dangerous and expansionist for the fact it inspires and leads a political movement represented in all parts of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Which of the different political centers was the most implacable? At times, we get the impression that we are watching a competition. Soon after the pact of non-aggression between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, Trotsky lets out a type of victory cry: finally, it’s now evident to even the “professional apologists for the Kremlin” and Stalin, “the ‘pro-Soviet’ fools of all types”, those who had the illusion of being able to count on Moscow’s support in containing Nazi Germany’s expansion. Neville Chamberlain is especially targeted. Yes, the British prime minister, who by this time is denounced by Churchill for his policy of &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039; pursued in relation to Hitler, is sharply criticized by Trotsky for having fed illusions toward… Stalin! “Despite all his aversions toward the Soviet regime”, the British conservative leader “had tried to make an alliance with Stalin using all means”: a colossal example of naivety! Trotsky had repeatedly stated since the rise of the Third Reich that―despite all the rhetoric about the anti-fascist popular fronts―”the real objective of Stalin’s foreign policy was to reach a deal with Hitler”; now all are forced to recognize that the Kremlin dictator is “Hitler’s butler.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn898|898]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This competition, seriously weakened by the epic resistance by the Soviet Union against the Third Reich, returns in force after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;. So Khrushchev accused Stalin of having deviated from Lenin? In fact―Orlov immediately increased the dose, publishing an article that in its very title announces a “sensational secret”―the man who led the Soviet Union for thirty years was a secret police agent for the Tsarist regime, obviously prepared to liquidate the unlucky souls who learn of his unspeakable past. Still today a Russian researcher (Rogowin), a zealous follower of Trotsky’s, appears to cling to that revelation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn899|899]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The competition can take on the most unique forms. In 1965, Deutscher reflects on the evolution by the Menshevik leader Dan, who―patriotically blinded by the image of a Russia “triumphantly emerging from a catastrophic war, with the Third Reich prostrated before it”― ended up recognizing the historical correctness of the October Revolution, but also, unfortunately, the correctness of “Stalinism, with all its ideological perversions and violence.&amp;amp;quot; There’s only one excuse for that tolerance toward a “degenerated” and “corrupted” Bolshevism: the fact that “when Dan wrote some of these pages, the pro-Stalinist tide in the allied countries was very strong, especially during the immediate post-war period in the United States!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn900|900]] Fortunately, the information coming from the very capital of the Soviet Union, and from within that country’s very own communist party, refuted and ridiculed once and for all the naive and ill informed who had in some way or another consumed Moscow’s propaganda.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only through this convergence of heterogeneous interests can one explain the paradox of a historiography that, while unceasingly denouncing the farcical nature of the trials carried out by Stalin in Moscow, has easily accepted the legitimacy of the trial conducted in different manners, first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Periodic Changes in the Depiction of Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
The depiction of the “enormous, shadowy, capricious and degenerate monster of man” is so widespread nowadays that we forget the contradictory history that preceded the rise of that image. We saw the acknowledgements directed at Stalin by illustrious statesmen, diplomats and intellectuals. The pages of his thirty years in government, today simply considered horrific, were in the past read very differently.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays it’s commonplace to identify the revolution from above, that radically changed the face of agricultural in the Soviet Union, as an exclusive product of ideological madness. But in 1944, even while revealing its terrible human costs, De Gasperi nevertheless expresses a fundamentally positive judgement on the “great economic enterprise” of collectivization of the countryside and industrialization, having been made necessary by the danger of war and by the “threat revealed in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn901|901]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays, very few would dare question the thesis according to which the bloody and large scale repression realized by Stalin had been the exclusive product of his &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039; or his paranoia. However, between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, Malaparte had calmly spoken of the preparations for a coup d&#039;état in Moscow and Stalin’s hesitation in counterattacking (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, § 7). An authoritative German press organization went even further, and mocked the naivety demonstrated by the Kremlin dictator “in not sending Trotsky and his crew to the beyond.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn902|902]] Around twenty years after the fact, Churchill himself at least indirectly evaluated the trials against Tukhachevsky and the other military leaders (it was a question of “a cruel, but perhaps not pointless, military-political purge”, that had eliminated “all the pro-German elements”) and, to a certain degree, that’s true even for the Moscow Trials (on the bench of the accused were seated Soviet leaders “full of jealousy toward Stalin who had ousted them”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn903|903]] This stance by the British statesman, champion of the struggle until the end against Hitler’s Germany, is yet more significant because it’s formulated in a polemic against Chamberlain, the protagonist of the policy of &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039;. More radical or more explicit was the American ambassador to the USSR, Joseph Davies, who “continued to insist that there really was a conspiracy, that the trials were carried out according to the law, and that consequently, Soviet authority had been strengthened by it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn904|904]] In 1944, De Gasperi also stressed that the veracity of the charges directed at the anti-Stalin opposition was confirmed by “objective American intelligence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn905|905]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there was a radical change, but the weakness and the inconsistency of the image of Stalin given to us first by the Cold War and then by the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; begin to emerge from the research by a growing number of scholars. In some ways one witnesses an evident turnaround. Let’s take the Great Terror. Alongside the other leading political figures we’ve already encountered, even a fervent admirer of Trotsky’s, namely Deutscher, in 1948 thinks the Moscow trials are more or less credible. In his opinion, Kirov’s assassination was in no way staged by the regime. The long tradition in Russia that “dared to attack the autocracy with bombs and pistols” had returned to influence the young communists. “Was not Lenin’s brother, by chance, among the conspirators who had tried to kill Alexander III? The textbooks depict those martyrs and those heroes with a romantic halo: that’s how the sacred shadows of the past now reappear to arm the more impatient anti-Stalinist &#039;&#039;Komsomols&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot; The “ideas of revolutionary terrorism” had expanded to the point of constituting “a state of mind widespread among the youths” and arming the hand of Kirov’s assassin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn906|906]] Still in 1949, Deutscher recognized certain “psychological truth” in the Moscow Trials in general, and also a factual truth with regard to the execution of Tukhachevsky in particular. Regarding the latter event, while certain sources speak of a set-up by the Nazi intelligence services, “numerous anti-Stalinist sources argue, however, that the generals had in fact plotted a coup d’état”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn907|907]] in either case, Stalin’s paranoia or his &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039; wouldn’t play any role.&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that a few years later, an American historian unmoved by the revelations of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; and who continued to have sympathy for the anti-Stalinist opposition, defined by him as “the consciousness of the revolution”, wrote: “What Bukharin stated in his guilty confession, and what’s known from other sources, makes a good part of what was revealed in the trial appear plausible, despite the suspicions provoked by the nature of those trials.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn908|908]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays it’s the very scholars of Trotskyist orientation who are calling attention to the civil war unleashed within the Soviet leadership and demanding the opposition’s recognition for having promoted by all means the overthrow of the Thermidorian regime imposed by the traitors of the revolution. It’s significant that this turn also affects Trotsky’s group of followers, who in their time had dedicated themselves, more than anyone else, to denouncing the Moscow Trials as a pure and simple farce.&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to the leadership of the USSR, both on the eve and during the Second World War, Deutscher’s evolution is particularly tortured and remarkable. We already came across his quite flattering portrait in 1948 of Stalin as a war leader (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, intro, 1). In 1956, writing in the immediate wake of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;, without much trouble Deutscher believes the “revelations” according to which in the days following the start of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin had retreated in paralysis to “his dacha, unresponsive and angry”, only to later, giving into the demands and pleas from his colleagues, return to lead the country and to conduct a war by “drawing fronts and lines attack on a globe.&amp;amp;quot; The only criticism Deutscher offers to Khrushchev and his circle is that they hadn’t followed the recommendations already put forth by Trotsky in 1927, in other words, of not having understood “the duty of toppling Stalin, in order to conduct the war in a more efficient way and guarantee its final victory”![[footnotes.xhtml#fn909|909]] Ten years later, returning to this subject, Deutscher writes: “I’m not willing to accept the so-called Khrushchev ‘revelations’ without reservations, particularly his statement that during World War II [and the victory over the Third Reich] Stalin had only played a practically insignificant part.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn910|910]] It must be said that more recent historical research goes further than this partial and timid reconsideration.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding the thesis of the oppressed nations, we’ve already encountered the radical and positive innovation of &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; put into practice in the USSR to the benefit of national minorities (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 4 § 9). But now it’s worthwhile to read the evaluation recently made by another American historian:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A new consensus is emerging, on the basis that, far from being the “killer of nations” familiar to Western history and the history of nationalism, the Soviet government takes on an ambitious, complex and prolonged effort to construct ethnically defined nations within a unified state at the political and economic level. With the aim of encouraging this “springtime of Soviet nations”, the Soviet state conceded juridical and political equality with Russians to the peoples of the former empire [...]. On these new national territories it reserved a privileged place for the languages of the national minorities, even when the Soviet ethnographers had to create an alphabet for local dialects, because they had never taken on a written form. That policy of promoting an autonomous national culture went as far as trying to assimilate Russians; Soviet government employees and administrators had to learn the languages of the nations where they worked.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn911|911]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A French historian on Central Asia, Olivier Roy, comes to the same conclusions; favorably cited in an essay published in &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, he summarizes the current outlook on that region as follows: they are solid and functional states that can assert themselves if they know how to “intelligently” take advantage of their Soviet “inheritance.&amp;amp;quot; “The crafters of Moscow’s national policy [...] codified languages (sometimes creating new alphabets for them), built national parliaments, national libraries, and instituted a policy of &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; in favor of ‘local cadre’.&amp;amp;quot; It was “primarily and especially Stalin” who stood out among the protagonists of this enlightened policy. How far we are from the Cold War thesis formulated by Arendt, according to which Stalin had deliberately disorganized and disarticulated “nationalities” with the aim of creating conditions favorable for the triumph of totalitarianism! An author, who was earlier a leader of the anti-Soviet ‘dissidents’, states his admiration for the Soviet Union (and Stalin) for its national policy in the following emphatic terms: “In the decades of Soviet rule, and in its solution to the national question, the positive elements were so numerous that it’s difficult to find a comparable example in the history of humanity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn912|912]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, the caricature of Stalin made first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev no longer enjoys much credibility. From the present day research by eminent scholars, beyond suspect of having indulged in the “cult of personality”, emerges the portrait of a politician who rises and secures the positions of power in the USSR primarily for the fact that he widely “surpasses his competitors” when it comes to understanding how the Soviet system operated;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn913|913]] a leader of “exceptional political talent” and “enormously gifted”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn914|914]] a statesman who saved the Russian nation from annihilation and enslavement, thanks not only to his astute military strategy, but also his “masterful” wartime speeches, speeches that are at times authentically “brilliant”, that in tragic or decisive moments manage to encourage national resistance;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn915|915]] a figure who doesn’t lack qualities when it comes to theory, as demonstrated by the insight with which he dealt with the national question in his writings from 1913, and the “positive effect” of his “contribution” to the linguistic question, among others.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn916|916]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, they rightly stress at the same time that this recognition is not an absolute moral judgement; however, the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;’s complete lack of credibility is by now clear. There’s not a detail in it that’s not contested today. Take the report of Stalin’s supposed psychological collapse in the days immediately following the start of Operation Barbarossa: according to the analysis we’ve already seen from two Russian historians (of anti-Stalinist orientation, of course), it’s an “episode” that is “totally invented” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 2), and that―a French historian insists―is in “complete contradiction” with the testimony and documentation that increasingly comes to light.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn917|917]] But it’s not a question of a single episode, however significant it may be. Also with regard to the so-called doctors plot: “Khrushchev crudely and deliberately distorted the truth.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn918|918]] Yes, he “took great liberty with the truth.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn919|919]] This observation made (this time by a British historian previously cited) regarding “Stalin’s wartime leadership” is generally useful: “To get to the truth, it’s necessary to look beyond the Western polemics of the Cold War, as well as the circumstances of de-stalinization in the USSR.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn920|920]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Contradictory Motives behind Stalin’s Demonization ===&lt;br /&gt;
Arendt’s thesis―that for a long time had been undisputed in the West and uncritically repeated time and again―that sought to prove the unbreakable attraction, in spite of everything, between communist “totalitarianism” and Nazi “totalitarianism” using these words: “the only man for whom Hitler has ‘unconditional respect’ was the ‘brilliant Stalin’”; moreover, “we know from Khrushchev’s speech to the Twentieth Party Congress that Stalin trusted in only one man, which was Hitler.&amp;amp;quot; It is so evident that, despite all the warnings, “he refused to believe that Hitler had broken the treaty” until the very end. To confirm this, Arendt again cites the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;, or to be more precise, “the version of Khrushchev’s speech provided by the American state department.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn921|921]] Against that affirmation, which was based on an evidently politicized speech that was certainly not concerned with historical rigor, one could counter with the well documented analysis according to which in post World War II Hungary and Eastern Europe, Stalin “only trusted” in Jewish cadre, who are in fact called upon to construct the framework for a new state apparatus (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 10). As one can see, the antithesis with respect to Hitler couldn’t be more clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s dwell on the fragility of the ideological theme treasured by Arendt and ruling ideology. Recently a reversal of positions has been witnessed. A few years ago, authoritative and ideologically relentless anti-communist scholars insisted on depicting Stalin as an insatiable expansionist, ready at the opportune moment to attack Germany itself, with whom it maintains a pact of non-aggression. To make that case, they specifically cited Stalin’s speech to the military academy graduates; in order to be brief, I’ll cite the summary found in Dimitrov’s diary: “Our peace and security policy is at the same time a policy in preparation for war. There’s no defense without offense. It’s necessary to prepare for war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn922|922]] It’s May 5th of 1941, the same day that Stalin meets personally with the highest officials of the party and state, in evident preparation for open battle with the Third Reich. The substantial development of Soviet military industry had been promoted by Stalin in preparation for an offensive war, against which Hitler sought to defend.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn923|923]] That thesis, incessantly pushed by historical revisionism, can be easily refuted by referring to something cited by an author who is among the most prominent members of that historical and ideological current: by the beginning of May, 1941, General Antonescu, who will end up taking power in Romania, informs his German allies that “the factories around Moscow had received the order to relocate their machinery to the country’s interior.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn924|924]] Moreover, the Nazis were desperately looking for a &#039;&#039;casus belli&#039;&#039;. The spy chief, Admiral Canaris, writes in his diary: “General Jodl informed me that they are very concerned by the unusual and forgiving Soviet behavior in relation to us, and [...] partly joking, added ‘if those individuals (the Soviets) continue to be so accommodating and letting everything go, it will have to be you who organizes an incident that starts the war’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn925|925]] Debunking revisionist historians’ latest weapon of argument, this testimony unequivocally proves who is the aggressor. Secondly, it clarifies that it was Stalin’s very own behavior, condemned by Khrushchev, that made the Third Reich nervous.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new accusation against Stalin found its immediate consecration in the mass media that, with the aim of giving it more credibility, didn’t hesitate to bring up the speech from August 19th, 1939; a prominent sovietologist commenting with righteous indignation: while he prepared to send the loyal Molotov to Berlin to finish the non-aggression pact, Stalin had already elaborated, with repugnant cynicism, a plan for aggression and sovietization of all of Europe, including Germany, at the opportune moment.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn926|926]] In reality, this is a serious historical falsehood (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 3). But that isn’t the important point. The revelation of this new treacherous act by Stalin could have been the moment to reconsider the thesis developed by Arendt―with credit also to Khrushchev’s report―about the close relationship between the two highest incarnations of “totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot; But none of that took place!&lt;br /&gt;
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Historians on the concentrationary universe rightly denounce the subsequent severity experienced in the Gulag and “the super exploitation of the prisoners” that reaches its horrible apex after the “breakneck growth of the economic plans of 1940-1941” (therefore, during the time of the non-aggression pact), when Soviet leadership, in preparation for war, ignore any other consideration in accelerating to the maximum the completion of plans “of great strategic and economic importance”―like, for example, the construction of airports, aircraft factories and industries essential for the war effort.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn927|927]] In light of this, the commonplace accusation made by Arendt becomes ever more grotesque, and yet it continues to be obsessively repeated: it’s necessary to always prove that Stalin had blind trust in Hitler! The ruling ideology, therefore, easily makes use of the most contradictory statements and accusations: what matters is that they are defamatory. The tendency to drift from history and into political mythology is clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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The obligation to demonize, for whatever motive, manifests itself in other fields. Nowadays the black legend of Stalin’s antisemitism is unchallenged. But we’re not without a perspective that’s diametrically opposed. There’s the research by a journalist, an American Jew, who speaks of “Stalin’s fondness toward Jews”, to whom he entrusts the management of the concentration camps where the Germans destined to be expelled from Poland are held. Thus, those who survived the “final solution” can avenge themselves in a terrible way and become the executioners of their executioners, all thanks to the Soviet dictator’s cunning and perfidy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn928|928]] He is also accused―in a book by an author closely associated with the military of the German Federal Republic―of having circulated “war propaganda” about gas chambers and the plan for the total extermination of the Jewish population by the Third Reich, with the aim of discrediting their enemies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn929|929]] It’s evidently in total contrast to the understanding of Stalin as an anti-Semite which is still widely accepted.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, it’s also worthwhile to observe how the subject of Stalin’s “paranoia” was often handled in a contradictory way. One historian, who stands out for making that diagnosis, nevertheless stresses the role Beria was to have in the Soviet leader’s death.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn930|930]] Certainly, one could say he had ended up being a victim of a climate he himself created; the fact would remain that, at least starting from a certain moment, the threat was real and no longer the product of a sickness induced fantasy. In addition: those who accused Stalin of being paranoid are sometimes figures and authors who, without providing any proof, claim he is responsible for the death of his closest collaborators, like Kirov and Zhdanov. Do they not resort here to the same attitude for which they condemn the dictator? But those questions and those problems aren’t even raised; what’s important is to highlight, in any way possible, the infamy of the communist and oriental despot.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Political Struggle and Mythology between the French Revolution and the October Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
In June of 1956, under the impression made by just having read the Khrushchev Report, Deutscher observes: “communists had for more than a quarter of a century bowed” before a monstrous tyrant, vile at both the moral and intellectual level; how could all of this have happened?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn931|931]] Following that line of argument, he could have added: What had led illustrious Western philosophers and statesmen to pay tribute to that monster with approving and respectful statements and, in certain cases, even admiration? These questions are legitimate and even inevitable, but maybe they should be complemented by another: how could Deutscher have allowed himself to be affected by that behavior which he sharply condemned in 1956? Yes, after the end of World War II and on the occasion of Stalin’s death, he would pay tribute to the statesman who had made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich and had built socialism in the USSR. In that period, the abject and idiotic monster had not yet entered the scene, and therefore the doubts had not yet emerged over the enormous credit that he enjoyed, despite everything, for a long time. Maybe in 1956, Deutscher would have had a better response if he had asked a very different question: led by a “generalissimo” and by such a ridiculous political leader, how was the Soviet Union able to defeat the terrible Nazi war machine that had so quickly subjugated the rest of continental Europe? And how was the Soviet Union, starting from a position of extreme weakness, able to turn into a military and industrial superpower?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, looking closely, with half of century of distance from Stalin’s death and the clamor of de-stalinization, it’s opportune to return to the question made by Deutscher to radically invert it: how did such a grotesque and absurd portrait like the one made by Khrushchev achieve the status of historiographical and political dogma? That dogma was even infused with new details, increasingly fantastical, following the revelations of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; that attributed to Stalin a blind confidence in Hitler’s respect for the non-aggression pact. Arendt, in the subsequent editions of &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, put together a theorem of the elective affinity between the two dictators, and that theorem identified an increasing number of points of contact and symmetries, until the two monsters become perfect equivalents in all aspects of their political action and ideology, including the consummation of a holocaust and anti-Semitic hatred.&lt;br /&gt;
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The key to explaining that unique phenomenon can be found in the history of political mythologies. After Thermidor, the Jacobins are also put to the guillotine at the moral level. They become “those sultans”, “those satyrs”, who had nearly everywhere created “places of pleasure” and “places for orgies” in which “they gave into all excesses.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn932|932]] In addition to sexual libido, what especially consumed Robespierre was &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039;, he was preparing to “get married to Capet’s daughter” in order to ascend to the throne of France.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn933|933]] The accusation was undoubtedly sensational, but there was no lack of proof, they were even abundant: “the marriage certificate” had already been signed; moreover, in the house of the recently executed tyrant were found a “seal with the symbol of France” and the dynastic seal of the house of Bourbon.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn934|934]] The execution or the murder of Louis XVI can now be seen in new light: the man responsible for that act had perhaps only intended to rid himself of a rival, he wanted to eliminate the obstacle that prevented him from ascending to the throne.&lt;br /&gt;
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The moral decapitation of Robespierre was linked to the more specifically intellectual decapitation. During the Jacobin period, popular episodes―not promoted from above―of vandalism and revolutionary iconoclasm take place that targeted the symbols of the old regime. Such episodes continued to arise during Thermidor, this time having in mind everything that recalled the Terror. But the new rulers accuse the Jacobins of the following: out of hatred for the culture they were totally deprived of, they had planned to burn libraries, and they had already put that crazy plan into action. Over the course of various passages, the list of accusations grows ever larger and becomes an ever more uncontroversial fact to the degree it loses all contact with reality. Boissy d’Anglas can subject the Jacobins to public derision by affirming:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Without a doubt, these ferocious enemies of humanity would have momentarily shown their villainy only under the light of the libraries burned, since they hoped that the darkness of ignorance would extend even further. Barbarians! They have set the human spirit back many centuries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn935|935]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jacobins had introduced mandatory schooling, and against them and against the French Revolution itself the counter-revolutionary propaganda did not tire in denouncing the hubris of reason, and on the contrary celebrating the beneficial function of “prejudice”; but in the ideological and political atmosphere of Thermidor, Robespierre and his collaborators are accused of having sought to spread “the darkness of ignorance.&amp;amp;quot; And the new accusation is made without even reconsidering the previous accusation: logical coherence is the last of their concerns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also with regard to the Terror’s number of victims, one witnesses a process similar to that which was just seen with the libraries. Again we turn to the words of the eminent scholar that we continue to follow here: “The numbers are not up for discussion: tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, they even speak of millions.&amp;amp;quot; In summary, it’s a matter of genocide, as denounced by the &#039;&#039;jeunesse dorée&#039;&#039; in their anti-Marseillaise anthem against “the drinkers of the blood of humanity”, “that anthropophagic horde”, “those terrible cannibals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn936|936]] It’s an accusation taken up and radicalized by the left. Soon after Thermidor, Babeuf speaks of a “process of depopulation” carried out in the Vendée by Robespierre, who goes as far as to pursue “the infamous, unprecedented political objective” of “wiping out the human race.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn937|937]] That is how we witness a convergence between the extreme right and the extreme left of the political spectrum, both agreeing to depict Robespierre as a genocidal monster. However, that paradox doesn’t last long. It doesn’t take Babuef long to get to the real meaning of Thermidor: before the judges that were prepared to condemn him to death, in denouncing the desperate situation to which the popular masses are condemned, he appeals to Saint-Just and his ideals for everyone’s “happiness” and salvation from misery; on the other hand, he expresses his disdain for the “system of hunger” put into practice by the new rulers and classifies the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas as “genocidal” (&#039;&#039;populicide&#039;&#039;). That is how the charge of genocide undergoes a radical reversal: it no longer targets Robespierre, but his victorious enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be interesting to make a comparative analysis of the mythologies that arise from the great revolutions. After October 1917, the Jacobin “drinkers of human blood” are substituted by the Bolsheviks who, according to refugees in the US from Soviet Russia, had invented and frantically used an electric guillotine capable of killing five-hundred men per hour. We saw the Jacobins branded as people who frequented “places of pleasure” and organized “orgies”; in October of 1919, the Hungarian communist leader, Béla Kun, is accused of having established “a harem with a lavish assortment” of women, where the perfidious and insatiable Jew could “rape and dishonor dozens of virgins of the Christian caste.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn938|938]] Repeating this slander is a newspaper that will later become the official press organ for the Nazi party, but at that time, in expressing its horror over the events in Eastern Europe, shares an outlook that’s widespread in Western public opinion and on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, too, the Bolsheviks are synonymous with debauchery and moral depravity: In Russia they had introduced the nationalization of women, as charged by documents published with the authorization of President Wilson and as was described in rich detail by an authoritative newspaper like the &#039;&#039;New York Times&#039;&#039;; yes, every girl upon turning eighteen years old is forced to register in an “office of free love”, and then sadly turned over to a man arbitrarily chosen, and she is forced to suffer on her body and soul the governmental entity’s impositions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn939|939]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Jacobins are ‘barbarians’, even more so are the protagonists of the October Revolution, first classified as agents of imperial Germany (or the “Huns” and the “Vandals”, as Germans are defined by Entente propaganda during World War I), and later as the agents of Jewish internationalism, even more alien to true civilization, both for their geographic origin, as well as the support provided to the colonial revolts and to the peoples of color, just as Nazi propaganda insisted on repeating. Finally, while Robespierre is for some time accused by Babeuf of having wanted to completely “wipe out the human race”, Conquest is satisfied in blaming Stalin for organizing the starvation of the Ukrainian people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The topics sketched out here are only modest suggestions for the future historian. In looking for the appropriate comparison for these political mythologies, it’s worthwhile, at any rate, to observe that Stalin was less fortunate than Robespierre: Yes, in Russia today there are popular demonstrations that raise his portrait, and the majority of adults have a positive view toward Stalin and see in him the “energetic leader” the country needed in such calamitous times. Among the ex-’dissidents’ we see Alexandr Zinoviev classify Yeltsin as the leader of a “criminal counter revolution” and a “colonial democracy”, and he makes a surprising overall evaluation of the history of the Soviet Union, including the three decades of the Stalin era: “Thanks precisely to communism, Russia was able to avoid even greater evils” and to realize, “in extremely difficult historical circumstances”, advancements that “only a cynical rabble can deny.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn940|940]] In the West, however, including on the left, the charge of “Stalinism” can hit anyone who even dares to express any doubts or ask any questions. If anything, it’s in the “bourgeois” camp where we can catch a timid glimpse at some reconsideration. Just a few months after the overthrow of the Soviet Union, an authoritative Italian newspaper reported: “A million and a half people run the risk of not surviving the winter, for lack of food and medicine throughout the Soviet Union; a report by the International Red Cross has stated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn941|941]] Some time later, still analyzing Yeltsin’s Russia, a prominent political scientist, Maurice Duverger, pointed to the “falling average life expectancy”, whose responsibility fell on the privileged minority that had managed “to accumulate enormous wealth” through parasitical speculation―though not explicitly illegal―and he denounced the “true genocide of the elderly.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn942|942]] If not a reversal, at least the charge of genocide is applied to all sides, with the condemnation of one of the West’s heroes (Yeltsin), and with him the West itself, considered responsible for the tragedy that in no way took place in a situation of acute political and economic crisis, but after the Cold War itself had ended, at a time when, at least in the most advanced countries, shortages were only a distant memory.&lt;br /&gt;
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It comes to mind the summary made by Edgar Quinet regarding the French Revolution: “The Terror had been the first calamity; the second, that which ruined the Republic, was the trial conducted against the Terror.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn943|943]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;8. Demonization and Hagiography in the Reading of the Contemporary World&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From the Omission of Russia’s Second Time of Troubles, to the Omission of China’s Century of Humiliation ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with the Cold War in particular, for decades the West’s anti-communist campaign had centered on the demonization of Stalin. Up until the Soviet Union’s overthrow, there weren’t such exaggerated polemics against Mao, nor even against Pol Pot, who was supported until the end by Washington against the Vietnamese and their Soviet protectors. Hitler had only one monstrous twin, and he had ruled in Moscow for thirty years and continued to loom over the country that had dared to challenge the US’s hegemony.&lt;br /&gt;
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This portrait could only change with China’s prodigious rise: now the great Asian country must be persecuted until it loses its identity and self-esteem. In addition to Stalin, the ruling ideologues are also determined to identify Hitler’s other monstrous twins. Thus, there is one book, which achieved great international success, that classifies Mao Zedong as the greatest criminal of the twentieth century, or maybe of all time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn944|944]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The ”investigative” methods are those we’ve already encountered: they start from the monster’s childhood instead of China’s history. It’s necessary to fill that gap, then. With a long history behind it, China had for centuries and millennia been in a prominent position in the development of human civilization: as late as 1820 it had a gross domestic product of 32.4% of world GDP. However, in 1949, at the time of modern China’s foundation, the People’s Republic of China was the poorest, or among the poorest, countries in the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn945|945]] The colonialist and imperialist aggression that began with the Opium Wars caused this drastic fall. A period that is even emphatically celebrated by the most illustrious representatives of the liberal West (think of Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill), those infamous wars open a decidedly tragic chapter in the history of the great Asian country. The Chinese trade deficit caused by the victory of the “British narco-traffickers”, the terrible humiliation suffered (“they have relations with Chinese women and they are raped” by the invaders; “graves are violated in the name of scientific curiosity; a woman’s tiny wrapped foot is exhumed from her grave”) and the crisis represented by the country’s inability to defend itself from external aggression, play a primary role in provoking the Taiping Revolt (1851-1864), which made the struggle against opium the order of the day. It was “the bloodiest civil war in world history, with an estimate between twenty and thirty million deaths.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn946|946]] After having contributed in a powerful way to provoking it, the West became its beneficiary, given that it could extend its control over a country gripped by an increasingly deeper crisis making it increasingly defenseless. A historical period of a “crucified China” begins (during which Russia and Japan had joined the Western executioners). Indeed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;As the end of the nineteenth century approached, China appears to become the victim of a fate against which it cannot fight. It’s a universal conspiracy by men and nature. The China of 1850 to 1950, the era of the most terrible insurrections in history, the target of foreign cannons, the country of invasions and civil wars, is also the country with the greatest natural cataclysms. Without a doubt, in the history of the world the number of victims was never so elevated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The generalized and drastic reduction in living standards, the collapse of the state apparatus and government, together with its general incapacity, corruption and growing subaltern status and subjugation to the outside world, all of this made the impact of floods and famines all the more devastating: “The Great Famine in North China in 1877-1878 [...] killed more than nine million people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn947|947]] Such tragedies occurred periodically: in 1928, the number of deaths reached “almost three million in Shanxi province alone.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn948|948]] There was no way to flee the hunger nor the cold: “The wooden beams of homes were burned so that they could stay warm.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn949|949]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only a question of a devastating economic crisis: “The state is almost destroyed.&amp;amp;quot; One figure is in itself significant: “between 1911 and 1928, 1,300 wars between warlords had taken place”, with each opposing “military faction” being supported at times by this or that foreign power. Moreover, “the repeated civil wars between 1919 and 1925 could be considered the new opium wars. What’s at stake is the control of their production and their transportation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn950|950]] Aside from the warlords’ armed groups, proper banditry was widespread, fed by army deserters and by weapons sold by soldiers. “It’s calculated that by around 1930 the number of bandits in China reached 20 million, in other words, 10% of the total male population.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn951|951]] In these conditions, it’s not difficult to imagine the fate that awaits women. Overall, there&#039;s the dissolution of all social bonds: “Sometimes the peasant sells his wife and children. The press describes columns of young women who’ve been sold passing through the streets, taken by traffickers in Shanxi province, devastated by the famine of 1928. They become domestic slaves or prostitutes.&amp;amp;quot; In Shanghai alone there are “around 50,000 regular prostitutes.&amp;amp;quot; And both banditry and prostitution can count on the support or the complicity of Western concessions, toward which they constitute “profitable activities.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn952|952]] The lives of the Chinese are worth very little, and the oppressed tend to share that point of view with their oppressors. In 1948, in attempting to halt the Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-shek’s air force bombed the Yellow River’s dykes: 900,000 peasants drowned with another 4 million forced to flee.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn953|953]] Nearly fifteen years earlier, Sun Yat-sen had expressed his fear that “the extinction of the nation and the annihilation of our race” could come to pass; yes, maybe the Chinese had expected to suffer the fate inflicted on the “redskins” on the American continent.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn954|954]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That tragic history behind the revolution vanishes in the historiography and propaganda that encompasses the negative cult of heroes. While in their reading of Russian history they pursue the repression of the Second Time of Troubles, for the great Asian country they skip over the Century of Humiliation (the period that stretches from the First Opium War to the seizure of power by the communists). Just as in Russia, in China it’s ultimately the revolution led by the communist party that saves the nation and even the state. In the biography of Mao Zedong earlier cited, not only do they ignore the historical background briefly restated here, but they blame the Chinese communist leader for most of the horrors caused by the starvation and famines that affected China. A rigorous silence is maintained with regard to the embargo imposed on that great Asia country after the communists came to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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On that last point, it’s worthwhile to consult a book by an American author that sympathetically describes the primary role played by a Cold War policy of siege and economic strangulated carried out by Washington at the expense of the People’s Republic of China. In October of 1949, China finds itself in a desperate situation. It’s necessary to note, however, that the Civil War hadn’t completely ended. The bulk of the Kuomintang army had taken shelter in Taiwan, and from there they continued to threaten the new state with air attacks and incursions, on top of the isolated spots of resistance that continued to operate on the continent. But that’s not the principal aspect: “After decades of civil wars and foreign invasions, the national economy was on the brink of total collapse.&amp;amp;quot; The fall in agricultural and industrial production was followed by inflation. And that’s not all: “In those years, great floods had devastated a large part of the nation, and more than 40 million people had been affected by that natural calamity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn955|955]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The embargo quickly decreed by the United States makes this extremely serious economic and humanitarian crisis more catastrophic than ever. The objectives of the United States clearly emerge in the studies and plans by the Truman administration and the admissions or declarations by its leaders: make it so that China “suffers a plague” and “a standard of living at or below the level of subsistence”; provoke “economic backwardness”, “cultural backwardness”, a “primitive and uncontrolled birth rate”, “mass disorder”; inflict “a heavy and very prolonged cost on its internal social structure” and ultimately create “a situation of chaos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn956|956]] It’s a concept that’s obsessively repeated: it’s necessary to reduce a country to “desperate necessity”, to a “situation of economic catastrophe”, “to disaster” and “collapse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn957|957]] This “economic weapon” pointed at an overpopulated country is lethal, but for the CIA it’s not enough: the situation that was caused by “the measures of economic warfare and by the naval blockade” could be made even worse with a “naval and aerial bombing campaign against selected ports, railways, industrial structures and storage sites”; with US assistance, the Kuomintang bombing campaigns continued against industrial cities on continental China, including Shanghai.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn958|958]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One president after another takes office in the White House, but the embargo remains and expands to medicine, tractors and fertilizers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn959|959]] At the start of the 1960s, an advisor in the Kennedy administration, namely Walt W. Rostow, observes that, thanks to this policy, the economic development of China was delayed by at least “decades”, while CIA reports highlight “communist China’s grave agricultural situation”, now seriously weakened by “overwork and malnutrition.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn960|960]] Is it a question, then, of reducing the pressure on a people reduced to a state of hunger? On the contrary, it’s important not to loosen the embargo, “not even for humanitarian relief.&amp;amp;quot; Taking advantage of the fact that “China doesn’t have key natural resources, particularly oil and fertile land”, and also exploiting the serious crisis occurring at the time between China and the USSR, they could try to land the definitive blow: “explore the possibilities of a total Western embargo against China” and block as much as possible the sale of oil and grain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn961|961]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Does it make sense, then, to exclusively assign Mao blame for the economic catastrophe that for a long time struck China and was intentionally and ruthlessly planned by Washington beginning in October of 1949? Committed as they are in making a caricature out of Mao and denouncing his crazy experiments, the authors of that successful monograph don’t ask that question. However, while they imposed their embargo, the leaders of the United States were well aware of the fact that it would be even more devastating due to “communist inexperience when it comes to the urban economy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn962|962]] It’s no coincidence that we’ve seen them speak explicitly of “economic warfare&#039;&#039; and an “economic weapon.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a practice that doesn’t even disappear after the end of the Cold War. A few years before China’s entry into The World Trade Organization, an American journalist in 1996 describes Washington’s behavior as follows: “The American leaders unsheathed one of the heaviest weapons in their commercial arsenal, openly pointed at China, to then menacingly discuss whether or not to pull the trigger.&amp;amp;quot; Once put into action, their threatened cancellation of normal commercial relations would have constituted, “in dollar terms, the biggest commercial sanctions in the history of the US, excluding the two world wars”; it would have been “the commercial equivalent to a nuclear attack.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn963|963]] That was also the opinion of a prominent American politician, namely Edward Luttwak: “Metaphorically one could state that the blocking of Chinese imports is the nuclear weapon that America has pointed at China.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn964|964]] Brandished as a threat in the 1990s, the economic “nuclear weapon” was systematically deployed during the Cold War against the great Asian country, while Washington openly and repeatedly reserved the right to use actual nuclear weapons.&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon seizing power, Mao is very well aware that a “very difficult task of economic reconstruction” awaits him; yes, it’s necessary “to undertake work in the industrial and economic fields” and “learn from every expert (whoever it may be).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn965|965]] In that context, the Great Leap Forward appears to be a desperate and catastrophic attempt at confronting the embargo.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn966|966]] This is true in part for the Cultural Revolution itself, characterized as well by the illusion of political power promoting a rapid economic development, appealing to the mobilization of the masses and to methods successfully used in the armed struggle. All of this is always in the hope of putting an end, once and for all, to the devastation of the “economic war”, behind which lurked the threat of an even more total war. With respect to Mao’s behavior as an oriental despot, especially during the Cultural Revolution, both the history of China as well as the ideology and personality of the man who exercises power help to explain it; the fact is that never has a country democratized while it was savagely attacked economically, isolated diplomatically, and subjected to a terrible and constant military threat. The situation being as it is, it’s all the more grotesque to exclusively blame Mao for “more than seventy million [...] peacetime deaths due to his inability to govern.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn967|967]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In reality, “the social conquests of the Mao era” are “extraordinary”, conquests that achieved a clear improvement in economic, social and cultural conditions, and a big increase in the Chinese people’s “life expectancy.&amp;amp;quot; Without that basis, one can’t understand the prodigious economic development that later freed hundreds of millions of people from hunger and even starvation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn968|968]] But in the ruling ideology, one witnesses a true inversion of responsibilities: the political leadership that put an end to the Century of Humiliation becomes a gang of criminals, while those responsible for the immense century long tragedy, and those that with their embargo did everything to prolong it, become the champions of freedom and civilization. We saw Goebbels in 1929 label Trotsky as “possibly” the man who could be considered the greatest criminal of all time (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 15); in the years that followed, maybe Goebbels had made Stalin the number one criminal. In any case, the argument by the Third Reich’s chief of propaganda and manipulation must have seemed too flawed for the authors of the Mao biography acclaimed in the West. They have no doubts: the title of number one criminal in universal history now belongs to the Chinese leader!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Omission of War and the Production of a Series of Monstrous Twins to Hitler ===&lt;br /&gt;
The omission of history, and especially the history of colonialism and war, is a constant in the mythology determined to transform all communist and anti-colonialist leaders into Hitler’s twin monsters, more or less. This is quite an easy task with Pol Pot. And it’s therefore worthwhile to dwell on him, certainly not to rehabilitate him or to reconsider the dimension of the horrors for which he became responsible, but with the aim of better clarifying the ways with which the dominant mythology today is constructed. In doing this, I will make almost exclusive use of a book by an American scholar on Asia and a monograph about Cambodia written by a journalist who worked for &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Economist&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The BBC&#039;&#039;. We therefore start by asking one question: when and how did the tragedy that culminated in the horrors of the Pol Pot regime start? Here’s an initial answer, offered by the American scholar:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At the start of the 1970s, President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger ordered a bombing campaign against rural Cambodia that included more bombs than had been dropped on Japan during World War II, killing at least 750,000 Cambodians.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn969|969]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The figure that appears in the monograph on Pol Pot’s Cambodia is more cautious: the number of victims reached “half a million.&amp;amp;quot; However, it’s evident that “the bombs fell en masse, and especially on the civilian population”, which was decimated, with the survivors’ bodies often horrendously wounded, and at any rate traumatized by the daily experience of the terror bombings and by the escape from the countryside (reduced to “a lunar landscape”) to the cities in the hands of government troops, and therefore spared of the inferno, but increasingly subjected to the chaos that following the growing influx of refugees, forced to endure “a precarious existence on the brink of starvation.&amp;amp;quot; By the end of the war, in the capital alone there were two million displaced people and they were housed in “shacks” and “slums”, with the sick and injured housed in hospitals, but with “little hope for survival.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn970|970]] To all of this it must be added the “large scale massacres” carried out by the troops led by Lon Nol, who comes to power in 1970 with a coup d’état engineered by Washington. Here’s how the regime backed by the US, supported with “hundreds of millions of dollars”, confronts the problem represented by ethnic minorities: “In the Vietnamese villages to the north of Phnom Penh, at least three thousand residents, all males above the age of fifteen, were rounded up and taken to the river bank and then shot dead. The women that remained were raped.&amp;amp;quot; Or: “In the region called Parrot’s Beak, the [Vietnamese] prisoners in the camp were warned of an imminent Vietcong attack and were given the order to flee. While they ran, the Cambodian guards [allies or in service to the US] opened fire with their machine guns.&amp;amp;quot; Those are only two examples. Authoritative journalists recall their impression at having visited places similar to the one we just saw: “It looked like a slaughterhouse, and it had the smell of a slaughterhouse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn971|971]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let it be clear: the fury of Lon Nol’s troops didn’t just target the Vietnamese: “the communists taken prisoner were often eliminated”; moreover, those responsible for those deaths enjoyed being photographed while they showed off, proud and smiling, the severed heads of guerrillas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn972|972]] On the other hand, it would wrong to exclusively blame Asians for the atrocities that took place in Cambodia, and more generally in Indochina. Consider the story by an American teacher, told an American magazine, about a CIA agent who lived in Laos “in a house decorated with a collection of ears pulled from the heads of dead [Indochinese] communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn973|973]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point a new question must be asked: is there a connection between the first act of the Cambodian tragedy and the ones that follow? In attempting to minimize that relationship, the book that I cited is not without contradictions and oscillations: “It’s possible that the bombing campaigns had contributed to an atmosphere that would lead to extremism. But the ground war would have caused that, in any case.&amp;amp;quot; Was the “ground war” inevitable? Shouldn’t we start with the war itself? “The equation ‘no Vietnam War, no Khmer Rouge’ is too simplistic, but it reflects an ‘undeniable truth’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn974|974]] The British journalist has trouble admitting, despite his inconvenient logic, that those primarily responsible for the tragedy have to be sought out in Washington. And from his reporting emerges a truth that’s inconvenient to the simplifications that are commonplace today. Here’s how the monograph on Cambodia reports the conquest of Phnom Penh by the guerrillas: after all that had happened, “it could have been much, much worse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn975|975]] At least with regard to the very first phase of holding power, there’s a moderation in Pol Pot that could hardly be found in Washington’s leaders!&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, the new rulers were facing real and dramatic difficulties: will the US begin a new round of terror bombing? And how to feed an urban population that had grown too much, with agriculture devastated by the transformation of the countryside into a “lunar landscape”? And how to face the CIA threat which in the cities “had installed secret radio transmitters and clandestine spy cells”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn976|976]] Certainly, Pol Pot’s extremist and messianic populism was also behind the decision to evacuate the cities, but that very behavior is driven by the sight of terribly overcrowded cities, exposed to the enemy threat and surrounded by chaos, with a large part of the population unable to play any productive role.&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, why should the moral judgement on Pol Pot be more severe than the one on Nixon and Kissinger (those responsible for the war)? The same British author I’ve repeatedly cited, while on the one hand he rejects the intentionalist explanation for the massacres to which Pol Pot’s adventure lead (“that was never the political line of the KCP”, that is the Cambodian communist party; “the objective wasn’t to destroy, but to transform”), on the other hand, he observes regarding the ferocity of the American war: “The bombing campaigns had turned into a symbol of virility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn977|977]] It must be added that, after seizing power, and during the war with Vietnam that follows, Pol Pot is supported politically and diplomatically by the US. However, ruling class ideology remains silent on the crucial and decisive role by Nixon and Kissinger in the Cambodian tragedy. It’s well known that the barbarians are always outside the West; if political leaders must be criminalized, it’s those responsible for the revolution, never those responsible for the war.&lt;br /&gt;
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That hypocrisy is even more repugnant for the fact that, while the torture and killing by Pol Pot comes to an end, the full weight of the American war and all its impacts continue to be felt. “Throughout Indochina there’s people dying of hunger, disease and unexploded projectiles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn978|978]] At least with respect to Vietnam, it’s necessary to have in mind the figure reached a while ago by a conservative French paper according to which, thirty years after the end of hostilities, there were still “four million” victims disfigured by the “terrible agent orange” (referring to the color of the dioxin endlessly dumped by American planes on an entire people).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn979|979]] And in Cambodia? Let’s put aside the devastating physical injuries. How many Cambodians still suffer from the devastating and irreversible “psychological damage” caused by the bombing campaign?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn980|980]] One conclusion is unavoidable: to concentrate exclusively on Pol Pot means being satisfied with a half truth, which in reality ends up constituting a complete lie, guilty of remaining silent on those principally responsible for the horrors.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Socialism and Nazism, Aryans and Anglo-Celtics ===&lt;br /&gt;
After having assimilated the “monsters of totalitarianism”, the ruling ideology of today goes further. Aside from the individual personalities that have historically embodied it, communism as such would be closely linked, by elective affinities and by sympathetic ties, to Nazism. Conquest is the one most committed to that approach; he begins its “demonstration” by affirming with respect to Hitler: “Although he hated ‘Jewish’ communism, he didn’t hate communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn981|981]] The hostilities between the two political movements is only an illusion. What to say about this new thesis?&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after coming to power, the Führer explains to the leadership of the armed forces that he first intends to liquidate the “poison” represented by “pacifism, Marxism and Bolshevism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn982|982]] A few days later, Göring further clarifies the new government’s combative program against Marxism (and Bolshevism): “Not only will we annihilate this pest, we will rip out the word Marxism from every book. In fifty years no man in Germany will know what that word means.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn983|983]] On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, Goebbels notes in his diary:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Bolshevism is dead (&#039;&#039;ist gewesen&#039;&#039;). Thus we will achieve before history our true task [...]. The Bolshevik poison must be expelled from Europe. Against that enterprise Churchill himself and Roosevelt have no reason to object. Maybe we’ll even convince the episcopate of both German denominations to bless this war as desired by God [...]. Now we will truly annihilate that which we have fought against for all our lives. I spoke about this with the Führer, and he is in complete agreement with me.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn984|984]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of words, as demonstrated by the systematic annihilation of communist party members, ordered by Hitler on the eve of Operation Barbarossa. There’s more: “By the end of 1941, the Germans had captured three million Soviet prisoners. In February of 1942, two million of these prisoners were dead, the majority from starvation, disease and mistreatment. On top of that, the Germans immediately executed prisoners suspected of being communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn985|985]] That means that in the very first months of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazis had killed more than two million Soviets, with the communists as their first target. And that’s not all. While he is forced to hide to escape the “final solution”, Klemperer, the prominent German intellectual of Jewish origin that we already came across, writes a diary entry that’s worth reflecting on. It’s August of 1942 and Zeiss-Ikon makes use of the forced labor by Polish, French, Danish, Jewish and Russian workers; the conditions of the latter are particularly tough: “They so desperately suffer from hunger that Jewish comrades come to their aid. That was prohibited; but they drop a slice of bread. Soon after the Russian bends down and then runs off to the bathroom with the slice of bread.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn986|986]] Therefore, going off that account, the conditions of Russian (or Soviet) slaves was, at times, even worse than those of the Jewish slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his peremptory statements, Conquest won’t stop half way. It’s a matter of proving the theory of the elective affinities between communism and Nazism well beyond Stalin’s personality and the borders of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the “long and mutual hostility” between the “totalitarian parties” is entirely superficial. The reality is quite the opposite: “Gramsci, for example, was one of Mussolini’s most intimate companions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn987|987]] And yet, all should know that, while the communist leader languished in fascist prisons, his tormentor received the praise of the leading representatives of the liberal world. Let’s consider Churchill in particular, who in speaking of the Duce in 1933, declares: “The brilliant Roman personified by Mussolini, the greatest living legislator, showed many nations how to resist the pressures of socialism and showed the path that a nation can follow when it’s courageously led.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn988|988]] Four years later―while Italy had barbarically carried out its conquest of Ethiopia and is deeply invested in the overthrow of the Spanish Republic―the British statesman repeats his statement: “It would be an act of dangerous madness for the British people to underestimate the long lasting position Mussolini will occupy in world history and the admirable qualities of courage, intelligence, self-control and perseverance that he personifies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn989|989]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s especially worthwhile to read the evaluation made by Croce at the end of World War II. The target of his criticism is the “submissive attitude by the British conservatives toward the leaders of Germany, Italy and Spain.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn990|990]] Moreover, at least with respect to Italian fascism, Britain went further: “its politicians, including some of its greatest, paid homage to and flirted with fascism and visited their leader and some of them were decorated with fascist insignia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn991|991]] Yes, Mussolini “received tributes from all over the world, with British politicians at the front of the line and [...], at least judging by what was said to me by people living in England, he is still considered a great man by British public opinion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn992|992]] The pro-fascist position by the West even finds its consecration in the philosophical field. Let’s consider an author like Ludwig von Mises, who is still today labeled as the master of liberalism, and who in 1927 praised the coup d’état by Mussolini that had stopped the communist threat and saved civilization: “the resulting merit achieved by fascism will live on forever in history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn993|993]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1937, even Hitler is painted in flattering terms by Churchill, who appreciates him not only as an “extremely competent” politician, but also his “gallant manner”, his “disarming smile” and his “subtle personal magnetism” that is difficult to escape.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn994|994]] More emphatic is former prime minister David Lloyd George, who speaks of the Führer as a “great man”, at a time when the start of the war is not far off, and the challenge announced in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039; (the subjugation and enslavement of the Slavs) is still considered acceptable to the British ambassador in Berlin, so long as it isn’t “at the same time turned against the British Empire.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn995|995]] At any rate, regardless of any opinion on the Führer, according to the opinion expressed in 1938 by the American ambassador in Paris, everything must be done to build a common front against “Asiatic despotism”, with the goal of saving “European civilization” (&#039;&#039;supra,&#039;&#039; ch. 5, § 3). In his &#039;&#039;Prison Notebooks&#039;&#039;, Gramsci in 1935 instead writes: “after the demonstrations of brutality and unprecedented ignominy of German ‘culture’ dominated by Nazism”, it’s time for everyone to make note of how “fragile modern culture” really is.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn996|996]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, in completing his crusade that, aside from communism, also targets political currents in some way influenced by socialism, Conquest affirms: “eugenics, with all its racist implications, was also popular among the Fabians.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn997|997]] It’s at this time that the &#039;&#039;tour de force&#039;&#039; reaches its conclusion, now any vague reformist ambitions toward existing capitalist society is enough to get labeled as Hitler’s associate or twin. Naturally, to make such an argument one can’t be hindered by empirical historical research; as a term, and even as a “science”, eugenics is born in liberal Britain and immediately experienced great popularity in the United States. The Austrian and German authors who, before even Hitler, recommended “racial hygiene” take the American Republic as their reference; similar to what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic, they tried to introduce norms in Austria and Germany that prohibited sexual relations and marriage between different and unequal races. It’s not by chance that the key term of the Third Reich’s eugenic and racial program, &#039;&#039;Untermensch&#039;&#039;, is just a translation of the American term &#039;&#039;Under Man&#039;&#039;, a definition coined by Lothrop Stoddard, an author celebrated both in the US and in Germany and legitimized by the praise of two American presidents (Harding and Hoover) as well as by the Third Reich’s Führer, and who was personally received with the highest honors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn998|998]] It’s worthwhile to note that the person who criticizes that line of thinking, committed to celebrating white and Nordic supremacy and its application to eugenics, is Antonio Gramsci, the communist leader and theorist targeted by Conquest.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn999|999]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To that author, obsessed with discovering ideological affinities to Nazis in the most remote places and in the most overlooked movements and individuals, I want to make a suggestion: he could try to submit his books to the same treatment he gives to the books of even the vaguest socialist orientation. Consider the thesis formulated in one of Conquest’s last published works: true civilization finds its most complete expression in the “English speaking community”, and the primacy of that community has a precise ethnic basis, constituted by “Anglo-Celtics.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1000|1000]] The Anglo-Celtic mythology traced here recalls the terrible memory of Aryan mythology. There’s only one detail to add. Aryan mythology, cherished by a long tradition that developed on both sides of the Atlantic and later led to Nazism, tended to identify itself with white mythology; in any case, it paid tribute to the Nordic nations and all nations that had their origin on German soil, therefore including the British and the Americans. The Anglo-Celtic community, however, is not only defined in total opposition to those foreign to the West, but also to those on the European continent. The club of truly civilized nations dear to Conquest is, without a doubt, more exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Anti-Communist Nuremberg and the Denial of the Principle of &#039;&#039;Tu Quoque&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
By now the trend is now clear. On the side of the victors there are no small number of voices being raised that recommend or demand a type of anti-communist Nuremberg; and that’s the orientation that inspires the ruling ideology and historiography. It’s known that during the Nuremberg trials the Nazi defendants were denied the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039;, in other words, that based on the charges being contended they could call attention to similar crimes committed by their accusers. The Tokyo trials play out in a similar way. It’s the justice of the victor, of course. Moreover, at the conclusion of the gigantic conflict, that had also played out as an international civil war and as a planetary clash between revolution and counter-revolution (think of the Nazis’ theorization of the master race’s right to enslave the “inferior races”, with a frightening and substantial leap backwards in relation to the process of the abolition of colonial slavery), we see revolutionary tribunals emerge in a number countries (think of Italy), that in the case of Germany and Japan (where the internal front held out until the end) are imposed from above and from outside. The current historical trials of the anti-communist Nuremberg are a farcical replica of a great tragedy. It’s evident that a historical judgement is unthinkable without the reconstruction of the time’s atmosphere: comparisons and the recourse to the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; are absolutely inevitable. It’s with that criteria that I intend to analyze the usual criminalization of the events initiated with the October Revolution and Stalin in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are no doubts about the terroristic methods of power exercised by him. But let’s make use of the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039;. We now know about the hundreds of thousands of victims caused by the American bombing campaign against Cambodia. Here I intend to call attention to one detail in particular:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The peasants became captive to a blind terror. “Their minds were paralyzed and they wandered around silently, without speaking for three or four days”, a young village resident recalled. “Their brains were completely disoriented [...] they couldn’t even have a meal.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And many, driven “partly mad by the terror”, were never able to become themselves again.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1001|1001]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The terror isn’t always exercised at a safe distance, bombarding from high above in the sky. With regard to the US, at the start of the twentieth century a guerrilla war is still underway in the Philippines, and it was repressed―an American historian reports―with the “massacre of entire villages”, or with the execution of all males over the age of ten.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1002|1002]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Other times, the terror is carried out by delegating the dirtiest tasks to third parties, who are always aided in that task. Let’s see how the US got rid of its political opponents in Indonesia: hundreds of thousands of communists were killed after the 1965 coup d’état, orchestrated and supported by Washington. The recourse to terror and even sadism is systematic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The mass killings began in October of 1965 [...]. The army had made and distributed lists of “communists” to right-wing Muslim groups, armed with &#039;&#039;parangs&#039;&#039; and transported by truck to villages where they killed and mutilated the inhabitants. School children were encouraged to identify “communists”, many of whom were killed on the spot, along with their entire family. Many people were denounced over personal disputes, and “a word or a finger pointed at someone was enough for them to be taken outside and shot dead.&amp;amp;quot; The number of victims was so elevated that it caused serious health problems in the east of Java and the north of Sumatra, where the smell of rotting corpses filled the air and the bodies obstructed navigation on the rivers [...]. In 1968 they ordered mass executions, and at once the army and the civil guard killed in the center of Java “3,500 supporters of the PKI, beating them on the head with iron bars” [...]. According to Amnesty International, boys less than thirteen years old, the elderly, the injured and sick, weren’t exempt from torture, used not only in interrogations, but also as punishment or out of mere sadism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1003|1003]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is the terror by the liberal West only practiced outside their national borders? No, it is not; one just needs to think of the violence that, in the first decades of the twentieth century, is still carried out against blacks, and that is often organized as a mass pedagogical spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;News about lynchings was published in local newspapers, and they added additional wagons to trains to transport spectators, at times thousands of them, coming from locations miles away. To allow them to attend the lynching, school children could have the day off. The spectacle could include castration, skinning, immolation, and gunshots. The souvenirs that could be taken include fingers, toes, teeth, bones, and even the victim’s genitals, as well as illustrated postcards of the event.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1004|1004]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, “the final solution to our Indian question” drags on in Canada even after achieving its independence.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s concentrate on the 1930s, the decade when we see Stalin’s terror unfold in the USSR. In the US, the headlines and stories in the local newspapers are in themselves revealing. “Big preparations for tonight’s lynching.&amp;amp;quot; Not a single detail should be neglected: “They fear that shots fired against the negro may miss its target and strike innocent spectators, including women carrying their children”; but if everyone sticks to the rules, “no one will be disappointed.&amp;amp;quot; Let’s look at other headlines: “the lynching was more or less carried out as advertised”; “the crowd applauded and laughed at the negro’s horrible death.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1005|1005]] It’s correct to speak of terror, and not just in consideration of the effects that such a cruel, happily announced and advertised spectacle had on the black community. There’s more. It wasn’t just black men accused of “rape”―or in the majority cases consensual relations with a white woman―who were lynched. Much more minor offenses were enough to be sentenced to death. &#039;&#039;The Atlanta Constitution&#039;&#039; of July 11th, 1934, reported the execution of a 25 year old black man “accused of having written an ‘indecent and insulting’ letter to a young white woman in Hinds County”; in this case “the crowd of armed citizens” were satisfied at firing rounds of gunshots at the body of the unfortunate soul.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1006|1006]] Moreover, besides striking the “guilty”, death, more or less inflicted in a sadistic way, also loomed over mere suspects. Let’s continue to examine the newspapers from that time and read the headlines: “Declared innocent by the jury, then lynched”; “Suspect hung from oak tree in Bastrop’s public square”; “The wrong man lynched.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1007|1007]] Lastly, the violence isn’t limited to the culprit or the suspected culprit: it has happened that, before carrying out a man’s lynching, the cabin where his family lived was set on fire and completely burned.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1008|1008]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to blacks, the terror also strikes at whites who, in becoming excessively close to blacks, become traitors to their race. It’s what emerges in the title of an article in the &#039;&#039;Galveston Tribune&#039;&#039; on July 21st, 1934: “A white girl is put in prison and her black friend is lynched.&amp;amp;quot; The fact is that―an editorial in the &#039;&#039;Chicago Defender&#039;&#039; comments a few days later―a white woman can more freely pair-up with a dog than with a black man.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1009|1009]] And if she doesn’t take that into account, the terroristic regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; lashes out at her twice over: depriving her of her personal freedom and attacking her loved ones. Therefore, terror also strikes at citizens (blacks and whites) who don’t carry out any political activity, but are considered guilty for having a private life contrary to societal norms.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Betrayal” in relation to the white race can take on even more serious forms. Communists are called “nigger lovers” for taking part in a campaign against the practice of lynching, and are therefore targeted by the terror wielded by the regime of white supremacy and forced to “face the possibility of prison, beatings, kidnapping and even murder.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1010|1010]] Once again, the stories from the newspapers of the time are revealing: “‘Fear of communism’ cited as the cause of lynchings.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1011|1011]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return to Stalin’s USSR. There’s no doubt that, especially starting with the forced collectivization of agriculture, the concentrationary universe, that had already begun taking form soon after the October Revolution, experienced a ghastly expansion. But let’s also apply the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; in this case. Skipping over the concentrationary universe (that we already came across) enforced in the US South at around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, let’s instead see what happens around the middle of the twentieth century. Between 1952 and 1959 the Mau Mau revolt breaks out in Kenya. Here’s how the London government maintains order in its colony: in the Kamiti concentration camp, the women:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Were whipped, starved and subjected to hard labor that included filling mass graves with the bodies arriving from other concentration camps. Many of them gave birth in Kamiti, but the mortality rate among the children was overwhelming. The women buried their children six at a time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1012|1012]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Also with regard to genocidal practices, the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; still applies for that accusation. I don’t know if it’s possible to define the massacre of communists in Indonesia (promoted or encouraged by the CIA) as “the second biggest holocaust of the twentieth century.&amp;amp;quot; In any case, it’s a massacre carried out without the industrial efficiency of the Nazis, and therefore with an added level of sadism. At any rate, it should be to everyone’s knowledge that, even after the end of the Third Reich, the liberal West’s interventions in its colonies and semi-colonies not only led to the establishment of ferocious dictatorships, it also aided in the realization of “acts of genocide”; the “Truth Commission” in Guatemala stresses this, referring to the fate suffered by the Maya, guilty of having sympathized with the opponents to the regime supported by Washington.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1013|1013]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, we saw how the Jacobins are “horrible cannibals” in the eyes of the Thermidorian bourgeoisie; later, however, it will be the descendants of that bourgeoisie who will endure the Paris Commune’s denouncement of the “cannibalistic acts by the Versailles bandits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1014|1014]] Regarding the twentieth century, while the civil war rages on, the Bolsheviks call for the struggle against “bourgeois cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1015|1015]] Later, as we are well aware, it was Stalin himself who classified antisemitism as an expression of “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot; Nowadays, however, they take the tragedy and horrors of Nazino island, where real cases of cannibalism took place, to reduce the events that began with the October Revolution to pure barbarism and to denounce “red cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1016|1016]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, episodes of cannibalism had previously occurred: in 1921, the gravity of the famine reaches “the point of provoking cases of anthropophagy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1017|1017]] A year later, the liberal Italian philosopher Guido de Ruggiero observes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Entente’s blockade, that sought to annihilate Bolshevism, instead killed Russian men, women and children; could the poor going hungry compete in democratic elegance with those from the Entente causing the hunger? As was natural, they rallied around their own government and identified its enemies as their own.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1018|1018]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the liberal philosopher blames the Entente more than Soviet rule. “Witnessed cases of anthropophagy” also occur in certain parts of China in 1928,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1019|1019]] cases that could hardly be blamed on the communists, who will seize power more than twenty years later; they will eventually blame the West, starting with the Opium Wars, of having sent that great Asian country into the abyss. But let’s return to the 1930s, yet relocating from Stalin’s Soviet Union to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s United States. Here’s how a fiendish crowd furiously attacks a black man:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The first thing they did was cut off his penis and forced him to eat it. Later they cut off his testicles and forced him to eat them and say that he enjoyed it. Next, they used knives to cut off strips of skin from his torso and stomach, and anyone, one by one, could rip off fingers or toes from his hands or feet. Red hot iron was used to burn the negro from top to bottom. From time to time a rope was tied around Neal’s neck and they removed the stand from under him, until he almost died, strangulated; but then the tortured resumed, starting over from the beginning. After various hours of that punishment they decided to kill him. Neal’s body was tied to the back of a car and dragged through the street all the way to Cannidy’s house. There, a crowd of between 3,000 and 7,000 people, coming from various southern states, excitedly awaited his arrival.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entertainment around the body continues for a long time and concludes with the sale of photographs, “fifty cents each”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1020|1020]] but we’ll stop there. It’s clear that the application of the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; has led us to discover in F.D. Roosevelt’s United States a case, not of cannibalism provoked by general scarcity, disorder and hunger, but rather self-inflicted cannibalism, forced and organized as a mass spectacle in a society otherwise enjoying a high standard of living.&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, the usual comparison of the communist movement on one side, and the liberal West on the other, makes abstraction, regarding the latter, of the fate reserved to the colonial peoples or people of colonial origin, and the measures approved in situations of more or less acute crisis. The comparison of the two heterogeneous set of measures ends up being Manichaean: one world exclusively analyzed by its sacred spaces and its periods of normality is triumphantly counterposed to a world that, having challenged the barrier that separates the sacred space from the profane space, the civilized and the barbarians, is forced to confront a prolonged state of emergency and the irreducible hostility from the guardians of that exclusive sacred space.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Demonization and Hagiography: the Example of the “Greatest Modern Living Historian” ===&lt;br /&gt;
According to Conquest, the catastrophe of the twentieth century begins, in fact, with the emergence of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; within the West’s “civil and democratic order”: the ideas expressed by Marx and Engels “caused significant problems in the world for more than five generations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1021|1021]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s look, then, at the world situation of 1848, the year of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039;’s fatal publication. Let’s begin with Great Britain, which for Conquest is one of the two centers for the exclusive and superior “Anglo-Celtic” community, and therefore true civilization. And yet, around the middle of the nineteenth century, according to Tocqueville the industrial area of Manchester and the working class neighborhoods look like an “infected labyrinth” and “hell” itself: the miserable slums are “the last refuge that man can find between misery and death.&amp;amp;quot; Nevertheless, “the unfortunate souls who live in those hovels draw the jealously of some of their peers.&amp;amp;quot; Let’s now move on to the work houses, again turning to the French liberal: they are the site of the “most horrendous and repugnant misery”; on one side those unable to work or who await their death, on the other women and children were crammed together “like pigs in the mud of their pigsty; it’s hard to avoid stepping on a half-naked body.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In France, the popular classes don’t accept these conditions. Here’s how Tocqueville called for the Revolt of June 1848 to be confronted: anyone who is caught in a “defense stance” must be shot dead on the spot. Yet one can’t be satisfied with “palliatives”: it’s necessary to liquidate once and for all the centers of subversion, eliminating not just the Mountain of Jacobin inspiration, but “all its surrounding hills”; one must not hesitate at all in taking a “heroic [...] remedy.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Around the middle of the nineteenth century, Ireland is an integral part of Great Britain; there we see the “proto-Eichmann” condemn hundreds of thousands of people to death by starvation. In the United Kingdom’s other colonies, the situation is no better. In 1835, the viceroy of India informs London about the consequences from the destruction of the local textile artisanry, wiped out by British industry: “It’s a state of misery that can hardly find precedents in the history of commerce. The bones of textile workers whiten the plains of India.&amp;amp;quot; The tragedy doesn’t stop there. Two years later, a famine takes place that is so terrible that―another British source, completely committed to celebrating the glory of the empire, candidly remarks―”the British residents [...] are forced to cancel their usual evening walks due to the awful smell of bodies, too numerous to be buried.&amp;amp;quot; There doesn’t appear to be any improved prospects for evening walks: “the successive outbreaks of cholera and smallpox decimated a part of the population that had survived the famine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1022|1022]] The slaughter isn’t just the result of “objective” economic processes: in New Zealand―&#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039; observes in 1864―the settlers, strengthened by the support from the London government, carried out the “extermination of the natives.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And now we’ll see what happens in the other center of the “Anglo-Celtic” community and true civilization. While in Europe the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; ruinously emerges, slavery is in full bloom in the United States, which had just earlier reintroduced it in Texas, taken from Mexico by force of arms, and that had previously declared, under Jefferson, its goal of reducing the people of Haiti to starvation, guilty for having broken the bonds of slavery. In the United States, the tragedy suffered by the Native Americans is added to the tragedy suffered by black people. Regarding the Native Americans, we will cite just one episode, summarized as follows by an American historian: “The degradation and annihilation of California’s Native Americans is one of the most shameful pages in United States history, an indelible stain to the honor and intelligence of the United States. It wasn’t a war, but a type of public sport.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In relation to the colonial peoples or the people of colonial origin, the brutality of Western “civil and democratic order” is not only put into practice, but also explicitly theorized by authors embraced as part of the liberal pantheon without any issues. Tocqueville invites his fellow patriots to not allow themselves to be hindered by residual moral scruples and to accept reality: to complete the conquest of Algeria, which in no way can be renounced, it’s inevitable “that crops will be burned, silos will be emptied, and finally we will overpower unarmed men, women and children.&amp;amp;quot; Yet, it’s necessary to go further, as is revealed by a terrible slogan: “Destroy everything that resembles a permanent concentration of people, in other words, a city [...]. Don’t allow any city to survive or emerge in the regions controlled by Abdel-Kader” (the resistance leader).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1023|1023]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The flattering depiction that Conquest traces of the world before the publication of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; can be compared to a similar one that is traced of slave society by a critic of abolitionism at the start of the nineteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Protected against the adversities of life, surrounded by comforts unknown to most European countries, secure in the enjoyment of their property (indeed, they had property and it was sacred), treated in illness with expenses and attention that you will search for in vain in those celebrated hospitals in England; protected and respected during the pains of old age, with their children and their families in peace [...] relieved once they had performed important services; this was the true, unembellished picture of how our negros were administered [...]. The most sincere affection linked the master to his slave; we slept soundly among these men, that had become our sons, and many of us didn’t keep locks or bolts on our doors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1024|1024]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Conquest, the “Cold War veteran”, is celebrated, however, as the “greatest living modern historian”, although it’s yet another court historian who expresses that opinion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1025|1025]] It’s obvious, the &#039;&#039;reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; of the events that began with the October Revolution, and especially with the figure who for more time than any other led the Soviet Union, is only the flip side to the insipid hagiography of the world before 1917, and even the world before the publication of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Abolitionist Revolutions and the Demonization of the “Anti-Whites” and the Barbarians ===&lt;br /&gt;
The comparative approach can once again help clarify the underlying logic of these ideological processes. There are three great revolutionary movements that, in different ways, had radically challenged the slavery or semi-slavery of the colonial regime, and the racist regime of white supremacy that existed at both the national and international level. We must first consider the great revolution by black slaves that broke out in Saint-Domingue in the wake of the French Revolution. Led by Toussaint Louverture, the ‘black Jacobin’, that revolution leads to Saint-Domingue-Haiti’s declaration of independence, the first country in the Americas to shake off the institution of slavery. The second great revolutionary movement is that which in the United States, following abolitionist agitation and the American Civil War, leads to the establishment of a multiracial society for a brief period of time (the years of &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;), within which the newly freed blacks enjoy not only full civil rights, but also political rights. Lastly, we must reference the October Revolution that calls upon the colonial slaves to break their chains, and that powerfully encourages those that until then were considered the “inferior races” in the struggle for decolonization and emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of these three great movements suffered, and still in part suffer, summary liquidation or their confinement to the darkness or shadows of history. Let’s take the revolution led by Toussaint Louverture. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, those who are sympathetic to it are called “anti-white and murderers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1026|1026]] Regarding Saint-Domingue, Tocqueville merely alludes to the “bloody catastrophe that had put an end to its existence.&amp;amp;quot; Paradoxically, the island ceases to exist at the very moment in which it puts an end to, for the first time on the American continent, the institution of slavery! But to reconstruct the atmosphere of that time, it’s perhaps necessary to specifically cite a popular novel by Heinrich von Kleist (&#039;&#039;The Betrothal in Santo Domingo&#039;&#039;), set at the start of the nineteenth century, “when blacks killed whites” and carried out a “massacre of whites” in the name of a “disorientating, generalized revenge.&amp;amp;quot; The criminalization of this great revolution went unchallenged for a long time. It continued on into the start of the twentieth century with Lothrop Stoddard: together with the revolution by black slaves in Saint-Domingue, the theorist of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; also condemns the second and third stages represented by the anti-slavery and anti-tsarist struggles, and naturally brands as traitors to the white race the French Jacobins, the American supporters of radical abolition and the cause of racial equality, as well as the Bolsheviks.&lt;br /&gt;
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With respect to so-called &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, one must have in mind the warning from an eminent American historian: “Despite its military defeat, the South won the ideological civil war a long time ago.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1027|1027]] It would appear that, at least in this case, there should be no doubt: after centuries of slavery in the fullest sense of the word, Reconstruction is forced to make way to a regime of anti-black terror, so ferocious that it can be identified as the most tragic moment in African-American history. However, let’s see how Wilson summarizes that time in history: “the household slaves were almost always indulgently and even warmly treated by their masters.&amp;amp;quot; In the wake of emancipation Reconstruction sets in, during which majorities are formed in the South that rely on blacks: it’s “an incredible carnival of public crime”, to which “the natural and inevitable rise of the whites” fortunately puts an end.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1028|1028]] A figure who went on to enter the pantheons of the United States and the West is not filled with horror at the time when the slave owner exercises absolute power over his human cattle, nor is it the time when the regime of white supremacy organizes the public spectacle of lynching and the slow martyrdom of the former slaves; synonymous with “public crime” is the brief period of time that followed the American Civil War and during which there’s the effort, despite everything, to take the human rights of African Americans seriously.&lt;br /&gt;
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For a time, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;Radical Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, had been considered synonymous with “totalitarianism”, or as the phenomenon that preceded “fascism and Nazism.&amp;amp;quot; Imposed at the conclusion of a war that was very similar to the “total war by the Nazis”, it had intended to forcefully realize the principle of equality and racial intermixing, trampling on the will of (white) majority and appealing to the savage population, with the consequent “victory achieved through physical force by civilization over barbarism.&amp;amp;quot; Fortunately, the stainless and fearless knights of the Ku Klux Klan were ready to challenge or contain those horrors; the KKK was the organization that kept alive the “knightly order” that had for so long characterized the US South! These are the themes that are promoted by a historiography that continued to make its influence felt well after the collapse of the Third Reich.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1029|1029]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the events that began in October 1917, with the appeal directed to the colonial slaves to break their chains, culminated with the arrival of Stalin’s autocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, it’s not in any way a matter of idealizing the protagonists of these three great emancipatory struggles. An eminent historian on the revolution by black slaves in Saint-Domingue argued against “the contemporary legend according to which the abolition of slavery had meant the extermination of the whites”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1030|1030]] but it’s undeniable that massacres took place on both sides. Nor is their doubt about the brutality, at that time unprecedented, with which the American Civil War was carried out by the North, and particularly by Sherman, who explicitly proposed striking at the civilian population and to “make Georgia howl”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1031|1031]] and it’s no coincidence that Hitler appears to look to him as a model. Finally, the ruthless nature of the dictatorship maintained first by Lenin, and especially by Stalin later, is not up for debate. At least the second war brought up here now appears to have been lost by the slave owning South in the field of history as well: it is no longer politically correct to regret the end of slavery or the regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039;. In contrast, commonplace is the understanding of “Stalinism” (and the history of the October Revolution) as merely criminal, as well as the comparison of Stalin to Hitler, who―inheriting and radicalizing the colonial tradition―explicitly demanded the right of the “master race” to decimate and enslave the “inferior races”: it’s a sign that the champions of colonialism still haven&#039;t lost the battle at either the political level or in the field of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Universal History as a “Grotesque Succession of Monsters” and as “Teratology”? ===&lt;br /&gt;
The movement in history condemned to &#039;&#039;damnatio memoriae&#039;&#039; is the one that more than any other radically challenged the arrogance of the “master race” that had ruled for centuries, from the classic colonial tradition, to the attempt by the Third Reich to radicalize it and apply it in the very heart of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there’s no movement in history that can’t be subjected to a similar process of criminalization. Take liberalism, for example. If we ignore the best pages written by it (the need for limitations on power, the rule of law, or its understanding of the powerful boost to the development of the productive forces and social wealth that can come from the market, competition, and individual initiative), and we concentrated exclusively on the fate suffered by the colonial peoples or those of colonial origin (for centuries subjected to enslavement, to the more or less brutal forms of forced labor and genocidal practices and even “holocausts”, according to the term increasingly used by historians), even liberalism can be read in a more or less criminal perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the current climate of the “War on Terror”, there’s certainly no lack of books that, in referencing the horrific suicide attacks in Beslan, Russia in 2004 (when an indiscriminate and limitless violence takes even children as targets), reconstruct the expansion of Islam as a history of a bloody and cruel conquest, that savagely rules over the defeated and only leaves behind a trail of blood. The role of Islam in the creation of the grand multiethnic and multicultural civilization that characterizes Spain before the Christian reconquest is hidden and forgotten, as is its radical questioning of caste society in India, and more generally of its promotion, beginning in the nineteenth century, of the emancipation struggle by colonial peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the opposition direction, however, we can cite the publication of the monumental &#039;&#039;Criminal History of Christianity&#039;&#039;, completely dedicated to denouncing the intolerance and violence inherent to its pretension of knowing the only true god; it contains an angry condemnation of the crusades of extermination (proclaimed against external infidels and internal heretics), the religious wars, the Inquisition, the witch hunts, the legitimization of the West’s colonial expansion and the horrors in its wake, the support given even in the twentieth century to tyrannical and bloody regimes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1032|1032]] And again resourcefulness is combined with omission. Preaching the idea of equality between men, and as late as the eighteenth and nineteenth century feeding the abolitionist and anti-slavery movement, Christianity is an essential part in the formation of the democratic society. In his lucid hatred, Nietzsche understood this well; it was precisely for that reason that he denounces the intrinsically violent and criminal impulse that, despite its appearances, characterizes Christianity and the early Judaism of the prophets; rallying around the idea of equality and against wealth, power and the status of masters in general, the Jewish prophets would be first among those responsible for the massacres that took place during the peasant wars, the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. A line of continuity which nineteenth century antisemitism and Hitler extend to the communist movement and the “Judeo-Bolshevik” revolution of October 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, the communist movement was quite often compared to early Christianity or to Islam. Thus, this depiction of universal history, understood as the universal history of crime, is almost complete. That sequencing of crimes not only avoids their motivations, but also the reasons for their uninterrupted duration, such that history as a whole is portrayed, as Hegel would say, as a “slaughterhouse” of planetary dimensions,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1033|1033]] or as an immensely unfathomable &#039;&#039;mysterium iniquitatis&#039;&#039;. At this moment―we can observe like Gramsci―the past as such looks “irrational” and “monstrous” to us: history as a whole is portrayed as a “grotesque succession of monsters”, as “teratology.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1034|1034]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Opposing the reduction of the events that began with October 1917 to a crime or to criminal madness, authors and figures committed in some way to defending communism’s honor react, at times, by distancing themselves from the darker pages of that movement’s history and branding them as the betrayal or the degeneration of the original ideas of the Bolshevik revolution and the teachings by Lenin and Marx. Looking closely, that approach also leads to an outcome not very different from that we just finished analyzing. Are all the pages ruthlessly described in the &#039;&#039;Criminal History of Christianity&#039;&#039; examples of “betrayal” and “degeneration”? How about the Reformation (and the principle of each Christian’s freedom, solemnly proclaimed by Luther) and the regimes that later side with Protestantism? Following that line, Cromwell is a “degenerate” in relation to the original protagonists of the Puritan Revolution, and the Terror by the Jacobins is a “degeneration” of the ideals of 1789. Is modern Islamic fundamentalism a “degeneration” in relation to the Quran and Muhammad’s teachings? Remaining coherent to this approach, anyone can consider the liberal West’s enslavement and annihilation of the colonial peoples to be a degeneration of “liberalism.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, the “traitors” would be Washington, Jefferson, Madison―all slave owners―and also Franklin, according to whom “the uprooting of those savages [the Native Americans] has been planned by Providence, for the purposes of clearing space for the cultivators of the land.&amp;amp;quot; Locke should also then be classified as a traitor to liberalism, as he is generally considered the father of that line of thinking, and not only did he legitimize the expropriation (and the deportation) of the Native Americans, but he was also, as observed by an eminent scholar (David B. Davis), “the last great philosopher who sought to justify absolute and perpetual slavery.&amp;amp;quot; Proceeding in that way, we thus transform the pantheon of the great figures of liberalism into a gallery of traitors without honor.&lt;br /&gt;
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That sort of argument is even more suspect if we consider the fact that, in the eyes of a great liberal theorist of slavery like John C. Calhoun, It’s precisely the abolitionists with their Jacobinism and anti-slavery fanaticism who betray liberal ideas of tolerance and respect for property rights in all their forms. That approach isn’t much more persuasive if we apply it to the history of Marxism and communism. Especially beginning with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Stalin is the criminal traitor par excellence. But it’s necessary not to forget that those very champions of de-stalinization are accused of betrayal and “revisionism” by the Chinese and Albanian communist parties. In our days, the criminalization process also targets Lenin, Mao Zedong, Tito―without even mentioning Pol Pot―, and not even Ho Chi Minh and Castro are spared. A truly miserable outcome is reached by relying on the category of betrayal. The history of the communist movement as a crime in itself, triumphantly written by the ruling ideology, is simply rebranded―by those who are unable to identify with the ruling ideology―as the history of betrayal of its original ideals. Not all that different results would be reached in the reading of liberalism or Christianity if we wanted to describe their darkest chapters as the betrayal of their original ideals. To conclude, the approach criticized here commits the mistake of erasing the real and profane history, which is substituted by a history of the unfortunate and mysterious corruption and distortion of doctrines elevated a priori to the status of purity and holiness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Theory is never innocent, however. The reading of Soviet Russia’s history in terms of the “betrayal” and “degeneration” of its noble original ideas is, most of the time, dismissively rejected by modern historiography, deeply committed not only to the collective criminalization of the Bolsheviks, but also in denouncing the authors that inspired the Bolsheviks as the original theorists of the Terror and the Gulag. While it’s necessary to avoid drawing hard lines of continuity and mixing up quite different kinds of responsibility, it is nevertheless permitted and even obligatory to question the role (however indirect and limited) played by Marx and Engels, rejecting the myth of their innocence and investigating the real history of their impact and the reasons for that impact. But then it’s necessary to take a similar approach toward all the great intellectuals, including those who are placed within a different and opposing intellectual tradition. Take Locke, for example. Is there a relation between his refusal to extend tolerance and even “compassion” to the “Papists” and the massacres the Catholics suffered in Ireland? And what of the underlying connection between his theoretical justification of slavery in the colonies and the slave trade, and the tragedy suffered by blacks, that which some African Americans today prefer to call the &#039;&#039;Black Holocaust&#039;&#039;? We can also turn to the time of Marx and Engels: must a theorist, like John Stuart Mill, of the West’s “despotism” over the “lesser” races (who must show “absolute obedience”) and the beneficial nature of slavery imposed on “savage tribes” alien to work and discipline, be considered in part responsible for the terror and massacres that accompany colonial expansion?&lt;br /&gt;
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Not a single movement or person can escape those questions. We saw Nietzsche refer to the fiery tirades against power and wealth by the Jewish prophets and founders of the Church to explain the destructive and bloody nature of the revolutionary cycle. In the opposite direction, those that denounce the protagonists of crusades as traitors to Christianity would do well not to overlook a commonly neglected detail: an integral part of that religion’s holy scriptures is the Old Testament, which legitimizes and celebrates the “Lord’s wars” even in its cruelest forms. In this case, it’s also misleading to counterpose the nobility of the original ideas to the mediocrity and the horrors of its real history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having confirmed theory’s non-innocence, it’s a matter of identifying the different levels of responsibility. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the bodies of black slaves were branded with the letters RAC, the Royal African Company (the corporation that managed the slave trade), in which Locke was a shareholder. The least that one could say is that the authors of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; didn’t profit from the forced labor that, a few decades after their deaths, will characterize the Gulag. Marx and Engels can be accused of having legitimized in advance violence that, at any rate, will be put into practice after their deaths, and with decades separating them. Mill, however, legitimizes practices that are contemporary to him; similarly, in Tocqueville we can read the explicit recommendation of colonial practices that are more or less genocidal (the systematic destruction of urban centers found in areas controlled by the rebels) that don’t refer to the future, but the immediate present.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1035|1035]] In other words, regarding the atrocities of colonialism that take place under their watch and, at times, with their direct approval, the representatives of the liberal tradition cited here have much more direct responsibility than that attributed to Marx and Engels regarding the shameful aspects of the Soviet regime and “Stalinism.&amp;amp;quot; While the path that leads from Marx to Stalin and the Gulag is problematic, bumpy and at any rate mediated by totally unpredictable events like World War II and the permanent state of emergency, it’s immediately evident the link that connects Locke to the slave trade or Mill and Tocqueville to the forced labor imposed on the indigenous people and the colonial massacres.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a theory, neither can utopianism claim any innocence. Liberals are correct on that point, though unfortunately they resort to that argument in a dogmatic way, applying it only to their adversaries and not to themselves: what were the terrible human and social costs of the utopia of a self-regulated market, with the subsequent rejection of any state intervention, a utopia to which Britain was loyal to even when, around the middle of the nineteenth century, a disease destroyed the potato harvest and the subsequent famine consumed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Irish people? Or, to give a more recent example: how many catastrophes were provoked and continue to be provoked by the utopia (supported by Wilson even before Bush Jr., as well as by prominent modern philosophers like Popper) of a permanent peace to be achieved by spreading democracy around the world through the force of arms? To avoid falling into that very dogmatism, a similar question is also raised in relation to the history of the Soviet Union. There are, of course, those that read the history of the country born out of the October Revolution by lamenting the gradual “betrayal” of the ideals elaborated by Marx and Engels; in reality, and in certain aspects, it’s precisely those “original” ideals (the millenarian hopes for a society without a state and juridical norms, without national borders and without the market and money, where there’s ultimately no real conflicts at all) that played a harmful role, obstructing the transition to a state of normality and prolonging and intensifying the state of emergency (caused by the crisis of the old regime, by the war and by the subsequent invasions).&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite their differences, the two approaches criticized here, that respectively base themselves on the category of crime (or criminal madness) or betrayal, have a shared characteristic: they have a tendency to focus their attention on either the criminal or the treacherous nature of individuals. In fact, they refuse to understand the real historical development and historical effectiveness of the social, political and religious movements that have a worldwide ability to draw people in and whose influence unfolds over quite a long period of time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an approach also proves to be inconclusive and misleading with regard to the Third Reich (which lasts for only 12 years and was only able to appeal to those included in the “master race”). It’s way too easy to exclusively blame Hitler for the atrocities of Nazism, suppressing the fact that he extracted from the world that preceded him―and then radicalized―the two essential parts of his ideology: the celebration of the white race’s colonial mission and the West itself, now called upon to further extend its dominion into Eastern Europe; the understanding of the October Revolution as a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy that, in encouraging the rebellion by the colonial peoples and undermining the natural racial hierarchy and, more generally, infecting society like a pathogen, constituted a frightening threat to civilization, to be confronted using all means, including the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, to comprehend the genesis of the Third Reich’s horrors, it’s not a question of reconstructing Hitler’s childhood or adolescence; nor does it make sense to start with Stalin’s very beginnings to analyze an institution (the Gulag) that has its roots in the history of Tsarist Russia and which, in ways that are always different, of which the countries of liberal West also made use, both during periods of colonial expansion as well as during the state of emergency caused by the Second Thirty Years’ War. Similarly misleading would be wanting to explain slavery and the decimation and extermination of the Native Americans based primarily on the individual characteristics of the US Founding Fathers, or seeking to explain the strategic and atomic bombings of German and Japanese cities through Churchill’s, Roosevelt’s and Truman’s perverse nature. It would be equally unreasonable to seek to explain the horrors of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib by starting with Bush Jr.’s adolescence or childhood.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s return to Stalin. Is it a case of moral indifference to reject the approach that interprets everything as a crime (or criminal madness) or as the betrayal of the original ideals? Historians today still debate individuals and events that go back nearly two thousand years: must we unhesitatingly accept the sinister portrait of Nero traced by both the senatorial aristocracy and by the Christians? In particular, must we accept without question the Christian propaganda that accused the Roman emperor of having started a fire in Rome in order to blame and persecute the innocent followers of the new religion? Or, as suggested by some scholars, was it possibly started by fundamentalist and apocalyptic tendencies within early Latin Christianity, which sought to see reduced to ashes the place par excellence of superstition and sin, and to accelerate the fulfillment of their eschatological hopes?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1036|1036]] Let’s skip ahead a few centuries. Regarding the large-scale anti-Christian persecution unleashed by Diocletian, historians continue to ask themselves if it was only the result of an inexplicable religious hatred that was alien to Roman traditions, or did genuine concern regarding the future of the state play a role, as its military was being undermined by Christian pacifist agitation, precisely at a time when the danger of barbarian invasions became more threatening? The historians who ask those questions are hardly accused of wanting to downplay the persecution that Christians endured, or of wanting to again send them to the beasts and to the most heinous forms of torment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, it’s easier to critically analyze the sacred history of Christianity than it is to express doubts regarding the sacred aura that usually surrounds the history of the West and the country that leads it; due to it being much further in the past and its much smaller impact on the interests and passions of the present, it’s much easier to understand the motives of those who were defeated by Christianity than to identify the motives of those whose defeat cleared the way for the triumph of the “American century.&amp;amp;quot; And that explains the heavy influence of demonization and hagiography in the understanding of the twentieth century, as well as the stubborn popularity enjoyed by the negative cult of heroes.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;amp;quot;Concentrate All Our Strength&amp;amp;quot; Against &amp;amp;quot;The Principal Enemy&amp;amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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“One of the fundamental qualities of the Bolsheviks [...], and one of the fundamental points of our revolutionary strategy is our ability to understand, at any given moment, who is the principal enemy and to know how to concentrate all our strength against that enemy.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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—Report to the VII Congress of the Communist International&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 1 ― Democracy and Peace? ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s worthwhile to begin with the Cold War. To specify the time we are dealing with I’ll limit myself to several details. In January of 1952, to break the stalemate in military operations in Korea, US president Harry S. Truman flirted with a radical idea that was even written down in a diary entry: he could send an ultimatum to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, specifying in advance that their lack of compliance “would mean that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dalian, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every industrial center in China and the Soviet Union, would be eliminated” (Sherry 1995, p. 182). It was not a matter of a fantasy with no connection to reality, as disturbing as that may be: in those years nuclear weapons had been repeatedly wielded as a threat against a China determined to complete its anti-colonial revolution and achieve national independence and territorial integrity. The threat was all the more believable due to the terrible and lingering memory of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when Japan had its attention primarily turned to the Soviet Union―on this, authoritative American historians agree (Alperovitz 1995). It also wasn’t only the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China being threatened. On May 7th, 1954, in Dien Bien Phu Vietnam, an army led by the communist party defeated colonialist France’s occupying troops. On the eve of the battle, the American Secretary of State Foster Dulles said to French Prime Minister Georges Bidault: “And what if we were to give you two atomic bombs?” It was understood immediately that they were to be used against Vietnam. (Fontaine 1968, vol. 2, p. 118).&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite not even hesitating at the prospect of a nuclear holocaust to hold back the anti-colonial revolution (an essential constitutive element of the democratic revolution), in those same years the United States and its allies sold NATO as a contribution to the cause of democracy and peace. It must be placed in this context the speech in March of 1949 by Togliatti to the Chamber of Deputies, during the debate over Italy’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Your principal thesis is that democracies, as you call them, don’t wage wars. But gentlemen, who do you take us for? Do you truly believe that we don’t have the most minimal political and historical background? It’s not true that democracies don’t wage wars: all the colonial wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were waged by regimes that classified themselves as democratic. Such as when the United States waged a war of aggression against Spain to establish its rule in a part of the world it was interested in; it waged war against Mexico to conquer specific regions where there were substantial sources of raw materials; for decades they waged war on the indigenous Native American tribes in order to destroy them, offering one of the primary examples of the crime of genocide that is today judicially enshrined and thus should be legally punished in the future.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor must one forget “the ‘crusade by nineteen nations’, as Churchill had called it at the time,” against Soviet Russia, and there was also, before the eyes of the world, France’s war against Vietnam, at that time fully underway. (TO, 5; 496-97).&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, far from being synonymous with peace, bourgeois democracies had started and continued to be responsible for wars that often had a genocidal character. In any case, from the Italian communist leader’s point of view, to believe in the thesis according to which bourgeois democracy would be free of military impulses would mean having no “political or cultural background.&amp;amp;quot; But that background would truly disappear a few decades later. During the outbreak of the first war against Iraq, while the Italian Communist Party was beginning to crumble, one of its prominent philosophers (Giacomo Marramao) declared to “l’Unità” on January 25th, 1991: “Never in history has a democratic state waged war on another democratic state.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tone of that declaration didn’t allow for responses or doubts. Yet I will allow myself to cite Henry Kissinger, regarding whom there are many things to be criticized, but not being “politically or historically uncultured”:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When the First World War broke out in Europe, most countries (including Great Britain, France and Germany) were governed by what were essentially democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the First World War―a catastrophe which Europe still hasn’t completely recovered from―was enthusiastically approved by all the (democratically elected) parliaments” (Kissinger 2011, pp. 425-26).&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, war has not even spared those that define themselves as the oldest democracies in the world. Great Britain and the United States were at war from 1812 to 1815. And on that occasion, it is even one of the founding fathers of the American Republic, namely Thomas Jefferson, who invokes against Great Britain a total and “eternal” war, a war that could only come to an end with the “extermination of one side or the other.&amp;amp;quot; And it’s not just a matter of a now distant historical event. Even between the two world wars, for some time the United States continued to consider Great Britain as its most likely enemy. The war plans they prepared in 1930, and approved by general Douglas MacArthur, even considered the use of chemical weapons.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2 ― The Colonial Wars ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s reread Marramao’s statement from 1991: he (incorrectly) maintains that wars between democracies don’t happen while consciously making abstraction of the colonial wars in which the so-called democracies are the protagonists. Are colonial wars even considered wars? In absolving the democracies, must we blame those wars on the colonial peoples, guilty of being backwards and barbarians?&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting in 1935, Togliatti was called upon to confront fascist Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia (or Abyssinia). Mussolini stated his desire to contribute to the spreading of European civilization: it was necessary to put an end to a “centuries long slavery” and to their “pseudo barbarian and slave state”, that is a slave state led by “Negus of the slavers”, by the leader of slavers (Mussolini 1979, pp. 292-96). The regime’s propaganda didn’t relent in insisting that the “horrors of slavery” could not be tolerated; in Milan, cardinal Schuster blessed and consecrated the undertaking that “at the price of blood opens Ethiopia’s doors to the Catholic faith and Roman civilization” and abolishing “slavery, bringing light to the darkness of barbarism” (Salvatorelli, Mira, 1972, vol. 2, pp. 254 and 294). Despite being carried out through the massive use of mustard and asphyxiating gas, and through the large scale massacre of the civilian population, the war was celebrated as civilizing and humanitarian operation, and not without its democratic elements, given that it abolished slavery. We are led to think of the seductive humanitarian operations that exist nowadays.&lt;br /&gt;
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How did Togliatti react to that campaign? In August of 1935, in his Report (The Struggle against the War) to the VII Congress of the Communist International, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“For entire decades, the indigenous people of Africa have been subjected to a regime, not only of exploitation and slavery, but of true and proper physical extermination. The crisis years have added to the horrors of the colonial regime installed by the Europeans on that immense black continent. Moreover, the fascists, in the war carried out in Libya from 1924 to 1929, have unequivocally demonstrated what are the fascist methods of colonization. Even in that field, fascism has demonstrated itself to be the most barbaric form of bourgeois rule. Italy’s war in Libya has been carried out, from beginning to end, as a war of extermination against the indigenous population” (TO, 3.2; 760).&lt;br /&gt;
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Having always had a genocidal tendency, even when unleashed by countries with a liberal and democratic order, the colonial wars with fascism become completely and consciously genocidal.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, Togliatti recognized that “Abyssinia is an economically and politically backward country.&amp;amp;quot; It’s true, “so far there’s no trace of any national revolutionary movement, or even a mere democratic one”; still largely present was the “feudal regime.&amp;amp;quot; Was it necessary, then, to support or at least not oppose the seductive civilizing and humanitarian intervention? Not at all. On the contrary, Togliatti declared himself “ready to support the liberation struggle by the Ethiopian people against the fascist bandits” (TO, 3.2; 761-2); and that’s in consideration not only of the very atrocities of expansionism and colonial rule, but also for the fact that the anti-colonialist struggle, even when conducted by countries and peoples still outside modernity, is nonetheless an integral part of the world revolutionary process that throws imperialism (capitalism) into crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, even this lesson from Togliatti has been lost. In 2011, NATO massively intervened against Gaddafi’s Libya. To use the words of an authoritative philosopher from well outside the communist camp: “Today we know that the war has caused at least 30,000 deaths, against the 300 victims of the initial repression” that the regime was condemned for, a regime that the West was determined to overthrow (Todorov 2012). Among those who called for or approved the intervention in this war―considered neocolonial even by numerous scholars, journalists and news outlets―were Susanna Camusso, secretary general of the CGIL, and Rosanna Rossanda, a historic figure in “il Manifesto”, the Italian “communist daily” (cfr. Losurdo 2014, ch. 1, § 10).&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 3 ― A “Baroque” Outlook on the Anti-Imperialist Struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
As is well known, Togliatti was one of the main protagonists of the political reversal that in 1935 pushes the Communist International to identify Nazi-fascism as the principal enemy and to promote the program of the united front and popular front against it. Taking this position was not straightforward for the communists. Trotskyist propaganda didn’t relent in denouncing it as a betrayal of anti-colonialism, for the fact that it placed the two largest colonial empires at the time (those of Britain and France) among the secondary enemies, and therefore among the Soviet Union’s potential allies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Resistance to the new political line even came from other orientations. Take Carlo Rosselli, for example. In the last years of his life, before being assassinated by Mussolini’s agents in 1937, the leader of liberal-socialism was fairly close to the communists, and he looked sympathetically to the “gigantic Russian experiment” of “socialist revolution” and of the “socialist organization of production” (Roselli 1988, p. 381). Although said between parentheses, yet without absolute clarity: Carlo Roselli’s liberal-socialism was very different to the liberal-socialism that later characterized Norberto Bobbio!&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet, at least at the beginning, Rosselli expressed his reservations about the turn by the Communist International, and he spoke in the name of the revolutionary orthodoxy: “Traditional Marxist theory has been set aside and has increasingly drifted toward the theory of the ‘democratic war’. The present conflict would no longer be the result of an inter-imperialist war, but one between peaceful states (the proletarian state) and fascism, especially German fascism.&amp;amp;quot; The communist parties, at least those “in the countries allied to Russia, will be forced into the “union sacrée” (Rosselli 1989-92, vol. 2, pp. 328-29). In other words, by waving the flag of anti-fascist unity, the communists make their own the patriotic slogans that they condemned during World War I.&lt;br /&gt;
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That argumentative approach lost sight of, or didn’t comprehend, the drastic changes to the international situation. The same representative of liberal-socialism, writing on November 9th of 1934, said that “the fall of the Soviet regime would be a tremendous calamity that we must work to avoid” (Rosselli 1988, p. 304). With respect to 1914, a new contradiction has intervened, that between capitalism and socialism. And that was just one aspect. Twenty years earlier, after having defined World War I as a “war between slave owners for the consolidation and strengthening of slavery” in the colonies, Lenin had added: “The originality of the situation is in the fact that, in this war, the destiny of the colonies are being determined by the military struggle on the continent” (LO, 21; 275 and 277): the “slave owners’, the large colonial powers and the imperialists were alone in having the initiative. That is no longer true on the eve of and during World War II: promoted by the October Revolution, the world anti-colonialist revolution had already begun; the colonial slaves had left behind their state of passivity and resignation. In other words, aside from the inter-imperialist contradiction that characterized World War I, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism, as well as the contradiction between the great colonial powers and the revolting colonial slaves, are both at work. And that latter contradiction became all the more acute due to the intentions of the imperialist powers on the offensive (Hitler’s Germany, Imperialist Japan, fascist Italy) to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, subjugating and enslaving even nations belonging to older civilizations (like Russia and China). Even a country like France was facing colonial or neo-colonial subjugation. Lenin had even predicted it to some extent. In 1916, while Wilhelm II’s army was at the gates to Paris, the great Russian revolutionary, on the one hand, reaffirmed the imperialist character of the world war then underway, on the other hand, he called attention to a possible reversal: if the gigantic conflict is concluded “with a Napoleonic style victory and with the subjugation of a whole series of nation states retaining some form of autonomy (...), then a great national war would be possible in Europe” (LO, 22; 308). It’s the very scenario that took place in a good part of the world between 1939 and 1945: in both cases, the Napoleonic victories achieved by Hitler in Europe and Japan in Asia ended up provoking wars of national liberation. Ignoring the multiplicity of the contradictions and their interaction with one another, in October of 1934 Rosselli defined the “historical phase that we are passing through” as “the phase of fascism, imperialist war and capitalist decadence” (Rosselli 1988, p. 301). While the reference to “capitalist decadence” may be an implicit reference to the rise of Soviet Russia, in any case the scenario outlined here completely ignores the anti-colonial revolution and the wars of resistance and national liberation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Maybe it wasn’t only the difficulty in understanding the changes to the international situation that explains the resistance to the political turn of 1935. Especially because it has been characterized by the desire to provide a complete understanding of the social and historical totality, Marxism has sometimes been read (and distorted) as a mode of understanding that simplifies and flattens the complexity of historical and social processes. Gramsci (1975, p. 1442) had called attention to the “infantile deviation by the philosophy of praxis” that, in ignoring the role of ideas and ideology, nurtures the “baroque conviction” that the more one relies on “material” objects, the more “orthodox” one becomes. It’s a memorable passage for its stylistic merit, in addition to its philosophical merit: the self-styled champions of orthodoxy are ridiculed as followers of a “baroque conviction”! Unfortunately, that can manifest itself on a very different level: in analyzing international relations there are those who consider themselves to be the foremost champions of anti-imperialism by expanding as much as possible their list of imperialist countries; all of them put on the same level!&lt;br /&gt;
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It goes without saying that such a baroque outlook was entirely alien to Lenin. Lenin, in 1916, in making the distinction between classic colonialism and neo-colonialism, notes that the latter is based not on “political annexation” but rather on “economic annexation”, and regarding that proposition he offers an example in addition to that of Argentina: even Portugal “was in fact a ‘vassal’ of Britain” (LO, 23; 41-42). Certainly, the great revolutionary didn’t ignore that Portugal also possessed a colonial empire (against which, obviously, the struggle had to continue); nevertheless, the principal aspect (which one must never lose sight of) was the neo-colonial subjugation of Portugal, that in some way became a part―at least at the economic level―of the British Empire. Elsewhere, we saw Lenin in 1916 consider the possibility of Wilhelm II’s Germany imposing its neo-colonial subjugation on a country like France, that for its part possessed a vast colonial empire.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s this lesson by Lenin that Togliatti had behind him when he criticized that which could be defined as the baroque conception of anti-imperialism:&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that this is not a question of an isolated declaration, however extraordinarily effective it may be. It should be kept in mind that at the time when Togliatti announced the Salerno Turn, Pietro Badoglio was still the leader of the government in Italy; Badoglio who, not by chance, carried the title of duke of Addis Ababa, among others: he had participated in the frenzy of imperialist crimes by fascism. And yet, that infamous chapter of history was secondary with respect to the urgency of the national liberation struggle against the occupation regime imposed on Italy by the Third Reich with Mussolini’s complicity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4 ― Togliatti, Stalin and the Cold War ===&lt;br /&gt;
We are now able to understand the attitude taken by Togliatti after the outbreak of the Cold War. Possibly the most uncomfortable year for him was 1952. It was the year in which two statements by Stalin were emitted that were difficult to reconcile with one another. Briefly speaking at the XIX Congress of the CPSU, and denouncing the subaltern status of Washington’s European and Western allies and vassals, the Soviet leader called on the communist parties to take up the banner of national independence and democratic freedom “”thrown out to sea” by their countries’ bourgeoisie. Still during the year before his death, Stalin expressed himself in substantially different terms in writing Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (§ 6): rather than resign themselves to the undisputed hegemony exercised by the United States, the other capitalist powers would have to challenge it; more acute than the very contradiction between capitalism and socialism, the inter-imperialist contradiction would sooner or later provoke a new world war, as had happened in 1914 and 1939; and all this confirms the inevitability of war within capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is well known, things have gone in the completely opposite direction with respect to the prediction made in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR: it hasn’t been the imperialist camp that has unraveled, but rather the socialist one; The more acute threats of a world war occurred not as a result of the competition for hegemony between the great capitalist powers, but as a result of the intention by the United States to contain socialism and the anti-colonial revolution and to reverse it (think of the crisis of 1962, which not by chance saw its epicenter in Cuba); the control exercised by Washington over its allies and vassals has not disappeared, instead it has since been consolidated, as has been demonstrated by the inglorious end to the Anglo-French adventure of 1956 in Suez (with the extension of United States rule to the Middle East as well) and the decline of the Gaullist challenge in France. The logical mistake contained in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR is evident: the premise of the inevitability of war in capitalism doesn’t in any way lead to the conclusion that the conflict between imperialist powers is always the order of the day, almost as if that conflict never contained, or contained only for a brief time, distinctions between winners and losers. For example, after the defeat of what Lenin defines as “Napoleonic imperialism” (LO, 22; 309), for almost a century British imperialism had practically no rivals. And this is all the more true for the United States, which hasn’t had any serious rivals in the imperialist camp after the end of World War II, that had witnessed the defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy, but also the wounding and serious decline of Great Britain and France. The fact remains that Stalin in 1952 outlined two contradictory scenarios: the first, looking to Europe at the time, he denounced the bourgeoisie for their capitulation toward the policies of war and oppression carried out by Washington; looking particularly toward the future, the second scenario denounced the intrinsically warmongering nature of the various bourgeois ruling classes, all put on the same level.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his report to the central committee of the PCI on November 10th, 1952, Togliatti warned against taking the “wrong conclusions” from the thesis of the inevitability of war (reaffirmed by Stalin in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR) and against losing sight of the concrete and immediate task of the struggle to keep the peace, at that time threatened by the aggressive policies put into action by the United States against the socialist camp and the anti-colonial revolution (TO, 5; 707). It’s for this reason that the Italian communist leader primarily and almost exclusively referenced the other speech by Stalin, the one that invited communists to defend their national independence and political democracy itself, put at risk by the McCarthyite wave that threatened to cross the Atlantic and establish itself in Italy and Western Europe as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, Togliatti had started elaborating this line before Stalin’s speech to the XIX Congress of the CPSU. In his report to the VII Congress of the PCI, held between April 3rd and April 8th in 1951, he denounced United States imperialism, determined to “disturb every effort toward the development and transformation of Italian democracy” and he demanded a program of “Italian independence, the independence of our country from anyone who seeks to subject our economic and political life to their interests or those of foreign imperialism” (TO, 5; 591 and 601). There’s a lot that suggests it had been Togliatti influencing Stalin, who had from the platform of the XIX Congress invited Western communists to take up the banner of democracy and national independence abandoned by the bourgeoisie. Certainly, in his subsequent report to the central committee of the PCI on November 10th, 1952, Togliatti was much more forceful, pointing the finger at the “reactionaries in our region”, against the Italian and European reactionaries:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Comrade Stalin has ripped off their masks, he has revealed how they had thrown out to sea all that which in the past had constituted the political action by democratic and liberal bourgeois groups, they had thrown out to sea the banner of freedom and independence for the people, therefore it’s left to us to pick up that banner and carry it forward, to become the patriots of our country and thereby become the nation’s leadership force” (TO, 5; 705).&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In light of the considerations already made, one could say that, in citing Stalin, Togliatti was primarily citing himself. The line that emerged was clear, yet nothing new: it was necessary to first fight against those that sought to “strangle freedom and sell the country’s independence”, who were prepared to accept the transformation of Italy “into a colony subservient to foreign imperialism”; it was necessary to strike at and neutralize the “leadership of countries dominated by the United States of America” (TO, 5; 705-6). The objective pursued by the latter was defined as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“To achieve dominion over the whole world [...]; the economic, political and military subjugation of a whole series of countries that until yesterday were independent countries, and even developed capitalist countries like France and Italy; the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, China, and the popular democracies. To be specific, in the preparation of the forces necessary for this attack and to complete its objectives, American imperialism has organized military bases all over the world, it sends its own troops and stations them in countries that until yesterday were independent, and who would have never tolerated their occupation by foreign troops” (TO, 5; 708).&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a serious mistake to read this passage as a banal, propagandistic tirade. Instead, before us is a theoretical and political reflection: what defines imperialism is not just its hostility toward the socialist bloc and the anti-colonial revolution; especially because what also characterizes it is the struggle for hegemony, imperialism can include the subjugation, whether colonial or semi-colonial, of “independent countries, and even those with developed capitalism like France and Italy”, and therefore of a country like France that in 1952 had a large colonial empire in its possession. The contradiction between “developed capitalist” countries is not necessarily and exclusively an inter-imperialist contradiction, it can even be the contradiction between a particularly strong and aggressive imperialist power and a potential colony or semi-colony. It would give it too much credit to think that imperialism would refrain from transforming a “developed capitalist” country into a colony or semi-colony. Togliatti was very familiar with Lenin’s dispute with Kautsky: “what defines imperialism is [...] not just its drive to conquer agrarian lands [like Kautsky predicted]. But to get its hands on heavily industrialized countries as well”, especially because that can weaken its “adversaries” (LO, 22, 268).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the basis of a precise historical and theoretical reading, with the aim of avoiding the danger of Italy being dragged by United States imperialism into a war against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, Togliatti made a call for the broadest mobilization possible: “The movement that Italy needs must be a movement of the great popular masses, from any party, from whatever social group they belong to, for the salvation of peace. Even the citizens who are furthest from us today can and should be drawn into this cause’s work.&amp;amp;quot; And therefore “it’s up to us, the party of the working class, at this time, like during the gravest moments of the past, to recognize and defend the interests of the entire nation” (TO, 5; 602 and 578). Was that the abandonment of the class struggle? The response to this possible objection was already prepared: “no, there’s no contradiction between a national program and a class program by the communist party” (TO, 5; 590). Togliatti knew &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; Too well to flatten the class struggle with a trade unionist reading. Especially because in the Soviet Union he had been able to directly follow the epic resistance by Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad against the attempt by the Third Reich to revive and radicalize the colonial tradition in Eastern Europe, reducing the entire Soviet people to a state of slavery, in service to the so-called master race. Togliatti had understood very well that the Great Patriotic War was one of the greatest class struggles, not only in the twentieth century, but in world history.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s worthwhile to note that in November of 1938, at a time when Japanese imperialism sought to impose a barbaric form of colonial rule and slavery on the Chinese people as a whole, Mao Zedong had theorized, in those circumstances, “the connection between the national struggle and the class struggle.&amp;amp;quot; Like the Great Patriotic War, the war of resistance against Japanese imperialism should also be counted among the great class struggles, not only in the twentieth century, but in world history (Losurdo 2013, cg. VI, § 7-8). It’s almost certain that Togliatti was unaware of the text from the Chinese communist leader that was just cited: all the more significant is the fact that he reaches the very same conclusions by working from the concrete analysis of the concrete situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5 ― US Imperialism and the Growing Threat of War ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let it be clear: it’s not a question of giving into a game of analogies. To really understand the political scenario of our time, we have to proceed to the concrete analysis of the concrete situation. It’s a task that remains incomplete, largely. Nevertheless, we can define some essential points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that we must be relentless in denouncing the infamous role by countries like Germany and Italy in the dismemberment of and the war against Yugoslavia, or the infamous role by Italy in the war against Libya, and the role by Germany in the coup d’état in Ukraine; not to mention the infamous role by France, first with Sarkozy and later by Hollande, in the wars against Libya and Syria. But all these neo-colonial infamies, and still others, were made possible due to the US’s overwhelming military power and its hegemonic role, that has often been promoted in a more or less direct way. And yet, in looking toward the large scale war that’s emerging on the horizon, we must take into consideration the profound changes that have occurred in relation to the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First and Second World War, there were two opposing military coalitions; in our time, in practice there’s one single gigantic military coalition (NATO) that increasingly expands and that continues to be under firm American control. On the eve of the First and Second World War, the major capitalist powers accused each other of unleashing an arms race; in our time, however, the United States criticizes its allies for not dedicating more resources to their military budgets, for not sufficiently accelerating their rearmament program. Obviously, the war that Washington has in mind is not against Germany, France or Italy, but one against China (the country that emerged out of the greatest anti-colonial revolution and led by an experienced communist party) and/or Russia (that under Putin had made the mistake, from the White House’s point of view, of shaking off the neo-colonial control that Yeltsin had submitted to or complied with). And in this large scale war, which could even cross the nuclear threshold, the United States plans to carry it out with the subaltern participation―side by side with US and under its command―of Germany, France, Italy and the other NATO member states.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is therefore against the threat of a war unleashed by the superpower that, alone in the world, continues to hold itself up as the “nation chosen by God”, by a superpower that for a long time has sought to guarantee for itself the “ability to deliver a first [nuclear] strike with impunity” (Romano 2014, p. 29), by a superpower that has installed in our country military bases and nuclear arms directly, or indirectly, controlled by Washington, we are called upon to struggle against this concrete threat of war. And we can much more effectively confront this growing threat by taking into consideration Palmiro Togliatti’s great lesson, and adequately adapting it to the current situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Bibliography: ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Opere, a cura di Ernesto Ragionieri, Editori Riuniti, Roma (a questa edizione si rinvia direttamente nel testo, facendo precedere dalla sigla TO l’indicazione del volume e della pagina&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;body13.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BESANÇON Alain&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;Le malheur du siècle. Sur le communisme, le nazisme et l’unicité de la Shoah&#039;&#039;, Fayard, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BESYMENSKI Lew&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003) &#039;&#039;Stalin und Hitler. Das Pokerspiel der Diktatoren&#039;&#039; (2002), translation from Russian by Ilde and Helmut Ettinger, Aufbau, Berlin, 2nd reprint.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BLACKMON Douglas A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Slavery by Another Name. The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II&#039;&#039;, Doubleday, New York-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BOBBIO&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Norberto&#039;&#039;&#039; (1977), &#039;&#039;Politica e cultura&#039;&#039; (1955), Einaudi, Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1997), &#039;&#039;Autobiografia,&#039;&#039; Alberto Papuzzi (org.), Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BOYLE Peter G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1990), &#039;&#039;The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence 1953-1955&#039;&#039;, The University of Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BRECHER Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1965), &#039;&#039;Nehru. A Political Biography&#039;&#039; (1959), Italian translation by Corrado Pavolini, &#039;&#039;Vita di Nehru&#039;&#039;, il Saggiatore, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BRENT Jonathan, NAUMOV Vladimir P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Last Crime. The Plot against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953&#039;&#039; (2003), Perennial, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BROUÉ Pierre&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Trotskij&#039;&#039; (1988), Italian translation from French by Piero Arlorio and Stefano Musso, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione perduta. Vita di Lev Trockij, 1879-1940&#039;&#039;, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUKHARIN Nikolai I.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1966), &#039;&#039;L’economia mondiale e l’imperialismo&#039;&#039; (1916), Italian translation from Russian by Ezio Ferrero, Samonà and Savelli, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969a), &#039;&#039;La nuova politica economica e i nostri compiti&#039;&#039; (1925), Italian translation from Russian in: Nikolai Bukharin, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, &#039;&#039;L’accumulazione socialista&#039;&#039;, Lisa Foa (org.), Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969b), &#039;&#039;Critica della piattaforma economica dell’opposizione&#039;&#039; (1924), Italian translation from Russian in: Nikolai Bukharin, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, &#039;&#039;L’accumulazione socialista&#039;&#039; [cf. Bukharin 1969a].&lt;br /&gt;
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(1970), &#039;&#039;Sulla teoria della rivoluzione permanente&#039;&#039; (1924), Italian translation from Russian in: Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, &#039;&#039;La “rivoluzione permanente” e il socialismo in un solo paese&#039;&#039; (1963), Giuliano Procacci (org.), Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1984), &#039;&#039;Lo Stato Leviatano, Scritti sullo Stato e la guerra 1915-1917&#039;&#039;, Alberto Giasanti (org.), Unicopli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUKHARIN Nikolai I., PREOBRAZHENSKY Yevgeni A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1920), &#039;&#039;Das ABC des Kommunismus. Populäre Erläuterung des Programms der Kommunistischen Partei Russlands (Bolschewiki)&#039;&#039;, Im Verlage der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs, Vienna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BULLOCK Alan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives&#039;&#039;, Knopf, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUTLER&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Susan&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (2005), &#039;&#039;My Dear Mr. Stalin. The Complete Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin&#039;&#039;, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CANFORA Luciano&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Democrazia. Storia di un’ideologia&#039;&#039; (2004), Laterza, Rome-Bari, new edition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARETTO Ennio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Ebrei rinnegati alla corte di Stalin&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Jan. 25th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARR Edward H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1964), &#039;&#039;A History of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923&#039;&#039; (1950), Italian translation by Franco Lucentini, Sergio Caprioglio, and Paolo Basevi, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione bolscevica&#039;&#039;, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1968-1969), &#039;&#039;A History of Soviet Russia. Socialism in one Country 1924-1926&#039;&#039;, vol. 1-2 (1958-1959), Italian translation by Luca Baranelli, Piero Bernardini Marzolla, Carlo Ginzburg and Massimo Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Il socialismo in un solo paese&#039;&#039;, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARYL Christian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Tyrants on the Take&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (April 11th), p. 27-30.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CATHERWOOD Christopher&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s Folly. How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq&#039;&#039;, Carrol &amp;amp;amp; Graf, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHAMBERLAIN Houston S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1937), &#039;&#039;Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (1898), Ungekürzte Volksausgabe, Bruckmann, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHAMBERLIN William H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;America’s Second Crusade&#039;&#039;, Regnery, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHANG Jung, HALLIDAY Jon&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Mao. The Unknown Story&#039;&#039; (2005), Italian translation by Elisabetta Valdrè, &#039;&#039;Mao. La Storia sconosciuta&#039;&#039;, Longanesi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHEN Jian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of Sino-American Confrontation&#039;&#039;, Columbia University Press, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHOMSKY Noam, HERMAN Edward S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. The Political Economy of Human Rights&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 (1979), Italian translation by Clara Ghibellini, &#039;&#039;La Washington Connection e il fascismo nel Terzo Mondo. L’economia politica dei diritti umani&#039;&#039;, Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHURCHILL W., ROOSEVELT F.D., STALIN J. V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1957), &#039;&#039;Carteggio di Guerra. 1941-1945&#039;&#039;, Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHURCHILL Winston&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;The Second World War&#039;&#039; (1948), Italian translation by Olga Ceretti Borsini, &#039;&#039;La seconda guerra mondiale&#039;&#039; (1948), vol. I, Mondadori, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1974), &#039;&#039;His Complete Speeches 1897-1963&#039;&#039;, Chelsea House, New York-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COBAIN Ian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;The interrogation camp that turned prisoners into living skeletons&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Dec. 17th).&lt;br /&gt;
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(2006), &#039;&#039;Revealed: victims of UK’s cold war torture camp&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Apr. 3rd).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COHEN Stephen F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1975), &#039;&#039;Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography 1888-1938&#039;&#039; (1975), Italian translation by Libero Sosio, &#039;&#039;Bucharin e la rivoluzione bolscevica. Biografia politica 1888-1938&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1986), &#039;&#039;Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Politics and History since 1917&#039;&#039;, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COHN Norman&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Warrant for Genocide&#039;&#039; (1966), French translation by Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;Histoire d’un mythe. La “conspiration” juive et les protocoles des sages de Sion&#039;&#039;, Gallimard, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COLE Wayne S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;America First. The Battle Against Intervention 1940-1941&#039;&#039;, Octagon Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CONQUEST Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Stalin Breaker of Nations&#039;&#039;, Penguin Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996) &#039;&#039;Stalin and the Jews&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (July 11th), p. 46-50.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2000) &#039;&#039;The Great Terror&#039;&#039; (1968), Italian translation by Adriana Valori Piperno, &#039;&#039;Il Grande Terrore&#039;&#039;, new revised and updated edition, Paolo Dossena, (org.), Rizzoli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2004), &#039;&#039;The Harvest of Sorrow&#039;&#039; (1986), Italian translation by Vittoria de Vio Molone and Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;Raccolto di dolore. Collettivizzazione sovietica e carestia terroristica&#039;&#039;, Liberal, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2001), &#039;&#039;Reflections on a Ravaged Century&#039;&#039; (1999), Italian translation by Luca Vanni, &#039;&#039;Il secolo delle idee assassine&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2006), &#039;&#039;Prefazione&#039;&#039; to Khlevniuk 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COOX Alvin D.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Nomonhan. Japan against Russia&#039;&#039;, 1939 (1985), University Press, Stanford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COSTELLO John&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Ten Days to Destiny. The Secret Story of the Hess Peace Initiative and British Efforts to Strike a Deal with Hitler&#039;&#039;, Morrow, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CROCE Benedetto&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;L’Italia dal 1914 al 1918. Pagine sulla guerra&#039;&#039;, Laterza, Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1993), &#039;&#039;Scritti e discorsi politici (1943-1947)&#039;&#039;, Angela Carella (editor) (vol. VII, I and VII, Second National Edition), Bibliopolis, Naples.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DALE Reginald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Time to Put Away the Big Trade Gun&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (April 30th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DANIELS Robert V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1970), &#039;&#039;The Conscience of the Revolution. Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia&#039;&#039; (1960), Italian translation by Giulio Lepschy, &#039;&#039;La coscienza della rivoluzione. L’opposizione comunista nell’Unione Sovietica&#039;&#039;, Sansoni, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIES Robert William&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930&#039;&#039;, MacMillan, London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIS David B.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982), &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039; (1969), Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIS Mike&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts (2001),&#039;&#039; Italian Translation by Giancarlo Carlotti, &#039;&#039;Olocausti tardovittoriani&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE CAROLIS Paola&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Churchill inedito: “Gli ebrei in parte responsabili delle loro sciagure”,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Mar. 11th), p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE FELICE Franco&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1973) &#039;&#039;Fascismo, democrazia, Frente popolare. Il movimento comunista alla svolta del VII Congresso dell’internazionale.&#039;&#039; De Donato, Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE FELICE Renzo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Rosso e Nero,&#039;&#039; Pasquale (editor), Baldini and Castoldi, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE GASPERI Alcide&#039;&#039;&#039; (1956), &#039;&#039;La democrazia cristiana e il momento politico&#039;&#039; (1944), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Discorsi politici,&#039;&#039; Tommaso Bozza (editor), CInque lune, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE RUGGIERO Guido&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;Apologia del Bolscevismo&#039;&#039; (1922), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Scritti politici 1912-1926,&#039;&#039; Renzo De felice (editor), Cappelli, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEÁK István&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;The Crime of the Century,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (Sept. 26th), p. 48-51.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEL BOCA Angelo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Italiani, brava gente?&#039;&#039; (2005), Neri Pozza, Venice.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DESCHNER Karlheinz&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Kriminalgeschichte des Christentums&#039;&#039;, Rowohlt, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEUTSCHER Isaac&#039;&#039;&#039; (1954), &#039;&#039;La Russia dopo Stalin,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969), &#039;&#039;Stalin. A Political Biography&#039;&#039; (1948),; Italian translation by Gilberto Forti, &#039;&#039;Stalin. Una biografia politica,&#039;&#039; Longanesi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972a) &#039;&#039;Necrologio di Stalin&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Manchester Guardian&#039;&#039; from March 6th, 1953), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Ironies of History. Essays on Communism&#039;&#039; (1966), Italian translation by Elsa Pelitti, &#039;&#039;Ironie della Storia. Saggi sul comunismo contemporaneo,&#039;&#039; Longanesi, Milan, p. 160-170.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972b), &#039;&#039;Kruscev parla di Stalin&#039;&#039; (June 1956), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Ironies of History&#039;&#039; [cf. Id. 1972a], p. 213-224.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972c), &#039;&#039;Esilio e umiliazione&#039;&#039; (April 1965), in: id, &#039;&#039;Ironies of History&#039;&#039; [cf. Id. 1972a], p. 213-224.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DI FEO Gianluca&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Sicilia 1943, l’ordine di Patton: “Uccidete i prigionieri italiani”,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (June 23rd), p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2005), &#039;&#039;“Sei un prigioniero italiano? E mi sparò al cuore”&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Mar. 3rd) p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DIAMOND Sander A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1985), &#039;&#039;Herr Hitler. Amerikas Diplomatie, Washington und der Untergang Weimars,&#039;&#039; translation from American English by Stephanie Kreuels, Droste Dusseldorf.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DIMITROV Georgi&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945),&#039;&#039; Silvio (editor), translation from Russian by Fausto Ibba, the German parts translated by Pasquale Rosafio, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DINNERSTEIN Leonard&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Antisemitism in America,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DOWER John W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;War Without Mercy. Race and Power in the Pacific War,&#039;&#039; Pantheon Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DUVERGER Maurice&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Mafia e inflazione uccidono la Russia&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Oct. 18th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;E. R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Clinton: “Usammo i neri come cavie umane. Una Vergogna americana”&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (April 10th), p. 8.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ELON Amos&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;A Very Special Relationship. Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (Jan. 15th), p. 15-19.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ESCHENAZI Gabriele, NISSIM Gabriele&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Ebrei invisibili. I sopravvissuti dell’Europa orientale dal comunismo a oggi,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEITO François&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;Histoire des démocraties populaires après Stalin&#039;&#039; (1969), Italian translation by Giovanni Simcich, &#039;&#039;Storia delle democrazie popolari dopo Stalin&#039;&#039;, Vallecchi, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FERRO Mare&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Ils étaient sept hommes en guerre, 1918-1945. Histoire parallèle,&#039;&#039; Perrin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEST Joachim C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1973), &#039;&#039;Hitler. Eine Biographie,&#039;&#039; Ullstein, Frankfurt a. M.Berlin-Wien.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEUCHTWANGER Lion&#039;&#039;&#039; (1946), &#039;&#039;Moskau 1937. Ein Reisebericht für meine Freunde&#039;&#039; (1937), Italian translation by Fulvia Carena, &#039;&#039;Mosca 1937. Diario di viaggio per i miei amici,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FIGES Orlando&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;A People’s Tragedy&#039;&#039; (1996), Italian translation by Raffaele Petrillo, &#039;&#039;La tragedia di un popolo. La Rivoluzione russa 1891-1924&#039;&#039; (1997), Tea, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FILENE Peter G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Americans and the Soviet Experiment 1917-1933&#039;&#039;, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FISCHER Fritz&#039;&#039;&#039; (1965), &#039;&#039;Griff nach der Weltmacht&#039;&#039; (1961); Italian translation Enzo Collotti (editor), &#039;&#039;Assalto al potere mondiale. La Germania nella guerra 1914-1918,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FISCHER Ruth&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Stalin und der deutsche Kommunismus&#039;&#039; (1948), Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FITZPATRICK Sheila&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FLORES Marcello&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;L’immagine dell’URSS. L’occidente e la Russia di Stalin (1927-1956),&#039;&#039; Il Saggiatore, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1995), &#039;&#039;L&#039;età del sospetto. I processi della guerra fredda,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FONTAINE André&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;La Tache rouge&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation by Franca Genta Bonelli, &#039;&#039;La Guerra Fredda,&#039;&#039; Piemme, Casale Monferrato.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FORD Henry&#039;&#039;&#039; (1933), &#039;&#039;Der internationale Jude&#039;&#039; (1920), German translation by Paul Lehmann, Hammer, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRANCESCHINI Enrico&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Emergenza in Russia. Un milione alla fame. Eltsin corre ai ripari,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;La Repubblica&#039;&#039; (Oct. 17th), p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRANKLIN John H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Race and History. Selected Essays 1938-1988&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FREIBERGER Steven Z.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Dawn over Suez. The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957,&#039;&#039; Ivan R. Dee, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FREUD Sigmund&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Einleitung zu “Thomas Woodrow Wilson”. Eine psychologische Studie&#039;&#039; (1930; published for the first time in 1971), Italian translation by Renata Colorni, &#039;&#039;Introduzione allo studio psicologico su Thomas Woodrow Wilson,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Opere&#039;&#039;, Cesare Luigi Musatti (editor), vol. 11, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, reprint.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRIEDMAN Lawrence M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Crime and Punishment in American History&#039;&#039;, Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRIEDRICH Jörg&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Der Brand&#039;&#039; (2002), Italian translation by Marco Bosonetto, Francesca Pisani and Cristiana Proto, &#039;&#039;La Germania bombardata,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FURET François&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Le passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle&#039;&#039; (1995); Italian translation Marina Valensise (editor),&#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione. L’idea comunista nel XX secolo,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FURET François, RICHET Denis&#039;&#039;&#039; (1980), &#039;&#039;La Révolution française&#039;&#039; (1965), Italian translation by Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FUSSELL Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Wartime&#039;&#039; (1989), Italian translation by Mario Spinella, &#039;&#039;Tempo di guerra,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GALLI DELLA LOGGIA Ernesto&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Cannibalismo rosso,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (June 3rd), p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GANDHI Mohandas K.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1969-2001), &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,&#039;&#039; Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi (new edition in 100 volumes).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GARDNER Lyod C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Spheres of Influence. The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta,&#039;&#039; Dee, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GERNET Jacques&#039;&#039;&#039; (1978), &#039;&#039;Le monde chinois&#039;&#039; (1972), Italian translation by Vera Pegna, &#039;&#039;Il mondo cinese. Dalle prime civiltà alla Repubblica popolare,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GINZBURG Ralph&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;100 years of Lynchings,&#039;&#039; Black Classic Press, Baltimore.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GLEASON Abbot&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Totalitarianism. The Inner History of the Cold War,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GOEBBELS Joseph&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Tagebucher,&#039;&#039; Ralf Georg Reuth (editor), Beck, Munich Zurich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996), &#039;&#039;Diario 1938,&#039;&#039; Italian translation Marina Bistolfi (editor), about the original transcription of the manuscript done by David Irving, Oscar Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GOLDMAN Wendy Z.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin, The Social Dynamics of Repression,&#039;&#039; University Press, Cambridge.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GORBACHEV Mikhail S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Avant-Mémoires,&#039;&#039; Odile Jacob, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GORTER Herman&#039;&#039;&#039; (1920), &#039;&#039;Offener Brief an den Genossen Lênin,&#039;&#039; Verlag der Kommunistischen Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRAMSCI Antonio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1975), &#039;&#039;Quaderni del carcere,&#039;&#039; critical edition Valentino Gerratana (editor), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1984), &#039;&#039;Il nostro Marx 1918-1919,&#039;&#039; Sergio Caprioglio, (editor), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1987), &#039;&#039;L’Ordine Nuovo 1919-1920,&#039;&#039; Valentino Gerratana and Antonio A. Santucci (editors), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRANT Madison&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;Introduction to Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy&#039;&#039; (1921), reedition, Negro University Press, Westport, Connecticut.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRAZIOSI Andrea&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;L’Urss di Lênin e Stalin. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica 1914-1945,&#039;&#039; il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GREGOIRE Henri&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau ou du préjugé des blancs contre la couleur des Africains et celle de leurs descendants noirs et sang-mêlés&#039;&#039; 1826), Jérôme Millon, Grenoble.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GERGORY G. H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1993), &#039;&#039;Posters of World War II,&#039;&#039; Avenel, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRUNFELD A. Tom&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;The Making of Modern Tibet,&#039;&#039; revised edition, Sharpe, Armonk (New York)-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HANDLIN Oscar, HANDLIN Lilian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;Liberty in Peril 1850-1920,&#039;&#039; Harper Collins, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HANLEY Charles, MENDOZA Martha&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Pentagon withheld letter on Korea dead&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (April 16th), p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HAUTER François&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;La campagne contre “l’agent Orange” des Américains,&#039;&#039; in &#039;&#039;Le Figaro&#039;&#039; (Oct. 6th), p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HAYEK Friedrich A. von&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039; (1982, the three parts of the volume are respectively 1973, 1976 and 1979), Italian translation Angelo Petroni and Stefano Monti Bragadin (editors), &#039;&#039;Legge, legislazione e libertà,&#039;&#039; il Saggiatore, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HEGEL Georg W. F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1919-1920), &#039;&#039;Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte&#039;&#039;, Georg Lasson (editor), Meiner, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969-1979), &#039;&#039;Werke in zwanzig Banden,&#039;&#039; Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (editors), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HERZEL Aleksandr&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;du développement des idées révolutionnaires en Russie&#039;&#039; (1851), Italian translation by Ida Giordano, &#039;&#039;Breve storia dei Russi. Lo sviluppo delle idee rivoluzionarie in Russia,&#039;&#039; Corbaccio, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HERZSTEIN Robert E.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Roosevelt &amp;amp;amp; Hitler. Prelude to War,&#039;&#039; Paragon House, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HILLGRUBER Andreas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Die Zerstörung Europas. Beitrage zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945&#039;&#039; (1988); Italian translation by Guido Mandarino, &#039;&#039;La distruzione dell’Europa,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HITLER Adolf&#039;&#039;&#039; (1939), &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039; (1925/27) Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1961), &#039;&#039;Hitlers Zweites Burch,&#039;&#039; G. L. Weinberg (editor), Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1965), &#039;&#039;Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945&#039;&#039; (1962-63), Max Dormarus (editor) Süddeutscher Verlag, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1980), &#039;&#039;Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944,&#039;&#039; Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, Werner Jochmann (editor), Albrecht Knaus, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1989), &#039;&#039;Tischgespräche&#039;&#039;, Henry Picker (editor) (1951), Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOBSBAWN Eric J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Nation and Nationalism since 1790&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Piero Arlorio, &#039;&#039;Nazione e nazionalismo dal 1780. Programma, mito realtà,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOFFMANN Joachim&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945,&#039;&#039; Verlag für Wehwissenschaften, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOFSTADTER Richard&#039;&#039;&#039; (1960, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039; (1951); Italian translation by Giuseppe Vetrano, &#039;&#039;La tradizione politica americana,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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(editor) (1982), &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039; (1958), Vintage Books, New York, in vol. 3 (vol. In collaboration with Clarence L, Ver Steeg and vol. 3 in collaboration with Beatrice K. Hofstadter).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOOPES Townsend, BRINKLEY Douglas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;FDR and the Creation of the U.N.,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HORNE Gerald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956,&#039;&#039;Associated University Press, London and Toronto.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HUGHES Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore. The Epic of Australia’s Founding&#039;&#039; (1986), Italian translation by Anna Ravano and Gabriella Luzzani, &#039;&#039;La riva fatale. L’epopea della fondazione dell’Australia,&#039;&#039; Adelphi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HUMBERT-DROZ Jules&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Mémoires&#039;&#039; (1969-72), Italian translation by Danilo Montaldi, &#039;&#039;L’internazionale comunista tra Lênin e Stalin. Memorie di un protagonista 1891/1941,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;IGNATIEFF Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;In the Center of the Earthquake&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The York Review books&#039;&#039; (June 12th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;IRVING David&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Hitler’s War and the War Path&#039;&#039; (1977 and 1979; expanded and combined edition of the two previously separate volumes, Italian translation by Mario Spataro, &#039;&#039;La guerra di Hitler,&#039;&#039; Settimo Sigillo, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JAMES C. L. R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1968), &#039;&#039;The Black Jacobins. Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution&#039;&#039; (1963), Italian translation by Raffaele Petrillo, &#039;&#039;I Giacobini neri. La prima rivolta contro l’uomo bianco&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JASPIN Elliot&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Buried in the Bitter Waters. The Hidden History of Racial Cleansing in America,&#039;&#039; Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JĘDRZEJEWICZ Wacław&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982), &#039;&#039;Pilsudski: A Life for Poland,&#039;&#039; Hippocrene Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JEFFERSON Thomas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1984), &#039;&#039;Writings,&#039;&#039; Merrill D. Peterson (editor), The Library of American, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JOHNSON Chalmers&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001) &#039;&#039;Blowback. The Costs and Consequences of American Empire&#039;&#039; (2000), Italian translation by Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;Gli ultimi giorni dell’impero americano,&#039;&#039; Garzanti, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JOHNSON Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Modern Times. From the Twenties to the Nineties,&#039;&#039; Revised Edition, Harper Collins, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KANT Immanuel&#039;&#039;&#039; (1900), &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Schriften,&#039;&#039; Academy of Sciences (editor), Berlin-Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1977), &#039;&#039;Die diktatur des Proletariats&#039;&#039; (1918), Italian translation Luciano Pellicani (editor), &#039;&#039;La Dittatura del proletariato,&#039;&#039; Sugarco, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KELLEY Robin D. G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Hammer and Hoe. Alabama Communists during the Great Depression,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press, Chappell Hill and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KELSEN Hans&#039;&#039;&#039; (1981a), &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Bolshevism. A Critical Analysis&#039;&#039; (1948), Italian translation: &#039;&#039;La teoria politica del bolscevismo e altri saggi di teoria del diritto e dello Stato,&#039;&#039; Riccardo Guastini (editor), Il Saggiatore, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1981b), &#039;&#039;The Communist Theory of Law&#039;&#039; (1955), Italian translation by Giuseppino Treves, &#039;&#039;La teoria comunista del diritto,&#039;&#039; Sugarco, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KENNAN George F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1956), &#039;&#039;Russia Leaves the War,&#039;&#039; Princeton University Press, New Jersey.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2001), &#039;&#039;Memorandum for the Minister,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (April 26), p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KERENSKY Alexander F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Memoirs. Russia and History’s Turning Point&#039;&#039; (1965), German translation by Günter Schlichting, &#039;&#039;Memoiren Rußland und der Wendepunkt der Geschichte,&#039;&#039; Rowohlt, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KERSHAW Ian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Alessio Catania, &#039;&#039;Hitler 1936-1945,&#039;&#039; Bompiani, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2005), &#039;&#039;Making Friends with Hitler&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation Alessio Catania, &#039;&#039;Gli amici di Hitler,&#039;&#039; Bompiani, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KHLEVNIUK Oleg V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;Das Politbüro. Mechanismen der Macht in der Sowjetunion der dreißiger Jahre,&#039;&#039; translation of the original Russian (1996) by Ruth and Heinz Deutschland, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2006), &#039;&#039;Storia del Gulag. Dalle Collettivizzazione al Grande terrore&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation from Russian by Emanuela Guercetti, Einaudi Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KHRUSHCHEV Nikita&#039;&#039;&#039; (1958), &#039;&#039;Sul culto della personalità e le sue conseguenze,&#039;&#039; Report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (Feb. 25th, 1956), in: Angelo Tasca (editor), &#039;&#039;Autopsie du stalinisme,&#039;&#039; Italian translation &#039;&#039;Autopsia dello stalinismo,&#039;&#039; Comunità, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KIRILINA Alla&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;L’assassinat de Kirov. Destin d’un stalinien, 1888-1934,&#039;&#039;translation from Russian by Pierre Forgues and Nicolas Werth, Seuil, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KISSINGER Henry&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994) &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, Simon Schuster, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KLEMPERER Victor&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten, Tagebücher 1933-1945,&#039;&#039; Walter Nowojski (editor) with the collaboration of Hadwig Klemperer, Aufbau, Berlin.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2005), &#039;&#039;LTI. Notizbuch eines Philologen&#039;&#039; (1957), Reclam, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KNIGHT Amy&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Beria. Stalin’s First Lieutenant&#039;&#039; (1993), Italian translation by Silvia Betocchi and Tania Garguilo, &#039;&#039;Beria. Ascesa e caduta del capo della polizia di Stalin&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOJEVE Alexandre&#039;&#039;&#039; (1954), &#039;&#039;Tyrannie et sagesse&#039;&#039; (195)0, in: Leo Strauss, &#039;&#039;de la Tyrannie&#039;&#039;, Gallimard, Paris, p. 217-290.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOLLONTAI Alexandra&#039;&#039;&#039; (1976), &#039;&#039;comunismo, famiglia, morale sessuale,&#039;&#039; Mariella Gramaglia (editor), Savelli, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOTEK Joël, RIGOULOT Pierre&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Le siècle des camps. Détention, concentration, extermination. Cent ans de mal radical,&#039;&#039; Lattès, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KUPISCH Karl&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1965), &#039;&#039;Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus 1871 bis 1945&#039;&#039; (1960), Siebenstern Taschenbuch, Munich and Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KUROMIYA Hiroaki&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Industrial Revolution. Politics and Workers, 1928-1932,&#039;&#039; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LASKI Harold J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1848), &#039;&#039;Liberty in the Modern State,&#039;&#039; Allen &amp;amp;amp; Unwin, London (new edition).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEIBOWITZ Clement, FINKEL Alvin&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;In Our Time. The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion&#039;&#039; (1997), Italian translation by Silvio Calzavarini, &#039;&#039;Il nemico comune. La collusione antiisovietica fra Gran Bretagna e Germania nazista,&#039;&#039; Fazi, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LENIN V. I.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1955-1970), &#039;&#039;Opere complete,&#039;&#039; Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEVIN Nora&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917&#039;&#039; (1988), Tauris, London-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEWIN Mosche&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Russia’s Twentieth Century, The Collapse of the Soviet System&#039;&#039; (2003), French translation by Denis Paiallard and Florence Prudhomme, &#039;&#039;Le siècle sovietique,&#039;&#039; Fayard-Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LIDDEL HART Basil H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Stratégie,&#039;&#039; translation from English by Lucien Poirier, Perrin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LIEBKNECHT Karl&#039;&#039;&#039; (1958-1968), &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Reden und Schriften,&#039;&#039; Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LINCOLN W. Bruce&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Passage through Armageddon. The Russians in War and Revolution 1914-1918&#039;&#039; (1986), Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOEWEN James W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Sundown Towns. A Hidden Dimension of American Racism,&#039;&#039; Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, New York-London-Toronto-Sydney.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOSURDO Domenico&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;La comunità, la morte, l’Occidente. Heidegger e “l’ideologia della guerra”,&#039;&#039; Bollati, Boringhieri Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1992), &#039;&#039;Hegel e la libertà dei moderni,&#039;&#039; editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996), &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico. Problemi e miti,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1997), &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalismo al comunismo critico”,&#039;&#039; Gamberetti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2002), &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico. Biografia intellettuale e bilancio critico,&#039;&#039; Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2005), &#039;&#039;Controstoria del liberalismo,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Roma-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2007), &#039;&#039;Il linguaggio dell’Impero. Lessico dell’ideologia americana,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOTH W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte,&#039;&#039; Rowohlt, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOWER Wendy&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press (in association with the United States Holocaust Museum), Chapell Hill.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUKÁCS György&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Taktik und Ethik&#039;&#039; (original Hungarian edition, 1919), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Schriften zur ideologie und Politik,&#039;&#039; Peter Ludz (editor), Luchterhand, Neuwied and Berlin.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1974), &#039;&#039;Die Zerstörung der Vernunft&#039;&#039; (1954), Italian translation by Eraldo Arnaud, &#039;&#039;La distruzione della regione&#039;&#039; (1959), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUTTWAK Edward&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;USA-Giappone-China, la strana geometria,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Limes. Revista italiana di geopolitica&#039;&#039;, n. 1, p. 149-152.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUXEMBURG Rosa&#039;&#039;&#039; (1968), &#039;&#039;Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie&#039;&#039; (1916), in: &#039;&#039;Politische Schriften,&#039;&#039; Ossip K. Flechtheim (editor), Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt, vol 2.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MACDONOGH Giles&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;After the Reich. The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation,&#039;&#039; Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MAISTRE Joseph de&#039;&#039;&#039; (1984), &#039;&#039;Oeuvres Complètes&#039;&#039; (Lyon 1884), anastatic republication, Olms, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MALAPARTE Curzio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1973), &#039;&#039;tecnica del colpo di Stato&#039;&#039; (1931), Vallecchi, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1986b), [&#039;&#039;An David McCoy&#039;&#039;] (1945), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Essays,&#039;&#039; H. Kurze (editor), Fischer, Frankfurt, vol. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MANOSCHEK Walter&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1995), &#039;&#039;“Es gibt nur eines für das judentum: Vernichtung”.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Das Judenbild in deutschen Soldatenbriefe 1939-1944&#039;&#039;, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARKUSEN Eric, KOPF David&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing. Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century,&#039;&#039; Westview Press, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARTIN Terry&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939,&#039;&#039; Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARTINEAU Harriet&#039;&#039;&#039; (1857), &#039;&#039;British Rule in India; A Historical Sketch&#039;&#039;, Smith, London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARX Karl, ENGELS Friedrich&#039;&#039;&#039; (1955-1989), &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MAYER Arno J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Why Did the Heavens not Darken?&#039;&#039; (1988); Italian translation by Giusepina Panzieri Saija, &#039;&#039;Soluzione finale. Lo sterminio degli Ebrei nella storia europea&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MCALLISTER LINN Brian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MEDVEDEV Roy A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1977), &#039;&#039;Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism&#039;&#039; (1971), Italian translation by Raffaello Uboldi, &#039;&#039;Lo stalinismo. Origini storia conseguenze,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MEDVEDEV Zores A., MEDVEDEV Roy A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;The Unknown Stalin&#039;&#039; (2003), Italian translation by Bruno Amato and revisions by Andrea Panaccione, &#039;&#039;Stalin sconosciuto, Alla luce degli archivi segreti sovietici,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MISES Ludwig von&#039;&#039;&#039; (1927), &#039;&#039;Liberalismus,&#039;&#039; Fischer, Jena.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MLECHIN Leonid&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Perché Stalin creò Israele,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian by Chiara Spano, preface and editing by Luciano Canfora, Sandro Teti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MONTEFIORE S. S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Stalin. Am Hof des roten Zaren,&#039;&#039; Fischer, Hamburg (German translation).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MOSSE George L.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Le guerre mondiali dalla tragedia al mito dei caduti,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NAIMARK Norman M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; (2001), Italian translation by Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;La politica dell’odio. La pulizia etnica nell’Europa contemporanea,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NAVARRO Mireya&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;U.S. Aid and “Genocide”. Guatemala Inquiry Details CIA’s Help to Military&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Feb. 27-28th), p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NEVINS Allan, COMMAGER Henry S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1960), &#039;&#039;The Pocket History of the United States&#039;&#039; (1942); Italian translation by Enrico Mattioli and Paola Soleri, &#039;&#039;Storia degli Stati Uniti,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NIRENSTEIN Fiamma&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Israele, la congiura rossa,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;La Stampa&#039;&#039; (July 14th), p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NOLTE Ernst&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,&#039;&#039; Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PANNEKOEK Anton&#039;&#039;&#039; (1970), &#039;&#039;Weltrevolution und Kommunistische Taktik&#039;&#039; (1920), Italian translation in: &#039;&#039;Organizzazione rivoluzionaria e Consigli operai,&#039;&#039; Piet Rademakers (editor), Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAPPE Ilan&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine&#039;&#039; (2006), Italian translation by Luisa Corbertta and Alfredo Tradardi (editors), &#039;&#039;La pulizia etnica della Palestina,&#039;&#039; Utet, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PARETO Vilfredo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1966), &#039;&#039;Trasformazione della democrazia&#039;&#039; (1920), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Scritti sociologici,&#039;&#039; Giovanni Busino (editor), Utet, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAUWELS Jacques R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Il mito della guerra buona. Gli Usa e la Seconda guerra mondiale,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from the original Dutch edition (2000), by Silvio Calzavarini, Datanews, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAYNE Matthew J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Railroad. Turksib and the Building of Socialism,&#039;&#039; University Press, Pittsburgh.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;POLIAKOV Léon&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974-1990), &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’antisémitisme&#039;&#039; (1961-1997), Italian translation by Rossella Rossini and Roberto Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’antisemitismo,&#039;&#039; La Nouva Italia, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1987), &#039;&#039;Le Mythe aryen. Essai sur les sources du racisme et des nationalisme&#039;&#039; (1971), new expanded edition, Complexe, Brussels.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PONTING Clive&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s plan for race purity&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Jan. 20-21st), p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;RAPOPORT Louis&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s War against the Jews&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Erica Joy Mannucci, &#039;&#039;La guerra di Stalin contro gli ebrei,&#039;&#039; Rizzoli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;REUTH Ralf G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Goebbels,&#039;&#039; Piper, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROBERTS Geoffrey&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Wars. From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROBESPIERRE Maximilien&#039;&#039;&#039; (1912-1967), &#039;&#039;Oeuvres,&#039;&#039; Puf, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROCCUCCI Adriano&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Gerusalemme, la seconda Mosca,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Limes. Rivista Italiana di geopolitica&#039;&#039; n. 1, p. 27-42.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROGOWIN Wadim S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;1937. Jahr des Terrors&#039;&#039; (1996), Russian translation by Hannelore Georgi and Harald Schubärth, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1999), &#039;&#039;Die Partei der Hingerichteten&#039;&#039; (1997), translation from Russian by Hannelore Georgi and Harald Schubärth, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROMEN Jan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1969), &#039;&#039;Il secolo dell’Asia. Imperialismo occidentale e rivoluzione asiatica nel secolo XX&#039;&#039; (1956), Italian translation from Dutch by Fernando Solinas and Enzo Collotti, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROSSELLI Carlo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Scritti politici,&#039;&#039; Zeffiro Ciuffoletti and Paolo Bagnoli (editors), Guida, Naples.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROTHBARD Murray N.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Hoover’s 1919 Food Diplomacy in Retrospect,&#039;&#039; in: Lawrence E. Gelfand (ed.), &#039;&#039;Herbert Hoover, The Great War and its Aftermath 1917-23,&#039;&#039; University Press, Iowa.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROUX Alain&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;La Chine au XXe siècle&#039;&#039; (1998), Colin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;RUGE Wolfgang, SCHUMANN Wolfgang&#039;&#039;&#039; (editors) (1977), &#039;&#039;Dokumente zur Deutschen Geschichte. 1933-1935,&#039;&#039; Rödelberg, Frankfurt.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SABRIN B. F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1991), &#039;&#039;Alliance for Murder. The Nazi-Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide,&#039;&#039; Sarpedon, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SACHAR Howard M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993) &#039;&#039;A History of the Jews in America,&#039;&#039; Vintage Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SACK John&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt; (1993), &#039;&#039;An Eye for an Eye. The Untold Story of Jewish Revenge Against Germans in 1945&#039;&#039;, Basic Books, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SAFIRE William&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;A secret victory&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Feb. 3rd), p. 7.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SANG-HUN Choe&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;South Korea excavates its killing fields,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Nov. 22nd), p. 2.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHLESINGER Arthur M. jr.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1959-1965), &#039;&#039;The Age of Roosevelt&#039;&#039; (1957-60), Italian translation by Giorgio Polla and Isabella Ponzetta, &#039;&#039;L’eta di Roosevelt,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1967), &#039;&#039;A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House&#039;&#039; (1965), Fawcett Crest, New &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHMID Alex P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s privater Krieg. Intervention und Konterrevolution im russischen Bürgerkrieg, November 1918-März 1920,&#039;&#039; Atlantis, Zürich.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHMIDT Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45,&#039;&#039; Athenäum, Bonn.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHNEIDER James J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;The Structure of Strategic Revolution. Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State,&#039;&#039; Presidio, Novato (CA).&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCOTTI Giacomo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Goli Otok. Ritorno all’isola calda,&#039;&#039; Lint, Trieste.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHERRY Michael S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;In the Shadow of War. The United States since the 1930s,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHIRER William L.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich&#039;&#039; (1959): Italian translation by Gustavo Glasser, &#039;&#039;Storia del Terzo Reich,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin (1962).&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHORT Philipp&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;Pol Pot; The History of a Nightmare&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation by Enzo Peru, Pol Pot. &#039;&#039;Anatomia di uno sterminio&#039;&#039;, Rizzoli, Milan. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SINGERMAN Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;The Jew as Racial Alien: The Genetic Component of American Anti-Semitism,&#039;&#039; in: David A. Gerber (editor), &#039;&#039;Anti-semitism in American History,&#039;&#039; University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SISCI Francesco&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;La differenza tra la China e il mondo. La rivoluzione degli anni ottanta,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SMITH Tony&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;America’s Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century,&#039;&#039; Princeton University Press, New Jersey.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SOUVARINE Boris&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Staline. Aperçu historique du bolchévisme&#039;&#039; (1935), Italian translation by Gisèle Bartoli, &#039;&#039;Stalin,&#039;&#039; Adelphi, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SPENCE Jonathan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;God’s Chinese Son. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan,&#039;&#039; Harper Collins, London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SPENGLER Oswald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1933), &#039;&#039;Jahre der Entscheidung,&#039;&#039; Beck, Munich.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STALIN Joseph W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1948), &#039;&#039;Storia del Partito comunista (bolscevico) dell’URSS. Breve corso&#039;&#039; (1938), editions in foreign languages, Moscow.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1952), &#039;&#039;Questioni del leninismo,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russia by Palmiro Togliatti, Edizioni Rinascita, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1952-1956), &#039;&#039;Opere complete,&#039;&#039; Rinascita, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1953), &#039;&#039;Problemi della pace,&#039;&#039; preface by Pietro Secchia, Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1968), &#039;&#039;Il marxismo e la linguistica,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian (1950) by Bruno Meriggi, Feltrinelli, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1971-1973), &#039;&#039;Werke,&#039;&#039; Roter Morgen, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1973), &#039;&#039;Problemi economici del socialismo nell’URSS,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian (1952), Cooperativa Editrice Distributrice Proletaria, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STODDARD Lothrop&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy&#039;&#039; (1921), reprint Negro University Press, Westport Connecticut.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1984), &#039;&#039;The Revolt against Civilization. The Menace of the Underman&#039;&#039; (1922), reprint, Scribner, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STRADA Vittorio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Stalin: si sbranino pure, poi arriveremo noi,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Aug. 10th), p. 25.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STRONG Anna Louise&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;The Stalin Era&#039;&#039; (1956), Italian translation by Alessandro Mazzone, &#039;&#039;L’era di Stalin,&#039;&#039; La Città del Sole, Naples.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SUN YAT-SEN&#039;&#039;&#039; (1976), &#039;&#039;I tre principi del popolo,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from French by Settimio Severo Caruso, Einaudi, Turin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TAYLOR Alan J. P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;The Origins of the Second World War&#039;&#039; (1961); Italian translation by Luciano Bianciardi, &#039;&#039;Le origini della seconda guerra mondiale,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TAYLOR Telford&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials&#039;&#039; (1992), Italian translation by Orsola Fenghi, &#039;&#039;Anatomia dei processi di Norimberga,&#039;&#039; Rizzoli, Milan. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THOMAS Evan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;The Very Best Men. Four Who Dared. The Early Years of the CIA,&#039;&#039; Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THOMAS Hugh&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Armed Truce. The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46&#039;&#039; (1986), Sceptre, London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THURSTON Robert W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia 1934-1941,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TORRI Michelguglielmo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Storia dell’India,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TOTTLE Douglas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;Fraud, Famine and Fascism. The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard,&#039;&#039; Progress Books, Toronto. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TOYNBEE Arnold&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;The World and the West&#039;&#039; (1953), Italian translation by Glauco Cambon, &#039;&#039;Il mondo e l’occidente,&#039;&#039; with a note by Luciano Canfora, Sellerio, Palermo. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TRAVERSO Enzo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;La violenza nazista. Una genealogia,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TROTSKY Lev D.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1962), &#039;&#039;Stalin&#039;&#039; (1946), Italian translation from English by Ugo Tolomei,Garzanti, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1967), &#039;&#039;La loro morale e la nostra&#039;&#039; (1938-39), Italian translation by De Donato, Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1968), &#039;&#039;La Révolution trahie&#039;&#039; (1936-37), Italian translation by Livio Maitan, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione tradita,&#039;&#039; Samonà e Savelli, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1969a), &#039;&#039;Millenovecentocinque&#039;&#039; (1908), Samonà e Savelli, Roma. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1969b), &#039;&#039;La Terza Internazionale dopo Lênin&#039;&#039; (1928), Italian translation by Livio Maitan, Samonà e Savelli, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1988), &#039;&#039;Schriften. Sowjetgesellschaft und stalinistische Diktatur,&#039;&#039; Helmut Dahmer et alii (editors), Rasch und Röhring, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1997-2001), &#039;&#039;Schriften. Linke Opposition und vierte Internationale,&#039;&#039; Helmut Dahmer et alii (editors), Rasch und Röhring, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1998), &#039;&#039;Europa im Krieg,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Hannelore and Harald Schubärath, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TUCKER Robert C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Stalin as Revolutionary. A Study in History and Personality, 1879-1929&#039;&#039; (1973), Norton, New York-London.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1990), &#039;&#039;Stalin in power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941,&#039;&#039; Norton, New York-London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WALZER Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Just and Unjust Wars&#039;&#039; (1977), Italian translation by Fabio Armao, &#039;&#039;Guerre giuste e ingiuste,&#039;&#039; Liguori, Naples.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WARNER Denis&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Brutality on All Sides Wracked Korea in the Years After WWII,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (may 5th), p. 5.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WASHBURN Wilcomb E.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039; (1975), Italian translation by Paola Ludovici and Roger Meservey, &#039;&#039;Gli indiani d’America,&#039;&#039; Editori Riuniti, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WASHINGTON Harriet A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present,&#039;&#039; Harlem Moon, Broadway Books, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WEAVER Richard M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;The Southern Essays,&#039;&#039; G. M. Curtis III and J. J. Thompson jr. (editors), Liberty Press, Indianapolis.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WEBB Beatrice&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982-1985) &#039;&#039;The Diary&#039;&#039;, Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie (editors), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WERTH Nicolas&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’Union Soviétique,&#039;&#039; PUF, Paris.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(2007a), &#039;&#039;La terreur et le désarroi. Stalin et son système,&#039;&#039; Perrin, Paris.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(2007b), &#039;&#039;L&#039;Île aux cannibales&#039;&#039; (2006), Italian translation by Francesco Roncacci, &#039;&#039;L’isola dei cannibali,&#039;&#039; Corbaccio, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WHITE Stephen&#039;&#039;&#039; (1980), &#039;&#039;Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924&#039;&#039;, Holmes &amp;amp;amp; Meier, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WIKLER Daniel&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;The Dalai Lama and the CIA,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, (Sept. 23rd), p. 81.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOLKOGONOW Dimitri&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Stalin. Triumph und Tragödie. Ein politisches Porträt,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Vesna Jovanoska, Claassen, Düsseldorf. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOLKOW Wladimir K.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen&#039;&#039;, Edition Ost, Berlin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOODWARD C. Vann&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877-1913&#039;&#039; (1951), Louisiana State University Press, Italian translation by Luciano Serra, &#039;&#039;Le origini del nuovo Sud&#039;&#039;, Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1966), &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZHANG Shu Guang&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Economic Cold War. America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance,&#039;&#039; University Press, Stanford.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZINN Howard&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;A People’s History of the United States. 1492-Present&#039;&#039; (1980), French translation by Frédéric Cotton, &#039;&#039;Une histoire populaire des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. De 1492 à nos jours,&#039;&#039; Agone, Marseilles.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZINOVIEV Alexander&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Katastroika. Gorbatschows Potemkinsche Dörfer,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Erich Hiller, Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1994), &#039;&#039;La Caduta dell’”impero del Male”.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Saggio sulle tragedie della Russia,&#039;&#039; Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZUBKOVA Elana&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Russia after the War. Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957&#039;&#039; (1998), Italian translation by Bruna Soravia, &#039;&#039;Quando c’era Stalin. I Russi dalla guerra al disgelo,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Domenico Losurdo]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about Stalin]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59297</id>
		<title>Library:Liberalism: A Counter-History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59297"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:41:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added categories and template&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;Contents&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Library work|title=Liberalism: a counter-history|author=Domenico Losurdo|publisher=Verso Books|published_date=2014|type=Book|isbn=978-1-78168-166-4}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html|&#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html|1 What Is Liberalism?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html|2 Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html|3 White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html|4 Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html|5 The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism Either Side of the Atlantic]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html|6 The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html|7 The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html|8 Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html|9 Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html|10 Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0015.html|&#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pagevii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgvii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How does this book differ from existing histories of liberalism, which continue to appear in growing numbers? Does it really succeed in making the innovation promised by the title? Once they have finished it, readers will be able to give their own answer. For now, the author can limit himself to a statement of intent. In formulating it, a great example can aid us. About to embark on the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France, de Tocqueville observed of studies of the eighteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e imagine we know all about the French social order of that time, for the good reason that its surface glitter holds our gaze and we are familiar not only with the life stories of its outstanding figures but also, thanks to the many brilliant critical studies now available, with the works of the great writers who adorned that age. But we have only vague, often quite wrong conceptions of the manner in which public business was transacted and institutions functioned; of the exact relations between the various classes in the social hierarchy; of the situation and sentiments of that section of the population which as yet could neither make itself heard nor seen; and, by the same token, of the ideas and mores basic to the social structure of eighteenth-century France.[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason not to apply the methodology so brilliantly indicated by de Tocqueville to the movement and society of which he was an integral and influential part. Solely because he intends to draw attention to aspects that he believes have hitherto been largely and unjustly ignored, the author refers in the book’s title to a ‘counter-history’. Otherwise, it is a history, whose subject-matter alone remains to be specified: not liberal thought in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pageviii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgviii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;concrete reality. As with any other major historical movement, this involves investigating the conceptual developments, but also—and primarily—the political and social relations it found expression in, as well as the more or less contradictory link that was established between these two dimensions of social reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, in commencing the investigation, we are forced to pose a preliminary question concerning the subject whose history we intend to reconstruct: What is liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1a|1]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg1&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;What Is Liberalism?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. A series of embarrassing questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The usual answer to this question admits of no doubt: liberalism is the tradition of thought whose central concern is the liberty of the individual, which is ignored or ridden roughshod over by organicist philosophies of various kinds. But if that is the case, how should we situate John C. Calhoun? This eminent statesman, vice president of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, burst into an impassioned ode to individual liberty, which, appealing to Locke, he vigorously defended against any abuse of power and any unwarranted interference by the state. And that is not all. Along with ‘absolute governments’ and the ‘concentration of power’, he unstintingly criticized and condemned fanaticism[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the spirit of ‘crusade’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] to which he opposed ‘compromise’ as the guiding principle of genuine ‘constitutional governments’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With equal eloquence Calhoun defended minority rights. It was not only a question of guaranteeing the alternation of the various parties in government through suffrage: unduly extensive power was unacceptable in any event, even if limited in duration and tempered by the promise or prospect of a periodic reversal of roles in the relationship between governors and governed.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unquestionably, we seem to have all the characteristics of the most mature and attractive liberal thought. On the other hand, however, disdaining the half-measures and timidity or fear of those who restricted themselves to accepting it as a necessary ‘evil’, Calhoun declared slavery to be ‘a positive good’ that civilization could not possibly renounce. Calhoun repeatedly denounced intolerance and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg2&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crusading spirit, not in order to challenge the enslavement of blacks or the ruthless hunting down of fugitive slaves, but exclusively to brand abolitionists as ‘blind fanatics’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who ‘consider themselves under the most sacred obligation to use every effort to destroy’ slavery, a form of property legitimized and guaranteed by the Constitution.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were not among the minorities defended with such vigour and legal erudition. In fact, in their case, tolerance and the spirit of compromise seem to turn into their opposite: if fanaticism actually succeeded in its mad project of abolishing slavery, what would follow would be ‘the extirpation of one or the other race’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, given the concrete balance of forces in the United States, it was not difficult to imagine which of the two would succumb: blacks could only survive on condition of being slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So is Calhoun a liberal? No doubts on this score were harboured by Lord Acton, a prominent figure in liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, an advisor and friend of William Gladstone, one of the major figures in nineteenth-century England. In Acton’s view, Calhoun was a champion of the cause of the struggle against any form of absolutism, including ‘democratic absolutism’; the arguments he employed were ‘the very perfection of political truth’. In short, we are dealing with one of the major authors and great minds in the liberal tradition and pantheon.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Albeit in less emphatic language, the question has been answered in the affirmative by those who in our time celebrate Calhoun as ‘a strong individualist’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as a champion of the ‘defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or as a theorist of the sense of limits and the self-limitation that should characterize the majority.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no doubt is one US publishing house, committed to republishing in a neo-liberal key ‘Liberty Classics’, among which the eminent statesman and ideologue of the slaveholding South features prominently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question we have posed does not only emerge from reconstructing the history of the United States. Prestigious scholars of the French Revolution, of firm liberal persuasion, have no hesitation in defining as ‘liberal’ those figures and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg3&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;circles that had the merit of opposing the Jacobin diversion, but who were firmly committed to the defence of colonial slavery. The reference is to Pierre-Victor Malouet and members of the Massiac Club, who were ‘all plantation-owners and slaveholders’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Is it possible to be a liberal and slaveholder at the same time? Such was not the opinion of John Stuart Mill, judging at least from his polemic against the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; British liberals (among them, perhaps, Acton and Gladstone), who, during the American Civil War, rallied en masse to ‘a furious pro-Southern partisanship’, or at any rate viewed the Union and Lincoln coolly and malevolently.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We face a dilemma. If we answer the question formulated above (Is Calhoun a liberal?) in the affirmative, we can no longer maintain the traditional (and edifying) image of liberalism as the thought and volition of liberty. If, on the other hand, we answer in the negative, we find ourselves confronting a new problem and new question, which is no less embarrassing than the first: Why should we continue to dignify John Locke with the title of father of liberalism? Calhoun refers to black slavery as a ‘positive good’. Yet without resorting to such brazen language, the English philosopher, to whom the US author explicitly appealed, regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formalization of the institution in Carolina. He took a hand in drafting the constitutional provision according to which ‘[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke was ‘the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this did not prevent him from inveighing against the political ‘slavery’ that absolute monarchy sought to impose.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in Calhoun the theorization of black slavery as a ‘positive good’ went hand in hand with warnings against a concentration of power that risked transforming ‘the governed’ into ‘the slaves of the rulers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Of course, the American statesman was a slave-owner, but the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg4&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;English philosopher also had sound investments in the slave trade.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the latter’s position proves even more compromising; for good or ill, in the slaveholding South of which Calhoun was the interpreter, there was no longer any place for the deportation of blacks from Africa, in a terrible voyage that condemned many of them to death before they landed in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do we want to bring historical distance to bear in order to distinguish the positions of the two authors being compared here, and exclude from the liberal tradition only Calhoun, who continued to justify or celebrate the institution of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century? The southern statesman would have reacted indignantly to such inconsistency of treatment: as regards the English liberal philosopher, he would perhaps have repeated, in slightly different language, the thesis formulated by him in connection with George Washington: ‘He was one of us—a slaveholder and a planter.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contemporary with Calhoun was Francis Lieber, one of the most eminent intellectuals of his time. Sometimes saluted as a sort of Montesquieu redivivus, in correspondence and on respectful terms with de Tocqueville, he was doubtless a critic, if a cautious one, of the institution of slavery. He hoped it would wither away through its gradual transformation into a kind of servitude or semi-servitude on the autonomous initiative of the slaveholding states, whose right to self-government could not be questioned. That is why Lieber was also admired in the South, all the more so because he himself, albeit on a rather modest scale, owned and sometimes rented male and female slaves. When one of the latter died, following a mysterious pregnancy and subsequent abortion, he recorded in his diary the painful financial loss suffered: ‘fully one thousand dollars—the hard labor of a year’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New, painful economies were required to replace the deceased slave, because Lieber, unlike Calhoun, was not a planter and did not live off profits, but a university professor who essentially used slaves as domestic servants. Does this authorize us in including the first, rather than the second, in the liberal tradition? In any event, temporal distance plays no role here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now take a contemporary of Locke’s. Andrew Fletcher was ‘a champion of liberty’ and, at the same time, ‘a champion of slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Politically, he &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg5&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;professed to be ‘a republican on principle’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and culturally was ‘a Scottish prophet of the Enlightenment’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He too fled to Holland in the wake of the anti-Jacobite and anti-absolutist conspiracy, exactly like Locke, with whom he was in correspondence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fletcher’s reputation crossed the Atlantic: Jefferson defined him as a ‘patriot’, whose merit was to have expressed the ‘political principles’ characteristic of ‘the purest periods of the British Constitution’—those that subsequently caught on and prospered in free America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing positions rather similar to Fletcher’s was his contemporary and fellow countryman James Burgh, who also enjoyed the respect of republican circles à la Jefferson,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was mentioned favourably by Thomas Paine in the most celebrated opuscule of the American Revolution (&#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, in contrast to the other authors—though like them characterized by a peculiar tangle of love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery—Fletcher and Burgh are virtually forgotten today, and no one seems to want to include them among exponents of the liberal tradition. The fact is that, in underlining the necessity of slavery, they were thinking primarily not of blacks in the colonies, but of the ‘vagrants’, the beggars, the odious, incorrigible rabble of the metropolis. Should they be regarded as illiberal for this reason? Were that to be the case, what would distinguish liberals from non-liberals would be not the condemnation of the institution of slavery, but only negative discrimination against peoples of colonial origin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal England presents us with another, different case. Francis Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of some significance (he was the ‘never to be forgotten’ master of Adam Smith),[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the one hand expressed criticisms and reservations about the slavery to which blacks were indiscriminately subjected. On the other hand, he stressed that, especially when dealing with the ‘lower conditions’ of society, slavery could be a ‘useful punishment’: it should be the ‘ordinary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg6&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and their families by any useful labours’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an author who, while evincing unease at hereditary, racial slavery, demanded a sort of penal slavery for those who, regardless of their skin colour, were guilty of vagrancy. Was Hutcheson a liberal?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically positioned between Locke and Calhoun, and with his focus precisely on the reality accepted by the two of them as obvious and indisputable, or even celebrated as a ‘positive good’, Adam Smith constructed an argument and expressed a position that warrants being cited at some length. Slavery could be more easily abolished under a ‘despotic government’ than a ‘free government’, with its representative bodies exclusively reserved in practice for white property-owners. In such circumstances, the condition of the black slaves was desperate: ‘every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves’. Hence ‘[t]he freedom of the free was the cause of the great oppression of the slaves … And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Can an author who, in at least one concrete instance, expressed his preference for ‘despotic government’ be regarded as liberal? Or, differently put, is Smith more liberal or are Locke and Calhoun, who, along with slavery, defended the representative bodies condemned by Smith as the prop, in a slaveholding society, of an infamous institution contrary to any sense of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, as the great economist had foreseen, slavery was abolished in the United States not thanks to local self-government, but by the iron fist of the Union’s army and the temporary military dictatorship imposed by it. For this Lincoln was accused by his opponents of despotism and Jacobinism. He resorted to ‘military government’ and ‘military commissions’ and interpreted ‘the word “law”‘ as ‘[t]he will of the President’ and habeas corpus as the ‘power of the President to imprison whom he pleases, as long as he pleases’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Together with representatives of the secessionist Confederacy, the drafters of this indictment were those who aspired to a compromise peace, for the purposes of returning to constitutional normality. And once again we are obliged to ask the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg7&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;question: Is it Lincoln who is more liberal, or his adversaries in the South, or his opponents in the North who came out in favour of compromise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mill adopt a position in favour of the Union and condemn the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberals who cried scandal over the energy with which it conducted the war against the South and kept at bay those who, in the North itself, were inclined to tolerate the slaveholders’ secession. However, we shall see that, when he turned his attention to the colonies, the English liberal justified the West’s ‘despotism’ over ‘races’ that were still ‘under age’, and who were obliged to observe an ‘absolute obedience’ in order to be set on the path of progress. This is a formulation that would not have displeased Calhoun, who likewise legitimized slavery by reference to the backwardness and nonage of populations of African origin. It was only in America, and thanks to the paternal care of white masters, that the ‘black race’ succeeded in progressing and making the transition from its previous ‘low, degraded and savage condition’ to ‘its present comparatively civilized condition’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Mill’s view, ‘any means’ were licit for those who took on the task of educating ‘savage tribes’; ‘slavery’ was sometimes a mandatory stage for inducing them to work and making them useful to civilization and progress (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]). But this was also the opinion of Calhoun, for whom slavery was an unavoidable means if one wished to achieve the end of civilizing blacks. Certainly, by contrast with the permanent slavery which, according to the US theorist and politician, blacks must be subjected to, the pedagogical dictatorship Mill refers to was destined to disappear in the distant, uncertain future. But the other side of the coin is that now explicitly subjected to this condition of unfreedom was not a particular ethnic group (the fragment of Africa located at the heart of the United States), but all the peoples invested by the West’s colonial expansion and forced to endure political ‘despotism’ and servile or semi-servile forms of labour. Is demanding ‘absolute obedience’, for an indeterminate period of time, from the overwhelming majority of humanity compatible with the liberal profession of faith? Or is it synonymous with &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The American Revolution and the revelation of an embarrassing truth&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now clear that what primarily divides the authors mentioned up to this point is the problem of slavery. In one way or another, they all refer to the Britain deriving from the Glorious Revolution or the United States. These are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg8&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;two countries that for around a century were a single state entity and formed, as it were, a single political party. Prior to the crisis that led to the American Revolution, the British on both sides of the Atlantic felt themselves to be proud subjects or citizens of ‘[a] land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus Blackstone. To confirm his thesis, he referred to Montesquieu, who spoke of England as the ‘one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not even the French liberal doubted the fact that ‘England is currently the freest country in the world, not discounting any republic’: the ‘free nation’, the ‘free people’ par excellence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, no dark clouds seemed to threaten relations between the two shores of the Atlantic. There were no conflicts and, according to Montesquieu at least, there could not be, because even in its relationship with the colonies what characterized England was its love of liberty:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this nation sent colonies abroad, it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as this government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, the English colonists in America proudly identified with Blackstone’s thesis that ‘our free constitution’, which ‘falls little short of perfection’, differed markedly ‘from the modern constitutions of other states’, from the political order of ‘the continent of Europe’ as a whole.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the ideology with which the Seven Years’ War was fought by the British Empire. The English colonists in America were the most determined in interpreting it as a clash between the ‘supporters of freedom in the world’—the British ‘sons of noble liberty’, or defenders of Protestantism—and a ‘cruel and oppressive’ France—despotic politically, and follower of ‘Roman bigotry’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg9&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Popery religiously. At the time, even the British Crown’s transatlantic subjects liked to repeat with Locke that ‘slavery’ was ‘directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation’; it was utterly inconceivable for an ‘Englishman’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French allegedly wanted to reduce the American colonists to a ‘slavish subjection’. Fortunately, however, arriving to foil this attempt was Great Britain, ‘[t]he Mistress of the Nations—the grand Support of Liberty, the Scourge of Oppression and Tyranny!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was an ideology that Edmund Burke sought to breathe new life into as late as 1775, in a desperate attempt to avoid the impending rupture. Presenting his motion of conciliation, he called upon people not to lose sight of, and not to sever, the ties that bound the American colonists to the mother country: what was at stake was a single ‘nation’ that shared ‘the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’, the faith in ‘liberty’. Largely unchallenged in countries like Spain or Prussia, slavery was ‘a weed that grows in every soil’ except the English. Accordingly, it was absurd to try to subdue the rebel colonists by force: ‘An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the slavery referred to here is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other slavery, which shackles blacks, is passed over in silence. With the increasing inevitability of the revolution, or ‘civil war’ with all its ‘horrors’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—as loyalists faithful to the Crown and British politicians in favour of compromise and preserving the unity of the English ‘nation’ and ‘race’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] preferred to call it—the picture changed markedly. The element of continuity is clear. Each of the two contending parties accused the other of wanting to reintroduce despotism, or political ‘slavery’. The rebel colonists’ charges are well known: they tirelessly denounced the tyranny of the British Crown and parliament, and their mad project of subjecting residents in America to a condition of ‘perpetual bondage and slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the response was not slow in coming. As early as 1773, a loyalist from New York had issued a warning: hitherto they had been ‘watchful against &#039;&#039;external&#039;&#039; attacks on our freedom’ (the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg10&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;reference is to the Seven Years’ War), but now a much more insidious danger had emerged—that of ‘becom[ing] &#039;&#039;enslaved&#039;&#039; by tyrants within’. Again in New York, another loyalist repeated the point two years later: the rebels aspired ‘to make us worse than slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In polemicizing against one another, the two branches the liberal party had divided into adopted the ideology and rhetoric that had presided over the self-celebration of the English nation in its entirety, as the sworn enemy of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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The novel factor was that, in the wake of the exchange of accusations, the other slavery—the one both branches had repressed as a disruptive element in their proud self-consciousness as members of the people and party of liberty—burst into the polemics alongside political slavery. In the rebel colonists’ view, the London government, which in sovereign fashion imposed taxation on citizens or subjects not represented in the House of Commons, was behaving like a master towards his slaves. But—objected the others—if slavery is the issue, why not start to discuss the slavery that is manifested in brutal, unequivocal form precisely where liberty is so passionately lauded? As early as 1764, Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time to plead the colonists’ cause, had to face the sarcastic comments of his interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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You Americans make a great Clamour upon every little imaginary infringement of what you take to be your Liberties; and yet there are no People upon Earth such Enemies to Liberty, such absolute Tyrants, where you have the Opportunity, as you yourselves are.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The self-styled champions of liberty branded taxation imposed without their explicit consent as synonymous with despotism and slavery. But they had no scruples about exercising the most absolute and arbitrary power over their slaves. This was a paradox: ‘How is it’, Samuel Johnson asked, ‘that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’ Across the Atlantic, those who sought to contest the secession ironized in similar fashion. Thomas Hutchinson, royal governor of Massachusetts, rebuked the rebels for their inconsistency or hypocrisy: they denied Africans those rights that they claimed to be ‘absolutely inalienable’ in the most radical way imaginable.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Echoing him was an American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher), who, having taken refuge in England, revisited the events that forced him into exile and observed: ‘the most &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg11&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clamorous advocates for liberty were uniformly the harshest and worst masters of slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only the people most directly involved in the polemical and political struggle who expressed themselves so harshly. The intervention of John Millar, prominent exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, was especially stinging:&lt;br /&gt;
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It affords a curious spectacle to observe, that the same people who talk in a high strain of political liberty, and who consider the privilege of imposing their own taxes as one of the inalienable rights of mankind, should make no scruple of reducing a great proportion of their fellow-creatures into circumstances by which they are not only deprived of property, but almost of every species of right. Fortune perhaps never produced a situation more calculated to ridicule a liberal hypothesis, or to show how little the conduct of men is at the bottom directed by any philosophical principles.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Millar was a disciple of Adam Smith. The master seems to have seen things in the same way. When he declared that to a ‘free government’ controlled by slaveowners, he preferred a ‘despotic government’ capable of erasing the infamy of slavery, he made explicit reference to America. Translated into directly political terms, the great economist’s words signify: the despotism the Crown is criticized for is preferable to the liberty demanded by the slave-owners, from which only a small class of planters and absolute masters benefits.&lt;br /&gt;
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English abolitionists went even further, calling for the defence of British institutions threatened by ‘arbitrary and inhuman uses, which prevail in a distant land’. So arbitrary and inhuman that, as indicated by an advert in the &#039;&#039;New York Journal&#039;&#039;, a black woman and her three-year-old daughter could be sold on the market separately, as if they were a cow and a calf. And hence (concluded Granville Sharp in 1769) one should not be led astray by ‘theatrical bombast and ranting expressions in praise of liberty’ employed by the slaveholding rebels; free English institutions must be vigorously defended against them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The accused reacted in their turn by upbraiding England for its hypocrisy: it boasted of its virtue and love of liberty, but who promoted and continued to promote the slave trade? And who was it that transported and sold slaves? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg12&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Thus argued Franklin,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] advancing an argument that became central in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence elaborated by Jefferson. This is how, in the original version of that solemn document, the Britain derived from the Glorious Revolution and George III himself were charged. The latter&lt;br /&gt;
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has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical war, the opprobrium of &#039;&#039;infidel&#039;&#039; powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The role of slavery between the two Atlantic shores&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
What should we make of this furious, unexpected polemic? There is no doubt that the accusations against the rebels struck a weak point. Virginia played a central role in the American Revolution. Forty per cent of the country’s slaves were to be found there, but a majority of the authors of the rebellion unleashed in the name of liberty also came from there. For thirty-two of the United States’ first thirty-six years of existence, slave-owners from Virginia occupied the post of president. This colony or state, founded on slavery, supplied the country with its most illustrious statesmen. It is enough to think of George Washington (great military and political protagonist of the anti-British revolt) and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (authors, respectively, of the Declaration of Independence and the federal Constitution of 1787), all three of them slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Regardless of this or that state, the influence slavery exercised on the country as a whole is clear. Sixty years after its foundation, we see that ‘of the first sixteen presidential elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern slaveholder in the White House’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence the persistence of the anti-American polemic on this point is understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side, we are familiar with Franklin’s and Jefferson’s ironic remarks about the moralizing anti-slavery lectures offered by a country deeply &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg13&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved in the slave trade. Burke, theorist of ‘conciliation with the colonies’, likewise stressed this. In rejecting the proposal of those who urged ‘a general enfranchisement of their slaves’ to counter the rebellion of their masters and the colonists generally, he observed: ‘Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?’ All the more so if this nation insisted on practising the slave trade, clashing with colonies that wished to restrict or abolish it. In the eyes of slaves landed in or deported to America, this would represent a peculiar spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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An offer of freedom from England, would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke’s irony hits home. In addition to Britain’s role in the slave trade, slaves long continued to be present in the metropolis itself. It has been calculated that in the mid-eighteenth century there were around 100,000 of them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were British abolitionists horrified by the market in human flesh in the American colonies and New York? In Liverpool in 1766, eleven black slaves were put on sale and the market in ‘black cattle’ was still open in Dublin twelve years later, regularly advertised in the local press.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The role played in the country’s economy by the trade in slaves and their exploitation was sizeable: ‘The &#039;&#039;Liverpool Courier&#039;&#039;, 22 August 1832, estimated that three-quarters of Britain’s coffee, fifteen-sixteenths of its cotton, twenty-two twenty-thirds of its sugar, and thirty-four thirty-fifths of its tobacco were still produced by slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In sum, we should bear in mind the candid judgement of two eighteenth-century British witnesses. The first, Joshua Gee, acknowledged that ‘[a]ll this great increase in our treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of negroes in the plantations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The second, Malachy Postlethwayt, engaged as he was in defending the role of the Royal African Company—the company that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg14&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;controlled the slave trade—was even sharper: ‘The &#039;&#039;Negroe Trade&#039;&#039; and the natural Consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation’; they were ‘the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Empire as a whole was merely ‘a magnificent superstructure’ upon this commerce.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, there was the political influence of the institution of slavery. Although obviously inferior to what it was in the American colonies, it was certainly not nugatory in England: in the 1790 parliament, two or three dozen members sat who had interests in the West Indies.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exchange of accusations between rebel colonists and the mother country—that is, between two branches of the party that had hitherto proudly celebrated itself as the party of liberty—was a mutual, pitiless demystification. Not only did the England derived from the Glorious Revolution not challenge the slave trade, but on the contrary the latter experienced strong growth.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And one of the new liberal monarchy’s first acts of international policy was wresting a monopoly on the slave trade from Spain. On the other side, the revolution that broke out across the Atlantic in the name of liberty involved official consecration of the institution of slavery, and the conquest and prolonged exercise of political hegemony by slave-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Possibly the most articulate and pained intervention in this polemic was by Josiah Tucker, ‘who, though a parson and a Tory, was, apart from that, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He denounced England’s pre-eminent role in the slave trade: ‘We … the boasted Patrons of Liberty, and the professed Advocates for the natural Rights of Mankind, engage deeper in this murderous inhuman Traffic than any Nation whatever.’ But even more hypocritical was the behaviour of the rebel colonists: ‘the Advocates for Republicanism, and for the supposed Equality of Mankind, ought to have been foremost in suggesting some such humane System for abolishing the worst of all the Species of Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But instead …&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Holland, England, America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg15&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;If, prior to constituting themselves as an independent state, the rebel colonies in America formed part of the British Empire, the latter assumed its liberal form with the ascent to the throne of William of Orange, who landed in England from Holland. On the other hand, while with his draft constitution for Carolina Locke referred to America, he wrote his first &#039;&#039;Letter Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039; in Holland, which was then ‘the centre of conspiracy’ against Stuart absolutism;[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Holland was also the birthplace of Bernard de Mandeville, unquestionably one of the more important figures in early liberalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not lose sight of the fact that the United Provinces, which emerged from the struggle against Philip II’s Spain, equipped themselves with a liberal type of set-up a century before England. This was a country that from a socio-economic point of view as well had left the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; behind. In the seventeenth century it had a per capita income one-and-a-half times that of England; whereas in the latter 60 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, the figure in Holland was 40 per cent. Moreover, the power structure was rather significant: in the country which emerged victorious from the clash with Philip II, ‘a bourgeois oligarchy that had broken decisively with the aristocratic landholding ethos’ was dominant.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was these enlightened, tolerant, liberal bourgeois who embarked on colonial expansion; and in this historical period the slave trade was an integral part of it:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he Dutch conducted the first serious slave trade in order to furnish the manpower for the sugar plantations; when they lost the plantations, they tried to remain in the field as slave traders, but by 1675, Dutch primacy ended, yielding place to the newly founded Royal African Company of the English.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company. But the history of the United Provinces leads to America as well as Britain. It would seem that it was a Dutch peddler who introduced African slaves into Virginia.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New Amsterdam, which the Dutch were forced to cede to the British and which became New York, had a population 20 per cent of which was composed of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg16&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;blacks, in large part slaves. In 1703 around 42 per cent of homeowners were also slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This represents the paradox already glimpsed in connection with Britain and the United States. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the country where the prologue to the successive liberal revolutions occurred—namely, Holland—had a ‘hold’ on the trade in slaves:[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of their [Dutch] possessions were slave or bound-labor societies.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, in one respect, it was synonymous with liberty at the time, in another, Holland was synonymous with slavery—and a particularly brutal form of it. In Voltaire’s &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; a severe blow is dealt to the protagonist’s naive optimism by the encounter in Surinam (‘where the Dutch are’) with a black slave, reduced to a ‘dreadful state’ by his Dutch master. The slave refers as follows to the working conditions to which he is forced to submit:&lt;br /&gt;
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When we’re working at the sugar-mill and catch our finger in the grinding-wheel, they cut off our hand. When we try to run away, they cut off a leg. I have been in both these situations. This is the price you pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Condorcet, launching his abolitionist campaign in 1781, in particular targeted England and Holland, where the institution of slavery seemed especially deep-rooted on account of ‘the general corruption of these nations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, it is worth citing the American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher) whom we have seen ironizing about the passion for liberty displayed by slave-owners engaged in the rebellion. In his view, ‘[d]espotic nations treated their slaves better than those under republics; the Spanish were the best masters while the Dutch were the worst.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The first country to embark on the liberal road is one that exhibited an especially tenacious attachment to the institution of slavery. It appears that colonists of Dutch origin offered the most determined resistance to the first abolitionist measures, those introduced in the northern United States during the Revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg17&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and in its wake.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As regards Holland itself, in 1791 the States-General formally declared that the slave trade was essential to the development of the colonies’ prosperity and commerce. Still in this period, clearly distinguishing itself from Britain, Holland recognized the right of slave-owners to transport and deposit their human chattels in the mother country before returning to the colonies. Finally, it is to be noted that Holland only abolished slavery in its colonies in 1863, when the secessionist and slaveholding Confederacy of the southern United States was going down to defeat.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Irish, the Indians and the inhabitants of Java&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The English colonists’ revolt in America was accompanied by another major controversy. For a long time, like that of the blacks, the Indians’ fate had not in the slightest unsettled the deep conviction of the English on either side of the Atlantic that they were the chosen people of liberty. In both cases, they appealed to Locke, for whom (as we shall see) the natives of the New World approximated to ‘wild beasts’. But with the eruption of the conflict between colonies and mother country, the exchange of accusations also encompassed the problem of the relationship with the Indians. England, Paine proclaimed in 1776, was ‘that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and the Negroes to destroy us’ or ‘to cut the throats of the freemen of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the Declaration of Independence berated George III for having not only ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’ by black slaves, but also ‘endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions’. In 1812, on the occasion of a new war between the two shores of the Atlantic, Madison condemned England for indiscriminately striking the civilian population with its fleet, not sparing women or children, and hence displaying a conduct similar to that of the red-skinned ‘savages’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having been accomplices of the barbarians, the English became barbarians themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the argument had begun much earlier, following the Crown proclamation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg18&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 1763 that sought to halt or contain expansion west of the Allegany Mountains. This was a measure that did not please the colonists and George Washington, who regarded it as ‘a temporary expedient’, destined to be rapidly superseded, but which should not be respected even in the immediate present: those ‘who neglect the present opportunity of hunting out good lands’ were foolish.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The future president of the United States was not one of these ‘fools’. In his new capacity, while declaring in official speeches that he wanted to bring the ‘blessings of civilization’ and ‘happiness’ to ‘an unenlightened race of men’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in private correspondence he identified the Indians as ‘savages’ and ‘wild beasts of the forest’. Given this, the British Crown’s pretension to block further expansion by the colonists was absurd and ultimately immoral: they (Washington declared in a letter of 1783) would force ‘the Savage [like] the Wolf to retire’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more extreme in this respect was Franklin, who in his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039; observed: ‘if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes who formerly inhabited the Seacoast.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The decimation or destruction of a people who worshipped ‘the Devil’ was part of a kind of divinely inspired eugenicist plan.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The de-humanization of the Indians was also subscribed to by those in Britain who supported reconciliation with the rebels. The Crown’s attempt to block the colonists’ expansionistic march seemed to Burke absurd and sacrilegious, for ‘attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil, the command and blessing of Providence, “Increase and multiply.”‘ Ultimately, it was an ill-fated ‘endeavour to keep as a lair of wild beasts, that earth, which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Those on either side of the Atlantic who supported or justified the Crown’s policy of ‘conciliation’ not of the colonists, but of the Indians, mounted some resistance to this process of de-humanization. In this context, a particular mention should be made of the figure of the likeable American loyalist whom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg19&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we have encountered several times, in his capacity as a critic of the peculiar libertarian zeal displayed by the ‘harshest and wickedest slave masters’. To these same circles he attributed cruelty to the Indians. Sometimes they were killed and scalped with veritable religious fervour; they even became targets for shooting practice. They were branded savages and yet (objected Jonathan Boucher) they were no more savage ‘than our progenitors appeared to Julius Caesar or to Agricola’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We have seen Paine accuse the London government of seeking an alliance with Indian cut-throats. In reality, warned an English commander in 1783, it was precisely the now victorious colonists who ‘were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians’. The victors’ behaviour (added another officer) was ‘shocking to humanity’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an enduring controversy. In the later nineteenth century a historian descended from a family of loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada argued as follows: Did the rebels claim to be the descendants of those who had disembarked in America to escape intolerance and stay loyal to the cause of liberty? In fact, reversing the policy of the British Crown, which aimed at conversion, the Puritans had initiated a massacre of the Indians, assimilated to ‘Canaanites and Amalekites’—that is, stocks marked out by the Old Testament for erasure from the face of the earth. This was ‘one of the darkest pages in English colonial history’, which was followed by the even more repugnant one written during the American Revolution, when the rebel colonists engaged in ‘the entire destruction of the Six Indian Nations’ that had remained loyal to England: ‘by an order which, we believe, has no parallel in the annals of any civilized nation, [Congress] commands the complete destruction of those people as a nation … including women and children’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his private correspondence at least, Jefferson had no problem acknowledging the horror of the war against the Indians. But in his view responsibility for it resided with the London government, which had incited these savage, bloodthirsty ‘tribes’. This was a situation that ‘will oblige us now to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach’. The ‘confirmed brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America’ was to be laid at Britain’s door. As with the similar fate of ‘the same colored man in Asia’, as well as of the Irish—who for the English, whose skin ‘colour’ they shared, should be ‘brethren’—it was attributable to a policy committed to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sowing death and destruction ‘wherever … Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with human blood’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson was not wrong to compare the treatment suffered by the Indians with that reserved for the Irish. Just as, according to the loyalist accusation, Puritans and rebel colonists assimilated the Indians to ‘Amalekites’, so the Irish had already been compared to ‘Amalekites’ marked out for extermination, this time by the English conquerors.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The colonization of Ireland, with all its horrors, was the model for the subsequent colonization of North America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If the British Empire as a whole mainly swept away Irish and blacks,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indians and blacks were the principal victims of the territorial and commercial expansion first of the English colonies in America and then of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the black question, in the case of the Indians the exchange of accusations ended up taking the form of a mutual demystification. There is no doubt that, along with black enslavement and the black slave trade, the rise of the two liberal countries either side of the Atlantic involved a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar observations can be made of Holland. A senior English civil servant, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who during the Napoleonic Wars was deputy governor of Java for a time, stated that the previous administration was ‘one of the extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness’. It is clear that colonial rivalry played a role in this judgement. Marx reports it, but pools ‘Dutch colonial administration’ and the English administration in his condemnation. As regards Holland more specifically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men in Celebes, in order to get slaves for Java … The young people thus stolen were hidden in secret dungeons on Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: ‘This one town of Macassar, for example, is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families.’ … Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg21&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, numbered over 80,000 inhabitants in 1750 and only 18,000 in 1811. That is peaceful commerce![[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, processes of enslavement and practical genocide were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Grotius, Locke and the Founding Fathers: a comparative interpretation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the start of the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe underlined the ideological fraternity between the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution and the country which, a century earlier, had rebelled against Philip II and won ‘freedom’ and prosperity thanks to ‘Heaven and the Assistance of England’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century, liberal authors liked to contrast the ordered triumph of liberty that had occurred in Holland, England and the United States with a France in the grip of an interminable revolutionary cycle and Bonapartism.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It might therefore be useful to proceed to a brief comparative analysis of the texts and authors in which the liberal revolutions of these three countries found theoretical expression and consecration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Holland, we cannot but refer to Hugo Grotius, who dedicated two of his most important books (&#039;&#039;Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae&#039;&#039;) to the revolt against Philip II and the country that derived from it. Liberal Holland immediately engaged in overseas expansion and slave-trading, and it is interesting to observe the position Grotius adopted towards colonial peoples. Having condemned the superstitious and idolatrous character of the ‘religious rites’ peculiar to paganism, he added:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when offered … to an evil spirit, it is an act of falsehood and hypocrisy; nay, it is an act of absolute rebellion, whereby we not only deprive our legal sovereign of his just homage, but even transfer that homage to a base apostate and an open enemy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg22&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Targeted here were peoples with&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
modes of worship … of a nature little suited to a Being of goodness and of purity: Human sacrifices; naked races up and down the temples; games and dances replete with obscenity; instances whereof are seen even at this day among the savage natives of America and Africa, who are still lost in the thick clouds of Paganism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was peoples assailed by Europe’s colonial expansion who were guilty of rebellion against God, and who must be punished for such a crime:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some … are weak enough to imagine, that God, as a being of infinite goodness, will never be provoked to punish this rebellion; a spirit of revenge, say they, is wholly incompatible with the attribute of perfect goodness. A fatal and absurd idea this! The powers of Mercy must be limited, that her actions may be just; and when wickedness becomes excessive, punishment as it were unavoidably arises out of justice.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against peoples who, staining themselves with ‘[o]ffences that are committed against GOD’ and violating the most basic norms of natural law, took the form of ‘barbarians’ or ‘rather Beasts than men’, war was ‘natural’, regardless of state borders and geographical distance. Indeed, ‘the justest War is that which is undertaken against wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like Beasts [&#039;&#039;homines belluis similes&#039;&#039;].’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the ideology that presided over the conquest of the New World. The sin of idolatry was the first of the arguments prompting Sepúlveda to regard war on the Indians and their enslavement as ‘just’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Grotius, along with the implicit legitimation of the genocidal practices underway in America, an explicit and insistent justification of slavery emerges. Sometimes it was punishment for criminal behaviour. Answerable for the latter were not only single individuals: ‘a whole People may be brought into Subjection for a publick Crime’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As well as in their capacity as ‘rebels’ against the Lord of the Universe, the inhabitants of America and Africa could also succumb to slavery &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg23&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as a result of a ‘just war’ (&#039;&#039;bellum justum&#039;&#039;), conducted by a European power. The prisoners captured during an armed conflict, formally declared in the requisite forms by the supreme authority of a state, were legitimately slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And their descendants too were legitimate slaves: otherwise, what interest would the victor have in keeping the vanquished alive? As the slave of the one who had spared his life, the prisoner became part of the victor’s property, and such property could be transmitted hereditarily or be an object of sale, just like ‘the Property of Goods’ (&#039;&#039;rerum dominium&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, all this did not apply to ‘those Nations where this Right of Bondage over Captives is not practised’; it did not apply to ‘Christian’ countries, which limited themselves to exchanging prisoners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Banned in intra-European conflicts, slavery by right of war continued to be a reality as and when Christian, civilized Europe confronted colonial peoples, barbarians and pagans in what, by definition, was a ‘just’ war. On the other hand, regardless of their actual behaviour, the lesson of a great master should not be forgotten: ‘as &#039;&#039;Aristotle&#039;&#039; said, some Men are naturally Slaves, that is, turned for Slavery. And some Nations also are of such a Temper, that they know better how to obey than to command’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a truth also confirmed by Holy Scripture: ‘the Apostle St Paul’ called on individuals and peoples who had legitimately been reduced to slavery to put up with their lot and not escape it by rebellion or flight.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, Grotius paid homage to the ‘free People’ who in Holland had availed themselves of their right of resistance, legitimately shaking off the yoke of a despotic prince.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other, he had no difficulty justifying slavery and even the kind of ‘wild beast’ hunt against Indians underway in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now pass on to the Glorious Revolution and Locke. The &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; may be regarded as key moments in the ideological preparation and consecration of the event that marks the birth of liberal England. We are dealing with texts deeply impregnated with the pathos of liberty, the condemnation of absolute power, the appeal to rise up against the wicked ones who seek to deprive man of his liberty and reduce him to slavery. But every now and then frightening passages open up in this ode to liberty, where slavery in the colonies is legitimized. As ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the institution, Grotius adduced the example of the Germans who, according to Tacitus’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg24&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;testimony, ‘ventured their very Liberty upon the Cast of a Die’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Locke’s view, ‘captives taken in a just war’ (on the part of the victors) had ‘forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties’. They were slaves ‘subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to now the thinking applies to blacks deported from Africa. But the fate reserved for Indians was not manifestly better. In addition to having an interest in the slave trade as a shareholder in the Royal African Company, the liberal English philosopher was concerned with the white colonists’ expansionist march as secretary (in 1673–74) of the Council of Trade and Plantations. As has been justly observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That so many of the examples Locke uses in his &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; are American ones shows that his intention was to provide the settlers, for whom he had worked in so many other ways, with a powerful argument based in natural law rather than legislative decree to justify their depredations.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; makes repeated reference to the ‘wild Indian’, who moved around ‘insolent and injurious in the woods of America’ or the ‘vacant places of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ignorant of labour, which was the only thing that could confer property right, and occupying a land not ‘improv[ed] by labour’, or ‘great tracts of unused’ ground’, the Indian inhabited ‘unpossessed quarters’, &#039;&#039;in vacuis locis&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to labour and property, Indians were also ignorant of money. They thus not only proved alien to civilization, but were also ‘not … joined with the rest of mankind’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As a result of their behaviour, they were not solely subject to human condemnation. Unquestionably, ‘God commanded … labour’ and private property, and could certainly not want the world created by him to remain ‘common and uncultivated’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he sought to challenge the march of civilization, violently opposing exploitation through labour of the uncultivated land occupied by him, the Indian, along with any other criminal, could be equated with ‘one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security’, and who ‘therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger’. Locke never tired of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg25&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;insisting on the right possessed by any man to destroy those reduced to the level of ‘beasts of prey’, ‘savage beasts’; to the level of ‘a savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are phrases that remind us of those used by Grotius in connection with barbarous peoples and pagans in general, and by Washington in connection with the Indians. However, before coming to the Founding Fathers and the solemn documents that mark the birth of the United States, it is worth dwelling on another macroscopic exclusion clause that characterizes the celebration of liberty in Locke. ‘Papists’, declared the &#039;&#039;Essay Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039;, are ‘like serpents never [to] be prevailed on by kind usage to lay by their venom’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even more than to English Catholics, this harsh declaration was formulated with a view to Ireland, where at the time unregistered priests were branded with a red-hot iron, when they were not punished with more severe penalties or death.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Irish, in endemic, desperate revolt against spoliation and oppression by Anglican settlers, were contemptuously referred to by Locke as a population of ‘brigands’. As for the rest, he reiterated the point the men are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
forward to have compassion for sufferers and esteem for that religion as pure, and the professors of it as sincere, which can stand the test of persecution. But I think it is far otherwise with Catholics, who are less apt to be pitied than others because they receive no other usage than what they [by the] cruelty of their own principles and practices are known to deserve.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The warning against feelings of ‘compassion’ makes it clear that we are dealing with Ireland primarily. Locke seems to have had no objections of any kind to the ruthless repression suffered by the Irish, whose fate calls to mind that reserved for Indians across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can now move on to examine the documents that informed the third liberal revolution and the foundation of the United States. At first sight, the Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution seem inspired and pervaded by a universal pathos of liberty: ‘all men are created equal’—such is the solemn preamble to the first document; it is necessary to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’—such is the no less solemn preamble &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg26&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to the second. But it requires a scarcely more attentive reading to encounter, already in Article 1 of the Constitution, a contrast between ‘free Persons’ and ‘all other Persons’. The latter were, of course, slaves, whose number, reduced to three-fifths, had to be factored in and added to that of ‘free persons’ when it came to calculating the number of members in the House of Representatives to which slaveholding states were entitled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With recourse to various euphemisms, a whole series of other Articles refer to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Where initially it was concealed among ‘other persons’ (the part of the population not made up of ‘free persons’), now the relationship of slavery is modestly subsumed under the general category of persons ‘held to Service or Labour’. On the basis of the principles of self-government, each individual state has the right to regulate it as it sees fit, while every state’s obligation to return fugitive slaves is a moral obligation to guarantee a legitimate property-owner the services that ‘may be due’. In a further linguistic expedient, tinged with the same discretion, the black slave trade becomes ‘[t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit’. It was ‘not [to] be prohibited by Congress prior to the year [1808]’, and, pending that, could only be subjected to a fairly modest tax (‘not exceeding ten dollars for each person’ or slave). The articles requiring the Union to suppress insurrections or ‘domestic violence’—primarily, a possible dreaded slave revolt in some particular state[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—are formulated in similarly elliptical fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although repressed through a strict linguistic proscription, the institution of slavery proves to be a pervasive presence in the American Constitution. It is not even absent from the Declaration of Independence, where the accusation against George III of having appealed to black slaves takes the already noted form of having ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the transition from Grotius to Locke, and from them to the founding documents of the American Revolution, we observe a phenomenon worth reflecting upon: although regarded as legitimate in all three cases, the institution of slavery was theorized and affirmed without the least reticence solely by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg27&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Dutch author, whose life straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Locke, by contrast, at least in the case of the &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, which were written and published on the eve and at the end of the Glorious Revolution, legitimation of slavery tends to occur exclusively between the lines of the discourse celebrating English liberty. The reticence reaches its peak in the documents that consecrate the foundation of the United States as the most glorious chapter in the history of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it came to the relationship with the Indians, things were different: Grotius, Locke and Washington all referred to them as ‘wild beasts’. A document like the Declaration of Independence, which was addressed to international public opinion and which (as we know) included among George III’s most heinous crimes the fact that he had incited the ‘merciless Indian savages’ against the rebel colonists, was linguistically more cautious. But it remains the case that in all three liberal revolutions the demand for liberty and justification of the enslavement, as well as the decimation (or destruction), of barbarians, were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Vulgar historicism and repression of the paradox of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition—namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such—be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well-known, precisely because it is &#039;&#039;well-&#039;&#039;known, is not &#039;&#039;known&#039;&#039;. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well-known and to accept it as such’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throwing a widespread apologia into crisis, the paradoxical tangle we have encountered while historically reconstructing the origins of liberalism is disturbing. We can therefore understand the tendency to repression. After all, that was the gesture, in their own day, of Locke and, especially, the rebel American colonists, who liked to draw a more or less thick veil of silence over the institution of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg28&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The same result can be arrived at in other ways. According to Hannah Arendt, what characterized the American Revolution was the project of realizing a political order based on liberty, while the persistence of black slavery referred to a cultural tradition homogeneously diffused either side of the Atlantic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]his indifference, difficult for us to understand, was not peculiar to Americans and hence must [not] be blamed … on any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest … Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, disquiet about slavery was so strongly felt in the Europe of the time that prominent authors not infrequently proceeded to a sharp contrast between the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us attend to Condorcet:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American forgets that negroes are men; he has no moral relationship with them; for him they are simply objects of profit … and such is the excess of his stupid contempt for this unhappy species that, when back in Europe, he is indignant to see them dressed like men and placed alongside him.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
‘The American’ condemned here is the transatlantic colonist, whether French or English. In his turn, in 1771 Millar denounced ‘the shocking barbarity to which the negroes in our colonies are frequently exposed’. Fortunately, ‘the practice of slavery [has] been … generally abolished in Europe’. Where it survived, across the Atlantic, the practice poisoned the whole society: cruelty and sadism were ‘exhibited even by persons of the weaker sex, in an age distinguished for humanity and politeness’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also the opinion of Condorcet, who pointed out how ‘the young American woman witnesses’, and sometimes even ‘presides over’, the brutal ‘tortures’ inflicted on black slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thesis formulated by Arendt can even be inverted. In the late eighteenth century the institution of slavery began to be unacceptable in salons where the ideas of the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; circulated, and in churches influenced by the Quakers or other abolitionist sections of Christianity. Even as the Philadelphia Convention ratified the Constitution that sanctioned racial chattel slavery, a French defender of this institution bitterly noted his isolation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg29&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The extremely powerful empire of public opinion … now offers its support to those in France and England who attack black slavery and pursue its abolition. The most odious interpretations are reserved for those who dare to hold a contrary opinion.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, another French defender of slavery bemoaned the fact that ‘negrophilia’ had become a ‘fashionable oddity’, to the point of abolishing any sense of distance between the two races: ‘African blood circulates much too abundantly in the veins of the Parisians themselves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we start out from the presupposition of a general ‘indifference’ to the lot of black slaves in these years, we shall understand nothing of the American Revolution. The ‘last great philosopher’ to justify slavery—Locke—was quite the reverse of unchallenged; and it is interesting to note that he was criticized together with the ‘current American rebellion’, which he was regarded as having inspired.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, celebration of a tendentially republican liberty was bound up with legitimation of the institution of slavery. After having cited various passages from the philosopher that leave no room for doubt in this regard, Josiah Tucker commented: ‘[s]uch is the language of the humane Mr Locke! The great and glorious Assertor of the natural Rights and Liberties of Mankind’; here were ‘his real Sentiments concerning Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the American loyalist we have already encountered—Boucher—conjointly condemned the republican secession and Locke’s claim to confer on ‘every freeman of Carolina absolute power and property over his slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While English patriots and loyalists opposed to secession ironized about the flag of liberty waved by slave-owners, the rebel colonists reacted not by invoking the legitimacy of enslaving blacks, but by highlighting the British Crown’s massive involvement and principal responsibility in trafficking and trading human flesh. It is clear that the institution of slavery was now largely delegitimized. This explains the linguistic proscriptions that characterized the new state’s Constitution. As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention observed, his colleagues ‘anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious to the ears of Americans’, but were ‘willing to admit into their system those &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; which the &#039;&#039;expressions signified’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg30&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is that, from the start of the debate on the new constitutional order (pointed out another witness), people ‘had been ashamed to use the term “Slaves” &amp;amp;amp; had substituted a description’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Less scrupulous (observed Condorcet in 1781) were the slaves’ ‘owners’: they were ‘guided by a false consciousness [&#039;&#039;fausse conscience&#039;&#039;]’ that rendered them impervious to the ‘protests of the defenders of humanity’ and ‘made them act not against their own interests, but to their own advantage’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, notwithstanding Arendt’s contrary opinion, ‘class interests’—principally of those who owned large plantations and a considerable number of slaves—played an important role, which did not escape contemporary observers. The fact is that Arendt ultimately ends up identifying with the viewpoint of the rebel colonists, who retained a clear conscience as champions of the cause of liberty, repressing the macroscopic fact of slavery by means of their ingenious euphemisms: what takes the place of such euphemisms is now the ‘historicist’ explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Colonial expansions and the rebirth of slavery: the positions of Bodin, Grotius and Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Decidedly misleading as regards the American Revolution, might the ‘historicist’ approach be of some use in clarifying the reasons for the tangle of freedom and oppression that was already manifest in the two preceding liberal revolutions? Although contemporaries, in as much as both of them straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin expressed diametrically opposed positions on the issue of concern to us here. While the first justified slavery by appealing to the authority of the Bible and Aristotle, the second refuted both these arguments. Having observed that in the Hebrew world only gentiles could be subjected to perpetual slavery, and that Christians and Muslims observed similar norms and customs, Bodin concluded that ‘those who profess all these three religions only partially observe the law of God with regard to slaves’, as if the prohibition of this horrible institution only applied to blood relations, not humanity as a whole. If a distinction among the three monotheistic religions could be made, it was to the advantage of Islam, which had proved capable of expanding thanks to a courageous policy of emancipation.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg31&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bodin also rejected Aristotle’s thesis, adopted and even radicalized by Grotius, that some individuals and peoples are naturally slaves. As proof of this, the universal diffusion, temporal and spatial, of the institution of slavery was often cited. But (objected the French author) no less universally diffused were slave revolts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil, inclines for the most part to do that which is forbidden and chooses the evil, defying the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While it had long seemed obvious and been generally accepted, and still continued to be, the institution of slavery pertained not to nature but to history—more precisely, to a deplorable and execrable chapter of history, which must rapidly be closed once and for all. It made no sense to try to justify it on the basis of right of war (as did Grotius): ‘[W]hat charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some profit or pleasure from them as if they were cattle?’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, Grotius and Bodin were contemporaries. While the former was an expression of liberal Holland, the latter was a theorist of absolute monarchy. But it was he—not Grotius—who questioned the absolute power wielded by the master over his slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We arrive at a similar result when, rather than with Grotius, we compare Bodin with Locke, whom he predated by some decades. Whereas the English liberal, also justifying slavery with his gaze on the past, pointed to Spartacus as culpable of an ‘aggression’ against ‘property’ and legitimate power, Bodin expressed himself quite differently: ‘The Romans, who were so great and powerful … however many laws they made, could not prevent the revolt of sixty thousand slaves led by Spartacus, who defeated the Roman army in open battle three times’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the English liberal the universalistic charge present in Bodin has disappeared, just as there is no longer any trace of the unconditional &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg32&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery we can read in the French theorist of absolute monarchy. If we bear in mind ‘the homicides, the cruelties and barbarities inflicted on slaves by their masters, it was an unmitigated catastrophe that the institution was ever introduced, and then, that once it had been declared abolished, it should ever have been allowed to persist.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The quotation above refers to persistence. In fact, Bodin traced a brief history of slavery in the world or, more precisely, the West (and the geographical area dominated by it). Certainly, the institution had been vital in Greco-Roman antiquity. As late as the American Civil War, the theorists and defenders of the southern cause appealed to the example and model of that splendid civilization in order to condemn abolitionism. By contrast, Bodin drew a rather realistic picture of classical antiquity. It was based on the enslavement of a number of human beings that was significantly greater than the number of free citizens. Consequently, it lived under the constant menace of slave revolts and, in order to solve the problem, did not hesitate to resort to the most barbaric measures, as proved by the massacre of 30,000 helots in Sparta ‘in a single night’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Subsequently, as a result also of the influence of Christianity, things seemed to change: ‘Europe was freed of slavery after about 1250’, but ‘we see it today newly restored’. Following colonial expansion, it was ‘in the process of being renewed throughout the world’. There had been a massive restoration of slavery, and already Portugal ‘derives from it veritable herds as of beasts’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, far from being affected by vulgar historicism’s attempts at repression, the paradox that characterizes the American Revolution and early liberalism in general not only survives, but proves even more marked. We are in the presence of a political movement counter to the trend of authors who, centuries earlier, had pronounced an unequivocal condemnation of the institution of slavery. While Locke, champion of the struggle against absolute monarchy, justified the white master’s absolute power over the black slave, a theorist of monarchical absolutism—Bodin—condemned such power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In analyzing the relationship that the three liberal revolutions developed on the one hand with the blacks, and on the other with the Irish, Indians and natives, it is misleading to start out from the presupposition of a homogeneous historical time unmarked by fractures and flowing in unilinear fashion. Clearly predating Locke and Washington, and a contemporary of Grotius, was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg33&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Montaigne, in whom we find a memorable self-critical reflection on the West’s colonial expansion that we would seek in vain in them. Such a reflection can even be read as a prefigurative but timely critique of the attitude of Grotius, Locke and Washington towards non-European populations. Among them there was ‘nothing savage or barbarous’; the fact was that ‘every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to’. People took their own country as a model: ‘There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going back further, we encounter Las Casas and his critique of the arguments employed to de-humanize the Indian ‘barbarians’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the arguments that are more or less widely echoed by Grotius, Locke and Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be added that the ‘historicist’ explanation turns out to be unfounded not only as regards the relationship with colonial peoples. While Fletcher, a self-defined ‘republican on principle’, member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of the liberal political world derived from the Glorious Revolution, called for ‘mak[ing] slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bodin also condemned slavery for ‘vagrants and idlers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to the observation of a great historian, it was in ‘the period between 1660 and 1760’ (the decades of the rise of the liberal movement) that an attitude of unprecedented harshness spread in England towards wage-labourers and the unemployed, ‘which has no modern parallel except in the behaviour of the less reputable of white colonists towards coloured labour’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the radical character of the paradox we are examining, let us return to Bodin. He primarily attributed the return of slavery in the world to the ‘greed of merchants’, and then added: ‘If the princes do not set things in good order, it will soon be full of slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later. On the other hand, in recommending the conversion of beggars &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg34&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into slaves, Fletcher polemicized against the Church, which he rebuked for having promoted the abolition of slavery in classical antiquity and for opposing its reintroduction in the modern world, thus encouraging the sloth and dissipation of vagrants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, too, the institution of slavery was felt to be in contradiction not with the new social and political forces, but with a power that was pre-modern in origin. Such considerations can also be applied to Grotius, who likewise developed an argument, if not against Christianity as such, then against interpretations of it in an abolitionist register:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat the Apostles and antient Canons enjoin Slaves, of not leaving their Masters, is a general Maxim, and only opposed to the Error of those who rejected every Subjection, both private and publick, as a State inconsistent with the Liberty of Christians.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Virginian property-owners who prevented the baptism of slaves in the late seventeenth century, so as not to spoil the spirit of submission and to avoid the emergence of a sense of pride in them because they belonged to the same religious community as the masters, provoked complaints from Church and Crown alike.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, we see that it was the forces of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; which acted to check and contain the novelty represented by racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recourse to vulgar historicism to ‘explain’ or repress the surprising tangle of freedom and oppression that characterizes the three liberal revolutions we have referred to is fruitless. The paradox persists and awaits a genuine, less comforting explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn1a|1]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R.M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 529.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., pp. 528–31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., pp. 30–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., pp. 30–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 582.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., pp. 529, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn8a|8]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, vol. 1, pp. 240, 250; vol. 3, p. 593.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn9a|9]] C. Gordon Post, Introduction to John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;A Disquisition on Government&#039;&#039;, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. vii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn10a|10]] Ross M. Lence, Foreword to Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. xxiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn11a|11]] Giovanni Sartori, &#039;&#039;Democrazia e definizioni&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 151; Sartori, &#039;&#039;The Theory of Democracy Revisited&#039;&#039;, Chatham (NJ): Chatham House Publishers, 1987, pp. 239, 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn12a|12]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 120–1, 160–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn13a|13]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 21, p. 157; vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn14a|14]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wooton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn15a|15]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 45.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn16a|16]] See John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, bk 1, ch. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn17a|17]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn18a|18]] Maurice Cranston, &#039;&#039;John Locke&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, 1959, pp. 114–15; Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, pp. 199, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn19a|19]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn20a|20]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 278, 235–58.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn21a|21]] Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox’, &#039;&#039;Journal of American History&#039;&#039;, vol. LIX, no. 1, 1972, p. 11; cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn22a|22]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn23a|23]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn24a|24]] Henry R. Fox Bourne, &#039;&#039;The Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Aalen: Scientia, 1969, vol. 1, p. 481; John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, ed. Esmond S. De Beer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89, vols 5–7, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn25a|25]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1134 (letter to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn26a|26]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 382; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn27a|27]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, p. 45 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn28a|28]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 309 (letter to Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 374–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn30a|30]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 452–3, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn31a|31]] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ed., &#039;&#039;History of US Political Parties&#039;&#039;, New York and London: Chelsea House and Bawker, 1973, pp. 915–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn32a|32]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn33a|33]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn34a|34]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Roger Caillois, Paris: Gallimard, 1949–51, vol. 1, p. 884; Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 243, 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn36a|36]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 328–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn37a|37]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 122–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn38a|38]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn39a|39]] Janice Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 115–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn40a|40]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, pp. 123–4, 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn41a|41]] Boucher, quoted in Anne Y. Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn42a|42]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn43a|43]] Barry Alan Shain, &#039;&#039;The Myth of American Individualism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn44a|44]] Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 646–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn46a|46]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn47a|47]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn48a|48]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, p. 294.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn49a|49]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 272–3, 386–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn50a|50]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 648–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn51a|51]] Cf. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 273; Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn52a|52]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 5–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn53a|53]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn54a|54]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 67–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn55a|55]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn56a|56]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174 n. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 170 n. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn58a|58]] Gee, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn59a|59]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, p. 150; Eric R. Wolf, &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn60a|60]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn61a|61]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn62a|62]] Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn63a|63]] Marx’s characterization in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 926.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn64a|64]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn65a|65]] Bourne, &#039;&#039;Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn66a|66]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 203, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn67a|67]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 2, p. 52.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn68a|68]] Jennings, &#039;&#039;Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn69a|69]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn70a|70]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn71a|71]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn72a|72]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, trans. and intro. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992, p. 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn73a|73]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn74a|74]] Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn75a|75]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 165, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn76a|76]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 218, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn77a|77]] Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 35, 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn78a|78]] Henry S. Commager, ed., &#039;&#039;Documents of American History&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 208–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn79a|79]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joelle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, p. 39 (letter from Washington to his friend W. Crawford, 21 September 1767).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn80a|80]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 475–6 (presidential message, 25 October 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn81a|81]] Delanoë and Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2 (letter from Washington to J. Duane, 7 September 1783).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn82a|82]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1422.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn84a|84]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn85a|85]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn86a|86]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 278, 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn87a|87]] Egerton Ryerson, &#039;&#039;The Loyalists of America and Their Times&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Haskell House, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 297–8 and n.; vol. 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn88a|88]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1312–13 (letter to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn89a|89]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 16, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn90a|90]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 14–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn91a|91]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 164.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn92a|92]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 916; cf. Werner Sombart, &#039;&#039;Der moderne Kapitalismus&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Munich: DTV, 1987, vol. 1, pt II, p. 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn93a|93]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn94a|94]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. viii; François Guizot, ‘Discours sur l’histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre’, in &#039;&#039;Histoire d’Angleterre&#039;&#039;, Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1850, pp. 41–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn95a|95]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;On the Truth of Christianity&#039;&#039;, trans. Spencer Madan, London: J. Dodsby, 1782, pp. 195–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn96a|96]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 1027, 1024.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn97a|97]] Lewis Hanke, &#039;&#039;Aristotle and the American Indians&#039;&#039;, London: Hollis and Carter, 1959, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn98a|98]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 565.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn99a|99]] See ibid., vol. 1, ch. iii, §4; vol. 3, ch. iii, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., vol. 3, ch. vii, §§2, 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1496, 1372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn102a|102]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn103a|103]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xxii, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn104a|104]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xvi, §16; vol. 1, ch. iv, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn105a|105]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn106a|106]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn107a|107]] Anthony Pagden, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700’, in Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn108a|108]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 129, 162, 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., pp. 136, 139, 152, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn110a|110]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 133, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn113a|113]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 202.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn114a|114]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 1, pp. 296–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn115a|115]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn116a|116]] Cf. Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn117a|117]] Georg W.F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 20 vols, eds Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–79, vol. 3, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn118a|118]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;On Revolution&#039;&#039;, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1963, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn119a|119]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 647–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn120a|120]] Millar, &#039;&#039;Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, pp. 258, 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn121a|121]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 648.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn122a|122]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn123a|123]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 48, 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn124a|124]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn125a|125]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 103–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn126a|126]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 296.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn127a|127]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn128a|128]] Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn129a|129]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130a|130]] Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books of the Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, abridg. and trans. M.J. Tooley, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, n.d., pp. 18, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131a|131]] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133a|133]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 216; Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri dello Stato&#039;&#039;, trans. Margherita Isnardi Parente, Turin: UTET, 1988, vol. 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134a|134]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books&#039;&#039;, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135a|135]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 247–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136a|136]] Ibid., pp. 253, 238, 260.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137a|137]] Michel de Montaigne, &#039;&#039;The Complete Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138a|138]] Bartolomé de las Casas, &#039;&#039;La leggenda nera&#039;&#039;, trans. Alberto Pincherle, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981, ch. xii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139a|139]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 882–3 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140a|140]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 262 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141a|141]] R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, West&#039;&#039; Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 267. C.B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 227–8 and Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325 reach the same conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142a|142]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 260 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143a|143]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144a|144]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 561.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145a|145]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 332.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg35&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The limitation of power and the emergence of an unprecedented absolute power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To render it explicable, the paradox must first be expounded in all its radicalism. Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success: ‘The total slave population in the Americas reached around 330,000 in 1700, nearly three million by 1800, and finally peaked at over six million in the 1850s’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Contributing decisively to the rise of an institution synonymous with the absolute power of man over man was the liberal world. In the mid-eighteenth century, it was Great Britain that possessed the largest number of slaves (878,000). The fact is unexpected. Although its empire was far more extensive, Spain came well behind. Second position was held by Portugal, which possessed 700,000 slaves and was in fact a kind of semi-colony of Great Britain: much of the gold extracted by Brazilian slaves ended up in London.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence there is no doubt that absolutely pre-eminent in this field was the country at the head of the liberal movement, which had wrested primacy in the trading and ownership of black slaves precisely from the Glorious Revolution onwards. It was Pitt the Younger himself who, intervening in April 1792 in the House of Commons on the subject of slavery and the slave trade, acknowledged that ‘[n]o nation in Europe … has … plunged so deeply into this guilt as Great Britain.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg36&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;That is not all. To a greater or lesser extent, there survived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies ‘&#039;&#039;ancillary&#039;&#039; slavery’, which is to be distinguished from ‘&#039;&#039;systemic&#039;&#039; slavery, linked to plantations and commodity production’. And it was the latter type of slavery, established above all in the eighteenth century (starting from the liberal revolution of 1688–89) and clearly predominant in the British colonies, which most consummately expressed the de-humanization of those who were now mere instruments of labour and chattels, subject to regular sale on the market.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This did not even involve a return to the slavery peculiar to classical antiquity. Certainly, chattel slavery had been widespread in Rome. Yet the slave could reasonably hope that, if not he himself, then his children or grandchildren would be able to achieve freedom and even an eminent social position. Now, by contrast, his fate increasingly took the form of a cage from which it was impossible to escape. In the first half of the eighteenth century, numerous English colonies in America enacted laws that made the emancipation of slaves increasingly difficult.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Quakers lamented the advent of what seemed to them a new and repugnant system. Slavery for a determinate period of time, and the other forms of more or less servile labour hitherto in force, tended to give way to slavery in the strict sense, to a permanent, hereditary condemnation of a whole people, who were denied any prospect of change and improvement, any hope of freedom.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, in a statute of 1696, South Carolina declared that it could not prosper ‘without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The barrier separating service and slavery was as yet not well defined, and the institution of slavery had not yet appeared in all its harshness. But the process that increasingly reduced slaves to chattels, and established the racial character of the condition they were subjected to, was already underway. An unbridgeable gulf separated blacks from the free population. Ever stricter laws prohibited interracial sexual and marital relations, making them a crime. We are now dealing with a hereditary caste of slaves, defined and recognizable by the colour of their skin. In this sense, in John Wesley’s view, ‘American slavery’ was ‘the vilest that ever saw the sun’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg37&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The verdict of American Quakers and British abolitionists has been fully confirmed by contemporary historians. At the end of a ‘cycle of degradation’ of blacks, with the ignition of the white ‘engine of oppression’ and the conclusive soldering of ‘slavery and racial discrimination’, we see at work in the ‘colonies of the British empire’ in the late seventeenth century a ‘chattel racial slavery’ unknown in Elizabethan England (and also classical antiquity), but ‘familiar to men living in the nineteenth century’ and aware of the reality of the southern United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence slavery in its most radical form triumphed in the golden age of liberalism and at the heart of the liberal world. This was acknowledged by James Madison, slave-owner and liberal (like numerous protagonists of the American Revolution), who observed that ‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man’—power based on ‘mere distinction of colour’—was imposed ‘in the most enlightened period of time’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Correctly stated, in all its radicalism, the paradox we face consists in this: the rise of liberalism and the spread of racial chattel slavery are the product of a twin birth which, as we shall see, has rather unique characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The self-government of civil society and the triumph of large-scale property&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On its emergence, the paradox we are attempting to explain did not escape the most attentive observers. We have just seen Madison’s admission; and we are familiar with Samuel Johnson’s irony on the passionate love of liberty displayed by slave-owners; and Adam Smith’s observation on the nexus between the persistence and reinforcement of slavery, on the one hand, and the power of representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners, on the other. In this connection, however, we must also record other, no less significant interventions. In fighting for conciliation of the rebel colonies, Burke recognized the influence of slavery within them. But this did not impair the ‘spirit of freedom’. On the contrary, it was precisely here that freedom appeared ‘more noble and liberal’. Indeed, ‘these people of the southern colonies are more much more strongly … attached to liberty, than those to the northward’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is a consideration that we also encounter, some decades later, from a Barbadian planter: ‘you will … &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg38&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;find that no nations in the world have been more jealous of their liberties than those amongst whom the institution of slavery existed’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, in England, countering Burke and his policy of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Josiah Tucker pointed out how ‘the Champions for American Republicanism’ were simultaneously the promoters of the ‘absurd Tyranny’ they exercised over their slaves: this was ‘a &#039;&#039;republican Tyranny&#039;&#039;, the worst of all Tyrannies’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the authors cited here, there is a more or less clear awareness, accompanied by different value judgements, of the paradox we are examining. And perhaps precisely now it begins to lose its aura of impenetrability. Why should we be surprised that those demanding, or in the forefront of the demand for, self-government and ‘freedom’ from central political power were the major slave-owners? In 1839 an eminent representative of Virginia observed that the position of the slave-owner stimulated in him ‘a more liberal cast of character, more elevated principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and juster estimate of that liberty by which he is so highly distinguished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wealth and leisure it enjoyed, and the culture it thus managed to acquire, reinforced the proud self-consciousness of a class that became ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority. Shaking off these constraints, the planter and slave-owner developed a liberal spirit and a liberal mentality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming this phenomenon are the changes that occurred from the Middle Ages. Between 1263 and 1265, by means of the &#039;&#039;Siete partidas&#039;&#039;, Alfonso X of Castile regulated the institution of slavery, which he seemed to recognize reluctantly because it was always ‘unnatural’. What limited the property right in the first instance was religion: an unbeliever was not permitted to own Christian slaves and, in any event, the slave had to be guaranteed the possibility of living in conformity with Christian principles—whence the recognition of his right to establish a family and have the chastity and honour of his wife and daughters respected. Later, there were even cases of masters denounced to the Inquisition for their failure to respect the rights of their slaves. Further limiting the power of the property-owner was the state, profoundly influenced by religion. It was committed to disciplining and limiting the punishment inflicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg39&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by masters on slaves and variously sought to promote their emancipation (we are dealing with Christian subjects). Emancipation occurred from above when the slave performed a meritorious deed for the country; in such cases, the master deprived of his property was compensated by the state.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of modern property entailed the master’s ability to dispose of it as he saw fit. In the Virginia of the second half of the seventeenth century, a law was in force that sanctioned the effective impunity of a master even when he killed his slave. Such behaviour could not be considered a ‘felony’, since ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that prepense malice (which alone makes murder felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] First with the Glorious Revolution and then later, more completely, with the American Revolution, the assertion of self-government by civil society hegemonized by slaveholders involved the definitive liquidation of traditional forms of ‘interference’ by political and religious authority. Christian baptism and profession of faith were henceforth irrelevant. In Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, one could proceed ‘without the solemnities of jury’ to the execution of a slave guilty of a capital crime; marriage between slaves was no longer a sacrament, and even funerals lost their solemnity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Virginian jurist (George Tucker) could observe that the slave was positioned ‘below the rank of human beings, not only politically, but physically and morally’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conquest of self-government by civil society hegemonized by large-scale property involved an even more drastic deterioration in the condition of the indigenous population. The end of the control exercised by the London government swept away the last obstacles to the expansionistic march of the white colonists. Already harboured by Jefferson, and then explicitly and brutally formulated by the Monroe administration (the natives of the East must clear off the land, ‘whether or not they agree, whether or not they become civilized’), the idea of deporting the Indians became a tragic reality with the Jackson Presidency:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg40&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by ‘civilian volunteers,’ invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The ‘civilian volunteers’ appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the ‘trail of tears,’ as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: ‘Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The black slave and the white servant: from Grotius to Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While it stimulated the development of racial chattel slavery and created an unprecedented, unbridgeable gulf between whites and peoples of colour, the self-government of civil society triumphed, waving the flag of liberty and the struggle against despotism. Between these two elements, which emerged together during a unique twin birth, a relationship full of tensions and contradictions was established. Such a celebration of liberty, which was bound up with the reality of an unprecedented absolute power, can clearly be interpreted as an ideology. But however mystificatory it might be, ideology is never null. In fact, its mystificatory function cannot even be conceived without some incidence in concrete social reality. And still less can ideology be regarded as synonymous with conscious falsehood. Were that to be the case, it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence. The theorists and agents of the liberal revolutions and movements were moved by a powerful, convinced pathos of liberty; and precisely for that reason, they displayed embarrassment at the reality of slavery. Obviously, in a majority of cases, such embarrassment did not push them to the point of questioning the ‘property’ on which the wealth and social influence of the class protagonist in the struggle for the self-government of civil society were based. As regards England, the course was taken that removed slavery in the strict sense to a geographical area remote from the metropolis, situated at the edge of the civilized world, where, precisely on account of the proximity and pressure of barbarous circumstances, the spirit of liberty was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg41&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not manifested in all its purity, unlike in England proper—the true homeland, the promised land of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, this was a conclusion reached via a route marked by oscillations and contradictions of various kinds. In Grotius the colour barrier is not yet visible that separates the fate reserved for blacks from the condition to which the poorest layers of the white population can be subjected. We read: ‘perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his Life long, for Diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood, and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it. However, slavery was not the only form of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, but only the ‘most ignoble … Kind of Subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectionis species ignobilissima&#039;&#039;).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There was also &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039;, peculiar, among others, to serfs and &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, labour as such was subsumed under the category of ‘service’ (&#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;) or ‘subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectio&#039;&#039;). Obviously, there is a difference between the two forms of ‘service’ and ‘subjection’. While it violated ‘natural reason’ or ‘the Rules of full and compleat Justice’—i.e. the norms of morality—on the basis of the legislation in force in some countries the master could kill his slave with impunity and hence exercise a right of life and death over him.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was something not found in the sphere of &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; and the labour relationship that employed &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a particular &#039;&#039;species&#039;&#039; of the single &#039;&#039;genus&#039;&#039; that is service or subjection. The boundary between the various species is fluid. For example, of the ‘apprentices [&#039;&#039;apprenticii&#039;&#039;] in England’, it was to be noted that they ‘come nearest to the State of Slavery, during their Apprenticeship’—that is to say, to the condition of slaves proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, by way of atoning for a crime one could be condemned to labour and to render one’s services either as a slave or as an individual subjected to some form of ‘imperfect slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with Grotius, Locke was concerned to distinguish more rigorously between the various kinds of service. Elements of continuity are certainly not lacking. Speaking of wage-labour and the contract that establishes it, the English philosopher wrote: ‘a free man makes himself a servant to another’. As we can see, labour as such continues to be subsumed under the category of service. In fact, the contract introduces the wage-labourer ‘into the family &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg42&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof’. This discipline was in fact very different from the unlimited power that characterized the relationship of slavery and defined the ‘perfect condition of slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Grotius’ distinction between &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; reappears in broad outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Locke urges us not to confuse servant and slave. Grotius compared the slave to a &#039;&#039;‘perpetual Hireling’&#039;&#039;, or a wage-labourer bound for the duration of his natural term to the same master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Locke stressed that we are dealing with two different statuses. In addition to being ‘temporary’, the power exercised by the master over a servant ‘is no greater than what is contained in the contract between them’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, on the one hand, this made the condition of the servant better, on the other, it rendered that of the slave proper manifestly worse. Shaking off the moral inhibitions of Grotius, who called on the master to respect not only the life but also the specificity of his slave, Locke endlessly stressed that the master exercises over the slave an ‘absolute dominion’ and ‘absolute power’, a ‘legislative power of life and death’, an ‘arbitrary power’ encompassing ‘life’ itself.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the slave tends to lose his human characteristics and become reduced to a thing and a chattel, as emerges in particular from the reference to the planters of the East Indies who possess ‘slaves or horses’ on the basis of a regular ‘purchase’, and this ‘by bargain and money’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Without any hint of criticism, Locke engaged in a conjunction that signifies a firm, indignant denunciation in abolitionist literature. This applies to Mirabeau, who (as we shall see) compared the condition of American slaves with ‘our horses and our mules’; and to Marx, who observed in &#039;&#039;Capital:&#039;&#039; ‘The slave-owner buys his worker in the same way as he buys his horse.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke marks a turning point theoretically. Sometimes freed by their masters, blacks slaves were long subjected to a condition not markedly dissimilar from that of indentured servants—that is, temporary white semi-slaves on a contractual basis. And it is this ambiguity that finds expression in the text of Grotius, who can hence also apply the category of contract to &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039;. In Locke, by contrast, we can read the development which chattel slavery and racial &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg43&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery began to undergo from the late seventeenth century. A whole series of English colonies in America enacted laws intended to make it clear that the slave’s conversion did not entail his emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke expressed himself thus in 1660 when, referring to Paul of Tarsus, he asserted that ‘conversion did not dissolve any of those obligations they were tied in before … the gospel continued them in the same condition and under the same civil obligations [under which] it found them. The married were not to leave their consorts, nor the servant freed from his master.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In complete conformity with this theoretical position, in the draft Carolina Constitution Locke reiterated the irrelevance of possible conversion to Christianity for the condition of the slave. And, once again, the element of novelty emerges. Although rejecting an abolitionist interpretation of Christianity, Grotius repeatedly appealed to Christian literature to underscore the common humanity of servant and master, both of them subject to the Father in Heaven, and hence in a relationship with each another that was in some sense one of fraternity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; is concerned, instead, to make it clear that the principle of equality applies exclusively to ‘creatures of the same species and rank’, only if ‘the lord and master of them all should [not], by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were burdened by the curse which, according to the Old Testament story, Noah had uttered against Ham and his descendants. This ideological motif, often invoked by defenders of the institution of slavery, seems also to find some echo in Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt: the English liberal philosopher legitimized the racial slavery that was being established in the politico-social reality of the time. Subject to ever more onerous conditions, the practice of emancipation tended to disappear; while, together with the neutralization of religion and baptism, laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital relations sanctioned the insurmountable character of the boundary between whites and blacks. At this point the category of contract can serve to explain only the figure of the servant, while the slave is such as a result of right of war (more precisely, just war, of which Europeans engaged in colonial conquests are protagonists), or of a divine ‘manifest declaration’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg44&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In order to clarify the difference between ‘the perfect condition of slavery’ and that of the indentured servant, Locke referred to the Old Testament, which provides for permanent, hereditary slavery only for gentiles, excluding from it servants who are blood relations of the Hebrew master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Old Testament line of demarcation between Hebrews and gentiles is configured in Locke as the line of demarcation between whites and blacks: servants of European origin are not subject to ‘perfect slavery’, which is intended for blacks and repressed to the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The pathos of liberty and unease about the institution of slavery: the case of Montesquieu&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal unease over slavery found what is perhaps its most acute expression in Montesquieu, who devoted some memorable pages to a critique of the institution. The reasons traditionally adduced by ‘jurists’ in justification of slavery were ‘not sensible’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was pointless trying to find others: ‘If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would say: The peoples of Europe, having exterminated those of America, had to make slaves of those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ Yet this condemnation, so ringing and seemingly unequivocal, soon gave way to a much more ambiguous discourse: ‘There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement: slavery there runs less counter to reason’. In such cases, while not conforming to abstract reason, slavery was in accord with ‘natural reason’ (&#039;&#039;raison naturelle&#039;&#039;), which took account of climate and concrete circumstances.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] True, Montesquieu observed that ‘there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the tone is uncertain here, much clearer is the assertion that a distinction must be made between those countries where the climate can in some way be an element justifying slavery and those where ‘even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence it is necessary to take cognizance of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ and restrict &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg45&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘natural slavery [&#039;&#039;servitude naturelle&#039;&#039;] … to certain particular countries of the world’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the one hand, Montesquieu endlessly stressed that freedom is an attribute—in fact, a way of living and being—of Nordic peoples, while, on the other, slavery had been ‘naturalized … among the southern peoples’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A general law could be formulated: ‘one must not be surprised that the cowardice of the peoples of hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free. This is an effect that derives from its natural cause.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Prominent in Grotius and Locke, the contrast between metropolis and colonies also emerges in Montesquieu. It is not by chance that in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, rather than being introduced in the books devoted to analysing freedom, the considerations on slavery make their appearance in the context of the discourse on the relationship between climate and laws and customs. The transition from Books XI–XIII, whose subjects are the ‘Constitution’, ‘political freedom’ and ‘freedom’ as such, to Books XIV-XVI, which deal with ‘climate’, despotism and ‘domestic slavery’ (slavery proper), is, at the same time, the transition from Europe—in particular, England—to the non-European world and the colonies. For that very reason, in asserting a climatic justification of slavery, its supporters would have no difficulty in appealing to Montesquieu.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his argument the French philosopher targeted not the theorists of slavery as such, but those who held to the thesis that ‘it would be good if there were slaves among us’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the colonies, it was a question of seeing ‘what the laws ought to do in relation to slavery’. Rather than abolition, Montesquieu’s discourse focused on amending the institution: ‘whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Are those ‘civil laws’ the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; issued some years earlier by Louis XIV, which consecrated black slavery and, at the same time, proposed to regulate it? The language of that document suggests as much. While he reiterated his ‘power’, in the preamble the sovereign asserted his concern for black slaves, who lived in ‘climates infinitely remote from our habitual sojourn’. They were to be guaranteed food and adequate clothing (Articles 22 and 25). And such guarantees, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg46&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;together with any treatment that was necessary, also applied to ‘slaves who are infirm on account of old age, illness or other circumstances, regardless of whether the illness is curable’ (Article 27).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These are concerns that also find expression in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws:&#039;&#039; ‘The magistrate should see to it that the slave is nourished and clothed; this should be regulated by law.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Montesquieu went on to assert that the slave must not be left completely at the mercy of the master’s arbitrary power. The latter might impose a death penalty in his capacity as a ‘judge’, respecting legal ‘formalities’, not as a private person. The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; argued in analogous fashion, providing for sanctions for the master guilty of the arbitrary mutilation or killing of his slave (Articles 42–43).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039; counted the sexual exploitation of female slaves among the main ‘abuses of slavery’: ‘Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness. The laws of modesty are a part of natural right and should be felt by all the nations in the world.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In homage to the precepts of the ‘Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion’, the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; regarded as ‘valid marriages’ those contracted between slaves who professed this religion (Article 8). It banned the separate sale of individual members of the family thus constituted (Article 47) and sought to repress the sexual exploitation of female slaves. A free, single man who had had children by a slave was obliged to marry her and recognize the offspring, who were to be freed together with the mother (Article 9).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further confirming that he intended to amend, rather than abolish, slavery is the fact that Montesquieu, as well as to its ‘abuses’, called attention to the ‘dangers’ it entailed and the ‘precautions’ required to confront them. Particular attention must be paid to the ‘danger of a large number of slaves’ and that represented by ‘armed slaves’. This warranted a recommendation of a general kind: ‘In the moderate state, the humanity one has for slaves will be able to prevent the dangers one could fear from there being too many of them. Men grow accustomed to anything, even to servitude, provided the master is not harsher than the servitude.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his desire to temper colonial slavery, Montesquieu looked for inspiration to the norms promulgated by the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, which in fact had no influence in the English world admired by him. In any case, his condemnation of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg47&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery is sharp only when it also seeks to break in ‘among ourselves’, thereby throwing Europe’s proud self-consciousness about being the exclusive locus of liberty into crisis. Along with despotism, slavery was present in Turkey and the Islamic world, and in Russia (in the form of abject serfdom), and prevailed unchallenged in Africa. But there was no room for it in Europe, or, rather, on metropolitan territory. The discourse relating to the colonies was different and more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Somersett case and the delineation of liberal identity&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Blackstone’s position is close to Montesquieu’s. We are in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘the law of England abhors, and can not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation’; not even its humblest, most base members, not even ‘idle vagabonds’ could be subjected to slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘spirit of liberty’ (argued the great jurist) ‘is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil’ that it could not in any instance permit the presence or spectacle of a relationship that was the concentrated expression of absolute power.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[S]trict slavery’ existed in ‘old Rome’ and continued to flourish in ‘modern Barbary’, but was now incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the English nation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, among the rights enjoyed by free men was free, undisturbed enjoyment of property, including property in slaves, on condition that the latter remained banished to the colonial world. The relationship between master and slave—and this applied to all ‘sorts of servants’, including slaves—was one of the ‘great relations in private life’;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] political authority had no right to intervene in it. And thus, celebration of England as the land of liberty was not perceived by Blackstone as being in contradiction with his reassertion of the black slave’s duty to serve his master. That was a duty which, on the basis of the ‘general principles’ of the ‘laws of England’, did not come to an end even were the ‘heathen negro’ to be converted to Christianity. Not even in that case could the slave stake a claim to ‘liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although recognized, the institution of slavery was, as it were, repressed from the ‘soil’ of England, confined to the border zone between the civilized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg48&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;world and barbarism. But what happened when a white master brought one of his slaves with him from the colonies as movable property? This was the problem raised by an impassioned debate in England in 1772. Turning to the courts, a slave—James Somersett—succeeded in extricating himself from the master who attempted to take him with him, in his capacity as movable property, on his return journey to Virginia. The Chief Justice’s judgment did not challenge the institution of slavery; it limited itself to asserting that ‘colonial laws’ only applied ‘in the colonies’, and hence that slavery had no legal basis in England. Somersett’s counsel eloquently proclaimed: ‘The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.’ But from this principle he deduced the conclusion that it was necessary to avoid an influx of blacks from Africa or America into England. Somersett’s master was held responsible for an assault on the purity of the land of the free, who could not tolerate being confused and mixed up with slaves, rather than a violation of the liberty and dignity of a human being. Not by chance, the 1772 judgment provided the premises for the subsequent deportation to Sierra Leone of blacks who, as loyal subjects of the Crown, sought refuge in England after the victory of the rebel American colonists.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of liberal freedom are beginning to become clear. Authors like Burgh and Fletcher could still be regarded as champions of the cause of liberty by Jefferson, who lived in a situation where black slavery and widespread ownership of land (taken from the Indians) made the project of enslaving white vagrants purely academic. In Europe things were different, as emerges from the interventions of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Those who did not subscribe to the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ began to be regarded as foreign to the emerging liberal party. Starting with Montesquieu and then, more clearly, Blackstone and the judgment in the Somersett case, what characterized the emergent liberal party were two essential points: (1) condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government by civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law; (2) assertion of the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, or of the principle on whose basis England—and, prospectively, Europe—possessed ‘too pure’ an air to be able to tolerate the presence of slaves on its ‘soil’. The second point is no less essential than the first. The legitimation of ‘slavery among ourselves’ would involve the dispersion of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg49&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand for self-government by civil society, or the self-government of the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. ‘We won’t be their Negroes’: the colonists’ rebellion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But the metropolis/colonies opposition, with its tendential exclusion of the latter from the sacred space of civilization and liberty, was bound to provoke a reaction from the colonists. Independently of particular concrete political and social demands, what was wounded was their self-consciousness. The metropolis seemed to be assimilating the American colonies to the ‘modern Barbary’ denounced by Blackstone; it seemed to be degrading them to a sort of dustbin, where the metropolitan rejects or prison population were dumped. The inmates of the mother country’s prisons were deported across the Atlantic to supply, along with blacks from Africa, the more or less forced labour required by it. According to the observation of the English abolitionist David Ramsay, slavery continued to survive in the region of the confines of the civilized world—namely, the West—‘where [its] proper religion and laws are not deemed to be in full force; and where individuals too often think themselves loosened from ties, which are binding in the mother country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If it saved the metropolis’s honour as the privileged site of liberty, despite the persistence of slavery on its extreme periphery, this view was wrong in the colonists’ view, because it confounded and assimilated free Englishmen, prison rabble and people of colour. In this way, lamented James Otis, a prominent supporter of the liberal revolution underway, one forgot that the colonies had been founded not ‘with a compound mixture of &#039;&#039;English, Indian and Negro&#039;&#039;, but with freeborn &#039;&#039;British white&#039;&#039; subjects’. Even more swingeing was Washington, who warned that the American colonists felt ‘as miserably oppressed as our own blacks’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having repeated that the American colonists could boast a lineage not less noble and deserving of liberty than the metropolitan English, John Adams exclaimed with reference to the rulers in London: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’![[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Quite apart even from the problem of representation, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free was perceived as an intolerable exclusion. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#page50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#pg50&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the other hand, the colonists, in demanding equality with the dominant British class, widened the gulf that separated them from blacks and Indians. While in London the zone of civilization was distinguished from the zone of barbarism, the sacred space from the profane, primarily by opposing the metropolis to the colonies, the American colonists were led to identify the boundary line principally in ethnic identity and skin colour. On the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Act, only whites could become citizens of the United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from a spatial delimitation of the community of the free to an ethnic and racial one brought with it combined, contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and dis-emancipation. Whites, even the poorest among them, also came within the sacred space; they found themselves forming part of the community or race of the free, albeit situated at inferior levels. White slavery disappeared, condemned by New York polite society as ‘contrary to … the idea of liberty this country has so happily established’. But the tendential emancipation of poor whites was only the other side of the coin of further dis-emancipation of blacks. The condition of the black slave deteriorated by virtue of no longer being, as in colonial America, one of several systems of unfree labour.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Virginia (and other states) land and black slaves were given to veterans of the War of Independence, in recognition of their contribution to the cause of the struggle against despotism;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the tendential social rise of poor whites coincided with the consummate de-humanization of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Racial slavery and the further deterioration in the condition of the ‘free’ black&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only a question of slaves. The triumph of the ethnic delimitation of the community of the free was bound seriously to affect the condition of those blacks who were notionally free. They were now struck by a series of measures that tended to render the colour line, the demarcation between the race of the free and the race of slaves, inviolable. Blacks not subject to slavery began to be perceived as an anomaly that would sooner or later have to be rectified. Their condition at the end of the eighteenth century was summed up by one of them in Boston, referring both to strictly legal forms of oppression and to the insults &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg51&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and threats which, while not legal, were widely tolerated by authority: ‘we may truly be said to carry our lives in our hands, and the arrows of death are flying about our heads’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is a description that might seem unduly emotive. But we should attend to de Tocqueville:&lt;br /&gt;
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The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On close inspection, it can be said of ‘emancipated Negroes’ that ‘their situation with regard to the Europeans is not unlike that of the Indians’. In fact, in some respects, they were ‘still more to be pitied’. In any event, they were ‘deprived of their rights’ and ‘exposed to the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of the people’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condition of blacks not reduced to slavery was no different and no better as one moved from South to North. In fact (de Tocqueville pitilessly observed), ‘the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condition of the notionally free black was distinguished from that of the slave, but perhaps even more from that of the genuinely free white. Only thus can we explain the danger that constantly threatened him of being reduced to conditions of slavery, and the temptation that periodically emerged among whites—for example, in Virginia after the slave revolt or attempted revolt of 1831—to deport the entire population of free blacks to Africa or elsewhere. The latter were anyhow obliged to register, and could only change residence with the permission of the local authorities; they were presumed to be slaves and detained until they managed to prove otherwise. The despotism exercised over slaves was bound to affect, in one way or another, the population of colour as a whole. This was explained in 1801 by the postmaster general in the Jefferson administration, in a letter in which he recommended to a Georgian senator that blacks and men of colour be excluded from the postal service. ‘Everything which tends to increase their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg52&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain and line of intelligence’ was extremely dangerous. Even the communication of feelings and ideas must be blocked or impeded by all possible means. In fact, the situation in Virginia immediately after the 1831 revolt was described as follows by a traveller: ‘Military service [by white patrols] is performed night and day, Richmond resembles a town besieged … the negroes … will not venture to communicate with one another for fear of punishment.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Spatial and racial delimitation of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The American Revolution threw into crisis the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which seemed established within the liberal movement. Now, far from being confined to the colonies, slavery acquired a new visibility and centrality in a country with a culture, religion and language of European origin, which conversed with European countries as an equal and in fact claimed a kind of primacy in embodying the cause of liberty. Declared legally void in England in 1772, the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like ‘niggers’. There thus emerged a country characterized by ‘a fixed and direct tie between slave ownership and political power’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as strikingly revealed both by the Constitution and the number of slave-owners who acceded to its highest institutional office.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did the platform of the liberal party shape up in a country which, like late-eighteenth-century England, could also boast of having air ‘too pure’ for it to be breathed by slaves? In fact, in the United States as well the ambition to retrieve the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ continued to make itself heard. Albeit utterly fancifully, Jefferson harboured the idea of re-deporting the blacks to Africa. However, in the new situation that had been created, the project of transforming the North American republic into a land inhabited exclusively by freemen proved difficult to implement. It would be necessary seriously to infringe the right, possessed by genuinely free persons, to enjoy their property without external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg53&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;interference! So, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a movement (the American Colonization Society) emerged that contrived a new way out: it was proposed to persuade the owners, by appealing to their religious feelings and also employing economic incentives, to free or sell their slaves, who, along with all the other blacks, would be sent to Africa to colonize it and convert it to Christianity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, without infringing the property rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution, it would have been possible to transform the United States into a land inhabited exclusively by free (and white) men.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a project doomed to fail from the outset. For a start, the acquisition of the slaves by the Union presupposed mobilizing enormous financial resources, and hence the imposition of high taxes. Expelled from the door in the shape of enforced expropriation, imposed from above, of the human cattle owned by the colonists, the spectre of despotic interference with private property by political power ended up arrogantly breaking in through the window as the taxation required to induce owners willingly to surrender their slaves, through a profitable sales contract. Moreover, taken as a whole, the class of planters had no intention of abandoning the source not only of its wealth, but also of its power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation in the North was different. Here slaves were small in number and performed no essential economic function. Abolishing slavery, but at the same time adhering to the federal order that legitimized and guaranteed it in the South, the northern states seemed to want to give a new lease of life in the new situation to the compromise we have already encountered. Without being abolished, the institution whose presence constituted a kind of ironic counterpoint to the claim to be champions of the cause of liberty was banished to the deep South. In fact, four states (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Oregon) strictly prohibited access into their territories by blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They thus avoided being contaminated by the presence not only of slaves, but also of blacks as such. This ban was the equivalent of the measure whereby, in the aftermath of the Somersett case, England deported to Sierra Leone blacks who not only were free, but also had the merit of having fought against the rebel colonists on behalf of the Empire. Nevertheless, even in the North of the United States, although it had been abolished, slavery had achieved the recognition it lacked in England, as demonstrated in particular by the constitutional provision that required the return of escaped slaves to their legitimate owners, in an indirect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg54&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sanction of the institution of slavery in states which were formally free. This was a point to which a representative of the South smugly drew attention: ‘We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clearly, in the United States as a whole the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which was more than ever reiterated across the Atlantic, had fallen into crisis. How had such a result been arrived at? Let us return to Burke. In asserting that the ‘spirit of freedom’ and the ‘liberal’ vision found their most consummate embodiment in the slave-owners of the southern colonies, he added that the colonists formed an integral part of the nation ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, of ‘the chosen race and sons of England’: it was a question of ‘pedigree’, in the face of which ‘human art’ was powerless.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here, as we can see, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free, which is the principle on which late-eighteenth-century liberal England was based, seems to be on the point of transmuting into a racial delimitation. And hence, in Calhoun and ideologists of the slaveholding South in general, a tendency already present in Burke comes to fruition. Having been spatial, the line of demarcation of the community of the free ends up becoming racial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, there was no insurmountable barrier between the two types of delimitation. In 1845 John O’Sullivan, popular theorist of the providential ‘manifest destiny’ that put wind in the sails of US expansion, sought to assuage abolitionists’ concerns about the introduction of slavery into Texas (wrested from Mexico and on the point of being annexed to the Union) with a significant argument. It was precisely its temporary extension that created the conditions for abolition of the ‘the slavery of an inferior to a superior race’, and hence ‘furnished much probability of the ultimate disappearance of the negro race from our borders’. At the appropriate time, the ex-slaves would be driven further south, into the ‘only receptacle’ appropriate for them. In Latin America the population of mixed blood, which had formed following the fusion of the Spaniards with the natives, would easily be able to accommodate the blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The racial delimitation of the community would then give way to a territorial delimitation. The end of slavery would, at the same time, entail the end of the presence of blacks in the land of liberty. Despite the abolitionists’ cry of alarm, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg55&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the concentration of slaves in a zone immediately proximate to territories that were fundamentally foreign to the zone of civilization and liberty pushed in this direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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For some time Lincoln harboured the idea of deporting the blacks, likewise regarded by him as ultimately alien to the community of the free, from the United States to Latin America after their emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, having confronted one another for decades, what clashed during the Civil War were the causes not of liberty and slavery, but precisely two different delimitations of the community of the free: the opposed parties accused one another of not knowing how, or not wanting, to delimit the community of the free effectively. To those who brandished the spectre of racial contamination as an inevitable consequence of the abolition of slavery, Lincoln replied by emphasizing that in the United States the overwhelming majority of ‘mulattoes’ were the result of sexual relations between white masters and their black slaves: ‘slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation’. For the rest, he had ‘no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races’, or to recognize the right of blacks to participate in political life or hold public office or perform the role of jury member. Lincoln declared himself well aware, like any other white man, of the radical difference between the two races and the supremacy of the whites.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crisis took a decisive step towards breaking-point following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Dred Scott case in summer 1857: ‘like an ordinary article of merchandise and property’, a black slave’s legitimate owner had the right to take him with him in any part of the Union.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Lincoln’s reaction: the country could not remain permanently divided, ‘half &#039;&#039;slave&#039;&#039; and half &#039;&#039;free’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In contrast to the England of the Somersett case, the North of the United States could not pose as a land of the free whose air was ‘too pure’ to be breathed by a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from the spatial delimitation to the racial delimitation of the community of the free henceforth made it impossible to repress the reality of slavery. There was now no alternative to the condemnation of this institution except its explicit defence or celebration. As the conflict dividing the two sections of the Union emerged more clearly, the South’s ideologues all the more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg56&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;provocatively mocked the circumlocutions and linguistic interdictions that had facilitated the Philadelphia compromise of 1787. ‘Negro slavery’, declared John Randolph, was a reality that ‘the Constitution has vainly attempted to blink, by not using the term’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the lifting of this taboo, the legitimation of slavery lost the timidity that had previously characterized it, assuming a defiant tone. Having been a necessary evil, slavery became (in the words of Calhoun with which we are familiar) a ‘positive good’. It made no sense to try to repress it as something to be ashamed of; in reality, it was the very foundation of civilization. Throwing into crisis the pathos of liberty that had presided over the foundation of the United States, and in a way de-legitimizing the very War of Independence, this new attitude helped make the clash between North and South inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. The Civil War and the resumption of the controversy initiated with the American Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, while the abolitionists adopted the arguments used during the American War of Independence by the British and the loyalists in their polemic against the South, the theorists of the South used arguments deployed by the rebel colonists. We have seen O’Sullivan, a New York lawyer and journalist, regard the South, bordering as it was on Mexico and Latin America, as the best place to deposit the blacks temporarily, pending their emancipation and deportation from the United States. Hence the South was a territory by no means uncontaminated by the barbarism of the blacks who lived there as slaves. Cohabitation with blacks, and sexual contamination, attested by a high number of mulattos—the abolitionist Theodore Parker piled it on—had also left profound traces on southern whites; it was precisely the influence of the ‘African element’ that explained attachment to an institution contrary to the principles of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And just as pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America had done, so too the South protested against the tendential exclusion, of which it felt itself the victim, from the authentic community of the free. It was now no longer the American colonies in their entirety, but the southern states that considered themselves assimilated to the ‘modern Barbary’ mentioned by Blackstone.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg57&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Along with the one just noted, further aspects of the legal argument reappeared that had opposed the rebel colonists to England. In Calhoun’s view, the abolitionists of the North, who wanted to abolish slavery by a federal law, were riding roughshod over the right of each individual state to self-government, and seeking to found the Union on political slavery, on ‘the bond between master and slave’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Naturally, the North reacted by ironizing about this impassioned defence of liberty by the ‘democratic’, slaveholding South. To understand the latter’s subsequent response, we can return for a moment to Franklin. Replying to his English interlocutors, who scoffed at the flag of liberty waved by the rebel colonists and slave-owners, he did not limit himself to recalling the Crown’s interest and involvement in the slave trade. He also employed a second argument, drawing attention to the fact that slavery and servitude had not disappeared across the Atlantic. In particular, coalminers in Scotland were ‘absolute Slaves by your law’; they were ‘bought and sold with the Colliery, and have no more Liberty to leave it than our Negroes have to leave their Master’s Plantation’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The authors of the denunciation of black slavery were responsible for a white slavery that was certainly no better than the one they condemned so vehemently.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, on the occasion of the conflict which had been brewing for decades and reached breaking-point with the Civil War, the South retorted in two ways to the accusations against it. It stressed that the North and abolitionist Britain were not in a position to give lectures even on the way blacks (and peoples of colour in general) were treated; and it pointed out how much slavery survived in an industrial society notionally based on ‘free’ labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us focus for now on the first point. Already during the Philadelphia Convention, the slave-owners rejected the lectures given them in the name of morality, pointing out that the North derived major benefits from the institution of slavery, since its merchant shipping transported the slaves and the commodities produced by them.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1808 the ban on the ‘immigration or introduction’ of black slaves provided for by the federal Constitution had come into effect. But it remained the case (observed the ideologues of the South) that blacks in the North, in addition to suffering the poverty and oppression that were the lot of the poor in general there, were exposed to maltreatment and violence of every kind, as demonstrated by the periodic outbreak of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg58&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;veritable pogroms. Even more repugnant (stressed Calhoun, in particular, in the years leading up to the Civil War) was the hypocrisy of Britain (the country which, having abolished slavery in its colonies, had become the model for the American abolitionists).’[T]he greatest slave dealer on earth’, the country ‘more responsible than any other … for the extent of that form of servitude’ in the American continent, then engaged in waving the banner of abolitionism, with a view to attracting the lucrative production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and coffee to its colonies and ruining potential competitors.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, what results had the putative emancipation of the slaves produced in the English colonies? The condition of the blacks was in no wise improved; in their case, freedom was more of a mirage than ever, while ‘the supremacy of the European race’ continued to be undisputed.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Inevitably, when ‘two races of men, of different color’, and markedly unequal in terms of culture and civilization, tried to live together, the inferior race was destined for subjection.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The very country that elevated itself into champion of the struggle against slavery distinguished itself in completely the opposite direction: not only did it use the labour of ‘slaves’ in India and other colonies, but it ‘[held] in unlimited subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million human beings, dispersed over every part of the globe’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We find an even more explicit reference to the lot of the coolies in another eminent representative of the South, George Fitzhugh. Arraigned once again was Britain, which lauded itself for having abolished slavery in its colonies. In reality, the ‘temporary slaves’ from Asia who had taken the place of the blacks, ‘if not worked to death before their terms of service expire’, subsequently died of starvation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In its main lines, the controversy that developed on the eve and in the course of the Civil War reproduced and resumed the one that had occurred some decades earlier, during the clash between the two shores of the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Liberal system of policy’, ‘liberality of sentiment’ and the institution of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the spread of the political use of the term ‘liberal’ in its various senses, we must remember two reference points. The first is the proud self-consciousness &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg59&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that matured in the wake of the victory achieved during the Seven Years’ War over the France of monarchical and religious absolutism, which was subsequently reinforced in England by the outcome of the Somersett case. The second is the struggles that developed within the community of the free. When the controversy provoked by the agitation of the rebel colonists erupted, the various positions confronting one another all tended to define themselves as in some sense ‘liberal’. Burke sought to promote conciliation, calling upon ‘the liberal government of this free nation’ to evince a spirit of compromise.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Across the Atlantic, at the moment when the United States was founded, Washington emphasized ‘the benefits of a wise and liberal Government’, or a ‘liberal system of policy’, which asserted itself ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, and which had as its basis ‘the free cultivation of Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce’, or ‘liberal and free commerce’, ‘the progressive refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment’, with the prevalence of a ‘liberal sentiment’ of tolerance also regarding relations between ‘every political and religious denomination of men in this country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hitherto the term ‘liberal’ has occurred solely as an adjective. In other contexts, adjective and substantive are interchangeable: ‘every Liberal Briton’ (wrote the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039; in 1798) rejoiced at the problems facing revolutionary, tyrannical France, which had to confront the difficult situation created by the uprising of the black slaves in San Domingo.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, the term in question made its appearance as a noun: signing himself ‘A Liberal’ was the author (possibly Paine) of an article in the &#039;&#039;Pennsylvania Packet&#039;&#039; of 25 March 1780, which came out for the abolition of slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here we have four interventions, which share a liberal profession of faith, but with orientations that are fairly diverse as regards black slavery. In Europe, while stances in favour of it were not wanting, a critical orientation was prevalent: a more or less clear distance tended to be taken from the institution that had had to be repressed to the colonies, in order to confer credibility on the self-consciousness developed by the community of the free. &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;—Adam Smith’s masterpiece, which appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson, a pre-eminent representative &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg60&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Virginia’s planters and slave-owners—observed that the ‘liberal reward of labour’, with the payment of a wage that the ‘free servant’ and ‘free man’ could freely dispose of, was the only thing likely to stimulate individual industry; while economic stagnation was the result of servile labour, whether serfdom or slavery proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Millar regarded the institution of slavery as in contradiction with ‘the liberal sentiments entertained in the latter part of the eighteenth century’, with the ‘more liberal views’ developed in the modern world.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going still further, the great economist’s disciple declared that credibility could be restored to the ‘liberal hypothesis’ only by avoiding its confusion with those who waved the flag of liberty while preserving and, in fact, developing the practice of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Across the Atlantic, by contrast, defence of that institution was much fiercer. Yet it would be mistaken to construct a clear-cut opposition. It is sufficient to reflect on the fact that the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South was, in the first instance, Burke. In 1832 an influential Virginian ideologue, Thomas R. Dew, lauded the advantages of slavery: ‘the menial and low offices’ were reserved for blacks, so that love of liberty and the ‘republican spirit’, peculiar to free, white citizens, flourished with a purity and vigour unknown in the rest of the United States, and had a precedent only in classical antiquity. But in saying this, Dew appealed to Burke and his thesis that, where slavery flourished, the spirit of liberty developed more abundantly.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, the theorist of the slaveholding South indirectly adopted and subscribed to the British Whig’s ‘liberal’ profession of faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In subsequent decades, during the struggle against the North, which was initially political and then military, the slaveholding South could count on many friends in liberal England. A few years before the Civil War, the arguments of the southern ideologues were explicitly echoed by Benjamin Disraeli. With the abolition of slavery in British and French colonies behind him, he characterized the abolition of slavery as ‘a narrative of ignorance, injustice, blundering, waste, and havoc, not easily paralleled in the history of mankind’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In America, if they mixed with the blacks, the whites ‘would become so deteriorated that their states would probably be reconquered and regained by the aborigines’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Would the abolition of slavery in the United States not encourage this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg61&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;admixture, imparting a novel dignity to it? Later, the secessionist Confederacy’s desperate struggle met with a profoundly sympathetic echo from prominent cultural and political representatives of liberal England, provoking the indignation of John Stuart Mill.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the occasion first of the Somersett case, then of the American Revolution and finally of the Civil War, the liberal world appeared profoundly divided over the problem of slavery. How are we to find our bearings in this seeming chaos?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. From the assertion of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ to the condemnation of slavery as such&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We are trying to answer the question we posed at the beginning: Can authors like Fletcher and Calhoun be considered liberals? In the liberal England derived from the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher could calmly demand the introduction of slavery for vagrants without being in any way isolated, just as Hutcheson and Burgh, who expressed more or less similar positions, were not isolated. While Hutcheson was the master of Smith, Fletcher was in correspondence with Locke and enjoyed, along with Burgh, the respect of Jefferson and the circles close to him. These were the years when, as Hume put it, ‘[s]ome passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty … cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution [slavery]’, which accounted for the grandeur of Athens and Rome.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, with the establishment of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, the positions expressed by Fletcher ceased to be, or ceased to be accepted as, liberal. It is true that they took a long time to die. As late as 1838, a German liberal reported the ‘advice, certainly more hinted at than clearly stated, which would wish to find a remedy for the serious danger [represented by an unprecedented and acute social question] in the introduction of veritable slavery for factory workers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it was a suggestion rejected with disdain: the line of demarcation of the liberal ‘party’ had been drawn for a while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar argument can be advanced in connection with Calhoun. In his view, it was the North that was guilty of betraying the liberal principles which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg62&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had inspired the American Revolution. In fact, ‘the defence of human liberty against the aggressions of despotic power had always been most efficient in States where domestic slavery was found to prevail’. Within the Union, it was the South that had ‘constantly inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was in the South that liberalism found its most authentic and mature expression. The term ‘liberal’ (warned John Randolph, sometimes defined as the ‘American Burke’), which originally meant ‘a man attached to enlarged and free principles—a votary of liberty’, would see its true meaning twisted if it had to be used to refer to those who flirted with abolitionism.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A contemporary liberal might be tempted to be shot of the unmanageable presence within the tradition of thought he refers to of an author like Burke, who celebrated the particular intensity of the liberal spirit and love of liberty among slave-owners; or of an author like Calhoun, who in the nineteenth century still hymned the ‘positive good’ that was slavery. And so both of them are officially included in the conservative party. However, such an operation immediately reveals its groundlessness. The category of conservatism is characterized by formalism, in the sense that it can subsume significantly different contents: it is a question of identifying what it is intended to conserve or guard. And there is no doubt that Burke and Calhoun aimed to be vigilant guardians of the social relations and political institutions which emerged, respectively, from the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—two eminently liberal revolutions. It would make no sense to regard Jefferson and Washington as liberals, but this is not the case with Burke—who, unlike them, was not a slaveowner and who, when he celebrated the ‘liberal spirit’ and ‘liberal’ emphasis of the slaveholding South, had in mind precisely figures like these two Virginian statesmen. As late as 1862 Lord Acton cited at length, and implicitly subscribed to, the passage by the British Whig who, far from excluding slave-owners, conferred on them a privileged position in the party of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be just as illogical to exclude from that party Calhoun, who tirelessly reiterated his attachment to representative bodies and the principle of the limitation of power. If, then, going beyond the merely formal meaning of the term, conservatism is to be understood as an uncritical attachment to a pre-modern, pre-industrial society, characterized by the cult of clod of earth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg63&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bell tower, such a category could hardly account for Calhoun’s positions. Once the rights of minorities had been guaranteed, he had no problem with extending the vote and even introducing male ‘universal suffrage’; and, along with representative bodies, he celebrated the development of ‘manufactures’, industry and free trade.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If to anyone, the category of conservatism might be applied to Jefferson. He identified cultivators of the land as ‘the chosen people of God’, assimilated ‘great cities’ to the ‘sores’ of a ‘human body’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1812, during the war with Britain, accused the latter of being an instrument of ‘Satan’ because it had compelled America to abandon the ‘paradise’ of agriculture and engage in ‘manufacturing’, in order to meet the test of arms (see [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). And the category of conservatism might also be applied to Washington. He too viewed with concern the prospect that the Americans might become ‘a manufacturing people’, rather than continuing to be ‘Cultivators’ of the land, thereby avoiding the scourge of the ‘tumultuous populace of large cities’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In particular, it is against Jefferson that Calhoun seems to be arguing when he rejects the thesis that manufacture ‘destroy[s] the moral and physical power of the people’. In reality, this was a concern rendered ever more obsolete by ‘the great perfection of machinery’ introduced into industry.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, if acceptance of free trade is an integral part of liberalism, it is clear that Calhoun can be included in such a tradition much more easily than his adversaries in the North, who were engaged in strict protectionist practices liable (according to the southern theorist’s denunciation) to ‘destroy the liberty of the country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Construed in the broadest sense of the term, the liberal party encompassed both Whigs and Tories. The former did not even necessarily represent the more advanced wing. Josiah Tucker was a Tory, who reprehended Locke and Burke for being followers of a ‘republicanism’ based, precisely, upon slavery and serfdom. For the rest, arguing with ‘Republican Zealots’, he liked to position himself among the true interpreters of ‘English constitutional Liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Disraeli was likewise a Tory, who, while on the one hand echoing the arguments of the slaveholding South, on the other significantly widened the social basis of British representative bodies, granting the vote to significant sections of the popular classes and anyway extending it much further than the Whigs had.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg64&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On the other hand, outside the liberal party even before the Civil War were those who, in their concern to save the institution of slavery and indignation at the weapons supplied by representative bodies to an increasingly threatening abolitionist agitation, spoke with Fitzhugh in the southern United States of the ‘collapse of liberal society’, or ironized with Carlyle in Europe itself over ruinous ‘anarchic–constitutional epochs’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although reiterating the absolute necessity of slavery as the foundation of civilization, both ended up challenging, at least on a theoretical level, the ethnic and spatial delimitations of the institution of slavery. For Fitzhugh, as was demonstrated by the examples of classical antiquity and confirmed by the reality of the modern world, work was inseparable from slavery, so that in one form or another ‘slavery, &#039;&#039;black or white&#039;&#039;, was right and necessary’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In justifying the slavery of the Afro-Americans across the Atlantic and branding the Irish ‘black’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carlyle, admired by Fitzhugh and other southerners, and in correspondence with some of them,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in his turn reached a general ‘conclusion’: ‘whether established by law, or by law abrogated, [slavery] exists very extensively in this world, in and out of the West Indies; and … you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the &#039;&#039;name&#039;&#039; of it, which is very little!’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Whether dealing with slaves, ‘servants hired for life’, or &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, it was still slavery. On the other hand, if the slave was a ‘servant hired for life’, why should one prefer the servant hired for a month or a day?[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spurred by the bitterness of the struggle underway, Fitzhugh and Carlyle ultimately returned to the positions of Fletcher, first marginalized and then regarded as alien to the liberal party. The transition from the liberal party’s first turn to the second can be summarized thus: following the defeat of the South, the emancipation of black slaves and amendments to the US Constitution to that effect, a transition was made from asserting the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ in Europe and the ‘free states’ of the northern United States to general condemnation, on both sides of the Atlantic, of slavery as such. Starting from this second result, the positions expressed by Calhoun were also rejected by the liberal party. But that is not a reason to expel him &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg65&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;retrospectively from the liberal tradition. Otherwise, the same fate would have to be meted out to Locke and a fair number of the protagonists of the American Revolution and the early decades of US history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In any event, with the end of the Civil War a historical cycle came to a close. Having emerged together from a unique twin birth, which saw them entwined in a relationship not without its tensions, liberalism as a whole now broke with slavery in the strict sense—with hereditary, racial slavery. But before examining these new courses, it is appropriate to extend our analysis of the society that was established on the two Atlantic shores up to the Civil War. We have hitherto focused attention on the problem of black slavery. But what relations were developing within the white community?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn1a|1]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1997, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn2a|2]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn3a|3]] Quoted in Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn4a|4]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn5a|5]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 123, 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn6a|6]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn7a|7]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn8a|8]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from John Wesley to William Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn9a|9]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn10a|10]] Max Farrand, ed., &#039;&#039;The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, vol. 1, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn11a|11]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn12a|12]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 199–200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn13a|13]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21, 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn14a|14]] Shearer Davis Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn15a|15]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 59–65; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 39 and &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn16a|16]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 38–9; Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 59.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn17a|17]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 49, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn18a|18]] Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn19a|19]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 557, 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn20a|20]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn21a|21]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §28; vol. 3, ch. xiv, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 562–3 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn23a|23]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn24a|24]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 157–8, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn25a|25]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1483.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn26a|26]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn27a|27]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §6; Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn29a|29]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 377.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn30a|30]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, pp. 84–93.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn31a|31]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Tracts on Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Philip Abrams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn32a|32]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn33a|33]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., p. 355.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn42a|42]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 394–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn43a|43]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn45a|45]] The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; is reproduced and commented on in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 89–203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn46a|46]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn49a|49]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 412.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 410–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn54a|54]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 37; David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 231, 472, 495–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn55a|55]] Ramsay, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 387.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn56a|56]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 92, 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn57a|57]] Adams, quoted in David B. Davis, ‘A Big Business’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 11 January 1998, p. 50 n. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn58a|58]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., pp. 19, 32; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn61a|61]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 16–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 367–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn65a|65]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn66a|66]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn67a|67]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 6ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn68a|68]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn69a|69]] Quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;An Imperfect Union&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn70a|70]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 66, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn71a|71]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, pp. 7–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn72a|72]] Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, pp. 254–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn73a|73]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 401, 511–12, 636.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn74a|74]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn75a|75]] Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 426.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn76a|76]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn77a|77]] Parker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 231–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn78a|78]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 436.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn79a|79]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 651.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn80a|80]] Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn81a|81]] Calhoun, quoted in Massimo L. Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà nel mondo moderno&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, pp. 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn82a|82]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn84a|84]] Calhoun, quoted in Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà&#039;&#039;, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn85a|85]] George Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, Richmond: Morris, 1854, pp. 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn86a|86]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn87a|87]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 242, 247, 242 (‘Circular to the States’, 4 June 1783), 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786), 545 (letter to the Hebrew Congregation, January 1790).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn88a|88]] Cf. David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 130.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn89a|89]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 132; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn90a|90]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 98–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn91a|91]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 296, 250.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn92a|92]] Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. II, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn93a|93]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95a|95]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96a|96]] Robert von Mohl, ‘Gwerbe- und Fabrikwesen’, in Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch, eds, &#039;&#039;Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97a|97]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 468, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98a|98]] Randolph, quoted in Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, pp. 63, 43 (for the characterization as ‘the American Burke’).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99a|99]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100a|100]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 35–6, 315.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101a|101]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 290–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102a|102]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, pp. 455 (‘Fragments of the First Discarded Inaugural Address’, April 1789), 554 (letter to La Fayette, 28 July 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103a|103]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 308.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105a|105]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. ix, 12, 96.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106a|106]] Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, ed. Michael K. Goldberg and Jules P. Seigel, Ottawa: Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1983, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107a|107]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, pp. 98, 225; cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12 &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039; and ch. 22, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108a|108]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109a|109]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, p. 286; Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110a|110]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 464–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER THREE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page66&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Franklin, Smith and ‘vestiges of slavery’ in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
First the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and then the South of the United States during the conflict that pitted it against the North, accused their opponents of hypocrisy. The latter waxed indignant over black slavery, but shut its eyes to the fact that what were essentially slave relations persisted within the society it held up as a model. As we know, Franklin compared the miners of Scotland to the blacks of the American plantations, and thus challenged the London government’s pretension to elevate itself into a champion of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, this was a polemical intervention, but one whose validity was confirmed by a rather authoritative witness. Although sharing the proud self-consciousness of his compatriots or the ruling class of his country, Adam Smith acknowledged the persistence in Great Britain of ‘vestiges of slavery’: a labour relationship not dissimilar from serfdom was in force in salt works and coalmines. Just as the &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, still very numerous in Eastern Europe, were forcibly bound to the land to be cultivated and sold at the same time as it, so in the country that had left behind the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; some decades earlier, the &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; were in a sense an integral part of the &#039;&#039;opus&#039;&#039; or works (the salt work or mine) and, when this was sold, passed together with their family into the service of the new master. Hence it was not a question of actual slavery, of chattel slavery, which allowed individual members of a family to be put on the market like any other commodity. The &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; could marry and lead a genuine family life; they could own a minimum of property; and, naturally, they did not risk being killed with impunity: ‘their lives are under the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protection of the laws of the land’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it remained the case that in Scotland workers in coalmines and salt works were obliged to wear a collar on which the name of their master was inscribed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the wake of the great economist, Millar too could not but ‘regret … that any species of slavery should still remain in Great Britain’; and it was to be hoped that parliament would intervene to remedy the situation, finally sanctioning ‘the freedom of the labouring people’ in Scottish mines and salt works.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Judging from Smith’s &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, these were ‘the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Does this mean that the other labour relations were based on freedom? Referring to England in the second half of the eighteenth century, Blackstone distinguished between three types of ‘servant’ in the strict sense (we ignore here personnel charged with overseeing and guarding the master’s property): ‘menial servants’ or ‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’, and finally ‘labourers’, who worked outside the master’s house. The most modern labour relation, least informed by feudal and servile echoes, would seem to be the last. In this connection, however, the great jurist indulged in celebrating ‘very good regulations’ on the basis of which, for example, ‘all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work’, while those who ‘leave or desert their work’ were punished. Over the domestic or apprentice, the master exercised a right of ‘corporal punishment’ that must not result in death or mutilation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what happened if this limit was exceeded? We can infer Smith’s answer: ‘The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon or with forethought and without provocation.’ It is difficult to regard such servants as free men even if, according to the great economist, they enjoyed ‘almost the same privileges with their master, liberty, wages, etca’. In fact, what creates a radical difference is the power of correction exercised by the one over the other. The same Smith included menial servants, together with slaves proper, in the master’s extended family.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Masters did not confine themselves to monitoring their servant’s industriousness. Let us attend to Hume’s evidence: ‘At present, all masters discourage &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg69&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the females, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their service.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The opportunity to have a family seems largely denied not only to the black slave, but also to the white domestic servant: the private lives of both were subject to the master’s power or will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it is to be noted that comparable to menial servants were ‘apprentices’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] whose condition, in England at any rate, had been regarded by Grotius as approximating closely enough to the slave’s. And such, basically, was also Blackstone’s opinion. He reiterated the slave’s obligation to provide service ‘for life’ with a rather eloquent argument: fundamentally, it was the same relationship that the apprentice had with his master, except that in the latter case there was a time limit (seven years and sometimes more).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has justly been observed, ‘[f]or most of human history the expression “free labor” was an oxymoron.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The unemployed, beggars and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As the controversy between the two sides of the Union became increasingly bitter, Calhoun positively contrasted the condition of American slaves with that of inmates of workhouses or poorhouses in England. The former were lovingly treated and cared for by the master or mistress during illness or old age, while the latter were reduced to a ‘forlorn and wretched condition’; the former continued to live among their family and friends, while the latter were uprooted from their environment and also separated from their loved ones.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The apologetic intention that governs the description or transfiguration of the institution of slavery is clear. Yet when it came to workhouses in England, Calhoun was not the only one to underscore the horror. In de Tocqueville’s view, they afforded ‘the most horrendous and repugnant [spectacle] of misery’: on the one hand, the infirm incapable of work and waiting to die; on the other, women and children massed pell-mell ‘like pigs in the mud of their sty; it is difficult not to trample over a semi-naked body’. Finally, there were the comparatively more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg70&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘fortunate’—those in a position to work: they earned little or nothing and fed off the leftovers of stately homes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But however horrible, poverty and degradation were not the most significant aspect of workhouses. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe favourably mentioned the example of the workhouse in Bristol, which ‘has been such a Terror to the Beggars that none of [them] will come near the City’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the workhouse was subsequently described by Engels as a total institution: ‘Paupers wear the uniform of the house and are subject to the will of the director without any protection whatsoever’; so that ‘the “morally degenerate” parents cannot influence their children, families are separated; the man is sent to one wing, the woman to another, the children to a third’. Families were broken up, but for the rest all were amassed sometimes to the tune of twelve or sixteen in a single room. Any kind of violence was inflicted on them, not even sparing the elderly and children, and involving particular attention to women. In practice, the inmates of workhouses were treated as ‘objects of disgust and horror placed outside the law and the human community’. Thus was explained the fact, underscored by Engels, that in order to escape the ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ (as they were popularly renamed), ‘inmates of work houses often deliberately make themselves guilty of any crime whatsoever in order to go to prison’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact (add contemporary historians), ‘many indigents preferred to die of hunger and illness’ rather than subject themselves to a workhouse.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We are put in mind of the suicide that slaves often resorted to in order to escape their condition. Examined carefully, the 1834 law that shut up anyone requiring assistance in a workhouse in a sense vindicates Calhoun and those who pointed to slavery as the only possible solution to the problem of poverty. Fighting for the new legislation, its inspirer, Nassau William Senior, denounced the fatal contradiction in the rules hitherto in force, which allowed the poor person to enjoy a minimum of assistance for continuing a normal life: ‘The labourer is to be a free agent, but without the hazards of free agency; to be free from the coercion, but to enjoy the assured existence of the slave.’ But ‘unit[ing] the irreconcilable advantages of freedom and servitude’ was utterly absurd: a choice was required.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing thus, the influential economist and liberal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg71&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;theorist, interlocutor and correspondent of Tocqueville, ended up recognizing the substantially slave-like character of the relations obtaining in workhouses.&lt;br /&gt;
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Coming as it did in 1834, the new legislation coincided with the emancipation of blacks in the colonies. We can thus understand the irony, on the one hand, of the theorists of the slaveholding South in the United States and, on the other, of the English popular masses faced with a dominant class which, while it lauded itself for having abolished slavery in the colonies, reintroduced it in a different form in the metropolis itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Liberals, vagrants and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have mentioned the role played by Senior in the passing of the 1834 law. But what position did the liberal tradition as a whole adopt towards workhouses and, more generally, the policy of disciplining poverty? According to Locke, it was necessary to intervene thoroughly and drastically in an infected area of society that was constantly expanding. From the age of three, the children of families not in a position to feed them should be sent out to work.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Moreover, it was necessary to intervene with their parents. To discourage the idleness and dissoluteness of vagrants, it was appropriate to proceed in areas frequented by them to ‘the suppressing of superfluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Secondly, begging should be discouraged and restricted. Beggars were obliged to wear a ‘badge’; to oversee them, and prevent them practising their activity outside the permitted area and hours, a special body was provided, the ‘beadles of beggars’, who in their turn were to be controlled by ‘guardians’ so that they performed their task with the requisite diligence and severity. But the whole community was called upon to participate in the beggar hunt, starting with the inhabitants of the house where the wretches had requested charity.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Draconian penalties awaited vagrants who managed to escape this comprehensive control. It was right that those caught asking for alms outside their parish and near a sea port should be pressed into the navy: they were to be ‘punished as deserters’—i.e. with the death penalty—‘if they go on shore without leave; or, when sent on shore, if they either go further, or stay longer, than they have leave’. The other illegal beggars were to be interned in a normal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg72&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse or house of correction. The master ‘shall have no other consideration nor allowance but what their labour shall produce; whom therefore he shall have power to employ according to his discretion’. Once again, this arbitrary power summons up the spectre of slavery. As is confirmed by a further detail: that ‘whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the forgery for the first time that he is found guilty thereof; and the second time, that he shall be transported to the plantations, as in case of felony’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, in the nineteenth century the situation was different. With the 1834 reform, arriving in the workhouses were those who sought to escape death from starvation in some way: the workhouses must be made as odious as possible in order to reduce the number of those who sought refuge in them to a minimum. In this philosophy, which began to take shape with Malthus,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville likewise joined: ‘It is obvious that we must make assistance unpleasant, we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison and render our charity repugnant.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In denouncing this institution, Calhoun referred exclusively to Europe. Yet it was present, in one form or another, in the United States. De Tocqueville referred to it, significantly, in the context of his analysis of the ‘prison system’. Who were the inmates? The answer was clear: ‘The indigent who cannot earn their living by honest work, and those who do not want to.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was therefore understandable that workhouses became particularly crowded at times of crisis:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The fluctuations in industry attract, when favourable, a large number of workers who find themselves without work in times of crisis. Thus we see that vagrancy, which is born of idleness, and stealing, which is invariably the result of vagrancy, are the two crimes that are experiencing the most rapid increase in the current state of society.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The crime that led to internment was already identified with unemployment and poverty. Making the judicial decisions, for example in New York, was a functionary who could readily deprive of their liberty those who in his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg73&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;judgment ‘have no means of subsistence’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Protests were understandable: the poor person thus confined ‘regards himself as unfortunate, not culpable; he challenges society’s right violently to force him to do fruitless work and to deal with him against his will’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us return to England. John Stuart Mill was inclined to trivialize the horror of workhouses when he observed: ‘Even the labourer who loses his employment by idleness or negligence, has nothing worse to suffer, in the most unfavourable case, than the discipline of a workhouse’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the liberal philosopher’s opinion can be contrasted with that of modern scholars: once they had entered workhouses, the poor ‘ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’, because they lost ‘the civil right of personal liberty’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was a radical loss: the ‘guardians’ of the workhouses had the discretional power of inflicting the corporal punishment deemed most fitting on inmates.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Bentham was decidedly enthusiastic. He tirelessly lauded the benefits of this institution, which he aimed further to perfect, locating the workhouse in a ‘panoptical’ building which allowed the director to exercise secret, total control—that is, to observe every single aspect of the behaviour of the unwitting inmates at any point in time:&lt;br /&gt;
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What hold can any other manufacturer have upon his workmen, equal to what my manufacturer would have upon his? What other master is there that can reduce his workmen, if idle, to a situation next to starving, without suffering them to go elsewhere? What other master is there, whose men can never get drunk unless he chooses that they should do so? and who, so far from being able to raise their wages by combination, are obliged to take whatever pittance he thinks it most for his interest to allow? … and what other master or manufacturer is there, who to appearance constantly, and in reality as much as he thinks proper, has every look and motion of each workman under his eye?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg74&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence the contribution to the development of national wealth by workhouses, intended to operate as ‘industry-houses’, would be enormous. They were to be spread over the whole national territory, confining up to 500,000 detainees, and in any event ‘all persons, able-bodied or otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of livelihood’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to this gigantic concentration-camp universe, where people would be interned without having committed any crime and without any control by the judiciary, it would be possible to perform the miracle of transforming the ‘dross’ that was the ‘refuse of the population’ into money.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was not all. Given the isolation it entailed, the workhouse made it possible to experiment, as we shall see, with producing a stock of especially industrious and conscientious labourers. Certainly, for such objectives to be achieved, rigorous discipline was required, which must be thoroughly internalized by the detainees in the workhouse:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Soldiers&#039;&#039; wear &#039;&#039;uniforms&#039;&#039;, why not paupers?—those who save the country, why not those who are saved by it? Not the &#039;&#039;permanent&#039;&#039; hands only, but likewise the &#039;&#039;coming-and-going&#039;&#039; hands should wear the uniform while in the house, for order, distinction, and recognition, as well as for tidiness …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The servant as soldier&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, it was Bentham who compared the condition of a workhouse inmate with that of the soldier. But it is appropriate to take a step back. During his residence in London, Franklin, discomfited by his English interlocutors mocking the flag of liberty waved by colonists who were often slave-owners, replied by highlighting, among other things, the persistence in England of slave-like relations even within the armed forces.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The reference was above all to the navy. Let us attend to historians of our day: ‘the men of the fleet were so ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-handled that it was impossible to obtain crews by free enlistment’. Many sought to escape this kind of sequestration, but Great Britain gave chase to them, without hesitating to search American ships and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg75&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;take by force deserters, including those who had become US citizens in the meantime. It was necessary to resort to drastic measures to ensure the functioning of ‘more than 700 warships in commission, with nearly 150,000 sailors and marines’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so, like Franklin before him, we have Calhoun denouncing ‘the slavery of impressed seamen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This was a common theme in the journalism of the time. In Britain itself, defenders of slavery stressed the analogy between this institution and being pressed into the navy. Both practices were justified by exceptional circumstances—namely, the need to maintain the colonies and the navy, respectively. On the other side, the abolitionist Sharp condemned both practices.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, William Wilberforce sought to make distinctions, and was accused of hypocrisy by his opponents:[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the pious pastor was moved by the condition of black slaves, but was indifferent to the no less grievous suffering of the kind of white slaves on whom the British Empire’s military power and glory were based. The argument was far from trivial. Sailors were ‘seized by press gangs from the streets of London and Liverpool’; and at a popular level no institution was more hated than the press gang.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conditions to which men were then subjected can be readily be inferred from Locke’s indirect comparison between the power of ‘the captain of a galley’ and that exercised by ‘a lord over his slave’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The capture of sailors in popular districts had something in common with the capture of blacks in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
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And it was not only the navy. A contemporary scholar summarizes the condition of those military ‘captives in uniform’ who were soldiers, called upon to defend a rapidly expanding empire in every corner of the world:&lt;br /&gt;
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They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk and culture of origin for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they might &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg76&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were apt to die prematurely anyway.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For the rest, the way Locke described ‘the common practice of martial discipline’ is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This above all calls to mind the ‘absolute power of life and death’ wielded by officers over their subordinates. It is the phrase Locke habitually used to define the essence of slavery. Is it a rhetorical exaggeration? Already in Grotius we find the observation that the condition of the slave is not very different from that of the soldier.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us concentrate on liberal England. The mortality rate of soldiers en route to India was comparable to that affecting black slaves during their deportation from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Moreover, British soldiers were subject to the punishment traditionally reserved for slaves—flogging—and, paradoxically, continued to be even when this form of discipline had been abolished for Indian troops.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Power relations in the army reproduced those existing in society. The figure of the soldier tended to coincide with that of the servant. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe observed: ‘any Man would carry a Musket rather than starve … ’tis Poverty makes Men Soldiers, and drives Crowds into the Armies’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At the end of the century, Townsend reiterated that ‘distress and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg77&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;poverty’ alone could impel ‘the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean, or in the field of battle’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, to put the point this time with Mandeville, ‘[t]he Hardships and Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the Brunt of every Thing’—namely, ‘the working slaving People’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the figure of the officer tended to coincide with that of the master, and the contempt officers/masters had for troops was professed and even ostentatious. Troops of the line (lamented an ordinary soldier) were ‘the lowest class of animals, and only fit to be ruled with the cat o’ nine tails’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—that is, with the whip capable of inflicting the most sadistic punishments, those usually reserved for disobedient slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The penal code, formation of a compulsory workforce, and the process of colonization&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of military recruitment is thus understandable: prisons were ‘rumag’d for Malefactors’; the profession of soldier (observed Defoe) above all devolved on ‘Men taken from the Gallows’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, there were plenty of them. From 1688 to 1820, the number of crimes carrying the death penalty increased from 50 to between 200 and 250, and they were almost always crimes against property. While attempted homicide was regarded as a petty crime until 1803, the theft of a shilling or handkerchief, or the illegal clipping of an ornamental bush, could entail hanging; and one could be consigned to the hangman even at the age of eleven.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, in some cases, even young children ran this risk: in 1833 the death penalty was pronounced on a pickpocket of nine, although the sentence was subsequently commuted.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more significant than the increase in penalties was the criminalization of behaviour that had hitherto been licit. The enclosure and private appropriation of common land underwent significant development; and the peasant or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg78&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;commoner who was late in appreciating the new situation became a thief, a criminal to be visited with all the force of the law. This might seem an arbitrary and brutal way to behave; but that is not what Locke thought. In legitimizing the colonists’ appropriation of land left uncultivated by the Indians, the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; simultaneously adopted a clear position in favour of enclosure in England. ‘[I]n the beginning, all the world was America’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and common land was a kind of vestige of this original, wild state, which work, private appropriation and money had subsequently overcome. It was a process that manifested itself on a large scale across the Atlantic, but which was not unknown in England: ‘even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’, until enclosure and private appropriation intervened positively.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with the despoliation of the Indians and English peasants, Locke also justified terroristic legislation in defence of property: it was ‘lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was only a petty crime in appearance. In reality, the guilty party, if only momentarily, had deprived his victim of his ‘right to liberty’ and had made him a ‘slave’. At this point, no one could exclude the possibility that theft would not be followed by homicide, since it was precisely the power of life and death that defined the relationship of slavery. This was synonymous with a state of war, and hence there was no reason why the thief should not be done to death, whatever the extent of the theft.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What Locke seems to be saying is that at stake is not only the shilling or handkerchief or whatever other rather minor stolen good: private property as such and, over and above it, liberty were in danger. Thus, what legitimized the pickpocket’s killing or execution is the same liberal pathos that had presided over the condemnation of monarchical despotism as the source of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to common land, even birds and wild animals became objects of private appropriation by the landed aristocracy. In this instance, it was not possible to appeal to Locke. In fact, on the basis of his theory, not having been transformed by labour, birds and wild animals should have been regarded as common property. And yet, in accordance with legislation enacted after the Glorious Revolution, while the peasant slid into the condition of thief, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg79&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hunter was transformed into poacher; and here too the terrorism of the penal code was called on to compel respect for the incursion.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the slavery and trading of blacks, the vulgar historicist explanation does not stand up when it comes to the expansion in crimes against property and the increased severity of the penalties provided for them. It is misleading to refer to the spirit of the times. ‘It is very doubtful whether any other country possessed a criminal code with anything like so many capital provisions as there were in this single statute.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruthless character of English legislation was already proverbial on its enactment. While Napoleon exercised his iron rule over France, a reformer like Sir Samuel Romilly felt compelled to offer a bitter observation: ‘there is probably no other country in the world in which so many and so great a variety of human actions are punishable with loss of life as in England’. [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel denounced the ‘draconian’ severity whereby ‘every thief in England [is] hanged’, in an absurd equation of life and property, of the two ‘qualitatively different’ crimes that were homicide and theft. The class origins of such ‘draconian’ severity were even identified: for peasants guilty of illegal hunting ‘the harshest and most disproportionate punishments’ were provided, because ‘those who made those laws and who are now sitting in the courts as magistrates and jurors’ were the aristocracy, the very class that held a monopoly on hunting.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to maintain law and order was only one aspect of the problem. Not infrequently, those sentenced to death (or even a long prison term) saw their sentence commuted to deportation to the colonies. Already in force for some time, from 1717 the practice of deportation assumed an official character and significant proportions.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So following the Glorious Revolution, we witness, on the one hand, the enactment of terroristic legislation and, on the other, the burgeoning phenomenon of deportation to remote colonies. Is there a link between the two events? It is difficult to deny that the formation of a large compulsory workforce through drastic harshening of the legal code ultimately made it possible to satisfy ‘the labor needs of the plantations’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, underlying this practice was a specific theory. Locke repeatedly demanded penal slavery for those who made an attempt on another person’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg80&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life or property. Already in the state of nature, ‘[t]he damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things were even clearer in the social state:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of the colonial war as just war (on the part of Europeans) and the theory of penal slavery legitimized and galvanized the deportation, respectively, of the black slaves and white semi-slaves required by colonial development. On the eve of the American Revolution, in Maryland alone there were 20,000 servants of criminal origin. To put the point with Samuel Johnson, they were ‘a race of convicts, and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging’. And that is how an inexhaustible source of forced labour was fed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Indentured servants&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This labour force proved precious for the purposes of populating and exploiting colonies as they were conquered. Initially, the flow of indentured servants went in the direction of America. Subsequently, supplanted and rendered superfluous by the massive introduction of black slaves, and in any event after the achievement of independence by the United States, white semi-slaves were diverted towards Australia, where they made an even more significant contribution to the process of exploiting the new colony. What were the characteristics of this labour relationship? Let us start with the journey of relocation or deportation from Britain. The horrors and mortality rate call to mind the famous ‘middle passage’ to which black slaves were subjected. Sometimes not even half the ‘passengers’ survived the voyage. Among them were to be found children between the ages of one and seven; they rarely escaped death. A witness related &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg81&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;having seen thirty-two children of tender years cast into the ocean in the course of a single voyage. Diseases continued to rage even after the crossing of the Atlantic; as a result, the new arrivals were often subjected to quarantine. There then intervened the moment of the market. In the papers commercial adverts of the following kind could be read: ‘Just arrived at Leedstown, the Ship &#039;&#039;Justitia&#039;&#039; with about one Hundred Healthy Servants. Men, Women and Boys, among which are many Tradesmen … The Sale will Commence on Tuesday, the 2nd of April’ (&#039;&#039;The Virginia Gazette&#039;&#039;, 28 March 1771). Husband and wife were often separated, and might be separated from their children, permanently or for a long period; children under the age of five were obliged to render service until they were twenty-one. Flogged by their masters in the event of indiscipline or disobedience, servants sometimes fled, and then a manhunt was unleashed. The local press provided an accurate physical description of the fugitives who, once taken, were punished and branded with the letter R (standing for ‘rogue’) or subjected to the excision of ears. Thus rendered immediately recognizable, they no longer had any escape.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, was the difference compared with slaves proper? Sometimes white semi-slaves bemoaned their lot: ‘Many blacks are treated better.’ In fact, unlike real slaves, servants could turn to the judiciary and hope to be accepted into the community of the free, and were indeed admitted ‘assuming they survived their period of labor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that death often intervened first. But we are dealing with a social relation that is different from hereditary racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was it a social relation marked by freedom? We have seen Locke on the one hand stress the contractual, and hence free, genesis of the figure of servant, and on the other let slip the admission that he was not really free. But on this point we should also attend to Sieyès’ opinion. Looking across the Atlantic, he argued thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The final class, composed of men who have only their hands, can have need of regulated &#039;&#039;slavery&#039;&#039; in order to escape the &#039;&#039;slavery of need&#039;&#039;. Why restrict natural liberty? I want to sell my time and my services of whatever kind (I do not say my life) for a &#039;&#039;year&#039;&#039;, two &#039;&#039;years&#039;&#039;, etc., as occurs in English America. The law is silent in this connection, and it should only speak to prevent abuses of the institution that endanger liberty. Thus it will be possible to hire oneself or serve [&#039;&#039;s’engager/s’asservir&#039;&#039;] for a maximum of five years.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg82&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Sieyès did not disguise the fact that what characterized the figure of the indentured servant was subservience, ‘servile engagement’ (&#039;&#039;engageance serve&#039;&#039;), or ‘legally regulated slavery’. However, especially after the outbreak of the French Revolution, apologetic concerns seem to have got the upper hand: in the new ideological and political climate, it was no longer possible to declare oneself in favour of an institution whose substantially slave-like character was acknowledged. And so we have Sieyès arguing against those for whom the indentured servant was a person who ‘loses some of his freedom’. No:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is more accurate to say that, at the point when the contract is drawn up, far from being impeded in his liberty, he exercises it in the way most opportune to him. Any convention is an exchange in which each likes what he receives more than what he gives up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is true that for the duration of the contract the servant could not exercise the liberty ceded by him. But it was a general rule that the liberty of an individual ‘never extends to the point of harming others’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, from the outset Sieyès upheld contractual servitude in the name of ‘natural liberty’, of the right possessed by every individual to draw up the contract that seemed most opportune to him. In other words, the key category of liberal thought (the category of contract), invoked by Grotius to legitimize slavery proper, was applied by Sieyès solely to the labour relation that binds the indentured servant to his master. This was not dissimilar from Locke, the difference being that the French author, prior to the Revolution at least, stressed the fundamentally slave-like character of the relationship. That is why he was concerned to stress the vigilance the law should be called on to exercise: public officials should control the master’s actions in order to prevent the ‘person’ of the servant ‘being harmed through unduly prolonged hire or during the hire’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sieyès seems to propose a kind of code for regulating this white semi-slavery, on the model of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; with which, in theory, the masters of black slaves should comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. ‘The extensive Herod-like kidnappings’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg83&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Among the compulsory labour force called on to ensure the development of the colonies were also youngsters of poor condition, deceived with honeyed words, abducted and deported across the Atlantic.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Alternatively, they arrived in America with their parents, who were often compelled to sell them, never seeing them again. The situation of children of popular extraction was not much better in England. Marx denounced ‘the extensive Herod-like kidnappings perpetrated in the early days of the factory system, when children were stolen from the work houses and orphanages, and capital thereby incorporated a mass of unresisting human material’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going beyond the use of orphanages as a source of low-cost and more or less compulsory labour, we can make a general observation here. If, in the proto-liberal theory and practice of the time, the wage-labourer was (as we shall soon see) the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; Burke mentions, or the ‘bipedal machine’ referred to by Sieyès, his children were ultimately &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;, destined to be used at the first opportunity precisely in their capacity as work tools and machines. Locke explicitly declared that poor children, who were to be sent to work from the age of three, must ‘be taken off their [parents’] hands’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over a century later, Bentham’s attitude was not dissimilar. He invited people to look for inspiration to ‘manufactures where children, down to four years old, earn something, and where children a few years older earn a subsistence, and that a comfortable one’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was permissible and beneficial to ‘tak[e] the children out of the hands of their parents as much as possible, and even, if possible, altogether’. There should be no hesitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Y]ou may even clap them up in an inspection-house, and then you make of them what you please. You need never grudge the parents &#039;&#039;a peep behind the curtain&#039;&#039; in the master’s lodge … you might keep up a sixteen or eighteen years separation between the male and female part of your young subjects …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The children of the poor were at the complete disposal of society. We are reminded of the fate reserved for slaves across the Atlantic. To end their presence on American soil, suggested Jefferson, one might at a moderate price, and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg84&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps even gratis, acquire newborn blacks, place them ‘under the guardianship of the State’, subject them to work as soon as possible, and thus largely recover the expenses required for their deportation to San Domingo, which should be set in train when convenient. Certainly, ‘[t]he separation of infants from their mothers … would produce some scruples of humanity’, but there was no need to be so fussy.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While he was motivated by economic calculations, rather than worries about racial purity, Bentham would have liked to proceed perhaps even more ruthlessly with the children of the poor in England: ‘An inspection-house, to which a set of children had been consigned from their birth, might afford experiments enough … What say you to a &#039;&#039;foundling-hospital&#039;&#039; upon this principle?’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall see that Bentham also envisaged experiments of a eugenic character. But for now we can reach a conclusion by attending to an English economist (Edward G. Wakefield), who in 1834 published a successful book devoted to the contrast between America and England: ‘it is the whole press of England, not I, that calls English children [of popular extraction] slaves’. The majority were compelled to work such long hours that they inadvertently fell asleep, only to be awoken and forced back to work with beatings and torments of every kind. As to foundlings, they were dispensed with rapidly enough: adverts were affixed to the doors of workhouses promoting their sale. In London the price of male and female children put on the market thus was significantly below that of black slaves in America; in rural regions, such commodities were even cheaper.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing down on this mass of wretches was legislation that was certainly not marked by the protection of civil liberties. One thinks of the blank warrants that allowed the police to arrest or search a person at will. Abolished by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, this ‘intolerable tool of oppression’ (to adopt the description of it given by the French liberal Laboulaye in 1866)[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] long continued to survive in England. Smith himself tended if not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg85&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to justify it, in any case to trivialize it. He was astonished that the ‘common people’, rather than fighting for the free circulation and buying and selling of labour power, exhibited all its indignation ‘against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The death penalty was imposed with great facility but also with some discretion. With the passing in 1723 of the Black Act—the ‘blacks’ were alleged deer rustlers—in some cases it was not necessary to resort to a formal process to provide for the death sentence, which consigned to the hangman even those who had in some way aided a thief (or alleged thief) to escape justice.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without betraying any disquiet, Mandeville recognized that ‘the Lives of Hundreds, if not Thousands, of Necessitous Wretches, that are daily hanged for Trifles’ were being snuffed out;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] execution often became a mass spectacle with pedagogical purposes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British liberal called upon magistrates not to be inhibited either by misplaced ‘compassion’ or by undue doubts and scruples. Certainly, thieves might have committed theft under the spur of necessity: ‘what they can get Honestly is not sufficient to keep them’. Yet ‘the Peace of the Society’ required that the guilty be hanged. Yes, ‘the Evidences perhaps want clearness or are otherwise insufficient’; and there was a risk that an innocent person might be put to death. But however ‘terrible’ that would be, the aim must be achieved that ‘not one Guilty Person [be] suffered to escape with Impunity’. It would be a serious thing if overly scrupulous judges prioritized their ‘Conscience’ over the ‘Advantage to a Nation’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The courts of the property-owner judges were called upon to operate as a kind of committee of public safety.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then conclude that, setting aside the colonies in their entirety (including Ireland), in Britain itself full enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by the law—the ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ liberty that Constant and Berlin, respectively, refer to[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—was the privilege of a small minority. The mass of people was subject to regulation and coercion that extended far beyond the workplace (or the place of punishment that was the prison, but also the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg86&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse and the army). While Locke proposed regulating the consumption of alcohol by the popular classes, Mandeville believed that, at least on Sunday, ‘every Amusement Abroad that might allure or draw them from’ attending church should be ‘prohibited’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the subject of alcohol, Burke argued differently: while it had no nutritional properties, it could alleviate hunger pangs in the poor person; moreover, ‘at all times, and in all countries’, alcohol, together with ‘opium’ and ‘tobacco’, had been turned to for the ‘moral consolations’ men sometimes needed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, even more than the disciplining of workers and vagrants as in Locke and Mandeville, the problem was that of dulling the consciousness and suffering of the starving in general. What remained constant was the tendency to govern the existence of the popular classes even in its smallest details. The reference to opium added a touch of cynicism. Reports by government committees of inquiry would subsequently denounce the catastrophe: in the poorest districts, opium consumption was spreading, and was becoming a means of feeding or a substitute for it. It was sometimes given to infants, who ‘ “shrank up into little old men”, or “wizened like little monkeys” ’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This detailed regulation obviously also included religious indoctrination. In Locke’s view, for poor children to start work from the age of three was a beneficial measure not only economically, but also morally: ‘Another advantage … of bringing poor children … to a working-school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday along with their school-masters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Mandeville demanded that Sunday attendance of church become ‘a Duty’ for the poor and illiterate. Appealing to spontaneous religious feelings was insufficient: ‘It is a Duty incumbent on all Magistrates to take particular Care’ of what happened on Sundays. ‘The Poor more especially and their Children should be made to go to Church on it both in the Fore and Afternoon’. Positive results would not be wanting: ‘Where this Care is taken by the Magistrates as far as it lies in their Power, Ministers of the Gospel may instill into the smallest Capacities’ devotion and the virtue of obedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Controlled in their private life, the popular classes were even more so in the public existence which, amid a host of difficulties, they sought: ‘Between 1793 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg87&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp; 1820, more than 60 acts directed at repression of working-class collective action were passed by Parliament.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More even than trade-union activity in the strict sense—that is, action aimed at raising wages and improving working conditions—the very attempt by servants to escape their isolation and communicate with one another was viewed with dismay. They (thundered Mandeville in alarm) ‘assemble when they please with Impunity’. They even developed relations of mutual solidarity; they sought to aid a colleague dismissed or flogged by his master. Simply by virtue of not confining themselves to the vertical, subaltern relationship with their superiors, but seeking to develop horizontal relations with one another, servants were to be considered culpable of unacceptable subversion: they were ‘daily incroaching upon Masters and Mistresses, and endeavouring to be more upon the Level with them’; they had already raised ‘the low Dignity of their Condition … from the Original Meanness which the publick Welfare requires it should always remain in’. Exceeding every limit, the servant posed as a gentleman; this was the ‘comedy’ of the ‘Gentleman Footman’, a comedy which in fact, in the absence of timely intervention, might turn into a ‘tragedy’ for the whole nation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant in this context was the position taken by Adam Smith. He acknowledged that ‘[w]e have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’ Besides, ‘[t]he masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily … Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’, or ‘to sink the wages of labour even below this rate’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence even were masters and workers to be treated identically in legislative terms, the former would always enjoy an advantageous situation. But they were also favoured by the precarious living conditions of the opposing party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they [the workers] have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg88&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;All this did not prevent Smith from recommending that the government act severely against working-class combinations. Certainly, ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. However, it was ‘impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which … would be consistent with liberty and justice’. But the government must forestall any working-class gathering, even the most casual and seemingly innocuous. For example, the requirement of bureaucratic registration for those who practice a specific profession ended up ‘connect[ing] individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another’. Utterly intolerable was any ‘regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, not only trade-union activity, but even a mutual aid society was to be considered illegal. Smith recognized that he was dealing with ‘desperate men’, who risked dying of starvation. And yet this consideration took second place to the need to avoid meetings, ‘conversations’ or gatherings that tended to be synonymous with a ‘conspiracy against the public’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to criminalize at birth any popular association, the dominant class in England resorted to yet more summary methods, which can be described in Constant’s words: ‘the horrendous expedient of sending spies to incite ignorant minds and suggest rebellion to them, so as then to be able to denounce them’. Results were not wanting: ‘The wretches captivated those who had the misfortune to listen to them and probably also accused those they did not succeed in captivating.’ And justice came crashing down on both.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. A whole with singular characteristics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mandeville call on judges to be summary in condemning to death those guilty or suspected of theft and pilferage, even at the cost of striking down some innocents. The priority was the need to safeguard ‘the peace of the society’ or ‘advantage to a nation’. Blackstone acknowledged that press-ganging men into the navy seemed dubious and detrimental to liberty. It was ‘only defensible for public necessity, to which all private considerations must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg89&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;give way’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Locke repeatedly called on people not to lose sight of ‘the public good’, ‘the good of the nation’, ‘the public weal’, or ‘the preservation of the whole’, ‘the whole commonwealth’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is so passionately invoked here is a Whole demanding the sacrifice, permanent not temporary, of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition was all the more tragic because any prospect of improvement seemed pretty remote. In fact, even to entertain projects tending towards such improvement was synonymous not only with abstract utopianism, but also and above all with dangerous subversion. According to Townsend, the ‘stock of human happiness is … much increased’ by the presence of ‘the poor’, who were compelled to perform the most arduous and painful work. The poor fully deserved their fate, were by definition wastrels and vagrants. But it would be a disaster for society if, by some chance, they were to mend their ways: ‘The fleets and armies of a state would soon be in want of soldiers and of sailors, if sobriety and diligence universally prevailed’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the country’s economy would find itself in difficulties. Mandeville reached the same conclusion: ‘To make the society … happy … it is requisite that great numbers … should be ignorant as well as poor’; ‘the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And let us now read Arthur Young: ‘every one but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and would not produce the ‘wealth of nations’ referred to by Smith. Later, in France, Destutt de Tracy arrived at the same conclusion: ‘In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally poor.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Why was the proposition, in its various forms, that society’s happiness and wealth depended on the hardship and deprivation of the poor, who formed a large majority of the population, not perceived as contradictory? It is Locke who explains the logic of this Whole with special characteristics: slaves ‘cannot … be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was also Algernon Sidney’s opinion: ‘a kingdom or city … is composed of freemen and equals: Servants may be in it, but are not members of it.’ Indeed, ‘no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth’; he is not even a member of the people, because ‘the people’ comprises &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg90&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all the freemen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The poor were the servile caste required by society; they were the subterranean foundation of the social edifice, those whom Nietzsche defined as ‘the blind moles of culture’. With society and civilization, the poor and the moles continued to have a relationship of estrangement.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Wage-labour and the categories of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades after Franklin, in transition from the first to the second great controversy in the liberal party, the governor of South Carolina, James Henry Hammond, likewise applied himself to emphasizing how much quasi-slavery persisted in Britain. He sent an open letter to Thomas Clarkson, the venerable patriarch of English abolitionism, putting his finger on the sore point of the workers’ condition in the country that boasted of having abolished slavery in its colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the world of Slavery? … If you are really humane, philanthropic, and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, reactions in Britain were indignant, insisting on the characteristic feature of the freeman that applied to even the most wretched wage-labourer. However, in defining him, the liberal tradition frequently had recourse to the same categories as were used in classical antiquity and across the Atlantic in relation to the black slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Locke’s view, not genuinely capable of intellectual and moral life was ‘the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living’. Wholly absorbed in ‘still[ing] the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children’, such people had no possibility of thinking about other things:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg91&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Locke had no hesitation in asserting that ‘there is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts’. To appreciate this, it was enough to contrast ‘Westminster-hall’ and the ‘Exchange’ with ‘Alms-Houses’ and ‘Bedlam’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The boundary separating the human world from the animal world was imperceptible and evanescent: ‘if we compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, Mandeville, condemning the spread of education to popular strata, compared the wage-labourer to a ‘horse’: ‘No Creatures submit contentedly to their Equals, and should a Horse know as much as a Man, I should not desire to be his Rider.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a metaphor that reappeared on the occasion of his polemic against the excessive generosity displayed by the rich master to the servant in England: ‘A Man may have Five and Twenty Horses in his Stables without being guilty of Folly, if it suits with the rest of his Circumstances, but if he keeps but one, and overfeeds it to shew his Wealth, he is a Fool for his Pains.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only English liberalism that argued in these terms. In fact, the process of de-humanization possibly reached its peak in Sieyès:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unfortunates devoted to arduous work, producers of other people’s enjoyments, who receive scarcely enough to sustain their suffering, needy bodies; this enormous crowd of bipedal tools, without liberty, without morality, without intellectual faculties, equipped solely with hands that earn little and a mind burdened with a thousand worries that serves them only to suffer … are these what you call men? They are deemed civilized [&#039;&#039;policés&#039;&#039;], but have we seen a single one of them who was capable of entering into society?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg92&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On other occasions, the process of de-humanization occurred in a different fashion. Adopting the distinction, peculiar to classical antiquity, between the various instruments of labour, Burke subsumed the wage-labourer under the category of &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Sieyès referred to the ‘majority of men’ defined, above all in private notes predating 1789, as ‘work machines’ (&#039;&#039;machines de travail&#039;&#039;), ‘instruments of labour’ (&#039;&#039;instruments de labeur&#039;&#039;), ‘human instruments of production’ (&#039;&#039;instruments humains de la production&#039;&#039;), or ‘bipedal tools’ (&#039;&#039;instruments bipèdes&#039;&#039;).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traces of this process of de-humanization can even be found in Smith. By dint of the duress and monotony of his work, a wage-labourer ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’, incapable of participating ‘in any rational conversation’ or ‘conceiving any generous … sentiment’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As across the Atlantic with black slaves and slaves in general, so in Europe the dominant class was separated from white servants by a gulf that had ethnic and racial connotations. In Locke’s view, ‘a day-labourer [is] no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural [i.e., an ignorant aborigine]’: neither had yet reached the level of ‘rational creatures and Christians’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Sieyès was of the opinion that the ‘human instruments of production’ pertained to a ‘people’ different from (and inferior to) that comprising ‘the heads of production’ or ‘intelligent persons’, ‘respectable folk’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further reason intervened to render the gulf separating the community of the free from servants and slaves unbridgeable. The latter were considered incapable of fully appreciating the humiliations, the frustrations, the sufferings, the pain, as well as all the other feelings characteristic of man’s spiritual existence. We have seen how Mandeville argued in relation to the mass of wretches in Europe. They were forced to suffer hardship and privations and often ended up on the gallows ‘for trifles’, which they made themselves guilty of in an attempt to escape hunger. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be happy is to be pleas’d, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more content he’ll be with his own … when a Man enjoys &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg93&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself, Laughs and Sings, and in his Gesture and Behaviour shews me all the tokens of Content and Satisfaction, I pronounce him happy …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On careful examination, the ‘greatest King’ could envy ‘the Peace of Mind’ of ‘the meanest and most unciviliz’d Peasant’ and his ‘Tranquillity of … Soul’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no less emphatic terms, the Virginian theorist we have already encountered, Thomas R. Dew, expressed himself on the subject of slaves: ‘we have no doubts that they form the happiest portion of our society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe, than the negro slave of the United States’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only is it very difficult to define the condition of white servants in Europe as free, but the image of them transmitted by the liberal thought of the time is not much different from the image of the black slave in the southern United States. So was the governor of South Carolina right to mock the abolitionists’ hypocrisy and credulity? That would be a hasty conclusion. In any event, we are obliged to reflect further on the characteristics of the society that was being formed either side of the Atlantic and on the categories best suited to understanding it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn1a|1]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn2a|2]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 437.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn3a|3]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn4a|4]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn5a|5]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 413–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn6a|6]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn7a|7]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn8a|8]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn9a|9]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn10a|10]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn13a|13]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms no Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn14a|14]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn15a|15]] Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, &#039;&#039;Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIX siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn16a|16]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1966, p. ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn17a|17]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wootton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 460.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn21a|21]] See Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 1, ch. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn22a|22]] Tocqueville, diary note of 4 February 1851, quoted in Hugh Brogan, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pt 2, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn23a|23]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn24a|24]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn25a|25]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, p. 71.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn28a|28]] T. H. Marshall, &#039;&#039;Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn30a|30]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 368–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 398; Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn33a|33]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 389.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn34a|34]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 652.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn35a|35]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 138.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn36a|36]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 291.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn37a|37]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 376, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn38a|38]] C. Duncan Rice, ‘The Missionary Context of the British Anti-Slavery Movement’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn39a|39]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 6; E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 88.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn40a|40]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn41a|41]] Linda Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, London: Random House, 2002, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn42a|42]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn43a|43]] See Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, ch. v, §28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn44a|44]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, pp. 314–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn45a|45]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn46a|46]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn47a|47]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, p. 119.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn48a|48]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn49a|49]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn50a|50]] E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 22–3; Anthony Arblaster, &#039;&#039;The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 172; Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn51a|51]] Ronald W. Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, London: Blandford Press, 1963, p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn52a|52]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 140.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn56a|56]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn57a|57]] Thus the legal historian Leon Radzinowicz, quoted in ibid., p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn58a|58]] Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn59a|59]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn60a|60]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn61a|61]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, p. 12; cf. Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn62a|62]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn64a|64]] Marcus W. Jernegan, &#039;&#039;Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America&#039;&#039;, Westport (CI): Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 77–9, and p. 48 (for the quotation from Dr Johnson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., pp. 50–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn66a|66]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn67a|67]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., pp. 89, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn70a|70]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 527 n. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn72a|72]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn73a|73]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 64–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn75a|75]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1450, 1485–7 (letters to Albert Gallatin, 26 December 1820, and Jared Sparks, 4 February 1824).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn76a|76]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn77a|77]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 347–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn78a|78]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 541–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn79a|79]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn80a|80]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn81a|81]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 273.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn82a|82]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn83a|83]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 272–3, 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn84a|84]] Benajmin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 309–28; Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Four Essays on Liberty&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118–72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn85a|85]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn86a|86]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 7, pp. 413–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn87a|87]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 522 and n. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn88a|88]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn89a|89]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 307–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn90a|90]] Karl Polanyi, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 3, p. 121 n. 333.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn91a|91]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn92a|92]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, pp. 83–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn95a|95]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 28 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn96a|96]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn97a|97]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3, 196–7, 205, 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn98a|98]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn99a|99]] Quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 765.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn100a|100]] Young, quoted in R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn101a|101]] Destutt de Tracy, quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 802.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn102a|102]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn103a|103]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 89, 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn104a|104]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105a|105]] Clarkson, quote in Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, pp. 233–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106a|106]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;An Essay Concerning Human Understanding&#039;&#039;, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 707, 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., p. 666.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108a|108]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110a|110]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111a|111]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112a|112]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113a|113]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 782.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114a|114]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Conduct of the Understanding&#039;&#039;, Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839, pp. 10, 12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115a|115]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 89, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 311–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117a|117]] Dew, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 318.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FOUR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page94&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg95&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The elusive liberalism of de Tocqueville’s America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How should we define the political regime which, following the Dutch prologue and starting from the liberal revolutions, was established first in Britain and then in the United States? As regards the latter, Washington was in no doubt. We have seen him immediately after the achievement of independence celebrating the ‘wise and liberal government’ his country had given itself. Some years later, on the eve of the ratification of the federal Constitution, which consecrated a strong executive power, the general-president coined a kind of advertising slogan, declaring himself in favour of a ‘liberal &amp;amp;amp; energetic’ government.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet if by liberalism is meant every individual’s equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by law—‘modern liberty’ or ‘negative liberty’—it is not difficult to perceive the rather problematic character of employing such a category. Even if we discount the problem of slavery, we know the condition of semi-slavery to which notionally free blacks were subjected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can ignore the population of colour in its entirety and still not thereby arrive at a different result. Those in the United States who were untainted by any crime, but interned in workhouses that were (as de Tocqueville himself acknowledged) an integral part of the ‘prison system’, did not exactly enjoy civil equality or modern liberty. And that is not all: such was the condition of the poor that, even in their capacity as witnesses, they were locked up in prison until the legal proceedings were over. And thus, ‘in the same country that the plaintiff is put in prison, the thief remains at liberty if he can pay a bail bond’. Of ‘three thousand examples’ which might be given, there was that of two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg96&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;young Irishmen ‘detained for a whole year while waiting for the judges to deign to hear their deposition’. We can now come to de Tocqueville’s unanticipated conclusion: we are dealing with laws consolidated by ‘customs’ and which yet can seem ‘monstrous’; they ‘have provided everything for the convenience of the wealthy and virtually nothing for the protection of the poor’, of whose liberty ‘they dispose cheaply’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us now pass over both populations of colonial origin and the poorest strata of the white community, who were denied not only political rights, but also ‘modern liberty’. Let us focus exclusively on the dominant class—i.e. on white, male property-owners. Did full civil and political equality obtain in this milieu? There are reasons to doubt it. One thinks of the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision on the basis of which, in calculating the number of seats due to the southern states, partial account was also taken of the number of slaves. Far from being a negligible detail, this clause played a significant role in the history of the United States: ‘four southern voters’ ended up exercising ‘more political power than ten northern voters’. Thus is explained the ‘Virginia dynasty’ that long succeeded in holding the country’s presidency.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was why Jefferson was branded the ‘black president’ by his opponents:[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he arrived in power thanks to the inclusion in the electoral result of blacks who remained his slaves. On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln proclaimed polemically: ‘It is a truth that cannot be denied, that in all the free States no white man is the equal of the white man of the slave States.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a thesis repeated in 1864 by a French liberal (Édouard Laboulaye). With the ‘three-fifths’ clause, it was as if the US Constitution was addressed to ‘the folks of the South’:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Because you have slaves, you will be allowed to elect a representative with ten thousand votes, while the Yankees [of the North], who live off their own labour, will require thirty thousand votes. The conclusion for the folks of the South is that they constitute a particular, superior race, that they are great lords. The aristocratic spirit has been developed and strengthened by the Constitution.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg97&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Accused of breaching the principle of political equality within the dominant elite itself, the southern planters replied by declaring that, in actual fact, the principle of civil equality was infringed to their detriment. They regarded themselves as suffering negative discrimination, in as much as they were deprived of the freedom to transfer their human cattle to any part of the Union. They considered it inadmissible that owners of the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; should be treated worse than the owners of any other movable goods. As Jefferson Davis, president of the secessionist Confederacy, declared at the moment of abandoning the Union, the North was wrong to hamper in any way ‘property in slaves’, to act ‘to the prejudice, detriment or discouragement of the owners of that species of property’, which was ‘recognized in the Constitution’ and which, on that basis, should enjoy complete equality of treatment with other types of property.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This exchange of accusations played a far from subsidiary role in the conflict that issued in the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
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===== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Absolute power and the community obligations of the slave-owners&#039;&#039;&#039; =====&lt;br /&gt;
From Constant onwards, modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property. But slave-owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations. There can be no doubt that the Glorious Revolution and then the American Revolution consecrated the self-government of a civil society composed of, and hegemonized by, slave-owners, who were more determined than ever not to tolerate interference by central political power and the Church. But it would be mistaken to equate the self-government of civil society, now freed from these fetters, with the free movement of the individual members composing it. Certainly, they could reduce the slaves they legitimately owned to chattels. In the New England of 1732, a master put up for sale a nineteen-year-old female slave along with her son of six months: they could be acquired (the advert announced) ‘together or separately’. There were no obstacles to bringing to market even adulterous offspring; a New Jersey master did this with the offspring of his relations with three black women whom he owned. Not by chance, slaves were frequently given names usually reserved for dogs and horses.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg98&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There can be no doubt that the slave-master wielded absolute power over his legitimate ‘property’, but not to the extent of being able freely to challenge the process of reification and commodification that had occurred. In this case, the community requirement prevailed of keeping the barrier between the race of masters and the race of servants clear and fixed. Let us attend to de Tocqueville: blacks had been ‘forbidden … under severe penalties, to be taught to read or write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The prohibition aimed to exclude the race of servants from any form of education, which was regarded as a serious source of danger not only because it was liable to fuel unacceptable hopes and claims, but also because it risked facilitating the communication of ideas and sentiments between blacks that was to be frustrated by any means. And yet, in the case of violation of such rules, to be struck in the first instance were white property-owners, who thus saw their negative liberty seriously restricted. The bans affecting slaves did not leave their masters unaffected. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, it became a crime in Georgia even to provide a slave with paper and writing materials.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant was the legislation that banned interracial sexual relations and marriages. Later, in 1896, when upholding the constitutional legitimacy of provisions for racial segregation as a whole, the US Supreme Court conceded that the ban on ‘the intermarriage of the two races’ might, ‘in a technical sense’, breach freedom of contract, but extricated itself from an awkward situation by adding that the right of any individual state to legislate in this area was ‘universally recognized’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, opposition was not lacking. The provision made in Virginia at the start of the eighteenth century, according to which not only those directly responsible for the sexual or marital relation were to be punished, was significant: ‘extremely severe penalties’ were prescribed for the priest guilty of having consecrated the interracial family bond.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And hence, along with ‘freedom of contract’, religious freedom itself was in some sense affected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The absolute power exercised over black slaves ended up having negative and even dramatic consequences for whites. Take Pennsylvania in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The free black caught violating the ban on miscegenation (as it later came to be called)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] risked being sold as a slave. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg99&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved serious consequences for the white woman, who had to suffer forced separation from her partner and the terrible punishment inflicted on him. Let us now see what happened in colonial Virginia immediately after the Glorious Revolution. On the basis of a law of 1691, a free white woman who had had a child by a black man or mulatto could be sentenced to five years of servitude and, above all, be forced to surrender the child to the parish, which then sold him or her as a servant for a term of thirty years.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But there is more. Well-nigh insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of recognition of the offspring of a relationship between an owner and one of his slaves. The father faced a tragic alternative: either to suffer exile from Virginia with his de facto family; or to agree to the child being a slave together with the mother.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More summary was New York’s legislation, which automatically converted all children born of a slave mother into slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus find ourselves in the presence of a society that in fact exercised such severe duress over its privileged members, partly legal and partly social, as to choke even the most natural feelings. As has justly been noted, in enslaving ‘their children and their children’s children’, white people were in fact ‘enslaving themselves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further to clarify the entanglement between the individual property-owner’s absolute power over his human livestock and his subservience to the ‘master race’ of which he was a member, we can offer a final consideration. We have already noted the law in force in Virginia whereby it was meaningless to define and treat the killing of a slave by his owner as a ‘felony’. Yet in not a few states, on the basis of legislation that survived even after the Second World War (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|§5]]), a white man who had sexual relations with a black woman was guilty of a ‘felony’. Thus, it was permissible for an owner to flog and beat his female slave to the point of killing her—property right was sacred; but so strong was the control exercised by the class of property-owners and the community of the free over their individual members that only by exposing himself to risks of various kinds could he have sexual relations with her. Other than by legal provisions, the ban on miscegenation was enforced by the intervention in the 1850s here and there of vigilante gangs, engaged in spying on, intimidating and attacking whites tempted by the fascination of their female slaves and women of colour in general.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg100&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While, in one respect, they were a form of property and a chattel completely at the disposal of their legitimate master, in another slaves represented the enemy within, against whom it was necessary to be constantly on guard. Certainly, to avert the threat recourse could be had to terror, ruthlessly and even sadistically striking at guilty individuals and transforming execution into a kind of terrifying educative spectacle for all the rest: the slaves in a particular area were obliged to witness the torment of two of their fellows, guilty of murder and condemned to be burnt alive.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But that was not sufficient. Once again, preservation of the institution of slavery required heavy sacrifices even on the part of the dominant class. In 1741, in New York, mysterious fires fanned fears of a slave revolt: condemned to death and burnt alive were two blacks whose lives the master had in vain sought to save, testifying that at the time of the fire they were at home. Some years later, in the environs of the same city, a black, having confessed to setting fire to a barn, suffered the same torment. There was only one difference: the crowd of white spectators contrived to ensure that the flames were not extinguished too quickly, so that the spectacle and sufferings of the rebel black lasted as long as possible; his cries were heard three miles away. In any case, the master heard them very clearly: he sobbed loudly, because his slave was dear to him. But he was powerless, and the most he could do was to see to it that the torture was not prolonged any further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Faced with the security requirements of the community they belonged to, individual slave-owners could not demand free disposal over their property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Given the circumstances, these security requirements were a permanent given. We can make a general observation:&lt;br /&gt;
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While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light; they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners (sometimes the law required publication of the code in the newspaper and that clergymen read it to their congregations). It was the white man who was &#039;&#039;required&#039;&#039; to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg101&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Specific penalties were provided for slave-owners who failed to inflict the punishments prescribed by law. According to a law in force in South Carolina, on her fourth attempt at flight a female slave was to be ‘severely whipped … branded on the left cheek with the letter R, and [have] her left ear cut off’. Until 1722, it was the slave-owners themselves who, directly or indirectly, had to provide for the execution of these operations.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In crisis situations the duty of vigilance made itself strongly felt. We have seen a ‘military service’ of whites patrolling day and night in Richmond in 1831. In such cases, observed Gustave de Beaumont during his journey in de Tocqueville’s company, ‘society arms itself with all its rigours’ and mobilizes ‘all social forces’, seeking in every possible way to encourage ‘informing’ and control; in South Carolina, along with the fugitive slave the death penalty awaited ‘any person who has helped him in his escape’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significant too were the results of the passage of laws on fugitive slaves in 1850. Subject to punishment was not only the citizen who sought to hide or help the black pursued or sought by his legitimate owners, but also those who did not collaborate in his capture. This was a legal provision which (as its critics put it) sought to compel ‘every freeborn American to become a manhunter’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as slave-owners, slave society ended up affecting the white community as a whole. Precisely because, in addition to being chattels, black slaves were also the enemy within, abolitionists were immediately suspected of treason, thus becoming the target of a series of more or less harsh repressive measures depending on the gravity of the impending danger. Severe restrictions were placed on the press: in 1800 the slave revolt in Virginia was often ignored by southern newspapers; there was the danger of spreading the contagion of subversion further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1836 the president of the United States (Andrew Jackson) permitted the postmaster general to block the circulation of all publications critical of the institution of slavery. Rounding off the gag placed on abolitionists, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution banning the examination of anti-slavery petitions.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Repression could take much more drastic forms. In 1805, denouncing writings liable to have an incendiary impact on slaves, South Carolina passed laws that provided for executing as traitors those who were in some way stained with the guilt of having stirred up a slave revolt or supported it. Georgia &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg102&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;proceeded similarly.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bound up with terror from above was terror from below. While it took less ruthless forms in the North (it aimed at preventing meetings and destroying the means of propaganda or the property of ‘agitators’), in the South violence against abolitionists took the form of a pogrom that did not hesitate to torture and physically eliminate traitors and their supporters, with complete impunity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The situation in the South in the years preceding the Civil War was described as follows by Joel R. Poinsett, an important political figure in the Union, in a letter written by him at the end of 1850:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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We are both [i.e., Poinsett and his correspondent] heartily sick of this atmosphere redolent of insane violence … There is a strong party averse to violent men and violent measures, but they are frightened into submission—afraid even to exchange opinions with others who think like them, lest they should be betrayed.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the contemporary historian who cites this testimony concludes that, through recourse to lynching, violence and threats of every kind, the South succeeded in silencing not only any opposition, but also any mild dissent. In addition to abolitionists, those who wanted to distance themselves from this pitiless witch-hunt felt threatened, and were threatened. They were impelled by terror into ‘holding one’s tongue, killing one’s doubts, burying one’s reservations’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is no doubt about it: the terroristic power wielded by slave-owners over their blacks also ended up affecting, on a lasting basis, members and fractions of the dominant race and class.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Three legislations, three castes, one ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So how are we to define the political regime of the society we are examining? Are we dealing with a liberal society? The problem posed in connection with a figure like Calhoun is now presented in more general terms. At least until the Civil War, there were three different sets of legislation in the United States. In relation to slaves, things are immediately clear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass calculated that there were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg103&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;seventy-two crimes in Virginia which, when committed by a slave, carried the death penalty, whereas only two of them involved the same penalty for a whiteman.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But special laws also affected men of colour who were notionally free—and not only because, in different ways depending on diverse local realities and in different historical periods, they were excluded from certain professions, from the right to own land, from the possibility of testifying in courts against whites or forming part of the judicial panel. There was a still more revealing circumstance: even ignoring slaves, the same crime continued to have very different consequences depending on the skin colour of the person responsible for it. Obviously, only free people of colour ran the risk of being reduced to slavery. This was the fate that befell those in Pennsylvania, who, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, were caught breaking the ban on miscegenation, or if they were not able to pay the fine issued to them for having traded with other blacks without permission.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the situation in the North changed with the abolition of slavery that followed the Revolution. But the complete control whites had over the magistracy remained in place. This was something highlighted by de Tocqueville, and its consequences were spelt out in the North as follows by a particularly courageous judge from Ohio: ‘The white man may now plunder the Negro, he may abuse his person; he may take his life: He may do this in open daylight … and he must be acquitted, unless [there be] some white man present [prepared to give evidence against the culprit]’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clear and insuperable was the barrier separating whites, the dominant race, from people of colour as such. In the words of Beaumont, ‘[w]hether slaves or freemen, negroes everywhere form a different people from the whites.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an observation confirmed by de Tocqueville: ‘In Philadelphia blacks are not buried in the same cemetery as whites’. Segregation also obtained in prisons: ‘blacks were also separated from whites for meals’. And again: ‘in Maryland [a slaveholding state] free blacks pay taxes for schools just like whites, but cannot send their children to them’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And (we might add) in mid-nineteenth-century Virginia, the law denied notionally free blacks ‘the right to learn how to read and write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg104&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are in the presence of a racial state, articulated (according to the explicit declaration of its theorists and apologists in the South), into ‘three &#039;&#039;castes—&#039;&#039; … free whites, free colored, and slave colored population’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the caste model was also evoked by some observers of the North. Referring to their own society, where slavery had been abolished, they spoke of a division into ‘Brahmins and pariahs’, as demonstrated by the racial segregation that operated at every level, from public transport to theatres and from churches to cemeteries, and which allowed blacks to enter hotels, restaurants and meeting-places for the most part solely in the capacity of servants. Yes, acknowledged another observer, who proposed to banish blacks from Indiana in order to spare them a yet worse fate, they were treated like ‘a race legally and socially excommunicated, as the Helots of Sparta—as the Pariahs of India—disfranchised outcasts; a separate and degraded caste’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When we identify three castes in the post-bellum United States, we are obviously ignoring the Indians, who were regarded until the Dawes Act of 1887 as ‘domestic dependent nations’—that is, as a set of nations with their own particular identity, under the protectorate of Washington, and whose members did not form part of American society in the strict sense.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It should be added that the discourse of the three castes is not without a dubious ideological component: it tends to neglect the differences that remained within the white community, which could impact heavily not only on the material living conditions, but also on the civil rights, of the poorest strata. The Articles of the Confederacy, designed to regulate the new state that was being formed, explicitly excluded ‘paupers’ and ‘vagrants’ from the group of ‘free inhabitants’ (Article IV). But it is true that, when we examine the society as a whole, the main demarcations were colour lines and, within the black community, the line separating slaves proper from the rest—from ‘free’ blacks, who in fact lived the nightmare of being deported or enslaved in their turn. On the other side, the absolute centrality of the colour line galvanized (as the southern ideologue of the three castes pointed out) the ‘spirit of equality’ within the white community, with a fairly rapid disappearance of the most odious forms of discrimination.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg105&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In this sense we can speak of ‘castes’, as do distinguished historians of the institution of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But registration of the naturalistic and racial rigidity of the relations between social classes tells us little about the nature of the political regime in the society under examination. On the basis of the history of South Africa, reference has sometimes been made to ‘segregationist liberalism’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in order to explain the tangle of freedom (for whites) and oppression (of colonial populations). It is a category that completely excludes from the focus of attention the practices of expropriation, deportation and annihilation implemented against the native populations of southern Africa or the Amerindians. Even as regards blacks and other ethnic groups, such a category seems to refer only to the period subsequent to the abolition of slavery. Like the adjective, the substantive is misleading. On the one hand, the white community soon shook off censitary discrimination, long recommended and in fact regarded as insuperable by exponents of classical liberalism. On the other, the property-owner-citizens were subject to a series of obligations that it would be very difficult to integrate into the modern liberty theorized by Constant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On other occasions, rather than to ‘segregationist liberalism’, reference has been made to ‘aristocratic republicanism’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] explicitly in connection with the pre–Civil War United States. Such a definition completely obscures the character both of the dominant aristocracy and of the plebs oppressed by it, and the entanglement between social classes and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the substantive makes it possible to take a step forward: we are not dealing with property-owners interested solely in the enjoyment of their private sphere; they also led a rich political life. While far from being generally enjoyed, ‘modern liberty’ was scarcely the sole objective of the protagonists of the Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States. For Hamilton, the ‘distinction between freedom and slavery’ was clear: in the first case, ‘a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent’; in the second, ‘he is governed by the will of another’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, in Franklin’s words, submitting to taxation from a legislative body where one is not represented signifies being considered and treated as ‘a conquer’d People’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be excluded from political decisions, to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg106&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be subject to laws imposed from without, however reasonable and liberal, was synonymous with political slavery or, at any rate, represented the onset of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, Calhoun, the author with whom we began when we posed the crucial question—what is liberalism?—professed democracy even more than liberalism; he was an eminent member of the Democratic Party of the United States. The category of liberalism should unify the two Anglo-Saxon countries. But Calhoun defined the Constitution of his country as ‘democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy’, and hence in contradistinction to Great Britain, where ‘title[s] of nobility’ and other ‘artificial distinctions’ that had been abolished in the North American republic survived.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, it was not an unqualified democracy, as might appear from the title of de Tocqueville’s book, which (as we shall see), in expressing itself thus, thought it possible to ignore the condition of Indians and blacks. Still less was it the ‘frontier democracy’ to which an eminent US historian, inclined to hagiography, pays homage.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Apart from anything else, the definition suggested by him evokes, in reticent, uncritical fashion, only the gradual expansion of the white colonists to the West, and hence only the relationship between two of the ‘three races’ referred to (as we shall see) by &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Calhoun was concerned to distinguish the democracy whose theorist he aspired to be from ‘absolute democracy’, guilty of wanting to ride roughshod over the rights of states and slave-owners.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are at the antipodes of the ‘abolitionist democracy’ dear to an eminent US historian and passionate Afro-American activist.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But then how are we to define a democracy which, far from wanting to abolish or even simply repress or hide slavery, celebrated it as a ‘positive good’? Reference has sometimes been made to ‘Hellenic democracy, based on the work of non-European slaves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this definition too is inadequate. It overlooks, or does not accurately describe, the fate reserved for Indians. And it does not take account of another crucial element: absent from ancient Greece was the racial chattel slavery which, in the American case, was conjoined not with direct democracy but representative democracy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg107&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to the modernity of the mode of production was the modernity of the political regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference in particular to the English colonies, another distinguished black theorist and activist speaks interchangeably of ‘white plantocracy’ or ‘planter democracy’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, calling attention to but one narrow social caste, this definition commits the error of concentrating exclusively on the South, which was not in fact separated by any barrier from the North. This applies at an economic level: after land, slaves were the country’s largest property; in 1860 their value was three times greater than the share capital in manufacturing and the railway industry. The cotton grown in the South was far and away the most sizeable US export, and made a decisive contribution to financing the country’s imports and industrial development.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At a political—constitutional level, the obligation to take part in hunting down escaped slaves and returning them obviously also extended to the citizens of the North. Finally, on an ideological level, we must not forget the racial apartheid in force in the free states. If the process of expropriating and deporting Indians is added to this, it is clear that, albeit with obvious differences between its two parts, the racial discrimination practised in the United States played a decisive role at a national level. Finally, although more adequate than those cited above, even the category of ‘white democracy’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] has a limitation—that of not stressing the proud seigneurial self-consciousness of the community of the free and the explosive violence such a community could unleash against the excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following, then, the suggestion of distinguished US historians and sociologists, we should speak of a ‘&#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’—that is, a democracy which applied exclusively to the ‘master race’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The clear line of demarcation between whites, on the one hand, and blacks and Indians, on the other, was conducive to the development of relations of equality within the white community. The members of an aristocracy of class or race tended to celebrate themselves as ‘peers’; the manifest inequality imposed on the excluded was the other aspect of the relationship of parity established between those who enjoyed the power to exclude ‘inferiors’. It must be added that the equality in question was primarily a clear line of demarcation from the excluded. This is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg108&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;what was expressed by the slogan that presided over the American Revolution: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’! For the rest, conflicts and mutual charges of abuses of power and violations of the principle of equality were (as we know) not lacking within the community of freemen and masters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After all, it was Josiah Tucker who had already come close to understanding the true nature of the republicanism for which he reprehended Locke and the rebellious American colonists: ‘all Republicans ancient and modern … suggest no other Schemes but those of pulling down and leveling all Distinctions above them, and of tyrannizing over those miserable Beings, who are unfortunately placed below them.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again: ‘he that is a Tyrant over his Inferiors is, of Course, a Patriot, and a Leveller in respect to his Superiors.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Freemen, servants and slaves&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
However, if they can serve to analyse the society that emerged from the American Revolution, what help is the discourse of the three castes and the category of ‘master-race democracy’ when it comes to understanding the politico-social relations that obtained in England? At least until the abolition of slavery in the colonies, the situations on both sides of the Atlantic had not a few points in common—and not only because slaves and the slave market were far from absent from the metropolis itself. More important is the consideration that the British Empire should be analysed as a whole, without repressing the reality of the colonies. Its economic development and political and military rise owed much to the &#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;—that is, to a monopoly on the slave trade. At the same time, those who derived their wealth from trade and property in human cattle were well represented in the British parliament. Hence we see the caste of white freemen and that of slaves operative here as well. Certainly, viewed from the London observatory, the third caste—notionally free blacks—was completely irrelevant. An initial difference between the two shores of the Atlantic thus emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is another, more significant one, which concerns the bulk of the metropolitan population. Within the American white community itself, there were small sections to which legal equality and even negative liberty were denied. This emerges from the description of de Tocqueville, who comments that it was the legacy of the ‘civil laws’ of England, clearly weighted in favour of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg109&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rich.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States the group of whites denied these privileges was a rather small sector, which fairly rapidly disappeared. The very presence of blacks, whether slaves or semi-slaves, encouraged the spread of a sense of relative equality between members of the higher ‘caste’. The situation of the white community in England was very different. Here exclusion from the enjoyment of legal equality and negative liberty was much more widespread. Let us ignore Ireland, which even after the formation of the United Kingdom in fact continued to be a colony. Let us focus on England proper, starting with Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He made a sharp distinction between three groups: men ‘by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’, or subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who were the black slaves from Africa; then freemen; and finally, white servants who were blood relations of the freemen. A key paragraph of the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; clarifies this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power, for the master could not have power to kill him at any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Here Locke primarily had in mind the two figures of the black slave and the indentured white servant. As we know, even the second was subject to buying and selling, was in large measure a commodity, exported to America and regularly traded on the market where possible purchasers arrived alerted by adverts in the local press. It goes without saying that the master possessed an extensive right of punishment, even if not as unlimited as that wielded over the black slave. We can understand then the comparison with the servant in the Old Testament, who, although not subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’, experiences a condition that might by contrast be defined as ‘imperfect slavery’. This imperfect slavery was defined by Locke by the term of servitude or drudgery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg110&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Within the British Empire three different legal situations coexisted—the first marked by liberty, the second by servitude, and the third by slavery in the strict sense. Notwithstanding the racial abyss that was now open, and which separated black slave from white servant, in England the latter did not form part of the community of the free in the strict sense. Even if different from that wielded by ‘a lord over his slave’, the power of ‘a master over his servant’, who was subject to the ‘ordinary discipline’ applied by the master within his family, was indisputable.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, although he was concerned to distinguish between slave and servant, Locke sometimes also used the second term to refer to the figure of the slave proper. In the &#039;&#039;First Treatise of Government&#039;&#039;, we can read: ‘those who were rich in the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as purchasing of new, came to have large and numerous families’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As demonstrated by the reference to the property-owners of the West Indies and the property right they exercised over the offspring of ‘servants’, it is clear that the discourse here concerns hereditary slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tripartite division formulated by Locke also appears in Mandeville. In the first place, we have ‘the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa’ to America.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England, on the other hand, ‘Slaves are not allow’d’, but free men can avail themselves of ‘the Children of the Poor’, of ‘willing Hands for all the Drudgery and hard and dirty Labour’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again we encounter the three figures of the freeman, the servant and the slave. It is so difficult to confuse the second with the first that the similarities with the third leap to the eye: ‘the meanest Indigent part of the Nation’ is ‘the working slaving People’, which is eternally destined to perform ‘dirty slavish Work’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, let us turn to Blackstone. In celebrating England as the land of liberty, he stressed that there was no place in it for ‘proper slavery’, ‘strict slavery’, ‘absolute slavery’, wherein the master was endowed with absolute, unlimited power over the life and fate of the slave. This insistent clarification left room for forms of compulsory labour different from that to which blacks in the colonies were subjected. In the great jurist’s writings too an intermediate condition between liberty and slavery ends up emerging, a sort of non-‘absolute’ slavery, slavery not understood in the ‘strict’ sense. Along with slaves, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg111&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’ and ‘labourers’ were servants. We are dealing with ‘different types of servant’, each with its specific characteristics, but all brought together by the fact of being subject to servitude.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Active once again is the legacy of Grotius, for whom &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; was the general category for understanding and defining the character of work. In Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone what is new is the stress on the distinction between two types of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;—that in force in the metropolis and that operative in the colonies. Thus, we pass from Grotius’ bipartite division to a tripartite division.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. England and the three ‘castes’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But now, setting aside major authors, let us take a look at the social reality and ideology that characterized Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Far from the ‘vestiges of slavery’ referred to by Smith, the persistence of servile relations is very clear from the treatment of the poor and the possibility of disposing of their children as a &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039; in workhouses, in the army, in prisons, and in the recruitment of servants sent to settle the colonies. An economist we have already encountered, Wakefield, drew attention to ‘English slavery’ and ‘white slaves’ in 1834.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this time authors of the most varied political persuasion compared slaves across the Atlantic with suffering workers in England: anti-abolitionists who echoed Calhoun-type statements; more or less radical currents that aimed at a more general emancipation of labour; more detached observers who confined themselves to registering the fact, like the economist we have just cited. And the comparison was established not simply by focusing on the spectre of death from starvation that constantly haunted the English worker. Certainly, this is an aspect that cannot be ignored: the number of poor people who, in order to avoid starvation, committed some crime in the hope of being able to survive as deportees or ‘galley slaves’, was not negligible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But considerable attention was also paid to encroachments on a more specifically liberal freedom—namely, ‘modern liberty’. For this to emerge with greater clarity, let us leave behind the cities and industrial centres and move to the countryside to hear the rural labourers’ grievances:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg112&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Speaking generally, since all laws have their exceptions, the privileged classes of our rural districts take infinite pains to be abhorred by their poorest neighbours. They enclose commons. They stop footpaths. They wall in their parks. They set spring-guns and man-traps … They build jails, and fill them. They make new crimes and new punishments for the poor. They interfere with the marriages of the poor, compelling some, and forbidding others to come together. They shut up paupers in workhouses, separating husband and wife, in pounds by day and wards by night. They harness poor men to carts. They superintend alehouses, decry skittles, deprecate beer-shops, meddle with fairs, and otherwise curtail the already narrow amusements of the poor.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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Around twenty years later, the popular and radical &#039;&#039;Reynold’s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, condemning the ‘slavery’ that existed in England, listed the flogging of soldiers and sailors, the separation of husbands and wives in workhouses, the obligation of rural servants to request permission from their masters before they could marry, and the systematic sexual abuse to which ‘the wives and daughters of the poorer orders’ were subject.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield reported the &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; deriving from the countryside and considered them incontrovertible. Writing on the immediate eve of the abolition of slavery in British colonies, he believed it possible to distinguish three figures—‘freeman’, ‘slave’ and ‘pauper’—within the empire as a whole.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are put in mind of the discourse of the three castes we have encountered in a theorist from the American South. In fact, in 1864 the &#039;&#039;Saturday Review&#039;&#039; (a periodical that circulated among the middle and upper classes) observed that the poor in England formed ‘a caste apart, a race’, placed in a social condition that underwent no alteration ‘from the cradle to the grave’, and which was divided from the rest of society by a barrier similar to that existing in America between whites and blacks. The respectable English periodical proceeded as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him. The relation in both instances is that of perpetual superior to perpetual inferior, of chief to dependant, and no amount of kindness or goodness is suffered to alter this relation.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg113&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are—it is important not to forget it—in 1864. Many decades had passed since the Glorious Revolution and the birth of liberal England. And yet, if the situation was unstable and tending to change as a result of popular struggles, the reality of a caste society continued to make itself felt. Already abolished thirty years earlier in the English colonies, the caste of slaves was on the point of disappearing in the United States as well. Having been three, the castes were becoming two in number on both sides of the Atlantic: corresponding to the black semi-slaves of the United States were the white servants of England. A more or less rigid barrier continued to separate both from the caste of genuine freemen.&lt;br /&gt;
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A sort of social apartheid seems to correspond to the racial apartheid. In eighteenth-century England we find Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, having his coach preceded by outriders who were charged with clearing the road in order to spare the nobleman the annoyance of meeting with plebeian persons and glances.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even a century later, a kind of segregation existed between the different social classes in English churches.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the already noted &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; drawn up by rural labourers bemoaned the fact that even then the aristocracy resorted to a curtain to shield itself from any ‘vulgar gaze’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When Senior visited Naples, what made him angry was the mixing of ranks: ‘In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets’. Worse, they were so little removed from the upper classes that they lived in the cellars of seigneurial palaces. The result? ‘[Y]ou never are free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degeneration.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The reproduction of the servile caste and the beginnings of eugenics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How to ‘continue the race of journeymen and servants’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Smith’s phrase reveals that social mobility was limited or non-existent. The heaviest, worst-paid work was entrusted to a stratum that tended to be reproduced from one generation to the next, and hence to a kind of hereditary servile caste.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg114&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The reproduction of this caste or race was absolutely necessary. According to Mandeville, a decidedly beneficial role was played by war. If, with its periodic massacres, it did not provide a remedy for excess male births, women, sought after by too many aspiring, competitive males, would become a kind of rare commodity accessible only to the rich. Society would then lose its re-supply of ‘the Children of the Poor; the greatest and most extensive of all temporal Blessings’. The hereditary reproduction of the poor destined to perform ‘the Drudgery of hard and dirty Labour’ would prove difficult or impossible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The natural order, of which war was a part, spontaneously generated the race of semi-slaves that society could never do without. However, this supposedly spontaneous process must be encouraged by timely political interventions from above. According to Mandeville, access to education on the part of the ‘Labouring Poor’ was to be avoided at all costs: the ‘Proportion of the Society’ would be compromised by it.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The requisite cheap, docile and obedient labour force would risk disappearing. Other representatives of the liberal tradition invoked much more extensive intervention. For the purposes of generating a potentially perfect race of docile workers and instruments of labour, the concentration-camp universe of the ‘workhouses’ could prove useful. Locking up the children of delinquents and ‘suspects’ therein, one could (observed Bentham) produce an ‘indigenous class’ that would be distinguished for its industriousness and sense of discipline. If early marriage was promoted within this class, treating the offspring as apprentices until they attained their majority, the workhouses and society would dispose of an inexhaustible reserve of manpower of the highest quality. In other words, through the ‘gentlest of all revolutions’—a sexual revolution[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the ‘indigenous class’, propagating itself in hereditary fashion from one generation to the next, would be transformed into a kind of indigenous race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sieyès envisaged a similarly ‘gentle’ revolution, and likewise for the purposes of producing a class or race of labourers as docile as possible. Like Bentham, the French liberal indulged in a eugenicist utopia (or dystopia). He imagined a ‘cross’ (&#039;&#039;croisement&#039;&#039;) between monkeys and ‘blacks’ for creating domesticated beings adapted to servile work: ‘the new race of anthropomorphic monkeys’. In this way, whites, who remained at the top of the social hierarchy as directors of production, could dispose of blacks as auxiliary instruments of production, or slaves proper, who would precisely be the anthropomorphic monkeys:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg115&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However extraordinary, however immoral this idea might seem at first sight, I have reflected on it at length, and can find no other way in a great nation, especially in countries that are very hot or very cold, to reconcile the directors of works with the simple instruments of labour.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While, on the one hand, it was necessary to encourage the production and reproduction of a race of servants or actual slaves, on the other, it was necessary to limit, so far as possible, the unproductive, parasitic surplus population, the mass of poor who, far from creating wealth, devoured it like locusts. To maintain the demographic balance, Malthus called for a policy that postponed marriage and procreation among the popular classes; otherwise, nature would dispose of them with wars, famines and epidemics. In this respect the role of medicine was problematic. In 1764 Franklin wrote to a doctor: ‘Half the Lives you save are not worth saving, as being useless; and almost the other Half ought not to be sav’d, as being mischievous. Does your Conscience never hint to you the Impiety of being in constant Warfare against the Plans of Providence?’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville hoped that one could finally be shot of the ‘prison rabble’ like rats, maybe thanks to a massive fire.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Did the French liberal ‘dream of genocide’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The claim is exaggerated. But there remains his harsh polemic against a ‘bastard charity’ that threatened order: ‘It is the philanthropy of Paris that is killing us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A general conclusion is indicated. The eugenic temptation runs deep in the liberal tradition. Not by chance, the discipline that took this name had its baptism in Great Britain and experienced extraordinary success in the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The elusive liberalism of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, we are compelled to pose a crucial question in connection with Great Britain: Was it a liberal society? Even after the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg116&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;abolition of slavery in the colonies proper, we certainly cannot speak of generalized enjoyment of the quintessential liberal freedom—modern liberty—by the United Kingdom’s inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Irish certainly did not enjoy it, being as they were (acknowledged de Tocqueville) constantly subjected to ‘emergency measures’ and at the mercy of ‘military tribunals’ and a numerous, hateful gendarmerie. In Castlebar, on the basis of the Insurrection Act, ‘any man caught without a passport outdoors after sunset is deported’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the press of the time, the condition of the Irish was often compared with that of blacks across the Atlantic. According to the judgement in 1824 of a rich English merchant, who was a disciple of Smith and an ardent Quaker and abolitionist (James Cropper), the Irish found themselves in a worse situation than black slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, the Irish represented for Britain what the blacks were for the United States; they were ‘two phenomena of the same kind’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Beaumont’s opinion found indirect confirmation from de Tocqueville. From &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; we know of the complete deafness of the judiciary, monopolized by whites, to the legitimate complaints of blacks. A conclusion suggests itself, also indicated by evidence gathered in Maryland: ‘The white population and the black population are in a state of war. They never mix. One of them must give way to the other.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French liberal heard a similar observation in the island subjugated and colonized by Britain: ‘To tell the truth, there is no justice in Ireland. Virtually all the country’s magistrates are in open warfare with the population. So the population does not even have the idea of public justice.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases a cornerstone of the &#039;&#039;Rechtsstaat&#039;&#039;—the judiciary—was at war with a substantial part of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On both sides of the Atlantic, laws that prevented or hampered access to education and outlawed marriage with members of the higher caste served to prolong the oppression of the blacks and the Irish. In Ireland, too, miscegenation was a crime punished with great severity; on the basis of a law of 1725, a priest guilty of secretly celebrating a mixed marriage could even be condemned to death.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Ireland as well, attempts were made to obstruct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg117&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the native population’s access to education. We can conclude on this point by attending to the words of a nineteenth-century liberal Anglo-Irish historian: British legislation aimed to deprive the Irish of their ‘property’ and ‘industry’; it ‘was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1798, three years prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish numbered ‘about four and a half million—a third of the population of the British Isles’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, a higher percentage of people were to be deprived of their negative liberty than in the United States, where, at the time of independence, blacks made up one-fifth of the population. It must be added that, before and after the Glorious Revolution, Britain’s rulers treated the Irish, on the one hand, like Indians, to be deprived of their land and thinned out through more or less drastic measures; and on the other, like blacks whose forced labour might conveniently be used. Hence the oscillation between practices of enslavement and genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain itself the popular classes saw their negative liberty seriously infringed, to the extent that they were assimilated in the culture and press of the time to an inferior ‘caste’ or ‘race’. But now it is appropriate to concentrate on relations within the upper ‘caste’. As we know, the American colonists’ rebellion developed out of protests against the negative discrimination they suffered by dint of their exclusion from the legislative body. At the same time, we must not forget that in eighteenth-century Britain the right to representation was a privilege granted by the Crown, so that even large industrial towns were excluded from the House of Commons, where, by contrast, boroughs which had virtually been abandoned, but which had the right to be ‘represented’ in London mainly by local nobles, were present. Bearing in mind that the House of Lords was the hereditary preserve of the landed aristocracy, a conclusion is dictated: in the case of Britain itself, not even relations within the property-owning classes were stamped by equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality was further compromised by another circumstance: only the second electoral Reform Act, put through by Disraeli in 1867, ‘effected the full political emancipation of Non-conformists’. Until then, significant forms of religious discrimination were in force:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg118&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Persons, whether Protestant or Catholic, who would not take the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England, were still debarred from holding office either under the Crown or in the municipalities; the doors of Parliament were still closed to Roman Catholics, and the doors of the Universities to dissenters of every kind. [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, on closer inspection, the non-conformists (among whom must obviously be included the Jews)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] were deprived not only of political equality, but also of full legal equality. Only in 1871 did all universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, ‘throw open College Fellowships and University posts to persons of every, or of no, religious denomination’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The argument with which Macaulay criticized the exclusion of Jews from political rights in 1831 is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money; and money may make members of Parliament … That a Jew should be privy-councilor to a Christian king would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money-market, and the money-market may govern the world.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In a paradoxical argument against the forms of discrimination of which Jews were victims, Macaulay seems to echo anti-Jewish stereotypes, but in reality the meaning of his discourse is clear: it was absurd and inadmissible to seek to deny political and even civil equality to those who, economically at any rate, were already members of the dominant elite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, like the class that was the protagonist of the American Revolution and the establishment of a racial state, the English aristocracy in no way restricted itself to aspiring to a merely negative liberty. Some decades before Hamilton (and the American revolutionaries), in England Sidney had already declared that ‘nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another’, or upon a law to which he had not given his consent.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg119&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Locke did not formulate things very differently, when with political ‘slavery’ he contrasted ‘liberty’ understood as ‘be[ing] under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again it was Locke who stressed the equivalence between the English and Latin terms;[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the latter clearly implied the participation of the &#039;&#039;cives&#039;&#039; in public life. The English philosopher argued along similar lines to the American revolutionaries, who not by chance appealed to him: he who wants to decide on his own, excluding me from the process of forming laws, may legitimately be suspected of ‘hav[ing] a design to take away everything else’, not just political ‘liberty’; he ultimately aims to ‘make me a slave’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the position adopted by this or that theorist, the English aristocracy aimed to play, and really did play, a political role of the first order. In addition to the upper house, ‘the lower house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club’ until almost the end of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy exercised political power directly: ‘it was the landed elite, not a separate service elite, that was in control of public affairs’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a control that encompassed the judiciary and local government and which, above all in the countryside, was seamless. Virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the grandees and gentry were still the unchallenged authorities, responsible to no one but themselves.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the South of the United States, the uncontested power of a social class in England did not preclude the imposition of restrictions on its individual members. The titled property-owner was required to respect a series of obligations, sanctioned partly by law and partly by custom. One thinks of primogeniture and the inalienability of property, as well as the endogamy that was fairly widespread within the aristocracy—a practice that once again calls to mind the ban on miscegenation in the United States. The members of the nobility ‘were concerned with voluntary service to the state, both locally and nationally, as civilians and as military men’. While they enjoyed their property and their wealth, patrician officers adopted the pose of ‘chivalric heroes’ required, when the nation was in danger, to exhibit ‘spartan and stoical bravery’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg120&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How should we define the society we have been analysing? Once again, we encounter the problem that has dogged us since the beginning of this book: Can we speak of liberalism in connection with Calhoun’s thinking and the reality of the United States where he lived and worked? And can we speak of it in relation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Given the dominant representation of liberalism today, what sense would it make to define as liberal a society where a considerable part of the population was subject to military dictatorship, where the popular metropolitan classes were at least partially excluded from negative liberty, where this type of liberty was by no means the ideal of the possessing classes, and where the principle of civil and political equality was limited among the latter in various ways?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constitutive element of a liberal regime should be competition between various candidates. But what actually happened?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many elections saw no contest at all. In seven general elections from 1760 to 1800, less than a tenth of the country seats were contested. Of the boroughs, some were purely inert in that their owners sold the seats or appointed the members without question; some seats were as much a property as seats in the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Liberalism, ‘property-owning individualism’ and ‘aristocratic society’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In an attempt to overcome the difficulty encountered in defining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, reference has sometimes been made to ‘individualism’ rather than liberalism; and the history of the intellectual tradition being examined now seems profoundly stamped with a ‘property-owning individualism’ or ‘possessive individualism’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This definition has some legitimacy. In Locke, political power begins to be configured as tyranny, and hence violence, when it attacks private property (belonging to the dominant class); and it is then licit to resist such violence. The citizen, in fact the individual, takes back the power he already possessed in the state of nature, which consists in ‘us[ing] such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and Nature allows him’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of legality is the sphere of respect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg121&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for private property, while violence is defined in the first instance by its violation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On closer examination, however, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ proves completely inadequate. We are confronted with a society and intellectual tradition which, far from being inspired by a superstitious respect for property and property right in general, in fact promoted and legitimized massive expropriations of the Irish and Indians. It is true that a central chapter in the second of Locke’s &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; bears the title ‘Of Property’. But ‘Expropriation’ might have been more fitting, given that it aims to justify white colonists’ appropriation of land from idle Indians incapable of cultivating it. Ignoring the colonies and colonial populations, or populations of colonial origin, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ seems to focus attention exclusively on the white community in the capitalist metropolis, and on the conflict between property-owners and non-property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we confine our attention to the metropolis, we see that the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; justifies and demands the enclosure of common land in England, and hence the massive expropriation of peasants. Like the transatlantic territories occupied by the Indians, common land was not properly fertilized by labour; and hence in both cases there was as yet no legitimate owner. In classic authors of the liberal tradition, we find the assertion and detailed demonstration that the property claimed by natives, and by social groups in the metropolis assimilated to natives, was in reality &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paradoxically, despite its critical intentions, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ ends up crediting the ideological self-consciousness of the classes that arrived in power in England and America advancing the slogan of liberty and property. Marx argued quite differently. &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; denounced the ‘stoical peace of mind [of] the political economist’ and of liberal thinkers in the face of ‘the most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property”‘, and ‘the forcible expropriation of the people’, carried out in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, in order to speed up the enclosure process, brutal methods were sometimes employed without hesitation: entire villages were destroyed and razed to the ground, so as to force the peasants to flee and transform common land into private property and pasture in the service of the textile industry.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining the category of ‘property-owning individualism’, we have hitherto concentrated on the adjective. If we now turn our attention to the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg122&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;noun, we shall find that it too proves rather problematic. The excluded were likened by the dominant class to instruments of labour, bipedal machines. In other words, they saw their quality as human beings and individuals denied. Certainly, the privileged insisted strongly on this quality, which they attributed exclusively to themselves. But is this individualism? Here, too, we find the modern historian aligning himself with the ideological self-consciousness of a social class and political movement he intends to criticize.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than ‘property-owning individualism’, the categories applied to England by some leading liberal authors of the nineteenth century seem more apt. In Constant’s view, ‘England is, at bottom, simply a vast, opulent and vigorous aristocracy.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The judgement formulated by de Tocqueville in the 1830s was no different: ‘Not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly stable than ever, but the nation leaves the government, seemingly without any signs of disapproval, to a very small number of families’, an ‘aristocracy’ primarily based on ‘birth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are dealing with an ‘aristocratic community’ characterized by the domination of ‘a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Besides, it was Disraeli himself who criticized the Whig Party, which long dominated the country that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, for having aimed to establish an aristocracy and oligarchy on the Venetian model.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. ‘Master-race democracy’ between the United States and England&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A question remains unanswered: Albeit intrinsically aristocratic, was England nevertheless a liberal society? Constant was in no doubt: it was the country where ‘social differences are most respected’ (wholly to the advantage of the aristocracy), but where, at the same time, ‘the rights of each man are most guaranteed’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also de Tocqueville’s opinion, but only after 1848, once anxiety about the socialist and Bonapartist drift of France had eclipsed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg123&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;any other consideration. ‘[T]he aristocratic constitution of English society’ was incontestable, and yet it was still the ‘wealthiest and freest country’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to the fall of the July Monarchy, by contrast, de Tocqueville had his doubts and reservations. It was necessary to distinguish between ‘two different forms of liberty’. One should not confuse ‘the democratic and, dare I say it, correct conception of liberty’ with the ‘aristocratic conception of liberty’, understood not as ‘common right’ but as ‘privilege’. The latter prevailed in England, as in ‘aristocratic societies’ in general, with the result that there was no place for ‘general liberty’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; referred and subscribed to the observation of a US citizen who had journeyed extensively in Europe: ‘The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprises us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not that the pathos of liberty was absent among those who adopted the stance of absolute masters. On the contrary: ‘It can happen that the love of liberty is all the more alive among some the less one encounters guarantees of liberty for all. The rarer it is, the exception in such cases is all the more precious.’ This aristocratic conception of liberty produces, among those who have been thus educated, an exalted sense of their individual value and a passionate taste for independence.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the value judgement, which is the converse, we are put in mind of Burke’s well-known observation: freedom appears even ‘more noble and more liberal’ to slave-masters. Should we equate England with slaveholding Virginia? In fact, points in common were not wanting, as emerges from a reading of de Tocqueville. He observed that in the United States whites refused to recognize ‘the common features of humanity’ in blacks.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But in England, too, inequalities were so marked and insuperable that ‘each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race’; ‘general ideas’ were lacking, starting precisely with the idea of humanity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, de Tocqueville was concerned to distinguish American democracy from the aristocracy predominant in England. However, on several occasions his analysis ended up drawing attention to the similarities between the two societies. What took the form of class relations on one side of the Atlantic presented itself as race relations on the other. In the case of England, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg124&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we can speak of liberal society in the same way that Burke spoke of liberal society in connection with the Virginia and Poland of his time. An essential point remains: often excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights and negative liberty in England itself, the popular classes, by de Tocqueville’s indirect but all the more significant admission, continued to be separated from the upper class or caste by a gulf that calls to mind the one obtaining in a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, it can be said that for some time even the society which emerged in England from the Glorious Revolution was configured as a sort of ‘master-race democracy’, on condition that this category is not understood in a purely ethnic sense. On this side of the Atlantic, too, an insurmountable barrier separated the community of the free and masters from the mass of servants, not fortuitously compared by Locke to ‘natives’. And far from being satisfied with negative liberty, the dominant aristocracy cultivated the ideal of active participation in political life, cultivating ‘republican’ ideals. Several influential contemporary interpreters base their arguments on this, when referring to a ‘neo-Roman’ vision or ‘Machiavellian moment’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we face the danger of inadvertent transfiguration: these two categories highlight the pathos of free, egalitarian participation in public life, but end up passing in silence over the macroscopic exclusion clauses presupposed by such pathos. The ideal of a rich public life, of ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Machiavellian’ character, is indeed present in an author like Fletcher, who on the one hand declared himself ‘republican in principle’, while on the other he advocated slavery for vagrants. Locke can be assimilated to such a milieu. He declared in favour of black slavery in the colonies and ‘drudgery’ for wage-labourers in the metropolis. At the same time, with his focus on the aristocracy he developed a pathos of the Commonwealth and the &#039;&#039;civitas&#039;&#039;, which echoes the republican models of antiquity. This, at least, was the opinion of Josiah Tucker, who identified and denounced Locke as a ‘republican Whig’ and supporter of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But perhaps the author who in England best expressed the ideal of ‘master-race democracy’ was Sidney. His insistence on the equality of free men was very marked: ‘the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others do the like’. Definitive is his condemnation of political slavery, inherent not only in absolute monarchy, but also in any political regime that claimed to subject the freeman to laws decided without his consent. But this pathos of liberty implied the demand for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg125&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the master’s right to be ‘judge’ of his own servant without outside interference.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One should not lose sight of the fact that ‘in many places (even by the law of God) the master hath a power of life and death over his servant’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the base and effeminate Asiaticks and Africans’, incapable of understanding the value of ‘liberty’, were rightly regarded by Aristotle as &#039;&#039;‘slaves by nature’&#039;&#039; and ‘little different from beasts’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance—together with Locke, Fletcher and Burgh—Sidney was indicated by Jefferson as a leading authority for understanding ‘the general principles of liberty’ that inspired the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker also conjoined Locke and Sidney, but this time critically. He further pointed out that Sidney was an admirer of ‘Polish liberty’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and of a country where serfdom in its harshest form, to which peasants were subjected, was intertwined with the rich political life of the aristocracy that dominated the Diet), and paid homage to ‘republican liberty’ (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Also expressing himself in flattering terms about Poland, as well as the ‘southern colonies’ of America, was Burke, who not by chance became the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South. Admiration for a regime of republican liberty founded on the slavery or servitude of a considerable proportion of the population, for a ‘master-race democracy’, was well represented in English liberalism. The authors expressing such positions could in their turn count on widespread sympathy across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn1a|1]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonopartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn2a|2]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn3a|3]] Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 301.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn4a|4]] Garry Wills, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn5a|5]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 2, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn6a|6]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn7a|7]] Jefferson Davis, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 399–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn8a|8]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 10–11, 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn9a|9]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn10a|10]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn11a|11]] Plessy versus Ferguson, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Isssues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn12a|12]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 51, 234–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn13a|13]] The term was coined in late 1863: cf. Forrest G. Wood, &#039;&#039;Black Scare&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 53ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn14a|14]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn16a|16]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn17a|17]] Joel Williamson, &#039;&#039;New People&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn19a|19]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., pp. 19–22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn21a|21]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., p. 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn23a|23]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie, ou L’esclavage aux États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gosselin, 1840, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn24a|24]] Robert William Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Consent or Contract&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn25a|25]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn26a|26]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn27a|27]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn28a|28]] David Grimsted, &#039;&#039;American Mobbing, 1828–1861&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn31a|31]] Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July’, in Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., &#039;&#039;Masterpieces of Negro Eloquence, 1818–1913&#039;&#039;, Mineola (NY): Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn32a|32]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn34a|34]] Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn35a|35]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn36a|36]] Brenda Stevenson, &#039;&#039;Life in Black and White&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 275; David B. Davis, ‘White Wives and Slave Mothers’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 20 February 1997, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn37a|37]] Dew quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn38a|38]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 97, 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn39a|39]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joëlle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991, pp. 74–5, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn40a|40]] Dew, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 320.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn41a|41]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 6, 10; Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 62, 205, 425.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn42a|42]] Hosea Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, trans. Alda Carrer and Davide Danti, Milan: Jaca Book, 1997, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn43a|43]] Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Contract or Consent&#039;&#039;, p. 413.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn44a|44]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 405.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn46a|46]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn47a|47]] Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn48a|48]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 120, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn49a|49]] William E. B. Du Bois, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction in America&#039;&#039;, ed. David L. Lewis, New York: Athenaeum, 1992, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn50a|50]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn51a|51]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 95 and &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, pp. 394, 397.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn52a|52]] George M. Frederickson, ‘America’s Original Sin’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 25 March 2004, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn53a|53]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn54a|54]] Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism, passim&#039;&#039;; George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;; Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America, passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, p. 22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 326.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn58a|58]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn62a|62]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 119, 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn65a|65]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 411–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn66a|66]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 339, 343.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., p. 344.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn69a|69]] Douglas A. Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn70a|70]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 339.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn71a|71]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, pp. 101–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn72a|72]] John Cannon, &#039;&#039;Aristocratic Century&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn73a|73]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn74a|74]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn75a|75]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn76a|76]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn77a|77]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 258–9, 261–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn79a|79]] Bentham, quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, pp. 78–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn80a|80]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn81a|81]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 803 (letter to John Fothergill, 14 March 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn82a|82]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 173–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 22 November 1836).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn83a|83]] Michelle Perrot, Introduction to ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn85a|85]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 19, §1; ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn86a|86]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn87a|87]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 180, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn88a|88]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 2, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn89a|89]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94–5. De Tocqueville is reporting a conversation between two influential representatives of the English political world, Nassau William Senior and John Revans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn91a|91]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 2, pp. 371–3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 289.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn93a|93]] Thomas Pakenham, &#039;&#039;The Year of Liberty&#039;&#039;, New York: Random House, 1969, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn94a|94]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945, pp. 631, 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn95a|95]] Michael C. N. Salbstein, &#039;&#039;The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain&#039;&#039;, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn96a|96]] Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, p. 681.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn98a|98]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, p. 402.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn99a|99]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., p. 183.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn102a|102]] David Cannadine, &#039;&#039;The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 14, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn103a|103]] Ibid., p. 14&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., pp. 13, 74.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn105a|105]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn106a|106]] C. B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn107a|107]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn108a|108]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 889, 891.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn109a|109]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 327 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 4 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn111a|111]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn112a|112]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 323–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113a|113]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, pp. 155, 150–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 333 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 27 February 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116a|116]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117a|117]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118a|118]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120a|120]] Quentin Skinner, &#039;&#039;Liberty Before Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121a|121]] Tucker, quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 119, 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122a|122]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 548–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123a|123]] Ibid., p. 312.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124a|124]] Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125a|125]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 479.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126a|126]] Tucker, quoted in Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FIVE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg127&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism either Side of the Atlantic&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto been concerned almost exclusively with England and the United States. The truth is that the liberal party in France betrayed its weakness fairly early on. And yet, several years before the appearance of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, Voltaire likewise proceeded to celebrate the country that embodied the cause of liberalism at the time: ‘Commerce, which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has developed commerce in its turn. By means of it the nation has grown great’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘[t]he English are the only people on earth who have managed to prescribe limits to the power of kings’; they alone were genuinely free.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More generally, given the difficulty they faced in dealing with comprehensive censorship, the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; hoped to escape this kind of cage and hence looked with sympathy across the Channel. Even Helvétius, whom Diderot rebuked for his indulgence towards enlightened despotism, was compelled to make a significant concession: ‘It is said that this century is the century of philosophy … Today, everyone seems occupied with the search for truth. But there is only one country where it can be published with impunity—and that is England.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The island happily &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg128&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rid of absolute monarchy exercised a powerful attraction. In the columns of the &#039;&#039;Encyclopédie&#039;&#039;, Diderot held up England as an example of ‘temperate monarchy’, where ‘the sovereign is repository solely of executive power’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A little less than ten years later, proposing to restrict representative bodies to ‘major property-owners’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he still viewed cross-Channel political institutions with great interest. In Condorcet’s view, too, they had the merit of having realized, albeit to an inadequate extent, the principles of the limitation of royal power, freedom of the press, habeas corpus and judicial independence.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, two years prior to the storming of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses on the political scene, the English model seemed to have triumphed in France as well. Supported by a wide popular consensus, the noble &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; challenged royal absolutism: ‘the anti-absolutism of the parlements’, or ‘aristocratic liberalism’, became the vehicle for widespread ‘liberal demands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Preserve of a nobility which, as a result also of the sale of offices, was open to the bourgeoisie, the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; for a while seemed destined to play godfather to the advent of a constitutional monarchy and to perform a role similar to that of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in England. Not by chance they appealed to Montesquieu, president of the Bordeaux &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; and a great admirer of the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Burke viewed this sensationally missed opportunity with regret, when he delivered his harsh indictment of a revolution that had degenerated rapidly and wickedly. Had it ended at the stage when the struggle was led by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, the French&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
would have shamed despotism from the earth [and] rendered the cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in every nation … You would have had a free constitution … a liberal order of commons to emulate and recruit that nobility …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg129&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unfortunately, this happy, auspicious moment had been short-lived; and people had started chasing after ‘a pure democracy’ that in fact secreted a tendency to a ‘party tyranny’ and ‘a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Reflections on the Revolution in France&#039;&#039; was published on 1 November 1790, but its basic arguments had already been set out with great clarity in a speech by Burke in the Commons on 9 February of that year. Jacobinism lay in the future. Rather than transforming the British Whig into the prophet of a catastrophe no one was in a position to predict at the time, we should examine the events that had occurred when he levelled his serious charges against the French Revolution. Revealing is the observation that, rather than striving to create a ‘bad constitution’ &#039;&#039;ex nihilo&#039;&#039;, the French should have engaged in further improving the ‘good one’, of which ‘[t]hey were in possession … the day the states met in separate orders’. The ruinous turn occurred when, in the course of the meeting of the Estates-General summoned by the King—at which the ‘good’ Constitution finally emerged or, rather, re-emerged—the tradition whereby the orders sat in separate chambers was abandoned and the transition to voting by head was decided, with the consequent transformation on 9 July of the Estates-General into a constituent National Assembly wherein the former Third Estate now possessed a majority. Thus burst onto the scene the ‘bad constitution’, which ‘melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass’. Everything else flowed from this: the attack on ‘the root of all property’ and ‘confiscat[ion] [of] all the possessions of the church’—the reference is to the night of 4 August 1789 and the abolition of feudal privileges (hunting rights, tithes, and so on)—and the promulgation on 26 August of the ‘mad declaration’ of the Rights of Man, that ‘sort of &#039;&#039;institute&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039; of anarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But everything began on 9 July. The French Revolution proved fatally degenerate even before the capture of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses—in a sense, even before its inception. And in fact Burke was concerned to stress that ‘the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England’ was in fact ‘a revolution, not made, but prevented’: William of Orange ‘was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its antient constitution, and not to level all distinctions’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as, alas, had happened in France. The latter had now gone beyond its fleeting liberal phase, which extended from the agitation of the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; to the summoning of the Estates-General.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg130&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The subsequent liberal tradition is inclined to extend the felicitous phase of the French Revolution somewhat, and identify the turning point in the tumultuous intervention of the popular masses, initially rural and then urban; thus de Tocqueville. But it is interesting to note that he, too, after 1848 at any rate, extolled the period when the movement was directed by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, all of them striving to reverse ‘the old absolute power’ and ‘the old arbitrary system’, and win ‘political liberty’, in a struggle promoted and led not by the ‘low classes’ but by the ‘higher’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, contrary to Burke, who tended to conceive the parliamentary agitation on the model of the so-called Glorious Revolution, de Tocqueville was prepared to stress that in this phase, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, an authentic revolution was underway:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should not be thought that the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; presented these principles as novelties. On the contrary, it derived them very industriously from the depths of the antiquity of the monarchy … It is a strange sight to see ideas that had hardly been born thus wrapped in ancient swaddling clothes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was ‘a very great revolution, but one that should rapidly have faded into the immensity of what happened and thus disappeared from the view of history’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only in a subsequent phase ‘was the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; no longer praised’ in the revolutionary movement, but ‘reviled, turning its liberalism against it’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruinous parabola of the French Revolution could be synthesized thus: ‘At the outset it was Montesquieu who was quoted and expounded; at the end people spoke exclusively of Rousseau.’ The turning point was described in terms similar to those we have noted in Burke: the rot set in when people rushed towards ‘pure democracy’ and laid claim to change ‘the very structure of society’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even closer to Burke was Guizot, who pointed to the eruption of the ‘Third Estate’s struggle against the nobility and the clergy’ as the moment when the French Revolution ceased to have ‘liberty’ as its goal and aimed exclusively at ‘power’, paving the way for the subsequent, interminable struggles—‘those of the poor against the rich, of the common people against the bourgeoisie, of the rabble against respectable folk [&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;]’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Parliaments, diets, the liberal aristocracy and serfdom&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg131&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;For Burke, the revolution in France should ultimately have confined itself to liberalizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. This was not an isolated, polemical idea. In stressing the particular attachment to liberty displayed by slave-owners, the discourse of reconciliation with the rebel colonists offered a general consideration:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]hese people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothick ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
No distinction is made here between slavery in the strict sense and the serfdom prevalent, in its harshest forms, in eastern Europe. In any event, the servile subjection of blacks or peasants, far from contradicting it, rendered the love of liberty by property-owners and freemen stronger and more credible.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sidney too was an admirer of Poland. Along with other ‘northern nations’, it was inspired by a love of liberty. What demonstrated this was, among other things, the fact that the king derived from ‘popular elections’—in other words, appointment by the Diet of nobles.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, proudly asserting their condition as free, equal men in the face of the monarch were magnates who wielded absolute power over their serfs. But Sidney argued along the lines we have already encountered: as with slavery, liberalism was also compatible with serfdom. In fact, both institutions rendered the appreciation of liberty more profound and more jealous.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Burke there is complete consistency between the recognition granted Poland and that granted the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;. The latters’ agitation was quite the reverse of an isolated phenomenon: ‘In Sweden the years from 1719 to 1772 are known as the Age of Freedom, because at this time the Diet or Riksdag ruled without interference by the King. Indeed, these Swedish Whigs, after their revolution of 1719, had the works of John Locke translated into Swedish.’ In Hungary the nobles instead appealed above all to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while, in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg132&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even more ringing language, the Polish aristocracy paid homage to ‘republican liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[t]he diets, estates, parlements, and councils all stoutly defended liberty, and indeed stood for many genuine liberal ideas; but at the same time they palpably insisted on the maintenance or enlargement of their own privileges.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this context we can also situate Bismarck’s celebration some decades later of the ‘liberal caste sentiments’ (&#039;&#039;ständisch-liberale Stimmung&#039;&#039;) of the class he belonged to,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which was interested in extending the jurisdiction and powers of representative bodies also in order to reinforce control over servants.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar observation can be made in connection with the agitation set off by the French &#039;&#039;parlements:&#039;&#039; guiding the ‘assault’ on royal absolutism was ‘one of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime’s&#039;&#039; most traditional institutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in addition to the English model, it was to this initial phase of the French Revolution—the one admired by Burke and de Tocqueville post-1848—that the liberal nobility of the Hapsburg Empire appealed to condemn Joseph II’s anti-feudal reforms, to reassert the role of diets and intermediate bodies, and hence ‘regain … control over their peasants’ and the ‘other political liberties’ they had lost.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sidney had already specified that a common feature of ‘northern nations’, which embodied the principle of liberty, was assignment of a decisive role to ‘lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The aristocratic liberalism represented in France by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; was thus widely diffused in Europe, especially central and eastern Europe. Certainly, unlike Burke, Montesquieu expressed a negative opinion of Poland, ‘where the peasants are slaves of the nobility’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Whig was well aware of these social relations. In fact, he started out from them to underscore the emphatic love of liberty displayed by slave-owners in Poland, as across the Atlantic. By contrast, Montesquieu saw liberty at work in the English colonies in America, but not in Poland. Does Burke demonstrate greater logical rigour? In reality, in accordance with his principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, Montesquieu did not identify with Poland, which could not invoke the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg133&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;justification or extenuation of a hot climate and where the zone of unfreedom lacked spatial as well as racial delimitation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It remains the case that Burke’s attitude had deep roots in the philosophy of history of the liberal tradition, which from Montesquieu onwards tended to date the inception of the history of freedom and free, representative government from the ancient Germans. Among them, as we know from Grotius, the institution of slavery was very much present and yet (according to the author of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;), ‘the English have taken their idea of political government from the Germans’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such presuppositions, Madame de Staël celebrated the liberty enjoyed by old France, despite the heavy presence of serfdom,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Constant ‘the intermediate bodies’ and &#039;&#039;‘Parlements’&#039;&#039; wrongly weakened by royal despotism,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which played an important role in the initial phase of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The American Revolution and the crisis of the English model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the seemingly favourable initial prospects, the English model met with rapid defeat in Paris. In reality, it was already deeply tarnished when the crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; reached maturity in France. In the 1760s, while the colonists’ rebellion was brewing across the Atlantic, John Wilkes attacked ‘the whole organization of the British oligarchy’ in London and initiated a crisis of such gravity as to make the Italian Pietro Verri believe in the imminence of ‘civil war’. Persecuted at home, Wilkes for a time found refuge in Paris, where he formed relations with the group of &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the turning point in the process that threw the English model into crisis in France was represented by the American Revolution. The British Constitution now ceased to be celebrated, and criticisms of Montesquieu for having transfigured it were not lacking.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The increasingly bitter condemnation of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; derived comfort from transatlantic political and social developments. Although not refusing England acknowledgement of the merits earned with the liquidation of royal absolutism, Condorcet looked primarily to America, with its magnificent ‘spectacle of equality’, without any trace of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg134&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belief diffused, albeit to different degrees, on both sides of the Channel that nature had ‘divided the human race into three or four orders’, condemning only one of them to ‘work much and eat little’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now appeal was no longer made to the Glorious Revolution, from which a liberal but also aristocratic England had emerged, but to the ‘happy revolution’ across the Atlantic,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which had given birth to a markedly superior politico-social reality: ‘there is no distinction of orders’ and ‘there is nothing that confines one part of the human species to an abjectness consigning it to idiocy as well as misery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Diderot was even more swingeing. The new country, which offered ‘all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum from fanaticism and tyranny’, was an alternative model to the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that continued to be all the rage in the old continent as a whole, and where ‘the inept, the corrupt rich and the pernicious [are promoted] to the most important offices’. Adherence to the cause of the rebel colonists was, at the same time, a ruthless critique of the behaviour of British troops and against Britain as such. This emerges from celebration of the ‘brave Americans, who have preferred to see their women outraged, their children slain, their homes destroyed, their fields ruined, their cities burnt, and who have preferred to shed their blood and die, rather than lose the least part of their liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks also to the support furnished to the American revolutionaries by France, their arguments were bound to find a favourable echo in Paris, and they involved an unequivocal condemnation of the country that Paine in &#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039; (substantially translated immediately after its publication) branded as ‘British barbarity’, ‘the Royal Brute of Britain’, whose aristocratic character was already evident from ‘what is called the Magna Charta’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nor should we lose sight of the presence in Paris, in the decisive years of the revolutionary crisis, of Jefferson, who, a few weeks after the storming of the Bastille, advised France to keep its distance from England’s worst aspects (a form of representation that was quite the reverse of equal—in fact, ‘abominably partial’—as well as the ‘absolute’ power which the monarch continued to possess in reality thanks to the venality of parliamentarians).[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg135&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This was the intellectual climate in which Brissot and Clavière, two figures destined to play a central role in the French Revolution, published a book in 1787 dedicated ‘to the American Congress and the friends of the United States in the two worlds’, and marked throughout by admiration for ‘free Americans’ and ‘free America’, for its ‘free’ and ‘excellent’ Constitution and noble ‘republican customs’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The counterpoint to such celebration was, of course, condemnation of ‘London’s ministerial despotism’ and the ‘ferocity’ of its troops. The ‘English nation’ was now vainly seeking to remedy the ‘devastation of its cruel dementia’ and renew relations with the country born in the wake of the struggle against it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This division must be followed by an intellectual and political alliance between those who had struggled together against England—namely, the United States and France, which ‘with its arms helped assert the independence of free America’, and which was now summoned to take inspiration from the great new model embodied by the country thrown up by the revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On this basis, Brissot and Clavière set up the French–American Society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When, two years later, the debate began that issued in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, not a few interventions appealed to the American example and the sort of synthetic proclamation of the rights of man contained in the Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to counter the revolution’s radicalization, Malouet, who became the spokesman for the interests of slave-owners in the colonies, drew attention to the radical differences between the United States and France. In the first case, there was a society ‘entirely composed of property-owners already accustomed to equality’. In the second, one witnessed the agitation of ‘an immense multitude of men without property’ in a daily struggle for survival and ‘placed by fate in a condition of dependency’: a gulf separated ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society’. This was where appeals to ‘democracy’ and the rights of man could have devastating consequences for the social order.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Stripped of its ideological caution and reticence, the meaning of the speech was clear. In America, thanks to expansion into territories occupied by the Indians and their expropriation, it was possible significantly to expand the ranks of property-owners who were European in origin. On the other hand, the ‘unfortunate classes’ were not in a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg136&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;position to do harm: they mainly comprised blacks reduced to slavery or relegated to a subaltern caste and subject to iron social control. Waved exclusively within the white community and the superior race, the flag of democracy and the rights of man had nothing subversive about it. But in France …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Malouet’s reasoning was not flawless. However, it was no longer possible to revert to the situation prior to the American Revolution. After the formation of significantly more democratic representative bodies at federal and state levels in the United States, little credibility could attach to the British parliament, which on the basis of a law of 1716 that remained in force for nearly two centuries (until 1911) was elected every seven years,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and monopolized by the landed aristocracy. Moreover, it was undermined by a corruption that had become proverbial in Europe and across the Atlantic, which seemed in France to be a repeat of the sale of offices—an essential element of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that was to be got rid of.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of their argument with London, the American revolutionaries had equated citizens deprived of the right of representation with slaves. But now this argument came to be applied in France by those who were opposed to censitary discrimination in the suffrage. This, thundered Robespierre, criticizing those inspired by the ‘example of England’, reduced the excluded to a condition similar to the slave: ‘liberty consists in obeying the laws one has given oneself and slavery in being forced to submit to an alien will’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, Babeuf argued in similar fashion: ‘citizens whose will is inactive—such men are slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These were declarations that could have come from the mouth of an American revolutionary; only now, pronounced in favour not of a narrow elite of gentlemen and property-owners, but of the mass of the dispossessed, they assumed a very different political and social value.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The transfiguration of American ‘master-race democracy’ in a universalistic key&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Focusing attention on the problem of slavery, the argument that developed on both sides of the Atlantic initially discredited England, protagonist of the slave trade, more than it did the rebel colonists: ‘staining the reputation of that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg137&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nation’ (observed Diderot in 1774) ‘is the fact that its blacks are the unhappiest of blacks’. Indeed, ‘the Englishman, enemy of tyranny at home, is the most ferocious despot abroad’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; reiterated the point: ‘The English, this people so jealous of their own liberty, have contempt for that of other men’. They did not hesitate to employ the most bestial methods and the most refined forms of torture to smother any hint of rebellion and any aspiration to freedom by their slaves; ‘it is to this excess of barbarism that the trading and slavery of blacks have necessarily led the usurpers’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, when it allied with the powers of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to fight revolutionary France, and refused to follow the latter’s example in abolishing slavery (decreed by the Jacobin Convention in February 1794, in the wake of the revolution by the black slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture), England was widely discredited in Europe. Robespierre was not alone in declaring that the island across the Channel could seem like a model of liberty only at a time when France groaned under monarchical absolutism. This was also Kant’s opinion: ‘England, which at one time could count on the sympathy of the best men in the world … has now completely lost that sympathy.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it provoked the crisis of the English model, the American Revolution prompted portrayals and hopes that were destined to prove completely unrealistic. At work was the illusion that the institution of slavery was destined rapidly to disappear in the republic produced by a great struggle for freedom. The founders of the French–American Society explicitly expressed themselves in such terms: ‘The most beautiful feature for which one honours the public spirit in the United States’ was ‘the emancipation of the blacks’. Thanks to the Quakers’ abolitionist campaigning, it ‘will soon be universal in all this part of the world’, so that only the Europeans, still committed to the slave trade and the oppression of blacks, would remain to blush at ‘their barbarism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet adopted a similar position: the rebel colonists were the ‘friends of universal liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, one could start from the presupposition that the stain of slavery would soon be washed away:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg138&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Slavery is universally regarded in the thirteen states as a crime of &#039;&#039;lèse-humanité&#039;&#039; … Now, given this opinion, it will be hard for the private interests of the slave-owners to prevail for long in a country where the press is free and where all measures of public authority, all the deliberations of the legislative body … are necessarily public acts.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This illusion is readily explicable: it involved a confusion between the abolition of the slave trade (effectively provided for by the US Constitution, which sanctioned its termination in 1808) and the abolition of slavery (which continued to flourish); and there was a sense that the process set in train in the North would shortly encompass the Union as a whole. More generally, the rebel colonists’ passionate denunciation of despotism and political slavery sounded like a declaration of war on any form of enslavement, and hence like the inception of black emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The process of transfiguring events across the Atlantic sometimes became a total misunderstanding. Enthusiastically saluting the rebel colonists, Raynal advertised a prize for answers to the question whether ‘the discovery of America has been useful or harmful to the human race’. The four responses submitted concurred in denouncing the event as a harbinger of intolerance and slavery and pointing to the American Revolution as the remedy for such ills.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The rebellion that broke out in the name also of the right to untrammelled expansion into lands inhabited by savages was thus construed in the completely opposite sense!&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The colonists of San Domingo, the American model and the second liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the outset, it was not understood in France that the independence secured by the white colonists strengthened their control over the Indians and blacks; and it was not realized that a similar dialectic was tending to develop in the French colonies. In the 1781 edition of the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039;, Diderot on the one hand evoked the figure of a ‘black Spartacus’, summoned to rise up against the slave-owners, but on the other, harking back to the example of the American Revolution, declared for the concession of self-government to San Domingo too, which would precisely have entailed the triumph of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg139&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slave-owners. The philosopher did not perceive the contradiction, and nor did Brissot, who took a similar position.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, self-government became the watchword of colonists interested in preserving the institution of slavery and shielding their property from the interference, whims and despotism attributed to central government. Among the first to make himself spokesman for these ideas and interests was Malouet, who in 1788 had already engaged in a sharp polemic against the abolitionists. Certainly, the institution of slavery was out of the question for a ‘free and proud nation’ like France. To tolerate it on metropolitan territory would risk erasing the boundary between liberty and slavery and inducing a ‘general enslavement’. Malouet was a liberal and admired England, where he took refuge following the failure of projects for establishing a monarchy on the English model in France. He appealed to the ‘wise Locke’ and his &#039;&#039;Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; to argue that slavery for ‘barbarous peoples … does not offend the right of nature’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence Malouet took care not to challenge the spatial and racial delimitation of slavery, as had his contemporary and fellow countryman Melon (against whom Montesquieu argued): slavery was inconceivable in the metropolis and, within the colonies, for the white race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to blacks, however, the discourse was very different: transported to America, they were providentially released from the ‘most absurd despotism’, which raged in Africa. It was true that they continued to suffer slavery, albeit of a decidedly milder variety than that prevalent in their countries of origin. However, much more so than the American slave, whose subsistence was guaranteed and who was protected by a series of laws, it was the European ‘worker’ (&#039;&#039;journalier&#039;&#039;) who was ‘subject to the &#039;&#039;absolute will’&#039;&#039;, the power of life and death, of his master, who, denying or ejecting him from work, could calmly condemn him to death. People cried scandal at the punishments inflicted on slaves, but what happened in Europe? A peasant who stole was hanged, a poacher was condemned to ‘forced labour’—a slavery much more pitiless than that typically existing across the Atlantic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, we encounter the arguments that would later receive more developed theoretical systematization particularly in Calhoun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg140&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Once the French Revolution had broken out, supporting the colonists’ interests and arguments was the Massiac Club, founded in Paris in August 1789, of which Malouet was a prominent member. Likewise aligned in defence of the colonists’ right to self-government and the undisturbed enjoyment of their property (plantations and slaves) was Antoine Barnave. We are dealing with an important author who expressed his liberal convictions not only in immediately political terms, but also at the level of the philosophy of history. In him too we find the dialectic we are already familiar with: ringing condemnation of political ‘slavery’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] did not prevent him from forcefully and skilfully defending the cause of the slaveholding colonists. The ‘spirit of liberty’ (he observed) increased and strengthened with the expansion of ‘industry’, ‘wealth’ and, above all, ‘movable wealth’. That was why, even prior to England with its splendid ‘Constitution’, it emerged in Holland, ‘the country where movable wealth has accumulated most’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Slaves were an integral part of this ‘movable property’, and had already been classified among the ‘movable’ goods in Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Massiac Club and Barnave were generally considered ‘Anglomanes’ and genuinely were, in the sense that they opposed the radicalization of the French Revolution and admired and envied the country across the Channel for its orderly rule of law and strict censitary discrimination, which consecrated the untrammelled, exclusive domination of the property-owning classes. However, in another respect they were led to appeal predominantly to the American model, with its pathos of the inviolable autonomy of representative bodies and states from central power and the guarantee that derived from it of the inviolability of the institution of slavery. In the face of central government, the colonies adopted the stance of the southern states. In March 1790 the colonists won a temporary victory:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The National Assembly declared that it had not the slightest intention of updating any branch of its trade with the colonies. It placed the colonists and their property under the special protection of the nation. It declared anyone who plotted to incite uprisings against them a criminal to the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg141&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a success that was repeated about a year later: ‘The National Assembly made it a constitutional rule that no law on the condition of unfree persons in the colonies could be made except at the formal, unsolicited request of the colonial Assemblies.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the whole discourse revolved around the problem of slavery, the relevant term did not appear: the articles of the US Constitution were imitated in substance and form alike. This was the French Revolution’s second liberal inception. Just as the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; expressed the desire for self-government by the liberal nobility in the metropolis, so the colonial Assemblies gave voice to the slave-owners’ desire for self-government in the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this second liberal inception was even more precarious than the first. Following the defeat suffered during the Seven Years’ War, France had lost virtually all its colonial empire in 1763. This had imparted to the critique of colonialism and the institution of slavery a diffusion and radicalism hampered, by contrast, in the English and American world by substantial material interests and a national, chauvinistic spirit understandably reinforced by victory. We can thus understand the split that immediately occurred in the French liberal party. Aspiring to a constitutional monarchy with the right to make war and peace reserved to the king, Mirabeau, like Malouet and Barnave, looked to England. Unlike them, however, he ended up rejecting the American model when it came to regulating the relations between central power, on the one hand, and colonies and colonists, on the other. In the Constituent Assembly the latter demanded that they be represented in proportion not only to their numbers, but also to the number of their slaves, in accordance with a criterion identical or similar to that adopted by the US Constitution. Here is Mirabeau’s stinging reply:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the colonists want the blacks and people of colour to be men, well then, emancipate them, so that all are electors and all can be elected. Otherwise, we beg them to note that, in proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have not taken into consideration the number of our horses and mules. The colonists’ claim to have twenty representatives is therefore utterly ridiculous.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was an argument that also applied in the United States, as is confirmed by a subsequent position of Mirabeau’s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg142&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I shall not debase either this assembly or myself by seeking to prove that the blacks have a right to liberty. You decided this question when you declared that all men are born and remain equal and free. And it is not on this side of the Atlantic that corrupt fallacies will dare to maintain that blacks are not men.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The condemnation of ideologies of slavery targeted both French colonists and the English colonists who had now constituted themselves as an independent state: the polemic against the former could not but encompass the latter; the initial ambiguity, which had led French abolitionists to attribute a completely imaginary universalistic impetus to the authors of the American Revolution, was dispelled—all the more so in that it was the very ideologues of slavery who drew attention to the vitality of that institution in the United States. Brissot had believed that the example of the Quakers of Pennsylvania would act as a model; in a sense adopting an observation already present in Smith, Malouet had pointed out in 1788 that the abolition of slavery decided by it affected a fairly limited number of people and certainly did not extend to the southern states, where the presence of slaves and blacks was much more pronounced.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1802 Baudry des Lozières’ sarcasm was stinging. Precisely where ‘Brissot locates perfection’, slavery not only flourished undisturbed, but manifested itself in particularly rigid form: ‘The North Americans, those lovers of liberty, those ardent republicans, who in their books celebrate their independence so much, buy and sell slaves.’ Moreover, ‘this country of liberty is very miserly in granting freedom’ and ‘those who are freed’ were treated ‘extremely harshly’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The crisis of the English and American models and the formation of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, figures were not lacking in the abolitionist camp who continued to harbour illusions about a possible restoration of the American model to its former splendour. The abolition of an institution whose stubborn survival was incomprehensible in a country so strongly attached to the cause of liberty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg143&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;would suffice. When in 1824 Lafayette visited the United States, where nearly fifty years earlier he had fought in the War of Independence, he cautiously tried to point out ‘the disadvantages of slavery’ in Ohio. However, his speech met with no success; in fact, his good intentions had an ironic objective accompaniment, since in various southern cities public notices warned ‘people of color’ to stay away from the ceremonies in honour of the illustrious guest.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Residual illusions were also evident in Grégoire. Demonstrating political naivety, in an attempt to convince Jefferson to abandon his racial prejudices, he referred to the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture to prove the ability of blacks to achieve a level of excellence![[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French abbot was unaware of his interlocutor’s efforts, in his capacity as US president, to reduce the republic born in the wake of the black slave revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture to hunger and force it to surrender (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|§8]]). Similarly, he did not know that in 1801 the latter was lamenting in his correspondence the fact that citizens of San Domingo were abducted by American corsairs and sold as slaves.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Leading the United States in 1801 was precisely Jefferson who, some years later, wrote to a friend in ironic terms about the French abolitionist abbot.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the predicted and desired emancipation of black slaves became an ever more problematic and remote prospect, bitter disappointment set in, as demonstrated in particular by Condorcet’s evolution. On the immediate eve of the French Revolution, when the Constitution consecrating slavery was in force across the Atlantic, he still continued to draw a rather optimistic picture. The various states of the new republic and the ‘common Senate that represents them’ were unanimous in desiring the abolition of slavery; it was an ‘act of justice’ dictated by ‘humanity’, but also by ‘honour’. A severe warning was already implicit in this final observation: ‘How, without blushing, can one dare to demand these declarations of rights, these inviolable bulwarks of the liberty and security of citizens, if every day one permits oneself to violate the most sacred articles?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, where once it had been implicit, the distancing became explicit, even if it continued to be cautiously phrased. Compared with the French Revolution, the American presented itself as ‘more peaceful’, but also as ‘slower’ and ‘more incomplete’. Sooner or later, it too would end up applying &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg144&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principle of liberty and equality in its universality. But for the time being there continued the ‘crimes whose avarice soils the shores of America, Africa or Asia’, the ‘bloody contempt for men of another colour’, the slave trade between the two shores of the Atlantic, the tragedy of Africa and the ‘shameful brigandage that has corrupted and depopulated it for two centuries’. By contrast, it was a merit of the more advanced French culture to treat as ‘&#039;&#039;friends …&#039;&#039; those blacks whom their stupid tyrants disdain to rank among men’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Condorcet denounce the ‘general corruption’ of Holland and England as slaveholding societies. This denunciation increasingly tended also to encompass the country that emerged from the third liberal revolution. The Terror was already hanging over Condorcet himself, who nevertheless identified revolutionary France as the country called upon to put an end to&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the cunning and false policy which, forgetting that all men have equal rights by virtue of their very nature, wanted on the one hand to measure the extent of the rights to be granted by the size of the territory, the climate, national character, the wealth of the people, the degree of perfection of trade and industry; and on the other to sub-divide these same rights unequally between different classes of men, assigning them to birth, wealth and profession, thus creating contrary interests and opposed powers, to then establish a balance between them that is rendered necessary solely by these institutions and which does not even correct their dangerous influences.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The United States no longer represented the genuine antithesis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, construed by Condorcet as a complex system of forms of discrimination and privilege that lacerated the unity of the human race. It was necessary to overcome once and for all a political order in which, intertwined with the hierarchization of peoples on the basis of climate, geographical location or differential economic development, there was a hierarchization within any individual people on the basis of birth or membership of an estate. While the first type of discrimination found concentrated expression across the Atlantic, the second had certainly not disappeared in England. The critical or scornful reference to the argument of ‘climate’ (a position prominent in Montesquieu and often used to justify the slavery of colonial peoples), and to the argument of the ‘balance’ of powers (often invoked in England to justify the privileges of the House of Lords and the landed aristocracy), demonstrates that Condorcet &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg145&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had become critical of the American and English models alike, and had ultimately broken with both fractions of the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fully to understand Condorcet’s mature view, it is important to take account of a peculiarity of the French Revolution. In the course of its development, the popular uprising in the metropolis against the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; was soon followed by the clash in the colonies between freemen and slaves and between blacks and whites. The two conflicts were all the more closely intertwined because sections of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, engaged against the process of radicalization underway in Paris, were sometimes simultaneously interested, as the owners of slaves in the colonies, in preventing their emancipation. Those on the opposite side were thus led to assimilate noble privilege and racial privilege, branding them conjointly as two different expressions of aristocratic arrogance. In 1791 the Jacobin Sonthonax pointed to the liberal and spokesman for the slaveholding colonies, Barnave, as the ‘protector of the aristocracy of the epidermis’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years before the outbreak of the July Revolution, although now ferociously critical of Jacobinism, Abbé Grégoire issued a firm denunciation, already encapsulated in the title of his little book, of the ‘nobility of the skin’. The analogy was now developed in all its aspects. The ban on interracial marriages in the United States was compared to the social obligation which, under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, required the aristocracy not to contaminate itself with elements alien to it, with commoners: at work in both cases was an insane concern to safeguard ‘the purity of the blood’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the nobility of the skin will suffer the same fate as the nobility of the scroll’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, the absolute power possessed by the slave-owner was certainly no more tolerable than that exercised by the monarch, and hence the ‘colonists’ were ‘similar to all despots’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this comparative perspective, the negative judgement on the United States was manifest: ‘Civilization is only dawning: five million Africans transported to America are still in chains there.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And if there was an encouraging example in the New World, it was not afforded by the ‘colonists’ and the country they had founded in North America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Simply by virtue of its existence, the republic of Haiti will be able to have a major influence on the destiny of Africans in the new world … A black &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg146&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;republic in the mid-Atlantic is a raised beacon to which the blushing oppressors and the sighing oppressed look. Seeing it, hope smiles on five million slaves scattered over the Antilles and the American continent.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the American model became even more explicit and bitter as those who wished to preserve slavery in the colonies appealed to it. Against the abolitionist projects or ambitions of Paris, the colonists invoked the spectre of a repeat of the American Revolution. They too would be forced into independence if they did not succeed in securing self-government, so as to be able to freely dispose of their slaves, without a ‘despotic’ power interfering with their legitimate property from without and above. Again, after the July Revolution, the French colonists declared themselves ready ‘to hand themselves over to the American Union if the metropolis did not permit them slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Making this observation in 1842 was Victor Schoelcher who, six years later, played a key role in the definitive abolition of slavery in the French colonies, which had been reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802. And we can then understand the bitterness of the polemic against the transatlantic republic. ‘Skin prejudices’ remained particularly ‘inveterate among the Americans’; they could be considered ‘the most ferocious masters on the earth’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] authors of ‘one of the most upsetting spectacles the world has ever offered’. Not only blacks, but also white abolitionists, were hit by the most savage violence. Lynching threatened anyone who dared to challenge the ‘iniquitous property’ and ‘demand freedom for all members of the human race’. ‘There is no cruelty of the most barbarous age that has not been committed by the slave states of North America.’ Hence the hope for a revolution from below: ‘I hope that these brusque lynchers will one day all be hung by rebellious slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance, Schoelcher, in condemning the crimes committed by ‘us other barbarians of the West’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] expressed his admiration for the ‘colossal revolution of S. Domingo’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and for the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture, to whom he devoted a sympathetic biography.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gulf separating the new political current forming in France from the two fractions of the liberal party is clear. Like Schoelcher, Brissot, who had played a significant part in founding the French–American Society, did not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg147&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hesitate to justify armed rebellion by black slaves and their right to revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this point the French–American Society was dead and buried. Between the July Revolution and the 1848 Revolution, manifestly in debate with French radicalism, de Tocqueville could once again present the United States as a model or source of inspiration only on condition of dropping the analogy between noble aristocracy and racial aristocracy, between monarchical despotism and slave despotism—the analogy on whose basis the North American republic was configured not as a model of liberty and democracy, but as a variant (and then not even the best) of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The liberal inception of the revolution in Latin America and its radical outcome&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the metropolis and colonies alike, the French Revolution was transformed in a radical direction. To clarify this process further, we must begin with the definition which, in the course of the struggle against Stuart absolutism, at the start of the English liberal movement, one of its exponents gave of the ‘true liberty’ dear to him: ‘we know by a certain law that our wives, our children, our servants, our goods, are our own, that we build, we plough, we sow, we reap, for ourselves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the event, ‘our servants’ did not passively endure assimilation to ‘our goods’ and, in opposition to the ‘true liberty’ cherished by the exponent of English proto-liberalism, demanded a quite different liberty, which required the intervention of political power to abolish servitude in its various forms and promote the emancipation of the subaltern classes. This is what occurred in France, thanks to the historically auspicious context already analysed. In the metropolis, the first liberal inception of the French Revolution was immediately followed by the revolt of the peasants (with the end, sealed on the night of 4 August 1789, of the feudal system), and then the agitation of the urban popular masses. The second liberal inception, which was to have consecrated self-government by slave-owners, ended up inciting the revolution of the slaves themselves. The latter achieved emancipation and later managed to frustrate the terrible war machine of Napoleonic France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar dialectic manifested itself in Latin America. Initially, the independence movement and revolution took the form of reactions against reform by the Spanish crown, which ‘reversed the old policy of segregating the Indians and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg148&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;urged them to assimilate by speaking Spanish and dressing in European style’. Such integrationist measures soon provoked the hostility of the Creole elite. The latter professed liberalism, and was liberal: it read Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith; it sometimes sought to enter into relations with Jefferson; it protested against central government interference and the obstacles it placed in the way of developing local industry; it aspired to emulate the example of the American Revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the English colonists in the North, so for the Latin American Creoles in the South, the slave, as the planter’s private property, did not pertain to the public sphere. In the various manifestos that signalled the start of the war of independence against Spain, no positions in favour of abolishing slavery were adopted.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where the English colonists had indignantly rejected London’s attempt to block their expansion beyond the Allegany Mountains, and proudly declared that they did not want to be treated ‘like negroes, the Latin American Creoles claimed equality with the peninsula’s ruling class and superiority to the Indians and, obviously, slaves deported from Africa. To this end they reminded Madrid that they were descendants of the conquistadores and, ultimately, artisans of the grandeur of the Spanish Empire. We are reminded of Franklin who, in the course of the controversy with the London government, had stressed the merits earned by the American colonists, ‘hazarding their Lives and Fortunes in subduing and settling new Countries, extending the Dominion and encreasing the Commerce of their Mother Nation’, enhancing the glory, ‘the Grandeur and Stability of the British Empire’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not long before the two roads diverged sharply. The fact is that in Spanish America, together with the Creole revolution but counter to it, an Indian revolution developed. In fact, the latter had announced itself decades earlier, as demonstrated by the series of revolts culminating in 1780–81 in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, which sought to win the blacks to its cause, liberating them too from the shackles of slavery. By contrast, the Creoles initially rose up with liberal slogans, demanding self-government, challenging interference by central power, aiming, like the North American colonists, to strengthen their control over the native populations and blacks. It was precisely this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg149&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political project that formed the main target of the struggle by the Latin American Indians. Their revolution brings to mind the one that later erupted in San Domingo, and which issued in the formation of a new country: Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt: it was San Domingo–Haiti that gave the Creole independence movement a decisive turn. To overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish troops, Simón Bolívar sought to secure the support of the rebel ex-slaves of the Caribbean state, which he personally visited. The president at the time was Alexandre Pétion, who immediately received the Latin American revolutionary. He promised him the aid he requested on condition that he freed the slaves in areas as they were wrested from Spanish control. Transcending the class and caste limits of the social group he belonged to, and demonstrating intellectual and political courage, Bolívar accepted. Seven ships, 6,000 men with arms and munitions, a printing press and numerous advisors set out from the island.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the beginning of the abolition of slavery in much of Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolívar started out as a liberal, appealing to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] underlining the need for ‘a liberal Constitution’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] with ‘eminently liberal provisions’, which were to sanction ‘the rights of man, the freedom to act, think, speak and write’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as well as ‘the division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience, a free press’—in short, ‘everything sublime that there is in politics’. He celebrated the ‘British Constitution’ and, above all, the American, the ‘most perfect of Constitutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, when he demanded not only liberty, but the ‘absolute freedom of the slaves’, Bolívar in fact took his distance from the United States, where, even in the North, blacks were confined to a caste which was not that of genuinely free men. And this distancing from the North American republic was confirmed by a further observation that ‘it is impossible to be free and slaves at the same time’. But especially significant was another element: the slave revolution from below, which in the United States represented a general nightmare, now became an object of explicit celebration. Bolívar not only appealed to the ‘history of the helots, Spartacus and Haiti’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] but in so doing defined Venezuelan and Latin American identity in a way that is worth reflecting on:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg150&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Let us bear in mind that our people is neither European nor North American. Rather than an emanation of Europe, it is a mixture of Africa and America because Spain itself ceased to be Europe on account of its African blood, its institutions and its character. It is impossible to determine exactly which human family we belong to. The majority of the indigenous population has been destroyed, the Europeans have mixed with Americans and Africans, and the latter with Indians and Europeans. All born from the breast of one and the same Mother, our fathers, different by origin and blood, are foreigners to one another and all visibly differ in their skin. Such diversity entails a consequence of the greatest importance. Thanks to the Constitution, interpreter of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The countries formed out of the independence struggle against the Madrid government thus acquired a political, social and ethnic identity characterized by an admixture of black and Indian, and hence very different from US identity. While the North American colonists identified with the chosen people who sailed across the Atlantic to conquer the promised land, to be wrested from its unauthorized inhabitants and cleansed of their presence (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|§5]]), the Latin American revolutionaries, in the wake of their argument with Spain, tended to denounce the genocidal practices of the conquistadores, Spanish in particular and European in general. Here too the road had been indicated by the black slaves of San Domingo who, after having broken with Napoleonic France and defeated its attempts to re-conquer it and reintroduce slavery, had assumed the Indian name of Haiti. For Bolívar miscegenation—the mixing denounced in the United States, and sometimes with particular fervour by abolitionist circles—became a political project, which rejected any racial discrimination, and an essential element in a new, proud identity. However, precisely on account of its radicalism, this project found itself confronting almost insurmountable difficulties. Thanks to the politico-social homogeneity (strengthened by the availability of land and westward expansion) of its dominant class, and thanks also to the confinement of much of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery, the North American republic soon succeeded in achieving a stable structure. It took the form of a ‘master-race democracy’ and a racial state, based on the rule of law within the white community and among the chosen people. The situation in Latin America was very different: between liberal beginnings and radical outcomes, the revolution had mobilized a front stamped with profound social and ethnic contradictions. Thus two contrasting &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg151&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ideas of liberty confronted one another: one calls to mind the English gentleman determined to dispose freely of his servants; the other ultimately refers to the struggle that had put an end to black slavery in San Domingo—Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. The United States and San Domingo—Haiti: two antagonistic poles&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Around 1830 the American continent presented a rather telling picture. While it had disappeared in a considerable part of Latin America, slavery remained in force in the European colonies, including British and Dutch ones, and above all in the United States. We can say that from the slave revolution onwards there developed a pent-up confrontation, a kind of cold war, between San Domingo and the United States. On one side, we have a country that saw ex-slaves in power, authors of a revolution that was possibly unique in world history; on the other, a country almost always led in the early decades of its existence by slave-owning presidents. On one side, we have a country that sanctioned the principle of racial equality to the point where, at least when it was ruled by Toussaint L’Ouverture, whites could play a leading role in the plantations; on the other, a country that constituted the first historical example of a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the tension between those two poles is understandable. When, in 1826, Abbé Grégoire pointed to Haiti as the ‘beacon’ looked to by slaves, he clearly had in mind the island’s contribution to the abolition of slavery in Latin America. On the other side, with the emergence and advance of the slave revolution, the French colonists of San Domingo responded by entertaining the idea, and brandishing the threat, of secession from France and adhesion to the North American Union. Once the new revolutionary power had consolidated itself, it was a constant concern of the United States, where not a few ex-colonists took refuge, to overthrow or at least isolate it through a cordon sanitaire. It would be dangerous, observed Jefferson in 1799, to enter into commercial relations with San Domingo. That would result in ‘black crews’ disembarking in the United States, and these emancipated slaves could represent ‘combustion’ for the slaveholding South.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such concerns, South Carolina banned the entry into its territory of any ‘man of colour’ from San Domingo or any of the other French islands, which might in some way have been infected by the new, dangerous ideas of liberty and racial equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg152&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Regardless of commercial exchanges, stressed influential political figures in the North American republic, by its very example the island risked challenging the institution of slavery far beyond its borders. Its inhabitants would in fact be ‘dangerous neighbors to the Southern States, and an asylum for renegades from these parts’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro revolution to be exhibited among them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Jefferson’s support for Napoleon’s attempt to re-conquer the island and reintroduce slavery. The US president assured the representative of France that ‘nothing will be easier than to furnish your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having succeeded Jefferson, Madison was likewise in no doubt as to the position to adopt: France was ‘the sole sovereign of Saint Domingue’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the consolidation of black power and the emergence of Haiti, the conflict did not come to an end. It also extended to the Caribbean islands under British control. Unrest spread among the black slaves and the governor of Barbados was well aware of ‘the dangers of insurrection’. For this reason, projects to reform and moderate the institution of slavery were entertained in London. This was a prospect immediately opposed by the colonists of Jamaica, who, sheltering behind defence of ‘their undoubted and acknowledged rights’ to self-government, threatened revolt against royal despotism and secession and adhesion to the North American republic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the example of San Domingo—Haiti had its most profound influence on Latin America. In 1822 the president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, proceeded to the annexation (which proved short-lived) of the Spanish part of the island, with the consequent emancipation of several thousand blacks, who along with freedom experienced notable social ascent, becoming small landowners. Slaves and free blacks in Cuba, who secretly kept the image of the Haitian leader, hoped for something similar. On the opposite side, sensing the danger, slave-owners of a liberal persuasion had already made contact with the US consul in Havana a decade earlier and outlined a project for joining the United States, which elicited the interest of Madison and Jefferson. In Calhoun’s view the annexation desired by him was a sort of pre-emptive counter-revolution: it would put paid for ever to the danger of a Cuba ‘revolutionized by Negroes’, which would have increased or doubled the threat already posed by Haiti.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg153&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Later, while the island of black power helped spread black emancipation in much of Latin America, the United States reintroduced slavery in Texas, which had previously been taken from Mexico. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, an attempt was made to expand the territory of the North American republic and, with it, the institution of slavery into other parts of Mexico and, above all, Nicaragua. One participant in this adventure, which after initial successes ended in dramatic failure, was William Walker. He considered himself—and in his own way was—a liberal, who enjoyed significant support in the United States. He proposed to fight the despotic legacy of Spanish power and extend his country’s free institutions, but exclusively for the benefit of the authentic white community. For those alien to the ‘strong, haughty race, bred to liberty’ who were the custodians of ‘a mission to place Americans under the rule of free laws’, slavery was indicated. The decree of abolition promulgated in the wake of a movement that had found inspiration and support in Haiti was therefore cancelled.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only after the end of the Civil War did the United States agree to open diplomatic relations with Haiti. But it was a move bereft of any warmth, and in fact functional for a project of ethnic cleansing. The idea, also entertained by Lincoln, of depositing on the island of black power the ex-slaves, who were to be deported from the republic that continued to be inspired by the principle of white supremacy and purity, had not yet been abandoned.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Liberalism and the critique of abolitionist radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Hence a distinguished historian of slavery has appropriately warned against the tendency ‘to confuse liberal principles with antislavery commitment’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Let us examine the reaction of various authors and sections of the liberal movement to the conflict that issued in the Civil War. We shall set aside Calhoun and the other theorists of the slaveholding South. And we already know Disraeli’s denunciation of the catastrophe of abolishing slavery in English colonies. On the point of the Confederacy’s military collapse, Lord Acton wrote to the general who had commanded its army:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg154&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I saw in States Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy … Therefore I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The defeat of the liberalism embodied in the Confederacy weighed more than the victory won some decades earlier by liberal England over Napoleonic despotism. Why? On the outbreak of the Civil War, although acknowledging ‘all the horrors of American slavery’, Lord Acton had unhesitatingly rejected ‘the categorical prohibition of slavery’ demanded by the abolitionists, as informed by an ‘abstract, ideal absolutism’ quite contrary to ‘the English spirit’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and to the liberal spirit as such, characterized as it was by flexibility and practical common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years earlier, Lieber had expressed himself in similar terms. He condemned the abolitionists as ‘jacobins’, followers of the ‘fifth monarchy’, incorrigible visionaries and fanatics: ‘if people must have slaves it is their affair to keep them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were such a declaration to be interpreted literally, not only would the right of states to self-government be inviolable, but also the right of each individual citizen to choose the type of property he preferred: let us not forget that at the time Lieber was himself a slave-owner! And hence while Disraeli ironized about the naive, misinformed ‘philanthropy’ of ‘the pure abolitionists’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the American liberal took his distance from such circles even more clearly: ‘I am not an abolitionist.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lieber was on excellent terms with de Tocqueville, who in his turn declared: ‘I have never been an abolitionist in the ordinary sense of the term’; ‘I have always been strongly opposed to the abolitionist party’. What was meant by these declarations, contained in two letters from 1857? ‘I have never believed it possible to destroy slavery in old states’: the abolitionists’ error was to seek ‘to effect a premature, dangerous abolition of slavery in countries where this abominable institution has always existed’. We are dealing with a firm &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg155&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery at a theoretical level, but one without results on the practical level. The situation in the South could only be altered through an initiative from above and from the centre, thereby throwing ‘the great experiment of Self-Government’ into crisis. And so? Preservation of the status quo was appropriate. However regrettable, people must resign themselves to the continuation of slavery in the South for a long time. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to introduce it into new states, to spread this horrible plague over a large area of the earth that has hitherto been immune to it, to impose all the crimes and all the miseries that accompany slavery on millions of men of future generations (masters or slaves), who could avoid this, is a crime against the human race, and this seems to me horrendous and inexcusable.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, an expansion of the zone of slavery had already occurred at the time of the annexation to the Union of Texas, seized from Mexico. De Tocqueville seemed to be ready to accept a compromise even more favourable to the slaveholding South, as emerges from a letter of 13 April 1857, once again sent to a transatlantic interlocutor:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I agree with you about the fact that the greatest internal threat to the northern states today is not so much slavery as the corruption of democratic institutions … As for the policy permitting slavery to develop in a whole portion of the territory where it was hitherto unknown, I will concede, as you argue, that one can do nothing but tolerate this extension in the special, current interests of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this could not go on indefinitely. It was inadmissible that there ‘can be contained in the clauses of any contract the destruction of the right and duty of the present generation to prevent the spread of the most horrible of all social evils to millions and millions of men of future generations’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condemnation of slavery was passionate, but it was possibly necessary to tolerate the preservation and even the extension of the institution for some time. The reason emerges from a letter sent to the English economist Senior: dismemberment of the country which, more than any other, embodied the cause of liberty, ‘would inflict a serious wound on the whole human race, stoking up war in the heart of a great continent from which it has been banished for more than a century’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg156&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville was ready to sacrifice the cause of abolishing slavery to the objective of preserving the unity and stability of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although powerfully encouraged first by French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of many of its colonies, and then by the revolution in San Domingo, radical abolitionism was a short-lived affair in France itself. Immediately after Thermidor, and in fact even at the moment of its preparation, the colonists’ agitation in defence of the liberal principle of self-government (and white supremacy) resumed: it must be local assemblies that determined people’s status and hence the condition of the blacks in the colonies. As we know, this was the position of the liberal Massiac Club. Those who resisted the Thermidorian turn were immediately branded traitors and renegades to the white race (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|§12]]). The ‘Anglomane’ and pro-slaveholding Malouet returned to hold positions of power under Napoleon,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who reintroduced colonial slavery and the black slave trade.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal movement certainly did not respond to this restoration, terminated only by the revolution of February 1848, with united, decisive opposition. There were some (including Granier de Cassagnac) who defended the institution of slavery in the name of liberalism, who in fact (polemically observed an ardent abolitionist) even claimed ‘a monopoly on liberalism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be precise, along with ‘liberalism’, Cassagnac also professed himself a follower of ‘democracy’: positions no different from those maintained across the Atlantic by Calhoun, with the difference that the former regarded slavery as ‘a provisional and empirical means of creating order’ and ‘maintaining the blacks in the apprenticeship of Christianity, work and the family’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side of the scale it is to be noted that, at least in his opponents’ view, the French author was mistaken in having developed in justification of slavery a philosophy of history that did not maintain the spatial or racial delimitation of the institution, with a tendency hence to regress to positions à la Fletcher, who was now alien to the liberal movement. By contrast, an integral part of it was Thiers, who, drawing up a catastrophic balance sheet of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies, pointed to the ‘base and barbarous idleness [of] Negroes left to their own devices’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg157&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Guizot seemed more susceptible to abolitionist ideas. Nevertheless, he stressed their impracticality with an argument that is already familiar from US history: it would be necessary to compensate the owners of a legitimate form of property, but there were insufficient funds for this operation.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Le Courier de la Gironde&#039;&#039; came out in favour of a gradual abolitionism which, avoiding the ‘savage liberty’ of ‘brutalized beings’, would take the form of an extended phase of ‘liberal slavery’ (&#039;&#039;esclavage libéral&#039;&#039;)—i.e. a somewhat mitigated slavery.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise opposed to hasty measures was de Tocqueville. In May 1847, noting that the ‘Bey of Tunisia’ had already abolished the ‘odious institution’—which in Muslim countries, by the French liberal’s admission, took a ‘milder’ form—de Tocqueville expressed the opinion that ‘we should doubtless only proceed to the abolition of slavery with care and moderation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can conclude with a general consideration relating to the France of the July Monarchy: ‘Immediate and complete emancipation was not even considered as an abolitionist program until less than a year before the Revolution of 1848.’ In fact, the golden age of French liberalism, far from involving the abolition of slavery, saw its expansion: ‘as a result of the expanding French conquest of Algeria, there was far more territory with slaves under French sovereignty by the mid-1840s than there had been at the time of the July Revolution in 1830.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. The enduring effectiveness of the black revolution from below&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But if things stood thus, how was the abolition of slavery achieved? Although firmly opposed by a formidable international coalition and the liberal movement as a whole, the San Domingo revolution had a lasting influence, which proved all the stronger when conflicts within the community of the free and the white community as a whole intensified. We already know the decisive role played by the country governed by ex-slaves in propelling the independence movement in Latin America towards abolitionist positions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outside the southern United States, slavery continued to be very much present in the European colonies in the Caribbean. However, here too Haiti’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg158&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;presence made itself felt. Proceeding in 1822 to annexation of the Spanish part of the island, the ex-slaves now in power delivered a further serious blow to the institution of slavery. The following year, the revolt of the black slaves in Demerara (today’s Guyana) erupted. This was a colony that had been affected by the upheavals which had reverberated in San Domingo from France. In 1794–95 a revolution exported and imposed by French forces had transformed Holland into the Batavian Republic and forced the Prince of Orange to flee to England. In the wake of events in Demerara, at the time under Dutch control, liberal agitation had developed, promoted by slave-owners who, witnessing the emergence of the prospect of black emancipation on the San Domingo model, had rapidly abandoned any sympathy for France and sought Britain’s intervention and protection.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the incorporation of Demerara into the British Empire did not extinguish the fire, which smouldered under the ashes. A black revolt broke out in 1823 and led to the death of three whites; martial law was proclaimed and 250 slaves were killed or executed. And yet, repressed in one place, revolts exploded again some years later and only a short distance away—this time in Jamaica, in 1831. In both cases Methodist and Baptist missionaries played a significant role. By converting the slaves to Christianity, they furnished them with a culture, consciousness and the possibility of meeting and communicating that clashed irreconcilably with the de-humanization and commodification of human livestock upon which the institution of slavery was based. The first revolt saw the death sentence for the Reverend John Smith, and his death in prison shortly before execution of the sentence and the arrival from London of a notice of pardon. The second became known as the ‘war of the Baptists’. In both cases, in addition to rebellious slaves, the repression by the white dominant class struck the Baptist and Methodist community. In Jamaica hundreds of black Christians were flogged, tortured or shot; and English missionaries also suffered arrest and humiliation of every kind. In fact, in neighbouring Barbados churches were sacked and destroyed and there were riots and attempted pogroms against the Methodist community. The colonists’ hatred of the non-conformist churches, accused of encouraging the slave revolt, could not be contained.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a danger that seemed all the more real and immediate because of Haiti’s proximity and the processes of emancipation underway in Latin America. Thanks to this geographical proximity, there now intervened in the struggle (wrote &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg159&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a white Jamaican to his governor) a ‘third party’ (in addition to the Crown, prompted in a reformist direction by Christian abolitionism, and the colonists, engaged in defence of self-government and their property). And this ‘third party’ comprised the slave, who ‘knows his strength, and will assert his claim to freedom’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, the abolition of slavery in the colonies presented itself to the dominant class of liberal England as the requisite way out in the face of two challenges: the first consisted in the black slaves’ revolution from below; the second in the indignation that was widespread in the British Christian community which, with growing impatience, demanded decisive measures against the colonists, guilty of enslaving blacks and persecuting Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The role of Christian fundamentalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This second challenge brings us to a movement we have not hitherto been concerned with, and which cannot be confused with either the liberal tradition or French-style radicalism. While the crisis that soon led to the black revolution in San Domingo was deepening, at a time when the campaign to suppress the slave trade seemed to be at an impasse, the dying John Wesley wrote a heartfelt letter to William Wilberforce:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unless the Divine power has raised you up to be an Athanasius contra mundum, I see not how you can go through your glorious enterprise, in opposing that execrable villainy which is the scandal of religion, of England, and of human nature. Unless God has raised you up for this very thing, you will be worn out by the opposition of men and devils; but if God be for you who can be against you? Are all of them together stronger than God? Oh be not weary of well-doing. Go in the name of God, and in the power of His might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The recipient of this letter was unquestionably one of the major actors in the struggle that led to the abolition first of the slave trade and then of slavery as such. A fervent Christian, member of the House of Commons and on close &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg160&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terms with Pitt the Younger, while he received honorary French citizenship in 1792 for his anti-slavery campaign, he had nothing to do with the revolution of 1789 or, a fortiori, with radicalism. Far from welcoming the black slave revolt in San Domingo, he continued in his unwavering support for the British government, which, during the war against France, was the guarantor in the West Indies of the repression of slave revolts and the preservation of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But if he identified with the England of the time and its dominant class, Wilberforce can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. Prior to directing his efforts against slavery, his religious zeal was engaged in the ‘reform of public manners’, to be advanced through the foundation of a new society intended as the ‘guardian of the religion and morals of the people’, which proposed to struggle ‘against Vice and Immorality’ and even aspired to the ‘suppression of Vice’. Hence the crusade launched against publications branded blasphemous and indecent, against rural feasts considered licentious, against the non-observance of the Sabbath among the popular classes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only subsequently did Christian fervour target the particular sin that was slavery—an institution completely unacceptable not only because of the obstacles it often put in the way of the spread of Christianity among slaves, but also because of the sexual libertinism in which it permitted their masters to indulge. Thus, another prominent supporter of English abolitionism (James Ramsay), along with slavery, called for an attack on ‘arbitrary divorces and bigamy’. Similarly, Granville Sharp combined abolitionist campaigning with a struggle against divorce legislation which, in flagrant violation of divine law, allowed the guilty couple to proceed to new weddings; and from this he moved on to announce that, together with those responsible for the slave trade and their accomplices, adulterers and those guilty of immorality would not escape divine punishment.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Sharp’s view, defenders of the institution of slavery were ‘refined modern Sadducees’. The Sadducees of Biblical fame had not hesitated to come to terms with Hellenistic and Roman culture, thereby contaminating Judaism and the word of God, and depriving them of their purity. Caught up in the enjoyment of wealth and the material world, they had forgotten or denied spiritual, otherworldly values. According to the English abolitionist, the modern Sadducees were no different. Ultimately, they were susceptible to the blandishments of the Demon, or the ‘Demon of Demons’. But the Bible must not be venerated in church, while remaining a dead letter in real life. On the contrary, it must serve as a guide in all political questions and the smallest problems of everyday &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg161&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life. All the more so in that the turning point was at hand: the times in which slavery continued to survive were the ‘latter days of Infidelity &amp;amp;amp; Deism’, representing the agony of the apocalyptic ‘Beast’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that here we have an attitude which, in contemporary terms, we would define as fundamentalist. It is a trait that was even more clearly exhibited in the United States. Here too Christian abolitionism had a programme which, along with slavery, wanted to attack vice and immorality as such. Theodore Parker denounced as contrary to the Scriptures and divine law (the only truly valid law) the ‘usury’ by which ‘banking capital’ was stained, the ‘brothels’ and bars that sold rum, and which the police not only did not target, but in fact frequented more assiduously than the ‘house of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with Britain, there was in fact a novel element. In the United States, where the law on the return of fugitive slaves required all citizens to be complicit with an institution that became ever more odious, a delicate dilemma of conscience emerged. The ‘higher laws’ of Holy Scripture must not be forgotten. For a true Christian, admonished the English abolitionist Sharp in an indignant letter to Franklin, the other laws were ‘so clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a &#039;&#039;crime&#039;&#039; to regard them as law’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with its fundamentalist character, the radicalism of Christian abolitionism was strengthened in the United States. ‘When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law that treads down the inalienable rights of man’, declared Parker, the Christian must know how to go to the limit: ‘I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice … I am not afraid of men. I can offend them. I care nothing for their hate or their esteem. But I should not dare to violate His laws, come what may come …’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sanctioned by Holy Scripture, divine, eternal, natural law was, in any event, inviolable: ‘To say that there is no law higher than what the State can make is practical atheism … If there is no God to make a law for me, then there is no God for me.’ The challenge to constituted authority was open and declared: ‘REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The federal Constitution, which obliged the Union as a whole to defend the slaveholding states against any potential slave revolution, seemed to William Garrison ‘An Agreement with Hell’ and a ‘Covenant with Death’. In 1845 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg162&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;another abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, drew attention to slave-owners’ purchase of the most important public offices and the tripling of slavery that had occurred since the ratification of the federal Constitution, which came to be branded as a ‘pro-Slavery Compact’. The coexistence of slaveholding states and free states was no longer licit, unless the latter wanted to become ‘partners in the guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Street demonstrations in which the American Constitution was burnt were understandable. In the years preceding the Civil War, when he briefly harboured the illusion that the South was on the point of giving in, Parker exulted in these terms: ‘The Devil is in great wrath because he knoweth that his time is short.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the basis of this view, no compromise was possible. And Garrison explicitly stated as much. His polemic against defenders of the institution of slavery and their accomplices assumed openly threatening tones. But also unequivocal was his condemnation of theorists of &#039;&#039;‘gradual&#039;&#039; abolition’ and ‘moderation’, and even of those in the North who displayed ‘apathy’ or limited enthusiasm for the ‘standard of emancipation’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the struggle against slavery, that ‘heinous crime in the sight of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Abolitionist radicalism and Christian fundamentalism were closely interwoven, as emerges from the summons to a crusade against ‘the governments of this world’, which ‘in their essential elements, and as present administered … are all Anti-Christ’. This involved achieving&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the emancipation of our whole race from the dominion of man, from the thraldom of self, from the government of brute force, from the bondage of sin—and bringing them under the dominion of God, the control of an inward spirit, the government of the law of love, and into the obedience and liberty of Christ …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamentalist character of such positions did not escape Calhoun. He thundered against ‘the rabid fanatics, who regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it, deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union’. For them abolition was a conscientious obligation; only thus did they conceive it possible to liberate &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg163&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;themselves from the agonizing sense of being accomplices of the unforgivable ‘sin’ allegedly represented by slavery, against which they then proclaimed a full-scale ‘crusade’, ‘a general crusade’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of southern theorists, these Christians blinded by abolitionist fury were alien to the liberal world and substantially akin to Jacobins. In fact, a movement similar to French radicalism tended to emerge in the United States, at various times and in various modes, but always on the basis of the crisis of the English and American models. The crisis of the first coincided with the rebellion against the London government. What provoked or intensified the crisis of the second was the progressive isolation of the North American republic as a slaveholding state, engaged not only in the defence of slavery but also its expansion, and which resisted unperturbed, despite the disappearance of that institution first in much of Latin America and subsequently in British and French colonies. At this point, the country that at its birth had celebrated itself as the land of liberty appeared as the champion of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There thus developed in the United States as well a radicalism that drew on Christianity. Such a ‘party’ no longer identified with either the English or the American model. It rejected both the spatial and the racial delimitation of the community of the free, and thus regarded the exclusion clauses that characterized the English and American models as unacceptable. And in order to change things, it did not preclude appeals to the revolutionary initiative of the excluded. This was the religious and political climate in which John Brown’s armed raid into Virginia in 1859 matured, intent on inciting a slave uprising and convinced that, without the shedding of blood, there was no remission of sins. The attempt failed miserably and ended with the protagonist being hanged, but Parker reiterated the slaves’ right to armed rebellion: sooner or later, ‘the Fire of Vengeance may be waked up even in an African’s heart’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. What is radicalism? The contrast with liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Formed in the wake of disappointment in the English and American models, how did ‘radicalism’ differ from liberalism? The answer is obvious, if we refer to authors like Locke and Calhoun, profoundly liberal and yet at the same time without any doubts as to the legitimacy of black slavery. The answer is not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg164&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even difficult if we draw a comparison with authors such as Burke, Jefferson and Acton who, notwithstanding reservations and criticisms of the institution, on various grounds represented ideological and political reference points for the slaveholding South, or even continued to defend it to the end. The line of demarcation also proves sufficiently clear if we compare authors like Blackstone and Montesquieu, who tended to contest ‘slavery among ourselves’ rather than slavery as such, with a radicalism committed to rejecting both the spatial delimitation (the English model until 1833) and the racial delimitation (the American model until 1865) of the community of the free. But how is de Tocqueville clearly distinguished from authors like Diderot, Condorcet and Schoelcher, whom I have included in the process of French radicalism’s formation and development? What sense does it make to situate in two different, even opposed formations de Tocqueville and Condorcet, who were, respectively, one of the great critics of the Terror and one of its most illustrious victims? Is it right to include in the same party French and American radicals who adopted such a different attitude towards Christianity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before answering these questions, it is worth lingering over something that characterized the liberal tradition from its outset. Let us take authors like Montesquieu, Smith and Millar. Although condemning slavery more or less sharply, all three continued to regard England—a country in the front rank in the slave trade—as a model. In no instance did criticism or condemnation of slavery involve exclusion of the beneficiaries or theorists of the institution from the community of the free and the liberal party. On more than one occasion, Burke distanced himself from the institution of slavery, but when the conflict between the two Atlantic shores erupted he not only celebrated the love of liberty which particularly animated southern colonies, but disdainfully rejected the idea that, in an attempt to suppress the rebellion, appeal might be made to ‘servile hands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, the British Whig continued to include slave-owners in the community of the free while excluding a priori their victims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the institution of slavery was clear and firm in Hume. But this did not prevent him from asserting that ‘European nations’ represented ‘that part of the globe [which] maintain[s] sentiments of liberty, honour, equity and valour superior to the rest of mankind’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, there was reason to believe that blacks were ‘naturally inferior to the whites’ and inferior to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg165&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the point of lacking any ‘symptoms’ of ‘ingenuity’ and free spirit.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So once again, despite the condemnation of slavery, it was its beneficiaries—not its victims—who formed an integral part of the community of the free and the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The boundaries of the community of the free could lose something of their naturalistic rigidity; but the rituals of self-celebration, and the enormous repression it was based on, persisted. In 1772 Arthur Young calculated that, out of 775 million global inhabitants, only 33 million enjoyed liberty; and they were concentrated in a fairly restricted zone of the planet, excluding Asia, Africa and virtually all of America, as well as the southern and eastern parts of Europe itself.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a theme subsequently taken up and eloquently developed by Adam Smith:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In similar vein, Millar contrasted ‘Great Britain, in which liberty is generally so well understood, and so highly valued’, with ‘all those tribes of barbarians, in different parts of the world, with which we have any correspondence’ and among whom ‘the practice of domestic slavery’ continued to rage.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Europe and the West were complacently depicted as a tiny island of liberty and civilization in a tempestuous ocean of tyranny, slavery and barbarism. In order to indulge in such self-celebration, Young, Smith and Millar were in fact obliged to overlook a far from trivial detail: the slave trade, which involved the most brutal form of slavery—chattel slavery—and in which western Europe, starting precisely with liberal England, was engaged for centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was not very different. When he published &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, there were few countries or colonies in the western hemisphere where slavery persisted, since it had been abolished in much of Latin America and the British colonies. In the interval between the publication of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg166&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;first and second volumes of the work, the United States introduced into Texas the institution that should have been synonymous with the absolute power of man over man. But this prompted no uncertainty in the French liberal when it came to identifying the American continent as the locus of liberty. Volume One of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; appeared shortly after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. But that would appear to have been an irrelevant event in the opinion of de Tocqueville, who, when it came to comparing England and the United States, had no doubt that the latter country most fully embodied the cause of liberty. And Jefferson, the president slave-owner and unyielding opponent of the country born out of a revolution by black slaves, seemed to the French liberal to be ‘the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln himself initially conducted the Civil War as a crusade against rebellion and separatism, not for the abolition of slavery, which could continue to survive in states loyal to central government. It was only later, with the recruitment of blacks into the Union army and hence with the direct intervention of slaves and ex-slaves in the conflict, that the civil war between whites was transformed into a revolution, conducted partly from above and partly from below, making the abolition of slavery inevitable. But in the first phase of the war the Union did not a priori exclude slave states from its bosom, just as liberal critics of the institution of slavery did not expel those who had a different and even contrary position on the problem from the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tendency we are examining finds fullest expression in Lieber. Cautious criticisms of the institution of slavery did not prevent him, even on the immediate eve of the Civil War, from attributing to the United States—the country that even more than England embodied the great cause of ‘liberal institutions’ and ‘self-government’—the ‘great mission’ of spreading liberty throughout the world. ‘[E]very American’ must always bear in mind the grandeur of the constitutional principles and texts of his country. Otherwise, they would resemble ‘the missionary that should proceed to convert the world without bible or prayer-book’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it was the sacred text of liberty for the liberal author, for the radicals Garrison and Phillips the US Constitution, which sanctioned slavery and the racial state, was an instrument of Satan. Over and above the very different significance assigned to the problem of slavery, here we have two opposed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg167&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;delimitations of political geography, of the camp of friends and enemies. Notwithstanding the argument and conflict over slavery, liberalism’s various exponents continued to recognize themselves as members of the same party and the same community of the free. By contrast, excluded from it were blacks, whom at an interval of decades Jefferson and Lincoln intended to deport from the Union and who, not by chance, after emancipation first in the North and then in the South did not come to enjoy either political or civil equality. Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, not to mention Lieber and Acton, could indeed criticize slavery, but it was understood that that their interlocutors were not black slaves but their masters. The latter were called upon to demonstrate moral sensitivity and political consistency and hence agree to expunge a stain that affected the credibility of the community of the free as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet’s attitude was very different. Here is how he addressed the black slaves in 1781:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dear friends, although I am not the same colour as you, I have always regarded you as my brothers. Nature has fashioned you to have the same spirit, the same reason and the same virtues as whites. I am only speaking here of whites in Europe, for when it comes to whites in the colonies, I shall not insult you by comparing them to you … Should one set off in search of a man in the islands of America, one would certainly not find him among the populations of white flesh.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The French philosopher was not yet aware of it, but the ruling group in the North American republic was on the point of being situated outside not only the party of liberty, but even the human race. What we have here is a political and ideological current different from liberalism—the radicalism that had been formed or was in the process of being formed. It might seem debatable to apply this category to an author who recommended extreme gradualism in the process of abolishing slavery. But that is not the main point. Marat himself, in 1791, proposed ‘gradually to prepare the transition from slavery to liberty’. And yet, already unequivocally condemning ‘the barbarism of the colonists’, it was not to them that he looked to make the desired change, and not even to the National Assembly which, coming to terms with the slaveholders, rode roughshod over the rights of man and ‘the sacred foundations of the Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The actual interlocutors tended to be the black slaves themselves, as would &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg168&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become clear in the course of Marat’s subsequent evolution. As for Condorcet, despite the gradualist character of his abolitionism, he deflected back onto slaveholding whites the de-humanizing drive they had mobilized against blacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was an attitude that could also develop on the basis of a profoundly Christian consciousness. Here is how Garrison expressed himself in 1841 on the subject of slave-owners:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No political, no religious copartnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the convicts at Botany Bay and New Zealand … We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But some decades earlier the English abolitionist Percival Stockdale had already declared: &#039;&#039;‘We&#039;&#039; are the savages; the Africans act like men; like beings endowed with rational and immortal minds’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, indignation at the treatment inflicted on the black slaves could even conduce to a de-humanization of the de-humanizers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regarding slaves as their interlocutors, radicals did not hesitate to appeal to a revolution from below by victims of the institution it was intended to abolish. Even prior to the revolution by San Domingo’s slaves, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; evoked a massive uprising, led by a black Spartacus, which might involve replacing the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in force by a &#039;&#039;‘Code blanc’&#039;&#039; that repaid the slaveholders for the injustices they had committed.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the liberal tradition, in Smith we can come across evocation of a dictatorship from above putting an end to the scandal of an institution that sullied the community of the free, but certainly not hopes for a revolution from below. We know the sympathy or admiration with which Grégoire and Schoelcher viewed Toussaint L’Ouverture and Haiti. These are two names that do not appear in de Tocqueville. In connection with San Domingo, he limited himself to mentioning the ‘bloody catastrophe that has put an end to its existence’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Paradoxically, the island ceased to exist the moment it put an end, for the first time in the Americas, to the institution of slavery!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg169&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Finally, Diderot reported an observation by Helvétius: ‘What is the cause of England’s extreme power? Its government.’ He followed up this assessment with a polemical question: ‘But what is the cause of the extreme poverty of Scotland and Ireland?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Judgement of the metropolis could not be separated from judgement of the colonies and semi-colonies. From the standpoint of authors like Diderot and Schoelcher, England and the United States, the holy sites of liberty in de Tocqueville’s view, were responsible for the most ferocious and barbarous despotism. Even when it criticized slavery, the liberal tradition did not question the identification of the West with civilization and of the colonial world with barbarism. Radicalism’s position was different: in the first instance, it identified and denounced barbarism in those responsible for, and complicit with, the most macroscopic violation of the rights and dignity of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels may be regarded as critical inheritors of radicalism. For the first in particular, not only was it epistemologically and politically arbitrary to ignore the politico-social reality of the colonies, but (as we shall see) those colonies were the requisite starting-point for understanding the ‘barbarism’ of bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. Liberalism, the self-celebration of the community of the free and repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The discourse developed by liberalism is profoundly marked by repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples. The self-celebration of the land of the free or the people of the free proved all the more persuasive in that it overlooked the slavery inflicted on colonial populations or populations of colonial origin. Only on this condition could Montesquieu, Blackstone and the American revolutionaries point to England or the United States as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This also applies to de Tocqueville. He lucidly and unsparingly described the inhuman treatment meted out to Indians and blacks. The former were forced to endure the ‘frightful sufferings’ attendant upon ‘forced migrations’ (the successive deportations imposed by the whites), and were even close to being wiped off the face of the earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the blacks, let us leave to one side the specifically slaveholding states of the South: What was the situation in the rest? Over and above harsh material living conditions, ‘a wretched and precarious &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg170&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;existence’, desperate poverty and a higher mortality rate than among slaves,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the notionally free black also weighed exclusion from the enjoyment of civil rights (as well as political rights): he was subjected to the ‘tyranny of the law’ and the ‘intolerance of customs’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|§7]]). And so, discounting the Far West and the South, even in the case of the free states we cannot speak of democracy or even strictly of the rule of law. But that was not the conclusion reached by de Tocqueville, who celebrated the democracy, ‘alive, active, triumphant’, he saw operative in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will see there a people among whom conditions are more equal than they have ever been among us; among whom the social structure, the customs, the laws, everything is democratic; among whom everything comes from the people and returns to it, and where, nevertheless, each individual enjoys an independence that is fuller, and a liberty that is greater, than in any other time or place on earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While he felt sympathy for the tragedy of the Indians and blacks, their fate had no epistemological relevance and in no way altered his overall political judgement. The programmatic declaration made by de Tocqueville at the start of the chapter devoted to the problem of ‘the three races that inhabit the territory of the United States’ is unequivocal: ‘The principal task that I had imposed upon myself is now performed: I have shown, as far as I was able, the laws and the customs of the American democracy. Here I might stop’. It was only in order to avoid possible disappointment on the reader’s part that de Tocqueville spoke of relations between the three ‘races’: ‘These topics are collaterally connected with my subject without forming a part of it; they are American without being democratic, and to portray democracy has been my principal aim.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Democracy could be defined and liberty lauded focusing exclusively on the white community. If, instead, we regard this abstraction as arbitrary, and bear in mind the entanglement of slavery and liberty revealed by authoritative US scholars, we cannot but be even more surprised by de Tocqueville’s epistemological than his political naivety. He celebrated as the locus of liberty one of the few countries in the New World where racial chattel slavery reigned and flourished and which, at the time of the French liberal’s journey, had as its president Andrew Jackson, slave-owner and protagonist of a policy of deporting and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;decimating the Indian; a president, moreover, who, blocking the circulation of abolitionist material by post, also struck at the freedom of expression of significant sections of the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such naivety reached its culmination in a French follower of de Tocqueville—namely, Édouard Laboulaye. He too contrasted the United States with a France plagued by constant revolutionary upheavals. In the former, he observed in 1849 in the inaugural lecture (published separately the following year) of a course devoted to US history, a Constitution characterized by extraordinary ‘wisdom’ and rejection of any ‘demagogic’ element made it possible to enjoy peace and, at the same time, the greatest liberty and ‘the most absolute political equality’—an equality that was ‘complete, absolute, in laws and customs alike’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the problem of the relations between the three races referred to by de Tocqueville, nothing remains in the text we are examining but the celebration of the remarkable successes achieved by ‘a nation of European race’, by this ‘strong race of emigrants’ or this ‘people of Puritans’—in other words, the ‘American race’. Even if it was a story that had unfolded across the Atlantic, it covered ‘our race’ (European and white) as a whole in glory.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a view reiterated ten years later, in an emotional essay published on the occasion of de Tocqueville’s death: the homage paid to the author of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; ended with homage to the ‘beautiful federal Constitution that has protected the liberty of the United States for seventy years’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are on the eve of the Civil War. But even its outbreak does not seem to have prompted any second thoughts in Laboulaye: it was understood that ‘complete, candid, sincere liberty’ reigned in the United States. The bloody conflict underway demonstrated the ‘courage’ of a ‘free people who sacrificed everything to maintain the unity’ of the country.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when reconstructing the history of America in the colonial period did Laboulaye feel obliged to confront the issue of slavery. Although mitigated by reference to ‘climate’ (which rendered work intolerable for whites but not blacks), historical circumstances (at the time it was at its height, ‘the slave trade was regarded as a pious undertaking’), and the particular characteristics of the people subjected to it (it involved a ‘race of eternal minors’),[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] condemnation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg172&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the institution was sharp. In the first volume, whose Preface is dated 1855, we read:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In half of the United States there are two societies established on the same soil: the one powerful, active, united and prudent; the other weak, disunited, indifferent and exploited like cattle. And yet this despised herd is a constant threat to America … The stain that soils this great society places it beneath Europe.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although sketching this realistic picture, the Preface continued to celebrate the United States indiscriminately as the privileged site of liberty, guaranteed and guarded by an ‘admirable Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However hard the lot of the blacks—silence persisted about the Indians—it was irrelevant when it came to formulating an overall judgement of the country under investigation. But there is more. Laboulaye acknowledged that slavery made its oppressive influence felt on the white master himself: he was denied the right to educate and emancipate his own slave, even if he or she was a child born from a relationship with a slave. He was required by law to inflict even the most drastic of punishments, including castration, on the guilty slave.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although criticized, these serious interferences with the individual freedom of white property-owners did not in the slightest darken the bright picture we already know.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1864 Laboulaye denounced the privilege granted by the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision to the ‘particular, superior race’ made up of the ‘great lords’ of the South who were the slave-owners (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). But if things stood thus, if inequality marked relations within the elite itself, if even within the white community there was a privileged ‘particular race’, what was the meaning of the claim that the United States was characterized by ‘the most absolute political equality’? Laboulaye felt no need to revise his positions. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to reiterate them in the Preface to the third volume, which continued to celebrate the American Revolution as the sole genuinely democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like colonies in the strict sense, Ireland continued to be ignored. In the course of his journey to the British Isles, de Tocqueville visited the unhappy island and described its desperate situation unsparingly. It was not simply that ‘the poverty is horrible’; denied here was liberal freedom itself, crushed by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg173&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘military tribunals’ and a ‘large gendarmerie hated by the people’. At this point a comparison between England and Ireland occurred: ‘The two aristocracies I have referred to have the same origin, the same customs and almost the same laws. Yet the one has for centuries given the English one of the best governments in the world, while the other has given the Irish one of the most detestable imaginable’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is an astonishing statement: not only are readers not informed that the aristocracy dominant in Ireland was itself British or of British origin, but they have the impression that they are dealing with two different countries, not two regions of a single state, subject to the authority of the same government and the same crown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then understand de Tocqueville’s admiring conclusion: ‘I see the Englishman secure under the protection of his laws’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, the Irish were not subsumed under the category of ‘English’, but such non-subsumption does not seem to be a problem, does not affect the laudatory judgement passed on the country visited and held up as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The colonial question and the differential development of radicalism in France, England and the United States&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has sometimes been made to ‘philosophic radicalism’ in connection with Bentham and his school.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theorist of utilitarianism adopted a debunking tone towards his country’s political, legal and ideological tradition. He did hesitate to denounce the ‘almost universal corruption’ that raged in England and the ill-starred role of a ‘corrupted and corrupting aristocracy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He did not even spare the Glorious Revolution, despite the religious aura habitually surrounding it: the &#039;&#039;‘original compact&#039;&#039;—the compact between king and people—was a fabulous one—the &#039;&#039;supervening&#039;&#039; compact—the compact between King, Lords, and Commons, was but too real a one’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and sanctioned the domination of an oligarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is sufficient to look at the attitude Bentham took towards the liberal tradition’s exclusion clauses to realize that we are very far removed from &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg174&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;radicalism in the sense specified here. Of the refuse and ‘dross’ and those confined in workhouses, we have already spoken. We must now concern ourselves with the condition of the blacks. Bentham included ‘the still unabrogated sanction given to domestic slavery on account of difference of colour’ among the ‘imperfections of detail’ to be found even in the ‘matchlessly felicitous system’ of the United States.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from this rather euphemistic description of the institution of slavery, the English liberal stressed that a project of emancipation must proceed with extreme gradualism, and be implemented exclusively from above. In a text from 1822, we come across a significant declaration: ‘The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are led to think of the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. But instead, as a note makes clear, the reference is to Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for gradualism, this was necessary for the purposes not only of respecting ‘rights of property’ (which must be compensated for the loss suffered), but also of educating slaves for liberty.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bentham wanted an emancipation ‘lottery’ that might occur at the moment of hereditary transmission of this special property, and from which one-tenth of the slaves owned by the deceased could benefit. An appeal to masters to demonstrate flexibility was the counterpart of indignant condemnation of any initiative from below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The injustice and the calamity which have accompanied precipitate attempts, form the greatest objection against projects of emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This operation need not be suddenly carried into effect by a violent revolution, which, by displeasing every body, destroying all property, and placing all persons in situations for which they were not fitted, might produce evils a thousand times greater than all the benefits that can be expected from it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Unquestionably, the prime site of the formation of radicalism, in the sense I have defined it, was France. It is easy to see why. The country was favourably disposed to accommodate it following defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of a large number of colonies. Subsequently, the controversy that developed either side of the Atlantic on the occasion of the English colonists’ rebellion ended up discrediting both fractions of the liberal party. The American Revolution, with its development of relations of equality within the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg175&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;white community and clear demarcation from the world of feudal privilege, galvanized harsher criticism of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France and the crisis of the English model. Disenchantment with the non-abolition of slavery in America and the emergence of an unprecedented racial state also threw the American model into crisis. The roots of French radicalism lay in this dual crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what was its influence across the Channel and the Atlantic? The problem can be reformulated as follows. Liberal England, derived from the Glorious Revolution, and especially the American Revolution, made a powerful contribution to the ideological preparation of the French Revolution and subsequently, through the crisis of the two models, to the formation of radicalism. But why did the latter not seem to take deep root in the two classical countries of the liberal tradition? Obviously, the vexed course of the revolution and the explosion of the Terror immediately damaged France’s powers of attraction. A far from negligible role in frustrating the diffusion of radicalism was also played by repression. In England in 1794 habeas corpus was suspended for eight years; a further suspension followed in 1817; while two years later there occurred what has passed into history as the Peterloo Massacre or (to put it in the indignant words of an English paper of the time) the ‘slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, unprovoked and unnecessary’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Suffering deportation to Australia and meeting with a horrible fate, sometimes dying under the lashes of merciless flogging, were members of workers’ societies, clubs that were or more or less Jacobin in orientation, and Chartists engaged in the struggle to extend the suffrage, not to mention ‘Irish dissidents’ for whom ‘Australia was the official Siberia … at the turn of the century’. In total, ‘between 1800 and 1850 … about 1,800 were deported for political “crimes”. Among them were representatives of nearly every protest movement known to the British Government’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, the repression also struck circles that regarded violent revolution by black slaves as legitimate, or even invoked it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1798 the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in the United States, containing serious restrictions on constitutional liberties, granting the president a wide range of discretionary power and particularly hitting followers of ideas suspected of being influenced by the French Revolution. And we already know about the violence, predominantly from below, to which abolitionists were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, neither the Terror in France nor the repression in Britain and the United States suffice to explain the weakness of radicalism across the Channel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg176&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or the Atlantic. The analysis must be taken further. In England the outbreak of war made it possible for the dominant class to present as a patriotic duty the struggle against the revolutionary fanaticism raging in France, and which threatened to spread to Ireland, posing a mortal risk to the British Empire. As for the United States, it is interesting to observe the debate which, on the eve of the war against Britain that broke out in 1812, involved two prestigious representatives of the South. The first, Randolph, declared himself against the opening of hostilities. The situation was full of peril on the home front, where the ‘infernal principles of French liberty’ risked provoking a revolt by slaves; ‘[t]he French Revolution has polluted them.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Calhoun, by contrast, did not share these concerns. Certainly, attention should be paid to the slaves’ moods, but happily ‘more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So radicalism, with its recognition of the right of black slaves or Irish semi-slaves to take up arms against their masters, posed a serious threat to the stability of the United States and the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The lesser weight of the colonial question, or of populations of colonial origin, also helps explain the greater diffusion of radicalism in France. When the black revolution in San Domingo broke out, radical circles in Paris had no great difficulty recognizing and legitimating the fait accompli. Even if there was a risk of losing the remaining colonies, as anti-abolitionists never tired of warning, that would not be an irreparable tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation was different when it came to Britain and the United States. The black revolution in San Domingo provoked a wave of indignation in both countries. ‘A Black State in the Western Archipelago’, wrote &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, ‘is utterly incompatible with the system of all European colonisation.’ And hence ‘Europe will, of course, recover in that quarter the ascendancy and dominion which it justly claims from the superior wisdom and talents of its inhabitants’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The United States not only refused to recognize the country born of a black revolution, but did everything it could to isolate, weaken and overthrow it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson distinguished himself in this operation. At first sight he seems closest to radicalism. In January 1793, without allowing himself to be impressed by the charges against the Jacobins levelled by his former private secretary (referring to Paris, he spoke of ‘streets … literally red with blood’), he continued passionately to defend the ‘cause’ of the French Revolution: ‘rather than it &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg177&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam &amp;amp;amp; an Eve left in every country, &amp;amp;amp; left free, it would be better than it now is.’ Moreover, Jefferson positively contrasted France with the United States, where Anglophiles regarded the 1787 Constitution, with the very wide powers it conferred on the president and executive, as a first step towards the establishment of a monarchy.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the picture changed markedly following the black revolution in San Domingo. We know that Jefferson interpreted the principle of equality in radical fashion, but always within the ambit of the white community. He never believed in the possibility of whites and blacks coexisting on an equal basis: it would represent an unjustifiable challenge to ‘the real distinctions which nature has made’ and end in ‘the extermination of the one or the other race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the conflict between white owners and black slaves exploded on the Caribbean island, the North American statesman’s sympathy immediately went to the former; his anxiety about ‘the revolutionary storm now sweeping the globe’ was profound. Hence his support for the invading army sent by Napoleon, which did not cease even in the face of recourse to revolting practices, such as the introduction of trained dogs to tear blacks to pieces and the organization around such events of mass spectacles, at once thrilling and educative.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. The liberal ebb of Christian radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States radicalism took shape on a Christian basis. Interpretation of the conflict in religious terms in fact involved serious limitations. Scarce attention was paid to the humiliation and oppression blacks also suffered in the North: this was a condition which did not take the immediately obvious form of slavery and sin. With the end of the Civil War, the abolitionist movement soon split, and thus was not in a position to offer theoretical, and still less practical, resistance to the regime of terroristic white supremacy that asserted itself in the South after the (anti-black) compromise of 1877 between the two sections of the white community. The weight of racial prejudice was too strong, and only the massive, prolonged presence of Union troops could have &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#page178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#pg178&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;guaranteed blacks the enjoyment of political rights and full recognition of their civil rights. But all this would have involved too serious a violation of the liberal principle of self-government. Among the theorists of abolitionism, possibly the only one who was inclined to go the whole way on the road of imposing the principle of racial equality by force of arms was Wendell Phillips. But when in 1875 he sought to set out his reasons at an assembly in Boston, he was brusquely silenced. The previous year, a senator from the South had observed with satisfaction: &#039;&#039;‘Radicalism&#039;&#039; is dissolving—going to pieces’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, local self-government was reasserted, but radical democracy disappeared and the Calvary of the blacks resumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, what prompted Anglo-American Christian abolitionism to condemnation of the sin of slavery was sympathy for a people largely converted to Christianity, who regarded Christianity as an instrument with which to overcome the condition of total de-humanization and achieve a minimum of recognition. Liberated from an obsession with sin and complicity in sin thanks to the abolition of slavery, Parker believed that there was no political solution to the persistent problem of the discrimination and injustice suffered by blacks: one could only place hope in the matrimonial fusion of the two races or the beneficent effects of the infusion of ‘dreadful Anglo-saxon blood’ in black veins. In a sense, this was a radical perspective, strongly counter to the dominant ideology. However, rather than on organizing the oppressed blacks, attention focused on overcoming the prejudices on the part of the oppressors that cemented barriers of race and caste. Radicalism thus tended to be reabsorbed by liberalism. Things were even worse for the Indians, regarded as savages and pagans. Parker had no hesitation in justifying the policy of ‘continual aggression, invasion, and extermination’ pursued by the indomitable people that were the Anglo-Saxons.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the end of the Civil War gave new impetus to the march into the Far West. The influence of the colonial question once again intervenes to explain the weakness of American radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. Liberal socialism and radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Much more so than Bentham, it was Kant who came close to radicalism. His clear adoption of a position favourable to revolutionary France is not so significant. More relevant is the fact that, intervening in 1795, a year after the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, with clear critical reference to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg179&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;England, &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039; identified ‘the sugar cane islands’ as the ‘site of the cruellest slavery that has ever been imagined’. There were two further decisive elements. Like the French radicals—we must not forget that the colonial question weighed even less heavily on Germany than France—Kant problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism: it was England that now represented the cause of ‘slavery and barbarism’. Finally, quite unlike the liberals, he did not confine himself to criticizing Pitt, whom he said was rightly ‘hated as an enemy of the human race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The German philosopher’s radicalism did not escape his contemporaries: while Goethe regarded his attitude towards England as scarcely ‘liberal’, Wilhelm von Humboldt sharply distanced himself from the ‘democratism’ pervading &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, rather than Bentham, it was John Stuart Mill who approximated to radicalism, when he identified slavery as ‘the most flagrant of all possible violations’ of liberal principles and branded those who defended it ‘the powers of evil’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, along with ‘the noble body of Abolitionists’, Mill also celebrated John Brown, author of the failed attempt to get the slaves of the southern United States to rise up.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a text of 1824 the English philosopher expressed his sympathy for the cause of the blacks of San Domingo–Haiti, whom the Napoleonic expedition vainly sought half to ‘exterminate’ and half to reduce to conditions of slavery once again.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Putting clear distance between himself and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries, Mill did not seem to recoil in horror from the prospect of a revolution from below by black slaves. And yet, in another respect, he was the theorist of a new ‘slavery’, temporary and pedagogical in kind, for ‘savages’ (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English author asserted that the final stage of his development was characterized by gravitation towards ‘socialism’ and, at the same time, renewed distrust of ‘democracy’. What caused and justified the latter was ‘the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Already problematic in the metropolis, democracy proved decidedly dangerous and inadvisable when it came to the colonies and peoples of colonial origin (including Afro-Americans). Theorist of the planetary despotism of the West, Mill seems equally remote from radical, ‘abolitionist democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg180&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused. Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ can be envisaged restrictively for the ‘master race’ and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin. At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism, but without crossing it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference to Zionism, Arendt drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a peculiar tendency. It was characterized, on the one hand, by support for ‘chauvinist’ objectives and, on the other, by commitment to pursuing collectivist experiments and a ‘rigorous realization of social justice’ within its own community. Thus crystallized ‘a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach and revolutionary social reforms domestically, with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy’, and in the field of relations with colonial peoples.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, ‘master-race democracy’ can also go further and take the form of ‘master-race socialism’, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as ‘master race’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in 1860, during the Second Opium War, a Franco-British expedition destroyed the Summer Palace, it was Victor Hugo who proved to be the inheritor of radicalism with his denunciation of the barbarity committed by self-styled civilizers, while for Mill, as for the liberal culture of the time, there continued to be few doubts about the complete identity between the West and civilization (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|§3]] and [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn1a|1]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, trans. Ernest Dilworth, New York: Mineola, 2003, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn3a|3]] Claude-Adrien Helvétius, &#039;&#039;De l’homme&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vols 7–12, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–69, vol. 8, p. 86. For the criticism of Helvétius, cf. Denis Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘L’homme’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Laurent Versini, vol. 1, Paris: Laffont, 1994, p. 862.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn4a|4]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Paul Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1963, p. 41 (article on &#039;&#039;Représentants&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn6a|6]] Cf. Gabriel Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1931, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn7a|7]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 47, 49, 55.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn8a|8]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn9a|9]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 230–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn10a|10]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 47–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn13a|13]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 55–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn17a|17]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. 2–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn18a|18]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn19a|19]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 167, 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn20a|20]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, pp. 31, 106.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Manuskripte über die polnische Frage&#039;&#039;, ed. Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1961, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn22a|22]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn23a|23]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Gedanken und Erinnerungen&#039;&#039;, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1928, pp. 51–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn24a|24]] Furet and Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn25a|25]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 384–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn26a|26]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn27a|27]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn29a|29]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn30a|30]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, p. 1078.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn31a|31]] Franco Venturi, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90, vol. 3, pp. 383, 398–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn32a|32]] Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique&#039;&#039;, pp. 133ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn33a|33]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 8, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn36a|36]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Saggio sui regni di Claudio e di Nerone e sui costume e gli scritti di Seneca&#039;&#039;, trans. Secondo Carpanetto and Luciano Guerci, Palermo: Sellerio, 1987, pp. 327–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn37a|37]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, pp. 31, 34, 33; Bernard Faÿ, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1925, p. 62 (for the translation of substantial extracts in France).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn38a|38]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 957–8 (letter to Diodati, 3 August 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn39a|39]] Étienne Clavière and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1996, pp. 64, 95 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 340.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn42a|42]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn43a|43]] Cf. Joel H. Wiener, &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983, vol. 1, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn44a|44]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 7, pp. 162–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn45a|45]] François-Noël Babeuf, &#039;&#039;Écrits&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Mazauric, 1988, p. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn46a|46]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn48a|48]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant&#039;&#039;, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn49a|49]] Clavière and Brissot, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, pp. 324–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn50a|50]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn52a|52]] Fay, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire&#039;&#039;, pp. 132–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn53a|53]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française et la fin des colonies&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1988, pp. 189–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn54a|54]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 27, 33–4. Cf. Carminella Biondi, &#039;&#039;Mon frère, tu es mon esclave&#039;&#039;, Pisa: Libreria Goliardica, 1973, pp. 23–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn56a|56]] Antoine-P.-J. M. Barnave, &#039;&#039;Introduction à la révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Fernand Rude, Paris: Colin, 1960, pp. 13, 18, 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn58a|58]] See articles 44–46 of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 178–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn59a|59]] Jean-Pierre Biondi and François Zuccarelli, &#039;&#039;16 pluviôse an II&#039;&#039;, Paris: Denoël, 1989, pp. 48, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn60a|60]] Mirabeau, quoted in Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 86 n. 4 (speech in National Assembly, 3 July 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn61a|61]] Mirabeau, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn62a|62]] Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 43–4; Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 388.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn63a|63]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 82–3, 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn64a|64]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 47.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn65a|65]] See Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes&#039;&#039;, trans. David Bailie Warden, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1997, pp. 42–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn66a|66]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn67a|67]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn68a|68]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 471.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 194–202 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;, 239–40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn71a|71]] Sonthonax, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 82.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn72a|72]] Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau&#039;&#039;, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996, pp. 50–1, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., p. 83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., p. 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn77a|77]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Des colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998, p. 242 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., pp. 166, 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn80a|80]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Esclavage et colonisation&#039;&#039;, ed. Émile Tersen, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn82a|82]] Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution francaise&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn83a|83]] Sir Thomas Aston, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn84a|84]] Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 161–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn85a|85]] Richard Hocquellet, ‘Crise de la monarchie hispanique et question coloniale ‘, in Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny, eds, &#039;&#039;Rétablissement de l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn86a|86]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 407, 760.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn87a|87]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 345–7; Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn88a|88]] Simón Bolívar, &#039;&#039;Obras completas&#039;&#039;, ed. Vicente Lecuna, Caracas: Ministerio de Educación nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; vol. 3, p. 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 170.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 679.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 685, 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 694.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 682.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn94a|94]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 381.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn95a|95]] Michael Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn96a|96]] Albert Gallatin, quoted in Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Hart Benton, quoted in ibid., p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn98a|98]] Jefferson, quoted in Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn99a|99]] Madison, quoted in ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn100a|100]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 202, 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn101a|101]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 388, 395–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn102a|102]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 245–61, in particular p. 257 (for the quotation from Walker).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn103a|103]] Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 270.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn104a|104]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn105a|105]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, pp. xx–xxi (letter to Robert E. Lee).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn107a|107]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn108a|108]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 324, 327.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 125.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 189–90 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 10 January 1857), p. 193 (letter to E. V. Childe, 2 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 195–6 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 13 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 190 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 4 September 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn113a|113]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 260–3, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn114a|114]] Henri-Alexandre Wallon, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974, p. v.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn115a|115]] See the letter from Granier de Cassagnac published in &#039;&#039;Journal des Débats&#039;&#039;, 23 July 1841.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn116a|116]] Thiers, quoted in Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn117a|117]] Cf. ibid., pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn118a|118]] André-Jean Tudesq, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 842.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn119a|119]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn120a|120]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 163, 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn121a|121]] Emília Viotti da Costa, &#039;&#039;Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn122a|122]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 195–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn123a|123]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn124a|124]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from Wesley to Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn125a|125]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn126a|126]] Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 387, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn127a|127]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, Ibid., pp. 387–90, 395.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn128a|128]] Parker, quoted in Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1978, p. 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn129a|129]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn130a|130]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn131a|131]] Parker, quoted in ibid., pp. 208, 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn132a|132]] Phillips, quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 1–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn133a|133]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn134a|134]] Garrison, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn135a|135]] Garrison, quoted in Aileen S. Kraditor, &#039;&#039;Means and Ends in American Abolitionism&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn136a|136]] Garrison, quoted in ibid., p. 86.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn137a|137]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 528–31, 261–2, 469.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn138a|138]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn139a|139]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn140a|140]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 1, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn141a|141]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1987, p. 208 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn143a|143]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 451–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn144a|144]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289, 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn145a|145]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn146a|146]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 264, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn147a|147]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn148a|148]] Cf. &#039;&#039;L’Ami du peuple&#039;&#039;, 18 May 1791, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, pp. 120–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn149a|149]] Garrison, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn150a|150]] Stockdale, quoted in David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn151a|151]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn152a|152]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn153a|153]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn154a|154]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 339, 354–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368 and n. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn156a|156]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 174 (speech to the Constituent Assembly, 12 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn157a|157]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn158a|158]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;De la Constitution américaine et de l’utilité de son étude&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hennuyer, 1850, pp. 10–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., pp. 6, 9–10, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn160a|160]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;L’état et ses limites suivi d’essais politiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn161a|161]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. viii–ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn162a|162]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, pp. 420–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn163a|163]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 431.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn164a|164]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. vi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn165a|165]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 425–7, 430.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn166a|166]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94, 128, 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn167a|167]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn168a|168]] See Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn169a|169]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 3, p. 442.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn170a|170]] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn172a|172]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn173a|173]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn174a|174]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 346.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn175a|175]] The text, taken from &#039;&#039;Sherwin’s Weekly Political Register&#039;&#039;, 18 August 1819, is quoted in Paola Casana Testore and Narciso Nada, &#039;&#039;L’età della Restaurazione&#039;&#039;, Turin: Loescher, 1981, pp. 226–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn176a|176]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, pp. 181, 195.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn177a|177]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 325–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn178a|178]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn179a|179]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 293.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn180a|180]] Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn181a|181]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1004 (letter to William Short, 3 January 1793). On all this, see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, &#039;&#039;The Age of Federalism&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 316–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn182a|182]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn183a|183]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 386; Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, pp. 197, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn184a|184]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1989, pp. 554, 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn185a|185]] Slotkin, &#039;&#039;Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, pp. 232, 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186a|186]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso&#039;&#039;, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187a|187]] Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 177, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188a|188]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 1, pp. 266–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189a|189]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190a|190]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 304–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191a|191]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192a|192]] Tocqueville mentions this critically in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193a|193]] Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, &#039;&#039;The Menorah Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 33, October 1945, pp. 171, 169, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER SIX ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg181&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The excluded and the struggle for recognition&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the liberal tradition is shot through with two macroscopic exclusion clauses. In reality, there is a third—that directed at women, which in fact presents peculiar characteristics. When they belonged to the upper classes, they formed part, albeit in a subordinate role, of the community of the free; one thinks, in particular, of female slave-owners. The women’s liberation movement was only able to acquire a mass social base later, when women previously confined to a position of slavery or restricted to the inferior levels of a caste society were able to participate in it. The development of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is explained, in the first instance, by the struggle waged by the bipedal machines of the metropolis, on the one hand, and slaves and colonial populations or populations of colonial origin, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
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In both cases, even more than for the achievement of specific objectives, the excluded protested against the fact that the dignity of man was denied them. This was a struggle for recognition—in the sense specified by Hegel in a celebrated chapter of &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;. The shackled black depicted by abolitionist propaganda demanded freedom, stressing (in the text attached to the image) that he too was a ‘man’. In his turn, Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the San Domingo revolution, invoked ‘the absolute adoption of the principle that no man, whether red, black or white, can be the property of his fellow being’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similar accents could be heard in Paris immediately &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg182&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;following the July Revolution, when popular periodicals accused ‘bourgeois notables’ of insisting on viewing workers not as ‘men’ but ‘machines’, nothing but ‘machines’ called upon to produce exclusively for the ‘needs’ of their masters. After the revolution of February 1848, the achievement by proletarians of political rights demonstrated in their view that they too were finally beginning to be raised to the ‘rank of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Condorcet emphatically recognized this status in black slaves, but denied it to their white masters. Similarly, Engels, referring to the English workers whom he was ‘happy and proud’ to have known and who suffered a ‘slavery worse than that of the American negroes’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] exclaimed: ‘I have found you to be men, members of the great, universal family of humanity’ who proclaimed ‘the cause of humanity’, trampled underfoot by capitalists engaged in an ‘indirect trade in human flesh’, in a barely disguised slave trade.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corresponding to the struggle of the excluded to be recognized in their dignity as men was the polemic against the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the other side. In the liberal camp the most celebrated intervention was Burke’s. His condemnation of this subversive theory was absolute: it paved the way for the political and social demands of ‘hair-dressers’ and ‘tallow-chandlers’, ‘to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments’, for the demands of the ‘swinish multitude’, or at any rate people whose ‘sordid mercenary occupation’ entailed ‘a mean contracted view of things’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades later, in Bentham’s view the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was nothing but a pile of ‘anarchical fallacies’. It sanctioned &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; between all men? The English liberal’s comment was sarcastic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;All men&#039;&#039; (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) &#039;&#039;remain equal in rights&#039;&#039;. The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master; he has as much liberty with relation to the master, as the master has with relation to him; he has as much right to command and to punish him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And hence the ‘absurd principle of &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; can only please “fanatics” and the “ignorant multitude”‘. The Declaration referred to law as an expression of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg183&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘general will’? But it is clear that therewith censitary restrictions of the vote could not be justified. The very theorization of property right contained in this solemn text was suspect to Bentham: the concrete object of such right was not clearly specified, and hence it involved a right which, once again, belonged ‘to every individual, without any limit’, even the propertyless person suffering from hunger:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, a universal property right is established—that is, everything is common to everyone. But because what belongs to everyone belongs to no one, what follows from it is that the effect of the Declaration is not to establish property but to destroy it. And that is how it was understood by Babeuf’s supporters, those true interpreters of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, who can be criticized for nothing but being consistent in applying the most false and absurd of principles.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Condemning these abstract ‘general principles’, for which Britain rightly displayed ‘extreme repugnance’ and which, when pronounced by ‘famished mouths’, could only result in catastrophe, Bentham referred to Malouet, one of the few in France to have attempted to dispel ‘the cloud of confused ideas’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, it was the Anglomanes who sought to block the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In appealing to ‘general principles’ and ‘metaphysical’ concepts, Malouet warned, people were playing with fire: they risked inciting the ‘immense multitude of propertyless men’, ‘the unfortunate classes of society’, ‘the men placed by fate in a condition of dependency’ and ‘lacking enlightenment and means’. They must be taught ‘just limits’, rather than the ‘extension of natural liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that one of those to adopt a clear position against the category of rights of man was Malouet, who subsequently played a prominent part in the argument against abolitionism. It was this second aspect that played a central role in the United States, where within the white community the social question did not have the significance it possessed in France, but where the conflict over black slavery became increasingly impassioned. A particular target was the statement (contained in the Declaration of Independence) that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg184&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all men are created equal’, with the right to enjoy ‘certain unalienable Rights’. Present in it was the ‘metaphysical folly’ that subsequently found more concentrated expression in the French Revolution. This was the charge formulated by the ‘American Burke’—namely, Randolph—who in this context explicitly appealed to the British liberal.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Born in the wake of the revolt against the alleged ‘imprescriptible rights of the king’ invoked by the British Crown, the United States now risked succumbing to the folly of the ‘imprescriptible rights of black slaves’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In similar fashion, Calhoun drew attention to the ‘poisonous fruits’ of that ‘place in the declaration of our independence’ which claimed to confer ‘the same right to liberty and equality’ on all men. This was the abolitionists’ starting-point in the fanatical struggle they had unleashed against black slavery and ‘Southern institutions’ as ‘outrageous on the rights of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, it was with his focus mainly on the colonies that Disraeli characterized the ‘rights of man’ as ‘nonsense’ in 1880.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The struggle for recognition waged by colonial populations or populations of colonial origin proved particularly long and complex. It would only achieve decisive results in the twentieth century. For now we must turn our attention to the struggle waged by the bipedal machines in the capitalist metropolis and within the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The instrument of labour becomes a passive citizen&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The social and political milieus which, on either side of the Atlantic, celebrated themselves as the community of the free understood by liberty not only the undisturbed enjoyment of the private sphere. Exclusion from representative bodies and political life was also perceived as an expression of despotism. On the other hand, denial of political rights to those with no title to be recognized as members of the community of the free seemed self-evidently proper. How could the ‘horse’ or ‘beast of burden’ to which Locke and Mandeville compared the wage-labourer, or the ‘speaking instrument’, ‘bipedal instrument’ or ‘work machine’ that Burke and Sieyès referred to, claim to form part of it? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg185&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In other words, those who continued to be defined via the categories used by Aristotle to conceptualize the figure of the slave could not enjoy political citizenship. If they were men, they were members of a different, inferior people; they were barbarians (the quintessential slaves).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the French case at least, the picture began to change significantly with the revolution. For some time Sieyès spoke nonchalantly of wage-labourers as the set of ‘work machines’ and ‘bipedal machines’, or of the ‘always childlike multitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But after 14 July 1789, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed, he felt a new need—the need for greater ‘clarity of language’. Hence a distinction between ‘natural and civil rights’, or ‘passive rights’, on the one hand, and ‘political rights’, or ‘active rights’, on the other. The first, which included the protection of the ‘person’, ‘property’ and ‘liberty’, applied to every man. The former bipedal machine now saw his dignity not only as a man but also as a citizen recognized, albeit a ‘passive citizen’ excluded from participation in political life, like ‘women’, ‘children’ and ‘foreigners’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are in the presence of a significant innovation. Just as ‘free labour’ had long been an oxymoron, because labour was in reality synonymous with &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, so the category of ‘passive citizen’ had long sounded like an oxymoron. He who was subject to the necessity of labour, and hence to &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, was by definition excluded from the group of freemen, who enjoyed liberty and citizenship to the full. For Locke it was meaningless to grant political rights to those who, as we have seen, were ‘made slaves’ by destitution, need, labour and the servitude implicit in this—and who did not form part of civil society, whose purpose was the defence of property. Blackstone argued in similar fashion: the right to vote could not be extended to ‘persons of indigent fortunes’, who by that token were ‘under the immediate domination of others’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, Constant resorted to the same justification when he excluded the wage-labourer from the enjoyment of political rights: he lacked ‘the necessary revenue to subsist independently of any external will’ and ‘property holders are the masters of his existence, since they may refuse him work.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is especially interesting to observe the development of the first major theorists of passive citizenship. In September 1789 Sieyès still did not hesitate to define as ‘forced’ the labour of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg186&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘uneducated multitude’, which was therefore ‘lacking freedom’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to pose the problem of conferring political liberty on someone destined to be deprived of liberty as such. On the contrary, it might be asked if it was not appropriate to transform the actually existing ‘slavery of need’ into a ‘legally sanctioned slavery’, in accordance with the model adopted in America for indentured white servants.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French Revolution challenged the configuration of the servant as a mere instrument of labour. The figure now emerged of the purely passive citizen, which in fact had a long gestation period behind it. A significant role was played by an exigency internal to the community of the free, interested in imparting credibility to its discourse and self-celebration. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone on the one hand recognized and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, even highlighted the &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; to which the wage-labourer was—and must be—subject. On the other, they celebrated England as the land of the free, where there was no place for ‘perfect slavery’ (Locke), ‘slavery in the strict sense’ (Blackstone), or colonial slavery (Mandeveille). In the nineteenth century Burke observed that among the subaltern classes the ‘common blessing’ of liberty ‘may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is here an obvious concern to stress the liberty of the wage-labourer, who is called upon not to let himself be vexed and misled by the harshness of his material living conditions, but to identify with an order that, despite everything, guarantees him liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The ideological dimension of this discourse clearly emerges from reading an eighteenth-century English author. Compared with legal coercion of the labourer–slave, Joseph Townsend regarded economic compulsion as more effective. It silently but unfailingly imposed obedience on servants, terrorized by the prospect of death from starvation. Taken for granted was the power exercised by ‘the more delicate’, who were excused work and ‘left at liberty, without interruption’, over those who, in one way or another, must be forced to perform ‘the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the transition from one condition to the other, coercion had not disappeared, but become more imperious. This did not prevent the English liberal pastor from painting an edifying picture of his country: even the poorest was a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg187&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘freeman’, who supplied ‘free service’ on the basis of ‘his own judgement and discretion’, without the ‘compulsion’ to which the ‘slave’ was subjected.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the figure of the passive citizen there is something more. It is the expression of an exigency internal to the community of the free, but also and above all a response to the struggle for recognition waged by servants in the metropolis. At least potentially, the idea of universal citizenship, even if merely passive in a majority of cases, called into question the caste ordering of society with which Townsend continued to identify. Precisely on account of its novelty, the category of citizen did not impose itself at a stroke on Sieyès, who compared non-property-owners to ‘foreigners’ and ‘children’: the slave too was a foreigner—in fact, the foreigner par excellence, the barbarian. Or he was a child, and as such formed part of the master’s extended family. In this sense, Constant was less shrewd than Sieyès, given that he continued to refer to non-property-owners excluded from political rights primarily as ‘foreigners’ and ‘minors’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The category of ‘passive citizenship’ possessed the further advantage of answering Rousseau’s objection, subsequently taken up by Robespierre. In a well-ordered state, the Genevan philosopher had stressed, no-one should be able to feel himself a ‘stranger’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly distancing himself from absolute monarchy and aristocracy, where a single individual or a few individuals could say they had a ‘homeland’, while everyone else was stateless, it was a question of constructing a society, a ‘democratic regime’, the Jacobin leader later reiterated, where ‘the state is genuinely the homeland of all individuals’, all of them admitted on an equal footing ‘to the rights of the citizen in full’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, if not exactly in the strict sense of the term, the proletarian was likewise a citizen, a member of the ‘nation’ dear to Sieyès that Boulainvilliers and the nobility had wrongly wanted to divide into an aristocratic people, descended from the victorious Franks, and a plebeian people, descended from the vanquished Gallo-Romans.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The invention of passive citizenship and negative liberty and the restriction of the political sphere&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg188&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Compelled by the struggle waged by the excluded to grant them at least passive citizenship, the community of the free now found itself facing a new challenge to its exclusivism. Already in June 1790, Marat had a representative of the ‘unlucky ones’ to whom political citizenship was denied argue thus against the ‘aristocracy of the rich’: ‘In your eyes we are still the rabble’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And we have seen Robespierre compare non-property-owners excluded from political rights to slaves: the concession of passive citizenship did not end the struggle for recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Constant sought to answer the objections of the most radical currents that had emerged during the French Revolution. No, the non-property-owner excluded from the enjoyment of political rights could not be confused with the slave.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the latter, the former, in common with all other citizens, was protected by laws and enjoyed full liberty within his private sphere. And this was what modern liberty consisted in. During the conflict with the monarchy, the community of the free in England and America had demanded a very different liberty, since it was in no way prepared to renounce administering public affairs. But it is clear that this platform could not survive the emergence of a struggle by the popular masses, which protested against exclusion from political rights and at the same time sought to change their labour relations and material living conditions. The dominant elite now developed a very different discourse: participation in political life was not an essential element of liberty; and, in the second place, labour relations and material living conditions pertained to an eminently private sphere, so that it was absurd and illegitimate to seek to change them through political action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new discourse did not impose itself at a stroke and wholly consistently. Constant let slip the admission that the provider of work was in fact ‘master’ of the worker’s ‘existence’. But even more significant is the oscillation we find in Macaulay. Fighting in 1831 for the political emancipation of Jews, the British liberal unhesitatingly rejected the thesis that a distinction should be made between civil rights and political rights, and that exclusion from the latter was not a factor of ‘mortification’ and discrimination. In reality, this was sophistry designed to justify ‘a system full of absurdity and injustice’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg189&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;polemic was incisive and effective, but the liberal author was careful not to intervene on behalf of the British popular masses as well as of property-owners whose religion was Judaism!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar consideration applies to other exponents of the liberal tradition. In regarding the enjoyment of political rights as an essential element of liberty, the Jacobins argued no differently from the American revolutionaries. But in Burke the proposal of ‘conciliation’ of the rebel colonists, who with their demand for the right to representation had confirmed that they were worthy members of the community of the free, was followed by the proclamation of a crusade against a revolution led by the mob, which had demanded and wrested political rights. As to de Tocqueville, his notes on his travels in England were almost coeval with the publication of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;. But the warm appreciation of widespread political participation in the North American republic was certainly not matched by bitter denunciation of strict censitary discrimination in Britain, or the slightest support for the Chartist demand for an extension of the suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s intervention was especially significant as regards the second point in the new liberal ideological platform, which drastically restricted the political sphere. In a text of 1842 he observed: ‘Equality is everywhere extending its dominion, except in industry, which is daily organized in increasingly aristocratic form’. The wage-labourer found himself in a ‘strict dependency’ (&#039;&#039;étroite dépendance&#039;&#039;) on the provider of work. Despite the charming appearance of ‘great French society’ as a whole, ‘industrial society’ (&#039;&#039;société industrielle&#039;&#039;) in the strict sense continued to be characterized by a strict hierarchy, which left little room not only for equality, but also for the individual liberty of those placed on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The harshness of the relations obtaining in factories was further confirmed by de Tocqueville’s comparison between working conditions and prison conditions, even if it was made not to challenge the former but to reject naively philanthropic projects for reform of the latter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of free workers, who in France painfully earn a living, have no rest but that taken at meal times, and cannot understand why criminals punished by society arouse so lively an interest that it gives way to tenderhearted exclamations and is on the verge of shedding tears at the idea of inflicting on them a deprivation suffered by all honest labourers.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg190&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Besides, we should not forget that the panopticon theorized by Bentham, a building designed to achieve surveillance from which there was no escape, could serve as prison, workhouse or even factory.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the ‘immediate dominion’ or ‘forced labour’ to which Blackstone and Sieyès, respectively, refer. However, this coercive relationship was no longer explicitly highlighted to justify censitary discrimination in political rights (whose enjoyment belonged only to freemen in the full sense of the term). Instead, the condition that subjected the worker to a ‘strict dependency’ (de Tocqueville), compelled him to work in prison-like institutions (Bentham and de Tocqueville), and to sell his labour power to buyers who were ultimately the ‘masters of his existence’ (Constant), was now recognized reluctantly, declared to be without political relevance and hence not corrosive of negative liberty, from which no one in the metropolis was excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can read the notes written by de Tocqueville during his trips to England in 1833 and 1835. The picture that emerges is no less dramatic than the one Engels was to draw some years later. The industrial region of Manchester and the working-class districts appeared as an ‘infected labyrinth’, an ‘inferno’: the miserable little cottages were like&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the last asylum man can occupy between misery and death. Yet the unfortunate beings that inhabit such cubby-holes arouse the envy of their fellows. Under their wretched abodes one finds a row of cellars to which a semi-underground corridor leads. In each of these damp, repugnant places, ten or fifteen human creatures are massed higgledy-piggledy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The appalling mass poverty formed a shocking contrast to the opulence of a few: ‘the organized forces of a multitude produce for the benefit of a single one’. Such a spectacle elicited a significant exclamation: ‘Here the slave, there the master; here the wealth of some, there the poverty of the greatest number’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On another occasion, de Tocqueville even warned against the danger of ‘slave wars’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby indirectly comparing modern proletarians with ancient slaves. We thus encounter the reality of unfreedom, and of unfreedom in its most drastic form. Yet this realistic analysis disappears as if by magic when it comes to drawing up an overall political balance sheet. We are dealing with the country that France was called upon to regard as a model, if it wished to save ‘the future &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg191&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of free institutions’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] English liberal society realized liberty as such, regardless of the conditions of the kind of slavery had had to register in the inferno of the industrial regions. The fact is that this inferno had nothing to do with the political sphere proper. And once poverty or even a condition of tangible slavery had been confined to a sphere lacking political relevance (for pertaining to private life), in a sphere where it was not legitimate or possible to intervene politically, the initially slimy and repugnant portrait of Manchester turned into its opposite:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the external appearance of the city, everything attests to the individual power of man and nothing to the regulatory power of society. At every step, liberty reveals its capricious, creative force there. Nowhere is the slow, continuous action of the government to be seen.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. ‘Civil laws’ and ‘political laws’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The restriction of the political sphere is so radical as to seem paradoxical. Analysing the prison system in the United States, de Tocqueville drew attention to legislation that threw the poor into prison even for utterly insignificant debts. In Pennsylvania the number of individuals annually incarcerated for debt amounted to 7,000. If to this figure was added the number of those condemned for more serious crimes, it turned out that for every 144 inhabitants virtually one a year ended up in prison. But this was not the most important aspect. The French liberal was obliged to acknowledge the influence, direct as well as indirect, exercised by the wealthy over the administration of justice. The ‘vagrant’ or someone suspected of vagrancy was locked up in prison without having committed any offence. Worse, while awaiting legal proceedings, the poor witness or plaintiff lost his liberty, while the thief capable of standing bail retained his (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). Clearly, the very principle of equality before the law ended up being travestied. But this was not de Tocqueville’s conclusion: ‘Of all modern peoples, it is the English who have instilled the greatest liberty in their political laws and made most frequent use of prison in their civil laws’. In their turn, although having largely altered the ‘political laws’, Americans had ‘preserved most of the civil laws’ of England.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#page192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#pg192&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;With this distinction we have reached a key point. The liberal author formulated his judgement on the countries visited by him exclusively on the basis of their &#039;&#039;lois politiques&#039;&#039;, while the &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039; were by definition politically irrelevant. Not by chance, there is little trace in &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; of the data gathered in the course of the inquiry into the US prison system. It might be said that de Tocqueville’s most interesting pages are those that did not make it into the work which sealed his fame. The almost triumphant conclusion then becomes explicable: in the transatlantic republic liberty had been comprehensively diffused, and did not constitute a privilege. Accustomed as he was to very different &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039;, the traveller from France expressed his disappointment at legislation in the United States that seemed to him ‘monstrous’. But ‘the mass of [American] men of law’ found no fault with it and did not regard it as contradicting the ‘democratic constitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was precisely the standpoint de Tocqueville ended up adopting—though not without contradictions and embarrassment. We can glimpse the former if we give the French liberal the floor once again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be acknowledged that the American prison regime is severe. While US society affords the example of the most extensive liberty, this country’s prisons offer a spectacle of utter despotism. The citizens subject to the law are protected by it; they cease to be free only when they become felons.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, by de Tocqueville’s own admission, vagrants and poor witnesses also suffered ‘severe’ treatment in prisons, or workhouses similar to prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us observe the embarrassment. We have already encountered the protests of vagrants locked up in prison by a society that cannot solve the problem of unemployment in any other way. What was de Tocqueville’s reaction? Just as it did not come within his ‘tasks’ to investigate possible remedies for unemployment, so it did not fall to him ‘even to investigate to what extent the society is just that punishes the man who does not work and lacks work, and how it might furnish means of subsistence without putting him in prison’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of politics and ‘political laws’ was so narrowly defined as to exclude not only material living conditions and relations of dependency in factories, but even the censitary discrimination that pervaded the administration of justice in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The de-politicization and naturalization of economic and social relations&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg193&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Any expansion of the political was utterly intolerable to the liberal tradition, because it would involve relations that were not only private in character, but whose immutability was consecrated by nature or Providence. In Burke’s view it was at once mad and blasphemous to believe that among ‘the competence of government’ was ‘supply[ing] to the poor, those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them’. Poverty was the result of ‘Divine displeasure’ and the latter could certainly not be placated by challenging ‘the laws of commerce’, which were ‘the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville argued no differently. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, he noted with concern the behaviour of the ‘working classes’. They seemed calm, no longer ‘bedevilled by political passions’. Unfortunately, however, ‘where once they had been political, their passions have become social’. Rather than the make-up of this or that ministry, they tended to question property relations themselves and hence the natural order of ‘society’, tearing ‘to shreds the basis on which it rests’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the revolution broke out, the French liberal regarded it as socialist or infected with socialism as early as February, because prominent in it were ‘the economic and political theories’ which would have people ‘believe that human miseries are the work of the laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be abolished by changing the social order’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ranging beyond the political sphere, the ‘threat of change in the social constitution’ was configured as an attack on the ‘ancient, holy laws of property and family on which Christian civilization is based’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, on the one hand political economy was merged with theology, while on the other it tended to take its place, in the sense that ‘science’ was now called on to sanction and sanctify existing social relations. According to Malthus, it was wholly desirable that political economy be ‘taught to the common people’. Thanks to it, the poor would understand that they must attribute the cause of their privations to Mother Nature or their own improvidence. Indeed, ‘[p]olitical economy is perhaps the only science of which it may be said that the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg194&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great evil.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was also the opinion of de Tocqueville, who believed it necessary&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to diffuse among the working classes … some of the most elementary and certain notions of political economy, which would make them understand, for example, what is constant and necessary in the economic laws that govern the wage rate. Because such laws, being in some sense of divine law, in that they derive from the nature of man and the very structure of society, are situated beyond the reach of revolutions. [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While for Burke, ‘Divine displeasure’ explained the misery of the popular masses, for Malthus it was the immorality of their behaviour, the sexual incontinence that brought into the world beings whose subsistence people were not in a position to ensure. Referring to ‘Malthus’s principle of population’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville reprehended ‘all the excesses of intemperance’ widespread among ‘the lower classes’, their ‘improvidence’, or their tendency to live ‘as if there will be no tomorrow’, and above all ‘these early, imprudent marriages that seem to have no other purpose than multiplying the number of unfortunates on earth’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notwithstanding the radical attitudes he liked to adopt, Bentham did not reach very different conclusions: ‘with respect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws’; the poor man was like a ‘savage’ who had not succeeded in transcending the state of nature. Or, to put it in the words of a French disciple and collaborator of the English philosopher, ‘Poverty is not a result of the social order. So why rebuke it? It is a legacy of the state of nature’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing against natural law, the English philosopher waxed ironic about the recourse to nature to ground rights that only made sense in society. But now nature popped up again to remove responsibility for poverty from the politico-social order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this elevation of existing social relations to the status of nature, and to nature sanctioned by Providence, attempts to alter them could only be an expression of madness. Burke expressed his utter ‘horror’ at revolutionaries or hasty reformists, who did not hesitate ‘to hack that aged parent [their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg195&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;country] in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, for de Tocqueville the illusion that there was a political ‘cure for this hereditary, incurable ill of poverty and work’ provoked the incessant, ruinous &#039;&#039;expérimentations&#039;&#039; that characterized the French revolutionary cycle,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or ‘the great social revolution’ begun in 1789.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Liberalism and radicalism: two different phenomenologies of power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In pronouncing his judgement on England and the United States, de Tocqueville ignored, in addition to colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, material living conditions, labour relations and even ‘civil laws’. Extraneous to his research and analysis of democracy, he declared, was not only the oppression of blacks and Indians, but also the detention of white citizens (‘vagrants’ or poor people summoned to testify in a trial) who were not guilty of any offence. The cult of the &#039;&#039;‘holy&#039;&#039; thing’ that was liberty[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ignored the fate of the excluded in their entirety, whether they lived in the colonies or the metropolis. And, once again, the divergence between liberalism and radicalism—of which Marx and Engels were the critical heirs—is already apparent at an epistemological level. In England, observed Engels, the ‘aiding and abetting of the rich is explicitly recognized even in the law’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Analysing the English ‘civil laws’ inherited by the United States, de Tocqueville arrived at the same conclusion. But this fact had political relevance only for Engels. And like the authors of the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the French liberal compared the worker of the time to the slave, forced to suffer a ‘strict dependency’ inside the factory and a degrading, oppressive poverty outside it. But de Tocqueville considered all this foreign to the political sphere proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely the drastic restriction of the political, and the consequent exclusion from it of the most profound dimension of the social totality, that prompted Marx’s criticisms. From the standpoint of bourgeois society and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg196&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political theory, he observed in his early writings, social relations ‘have only a private significance, not any political significance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited itself ‘to closing its eyes and declaring that certain &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; oppositions do not have a &#039;&#039;political character&#039;&#039;, that these do not bother it’. While regarded as lacking political relevance, bourgeois social relations and power relations in the factory and society could develop without inhibition or external impediment.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above poverty, the reality of the factory (stressed the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;) highlighted the ‘despotism’ that hung over workers, ‘organised like soldiers’ and ‘[a]s privates of the industrial army … placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s conclusion was scarcely milder. But now the despotism identified and denounced was not this reality, but attempts by political power to change or alleviate it. Against demands to put ‘the prescience and wisdom of the state in the place of individual prescience and wisdom’, the French liberal proclaimed that ‘nothing authorizes the state to interfere in industry’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the famous speech of 12 September 1848, made to persuade the Constituent Assembly to reject demands for the ‘right to work’ that had already been drowned in blood in the June Days. De Tocqueville went so far as to attribute to ‘socialist doctrines’ the regulation and reduction of working hours (‘the twelve-hour day’), which therefore became an object of unequivocal condemnation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise dismissed as an expression of socialism and despotism was any legislative measure to alleviate the misery of the ‘lower classes’ through rent controls.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French liberal insisted on this intransigently. Immediately after the bloody June Days, he did not hesitate to accuse the Interior Minister of being inconsistent and soft: ‘While Cavaignac and Lamorcière fought socialism in the streets, Sénard supported socialist doctrine as regards the twelve-hour day’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some months later, in his draft electoral circular of May 1849, de Tocqueville advertised as a badge of merit the fact that he had voted, &#039;&#039;inter alia&#039;&#039;, ‘against the limit it was proposed to place on the working day, against progressive taxation, and finally against the abolition of military substitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The last point was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;no less significant than the others. In de Tocqueville’s view, the option the rich man had of hiring a poor man to replace him when it came to performing the duty of military service did not involve an inequality, based on wealth and sanctioned by law, even in the face of the danger of death. Rather, it was a contract between individuals, which pertained to the private sphere and hence did not infringe the principle of legal equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in his capacity as a historian, when reconstructing the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, de Tocqueville stuck to this restriction of the political sphere and this peculiar phenomenology of power, which identified dominion and oppression exclusively with the intervention of political power in a private sphere that had been unduly expanded. He drew a terrible picture of the conditions of the popular classes. ‘Beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ were sometimes proceeded against ‘in the most violent way’, with the arrest and condemnation of thousands of people to forced labour without trial. Not much better was the treatment reserved for peasants. While, materially and socially, they lived in an ‘abyss of misery and isolation’, in terms of civil rights they were deprived of any protection: they ‘were constantly arrested in connection with the levies of forced labour or the militia; for begging, for misdemeanours, and countless other minor offences’. In conclusion, the peasants were viewed rather like ‘the Negroes in our colonies’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Was the revolution therefore legitimate and necessary? Such was not de Tocqueville’s opinion. France, which with the economists radically criticized and readied itself to overthrow the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, ‘wanted not so much a recognition of the “rights of man” as reforms in the existing system’![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An organ of the titled aristocracy and hence jointly responsible for the degradation of the peasants to ‘negroes’, the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; were the body which, before unfortunately being dissolved by the revolution, embodied the whole cause of liberty. In the years preceding the fatal 1789, ‘our judicial institutions were still those of a free people.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The new self-representation of the community of the free as a community of individuals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To the revolutionary demand for the rights of man and the equal dignity of every individual, which risked grinding society ‘into the dust and powder of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’, Burke opposed the sacredness of a community: ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, in ‘the great primaeval contract of eternal society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thanks to a ‘relation in blood’ that united and founded in an indivisible unity ‘our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, as against the individualism reprehended in the French revolutionaries, the British liberal vindicated an emphatic organicism. Not by chance, the partnership celebrated by him subsequently became in German culture the &#039;&#039;Gemeinschaft&#039;&#039; that played such an important role in nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative and reactionary thinking.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the dissolvent charge contained in revolutionary individualism can also be found in de Tocqueville, who in 1843 observed: ‘For some years, doubt and individualism have made us such progressives that the nation will soon no longer offer any foothold for resistance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But already during the French Revolution a different attitude had begun to emerge. Barnave warned as follows against the demand for an extension of political rights to non-property-owners: ‘Another step on the road of equality would mean the destruction of liberty.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to Constant, too, the diffusion among the popular masses of the demand for political rights and stress on their enjoyment risked making people lose sight of the centrality of ‘private independence’ or ‘individual independence’, leading to the subjection of individual existence to the collective body.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albeit in a different idiom, Barnarve’s argument was reintroduced: the generalization of political rights had a levelling, homogenizing effect at the expense of individual liberty. Later, Guizot declared that to fight for a society where everything revolved around ‘order’, ‘well-being’ and the ‘equitable distribution … of the means of life’ meant forgetting ‘the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties’, and aspiring to an ‘ant-hill or bee-hive’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a theme that enjoyed enormous success after 1848. The more the struggle for recognition developed as a struggle for the conquest of political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg199&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rights and of economic and social rights, the more the popular and socialist movement was accused of not understanding the autonomous dignity of the individual, and in fact of wanting to trample it underfoot. Rejecting the social demands that issued from the February Revolution, de Tocqueville gave full vent to his disgust at the emergence on the horizon of the spectre of a ‘levelled society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a ‘society of bees and beavers’, composed ‘more of sapient animals than free, civilized men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so in his turn did John Stuart Mill: ‘At present individuals are lost in the crowd … The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence, in a reversal of positions compared with Burke, liberalism now rebuked the most radical currents not for their individualism, but for riding roughshod over the rights of the individual. De Tocqueville sought to provide this accusation with an epistemological foundation: conferring ‘a separate existence on the species [espèce]’, and expanding ‘the notion of genus [&#039;&#039;genre&#039;&#039;]’, radicalism and socialism were simply the application to politics of the ‘doctrine of the realists’ of scholastic fame. It entailed ‘contempt for particular rights’ and devaluation of the individual as such.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But what is the value of this theoretical construct? It is interesting to see how de Tocqueville rejects proposals for reforming the prison system promoted primarily by the radical and socialist movement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philanthropy elicits our pity for an isolated unfortunate, we must not forget to reserve a little of our sympathy for a yet greater interest—that of the whole society. Let us distrust these narrow, ungenerous views that notice the individual but never the mass of men and let us eternally remember this thought of a great philosopher: pity for the wicked is a great cruelty to the good … The social interest, which is nothing if not the interest of the honest mass, requires that the wicked be severely punished.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Even the troubled diagnosis of massification was made with an eye to the fate of ‘[t]he nation, taken as a whole’, which now risked turning out to be ‘less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was also in the name of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg200&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an emphatic (and chauvinist) idea of the nation that de Tocqueville invoked ‘terror’ against those who risked compromising the honour of France (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a concrete level, too, de Tocqueville was concerned to see what were for him the requirements of society prevail. In the years of the July Monarchy, faced with the spread of mass misery, he proposed nothing to prevent it except police measures gravely corrosive of the liberty of the individual (the poor individual): ‘Could we not prevent the rapid movement of the population, so that men do not abandon the earth and move to industry, except to the extent that the latter can readily meet their needs?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Restrictions on freedom of movement should also be imposed on ‘vagrants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although committed to denouncing the expansion of the state—‘the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power’—Mill did not hesitate to assert: ‘The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’; they were ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The view that any ‘interference’ in the procreation of human life was illegitimate was ‘a superstition which will one day be regarded with as much contempt, as any of the idiotic notions and practices of savages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can understand Proudhon’s irony in connection with the liberal school:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It, which in all circumstances and places professes &#039;&#039;laissez-faire, laissez-passer&#039;&#039;, which reprehends socialists for substituting their convictions for the laws of nature, which protests against any state intervention, and which demands liberty here, there and everywhere, nothing but liberty, does not hesitate when it comes to conjugal fertility to cry to the spouses: Stop there! What devil incites you![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the conflict between liberalism and its critics, an inversion of positions has occurred as regards laissez-faire for the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disgusted by the radicalism of the 1848 revolution and Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, de Tocqueville arrived at a bitter conclusion: ‘The revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg201&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in England was made solely with a view to liberty, while that in France was made principally with a view to equality.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The criticism also encompassed the Enlightenment culture that had prepared and promoted the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime:&#039;&#039; in it a sure ‘zeal for equality’ was matched by a rather ‘tepid’ ‘desire for liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we know, the first to counterpose liberty and equality and denounce the demand for political equality as an attack on liberty was Barnarve, who was nevertheless a defender of slavery. This institution continued to be alive and well in the United States when de Tocqueville held up the transatlantic republic, together with England, as the model country for love of liberty to a France devoured by the passion for equality. It was precisely here that slavery was justified and even celebrated by southern theorists as an instrument to ensure, along with their liberty, the equality of members of the white community. For confirmation of the problematic character of the opposition between liberty and equality, we might adduce the pre-1848 de Tocqueville, who criticized England for an erroneous conception of liberty in as much as it was based on ‘privilege’ (and inequality), and who attributed to the French Revolution the merit of having, in the name of equality, promoted the cause of the abolition of slavery and the freedom of the blacks (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]; below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|§7]]). At this time, far from being in opposition, liberty and equality were fully in accord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposition was represented, in significantly different form, in the work of another important representative of the liberal tradition. In Bentham we read: ‘When security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the very country held up by de Tocqueville as a model for its ability to understand the absolute priority of the value of liberty, we see that the reassertion of the subordinate value of equality occurs, in the first instance, in the name of the ‘security’ of society and the existing order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Economic and social rights, the socialist ‘ants’ nest’ and liberal ‘individualism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point it is appropriate to analyse nineteenth-century liberals’ individualist profession of faith at greater length. Especially after 1848, in the midst &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg202&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the massification they reprehended in socialism, they sometimes seemed to consider individualism a pre-modern reality, which had, alas, faded in the course of subsequent historical developments. According to Mill, ‘[i]n ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself’; he was not ‘lost in the crowd’ and the ‘masses’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville likewise paid homage to the ‘individualism of the Middle Ages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Manifestly, he did not take into consideration the fate of serfs, just as he did not take account of the fate of slaves and blacks in general when he pointed to the United States as the country where &#039;&#039;‘every&#039;&#039; individual’ enjoyed unprecedented ‘independence’. When he subsequently asserted that in colonized Algeria, ‘the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the motherland’, de Tocqueville ignored the Arabs, who, by his own admission, were often equated with the occupying forces to ‘evil beasts’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]; below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|§6]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus emerges the somewhat problematic character of the pathos of the individual, which was the flag waved by liberalism in its conflict with radicalism and socialism. Who was more individualist? Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the slave revolution? Or Calhoun, the great US theorist of the slaveholding South? Who demonstrated respect for the dignity of the individual as such? The black Jacobin who, taking the Declaration of the Rights of Man seriously, considered that it was always inadmissible to reduce a man to an object of ‘property’ of one of ‘his follow men’? Or Jefferson, who kept silent about his doubts about slavery out of a conviction of white superiority and his concern not to endanger the peace and stability of the South and the Union? Who expressed individualism better? Mill and his English and French followers, who considered the subjection and even slavery (albeit temporary) of colonial peoples beneficial and necessary? Or the French radicals who began to question colonial despotism as such (‘Let the colonies perish if they are to cost honour, freedom’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]])?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doubts are not dispelled even if we ignore the colonies and peoples of colonial origin. Prominent in the liberal tradition (for example, Laboulaye) is the polemic against the fanaticism of the French revolutionaries, who regarded access to the vote and representative office as a ‘natural, absolute right’ of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg203&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;every individual, rather than a ‘political function’ of society.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So which of the two positions better expressed individualism? On the other hand, if the generalization of political rights imperilled ‘individual independence’, as Constant seemed to believe, why direct such a reproof solely against French radicalism and not also against the American Revolution (which erupted in the wake of the demand for the colonists’ right to political representation)?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examined more closely, the cry of alarm at the danger of the disappearance of individuality, and the impeding ‘ants’ nest’, expressed the disquiet of the restricted community of the free first at the extension of political rights and then, increasingly, at the extension of economic and social rights. Yet it was de Tocqueville himself who compared the hungry man to a slave—that is, a man or an individual deprived of liberty and recognition. Compared with the liberal tradition, Nietzsche proved much more lucid and consistent. Although inspired by an implacable hatred of socialism and the social state demanded by it, and in fact precisely because inspired by such hatred, the brilliant reactionary thinker understood that, with its ‘individualistic agitation’, socialism aimed to ‘render many individuals possible’, raising them above their condition as instruments of labour and their herd-like relationship to the masters. With its universalistic charge, socialism issued in the recognition of every individual, independently of wealth, sex or race, as a subject endowed at a moral level with equal human dignity and possessor, politically, of inalienable rights. That was why Nietzsche indignantly condemned individualism and socialism. Albeit with a converse value judgement, Oscar Wilde also connected the two terms: ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming the ambiguous character of the liberal tradition’s individualism, it is worth noting that, in criticizing the French Revolution and the danger of subversion represented by the working-class and socialist movement, it liked positively to oppose the countryside to the city. This is readily intelligible in the case of the theorist of organicist ‘partnership’, Burke, who with utter consistency celebrated the ‘agricultural class’ that ‘of all others is the least inclined to sedition’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his attention still fixed on the French Revolution and the role in it played by Paris, Constant stressed the danger of ‘[a]rtisans, crowded into the towns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the theme of distrust or hostility towards the city, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg204&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the prime site for development of the individual, runs deep in the liberal tradition. In Mandeville’s view, ‘London is too big for the Country’, and it was precisely there that disturbing phenomena of social insubordination were emerging. Much more reassuring were rural areas, where it was possible to count on ‘the poor silly Country People’, who in fact were conspicuous for their ‘Innocence and Honesty’ and who, ‘from their very Infancy’, could be educated into obedience to authority and respect for customs and tradition.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain regret for this world can also be observed in de Tocqueville, when in 1834 he described the condition of the poor man in the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. Characterized by ‘limited’ desires and calm indifference to ‘a future that did not belong to him’, his lot ‘was less to be felt sorry for than that of men of the people of our days’. Accustomed to their condition from time immemorial, the poor under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; ‘enjoyed the kind of vegetative happiness whose attractiveness is so difficult for the civilized man to understand that he denies its existence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the resumption of revolution in France, against those who sought to ‘stir up the working population of the city’, Tocqueville called for reliance on ‘the inhabitants of the countryside, [who] are full of good sense and, thus far, of balance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The first person to take this recommendation to heart was de Tocqueville himself, who described how he organized the elections in his native village as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We all had to go to vote together in the village of Saint-Pierre, a league from our hamlet. The morning of the election, all the electors (that is, the whole male population over the age of twenty) met in front of the church, and all these men formed a queue in twos in alphabetical order … I reminded these good folk of the seriousness and importance of the act they were performing and recommended that they not allow themselves to be approached or led astray by those who, on our arrival in the village, might seek to mislead them, but instead proceed in a group and stay together, each in his place, until we had voted. ‘Let no one—I said—go home either to eat something or to dry himself (it rained that day) before he has done his duty’. They shouted that they would do this and did it. All the votes were cast at the same time, and I have reason to believe that virtually all of them were given to the same candidate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg205&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It is hard to regard as a manifestation of individualism the events narrated here by the French liberal, beneficiary of the plebiscitary vote of the village whose lord he remained.&lt;br /&gt;
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Just as the dichotomy between English love of liberty and French egalitarianism proves unfounded, so the opposition between the individualism of the liberal tradition (whose favoured site was England) and the anti-individualism of radicalism (whose centre was in France) does not withstand critical analysis. To the French revolutionaries, who with their Declaration of the Rights of Man aimed simply ‘to excite and keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of insurrection against all governments’, Bentham opposed his principle of social utility: ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the view condemned by Marx, who indignantly reported the reasons with which the prime minister, Palmerston, had once justified his distrust or hostility towards the demand for emancipation advanced by Irish Catholics: ‘because the legislature of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare of the whole’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Criticism of liberalism as anti-modern reaction?&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, we encounter a paradoxical phenomenon. While, on the one hand, it cultivated pre-modern nostalgia, on the other, liberalism contested the movement engaged in the demand for political rights and economic and social rights, accusing it of a basic inability to understand and accept modernity. The first to set off in this direction was Constant. Clinging to the idea of unanimous participation in political life and hence to ‘ancient liberty’, the Jacobins forgot that the latter was based on slavery, the institution that made it possible for freemen to enjoy the &#039;&#039;otium&#039;&#039; required for them to be genuinely active citizens in every respect.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was 1819 when the French liberal argued thus. At this time, in every country where modern liberty flourished, slavery continued in one form or another to be a living reality and, what is more, had assumed a harshness and naturalistic rigidity unknown in classical antiquity. Certainly, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg206&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;although it had not ceased to play a significant role, the institution was mostly isolated and concealed in the colonies. But that was not the case in the United States. There slavery was not only highly visible but, according to the analysis of not a few southern theorists (who took up and developed a suggestion of Burke’s), it encouraged the republican spirit of the free. In other words, ‘ancient liberty’ continued to survive in some sense in the United States, which was nevertheless pointed to by Constant as a ‘great example’ of the modern liberty dear to him.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, in stressing the invigorating function that the presence of slaves had on the spirit of liberty of free citizens, Burke explicitly referred to the example of the ‘ancient states’ (above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Hence Constant’s theoretical construct is based on a colossal repression, which is all the more amazing if we bear in mind the bitter struggles over slavery that developed in France. Abolished by the Jacobins, it had been restored by Napoleon, who arrived in power with the support not only of Sieyès, but also (as we shall see) of Constant himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than emulating a model from antiquity, the French Revolution and the most radical currents thrown up by it were sometimes accused of encouraging nostalgia for the Middle Ages. Spencer compared progressive taxation to a corvée (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|§4]]). This was a theme subsequently developed by him with the observation that ‘national charity’ (i.e. laws benefiting the poor) was merely a new version of the pre-modern ‘established church’. And just as the old dissenter had fought for respect for the spontaneity of authentic religious sentiment, so the new ‘dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary’. While the old dissenter denied any authority the right to dictate laws to his religious conscience, the new ‘dissenter from established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in between him and the &#039;&#039;exercise&#039;&#039; of his religion’, and indignantly rejected ‘the interference of the state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of [the] gospel’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the last analysis, the demand for economic and social rights, to be legally ratified in the name of moral and religious values such as compassion and human solidarity, were simply a claim to restore life to a state religion! And the prophets of this state religion likewise referred to a pre-modern world. From the French Revolution onwards, as we shall soon see, the liberal tradition was fond of equating trade unions with medieval corporations. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Lecky reproved trade unions and the working-class movement for aspiring to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg207&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an ‘industrial organization’ similar to that of the Middle Ages and the Tudor period.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Trade unions, Pareto stressed some years later, claimed to enjoy (and did enjoy) a kind of ‘Mediaeval immunity’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Lord Acton’s view, even more so than the demand by unions for alleged economic and social rights, it was that for universal suffrage that amounted to a pre-modern, regressive phenomenon. It was ‘absolutist and retrograde’, since it favoured the expansion of the state and of despotism that had happily been transcended by liberalism.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, rather than classical antiquity as for Constant, Jacobinism, socialism and sometimes democracy itself were now accused of cultivating nostalgia for the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, whether it was of the Middle Ages or absolute monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The latter theme found fullest expression in de Tocqueville, according to whom, with their statist pathos, radicalism, Jacobinism and socialism were in a line of continuity with the statism, ‘administrative centralization’ and ‘paternal government’ of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this was an argument which, albeit with timely variations, proved especially dear to defenders of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; themselves! In Berlin the &#039;&#039;Berliner politische Wochenblatt&#039;&#039; never tired of repeating that revolution and absolutism were ‘identical, when regarded from a higher viewpoint’. In citing Louis XIV’s motto (‘L’état c’est moi!’), the journal observed that ‘revolutionary freedom … is reconciled with this centralization, this bureaucratic despotism, with this tutelage through ministerial assistants of the provinces and the community, with this Hobbesian governmental omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville stressed the revolutionary role played, even before 1789, by the figure of the ‘intendant’ and ‘public administration’, which had in fact already expelled the nobility.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The periodical cited above arrived at the same conclusion, identifying and branding in the figure of the ‘civil servant’ the author of the cancellation of ‘local liberties’ and all intermediate bodies liable to overshadow ‘state power’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to de Tocqueville, ‘those peoples who are so constituted as to have the utmost difficulty in getting rid of despotic government for any considerable period are the ones in which aristocracy has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg208&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ceased to exist and can no longer exist’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was precisely the guiding thread of the condemnation of the French Revolution pronounced by the organ of the Prussian nobility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Immediately after the publication of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the Revolution&#039;&#039;, expressing his agreement and admiration, Lieber observed that the book as a whole was a historical running commentary on the analysis of ‘Gallican’ political tendencies he had already developed.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, a degree of boasting is not absent. Yet we should understand the German-American liberal’s point of view. In 1849 he had underlined the continuity between Louis XIV and the 1789 revolution, and between it and Napoleon Bonaparte and the 1848 Revolution. It was a history utterly pervaded by the ideal of ‘equality’ and the ‘concentration’ and ‘centralization of power’, the ‘organization’ and generalized ‘interference of public power’, with a consequent inevitable sacrifice of freedom, ‘individualism’ and the principle of the ‘limitation of government’. By contrast, the latter was at the heart of the concerns and aspirations of the ‘Britannic race’ or ‘Anglican race’—i.e. England and the United States.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are, I repeat, in 1849; and at this time de Tocqueville confined himself to an indictment of socialism. While ‘on many points’ it had a different orientation from the ‘&#039;&#039;ancien régime’&#039;&#039;, it had inherited ‘the opinion that the only wisdom lies in the state’. But the partial and limited continuity established here did not in any way include the French Revolution. In fact, in his anti-socialist polemic, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to refer to Robespierre:&lt;br /&gt;
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Flee … flee the old mania … of wanting to govern excessively; allow individuals, allow families the right freely to do anything that does not harm others; allow the communes the right to manage their own affairs; in a word, restore to the liberty of individuals everything that has illegitimately been taken from them, everything that does not of necessity pertain to the public authority.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, far from formulating the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution, de Tocqueville was refuting it in advance. Someone who did support it was Lieber, who was in a sense justified in claiming priority. In fact, it must be added that, by his own explicit admission, he had derived the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg209&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thesis from Niebuhr, whose disciple he considered himself to be,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and, more generally, from the German culture he had absorbed before leaving Prussia at the age of twenty-seven. In the first instance, the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution met with great success in the country where the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; proved most tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are clearly dealing with a rhetorical strategy: the revolutionary movement that claimed to be constructing a new world was branded as antiquated. Yet the strains are obvious. If we analyse the arguments of the various exponents of the liberal tradition, we see that the French Revolution and Jacobinism are variously situated in a line of continuity with classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and monarchical absolutism. The past to which the new is returned and reduced can assume the most diverse forms. Thus, the revolution was criticized with arguments that are difficult to reconcile with one another, and which are even opposed. On the one hand, it was accused of having destroyed the intermediate bodies that predated the advent of the absolute state; on the other, of wanting to preserve or reintroduce bodies, such as trade unions, that pertained to feudal particularism and that tended to take the form of a state within the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of subsequent historical experience, it is difficult to regard the demand for economic and social rights (in our day also ratified by the UN) as pre-modern and, contrariwise, the view, which was not foreign even to de Tocqueville, regarding mass poverty as a datum of nature pertaining to Providence, rather than determinate politico-social relations, as modern. And, still with reference to the French liberal, it is difficult to reconcile condemnation of Jacobinism and socialism as movements situated in the wake of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, with alarmist and apocalyptic denunciation of the ‘new race’ of delirious ideologues and agitators,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who menaced ‘European civilization’, in fact civilization as such, with an unprecedented danger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Individualism’ and the repression of working-class coalitions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg210&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In some instances, the individualist profession of faith played a manifestly repressive role. Together with the phenomenology of power and the restriction of the political sphere we are already familiar with, it operated to justify the proscription of working-class coalitions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mandeville expressed his utter consternation at a new, disturbing phenomenon:&lt;br /&gt;
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I am credibly inform’d that a parcel of Footmen are arriv’d to that height of Insolence as to have enter’d into a Society together, and made Laws by which they oblige themselves not to serve for less than such a Sum, nor carry Burdens or any Bundle or Parcel above a certain Weight, not exceeding Two or Three Pounds, with other Regulations directly opposite to the Interest of those they Serve, and altogether destructive to the Use they were design’d for.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What prompted the ban at this time was simply a refusal of recognition, as emerges from the contempt, in fact the disgust, provoked by the unheard of behaviour among servants. Organizing themselves autonomously, as if they were gentlemen, they pretended to raise themselves to the level of masters or even to usurp their rights (above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). The absence of recognition continued to play a role in Burke. Certainly, in regarding only contracts drawn up outside any ‘collusion or combination’ as valid [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the allusion to and support for the Combination Acts, which banned and penalized working-class coalitions in these years, are transparent—he appealed to the principle of freedom of trade, which did not tolerate impediments of any kind. But it is clear that the wage labourer, unrecognized in his autonomous subjectivity and dignity and degraded to an &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;, was to see himself denied the right of autonomous organization from below.&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith’s position was more tortured. He recognized that what led to the formation of workers’ coalitions was the desperate attempt to counter the de facto coalition whereby suppliers of work lowered wages, and to escape the threat of death from starvation. However, these ‘enlarged monopolies’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg211&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be prevented and repressed in order to assert the rights not only of the market, but also of the individual. It was necessary to ‘allow … every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice’;[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in accordance with ‘the system of natural liberty’, every man must be able to contribute and bring into competition ‘both his industry and his capital’, without any obstacles whatsoever.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case could ‘violations of natural liberty [and justice]’ be tolerated.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In its turn, the Le Chapelier law, which banned workers’ coalitions in France in 1791, was also said to be aimed at defending individual freedom. In the name of ‘alleged common interests’, such coalitions violated the freedom to work possessed by every individual.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And de Tocqueville referred to this law when, after 1848, he condemned the working-class and socialist movement thus: while ‘the revolution has swept away all the obstructions that impeded the liberty of the citizen, that is, corporations and craft associations [&#039;&#039;les maîtrises, les jurandes&#039;&#039;]’, the socialists proposed to reintroduce this junk, albeit ‘in a new form’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps Marx had in mind the liberalism of his time, as well as the French Revolution, when he criticized the Le Chapelier law for having banned ‘working-class associations of any kind’, on the pretext that they represented the ‘re-establishment of the mediaeval guilds’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theme, which stigmatized trade unions as a residue or reminiscence of the Middle Ages and the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, was widely diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century. In England, while Lecky condemned resumption of the ‘guilds’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more vehement: acting as new tyrants and taking the place of monarchical despotism, trade unions suffocated individual autonomy and liberty in every way. It was true that they could also be consenting, but this did not alter the terms of the problem: ‘If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The picture was the same across the Atlantic. Lieber condemned unions in the name of economics and morality alike: they were guilty of encouraging &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg212&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sloth and, ultimately, vice.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Laboulaye demonstrated an attitude of cautious openness,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while Mill continued to be fundamentally hostile. He targeted the ‘moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one’, exercised by the trade-union movement: ‘the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry’ tried to block ‘piecework’ and thus oppressed workers of ‘superior skill or industry’, who sought to earn more. In reality, the consequences of piecework had been described as follows by Smith some decades earlier: the workers subjected to it ‘are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years’; if they listened to ‘the dictates of reason and humanity’, it would be the masters themselves who restricted this type of remuneration. But philanthropic intervention from above was one thing. Quite another was intervention from below by organizations that trampled over individual rights and arbitrarily interfered in what Mill too continued to regard as ‘private concerns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While they sought to impose intervention from above on bourgeois government itself, workers promoted an autonomous movement of transformation from below. However, in the sphere sovereignly declared by it to be ‘private’, the liberal bourgeoisie did not tolerate the intervention of political power, or even that deriving from civil society. Theoretically legalized in England in 1825, following a phase of persecution that even saw culprits condemned to deportation, trade unions continued to be attacked by the judiciary, in as much as they were defined as corporations hampering free enterprise. They acquired full legitimacy in 1871. However, ‘what Gladstone’s government gave with one hand it took away with another.’ If not trade unions as such, it was individual workers who could be dragged before the courts on the basis of a new law: ‘ “Watching and besetting”, that is “picketing” workmen continuing at work during a strike, was made illegal even when done only by a single person.’ This law was repealed by Disraeli in 1875.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In France, the Le Chapelier law was only repealed in 1887. What lay behind full recognition of the legitimacy of workers’ coalitions and organizations was the gigantic struggles that culminated in the Paris Commune. Hence we are beyond 1870, the date that according to Hayek marks the beginning of ‘the decline of the liberal movement’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg213&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself thus is an author who, not by chance, seems to want to call everything back into question. In his view, by destroying ‘the competitive determination of the price’ of labour power, and claiming to interfere in the ‘game’ of the market, trade unions undermined the liberal system at its roots; and it was ‘the clear moral duty of government’ to prevent this happening.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Paris Commune was a watershed in Europe, but not across the Atlantic. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was ‘applied first and most effectively to labour’, which was guilty of combining in trade-union ‘monopolies’ that did not respect individual initiative and freedom. By contrast, so-called yellow-dog contracts were long considered perfectly respectful of the rules of the market and individual liberty: on the basis of them, when hired, workers and employees committed themselves (were forced to commit themselves) not to join any trade-union organization.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The demand for economic and social rights and the transition from paternalistic liberalism to social-Darwinist liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A social-Darwinist streak ran through liberal thought from the start. The arguments used by Joseph Townsend in England in the second half of the eighteenth century against any attempt to introduce legislation in favour of the poor are eloquent: it would only end up destroying the balance of nature, cancelling the ‘peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure’ that was hunger and encouraging the growth of an idle, redundant surplus population. Left to itself, without the artificial interference of law-makers moved by false compassion, nature would restore its own balance, just as occurred on an island inhabited solely by goats and dogs. The struggle for survival selected the strongest, most vital elements, condemning the rest to their fate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the outset, the tendency to naturalize social conflict, and to present the wealth and power of the dominant classes as the expression of an immutable natural law (in this sense Burke referred to a &#039;&#039;‘natural&#039;&#039; aristocracy’ consecrated by ‘Nature’),[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] contained a social-Darwinist element &#039;&#039;avant la lettre&#039;&#039;. We are familiar with Franklin’s criticisms of doctors &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg214&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for their commitment to saving lives ‘not worth saving’. The ‘disease’ such people suffered from was the manifestation of divine anger at ‘Intemperance, Sloth, and other Vices’; and it was fitting that all this met with the ‘punishment’ provided for by nature and Providence.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] God’s higher design must not be hindered, especially if colonial populations were the target. This applied not only to the Indians. The terrible famine that decimated an Irish population already severely tried by the British colonizers’ plundering and oppression in the mid-nineteenth century seemed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan—charged by the London government with following the situation—to be the expression of ‘omniscient Providence’, which thereby solved the problem of overpopulation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the social-Darwinist element was accentuated as the popular classes, shaking off their traditional subalternity, intervened directly on the political scene to assert their rights. In the United States, following the abolition of slavery, paternalism rapidly gave way to an explicitly violent attitude towards blacks, subject to the terror that threatened anyone who dared to challenge white supremacy. Something similar occurred in Europe. Large sections of the dominant class reacted to the new situation achieved by the struggle for recognition by brandishing the law of natural selection, which condemned the unfit to an early death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most conservative sections of the liberal movement responded to the demand for economic and social rights with a radical, uncompromising liberalism. The state must not in any way interfere with the kind of divine judgement, or struggle for existence, to which Spencer had referred before Darwin. The English political and economic liberal condemned any state interference in the economy with the argument that one should not frustrate that cosmic law which required the elimination of the unfit and life’s failures: ‘the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better’. All men were as if subject to a divine judgment: ‘If they are sufficiently complete to live, they &#039;&#039;do&#039;&#039; live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was necessary to respect ‘that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg215&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Distancing himself from attempts to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the popular classes, Lecky observed that, in reality, ‘in not a few cases’, infant mortality was ‘a blessing in disguise’. Indeed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sanitary reform is not wholly a good thing when it enables the diseased and feeble members of the community, who in another stage of society would have died in infancy, to grow up and become parent stocks, transmitting a weakened type or the taint of hereditary disease.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Arguing thus, Lecky aligned himself with eugenics, the new ‘science’ that had made its appearance in England and met with extraordinary success in the United States, where between 1907 and 1915 as many as thirteen states passed legislation for compulsory sterilization. According to the legislation of Indiana (the first state to move in this direction), subject to it were ‘habitual delinquents, idiots, imbeciles and rapists’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like eugenics, Spencer celebrated his greatest triumph in the transatlantic republic.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here William G. Sumner, often regarded as a kind of US Spencer, warned people not to forget the ‘struggle for existence’, as ‘poets and sentimentalists’ liked to.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Socialism’s mistake primarily consisted in its claim ‘to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of “the state”‘.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Anti-statism and Social Darwinism went hand in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Germany Heinrich von Treitschke drew attention to the example of the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine the most delectable common people in the world, that of New York. It is a set of rejects who have merged from all over the whole earth. Yet left to themselves, these corrupted elements are compelled to control themselves. Do you think there is a Prussian police capable of keeping them at bay in the same way that they are held at bay by the harsh law of necessity? All are well aware: nobody takes any notice if someone dies of hunger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg216&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Still in Germany, in August L. von Rochau’s view the United States had the merit of applying the principle that every individual must, in the first instance, know how to help himself, unlike revolutionary, centralist France, which delegated care of individual well-being to the state, transforming the latter into a ‘hospital’ for ‘sickly, deformed people’ (&#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039;). The country across the Atlantic also asserted its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in its foreign policy, taking territory after territory from Mexico or the Indians, the latter a people now doomed to an ‘unstoppable decline’, and thus the equivalent on the international plane of the &#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039; who demanded state aid.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It makes no sense to seek to exclude Treitschke and Rochau from the liberal tradition by looking forward to the Third Reich and presupposing a variety of infernal negative teleology at work in Germany. In reality, both authors, especially the first, viewed England and the United States with sympathy and admiration and, echoing a theme widely diffused in the liberal culture of the time, unstintingly denounced the statist and anti-individualist tradition that revolutionary, socialist and Bonapartist France had inherited from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. In particular, the presence in Treitschke of the influence of Constant and de Tocqueville is immediately obvious. One thinks of his condemnation of the ‘deification of the state’ and the subsequent expansion of the political sphere. From ‘semi-ancient concepts’ and ‘Rousseau’s enthusiasm for the civic sense of the ancients’ derived the ‘omnipotent state power’ constructed by the Jacobins, who were likewise oblivious of the cost of the unanimous participation of citizens in political life: ‘the civic splendour of Athens rested on a vast foundation of slavery’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This inability to understand modern liberty led to tragedy: from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to the revolution, from Napoleon I to Napoleon III, ‘under all the regimes, the state’s excessive activity has remained the hereditary disease of France’, whose ideal was ‘the state’s providential omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can understand why social Darwinism established itself above all in Britain, the United States and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, these were three countries on the crest of a wave of economic development and international influence and prestige. If the first two were able to boast powerful expansion overseas or continentally, the third was already engaged in a frenetic scramble for colonies. We shall see that all three regarded themselves &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg217&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as members of a single family or race which, setting out from Germany, had first crossed the Channel and then the Atlantic. And all three tended to regard Latins (not to mention colonial peoples) as failures, and to attribute their own success to the action of natural selection, which rewarded the best within any individual state, but especially at an international level.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn1a|1]] L’Ouverture, quoted in Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn2a|2]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn3a|3]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 229, 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 230–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn5a|5]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, pp. 154, 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn6a|6]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Étienne Dumont, Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1840, vol. 1, pp. 509–21. The text quoted here was subsequently reprinted with alterations in Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 2, pp. 491ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn7a|7]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 524–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn8a|8]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 104–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn9a|9]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 63–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn10a|10]] Randolph, quoted in ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 568–9, 464.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn12a|12]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn13a|13]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn15a|15]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 165.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn16a|16]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn17a|17]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn19a|19]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn20a|20]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn21a|21]] Ibid., p. 24. On Townsend, cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 800–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn22a|22]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn23a|23]] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, vol. 3, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn24a|24]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 10, pp. 352–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn25a|25]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn26a|26]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn27a|27]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn28a|28]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, pp. 291–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn29a|29]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 3, pt 2, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn31a|31]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn32a|32]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 80–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn33a|33]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 2, p. 727.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn40a|40]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 404.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 750 (speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 27 January 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 92–4, 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 221, 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 2, p. 152 n. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn45a|45]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 241 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 283 (letter to L. von Thun, 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn48a|48]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 309; Étienne Dumont, Introduction to Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn49a|49]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn50a|50]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 240 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn53a|53]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 284.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 101, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn56a|56]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 179–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 November 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 182 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, pp. 155, 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn65a|65]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 79–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §1; ch. 7, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn68a|68]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn69a|69]] Barnarve, quoted in François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, p. 168.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn70a|70]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 316–17, 318–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn71a|71]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;General History of Civilisation in Europe&#039;&#039;, Oxford and London: D. A. Talboys, 1837, pp. 13–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn72a|72]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 12, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 544.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn74a|74]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1 (letter to H. Reeve, 3 February 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn80a|80]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 165, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn81a|81]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 20, p. 350.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn82a|82]] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, &#039;&#039;La giustizia nella rivoluzione e nella Chiesa&#039;&#039;, ed. Mario Albertini, Turin: UTET, 1968, p. 408.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn83a|83]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, p. 334.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn85a|85]] Bentham, quoted in Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn86a|86]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn87a|87]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn88a|88]] Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 85 n. (this is an assertion which, with some variations, can be found in Dupont de Nemours as well as Robespierre).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn89a|89]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn90a|90]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 33, §1 (for Nietzsche); Alain Laurent, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’individualismo&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, p. 66 (for Wilde’s &#039;&#039;The Soul of Man under Socialism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn91a|91]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn92a|92]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn93a|93]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 269, 306–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 121.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn95a|95]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 242 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 3 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn97a|97]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn98a|98]] Palmerston, quoted in Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston&#039;&#039;, ed. Lester Hutchinson, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn99a|99]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 309–28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn100a|100]] Ibid., p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn101a|101]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 197–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn102a|102]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, p. 218; vol. 2, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn103a|103]] Vilfredo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et ideologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1999, pp. 14, 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn104a|104]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 3, pp. 554–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 61, 70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn106a|106]] Wolfgang Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’ und die politische und soziale Revolution in Frankreich und England&#039;&#039;, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, pp. 74, 80–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn107a|107]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 214, 217, 220.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn108a|108]] Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’&#039;&#039;, p. 78.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn109a|109]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn110a|110]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, p. 259 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn111a|111]] Francis Lieber, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty’, &#039;&#039;New Individualist Review&#039;&#039;, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 718–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn112a|112]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 173; Robespierre &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 501–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn113a|113]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 51, 326; on his relations with Berthold Georg Niebuhr, cf. Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Erinnerungen aus meinem Zusammenleben mit Georg Berthold Niebuhr&#039;&#039;, trans. Karl Thibaut, Heidelberg: Winter, 1837.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 337 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 16 May 1858).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 292.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn117a|117]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn118a|118]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., p. 664.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., p. 687.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn121a|121]] Ibid., p. 530.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn122a|122]] The text of the Le Chapelier law is quoted in Jean-Pierre Potier, ‘L’Assemblé constituante et la question de la liberté du travail’, in Jean-Michel Servet, &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn123a|123]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn124a|124]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 31, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn125a|125]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn126a|126]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 512–13, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn127a|127]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn128a|128]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. 25–6, 310.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn129a|129]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 144; Smith, &#039;&#039;Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn130a|130]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn131a|131]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 146; Hayek, &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn133a|133]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 318; Valerie Jean Conner, &#039;&#039;The National War Labor Board&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134a|134]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 36–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135a|135]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136a|136]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 803 (letter to J. Fothergill, 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137a|137]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 5, §10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138a|138]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;Social Statics&#039;&#039;, New York: Appleton, 1877, pp. 414–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 32–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140a|140]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141a|141]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142a|142]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism in American Thought&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. 18–36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143a|143]] William Graham Sumner, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 187, 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144a|144]] Sumner, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145a|145]] Heinrich von Treitschke, &#039;&#039;Politik&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, vol. 2, p. 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146a|146]] Augus Ludwig von Rochau, &#039;&#039;Grundsätze der Realpolitik&#039;&#039;, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 150, 186, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147a|147]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886, pp. 9–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148a|148]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SEVEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg219&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Self-government by white communities and deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Asserting the principle of consent by the governed as a condition of the legitimacy of political power, liberalism galvanized national independence movements. This initially occurred with the American Revolution. And it immediately offered an example. Some years later, it was the French colonists of San Domingo, determined to defend their property in slaves against interference from central power, who entertained projects of independence or adhesion to the North American Union. However, the colonists’ agitation had an utterly unanticipated consequence, in the emergence on the American continent of a new independent state ruled by blacks and which was the first to abolish the institution of slavery. But San Domingo–Haiti was the exception—and an exception that filled the liberal world in its entirety with horror and scandal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The outcome of the war of independence against Spain also induced perplexity and unease. It was crowned with success thanks to the aid of the ex-slaves of San Domingo and, albeit amid bitter conflicts, witnessed the emergence of a new identity stamped by a restoration of pre-Columbian ancestry and a mixing of races. Giving vent to a widespread sentiment, at the start of the Latin American revolution a senator from South Carolina (Robert Y. Hayne) scornfully referred to its leaders as ‘men of color’, who were ‘looking to Hayti … with feelings of the strongest confraternity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They admired the island which, in Jefferson’s view, could serve only as a dumping ground where blacks could &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg220&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be deported and deposited. For the purposes of that operation—i.e. ‘the definitive disappearance of the black race from our borders’—John O’Sullivan, the theorist of ‘manifest destiny’, thought above all of the Latin American continent: ‘The Spanish-Indian-American population of Mexico, Central America and South America, afford the only receptacle capable of absorbing that race … [They are] themselves already of mixed and confused blood’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of Elam Lynds, ‘father of the prison system’ then in force and a prominent US figure, ‘whose practical talents are universally acknowledged’ (the characterization is de Tocqueville’s) ‘the Spanish of South America’ formed ‘a race closer to the ferocious beast and the savage than civilized man’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The category traditionally employed to define Indians was now also applied to the populations that had committed the error of mixing with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While white colonists in the British Commonwealth saw their right to self-government recognized, the Latin American peoples, excluded from the white community and the community of the free strictly defined, became part of the colonial world. This explains the Monroe Doctrine. Reinterpreted and radicalized in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, it conferred an ‘international police power’ on ‘civilized society’ in general, and the United States in particular, in relation to Latin America.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The white colonists of the British Empire encountered no serious difficulty achieving recognition. Having learnt the lesson implicit in the American Revolution, the London government decided to pursue the policy of ‘conciliation’ formerly suggested by Burke in its relationship with peoples ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. Thus, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa first achieved significant autonomy inside the Commonwealth and subsequently attained complete independence. It was a well-founded principle (observed John Stuart Mill in 1861) that, at least in domestic policy, the ‘colonies of European race’ were fully entitled to self-government.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, self-government by the colonists could entail a drastic deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, now subject to the exclusive, unhampered control of their direct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg221&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;oppressors. We are familiar with Smith’s observation about the catastrophic consequences that ‘free’ representative bodies monopolized or controlled by slave-owners could have for black slaves. Several decades later, in 1841, James Stephen, one of the actors in the struggle that had led to the abolition of slavery in British colonies, declared himself in favour of their firm control by the Crown: ‘popular franchises in the hands of a great body of owners of slaves were the worst instruments of tyranny which were ever yet forged for the oppression of mankind’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pertinence of this warning was tragically confirmed by subsequent developments. In 1864, referring to New Zealand, which for some years had been able to count on ‘responsible government’—that is, ultimately, self-government by the white community&#039;&#039;—The Times&#039;&#039; observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lost all imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Australia the extermination of the Aborigines had already begun some time earlier. But in this case too it was the de facto self-government which the colonists succeeded in exercising that pressed on the accelerator, whereas expressing concern in 1830 about the ‘indelible stain’ being imprinted ‘upon the character of the British Government’ was the Colonial Secretary.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, according to the observation made at the start of the twentieth century by an English liberal whose position was highly anomalous—namely, John Hobson—what was occurring was a kind of ‘private slaughter’, carried out by colonists who had wrested self-government or substantial freedom of action.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of South Africa, once the government had defeated the Boer settlers and subjected them to the Empire, it reassured them: ‘Your fate is in your own hands … the good sense of the British people will never tolerate any intermeddling in the purely domestic concerns of the people to whom it has conceded the fullest liberties of government.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Self-government by white &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg222&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;settlers involved the emergence of a racial state, which segregated blacks in a semi-servile condition and remained in place for almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Significantly, this regime took the South of the United States as its model.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There, following a brief interlude (so-called Reconstruction) immediately after the Civil War, when African Americans were genuinely able to enjoy civil and political rights, the reconciliation between the former enemies in 1877 reestablished in the southern states the self-government of whites, who subjected the recently emancipated slaves to a terroristic dictatorship based on the principle of white supremacy. As in South Africa with the compromise between the British and the Boers, in the United States the compromise between central government and the dominant class in the South, which re-acquired the right to self-government, paved the way for the reassertion of ‘master-race democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The abolition of slavery and the development of servile labour&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a question suggests itself. The military defeat of the South was clear and irreversible, but had the principle of the racial delimitation of the community of the free really been overcome? Scorning abolitionism, Calhoun summarized the change that had occurred in Britain’s colonies following the desired emancipation: blacks were ‘forced to labor, not by the authority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This statement dates from 1837. Laws against vagrancy forced the former slaves to work as ‘apprentices’. In what conditions? A year prior to the intervention of the theorist of the slaveholding South, a representative of the British colonial administration, inspired by evangelical sentiments, had observed in a letter to the governor of the island of Mauritius:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than that of slavery itself.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg223&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville would later observe that ‘having nominally abolished slavery, the British have reintroduced it under the rubric of apprenticeship for a certain period of time’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the apprenticeship only lasted a few years, even if much time had to pass before the ex-slaves could shake off the negative discriminations of every kind they continued to suffer. In any event, even before the abolition of slavery in its colonies, Britain was concerned to replace the blacks, importing indentured servants from Africa and Asia. Here we see at work Indian and Chinese coolies in particular. On their arrival in the British colonies, they were settled in the accommodation reserved for slaves. It is true that this involved indentured servants, but in fact many of them did not survive until the expiry of their contract. Even the sexual exploitation of women was not lacking. In the popular art of the time, the coolie was represented in chains, exactly like a slave. Obviously, there was no longer a hereditary transmission of the servile condition; in a sense, there was not even any need for it. British ships could continue to transport coolies from Asia in a voyage that resembled the classic slave trade. Conditions were harsh and the mortality rate high.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the losses could rapidly be made up. A distinguished American historian of the institution of slavery has offered a summary of the golden age of liberalism that is worth quoting:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, as in 1760, non-European compulsory labor was still the labor of choice for rational capitalists who chose to cultivate the vast undeveloped parts of the tropics … The 20 millions who left India alone, mostly as indentured servants, between the 1830s and the 1910s, amounted to twice the number of Africans forcibly landed in the Americas during the four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain in 1840 a political figure of the first importance—Lord John Russell—expressed his unease at the advent of a ‘new system of slavery’. Initially, it met with resistance from the abolitionist movement, which was still fairly strong. However, as a result of the already noted weakness of abolitionism inspired by Christianity, demands for the import from Africa and Asia of indentured servants, who in reality were a more or less compulsory labour force, soon got the upper hand.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg224&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;As well as in British colonies, this new servile labour force also made its appearance in the United States. Around 10,000 coolies imported from China were engaged in building inaccessible railroads, intended to consolidate the conquest of the Far West.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As Engels put it, this was an attempt to replace black slavery with the ‘disguised slavery of Indian and Chinese coolies’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was this confirmation of the thesis maintained by Calhoun of the inseparability of work and slavery? In North America, prior to being overshadowed and then definitively supplanted by more profitable black slavery, Indian slavery had long persisted here and there, even after the Glorious Revolution. In 1767 Sharp, the abolitionist we have already encountered, felt obliged to denounce it. In the case of Virginia it was only in 1808 that the Supreme Court definitively pronounced its illegality.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the American Revolution onwards, the indentured servant or temporary white slave was completely replaced by the black slave, who in turn, after the end of the Civil War, gave way to the coolie from China or India—another temporary slave, even if the skin colour was now yellow. In 1834, the same year as the abolition of slavery in British colonies, the liberal Wakefield acknowledged that ‘yellow slaves’ were beginning to take the place of ‘blacks’, just as the latter had taken over from ‘red’ (Indian) slaves.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, ‘red’ slavery or semi-slavery would have a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century in Texas and California, taken from Mexico (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|§2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, it can reasonably be objected to Calhoun that semi-slavery or slavery for a specified period of time is not the same thing as perpetual and hereditary slavery. But let us note the further development of the argument by the theorist of the slaveholding South. In any ‘wealthy and civilized society’, part of the population ‘live[s] on the labor of the other’. This was a manifestly conflictual relationship: the best way of regulating it was achieved when ‘the labor of the African race is, [as] among us, commanded by the European’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The expansion of Europe in the colonies and the diffusion of ‘master-race democracy’ in Europe&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg225&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Not even Mill had any doubts about the dominion the ‘European race’ was called upon to exercise over the rest of the world. Certainly, he declared for recognition of the right of self-government by the ‘colonies of European race’. But only for them. As for the rest,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear: freedom applied ‘only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’ and could not be demanded by minors or ‘those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No different was the position of Lecky, who at the start of the twentieth century celebrated the glory of the United Kingdom thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing in the history of the world is more wonderful than that under the flag of these two little islands there should have grown up the greatest and most beneficent despotism in the world, comprising nearly two hundred and thirty millions of inhabitants under direct British rule, and more than fifty millions under British protectorates …[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘despotism’ theorized here was certainly synonymous with slavery from the standpoint of Locke and the protagonists of the American Revolution, all the more so in that it seemed to know no limits. In Mill’s view, ‘a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Political ‘slavery’ could not be equated with slavery in the strict sense. Yet Mill went further. He demanded the barbarians’ ‘obedience’ for the purposes of their education for ‘continuous &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg226&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;labour’, which was the foundation of civilization. And, in this context, he did not hesitate to theorize a transitional phase of ‘slavery’ for ‘uncivilized races’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The point was forcefully reiterated: there were ‘savage tribes so averse from regular industry, that industrial life is scarcely able to introduce itself among them until they are … conquered and made slaves of’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the slave had no cause for complaint; he was ‘one step in advance of a savage’, and thanks to the conditions imposed on him had already achieved a certain progress. We are put in mind of Calhoun and the slaveholding South, all the more so when Mill refers to &#039;&#039;‘born&#039;&#039; slaves’ recalcitrant to work and discipline.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, despite his employment of the expression just noted, the English liberal envisaged a temporary slavery. This would in fact seem to hang over ‘the great majority of the human race’, which unfortunately was ‘in a savage or semi-savage state’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the condition dictating slavery. While, on the one hand, Mill sided decisively with the Union during the Civil War, on the other, he legitimized the practice of forced labour imposed by colonial powers on subject populations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the coin of this opposition between civilized, adult England and savage races of minors was the process whereby the barrier separating servants from masters in the metropolis tended to lose its caste rigidity. The attitude adopted in the mid-nineteenth century by Disraeli, champion of the colonial expansion of ‘superior’ races and major theorist of race as the ‘key to history’ (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|§10]]), was significant. He denied that it was possible to speak of the existence in England of ‘two nations’—‘the rich and the poor’—as the Chartists claimed. On the basis of his assertion of the unity that now characterized the ‘privileged, prosperous English people’, Disraeli promoted the Second Reform Act, which extended political rights to significant sections of the popular masses.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Class differences within the white community remained, but were being reduced even at a social level. The exploitation of Chinese coolies and other more or less servile labour forces created the possibility of ‘raising to the position of “independent gentlemen”‘, if not ‘whole white populations of the West’, as Hobson maintained,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] then at least a significant proportion of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg227&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The decisive barrier now lay elsewhere. The three ‘castes’ had become two—in the United States thanks to the abolition of slavery, and in Europe thanks to the reduction of differences within the white community, which was tending to develop more egalitarian internal relations than in the past, similar to those of the white community across the Atlantic. In this sense, ‘master-race democracy’ now characterized the overall relations between the West and the colonial world, whether internal or external.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Hobson could denounce the extreme expansion of ‘the area of British despotism’. The London government resorted to ‘distinctively autocratic methods’ in its relations with an enormous number of human beings:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of the three hundred and sixty-seven millions of British subjects outside these isles, not more than eleven millions, or one in thirty-four, have any real self-government for purposes of legislation and administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political freedom, and civil freedom, so far as it rests upon the other, are simply non-existent for the overwhelming majority of British subjects.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Essentially, this was the same analysis as Mill’s (and Lecky’s), with the difference that ‘despotism’ now had a negative connotation. Suffering it (stressed Hobson) were populations coerced into forced labour. And here too we have a convergence with Mill as regards factual analysis, but a sharp contrast when it comes to value judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. De Tocqueville, Western supremacy and the danger of ‘miscegenation’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The model of ‘master-race democracy’ also had a clear influence on de Tocqueville. It is true that during the July Monarchy he stood for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. But how were the ex-slaves to be treated once they had been emancipated? It was necessary ‘to prevent the negroes of our colonies imitating those of the English colonies and, like them, abandoning the major industries to retire to a piece of fertile soil, which has been bought cheaply or grabbed’. Hence emancipated slaves could be permitted to choose their ‘master’, but not to ‘remain idle or to work exclusively for themselves’. That could not be tolerated:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg228&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In temporarily banning negroes from owning land, what are we doing? We are artificially placing them in the position in which the European labourer naturally finds himself. This is certainly not tyranny and the man this obstacle is imposed on when he escapes slavery would not seem to have any right to complain.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the measure suggested here was the one historically implemented in the colonies, making it possible to transform slavery proper into a semi-servile labour relationship. In any event, in addition to their political rights, notionally emancipated blacks were thus also deprived of civil rights, by its ‘artificially’ being made impossible for them to own a piece of land and freely choose their occupation. While he condemned legal regulation of working hours as ‘despotism’, de Tocqueville had nothing against the creation from above of a caste of wage-labour denied any possibility of social mobility. When he referred to workers from India or other parts of the world, called on by England to replace the emancipated black slaves, the French liberal also made indirect mention of the coolies.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, however, he ventured no critical remarks about a labour relationship construed even by influential representatives of the liberal world as a recreation of the institution of slavery in a different form. As in Mill, so in Tocqueville, the supremacy pertaining to Europeans was not only political, but also had direct consequences economically and socially. In any event, the gulf separating dominant and dominated was unbridgeable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European race has received from heaven, or acquired by its own efforts, such incontestable superiority over the other races which compose the great human family that the man placed by us, on account of his vices and ignorance, on the bottom rung of the social scale is still first among the savages.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was fitting that such colossally different races continued to remain clearly distinct. De Tocqueville referred with horror to the behaviour of some prisoners deported to Australia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The condemned have fled in large numbers into the woods. There they have formed companies of looters; they have allied with the savages, married their children and partially adopted their customs. Out of this crossbreeding, a race of half-castes has been born that is more barbarous than the Europeans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg229&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but more civilized than the savages, and whose hostility has constantly disturbed the colony and sometimes caused it to run the greatest dangers. [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This denunciation of miscegenation, which imperilled European or white supremacy, is a theme that takes us back to the United States and, above all, to the ideology that continued to inspire the South even after the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The ‘empty cradle’ and the ‘destiny’ of the Indians&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others ‘master-race democracy’, which was now on the point of becoming established on a planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. Leading the Union’s war against the secessionist states and promoting the abolition of slavery was a figure (Lincoln) who, like Jefferson before him, toyed with the idea of deporting the blacks to Africa or Latin America, and who was a veteran of the wars against the Indians, against ‘men, women, and children … mercilessly cut to pieces’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1871 General Francis C. Walker, commissioner for Indian affairs, proposed to treat ‘wild men’ no differently from ‘wild beasts’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison we have already encountered in Washington, and which presided over the substantial erasure of the Indians (and the natives of Australia and New Zealand) from the face of the earth, thus makes its reappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A genealogical myth derived from the Old Testament was called upon to legitimize these genocidal practices. A major modern historian, Arnold Toynbee, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated. Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent … [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg230&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This genealogical myth, which presided over the expropriation, deportation and decimation of the Irish and the Indians, was explicitly present in Lieber: ‘[God] has given [this great country] to us, as much as He gave Palestine to the Jews’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention was made of the Indians, even if they seem to be implicitly compared to the populations that occupied the Promised Land without authorization prior to the arrival of the chosen people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; seems to support this deadly genealogical myth. De Tocqueville underlined the religious fervour of New England’s founders, who regarded themselves as descendants from ‘Abraham’s stock’. In the writings and documents left behind by them, one sensed ‘the very savor of Gospel antiquity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was an aroma that in a way ended up turning the head of the French liberal himself. He uncritically adopted and subscribed to the description Nathaniel Morton, one of the colony’s founders and first leaders, gave of the Pilgrim Fathers’ arrival in America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men? [A]nd what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not … the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, as in the Old Testament description of the unauthorized inhabitants of Canaan, those destined to be subjugated or wiped out by the chosen people—or, as de Tocqueville characterized it, ‘the germ of a great nation wafted by Providence to a predestined shore’—are completely confounded with nature.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This providential design is all the more clear because, ultimately, it involved a desert. It is a theme &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; returns to repeatedly: the Indian ‘has nothing to oppose to our perfection in the arts but the resources of the wilderness’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One phrase is especially significant: ‘the Indians were the sole inhabitants of the wilds whence they have since been expelled’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The desert ceased to be such, becoming a place inhabited by humans, only with the entry of the Europeans and the flight or deportation of the indigenous population. As we know, Locke and Montesquieu preferred to speak of ‘virgin &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg231&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;forests’. But even though the two metaphors are different, their meaning is identical: we are dealing with places where there is no human trace, an area that is (as Locke put it) ‘vacant’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When subsequently forced to register the presence of the Indians, de Tocqueville hastened to stress that they had no right to the land occupied by them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the vast country that I have been describing was inhabited by many indigenous tribes, it may justly be said, at the time of its discovery by Europeans, to have formed one great desert. The Indians occupied without possessing it. It is by agricultural labor that man appropriates the soil, and the early inhabitants of North America lived by the produce of the chase.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For Locke already, the sole possible foundation of property right was labour, of which a people dedicated exclusively to hunting were incapable. But an explicitly theological justification was added by de Tocqueville to seal the fate of the Indians:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; those wide and deep rivers; that inexhaustible valley of the Mississippi; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, de Tocqueville ended up legitimizing the policy of deportation implemented by Jackson, president of the transatlantic republic when the French liberal visited it. The argument of the ‘empty cradle’ was widespread in the US culture of the time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a ‘freethinker’ aligned with the liberals and a writer and intellectual who enjoyed undisputed prestige in Boston,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] had no doubts in interpreting God’s will. Only pending the arrival of a superior stock had the Indians been placed on American soil. Thereafter &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg232&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they were clearly marked out for ‘destruction’ or ‘extermination’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Franklin had not argued very differently, when he attributed to a providential design the devastating effect of alcohol on a population destined to be wiped off the face of the earth (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was more pained. He did not shut his eyes to the horrors that were occurring. Yet, however distressing, the tragedy of the Indians expressed both the progress of civilization and a providential design. In any event, it was ineluctable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their implacable prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction. The ruin of these tribes began from the day when Europeans landed on their shores; it has proceeded ever since, and we are now witnessing its completion.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
True, de Tocqueville expressed unease at the ‘cold egotism’, ‘utter insensitivity’ and ‘ruthless sentiment’ with which the white population of the United States, so attached to its morality and Christianity, viewed the fate of the Indians. Yet the French liberal’s description of the ‘savages’, more than ever recalcitrant to ‘civilization’, certainly did not conduce to the cause of their salvation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a general rule, their mouth was disproportionately large and their facial expression ignoble and wicked … Their physiognomy exhibited that deep depravity which can only derive from a long abuse of civilization, and yet they were still savages. Mixed with the vices they have adopted from us is something barbaric and uncivilized, making them a hundred times more repugnant … Their movements were rapid and uncoordinated, their voice shrill and tuneless, their glance worried and savage. On first contact, one would be tempted to regard them as nothing but a beast of the forest on which education has been able to confer a semblance of humanity, but which has nevertheless remained an animal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We can now understand the question de Tocqueville posed to his US interlocutors: ‘Do the Indians have an idea that sooner or later their race will be destroyed by ours?’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg233&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The Indians’ deportation and decimation made explicit the fact that the North American territory was an ‘empty cradle’, awaiting the white settler committed from the time of his arrival to ‘struggl[ing] against the obstacles that nature opposes to him’, against ‘the wilderness and savage life’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, what ends up emerging is the process of de-humanization of the natives, reduced, even more than to barbarism, to inanimate nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. De Tocqueville, Algeria and ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In de Tocqueville the American model asserted itself with particular clarity when he confronted the problem of Algeria. The letter sent to Francis Lieber on 22 July 1846 is revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time I am very concerned about our affairs in Africa, which assume greater importance with every passing day. For us &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; has become, and will remain, the secondary aspect as long we do not have quarrels in Europe. The principal aspect today is colonization, is how to attract a major &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; population of cultivators to Algeria and, above all, keep them there. We already have 100,000 &#039;&#039;Christians&#039;&#039; in Africa, not counting the army. But they have almost all settled in the towns, which are becoming large, beautiful cities, while the countryside remains a &#039;&#039;desert&#039;&#039;. It is impossible to consider colonization in Africa without thinking of the great examples furnished by the United States in this field. But how to study them? Have books or documents of any kind been published in the United States that can enlighten us on this point and tell us how things unfolded? Can this information be found in official or other kinds of reports? Anything you could provide in this connection would be received with great gratitude.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
I have highlighted four phrases in italics. Let us begin with the last of them. Like the lands inhabited or, rather, occupied without authorization by the Indians, Algeria was a desert prior to the arrival of the French or ‘Christians’. A sort of Biblical aroma begins to make itself felt in connection with the landing in North Africa of a civilized people, who likewise seem invested with a providential mission. It was a people at once European and Christian: the colonial war tended to assume a religious character. Certainly, expelling the Algerians &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg234&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from their ‘desert’ was an operation that met with fierce resistance, but de Tocqueville was careful in this instance not to speak of ‘war’. That was a category which could only be applied to armed conflicts in Europe and between civilized peoples. It somehow implied recognition of the enemy, which was something denied Arabs and Indians alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precisely because of this lack of recognition, the campaign of colonial conquest could resort to pitiless violence that did not spare the civilian population. On account of their brutal, indiscriminate character, the methods used to subjugate Algeria ended up eliciting reservations and disquiet in France. De Tocqueville was not among the ‘excellent philanthropists’ about whom Bugeaud, the general in charge of military operations,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ironized:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often heard in France men whom I respect, but do not support, consider it reprehensible that crops are burned, silos emptied, and lastly that unarmed men, women and children are seized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For me, this is a regrettable necessity, but one to which any people that wants to make war on the Arabs will have to submit.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
According to de Tocqueville, the head of military operations in Algeria had the merit of having understood all this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is the first who has known how to apply ubiquitously and simultaneously the kind of war which, in my view as in his, is the only kind of war that is feasible in Africa. He has pursued this system of war with incomparable energy and vigour.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This was a ‘new science’ that must be taken to heart.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In order to starve them, and confront them with the clear alternative of capitulation or death from starvation, Arabs who insisted on resisting must be deprived not only of their harvest, but also of the possibility of trading with neighbours: ‘They suffer greatly from being parked between our bayonets and the desert’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we are explicitly referred to the American model; this is how ‘the most barbaric Indian tribes’ were disciplined: ‘the tribe from which a robbery or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg235&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;murder has been committed’ was subjected to collective punishment, which excluded it from the trade with Europeans absolutely vital to it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the rebel Arabs must by all means be prevented from the possibility of combining or settling anywhere:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the passionate taste they display for a nomadic existence, they need settlements. It is of the utmost importance to prevent them being able to establish a single one. All expeditions whose aim is to occupy or destroy existing towns and emerging towns seem to me useful.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville had no hesitation in issuing a radical watchword:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To destroy anything that resembles a permanent gathering of population or, in other words, a town: I believe it is of the utmost importance not to allow any town to survive, or arise, in the regions controlled by Abd el-Kader [the leader of the resistance].[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the modality of the war. But what results was it intended to achieve? We know the model that inspired de Tocqueville. In May 1841, while visiting Philippeville, founded on land acquired at a derisory price from the indigenous inhabitants, he was pleased by the ‘American aspect of the city’, which was rapidly expanding.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expropriation and colonization were proceeding apace. Once the process had been completed, what kind of society should be built? What relations might be developed between the Arabs and the French? De Tocqueville was in no doubt:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fusion of these two peoples is a chimera that can be dreamt of only when one has not been on the spot. Hence it is possible and necessary that there be two clearly distinct sets of laws in Africa, because we are faced with two clearly separate societies. When one is dealing with Europeans, &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; nothing prevents us from treating them as if they were alone; the laws enacted for them must always be applied exclusively to them.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg236&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to scrupulous protection of the invaders’ civil liberties was a terroristic law of suspects directed at the indigenous population. During his visit to Philippeville, the French liberal was invited to lunch by a colonel in the occupying army, who painted an eloquent picture of the situation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir, only force and terror work with these people … The other day, a murder was committed in the street. An Arab was brought before me who was a suspect. I interrogated him and then had him beheaded. You will see his head on the gate of Constantine.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville seems to have betrayed no emotion. He repeated the idea of two sets of laws. As regards criminal trials of ‘natives’, ‘if it is thought that our forms are too slow (which I do not think), war tribunals could be set up for them’. And even for ‘civil trials’, the ‘emergency procedure’ already in force could be retained.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs must also be discriminated against economically, as well as legally: ‘Allow free entry into France of all produce from Algeria, especially that derived not from native industry but colonial industry’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only on these conditions would French settlers in North Africa genuinely be able to develop on the American model:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no easy thing to instil in Europeans the desire to abandon their country, because they are happy there and enjoy certain rights and certain goods that are dear to them. It is even more difficult to attract them to a country where from the outset they encounter a torrid, unhealthy climate and a formidable enemy, who incessantly hangs around you to take your property or your life. To get inhabitants to come to such a country, it is first of all necessary to give them great opportunities to make their fortune; in the second place, they must find social conditions that conform to their habits and tastes.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen de Tocqueville celebrate the unprecedented zone of liberty enjoyed by the individual in the United States (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]). But now something similar is to be found in the African space conquered by France: ‘The colonies of all the European peoples afford the same spectacle. Rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg237&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;than being smaller, the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the mother country. His freedom of action is less restricted’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, the other side of the coin was a drastic deterioration in the condition of the Arabs. De Tocqueville did not hide the fact: ‘We have decimated the population’ and the survivors were being exterminated by the starvation caused by the methods of war we have noted; ‘at this moment Abd el-Kader is &#039;&#039;literally&#039;&#039; dying of hunger’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It had to be admitted that ‘we have made Muslim society much more miserable, disorganised, ignorant and barbarous than it was before it knew us’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So what was to be done? The French liberal distanced himself from the attitude of not a few officers and soldiers of the French army: in their view, ‘the Arabs are like noxious beasts’ and ‘the death of each and every one of them seems a good thing’. No, ‘it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable to want to snuff out or exterminate the natives’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a second, de Tocqueville lets slip an admission: ‘At this time we are making war in much more barbarous fashion than the Arabs themselves. Currently, civilization is to be found on their side.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Immediately afterwards, however, we find the declaration we have already noted: there was no room for humanitarian scruples in a colonial war that directly targeted the civilian populations, who were denied means of subsistence and the possibility of combining. Or: ‘Once we have committed the major violence of the conquest, I believe we must not shrink from the minor forms of violence absolutely required to consolidate it.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the conquest had been completed, it was necessary to promote self-government by civil society (French and white). It was called on to free itself altogether of military control, which must continue to be deployed with the requisite firmness over the Arabs. The conflict across the Atlantic, which during the War of Independence against Britain and in subsequent decades saw local self-government reject any interference by central political power—be it in London or Washington—in the colonists’ expansion or slave-owners’ enjoyment of their legitimate property, also manifested itself in Algeria. On one side were the colonists, who demanded complete freedom of action and expropriation, and on the other the political and military authorities, called upon to administer a ruthless colonial conquest with a minimum of prudence. How &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg238&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;many colonists could Africa absorb and how far could the process of expropriation of the indigenous population be pushed? De Tocqueville criticized hesitations and doubts: ‘It is not correct to say that the introduction of European farmers is a measure whose implementation is impractical’, or feasible only to a limited extent. At issue was a territory over which ‘the indigenous population is fairly scarce or fairly dispersed’. In any event, ‘the common property of the tribe is not founded on any title’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The colonel encountered by de Tocqueville, who did not hesitate to have Arabs decapitated on the basis of mere suspicion, on the other hand expressed his contempt for the colonists, a ‘mass of scoundrels’ and ‘thieves’, for whom the army was nothing more than a tool for accumulating a ‘fortune’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The date is 30 May 1841. The previous year, Bugeaud had set out his policy to the Chamber of Deputies: ‘Wherever there is clean water and fertile soil, it is necessary to settle colonists, without worrying about whom the land belongs to. It must be distributed to them so that it is enjoyed as rightful property’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, in the previously cited article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039; on 25 December 1843, he observed that, although conducting the merciless war dictated by circumstances, his army demonstrated generosity towards the Arab who finally decided to surrender: ‘We return to him all his world and sometimes part of his herd’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This attitude seems to have prompted reservations in de Tocqueville, judging at any rate from his intervention in the Chamber in June 1846:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some localities, rather than reserving the most fertile land, the best irrigated and most adapted for government property for Europeans, we have given it to the natives … After betrayals and rebellions, the natives have often been received by us with singular magnanimity. There are some who, having indulged in soaking their hands in our blood, have had their goods, their honour and their power restored to them, thanks to our generosity. There is more. In many places where the civilized European population is mixed with the indigenous population, there are not unfounded complaints that in general it is the native who is better protected, while the European obtains justice with greater difficulty.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg239&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a letter from the same period, de Tocqueville even ended up ironizing about ‘the tenderness towards the Arabs that came over Monsieur Bugeaud at the point when he saw in it a powerful means of blocking the development of civilized colonization’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We seem to hear once again the laments and protests of the American colonists against the London government, or of the southern planters of the United States against the threat of interference by federal government. And, in fact, de Tocqueville elaborated on his indictment of the political and military authorities. At issue was not only the assignment of land:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lavished honorific distinctions on the Arab, which are intended to indicate the merit of our citizens … One is led to conclude that our government in Africa is taking softness towards the vanquished so far as to forget its conquering position … It is neither useful nor obligatory for us to permit exaggerated ideas of their own importance in our Muslim subjects, and not even to persuade them that we are obliged in any circumstances to treat them as if they were our co-citizens and equals. They know that we have a dominant position in Africa and they expect us to retain it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of human equality could not be extended to embrace ‘semi-civilized peoples’ located outside the West: it was absolutely vital to avoid occasioning ‘astonishment and confusion in their spirits, filling them with erroneous and dangerous ideas’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case was it permissible to lose sight of the objective of building a society based on the legally sanctioned domination of French, Christian and European colonists. The attainment of this objective was now close at hand: ‘The Arab element is ever more isolated and little by little is dissolving. The Muslim population is tending to decline relentlessly, while the Christian population is growing relentlessly’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed: ‘Our weapons have decimated some tribes … On the other hand, our cultivators willingly use native manpower. The European needs the Arab to make the most of his land; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high wage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville had not lost sight of the American model. The Algerians were part Indians, forced to suffer expropriation, and part blacks. In the latter guise, Arabs could not claim to enjoy the rights of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg240&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;citizenship either on a civil level or, still less, politically. Without being slaves, now deprived of land they could earn a living only by supplying ‘manpower’ to the new property-owners. The society hoped for here was not very different from the one that would be realized in the southern United States after the Civil War. In Algeria, French and Western supremacy took the place of ‘white supremacy’. For the rest, there continued to exist two sets of laws, separated by a racial barrier, and the prejudice, on a more or less accentuated racial basis, called upon to justify these relations. Already at the beginning of the conquest, writing to de Tocqueville, Kergolay (his cousin and a life-long friend) had spoken of the Arabs as an ‘infamous, despicable race’, to be kept under constant control ‘by force combined with simple, uncomplicated equity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The recipient of this letter seems not to have seen things very differently. After a notable interval of time, we find him using, in slightly different form, some of the expressions we have just noted: ‘semi-civilized peoples’ were only capable of understanding the discourse of ‘correct but strict justice’; hence France should beware of indulging in ‘magnanimity and leniency’—virtues that would be incomprehensible and, worse, might produce dangerous results.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, writing precisely to Kergolay, de Tocqueville denounced the ‘greed’ and ‘fanaticism’ of the Arabs,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who, by his own admission, were suffering the systematic expropriation carried out by occupying forces inclined to regard their enemies as ‘noxious beasts’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To complete this picture, it is appropriate to mention a final detail. There was a moment in 1833 when the French liberal thought of settling as a colonist in Algeria.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Identification with the regime of white or Western supremacy, or ‘master-race democracy’, seems to have been total.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn1a|1]] Hayne, quoted in Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn2a|2]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn3a|3]] Lynds, quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn4a|4]] Roosevelt, quoted in Jean-Pierre Martin and Daniel Royot, &#039;&#039;Histoire et civilisation des États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn5a|5]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn6a|6]] Stephen, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn7a|7]] Quoted in Henri Grimal, &#039;&#039;De l’Empire britannique au Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, Paris: Colin, 1999, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn8a|8]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 420.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn9a|9]] J. A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn10a|10]] Chamberlain, quoted in Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn12a|12]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lene, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn13a|13]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn14a|14]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 92, 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn15a|15]] Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 176–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn16a|16]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn17a|17]] Cf. Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. vii; Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn18a|18]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 246.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn19a|19]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 4, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn20a|20]] Almon Wheeler Lauber, &#039;&#039;Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States&#039;&#039;, Williamstown (MA): Corner House, 1979, pp. 306–7, 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn21a|21]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 473ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn22a|22]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn23a|23]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn24a|24]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn25a|25]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn28a|28]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn30a|30]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn31a|31]] Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., pp. 124, 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn33a|33]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 103, 105.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 271–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn37a|37]] Nevins and Commager, &#039;&#039;America&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn38a|38]] Walker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn39a|39]] A. J. Toynbee, &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 211–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn40a|40]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 317.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn41a|41]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 25, 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 335.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn45a|45]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 337.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn46a|46]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn47a|47]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn49a|49]] Vernon L. Parrington, &#039;&#039;Main Currents in American Thought&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn50a|50]] Thomas F. Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 243.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn51a|51]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn52a|52]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 73–6, 223–5; cf. pp. 343–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn53a|53]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 434.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54a|54]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (letter to Francis Lieber, 22 July 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55a|55]] In an article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039;, 25 December 1843: ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 226–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 316.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 280.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 323.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72a|72]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 226.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74a|74]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 304 (unpublished letter to C. L. L. J. de Lamorcière, 5 April 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 380–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77a|77]] Bugeaud, quoted in Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi and André Prenant, &#039;&#039;L’Algérie, passé et présent&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1960, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78a|78]] Bugeaud, quoted in Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80a|80]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 220 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2, 324.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84a|84]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 1, pp. 193, 199 (letters of 22 June and 8 July 1830).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86a|86]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87a|87]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 2, p. 86 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 23 May 1841).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88a|88]] Cf. Jean-Jacques Chevallier and André Jardin, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER EIGHT ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Return to the question: What is liberalism? The well-born, the free and the liberals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having briefly reconstructed periods in the history of liberalism and the concrete politico-social relationships developed in its name, we must now return to our opening question. Use of the term ‘liberal’ is usually dated to the political struggles that developed in Spain in the wake of the 1812 revolution and the opposition that emerged between ‘liberals’, engaged in defending the constitution, and their opponents, whom they branded ‘servile’. Only now was the adjective transformed into a substantive. In fact, in revolutionary America the author of an article opposed to the institution of slavery had already signed himself ‘A Liberal’ (see [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|§10]]). But that is not the key point. When we come across a text from 1818 in which Constant sets out and supports the programme of the ‘liberal party’, it can be said that we are dealing with an adjective.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The political meaning of the term is clear; and implicit in it is the transition to the noun employed to define members of the party in question. On the other hand, there is not much difference between this stance in favour of the ‘liberal party’ and the stance in favour of the ‘liberal political system’ that we have seen make its appearance in a text by Washington as early as 1783. Hence the real problem is to identify the moment when, partly inheriting and partly transforming the meaning bequeathed by a long tradition, the term ‘liberal’ began to assume its modern political meaning. This was the precondition for the transition from the adjective to the substantive.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg242&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a semantic event that cannot be uncoupled from the actual history of the liberal movement and liberal revolutions. We can start with the Glorious Revolution. Arguing against Robert Filmer, defender of the thesis that the Almighty had conferred exclusive ownership of, and dominion over, the earth to Adam, the first absolute monarch, Locke objected that God had bestowed his blessings ‘with a liberal hand’. The hypothetical absolute property-owner or monarch who, rather than displaying ‘liberal allowance’, sought to exploit the needy situation of all other men in order to reduce them to ‘hard service’ or even the condition of a ‘vassal’, would be acting no differently from the bandit who threatened a man with death in order to reduce him to ‘slavery’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, ‘liberal’ is synonymous with generous here. However, God’s liberal generosity is in contradiction with the political slavery that Filmer would like to impose on all men. The, as it were, constitutional and liberal God presupposed here refutes the claims of absolute monarchy. The vile, miserable condition of the ‘vassal’, of the individual subjected to ‘hard service’, of the servant or ‘slave’, was incompatible with the mode of being and feeling, in the first instance, of an Englishman and ‘gentleman’, who scornfully rejected the servile view that ‘we are all born slaves’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Hume on the one hand used the term ‘liberal’ synonymously with ‘disinterested’ and ‘generous’, and on the other criticized as ‘illiberal’ the popular agitation and plebeian riots that characterized the first English revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Smith distinguished in the moral field between the ‘liberal’ view peculiar to the well-off classes, restive at overly rigid bans on ‘luxury’ and the other pleasures of life, and the ‘strict or austere’ view peculiar to poorer classes, who by force of circumstance could not indulge in ‘thoughtlessness and dissipation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the context of the ‘liberal’/‘servile’ opposition that was crystallizing, the ‘liberal’ attitude was defined by antithesis either to the absolute power of the monarch or the servile or even merely plebeian condition. The liberal/illiberal dichotomy referred to a difference and conflict between two world-views, but also between two social conditions. In the course of the American Revolution, adopting a position in favour of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Burke deplored the restrictions on individual liberty introduced in Britain on account of the war, and regretted the fact that ‘the liberal government of this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg243&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and vassals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the liberal profession of faith criticized the unwarranted expansion of the Crown’s power, on the one hand, and distanced itself from the subaltern classes, subjected to work and hence servile, on the other. We can now understand the British Whig’s scorn for those who, in the name of a so-called ‘indiscriminate’ freedom, wished to appeal to the servile hands of slaves or emancipated slaves to suppress the revolt of colonists who, precisely as slaveowners, nurtured with particular sincerity the love of liberty that must dwell in any non-servile soul. And we can also understand why as early as 1790, on account of the restructuring of the nobility’s political influence, the ‘liberty’ of the French seemed to the British statesman to be contaminated with ‘coarseness and vulgarity’: it ‘is not liberal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Opposed to anything vulgar and plebeian, ‘liberal’ tended to be synonymous with aristocratic. In fact, among Virginia’s slave-owners the ‘aristocratic spirit’ was intimately bound up with ‘a spirit of liberty’ distinguished by its ‘more noble and liberal’ character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While paying homage to the ‘liberal government of this free nation’, Burke declared himself a member of the ‘aristocratick Party’—the party ‘connected with the solid, permanent long possessed property of the Country’—and felt committed to fighting with all his energy for ‘aristocratick principles, and the aristocratick Interests connected with them’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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During the American Revolution, along with the celebration of the ‘liberal political system’ we have already noted, we find in Washington a celebration of patrons of the ‘liberal arts’, contrasted with ‘mechanics’, with immigrants of a modest social condition from Europe.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But particularly illuminating is the discourse of John Adams. For a well-ordered liberty to be achieved, it could not be ‘mechanics’ and the ‘common people’, ‘without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences’, who exercised power. Instead, it must be those who had ‘received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences’; and they were the ‘well-born and wealthy’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg244&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In France, too, the liberal party, which was in the process of being formed, defined itself during the polemic against the absolute monarchy but also, and possibly above all, against the popular masses and their vulgarity. Attention was turned to the Third Estate, to those circles where ‘a sort of affluence allows men to receive a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was Sieyès, who subsequently played an important role on the occasion of the 18th Brumaire in 1799. Sealing the coup d’état was the ‘proclamation of general-in-chief Bonaparte’, who announced the ‘disbandment of factions’—i.e. of popular and plebeian agitation—and the triumph of ‘conservative, tutelary, liberal ideas’ (&#039;&#039;idées conservatrices, tutélaires, libérales&#039;&#039;). This language was not the invention of a general, however brilliant: he enjoyed the support of the liberal circles of the time. The adjectival usage just noted refers to them. Constant, who later (as we know) declared himself a member of the ‘liberal party’, had already been recommended by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1797 as a man ‘passionate about liberty’ and as an ‘unshakeable, liberal republican’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The following year, Constant had underlined the Directory’s merit in having ‘proclaimed its unshakeable attachment to the conservative system’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, shortly after the coup d’état, he paid homage to ‘France’s tutelary genius which, from 9 Thermidor, has rescued it from so many dangers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ in Burke, ‘liberal’ was now synonymous with ‘conservative’ (and tutelary). For Constant (as for Madame de Staël), the cause of liberalism found expression in ‘respectable people’ (&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;),[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or (as Necker made clear in a letter to his daughter) well-off, ‘decent people’ (&#039;&#039;gens de bien:&#039;&#039; see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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As in England and America, so too in France it was the property-owning classes, proud of their non-servile condition and spirit, who tended to define themselves as liberals. This is further confirmed, even after the mid-nineteenth century, by de Tocqueville’s stance. Those genuinely capable of defending the cause of liberty against Louis Bonaparte’s ‘illiberal’ government were not ‘the people strictly speaking, with their incomplete education’, but the ‘property-owners’, the ‘bourgeoisie’, the ‘men of culture’—‘in a word, all those who have received a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg245&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Under the spur also of popular struggles, the liberal/servile dichotomy gradually tended to lose its class connotation and came to refer exclusively to political ideologies. But at moments of acute struggle the original meaning re-emerged with all its discriminatory charge. For de Tocqueville, as we shall see, anyone who wanted to endow the ideal of liberty with a social content was ‘made for serving’!&lt;br /&gt;
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Bitter conflicts could, and did, develop within the property-owning classes. Debating with Burke, who suspected wealth not rooted in the mother country’s land and soil of lacking in patriotism and even of subversive tendencies, Mackintosh declared that ‘[t]he commercial, or monied interest, has … been less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent, than the landed gentry.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in France, Sieyès saw ‘liberal education’ embodied in the Third Estate, and certainly not in an aristocracy used to pursuing ‘the favour of servitude’ at court.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Invitations not to discriminate, and create conflicts, between the different types of property were more frequent. In the view of the anti-Jacobin Jean-Joseph Mounier, in addition to the United States, the country that had diffused ‘in the France the idea of liberty’ was England, construed in fact as the country where ‘a liberal education without genealogical tests confers the quality of gentleman’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear that the term ‘liberal’ was generated by a proud self-consciousness, which had a simultaneously political, social and even ethnic connotation. We are dealing with a movement and party that intended to rally persons furnished with a ‘liberal education’ and genuinely free, or people who had the privilege of being free, the ‘chosen race’ (as Burke put it), the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of liberty circulates’. All this is not surprising. As has been made clear by distinguished scholars of the Indo-European languages, ‘freemen’ is a ‘collective notion’—a sign of distinction that applies to the ‘well-born’ and them alone. For this very reason, outside the community of the free and the well-born, not only was service or slavery not excluded, it was even presupposed. In Cicero’s view, at the head of the &#039;&#039;liberi populi&#039;&#039; was Rome, which engaged in the mass enslavement of defeated peoples considered unworthy of freedom.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in eighteenth-century liberal England what became a popular song (‘Rule Britannia’) lauded in these terms the empire that had just wrested the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg246&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;, a monopoly on the slave trade, from Spain: ‘This was the charter of the land, / And guardian angels sang this strain: / “Rule, Britannia! rule the waves: / Britons never will be slaves.”‘&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The pyramid of peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This was a self-proclamation that was simultaneously an act of exclusion. It was not only colonial peoples who were affected by it. Even before the American Revolution, Franklin had established a hierarchy of nations on the basis of skin colour, which claimed to classify the whole human race: ‘All &#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039; is black or tawny. &#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039; chiefly tawny.’ The same applied to pre-Columbian America; it was ‘wholly so’. The quantitative prevalence of peoples of colour was evident. In a way, their presence even made itself felt in Europe: ‘the &#039;&#039;Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Swedes&#039;&#039;, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion’. The inhabitants of Germany did not come off much better. Representing the highest form of humanity were the English settled on both shores of the Atlantic, ‘the Principal Body of White People’, of ‘purely white People’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the only community to embody the cause of liberty. The classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theme of the great chain of Being[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] becomes here the great chain of Colour. And it excluded the non-European peoples from the sacred space of civilization, relegating much of the West to its margins.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it rarely took such a naively naturalistic form, the pyramid dear to Franklin continued, in one shape or another, to be present in liberal culture. We find it again in Lieber. At its apex, obviously, was the ‘Anglican race’, which fully expressed authentic liberty, while forming the base were the colonial peoples (not only the blacks, but also the Chinese). In the middle we find jostling Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitans, who had hitherto proved incapable of elevating themselves to the principle of self-government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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John Stuart Mill employed a language that was scarcely different. The apex continued to be composed of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (to be precise, England and the United States), peerless champions of representative government and ‘the general improvement of mankind’, while at the base, in addition to more or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg247&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;less savage peoples,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we find the Chinese. It is true that the latter could boast a very ancient civilization. Yet ‘they have become stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland could be assimilated to the other colonies or semi-colonies. ‘[H]alf civilized’, in Bentham’s view,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland for Mill was not only incapable of self-government, but also in need of ‘a good stout despotism’, exactly like India.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not much better was the situation of Greece: situated as it was at the confines of Europe, it was still ‘too Oriental’ in many respects to be able to govern itself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, at the centre of the pyramid we have the people of ‘southern Europe’, whose ‘inactivity’ and ‘envy’ prevented the development of industrial society, the establishment of a strong ruling group and the orderly functioning of institutions. By comparison with them, too, the Anglo-Saxons proved superior, free as they were of those characteristics (‘submission’, ‘endurance’, statism) typical of the French and ‘continental nations’, all of them rendered gangrenous by ‘bureaucracy’ and an envious craving for equality.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the ‘continental nations’ were not some homogenous whole. With its geographical location close to Africa and an Arabic past behind it, Spain came out of things badly. In the list Mill drew up of ‘envy’ of grandeur and ‘inactivity’, its inhabitants came immediately after ‘Orientals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Visiting Spain in 1836, at a time when it was plunged in a civil war, Richard Cobden, rather than taking sides with one of the parties, reached a general conclusion about ‘barbarians beyond the Bay of Biscay’: Spain was ‘a nation of bigots, beggars and cut-throats with a government of whores and rogues’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Spanish of Latin America were not worth speaking about because, from the standpoint of the dominant ideology in the United States at any rate, they formed part of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg248&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;colonial world. Finally, distinguishing themselves negatively in Senior’s view were also the Neapolitans: ‘I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.’ Moreover, no barrier separated the plebs from the upper classes.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The community of the free and its dictatorship over peoples unworthy of liberty&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the charge of exclusion implicit in the self-proclamation of the community of the free displayed its full force in the relationship with colonial peoples. In most cases, far from being perceived as a contradiction, the theorization and practice of slavery at the expense of the excluded further strengthened the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free, who lauded themselves for their immunity from the servile spirit attributed to the barbarians subjugated by them. That was why Locke could set himself up as a champion of liberty and, at the same time, legitimize the absolute power the community of the free was called upon to exercise over black slaves. In 1809 Jefferson celebrated the United States as ‘an empire for liberty’, founded on a constitution that guaranteed ‘self government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was a slave-owner, who exercised power over his slaves brutally, if need be selling the individual members of the family of his property as separate pieces or chattels. And he indulged in this celebration in a letter sent to another slave-owner, who had just taken his place in the US presidency. The Constitution held up as a model consecrated the birth of the first racial state, while the self-government extolled here guaranteed southern slave-owners legitimate enjoyment of their property without interference by the federal government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from hereditary slavery to semi-slavery, still at the expense of colonial peoples, did not radically change the overall picture. Albeit in different forms, the phenomenon we are already familiar with emerged. Thus, major authors such as Mill, de Tocqueville and Lecky passionately denounced monarchical or Jacobin absolutism, and at the same time enthusiastically saluted despotism at the expense of colonial peoples. This was a power relationship which, for a whole historical period, far from being fought or contained, was to be extended and generalized. Given that a ‘vigorous despotism’ was the only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg249&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;method capable of raising backward peoples or ‘barbarians’ to a higher level, the interests of civilization and peace were served by colonial conquests, which must therefore be expanded to embrace the entire globe. Already ‘common’, ‘direct subjection’ of ‘backward populations’ by ‘the more advanced’ was becoming ‘universal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So proud and self-confident was the self-consciousness of the community of the free that it could face down possible refutations from the history or empirical analysis of society without difficulty. In the years of the July Monarchy, unperturbed, de Tocqueville registered a disconcerting fact: in the Islamic world and ‘the whole East’, slavery presented itself in a ‘milder’ form than in the West. Tunisia was engaged in abolishing this institution, which by contrast continued to survive in the colonies of liberal France (and democratic America).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The balance-sheet drawn up by Mill on the morrow of the American Civil War was significant. In the United States a ‘[h]opeless slavery’ that ‘brutifies the intellect’, and where ‘it was a highly penal offence to teach a slave to read’, had only just been abolished. Even worse, added the English liberal, was the situation at the time of the slave trade in ‘our slave colonies’, where slaves were in practice condemned to work themselves to death, to be rapidly replaced through the ‘importation’ of other unfortunates, who in their turn were soon doomed to be consumed. In the British colonies and the United States a form of slavery had prevailed with particularly repugnant characteristics, which was largely unknown ‘in the ancient world and the East’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here the phenomenon of the twin birth of liberalism and racial chattel slavery seems to be perceived or intuited. And yet, like de Tocqueville, Mill had no doubts about the complete coincidence of the West and the cause of liberty, or about the West’s right to exercise despotism over Islamic peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English liberal had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and for liberty as such: ‘the prohibition of the importation of opium into China’ violated ‘the liberty … of the buyer’, rather than that of ‘the producer or seller’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The lesson taught to the Chinese ‘barbarians’ could only be salutary. This was not the time to split hairs over forms: ‘appeals to humanity and Christianity in favour of ruffians, &amp;amp;amp; to international law in favour of people who recognize &#039;&#039;no&#039;&#039; laws of war at all’, were ‘ridiculous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are in 1857–58: even if we pass over the lot of the coolies in silence, in these years &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg250&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Britain had stained itself with the ‘barbarism’ referred to by de Tocqueville in connection with the repression of the sepoys’ mutiny in India; in China it gave decisive support to the liquidation of the attempt by the Taiping to reverse the autocratic and decrepit Manchu dynasty; in Ireland a ferocious dominion continued to obtain (‘in no country have I ever seen so many gendarmes’, observed Engels);[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] finally, in the United States, Britain contributed to the wealth of the South, absorbing much of the cotton produced by the labour of black slaves. Yet Mill was in no doubt: his country promoted the cause of liberty in the world, imposing on China by force of arms the importation of opium produced in India on the initiative of the colonial power!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the sepoys’ revolt broke out in India, de Tocqueville did not conceal the fact that ‘massacres by the [Indian] barbarians’ were followed by ‘the barbarism of the civilized’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prevent him from arriving at a Manichaean conclusion: ‘these Hindus are beasts who are as brutal as they are ferocious’; their victory would mean ‘the restoration of barbarism’, the victory of ‘savages’ and the defeat of the ‘only surviving country of political liberty in Europe’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The aspiration of the Chinese or Indians to maintain or recover their national independence, the desire to liberate themselves from colonial domination, were not even taken into consideration. Precisely because it assumed the position of exclusive representative of the cause of liberty, the community of the free interpreted the challenges it occasionally had to confront as attacks on liberty, as expressions of the servile spirit as well as barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Macaulay acknowledged that the English colonists in India behaved like Spartans confronting helots: we are dealing with ‘a race of sovereigns’ or a ‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prompt any doubts about the right of free England to exercise dictatorship over the barbarians of the colonies. It was a dictatorship that could take the most ruthless forms. Macaulay powerfully describes how the governor of India, Warren Hastings, proceeded when, at a difficult moment for Britain, already engaged in the struggle against the American colonists and their French allies, he had to confront the colony’s native population:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg251&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;A reign of terror began, of terror heightened by mystery; for even that which was endured was less horrible than that which was anticipated. No man knew what was next to be expected from this strange tribunal … It consisted of judges not one of whom was familiar with the usages of the millions over whom they claimed boundless authority. Its records were kept in unknown characters; its sentences were pronounced in unknown sounds. It had already collected round itself an army of the worst part of the native population …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
A wave of arrests without any charge was unleashed, not even sparing the elderly of ‘the most venerable dignity’. There was an orgy of violence that did not respect sanctuaries and unchained the most bestial instincts. There were Indians who ‘shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women’. In conclusion: ‘All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the Supreme Court.’ And yet, despite this horrifying description, Macaulay concluded that, for having saved England and civilization, Hastings deserved ‘high admiration’ and to rank among ‘the most remarkable men in our history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. How to confront the barbarian threat in the metropolis in timely fashion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The challenge to the community of the free could arise in the metropolis as well as from the colonies. The status of the popular classes, whom the dominant elite often tended to assimilate to ‘savages’, long remained uncertain. The assimilation became a veritable identification on the occasion of rebellions and revolutions. And as in the case of external barbarism, the remedy for the internal variety was dictatorship. Montesquieu was in no doubt about the fact that ‘the usage of the freest peoples that ever lived on earth makes me believe that there are cases where a veil has to be drawn, for a moment, over liberty, as one hides the statues of the gods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is what occurred in a state of emergency: in facing it, it was necessary to take to heart the ‘admirable institution’ that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg252&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the Roman dictatorship.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However ‘terrible’, at the opportune moment it ‘violently return[ed] the state to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
People argued no differently across the Atlantic. The &#039;&#039;Federalist&#039;&#039; maintained that, with the onset of a state of emergency, the powers granted to the federal authorities ‘ought to exist without limitation’ and without ‘constitutional shackles’. Hamilton pointed out that even the Roman republic did not hesitate ‘to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator’, when this was required to confront grave dangers and defend Rome against ‘the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘existence of all government’ mentioned by Hamilton took the form of ‘the public good’ in Locke. When it was imperilled, ‘prerogative’ legitimately enabled the ‘prince’ to safeguard it through ‘an arbitrary power’, or ‘discretion’, which could be exercised ‘without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In favour of granting emergency powers to General Cavaignac, during the crisis of 1848, was de Tocqueville (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is particularly interesting to note that what prompted an energetic reaction from the community of the free was not necessarily an actual revolt. An indirect, potential threat was enough. For Locke the right to employ force already existed in the event of the imposition of a tax not authorized by those directly affected: ‘the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if mediated by the intervention of the legislative power, the intrusion of non-property-owners in the sphere of property was always an act of illegality and plunder, of violence, and hence one that could legitimately be countered with violence by the person under attack. There is more: paving the way for unlawful interventions in property, any alteration in the composition of the legislative power, with the restructuring, for example, of the House of Lords or abolition of the hereditary transmission of its seats, betokened ‘the dissolution of government’ and hence the unavoidability of a test of arms.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Montesquieu was fairly explicit on the subject:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg253&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a state there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth or honors; but if they were mixed among the people and if they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions would be against them. Therefore, the part they have in legislation should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state, which will happen if they form a body that has the right to check the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to check theirs … The nobility should be hereditary.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While Montesquieu denounced any interference that abolished the hereditary privileges of the nobility as illiberal and despotic, Constant regarded any challenge to a property-owners’ monopoly on representative bodies as inadmissible. Since ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them are sure to be used for this purpose’; and political rights ‘will inevitably serve to encroach upon property’. It was sufficient for non-property-owners to be admitted into ‘representative assemblies’ for ‘[t]he wisest of laws’ to be ‘suspected and consequently disobeyed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicitly, the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas, having warned against the ‘fatal taxes’ that would inevitably be imposed by the legislative power once it was at the mercy or under the influence of non-property-owners, added: ‘A country governed by property-owners is in the social order; by contrast, one where non-property-owners govern is in the state of nature.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in a situation without a legal order and legal norms, arms obviously came to the fore.&lt;br /&gt;
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Constant’s reasoning continued to resonate in de Tocqueville: ‘For various reasons, all governments can be led to maintain the poor at state expense, but the democratic form of government is led by its very &#039;&#039;nature&#039;&#039; to act in this way.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Encouraged by democracy more than by any other political regime, ‘legal charity’ (i.e. aid to the poor through the use of resources procured by the state through taxes on the wealthy) could only be synonymous with despoliation in the view of its victims: ‘The rich man whom the law, without consultation, strips of part of his surplus regards the poor man as nothing but a grasping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg254&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;foreigner summoned by the legislator for the division of his goods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In effect, this was an expropriation: if prolonged, laws in favour of the poor would end up transforming ‘proletarians’ into effective beneficiaries of the land and ‘property-owners’ into their mere ‘farm managers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mill fluctuated more. On the one hand, he reiterated positions we have already encountered: ‘any power of voting’ in the hands of those who did not pay taxes was ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of free government’; to assign political rights, and hence participation in legislative power, to poor citizens, not subject to taxation, ‘amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the English left-liberal expressed a more flexible position:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them … It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This is a distinction that would seem to pave the way for a policy of income redistribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any such prospect was violently opposed by the most conservative wing of liberalism. According to Spencer, taxation aimed at income redistribution ultimately introduced a sort of ‘state &#039;&#039;corvée’&#039;&#039;, which was no less iniquitous and slave-like than the medieval one just because it imposed payment of a determinate sum of money, rather than the provision of free services to the master.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Lecky, having adopted the thesis already noted in Constant, according to which non-property-owners with political rights would inevitably be led to pursue ‘predatory and anarchic purposes’ and even ‘break up society’, defined the system that enabled non-property-owners to burden the well-off with taxes as ‘a system of veiled confiscation’. In this way, the latter would in fact end up being ‘completely disenfranchised’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The unwarranted political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg255&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;emancipation of the popular classes involved the dis-emancipation of the only classes qualified to run the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The liberal tradition and its three theories of dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As well as averting the real or potential threat of the barbarians in the colonies or metropolis, dictatorship could also be useful and indispensable in confronting the most serious problems that the community of the freemen could not resolve by ordinary means. To abolish the institution of slavery, to which representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners proved stubbornly attached, Smith looked to ‘despotism’, which effectively took shape during the Civil War and in the early post-war years. The attitude adopted in these circumstances by Lieber was significant. In publishing his principal work, he certainly foresaw the possibility of recourse to ‘martial law’ to confront a possible state of emergency, but was concerned to specify that it would not be the executive power which declared it. But with the outbreak of hostilities, he discarded his previous constitutional scruples: the suspension of habeas corpus must be implemented in any event and as extensively and radically as possible. In silencing his critics, Lincoln declared: ‘Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?’ Lieber was not only in full agreement, but as early as January 1862 was amazed and angry at the fact that no traitor or spy had as yet been hanged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory of temporary modernizing dictatorship can also be found in de Tocqueville. Reconstructing the catastrophe of the French Revolution, he arrived at a conclusion: given the irreversible crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, the radical transformation of society was inevitable, but it would have been better if, ‘instead of being carried out by the masses on behalf of the sovereignty of the people, [it] had been the work of an enlightened autocrat’; indeed, ‘[a]n absolute monarch would have been a far less dangerous innovator.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He would have been able to exercise against the most reactionary feudal aristocracy the temporary dictatorship over slave-owners invoked by Smith. Modernizing dictatorship was not evoked by de Tocqueville solely with a view to the past. The French liberal asked himself, and one of his English interlocutors, whether a ‘temporary dictatorship, exercised in firm, enlightened fashion like that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg256&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire, is not the only way of saving Ireland’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The dictatorship hypothesized here is different from that theorized by Locke against ‘papists’, which was directly exercised by the British Protestant settlers, albeit with the support of central government. De Tocqueville seems to envisage a power imposed from London that would be above the parties (Catholic peasants and Anglo-Protestant property-owners), just as in Smith ‘dictatorship’ is called upon to situate itself above both property-owners and their slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, the position taken by Mill was more general in character: ‘I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.’ The dictator could, ‘for a time strictly limited’, ‘employ … the whole power he assumes in removing obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An integral part of the self-celebration of the community of the free (and the liberal tradition) was the opposition between intransigent, unconditional guardianship of the liberty it assigned itself and the inclination to despotism reprehended in opponents. In reality, we have seen three theories of dictatorship emerge: the dictatorship of civilized peoples over barbarians in the colonies; the dictatorship that suppresses popular subversion in the metropolis; and the dictatorship which, in a situation of stalemate, imposes the requisite reforms from above. A contrast with authors not within the liberal tradition, or even foreign to it, might prove useful. Mazzini invoked ‘a highly centralized dictatorial Power’, which proceeded to the ‘suspension’ of the bill of rights and finished its work only with the achievement of national independence and the final victory of the national revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Marx applied this perspective to the social revolution as well as the national revolution. In both cases a dictatorship is envisaged that emerges in the wake of a popular revolution from below. But for de Tocqueville (and the liberal tradition as a whole), it was precisely ‘revolutionary dictatorship’ from below that was ‘most hostile to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although not free of uncertainties, in Marx criticism of the pedagogical dictatorship that the community of the free claimed to exercise over barbarians was recurrent. In reality, it was precisely in the colonies that the ‘profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg257&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This also applied to Ireland: it groaned under ‘police terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘English terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a regime that kept the population under control ‘solely by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] resorting to summary executions and the most drastic war measures.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The ills of the community of the free: the psychopathology of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the central area of the pyramid of peoples, Mill also inserted the French. Likewise, along with the Spanish, Portuguese and Neopolitans despised by him, Lieber combined the people who more than any other embodied the spurious and wicked ‘Gallic’ or ‘Gallican’ freedom, which in reality was synonymous with extreme centralization and despotism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The combination is surprising. According to Burke, at the point when the Estates General was summoned France was already in possession of a good legal order. Rid of the absolute monarchy, it had become a full member of the community of the free. What had occurred in the intervening years to provoke such a ruinous descent and consequent confinement to the grey border area between civilization and barbarism?&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, Burke observed on 9 February 1790, with the transformation of the Estates General into a constituent National Assembly, and hence with the restructuring of the political influence of the nobility and clergy, the French had turned out to be infected with a ‘disease’. Passing from despotism to anarchical subversionism, they had proved that they were ‘a people, whose character knows no medium’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and (added the British Whig a year later) ‘[i]t is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.’ Lecky referred to this analysis some years later, repeating it: ‘It was … in the opinion of Burke a total mistake to suppose that political liberty of any kind can be, or ought to be, possessed by all nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg258&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The further radicalization of the revolution that had been sparked off in Paris confirmed this diagnosis. While the outbreak and manifestation of the disease could be variously dated, it was understood that the French lacked the ‘practical good sense’ that had enabled the Anglo-Americans and the United States in particular to avoid ‘revolutionary times’, the devastation and ‘adventure’ of civil war. This was a point tirelessly stressed by de Tocqueville and, in his wake, by Laboulaye and Guizot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, on inspection, it was not merely good sense and practical spirit that were wanting. In Anglo-Americans these qualities were a constitutive element in a more general mental disposition, whereby ‘a man by following his own interest, rightly understood, will be led to do what is just and good’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We know that, although de Tocqueville deplored it, the fate of Indians and blacks was irrelevant when it came to forming an overall judgement on the republic across the Atlantic. What promoted the undisturbed flourishing of liberty here was the mature personality of its inhabitants, who displayed manifest political and moral superiority to the French. De Tocqueville found the explanation suggested by his fellow countryman Victor Lanjuinais ‘profound and original’: ‘socialism is our natural disease’. And socialism was synonymous with abstraction, but also with something worse. The French were ‘afraid of isolation’ and harboured a ‘desire to be in the crowd’; they felt themselves members of a ‘nation that marches to the same step in perfect alignment’; they regarded liberty as ‘the least important of their possessions, and thus are always ready to offer it up with reason at moments of danger’. Hence a France irremediably ‘revolutionary and servile’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, having stressed that it was ‘contained in germ in the February revolution’, when ‘socialism had been seen to make its appearance’, de Tocqueville offered a kind of epitaph on the French nation: ‘It is incapable and, I say it certainly with regret, unworthy of being free’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The oscillation between anarchical revolutionism and submission to despotism, and an inclination to surrender to passing impulses and moods, confronted one with a people whose ‘basic characteristics are so constant that we can recognise the France we know in portraits made of it two or three &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg259&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousand years ago’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact that the process begun in 1789 or 1787 had finally issued in the establishment of the Bonapartist dictatorship, dragging the country down to the level of the ‘nations best made for servitude’, clarified everything. In France, ‘what at first seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant. But what a nation with a real instinct for freedom cannot endure is the feeling of not being its own master.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The closing chapters of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; are a bravura rhetorical performance. Rarely has the love of liberty been hymned in such impassioned terms. And the beauty and power of these passages prove all more the engaging if we bear in mind the polemic, allusive but transparent and courageous, against Napoleon III’s despotism. However, read more coolly, this hymn to liberty proves problematic and even disturbing, with the opposition it sets up between ‘peoples made to be free’ and ‘nations best made for servitude’. It was a divide reproduced within France at the level of social classes. The enlightened love of liberty, which had manifested itself at the start of the revolution, was rapidly overwhelmed by the blind passion for equality, from which the Terror and the equal enslavement of all to an unprecedented despotic power derived. How was this distortion to be explained? De Tocqueville had no doubts: it became ‘less startling when we remember that the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A disdainful warning was issued to the latter, intent on pursuing ‘material benefits’ and incapable of appreciating liberty in and for itself: ‘The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave.’ Once again we are presented with an opposition between those born for liberty and those born for servitude, between freemen and servants, between liberals and serviles. And for de Tocqueville it was futile to try to explain the presence or absence, or variable intensity, of the ‘desire’ for liberty by the level of historical development and material living conditions of particular peoples and social classes. It was ultimately of little use even to challenge the influence of erroneous theories; or rather, these referred to something more profound. The ‘lofty aspiration’ to liberty was a thing that some men are capable of feeling, while others are not: ‘[i]t is a privilege of noble minds which God has fitted to receive it, and it inspires them with a generous fervour.’ The discourse has hitherto focused on a few noble souls: ‘to meaner souls, untouched by the sacred flame, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg260&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it may well seem incomprehensible’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An original curse, which cannot be lifted, seems to hang over the men, classes or peoples who, on account of their vulgarity or coarseness, are excluded or expelled from the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, in its sad destiny France was not alone. Some years earlier—in September 1848, to be precise—de Tocqueville had seen the spectre of socialism lurking across the Alps and had not hesitated to conclude that the Italians ‘have likewise shown themselves unworthy of liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘Likewise’: which country is being alluded to? At this time, not yet invested by a coup d’état, France was still part of the community of the free. The reference is to Germany: as in much of Europe, there too the revolution continued to flare up and pursue radical objectives. The ambit of countries deserving of liberty thus risked being extremely restricted.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Interpretations of the interminable French Revolutionary cycle: from ‘disease’ to ‘race’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is not by chance that politico-social conflict came to be interpreted in a psychopathological register. Immediately after the February revolution, de Tocqueville was concerned to specify that ‘[i]t is not needs but ideas that have led to this great upheaval’ and made the French ‘so ill’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was madness that encouraged the socialist pretension to alter not only ‘political laws’, but even social and ‘civil laws’—in particular, relations of property and production consecrated by nature and Providence. In the course of his journey in England, de Tocqueville compared workers to slaves and drew attention to the relations of ‘strict dependency’ that were being established within the factory. On the basis of this analysis, the struggle to overcome or alleviate the condition of slavery or ‘strict dependency’ could be construed as a struggle for freedom. But, as we know, this was not how the French liberal argued, as he denounced the ‘despotism’ of those who sought to regulate working hours and the servile spirit of those who contaminated the ideal of liberty with economic and social demands. The community of the free claimed the merit of pursuing the ideal of liberty in all its purity and in any circumstances for itself. Hence it interpreted not only challenges from the colonial and barbaric world, but also challenges &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg261&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arising in the zone of civilization itself, as an attack on the ideal of liberty, which was lashed out at by those not in a position to appreciate its grandeur and beauty. Wholly understandable and, indeed, natural among savages, such deafness was construed as a pathological anomaly in a civilized people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this sense, the resort to explaining conflict in a psychopathological register was immanent in the liberal tradition. Burke spoke of French ‘disease’ in the very first stages of the revolution. And it should be added that for a time it was in fact the ‘American inoculation’, and hence a disease from across the Atlantic, which was held responsible for the contraction and contagious spread of ideas marked by abstract, insane extremism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the disease and psychopathological diagnosis of the adversary could occur in the converse direction. As the abolitionist movement developed, it became a commonplace in the United States to condemn it as an expression of an illiberal spirit, fanaticism and madness. However, at the time of the British colonists’ revolt in America, we find Josiah Tucker inviting the London government to accept and even encourage the secession, so as to avoid the ‘contagion’ of a ‘mad, &#039;&#039;fanatical&#039;&#039; liberty’, which was sweeping through slaves or serfs, the contagion of a ‘republicanism’ that was indeed ‘American’, but which ultimately dated back to Locke and the ‘Lockian Sect’ and could count on the sympathy of Burke himself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After 1848, following the umpteenth return of revolution with yet more radical slogans, the tendency to warn against the disease raging in France dramatically intensified. Underlining the rootedness in the United States of the rule of law and liberal institutions, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; attributed much more weight to history and geography than &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;. Why had Napoleon Bonaparte’s military dictatorship been imposed on France?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government … If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg262&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The situation across the Atlantic was very different: ‘Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While we once again encounter the dubious assimilation of the Indians (and even Mexico) to a ‘wilderness’, we are far removed from the explanation that peremptorily and definitively opposes a ‘sublime desire’ for freedom to vulgar indifference to it, ‘noble souls’ to ‘mediocre souls’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By way of confirming the anthropological drift that manifested itself with 1848, we can adduce the long letter (a small essay) sent by de Tocqueville twenty years earlier to his friend de Beaumont. The history of Europe was conceived here in such a unitary way that the terminology became interchangeable: mention was made of the ‘Commons’ in the case of France and the ‘Third Estate’ in the case of England. In the two countries the victory of the bourgeoisie had been achieved in different ways, which were in fact the ‘forced result of the state of things’—that is, of the different configuration of power relations between the contending politico-social subjects.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were statism and despotism the hereditary disease of the country where Jacobinism and Bonapartism had made their appearance? In truth, England had not only succeeded in constructing a strong state and military apparatus before France, but at the time of the Tudors had suffered an unlimited despotism: ‘I know of no tyranny in history more complete than that of … Henry VIII’; the Commons, ‘which had denied the king’s will a man’s life’, now ended up ‘condemning without even giving a hearing’. A worse terror than the Jacobin version had manifested itself, as demonstrated by ‘ “bills of attainder”, a diabolical invention that not even the revolutionary Tribunal called into being’. Yet it was nonetheless a revolution that had played a positive role. It nurtured the ‘first fruit of civilization’ as a result of the fact that, albeit in its terrible absolutism, in England royal power attacked the ‘vices of the feudal system’ and subdued ‘oligarchical liberty’. This was a general tendency, though in no country did ‘despotism prove more terrible’. Was the island across the Channel, unlike France, characterized and blessed by a gradualism of historical evolution? The letter/essay we are examining explicitly argued against the thesis that the English Constitution had passed through ‘successive, regular stages, before reaching the point it has arrived at today’, so that it could be considered ‘a fruit which has matured over &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg263&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;successive centuries’. In truth, de Tocqueville observed, from Henry VIII onwards, ‘I see the English people change religion four times according to the will of their master’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, one might try to devalue the letter/essay of 1828 as ‘youthful’. However, even in subsequent years, if there was a contrast between France and England, it was often to the detriment of the latter, which continued to interpret liberty as a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘common right’, as occurred in the country that was the protagonist of the 1789 revolution (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]). In 1843, having compared slave-masters in the colonies with the ‘aristocracy’ overthrown by the French Revolution, de Tocqueville celebrated ‘the great principles’ of the revolution, ‘which was carried out entirely in the name of equality’, in the name of the equality of the ‘human race’, and which had the further merit of being first to abolish slavery.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from the 1848 revolution, under the impression made by the spectre of socialism, it was precisely the pathos of equality that defined the failure of the French Revolution and the disease of an entire people, who now prostrated themselves before Louis Napoleon.&lt;br /&gt;
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The psychopathological interpretation of developments in the French situation had the advantage of dispelling possible anxieties in the community of the free, which absolved itself of any responsibility for the Bonapartist outcome of the 1848 revolution. De Tocqueville might have drawn up a critical balance-sheet of the conduct of the liberal party and himself. After the dictatorship’s advent, with some exaggeration he denounced the limited resistance met with by Louis Napoleon in French society. Had the disappointment they experienced with the exclusion of three million Frenchmen from political rights contributed to the passivity of the popular masses? This was a measure the liberal bourgeoisie had been guilty of in 1850, thereby furnishing the dictator with the possibility of elevating himself into a champion of universal suffrage and the struggle against privilege and discrimination.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And what role in undermining the Second Republic had been played by intransigent liberalism à la de Tocqueville, who had branded the reduction of working hours and any intervention by political power in favour of the most deprived as intolerable ‘despotism’? The Bonapartist regime had its stronghold in the countryside: had it not been primarily the liberal bourgeoisie, with de Tocqueville’s active participation, which stirred it up against the city and mobilized it in the name &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg264&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the terrible threat that hung over civilization, dictating extraordinary measures commensurate with the situation? And again: Had the discrediting of institutions and the rule of law been aided by the supreme contempt for the Constitution displayed by de Tocqueville, when in his capacity as foreign minister he demanded ‘the right, in spite of our Constitution, to overthrow the Roman Republic’?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, a basic contradiction ran through the French liberal’s attitude. On the one hand, on an immediate political level, he vigorously condemned the Bonapartist regime; on the other, as an historian he regretted the fact that the requisite modernization of France had not been completed by an ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’, rather than a popular revolution (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|§5]]). But a modernizing ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’ is precisely what Napoleon I had wanted to be and what Napoleon III aspired to be! Rather than engage in an examination that was possibly too painful at a personal level, the author of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; preferred to come to blows with a mythical, eternal France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A not dissimilar evolution is found in Mill. In 1849 he vigorously defended the February Revolution of the previous year. Thereafter, he continued to make an important acknowledgement of ‘the heroic and calumniated Provisional Government of France’ for having promptly abolished slavery in the colonies, in an implicit contrast not only with the North American republic, but also with England, on whose history ‘a lasting blot’ was left by the support of ‘the leading portion of our higher and middle classes’ for the South’s pro-slavery secession from the United States.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, reminiscing about the debate that developed in Europe over the American Civil War, having denounced the ‘furious’ pro-Southern position of much of the English liberalism of the time, Mill added: ‘None of the Continental Liberals committed the same frightful mistake.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet in 1861 we have seen him inclined to exclude the French people and ‘continental nations’ in general from the community of the free in the strict sense. These were years when, not altogether in jest, people liked to say that ‘negroes begin in Calais’, just across the Channel.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, if not skin colour alone, ‘race’ was now called on to explain the differential development of European countries. What must not be overlooked, observed Lieber, still pointing a finger at France, was ‘the Celtic spirit of being &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg265&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swayed by masses’ and hence surrendering to political, religious and literary ‘centralization’. Absent there was ‘the original Teutonic spirit of individual independence’, which exhibited itself with particular vigour in the ‘Anglican race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. ‘Disease’ as a symptom of racial degeneration&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From ‘disease’ we have passed to ‘race’. Were these two interpretations of politico-social conflict compatible? Burke, who denounced the outbreak of ‘disease’ across the Channel, celebrated the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, the ‘chosen race of the sons of England’. It was a ‘nation’ and a ‘race’ possibly less vulnerable than others to the pathological manifestations raging in France. In other words, the question is whether the servile, herd spirit and inability to enjoy a regular, orderly liberty were a passing disturbance in the personality of a civilized people or possessed an ethnic origin that was yet to be identified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States, from the mid-nineteenth century the threat represented by the immigration of yellow skins—the coolies—was added to the traditional peril of miscegenation with blacks. The coastal region of the Pacific, warned Lieber, risked being ‘mongolized’ by Chinese, whose proliferation resembled that of ‘mice’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more drastic. Large-scale settlement by the Chinese (or Japanese) in America would result in catastrophe: ‘they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approximating to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid.’ The upshot would be individuals with a ‘chaotic constitution’ internally, as was sadly demonstrated by ‘the Eurasians in India, and the half-breeds in America’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hitherto we have been dealing with populations of colonial or semi-colonial origin, and hence extraneous to the West. And Lieber and Spencer’s agreement with legislation that prohibited non-whites from access to the land of liberty is not surprising. Although an enthusiastic expansionist, the former declared himself opposed to the annexation of any territory that involved a further incorporation of peoples of colour. But, as his biographer observes, he went further. He feared that an influx of immigrants from southern Europe &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg266&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belonging to the ‘Latin Race’ might also cause a ‘dilution of American blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, likewise focusing on the United States, another distinguished representative of liberalism—Lecky—drew attention to the effect of ‘the contamination of the immigrant vote’, since immigrants were often ‘revolutionary elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are concerns that were powerfully echoed by de Tocqueville. As the storm clouds gathered over the North American republic that would shortly lead to the Civil War, the French liberal posed an anxious question: How was the fading of the ‘practical good sense’ that had hitherto spared the transatlantic republic the catastrophe of France and continental Europe to be explained? What had provoked the crisis was the ‘rapid introduction into the United States of men alien to the English race’, who for that very reason caused America to run ‘the greatest danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Its inhabitants were now no longer so ‘united by … common opinions’ as to render a bloody division inconceivable, as &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; had believed.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville warned his US friends and interlocutors that ‘however great your capacity for assimilation, it is very difficult for so many foreign bodies to be digested’ with such rapidity as to avoid their disturbing ‘the economy and the health of your social body’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The looming civil war was put down to the new immigrants from southern or eastern Europe: they were configured as a pathogenic element, attacking from without a social organism that was in itself healthy. In the face of such a danger, de Tocqueville tirelessly warned his transatlantic friends and interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Alas, every day brings you so many foreign elements that you will soon no longer be yourselves: all the arguments that could be made about your nature become ever more uncertain. In fact, mixed as you are today with so many races, who could now say what your nature is?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And again: ‘What frightens me is the prodigious number of foreigners that makes of you a new people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The waves of migration condemned here obviously involved the North of the United States. Did they lead to the emergence of radical abolitionism? In that case, de Tocqueville’s position would not be very different from that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg267&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the theorists of the South. They branded as fundamentally alien to America, and ultimately reducible to radicalism of a European (and French and Jacobin) variety, the positions of those who, to abolish slavery, did not even shrink at the prospect of a bloody conflict. At all events, de Tocqueville’s tendency in explaining the impending civil war is clear: he assigned responsibility for it to the growing presence of ethnic groups traditionally lacking in the political and moral qualities attributed to Anglo-Americans.&lt;br /&gt;
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This type of explanation obviously proves impossible when dealing with an ethnically homogenous country. Or should we assume that such homogeneity is merely apparent? To this question de Gobineau replied decisively in the affirmative. But let us observe his starting-point. He fully shared the pitiless psychopathological diagnosis of the French people made by de Tocqueville. It was necessary to register the raging of an age-old disease in France that rendered the functioning of ‘free institutions’ impossible and which, in the name of ‘public utility’ or the ‘monstrosity’ that was alleged ‘social right’, constantly promoted ‘the absorption of private rights into single state right’. We are dealing with ‘a people for whom absolute centralization is the height of good government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, the same ideological themes and even the same language we have heard in de Tocqueville, Lieber and Mill recur.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was in fact something new. The disease now had a specific ethnic base. The carriers of it in France and the rest of the world were non-Aryans. Given the importance of such an innovation, it is an exaggeration to claim that de Gobineau was ‘not so far removed from Alexis de Tocqueville, at one time his mentor and superior, as might be supposed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, there is no doubt they moved in a cultural and political circle with not a few points of contact and commonality. On close epistolary and intellectual terms, de Tocqueville and Lieber were in full agreement in their diagnosis of the disease raging in France and which, as a result of waves of migration, also risked having a harmful impact on the United States. Advancing further down the road of interpreting history in an ethnic key, Lieber counterposed to the herd and servile spirit of the ‘Celts’ the jealous sense of individuality peculiar to the ‘Teutons’. The latter were the vanguard of the West, or the ‘western Caucasian portion of humanity’. Perhaps, concluded Lieber, for brevity’s sake one could speak of ‘cis-Caucasians’, while the phrase ‘Japhetics’ had the drawback of being too broad.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, we are on the threshold of the Aryan mythology: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg268&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘Japhetics’ were the descendants of Japheth, by contrast with the progeny of Sem (‘Semites’) and Ham (‘Hamites’). And the American liberal expressed reservations about the category of Japhetics or Aryans solely because it referred to the mythical deeds of a people that had started out from India—in other words, a region foreign to the West. Hence the distance from de Gobineau was not great, even if the latter preferred to speak of Aryans, rather than employing what he regarded as the less rigorous categories of ‘Japhetics, Caucasians and Indo-Germans’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. De Gobineau, liberalism and the genealogical myths of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From the outset, the self-proclamation of the community of the free felt the need to resort to genealogical myths that endowed this distinguishing gesture with a foundation. Montesquieu pointed to ‘the forests’ inhabited by ‘the Germans’ as the birthplace of free, representative government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The origin was not accidental: if slavery was at home among ‘the peoples of the south’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|§4]]), by contrast ‘the peoples of the north have and will always have a spirit of independence and liberty that the peoples of the south do not’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘the peoples of the north’, who had demonstrated ‘remarkable wisdom against the Roman power’ they ultimately destroyed, were also distinguished by ‘good sense’, courage, ‘generous sentiment’, and ‘the strength of spirit necessary to guide one’s own conduct’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘northern nations’ were referred to in England by Sidney and Hume, who celebrated as ‘extremely free’ the ‘government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations’, which was established on the ‘ruins of Rome’ and its ‘military despotism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, for the Mill of 1861, the French were excluded from the community of the free because they were ‘essentially a southern people’, stamped by ‘the double education of despotism and Catholicism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Burke instead preferred to glory in descent from ‘our Gothic ancestors’, as well as in belonging to the English &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#page269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#pg269&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘chosen race’ of liberty, while Lieber worked ‘Teutonic’ ancestors into the coat of arms of the United States and the Anglican race.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the Teutonic genealogical myth met with great success. Notwithstanding the stabilization achieved with the Third Republic, the memory of the Paris Commune and of the interminable revolutionary cycle behind it influenced France’s image. The scourge of brigandage in the south, and the geographical location (not properly Nordic) especially of its southern regions, affected the image of Italy. The Second Reich, by contrast, seemed to stand unproblematically alongside England and the United States in enjoying representative bodies, a liberal order and economic development. These were the three countries now celebrated as the vanguard of the community of the free, or as the peoples who best embodied the cause of liberty. In England, as early as 1860 Lord Robert Cecil—future Marquis of Salisbury and prime minister—contrasted ‘the people of a southern climate’ with those of ‘Teutonic parentage’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1889 Joseph Chamberlain (the colonial secretary) officially called on the United States and Germany to form a ‘Teutonic’ alliance with his country.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a position shared across the Atlantic by Alfred T. Mahan, the great theorist of geopolitics, who likewise declared for the unity of the ‘Teutonic family’, of peoples belonging to the same Germanic ‘stock’. Mahan was on excellent terms with Theodore Roosevelt who, going still further in his celebration of ‘German’ and ‘Teutonic’ peoples, hymned the ‘war-like prowess of the stalwart sons of Odin’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideological climate prompted a reinterpretation of the category of Anglo-Saxons, which now tended to include Germany—the starting-point for the great adventure of the emigration of the descendants of liberty, praiseworthy for having rebelled against first Roman despotism and then Papal despotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Disraeli, de Gobineau and ‘race’ as the ‘key of history’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The cultural and political universe to which de Gobineau belonged is becoming clear. With him, the approach chosen by de Tocqueville to explain the crisis &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg270&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the United States became a key to understanding universal history. Why did ‘liberal institutions’ in the North American republic exhibit a vitality unimaginable in Latin America? Because in the latter Europeans had mixed with the defeated natives. And as for Europe, why had France suffered a catastrophe unknown to England? Because the mixing of races had been much more radical in the former than the latter, ‘that of all the countries of Europe where modifications of blood have been slowest and hitherto least varied’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And why was an unprecedented crisis impending in the United States? De Gobineau’s answer was substantially identical to de Tocqueville’s: as a result of massive waves of migration that were heterogeneous in origin, the original Anglo-Saxon element was on the point of losing its identity.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that in de Gobineau the anthropological explanation underwent such a naturalistic rigidification as to prompt de Tocqueville to ironize about the decisive role of ‘blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Must we then regard the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039; as foreign to the liberal tradition? In reality, even if we ignore the South of the United States, where the theory and practice reigned whereby a single drop of black blood was enough to exclude a person from the community of the free (and the enjoyment of political and civil rights), in Europe itself and, what is more, in the other classic country of the liberal tradition, voices echoed that were not very different from that just heard. Declaring himself in favour of a legal ban on miscegenation, Spencer stressed: ‘It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the inter-marriages of human races and by the inter-breeding of animals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But in this context the figure of Disraeli assumes particular prominence. The positions he adopted were clear: race was ‘the key of history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to speak of ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’: in reality, ‘[a]ll is race’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[a]ll is race; there is no other truth.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only thus could it be understood how, although fairly small in numbers, the Spanish conquistadores (or ‘Goths’, as Disraeli preferred to call them) had managed to triumph in America and the English in China.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was how the constant ravages devastating France &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg271&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;were to be explained: we were witnessing ‘the great revolt of the Celts’, or the ancient ‘conquered races’, against ‘the northern and western races’, who had assimilated ‘the Semitic principle’ (the Old and New Testaments) and embodied civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The principal and primary aspect of these processes was not culture: the ‘greatness’ of a race ‘results from its organisation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a physiological fact, and it was therefore necessary to ‘study physiology’, [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] so as to be able to orientate oneself correctly in the conflicts of the historical and political world: ‘Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which makes a race, and that is blood.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this blood mythology, Disraeli too insisted on the superiority of the ‘pure races of the Caucasus’, to which the Jewish race belonged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a purity to be jealously guarded: ‘that pernicious doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man’, the doctrine of ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ which led to mixing and contamination, was condemned out of hand; if really implemented, it ‘would deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the partial difference of idiom, we are not removed from the ideological universe of de Gobineau. The latter, who celebrated the Aryans in the first instance for their liberal and individualistic ‘traditions’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] not by chance dedicated his book ‘to His Majesty George V, King of Hanover’. Along with England, de Gobineau took the other classical country of the liberal tradition, the United States, as his model. It was an ‘essentially practical land’, as had been confirmed by the fact that, without allowing themselves to be fettered by the abstractions rampant in France, even the ‘abolitionist papers had acknowledged the correctness’ of the thesis of the natural inequality of races.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The celebration of racial purity was the celebration primarily of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, the branch of the ‘Aryan family’ that more than any other had resisted the general bastardization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg272&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There is no reason to include Disraeli in the liberal tradition while excluding the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039;, all the less so given that the latter drew considerable inspiration from the English writer and statesman.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If de Gobineau ceased to be a liberal, it was when, now discouraged, he ended up accommodating, in de Tocqueville’s harsh but accurate judgement, to the ‘government of the sabre, and even of the baton’—that is, to the dictatorship of Napoleon III.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should not be forgotten that in these same years Disraeli believed the ‘government of the sword’ and the ‘military camp’ inevitable and legitimate, for France and continental Europe (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]). In any event, as a theorist of race, admirer and collaborator of de Tocqueville, and follower of Disraeli, the author, disgusted by the French revolutionary cycle and statism, and filled with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon world and the ‘liberal traditions of the Aryans’, fitted into the milieu of liberalism without difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the Aryan mythology was explicitly present in other exponents of this intellectual tradition should not be overlooked. Here is how Lecky came to the defence of Ireland, from which he originated: while they were Celts, the Irish were nevertheless part of ‘the great Aryan race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer reached the same conclusion in the course of his visit to the United States: ‘descendants of the immigrant Irish lose their Celtic aspect, and become Americanised’; they had fused with the other ‘varieties of the Aryan race’ and, in this instance, the admixture had proved beneficial.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things stood differently in the case of France. What explained its defeat in the war with Prussia and the raging of the Paris Commune was ‘race’, which seemed to have remained stubbornly Celtic (unlike Lecky, Spencer considered the Celts wholly alien to the Aryan race).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the authors we have just cited might be added Renan, who also regarded himself as a liberal, was ‘in regular contact’ with de Gobineau,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was a no less passionate cantor (as we shall see) of the excellence of the Aryan race and, more generally, the ‘Aryan–Semitic races’. Finally, it should be noted that across the Atlantic the Aryan mythology was prominent, and in fact so widespread as to go beyond the circle of ideologies. In 1902 Arthur &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg273&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, demanded the United States’ right to dominion on the grounds that it belonged to the ‘magnificent Aryan people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The repression of conflict, the search for the pathogenic element, and conspiracy theory&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even if he rejected the facile Aryan solution, this did not make de Tocqueville any less obsessed than de Gobineau with the problem of identifying the pathogenic element attacking a social organism that was healthy in itself. After 1848 there was no doubt: the carrier of the ‘revolutionary disease’, the ‘permanent disease’, the ‘virus of a new and unknown kind’, which raged incessantly in France, was a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;): ‘we are always dealing with the same men, even if the circumstances vary’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is to be added that this ‘virus’ or ‘race’ was spreading alarmingly throughout the world. Having made their appearance in France, these ‘[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown breed came on the scene … They were the first of a new race of men who subsequently prospered and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What once again leaps to the eye is the transition from ‘disease’ or ‘virus’ to ‘race’. Likewise in Constant, ‘cold in their delirium’, subversive intellectuals, those ‘jugglers of sedition’ (&#039;&#039;jongleurs de sédition&#039;&#039;), never tired of undermining not just a particular society, but ‘the very foundations of the social order’. They were ‘beings of an unknown species’ (&#039;&#039;êtres d’une espèce inconnue&#039;&#039;) and in fact formed a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;), a ‘detestable race’ (&#039;&#039;déstestable race&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a crescendo, an anthropological type of explanation tends to become a racial type of explanation—the transition from the category of &#039;&#039;espèce&#039;&#039; to that of &#039;&#039;race&#039;&#039; is symptomatic. At this point the idea of a radical solution emerges. One could only hope for the ‘eradication’ of this ‘detestable race’ composed of pathogenic agents:[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] such was the precondition for restoring the health and safety of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The term ‘race’ does not possess a genuinely ethnic connotation in either Constant or de Tocqueville. Yet its recurrence is a symptom of a tendency to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg274&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;racialize the intellectuals who were carriers of the virus of subversion. Burke went significantly further. In addition to a clearly defined social stratum (non-property-owning intellectuals, who were not connected with the land and lacked roots), the ideological ‘intoxication’ of which radicalism was culpable[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] pertained to a social bloc that began to exhibit an ethnic dimension. What explained the catastrophe of the French Revolution was an alliance between two significantly different social strata: on the one hand, ‘political men of letters’ and, on the other, the ‘new monied interest’. The reasons for this alliance, at first sight so strange, were readily understandable. To begin with, the two parties shared a hatred of Christianity: ‘[t]he literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the irreligiousness and atheism of intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment were well-known, one should not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Jews in Change-alley’, already alien to Christianity for religious and ideological reasons, also had a material interest in undermining or destroying it: they were hoping for ‘a mortgage on the revenues belonging to the see of Canterbury’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attack on the Church was also an attack on ‘the landed property of ecclesiastical corporations’, on landed property as such. The revolutionaries’ programme was sinister: ‘Is the house of lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers[?]’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Intent on destroying a society whose pillars were Christianity and the landed aristocracy was an alliance between subversive intellectuals gathered in ‘the revolution society’ and ‘the pulpit of the Old Jewry’, or the ‘gentlemen of the Old Jewry’, engaged in distorting the real meaning of the Glorious Revolution and spreading ‘the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, Burke did not tire of stressing the role of the Jews. These two components of the revolutionary bloc were linked by multiple affinities. Over and above hatred of the Church and the agrarian, Christian nobility, an important role was also played by their fundamental foreignness to the nation. The intellectual stratum was itself stateless, because intellectuals displayed ‘attachment to their country’ only to the extent that it conduced to their ‘fleeting projects’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg275&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But whence did subversion draw its shock force? To overthrow the existing order, intellectuals and usurers were insufficient. In reality, an integral, albeit subaltern, part of the subversive attack was ‘the Tavern’, the inebriated, bloodthirsty rabble. How was the unnatural union repeatedly denounced by Burke as the social bloc between ‘Old Jewry’ and ‘the London Tavern’ formed and sealed?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Who enrolled the most desperate in the retinue and service of the wealthiest, and in fact of the most parasitic, repugnant wealth—the wealth which, rather than being based on the land and love of the land, pertained exclusively to speculation and usury? It was the intellectuals—more precisely, rootless intellectuals of humble origin. It was ‘feathered scoundrels’ [&#039;&#039;gueux plumées&#039;&#039;],[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] wretches like the scoundrels of the Tavern whom they were constantly inciting. Wanting in religion, faith and genuine ideals, they called on the scoundrels, of whom they were an integral part, to rise up against wealth, but only against the most respectable wealth—landed wealth—while financial (and Jewish) wealth was spared. In France these intellectuals ‘pretended to a great zeal for the poor … They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In their turn, the Jews were perfectly content to support the French rabble’s attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, on the pillars of Christianity. The revolutionary atrocities seemed to Burke ‘Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of the subversive social bloc were now clear. Thanks to the work of plebeian, subversive intellectuals, here were the propertyless in the retinue of the usurers, the Tavern in the service of Old Jewry, or ‘Jewish brokers contending with each other who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Jews were ultimately at the head of the variegated social bloc of subversion. It was enough to observe the development of the revolution in France: ‘The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will be always their fellows, sometimes their masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Levelling and homogenizing everything, the French Revolution ended up making a single ‘difference’ prevail, that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg276&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;constituted by ‘money’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and hence sanctioning the predominance of finance (largely controlled by Jews). If remedial action was not promptly taken, a ‘general earthquake’ threatened to flatten the social order and civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, we are dealing with the first organic theory of revolution as a Jewish conspiracy. The &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; and the denunciation of the infamous role of Old Jewry date from 1790. Only later did Abbé Barruel set himself to work. Exiled in England, he was received with honour by Burke, who warmly greeted him and the work that was taking shape: ‘The whole of the wonderful narrative is supported by documents and proofs with almost juridical regularity and exactness.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to chronological priority, another, more important characteristic highlights the novelty and perilousness of the conspiracy theory in Burke. While the &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; also referred to the disturbing role of Enlightenment ‘confederacies’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it was now no longer a question of pointing a finger at this or that sect or at freemasonry, as did Barruel, and exposing the role of Jews therein. Foremost among the charges against the latter was not hostility towards the dominant religion or throne and altar, as in the traditional Christian polemic. Burke, who was himself a mason,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] aimed to explain a new politico-social conflict that was destined to last a long time. In the British Whig’s view, we have on the one hand the countryside, as the site embodying the natural order of society and the values of attachment to the land, and a national community cemented (as we know) by a ‘relation in blood’; on the other, the city as the site of rootlessness and stateless subversion, jointly promoted by Jewish finance, abstract, revolutionary intellectuals and the rabble. For the first time, the Jews were accused of simultaneously operating through rapacious, parasitic finance and a plebeian movement inspired by blind, destructive fury.&lt;br /&gt;
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This motif reappeared in the liberal tradition after another major revolutionary upheaval. On the outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, Disraeli immediately put them down to the ‘manoeuvres’ of ‘secret associations’, which were ‘always vigilant and always prepared’ to take ‘society by surprise’ and ‘strik[e] at property and Christ’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, the English statesman of Jewish origin drew up a more sophisticated, highly surprising balance-sheet. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg277&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;account of ‘their accumulated wealth’, attachment to their religious tradition and proud racial self-consciousness, Jews tended to be hostile to ‘the doctrine of the equality of man’ and ‘conservative’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although shaking off oppression, they were not averse to the most unscrupulous operations and alliances: ‘you find the once loyal Hebrew invariably arrayed in the same ranks as the leveller and the latitudinarian’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There then spread the ‘destructive principle’ and ‘insurrection … against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property’. Fuelling all of this was an unexpected ethnic and social group: the destruction of Christianity, ‘the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them’. There was no doubt: ‘If the reader throws his eye over the provisional governments of Germany, and Italy, and even of France, formed at that period, he will recognise everywhere the Jewish element.’ Thus, ‘[t]he people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skilful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not difficult to hear in this discourse an echo of the resentment of the Jew at humiliations and persecution suffered. But it remains the case that we are once again dealing with a new conspiracy theory destined to enjoy fatal success in the twentieth century. What encouraged such a theory was the tendency, widespread in the liberal culture of the time, to repress the objectivity of politico-social conflict. The picture Disraeli paints of the great revolutionary wave of 1848 is eloquent. Had it not been for the occult Jewish leadership, ‘the uncalled for outbreak would not have ravaged Europe.’ Not objective social needs, but ‘the fiery energy and teeming resources of the children of Israel maintained for a long time the unnecessary and useless struggle’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, still within the ambit of the liberal tradition, the cry of alarm at ‘conspiracy’ also resounded during another great revolutionary upheaval. When Napoleonic France’s attempt to reintroduce slavery into San Domingo was defeated by the fierce resistance of the ex-slaves, Malouet warned against the ‘universal plot of the blacks’ who, with the complicity of the abolitionists, aspired to dominate and massacre the whites.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this theme was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg278&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;widely diffused in the South of the United States. Obsession with ‘conspiracy’ runs deep in the history of that country and both the contending alliances, in different forms, were constantly concerned to uncover and fight it. For example, in the years leading up to the Civil War, while the South denounced the North’s ‘abolitionist conspiracy’, the latter endlessly warned against the plot that aimed to impose slaveholding power at a federal level. For this reason, reference has been made to a widespread ‘paranoid style’ in connection with the history of the North American republic.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this mythology of the conspiracy, one element was especially significant and pregnant with consequences. The actor in the black, abolitionist plot, the anti-slavery militant, tended to be delineated in accordance with the model generally used to stigmatize the Jew: ‘Essentially weak and cowardly, he would pose no threat in a fair and open fight’; but this was where deception, intrigue and, precisely, conspiracy came in.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. The conflict of the two liberalisms, and mutual accusations of betrayal&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In confronting the challenges represented by the struggle for recognition waged by the excluded, obviously the community of the free did not always react as one. On more than a few occasions, there were internal clashes and divisions. In broad terms, we can distinguish two tendencies. One fraction more or less stubbornly identified with the positions of the representatives of English proto-liberalism, who equated ‘true liberty’ with untrammelled control by the master over &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; family, as well as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; servants and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; goods. By contrast, another fraction sought to come to terms with the idea of liberty originally mobilized by servants, who refused to let themselves be assimilated to the master’s belongings and pursued emancipation through intervention by political power on their behalf, be it existing political power or that formed in the wake of a revolution from below. The struggles waged by servants aggravated the sense of unease in some sections of the community of the free, who soon sought to acquire a good conscience by repressing slavery to the colonies and changing or masking the politico-social relations that most blatantly gave the lie to their proclaimed attachment to the cause of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entanglement of, and clash between, these two different ideas of liberty, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg279&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and of the politico-social subjects who appealed to them, explains the especially complex and tortuous character of the first English revolution and the French Revolution as such. Not even the United States was spared this conflict. In fact, it flared up there in the most violent and bloody way during the Civil War, in a clash between, on the one hand, the idea of liberty understood as self-government by the dominant class and race and, on the other, the idea of liberty that experienced increasing disquiet because of the persistence of the institution of slavery. Defeated militarily, in slightly different form, as a regime of terroristic white supremacy, the idea of liberty dear to the South ended up achieving a political success in the United States that lasted beyond the mid-twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two liberalisms we are referring to are to be construed in an ideal-typical sense: within the same author, it is possible to register fluctuation from one to the other. In condemning as contrary to liberty coalitions composed of ‘desperate men’, who sought to escape death from starvation, Smith clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the very wealthy. On the other hand, in calling for a ‘despotic government’ to abolish slavery, he was embracing a different theoretical paradigm, which identified liberty with the abolition of oppressive relations existing within civil society itself. And the great economist adhered to this second paradigm when he observed that in eastern Europe ‘serfdom’ continued to exist in ‘Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority’, and thus was not in a position to foil the resistance of feudal lords.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an observation which, albeit to a lesser extent, also applies to de Tocqueville. When he condemned the reduction of the working day in factories to twelve hours as an expression of despotism, he clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the bourgeoisie. But on other occasions the French liberal argued differently. In a letter of 1840 to an American correspondent, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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For me it is a rather melancholy reflection to think that your nation has incorporated slavery to such an extent that they expand together … In practice, there are no precedents for an abolition of slavery on the master’s initiative. It has only been abolished thanks to the power of a government that dominated master and slave alike. That is why, precisely because you are completely independent, slavery will last longer among you than anywhere else.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg280&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Rather than the locus of liberty, here self-government is the condition for the perpetuation of the evil of slavery. Only a strong government would be able to abolish it. More concerned about the stability of the United States than the freedom of blacks, de Tocqueville, unlike Smith, did not go so far as to come out in favour of a ‘despotic government’. But in the case of Ireland, the same French liberal harboured the idea of a temporary dictatorship that would put an end to the terrible ills visited on the native population by the self-government of Anglo-Irish, Protestant property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although convinced that ‘public education is salutary, above all in free countries’, Constant was firmly opposed to the introduction of compulsory schooling, since he considered unacceptable any form of ‘restriction’ that violated the ‘rights of individuals’, including ‘those of fathers over their children’. True, poverty meant that in poor families children were taken out of school and put to work early. Yet it was necessary to renounce any restrictions and wait for poverty to fade away.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of this logic, in addition to rejecting compulsory schooling, Constant did not even entertain the hypothesis of state intervention against the scourge of child labour. Some decades later, by contrast, declaring himself in favour of compulsory schooling, Mill argued against the ‘misplaced notions of liberty’ of parents and added: ‘The State … is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his [the individual’s] exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this different judgement, we see the transition from one theoretical paradigm to another; and the transition was also the result of the struggle of those who were excluded from liberty construed simply as self-government by civil society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reacting to the protests and challenge of the working-class movement, it was liberal England that regulated working hours and conditions in factories, abolishing or tempering the most odious aspects of what Marx and Engels branded as employers’ ‘despotism’. This aroused the protests of not a few liberal representatives and English capitalists themselves, who (observed &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;) ‘denounced the factory inspector as a species of revolutionary commissioner reminiscent of the [Jacobin] Convention’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Bismarck made a profession of liberalism and thundered against the ‘Royal Prussian Court Jacobin’, who claimed to interfere in the relationship between masters and servants and hence to ride roughshod over the principle of self-government by civil society, hegemonized in this instance by feudal property and not an aristocratic—bourgeois &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg281&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;coalition, as in the British case. And it was precisely the Prussian–German statesman who distinguished between two types of liberalism in this connection. The first was characterized by ‘repugnance at the power of bureaucracy’, on the basis of ‘liberal caste sentiments’ widely diffused among the Junkers and nobility of pre-revolutionary Prussia; the second, utterly odious in Bismarck’s view, was ‘Rhineland–French liberalism’, or the ‘liberalism of civil servants’ (&#039;&#039;Geheimratsliberalismus&#039;&#039;), inclined to incisive anti-feudal reforms from above, which inspired an oppressive, suffocating state bureaucracy with its ‘tendency … to levelling and centralization’ and even ‘bureaucratic omnipotence’ (&#039;&#039;geheimrätliche Allgewalt&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note that a similar distinction occurs in the young Marx. The &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; edited by him defined itself as a ‘liberal paper’, but was careful to specify that its liberalism was not in any way to be confused with ‘vulgar liberalism’ (&#039;&#039;gewöhnlicher Liberalismus&#039;&#039;). While the latter saw ‘all good on the part of representative bodies and all evil on the part of government’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039;, by contrast, was characterized by its attempt to analyse relations of domination and oppression in their concrete form, without hesitating in particular circumstances to underline ‘the general wisdom of the government against the private egotism of representative bodies’ (often monopolized by feudal strata and a narrow-minded, short-sighted big bourgeoisie). Contrary to ‘vulgar liberalism’, far from fighting ‘bureaucracy one-sidedly’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; had no difficulty acknowledging the merits of its struggle against the ‘romantic’ or ‘romantic–feudal’ current.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Despite the contrasting value judgements, in both Bismarck and Marx we witness a distinction between a liberalism inclined to consecrate the self-government of a civil society hegemonized by the feudal aristocracy or grand bourgeoisie, and a liberalism ready to intervene in the relations of domination and oppression that manifest themselves within civil society itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they are located in this historical and theoretical context, we can understand two significant turns that occurred in the course of the liberal tradition. We know that, initially, the liberal/servile dichotomy had a strong social and ethnic connotation. This connotation tended to weaken as the struggle for recognition intensified and the concessions that the community of the free was forced to make became more significant. We can then understand the attempt &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg282&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by some sections of the liberal movement to differentiate between political liberalism and economic liberalism, and thus distance themselves from those (economic-liberal) sections which, crying scandal at any state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, refused to question the relations of domination and oppression present within civil society, within the ‘private sphere’.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, with every significant concession that the community of the free (or its most advanced sectors) found itself obliged to make to the excluded, engaged in the struggle for recognition, there were denunciations of ‘betrayal’ from the most intransigent sectors, with a consequent laceration and division of the liberal movement. Clearly distancing himself from those who refused to follow him in the crusade against the French Revolution, in 1791 Burke, in the name of loyalty to the ‘Old Whigs’, authors of the Glorious Revolution, broke with the ‘new Whigs’, guilty of having derived ideas and ideals ‘from a French die, unknown to the impress of our fathers in the constitution’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, at the heart of the conflict was the idea of representation, which the French revolutionaries and their followers on British soil, in the name of the imaginary, ‘pretended rights of man’, interpreted in a merely quantitative sense, invoking the principle of calculating a majority by head, ignoring the special function of the aristocracy and trampling the healthy arrangement of society into estates underfoot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A century or so later, the struggle for recognition was continuing to develop in new, more advanced conditions. Over and above political citizenship, the ‘multitude’, previously branded ‘swinish’, demanded the right to health, education and a minimum of free time. It succeeded in wresting more or less sizeable concessions and enjoyed support from significant representatives of liberalism. In Britain this was true above all of T. H. Green, who theorized ‘freedom in the positive sense’ in controversy with the economic liberals of his time. They condemned state regulation of working hours in factories or of female and child labour, in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ and liberty understood exclusively as non-interference by political power in the private sphere of production and labour relations.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, responding to the attempts at adaptation and reconciliation by some sectors of liberalism were cries of scandal from the movement’s most intransigent sections. Spencer, Acton and Henry S. Maine were among the many to denounce the ‘betrayal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg283&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Spencer particularly stood out. Those who, under the pretence of improving popular living conditions, banned the employment of children under the age of twelve, forced parents to send their children to school, subjected factory work (especially female labour) to a whole variety of regulations, and introduced compulsory insurance for illness and old age had ceased to be liberals: they had arrived at a ‘New Toryism’. In effect, they were simply inflating the state, enlarging the zone of coercion and limiting that of freedom of contract and the autonomous development of the individual.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As in the case of Burke with the ‘new Whigs’, so Spencer branded the ‘New Toryism’: albeit in a different idiom, what was targeted was a spurious liberalism forgetful of its own noble past; a liberalism guilty of abandoning the cause of self-government by civil society (whether aristocratic or bourgeois) and of the spontaneity of the market, giving way to the blandishments of statism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Celebration of the spontaneity of the market, as if its historically determinate form was not the result of political action, was philosophically ingenuous enough. For centuries the market of the liberal West had involved the presence of chattel slavery and the buying and selling of indentured white servants. Even the borderline that separated commodities on the one hand, and the figure of the buyer/seller on the other, was the result of political and even military intervention, abhorred for centuries as being synonymous with artificial, violent constructivism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us ignore the peculiar ‘commodities’ long represented by slaves and indentured servants. When can the market be regarded as free of external disturbance, and hence such that the parties to any exchange find themselves in a position of liberty and equality? Locke regarded the truck-system, whereby workers were paid not in money but in commodities produced by the factory they worked in, as perfectly legitimate. In agreement with him was Frederick William III, who in 1832 silenced voices raised in protest against this system with the argument that the state did not have the right to intervene in a ‘relationship of private right’, trampling over ‘civil liberty’ or arbitrarily restricting it. For Smith, by contrast, ‘the law which obliges the masters … to pay their workmen in money and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the liberal philosopher and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg284&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prussian monarch, the great economist was of the opinion that the truck-system violated the principle of equality between the contracting parties and therefore justified legal intervention that would have seemed intolerable to Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much later liberal authors like Lecky and others condemned state regulation of working hours as an inadmissible interference in the market sphere.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In our times, by contrast, Hayek believed that the promulgation by the state of ‘general, equal, and known rules’, of ‘general conditions’ which must be fulfilled by any contract, was not in itself a violation of the principle of liberty. But the Austro-American author, who distinguished himself by thundering against any form of statism and constructivism, would have seemed statist and constructivist to Lecky, whom Hayek regarded as a classic proponent of liberalism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Potentially a traitor in the eyes of economic liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, Hayek elsewhere identified and denounced the betrayal of liberalism. Although in favour of the social state and hence aligning himself with Green, Hobhouse continued to profess himself a follower of that intellectual current. &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, read the title of his book, which in fact, according to Hayek, would more accurately have been entitled Socialism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years earlier, von Mises had reached the same conclusion: most British ‘liberals’ were ‘so in name only. In fact, they are rather moderate socialists.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The charges of treason against the wing of liberalism disposed to make concessions to colonial peoples were even more violent. In France, immediately after Thermidor, anyone who resisted the turn intended to re-establish if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy in the colonies, was branded ‘African’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States of the 1820s, arguing against abolitionist tendencies, Randolph declared that the term ‘liberal’ now risked becoming synonymous with ‘black alliance’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The polemic against the ‘black republicans’ subsequently became the guiding thread of the struggle against the abolitionist tendencies that were coagulating in Lincoln’s Republican Party, as emerges in particular from the debate which, a few years before the Civil War, pitted the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg285&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;future president against Senator Stephen A. Douglas.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In subsequent years, Lecky was among those crying treason. The brief period of interracial and multi-ethnic democracy experienced by the South—Reconstruction—was, in his view, the triumph of the ‘negro vote’ and the disappearance of ‘the influence of property and intelligence’; it was the advent, ‘under the protection of the Northern bayonets’, of ‘a hideous orgie of anarchy, violence, unrestrained corruption, undisguised, ostentatious, insulting robbery, such as the world had scarcely ever seen’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. The community of the free as a community of peace? Policing operations and colonial wars&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto concentrated on the challenges to the community of the free that might be mounted by the barbarians in the colonies or the metropolis, and on the acute crisis situations that could arise within an individual country. But what were the relations between the various countries into which the community of the free was divided? Precisely because it was inclined to repress the genesis of the conflict and situate it outside itself, it tended to present itself as the community of peace, deaf to the sirens of war and bellicose adventures, which were a pre-modern legacy, and as wholly absorbed in the production, exchange and peaceful enjoyment of the goods that constituted civilization. George Washington expressed the hope that the development of ‘free commerce’ and civilization, ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, would put a stop to ‘the devastations and horrors of war’, uniting humanity ‘like one great family in fraternal ties’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, repeated Constant, in ‘the age of commerce’ even ‘a successful war always costs more than it brings in’: having become obsolete as a tool for acquiring wealth, war was destined to disappear; ‘the uniform tendency is towards peace’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn194|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;194&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This ideal of perpetual peace, produced by freedom of industry and trade, was sometimes so deeply felt that it prompted harsh criticism of the realpolitik of war and conquest pursued, for example, by England. Thus authors like Cobden and Spencer, bitter critics of their country’s foreign and military policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg286&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In the mid-nineteenth century, the former exclaimed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been the most combative and aggressive community that has existed since the days of the Roman dominion. Since the Revolution of 1688 we have expended more than fifteen hundred millions of money upon wars, not one of which has been upon our own shores, or in defence of our hearths and homes … this pugnacious propensity has been invariably recognized by those who have studied our national character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn195|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;195&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the self-proclamation of the community of the free as a community of peace could generate a different line of argument. However pitiless, the struggle against the ‘savage beasts’ represented (in Washington’s view) by Indians was not an act of war, but a policing operation. This applied to conflicts with those peoples or, rather, those hordes that had not yet attained the stage of civilization and peace. Against barbaric pirates it was necessary to organize an expedition that ‘would crush them into non-existence’; sooner or later, it would be necessary to ‘exterminate those nests of Miscreants’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn196|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;196&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville likewise tended to liken conflict with barbarians to a policing operation. In September 1856 he expressed the fear that the clash between North and South in the United States would end up provoking ‘war in the heart of a great continent whence it has been banished for more than a century’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]). Clearly, subsumed under the category of war were neither the expeditions that had decimated and were decimating the Indians, nor the armed conflict that had involved a significant amputation of Mexican territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the growing colonial expansion of Europe, and primarily of Britain, which now also encompassed a country of ancient civilization like China, made resort to the category of policing operation problematic. On the other side, recognizing the reality of war might also play a positive role at the level of domestic policy, might serve to overshadow the worsening social conflict, and counter the vulgarly hedonistic ideology in whose wake radical and socialist agitation had developed. The ideal tension that presided over war was thus positively contrasted with the pettiness of material demands advanced by popular protest movements: ‘The masses want tranquillity and earnings’, and hence peace, but the merit of war precisely lay in throwing this philistine view of life &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg287&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into crisis, observed Burckhardt, who in this connection quoted Heraclitus’ motto (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn197|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;197&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For de Tocqueville war and ‘great events’ could form a useful antidote to ‘our mediocre democratic and bourgeois soup’, which was the breeding ground of sensualism and socialist hedonism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn198|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;198&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; forcefully asserted that ‘I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and elevates their character.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn199|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;199&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it involved an advance by the West, and hence by the cause of liberty, war revealed its true nobility and beauty. De Tocqueville expressed himself in lyrical terms on the first Opium War (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|§6]]), in a letter whose addressee was the English liberal Reeve. He in turn, on the occasion of the Crimean War (which saw England allied with Bonapartist France), expressed himself no less magniloquently in the course of correspondence with the French liberal:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We live at a time when it is necessary to know how to suffer and witness suffering. The sword of war cuts to the heart. But what a mighty influence this struggle has on the political and social body! What a unity of sentiment and endeavour it creates! What a reawakening of the forces which, after all, make up the greatness of a people. I willingly accept all the anguish and all the ills of war for what it brings morally even more than politically.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn200|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;200&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The proud self-consciousness of the community of the free and the emergence of ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
War against barbarians in the colonies, or against countries situated on the margins of civilization, had hitherto been a subject for appreciation or celebration. At first sight, no cloud seemed to trouble the unity of the community of the free. However, after having desired the extension to the entire planet of the enlightened ‘despotism’ of civilized countries, Mill continued as follows: the gigantic ‘federation’, albeit ‘unequal’, that was the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg288&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Backward populations had an interest in becoming part of the British Empire, in order to avoid ‘being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn201|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;201&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years of the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville had responded prematurely and indirectly to Mill’s claim to raise the British Empire to the status of unique, privileged representative of a universal cause. The English were characterized by&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
their constant commitment to seek to demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of a principle, or for the good of the natives, or even for the benefit of the sovereigns whom they subjugate; honest is their indignation at those who put up resistance; these are the procedures with which they always cover up violence.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn202|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;202&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
With the disappearance of the semblance of complete unity, rivalry emerged between the different countries that made up the community of the free—rivalry that became all the more intense as the liquidation of despotism and, more generally, the construction of a new political regime deemed more advanced reinforced the self-consciousness of the individual protagonists. This was soil wherein was rooted the celebration, dear to Burke, of the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. The most lucid exponents of liberalism were perfectly well aware of this. While it also made itself felt in the works of authors such as Constant and, above all, Spencer, in this intellectual tradition the illusion that the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; betokened the advent of perpetual peace did not play the role it had in the French Revolution and radicalism. A source of possible conflicts between the various countries, observed Hamilton, was not only the diversity of political orders and interests:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg289&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? … Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn203|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;203&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of the representative regime and the transfer of power from absolute monarchy to the nation were not in themselves an antidote to war. Holland and England, the first two nations to have equipped themselves with liberal orders, had turned out to be ‘frequently engaged in war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn204|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;204&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hamilton felt great admiration for Britain: ‘I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn205|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;205&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet on the level of international policy, Britain remained an enemy to be defeated. The American statesman rebuked Europe, which wanted ‘to plume herself as the Mistress of the World’ and tended ‘to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit’. This was a pretence that must be countered with force: ‘It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.’ Sooner or later, the new Union would be the one ‘able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn206|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;206&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the enemy was generically identified as Europe and the Old World, the particular reference was to Britain which at this time (1787), following France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, was the only great imperial power. Jefferson was more explicit. The ‘empire for liberty’ desired by him presupposed Britain’s defeat: not only was it called upon to be the most grand and glorious ‘since the creation’, and hence to outclass the British Empire, but it also presupposed the annexation of Canada (in addition to Cuba), ‘which would be of course in the first war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn207|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;207&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For de Tocqueville, too, shared membership of the community of the free by certain countries did not guarantee permanent relations of friendship and peace between them. In defining its foreign policy, France must not exclusively assert its ‘interest in developing the principles of liberty in the world’. Only the naive could believe that their spread meant the simultaneous disappearance of the threat of war:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg290&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Will anyone go so far as to claim that two peoples must necessarily live in peace with one another just because they have similar political institutions? That all the causes of ambition, rivalry, jealousy, all the bad memories have been abolished? Free institutions render these feelings even more vital.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn208|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;208&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; stressed that ‘[a]ll free nations are vainglorious’; the ‘restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people’ was self-evident. This was confirmed, in particular, by the transatlantic republic: ‘The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise … Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn209|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;209&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an excessive ‘national pride’, an ‘irritable patriotism’ (&#039;&#039;patriotisme irritable&#039;&#039;), which did not tolerate criticism of any kind.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn210|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;210&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a demand for primacy that sought utter exclusivity. If a foreigner admired the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by Americans, they would react by accepting the compliment, but immediately rendering it more emphatic and more exclusive: ‘few nations are worthy of it’. If a foreigner admired their ‘purity of morals’, the American interlocutor would react by denouncing ‘the corruption that prevails in other nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn211|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;211&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he turned to the international rivalry between the countries making up the community of the free and the West, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to speak harshly of the United States. Writing to an American interlocutor, and referring to attempts to expand southwards also made by ‘private’ adventurers (he was thinking of William Walker), the French liberal wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not without concern, I have seen this spirit of conquest, even of rapine, exhibited among you for some years. It is not a sign of good health in a people that already has more territory than it can fill. I confess that I could not but be sad if I came to learn that the [American] nation had embarked on an operation against Cuba or—even worse—entrusted it to its lost sons.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn212|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;212&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The American interlocutor might easily have retorted by recalling de Tocqueville’s enthusiastic support for France’s policy of ‘conquest’ and ‘rapine’ in Algeria. But the key point is different. Far from damping it down, the common waving of the flag of liberty further fuelled international rivalry. After &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg291&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the February Revolution, de Tocqueville declared that ‘starting from 1789’ France once again donned the ‘role’ of ‘saviour’ ‘of peoples whose liberty is in danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn213|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;213&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An ‘empire for liberty’ was thus evoked whose capital was Paris, and which tended to come into conflict with the ‘empire for liberty’ cherished by Jefferson.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. De Tocqueville’s ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The realism with which the most lucid representatives of the liberal tradition analysed the persistence of national rivalries, despite their shared reference to the ideal of liberty, had another aspect to it: the candid, avowed chauvinism presiding over the international policy programme. This applies to de Tocqueville in particular. The principle of consent by the governed as a criterion for legitimizing political power gave impetus to national movements in Europe as well. Prima facie, it would seem that the liberal world as a whole should have felt unequivocal sympathy for them. In this case, we are dealing not with colonial peoples, but with peoples regarded as more or less civilized, who primarily came into conflict with the Habsburg Empire—that is, a power which had remained foreign to liberal development. Yet de Tocqueville proved cool, or frankly hostile. A partial explanation of this attitude can be found in the social demands that contaminated such movements and imperilled the traditional liberal delimitation of the political sphere. The Mazzinian republic established in Rome was ‘the red republic’ and against it, and ‘the anarchical party in Rome and the rest of the world’, no blows should be spared. Ideological fury impelled the French liberal to speak of his political opponents in Italy as ‘a whole category of political criminals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn214|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;214&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville proved harsh and even cynical about one of the protagonists of the Hungarian national revolution: rather than agitating to save ‘Kossuth’s skin’, it might happily be made into a ‘drum’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn215|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;215&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above rejection of radicalism, what motivated this attitude was ‘irritable patriotism’, concerns of a chauvinistic kind, as emerges in particular from de Tocqueville’s furious polemic against ‘our imbecile agents’ in Germany, who were guilty of not countering the prospect of that country’s ‘political unification’ more firmly and effectively. Certainly, ‘the population’s passion for this idea seems sincere and profound’; but ‘nothing would be more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg292&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;frightful for us’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn216|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;216&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But did this not ride roughshod over the liberal principle of self-government and consent by the governed as a criterion of the legitimacy of any government? That was a problem de Tocqueville did not pose. He hoped for ‘the victory of the princes’ and the Prussian army to put paid to ‘excessive decentralization’ that encouraged the swarming of ‘revolutionary breeding grounds’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn217|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;217&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to Italy, chauvinistic concerns should have played a more modest role. Yet in September 1848, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville summarized his position as follows: ‘preservation of the old territories … and real, significant changes in institutions’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn218|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;218&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, there was no place for demands for national unity. And the principle of consent by the governed? Having invited the organization of ‘a &#039;&#039;Roman demonstration’&#039;&#039; in favour of restoring the Pope’s temporal power, de Tocqueville continued as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In my opinion, this is &#039;&#039;indispensable&#039;&#039;. And, in order to achieve this result, if we do not also have the reality, it is &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; necessary to produce at least the semblance. This is the only way to connect the expedition with one of the main objectives we have always assigned it and on which the National Assembly has always wished to stand firm—coming to the aid of the real will and hidden desires of the people of Rome.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn219|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;219&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage the roles of appearance and reality are reversed rapidly and inadvertently. The ‘semblance’ of a demonstration to be organized at all costs expressed the ‘hidden’ but nevertheless ‘real’ will of the Roman population, whose interpreter was the government of the occupying power. At this point it was also possible to resort to radical measures with a clear conscience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I cannot really understand why, in the twenty-four hours following the city’s capture, we did not, with utmost rapidity and energy, close the clubs, tear down the flag of the Republic, disarm the citizens and soldiers, arrest all those who, in their attitude, indicated that they disapproved of our presence [&#039;&#039;tous ceux qui faisaient mine de trouver mauvais notre présence&#039;&#039;]—in a word, strike our enemies with terror in order to conquer the terror that had gripped our friends.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn220|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;220&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg293&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;So here we have an invitation to make arrests even on the basis of mere suspicion. Not by chance, reference is made to terror. It is a term that recurs frequently; it amounts to a veritable watchword: ‘strike the demagogic party with terror and lift the liberal party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn221|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;221&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But another watchword was immediately added: ‘negate the rigours of the past, although leaving terror to waft over the future’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn222|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;222&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, European public opinion, which already felt ‘deep repulsion’ at France’s conduct, must not be unduly ruffled. Yet it was a question of ‘advancing and advancing with the most extreme rigour’; all the more so because the country’s honour was at stake. It found itself faced with a ‘terrible alternative’—a Hobson’s choice:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Either to deliver Rome over to all the horrors of war or to retreat shamefully, beaten by the same men who for eighteen months fled all the battlefields of Italy. The first would be a great misfortune, but the second would be a fearful disaster and, as far as I am concerned, I have no hesitation.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn223|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;223&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, chauvinism took priority over any other concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. The conflict of ideas of mission from the American Revolution to the First World War&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So we can understand the recurrent divisions that opened up in the community of the free. The one that occurred in the two decades preceding the foundation of the United States is illuminating. The Seven Years’ War was also experienced and fought by the English colonists in America, and in fact primarily by them, not only as a war for the defence of English liberty, but also (as the sermons of Protestant ministers never tired of repeating) as a holy war in which it was God himself who guided and saved England–Israel from the threat represented by France. The victory achieved over the enemies of Israel was proof of the ‘favourable providential presence of God with his people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;224&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years later, it was England’s turn to form the core of the alliance of the ‘enemies of God’, while the rebel American colonists continued to be ‘true Christians, good &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg294&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;soldiers of Jesus Christ’, called upon to cultivate ‘a martial spirit’ and ‘the art of war’, so as to accomplish ‘the work of the Lord’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;225&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the first major conflict to convulse the community of the free, and it spans the period that extends from the American Revolution to the war of 1812–15. As the latter was coming to an end, Jefferson expressed the opinion that Great Britain was no less despotic than Napoleon. Moreover, while the latter would take ‘his tyrannies’ to the grave with him, a whole ‘nation’ was seeking to impose its absolute domination over the seas; and it was an ‘insult to the human understanding’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;226&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Such was his ideological fury that the American statesman ended up declaring: ‘Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents from Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military and manufacturing one.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;227&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having heard the news of the end of hostilities, Jefferson wrote that it was ‘an armistice only’. So radical was the antagonism not only of interests, but also of principles, that the two countries were in fact engaged in an ‘eternal war’, which would terminate or was destined to end with the ‘extermination of the one or the other party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;228&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major conflict was the one that exploded with the American Civil War. The dialectic we have already encountered was on display once again. The fact that for decades the antagonists had regarded themselves as members of the chosen people of liberty, far from reducing the bitterness of the clash, accentuated it. Both sides were convinced that they were fighting a holy war; they appealed to Holy Scripture and half of their propaganda texts were written by ecclesiastics.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;229&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major conflict survived the second, which was eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century by the rising tide of chauvinism that invested the United States as a whole, without significant distinctions between North and South. In 1889 Kipling noted with disappointment that the 4 July celebrations in San Francisco were the occasion for official speeches against what the Americans defined as ‘our natural enemy’, represented by Great Britain ‘with her chain of fortresses across the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;230&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, this antagonism too was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg295&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;being damped down, because a completely new international situation was maturing. More than ever engaged in colonial expansion, and increasingly taken in by the idea of the freedom mission they assigned themselves in competition with one another, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the various national centres of the community of the free turned out to be on a collision course. This is the context in which we can situate the third major conflict in the history of liberalism. Starting with the First World War, in particular it saw ranged against one another Britain (and the United States) and Germany—the most recent and ambitious recruit to the community of the free, which at the end of the nineteenth century had likewise begun to cherish the idea of an empire for liberty, putting itself at the head of a crusade for the abolition of slavery in the colonies.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;231&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interpretation of the third major conflict suggested here might occasion astonishment. What obstructs an understanding of this event is the negative teleology that tends to interpret German history in its entirety as a series of stages leading inexorably to the horror of the Third Reich. In reality, on the eve of the First World War Germany was not obviously less ‘democratic’ than the United States, where racial oppression raged, or than Great Britain, which completely disregarded universal male suffrage (on which elections to the Reichstag were based), and exercised imperial domination on a global scale and even in Europe itself, at the expense of Ireland. Above all, it must not be forgotten that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in England and America, Germany was regarded as a full member of the exclusive club of free peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So the by now familiar dialectic emerges once again. Confronting one another in a total war, which required the mobilization of culture as well as armies, were antagonists who had previously congratulated one another on being members, or even especially influential members, of the community of the free—in this case, of the great Teutonic or Aryan family, united by a jealous custodianship of individual autonomy and love of self-government and liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn1a|1]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Recueil d’articles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Éphraim Harpaz, Geneva: Droz, 1972, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn2a|2]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 29–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn4a|4]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 6, p. 84; vol. 5, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn5a|5]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1981, p. 794.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn6a|6]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 155–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn8a|8]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn9a|9]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, ed. Thomas W. Copeland and John A. Woods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 7, pp. 52–3 (letter to William Weddell, 31 January 1792).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn10a|10]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 397 (letter to La Fayette, 28 May 1788), 455 (fragments of the discarded first inaugural address, April 1789)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn11a|11]] Adams, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn12a|12]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn13a|13]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., pp. 194–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn15a|15]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel de France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier&#039;&#039;, ed. Philippe Raynaud, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn16a|16]] Constant, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 183, 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn17a|17]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 7, pp. 144–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn18a|18]] James Mackintosh, &#039;&#039;Vindiciae gallicae&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Woodstock, 1989, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn19a|19]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn20a|20]] Jean-Joseph Mounier, &#039;&#039;De l’influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-maçons et aux illuminés sur la révolution de France&#039;&#039;, Tübingen: Cotta, 1801, pp. 31, 36–7, 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 33, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn22a|22]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn23a|23]] Arthur O. Lovejoy, &#039;&#039;The Great Chain of Being&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn24a|24]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn25a|25]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn27a|27]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn28a|28]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 12, p. 365 (letter to J. P. Nichol, 21 December 1837). On this see Eileen P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983, p. 606.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn29a|29]] Pasquale Villari, &#039;&#039;Dai cargeggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984, p. 151 (letter from Mill to Villari, 11 June 1862).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn30a|30]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn32a|32]] Cobden, quoted in Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 25–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn33a|33]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in Italy and France from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn34a|34]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. James Morton Smith, New York: Norton, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 1585–6 (letter to James Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn35a|35]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 382.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn36a|36]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn37a|37]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 245–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn38a|38]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn39a|39]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 21, p. 528 (letter to Edwin Chadwick, 13 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn40a|40]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 29, p. 26 (letter from Engels to Marx, 23 May 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 496 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 17 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 18, p. 424 (letter to A. de Circourt, 25 October 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn43a|43]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, London: Penguin, 1986, pp. 301–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 4, pp. 273–4, 266, 300–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn45a|45]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn48a|48]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, pp. 253, 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn49a|49]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 223, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., pp. 224, 242.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn52a|52]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn53a|53]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 215–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn54a|54]] Boissy d’Anglas, quoted in Georges Lefebvre, &#039;&#039;La France sous le Directoire&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1984, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn55a|55]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 2, p. 70 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 21 February 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn57a|57]] Ibid. vol. 4, pt 1, p. 321.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn58a|58]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 281.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn59a|59]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn60a|60]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Principles of Ethics&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Tibor R. Machan, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn61a|61]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 2, 21, 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn62a|62]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 309–19 (for the quotation from Lincoln, see p. 312).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn63a|63]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn64a|64]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 131.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn65a|65]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn66a|66]] Giuseppe Mazzini, &#039;&#039;Note autobiografiche&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Pertici, Milan: Rizzoli, 1986, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn67a|67]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 234 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn68a|68]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn69a|69]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 863.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn72a|72]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 11, p. 392 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn73a|73]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn74a|74]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 64; William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 5, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn76a|76]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 19 August and 14 October 1856); Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, p. xviii; and on Guizot, cf. Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 331–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn79a|79]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 437 (letter of 14 December 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn80a|80]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 101 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 10 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn86a|86]] François-Alphonse Aulard, &#039;&#039;Histoire politique de la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1977, p. 19 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn87a|87]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 4, pp. 65, 100, 140; vol. 5, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn88a|88]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 268–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn90a|90]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 57–8 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 5 October 1828).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 64, 67–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 124–5, 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn93a|93]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 15, pt 1, p. 342 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn95a|95]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 20, pp. 319–63; and vol. 2, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn97a|97]] Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Britannica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 2, p. 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn98a|98]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 55 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn99a|99]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn100a|100]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 322–3 (letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn101a|101]] Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, pp. 393–6, 409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn102a|102]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 78, 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn103a|103]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 229 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 6 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn104a|104]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 159 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 14 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 29 August and 14 October 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 272–4 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 29 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn108a|108]] Ernst Nolte, &#039;&#039;Three Faces of Fascism&#039;&#039;, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Mentor, 1969, p. 635 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 55 n. 1 and 22 n. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn110a|110]] Arthur de Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie de Paris, vol. 1, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn111a|111]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn113a|113]] Ibid., pp. 235, 234.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn114a|114]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 103, 167; Hume, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn115a|115]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn116a|116]] David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn117a|117]] Chamberlain, quoted in Henry Kissinger, &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1994, p. 186.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn118a|118]] Alfred Thayer Mahan, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Asia&#039;&#039;, New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 125–6; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, pp. 55–7, 48–50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn119a|119]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 41ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 536–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn121a|121]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn122a|122]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, p. 322 (letter to Kentaro Kaneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn123a|123]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn124a|124]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn125a|125]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1847, vol. 1, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn126a|126]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn127a|127]] Ibid., pp. 508–9, 553.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn128a|128]] Ibid., p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn129a|129]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn130a|130]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 361.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn131a|131]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, pp. 221, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn132a|132]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn133a|133]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn134a|134]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 260–1 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 20 March 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn135a|135]] See Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 520–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn136a|136]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The History of Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, Natalie Gerardie and Mirian Kochan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974–75, vol. 3, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn137a|137]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 280 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 24 January 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn138a|138]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, pp. 151–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn140a|140]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, pp. 154–5 (letter to E. Cazelles, 3 May 1871).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn141a|141]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 305 (letter of 21 March 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 20, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn143a|143]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 348–9; vol. 13, pt 2, pp. 337–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn144a|144]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn145a|145]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14, 84, 194; Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn146a|146]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn147a|147]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn148a|148]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn149a|149]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn150a|150]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 211, 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn151a|151]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 75, 50–51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn152a|152]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 169–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn153a|153]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn154a|154]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn156a|156]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn157a|157]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 102.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn158a|158]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 18–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn160a|160]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn161a|161]] Burke, quoted in Johannes Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These von der Verschwörung&#039;&#039;, Bern and Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1976, p. 111 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn162a|162]] See Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn163a|163]] Cf. Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These&#039;&#039;, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn164a|164]] Disraeli, quoted in George E. Buckle and William F. Monypenny, &#039;&#039;The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, New York: Macmillan, 1914–20, vol. 3, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn165a|165]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn166a|166]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn167a|167]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 497–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn168a|168]] Ibid., p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn169a|169]] Malouet, quoted in Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn170a|170]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 38 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn172a|172]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 455.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn173a|173]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 83 (letter to J. Sparks, 13 October 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn174a|174]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn175a|175]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 159–60, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn176a|176]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 396.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn177a|177]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Die großen Reden&#039;&#039;, ed. Lothar Gall, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1984, p. 137; Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Werke in Auswahl&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, ed. Gustave Adolf Rein, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, p. 354 (speeches in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 18 October 1849 and 14 February 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn178a|178]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 424.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn179a|179]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn180a|180]] See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 89, 248, 257, 220, 228.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn181a|181]] Thomas Hill Green, ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard L. Nettleship, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1973, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn182a|182]] George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classsics, 1981; Henry S. Maine, &#039;&#039;Popular Government&#039;&#039;, ed. George W. Carey, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn183a|183]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 5–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn184a|184]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 3, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn185a|185]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn186a|186]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 230, 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn187a|187]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Conceit&#039;&#039;, ed. William Warren Bartley III, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn188a|188]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. xviii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn189a|189]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 262–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn190a|190]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn191a|191]] Cf. Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 498–504 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn192a|192]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn193a|193]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, p. 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn194a|194]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn195a|195]] Cobden, quoted in Daniel Pick, &#039;&#039;War Machine&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn196a|196]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, p. 401 (letter to La Fayette, 19 June 1788).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn197a|197]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, pp. 150, 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn198a|198]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, p. 421 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 9 August 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn199a|199]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn200a|200]] Reeve, quoted in de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn201a|201]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn202a|202]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 505.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn203a|203]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn204a|204]] Ibid., p. 180.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn205a|205]] Hamilton, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, ed., &#039;&#039;Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn206a|206]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn207a|207]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1586 (letter to Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn208a|208]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn209a|209]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 225–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn210a|210]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn211a|211]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 225.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn212a|212]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 147 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 4 December 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn213a|213]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn214a|214]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 249, 277, 399 (letters to F. de Corcelle, 10 and 20 June and 12 September 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn215a|215]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 92 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 January 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn216a|216]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 29, 38 (letters to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August and 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn217a|217]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 133–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 18 May 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn218a|218]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn219a|219]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 276 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 20 June 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn220a|220]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn221a|221]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn222a|222]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 294 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 2 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn223a|223]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 293 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224a|224]] Ellis Sandoz, ed., &#039;&#039;Political Sermons of the American Founding Era&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991, pp. 216–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225a|225]] Ibid., pp. 623–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226a|226]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 1272–3 (letter to Madame de Staël, 24 May 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227a|227]] Ibid., p. 1357 (letter to William Short, 28 November 1814).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228a|228]] Ibid., p. 1366 (letter to La Fayette, 14 February 1815).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229a|229]] Eugene D. Genovese, ‘Religion in the Collapse of the American Union’, in Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds, &#039;&#039;Religion and the American Civil War&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 74–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230a|230]] Kipling, quoted in Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, p. 322.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231a|231]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 17, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER NINE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page296&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg297&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Historiography and hagiography&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Our history of liberalism ends with the outbreak of the First World War, when (according to Weber) even in countries with the most stable liberal tradition the state was assigned ‘ “legitimate” power over the life, death and liberty’ of individuals, and ‘unlimited disposition over all the economic goods accessible to it’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, as Furet puts it, ‘in virtually all of Europe, the canons of August 1914 literally and metaphorically buried liberty in the name of country’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is appropriate to take a look back from this watershed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following the prelude of the revolt against Philip II’s absolutism by the Netherlands, liberalism asserted itself in two counties so positioned that they were sheltered from the threats to which continental European states were exposed. It should be added that, not by chance, the Glorious Revolution succeeded England’s victory first over Spain and then over France, while the American colonists’ revolt only began with the defeat of France in the Seven Years’ War. Thus, the two liberal revolutions both presupposed a clear improvement in the geopolitical situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards continental Europe, we can distinguish two phases: after the defeat of Turkey at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and the fading of the Ottoman threat, criticism of absolutism became widespread. The second phase was the so-called hundred years’ peace, which extended from the end of the Napoleonic &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg298&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This was the period when liberalism also asserted itself at a concrete political level. And just as the institutions that emerged from the 1789 revolution did not survive the war which engulfed revolutionary France, from 1914 the liberal institutions that had flourished in continental Europe during the hundred years’ peace experienced a dramatic crisis. Taken as a whole, as well as enjoying a more or less high degree of peace and geopolitical security, the liberal countries had another characteristic in common: in the period under investigation here, they had marked possibilities of defusing politico-social conflict in the metropolis through colonial expansion, whether continentally or overseas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the epochal rupture of 1914 there erupted in all its horror the second Thirty Years’ War, as the two global conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, separated by a fragile armistice, have often been defined. What is the relationship between all this and the preceding historical period? Or are we to believe that there is no relationship and that the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; came to an unanticipated end, brought about exclusively by circumstances altogether foreign to the liberal West? This is the conclusion that seems to be suggested by an eminent English historian of the modern world, A. J. P. Taylor:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit … Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service … It left the adult citizen alone.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Citing this picture, already problematic enough in itself, a contemporary British liberal scholar elevates it into ‘the historical paradigm of a liberal civilization’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, a couple of pages later, Taylor himself observes that ‘[s]ome 50 million Africans and 250 million Indians were involved, without consultation, in a war of which they understood nothing’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us ignore the colonies, and even Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom and experienced such political and military oppression from the London government that it was (again in Taylor’s words) the protagonist of ‘the only national rebellion in any &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg299&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;European country during the First World War—an ironical comment on the British claim to be fighting for freedom’ and to represent the cause of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for England specifically, I do not know if Cobden ‘noticed’ the state that inspected his mail, but it was certainly on its guard against a citizen who was unquestionably ‘sensible and law-abiding’, but whose fault was to be suspected of Chartist sympathies.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the state even more readily ‘noticed’ the Chartism and the working-class movement in general, which faced repeated suspension of habeas corpus and recourse to the use of &#039;&#039;agents provocateurs&#039;&#039; who elicited horror not only in the liberal Constant, but also in a ‘statist’ like Hegel.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the England of the time, ‘a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers’ was at work.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even the contrast with the continent as regards military conscription is mistaken: this had already made its appearance some years earlier in the United States during the Civil War and, in order to impose it, Lincoln, putting down violent resistance, had no hesitation in having an army corps march on New York.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Military conscription was not a practice imposed on the liberal world from without, from the continent!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historiography tends to shade into hagiography. I use this term in a technical sense: it involves a discourse completely focused on what, for the community of the free, was the restricted sacred space. It is enough, however briefly, to introduce the profane space (slaves in the colonies and servants in the metropolis) into the analysis, to realize the inadequate, misleading character of the categories (absolute pre-eminence of individual liberty, anti-statism, individualism) generally used to trace the history of the liberal West. Was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain the land of religious freedom? Referring to Ireland, the liberal de Beaumont, who was de Tocqueville’s companion during his trip to America, spoke of ‘unimaginable religious oppression’. We are dealing with a people not only deprived of its ‘religious freedom’, but also forced, notwithstanding its poverty, to subsidize the wealthy Anglican Church that oppressed it with tithes. The vexations, humiliations and suffering inflicted by British ‘tyranny’ on this ‘slave people’ proved that ‘a degree of egotism and madness is present in human institutions whose limits cannot be defined’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg300&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But let us concentrate on the metropolis. Celebrating the individualism and anti-statism attributed to the liberal tradition, Hayek pays homage to Mandeville, for whom the ‘arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In truth, the author elevated into a model here was not only completely undisturbed by the spectacle of hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’, but invoked summary trials and an acceleration in death sentences—and demanded state intervention even in the private life of these poor people, on whom the observance of Sunday worship should be imposed from infancy (see above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). It is clear that what held Hayek’s attention was neither the colonies nor metropolitan servants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Things do not fall out right even if such neglect is regarded as innocuous. The experience of the British colonies in America that subsequently became the United States is particularly revealing. Servile, semi-servile and free labourpower came from across the Atlantic in ways and in accordance with rules fixed by the political authorities, which also played a decisive role in delimiting the area opened up to colonization from time to time. The slavery or marginalization and degradation imposed on blacks ended up impinging on the ‘modern liberty’ of the whites themselves—and so seriously that the wrong choice of sexual or marriage partner risked transforming the culprit into a ‘felon’, a traitor to his own country and race! The white population as a whole, and slave-owners themselves, were subject to a whole series of laws that gravely interfered in even the most intimate aspect of private life. The political authorities exercised comprehensive surveillance so that miscegenation and, above all, the potential fruit of such noxious mixing did not lead to emancipation and did not threaten the purity of the community of the free with its false presence. It was a crime to give or even merely furnish writing materials to slaves. The postal administration prevented the circulation of materials vaguely critical of the institution of slavery. In the South a climate of terror reigned over citizens suspected of harbouring abolitionist ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the race issue and the dark cloud it suspended over the civil rights of the white community itself. We can take a key state in the history of the North American revolution and republic: ‘Pennsylvania was … renowned in the nineteenth century for its stringent laws against blasphemy, profanity, and desecrating the sabbath’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Independently of the prohibition of miscegenation, which remained in force beyond the mid-twentieth century, sexual &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg301&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;freedom in the United States was restricted in ways that were largely foreign to the despised, ‘statist’ continental Europe. Here is the picture drawn in 2003 by a distinguished US newspaper:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All 50 states had laws banning sodomy until 1961 … The number had dwindled to 24 states by 1968 and stands at 13 today … Most of the remaining states with anti-sodomy laws forbid anal or oral sex among consenting adults no matter their sex or relationship.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
To this we must add the constitutional amendment of 1919 that sought to prevent the production and consumption of ‘intoxicating liquors’—a further intervention in the private life of citizens with few parallels in other Western countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the history of the English colonies in America and then of the United States—both classical countries of the liberal tradition are thus involved to differing degrees—is better explained by the complexity of the process of constructing and protecting the sacred space, than by the categories of anti-statism and individualism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The liberal revolution as a tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once the field of hagiography has been evacuated, in reconstructing the history of liberalism it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: ‘We won’t be their Negroes!’ On the one hand, the rebellion began by demanding equality, while on the other it reasserted inequality and further deepened it. The two demands were indissolubly linked: precisely because they established a marked superiority over blacks and Indians, the colonists felt themselves completely equal to gentlemen and property-owners residing in London, and demanded that such equality be recognized and consecrated at every level. The dialectic that issued in the Glorious Revolution was not very different. We have seen an exponent of English proto-liberalism demanding, in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of his own possessions and servants. Far from questioning it, ‘true liberty’ consecrated the existing relations of service (and, in the colonies, slavery) as belonging to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg302&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an inviolable private sphere. The equality property-owners demanded with the sovereign, who could now be nothing but &#039;&#039;primus inter pares&#039;&#039;, went hand in hand with the reification of servants, who tended to be likened to other objects of property. That is why liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we should analyse as a whole the three revolutions from which we started out. Of the first, which occurred in Holland, Huizinga observed that ‘the revolt against the Spanish government was a conservative revolution and could not have been otherwise’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same conclusion has been reached by other eminent historians. Philip II was concerned to ‘require that bishops be technically skilled (that is, theologians rather than sons of great lords)’ and was opposed to the nobility’s attempt to transform the Council of State into ‘an exclusively aristocratic executive body’. We can then understand that ‘large parts of the “Netherlands” nobility were suddenly afraid that the prince was not their &#039;&#039;agent&#039;&#039;, that his policies would in the short and medium run threaten their interests significantly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So, on the one hand, we have Philip II, who surrounded himself with ‘secretaries who were generally from modest origins, passive instruments of his will’; on the other, ‘an oligarchic princely republic of communal cities and feudal lordships’, a ‘grand aristocracy’, a ‘feudal oligarchy’ engaged in defending ‘privileges and customs’ that consecrated its power and prestige.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is as if the nobles of the Netherlands, like large English property-owners and the English colonists in America subsequently, declared: ‘We don’t want to be treated as your servants!’ In its initial stages, the revolt against Philip II was not very different from the contemporaneous agitation of the Fronde in France.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, what ignited the powder was the clash between the high nobility’s autonomist and in some sense liberal aspirations and the Crown’s centralizing tendencies—except that, in the second case, the influence of the struggle for national independence and the intervention of the popular masses in it profoundly altered the initial picture.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already seen the impetus given by the Glorious Revolution to the slave trade and the development of racial slavery in the colonies. The aspect of dis-emancipation also emerges with clarity in Ireland. Systematic expropriation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg303&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the natives intensified; in 1688 Catholics still owned 22 per cent of Irish land, but the figure fell to ‘14 per cent in 1703 and a mere 5 per cent in 1778’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that is not all: ‘Catholics—the overwhelming majority of the Irish population—were excluded from all public offices and from the legal profession.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England itself, the Glorious Revolution swept away the obstacles that still stood in the way of enclosures. As Marx put it, having attained full control of power, land-owners and capitalists ‘inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale the thefts of state lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the extent that rural labourers had found an ear more or less attentive to their lamentations, it was from the Stuart monarchy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Up to 1688, by dint of the control over them exercised from above, Justices of the Peace had some autonomy from the landed aristocracy. They subsequently lost it, becoming ‘virtual dictators of local government’ and answering only to the members of their own class who sat in parliament.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, we must not lose sight of the incredible increase in the number of crimes against property that carried the death penalty, with the establishment of a regime of terror over the popular masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dimension of dis-emancipation is even more obvious in the American Revolution. The terms in which Theodore Roosevelt celebrated it at the start of the twentieth century are revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief factor in producing the Revolution, and later in producing the War of 1812, was the inability of the motherland country to understand that the freemen who went forth to conquer a continent should be encouraged in that work … The spread of the hardy, venturesome backwoodsmen was to most of the statesmen of London a matter of anxiety rather than of pride, and the famous Quebec Act of 1774 was in part designed with the purpose of keeping the English-speaking settlements permanently east of the Alleghanies, and preserving the mighty and beautiful valley of the Ohio as a hunting-ground for savages …[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg304&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Indians was dramatically hastened by the foundation of the United States.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Great Britain’s interests in its transatlantic possessions were commercial rather than territorial; and, as we know, it was loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada who accused the insurgents of a systematic policy of genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Indians gained nothing from the American Revolution, what about blacks? The foundation of the United States involved the advent of a racial state and an unprecedented consolidation of racial chattel slavery. It is true that, in line with the watchword of the struggle against (political) slavery advanced during the revolt against Britain, the Northern states abolished slavery in the strict sense. But blacks did not thereby acquire freedom, confined as they were to a ‘caste’ different from that of freemen. In any event, there is a fact that provides food for thought: Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1834, while it survived in the United States for another three decades. Even the condition of free blacks was worse there, for example, than in Canada. In that British colony between 1850 and 1860, 20,000 blacks found refuge who had abandoned the United States, where they feared that laws on the return of fugitive slaves to their legitimate owners might furnish pretexts for the enslavement even of free blacks. But already, some decades earlier, more than a thousand black slaves had sought refuge in Canada after their delegation had been benevolently received by the local authorities with a stinging polemic against the United States: ‘Tell the Republicans on your side of the line that we royalists do not know men by their colour. Should you come to us you will be entitled to all the privileges of the rest of His Majesty’s subjects.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this declaration was not free from an ideological, self-serving element. But it remains the case that blacks in the US looked to Canada as the promised land of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The most significant steps in the expansion of the United States simultaneously sealed the extension of the democracy and domination, in its harshest forms, of the ‘master race’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1803 Napoleon sold Louisiana. Although already in force, slavery had not yet assumed a clearly racial form. There were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg305&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;20,000 half-castes, who to all intents and purposes were free and sometimes engaged in the liberal professions. They might even be very wealthy, and thus form part of the dominant elite. Transfer to the United States involved the consecration of local self-government and the power, in the final analysis, of white property-owners (French and Anglo-American). The result was a deterioration in the conditions not only of slaves—emancipation became increasingly difficult—but, above all, of freemen of colour. Their numbers diminished in absolute terms, and even more appreciably in percentage terms (their immigration was discouraged, while that of whites was encouraged). Hit by a series of discriminatory measures, freemen of colour now began to form an intermediate caste closer to slaves than freemen proper. In Louisiana, annexed to the United States, the twin birth of free representative bodies and racial chattel slavery was also seen in due course.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new, considerable expansion of US territory occurred some decades later with the drastic amputation of Mexico. We already know about the introduction of slavery into Texas. But even more significant was the tragedy that struck the Indians in both Texas and California. Subjected to forced labour and a thinly disguised slavery, their children in effect became &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;. Particularly desirable were young girls because, as a local paper put it, they served the dual purpose of ‘work and lust’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was only one chapter in a horrific story: ‘The destruction and degradation of the California Indians is one of the sorriest blotches on the honor and intelligence of a nation. It was less a matter of war than of “sport”.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;and comparativism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Viewed comparatively and from the perspective of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, the American Revolution appears as the start of a long series of attempts by white colonists to rid themselves of the obstacle represented by central power, whether ecclesiastical or monarchical. In 1537 Pope Paul III declared that the sacraments must be forbidden to colonists who, denying the humanity of Indians, reduced them to slavery. ‘Moralistic interference’ was also carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Thus, a ‘continuing tension between slavery and Christian ideals’ made itself felt. But the colonists, for whom forced labour was an &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg306&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unavoidable necessity, responded by expelling the Jesuits from Brazil or provoking veritable ‘colonial insurrections’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the first rebellions by black slaves tended to appeal to the Crown and to look to central government for a counter-weight to the despotism of local masters.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As for British America, the revolt that developed in Virginia a century before the American Revolution, and which was led by Nathaniel Bacon, must be borne in mind. While on the one hand targeting the privileges of the governing faction, on the other the rebels ‘demanded land, without regard to the rights or needs of the border Indians’, who in fact were exterminated in some instances.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conflicts that subsequently emerged in the American Revolution are present here &#039;&#039;in nuce:&#039;&#039; on the one hand, the polemic against central government arrogance and interference; on the other, the demand for complete freedom vis-à-vis ‘savages’. And in fact, when we read in Bacon’s manifesto his denunciation of the collusion, in the course of the struggle against the champions of liberty, between the governor of Virginia and the ‘barbarous’, bloodthirsty Indians,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we are reminded of the Declaration of Independence.&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that the French and English colonists also waved the flag of self-government, independence and imitation of the US model against the policy of emancipating slaves, for which they criticized the central political power. But events in Southern Africa are especially significant. Here, too, whether the colonies were controlled by the Dutch or British, the development of self-government by civil society went hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of racial slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolts erupted which, in the name of liberty and the struggle against despotism, denounced interference by central government and its claim to limit the right of masters to punish their slaves.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The civil society referred to was, obviously, the white community. The natives were descendants of Ham, condemned to perpetual slavery by the Old Testament, or were assimilated to the inhabitants of Canaan, doomed to destruction by the chosen people, the Boer settlers who embodied the cause of liberty and self-government.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg307&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The crucial question posed by eminent US historians in connection with the English colonists’ revolt in America is thus wholly understandable: Was the ‘movement of political emancipation by a section of the white settlers against control from England’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] really a revolution? Or are we dealing with ‘a reactionary slaveholders’ rebellion’? In the case of the South at least, this was the principal aspect: ‘With the threat of British interference removed and a relatively weak central government to contend with, the road to regional power lay open before the slaveholders, who constituted the only class capable of treading it.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A not dissimilar conclusion has been reached on the basis of an analysis of the relationship the Union as a whole had with the Indians: the American Revolution ‘had some of the character of a white settlers’ revolt against imperial policy’, which afforded relative protection to the natives.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point we can draw a comparison between the role played by the ‘redskin question’ in the colonists’ rebellion that issued in the American Revolution and the part the ‘negro question’ played in the sparking off the Civil War:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he British authorities prior to 1776, by promulgating regulations restricting the colonists’ geographic expansion beyond the Appalachians, also alienated wealthy planters and merchants with speculative investments in western territory, as well as less affluent farmers who hoped for a new and inexpensive start on fresh lands … In 1860–61, when a newly elected Republican administration promised to prohibit the further westward expansion of slavery, the response from most white Southerners was another revolution for political autonomy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If this is the case, the history of the United States is characterized by two reactionary secessions (or secessions with more or less strong reactionary components), the one victorious, the other defeated. And, although defeated, the second would be situated in a line of substantial continuity with the first.&lt;br /&gt;
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The triumphal rise of the United States created an ideological climate in which, when reconstructing the American Revolution, historians tended to identify directly and naively with the rebel colonists’ arguments. But today it is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg308&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inadmissible to continue to ignore the voices of their opponents, in particular those (for example, Samuel Johnson and Josiah Tucker) who from the outset highlighted the significance of the black and Indian questions in the divisions that occurred between the two shores of the Atlantic. When the subsequent clash between the two sections of the Union loomed, claiming the legacy of the American Revolution were also, and perhaps primarily, the theorists of the South. Calhoun referred to Washington the ‘slave-owner’. An utterly instrumental attitude? It was in fact endorsed by the most radical currents in abolitionism, which had no hesitation in publicly burning a Constitution branded as intrinsically pro-slavery and hence, ultimately, satanic. In their interpretation of the American Revolution, Calhoun and Garrison in a way vindicated Johnson and Tucker. Just as the Declaration of Independence accused George III of seeking to incite black slaves against the colonists, so the Confederacy accused Lincoln of wanting to provoke a slave war in the South. In both cases the rebels criticized central political power for misunderstanding the self-government that was due to free, civilized men and for attempting to erase the boundary line between civilization and barbarism. Not by chance, the attempted secession could count on passionate support from prominent representatives of the liberal world and culture even in England. One thinks, in particular, of Lord Acton, who to the end believed he was supporting an authentic, great liberal revolution, just as the leaders of the secessionist, slaveholding South thought they were promoting an authentic, great liberal revolution (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further developing a comparative perspective and the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, it might be observed that in the twentieth century the process of decolonization was itself accompanied by secessionist movements, initiated by colonists who sought to maintain control over the natives and colonial populations in general, waving the flag of self-government and continuing to be inspired by the model of ‘master-race democracy’—one thinks, in particular, of South Africa and Rhodesia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039; and a comparative perspective that expose the reductive, misleading character of the view which conceives the American Revolution as a mere ‘reactionary rebellion’. To begin with, we are dealing with a more general problem. We find Marx defining the Glorious Revolution as a ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, thanks to which the English landed aristocracy succeeded in consolidating its domination over the unfortunate Irish (the Indians and blacks of the situation) and giving impetus to the enclosure of common land and the expulsion of the peasantry. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the other side of the coin. The conquest of self-government by civil society had a genuine revolutionary significance. Liberated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg309&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from an arbitrary power, the members of the class that had assumed power granted one another liberty and respect for the rules, with the construction of the constitutional state and the advent of the liberal rule of law. The first to achieve this novel phenomenon were precisely the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, which therefore cannot be put on the same level as subsequent historical movements inspired by them. In other words, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that characterized the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution subsequently saw the second aspect prevail ever more markedly.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Realization of the rule of law within the sacred space and the widening of the gulf with the profane space&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented in the metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘original capitalist accumulation’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Against monarchical despotism and central power, this class demanded self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law. We can then say that this liberalism was the intellectual tradition which most rigorously circumscribed a restricted sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power obtained. It was an intellectual tradition characterized more by celebration of the community of free individuals that defined the sacred space than by celebration of liberty or the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident, the classical countries of the liberal tradition were those where, through Puritanism, the Old Testament had the deepest impact. This already applies to the Dutch Revolution or, at least, to the Boers of Dutch origin, who identified themselves with the ‘chosen people’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it applies a fortiori to England. Especially from the Reformation, the English regarded themselves as the new Israel, ‘the people chosen by the Almighty for a special and at the same time a universal mission’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideology and missionary consciousness were diffused, in accentuated form, across the Atlantic. It is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg310&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enough to think of Jefferson, who suggested that the US coat of arms should represent the children of Israel guided by a ray of light.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the distinction between sacred space and profane space is seen in all its radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Old Testament beloved of the dominant elite, which liked to identify with the chosen people that conquered Canaan and destroyed its inhabitants, or which recruited its slaves from gentiles, two strict, drastic delimitations are operative. Anthropocentrism sharply separates from circumambient nature the human world, wherein an absolutely privileged and unique role is reserved for the ‘chosen people’. The sacred space, the tiny sacred island, is thus delimited with the utmost clarity from the infinite profane space. We might say that outside the chosen people everything tended to be reduced to deconsecrated nature, within whose orbit also came the populations condemned by Jehovah to be wiped off the face of the earth. The destruction fell upon ‘both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass’; or, in more pregnant terms, ‘all the souls’, ‘all that breathed’, ‘all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the specifically profane space, the distinction between man and nature does not seem to emerge, or does not play a prominent role.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the exclusive restriction of the sacred space also performs an enormously positive function. Among the chosen people specific rules are in force, so that there is room for servitude but not for slavery in the strict sense. Thousands of years later, this was the viewpoint of Locke who, explicitly appealing to the Old Testament, distinguished between the servitude of wage-labourers (in the metropolis) and slavery in the colonies. And the continuity turns out to be even more striking when we bear in mind that destined for slavery were blacks, whom the theology and ideology of the time regarded as the descendants of Ham and Canaan, condemned in perpetuity by Noah, according to Genesis, to wear chains.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at a paradoxical result, at least with respect to the dominant ideology. The West is at once the culture which most rigorously and effectively theorizes and practises the limitation of power, and which, with the greatest success and on the largest scale, is engaged in the development of chattel slavery—an institution that involves the full deployment of the master’s power over slaves reduced to chattels and ‘nature’. And this paradox is exhibited in especially striking fashion precisely in the countries with the most established liberal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg311&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Certainly, already within Judaism the exclusivist pathos of the sacred space tended to take the form of a universalism that relied sometimes on the subjugation (or destruction) of the profane, and sometimes on its co-option. As becomes apparent above all in post-exile Judaism, the absolute transcendence of Jehovah prompted a process of de-naturalization of the sacred space/profane space dichotomy. The mobility of borders, and hence the possibility of effecting co-options within the sacred space and civilization, applies a fortiori to the Puritans and the liberal tradition, which inherited Judaism filtered through Christianity. On the other hand, the albeit partial amplification of the sacred space was a necessary response to the struggles waged by the excluded, who often derived different motifs from the Old Testament opposed to those dear to the dominant elite. They were inspired by the story of the people reduced to slavery in a foreign land who finally managed to free themselves from the Pharaoh’s domination. This was the ideology that inspired the slave revolt which broke out in 1800 in Virginia, whose leader posed as a new Moses.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The slaves’ ability to derive justifications for rebellion from the dominant culture itself led property-owners to regard even religious education with suspicion.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. Delimitation of the sacred space and theorization of a planetary dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space. The element of regression in this is clear. A comparison will suffice to account for it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the most exalted texts of its culture, Europe long strove to maintain a lucid and self-critical view of itself, refusing to allow itself to be intoxicated and carried away by euphoria on account of the irresistible march begun with the discovery–conquest of America. And this approach continued to display its vitality in the Enlightenment and the culture that became part of the inheritance of French radicalism. Let us read Raynal and Diderot: ‘The conquistadores’ first steps were marked by rivers of blood … In the inebriation of their success, they took the decision to exterminate those they had robbed. Countless people vanished from the face of the earth on the arrival of these barbarians’, who took to ‘treating the brothers they had just discovered without remorse, as they treated the wild beasts of the old hemisphere’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg312&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;extermination of the Indians was rounded off with condemnation of the trade in slaves called upon to replace them as labour.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, it was not only in the New World that the ‘European barbarians’ stained themselves with genocide;[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the ‘unhappy Hottentots’ likewise suffered a ‘pitiless’ massacre.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to the colonial conquest, Louis-Sébastien Mercier drew attention to further dark pages in Europe’s history in the second half of the French eighteenth century. His utopian novel imagined a ‘singular monument’ in which ‘the nations represented … asked humanity’s pardon’ for the cruelty shown by them. Along with the genocide of the Indians, the expiatory monument recalled forced labour, or ‘the slow torture of so many unfortunates condemned to the mines’, and the subsequent black slave trade symbolized by ‘numerous mutilated slaves’. Incontestably responsible for all this were ‘the Europeans’, also charged with ‘the atrocity of the crusades’, ‘the horrible Saint Bartholomew’s night’ and the wars of religion.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, let us now observe the way Edgar Quinet argues. In 1845, sketching in broad outline the history of the West, the French liberal historian came to the Spanish conquest of America. He could not ignore the extermination of the indigenous populations, but hit upon an explanation that was simultaneously ingenuous and reassuring. True, it had been carried out by Spain, a country that was an integral part of the West. But at the time Spain had experienced a decisive influx of the culture and religion of Islam, which was thus the actual, if indirect, executioner of the Indians.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same line of argument was adopted for other black pages in the West’s history. Had not the Inquisition had its centre in a Spain widely influenced by barbarians? And as to the crusade that destroyed the Albigensian heretics, without distinction of age and sex, was it not perhaps prepared by the prayers of the Spaniard San Domenico di Guzmán?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Via Spain, all signs pointed to Islam, at whose door could be laid even the Crusades, which precisely had as their stated target the Muslim ‘infidels’. Quinet passed judgement: ‘In the Crusades the Catholic Church enacted the principle of Islamism: extermination.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg313&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But not only Islam was stigmatized as synonymous with barbarism. European high culture had long regarded China with curiosity and interest. Where were the wars of religion that had covered Europe with blood? They were prevented by a religion that shunned mystery and dogma, resolving itself into an ethics.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; it was easier to recognize themselves in the mandarins than the Catholic clergy or Protestant ministers. The importance of the role played by a layer of secular intellectuals in the great Asiatic country was confirmed by the fact that the highest administrative public offices were often allocated through public competition, rather than being the monopoly (as in France) of a titled aristocracy, allied and intertwined with the clergy. In any event, in China the secular, modern principle of merit prevailed over the obscurantist principle of privilege based on birth and blood. The Enlightenment’s sympathetic attention to non-European cultures, employed as a critical mirror of Europe, became a charge in the indictment drawn up by de Tocqueville: the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; had turned for a ‘model’ to China, ‘[t]hat unenlightened, barbarian government which lets itself be manipulated at will by a handful of Europeans’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The feudal aristocracy’s prevalence in Europe was also the prevalence of bellicose values, while China (observed Leibniz, an author already completely infused with the pathos of Enlightenment) was distinguished by its aversion to anything that ‘creates or nourishes ferocity in men’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby constituting a reference point for &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; engaged in criticizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;‘s privy wars. Thus the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; applauded the pacific spirit exhibited by Chinese culture.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this became off-key at the moment of the triumph of colonial expansionism. And so in de Tocqueville, corresponding to the celebration of war as an expression of the nation’s grandeur and an antidote to the socialist movement’s vulgar hedonism, we find an intensification of the indictment against China, also reproved for its unwarlike character. The French liberal displayed his contempt for a country whose army enjoyed ‘peacefully scraping a living’, overwhelmed as it was by the ‘general softness of ideas and desires’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, all this facilitated the conquest of China: ‘It would be &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg314&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;difficult for me to console myself if, before dying, I did not see China opened and the eye of Europe penetrate there with its arms’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Now there was nothing to be learnt from non-European civilizations. In 1835 Macaulay declared that ‘a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, we can understand the indifference with which the destruction of the Summer Palace, in all its incomparable beauty, by English and French troops during the second Opium War was viewed. Expressing his indignation was Victor Hugo: ‘We Europeans are the civilized ones and for us the Chinese are barbarians. And here is what civilization has done to barbarism. In history’s eyes, one bandit will be called France, the other will be called England’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, on the occasion of the Commune, the good liberal Bagehot expressed his contempt for the behaviour of the rebels, whom he criticized for having wanted to destroy everything worth seeing and admiring in Paris, any testament to ‘culture’ and civilization.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus was credited the rumour, which subsequently proved unfounded, that the communards had destroyed the Louvre. But no mention was made here of the destruction of the Summer Palace in Peking, which actually occurred roughly ten years earlier, with the decisive participation of the country that for Bagehot was the privileged embodiment of the cause of liberty and civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
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Authors like Las Casas and Montaigne had problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism and made them fluid. In this perspective civilization advanced through exchanges between different cultures. Developing their thinking in the years when missionaries from Christian Europe were received with respect and benevolence in China, while in France Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and resumed persecution of the Huguenots, Bayle and Leibniz reached a radical conclusion. It was a pity that the relationship between China and European was marked by its one-sidedness; the presence of Chinese missionaries in Europe would definitely be beneficial![[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; assigned a black Spartacus the task of advancing the cause of freedom, breaking the chains of slavery and putting an end to the barbarism of which Europeans were the agents. But this attempt to cast a glance at &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg315&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Europe, as it were, from without, recognizing the contributions of different cultures to the cause of advancing civilization, did not survive the irresistible march of colonial expansionism. Having triumphed on a planetary scale, the liberal West saw fit to identify itself permanently with the cause of civilization and liberty. On the basis of this absolute and immutable pre-eminence, we see an exclusive elite—the restricted community of the free—explicitly formulate the claim, hitherto unknown and unheard of, to exercise a planetary dictatorship over the rest of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The triumph of colonial expansionism: liberalism as an ideology of war&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The celebration of civilization and liberty now took the form of an ideology of war. It was an ideology refuted by Raynal and Diderot who, addressing the ‘monsters’ or European conquistadores, expressed themselves as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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You are proud of your &#039;&#039;lumières&#039;&#039;, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot? … If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable to his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer’s lash.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This criticism is all the more apt if we bear in mind Washington’s characterization of the Indians as an ‘unenlightened race’ (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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So exalted was the self-consciousness of the liberal West in the nineteenth century that sometimes it did not even feel the need to confer ideological legitimacy on its wars. Unlike John Stuart Mill, de Tocqueville did not present the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and liberty as such. For the French liberal the main cause for celebration was the West’s overwhelming power, and this power was also configured as a war machine ideologically:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Here finally we have Europe’s mobility at grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, above all if one believes that it is merely the sequel, the latest step in a multiplicity of events of the same kind that are gradually impelling the European race beyond its borders and successively subjecting all the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg316&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;other races to its empire and influence. It is the enslavement of four-fifths of the world by the other fifth. Hence it is best not to be unduly despairing about our century and ourselves; the men are petty, but the events are great.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s attitude left de Gobineau puzzled. The first ridiculed the mythology of blood entertained by the second. There was in fact another side to the coin. Once adopted as the key to explaining universal history, racial contamination cast its fatal shadow over the West itself, which was likewise condemned to decadence. Hence for de Gobineau there was no insurmountable barrier between conquerors and colonial peoples. As for the economy, the latter would sooner or later manage to develop the textile industry (the key industry of the period) and defeat British and European competition in general.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Morally, there was no reason to idealize the conquerors: in Persia and the Middle East ‘their immorality and rapacity’ were manifest. If the natives ‘are rogues’, ‘in some respects they can be considered our cousins’; ‘this is how we will be tomorrow’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s criticism focused precisely on this point: ‘You say that one day we shall resemble the rabble you see before you: maybe. But before this happens, we shall have been its masters.’ As we can see, from the ‘rogues’ they were in de Gobineau, the peoples of the Middle East have now been transformed into a ‘rabble’, with this fully legitimizing the domination exercised over them by European ‘masters’. It is with reference to the latter that de Tocqueville employs the more indulgent term ‘rogues’: ‘If, as I agree, they are often great rogues, at least they are rogues to whom God has given strength and power and whom He has manifestly placed, for a certain period, at the head of the human race’. Faced with this, de Gobineau’s reservations about the ‘immorality’ and ‘rapacity’ of the conquerors, and the thesis of their basic kinship with subject peoples, seemed to lose any significance. De Tocqueville continued:&lt;br /&gt;
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You are in the heart of the Asiatic and Muslim world: I would be curious to know to what you attribute the rapid and seemingly unstoppable decadence of all the races you have seen passing through … Some millions of men who, a few centuries back, lived virtually without shelter, in the forests and marshes, will in less than one hundred years be the transformers of the globe they inhabit and the dominators of their whole species. Nothing is more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg317&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly preordained in the sight of Providence … Nothing will resist them on the surface of the earth. I have no doubt of it. I fear that all this might sound to you like a philosophical heresy. But if you have theory on your side, I am confident that I have the facts on mine—a not unimportant detail.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Gobineau, who regarded himself as a ‘citizen of the world’, refused to give in: ‘I take an extraordinary interest in my daily conversations with the natives, and am very far from having the bad opinion of them people are pleased to entertain in Europe’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not a viewpoint de Tocqueville could share. We already know his opinion that the ‘last’ member of the ‘European race’ was always ‘first next to the savages’—that is, in the last analysis, next to ‘all the other races’. Of his daughter, de Gobineau remarked: ‘She has made herself a true Turkoman, save for her colour, which is that of an Abyssinian’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville did not respond to this observation, but it should not be forgotten that for him it was precisely ‘half-breeds’ who represented the most serious threat to the West’s supremacy and civilization as such (see above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|§4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt about the greater intellectual and political subtlety of de Tocqueville who, criticizing the blood myth, distanced himself from the ideology increasingly prevalent in the South of the United States, where de Gobineau’s views about the natural and eternal inequality of races met with understandable success. Yet it is to be noted that, much more so than the latter, it was the former who created an unbridgeable gulf between the West and colonial peoples. How are we to explain this fact?&lt;br /&gt;
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Straddling the American Revolution, ‘[r]acism became an essential, an unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology’—that is, of the ideology which presided over the construction of ‘master-race democracy’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century this regime tended to characterize the relationship between the West as a whole and colonial peoples. Certainly, in order to impart credibility to its self-proclamation, the community of the free was ever more inclined in this period to abolish slavery in the strict sense—hereditary slavery—which was in fact replaced by other forms of forced labour. But the model of a ‘master-race democracy’ remained unchanged. The gradual abolition of censitary discrimination in the metropolis gave further impetus &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg318&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to colonial expansion, which now in fact enjoyed the consent of the popular classes in the metropolis. These, like the poor whites in the North American republic, aspired to be co-opted into the bloc of ‘masters’. And once again what explained and legitimized the barrier dividing masters and servants was a more or less marked, and more or less crude racial ideology, which was now pervasive. This was a trend that also made its influence felt on de Tocqueville.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having been asserted in countries (Holland, England and the United States) more involved than any others in the slave trade and colonial expansion (overseas in the case of the first two, continentally in that of the third), liberalism spread in the West at a time when it seemed destined by Providence itself to dominate the whole world and wipe out all other cultures. In these circumstances, the self-critical thinking and awareness of limits that had characterized the pre-eminent voices of European and Western culture tended to disappear. The inheritors of that tradition were French radicalism, and then Marx. The latter waxed ironic about the ‘civilizing wars’ of the colonial powers. In reality, during the Opium War, while China, ‘the semi-barbarian[,] remained faithful to the principles of the moral law’, the ‘civilized’ opposed to it the principle of free trade,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the principle so eloquently defended by Mill. But especially significant are the pages of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; devoted to original capitalist accumulation and denunciation of ‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population’, and the transformation of Africa into ‘a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a chapter of history that was extended in the subsequent colonial expansion.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Oscillations and limitations of the Marxian model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly distancing himself from the apologetics more dominant than ever today, Marx drew attention to the ‘conservative character of the English revolution’. While, on the one hand, it marked ‘the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy’, and promoted the development of industry and the bourgeoisie,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the other, it gave impetus to a gigantic, ruthlessly implemented expropriation of peasants. Examined closely, the Glorious Revolution emerged as ‘a parliamentary coup d’état for [the] transformation of [communal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg319&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;property] into private property’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus encounter a formula that in a way evokes the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation I have stressed: the mention, albeit vague, of parliament’s decisive role in this event draws attention to the disappearance of the absolute monarchy, while making clear reference to the tragedy of the peasantry. Someone who distinguished himself in the ideological legitimation of the colossal expropriation and ruthless repression that struck its victims was Locke. This ‘most particular supporter of the lash for vagrants and paupers’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was in fact, at the same time, the ‘father’ of ‘free-thinking’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the protagonist of the great ideological battle that deconsecrated absolute monarchy and stripped it of its Christian and Biblical cover. And once again, as in the Glorious Revolution, so in the liberal philosopher in whom it found theoretical expression, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation reveals itself. Finally, Marx recalled that corresponding to the advent of constitutional monarchy in England was a further intensification of the dictatorship exercised by English property-owners over Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
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Over and above any particular country, what should especially be borne in mind are the general considerations offered by &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;. With the disappearance of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, corresponding to the dissolution of the ‘political existence’ of property was its ‘more potent existence’, which could now unfold ‘the full scale of its own existence’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, as &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; put it: ‘The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the &#039;&#039;appearance&#039;&#039; of a universal content.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Marx brought out the entanglement of emancipation and dis-emancipation. The ‘more potent existence’ injected into property was also the autonomization of property in human cattle from the controls, albeit vague, of the Church and Crown, with the consequent crystallization of racial chattel slavery. And it was also the disappearance of the restrictions placed by the Crown on the expansion of the colonists, who could now proceed unhindered, without being in any way concerned with the terrible human costs inflicted on the Indians. In England, enclosure of common land was followed by the new law of 1834 which, abolishing any other form of assistance, confronted the poor with a brutal alternative: death from starvation or internment in a total institution.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg320&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are not dealing with an autonomization of property as such. What corresponded to the ‘more potent existence’ of the colonists’ property was the death-agony of another form of property. It was a gigantic process of expropriation (justified and theorized by Locke and de Tocqueville alike), which unfolded at the expense not only of colonial peoples—in America or Ireland—but also of English peasants. The same reasons that led me to regard the category of ‘proprietorial individualism’ as inadequate and misleading now prompt me to seek to clarify Marx’s analysis. The process we are examining was the autonomization of the property of those who already enjoyed recognition, of those who aspired to form themselves into the community or caste of freemen. Liberated from the fetters of control by Crown and Church was not only bourgeois property, but also traditional noble property. In the England that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, the landed aristocracy consolidated its enjoyment of certain privileges (hunting, for example) and consecrated its political power in representative bodies—in the first instance, the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Marx we can say that ‘[t]he political revolution is the revolution of civil society.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should be added that civil society can be hegemonized by the bourgeoisie or the landed aristocracy, or can be characterized by a compromise between these two classes. And the liberal revolution consists in this political revolution. Up to this point we can only subscribe to Marx’s analysis and admire it for its acuteness. But he continues by opposing the ‘political revolution’ to the ‘social revolution’, or ‘political emancipation’, which is the objective of the first, to ‘social emancipation’ (the end of class domination), which is the objective of the second. The limitation of this conceptual couplet is that it does not take account of the fact that for some social or ethnic groups the liberal revolution did not involve any kind of emancipation, but in fact meant the reverse. Is it really correct to define the United States of 1844 (the year &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; was published) as ‘the country of complete political emancipation’?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the reference is to the rapid disappearance of censitary discrimination, which continued to be marked in France under the July Monarchy, and in Britain. However, what induced this differential development in the case of the North American republic was the availability of land (taken from the Indians) and the confinement of a large part of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery. In other words, the property barrier proved much weaker because the race barrier was much more rigid. Differently put, in the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg321&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States democracy emerged first because it emerged as a &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy, as a ‘master-race democracy’, and this specific form proved so tenacious that it survived the Civil War by many decades. It is highly problematic to regard &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy as complete political emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we restrict the comparison to New World countries, some questions are indicated: Was political emancipation more advanced in the North American republic, which saw slavery flourish in these years and which a little earlier had extended that institution to the Texas taken from Mexico? Or was political emancipation more advanced precisely in Mexico and those Latin American countries that had abolished the institution of slavery some decades before? In these years US leaders and ideologues liked positively to contrast the ban on miscegenation imposed by them with the cross-breeding that was spreading in Latin America: Where was political emancipation more advanced?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot even unreservedly endorse Marx’s thesis that ‘&#039;&#039;[p]olitical&#039;&#039; emancipation is certainly a big step forward.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We already know that the most tragic chapter in the history of the Indians began with the American Revolution, and that the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution witnessed the emergence of a racial chattel slavery of unprecedented harshness. In the case of Britain, it was Marx himself who drew attention to the far from positive consequences of the ‘coup d’état’ of 1688–89 for English peasants and the Irish population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more debatable is the subsequent identification of political revolution with bourgeois revolution. The latter category is at once too narrow and too broad. As regards the first aspect, it is difficult to subsume under the category of bourgeois revolution the Glorious Revolution and the parliamentary revolt that preceded the upheavals that began in France in 1789, not to mention the struggles against monarchical absolutism, explicitly led by the liberal nobility, which developed in Switzerland and other countries. On the other hand, the category of bourgeois revolution is too broad: it subsumes both the American Revolution that sealed the advent of a racial state and the French Revolution and the San Domingo Revolution, which involved complete emancipation of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model proposed here is different. It equates ‘political revolution’ qua ‘revolution of civil society’, referred to by Marx, with the liberal revolution in the strict sense. Certainly, in order to be able to promote its emancipation from absolute power, civil society had to have achieved a certain level of development. Analysed in their initial phases, the revolutions that occurred in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg322&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Netherlands, England, America, France and Latin America were not very different from one another: they were all liberal revolutions. What clearly differentiated them were three factors: the varying configurations of civil society; the social, political and ideological conflicts that developed within it (one thinks in the French case of the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie); and the irruption in the struggle of servants and slaves. With the emergence of the last factor, the struggle for the emancipation of civil society waged by the property-owning classes became entangled with the struggle waged against them by those who did not want to be regarded as objects of property and who sought to secure recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The secessionist revolt of the slaveholding South also presented itself as a liberal revolution: it was a new struggle for self-government by civil society, like the one that had sanctioned the independence of the United States. Was the Confederacy a liberal country? If we regard the country born from the War of Independence against England and long led by slave-owners as liberal, it is hard to see why such recognition should be denied to the Confederacy. Yet, rather than at a conceptual level, the solution to the problem is to be sought at a historical level. At the point when the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ was imposed in the liberal world, an author like Fletcher, who also recommended slavery for white vagrants, ceased to be a liberal. Almost a century after its first turn, the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery as such was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the racial state largely survived. And once again the question arises: Was the United States, where discrimination and oppression raged against blacks and genocidal practices against Indians, a liberal country? The principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The racial state continued to exist for some decades in South Africa. However, although historically inspired by Britain in the area of self-government and representative bodies, and by the southern United States in that of race relations, it was henceforth regarded as alien to the liberal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn1a|1]] Max Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968, p.276.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn2a|2]] François Furet, &#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione&#039;&#039;, ed. Marina Valensise, Milan: Mondadori, 1995, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn3a|3]] A. J. P. Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History 1914–1945&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn4a|4]] John Gray, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn5a|5]] Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn7a|7]] Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 111.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn8a|8]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn9a|9]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins, Harvill, 1987, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn10a|10]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn11a|11]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 1, p. 331; vol. 2, pp. 306, 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn12a|12]] Nathan Rosenberg, quoted in Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn13a|13]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn14a|14]] Joel Brinkley, ‘US Court Strikes Down Sodomy Ban’, &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, 27 June 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn15a|15]] Huizinga, quoted in Hans-Christoph Schröder, &#039;&#039;Die Revolutionen Englands im 17. Jahrundert&#039;&#039;, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn16a|16]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 1, pp. 203–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn17a|17]] Giorgio Spini, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’età moderna&#039;&#039;, Turin: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 272, 276–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn18a|18]] Charles Tilly, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1993, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn20a|20]] Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 884.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn22a|22]] Barrington Moore Jr, &#039;&#039;The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy&#039;&#039;, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn23a|23]] Hill, &#039;&#039;Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn24a|24]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;The Strenuous Life&#039;&#039;, New York: Century, 1901, pp. 246–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn25a|25]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn26a|26]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 249, 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn27a|27]] Reginald C. Stuart, &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 167ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn28a|28]] Ronald Creagh, &#039;&#039;Nos cousins d’Amérique&#039;&#039;, Paris: Payot, 1988, pp. 248–9; Joseph Zitomersky, ‘Culture, classe ou État?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson and de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001, pp. 77–84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn29a|29]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn30a|30]] Wilcomb E. Washburn, &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn31a|31]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165, 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn32a|32]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;From Rebellion to Revolution&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn33a|33]] Bernard Bailyn &#039;&#039;et al., The Great Republic&#039;&#039;, Lexington (MA): D. C. Heath, 1977, p. 149.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn34a|34]] Bacon, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 1, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn35a|35]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 40–6, 146–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn37a|37]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 77.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn38a|38]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;The World the Slaveholders Made&#039;&#039;, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn39a|39]] Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn40a|40]] Shearer David Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn41a|41]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 873ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn42a|42]] Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn43a|43]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard, London: Sussex University Press and Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn44a|44]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn45a|45]] Joshua 6, 25; 10, 35 and 40; Genesis 19, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn46a|46]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn49a|49]] Ibid., p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., pp. 54–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn51a|51]] Louis-Sébastien Mercier, &#039;&#039;L’An deux mille quatre cent quarante&#039;&#039;, ed. Raymond Trousson, Bordeaux: Ducros, 1971, pp. 201–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn52a|52]] Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Christianisme et la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1984, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 137 (Quinet had already expressed himself to this effect in the subtitles to the eighth lecture).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn55a|55]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 69, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn56a|56]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn57a|57]] Leibniz, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, Norton: New York, 1998, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn58a|58]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 19, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn59a|59]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 15, pt 2, p. 54 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 13 May 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 199 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn61a|61]] Quoted in Ramsay Muir, ed., &#039;&#039;The Making of British India 1756–1858&#039;&#039;, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn62a|62]] Hugo, quoted in Nora Wang, Xin Ye and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savantes, 2003, pp. 9–10 (letter to Captain Butler, 25 November 1861).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn63a|63]] Walter Bagehot, ‘The Destruction in Paris of What the World Goes to See in Paris’, in &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman St John-Stevas, vol. 8, London: The Economist, 1974, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn64a|64]] Cf. Giorgio Borsa, &#039;&#039;La nascita del mondo modern in Asia orientale&#039;&#039;, Milan: Rizzoli, 1977, pp. 84, 89; Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn65a|65]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn66a|66]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 58 (letter to Henry Reeve, 12 April 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 254–6 (letter of 15 January 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 243–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 241.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 231 (letter of 7 July 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn72a|72]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn73a|73]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 13, p. 516; vol. 12, p. 552.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn74a|74]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 915.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75a|75]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 209–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76a|76]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 886.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77a|77]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 510–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80a|80]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82a|82]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 352.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83a|83]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER TEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The struggle for recognition and coups d’état: the conflict in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The catastrophic crisis that struck Europe and the whole planet with the outbreak of the First World War was already maturing within the liberal world. To account for it, we must take stock of the situation on the eve of 1914. Let us deal with the metropolis first. There is no doubt that the struggle for recognition had achieved important successes. True, we are still a long way from the universal assertion of the principle ‘one person, one vote’—and not only because women continued to be excluded from the enjoyment of political rights. More or less conspicuous traces of censitary discrimination still survived. But the fact remains that the vote was no longer the exclusive privilege of wealth. Also largely defeated was the attempt to reintroduce through the back window the censitary discrimination that had been shown the door, in the shape of plural votes to be granted to the more ‘intelligent’ (this was a solution entertained above all by John Stuart Mill!). Here and there the first elements of a social state began to emerge; and if this involved fairly modest results, we should bear in mind the legalization of workers’ coalitions and trade unions, determined to wrest much more substantial concessions. Even in this milieu, the long road travelled by the former instruments of labour leaps to the eye![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it must immediately be added that this was quite the reverse of a pacific development. Each of its stages was marked not only by intense struggles, but also by profound divisions in the liberal alliance. While one &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg324&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wing of it was open to concessions, the other proved intransigent and sought confrontation. Thus, we witness a succession of coups d’état which, prior to issuing in the establishment of an open dictatorship at any rate, could count on the support or sympathy of distinguished representatives of the liberal world. Availing itself of Sieyès’ active participation, Napoleon’s 18th Brumaire elicited the ‘enthusiasm’ of Madame de Staël, as emerges from the letter her father sent her a few days later: ‘You paint for me in lively colours the part you take in the power and glory of your hero’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Constant too viewed the turn with confidence. Thirty years later, he recalled having on its eve been in daily contact with Sieyès, ‘the true author of the 18th Brumaire’, or the ‘main motor’ of the novelty that was already foreshadowed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As early as 1795, Constant had made it clear that it was necessary to go beyond Thermidor: the taxation that continued to weigh on property for the benefit of the poor, who were now turning into ‘a privileged caste’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was excessive. In fact, according to various pieces of evidence (including Madame de Staël’s), the combined effect of famine and inflation was reducing ‘the last class of society to the most wretched condition’, visiting ‘unheard of ills’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on it, up to and including ‘starvation’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, for the liberalism of the time there was no doubt: the risks run by property legitimized the coup d’état. After the homage already noted to ‘conservative, liberal, tutelary ideas’, in the days immediately afterwards the new government hastened to abolish any trace of progressive taxation. On 24 December 1799, the same day Bonaparte became First Consul, Constant entered the Tribunate. But Madame de Staël harboured the idea of an even more ambitious political career for him, in the shadow of the one who (wrote Necker to his daughter at the end of 1800) promised to be ‘the protector of all respectable’ and well-off folk, finally liberated—such was Constant and Madame de Staël’s sigh of relief—from the threat of the ‘riffraff’ (&#039;&#039;populace&#039;&#039;).[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The significance of the initial hopes and subsequent disappointment in liberal circles was clarified by Guizot in 1869. Acquitting the task of ‘putting an end to anarchy’, Napoleon’s ‘dictatorship’ was ‘natural, urgent’—in fact, ‘beneficial and glorious’. However, contrary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg325&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to expectations, ‘this accidental, temporary regime’ transformed itself into ‘a dogmatic and permanent system of government’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A not dissimilar dialectic emerged after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, greeted with ‘indecent haste’ (the phrase is Marx’s) by liberal England.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not opportunism: once the beneficent ‘traditionary influences’ had disappeared, wrote Disraeli in 1851, what checked anarchy and dissolution was ‘the government of the sword’. Indeed, ‘the state quits the senate and takes refuge in the camp’; only thus was it possible to avoid the catastrophe of the domination of ‘secret societies’ and a ‘convention’ of the Jacobin variety.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of France, setting aside a figure like Granier de Cassagnac, who declared himself a ‘liberal’ and openly sided with Louis Napoleon,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it is worth dwelling on de Tocqueville’s participation in the various stages of the ideological and political reaction that ended up de-legitimizing and then overthrowing the Second Republic. In the French liberal’s view, it was the product of a revolution—that of February 1848—which had developed in a socialist and hence despotic spirit, and which had unfolded throughout continental Europe. In Germany and Italy, de Tocqueville desired and promoted ‘the victory of the princes’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]). But was his attitude towards France very different? As early as March, even before the working-class revolt of June, de Tocqueville thundered against ‘this ultra-democratic revolution, which has extended the right to vote beyond all the limits known even in America’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While the clouds that presaged the June storm were gathering, the French liberal expressed his opinion that ‘the National Guard and the army will be without pity this time’. In order to achieve the objective of maintaining or restoring order and destroying the ‘anarchical party’, one should not hesitate to recruit into the police unscrupulous types and rabble—‘outlaws’, ‘thieves’, ‘scoundrels’ and all the ‘rejects of society’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Evoked with precision here is the politico-social formula that subsequently presided over Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, which was successful thanks to the support not only of the property-owning classes and traditional state apparatuses, but also of a sub-proletariat happy to perform the function of gang intimidation entrusted to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg326&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;After the outbreak of the workers’ revolt, de Tocqueville was not only in favour of conferring emergency powers on Cavaignac, but recommended shooting on sight anyone caught ‘in a posture of defence’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The bloody repression of the June Days was not enough to assuage anxiety; and so we have the invocation of an ‘energetic and definitive reaction on behalf of order’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] required to put an end to revolutionary and anarchic chaos not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. In any event, ‘France is among those who will restore order’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and terminate the ‘follies of 1848’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More than a year after the desperate working-class revolt, when pitiless repression seemed to have averted the Jacobin and socialist peril for good, the French liberal believed that an iron fist was still required: it was necessary to proceed ‘as far as reaction’; ‘palliatives’ would not do; to sweep away not only the Mountain, but also ‘all the surrounding hills’, it was necessary ‘courageously to take the lead of all those who want to re-establish order, whatever their complexion’. There should be no hesitation even over ‘a heroic … remedy’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What is indirectly suggested is the need for emergency measures with the suspension of constitutional liberties. If as a historian he tirelessly condemned the Jacobin Terror, as a politician de Tocqueville had no hesitation invoking ‘terror’ for the purposes of suppressing ‘the demagogic party’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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In these years, every so often a shudder ran through the liberal self-consciousness: perhaps there was a risk of the ruthless methods used to subjugate barbarians in the colonies spreading in Europe. Although warmly applauding the pitiless energy with which the conquest of Algeria was conducted, de Tocqueville let slip a sort of exclamation: ‘God spare us ever seeing France led by an officer of the army of Africa’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, Cavaignac, having implemented the ‘new science’ called on to liquidate Arab resistance at any cost, was subsequently the author of the bloody, ruthless repression that struck the barbarians of the metropolis, the Parisian workers who rose up demanding the right to work and life. Notwithstanding the preceding admonition, however, de Tocqueville offered him constant, unwavering support.&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, starting with the Paris Commune, there spread throughout the liberal West a tendency to challenge not only the democratic concessions wrested by the popular masses, but also the rule of law itself. In the United States &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg327&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Theodore Roosevelt stated an expeditious method for putting down strikes and social conflicts: ‘The sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be suppressed … by taking ten or a dozen of their leaders out, standing … them against a wall, and shooting them dead.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These tendencies underwent further radicalization after the October Revolution. We can now fully understand the fascist coup d’état in Italy in 1922. Numerous figures who professed themselves liberals, and who in fact claimed to be restoring genuine liberalism, supported it for a more or less extended period of time. This was true of Luigi Einaudi, who saluted the return of ‘classical liberalism’. For a while Croce likewise viewed the attempt to return to ‘pure liberalism’, not to be confused with insensate ‘democratic liberalism’, with sympathy. Even in 1929, implicitly endorsing Mussolini’s condemnation of any ‘demo-liberal regime’, Antonio Salandra defined himself as an ‘old liberal of the right (without the demo)’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As we can see, a benevolent attitude towards the fascist coup d’état is not explicable solely by the severe social and political crisis of the time. Instead, at issue was cancelling, or more or less drastically reducing, the democratic concessions won from liberal society by the popular movement. While the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; still persisted, in 1909 Einaudi had branded progressive taxation a kind of ‘organized brigandage to steal money from others through the state’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Mussolini hastened to put an end to such ‘brigandage’, thereby eliciting applause from not a few liberals. In the preceding decades Pareto had, as a liberal, developed a sharp polemic against the ‘myth’ of the social state, had agreed with the positions of Spencer and Maine, and had adhered, still as a liberal, to the Liberty and Property Defence League.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1922–23 he breathed a sigh of relief at the coup d’état that finally averted threats, if not to liberty, in any event to property.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, von Mises seemed to be referring exclusively to the state of emergency when, in 1927, he pointed to fascist &#039;&#039;squadrismo&#039;&#039; as ‘an emergency makeshift’ adequate to the task of saving ‘European civilization’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, five &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg328&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years earlier, having distanced himself from the democratic and even socialist contaminations liberalism had undergone in England, he had thundered against the ‘destructionism’, the ‘destructionist policy’ and ‘terrorism’ of the trade unions with their strikes.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to Mussolini, all this had ceased in Italy. The fact remains that, in a book whose very title is devoted to the celebration of liberalism, we can read an emphatic eulogy of the coup d’état which, albeit with rough and ready methods, had saved civilization: ‘The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The struggle for recognition by colonial peoples and threats of secession&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While the struggle for recognition waged by the servants in the metropolis was constantly countered by the threat or implementation of a coup d’état, the more intransigent sectors of the liberal and bourgeois world reacted to the struggle for recognition waged by colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin with the threat or implementation of secession. This is a dialectic we have already analysed in relation to San Domingo in the late eighteenth century and the British West Indies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville observed that the colonists, in rejecting any abolitionist project, were denying the French parliament and government ‘the right to take this great work in hand and carry it through’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, in this context the most striking case was the secession of the South of the United States, which effected advancing liberal slogans in defence of the natural right to self-government and the peaceful enjoyment of property. The North’s military victory did not terminate the conflict. Supporters of white supremacy immediately reacted to the fleeting advent of multiracial democracy not only with the lynchings and anti-black terrorism unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan, but by resorting to guerrilla warfare and armed violence. In 1874 an appeal circulated in the South to found a White League to foil by any means attempts by Congress to make black emancipation effective: ‘our war [will be] interminable and merciless’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[a]s surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865 to 1877, with all the more bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#page329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#pg329&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This second stage in the Civil War ended in a substantial victory for the South. While slavery in the strict sense was not reintroduced, a regime of terroristic white supremacy was imposed. Although formally emancipated, the Afro-Americans now embarked on one of the most tragic phases in their history. It might even be said that their condition touched a ‘nadir’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, racist ‘dogmas’ and ‘racial fundamentalism’ reached their zenith.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A sequence of events with notable similarities to the American Civil War unfolded in Great Britain. Here what was at stake was the emancipation not of the blacks but of the Irish. The dominant class in Ulster reacted to the London government’s decision to introduce Home Rule for the island as had the southern US to the challenge of central power, even when democratically elected. It threatened and prepared secession, arming a militia tens of thousands strong. While the planters across the Atlantic could not tolerate the loss of the domination guaranteed to them by the possession of human cattle, the Protestant property-owners in Ireland rejected with horror the prospect of being governed at a local level by Catholic ragamuffins. In both cases the self-government demanded was the self-government that the descendants of the settlers were summoned to enjoy, and which sanctioned white supremacy or Anglo-Protestant supremacy. In both cases the secessionists proclaimed that they were the true inheritors of the American Revolution and the Glorious Revolution, respectively. And only the outbreak of the First World War blocked an impending war of secession in Britain: in Northern Ireland thousands of men armed to the hilt and organized militarily were ready to go into action.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The de-humanization of colonial peoples and ‘social cannibalism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First World War, unlike that waged by the servants in the metropolis, the struggle for recognition by colonial servants or servants of colonial origin could boast very few successes. In fact, the advances made by the former on the road of emancipation were often used to widen still further the gulf that separated the dominant ‘European race’ from the rest. In the late nineteenth century, while a sign was displayed at the entrance to some public parks in the southern United States reading ‘No Dogs and Niggers Allowed’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg330&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Shanghai the French concession defended its purity by clearly drawing attention to the notice ‘No Entry for Dogs and Chinese’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What made the comparison between colonial populations and domestic animals more credible was certain collective punishments, like that provided for by the British government in India in 1919:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he most degrading measure was a ‘crawling order’ imposed on all Indians who passed a narrow lane in the city where a medical missionary, Miss Sherwood, had been assaulted during the disturbances. The humiliation of crawling on all fours to and from one’s home, for many lived in this lane, was not to be forgotten or forgiven by those who were subjected to this indignity, or indeed, by any sensitive Indian.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was only in 1920, after the First World War and the October Revolution, that the chapter of history involving the coolies was definitively concluded, in the wake of a movement of anti-colonial struggle which no longer intended to tolerate ‘the blot of indentured labour’ imprinted by that institution on the whole Indian race.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that, having played a central role in black enslavement and the black slave trade, and then in the promotion of the semi-slavery of the coolies, the liberal West presented itself as the champion of the struggle against slavery. It was precisely with this watchword that it promoted colonial expansion. But this is how a missionary described the work the indigenous population was forced to perform in the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo:&lt;br /&gt;
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Each town and district is forced to bring in a certain quantity to the headquarters of the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; every Sunday. It is collected by force; the soldiers drive the people into the bush. If they will not go, they are shot down, and their left hands cut off and taken as trophies to the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; … these hands, the hands of men, women and children [are] placed in rows before the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039;.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The imposition of forced labour was sometimes bound up with genocidal practices, while on other occasions it gave way to them. In the late nineteenth century Theodore Roosevelt issued a general warning to ‘inferior races’: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg331&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should one of them attack the ‘superior’ race, the latter would be entitled to react with ‘a war of extermination’, destined ‘to put to death man, woman and child, exactly as if they were crusaders’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, there were races whose disappearance was desired regardless of their actual behaviour. Franklin greeted as a providential design the slaughter that the rum diffused by the conquerors was wreaking among the Indians. However, according to the charge formulated by loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada, the rebel colonists proceeded directly to the annihilation of entire ethnic groups (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]). In 1851, while the hunt for individual Indians was raging, the governor of California pronounced judgement:&lt;br /&gt;
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That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the two races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected; while we cannot anticipate this result with but painful regret, the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power and wisdom of man to avert.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The programme set out by General Sherman was unambiguous: ‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of the case.’ In the course of his two expeditions against the Cheyenne and the Arapaho, a colonel ordered that even the new-born should be killed and scalped: ‘Nits make lice!’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this would not seem to have particularly disturbed Theodore Roosevelt: ‘I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians. But I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that this sinister ideology, in its variations and different gradations, caught on exclusively in the United States, where, for obvious historical reasons, the racial question was more acutely felt. Let us take a look at Europe. Lord Acton coldly observed: ‘The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There were races, Disraeli in turn believed, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg332&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;experienced ‘exterminat[ion] without persecution, by that irresistible law of Nature which is fatal to curs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, this was not a completely spontaneous process, as Disraeli ended up acknowledging, when he mentioned the tragic end of the ‘Aztecs’, ‘overthrown by Cortez and a handful of Goths’, in accordance with ‘the inexorable law of nature’ that sanctioned the complete victory of ‘a superior race’ and the irrevocable defeat of ‘an inferior’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicit was Burckhardt, for whom the ‘erasure or enslavement of the weakest races’ seemed to pertain to the ‘great economy of world history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Renan, an author who liked to situate himself among the ‘enlightened liberals’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and who was appreciated by Hayek for his ‘important’ contribution to this intellectual tradition),[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] reached the same conclusion: the ‘semi-savage races’ were destined to be subjugated or exterminated by the ‘great Aryan-Semitic family’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not even the greatest figures in the liberal tradition succeeded in mounting effective resistance to this view. This applies to de Tocqueville who, while he drew a decidedly repugnant picture of the Aborigines, was a passionate cantor of the motif of the ‘empty cradle’—that is, of the deadly genealogical myth dear to colonists. And, to a lesser extent, it applies to Mill. His discourse could hardly arouse a strongly sympathetic interest in the victims. The Indians seemed to belong to the ‘community’ whose state, ‘in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’. In any event, ‘[n]othing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention is made here of the fated disappearance, still less of the destruction, of the Indians; instead, a temporary pedagogical dictatorship is theorized. However, as emerges from the stance of another distinguished exponent of English liberalism, on the occasion of bitter conflicts the dictatorship over barbarians, having been pedagogical, risked turning exterminatory. After the rebellion that challenged the British Empire in India, Macaulay wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg333&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the Nation to a degree unprecedented within my memory. Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and societies for the reformation of criminals are silent. There is one terrible cry to revenge … The almost universal feeling is that not a single Sepoy within the walls of Delhi should be spared, and I own that is a feeling with which I cannot help sympathizing.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Expressing genuine dissent were unexpected representatives of the liberal tradition or figures who moved on its margins. While he interpreted the social conflict in the metropolis in a social-Darwinist register, Spencer protested against ‘the barbarous maxim’ that the strongest ‘have a lawful right to whatever territories they can conquer’. What followed the expropriation of the defeated was in fact their ‘extermination’. Paying the price were not only the ‘North American Indians’ and the ‘natives of Australia’; in India ‘whole regiments of [natives] have been put to death, for daring to disobey the tyrannical commands of their oppressors’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unfortunately, ‘we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker’; it could now indeed be said that ‘the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, Spencer pointed an accusing finger at the state ‘system of colonisation’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] at the statism that was now expanding at every level—as if this statism had not accompanied the history of the liberal West from the outset, and as if the terrible practices denounced by Spencer had not often actually been promoted in the name of the self-government and free disposal of property, and had not taken the form (to use Hobson’s phrase) of ‘private slaughter’! (See above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The ‘final and complete solution’ of the Indian and black questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely Hobson (an author close to the liberal circles branded ‘socialist’ by von Mises and Hayek) who effectively summed up the attitude to barbarians adopted by the West, and in the first instance the liberal West, which was in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg334&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the forefront of colonial expansion in the Far West and overseas. The populations that were susceptible to ‘profitable exploitation by the superior white settlers’ survived, while the rest ‘tend[ed] to disappear’ or be destroyed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, from the late nineteenth century the theme of the inevitable disappearance of savages and peoples who could not be used as forced labour became an obsession. Articulating it were often authors who at the same time saluted the triumph of liberal institutions and ideas in the civilized world. In 1885 a book by a Protestant minister, Josiah Strong, enjoyed extraordinary success. His celebration of ‘liberty’, of ‘self-government’, of ‘the right of the individual to himself’, was passionate.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He frequently appealed to Burke, de Tocqueville, Guizot, Macaulay and Spencer. Strong and emphatic was his assertion of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon world, which had the merit of quintessentially embodying both ‘love of liberty’ and a ‘genius for colonizing’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] that expanded the zone of freedom. But this expansion also entailed the inexorable ‘extinction of inferior races’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albert J. Beveridge, a Republican senator and prominent US political figure, argued in similar fashion at the start of the twentieth century. The homage paid to the ‘gospel of liberty’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the sons of liberty and, in particular, the United States as the country and people that were ‘leading the world to liberty’ went hand in hand with the assertion that ‘a part of the Almighty’s infinite plan [was] the disappearance of debased civilisations and decaying races before the higher civilisation of the nobler and more virile types of man’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A watchword even emerged that was to assume an unambiguously genocidal meaning in the twentieth century and know tragic success. While Strong invoked ‘God’s final and complete solution of the dark problem of heathenism among many inferior peoples’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in 1913 a book published in Boston evoked the ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘negro problem’ in its title. Even in this instance, it did not involve an author foreign to the liberal world, and not only because he lived and worked in the United States, advancing ideas diffused and echoed even by influential political figures of the time. Far from regretting the ‘abhorrent practice’ of slavery, he identified with the ‘comparatively few liberal and enlightened men’ or ‘liberal intellects’ who had wanted to abolish it when deliberating the ‘splendid instrument’ that was the Constitution of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg335&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United States, ‘the guiding star of the greatest temporal power in history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nevertheless, in the land of liberty there was no room for races intellectually incapable of participating in the superior ‘Caucasic civilization and culture’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reaching this conclusion, the author knew that he was situated in the wake of Franklin and Jefferson. Happily, nature and the law of the ‘survival of the fittest’ were already acting on their behalf: Afro-Americans were being wiped out by tuberculosis, pneumonia, venereal disease and other illnesses that confirmed the natural inferiority of this people. ‘[F]ew Negro children are born without scrofulous tendencies, rickets, blindness, or other transmitted evidence of ancestral infection’. The ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘Negro problem’ was in sight, and it would be a happy repeat of the already accomplished final solution of the Amerindian question.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the words of a southern senator who was on the same wavelength, ‘God’s law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, and the extinction of the unfit is operating’, and would bring about ‘a gradual whitening of the South’ and the United States as a whole[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the touch of white already dreamt of by Franklin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the Indians had largely been wiped off the face of the earth. In 1876, to celebrate its centenary as an independent country, the United States organized an exhibition in Philadelphia that drew the world’s attention to its extraordinary development. Along with marvels of industry and technology, sideshows exhibited ‘wild children from Borneo, a five-legged horse, and wax figures of famous Indian chiefs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In summer 1911, in a remote part of California, an Indian was discovered who could not communicate in English or Spanish. Ethnological experts subsequently verified that he was a survivor of the Yahi tribe, largely exterminated over the course of a generation. The unknown, who refused to give his name or recount the history of his destroyed family, was put in a museum, where he became an object of much amused curiosity on the part of adults and children, all the more so in that the local press drew attention to the ‘last aborigine’, the ‘wild man of California’, a ‘genuine survivor of Stone Age barbarism’. After his death, his brain was conveniently preserved for further study.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A great philosopher, Edmund Husserl, who was certainly liberal and democratic in orientation, observed twenty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg336&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years later, alas without any critical accent, that totally foreign to Europe and the West, the Indians (or rather the surviving ones) ‘are exhibited in fairground booths’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. From the nineteenth to the twentieth century&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the years leading up to the outbreak of the second Thirty Years’ War, we witness the accumulation of a mass of explosive material. At the end of the nineteenth century, corresponding to the formation of the Liberty and Property Defence League in England was the formation of the White Leagues (and the Ku Klux Klan) in the United States. At stake was halting or reversing the two struggles for recognition with which we are familiar. Across the Atlantic the restoration of white supremacy registered its triumph as early as 1877; in Europe the Liberty and Property Defence League would have to wait until 1922 to record its first victory, in Italy. The persistent unrest of servants or ex-servants in the metropolis, and of slaves or ex-slaves in the colonies or of colonial origin, and the increasing aggressiveness of the social and political circles that felt threatened by these two agitations, were compounded by contradictions within the community of the free and of Teutonic stock (previously celebrated in its entirety as the chosen people or race of liberty), which now tended to assume an antagonistic form. Moreover, these multiple conflicts were further exacerbated by an ideological climate marked by the assertion of trends—social Darwinism, a racial interpretation of history and conspiracy theory—present from the outset in the liberal tradition, but which now met with ever weaker resistance, rendering a rational understanding and limitation of the conflict impossible. Not by chance have we heard two deadly slogans echo: the first declared that ‘race is everything’; the second invoked the ‘ultimate solution’, or the ‘final and complete solution’, of the racial question!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The degree of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not escaped a whole series of scholars who cannot be suspected of preconceived hostility to the liberal world. While she generously overlooked the North American republic (which had had the merit of offering her refuge), Hannah Arendt explained the genesis of twentieth-century totalitarianism commencing with the colonies of the British Empire. It was here that ‘a new form of government’, ‘a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg337&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arbitrariness’ saw the light of day,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and where the temptation of ‘administrative massacres’ as an instrument for maintaining domination began to emerge.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But especially interesting in this context is the fact that not a few US scholars, in order to explain the history of their country, have turned to the category of ‘master-race democracy’ or &#039;&#039;‘Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’, in an eloquent linguistic admixture of English and German, and a German that in several respects refers to the history of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only the concentration-camp universe as a whole, but also the individual total institutions of the twentieth century, began to take shape well before the end of the supposed &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039;. We may begin with deportation. The successive bloody deportations of Indians, starting with the one implemented by Jackson’s America (held up as a model of democracy by de Tocqueville), recall the ‘horrors created by the Nazi handling of subject peoples’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Indians were not the only victims of this practice. The slave trade represented ‘the largest involuntary movement of human beings in all history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The deportees were subsequently forced to work in a slave plantation that bore some similarities to the concentration camp.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison does not seem exaggerated. Precisely in this context the process of de-humanization reached levels that were difficult to match. In Jamaica, in the liberal British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, we find a type of punishment at work that speaks volumes: ‘a slave was forced to defecate into the offending slave’s mouth, which was then wired shut for four or five hours’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even his completely innocent fellow slaves were forced to participate in the de-humanization of the victim and, with him, of the ethnic group. Should all this not seem sufficiently cruel, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, white supremacy was imposed in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notices of lynchings were printed in local papers, and extra cars added to trains for spectators from miles around, sometimes thousands of them. Schoolchildren might get a day off school to attend the lynching.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg338&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The spectacle could include castration, skinning, roasting, hanging, and shooting. Souvenirs for purchasers might include fingers, toes, teeth and bones, even genitals of the victim, as well as picture postcards of the event.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again we encounter a process of de-humanization difficult to emulate.&lt;br /&gt;
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First in the North and then, after the Civil War, in the South, notionally ‘free’ blacks suffered humiliation and persecution of every kind. In fact, stresses a historian in language that once again demands our attention, they became the target of veritable ‘pogroms’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carrying them out were gangs already active in the North in the 1820s and 1830s and which later, in the South, achieved consummate form in the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that seems to anticipate the ‘Blackshirts’ of Italian fascism and the ‘Brownshirts’ of German Nazism.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No less brutal than extra-legal violence was official justice: in the South blacks continued to be subject to a prison system so sadistic that it calls to mind ‘the prison camps of Nazi Germany’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, the two situations were united by the violence of racist ideology. Theodore Roosevelt can calmly be approximated to Hitler.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over and above individual figures, we must not lose sight of the general picture: ‘The effort to guarantee “race purity” in the American South anticipated aspects of the official Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.’ If we bear in mind the rule whereby a single drop of impure blood was enough for someone to be excluded from the white community in the South of the United States, a conclusion dictates itself: ‘the Nazi definition of a Jew was never as stringent as “the one-drop rule” that prevailed in the categorization of Negroes in the race-purity laws of the American South.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, two US scholars have recently referred to the ‘Nazi Connection’, or the ‘American legacy’ present in Nazism, to explain the parabola of eugenics, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg339&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘science’ born in liberal England and massively diffused in the other classic country of that intellectual tradition, which experienced its greatest triumphs in the Third Reich![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this connection we in fact encounter a paradox. Having disappeared together with Hitler’s Germany, eugenic measures continued to survive for some time in the United States. Let us observe the situation in 1952: ‘At the present time some thirty states in the Union legally forbid “interracial marriage.” In almost all these states miscegenation is a felony; in many a crime.’ Regarded as elements of contamination were not only ‘Negroes’ but also, in this or that state, ‘Mulattoes’, ‘Indians’, ‘Mongolians’, Koreans, ‘members of the Malay race’, Chinese, or ‘[any] person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation inclusive’, or even anyone ‘having one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood’, or even someone with ‘one-fourth or more’ ‘Kanak [Hawaiian] blood’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Reporting these facts is a US scholar who feels obliged to draw a bitter conclusion in respect of ‘racism’ (and Nazism): ‘The monster that has been let loose upon the world is to a large extent of our own making, and whether we are willing to face the fact or not we are, all of us, individually and collectively, responsible for the ghastly form which he has assumed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, genocide. An eminent scholar, Tzvetan Todorov, has defined the destruction of the Indians, whose final chapter was written in the English colonies in America and then in the United States, as ‘the greatest genocide in human history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the tragedy of the natives in America, Australia or the British colonies in general, other authors have referred, respectively, to the ‘American holocaust’ (or the ‘final solution’ of the Amerindian question), the ‘Australian holocaust’ and ‘late Victorian holocausts’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not to mention the ‘black holocaust’—the deportation and enslavement of the survivors, who numbered one in three or four—that Afro-Americans seek to draw attention to, and whose main protagonist was the liberal world. Finally, branded as the author of a tragedy to be regarded as the prototype of twentieth-century genocides, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg340&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principal official (Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan) of the British policy that led to the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Irish in the mid-nineteenth century has sometimes been defined as the ‘proto-Eichmann’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not the place to proceed to a comparative history of massacres, decimations and genocides, or to discuss the pertinence of the categories employed to describe them. But one point seems to me to be settled: it is banally ideological to characterize the catastrophe of the twentieth century as a kind of new barbarian invasion that unexpectedly attacked and overwhelmed a healthy, happy society. The horror of the twentieth century casts a shadow over the liberal world even if we ignore the fate reserved for peoples of colonial origin. ‘Totalitarian society’: thus has been defined the one that swallowed up deportees from Britain in Australia.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, with particular reference to the ‘development of industrial capitalism’ in England, it has been claimed that ‘the gulag is not a twentieth-century invention’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The usual hagiography proves unfounded even when, in reconstructing the liberal world, we restrict ourselves to analysing the metropolis and the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take an author celebrated by de Tocqueville as the apex of the liberal tradition. Jefferson raised the spectre of genocide in three very different contexts. He referred to ‘extermination’ in connection with the Indians as a process that was underway in the United States, could not be stopped, and was in fact to be attributed exclusively to the British. He pointed to the ‘extermination’ of the blacks as the inevitable outcome of the utopia of constructing a multiracial society. Finally, he experienced the clash with Britain as a total war, destined to issue in the ‘extermination’ of one of the contending parties (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]; [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|§14]]; and [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). As we can see, even a conflict completely internal to the community of the free provoked an ideological violence that might well bring to mind the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. After the catastrophe and beyond hagiography: the enduring legacy of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The horror of the twentieth century was not something that burst into a world of peaceful coexistence suddenly and from without. At the same time, being dissatisfied with the edifying picture of the habitual hagiography and situating oneself on the firm ground of reality, with its contradictions and conflicts, does &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg341&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not in any way mean denying the merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination. But we certainly must bid farewell once and for all to the myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Meanwhile, the presupposition of that discourse turns out to be wholly imaginary: the community of the free asserted itself demanding both negative and positive liberty, while excluding populations of colonial origin and metropolitan semi-slaves and servants from both. In addition, I would like to adduce a series of reasons, which I shall set out in ascending order of importance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the first place, it should not be forgotten that not only did the classics of the liberal tradition refer to democracy with coldness, hostility and sometimes frank contempt, but regarded its advent as an unlawful, intolerable rupture of the social contract and hence as a legitimate cause for the ‘appeal to Heaven’ (in Locke’s words) or to arms.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the exclusion clauses were not overcome painlessly, but through violent upheavals of a sometimes quite unprecedented violence. The abolition of slavery in the wake of the Civil War cost the United States more victims than both world wars combined. As for censitary discrimination, a decisive contribution was made to its abolition by the French revolutionary cycle. Finally, in major countries like Russia, Germany and the United States the accession of women to political rights had behind it the war and revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thirdly, in addition to not being painless, the historical process that resulted in the advent of democracy was quite the reverse of unilinear. Emancipation—that is, the acquisition of rights previously not recognized or enjoyed—might well be followed by dis-emancipation—that is, deprivation of the rights whose recognition and enjoyment the excluded had won. Asserted in France in the wake of the February 1848 revolution, universal (male) suffrage was abolished two years later by the liberal bourgeoisie and was shortly afterwards reintroduced not as a result of the maturation of liberalism, but by the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon, who used it to stage the ritual of plebiscitary acclamation. In this context the most striking example is provided by the United States. The end of the Civil War inaugurated the happiest phase in the history of Afro-Americans, who now won civil and political rights and began to participate in representative bodies. But this was a kind of brief interlude in the tragedy. The 1877 compromise between the whites of the North and South involved the loss of political and, often, civil rights for blacks, as is attested by the regime of racial segregation and the savage violence of pogroms and lynching. This phase &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg342&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of dis-emancipation, which developed in a society that continued to define itself as liberal, lasted almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is then a fourth reason. The process of emancipation very often had a spur completely external to the liberal world. The abolition of slavery in British colonies cannot be understood without the black revolution in San Domingo, which was viewed with horror, and often combated, by the liberal world as a whole. Around thirty years afterwards, the institution of slavery had been abolished even in the United States. But we know that the most ardent abolitionists were accused by their opponents of being influenced or infected by French and Jacobin ideas. The brief experience of multiracial democracy was followed a long phase of dis-emancipation marked by a terroristic white supremacy. When was the turning point? In December 1952 the US Justice Secretary sent the Supreme Court, which was engaged in deliberating on the issue of integration in public schools, an eloquent letter: ‘Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.’ Washington, observes the American historian who has reconstructed this story, ran the risk of alienating the ‘colored races’ not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States. Even there communist propaganda met with considerable success in its attempt to win blacks to the ‘revolutionary cause’, making them lose ‘faith in American institutions’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On close examination, first slavery and then the terrorist regime of white supremacy were thrown into crisis by the San Domingo revolt and the October Revolution, respectively. The implementation of an essential principle, if not of liberalism then of liberal democracy (in the usual sense of the term), is inconceivable without the decisive contribution of two of the chapters of history most hated by the liberal culture of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fifth and final reason is the most important. I refer to the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that distinguishes the individual stages in the process of overcoming the exclusion clauses characteristic of the liberal tradition. In the United States the disappearance of censitary discrimination, and affirmation of the principle of political equality, were aided by the quantitative containment and political and social neutralization of the ‘dangerous classes’, thanks to the expropriation and deportation of Indians—which for a long time made it possible to enlarge the class of landowners—and the enslavement of blacks. In Europe extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg343&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;century proceeded in tandem with colonial expansion and the imposition of forced labour on peoples or ‘races’ deemed barbarous or childlike. This tangle sometimes presented itself in a decidedly tragic form. Subject to humiliation, discrimination and persecution of every kind in the South, Afro-Americans sought to win recognition by participating in the front line in the Union’s wars. And so in some circles homage began to be paid to the courage displayed by soldiers of colour in the Battle of Wounded Knee.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, blacks’ hopes for emancipation took the form—were obliged to take the form—of their active participation in destroying Indians!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is precisely from such historical reconstruction, remote from any apologetic, edifying tones, that the genuine merits and real strong points of liberalism emerge. Demonstrating an extraordinary flexibility, it constantly sought to react and rise to the challenges of the time. It is true that, far from being spontaneous and painless, such transformation was largely imposed from without, by political and social movements with which liberalism has repeatedly and fiercely clashed. But precisely in this resides its flexibility. Liberalism has proved capable of learning from its antagonist (the tradition of thinking that, starting with ‘radicalism’ and passing through Marx, issued in the revolutions which variously invoked him) to a far greater extent than its antagonist has proved capable of learning from it. Above all, the antagonist has proved incapable of learning what constitutes the second major strong point of liberalism. Certainly, liberalism’s learning process was quite the reverse of smooth, at least for those who wanted to overcome the exclusion clauses that run deep in this intellectual tradition. None has been as committed as it to thinking through the decisive problem of the limitation of power. However, historically, this limitation of power went hand in hand with the delimitation of a restricted sacred space: nurturing a proud, exclusivist self-consciousness, the community of the freemen inhabiting it was led to regard enslavement, or more or less explicit subjection, imposed on the great mass dispersed throughout the profane space, as legitimate. Sometimes they even arrived at decimation or annihilation. Has this dialectic on the basis of which liberalism was transformed into an ideology of domination, and even an ideology of war, wholly disappeared?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In economics, clearly distancing itself from an insipid ideology of social harmony miraculously lacking any element of contradiction, conflict and tension, liberal thought has vigorously insisted on the need for competition between individuals in the market, in order to develop social wealth and the productive forces. This is a further, major historical merit to be acknowledged. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg344&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, at this level, too, there emerged the awful exclusion clauses we are already familiar with. Far from being a site where all individuals freely meet as sellers and buyers of commodities, for centuries the liberal market was a site of exclusion, de-humanization and even terror. In the past the ancestors of today’s black citizens were commodities, not autonomous buyers and sellers. And for centuries the market functioned as an instrument of terror: even more than the lash, what imposed total obedience on the slave was the threat of being sold, like a commodity exchanged on the market, separately from other family members.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a long time indentured white servants were also bought and sold on the market, and thus condemned to a fate not very different from that of black slaves. And in the name of the market, workers’ coalitions were repressed and economic and social rights ignored and denied, with a consequent commodification of essential aspects of the human personality and human dignity (health, education, and so on). In extreme cases the superstitious cult of the Market sealed huge tragedies, like the one which in 1847 saw Britain condemn an enormous mass of actual (Irish) individuals to death from starvation. Is all this a definitively concluded chapter of history? Moreover, has liberalism definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, with the dangers of regression and restoration implicit in it? Or is this dialectic still alive and well, thanks to the malleability peculiar to this current of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet however difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task. On the other hand, liberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it. If one starts out from such a presupposition, the tragedy of peoples subjected to slavery or semi-slavery, or deported, decimated and destroyed, becomes utterly inexplicable. This was a tragedy which, far from being impeded or prevented by the liberal world, developed in close connection with it. Unfounded on a historiographical level, the habitual hagiography is also an insult to the memory of the victims. Only in opposition to the pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a ‘counter-history’: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn1a|1]] On all this, cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §7 (on the plural vote) and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn2a|2]] Necker, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant et Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn3a|3]] Constant, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 ibid., p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn4a|4]] Constant, quoted in ibid., pp. 76–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn5a|5]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, p. 347.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn6a|6]] According to the testimony of J. Mallet du Pan, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn7a|7]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël&#039;&#039;, pp. 8–19 and &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 29, 63n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn8a|8]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn9a|9]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 17, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn10a|10]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 554–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn11a|11]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, §1; ch. 3, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, (1951–), vol. 6, pt 2, p. 108 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn13a|13]] This emerges from a conversation of 25 May 1848 reported by Nassau William Senior: cf. ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 176.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 52 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 31 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn17a|17]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 143 (letter to Francis Lieber, 4 August 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 53 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn20a|20]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;La Seconda Repubblica&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, ch. 2, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn22a|22]] Einaudi, quoted in Paolo Favilli, &#039;&#039;Riformismo e sindicalismo&#039;&#039;, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1984, pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn23a|23]] See, especially, Vilfedo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et idéologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1966, pp. 224–5; Thomas Mackay, Introduction to George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. vii, xii (on Pareto’s adhesion to the League).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn24a|24]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn25a|25]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Die Gemeinwirtschaft&#039;&#039;, Jena: Fischer, 1922, pp. 469ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn26a|26]] Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn27a|27]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn28a|28]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 3, p. 43–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn29a|29]] John Hope Franklin, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 328.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn30a|30]] Rayford W. Logan, &#039;&#039;The Betrayal of the Negro&#039;&#039;, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, p. xxi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn31a|31]] Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 13, 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn32a|32]] Cf. Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Brittanica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 3, pp. 179–85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn34a|34]] Office d’Information, &#039;&#039;Les droits de l’homme en Chine&#039;&#039;, Beijing, 1991, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn35a|35]] Michael Brecher, &#039;&#039;Nehru&#039;&#039;, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn36a|36]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 364.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn37a|37]] Colm Tóibín, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May 2004, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn38a|38]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;Letters&#039;&#039;, ed. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum, 8 vols, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1951–54, vol. 1, p. 377 (letter to Charles Henry Pearson, 11 May 1894).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn39a|39]] Reginald Horsman, &#039;&#039;Race and Manifest Destiny&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn40a|40]] Dee Brown, &#039;&#039;Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee&#039;&#039;, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn41a|41]] Roosevelt, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn42a|42]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn43a|43]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn44a|44]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn45a|45]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn46a|46]] Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–, vol. 1, p. 443.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn47a|47]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 435 n. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn48a|48]] Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 585.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn49a|49]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 197, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn50a|50]] Macaulay, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn51a|51]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn52a|52]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 410 (letter to Moncure D. Conway, 17 July 1898).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn53a|53]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn54a|54]] J.A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1963, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., pp. 200, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn58a|58]] Albert J. Beveridge, &#039;&#039;The Meaning of the Times&#039;&#039;, Freeport (NY): Books for Libraries Press, 1968, pp. 50, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn60a|60]] Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn61a|61]] Edward Eggleston, &#039;&#039;The Ultimate Solution of the American Negro Problem&#039;&#039;, New York: AMS Press, 1973, pp. 133–5, 141–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., pp. 183–5, 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn64a|64]] John Sharp Williams, quoted in George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn65a|65]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn66a|66]] Clifford Geertz, ‘Morality Tale’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 7 October 2004, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn68a|68]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 186, 212–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., pp. 131, 133–4, 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn70a|70]] Thus William T. Hagan, quoted in agreement by Laurence M. Hauptman, &#039;&#039;Between Two Fires&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn71a|71]] Davis, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November 2004, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn72a|72]] Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn73a|73]] Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn74a|74]] C. Vann Woodward, ‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February 1998, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn75a|75]] Richard Maxwell Brown, &#039;&#039;Strain of Violence&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn76a|76]] Nancy MacLean, &#039;&#039;Behind the Mask of Chivalry&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn77a|77]] Fletcher M. Green, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn78a|78]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 13; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, p. xiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn79a|79]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;Racism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 2, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn80a|80]] Stefan Kühl, &#039;&#039;The Nazi Connection&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Edwin Black, &#039;&#039;War against the Weak&#039;&#039;, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003, pp. 385–409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn81a|81]] Ashley Montagu, &#039;&#039;Man’s Most Dangerous Myth&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966, pp. 302ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 265.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn83a|83]] Tzvetan Todorov, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn84a|84]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Philippe Jacquin, &#039;&#039;Storia degli indiani d’America&#039;&#039;, trans. Franco Moccia, Milan: Mondadori, 1976; Thomas Schmid, ‘Australiens Holocaust’, &#039;&#039;Die Zeit&#039;&#039;, 31 May 2000; Mike Davis, &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn85a|85]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalism al ‘comunismo critico’&#039;&#039;, Rome: Gamberetti, 1997, ch. 5, §§10, 13; Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, pp. 317–18 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn86a|86]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn87a|87]] Robert Castel, &#039;&#039;Les métamorphoses de la question sociale&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88a|88]] C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 131–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89a|89]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90a|90]] Walter Johnson, &#039;&#039;Soul by Soul&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 19, 22–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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Stuart, Reginald C., &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America: 1775–1871&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sullivan, Eileen P., ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sumner, William Graham, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society, and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tawney, Richard H., &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948 [1926].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
Thomas, Hugh, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thompson, E. P., &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977 [1975].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988 [1963].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tilly, Charles, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tinker, Hugh, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920&#039;&#039;, London and New York: OUP, 1974.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tocqueville, Alexis de, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, transl. Stuart Gilbert, introd. Hugh Brogan, London: Fontana, 1966 [1856].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, introd. Alan Ryan, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994 [1835–40].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Todorov, Tzvetan, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other&#039;&#039;, transl. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992 [1982].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tóibín, Colm, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May, 2004.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Townsend, Joseph, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 [1786].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#page360&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#pg360&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;360&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Toynbee, A. J., &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: OUP, 1962 [1934–54].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Treitschke, Heinrich von, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——&#039;&#039;‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886 [1861].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Politik. Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Trevelyan, George M., &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After (1782–1919)&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp;amp; Co., 1937 [1922].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green &amp;amp;amp; Co., 1945.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker, Josiah, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96 [1775–82].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tudesq, André-Jean, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France (1840–1849)&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Turner, Frederick Jackson, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994 [1893].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Van den Berghe, Pierre L., &#039;&#039;Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Venturi, Franco, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Villari, Pasquale, &#039;&#039;Dai carteggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963 [1751].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, transl. and introd. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992 [1759].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, transl. Ernest Dilworth, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003 [1734].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wallerstein, Immanuel, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wallon, Henri-Alexandre, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974 [1879].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wang, Nora, Xin Ye, and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savants, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Washburn, Wilcomb E., &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Washington, George, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Weber, Max, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften. Studiensausgabe&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968 [1917].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#page361&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#pg361&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;361&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wiener, Joel H., &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home—A Documentary History of Domestic Policy, 1689–1973&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wilberforce, Robert Isaac, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce, by His Sons&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Williams, Eric E., &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492–1969&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972 [1964].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990 [1942].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Williamson, Joel, &#039;&#039;New People: Miscegenation and Mulattos in the United States&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wills, Garry, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’: Jefferson and the Slave Power&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wolf, Eric R., &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wood, Forrest G., &#039;&#039;Black Scare: The Racist Response to Emancipation and Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wood, Gordon S., ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November, 2004.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Woodward, C. Vann, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, 2nd edn, New York: OUP, 1966 [1955].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——&#039;&#039;‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February, 1998.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zilversmit, Arthur, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North&#039;&#039;, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969 [1967].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zimmer, Anne Y., &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher, Loyalist in Exile&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zitomersky, Joseph, ‘Culture, classe ou État? Comment interpréter les relations raciales dans la Grande Louisiane française avant et après 1803?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson et de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zuckerman, Michael, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People: Oblique Biographies in the American Grain&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works by Domenico Losurdo]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Library works about Liberalism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59296</id>
		<title>Library:Liberalism: A Counter-History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59296"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:34:03Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added fixed headings&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;Contents&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0000.html|&#039;&#039;Title Page&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0001.html|&#039;&#039;Copyright&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0002.html|&#039;&#039;Dedication&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html|&#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html|1 What Is Liberalism?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html|2 Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html|3 White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html|4 Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html|5 The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism Either Side of the Atlantic]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html|6 The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html|7 The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html|8 Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html|9 Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html|10 Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0015.html|&#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pagevii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgvii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How does this book differ from existing histories of liberalism, which continue to appear in growing numbers? Does it really succeed in making the innovation promised by the title? Once they have finished it, readers will be able to give their own answer. For now, the author can limit himself to a statement of intent. In formulating it, a great example can aid us. About to embark on the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France, de Tocqueville observed of studies of the eighteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e imagine we know all about the French social order of that time, for the good reason that its surface glitter holds our gaze and we are familiar not only with the life stories of its outstanding figures but also, thanks to the many brilliant critical studies now available, with the works of the great writers who adorned that age. But we have only vague, often quite wrong conceptions of the manner in which public business was transacted and institutions functioned; of the exact relations between the various classes in the social hierarchy; of the situation and sentiments of that section of the population which as yet could neither make itself heard nor seen; and, by the same token, of the ideas and mores basic to the social structure of eighteenth-century France.[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason not to apply the methodology so brilliantly indicated by de Tocqueville to the movement and society of which he was an integral and influential part. Solely because he intends to draw attention to aspects that he believes have hitherto been largely and unjustly ignored, the author refers in the book’s title to a ‘counter-history’. Otherwise, it is a history, whose subject-matter alone remains to be specified: not liberal thought in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pageviii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgviii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;concrete reality. As with any other major historical movement, this involves investigating the conceptual developments, but also—and primarily—the political and social relations it found expression in, as well as the more or less contradictory link that was established between these two dimensions of social reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, in commencing the investigation, we are forced to pose a preliminary question concerning the subject whose history we intend to reconstruct: What is liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1a|1]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER ONE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg1&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;What Is Liberalism?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. A series of embarrassing questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The usual answer to this question admits of no doubt: liberalism is the tradition of thought whose central concern is the liberty of the individual, which is ignored or ridden roughshod over by organicist philosophies of various kinds. But if that is the case, how should we situate John C. Calhoun? This eminent statesman, vice president of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, burst into an impassioned ode to individual liberty, which, appealing to Locke, he vigorously defended against any abuse of power and any unwarranted interference by the state. And that is not all. Along with ‘absolute governments’ and the ‘concentration of power’, he unstintingly criticized and condemned fanaticism[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the spirit of ‘crusade’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] to which he opposed ‘compromise’ as the guiding principle of genuine ‘constitutional governments’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With equal eloquence Calhoun defended minority rights. It was not only a question of guaranteeing the alternation of the various parties in government through suffrage: unduly extensive power was unacceptable in any event, even if limited in duration and tempered by the promise or prospect of a periodic reversal of roles in the relationship between governors and governed.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unquestionably, we seem to have all the characteristics of the most mature and attractive liberal thought. On the other hand, however, disdaining the half-measures and timidity or fear of those who restricted themselves to accepting it as a necessary ‘evil’, Calhoun declared slavery to be ‘a positive good’ that civilization could not possibly renounce. Calhoun repeatedly denounced intolerance and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg2&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crusading spirit, not in order to challenge the enslavement of blacks or the ruthless hunting down of fugitive slaves, but exclusively to brand abolitionists as ‘blind fanatics’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who ‘consider themselves under the most sacred obligation to use every effort to destroy’ slavery, a form of property legitimized and guaranteed by the Constitution.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were not among the minorities defended with such vigour and legal erudition. In fact, in their case, tolerance and the spirit of compromise seem to turn into their opposite: if fanaticism actually succeeded in its mad project of abolishing slavery, what would follow would be ‘the extirpation of one or the other race’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, given the concrete balance of forces in the United States, it was not difficult to imagine which of the two would succumb: blacks could only survive on condition of being slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So is Calhoun a liberal? No doubts on this score were harboured by Lord Acton, a prominent figure in liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, an advisor and friend of William Gladstone, one of the major figures in nineteenth-century England. In Acton’s view, Calhoun was a champion of the cause of the struggle against any form of absolutism, including ‘democratic absolutism’; the arguments he employed were ‘the very perfection of political truth’. In short, we are dealing with one of the major authors and great minds in the liberal tradition and pantheon.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Albeit in less emphatic language, the question has been answered in the affirmative by those who in our time celebrate Calhoun as ‘a strong individualist’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as a champion of the ‘defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or as a theorist of the sense of limits and the self-limitation that should characterize the majority.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no doubt is one US publishing house, committed to republishing in a neo-liberal key ‘Liberty Classics’, among which the eminent statesman and ideologue of the slaveholding South features prominently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question we have posed does not only emerge from reconstructing the history of the United States. Prestigious scholars of the French Revolution, of firm liberal persuasion, have no hesitation in defining as ‘liberal’ those figures and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg3&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;circles that had the merit of opposing the Jacobin diversion, but who were firmly committed to the defence of colonial slavery. The reference is to Pierre-Victor Malouet and members of the Massiac Club, who were ‘all plantation-owners and slaveholders’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Is it possible to be a liberal and slaveholder at the same time? Such was not the opinion of John Stuart Mill, judging at least from his polemic against the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; British liberals (among them, perhaps, Acton and Gladstone), who, during the American Civil War, rallied en masse to ‘a furious pro-Southern partisanship’, or at any rate viewed the Union and Lincoln coolly and malevolently.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We face a dilemma. If we answer the question formulated above (Is Calhoun a liberal?) in the affirmative, we can no longer maintain the traditional (and edifying) image of liberalism as the thought and volition of liberty. If, on the other hand, we answer in the negative, we find ourselves confronting a new problem and new question, which is no less embarrassing than the first: Why should we continue to dignify John Locke with the title of father of liberalism? Calhoun refers to black slavery as a ‘positive good’. Yet without resorting to such brazen language, the English philosopher, to whom the US author explicitly appealed, regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formalization of the institution in Carolina. He took a hand in drafting the constitutional provision according to which ‘[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke was ‘the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this did not prevent him from inveighing against the political ‘slavery’ that absolute monarchy sought to impose.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in Calhoun the theorization of black slavery as a ‘positive good’ went hand in hand with warnings against a concentration of power that risked transforming ‘the governed’ into ‘the slaves of the rulers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Of course, the American statesman was a slave-owner, but the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg4&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;English philosopher also had sound investments in the slave trade.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the latter’s position proves even more compromising; for good or ill, in the slaveholding South of which Calhoun was the interpreter, there was no longer any place for the deportation of blacks from Africa, in a terrible voyage that condemned many of them to death before they landed in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do we want to bring historical distance to bear in order to distinguish the positions of the two authors being compared here, and exclude from the liberal tradition only Calhoun, who continued to justify or celebrate the institution of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century? The southern statesman would have reacted indignantly to such inconsistency of treatment: as regards the English liberal philosopher, he would perhaps have repeated, in slightly different language, the thesis formulated by him in connection with George Washington: ‘He was one of us—a slaveholder and a planter.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contemporary with Calhoun was Francis Lieber, one of the most eminent intellectuals of his time. Sometimes saluted as a sort of Montesquieu redivivus, in correspondence and on respectful terms with de Tocqueville, he was doubtless a critic, if a cautious one, of the institution of slavery. He hoped it would wither away through its gradual transformation into a kind of servitude or semi-servitude on the autonomous initiative of the slaveholding states, whose right to self-government could not be questioned. That is why Lieber was also admired in the South, all the more so because he himself, albeit on a rather modest scale, owned and sometimes rented male and female slaves. When one of the latter died, following a mysterious pregnancy and subsequent abortion, he recorded in his diary the painful financial loss suffered: ‘fully one thousand dollars—the hard labor of a year’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New, painful economies were required to replace the deceased slave, because Lieber, unlike Calhoun, was not a planter and did not live off profits, but a university professor who essentially used slaves as domestic servants. Does this authorize us in including the first, rather than the second, in the liberal tradition? In any event, temporal distance plays no role here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now take a contemporary of Locke’s. Andrew Fletcher was ‘a champion of liberty’ and, at the same time, ‘a champion of slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Politically, he &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg5&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;professed to be ‘a republican on principle’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and culturally was ‘a Scottish prophet of the Enlightenment’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He too fled to Holland in the wake of the anti-Jacobite and anti-absolutist conspiracy, exactly like Locke, with whom he was in correspondence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fletcher’s reputation crossed the Atlantic: Jefferson defined him as a ‘patriot’, whose merit was to have expressed the ‘political principles’ characteristic of ‘the purest periods of the British Constitution’—those that subsequently caught on and prospered in free America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing positions rather similar to Fletcher’s was his contemporary and fellow countryman James Burgh, who also enjoyed the respect of republican circles à la Jefferson,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was mentioned favourably by Thomas Paine in the most celebrated opuscule of the American Revolution (&#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, in contrast to the other authors—though like them characterized by a peculiar tangle of love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery—Fletcher and Burgh are virtually forgotten today, and no one seems to want to include them among exponents of the liberal tradition. The fact is that, in underlining the necessity of slavery, they were thinking primarily not of blacks in the colonies, but of the ‘vagrants’, the beggars, the odious, incorrigible rabble of the metropolis. Should they be regarded as illiberal for this reason? Were that to be the case, what would distinguish liberals from non-liberals would be not the condemnation of the institution of slavery, but only negative discrimination against peoples of colonial origin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal England presents us with another, different case. Francis Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of some significance (he was the ‘never to be forgotten’ master of Adam Smith),[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the one hand expressed criticisms and reservations about the slavery to which blacks were indiscriminately subjected. On the other hand, he stressed that, especially when dealing with the ‘lower conditions’ of society, slavery could be a ‘useful punishment’: it should be the ‘ordinary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg6&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and their families by any useful labours’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an author who, while evincing unease at hereditary, racial slavery, demanded a sort of penal slavery for those who, regardless of their skin colour, were guilty of vagrancy. Was Hutcheson a liberal?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically positioned between Locke and Calhoun, and with his focus precisely on the reality accepted by the two of them as obvious and indisputable, or even celebrated as a ‘positive good’, Adam Smith constructed an argument and expressed a position that warrants being cited at some length. Slavery could be more easily abolished under a ‘despotic government’ than a ‘free government’, with its representative bodies exclusively reserved in practice for white property-owners. In such circumstances, the condition of the black slaves was desperate: ‘every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves’. Hence ‘[t]he freedom of the free was the cause of the great oppression of the slaves … And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Can an author who, in at least one concrete instance, expressed his preference for ‘despotic government’ be regarded as liberal? Or, differently put, is Smith more liberal or are Locke and Calhoun, who, along with slavery, defended the representative bodies condemned by Smith as the prop, in a slaveholding society, of an infamous institution contrary to any sense of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, as the great economist had foreseen, slavery was abolished in the United States not thanks to local self-government, but by the iron fist of the Union’s army and the temporary military dictatorship imposed by it. For this Lincoln was accused by his opponents of despotism and Jacobinism. He resorted to ‘military government’ and ‘military commissions’ and interpreted ‘the word “law”‘ as ‘[t]he will of the President’ and habeas corpus as the ‘power of the President to imprison whom he pleases, as long as he pleases’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Together with representatives of the secessionist Confederacy, the drafters of this indictment were those who aspired to a compromise peace, for the purposes of returning to constitutional normality. And once again we are obliged to ask the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg7&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;question: Is it Lincoln who is more liberal, or his adversaries in the South, or his opponents in the North who came out in favour of compromise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mill adopt a position in favour of the Union and condemn the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberals who cried scandal over the energy with which it conducted the war against the South and kept at bay those who, in the North itself, were inclined to tolerate the slaveholders’ secession. However, we shall see that, when he turned his attention to the colonies, the English liberal justified the West’s ‘despotism’ over ‘races’ that were still ‘under age’, and who were obliged to observe an ‘absolute obedience’ in order to be set on the path of progress. This is a formulation that would not have displeased Calhoun, who likewise legitimized slavery by reference to the backwardness and nonage of populations of African origin. It was only in America, and thanks to the paternal care of white masters, that the ‘black race’ succeeded in progressing and making the transition from its previous ‘low, degraded and savage condition’ to ‘its present comparatively civilized condition’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Mill’s view, ‘any means’ were licit for those who took on the task of educating ‘savage tribes’; ‘slavery’ was sometimes a mandatory stage for inducing them to work and making them useful to civilization and progress (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]). But this was also the opinion of Calhoun, for whom slavery was an unavoidable means if one wished to achieve the end of civilizing blacks. Certainly, by contrast with the permanent slavery which, according to the US theorist and politician, blacks must be subjected to, the pedagogical dictatorship Mill refers to was destined to disappear in the distant, uncertain future. But the other side of the coin is that now explicitly subjected to this condition of unfreedom was not a particular ethnic group (the fragment of Africa located at the heart of the United States), but all the peoples invested by the West’s colonial expansion and forced to endure political ‘despotism’ and servile or semi-servile forms of labour. Is demanding ‘absolute obedience’, for an indeterminate period of time, from the overwhelming majority of humanity compatible with the liberal profession of faith? Or is it synonymous with &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The American Revolution and the revelation of an embarrassing truth&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is now clear that what primarily divides the authors mentioned up to this point is the problem of slavery. In one way or another, they all refer to the Britain deriving from the Glorious Revolution or the United States. These are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg8&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;two countries that for around a century were a single state entity and formed, as it were, a single political party. Prior to the crisis that led to the American Revolution, the British on both sides of the Atlantic felt themselves to be proud subjects or citizens of ‘[a] land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus Blackstone. To confirm his thesis, he referred to Montesquieu, who spoke of England as the ‘one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not even the French liberal doubted the fact that ‘England is currently the freest country in the world, not discounting any republic’: the ‘free nation’, the ‘free people’ par excellence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, no dark clouds seemed to threaten relations between the two shores of the Atlantic. There were no conflicts and, according to Montesquieu at least, there could not be, because even in its relationship with the colonies what characterized England was its love of liberty:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this nation sent colonies abroad, it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as this government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, the English colonists in America proudly identified with Blackstone’s thesis that ‘our free constitution’, which ‘falls little short of perfection’, differed markedly ‘from the modern constitutions of other states’, from the political order of ‘the continent of Europe’ as a whole.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the ideology with which the Seven Years’ War was fought by the British Empire. The English colonists in America were the most determined in interpreting it as a clash between the ‘supporters of freedom in the world’—the British ‘sons of noble liberty’, or defenders of Protestantism—and a ‘cruel and oppressive’ France—despotic politically, and follower of ‘Roman bigotry’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg9&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Popery religiously. At the time, even the British Crown’s transatlantic subjects liked to repeat with Locke that ‘slavery’ was ‘directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation’; it was utterly inconceivable for an ‘Englishman’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French allegedly wanted to reduce the American colonists to a ‘slavish subjection’. Fortunately, however, arriving to foil this attempt was Great Britain, ‘[t]he Mistress of the Nations—the grand Support of Liberty, the Scourge of Oppression and Tyranny!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was an ideology that Edmund Burke sought to breathe new life into as late as 1775, in a desperate attempt to avoid the impending rupture. Presenting his motion of conciliation, he called upon people not to lose sight of, and not to sever, the ties that bound the American colonists to the mother country: what was at stake was a single ‘nation’ that shared ‘the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’, the faith in ‘liberty’. Largely unchallenged in countries like Spain or Prussia, slavery was ‘a weed that grows in every soil’ except the English. Accordingly, it was absurd to try to subdue the rebel colonists by force: ‘An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the slavery referred to here is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other slavery, which shackles blacks, is passed over in silence. With the increasing inevitability of the revolution, or ‘civil war’ with all its ‘horrors’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—as loyalists faithful to the Crown and British politicians in favour of compromise and preserving the unity of the English ‘nation’ and ‘race’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] preferred to call it—the picture changed markedly. The element of continuity is clear. Each of the two contending parties accused the other of wanting to reintroduce despotism, or political ‘slavery’. The rebel colonists’ charges are well known: they tirelessly denounced the tyranny of the British Crown and parliament, and their mad project of subjecting residents in America to a condition of ‘perpetual bondage and slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the response was not slow in coming. As early as 1773, a loyalist from New York had issued a warning: hitherto they had been ‘watchful against &#039;&#039;external&#039;&#039; attacks on our freedom’ (the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg10&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;reference is to the Seven Years’ War), but now a much more insidious danger had emerged—that of ‘becom[ing] &#039;&#039;enslaved&#039;&#039; by tyrants within’. Again in New York, another loyalist repeated the point two years later: the rebels aspired ‘to make us worse than slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In polemicizing against one another, the two branches the liberal party had divided into adopted the ideology and rhetoric that had presided over the self-celebration of the English nation in its entirety, as the sworn enemy of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The novel factor was that, in the wake of the exchange of accusations, the other slavery—the one both branches had repressed as a disruptive element in their proud self-consciousness as members of the people and party of liberty—burst into the polemics alongside political slavery. In the rebel colonists’ view, the London government, which in sovereign fashion imposed taxation on citizens or subjects not represented in the House of Commons, was behaving like a master towards his slaves. But—objected the others—if slavery is the issue, why not start to discuss the slavery that is manifested in brutal, unequivocal form precisely where liberty is so passionately lauded? As early as 1764, Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time to plead the colonists’ cause, had to face the sarcastic comments of his interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You Americans make a great Clamour upon every little imaginary infringement of what you take to be your Liberties; and yet there are no People upon Earth such Enemies to Liberty, such absolute Tyrants, where you have the Opportunity, as you yourselves are.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The self-styled champions of liberty branded taxation imposed without their explicit consent as synonymous with despotism and slavery. But they had no scruples about exercising the most absolute and arbitrary power over their slaves. This was a paradox: ‘How is it’, Samuel Johnson asked, ‘that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’ Across the Atlantic, those who sought to contest the secession ironized in similar fashion. Thomas Hutchinson, royal governor of Massachusetts, rebuked the rebels for their inconsistency or hypocrisy: they denied Africans those rights that they claimed to be ‘absolutely inalienable’ in the most radical way imaginable.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Echoing him was an American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher), who, having taken refuge in England, revisited the events that forced him into exile and observed: ‘the most &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg11&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clamorous advocates for liberty were uniformly the harshest and worst masters of slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the people most directly involved in the polemical and political struggle who expressed themselves so harshly. The intervention of John Millar, prominent exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, was especially stinging:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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It affords a curious spectacle to observe, that the same people who talk in a high strain of political liberty, and who consider the privilege of imposing their own taxes as one of the inalienable rights of mankind, should make no scruple of reducing a great proportion of their fellow-creatures into circumstances by which they are not only deprived of property, but almost of every species of right. Fortune perhaps never produced a situation more calculated to ridicule a liberal hypothesis, or to show how little the conduct of men is at the bottom directed by any philosophical principles.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Millar was a disciple of Adam Smith. The master seems to have seen things in the same way. When he declared that to a ‘free government’ controlled by slaveowners, he preferred a ‘despotic government’ capable of erasing the infamy of slavery, he made explicit reference to America. Translated into directly political terms, the great economist’s words signify: the despotism the Crown is criticized for is preferable to the liberty demanded by the slave-owners, from which only a small class of planters and absolute masters benefits.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
English abolitionists went even further, calling for the defence of British institutions threatened by ‘arbitrary and inhuman uses, which prevail in a distant land’. So arbitrary and inhuman that, as indicated by an advert in the &#039;&#039;New York Journal&#039;&#039;, a black woman and her three-year-old daughter could be sold on the market separately, as if they were a cow and a calf. And hence (concluded Granville Sharp in 1769) one should not be led astray by ‘theatrical bombast and ranting expressions in praise of liberty’ employed by the slaveholding rebels; free English institutions must be vigorously defended against them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The accused reacted in their turn by upbraiding England for its hypocrisy: it boasted of its virtue and love of liberty, but who promoted and continued to promote the slave trade? And who was it that transported and sold slaves? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg12&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Thus argued Franklin,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] advancing an argument that became central in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence elaborated by Jefferson. This is how, in the original version of that solemn document, the Britain derived from the Glorious Revolution and George III himself were charged. The latter&lt;br /&gt;
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has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical war, the opprobrium of &#039;&#039;infidel&#039;&#039; powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The role of slavery between the two Atlantic shores&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
What should we make of this furious, unexpected polemic? There is no doubt that the accusations against the rebels struck a weak point. Virginia played a central role in the American Revolution. Forty per cent of the country’s slaves were to be found there, but a majority of the authors of the rebellion unleashed in the name of liberty also came from there. For thirty-two of the United States’ first thirty-six years of existence, slave-owners from Virginia occupied the post of president. This colony or state, founded on slavery, supplied the country with its most illustrious statesmen. It is enough to think of George Washington (great military and political protagonist of the anti-British revolt) and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (authors, respectively, of the Declaration of Independence and the federal Constitution of 1787), all three of them slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Regardless of this or that state, the influence slavery exercised on the country as a whole is clear. Sixty years after its foundation, we see that ‘of the first sixteen presidential elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern slaveholder in the White House’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence the persistence of the anti-American polemic on this point is understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side, we are familiar with Franklin’s and Jefferson’s ironic remarks about the moralizing anti-slavery lectures offered by a country deeply &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg13&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved in the slave trade. Burke, theorist of ‘conciliation with the colonies’, likewise stressed this. In rejecting the proposal of those who urged ‘a general enfranchisement of their slaves’ to counter the rebellion of their masters and the colonists generally, he observed: ‘Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?’ All the more so if this nation insisted on practising the slave trade, clashing with colonies that wished to restrict or abolish it. In the eyes of slaves landed in or deported to America, this would represent a peculiar spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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An offer of freedom from England, would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke’s irony hits home. In addition to Britain’s role in the slave trade, slaves long continued to be present in the metropolis itself. It has been calculated that in the mid-eighteenth century there were around 100,000 of them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were British abolitionists horrified by the market in human flesh in the American colonies and New York? In Liverpool in 1766, eleven black slaves were put on sale and the market in ‘black cattle’ was still open in Dublin twelve years later, regularly advertised in the local press.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The role played in the country’s economy by the trade in slaves and their exploitation was sizeable: ‘The &#039;&#039;Liverpool Courier&#039;&#039;, 22 August 1832, estimated that three-quarters of Britain’s coffee, fifteen-sixteenths of its cotton, twenty-two twenty-thirds of its sugar, and thirty-four thirty-fifths of its tobacco were still produced by slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In sum, we should bear in mind the candid judgement of two eighteenth-century British witnesses. The first, Joshua Gee, acknowledged that ‘[a]ll this great increase in our treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of negroes in the plantations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The second, Malachy Postlethwayt, engaged as he was in defending the role of the Royal African Company—the company that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg14&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;controlled the slave trade—was even sharper: ‘The &#039;&#039;Negroe Trade&#039;&#039; and the natural Consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation’; they were ‘the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Empire as a whole was merely ‘a magnificent superstructure’ upon this commerce.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, there was the political influence of the institution of slavery. Although obviously inferior to what it was in the American colonies, it was certainly not nugatory in England: in the 1790 parliament, two or three dozen members sat who had interests in the West Indies.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The exchange of accusations between rebel colonists and the mother country—that is, between two branches of the party that had hitherto proudly celebrated itself as the party of liberty—was a mutual, pitiless demystification. Not only did the England derived from the Glorious Revolution not challenge the slave trade, but on the contrary the latter experienced strong growth.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And one of the new liberal monarchy’s first acts of international policy was wresting a monopoly on the slave trade from Spain. On the other side, the revolution that broke out across the Atlantic in the name of liberty involved official consecration of the institution of slavery, and the conquest and prolonged exercise of political hegemony by slave-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Possibly the most articulate and pained intervention in this polemic was by Josiah Tucker, ‘who, though a parson and a Tory, was, apart from that, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He denounced England’s pre-eminent role in the slave trade: ‘We … the boasted Patrons of Liberty, and the professed Advocates for the natural Rights of Mankind, engage deeper in this murderous inhuman Traffic than any Nation whatever.’ But even more hypocritical was the behaviour of the rebel colonists: ‘the Advocates for Republicanism, and for the supposed Equality of Mankind, ought to have been foremost in suggesting some such humane System for abolishing the worst of all the Species of Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But instead …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Holland, England, America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg15&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;If, prior to constituting themselves as an independent state, the rebel colonies in America formed part of the British Empire, the latter assumed its liberal form with the ascent to the throne of William of Orange, who landed in England from Holland. On the other hand, while with his draft constitution for Carolina Locke referred to America, he wrote his first &#039;&#039;Letter Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039; in Holland, which was then ‘the centre of conspiracy’ against Stuart absolutism;[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Holland was also the birthplace of Bernard de Mandeville, unquestionably one of the more important figures in early liberalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not lose sight of the fact that the United Provinces, which emerged from the struggle against Philip II’s Spain, equipped themselves with a liberal type of set-up a century before England. This was a country that from a socio-economic point of view as well had left the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; behind. In the seventeenth century it had a per capita income one-and-a-half times that of England; whereas in the latter 60 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, the figure in Holland was 40 per cent. Moreover, the power structure was rather significant: in the country which emerged victorious from the clash with Philip II, ‘a bourgeois oligarchy that had broken decisively with the aristocratic landholding ethos’ was dominant.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was these enlightened, tolerant, liberal bourgeois who embarked on colonial expansion; and in this historical period the slave trade was an integral part of it:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he Dutch conducted the first serious slave trade in order to furnish the manpower for the sugar plantations; when they lost the plantations, they tried to remain in the field as slave traders, but by 1675, Dutch primacy ended, yielding place to the newly founded Royal African Company of the English.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company. But the history of the United Provinces leads to America as well as Britain. It would seem that it was a Dutch peddler who introduced African slaves into Virginia.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New Amsterdam, which the Dutch were forced to cede to the British and which became New York, had a population 20 per cent of which was composed of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg16&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;blacks, in large part slaves. In 1703 around 42 per cent of homeowners were also slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This represents the paradox already glimpsed in connection with Britain and the United States. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the country where the prologue to the successive liberal revolutions occurred—namely, Holland—had a ‘hold’ on the trade in slaves:[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of their [Dutch] possessions were slave or bound-labor societies.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, in one respect, it was synonymous with liberty at the time, in another, Holland was synonymous with slavery—and a particularly brutal form of it. In Voltaire’s &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; a severe blow is dealt to the protagonist’s naive optimism by the encounter in Surinam (‘where the Dutch are’) with a black slave, reduced to a ‘dreadful state’ by his Dutch master. The slave refers as follows to the working conditions to which he is forced to submit:&lt;br /&gt;
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When we’re working at the sugar-mill and catch our finger in the grinding-wheel, they cut off our hand. When we try to run away, they cut off a leg. I have been in both these situations. This is the price you pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Condorcet, launching his abolitionist campaign in 1781, in particular targeted England and Holland, where the institution of slavery seemed especially deep-rooted on account of ‘the general corruption of these nations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, it is worth citing the American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher) whom we have seen ironizing about the passion for liberty displayed by slave-owners engaged in the rebellion. In his view, ‘[d]espotic nations treated their slaves better than those under republics; the Spanish were the best masters while the Dutch were the worst.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The first country to embark on the liberal road is one that exhibited an especially tenacious attachment to the institution of slavery. It appears that colonists of Dutch origin offered the most determined resistance to the first abolitionist measures, those introduced in the northern United States during the Revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg17&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and in its wake.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As regards Holland itself, in 1791 the States-General formally declared that the slave trade was essential to the development of the colonies’ prosperity and commerce. Still in this period, clearly distinguishing itself from Britain, Holland recognized the right of slave-owners to transport and deposit their human chattels in the mother country before returning to the colonies. Finally, it is to be noted that Holland only abolished slavery in its colonies in 1863, when the secessionist and slaveholding Confederacy of the southern United States was going down to defeat.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Irish, the Indians and the inhabitants of Java&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The English colonists’ revolt in America was accompanied by another major controversy. For a long time, like that of the blacks, the Indians’ fate had not in the slightest unsettled the deep conviction of the English on either side of the Atlantic that they were the chosen people of liberty. In both cases, they appealed to Locke, for whom (as we shall see) the natives of the New World approximated to ‘wild beasts’. But with the eruption of the conflict between colonies and mother country, the exchange of accusations also encompassed the problem of the relationship with the Indians. England, Paine proclaimed in 1776, was ‘that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and the Negroes to destroy us’ or ‘to cut the throats of the freemen of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the Declaration of Independence berated George III for having not only ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’ by black slaves, but also ‘endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions’. In 1812, on the occasion of a new war between the two shores of the Atlantic, Madison condemned England for indiscriminately striking the civilian population with its fleet, not sparing women or children, and hence displaying a conduct similar to that of the red-skinned ‘savages’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having been accomplices of the barbarians, the English became barbarians themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the argument had begun much earlier, following the Crown proclamation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg18&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 1763 that sought to halt or contain expansion west of the Allegany Mountains. This was a measure that did not please the colonists and George Washington, who regarded it as ‘a temporary expedient’, destined to be rapidly superseded, but which should not be respected even in the immediate present: those ‘who neglect the present opportunity of hunting out good lands’ were foolish.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The future president of the United States was not one of these ‘fools’. In his new capacity, while declaring in official speeches that he wanted to bring the ‘blessings of civilization’ and ‘happiness’ to ‘an unenlightened race of men’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in private correspondence he identified the Indians as ‘savages’ and ‘wild beasts of the forest’. Given this, the British Crown’s pretension to block further expansion by the colonists was absurd and ultimately immoral: they (Washington declared in a letter of 1783) would force ‘the Savage [like] the Wolf to retire’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more extreme in this respect was Franklin, who in his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039; observed: ‘if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes who formerly inhabited the Seacoast.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The decimation or destruction of a people who worshipped ‘the Devil’ was part of a kind of divinely inspired eugenicist plan.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The de-humanization of the Indians was also subscribed to by those in Britain who supported reconciliation with the rebels. The Crown’s attempt to block the colonists’ expansionistic march seemed to Burke absurd and sacrilegious, for ‘attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil, the command and blessing of Providence, “Increase and multiply.”‘ Ultimately, it was an ill-fated ‘endeavour to keep as a lair of wild beasts, that earth, which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Those on either side of the Atlantic who supported or justified the Crown’s policy of ‘conciliation’ not of the colonists, but of the Indians, mounted some resistance to this process of de-humanization. In this context, a particular mention should be made of the figure of the likeable American loyalist whom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg19&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we have encountered several times, in his capacity as a critic of the peculiar libertarian zeal displayed by the ‘harshest and wickedest slave masters’. To these same circles he attributed cruelty to the Indians. Sometimes they were killed and scalped with veritable religious fervour; they even became targets for shooting practice. They were branded savages and yet (objected Jonathan Boucher) they were no more savage ‘than our progenitors appeared to Julius Caesar or to Agricola’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We have seen Paine accuse the London government of seeking an alliance with Indian cut-throats. In reality, warned an English commander in 1783, it was precisely the now victorious colonists who ‘were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians’. The victors’ behaviour (added another officer) was ‘shocking to humanity’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an enduring controversy. In the later nineteenth century a historian descended from a family of loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada argued as follows: Did the rebels claim to be the descendants of those who had disembarked in America to escape intolerance and stay loyal to the cause of liberty? In fact, reversing the policy of the British Crown, which aimed at conversion, the Puritans had initiated a massacre of the Indians, assimilated to ‘Canaanites and Amalekites’—that is, stocks marked out by the Old Testament for erasure from the face of the earth. This was ‘one of the darkest pages in English colonial history’, which was followed by the even more repugnant one written during the American Revolution, when the rebel colonists engaged in ‘the entire destruction of the Six Indian Nations’ that had remained loyal to England: ‘by an order which, we believe, has no parallel in the annals of any civilized nation, [Congress] commands the complete destruction of those people as a nation … including women and children’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his private correspondence at least, Jefferson had no problem acknowledging the horror of the war against the Indians. But in his view responsibility for it resided with the London government, which had incited these savage, bloodthirsty ‘tribes’. This was a situation that ‘will oblige us now to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach’. The ‘confirmed brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America’ was to be laid at Britain’s door. As with the similar fate of ‘the same colored man in Asia’, as well as of the Irish—who for the English, whose skin ‘colour’ they shared, should be ‘brethren’—it was attributable to a policy committed to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sowing death and destruction ‘wherever … Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with human blood’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Jefferson was not wrong to compare the treatment suffered by the Indians with that reserved for the Irish. Just as, according to the loyalist accusation, Puritans and rebel colonists assimilated the Indians to ‘Amalekites’, so the Irish had already been compared to ‘Amalekites’ marked out for extermination, this time by the English conquerors.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The colonization of Ireland, with all its horrors, was the model for the subsequent colonization of North America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If the British Empire as a whole mainly swept away Irish and blacks,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indians and blacks were the principal victims of the territorial and commercial expansion first of the English colonies in America and then of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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As with the black question, in the case of the Indians the exchange of accusations ended up taking the form of a mutual demystification. There is no doubt that, along with black enslavement and the black slave trade, the rise of the two liberal countries either side of the Atlantic involved a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similar observations can be made of Holland. A senior English civil servant, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who during the Napoleonic Wars was deputy governor of Java for a time, stated that the previous administration was ‘one of the extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness’. It is clear that colonial rivalry played a role in this judgement. Marx reports it, but pools ‘Dutch colonial administration’ and the English administration in his condemnation. As regards Holland more specifically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men in Celebes, in order to get slaves for Java … The young people thus stolen were hidden in secret dungeons on Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: ‘This one town of Macassar, for example, is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families.’ … Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg21&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, numbered over 80,000 inhabitants in 1750 and only 18,000 in 1811. That is peaceful commerce![[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, processes of enslavement and practical genocide were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Grotius, Locke and the Founding Fathers: a comparative interpretation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the start of the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe underlined the ideological fraternity between the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution and the country which, a century earlier, had rebelled against Philip II and won ‘freedom’ and prosperity thanks to ‘Heaven and the Assistance of England’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century, liberal authors liked to contrast the ordered triumph of liberty that had occurred in Holland, England and the United States with a France in the grip of an interminable revolutionary cycle and Bonapartism.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It might therefore be useful to proceed to a brief comparative analysis of the texts and authors in which the liberal revolutions of these three countries found theoretical expression and consecration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of the Holland, we cannot but refer to Hugo Grotius, who dedicated two of his most important books (&#039;&#039;Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae&#039;&#039;) to the revolt against Philip II and the country that derived from it. Liberal Holland immediately engaged in overseas expansion and slave-trading, and it is interesting to observe the position Grotius adopted towards colonial peoples. Having condemned the superstitious and idolatrous character of the ‘religious rites’ peculiar to paganism, he added:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when offered … to an evil spirit, it is an act of falsehood and hypocrisy; nay, it is an act of absolute rebellion, whereby we not only deprive our legal sovereign of his just homage, but even transfer that homage to a base apostate and an open enemy!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg22&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Targeted here were peoples with&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
modes of worship … of a nature little suited to a Being of goodness and of purity: Human sacrifices; naked races up and down the temples; games and dances replete with obscenity; instances whereof are seen even at this day among the savage natives of America and Africa, who are still lost in the thick clouds of Paganism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was peoples assailed by Europe’s colonial expansion who were guilty of rebellion against God, and who must be punished for such a crime:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some … are weak enough to imagine, that God, as a being of infinite goodness, will never be provoked to punish this rebellion; a spirit of revenge, say they, is wholly incompatible with the attribute of perfect goodness. A fatal and absurd idea this! The powers of Mercy must be limited, that her actions may be just; and when wickedness becomes excessive, punishment as it were unavoidably arises out of justice.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Against peoples who, staining themselves with ‘[o]ffences that are committed against GOD’ and violating the most basic norms of natural law, took the form of ‘barbarians’ or ‘rather Beasts than men’, war was ‘natural’, regardless of state borders and geographical distance. Indeed, ‘the justest War is that which is undertaken against wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like Beasts [&#039;&#039;homines belluis similes&#039;&#039;].’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is the ideology that presided over the conquest of the New World. The sin of idolatry was the first of the arguments prompting Sepúlveda to regard war on the Indians and their enslavement as ‘just’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Grotius, along with the implicit legitimation of the genocidal practices underway in America, an explicit and insistent justification of slavery emerges. Sometimes it was punishment for criminal behaviour. Answerable for the latter were not only single individuals: ‘a whole People may be brought into Subjection for a publick Crime’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As well as in their capacity as ‘rebels’ against the Lord of the Universe, the inhabitants of America and Africa could also succumb to slavery &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg23&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as a result of a ‘just war’ (&#039;&#039;bellum justum&#039;&#039;), conducted by a European power. The prisoners captured during an armed conflict, formally declared in the requisite forms by the supreme authority of a state, were legitimately slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And their descendants too were legitimate slaves: otherwise, what interest would the victor have in keeping the vanquished alive? As the slave of the one who had spared his life, the prisoner became part of the victor’s property, and such property could be transmitted hereditarily or be an object of sale, just like ‘the Property of Goods’ (&#039;&#039;rerum dominium&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, all this did not apply to ‘those Nations where this Right of Bondage over Captives is not practised’; it did not apply to ‘Christian’ countries, which limited themselves to exchanging prisoners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Banned in intra-European conflicts, slavery by right of war continued to be a reality as and when Christian, civilized Europe confronted colonial peoples, barbarians and pagans in what, by definition, was a ‘just’ war. On the other hand, regardless of their actual behaviour, the lesson of a great master should not be forgotten: ‘as &#039;&#039;Aristotle&#039;&#039; said, some Men are naturally Slaves, that is, turned for Slavery. And some Nations also are of such a Temper, that they know better how to obey than to command’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a truth also confirmed by Holy Scripture: ‘the Apostle St Paul’ called on individuals and peoples who had legitimately been reduced to slavery to put up with their lot and not escape it by rebellion or flight.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the one hand, Grotius paid homage to the ‘free People’ who in Holland had availed themselves of their right of resistance, legitimately shaking off the yoke of a despotic prince.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other, he had no difficulty justifying slavery and even the kind of ‘wild beast’ hunt against Indians underway in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now pass on to the Glorious Revolution and Locke. The &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; may be regarded as key moments in the ideological preparation and consecration of the event that marks the birth of liberal England. We are dealing with texts deeply impregnated with the pathos of liberty, the condemnation of absolute power, the appeal to rise up against the wicked ones who seek to deprive man of his liberty and reduce him to slavery. But every now and then frightening passages open up in this ode to liberty, where slavery in the colonies is legitimized. As ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the institution, Grotius adduced the example of the Germans who, according to Tacitus’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg24&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;testimony, ‘ventured their very Liberty upon the Cast of a Die’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Locke’s view, ‘captives taken in a just war’ (on the part of the victors) had ‘forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties’. They were slaves ‘subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Up to now the thinking applies to blacks deported from Africa. But the fate reserved for Indians was not manifestly better. In addition to having an interest in the slave trade as a shareholder in the Royal African Company, the liberal English philosopher was concerned with the white colonists’ expansionist march as secretary (in 1673–74) of the Council of Trade and Plantations. As has been justly observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
That so many of the examples Locke uses in his &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; are American ones shows that his intention was to provide the settlers, for whom he had worked in so many other ways, with a powerful argument based in natural law rather than legislative decree to justify their depredations.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; makes repeated reference to the ‘wild Indian’, who moved around ‘insolent and injurious in the woods of America’ or the ‘vacant places of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ignorant of labour, which was the only thing that could confer property right, and occupying a land not ‘improv[ed] by labour’, or ‘great tracts of unused’ ground’, the Indian inhabited ‘unpossessed quarters’, &#039;&#039;in vacuis locis&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to labour and property, Indians were also ignorant of money. They thus not only proved alien to civilization, but were also ‘not … joined with the rest of mankind’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As a result of their behaviour, they were not solely subject to human condemnation. Unquestionably, ‘God commanded … labour’ and private property, and could certainly not want the world created by him to remain ‘common and uncultivated’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he sought to challenge the march of civilization, violently opposing exploitation through labour of the uncultivated land occupied by him, the Indian, along with any other criminal, could be equated with ‘one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security’, and who ‘therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger’. Locke never tired of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg25&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;insisting on the right possessed by any man to destroy those reduced to the level of ‘beasts of prey’, ‘savage beasts’; to the level of ‘a savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are phrases that remind us of those used by Grotius in connection with barbarous peoples and pagans in general, and by Washington in connection with the Indians. However, before coming to the Founding Fathers and the solemn documents that mark the birth of the United States, it is worth dwelling on another macroscopic exclusion clause that characterizes the celebration of liberty in Locke. ‘Papists’, declared the &#039;&#039;Essay Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039;, are ‘like serpents never [to] be prevailed on by kind usage to lay by their venom’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even more than to English Catholics, this harsh declaration was formulated with a view to Ireland, where at the time unregistered priests were branded with a red-hot iron, when they were not punished with more severe penalties or death.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Irish, in endemic, desperate revolt against spoliation and oppression by Anglican settlers, were contemptuously referred to by Locke as a population of ‘brigands’. As for the rest, he reiterated the point the men are:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
forward to have compassion for sufferers and esteem for that religion as pure, and the professors of it as sincere, which can stand the test of persecution. But I think it is far otherwise with Catholics, who are less apt to be pitied than others because they receive no other usage than what they [by the] cruelty of their own principles and practices are known to deserve.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The warning against feelings of ‘compassion’ makes it clear that we are dealing with Ireland primarily. Locke seems to have had no objections of any kind to the ruthless repression suffered by the Irish, whose fate calls to mind that reserved for Indians across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can now move on to examine the documents that informed the third liberal revolution and the foundation of the United States. At first sight, the Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution seem inspired and pervaded by a universal pathos of liberty: ‘all men are created equal’—such is the solemn preamble to the first document; it is necessary to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’—such is the no less solemn preamble &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg26&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to the second. But it requires a scarcely more attentive reading to encounter, already in Article 1 of the Constitution, a contrast between ‘free Persons’ and ‘all other Persons’. The latter were, of course, slaves, whose number, reduced to three-fifths, had to be factored in and added to that of ‘free persons’ when it came to calculating the number of members in the House of Representatives to which slaveholding states were entitled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With recourse to various euphemisms, a whole series of other Articles refer to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Where initially it was concealed among ‘other persons’ (the part of the population not made up of ‘free persons’), now the relationship of slavery is modestly subsumed under the general category of persons ‘held to Service or Labour’. On the basis of the principles of self-government, each individual state has the right to regulate it as it sees fit, while every state’s obligation to return fugitive slaves is a moral obligation to guarantee a legitimate property-owner the services that ‘may be due’. In a further linguistic expedient, tinged with the same discretion, the black slave trade becomes ‘[t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit’. It was ‘not [to] be prohibited by Congress prior to the year [1808]’, and, pending that, could only be subjected to a fairly modest tax (‘not exceeding ten dollars for each person’ or slave). The articles requiring the Union to suppress insurrections or ‘domestic violence’—primarily, a possible dreaded slave revolt in some particular state[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—are formulated in similarly elliptical fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although repressed through a strict linguistic proscription, the institution of slavery proves to be a pervasive presence in the American Constitution. It is not even absent from the Declaration of Independence, where the accusation against George III of having appealed to black slaves takes the already noted form of having ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the transition from Grotius to Locke, and from them to the founding documents of the American Revolution, we observe a phenomenon worth reflecting upon: although regarded as legitimate in all three cases, the institution of slavery was theorized and affirmed without the least reticence solely by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg27&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Dutch author, whose life straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Locke, by contrast, at least in the case of the &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, which were written and published on the eve and at the end of the Glorious Revolution, legitimation of slavery tends to occur exclusively between the lines of the discourse celebrating English liberty. The reticence reaches its peak in the documents that consecrate the foundation of the United States as the most glorious chapter in the history of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it came to the relationship with the Indians, things were different: Grotius, Locke and Washington all referred to them as ‘wild beasts’. A document like the Declaration of Independence, which was addressed to international public opinion and which (as we know) included among George III’s most heinous crimes the fact that he had incited the ‘merciless Indian savages’ against the rebel colonists, was linguistically more cautious. But it remains the case that in all three liberal revolutions the demand for liberty and justification of the enslavement, as well as the decimation (or destruction), of barbarians, were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Vulgar historicism and repression of the paradox of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition—namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such—be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well-known, precisely because it is &#039;&#039;well-&#039;&#039;known, is not &#039;&#039;known&#039;&#039;. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well-known and to accept it as such’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throwing a widespread apologia into crisis, the paradoxical tangle we have encountered while historically reconstructing the origins of liberalism is disturbing. We can therefore understand the tendency to repression. After all, that was the gesture, in their own day, of Locke and, especially, the rebel American colonists, who liked to draw a more or less thick veil of silence over the institution of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg28&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The same result can be arrived at in other ways. According to Hannah Arendt, what characterized the American Revolution was the project of realizing a political order based on liberty, while the persistence of black slavery referred to a cultural tradition homogeneously diffused either side of the Atlantic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]his indifference, difficult for us to understand, was not peculiar to Americans and hence must [not] be blamed … on any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest … Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, disquiet about slavery was so strongly felt in the Europe of the time that prominent authors not infrequently proceeded to a sharp contrast between the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us attend to Condorcet:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American forgets that negroes are men; he has no moral relationship with them; for him they are simply objects of profit … and such is the excess of his stupid contempt for this unhappy species that, when back in Europe, he is indignant to see them dressed like men and placed alongside him.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
‘The American’ condemned here is the transatlantic colonist, whether French or English. In his turn, in 1771 Millar denounced ‘the shocking barbarity to which the negroes in our colonies are frequently exposed’. Fortunately, ‘the practice of slavery [has] been … generally abolished in Europe’. Where it survived, across the Atlantic, the practice poisoned the whole society: cruelty and sadism were ‘exhibited even by persons of the weaker sex, in an age distinguished for humanity and politeness’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also the opinion of Condorcet, who pointed out how ‘the young American woman witnesses’, and sometimes even ‘presides over’, the brutal ‘tortures’ inflicted on black slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thesis formulated by Arendt can even be inverted. In the late eighteenth century the institution of slavery began to be unacceptable in salons where the ideas of the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; circulated, and in churches influenced by the Quakers or other abolitionist sections of Christianity. Even as the Philadelphia Convention ratified the Constitution that sanctioned racial chattel slavery, a French defender of this institution bitterly noted his isolation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg29&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The extremely powerful empire of public opinion … now offers its support to those in France and England who attack black slavery and pursue its abolition. The most odious interpretations are reserved for those who dare to hold a contrary opinion.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, another French defender of slavery bemoaned the fact that ‘negrophilia’ had become a ‘fashionable oddity’, to the point of abolishing any sense of distance between the two races: ‘African blood circulates much too abundantly in the veins of the Parisians themselves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we start out from the presupposition of a general ‘indifference’ to the lot of black slaves in these years, we shall understand nothing of the American Revolution. The ‘last great philosopher’ to justify slavery—Locke—was quite the reverse of unchallenged; and it is interesting to note that he was criticized together with the ‘current American rebellion’, which he was regarded as having inspired.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, celebration of a tendentially republican liberty was bound up with legitimation of the institution of slavery. After having cited various passages from the philosopher that leave no room for doubt in this regard, Josiah Tucker commented: ‘[s]uch is the language of the humane Mr Locke! The great and glorious Assertor of the natural Rights and Liberties of Mankind’; here were ‘his real Sentiments concerning Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the American loyalist we have already encountered—Boucher—conjointly condemned the republican secession and Locke’s claim to confer on ‘every freeman of Carolina absolute power and property over his slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While English patriots and loyalists opposed to secession ironized about the flag of liberty waved by slave-owners, the rebel colonists reacted not by invoking the legitimacy of enslaving blacks, but by highlighting the British Crown’s massive involvement and principal responsibility in trafficking and trading human flesh. It is clear that the institution of slavery was now largely delegitimized. This explains the linguistic proscriptions that characterized the new state’s Constitution. As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention observed, his colleagues ‘anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious to the ears of Americans’, but were ‘willing to admit into their system those &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; which the &#039;&#039;expressions signified’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg30&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is that, from the start of the debate on the new constitutional order (pointed out another witness), people ‘had been ashamed to use the term “Slaves” &amp;amp;amp; had substituted a description’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Less scrupulous (observed Condorcet in 1781) were the slaves’ ‘owners’: they were ‘guided by a false consciousness [&#039;&#039;fausse conscience&#039;&#039;]’ that rendered them impervious to the ‘protests of the defenders of humanity’ and ‘made them act not against their own interests, but to their own advantage’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, notwithstanding Arendt’s contrary opinion, ‘class interests’—principally of those who owned large plantations and a considerable number of slaves—played an important role, which did not escape contemporary observers. The fact is that Arendt ultimately ends up identifying with the viewpoint of the rebel colonists, who retained a clear conscience as champions of the cause of liberty, repressing the macroscopic fact of slavery by means of their ingenious euphemisms: what takes the place of such euphemisms is now the ‘historicist’ explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Colonial expansions and the rebirth of slavery: the positions of Bodin, Grotius and Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Decidedly misleading as regards the American Revolution, might the ‘historicist’ approach be of some use in clarifying the reasons for the tangle of freedom and oppression that was already manifest in the two preceding liberal revolutions? Although contemporaries, in as much as both of them straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin expressed diametrically opposed positions on the issue of concern to us here. While the first justified slavery by appealing to the authority of the Bible and Aristotle, the second refuted both these arguments. Having observed that in the Hebrew world only gentiles could be subjected to perpetual slavery, and that Christians and Muslims observed similar norms and customs, Bodin concluded that ‘those who profess all these three religions only partially observe the law of God with regard to slaves’, as if the prohibition of this horrible institution only applied to blood relations, not humanity as a whole. If a distinction among the three monotheistic religions could be made, it was to the advantage of Islam, which had proved capable of expanding thanks to a courageous policy of emancipation.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg31&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bodin also rejected Aristotle’s thesis, adopted and even radicalized by Grotius, that some individuals and peoples are naturally slaves. As proof of this, the universal diffusion, temporal and spatial, of the institution of slavery was often cited. But (objected the French author) no less universally diffused were slave revolts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil, inclines for the most part to do that which is forbidden and chooses the evil, defying the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While it had long seemed obvious and been generally accepted, and still continued to be, the institution of slavery pertained not to nature but to history—more precisely, to a deplorable and execrable chapter of history, which must rapidly be closed once and for all. It made no sense to try to justify it on the basis of right of war (as did Grotius): ‘[W]hat charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some profit or pleasure from them as if they were cattle?’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, Grotius and Bodin were contemporaries. While the former was an expression of liberal Holland, the latter was a theorist of absolute monarchy. But it was he—not Grotius—who questioned the absolute power wielded by the master over his slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We arrive at a similar result when, rather than with Grotius, we compare Bodin with Locke, whom he predated by some decades. Whereas the English liberal, also justifying slavery with his gaze on the past, pointed to Spartacus as culpable of an ‘aggression’ against ‘property’ and legitimate power, Bodin expressed himself quite differently: ‘The Romans, who were so great and powerful … however many laws they made, could not prevent the revolt of sixty thousand slaves led by Spartacus, who defeated the Roman army in open battle three times’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the English liberal the universalistic charge present in Bodin has disappeared, just as there is no longer any trace of the unconditional &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg32&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery we can read in the French theorist of absolute monarchy. If we bear in mind ‘the homicides, the cruelties and barbarities inflicted on slaves by their masters, it was an unmitigated catastrophe that the institution was ever introduced, and then, that once it had been declared abolished, it should ever have been allowed to persist.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The quotation above refers to persistence. In fact, Bodin traced a brief history of slavery in the world or, more precisely, the West (and the geographical area dominated by it). Certainly, the institution had been vital in Greco-Roman antiquity. As late as the American Civil War, the theorists and defenders of the southern cause appealed to the example and model of that splendid civilization in order to condemn abolitionism. By contrast, Bodin drew a rather realistic picture of classical antiquity. It was based on the enslavement of a number of human beings that was significantly greater than the number of free citizens. Consequently, it lived under the constant menace of slave revolts and, in order to solve the problem, did not hesitate to resort to the most barbaric measures, as proved by the massacre of 30,000 helots in Sparta ‘in a single night’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Subsequently, as a result also of the influence of Christianity, things seemed to change: ‘Europe was freed of slavery after about 1250’, but ‘we see it today newly restored’. Following colonial expansion, it was ‘in the process of being renewed throughout the world’. There had been a massive restoration of slavery, and already Portugal ‘derives from it veritable herds as of beasts’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, far from being affected by vulgar historicism’s attempts at repression, the paradox that characterizes the American Revolution and early liberalism in general not only survives, but proves even more marked. We are in the presence of a political movement counter to the trend of authors who, centuries earlier, had pronounced an unequivocal condemnation of the institution of slavery. While Locke, champion of the struggle against absolute monarchy, justified the white master’s absolute power over the black slave, a theorist of monarchical absolutism—Bodin—condemned such power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In analyzing the relationship that the three liberal revolutions developed on the one hand with the blacks, and on the other with the Irish, Indians and natives, it is misleading to start out from the presupposition of a homogeneous historical time unmarked by fractures and flowing in unilinear fashion. Clearly predating Locke and Washington, and a contemporary of Grotius, was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg33&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Montaigne, in whom we find a memorable self-critical reflection on the West’s colonial expansion that we would seek in vain in them. Such a reflection can even be read as a prefigurative but timely critique of the attitude of Grotius, Locke and Washington towards non-European populations. Among them there was ‘nothing savage or barbarous’; the fact was that ‘every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to’. People took their own country as a model: ‘There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going back further, we encounter Las Casas and his critique of the arguments employed to de-humanize the Indian ‘barbarians’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the arguments that are more or less widely echoed by Grotius, Locke and Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be added that the ‘historicist’ explanation turns out to be unfounded not only as regards the relationship with colonial peoples. While Fletcher, a self-defined ‘republican on principle’, member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of the liberal political world derived from the Glorious Revolution, called for ‘mak[ing] slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bodin also condemned slavery for ‘vagrants and idlers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to the observation of a great historian, it was in ‘the period between 1660 and 1760’ (the decades of the rise of the liberal movement) that an attitude of unprecedented harshness spread in England towards wage-labourers and the unemployed, ‘which has no modern parallel except in the behaviour of the less reputable of white colonists towards coloured labour’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the radical character of the paradox we are examining, let us return to Bodin. He primarily attributed the return of slavery in the world to the ‘greed of merchants’, and then added: ‘If the princes do not set things in good order, it will soon be full of slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later. On the other hand, in recommending the conversion of beggars &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg34&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into slaves, Fletcher polemicized against the Church, which he rebuked for having promoted the abolition of slavery in classical antiquity and for opposing its reintroduction in the modern world, thus encouraging the sloth and dissipation of vagrants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, too, the institution of slavery was felt to be in contradiction not with the new social and political forces, but with a power that was pre-modern in origin. Such considerations can also be applied to Grotius, who likewise developed an argument, if not against Christianity as such, then against interpretations of it in an abolitionist register:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[W]hat the Apostles and antient Canons enjoin Slaves, of not leaving their Masters, is a general Maxim, and only opposed to the Error of those who rejected every Subjection, both private and publick, as a State inconsistent with the Liberty of Christians.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Virginian property-owners who prevented the baptism of slaves in the late seventeenth century, so as not to spoil the spirit of submission and to avoid the emergence of a sense of pride in them because they belonged to the same religious community as the masters, provoked complaints from Church and Crown alike.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, we see that it was the forces of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; which acted to check and contain the novelty represented by racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recourse to vulgar historicism to ‘explain’ or repress the surprising tangle of freedom and oppression that characterizes the three liberal revolutions we have referred to is fruitless. The paradox persists and awaits a genuine, less comforting explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn1a|1]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R.M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 529.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., pp. 528–31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., pp. 30–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., pp. 30–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 582.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., pp. 529, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn8a|8]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, vol. 1, pp. 240, 250; vol. 3, p. 593.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn9a|9]] C. Gordon Post, Introduction to John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;A Disquisition on Government&#039;&#039;, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. vii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn10a|10]] Ross M. Lence, Foreword to Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. xxiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn11a|11]] Giovanni Sartori, &#039;&#039;Democrazia e definizioni&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 151; Sartori, &#039;&#039;The Theory of Democracy Revisited&#039;&#039;, Chatham (NJ): Chatham House Publishers, 1987, pp. 239, 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn12a|12]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 120–1, 160–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn13a|13]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 21, p. 157; vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn14a|14]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wooton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn15a|15]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 45.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn16a|16]] See John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, bk 1, ch. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn17a|17]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn18a|18]] Maurice Cranston, &#039;&#039;John Locke&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, 1959, pp. 114–15; Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, pp. 199, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn19a|19]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn20a|20]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 278, 235–58.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn21a|21]] Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox’, &#039;&#039;Journal of American History&#039;&#039;, vol. LIX, no. 1, 1972, p. 11; cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn22a|22]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn23a|23]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn24a|24]] Henry R. Fox Bourne, &#039;&#039;The Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Aalen: Scientia, 1969, vol. 1, p. 481; John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, ed. Esmond S. De Beer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89, vols 5–7, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn25a|25]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1134 (letter to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn26a|26]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 382; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn27a|27]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, p. 45 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn28a|28]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 309 (letter to Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 374–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn30a|30]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 452–3, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn31a|31]] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ed., &#039;&#039;History of US Political Parties&#039;&#039;, New York and London: Chelsea House and Bawker, 1973, pp. 915–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn32a|32]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn33a|33]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn34a|34]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Roger Caillois, Paris: Gallimard, 1949–51, vol. 1, p. 884; Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 243, 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn36a|36]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 328–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn37a|37]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 122–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn38a|38]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn39a|39]] Janice Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 115–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn40a|40]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, pp. 123–4, 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn41a|41]] Boucher, quoted in Anne Y. Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn42a|42]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn43a|43]] Barry Alan Shain, &#039;&#039;The Myth of American Individualism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn44a|44]] Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 646–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn46a|46]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn47a|47]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn48a|48]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, p. 294.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn49a|49]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 272–3, 386–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn50a|50]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 648–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn51a|51]] Cf. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 273; Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn52a|52]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 5–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn53a|53]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn54a|54]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 67–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn55a|55]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn56a|56]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174 n. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 170 n. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn58a|58]] Gee, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn59a|59]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, p. 150; Eric R. Wolf, &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn60a|60]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn61a|61]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn62a|62]] Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn63a|63]] Marx’s characterization in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 926.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn64a|64]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn65a|65]] Bourne, &#039;&#039;Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn66a|66]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 203, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn67a|67]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 2, p. 52.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn68a|68]] Jennings, &#039;&#039;Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn69a|69]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn70a|70]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn71a|71]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn72a|72]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, trans. and intro. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992, p. 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn73a|73]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn74a|74]] Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn75a|75]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 165, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn76a|76]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 218, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn77a|77]] Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 35, 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn78a|78]] Henry S. Commager, ed., &#039;&#039;Documents of American History&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 208–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn79a|79]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joelle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, p. 39 (letter from Washington to his friend W. Crawford, 21 September 1767).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn80a|80]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 475–6 (presidential message, 25 October 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn81a|81]] Delanoë and Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2 (letter from Washington to J. Duane, 7 September 1783).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn82a|82]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1422.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn84a|84]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn85a|85]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn86a|86]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 278, 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn87a|87]] Egerton Ryerson, &#039;&#039;The Loyalists of America and Their Times&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Haskell House, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 297–8 and n.; vol. 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn88a|88]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1312–13 (letter to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn89a|89]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 16, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn90a|90]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 14–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn91a|91]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 164.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn92a|92]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 916; cf. Werner Sombart, &#039;&#039;Der moderne Kapitalismus&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Munich: DTV, 1987, vol. 1, pt II, p. 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn93a|93]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn94a|94]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. viii; François Guizot, ‘Discours sur l’histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre’, in &#039;&#039;Histoire d’Angleterre&#039;&#039;, Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1850, pp. 41–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn95a|95]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;On the Truth of Christianity&#039;&#039;, trans. Spencer Madan, London: J. Dodsby, 1782, pp. 195–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn96a|96]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 1027, 1024.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn97a|97]] Lewis Hanke, &#039;&#039;Aristotle and the American Indians&#039;&#039;, London: Hollis and Carter, 1959, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn98a|98]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 565.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn99a|99]] See ibid., vol. 1, ch. iii, §4; vol. 3, ch. iii, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., vol. 3, ch. vii, §§2, 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1496, 1372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn102a|102]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn103a|103]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xxii, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn104a|104]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xvi, §16; vol. 1, ch. iv, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn105a|105]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn106a|106]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn107a|107]] Anthony Pagden, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700’, in Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn108a|108]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 129, 162, 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., pp. 136, 139, 152, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn110a|110]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 133, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn113a|113]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 202.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn114a|114]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 1, pp. 296–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn115a|115]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn116a|116]] Cf. Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn117a|117]] Georg W.F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 20 vols, eds Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–79, vol. 3, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn118a|118]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;On Revolution&#039;&#039;, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1963, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn119a|119]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 647–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn120a|120]] Millar, &#039;&#039;Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, pp. 258, 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn121a|121]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 648.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn122a|122]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn123a|123]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 48, 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn124a|124]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn125a|125]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 103–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn126a|126]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 296.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn127a|127]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn128a|128]] Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn129a|129]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130a|130]] Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books of the Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, abridg. and trans. M.J. Tooley, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, n.d., pp. 18, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131a|131]] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133a|133]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 216; Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri dello Stato&#039;&#039;, trans. Margherita Isnardi Parente, Turin: UTET, 1988, vol. 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134a|134]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books&#039;&#039;, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135a|135]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 247–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136a|136]] Ibid., pp. 253, 238, 260.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137a|137]] Michel de Montaigne, &#039;&#039;The Complete Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138a|138]] Bartolomé de las Casas, &#039;&#039;La leggenda nera&#039;&#039;, trans. Alberto Pincherle, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981, ch. xii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139a|139]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 882–3 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140a|140]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 262 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141a|141]] R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, West&#039;&#039; Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 267. C.B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 227–8 and Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325 reach the same conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142a|142]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 260 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143a|143]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144a|144]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 561.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145a|145]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 332.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER TWO ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg35&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The limitation of power and the emergence of an unprecedented absolute power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To render it explicable, the paradox must first be expounded in all its radicalism. Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success: ‘The total slave population in the Americas reached around 330,000 in 1700, nearly three million by 1800, and finally peaked at over six million in the 1850s’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Contributing decisively to the rise of an institution synonymous with the absolute power of man over man was the liberal world. In the mid-eighteenth century, it was Great Britain that possessed the largest number of slaves (878,000). The fact is unexpected. Although its empire was far more extensive, Spain came well behind. Second position was held by Portugal, which possessed 700,000 slaves and was in fact a kind of semi-colony of Great Britain: much of the gold extracted by Brazilian slaves ended up in London.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence there is no doubt that absolutely pre-eminent in this field was the country at the head of the liberal movement, which had wrested primacy in the trading and ownership of black slaves precisely from the Glorious Revolution onwards. It was Pitt the Younger himself who, intervening in April 1792 in the House of Commons on the subject of slavery and the slave trade, acknowledged that ‘[n]o nation in Europe … has … plunged so deeply into this guilt as Great Britain.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg36&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;That is not all. To a greater or lesser extent, there survived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies ‘&#039;&#039;ancillary&#039;&#039; slavery’, which is to be distinguished from ‘&#039;&#039;systemic&#039;&#039; slavery, linked to plantations and commodity production’. And it was the latter type of slavery, established above all in the eighteenth century (starting from the liberal revolution of 1688–89) and clearly predominant in the British colonies, which most consummately expressed the de-humanization of those who were now mere instruments of labour and chattels, subject to regular sale on the market.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This did not even involve a return to the slavery peculiar to classical antiquity. Certainly, chattel slavery had been widespread in Rome. Yet the slave could reasonably hope that, if not he himself, then his children or grandchildren would be able to achieve freedom and even an eminent social position. Now, by contrast, his fate increasingly took the form of a cage from which it was impossible to escape. In the first half of the eighteenth century, numerous English colonies in America enacted laws that made the emancipation of slaves increasingly difficult.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Quakers lamented the advent of what seemed to them a new and repugnant system. Slavery for a determinate period of time, and the other forms of more or less servile labour hitherto in force, tended to give way to slavery in the strict sense, to a permanent, hereditary condemnation of a whole people, who were denied any prospect of change and improvement, any hope of freedom.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, in a statute of 1696, South Carolina declared that it could not prosper ‘without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The barrier separating service and slavery was as yet not well defined, and the institution of slavery had not yet appeared in all its harshness. But the process that increasingly reduced slaves to chattels, and established the racial character of the condition they were subjected to, was already underway. An unbridgeable gulf separated blacks from the free population. Ever stricter laws prohibited interracial sexual and marital relations, making them a crime. We are now dealing with a hereditary caste of slaves, defined and recognizable by the colour of their skin. In this sense, in John Wesley’s view, ‘American slavery’ was ‘the vilest that ever saw the sun’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg37&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The verdict of American Quakers and British abolitionists has been fully confirmed by contemporary historians. At the end of a ‘cycle of degradation’ of blacks, with the ignition of the white ‘engine of oppression’ and the conclusive soldering of ‘slavery and racial discrimination’, we see at work in the ‘colonies of the British empire’ in the late seventeenth century a ‘chattel racial slavery’ unknown in Elizabethan England (and also classical antiquity), but ‘familiar to men living in the nineteenth century’ and aware of the reality of the southern United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence slavery in its most radical form triumphed in the golden age of liberalism and at the heart of the liberal world. This was acknowledged by James Madison, slave-owner and liberal (like numerous protagonists of the American Revolution), who observed that ‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man’—power based on ‘mere distinction of colour’—was imposed ‘in the most enlightened period of time’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Correctly stated, in all its radicalism, the paradox we face consists in this: the rise of liberalism and the spread of racial chattel slavery are the product of a twin birth which, as we shall see, has rather unique characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The self-government of civil society and the triumph of large-scale property&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On its emergence, the paradox we are attempting to explain did not escape the most attentive observers. We have just seen Madison’s admission; and we are familiar with Samuel Johnson’s irony on the passionate love of liberty displayed by slave-owners; and Adam Smith’s observation on the nexus between the persistence and reinforcement of slavery, on the one hand, and the power of representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners, on the other. In this connection, however, we must also record other, no less significant interventions. In fighting for conciliation of the rebel colonies, Burke recognized the influence of slavery within them. But this did not impair the ‘spirit of freedom’. On the contrary, it was precisely here that freedom appeared ‘more noble and liberal’. Indeed, ‘these people of the southern colonies are more much more strongly … attached to liberty, than those to the northward’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is a consideration that we also encounter, some decades later, from a Barbadian planter: ‘you will … &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg38&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;find that no nations in the world have been more jealous of their liberties than those amongst whom the institution of slavery existed’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, in England, countering Burke and his policy of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Josiah Tucker pointed out how ‘the Champions for American Republicanism’ were simultaneously the promoters of the ‘absurd Tyranny’ they exercised over their slaves: this was ‘a &#039;&#039;republican Tyranny&#039;&#039;, the worst of all Tyrannies’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the authors cited here, there is a more or less clear awareness, accompanied by different value judgements, of the paradox we are examining. And perhaps precisely now it begins to lose its aura of impenetrability. Why should we be surprised that those demanding, or in the forefront of the demand for, self-government and ‘freedom’ from central political power were the major slave-owners? In 1839 an eminent representative of Virginia observed that the position of the slave-owner stimulated in him ‘a more liberal cast of character, more elevated principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and juster estimate of that liberty by which he is so highly distinguished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The wealth and leisure it enjoyed, and the culture it thus managed to acquire, reinforced the proud self-consciousness of a class that became ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority. Shaking off these constraints, the planter and slave-owner developed a liberal spirit and a liberal mentality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Confirming this phenomenon are the changes that occurred from the Middle Ages. Between 1263 and 1265, by means of the &#039;&#039;Siete partidas&#039;&#039;, Alfonso X of Castile regulated the institution of slavery, which he seemed to recognize reluctantly because it was always ‘unnatural’. What limited the property right in the first instance was religion: an unbeliever was not permitted to own Christian slaves and, in any event, the slave had to be guaranteed the possibility of living in conformity with Christian principles—whence the recognition of his right to establish a family and have the chastity and honour of his wife and daughters respected. Later, there were even cases of masters denounced to the Inquisition for their failure to respect the rights of their slaves. Further limiting the power of the property-owner was the state, profoundly influenced by religion. It was committed to disciplining and limiting the punishment inflicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg39&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by masters on slaves and variously sought to promote their emancipation (we are dealing with Christian subjects). Emancipation occurred from above when the slave performed a meritorious deed for the country; in such cases, the master deprived of his property was compensated by the state.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The advent of modern property entailed the master’s ability to dispose of it as he saw fit. In the Virginia of the second half of the seventeenth century, a law was in force that sanctioned the effective impunity of a master even when he killed his slave. Such behaviour could not be considered a ‘felony’, since ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that prepense malice (which alone makes murder felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] First with the Glorious Revolution and then later, more completely, with the American Revolution, the assertion of self-government by civil society hegemonized by slaveholders involved the definitive liquidation of traditional forms of ‘interference’ by political and religious authority. Christian baptism and profession of faith were henceforth irrelevant. In Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, one could proceed ‘without the solemnities of jury’ to the execution of a slave guilty of a capital crime; marriage between slaves was no longer a sacrament, and even funerals lost their solemnity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Virginian jurist (George Tucker) could observe that the slave was positioned ‘below the rank of human beings, not only politically, but physically and morally’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The conquest of self-government by civil society hegemonized by large-scale property involved an even more drastic deterioration in the condition of the indigenous population. The end of the control exercised by the London government swept away the last obstacles to the expansionistic march of the white colonists. Already harboured by Jefferson, and then explicitly and brutally formulated by the Monroe administration (the natives of the East must clear off the land, ‘whether or not they agree, whether or not they become civilized’), the idea of deporting the Indians became a tragic reality with the Jackson Presidency:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg40&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by ‘civilian volunteers,’ invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The ‘civilian volunteers’ appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the ‘trail of tears,’ as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: ‘Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The black slave and the white servant: from Grotius to Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While it stimulated the development of racial chattel slavery and created an unprecedented, unbridgeable gulf between whites and peoples of colour, the self-government of civil society triumphed, waving the flag of liberty and the struggle against despotism. Between these two elements, which emerged together during a unique twin birth, a relationship full of tensions and contradictions was established. Such a celebration of liberty, which was bound up with the reality of an unprecedented absolute power, can clearly be interpreted as an ideology. But however mystificatory it might be, ideology is never null. In fact, its mystificatory function cannot even be conceived without some incidence in concrete social reality. And still less can ideology be regarded as synonymous with conscious falsehood. Were that to be the case, it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence. The theorists and agents of the liberal revolutions and movements were moved by a powerful, convinced pathos of liberty; and precisely for that reason, they displayed embarrassment at the reality of slavery. Obviously, in a majority of cases, such embarrassment did not push them to the point of questioning the ‘property’ on which the wealth and social influence of the class protagonist in the struggle for the self-government of civil society were based. As regards England, the course was taken that removed slavery in the strict sense to a geographical area remote from the metropolis, situated at the edge of the civilized world, where, precisely on account of the proximity and pressure of barbarous circumstances, the spirit of liberty was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg41&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not manifested in all its purity, unlike in England proper—the true homeland, the promised land of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, this was a conclusion reached via a route marked by oscillations and contradictions of various kinds. In Grotius the colour barrier is not yet visible that separates the fate reserved for blacks from the condition to which the poorest layers of the white population can be subjected. We read: ‘perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his Life long, for Diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood, and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it. However, slavery was not the only form of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, but only the ‘most ignoble … Kind of Subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectionis species ignobilissima&#039;&#039;).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There was also &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039;, peculiar, among others, to serfs and &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, labour as such was subsumed under the category of ‘service’ (&#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;) or ‘subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectio&#039;&#039;). Obviously, there is a difference between the two forms of ‘service’ and ‘subjection’. While it violated ‘natural reason’ or ‘the Rules of full and compleat Justice’—i.e. the norms of morality—on the basis of the legislation in force in some countries the master could kill his slave with impunity and hence exercise a right of life and death over him.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was something not found in the sphere of &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; and the labour relationship that employed &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a particular &#039;&#039;species&#039;&#039; of the single &#039;&#039;genus&#039;&#039; that is service or subjection. The boundary between the various species is fluid. For example, of the ‘apprentices [&#039;&#039;apprenticii&#039;&#039;] in England’, it was to be noted that they ‘come nearest to the State of Slavery, during their Apprenticeship’—that is to say, to the condition of slaves proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, by way of atoning for a crime one could be condemned to labour and to render one’s services either as a slave or as an individual subjected to some form of ‘imperfect slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with Grotius, Locke was concerned to distinguish more rigorously between the various kinds of service. Elements of continuity are certainly not lacking. Speaking of wage-labour and the contract that establishes it, the English philosopher wrote: ‘a free man makes himself a servant to another’. As we can see, labour as such continues to be subsumed under the category of service. In fact, the contract introduces the wage-labourer ‘into the family &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg42&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof’. This discipline was in fact very different from the unlimited power that characterized the relationship of slavery and defined the ‘perfect condition of slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Grotius’ distinction between &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; reappears in broad outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Locke urges us not to confuse servant and slave. Grotius compared the slave to a &#039;&#039;‘perpetual Hireling’&#039;&#039;, or a wage-labourer bound for the duration of his natural term to the same master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Locke stressed that we are dealing with two different statuses. In addition to being ‘temporary’, the power exercised by the master over a servant ‘is no greater than what is contained in the contract between them’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, on the one hand, this made the condition of the servant better, on the other, it rendered that of the slave proper manifestly worse. Shaking off the moral inhibitions of Grotius, who called on the master to respect not only the life but also the specificity of his slave, Locke endlessly stressed that the master exercises over the slave an ‘absolute dominion’ and ‘absolute power’, a ‘legislative power of life and death’, an ‘arbitrary power’ encompassing ‘life’ itself.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the slave tends to lose his human characteristics and become reduced to a thing and a chattel, as emerges in particular from the reference to the planters of the East Indies who possess ‘slaves or horses’ on the basis of a regular ‘purchase’, and this ‘by bargain and money’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Without any hint of criticism, Locke engaged in a conjunction that signifies a firm, indignant denunciation in abolitionist literature. This applies to Mirabeau, who (as we shall see) compared the condition of American slaves with ‘our horses and our mules’; and to Marx, who observed in &#039;&#039;Capital:&#039;&#039; ‘The slave-owner buys his worker in the same way as he buys his horse.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke marks a turning point theoretically. Sometimes freed by their masters, blacks slaves were long subjected to a condition not markedly dissimilar from that of indentured servants—that is, temporary white semi-slaves on a contractual basis. And it is this ambiguity that finds expression in the text of Grotius, who can hence also apply the category of contract to &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039;. In Locke, by contrast, we can read the development which chattel slavery and racial &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg43&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery began to undergo from the late seventeenth century. A whole series of English colonies in America enacted laws intended to make it clear that the slave’s conversion did not entail his emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke expressed himself thus in 1660 when, referring to Paul of Tarsus, he asserted that ‘conversion did not dissolve any of those obligations they were tied in before … the gospel continued them in the same condition and under the same civil obligations [under which] it found them. The married were not to leave their consorts, nor the servant freed from his master.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In complete conformity with this theoretical position, in the draft Carolina Constitution Locke reiterated the irrelevance of possible conversion to Christianity for the condition of the slave. And, once again, the element of novelty emerges. Although rejecting an abolitionist interpretation of Christianity, Grotius repeatedly appealed to Christian literature to underscore the common humanity of servant and master, both of them subject to the Father in Heaven, and hence in a relationship with each another that was in some sense one of fraternity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; is concerned, instead, to make it clear that the principle of equality applies exclusively to ‘creatures of the same species and rank’, only if ‘the lord and master of them all should [not], by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were burdened by the curse which, according to the Old Testament story, Noah had uttered against Ham and his descendants. This ideological motif, often invoked by defenders of the institution of slavery, seems also to find some echo in Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt: the English liberal philosopher legitimized the racial slavery that was being established in the politico-social reality of the time. Subject to ever more onerous conditions, the practice of emancipation tended to disappear; while, together with the neutralization of religion and baptism, laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital relations sanctioned the insurmountable character of the boundary between whites and blacks. At this point the category of contract can serve to explain only the figure of the servant, while the slave is such as a result of right of war (more precisely, just war, of which Europeans engaged in colonial conquests are protagonists), or of a divine ‘manifest declaration’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg44&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In order to clarify the difference between ‘the perfect condition of slavery’ and that of the indentured servant, Locke referred to the Old Testament, which provides for permanent, hereditary slavery only for gentiles, excluding from it servants who are blood relations of the Hebrew master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Old Testament line of demarcation between Hebrews and gentiles is configured in Locke as the line of demarcation between whites and blacks: servants of European origin are not subject to ‘perfect slavery’, which is intended for blacks and repressed to the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The pathos of liberty and unease about the institution of slavery: the case of Montesquieu&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal unease over slavery found what is perhaps its most acute expression in Montesquieu, who devoted some memorable pages to a critique of the institution. The reasons traditionally adduced by ‘jurists’ in justification of slavery were ‘not sensible’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was pointless trying to find others: ‘If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would say: The peoples of Europe, having exterminated those of America, had to make slaves of those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ Yet this condemnation, so ringing and seemingly unequivocal, soon gave way to a much more ambiguous discourse: ‘There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement: slavery there runs less counter to reason’. In such cases, while not conforming to abstract reason, slavery was in accord with ‘natural reason’ (&#039;&#039;raison naturelle&#039;&#039;), which took account of climate and concrete circumstances.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] True, Montesquieu observed that ‘there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the tone is uncertain here, much clearer is the assertion that a distinction must be made between those countries where the climate can in some way be an element justifying slavery and those where ‘even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence it is necessary to take cognizance of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ and restrict &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg45&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘natural slavery [&#039;&#039;servitude naturelle&#039;&#039;] … to certain particular countries of the world’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the one hand, Montesquieu endlessly stressed that freedom is an attribute—in fact, a way of living and being—of Nordic peoples, while, on the other, slavery had been ‘naturalized … among the southern peoples’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A general law could be formulated: ‘one must not be surprised that the cowardice of the peoples of hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free. This is an effect that derives from its natural cause.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Prominent in Grotius and Locke, the contrast between metropolis and colonies also emerges in Montesquieu. It is not by chance that in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, rather than being introduced in the books devoted to analysing freedom, the considerations on slavery make their appearance in the context of the discourse on the relationship between climate and laws and customs. The transition from Books XI–XIII, whose subjects are the ‘Constitution’, ‘political freedom’ and ‘freedom’ as such, to Books XIV-XVI, which deal with ‘climate’, despotism and ‘domestic slavery’ (slavery proper), is, at the same time, the transition from Europe—in particular, England—to the non-European world and the colonies. For that very reason, in asserting a climatic justification of slavery, its supporters would have no difficulty in appealing to Montesquieu.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his argument the French philosopher targeted not the theorists of slavery as such, but those who held to the thesis that ‘it would be good if there were slaves among us’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the colonies, it was a question of seeing ‘what the laws ought to do in relation to slavery’. Rather than abolition, Montesquieu’s discourse focused on amending the institution: ‘whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Are those ‘civil laws’ the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; issued some years earlier by Louis XIV, which consecrated black slavery and, at the same time, proposed to regulate it? The language of that document suggests as much. While he reiterated his ‘power’, in the preamble the sovereign asserted his concern for black slaves, who lived in ‘climates infinitely remote from our habitual sojourn’. They were to be guaranteed food and adequate clothing (Articles 22 and 25). And such guarantees, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg46&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;together with any treatment that was necessary, also applied to ‘slaves who are infirm on account of old age, illness or other circumstances, regardless of whether the illness is curable’ (Article 27).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These are concerns that also find expression in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws:&#039;&#039; ‘The magistrate should see to it that the slave is nourished and clothed; this should be regulated by law.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Montesquieu went on to assert that the slave must not be left completely at the mercy of the master’s arbitrary power. The latter might impose a death penalty in his capacity as a ‘judge’, respecting legal ‘formalities’, not as a private person. The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; argued in analogous fashion, providing for sanctions for the master guilty of the arbitrary mutilation or killing of his slave (Articles 42–43).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039; counted the sexual exploitation of female slaves among the main ‘abuses of slavery’: ‘Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness. The laws of modesty are a part of natural right and should be felt by all the nations in the world.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In homage to the precepts of the ‘Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion’, the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; regarded as ‘valid marriages’ those contracted between slaves who professed this religion (Article 8). It banned the separate sale of individual members of the family thus constituted (Article 47) and sought to repress the sexual exploitation of female slaves. A free, single man who had had children by a slave was obliged to marry her and recognize the offspring, who were to be freed together with the mother (Article 9).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further confirming that he intended to amend, rather than abolish, slavery is the fact that Montesquieu, as well as to its ‘abuses’, called attention to the ‘dangers’ it entailed and the ‘precautions’ required to confront them. Particular attention must be paid to the ‘danger of a large number of slaves’ and that represented by ‘armed slaves’. This warranted a recommendation of a general kind: ‘In the moderate state, the humanity one has for slaves will be able to prevent the dangers one could fear from there being too many of them. Men grow accustomed to anything, even to servitude, provided the master is not harsher than the servitude.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his desire to temper colonial slavery, Montesquieu looked for inspiration to the norms promulgated by the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, which in fact had no influence in the English world admired by him. In any case, his condemnation of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg47&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery is sharp only when it also seeks to break in ‘among ourselves’, thereby throwing Europe’s proud self-consciousness about being the exclusive locus of liberty into crisis. Along with despotism, slavery was present in Turkey and the Islamic world, and in Russia (in the form of abject serfdom), and prevailed unchallenged in Africa. But there was no room for it in Europe, or, rather, on metropolitan territory. The discourse relating to the colonies was different and more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Somersett case and the delineation of liberal identity&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Blackstone’s position is close to Montesquieu’s. We are in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘the law of England abhors, and can not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation’; not even its humblest, most base members, not even ‘idle vagabonds’ could be subjected to slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘spirit of liberty’ (argued the great jurist) ‘is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil’ that it could not in any instance permit the presence or spectacle of a relationship that was the concentrated expression of absolute power.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[S]trict slavery’ existed in ‘old Rome’ and continued to flourish in ‘modern Barbary’, but was now incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the English nation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, among the rights enjoyed by free men was free, undisturbed enjoyment of property, including property in slaves, on condition that the latter remained banished to the colonial world. The relationship between master and slave—and this applied to all ‘sorts of servants’, including slaves—was one of the ‘great relations in private life’;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] political authority had no right to intervene in it. And thus, celebration of England as the land of liberty was not perceived by Blackstone as being in contradiction with his reassertion of the black slave’s duty to serve his master. That was a duty which, on the basis of the ‘general principles’ of the ‘laws of England’, did not come to an end even were the ‘heathen negro’ to be converted to Christianity. Not even in that case could the slave stake a claim to ‘liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although recognized, the institution of slavery was, as it were, repressed from the ‘soil’ of England, confined to the border zone between the civilized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg48&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;world and barbarism. But what happened when a white master brought one of his slaves with him from the colonies as movable property? This was the problem raised by an impassioned debate in England in 1772. Turning to the courts, a slave—James Somersett—succeeded in extricating himself from the master who attempted to take him with him, in his capacity as movable property, on his return journey to Virginia. The Chief Justice’s judgment did not challenge the institution of slavery; it limited itself to asserting that ‘colonial laws’ only applied ‘in the colonies’, and hence that slavery had no legal basis in England. Somersett’s counsel eloquently proclaimed: ‘The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.’ But from this principle he deduced the conclusion that it was necessary to avoid an influx of blacks from Africa or America into England. Somersett’s master was held responsible for an assault on the purity of the land of the free, who could not tolerate being confused and mixed up with slaves, rather than a violation of the liberty and dignity of a human being. Not by chance, the 1772 judgment provided the premises for the subsequent deportation to Sierra Leone of blacks who, as loyal subjects of the Crown, sought refuge in England after the victory of the rebel American colonists.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of liberal freedom are beginning to become clear. Authors like Burgh and Fletcher could still be regarded as champions of the cause of liberty by Jefferson, who lived in a situation where black slavery and widespread ownership of land (taken from the Indians) made the project of enslaving white vagrants purely academic. In Europe things were different, as emerges from the interventions of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Those who did not subscribe to the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ began to be regarded as foreign to the emerging liberal party. Starting with Montesquieu and then, more clearly, Blackstone and the judgment in the Somersett case, what characterized the emergent liberal party were two essential points: (1) condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government by civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law; (2) assertion of the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, or of the principle on whose basis England—and, prospectively, Europe—possessed ‘too pure’ an air to be able to tolerate the presence of slaves on its ‘soil’. The second point is no less essential than the first. The legitimation of ‘slavery among ourselves’ would involve the dispersion of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg49&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand for self-government by civil society, or the self-government of the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. ‘We won’t be their Negroes’: the colonists’ rebellion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But the metropolis/colonies opposition, with its tendential exclusion of the latter from the sacred space of civilization and liberty, was bound to provoke a reaction from the colonists. Independently of particular concrete political and social demands, what was wounded was their self-consciousness. The metropolis seemed to be assimilating the American colonies to the ‘modern Barbary’ denounced by Blackstone; it seemed to be degrading them to a sort of dustbin, where the metropolitan rejects or prison population were dumped. The inmates of the mother country’s prisons were deported across the Atlantic to supply, along with blacks from Africa, the more or less forced labour required by it. According to the observation of the English abolitionist David Ramsay, slavery continued to survive in the region of the confines of the civilized world—namely, the West—‘where [its] proper religion and laws are not deemed to be in full force; and where individuals too often think themselves loosened from ties, which are binding in the mother country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If it saved the metropolis’s honour as the privileged site of liberty, despite the persistence of slavery on its extreme periphery, this view was wrong in the colonists’ view, because it confounded and assimilated free Englishmen, prison rabble and people of colour. In this way, lamented James Otis, a prominent supporter of the liberal revolution underway, one forgot that the colonies had been founded not ‘with a compound mixture of &#039;&#039;English, Indian and Negro&#039;&#039;, but with freeborn &#039;&#039;British white&#039;&#039; subjects’. Even more swingeing was Washington, who warned that the American colonists felt ‘as miserably oppressed as our own blacks’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having repeated that the American colonists could boast a lineage not less noble and deserving of liberty than the metropolitan English, John Adams exclaimed with reference to the rulers in London: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’![[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Quite apart even from the problem of representation, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free was perceived as an intolerable exclusion. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#page50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#pg50&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the other hand, the colonists, in demanding equality with the dominant British class, widened the gulf that separated them from blacks and Indians. While in London the zone of civilization was distinguished from the zone of barbarism, the sacred space from the profane, primarily by opposing the metropolis to the colonies, the American colonists were led to identify the boundary line principally in ethnic identity and skin colour. On the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Act, only whites could become citizens of the United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from a spatial delimitation of the community of the free to an ethnic and racial one brought with it combined, contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and dis-emancipation. Whites, even the poorest among them, also came within the sacred space; they found themselves forming part of the community or race of the free, albeit situated at inferior levels. White slavery disappeared, condemned by New York polite society as ‘contrary to … the idea of liberty this country has so happily established’. But the tendential emancipation of poor whites was only the other side of the coin of further dis-emancipation of blacks. The condition of the black slave deteriorated by virtue of no longer being, as in colonial America, one of several systems of unfree labour.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Virginia (and other states) land and black slaves were given to veterans of the War of Independence, in recognition of their contribution to the cause of the struggle against despotism;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the tendential social rise of poor whites coincided with the consummate de-humanization of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Racial slavery and the further deterioration in the condition of the ‘free’ black&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only a question of slaves. The triumph of the ethnic delimitation of the community of the free was bound seriously to affect the condition of those blacks who were notionally free. They were now struck by a series of measures that tended to render the colour line, the demarcation between the race of the free and the race of slaves, inviolable. Blacks not subject to slavery began to be perceived as an anomaly that would sooner or later have to be rectified. Their condition at the end of the eighteenth century was summed up by one of them in Boston, referring both to strictly legal forms of oppression and to the insults &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg51&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and threats which, while not legal, were widely tolerated by authority: ‘we may truly be said to carry our lives in our hands, and the arrows of death are flying about our heads’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is a description that might seem unduly emotive. But we should attend to de Tocqueville:&lt;br /&gt;
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The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On close inspection, it can be said of ‘emancipated Negroes’ that ‘their situation with regard to the Europeans is not unlike that of the Indians’. In fact, in some respects, they were ‘still more to be pitied’. In any event, they were ‘deprived of their rights’ and ‘exposed to the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of the people’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condition of blacks not reduced to slavery was no different and no better as one moved from South to North. In fact (de Tocqueville pitilessly observed), ‘the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condition of the notionally free black was distinguished from that of the slave, but perhaps even more from that of the genuinely free white. Only thus can we explain the danger that constantly threatened him of being reduced to conditions of slavery, and the temptation that periodically emerged among whites—for example, in Virginia after the slave revolt or attempted revolt of 1831—to deport the entire population of free blacks to Africa or elsewhere. The latter were anyhow obliged to register, and could only change residence with the permission of the local authorities; they were presumed to be slaves and detained until they managed to prove otherwise. The despotism exercised over slaves was bound to affect, in one way or another, the population of colour as a whole. This was explained in 1801 by the postmaster general in the Jefferson administration, in a letter in which he recommended to a Georgian senator that blacks and men of colour be excluded from the postal service. ‘Everything which tends to increase their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg52&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain and line of intelligence’ was extremely dangerous. Even the communication of feelings and ideas must be blocked or impeded by all possible means. In fact, the situation in Virginia immediately after the 1831 revolt was described as follows by a traveller: ‘Military service [by white patrols] is performed night and day, Richmond resembles a town besieged … the negroes … will not venture to communicate with one another for fear of punishment.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Spatial and racial delimitation of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The American Revolution threw into crisis the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which seemed established within the liberal movement. Now, far from being confined to the colonies, slavery acquired a new visibility and centrality in a country with a culture, religion and language of European origin, which conversed with European countries as an equal and in fact claimed a kind of primacy in embodying the cause of liberty. Declared legally void in England in 1772, the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like ‘niggers’. There thus emerged a country characterized by ‘a fixed and direct tie between slave ownership and political power’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as strikingly revealed both by the Constitution and the number of slave-owners who acceded to its highest institutional office.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did the platform of the liberal party shape up in a country which, like late-eighteenth-century England, could also boast of having air ‘too pure’ for it to be breathed by slaves? In fact, in the United States as well the ambition to retrieve the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ continued to make itself heard. Albeit utterly fancifully, Jefferson harboured the idea of re-deporting the blacks to Africa. However, in the new situation that had been created, the project of transforming the North American republic into a land inhabited exclusively by freemen proved difficult to implement. It would be necessary seriously to infringe the right, possessed by genuinely free persons, to enjoy their property without external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg53&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;interference! So, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a movement (the American Colonization Society) emerged that contrived a new way out: it was proposed to persuade the owners, by appealing to their religious feelings and also employing economic incentives, to free or sell their slaves, who, along with all the other blacks, would be sent to Africa to colonize it and convert it to Christianity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, without infringing the property rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution, it would have been possible to transform the United States into a land inhabited exclusively by free (and white) men.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a project doomed to fail from the outset. For a start, the acquisition of the slaves by the Union presupposed mobilizing enormous financial resources, and hence the imposition of high taxes. Expelled from the door in the shape of enforced expropriation, imposed from above, of the human cattle owned by the colonists, the spectre of despotic interference with private property by political power ended up arrogantly breaking in through the window as the taxation required to induce owners willingly to surrender their slaves, through a profitable sales contract. Moreover, taken as a whole, the class of planters had no intention of abandoning the source not only of its wealth, but also of its power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation in the North was different. Here slaves were small in number and performed no essential economic function. Abolishing slavery, but at the same time adhering to the federal order that legitimized and guaranteed it in the South, the northern states seemed to want to give a new lease of life in the new situation to the compromise we have already encountered. Without being abolished, the institution whose presence constituted a kind of ironic counterpoint to the claim to be champions of the cause of liberty was banished to the deep South. In fact, four states (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Oregon) strictly prohibited access into their territories by blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They thus avoided being contaminated by the presence not only of slaves, but also of blacks as such. This ban was the equivalent of the measure whereby, in the aftermath of the Somersett case, England deported to Sierra Leone blacks who not only were free, but also had the merit of having fought against the rebel colonists on behalf of the Empire. Nevertheless, even in the North of the United States, although it had been abolished, slavery had achieved the recognition it lacked in England, as demonstrated in particular by the constitutional provision that required the return of escaped slaves to their legitimate owners, in an indirect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg54&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sanction of the institution of slavery in states which were formally free. This was a point to which a representative of the South smugly drew attention: ‘We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly, in the United States as a whole the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which was more than ever reiterated across the Atlantic, had fallen into crisis. How had such a result been arrived at? Let us return to Burke. In asserting that the ‘spirit of freedom’ and the ‘liberal’ vision found their most consummate embodiment in the slave-owners of the southern colonies, he added that the colonists formed an integral part of the nation ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, of ‘the chosen race and sons of England’: it was a question of ‘pedigree’, in the face of which ‘human art’ was powerless.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here, as we can see, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free, which is the principle on which late-eighteenth-century liberal England was based, seems to be on the point of transmuting into a racial delimitation. And hence, in Calhoun and ideologists of the slaveholding South in general, a tendency already present in Burke comes to fruition. Having been spatial, the line of demarcation of the community of the free ends up becoming racial.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, there was no insurmountable barrier between the two types of delimitation. In 1845 John O’Sullivan, popular theorist of the providential ‘manifest destiny’ that put wind in the sails of US expansion, sought to assuage abolitionists’ concerns about the introduction of slavery into Texas (wrested from Mexico and on the point of being annexed to the Union) with a significant argument. It was precisely its temporary extension that created the conditions for abolition of the ‘the slavery of an inferior to a superior race’, and hence ‘furnished much probability of the ultimate disappearance of the negro race from our borders’. At the appropriate time, the ex-slaves would be driven further south, into the ‘only receptacle’ appropriate for them. In Latin America the population of mixed blood, which had formed following the fusion of the Spaniards with the natives, would easily be able to accommodate the blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The racial delimitation of the community would then give way to a territorial delimitation. The end of slavery would, at the same time, entail the end of the presence of blacks in the land of liberty. Despite the abolitionists’ cry of alarm, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg55&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the concentration of slaves in a zone immediately proximate to territories that were fundamentally foreign to the zone of civilization and liberty pushed in this direction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For some time Lincoln harboured the idea of deporting the blacks, likewise regarded by him as ultimately alien to the community of the free, from the United States to Latin America after their emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, having confronted one another for decades, what clashed during the Civil War were the causes not of liberty and slavery, but precisely two different delimitations of the community of the free: the opposed parties accused one another of not knowing how, or not wanting, to delimit the community of the free effectively. To those who brandished the spectre of racial contamination as an inevitable consequence of the abolition of slavery, Lincoln replied by emphasizing that in the United States the overwhelming majority of ‘mulattoes’ were the result of sexual relations between white masters and their black slaves: ‘slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation’. For the rest, he had ‘no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races’, or to recognize the right of blacks to participate in political life or hold public office or perform the role of jury member. Lincoln declared himself well aware, like any other white man, of the radical difference between the two races and the supremacy of the whites.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The crisis took a decisive step towards breaking-point following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Dred Scott case in summer 1857: ‘like an ordinary article of merchandise and property’, a black slave’s legitimate owner had the right to take him with him in any part of the Union.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Lincoln’s reaction: the country could not remain permanently divided, ‘half &#039;&#039;slave&#039;&#039; and half &#039;&#039;free’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In contrast to the England of the Somersett case, the North of the United States could not pose as a land of the free whose air was ‘too pure’ to be breathed by a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The transition from the spatial delimitation to the racial delimitation of the community of the free henceforth made it impossible to repress the reality of slavery. There was now no alternative to the condemnation of this institution except its explicit defence or celebration. As the conflict dividing the two sections of the Union emerged more clearly, the South’s ideologues all the more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg56&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;provocatively mocked the circumlocutions and linguistic interdictions that had facilitated the Philadelphia compromise of 1787. ‘Negro slavery’, declared John Randolph, was a reality that ‘the Constitution has vainly attempted to blink, by not using the term’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the lifting of this taboo, the legitimation of slavery lost the timidity that had previously characterized it, assuming a defiant tone. Having been a necessary evil, slavery became (in the words of Calhoun with which we are familiar) a ‘positive good’. It made no sense to try to repress it as something to be ashamed of; in reality, it was the very foundation of civilization. Throwing into crisis the pathos of liberty that had presided over the foundation of the United States, and in a way de-legitimizing the very War of Independence, this new attitude helped make the clash between North and South inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. The Civil War and the resumption of the controversy initiated with the American Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In these circumstances, while the abolitionists adopted the arguments used during the American War of Independence by the British and the loyalists in their polemic against the South, the theorists of the South used arguments deployed by the rebel colonists. We have seen O’Sullivan, a New York lawyer and journalist, regard the South, bordering as it was on Mexico and Latin America, as the best place to deposit the blacks temporarily, pending their emancipation and deportation from the United States. Hence the South was a territory by no means uncontaminated by the barbarism of the blacks who lived there as slaves. Cohabitation with blacks, and sexual contamination, attested by a high number of mulattos—the abolitionist Theodore Parker piled it on—had also left profound traces on southern whites; it was precisely the influence of the ‘African element’ that explained attachment to an institution contrary to the principles of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And just as pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America had done, so too the South protested against the tendential exclusion, of which it felt itself the victim, from the authentic community of the free. It was now no longer the American colonies in their entirety, but the southern states that considered themselves assimilated to the ‘modern Barbary’ mentioned by Blackstone.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg57&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Along with the one just noted, further aspects of the legal argument reappeared that had opposed the rebel colonists to England. In Calhoun’s view, the abolitionists of the North, who wanted to abolish slavery by a federal law, were riding roughshod over the right of each individual state to self-government, and seeking to found the Union on political slavery, on ‘the bond between master and slave’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Naturally, the North reacted by ironizing about this impassioned defence of liberty by the ‘democratic’, slaveholding South. To understand the latter’s subsequent response, we can return for a moment to Franklin. Replying to his English interlocutors, who scoffed at the flag of liberty waved by the rebel colonists and slave-owners, he did not limit himself to recalling the Crown’s interest and involvement in the slave trade. He also employed a second argument, drawing attention to the fact that slavery and servitude had not disappeared across the Atlantic. In particular, coalminers in Scotland were ‘absolute Slaves by your law’; they were ‘bought and sold with the Colliery, and have no more Liberty to leave it than our Negroes have to leave their Master’s Plantation’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The authors of the denunciation of black slavery were responsible for a white slavery that was certainly no better than the one they condemned so vehemently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, on the occasion of the conflict which had been brewing for decades and reached breaking-point with the Civil War, the South retorted in two ways to the accusations against it. It stressed that the North and abolitionist Britain were not in a position to give lectures even on the way blacks (and peoples of colour in general) were treated; and it pointed out how much slavery survived in an industrial society notionally based on ‘free’ labour.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us focus for now on the first point. Already during the Philadelphia Convention, the slave-owners rejected the lectures given them in the name of morality, pointing out that the North derived major benefits from the institution of slavery, since its merchant shipping transported the slaves and the commodities produced by them.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1808 the ban on the ‘immigration or introduction’ of black slaves provided for by the federal Constitution had come into effect. But it remained the case (observed the ideologues of the South) that blacks in the North, in addition to suffering the poverty and oppression that were the lot of the poor in general there, were exposed to maltreatment and violence of every kind, as demonstrated by the periodic outbreak of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg58&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;veritable pogroms. Even more repugnant (stressed Calhoun, in particular, in the years leading up to the Civil War) was the hypocrisy of Britain (the country which, having abolished slavery in its colonies, had become the model for the American abolitionists).’[T]he greatest slave dealer on earth’, the country ‘more responsible than any other … for the extent of that form of servitude’ in the American continent, then engaged in waving the banner of abolitionism, with a view to attracting the lucrative production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and coffee to its colonies and ruining potential competitors.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, what results had the putative emancipation of the slaves produced in the English colonies? The condition of the blacks was in no wise improved; in their case, freedom was more of a mirage than ever, while ‘the supremacy of the European race’ continued to be undisputed.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Inevitably, when ‘two races of men, of different color’, and markedly unequal in terms of culture and civilization, tried to live together, the inferior race was destined for subjection.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The very country that elevated itself into champion of the struggle against slavery distinguished itself in completely the opposite direction: not only did it use the labour of ‘slaves’ in India and other colonies, but it ‘[held] in unlimited subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million human beings, dispersed over every part of the globe’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We find an even more explicit reference to the lot of the coolies in another eminent representative of the South, George Fitzhugh. Arraigned once again was Britain, which lauded itself for having abolished slavery in its colonies. In reality, the ‘temporary slaves’ from Asia who had taken the place of the blacks, ‘if not worked to death before their terms of service expire’, subsequently died of starvation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its main lines, the controversy that developed on the eve and in the course of the Civil War reproduced and resumed the one that had occurred some decades earlier, during the clash between the two shores of the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Liberal system of policy’, ‘liberality of sentiment’ and the institution of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the spread of the political use of the term ‘liberal’ in its various senses, we must remember two reference points. The first is the proud self-consciousness &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg59&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that matured in the wake of the victory achieved during the Seven Years’ War over the France of monarchical and religious absolutism, which was subsequently reinforced in England by the outcome of the Somersett case. The second is the struggles that developed within the community of the free. When the controversy provoked by the agitation of the rebel colonists erupted, the various positions confronting one another all tended to define themselves as in some sense ‘liberal’. Burke sought to promote conciliation, calling upon ‘the liberal government of this free nation’ to evince a spirit of compromise.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Across the Atlantic, at the moment when the United States was founded, Washington emphasized ‘the benefits of a wise and liberal Government’, or a ‘liberal system of policy’, which asserted itself ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, and which had as its basis ‘the free cultivation of Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce’, or ‘liberal and free commerce’, ‘the progressive refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment’, with the prevalence of a ‘liberal sentiment’ of tolerance also regarding relations between ‘every political and religious denomination of men in this country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hitherto the term ‘liberal’ has occurred solely as an adjective. In other contexts, adjective and substantive are interchangeable: ‘every Liberal Briton’ (wrote the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039; in 1798) rejoiced at the problems facing revolutionary, tyrannical France, which had to confront the difficult situation created by the uprising of the black slaves in San Domingo.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, the term in question made its appearance as a noun: signing himself ‘A Liberal’ was the author (possibly Paine) of an article in the &#039;&#039;Pennsylvania Packet&#039;&#039; of 25 March 1780, which came out for the abolition of slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here we have four interventions, which share a liberal profession of faith, but with orientations that are fairly diverse as regards black slavery. In Europe, while stances in favour of it were not wanting, a critical orientation was prevalent: a more or less clear distance tended to be taken from the institution that had had to be repressed to the colonies, in order to confer credibility on the self-consciousness developed by the community of the free. &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;—Adam Smith’s masterpiece, which appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson, a pre-eminent representative &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg60&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Virginia’s planters and slave-owners—observed that the ‘liberal reward of labour’, with the payment of a wage that the ‘free servant’ and ‘free man’ could freely dispose of, was the only thing likely to stimulate individual industry; while economic stagnation was the result of servile labour, whether serfdom or slavery proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Millar regarded the institution of slavery as in contradiction with ‘the liberal sentiments entertained in the latter part of the eighteenth century’, with the ‘more liberal views’ developed in the modern world.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going still further, the great economist’s disciple declared that credibility could be restored to the ‘liberal hypothesis’ only by avoiding its confusion with those who waved the flag of liberty while preserving and, in fact, developing the practice of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Across the Atlantic, by contrast, defence of that institution was much fiercer. Yet it would be mistaken to construct a clear-cut opposition. It is sufficient to reflect on the fact that the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South was, in the first instance, Burke. In 1832 an influential Virginian ideologue, Thomas R. Dew, lauded the advantages of slavery: ‘the menial and low offices’ were reserved for blacks, so that love of liberty and the ‘republican spirit’, peculiar to free, white citizens, flourished with a purity and vigour unknown in the rest of the United States, and had a precedent only in classical antiquity. But in saying this, Dew appealed to Burke and his thesis that, where slavery flourished, the spirit of liberty developed more abundantly.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, the theorist of the slaveholding South indirectly adopted and subscribed to the British Whig’s ‘liberal’ profession of faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In subsequent decades, during the struggle against the North, which was initially political and then military, the slaveholding South could count on many friends in liberal England. A few years before the Civil War, the arguments of the southern ideologues were explicitly echoed by Benjamin Disraeli. With the abolition of slavery in British and French colonies behind him, he characterized the abolition of slavery as ‘a narrative of ignorance, injustice, blundering, waste, and havoc, not easily paralleled in the history of mankind’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In America, if they mixed with the blacks, the whites ‘would become so deteriorated that their states would probably be reconquered and regained by the aborigines’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Would the abolition of slavery in the United States not encourage this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg61&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;admixture, imparting a novel dignity to it? Later, the secessionist Confederacy’s desperate struggle met with a profoundly sympathetic echo from prominent cultural and political representatives of liberal England, provoking the indignation of John Stuart Mill.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the occasion first of the Somersett case, then of the American Revolution and finally of the Civil War, the liberal world appeared profoundly divided over the problem of slavery. How are we to find our bearings in this seeming chaos?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. From the assertion of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ to the condemnation of slavery as such&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We are trying to answer the question we posed at the beginning: Can authors like Fletcher and Calhoun be considered liberals? In the liberal England derived from the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher could calmly demand the introduction of slavery for vagrants without being in any way isolated, just as Hutcheson and Burgh, who expressed more or less similar positions, were not isolated. While Hutcheson was the master of Smith, Fletcher was in correspondence with Locke and enjoyed, along with Burgh, the respect of Jefferson and the circles close to him. These were the years when, as Hume put it, ‘[s]ome passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty … cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution [slavery]’, which accounted for the grandeur of Athens and Rome.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, with the establishment of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, the positions expressed by Fletcher ceased to be, or ceased to be accepted as, liberal. It is true that they took a long time to die. As late as 1838, a German liberal reported the ‘advice, certainly more hinted at than clearly stated, which would wish to find a remedy for the serious danger [represented by an unprecedented and acute social question] in the introduction of veritable slavery for factory workers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it was a suggestion rejected with disdain: the line of demarcation of the liberal ‘party’ had been drawn for a while.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar argument can be advanced in connection with Calhoun. In his view, it was the North that was guilty of betraying the liberal principles which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg62&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had inspired the American Revolution. In fact, ‘the defence of human liberty against the aggressions of despotic power had always been most efficient in States where domestic slavery was found to prevail’. Within the Union, it was the South that had ‘constantly inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was in the South that liberalism found its most authentic and mature expression. The term ‘liberal’ (warned John Randolph, sometimes defined as the ‘American Burke’), which originally meant ‘a man attached to enlarged and free principles—a votary of liberty’, would see its true meaning twisted if it had to be used to refer to those who flirted with abolitionism.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A contemporary liberal might be tempted to be shot of the unmanageable presence within the tradition of thought he refers to of an author like Burke, who celebrated the particular intensity of the liberal spirit and love of liberty among slave-owners; or of an author like Calhoun, who in the nineteenth century still hymned the ‘positive good’ that was slavery. And so both of them are officially included in the conservative party. However, such an operation immediately reveals its groundlessness. The category of conservatism is characterized by formalism, in the sense that it can subsume significantly different contents: it is a question of identifying what it is intended to conserve or guard. And there is no doubt that Burke and Calhoun aimed to be vigilant guardians of the social relations and political institutions which emerged, respectively, from the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—two eminently liberal revolutions. It would make no sense to regard Jefferson and Washington as liberals, but this is not the case with Burke—who, unlike them, was not a slaveowner and who, when he celebrated the ‘liberal spirit’ and ‘liberal’ emphasis of the slaveholding South, had in mind precisely figures like these two Virginian statesmen. As late as 1862 Lord Acton cited at length, and implicitly subscribed to, the passage by the British Whig who, far from excluding slave-owners, conferred on them a privileged position in the party of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be just as illogical to exclude from that party Calhoun, who tirelessly reiterated his attachment to representative bodies and the principle of the limitation of power. If, then, going beyond the merely formal meaning of the term, conservatism is to be understood as an uncritical attachment to a pre-modern, pre-industrial society, characterized by the cult of clod of earth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg63&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bell tower, such a category could hardly account for Calhoun’s positions. Once the rights of minorities had been guaranteed, he had no problem with extending the vote and even introducing male ‘universal suffrage’; and, along with representative bodies, he celebrated the development of ‘manufactures’, industry and free trade.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If to anyone, the category of conservatism might be applied to Jefferson. He identified cultivators of the land as ‘the chosen people of God’, assimilated ‘great cities’ to the ‘sores’ of a ‘human body’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1812, during the war with Britain, accused the latter of being an instrument of ‘Satan’ because it had compelled America to abandon the ‘paradise’ of agriculture and engage in ‘manufacturing’, in order to meet the test of arms (see [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). And the category of conservatism might also be applied to Washington. He too viewed with concern the prospect that the Americans might become ‘a manufacturing people’, rather than continuing to be ‘Cultivators’ of the land, thereby avoiding the scourge of the ‘tumultuous populace of large cities’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In particular, it is against Jefferson that Calhoun seems to be arguing when he rejects the thesis that manufacture ‘destroy[s] the moral and physical power of the people’. In reality, this was a concern rendered ever more obsolete by ‘the great perfection of machinery’ introduced into industry.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, if acceptance of free trade is an integral part of liberalism, it is clear that Calhoun can be included in such a tradition much more easily than his adversaries in the North, who were engaged in strict protectionist practices liable (according to the southern theorist’s denunciation) to ‘destroy the liberty of the country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Construed in the broadest sense of the term, the liberal party encompassed both Whigs and Tories. The former did not even necessarily represent the more advanced wing. Josiah Tucker was a Tory, who reprehended Locke and Burke for being followers of a ‘republicanism’ based, precisely, upon slavery and serfdom. For the rest, arguing with ‘Republican Zealots’, he liked to position himself among the true interpreters of ‘English constitutional Liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Disraeli was likewise a Tory, who, while on the one hand echoing the arguments of the slaveholding South, on the other significantly widened the social basis of British representative bodies, granting the vote to significant sections of the popular classes and anyway extending it much further than the Whigs had.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg64&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On the other hand, outside the liberal party even before the Civil War were those who, in their concern to save the institution of slavery and indignation at the weapons supplied by representative bodies to an increasingly threatening abolitionist agitation, spoke with Fitzhugh in the southern United States of the ‘collapse of liberal society’, or ironized with Carlyle in Europe itself over ruinous ‘anarchic–constitutional epochs’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although reiterating the absolute necessity of slavery as the foundation of civilization, both ended up challenging, at least on a theoretical level, the ethnic and spatial delimitations of the institution of slavery. For Fitzhugh, as was demonstrated by the examples of classical antiquity and confirmed by the reality of the modern world, work was inseparable from slavery, so that in one form or another ‘slavery, &#039;&#039;black or white&#039;&#039;, was right and necessary’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In justifying the slavery of the Afro-Americans across the Atlantic and branding the Irish ‘black’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carlyle, admired by Fitzhugh and other southerners, and in correspondence with some of them,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in his turn reached a general ‘conclusion’: ‘whether established by law, or by law abrogated, [slavery] exists very extensively in this world, in and out of the West Indies; and … you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the &#039;&#039;name&#039;&#039; of it, which is very little!’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Whether dealing with slaves, ‘servants hired for life’, or &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, it was still slavery. On the other hand, if the slave was a ‘servant hired for life’, why should one prefer the servant hired for a month or a day?[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spurred by the bitterness of the struggle underway, Fitzhugh and Carlyle ultimately returned to the positions of Fletcher, first marginalized and then regarded as alien to the liberal party. The transition from the liberal party’s first turn to the second can be summarized thus: following the defeat of the South, the emancipation of black slaves and amendments to the US Constitution to that effect, a transition was made from asserting the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ in Europe and the ‘free states’ of the northern United States to general condemnation, on both sides of the Atlantic, of slavery as such. Starting from this second result, the positions expressed by Calhoun were also rejected by the liberal party. But that is not a reason to expel him &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg65&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;retrospectively from the liberal tradition. Otherwise, the same fate would have to be meted out to Locke and a fair number of the protagonists of the American Revolution and the early decades of US history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In any event, with the end of the Civil War a historical cycle came to a close. Having emerged together from a unique twin birth, which saw them entwined in a relationship not without its tensions, liberalism as a whole now broke with slavery in the strict sense—with hereditary, racial slavery. But before examining these new courses, it is appropriate to extend our analysis of the society that was established on the two Atlantic shores up to the Civil War. We have hitherto focused attention on the problem of black slavery. But what relations were developing within the white community?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn1a|1]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1997, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn2a|2]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn3a|3]] Quoted in Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn4a|4]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn5a|5]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 123, 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn6a|6]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn7a|7]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn8a|8]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from John Wesley to William Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn9a|9]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn10a|10]] Max Farrand, ed., &#039;&#039;The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, vol. 1, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn11a|11]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn12a|12]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 199–200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn13a|13]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21, 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn14a|14]] Shearer Davis Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn15a|15]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 59–65; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 39 and &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn16a|16]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 38–9; Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 59.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn17a|17]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 49, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn18a|18]] Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn19a|19]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 557, 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn20a|20]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn21a|21]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §28; vol. 3, ch. xiv, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 562–3 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn23a|23]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn24a|24]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 157–8, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn25a|25]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1483.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn26a|26]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn27a|27]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §6; Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn29a|29]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 377.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn30a|30]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, pp. 84–93.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn31a|31]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Tracts on Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Philip Abrams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn32a|32]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn33a|33]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., p. 355.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn42a|42]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 394–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn43a|43]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn45a|45]] The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; is reproduced and commented on in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 89–203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn46a|46]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn49a|49]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 412.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 410–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn54a|54]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 37; David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 231, 472, 495–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn55a|55]] Ramsay, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 387.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn56a|56]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 92, 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn57a|57]] Adams, quoted in David B. Davis, ‘A Big Business’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 11 January 1998, p. 50 n. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn58a|58]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., pp. 19, 32; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn61a|61]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 16–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 367–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn65a|65]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn66a|66]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn67a|67]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 6ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn68a|68]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn69a|69]] Quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;An Imperfect Union&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn70a|70]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 66, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn71a|71]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, pp. 7–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn72a|72]] Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, pp. 254–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn73a|73]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 401, 511–12, 636.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn74a|74]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn75a|75]] Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 426.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn76a|76]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn77a|77]] Parker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 231–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn78a|78]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 436.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn79a|79]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 651.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn80a|80]] Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn81a|81]] Calhoun, quoted in Massimo L. Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà nel mondo moderno&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, pp. 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn82a|82]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn84a|84]] Calhoun, quoted in Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà&#039;&#039;, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn85a|85]] George Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, Richmond: Morris, 1854, pp. 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn86a|86]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn87a|87]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 242, 247, 242 (‘Circular to the States’, 4 June 1783), 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786), 545 (letter to the Hebrew Congregation, January 1790).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn88a|88]] Cf. David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 130.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn89a|89]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 132; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn90a|90]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 98–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn91a|91]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 296, 250.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn92a|92]] Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. II, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn93a|93]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95a|95]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96a|96]] Robert von Mohl, ‘Gwerbe- und Fabrikwesen’, in Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch, eds, &#039;&#039;Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97a|97]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 468, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98a|98]] Randolph, quoted in Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, pp. 63, 43 (for the characterization as ‘the American Burke’).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99a|99]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100a|100]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 35–6, 315.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101a|101]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 290–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102a|102]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, pp. 455 (‘Fragments of the First Discarded Inaugural Address’, April 1789), 554 (letter to La Fayette, 28 July 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103a|103]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 308.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105a|105]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. ix, 12, 96.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106a|106]] Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, ed. Michael K. Goldberg and Jules P. Seigel, Ottawa: Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1983, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107a|107]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, pp. 98, 225; cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12 &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039; and ch. 22, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108a|108]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109a|109]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, p. 286; Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110a|110]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 464–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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== CHAPTER THREE ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Franklin, Smith and ‘vestiges of slavery’ in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
First the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and then the South of the United States during the conflict that pitted it against the North, accused their opponents of hypocrisy. The latter waxed indignant over black slavery, but shut its eyes to the fact that what were essentially slave relations persisted within the society it held up as a model. As we know, Franklin compared the miners of Scotland to the blacks of the American plantations, and thus challenged the London government’s pretension to elevate itself into a champion of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, this was a polemical intervention, but one whose validity was confirmed by a rather authoritative witness. Although sharing the proud self-consciousness of his compatriots or the ruling class of his country, Adam Smith acknowledged the persistence in Great Britain of ‘vestiges of slavery’: a labour relationship not dissimilar from serfdom was in force in salt works and coalmines. Just as the &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, still very numerous in Eastern Europe, were forcibly bound to the land to be cultivated and sold at the same time as it, so in the country that had left behind the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; some decades earlier, the &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; were in a sense an integral part of the &#039;&#039;opus&#039;&#039; or works (the salt work or mine) and, when this was sold, passed together with their family into the service of the new master. Hence it was not a question of actual slavery, of chattel slavery, which allowed individual members of a family to be put on the market like any other commodity. The &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; could marry and lead a genuine family life; they could own a minimum of property; and, naturally, they did not risk being killed with impunity: ‘their lives are under the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protection of the laws of the land’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it remained the case that in Scotland workers in coalmines and salt works were obliged to wear a collar on which the name of their master was inscribed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the wake of the great economist, Millar too could not but ‘regret … that any species of slavery should still remain in Great Britain’; and it was to be hoped that parliament would intervene to remedy the situation, finally sanctioning ‘the freedom of the labouring people’ in Scottish mines and salt works.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Judging from Smith’s &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, these were ‘the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Does this mean that the other labour relations were based on freedom? Referring to England in the second half of the eighteenth century, Blackstone distinguished between three types of ‘servant’ in the strict sense (we ignore here personnel charged with overseeing and guarding the master’s property): ‘menial servants’ or ‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’, and finally ‘labourers’, who worked outside the master’s house. The most modern labour relation, least informed by feudal and servile echoes, would seem to be the last. In this connection, however, the great jurist indulged in celebrating ‘very good regulations’ on the basis of which, for example, ‘all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work’, while those who ‘leave or desert their work’ were punished. Over the domestic or apprentice, the master exercised a right of ‘corporal punishment’ that must not result in death or mutilation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what happened if this limit was exceeded? We can infer Smith’s answer: ‘The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon or with forethought and without provocation.’ It is difficult to regard such servants as free men even if, according to the great economist, they enjoyed ‘almost the same privileges with their master, liberty, wages, etca’. In fact, what creates a radical difference is the power of correction exercised by the one over the other. The same Smith included menial servants, together with slaves proper, in the master’s extended family.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Masters did not confine themselves to monitoring their servant’s industriousness. Let us attend to Hume’s evidence: ‘At present, all masters discourage &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg69&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the females, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their service.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The opportunity to have a family seems largely denied not only to the black slave, but also to the white domestic servant: the private lives of both were subject to the master’s power or will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it is to be noted that comparable to menial servants were ‘apprentices’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] whose condition, in England at any rate, had been regarded by Grotius as approximating closely enough to the slave’s. And such, basically, was also Blackstone’s opinion. He reiterated the slave’s obligation to provide service ‘for life’ with a rather eloquent argument: fundamentally, it was the same relationship that the apprentice had with his master, except that in the latter case there was a time limit (seven years and sometimes more).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has justly been observed, ‘[f]or most of human history the expression “free labor” was an oxymoron.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The unemployed, beggars and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As the controversy between the two sides of the Union became increasingly bitter, Calhoun positively contrasted the condition of American slaves with that of inmates of workhouses or poorhouses in England. The former were lovingly treated and cared for by the master or mistress during illness or old age, while the latter were reduced to a ‘forlorn and wretched condition’; the former continued to live among their family and friends, while the latter were uprooted from their environment and also separated from their loved ones.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The apologetic intention that governs the description or transfiguration of the institution of slavery is clear. Yet when it came to workhouses in England, Calhoun was not the only one to underscore the horror. In de Tocqueville’s view, they afforded ‘the most horrendous and repugnant [spectacle] of misery’: on the one hand, the infirm incapable of work and waiting to die; on the other, women and children massed pell-mell ‘like pigs in the mud of their sty; it is difficult not to trample over a semi-naked body’. Finally, there were the comparatively more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg70&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘fortunate’—those in a position to work: they earned little or nothing and fed off the leftovers of stately homes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But however horrible, poverty and degradation were not the most significant aspect of workhouses. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe favourably mentioned the example of the workhouse in Bristol, which ‘has been such a Terror to the Beggars that none of [them] will come near the City’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the workhouse was subsequently described by Engels as a total institution: ‘Paupers wear the uniform of the house and are subject to the will of the director without any protection whatsoever’; so that ‘the “morally degenerate” parents cannot influence their children, families are separated; the man is sent to one wing, the woman to another, the children to a third’. Families were broken up, but for the rest all were amassed sometimes to the tune of twelve or sixteen in a single room. Any kind of violence was inflicted on them, not even sparing the elderly and children, and involving particular attention to women. In practice, the inmates of workhouses were treated as ‘objects of disgust and horror placed outside the law and the human community’. Thus was explained the fact, underscored by Engels, that in order to escape the ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ (as they were popularly renamed), ‘inmates of work houses often deliberately make themselves guilty of any crime whatsoever in order to go to prison’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact (add contemporary historians), ‘many indigents preferred to die of hunger and illness’ rather than subject themselves to a workhouse.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the suicide that slaves often resorted to in order to escape their condition. Examined carefully, the 1834 law that shut up anyone requiring assistance in a workhouse in a sense vindicates Calhoun and those who pointed to slavery as the only possible solution to the problem of poverty. Fighting for the new legislation, its inspirer, Nassau William Senior, denounced the fatal contradiction in the rules hitherto in force, which allowed the poor person to enjoy a minimum of assistance for continuing a normal life: ‘The labourer is to be a free agent, but without the hazards of free agency; to be free from the coercion, but to enjoy the assured existence of the slave.’ But ‘unit[ing] the irreconcilable advantages of freedom and servitude’ was utterly absurd: a choice was required.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing thus, the influential economist and liberal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg71&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;theorist, interlocutor and correspondent of Tocqueville, ended up recognizing the substantially slave-like character of the relations obtaining in workhouses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Coming as it did in 1834, the new legislation coincided with the emancipation of blacks in the colonies. We can thus understand the irony, on the one hand, of the theorists of the slaveholding South in the United States and, on the other, of the English popular masses faced with a dominant class which, while it lauded itself for having abolished slavery in the colonies, reintroduced it in a different form in the metropolis itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Liberals, vagrants and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have mentioned the role played by Senior in the passing of the 1834 law. But what position did the liberal tradition as a whole adopt towards workhouses and, more generally, the policy of disciplining poverty? According to Locke, it was necessary to intervene thoroughly and drastically in an infected area of society that was constantly expanding. From the age of three, the children of families not in a position to feed them should be sent out to work.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Moreover, it was necessary to intervene with their parents. To discourage the idleness and dissoluteness of vagrants, it was appropriate to proceed in areas frequented by them to ‘the suppressing of superfluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Secondly, begging should be discouraged and restricted. Beggars were obliged to wear a ‘badge’; to oversee them, and prevent them practising their activity outside the permitted area and hours, a special body was provided, the ‘beadles of beggars’, who in their turn were to be controlled by ‘guardians’ so that they performed their task with the requisite diligence and severity. But the whole community was called upon to participate in the beggar hunt, starting with the inhabitants of the house where the wretches had requested charity.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Draconian penalties awaited vagrants who managed to escape this comprehensive control. It was right that those caught asking for alms outside their parish and near a sea port should be pressed into the navy: they were to be ‘punished as deserters’—i.e. with the death penalty—‘if they go on shore without leave; or, when sent on shore, if they either go further, or stay longer, than they have leave’. The other illegal beggars were to be interned in a normal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg72&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse or house of correction. The master ‘shall have no other consideration nor allowance but what their labour shall produce; whom therefore he shall have power to employ according to his discretion’. Once again, this arbitrary power summons up the spectre of slavery. As is confirmed by a further detail: that ‘whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the forgery for the first time that he is found guilty thereof; and the second time, that he shall be transported to the plantations, as in case of felony’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, in the nineteenth century the situation was different. With the 1834 reform, arriving in the workhouses were those who sought to escape death from starvation in some way: the workhouses must be made as odious as possible in order to reduce the number of those who sought refuge in them to a minimum. In this philosophy, which began to take shape with Malthus,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville likewise joined: ‘It is obvious that we must make assistance unpleasant, we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison and render our charity repugnant.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In denouncing this institution, Calhoun referred exclusively to Europe. Yet it was present, in one form or another, in the United States. De Tocqueville referred to it, significantly, in the context of his analysis of the ‘prison system’. Who were the inmates? The answer was clear: ‘The indigent who cannot earn their living by honest work, and those who do not want to.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was therefore understandable that workhouses became particularly crowded at times of crisis:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The fluctuations in industry attract, when favourable, a large number of workers who find themselves without work in times of crisis. Thus we see that vagrancy, which is born of idleness, and stealing, which is invariably the result of vagrancy, are the two crimes that are experiencing the most rapid increase in the current state of society.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crime that led to internment was already identified with unemployment and poverty. Making the judicial decisions, for example in New York, was a functionary who could readily deprive of their liberty those who in his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg73&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;judgment ‘have no means of subsistence’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Protests were understandable: the poor person thus confined ‘regards himself as unfortunate, not culpable; he challenges society’s right violently to force him to do fruitless work and to deal with him against his will’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us return to England. John Stuart Mill was inclined to trivialize the horror of workhouses when he observed: ‘Even the labourer who loses his employment by idleness or negligence, has nothing worse to suffer, in the most unfavourable case, than the discipline of a workhouse’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the liberal philosopher’s opinion can be contrasted with that of modern scholars: once they had entered workhouses, the poor ‘ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’, because they lost ‘the civil right of personal liberty’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was a radical loss: the ‘guardians’ of the workhouses had the discretional power of inflicting the corporal punishment deemed most fitting on inmates.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bentham was decidedly enthusiastic. He tirelessly lauded the benefits of this institution, which he aimed further to perfect, locating the workhouse in a ‘panoptical’ building which allowed the director to exercise secret, total control—that is, to observe every single aspect of the behaviour of the unwitting inmates at any point in time:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What hold can any other manufacturer have upon his workmen, equal to what my manufacturer would have upon his? What other master is there that can reduce his workmen, if idle, to a situation next to starving, without suffering them to go elsewhere? What other master is there, whose men can never get drunk unless he chooses that they should do so? and who, so far from being able to raise their wages by combination, are obliged to take whatever pittance he thinks it most for his interest to allow? … and what other master or manufacturer is there, who to appearance constantly, and in reality as much as he thinks proper, has every look and motion of each workman under his eye?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg74&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence the contribution to the development of national wealth by workhouses, intended to operate as ‘industry-houses’, would be enormous. They were to be spread over the whole national territory, confining up to 500,000 detainees, and in any event ‘all persons, able-bodied or otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of livelihood’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to this gigantic concentration-camp universe, where people would be interned without having committed any crime and without any control by the judiciary, it would be possible to perform the miracle of transforming the ‘dross’ that was the ‘refuse of the population’ into money.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was not all. Given the isolation it entailed, the workhouse made it possible to experiment, as we shall see, with producing a stock of especially industrious and conscientious labourers. Certainly, for such objectives to be achieved, rigorous discipline was required, which must be thoroughly internalized by the detainees in the workhouse:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Soldiers&#039;&#039; wear &#039;&#039;uniforms&#039;&#039;, why not paupers?—those who save the country, why not those who are saved by it? Not the &#039;&#039;permanent&#039;&#039; hands only, but likewise the &#039;&#039;coming-and-going&#039;&#039; hands should wear the uniform while in the house, for order, distinction, and recognition, as well as for tidiness …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The servant as soldier&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, it was Bentham who compared the condition of a workhouse inmate with that of the soldier. But it is appropriate to take a step back. During his residence in London, Franklin, discomfited by his English interlocutors mocking the flag of liberty waved by colonists who were often slave-owners, replied by highlighting, among other things, the persistence in England of slave-like relations even within the armed forces.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The reference was above all to the navy. Let us attend to historians of our day: ‘the men of the fleet were so ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-handled that it was impossible to obtain crews by free enlistment’. Many sought to escape this kind of sequestration, but Great Britain gave chase to them, without hesitating to search American ships and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg75&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;take by force deserters, including those who had become US citizens in the meantime. It was necessary to resort to drastic measures to ensure the functioning of ‘more than 700 warships in commission, with nearly 150,000 sailors and marines’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so, like Franklin before him, we have Calhoun denouncing ‘the slavery of impressed seamen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a common theme in the journalism of the time. In Britain itself, defenders of slavery stressed the analogy between this institution and being pressed into the navy. Both practices were justified by exceptional circumstances—namely, the need to maintain the colonies and the navy, respectively. On the other side, the abolitionist Sharp condemned both practices.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, William Wilberforce sought to make distinctions, and was accused of hypocrisy by his opponents:[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the pious pastor was moved by the condition of black slaves, but was indifferent to the no less grievous suffering of the kind of white slaves on whom the British Empire’s military power and glory were based. The argument was far from trivial. Sailors were ‘seized by press gangs from the streets of London and Liverpool’; and at a popular level no institution was more hated than the press gang.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conditions to which men were then subjected can be readily be inferred from Locke’s indirect comparison between the power of ‘the captain of a galley’ and that exercised by ‘a lord over his slave’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The capture of sailors in popular districts had something in common with the capture of blacks in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And it was not only the navy. A contemporary scholar summarizes the condition of those military ‘captives in uniform’ who were soldiers, called upon to defend a rapidly expanding empire in every corner of the world:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk and culture of origin for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they might &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg76&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were apt to die prematurely anyway.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For the rest, the way Locke described ‘the common practice of martial discipline’ is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]he preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This above all calls to mind the ‘absolute power of life and death’ wielded by officers over their subordinates. It is the phrase Locke habitually used to define the essence of slavery. Is it a rhetorical exaggeration? Already in Grotius we find the observation that the condition of the slave is not very different from that of the soldier.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us concentrate on liberal England. The mortality rate of soldiers en route to India was comparable to that affecting black slaves during their deportation from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Moreover, British soldiers were subject to the punishment traditionally reserved for slaves—flogging—and, paradoxically, continued to be even when this form of discipline had been abolished for Indian troops.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Power relations in the army reproduced those existing in society. The figure of the soldier tended to coincide with that of the servant. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe observed: ‘any Man would carry a Musket rather than starve … ’tis Poverty makes Men Soldiers, and drives Crowds into the Armies’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At the end of the century, Townsend reiterated that ‘distress and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg77&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;poverty’ alone could impel ‘the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean, or in the field of battle’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, to put the point this time with Mandeville, ‘[t]he Hardships and Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the Brunt of every Thing’—namely, ‘the working slaving People’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the figure of the officer tended to coincide with that of the master, and the contempt officers/masters had for troops was professed and even ostentatious. Troops of the line (lamented an ordinary soldier) were ‘the lowest class of animals, and only fit to be ruled with the cat o’ nine tails’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—that is, with the whip capable of inflicting the most sadistic punishments, those usually reserved for disobedient slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The penal code, formation of a compulsory workforce, and the process of colonization&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The problem of military recruitment is thus understandable: prisons were ‘rumag’d for Malefactors’; the profession of soldier (observed Defoe) above all devolved on ‘Men taken from the Gallows’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, there were plenty of them. From 1688 to 1820, the number of crimes carrying the death penalty increased from 50 to between 200 and 250, and they were almost always crimes against property. While attempted homicide was regarded as a petty crime until 1803, the theft of a shilling or handkerchief, or the illegal clipping of an ornamental bush, could entail hanging; and one could be consigned to the hangman even at the age of eleven.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, in some cases, even young children ran this risk: in 1833 the death penalty was pronounced on a pickpocket of nine, although the sentence was subsequently commuted.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more significant than the increase in penalties was the criminalization of behaviour that had hitherto been licit. The enclosure and private appropriation of common land underwent significant development; and the peasant or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg78&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;commoner who was late in appreciating the new situation became a thief, a criminal to be visited with all the force of the law. This might seem an arbitrary and brutal way to behave; but that is not what Locke thought. In legitimizing the colonists’ appropriation of land left uncultivated by the Indians, the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; simultaneously adopted a clear position in favour of enclosure in England. ‘[I]n the beginning, all the world was America’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and common land was a kind of vestige of this original, wild state, which work, private appropriation and money had subsequently overcome. It was a process that manifested itself on a large scale across the Atlantic, but which was not unknown in England: ‘even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’, until enclosure and private appropriation intervened positively.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with the despoliation of the Indians and English peasants, Locke also justified terroristic legislation in defence of property: it was ‘lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was only a petty crime in appearance. In reality, the guilty party, if only momentarily, had deprived his victim of his ‘right to liberty’ and had made him a ‘slave’. At this point, no one could exclude the possibility that theft would not be followed by homicide, since it was precisely the power of life and death that defined the relationship of slavery. This was synonymous with a state of war, and hence there was no reason why the thief should not be done to death, whatever the extent of the theft.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What Locke seems to be saying is that at stake is not only the shilling or handkerchief or whatever other rather minor stolen good: private property as such and, over and above it, liberty were in danger. Thus, what legitimized the pickpocket’s killing or execution is the same liberal pathos that had presided over the condemnation of monarchical despotism as the source of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In addition to common land, even birds and wild animals became objects of private appropriation by the landed aristocracy. In this instance, it was not possible to appeal to Locke. In fact, on the basis of his theory, not having been transformed by labour, birds and wild animals should have been regarded as common property. And yet, in accordance with legislation enacted after the Glorious Revolution, while the peasant slid into the condition of thief, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg79&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hunter was transformed into poacher; and here too the terrorism of the penal code was called on to compel respect for the incursion.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the slavery and trading of blacks, the vulgar historicist explanation does not stand up when it comes to the expansion in crimes against property and the increased severity of the penalties provided for them. It is misleading to refer to the spirit of the times. ‘It is very doubtful whether any other country possessed a criminal code with anything like so many capital provisions as there were in this single statute.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruthless character of English legislation was already proverbial on its enactment. While Napoleon exercised his iron rule over France, a reformer like Sir Samuel Romilly felt compelled to offer a bitter observation: ‘there is probably no other country in the world in which so many and so great a variety of human actions are punishable with loss of life as in England’. [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel denounced the ‘draconian’ severity whereby ‘every thief in England [is] hanged’, in an absurd equation of life and property, of the two ‘qualitatively different’ crimes that were homicide and theft. The class origins of such ‘draconian’ severity were even identified: for peasants guilty of illegal hunting ‘the harshest and most disproportionate punishments’ were provided, because ‘those who made those laws and who are now sitting in the courts as magistrates and jurors’ were the aristocracy, the very class that held a monopoly on hunting.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The need to maintain law and order was only one aspect of the problem. Not infrequently, those sentenced to death (or even a long prison term) saw their sentence commuted to deportation to the colonies. Already in force for some time, from 1717 the practice of deportation assumed an official character and significant proportions.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So following the Glorious Revolution, we witness, on the one hand, the enactment of terroristic legislation and, on the other, the burgeoning phenomenon of deportation to remote colonies. Is there a link between the two events? It is difficult to deny that the formation of a large compulsory workforce through drastic harshening of the legal code ultimately made it possible to satisfy ‘the labor needs of the plantations’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, underlying this practice was a specific theory. Locke repeatedly demanded penal slavery for those who made an attempt on another person’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg80&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life or property. Already in the state of nature, ‘[t]he damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things were even clearer in the social state:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of the colonial war as just war (on the part of Europeans) and the theory of penal slavery legitimized and galvanized the deportation, respectively, of the black slaves and white semi-slaves required by colonial development. On the eve of the American Revolution, in Maryland alone there were 20,000 servants of criminal origin. To put the point with Samuel Johnson, they were ‘a race of convicts, and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging’. And that is how an inexhaustible source of forced labour was fed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Indentured servants&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This labour force proved precious for the purposes of populating and exploiting colonies as they were conquered. Initially, the flow of indentured servants went in the direction of America. Subsequently, supplanted and rendered superfluous by the massive introduction of black slaves, and in any event after the achievement of independence by the United States, white semi-slaves were diverted towards Australia, where they made an even more significant contribution to the process of exploiting the new colony. What were the characteristics of this labour relationship? Let us start with the journey of relocation or deportation from Britain. The horrors and mortality rate call to mind the famous ‘middle passage’ to which black slaves were subjected. Sometimes not even half the ‘passengers’ survived the voyage. Among them were to be found children between the ages of one and seven; they rarely escaped death. A witness related &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg81&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;having seen thirty-two children of tender years cast into the ocean in the course of a single voyage. Diseases continued to rage even after the crossing of the Atlantic; as a result, the new arrivals were often subjected to quarantine. There then intervened the moment of the market. In the papers commercial adverts of the following kind could be read: ‘Just arrived at Leedstown, the Ship &#039;&#039;Justitia&#039;&#039; with about one Hundred Healthy Servants. Men, Women and Boys, among which are many Tradesmen … The Sale will Commence on Tuesday, the 2nd of April’ (&#039;&#039;The Virginia Gazette&#039;&#039;, 28 March 1771). Husband and wife were often separated, and might be separated from their children, permanently or for a long period; children under the age of five were obliged to render service until they were twenty-one. Flogged by their masters in the event of indiscipline or disobedience, servants sometimes fled, and then a manhunt was unleashed. The local press provided an accurate physical description of the fugitives who, once taken, were punished and branded with the letter R (standing for ‘rogue’) or subjected to the excision of ears. Thus rendered immediately recognizable, they no longer had any escape.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What, then, was the difference compared with slaves proper? Sometimes white semi-slaves bemoaned their lot: ‘Many blacks are treated better.’ In fact, unlike real slaves, servants could turn to the judiciary and hope to be accepted into the community of the free, and were indeed admitted ‘assuming they survived their period of labor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that death often intervened first. But we are dealing with a social relation that is different from hereditary racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was it a social relation marked by freedom? We have seen Locke on the one hand stress the contractual, and hence free, genesis of the figure of servant, and on the other let slip the admission that he was not really free. But on this point we should also attend to Sieyès’ opinion. Looking across the Atlantic, he argued thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The final class, composed of men who have only their hands, can have need of regulated &#039;&#039;slavery&#039;&#039; in order to escape the &#039;&#039;slavery of need&#039;&#039;. Why restrict natural liberty? I want to sell my time and my services of whatever kind (I do not say my life) for a &#039;&#039;year&#039;&#039;, two &#039;&#039;years&#039;&#039;, etc., as occurs in English America. The law is silent in this connection, and it should only speak to prevent abuses of the institution that endanger liberty. Thus it will be possible to hire oneself or serve [&#039;&#039;s’engager/s’asservir&#039;&#039;] for a maximum of five years.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg82&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Sieyès did not disguise the fact that what characterized the figure of the indentured servant was subservience, ‘servile engagement’ (&#039;&#039;engageance serve&#039;&#039;), or ‘legally regulated slavery’. However, especially after the outbreak of the French Revolution, apologetic concerns seem to have got the upper hand: in the new ideological and political climate, it was no longer possible to declare oneself in favour of an institution whose substantially slave-like character was acknowledged. And so we have Sieyès arguing against those for whom the indentured servant was a person who ‘loses some of his freedom’. No:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is more accurate to say that, at the point when the contract is drawn up, far from being impeded in his liberty, he exercises it in the way most opportune to him. Any convention is an exchange in which each likes what he receives more than what he gives up.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is true that for the duration of the contract the servant could not exercise the liberty ceded by him. But it was a general rule that the liberty of an individual ‘never extends to the point of harming others’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, from the outset Sieyès upheld contractual servitude in the name of ‘natural liberty’, of the right possessed by every individual to draw up the contract that seemed most opportune to him. In other words, the key category of liberal thought (the category of contract), invoked by Grotius to legitimize slavery proper, was applied by Sieyès solely to the labour relation that binds the indentured servant to his master. This was not dissimilar from Locke, the difference being that the French author, prior to the Revolution at least, stressed the fundamentally slave-like character of the relationship. That is why he was concerned to stress the vigilance the law should be called on to exercise: public officials should control the master’s actions in order to prevent the ‘person’ of the servant ‘being harmed through unduly prolonged hire or during the hire’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sieyès seems to propose a kind of code for regulating this white semi-slavery, on the model of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; with which, in theory, the masters of black slaves should comply.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. ‘The extensive Herod-like kidnappings’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg83&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Among the compulsory labour force called on to ensure the development of the colonies were also youngsters of poor condition, deceived with honeyed words, abducted and deported across the Atlantic.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Alternatively, they arrived in America with their parents, who were often compelled to sell them, never seeing them again. The situation of children of popular extraction was not much better in England. Marx denounced ‘the extensive Herod-like kidnappings perpetrated in the early days of the factory system, when children were stolen from the work houses and orphanages, and capital thereby incorporated a mass of unresisting human material’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going beyond the use of orphanages as a source of low-cost and more or less compulsory labour, we can make a general observation here. If, in the proto-liberal theory and practice of the time, the wage-labourer was (as we shall soon see) the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; Burke mentions, or the ‘bipedal machine’ referred to by Sieyès, his children were ultimately &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;, destined to be used at the first opportunity precisely in their capacity as work tools and machines. Locke explicitly declared that poor children, who were to be sent to work from the age of three, must ‘be taken off their [parents’] hands’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over a century later, Bentham’s attitude was not dissimilar. He invited people to look for inspiration to ‘manufactures where children, down to four years old, earn something, and where children a few years older earn a subsistence, and that a comfortable one’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was permissible and beneficial to ‘tak[e] the children out of the hands of their parents as much as possible, and even, if possible, altogether’. There should be no hesitation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[Y]ou may even clap them up in an inspection-house, and then you make of them what you please. You need never grudge the parents &#039;&#039;a peep behind the curtain&#039;&#039; in the master’s lodge … you might keep up a sixteen or eighteen years separation between the male and female part of your young subjects …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The children of the poor were at the complete disposal of society. We are reminded of the fate reserved for slaves across the Atlantic. To end their presence on American soil, suggested Jefferson, one might at a moderate price, and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg84&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps even gratis, acquire newborn blacks, place them ‘under the guardianship of the State’, subject them to work as soon as possible, and thus largely recover the expenses required for their deportation to San Domingo, which should be set in train when convenient. Certainly, ‘[t]he separation of infants from their mothers … would produce some scruples of humanity’, but there was no need to be so fussy.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While he was motivated by economic calculations, rather than worries about racial purity, Bentham would have liked to proceed perhaps even more ruthlessly with the children of the poor in England: ‘An inspection-house, to which a set of children had been consigned from their birth, might afford experiments enough … What say you to a &#039;&#039;foundling-hospital&#039;&#039; upon this principle?’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We shall see that Bentham also envisaged experiments of a eugenic character. But for now we can reach a conclusion by attending to an English economist (Edward G. Wakefield), who in 1834 published a successful book devoted to the contrast between America and England: ‘it is the whole press of England, not I, that calls English children [of popular extraction] slaves’. The majority were compelled to work such long hours that they inadvertently fell asleep, only to be awoken and forced back to work with beatings and torments of every kind. As to foundlings, they were dispensed with rapidly enough: adverts were affixed to the doors of workhouses promoting their sale. In London the price of male and female children put on the market thus was significantly below that of black slaves in America; in rural regions, such commodities were even cheaper.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Bearing down on this mass of wretches was legislation that was certainly not marked by the protection of civil liberties. One thinks of the blank warrants that allowed the police to arrest or search a person at will. Abolished by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, this ‘intolerable tool of oppression’ (to adopt the description of it given by the French liberal Laboulaye in 1866)[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] long continued to survive in England. Smith himself tended if not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg85&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to justify it, in any case to trivialize it. He was astonished that the ‘common people’, rather than fighting for the free circulation and buying and selling of labour power, exhibited all its indignation ‘against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The death penalty was imposed with great facility but also with some discretion. With the passing in 1723 of the Black Act—the ‘blacks’ were alleged deer rustlers—in some cases it was not necessary to resort to a formal process to provide for the death sentence, which consigned to the hangman even those who had in some way aided a thief (or alleged thief) to escape justice.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Without betraying any disquiet, Mandeville recognized that ‘the Lives of Hundreds, if not Thousands, of Necessitous Wretches, that are daily hanged for Trifles’ were being snuffed out;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] execution often became a mass spectacle with pedagogical purposes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British liberal called upon magistrates not to be inhibited either by misplaced ‘compassion’ or by undue doubts and scruples. Certainly, thieves might have committed theft under the spur of necessity: ‘what they can get Honestly is not sufficient to keep them’. Yet ‘the Peace of the Society’ required that the guilty be hanged. Yes, ‘the Evidences perhaps want clearness or are otherwise insufficient’; and there was a risk that an innocent person might be put to death. But however ‘terrible’ that would be, the aim must be achieved that ‘not one Guilty Person [be] suffered to escape with Impunity’. It would be a serious thing if overly scrupulous judges prioritized their ‘Conscience’ over the ‘Advantage to a Nation’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The courts of the property-owner judges were called upon to operate as a kind of committee of public safety.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then conclude that, setting aside the colonies in their entirety (including Ireland), in Britain itself full enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by the law—the ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ liberty that Constant and Berlin, respectively, refer to[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—was the privilege of a small minority. The mass of people was subject to regulation and coercion that extended far beyond the workplace (or the place of punishment that was the prison, but also the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg86&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse and the army). While Locke proposed regulating the consumption of alcohol by the popular classes, Mandeville believed that, at least on Sunday, ‘every Amusement Abroad that might allure or draw them from’ attending church should be ‘prohibited’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the subject of alcohol, Burke argued differently: while it had no nutritional properties, it could alleviate hunger pangs in the poor person; moreover, ‘at all times, and in all countries’, alcohol, together with ‘opium’ and ‘tobacco’, had been turned to for the ‘moral consolations’ men sometimes needed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, even more than the disciplining of workers and vagrants as in Locke and Mandeville, the problem was that of dulling the consciousness and suffering of the starving in general. What remained constant was the tendency to govern the existence of the popular classes even in its smallest details. The reference to opium added a touch of cynicism. Reports by government committees of inquiry would subsequently denounce the catastrophe: in the poorest districts, opium consumption was spreading, and was becoming a means of feeding or a substitute for it. It was sometimes given to infants, who ‘ “shrank up into little old men”, or “wizened like little monkeys” ’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This detailed regulation obviously also included religious indoctrination. In Locke’s view, for poor children to start work from the age of three was a beneficial measure not only economically, but also morally: ‘Another advantage … of bringing poor children … to a working-school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday along with their school-masters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Mandeville demanded that Sunday attendance of church become ‘a Duty’ for the poor and illiterate. Appealing to spontaneous religious feelings was insufficient: ‘It is a Duty incumbent on all Magistrates to take particular Care’ of what happened on Sundays. ‘The Poor more especially and their Children should be made to go to Church on it both in the Fore and Afternoon’. Positive results would not be wanting: ‘Where this Care is taken by the Magistrates as far as it lies in their Power, Ministers of the Gospel may instill into the smallest Capacities’ devotion and the virtue of obedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Controlled in their private life, the popular classes were even more so in the public existence which, amid a host of difficulties, they sought: ‘Between 1793 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg87&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp; 1820, more than 60 acts directed at repression of working-class collective action were passed by Parliament.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More even than trade-union activity in the strict sense—that is, action aimed at raising wages and improving working conditions—the very attempt by servants to escape their isolation and communicate with one another was viewed with dismay. They (thundered Mandeville in alarm) ‘assemble when they please with Impunity’. They even developed relations of mutual solidarity; they sought to aid a colleague dismissed or flogged by his master. Simply by virtue of not confining themselves to the vertical, subaltern relationship with their superiors, but seeking to develop horizontal relations with one another, servants were to be considered culpable of unacceptable subversion: they were ‘daily incroaching upon Masters and Mistresses, and endeavouring to be more upon the Level with them’; they had already raised ‘the low Dignity of their Condition … from the Original Meanness which the publick Welfare requires it should always remain in’. Exceeding every limit, the servant posed as a gentleman; this was the ‘comedy’ of the ‘Gentleman Footman’, a comedy which in fact, in the absence of timely intervention, might turn into a ‘tragedy’ for the whole nation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant in this context was the position taken by Adam Smith. He acknowledged that ‘[w]e have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’ Besides, ‘[t]he masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily … Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’, or ‘to sink the wages of labour even below this rate’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence even were masters and workers to be treated identically in legislative terms, the former would always enjoy an advantageous situation. But they were also favoured by the precarious living conditions of the opposing party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they [the workers] have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg88&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;All this did not prevent Smith from recommending that the government act severely against working-class combinations. Certainly, ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. However, it was ‘impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which … would be consistent with liberty and justice’. But the government must forestall any working-class gathering, even the most casual and seemingly innocuous. For example, the requirement of bureaucratic registration for those who practice a specific profession ended up ‘connect[ing] individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another’. Utterly intolerable was any ‘regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, not only trade-union activity, but even a mutual aid society was to be considered illegal. Smith recognized that he was dealing with ‘desperate men’, who risked dying of starvation. And yet this consideration took second place to the need to avoid meetings, ‘conversations’ or gatherings that tended to be synonymous with a ‘conspiracy against the public’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to criminalize at birth any popular association, the dominant class in England resorted to yet more summary methods, which can be described in Constant’s words: ‘the horrendous expedient of sending spies to incite ignorant minds and suggest rebellion to them, so as then to be able to denounce them’. Results were not wanting: ‘The wretches captivated those who had the misfortune to listen to them and probably also accused those they did not succeed in captivating.’ And justice came crashing down on both.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. A whole with singular characteristics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mandeville call on judges to be summary in condemning to death those guilty or suspected of theft and pilferage, even at the cost of striking down some innocents. The priority was the need to safeguard ‘the peace of the society’ or ‘advantage to a nation’. Blackstone acknowledged that press-ganging men into the navy seemed dubious and detrimental to liberty. It was ‘only defensible for public necessity, to which all private considerations must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg89&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;give way’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Locke repeatedly called on people not to lose sight of ‘the public good’, ‘the good of the nation’, ‘the public weal’, or ‘the preservation of the whole’, ‘the whole commonwealth’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is so passionately invoked here is a Whole demanding the sacrifice, permanent not temporary, of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition was all the more tragic because any prospect of improvement seemed pretty remote. In fact, even to entertain projects tending towards such improvement was synonymous not only with abstract utopianism, but also and above all with dangerous subversion. According to Townsend, the ‘stock of human happiness is … much increased’ by the presence of ‘the poor’, who were compelled to perform the most arduous and painful work. The poor fully deserved their fate, were by definition wastrels and vagrants. But it would be a disaster for society if, by some chance, they were to mend their ways: ‘The fleets and armies of a state would soon be in want of soldiers and of sailors, if sobriety and diligence universally prevailed’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the country’s economy would find itself in difficulties. Mandeville reached the same conclusion: ‘To make the society … happy … it is requisite that great numbers … should be ignorant as well as poor’; ‘the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And let us now read Arthur Young: ‘every one but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and would not produce the ‘wealth of nations’ referred to by Smith. Later, in France, Destutt de Tracy arrived at the same conclusion: ‘In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally poor.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Why was the proposition, in its various forms, that society’s happiness and wealth depended on the hardship and deprivation of the poor, who formed a large majority of the population, not perceived as contradictory? It is Locke who explains the logic of this Whole with special characteristics: slaves ‘cannot … be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was also Algernon Sidney’s opinion: ‘a kingdom or city … is composed of freemen and equals: Servants may be in it, but are not members of it.’ Indeed, ‘no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth’; he is not even a member of the people, because ‘the people’ comprises &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg90&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all the freemen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The poor were the servile caste required by society; they were the subterranean foundation of the social edifice, those whom Nietzsche defined as ‘the blind moles of culture’. With society and civilization, the poor and the moles continued to have a relationship of estrangement.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Wage-labour and the categories of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades after Franklin, in transition from the first to the second great controversy in the liberal party, the governor of South Carolina, James Henry Hammond, likewise applied himself to emphasizing how much quasi-slavery persisted in Britain. He sent an open letter to Thomas Clarkson, the venerable patriarch of English abolitionism, putting his finger on the sore point of the workers’ condition in the country that boasted of having abolished slavery in its colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the world of Slavery? … If you are really humane, philanthropic, and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, reactions in Britain were indignant, insisting on the characteristic feature of the freeman that applied to even the most wretched wage-labourer. However, in defining him, the liberal tradition frequently had recourse to the same categories as were used in classical antiquity and across the Atlantic in relation to the black slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Locke’s view, not genuinely capable of intellectual and moral life was ‘the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living’. Wholly absorbed in ‘still[ing] the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children’, such people had no possibility of thinking about other things:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg91&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Locke had no hesitation in asserting that ‘there is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts’. To appreciate this, it was enough to contrast ‘Westminster-hall’ and the ‘Exchange’ with ‘Alms-Houses’ and ‘Bedlam’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The boundary separating the human world from the animal world was imperceptible and evanescent: ‘if we compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, Mandeville, condemning the spread of education to popular strata, compared the wage-labourer to a ‘horse’: ‘No Creatures submit contentedly to their Equals, and should a Horse know as much as a Man, I should not desire to be his Rider.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a metaphor that reappeared on the occasion of his polemic against the excessive generosity displayed by the rich master to the servant in England: ‘A Man may have Five and Twenty Horses in his Stables without being guilty of Folly, if it suits with the rest of his Circumstances, but if he keeps but one, and overfeeds it to shew his Wealth, he is a Fool for his Pains.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only English liberalism that argued in these terms. In fact, the process of de-humanization possibly reached its peak in Sieyès:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unfortunates devoted to arduous work, producers of other people’s enjoyments, who receive scarcely enough to sustain their suffering, needy bodies; this enormous crowd of bipedal tools, without liberty, without morality, without intellectual faculties, equipped solely with hands that earn little and a mind burdened with a thousand worries that serves them only to suffer … are these what you call men? They are deemed civilized [&#039;&#039;policés&#039;&#039;], but have we seen a single one of them who was capable of entering into society?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg92&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On other occasions, the process of de-humanization occurred in a different fashion. Adopting the distinction, peculiar to classical antiquity, between the various instruments of labour, Burke subsumed the wage-labourer under the category of &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Sieyès referred to the ‘majority of men’ defined, above all in private notes predating 1789, as ‘work machines’ (&#039;&#039;machines de travail&#039;&#039;), ‘instruments of labour’ (&#039;&#039;instruments de labeur&#039;&#039;), ‘human instruments of production’ (&#039;&#039;instruments humains de la production&#039;&#039;), or ‘bipedal tools’ (&#039;&#039;instruments bipèdes&#039;&#039;).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traces of this process of de-humanization can even be found in Smith. By dint of the duress and monotony of his work, a wage-labourer ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’, incapable of participating ‘in any rational conversation’ or ‘conceiving any generous … sentiment’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As across the Atlantic with black slaves and slaves in general, so in Europe the dominant class was separated from white servants by a gulf that had ethnic and racial connotations. In Locke’s view, ‘a day-labourer [is] no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural [i.e., an ignorant aborigine]’: neither had yet reached the level of ‘rational creatures and Christians’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Sieyès was of the opinion that the ‘human instruments of production’ pertained to a ‘people’ different from (and inferior to) that comprising ‘the heads of production’ or ‘intelligent persons’, ‘respectable folk’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further reason intervened to render the gulf separating the community of the free from servants and slaves unbridgeable. The latter were considered incapable of fully appreciating the humiliations, the frustrations, the sufferings, the pain, as well as all the other feelings characteristic of man’s spiritual existence. We have seen how Mandeville argued in relation to the mass of wretches in Europe. They were forced to suffer hardship and privations and often ended up on the gallows ‘for trifles’, which they made themselves guilty of in an attempt to escape hunger. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To be happy is to be pleas’d, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more content he’ll be with his own … when a Man enjoys &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg93&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself, Laughs and Sings, and in his Gesture and Behaviour shews me all the tokens of Content and Satisfaction, I pronounce him happy …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
On careful examination, the ‘greatest King’ could envy ‘the Peace of Mind’ of ‘the meanest and most unciviliz’d Peasant’ and his ‘Tranquillity of … Soul’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no less emphatic terms, the Virginian theorist we have already encountered, Thomas R. Dew, expressed himself on the subject of slaves: ‘we have no doubts that they form the happiest portion of our society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe, than the negro slave of the United States’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only is it very difficult to define the condition of white servants in Europe as free, but the image of them transmitted by the liberal thought of the time is not much different from the image of the black slave in the southern United States. So was the governor of South Carolina right to mock the abolitionists’ hypocrisy and credulity? That would be a hasty conclusion. In any event, we are obliged to reflect further on the characteristics of the society that was being formed either side of the Atlantic and on the categories best suited to understanding it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn1a|1]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn2a|2]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 437.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn3a|3]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn4a|4]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn5a|5]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 413–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn6a|6]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn7a|7]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn8a|8]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn9a|9]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn10a|10]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn13a|13]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms no Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn14a|14]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn15a|15]] Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, &#039;&#039;Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIX siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn16a|16]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1966, p. ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn17a|17]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wootton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 460.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn21a|21]] See Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 1, ch. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn22a|22]] Tocqueville, diary note of 4 February 1851, quoted in Hugh Brogan, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pt 2, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn23a|23]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn24a|24]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn25a|25]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, p. 71.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn28a|28]] T. H. Marshall, &#039;&#039;Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn30a|30]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 368–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 398; Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn33a|33]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 389.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn34a|34]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 652.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn35a|35]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 138.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn36a|36]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 291.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn37a|37]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 376, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn38a|38]] C. Duncan Rice, ‘The Missionary Context of the British Anti-Slavery Movement’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn39a|39]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 6; E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 88.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn40a|40]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn41a|41]] Linda Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, London: Random House, 2002, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn42a|42]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn43a|43]] See Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, ch. v, §28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn44a|44]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, pp. 314–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn45a|45]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn46a|46]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn47a|47]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, p. 119.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn48a|48]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn49a|49]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn50a|50]] E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 22–3; Anthony Arblaster, &#039;&#039;The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 172; Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn51a|51]] Ronald W. Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, London: Blandford Press, 1963, p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn52a|52]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 140.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn56a|56]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn57a|57]] Thus the legal historian Leon Radzinowicz, quoted in ibid., p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn58a|58]] Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn59a|59]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn60a|60]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn61a|61]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, p. 12; cf. Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn62a|62]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn64a|64]] Marcus W. Jernegan, &#039;&#039;Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America&#039;&#039;, Westport (CI): Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 77–9, and p. 48 (for the quotation from Dr Johnson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., pp. 50–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn66a|66]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn67a|67]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., pp. 89, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn70a|70]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 527 n. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn72a|72]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn73a|73]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 64–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn75a|75]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1450, 1485–7 (letters to Albert Gallatin, 26 December 1820, and Jared Sparks, 4 February 1824).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn76a|76]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn77a|77]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 347–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn78a|78]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 541–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn79a|79]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn80a|80]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn81a|81]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 273.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn82a|82]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn83a|83]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 272–3, 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn84a|84]] Benajmin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 309–28; Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Four Essays on Liberty&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118–72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn85a|85]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn86a|86]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 7, pp. 413–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn87a|87]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 522 and n. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn88a|88]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn89a|89]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 307–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn90a|90]] Karl Polanyi, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 3, p. 121 n. 333.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn91a|91]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn92a|92]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, pp. 83–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn95a|95]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 28 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn96a|96]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn97a|97]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3, 196–7, 205, 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn98a|98]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn99a|99]] Quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 765.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn100a|100]] Young, quoted in R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn101a|101]] Destutt de Tracy, quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 802.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn102a|102]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn103a|103]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 89, 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn104a|104]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105a|105]] Clarkson, quote in Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, pp. 233–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106a|106]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;An Essay Concerning Human Understanding&#039;&#039;, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 707, 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., p. 666.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108a|108]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110a|110]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111a|111]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112a|112]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113a|113]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 782.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114a|114]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Conduct of the Understanding&#039;&#039;, Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839, pp. 10, 12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115a|115]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 89, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 311–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117a|117]] Dew, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 318.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FOUR ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page94&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg95&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The elusive liberalism of de Tocqueville’s America&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How should we define the political regime which, following the Dutch prologue and starting from the liberal revolutions, was established first in Britain and then in the United States? As regards the latter, Washington was in no doubt. We have seen him immediately after the achievement of independence celebrating the ‘wise and liberal government’ his country had given itself. Some years later, on the eve of the ratification of the federal Constitution, which consecrated a strong executive power, the general-president coined a kind of advertising slogan, declaring himself in favour of a ‘liberal &amp;amp;amp; energetic’ government.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet if by liberalism is meant every individual’s equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by law—‘modern liberty’ or ‘negative liberty’—it is not difficult to perceive the rather problematic character of employing such a category. Even if we discount the problem of slavery, we know the condition of semi-slavery to which notionally free blacks were subjected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can ignore the population of colour in its entirety and still not thereby arrive at a different result. Those in the United States who were untainted by any crime, but interned in workhouses that were (as de Tocqueville himself acknowledged) an integral part of the ‘prison system’, did not exactly enjoy civil equality or modern liberty. And that is not all: such was the condition of the poor that, even in their capacity as witnesses, they were locked up in prison until the legal proceedings were over. And thus, ‘in the same country that the plaintiff is put in prison, the thief remains at liberty if he can pay a bail bond’. Of ‘three thousand examples’ which might be given, there was that of two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg96&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;young Irishmen ‘detained for a whole year while waiting for the judges to deign to hear their deposition’. We can now come to de Tocqueville’s unanticipated conclusion: we are dealing with laws consolidated by ‘customs’ and which yet can seem ‘monstrous’; they ‘have provided everything for the convenience of the wealthy and virtually nothing for the protection of the poor’, of whose liberty ‘they dispose cheaply’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But let us now pass over both populations of colonial origin and the poorest strata of the white community, who were denied not only political rights, but also ‘modern liberty’. Let us focus exclusively on the dominant class—i.e. on white, male property-owners. Did full civil and political equality obtain in this milieu? There are reasons to doubt it. One thinks of the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision on the basis of which, in calculating the number of seats due to the southern states, partial account was also taken of the number of slaves. Far from being a negligible detail, this clause played a significant role in the history of the United States: ‘four southern voters’ ended up exercising ‘more political power than ten northern voters’. Thus is explained the ‘Virginia dynasty’ that long succeeded in holding the country’s presidency.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was why Jefferson was branded the ‘black president’ by his opponents:[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he arrived in power thanks to the inclusion in the electoral result of blacks who remained his slaves. On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln proclaimed polemically: ‘It is a truth that cannot be denied, that in all the free States no white man is the equal of the white man of the slave States.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a thesis repeated in 1864 by a French liberal (Édouard Laboulaye). With the ‘three-fifths’ clause, it was as if the US Constitution was addressed to ‘the folks of the South’:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because you have slaves, you will be allowed to elect a representative with ten thousand votes, while the Yankees [of the North], who live off their own labour, will require thirty thousand votes. The conclusion for the folks of the South is that they constitute a particular, superior race, that they are great lords. The aristocratic spirit has been developed and strengthened by the Constitution.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg97&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Accused of breaching the principle of political equality within the dominant elite itself, the southern planters replied by declaring that, in actual fact, the principle of civil equality was infringed to their detriment. They regarded themselves as suffering negative discrimination, in as much as they were deprived of the freedom to transfer their human cattle to any part of the Union. They considered it inadmissible that owners of the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; should be treated worse than the owners of any other movable goods. As Jefferson Davis, president of the secessionist Confederacy, declared at the moment of abandoning the Union, the North was wrong to hamper in any way ‘property in slaves’, to act ‘to the prejudice, detriment or discouragement of the owners of that species of property’, which was ‘recognized in the Constitution’ and which, on that basis, should enjoy complete equality of treatment with other types of property.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This exchange of accusations played a far from subsidiary role in the conflict that issued in the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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===== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Absolute power and the community obligations of the slave-owners&#039;&#039;&#039; =====&lt;br /&gt;
From Constant onwards, modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property. But slave-owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations. There can be no doubt that the Glorious Revolution and then the American Revolution consecrated the self-government of a civil society composed of, and hegemonized by, slave-owners, who were more determined than ever not to tolerate interference by central political power and the Church. But it would be mistaken to equate the self-government of civil society, now freed from these fetters, with the free movement of the individual members composing it. Certainly, they could reduce the slaves they legitimately owned to chattels. In the New England of 1732, a master put up for sale a nineteen-year-old female slave along with her son of six months: they could be acquired (the advert announced) ‘together or separately’. There were no obstacles to bringing to market even adulterous offspring; a New Jersey master did this with the offspring of his relations with three black women whom he owned. Not by chance, slaves were frequently given names usually reserved for dogs and horses.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg98&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There can be no doubt that the slave-master wielded absolute power over his legitimate ‘property’, but not to the extent of being able freely to challenge the process of reification and commodification that had occurred. In this case, the community requirement prevailed of keeping the barrier between the race of masters and the race of servants clear and fixed. Let us attend to de Tocqueville: blacks had been ‘forbidden … under severe penalties, to be taught to read or write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The prohibition aimed to exclude the race of servants from any form of education, which was regarded as a serious source of danger not only because it was liable to fuel unacceptable hopes and claims, but also because it risked facilitating the communication of ideas and sentiments between blacks that was to be frustrated by any means. And yet, in the case of violation of such rules, to be struck in the first instance were white property-owners, who thus saw their negative liberty seriously restricted. The bans affecting slaves did not leave their masters unaffected. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, it became a crime in Georgia even to provide a slave with paper and writing materials.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant was the legislation that banned interracial sexual relations and marriages. Later, in 1896, when upholding the constitutional legitimacy of provisions for racial segregation as a whole, the US Supreme Court conceded that the ban on ‘the intermarriage of the two races’ might, ‘in a technical sense’, breach freedom of contract, but extricated itself from an awkward situation by adding that the right of any individual state to legislate in this area was ‘universally recognized’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, opposition was not lacking. The provision made in Virginia at the start of the eighteenth century, according to which not only those directly responsible for the sexual or marital relation were to be punished, was significant: ‘extremely severe penalties’ were prescribed for the priest guilty of having consecrated the interracial family bond.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And hence, along with ‘freedom of contract’, religious freedom itself was in some sense affected.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The absolute power exercised over black slaves ended up having negative and even dramatic consequences for whites. Take Pennsylvania in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The free black caught violating the ban on miscegenation (as it later came to be called)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] risked being sold as a slave. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg99&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved serious consequences for the white woman, who had to suffer forced separation from her partner and the terrible punishment inflicted on him. Let us now see what happened in colonial Virginia immediately after the Glorious Revolution. On the basis of a law of 1691, a free white woman who had had a child by a black man or mulatto could be sentenced to five years of servitude and, above all, be forced to surrender the child to the parish, which then sold him or her as a servant for a term of thirty years.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But there is more. Well-nigh insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of recognition of the offspring of a relationship between an owner and one of his slaves. The father faced a tragic alternative: either to suffer exile from Virginia with his de facto family; or to agree to the child being a slave together with the mother.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More summary was New York’s legislation, which automatically converted all children born of a slave mother into slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus find ourselves in the presence of a society that in fact exercised such severe duress over its privileged members, partly legal and partly social, as to choke even the most natural feelings. As has justly been noted, in enslaving ‘their children and their children’s children’, white people were in fact ‘enslaving themselves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Further to clarify the entanglement between the individual property-owner’s absolute power over his human livestock and his subservience to the ‘master race’ of which he was a member, we can offer a final consideration. We have already noted the law in force in Virginia whereby it was meaningless to define and treat the killing of a slave by his owner as a ‘felony’. Yet in not a few states, on the basis of legislation that survived even after the Second World War (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|§5]]), a white man who had sexual relations with a black woman was guilty of a ‘felony’. Thus, it was permissible for an owner to flog and beat his female slave to the point of killing her—property right was sacred; but so strong was the control exercised by the class of property-owners and the community of the free over their individual members that only by exposing himself to risks of various kinds could he have sexual relations with her. Other than by legal provisions, the ban on miscegenation was enforced by the intervention in the 1850s here and there of vigilante gangs, engaged in spying on, intimidating and attacking whites tempted by the fascination of their female slaves and women of colour in general.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg100&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While, in one respect, they were a form of property and a chattel completely at the disposal of their legitimate master, in another slaves represented the enemy within, against whom it was necessary to be constantly on guard. Certainly, to avert the threat recourse could be had to terror, ruthlessly and even sadistically striking at guilty individuals and transforming execution into a kind of terrifying educative spectacle for all the rest: the slaves in a particular area were obliged to witness the torment of two of their fellows, guilty of murder and condemned to be burnt alive.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But that was not sufficient. Once again, preservation of the institution of slavery required heavy sacrifices even on the part of the dominant class. In 1741, in New York, mysterious fires fanned fears of a slave revolt: condemned to death and burnt alive were two blacks whose lives the master had in vain sought to save, testifying that at the time of the fire they were at home. Some years later, in the environs of the same city, a black, having confessed to setting fire to a barn, suffered the same torment. There was only one difference: the crowd of white spectators contrived to ensure that the flames were not extinguished too quickly, so that the spectacle and sufferings of the rebel black lasted as long as possible; his cries were heard three miles away. In any case, the master heard them very clearly: he sobbed loudly, because his slave was dear to him. But he was powerless, and the most he could do was to see to it that the torture was not prolonged any further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Faced with the security requirements of the community they belonged to, individual slave-owners could not demand free disposal over their property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given the circumstances, these security requirements were a permanent given. We can make a general observation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light; they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners (sometimes the law required publication of the code in the newspaper and that clergymen read it to their congregations). It was the white man who was &#039;&#039;required&#039;&#039; to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg101&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Specific penalties were provided for slave-owners who failed to inflict the punishments prescribed by law. According to a law in force in South Carolina, on her fourth attempt at flight a female slave was to be ‘severely whipped … branded on the left cheek with the letter R, and [have] her left ear cut off’. Until 1722, it was the slave-owners themselves who, directly or indirectly, had to provide for the execution of these operations.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In crisis situations the duty of vigilance made itself strongly felt. We have seen a ‘military service’ of whites patrolling day and night in Richmond in 1831. In such cases, observed Gustave de Beaumont during his journey in de Tocqueville’s company, ‘society arms itself with all its rigours’ and mobilizes ‘all social forces’, seeking in every possible way to encourage ‘informing’ and control; in South Carolina, along with the fugitive slave the death penalty awaited ‘any person who has helped him in his escape’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significant too were the results of the passage of laws on fugitive slaves in 1850. Subject to punishment was not only the citizen who sought to hide or help the black pursued or sought by his legitimate owners, but also those who did not collaborate in his capture. This was a legal provision which (as its critics put it) sought to compel ‘every freeborn American to become a manhunter’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as slave-owners, slave society ended up affecting the white community as a whole. Precisely because, in addition to being chattels, black slaves were also the enemy within, abolitionists were immediately suspected of treason, thus becoming the target of a series of more or less harsh repressive measures depending on the gravity of the impending danger. Severe restrictions were placed on the press: in 1800 the slave revolt in Virginia was often ignored by southern newspapers; there was the danger of spreading the contagion of subversion further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1836 the president of the United States (Andrew Jackson) permitted the postmaster general to block the circulation of all publications critical of the institution of slavery. Rounding off the gag placed on abolitionists, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution banning the examination of anti-slavery petitions.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Repression could take much more drastic forms. In 1805, denouncing writings liable to have an incendiary impact on slaves, South Carolina passed laws that provided for executing as traitors those who were in some way stained with the guilt of having stirred up a slave revolt or supported it. Georgia &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg102&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;proceeded similarly.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bound up with terror from above was terror from below. While it took less ruthless forms in the North (it aimed at preventing meetings and destroying the means of propaganda or the property of ‘agitators’), in the South violence against abolitionists took the form of a pogrom that did not hesitate to torture and physically eliminate traitors and their supporters, with complete impunity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The situation in the South in the years preceding the Civil War was described as follows by Joel R. Poinsett, an important political figure in the Union, in a letter written by him at the end of 1850:&lt;br /&gt;
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We are both [i.e., Poinsett and his correspondent] heartily sick of this atmosphere redolent of insane violence … There is a strong party averse to violent men and violent measures, but they are frightened into submission—afraid even to exchange opinions with others who think like them, lest they should be betrayed.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the contemporary historian who cites this testimony concludes that, through recourse to lynching, violence and threats of every kind, the South succeeded in silencing not only any opposition, but also any mild dissent. In addition to abolitionists, those who wanted to distance themselves from this pitiless witch-hunt felt threatened, and were threatened. They were impelled by terror into ‘holding one’s tongue, killing one’s doubts, burying one’s reservations’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is no doubt about it: the terroristic power wielded by slave-owners over their blacks also ended up affecting, on a lasting basis, members and fractions of the dominant race and class.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Three legislations, three castes, one ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So how are we to define the political regime of the society we are examining? Are we dealing with a liberal society? The problem posed in connection with a figure like Calhoun is now presented in more general terms. At least until the Civil War, there were three different sets of legislation in the United States. In relation to slaves, things are immediately clear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass calculated that there were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg103&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;seventy-two crimes in Virginia which, when committed by a slave, carried the death penalty, whereas only two of them involved the same penalty for a whiteman.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But special laws also affected men of colour who were notionally free—and not only because, in different ways depending on diverse local realities and in different historical periods, they were excluded from certain professions, from the right to own land, from the possibility of testifying in courts against whites or forming part of the judicial panel. There was a still more revealing circumstance: even ignoring slaves, the same crime continued to have very different consequences depending on the skin colour of the person responsible for it. Obviously, only free people of colour ran the risk of being reduced to slavery. This was the fate that befell those in Pennsylvania, who, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, were caught breaking the ban on miscegenation, or if they were not able to pay the fine issued to them for having traded with other blacks without permission.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the situation in the North changed with the abolition of slavery that followed the Revolution. But the complete control whites had over the magistracy remained in place. This was something highlighted by de Tocqueville, and its consequences were spelt out in the North as follows by a particularly courageous judge from Ohio: ‘The white man may now plunder the Negro, he may abuse his person; he may take his life: He may do this in open daylight … and he must be acquitted, unless [there be] some white man present [prepared to give evidence against the culprit]’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clear and insuperable was the barrier separating whites, the dominant race, from people of colour as such. In the words of Beaumont, ‘[w]hether slaves or freemen, negroes everywhere form a different people from the whites.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an observation confirmed by de Tocqueville: ‘In Philadelphia blacks are not buried in the same cemetery as whites’. Segregation also obtained in prisons: ‘blacks were also separated from whites for meals’. And again: ‘in Maryland [a slaveholding state] free blacks pay taxes for schools just like whites, but cannot send their children to them’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And (we might add) in mid-nineteenth-century Virginia, the law denied notionally free blacks ‘the right to learn how to read and write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg104&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are in the presence of a racial state, articulated (according to the explicit declaration of its theorists and apologists in the South), into ‘three &#039;&#039;castes—&#039;&#039; … free whites, free colored, and slave colored population’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the caste model was also evoked by some observers of the North. Referring to their own society, where slavery had been abolished, they spoke of a division into ‘Brahmins and pariahs’, as demonstrated by the racial segregation that operated at every level, from public transport to theatres and from churches to cemeteries, and which allowed blacks to enter hotels, restaurants and meeting-places for the most part solely in the capacity of servants. Yes, acknowledged another observer, who proposed to banish blacks from Indiana in order to spare them a yet worse fate, they were treated like ‘a race legally and socially excommunicated, as the Helots of Sparta—as the Pariahs of India—disfranchised outcasts; a separate and degraded caste’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When we identify three castes in the post-bellum United States, we are obviously ignoring the Indians, who were regarded until the Dawes Act of 1887 as ‘domestic dependent nations’—that is, as a set of nations with their own particular identity, under the protectorate of Washington, and whose members did not form part of American society in the strict sense.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It should be added that the discourse of the three castes is not without a dubious ideological component: it tends to neglect the differences that remained within the white community, which could impact heavily not only on the material living conditions, but also on the civil rights, of the poorest strata. The Articles of the Confederacy, designed to regulate the new state that was being formed, explicitly excluded ‘paupers’ and ‘vagrants’ from the group of ‘free inhabitants’ (Article IV). But it is true that, when we examine the society as a whole, the main demarcations were colour lines and, within the black community, the line separating slaves proper from the rest—from ‘free’ blacks, who in fact lived the nightmare of being deported or enslaved in their turn. On the other side, the absolute centrality of the colour line galvanized (as the southern ideologue of the three castes pointed out) the ‘spirit of equality’ within the white community, with a fairly rapid disappearance of the most odious forms of discrimination.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg105&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In this sense we can speak of ‘castes’, as do distinguished historians of the institution of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But registration of the naturalistic and racial rigidity of the relations between social classes tells us little about the nature of the political regime in the society under examination. On the basis of the history of South Africa, reference has sometimes been made to ‘segregationist liberalism’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in order to explain the tangle of freedom (for whites) and oppression (of colonial populations). It is a category that completely excludes from the focus of attention the practices of expropriation, deportation and annihilation implemented against the native populations of southern Africa or the Amerindians. Even as regards blacks and other ethnic groups, such a category seems to refer only to the period subsequent to the abolition of slavery. Like the adjective, the substantive is misleading. On the one hand, the white community soon shook off censitary discrimination, long recommended and in fact regarded as insuperable by exponents of classical liberalism. On the other, the property-owner-citizens were subject to a series of obligations that it would be very difficult to integrate into the modern liberty theorized by Constant.&lt;br /&gt;
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On other occasions, rather than to ‘segregationist liberalism’, reference has been made to ‘aristocratic republicanism’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] explicitly in connection with the pre–Civil War United States. Such a definition completely obscures the character both of the dominant aristocracy and of the plebs oppressed by it, and the entanglement between social classes and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the substantive makes it possible to take a step forward: we are not dealing with property-owners interested solely in the enjoyment of their private sphere; they also led a rich political life. While far from being generally enjoyed, ‘modern liberty’ was scarcely the sole objective of the protagonists of the Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States. For Hamilton, the ‘distinction between freedom and slavery’ was clear: in the first case, ‘a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent’; in the second, ‘he is governed by the will of another’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, in Franklin’s words, submitting to taxation from a legislative body where one is not represented signifies being considered and treated as ‘a conquer’d People’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be excluded from political decisions, to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg106&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be subject to laws imposed from without, however reasonable and liberal, was synonymous with political slavery or, at any rate, represented the onset of it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, Calhoun, the author with whom we began when we posed the crucial question—what is liberalism?—professed democracy even more than liberalism; he was an eminent member of the Democratic Party of the United States. The category of liberalism should unify the two Anglo-Saxon countries. But Calhoun defined the Constitution of his country as ‘democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy’, and hence in contradistinction to Great Britain, where ‘title[s] of nobility’ and other ‘artificial distinctions’ that had been abolished in the North American republic survived.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, it was not an unqualified democracy, as might appear from the title of de Tocqueville’s book, which (as we shall see), in expressing itself thus, thought it possible to ignore the condition of Indians and blacks. Still less was it the ‘frontier democracy’ to which an eminent US historian, inclined to hagiography, pays homage.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Apart from anything else, the definition suggested by him evokes, in reticent, uncritical fashion, only the gradual expansion of the white colonists to the West, and hence only the relationship between two of the ‘three races’ referred to (as we shall see) by &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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Calhoun was concerned to distinguish the democracy whose theorist he aspired to be from ‘absolute democracy’, guilty of wanting to ride roughshod over the rights of states and slave-owners.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are at the antipodes of the ‘abolitionist democracy’ dear to an eminent US historian and passionate Afro-American activist.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But then how are we to define a democracy which, far from wanting to abolish or even simply repress or hide slavery, celebrated it as a ‘positive good’? Reference has sometimes been made to ‘Hellenic democracy, based on the work of non-European slaves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this definition too is inadequate. It overlooks, or does not accurately describe, the fate reserved for Indians. And it does not take account of another crucial element: absent from ancient Greece was the racial chattel slavery which, in the American case, was conjoined not with direct democracy but representative democracy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg107&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to the modernity of the mode of production was the modernity of the political regime.&lt;br /&gt;
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With reference in particular to the English colonies, another distinguished black theorist and activist speaks interchangeably of ‘white plantocracy’ or ‘planter democracy’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, calling attention to but one narrow social caste, this definition commits the error of concentrating exclusively on the South, which was not in fact separated by any barrier from the North. This applies at an economic level: after land, slaves were the country’s largest property; in 1860 their value was three times greater than the share capital in manufacturing and the railway industry. The cotton grown in the South was far and away the most sizeable US export, and made a decisive contribution to financing the country’s imports and industrial development.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At a political—constitutional level, the obligation to take part in hunting down escaped slaves and returning them obviously also extended to the citizens of the North. Finally, on an ideological level, we must not forget the racial apartheid in force in the free states. If the process of expropriating and deporting Indians is added to this, it is clear that, albeit with obvious differences between its two parts, the racial discrimination practised in the United States played a decisive role at a national level. Finally, although more adequate than those cited above, even the category of ‘white democracy’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] has a limitation—that of not stressing the proud seigneurial self-consciousness of the community of the free and the explosive violence such a community could unleash against the excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
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Following, then, the suggestion of distinguished US historians and sociologists, we should speak of a ‘&#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’—that is, a democracy which applied exclusively to the ‘master race’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The clear line of demarcation between whites, on the one hand, and blacks and Indians, on the other, was conducive to the development of relations of equality within the white community. The members of an aristocracy of class or race tended to celebrate themselves as ‘peers’; the manifest inequality imposed on the excluded was the other aspect of the relationship of parity established between those who enjoyed the power to exclude ‘inferiors’. It must be added that the equality in question was primarily a clear line of demarcation from the excluded. This is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg108&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;what was expressed by the slogan that presided over the American Revolution: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’! For the rest, conflicts and mutual charges of abuses of power and violations of the principle of equality were (as we know) not lacking within the community of freemen and masters.&lt;br /&gt;
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After all, it was Josiah Tucker who had already come close to understanding the true nature of the republicanism for which he reprehended Locke and the rebellious American colonists: ‘all Republicans ancient and modern … suggest no other Schemes but those of pulling down and leveling all Distinctions above them, and of tyrannizing over those miserable Beings, who are unfortunately placed below them.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again: ‘he that is a Tyrant over his Inferiors is, of Course, a Patriot, and a Leveller in respect to his Superiors.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Freemen, servants and slaves&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
However, if they can serve to analyse the society that emerged from the American Revolution, what help is the discourse of the three castes and the category of ‘master-race democracy’ when it comes to understanding the politico-social relations that obtained in England? At least until the abolition of slavery in the colonies, the situations on both sides of the Atlantic had not a few points in common—and not only because slaves and the slave market were far from absent from the metropolis itself. More important is the consideration that the British Empire should be analysed as a whole, without repressing the reality of the colonies. Its economic development and political and military rise owed much to the &#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;—that is, to a monopoly on the slave trade. At the same time, those who derived their wealth from trade and property in human cattle were well represented in the British parliament. Hence we see the caste of white freemen and that of slaves operative here as well. Certainly, viewed from the London observatory, the third caste—notionally free blacks—was completely irrelevant. An initial difference between the two shores of the Atlantic thus emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is another, more significant one, which concerns the bulk of the metropolitan population. Within the American white community itself, there were small sections to which legal equality and even negative liberty were denied. This emerges from the description of de Tocqueville, who comments that it was the legacy of the ‘civil laws’ of England, clearly weighted in favour of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg109&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rich.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States the group of whites denied these privileges was a rather small sector, which fairly rapidly disappeared. The very presence of blacks, whether slaves or semi-slaves, encouraged the spread of a sense of relative equality between members of the higher ‘caste’. The situation of the white community in England was very different. Here exclusion from the enjoyment of legal equality and negative liberty was much more widespread. Let us ignore Ireland, which even after the formation of the United Kingdom in fact continued to be a colony. Let us focus on England proper, starting with Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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He made a sharp distinction between three groups: men ‘by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’, or subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who were the black slaves from Africa; then freemen; and finally, white servants who were blood relations of the freemen. A key paragraph of the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; clarifies this:&lt;br /&gt;
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[W]e find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power, for the master could not have power to kill him at any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Here Locke primarily had in mind the two figures of the black slave and the indentured white servant. As we know, even the second was subject to buying and selling, was in large measure a commodity, exported to America and regularly traded on the market where possible purchasers arrived alerted by adverts in the local press. It goes without saying that the master possessed an extensive right of punishment, even if not as unlimited as that wielded over the black slave. We can understand then the comparison with the servant in the Old Testament, who, although not subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’, experiences a condition that might by contrast be defined as ‘imperfect slavery’. This imperfect slavery was defined by Locke by the term of servitude or drudgery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg110&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Within the British Empire three different legal situations coexisted—the first marked by liberty, the second by servitude, and the third by slavery in the strict sense. Notwithstanding the racial abyss that was now open, and which separated black slave from white servant, in England the latter did not form part of the community of the free in the strict sense. Even if different from that wielded by ‘a lord over his slave’, the power of ‘a master over his servant’, who was subject to the ‘ordinary discipline’ applied by the master within his family, was indisputable.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, although he was concerned to distinguish between slave and servant, Locke sometimes also used the second term to refer to the figure of the slave proper. In the &#039;&#039;First Treatise of Government&#039;&#039;, we can read: ‘those who were rich in the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as purchasing of new, came to have large and numerous families’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As demonstrated by the reference to the property-owners of the West Indies and the property right they exercised over the offspring of ‘servants’, it is clear that the discourse here concerns hereditary slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tripartite division formulated by Locke also appears in Mandeville. In the first place, we have ‘the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa’ to America.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England, on the other hand, ‘Slaves are not allow’d’, but free men can avail themselves of ‘the Children of the Poor’, of ‘willing Hands for all the Drudgery and hard and dirty Labour’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again we encounter the three figures of the freeman, the servant and the slave. It is so difficult to confuse the second with the first that the similarities with the third leap to the eye: ‘the meanest Indigent part of the Nation’ is ‘the working slaving People’, which is eternally destined to perform ‘dirty slavish Work’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, let us turn to Blackstone. In celebrating England as the land of liberty, he stressed that there was no place in it for ‘proper slavery’, ‘strict slavery’, ‘absolute slavery’, wherein the master was endowed with absolute, unlimited power over the life and fate of the slave. This insistent clarification left room for forms of compulsory labour different from that to which blacks in the colonies were subjected. In the great jurist’s writings too an intermediate condition between liberty and slavery ends up emerging, a sort of non-‘absolute’ slavery, slavery not understood in the ‘strict’ sense. Along with slaves, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg111&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’ and ‘labourers’ were servants. We are dealing with ‘different types of servant’, each with its specific characteristics, but all brought together by the fact of being subject to servitude.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Active once again is the legacy of Grotius, for whom &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; was the general category for understanding and defining the character of work. In Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone what is new is the stress on the distinction between two types of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;—that in force in the metropolis and that operative in the colonies. Thus, we pass from Grotius’ bipartite division to a tripartite division.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. England and the three ‘castes’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But now, setting aside major authors, let us take a look at the social reality and ideology that characterized Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Far from the ‘vestiges of slavery’ referred to by Smith, the persistence of servile relations is very clear from the treatment of the poor and the possibility of disposing of their children as a &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039; in workhouses, in the army, in prisons, and in the recruitment of servants sent to settle the colonies. An economist we have already encountered, Wakefield, drew attention to ‘English slavery’ and ‘white slaves’ in 1834.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this time authors of the most varied political persuasion compared slaves across the Atlantic with suffering workers in England: anti-abolitionists who echoed Calhoun-type statements; more or less radical currents that aimed at a more general emancipation of labour; more detached observers who confined themselves to registering the fact, like the economist we have just cited. And the comparison was established not simply by focusing on the spectre of death from starvation that constantly haunted the English worker. Certainly, this is an aspect that cannot be ignored: the number of poor people who, in order to avoid starvation, committed some crime in the hope of being able to survive as deportees or ‘galley slaves’, was not negligible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But considerable attention was also paid to encroachments on a more specifically liberal freedom—namely, ‘modern liberty’. For this to emerge with greater clarity, let us leave behind the cities and industrial centres and move to the countryside to hear the rural labourers’ grievances:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg112&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Speaking generally, since all laws have their exceptions, the privileged classes of our rural districts take infinite pains to be abhorred by their poorest neighbours. They enclose commons. They stop footpaths. They wall in their parks. They set spring-guns and man-traps … They build jails, and fill them. They make new crimes and new punishments for the poor. They interfere with the marriages of the poor, compelling some, and forbidding others to come together. They shut up paupers in workhouses, separating husband and wife, in pounds by day and wards by night. They harness poor men to carts. They superintend alehouses, decry skittles, deprecate beer-shops, meddle with fairs, and otherwise curtail the already narrow amusements of the poor.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Around twenty years later, the popular and radical &#039;&#039;Reynold’s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, condemning the ‘slavery’ that existed in England, listed the flogging of soldiers and sailors, the separation of husbands and wives in workhouses, the obligation of rural servants to request permission from their masters before they could marry, and the systematic sexual abuse to which ‘the wives and daughters of the poorer orders’ were subject.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield reported the &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; deriving from the countryside and considered them incontrovertible. Writing on the immediate eve of the abolition of slavery in British colonies, he believed it possible to distinguish three figures—‘freeman’, ‘slave’ and ‘pauper’—within the empire as a whole.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are put in mind of the discourse of the three castes we have encountered in a theorist from the American South. In fact, in 1864 the &#039;&#039;Saturday Review&#039;&#039; (a periodical that circulated among the middle and upper classes) observed that the poor in England formed ‘a caste apart, a race’, placed in a social condition that underwent no alteration ‘from the cradle to the grave’, and which was divided from the rest of society by a barrier similar to that existing in America between whites and blacks. The respectable English periodical proceeded as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him. The relation in both instances is that of perpetual superior to perpetual inferior, of chief to dependant, and no amount of kindness or goodness is suffered to alter this relation.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg113&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are—it is important not to forget it—in 1864. Many decades had passed since the Glorious Revolution and the birth of liberal England. And yet, if the situation was unstable and tending to change as a result of popular struggles, the reality of a caste society continued to make itself felt. Already abolished thirty years earlier in the English colonies, the caste of slaves was on the point of disappearing in the United States as well. Having been three, the castes were becoming two in number on both sides of the Atlantic: corresponding to the black semi-slaves of the United States were the white servants of England. A more or less rigid barrier continued to separate both from the caste of genuine freemen.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sort of social apartheid seems to correspond to the racial apartheid. In eighteenth-century England we find Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, having his coach preceded by outriders who were charged with clearing the road in order to spare the nobleman the annoyance of meeting with plebeian persons and glances.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even a century later, a kind of segregation existed between the different social classes in English churches.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the already noted &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; drawn up by rural labourers bemoaned the fact that even then the aristocracy resorted to a curtain to shield itself from any ‘vulgar gaze’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When Senior visited Naples, what made him angry was the mixing of ranks: ‘In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets’. Worse, they were so little removed from the upper classes that they lived in the cellars of seigneurial palaces. The result? ‘[Y]ou never are free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degeneration.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The reproduction of the servile caste and the beginnings of eugenics&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
How to ‘continue the race of journeymen and servants’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Smith’s phrase reveals that social mobility was limited or non-existent. The heaviest, worst-paid work was entrusted to a stratum that tended to be reproduced from one generation to the next, and hence to a kind of hereditary servile caste.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg114&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The reproduction of this caste or race was absolutely necessary. According to Mandeville, a decidedly beneficial role was played by war. If, with its periodic massacres, it did not provide a remedy for excess male births, women, sought after by too many aspiring, competitive males, would become a kind of rare commodity accessible only to the rich. Society would then lose its re-supply of ‘the Children of the Poor; the greatest and most extensive of all temporal Blessings’. The hereditary reproduction of the poor destined to perform ‘the Drudgery of hard and dirty Labour’ would prove difficult or impossible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The natural order, of which war was a part, spontaneously generated the race of semi-slaves that society could never do without. However, this supposedly spontaneous process must be encouraged by timely political interventions from above. According to Mandeville, access to education on the part of the ‘Labouring Poor’ was to be avoided at all costs: the ‘Proportion of the Society’ would be compromised by it.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The requisite cheap, docile and obedient labour force would risk disappearing. Other representatives of the liberal tradition invoked much more extensive intervention. For the purposes of generating a potentially perfect race of docile workers and instruments of labour, the concentration-camp universe of the ‘workhouses’ could prove useful. Locking up the children of delinquents and ‘suspects’ therein, one could (observed Bentham) produce an ‘indigenous class’ that would be distinguished for its industriousness and sense of discipline. If early marriage was promoted within this class, treating the offspring as apprentices until they attained their majority, the workhouses and society would dispose of an inexhaustible reserve of manpower of the highest quality. In other words, through the ‘gentlest of all revolutions’—a sexual revolution[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the ‘indigenous class’, propagating itself in hereditary fashion from one generation to the next, would be transformed into a kind of indigenous race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sieyès envisaged a similarly ‘gentle’ revolution, and likewise for the purposes of producing a class or race of labourers as docile as possible. Like Bentham, the French liberal indulged in a eugenicist utopia (or dystopia). He imagined a ‘cross’ (&#039;&#039;croisement&#039;&#039;) between monkeys and ‘blacks’ for creating domesticated beings adapted to servile work: ‘the new race of anthropomorphic monkeys’. In this way, whites, who remained at the top of the social hierarchy as directors of production, could dispose of blacks as auxiliary instruments of production, or slaves proper, who would precisely be the anthropomorphic monkeys:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg115&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However extraordinary, however immoral this idea might seem at first sight, I have reflected on it at length, and can find no other way in a great nation, especially in countries that are very hot or very cold, to reconcile the directors of works with the simple instruments of labour.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While, on the one hand, it was necessary to encourage the production and reproduction of a race of servants or actual slaves, on the other, it was necessary to limit, so far as possible, the unproductive, parasitic surplus population, the mass of poor who, far from creating wealth, devoured it like locusts. To maintain the demographic balance, Malthus called for a policy that postponed marriage and procreation among the popular classes; otherwise, nature would dispose of them with wars, famines and epidemics. In this respect the role of medicine was problematic. In 1764 Franklin wrote to a doctor: ‘Half the Lives you save are not worth saving, as being useless; and almost the other Half ought not to be sav’d, as being mischievous. Does your Conscience never hint to you the Impiety of being in constant Warfare against the Plans of Providence?’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville hoped that one could finally be shot of the ‘prison rabble’ like rats, maybe thanks to a massive fire.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Did the French liberal ‘dream of genocide’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The claim is exaggerated. But there remains his harsh polemic against a ‘bastard charity’ that threatened order: ‘It is the philanthropy of Paris that is killing us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A general conclusion is indicated. The eugenic temptation runs deep in the liberal tradition. Not by chance, the discipline that took this name had its baptism in Great Britain and experienced extraordinary success in the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The elusive liberalism of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, we are compelled to pose a crucial question in connection with Great Britain: Was it a liberal society? Even after the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg116&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;abolition of slavery in the colonies proper, we certainly cannot speak of generalized enjoyment of the quintessential liberal freedom—modern liberty—by the United Kingdom’s inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Irish certainly did not enjoy it, being as they were (acknowledged de Tocqueville) constantly subjected to ‘emergency measures’ and at the mercy of ‘military tribunals’ and a numerous, hateful gendarmerie. In Castlebar, on the basis of the Insurrection Act, ‘any man caught without a passport outdoors after sunset is deported’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the press of the time, the condition of the Irish was often compared with that of blacks across the Atlantic. According to the judgement in 1824 of a rich English merchant, who was a disciple of Smith and an ardent Quaker and abolitionist (James Cropper), the Irish found themselves in a worse situation than black slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, the Irish represented for Britain what the blacks were for the United States; they were ‘two phenomena of the same kind’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Beaumont’s opinion found indirect confirmation from de Tocqueville. From &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; we know of the complete deafness of the judiciary, monopolized by whites, to the legitimate complaints of blacks. A conclusion suggests itself, also indicated by evidence gathered in Maryland: ‘The white population and the black population are in a state of war. They never mix. One of them must give way to the other.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French liberal heard a similar observation in the island subjugated and colonized by Britain: ‘To tell the truth, there is no justice in Ireland. Virtually all the country’s magistrates are in open warfare with the population. So the population does not even have the idea of public justice.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases a cornerstone of the &#039;&#039;Rechtsstaat&#039;&#039;—the judiciary—was at war with a substantial part of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On both sides of the Atlantic, laws that prevented or hampered access to education and outlawed marriage with members of the higher caste served to prolong the oppression of the blacks and the Irish. In Ireland, too, miscegenation was a crime punished with great severity; on the basis of a law of 1725, a priest guilty of secretly celebrating a mixed marriage could even be condemned to death.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Ireland as well, attempts were made to obstruct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg117&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the native population’s access to education. We can conclude on this point by attending to the words of a nineteenth-century liberal Anglo-Irish historian: British legislation aimed to deprive the Irish of their ‘property’ and ‘industry’; it ‘was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1798, three years prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish numbered ‘about four and a half million—a third of the population of the British Isles’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, a higher percentage of people were to be deprived of their negative liberty than in the United States, where, at the time of independence, blacks made up one-fifth of the population. It must be added that, before and after the Glorious Revolution, Britain’s rulers treated the Irish, on the one hand, like Indians, to be deprived of their land and thinned out through more or less drastic measures; and on the other, like blacks whose forced labour might conveniently be used. Hence the oscillation between practices of enslavement and genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain itself the popular classes saw their negative liberty seriously infringed, to the extent that they were assimilated in the culture and press of the time to an inferior ‘caste’ or ‘race’. But now it is appropriate to concentrate on relations within the upper ‘caste’. As we know, the American colonists’ rebellion developed out of protests against the negative discrimination they suffered by dint of their exclusion from the legislative body. At the same time, we must not forget that in eighteenth-century Britain the right to representation was a privilege granted by the Crown, so that even large industrial towns were excluded from the House of Commons, where, by contrast, boroughs which had virtually been abandoned, but which had the right to be ‘represented’ in London mainly by local nobles, were present. Bearing in mind that the House of Lords was the hereditary preserve of the landed aristocracy, a conclusion is dictated: in the case of Britain itself, not even relations within the property-owning classes were stamped by equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality was further compromised by another circumstance: only the second electoral Reform Act, put through by Disraeli in 1867, ‘effected the full political emancipation of Non-conformists’. Until then, significant forms of religious discrimination were in force:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg118&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Persons, whether Protestant or Catholic, who would not take the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England, were still debarred from holding office either under the Crown or in the municipalities; the doors of Parliament were still closed to Roman Catholics, and the doors of the Universities to dissenters of every kind. [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, on closer inspection, the non-conformists (among whom must obviously be included the Jews)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] were deprived not only of political equality, but also of full legal equality. Only in 1871 did all universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, ‘throw open College Fellowships and University posts to persons of every, or of no, religious denomination’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The argument with which Macaulay criticized the exclusion of Jews from political rights in 1831 is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money; and money may make members of Parliament … That a Jew should be privy-councilor to a Christian king would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money-market, and the money-market may govern the world.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In a paradoxical argument against the forms of discrimination of which Jews were victims, Macaulay seems to echo anti-Jewish stereotypes, but in reality the meaning of his discourse is clear: it was absurd and inadmissible to seek to deny political and even civil equality to those who, economically at any rate, were already members of the dominant elite.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, like the class that was the protagonist of the American Revolution and the establishment of a racial state, the English aristocracy in no way restricted itself to aspiring to a merely negative liberty. Some decades before Hamilton (and the American revolutionaries), in England Sidney had already declared that ‘nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another’, or upon a law to which he had not given his consent.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg119&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Locke did not formulate things very differently, when with political ‘slavery’ he contrasted ‘liberty’ understood as ‘be[ing] under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again it was Locke who stressed the equivalence between the English and Latin terms;[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the latter clearly implied the participation of the &#039;&#039;cives&#039;&#039; in public life. The English philosopher argued along similar lines to the American revolutionaries, who not by chance appealed to him: he who wants to decide on his own, excluding me from the process of forming laws, may legitimately be suspected of ‘hav[ing] a design to take away everything else’, not just political ‘liberty’; he ultimately aims to ‘make me a slave’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the position adopted by this or that theorist, the English aristocracy aimed to play, and really did play, a political role of the first order. In addition to the upper house, ‘the lower house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club’ until almost the end of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy exercised political power directly: ‘it was the landed elite, not a separate service elite, that was in control of public affairs’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a control that encompassed the judiciary and local government and which, above all in the countryside, was seamless. Virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the grandees and gentry were still the unchallenged authorities, responsible to no one but themselves.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the South of the United States, the uncontested power of a social class in England did not preclude the imposition of restrictions on its individual members. The titled property-owner was required to respect a series of obligations, sanctioned partly by law and partly by custom. One thinks of primogeniture and the inalienability of property, as well as the endogamy that was fairly widespread within the aristocracy—a practice that once again calls to mind the ban on miscegenation in the United States. The members of the nobility ‘were concerned with voluntary service to the state, both locally and nationally, as civilians and as military men’. While they enjoyed their property and their wealth, patrician officers adopted the pose of ‘chivalric heroes’ required, when the nation was in danger, to exhibit ‘spartan and stoical bravery’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg120&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How should we define the society we have been analysing? Once again, we encounter the problem that has dogged us since the beginning of this book: Can we speak of liberalism in connection with Calhoun’s thinking and the reality of the United States where he lived and worked? And can we speak of it in relation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Given the dominant representation of liberalism today, what sense would it make to define as liberal a society where a considerable part of the population was subject to military dictatorship, where the popular metropolitan classes were at least partially excluded from negative liberty, where this type of liberty was by no means the ideal of the possessing classes, and where the principle of civil and political equality was limited among the latter in various ways?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constitutive element of a liberal regime should be competition between various candidates. But what actually happened?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many elections saw no contest at all. In seven general elections from 1760 to 1800, less than a tenth of the country seats were contested. Of the boroughs, some were purely inert in that their owners sold the seats or appointed the members without question; some seats were as much a property as seats in the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Liberalism, ‘property-owning individualism’ and ‘aristocratic society’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In an attempt to overcome the difficulty encountered in defining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, reference has sometimes been made to ‘individualism’ rather than liberalism; and the history of the intellectual tradition being examined now seems profoundly stamped with a ‘property-owning individualism’ or ‘possessive individualism’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This definition has some legitimacy. In Locke, political power begins to be configured as tyranny, and hence violence, when it attacks private property (belonging to the dominant class); and it is then licit to resist such violence. The citizen, in fact the individual, takes back the power he already possessed in the state of nature, which consists in ‘us[ing] such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and Nature allows him’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of legality is the sphere of respect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg121&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for private property, while violence is defined in the first instance by its violation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On closer examination, however, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ proves completely inadequate. We are confronted with a society and intellectual tradition which, far from being inspired by a superstitious respect for property and property right in general, in fact promoted and legitimized massive expropriations of the Irish and Indians. It is true that a central chapter in the second of Locke’s &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; bears the title ‘Of Property’. But ‘Expropriation’ might have been more fitting, given that it aims to justify white colonists’ appropriation of land from idle Indians incapable of cultivating it. Ignoring the colonies and colonial populations, or populations of colonial origin, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ seems to focus attention exclusively on the white community in the capitalist metropolis, and on the conflict between property-owners and non-property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we confine our attention to the metropolis, we see that the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; justifies and demands the enclosure of common land in England, and hence the massive expropriation of peasants. Like the transatlantic territories occupied by the Indians, common land was not properly fertilized by labour; and hence in both cases there was as yet no legitimate owner. In classic authors of the liberal tradition, we find the assertion and detailed demonstration that the property claimed by natives, and by social groups in the metropolis assimilated to natives, was in reality &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paradoxically, despite its critical intentions, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ ends up crediting the ideological self-consciousness of the classes that arrived in power in England and America advancing the slogan of liberty and property. Marx argued quite differently. &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; denounced the ‘stoical peace of mind [of] the political economist’ and of liberal thinkers in the face of ‘the most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property”‘, and ‘the forcible expropriation of the people’, carried out in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, in order to speed up the enclosure process, brutal methods were sometimes employed without hesitation: entire villages were destroyed and razed to the ground, so as to force the peasants to flee and transform common land into private property and pasture in the service of the textile industry.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining the category of ‘property-owning individualism’, we have hitherto concentrated on the adjective. If we now turn our attention to the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg122&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;noun, we shall find that it too proves rather problematic. The excluded were likened by the dominant class to instruments of labour, bipedal machines. In other words, they saw their quality as human beings and individuals denied. Certainly, the privileged insisted strongly on this quality, which they attributed exclusively to themselves. But is this individualism? Here, too, we find the modern historian aligning himself with the ideological self-consciousness of a social class and political movement he intends to criticize.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than ‘property-owning individualism’, the categories applied to England by some leading liberal authors of the nineteenth century seem more apt. In Constant’s view, ‘England is, at bottom, simply a vast, opulent and vigorous aristocracy.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The judgement formulated by de Tocqueville in the 1830s was no different: ‘Not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly stable than ever, but the nation leaves the government, seemingly without any signs of disapproval, to a very small number of families’, an ‘aristocracy’ primarily based on ‘birth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are dealing with an ‘aristocratic community’ characterized by the domination of ‘a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Besides, it was Disraeli himself who criticized the Whig Party, which long dominated the country that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, for having aimed to establish an aristocracy and oligarchy on the Venetian model.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. ‘Master-race democracy’ between the United States and England&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A question remains unanswered: Albeit intrinsically aristocratic, was England nevertheless a liberal society? Constant was in no doubt: it was the country where ‘social differences are most respected’ (wholly to the advantage of the aristocracy), but where, at the same time, ‘the rights of each man are most guaranteed’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also de Tocqueville’s opinion, but only after 1848, once anxiety about the socialist and Bonapartist drift of France had eclipsed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg123&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;any other consideration. ‘[T]he aristocratic constitution of English society’ was incontestable, and yet it was still the ‘wealthiest and freest country’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to the fall of the July Monarchy, by contrast, de Tocqueville had his doubts and reservations. It was necessary to distinguish between ‘two different forms of liberty’. One should not confuse ‘the democratic and, dare I say it, correct conception of liberty’ with the ‘aristocratic conception of liberty’, understood not as ‘common right’ but as ‘privilege’. The latter prevailed in England, as in ‘aristocratic societies’ in general, with the result that there was no place for ‘general liberty’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; referred and subscribed to the observation of a US citizen who had journeyed extensively in Europe: ‘The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprises us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not that the pathos of liberty was absent among those who adopted the stance of absolute masters. On the contrary: ‘It can happen that the love of liberty is all the more alive among some the less one encounters guarantees of liberty for all. The rarer it is, the exception in such cases is all the more precious.’ This aristocratic conception of liberty produces, among those who have been thus educated, an exalted sense of their individual value and a passionate taste for independence.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the value judgement, which is the converse, we are put in mind of Burke’s well-known observation: freedom appears even ‘more noble and more liberal’ to slave-masters. Should we equate England with slaveholding Virginia? In fact, points in common were not wanting, as emerges from a reading of de Tocqueville. He observed that in the United States whites refused to recognize ‘the common features of humanity’ in blacks.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But in England, too, inequalities were so marked and insuperable that ‘each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race’; ‘general ideas’ were lacking, starting precisely with the idea of humanity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, de Tocqueville was concerned to distinguish American democracy from the aristocracy predominant in England. However, on several occasions his analysis ended up drawing attention to the similarities between the two societies. What took the form of class relations on one side of the Atlantic presented itself as race relations on the other. In the case of England, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg124&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we can speak of liberal society in the same way that Burke spoke of liberal society in connection with the Virginia and Poland of his time. An essential point remains: often excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights and negative liberty in England itself, the popular classes, by de Tocqueville’s indirect but all the more significant admission, continued to be separated from the upper class or caste by a gulf that calls to mind the one obtaining in a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, it can be said that for some time even the society which emerged in England from the Glorious Revolution was configured as a sort of ‘master-race democracy’, on condition that this category is not understood in a purely ethnic sense. On this side of the Atlantic, too, an insurmountable barrier separated the community of the free and masters from the mass of servants, not fortuitously compared by Locke to ‘natives’. And far from being satisfied with negative liberty, the dominant aristocracy cultivated the ideal of active participation in political life, cultivating ‘republican’ ideals. Several influential contemporary interpreters base their arguments on this, when referring to a ‘neo-Roman’ vision or ‘Machiavellian moment’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we face the danger of inadvertent transfiguration: these two categories highlight the pathos of free, egalitarian participation in public life, but end up passing in silence over the macroscopic exclusion clauses presupposed by such pathos. The ideal of a rich public life, of ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Machiavellian’ character, is indeed present in an author like Fletcher, who on the one hand declared himself ‘republican in principle’, while on the other he advocated slavery for vagrants. Locke can be assimilated to such a milieu. He declared in favour of black slavery in the colonies and ‘drudgery’ for wage-labourers in the metropolis. At the same time, with his focus on the aristocracy he developed a pathos of the Commonwealth and the &#039;&#039;civitas&#039;&#039;, which echoes the republican models of antiquity. This, at least, was the opinion of Josiah Tucker, who identified and denounced Locke as a ‘republican Whig’ and supporter of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But perhaps the author who in England best expressed the ideal of ‘master-race democracy’ was Sidney. His insistence on the equality of free men was very marked: ‘the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others do the like’. Definitive is his condemnation of political slavery, inherent not only in absolute monarchy, but also in any political regime that claimed to subject the freeman to laws decided without his consent. But this pathos of liberty implied the demand for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg125&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the master’s right to be ‘judge’ of his own servant without outside interference.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One should not lose sight of the fact that ‘in many places (even by the law of God) the master hath a power of life and death over his servant’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the base and effeminate Asiaticks and Africans’, incapable of understanding the value of ‘liberty’, were rightly regarded by Aristotle as &#039;&#039;‘slaves by nature’&#039;&#039; and ‘little different from beasts’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance—together with Locke, Fletcher and Burgh—Sidney was indicated by Jefferson as a leading authority for understanding ‘the general principles of liberty’ that inspired the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker also conjoined Locke and Sidney, but this time critically. He further pointed out that Sidney was an admirer of ‘Polish liberty’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and of a country where serfdom in its harshest form, to which peasants were subjected, was intertwined with the rich political life of the aristocracy that dominated the Diet), and paid homage to ‘republican liberty’ (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Also expressing himself in flattering terms about Poland, as well as the ‘southern colonies’ of America, was Burke, who not by chance became the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South. Admiration for a regime of republican liberty founded on the slavery or servitude of a considerable proportion of the population, for a ‘master-race democracy’, was well represented in English liberalism. The authors expressing such positions could in their turn count on widespread sympathy across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn1a|1]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonopartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn2a|2]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn3a|3]] Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 301.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn4a|4]] Garry Wills, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn5a|5]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 2, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn6a|6]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn7a|7]] Jefferson Davis, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 399–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn8a|8]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 10–11, 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn9a|9]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn10a|10]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn11a|11]] Plessy versus Ferguson, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Isssues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn12a|12]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 51, 234–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn13a|13]] The term was coined in late 1863: cf. Forrest G. Wood, &#039;&#039;Black Scare&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 53ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn14a|14]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn16a|16]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn17a|17]] Joel Williamson, &#039;&#039;New People&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn19a|19]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., pp. 19–22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn21a|21]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., p. 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn23a|23]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie, ou L’esclavage aux États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gosselin, 1840, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn24a|24]] Robert William Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Consent or Contract&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn25a|25]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn26a|26]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn27a|27]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn28a|28]] David Grimsted, &#039;&#039;American Mobbing, 1828–1861&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn31a|31]] Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July’, in Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., &#039;&#039;Masterpieces of Negro Eloquence, 1818–1913&#039;&#039;, Mineola (NY): Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn32a|32]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn34a|34]] Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn35a|35]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn36a|36]] Brenda Stevenson, &#039;&#039;Life in Black and White&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 275; David B. Davis, ‘White Wives and Slave Mothers’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 20 February 1997, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn37a|37]] Dew quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn38a|38]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 97, 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn39a|39]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joëlle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991, pp. 74–5, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn40a|40]] Dew, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 320.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn41a|41]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 6, 10; Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 62, 205, 425.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn42a|42]] Hosea Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, trans. Alda Carrer and Davide Danti, Milan: Jaca Book, 1997, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn43a|43]] Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Contract or Consent&#039;&#039;, p. 413.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn44a|44]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 405.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn46a|46]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn47a|47]] Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn48a|48]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 120, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn49a|49]] William E. B. Du Bois, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction in America&#039;&#039;, ed. David L. Lewis, New York: Athenaeum, 1992, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn50a|50]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn51a|51]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 95 and &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, pp. 394, 397.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn52a|52]] George M. Frederickson, ‘America’s Original Sin’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 25 March 2004, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn53a|53]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn54a|54]] Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism, passim&#039;&#039;; George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;; Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America, passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, p. 22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 326.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn58a|58]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn62a|62]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 119, 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn65a|65]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 411–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn66a|66]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 339, 343.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., p. 344.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn69a|69]] Douglas A. Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn70a|70]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 339.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn71a|71]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, pp. 101–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn72a|72]] John Cannon, &#039;&#039;Aristocratic Century&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn73a|73]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn74a|74]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn75a|75]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn76a|76]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn77a|77]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 258–9, 261–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn79a|79]] Bentham, quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, pp. 78–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn80a|80]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn81a|81]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 803 (letter to John Fothergill, 14 March 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn82a|82]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 173–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 22 November 1836).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn83a|83]] Michelle Perrot, Introduction to ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn85a|85]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 19, §1; ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn86a|86]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn87a|87]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 180, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn88a|88]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 2, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn89a|89]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94–5. De Tocqueville is reporting a conversation between two influential representatives of the English political world, Nassau William Senior and John Revans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn91a|91]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 2, pp. 371–3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 289.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn93a|93]] Thomas Pakenham, &#039;&#039;The Year of Liberty&#039;&#039;, New York: Random House, 1969, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn94a|94]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945, pp. 631, 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn95a|95]] Michael C. N. Salbstein, &#039;&#039;The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain&#039;&#039;, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn96a|96]] Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, p. 681.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn98a|98]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, p. 402.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn99a|99]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., p. 183.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn102a|102]] David Cannadine, &#039;&#039;The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 14, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn103a|103]] Ibid., p. 14&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., pp. 13, 74.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn105a|105]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn106a|106]] C. B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn107a|107]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn108a|108]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 889, 891.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn109a|109]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 327 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 4 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn111a|111]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn112a|112]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 323–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113a|113]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, pp. 155, 150–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 333 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 27 February 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116a|116]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117a|117]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118a|118]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120a|120]] Quentin Skinner, &#039;&#039;Liberty Before Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121a|121]] Tucker, quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 119, 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122a|122]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 548–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123a|123]] Ibid., p. 312.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124a|124]] Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125a|125]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 479.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126a|126]] Tucker, quoted in Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER FIVE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg127&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism either Side of the Atlantic&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto been concerned almost exclusively with England and the United States. The truth is that the liberal party in France betrayed its weakness fairly early on. And yet, several years before the appearance of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, Voltaire likewise proceeded to celebrate the country that embodied the cause of liberalism at the time: ‘Commerce, which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has developed commerce in its turn. By means of it the nation has grown great’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘[t]he English are the only people on earth who have managed to prescribe limits to the power of kings’; they alone were genuinely free.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More generally, given the difficulty they faced in dealing with comprehensive censorship, the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; hoped to escape this kind of cage and hence looked with sympathy across the Channel. Even Helvétius, whom Diderot rebuked for his indulgence towards enlightened despotism, was compelled to make a significant concession: ‘It is said that this century is the century of philosophy … Today, everyone seems occupied with the search for truth. But there is only one country where it can be published with impunity—and that is England.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The island happily &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg128&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rid of absolute monarchy exercised a powerful attraction. In the columns of the &#039;&#039;Encyclopédie&#039;&#039;, Diderot held up England as an example of ‘temperate monarchy’, where ‘the sovereign is repository solely of executive power’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A little less than ten years later, proposing to restrict representative bodies to ‘major property-owners’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he still viewed cross-Channel political institutions with great interest. In Condorcet’s view, too, they had the merit of having realized, albeit to an inadequate extent, the principles of the limitation of royal power, freedom of the press, habeas corpus and judicial independence.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, two years prior to the storming of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses on the political scene, the English model seemed to have triumphed in France as well. Supported by a wide popular consensus, the noble &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; challenged royal absolutism: ‘the anti-absolutism of the parlements’, or ‘aristocratic liberalism’, became the vehicle for widespread ‘liberal demands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Preserve of a nobility which, as a result also of the sale of offices, was open to the bourgeoisie, the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; for a while seemed destined to play godfather to the advent of a constitutional monarchy and to perform a role similar to that of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in England. Not by chance they appealed to Montesquieu, president of the Bordeaux &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; and a great admirer of the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke viewed this sensationally missed opportunity with regret, when he delivered his harsh indictment of a revolution that had degenerated rapidly and wickedly. Had it ended at the stage when the struggle was led by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, the French&lt;br /&gt;
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would have shamed despotism from the earth [and] rendered the cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in every nation … You would have had a free constitution … a liberal order of commons to emulate and recruit that nobility …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg129&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unfortunately, this happy, auspicious moment had been short-lived; and people had started chasing after ‘a pure democracy’ that in fact secreted a tendency to a ‘party tyranny’ and ‘a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Reflections on the Revolution in France&#039;&#039; was published on 1 November 1790, but its basic arguments had already been set out with great clarity in a speech by Burke in the Commons on 9 February of that year. Jacobinism lay in the future. Rather than transforming the British Whig into the prophet of a catastrophe no one was in a position to predict at the time, we should examine the events that had occurred when he levelled his serious charges against the French Revolution. Revealing is the observation that, rather than striving to create a ‘bad constitution’ &#039;&#039;ex nihilo&#039;&#039;, the French should have engaged in further improving the ‘good one’, of which ‘[t]hey were in possession … the day the states met in separate orders’. The ruinous turn occurred when, in the course of the meeting of the Estates-General summoned by the King—at which the ‘good’ Constitution finally emerged or, rather, re-emerged—the tradition whereby the orders sat in separate chambers was abandoned and the transition to voting by head was decided, with the consequent transformation on 9 July of the Estates-General into a constituent National Assembly wherein the former Third Estate now possessed a majority. Thus burst onto the scene the ‘bad constitution’, which ‘melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass’. Everything else flowed from this: the attack on ‘the root of all property’ and ‘confiscat[ion] [of] all the possessions of the church’—the reference is to the night of 4 August 1789 and the abolition of feudal privileges (hunting rights, tithes, and so on)—and the promulgation on 26 August of the ‘mad declaration’ of the Rights of Man, that ‘sort of &#039;&#039;institute&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039; of anarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But everything began on 9 July. The French Revolution proved fatally degenerate even before the capture of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses—in a sense, even before its inception. And in fact Burke was concerned to stress that ‘the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England’ was in fact ‘a revolution, not made, but prevented’: William of Orange ‘was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its antient constitution, and not to level all distinctions’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as, alas, had happened in France. The latter had now gone beyond its fleeting liberal phase, which extended from the agitation of the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; to the summoning of the Estates-General.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg130&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The subsequent liberal tradition is inclined to extend the felicitous phase of the French Revolution somewhat, and identify the turning point in the tumultuous intervention of the popular masses, initially rural and then urban; thus de Tocqueville. But it is interesting to note that he, too, after 1848 at any rate, extolled the period when the movement was directed by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, all of them striving to reverse ‘the old absolute power’ and ‘the old arbitrary system’, and win ‘political liberty’, in a struggle promoted and led not by the ‘low classes’ but by the ‘higher’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, contrary to Burke, who tended to conceive the parliamentary agitation on the model of the so-called Glorious Revolution, de Tocqueville was prepared to stress that in this phase, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, an authentic revolution was underway:&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; presented these principles as novelties. On the contrary, it derived them very industriously from the depths of the antiquity of the monarchy … It is a strange sight to see ideas that had hardly been born thus wrapped in ancient swaddling clothes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was ‘a very great revolution, but one that should rapidly have faded into the immensity of what happened and thus disappeared from the view of history’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only in a subsequent phase ‘was the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; no longer praised’ in the revolutionary movement, but ‘reviled, turning its liberalism against it’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruinous parabola of the French Revolution could be synthesized thus: ‘At the outset it was Montesquieu who was quoted and expounded; at the end people spoke exclusively of Rousseau.’ The turning point was described in terms similar to those we have noted in Burke: the rot set in when people rushed towards ‘pure democracy’ and laid claim to change ‘the very structure of society’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even closer to Burke was Guizot, who pointed to the eruption of the ‘Third Estate’s struggle against the nobility and the clergy’ as the moment when the French Revolution ceased to have ‘liberty’ as its goal and aimed exclusively at ‘power’, paving the way for the subsequent, interminable struggles—‘those of the poor against the rich, of the common people against the bourgeoisie, of the rabble against respectable folk [&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;]’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Parliaments, diets, the liberal aristocracy and serfdom&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg131&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;For Burke, the revolution in France should ultimately have confined itself to liberalizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. This was not an isolated, polemical idea. In stressing the particular attachment to liberty displayed by slave-owners, the discourse of reconciliation with the rebel colonists offered a general consideration:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]hese people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothick ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No distinction is made here between slavery in the strict sense and the serfdom prevalent, in its harshest forms, in eastern Europe. In any event, the servile subjection of blacks or peasants, far from contradicting it, rendered the love of liberty by property-owners and freemen stronger and more credible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sidney too was an admirer of Poland. Along with other ‘northern nations’, it was inspired by a love of liberty. What demonstrated this was, among other things, the fact that the king derived from ‘popular elections’—in other words, appointment by the Diet of nobles.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, proudly asserting their condition as free, equal men in the face of the monarch were magnates who wielded absolute power over their serfs. But Sidney argued along the lines we have already encountered: as with slavery, liberalism was also compatible with serfdom. In fact, both institutions rendered the appreciation of liberty more profound and more jealous.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Burke there is complete consistency between the recognition granted Poland and that granted the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;. The latters’ agitation was quite the reverse of an isolated phenomenon: ‘In Sweden the years from 1719 to 1772 are known as the Age of Freedom, because at this time the Diet or Riksdag ruled without interference by the King. Indeed, these Swedish Whigs, after their revolution of 1719, had the works of John Locke translated into Swedish.’ In Hungary the nobles instead appealed above all to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while, in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg132&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even more ringing language, the Polish aristocracy paid homage to ‘republican liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[t]he diets, estates, parlements, and councils all stoutly defended liberty, and indeed stood for many genuine liberal ideas; but at the same time they palpably insisted on the maintenance or enlargement of their own privileges.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this context we can also situate Bismarck’s celebration some decades later of the ‘liberal caste sentiments’ (&#039;&#039;ständisch-liberale Stimmung&#039;&#039;) of the class he belonged to,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which was interested in extending the jurisdiction and powers of representative bodies also in order to reinforce control over servants.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar observation can be made in connection with the agitation set off by the French &#039;&#039;parlements:&#039;&#039; guiding the ‘assault’ on royal absolutism was ‘one of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime’s&#039;&#039; most traditional institutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in addition to the English model, it was to this initial phase of the French Revolution—the one admired by Burke and de Tocqueville post-1848—that the liberal nobility of the Hapsburg Empire appealed to condemn Joseph II’s anti-feudal reforms, to reassert the role of diets and intermediate bodies, and hence ‘regain … control over their peasants’ and the ‘other political liberties’ they had lost.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sidney had already specified that a common feature of ‘northern nations’, which embodied the principle of liberty, was assignment of a decisive role to ‘lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The aristocratic liberalism represented in France by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; was thus widely diffused in Europe, especially central and eastern Europe. Certainly, unlike Burke, Montesquieu expressed a negative opinion of Poland, ‘where the peasants are slaves of the nobility’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Whig was well aware of these social relations. In fact, he started out from them to underscore the emphatic love of liberty displayed by slave-owners in Poland, as across the Atlantic. By contrast, Montesquieu saw liberty at work in the English colonies in America, but not in Poland. Does Burke demonstrate greater logical rigour? In reality, in accordance with his principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, Montesquieu did not identify with Poland, which could not invoke the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg133&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;justification or extenuation of a hot climate and where the zone of unfreedom lacked spatial as well as racial delimitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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It remains the case that Burke’s attitude had deep roots in the philosophy of history of the liberal tradition, which from Montesquieu onwards tended to date the inception of the history of freedom and free, representative government from the ancient Germans. Among them, as we know from Grotius, the institution of slavery was very much present and yet (according to the author of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;), ‘the English have taken their idea of political government from the Germans’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such presuppositions, Madame de Staël celebrated the liberty enjoyed by old France, despite the heavy presence of serfdom,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Constant ‘the intermediate bodies’ and &#039;&#039;‘Parlements’&#039;&#039; wrongly weakened by royal despotism,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which played an important role in the initial phase of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The American Revolution and the crisis of the English model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the seemingly favourable initial prospects, the English model met with rapid defeat in Paris. In reality, it was already deeply tarnished when the crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; reached maturity in France. In the 1760s, while the colonists’ rebellion was brewing across the Atlantic, John Wilkes attacked ‘the whole organization of the British oligarchy’ in London and initiated a crisis of such gravity as to make the Italian Pietro Verri believe in the imminence of ‘civil war’. Persecuted at home, Wilkes for a time found refuge in Paris, where he formed relations with the group of &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the turning point in the process that threw the English model into crisis in France was represented by the American Revolution. The British Constitution now ceased to be celebrated, and criticisms of Montesquieu for having transfigured it were not lacking.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The increasingly bitter condemnation of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; derived comfort from transatlantic political and social developments. Although not refusing England acknowledgement of the merits earned with the liquidation of royal absolutism, Condorcet looked primarily to America, with its magnificent ‘spectacle of equality’, without any trace of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg134&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belief diffused, albeit to different degrees, on both sides of the Channel that nature had ‘divided the human race into three or four orders’, condemning only one of them to ‘work much and eat little’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now appeal was no longer made to the Glorious Revolution, from which a liberal but also aristocratic England had emerged, but to the ‘happy revolution’ across the Atlantic,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which had given birth to a markedly superior politico-social reality: ‘there is no distinction of orders’ and ‘there is nothing that confines one part of the human species to an abjectness consigning it to idiocy as well as misery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Diderot was even more swingeing. The new country, which offered ‘all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum from fanaticism and tyranny’, was an alternative model to the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that continued to be all the rage in the old continent as a whole, and where ‘the inept, the corrupt rich and the pernicious [are promoted] to the most important offices’. Adherence to the cause of the rebel colonists was, at the same time, a ruthless critique of the behaviour of British troops and against Britain as such. This emerges from celebration of the ‘brave Americans, who have preferred to see their women outraged, their children slain, their homes destroyed, their fields ruined, their cities burnt, and who have preferred to shed their blood and die, rather than lose the least part of their liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks also to the support furnished to the American revolutionaries by France, their arguments were bound to find a favourable echo in Paris, and they involved an unequivocal condemnation of the country that Paine in &#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039; (substantially translated immediately after its publication) branded as ‘British barbarity’, ‘the Royal Brute of Britain’, whose aristocratic character was already evident from ‘what is called the Magna Charta’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nor should we lose sight of the presence in Paris, in the decisive years of the revolutionary crisis, of Jefferson, who, a few weeks after the storming of the Bastille, advised France to keep its distance from England’s worst aspects (a form of representation that was quite the reverse of equal—in fact, ‘abominably partial’—as well as the ‘absolute’ power which the monarch continued to possess in reality thanks to the venality of parliamentarians).[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg135&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This was the intellectual climate in which Brissot and Clavière, two figures destined to play a central role in the French Revolution, published a book in 1787 dedicated ‘to the American Congress and the friends of the United States in the two worlds’, and marked throughout by admiration for ‘free Americans’ and ‘free America’, for its ‘free’ and ‘excellent’ Constitution and noble ‘republican customs’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The counterpoint to such celebration was, of course, condemnation of ‘London’s ministerial despotism’ and the ‘ferocity’ of its troops. The ‘English nation’ was now vainly seeking to remedy the ‘devastation of its cruel dementia’ and renew relations with the country born in the wake of the struggle against it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This division must be followed by an intellectual and political alliance between those who had struggled together against England—namely, the United States and France, which ‘with its arms helped assert the independence of free America’, and which was now summoned to take inspiration from the great new model embodied by the country thrown up by the revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On this basis, Brissot and Clavière set up the French–American Society.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, two years later, the debate began that issued in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, not a few interventions appealed to the American example and the sort of synthetic proclamation of the rights of man contained in the Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to counter the revolution’s radicalization, Malouet, who became the spokesman for the interests of slave-owners in the colonies, drew attention to the radical differences between the United States and France. In the first case, there was a society ‘entirely composed of property-owners already accustomed to equality’. In the second, one witnessed the agitation of ‘an immense multitude of men without property’ in a daily struggle for survival and ‘placed by fate in a condition of dependency’: a gulf separated ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society’. This was where appeals to ‘democracy’ and the rights of man could have devastating consequences for the social order.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Stripped of its ideological caution and reticence, the meaning of the speech was clear. In America, thanks to expansion into territories occupied by the Indians and their expropriation, it was possible significantly to expand the ranks of property-owners who were European in origin. On the other hand, the ‘unfortunate classes’ were not in a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg136&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;position to do harm: they mainly comprised blacks reduced to slavery or relegated to a subaltern caste and subject to iron social control. Waved exclusively within the white community and the superior race, the flag of democracy and the rights of man had nothing subversive about it. But in France …&lt;br /&gt;
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Malouet’s reasoning was not flawless. However, it was no longer possible to revert to the situation prior to the American Revolution. After the formation of significantly more democratic representative bodies at federal and state levels in the United States, little credibility could attach to the British parliament, which on the basis of a law of 1716 that remained in force for nearly two centuries (until 1911) was elected every seven years,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and monopolized by the landed aristocracy. Moreover, it was undermined by a corruption that had become proverbial in Europe and across the Atlantic, which seemed in France to be a repeat of the sale of offices—an essential element of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that was to be got rid of.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the course of their argument with London, the American revolutionaries had equated citizens deprived of the right of representation with slaves. But now this argument came to be applied in France by those who were opposed to censitary discrimination in the suffrage. This, thundered Robespierre, criticizing those inspired by the ‘example of England’, reduced the excluded to a condition similar to the slave: ‘liberty consists in obeying the laws one has given oneself and slavery in being forced to submit to an alien will’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, Babeuf argued in similar fashion: ‘citizens whose will is inactive—such men are slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These were declarations that could have come from the mouth of an American revolutionary; only now, pronounced in favour not of a narrow elite of gentlemen and property-owners, but of the mass of the dispossessed, they assumed a very different political and social value.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The transfiguration of American ‘master-race democracy’ in a universalistic key&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Focusing attention on the problem of slavery, the argument that developed on both sides of the Atlantic initially discredited England, protagonist of the slave trade, more than it did the rebel colonists: ‘staining the reputation of that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg137&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nation’ (observed Diderot in 1774) ‘is the fact that its blacks are the unhappiest of blacks’. Indeed, ‘the Englishman, enemy of tyranny at home, is the most ferocious despot abroad’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; reiterated the point: ‘The English, this people so jealous of their own liberty, have contempt for that of other men’. They did not hesitate to employ the most bestial methods and the most refined forms of torture to smother any hint of rebellion and any aspiration to freedom by their slaves; ‘it is to this excess of barbarism that the trading and slavery of blacks have necessarily led the usurpers’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, when it allied with the powers of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to fight revolutionary France, and refused to follow the latter’s example in abolishing slavery (decreed by the Jacobin Convention in February 1794, in the wake of the revolution by the black slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture), England was widely discredited in Europe. Robespierre was not alone in declaring that the island across the Channel could seem like a model of liberty only at a time when France groaned under monarchical absolutism. This was also Kant’s opinion: ‘England, which at one time could count on the sympathy of the best men in the world … has now completely lost that sympathy.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it provoked the crisis of the English model, the American Revolution prompted portrayals and hopes that were destined to prove completely unrealistic. At work was the illusion that the institution of slavery was destined rapidly to disappear in the republic produced by a great struggle for freedom. The founders of the French–American Society explicitly expressed themselves in such terms: ‘The most beautiful feature for which one honours the public spirit in the United States’ was ‘the emancipation of the blacks’. Thanks to the Quakers’ abolitionist campaigning, it ‘will soon be universal in all this part of the world’, so that only the Europeans, still committed to the slave trade and the oppression of blacks, would remain to blush at ‘their barbarism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet adopted a similar position: the rebel colonists were the ‘friends of universal liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, one could start from the presupposition that the stain of slavery would soon be washed away:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg138&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Slavery is universally regarded in the thirteen states as a crime of &#039;&#039;lèse-humanité&#039;&#039; … Now, given this opinion, it will be hard for the private interests of the slave-owners to prevail for long in a country where the press is free and where all measures of public authority, all the deliberations of the legislative body … are necessarily public acts.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This illusion is readily explicable: it involved a confusion between the abolition of the slave trade (effectively provided for by the US Constitution, which sanctioned its termination in 1808) and the abolition of slavery (which continued to flourish); and there was a sense that the process set in train in the North would shortly encompass the Union as a whole. More generally, the rebel colonists’ passionate denunciation of despotism and political slavery sounded like a declaration of war on any form of enslavement, and hence like the inception of black emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The process of transfiguring events across the Atlantic sometimes became a total misunderstanding. Enthusiastically saluting the rebel colonists, Raynal advertised a prize for answers to the question whether ‘the discovery of America has been useful or harmful to the human race’. The four responses submitted concurred in denouncing the event as a harbinger of intolerance and slavery and pointing to the American Revolution as the remedy for such ills.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The rebellion that broke out in the name also of the right to untrammelled expansion into lands inhabited by savages was thus construed in the completely opposite sense!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The colonists of San Domingo, the American model and the second liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At the outset, it was not understood in France that the independence secured by the white colonists strengthened their control over the Indians and blacks; and it was not realized that a similar dialectic was tending to develop in the French colonies. In the 1781 edition of the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039;, Diderot on the one hand evoked the figure of a ‘black Spartacus’, summoned to rise up against the slave-owners, but on the other, harking back to the example of the American Revolution, declared for the concession of self-government to San Domingo too, which would precisely have entailed the triumph of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg139&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slave-owners. The philosopher did not perceive the contradiction, and nor did Brissot, who took a similar position.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the outbreak of the French Revolution, self-government became the watchword of colonists interested in preserving the institution of slavery and shielding their property from the interference, whims and despotism attributed to central government. Among the first to make himself spokesman for these ideas and interests was Malouet, who in 1788 had already engaged in a sharp polemic against the abolitionists. Certainly, the institution of slavery was out of the question for a ‘free and proud nation’ like France. To tolerate it on metropolitan territory would risk erasing the boundary between liberty and slavery and inducing a ‘general enslavement’. Malouet was a liberal and admired England, where he took refuge following the failure of projects for establishing a monarchy on the English model in France. He appealed to the ‘wise Locke’ and his &#039;&#039;Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; to argue that slavery for ‘barbarous peoples … does not offend the right of nature’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence Malouet took care not to challenge the spatial and racial delimitation of slavery, as had his contemporary and fellow countryman Melon (against whom Montesquieu argued): slavery was inconceivable in the metropolis and, within the colonies, for the white race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to blacks, however, the discourse was very different: transported to America, they were providentially released from the ‘most absurd despotism’, which raged in Africa. It was true that they continued to suffer slavery, albeit of a decidedly milder variety than that prevalent in their countries of origin. However, much more so than the American slave, whose subsistence was guaranteed and who was protected by a series of laws, it was the European ‘worker’ (&#039;&#039;journalier&#039;&#039;) who was ‘subject to the &#039;&#039;absolute will’&#039;&#039;, the power of life and death, of his master, who, denying or ejecting him from work, could calmly condemn him to death. People cried scandal at the punishments inflicted on slaves, but what happened in Europe? A peasant who stole was hanged, a poacher was condemned to ‘forced labour’—a slavery much more pitiless than that typically existing across the Atlantic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, we encounter the arguments that would later receive more developed theoretical systematization particularly in Calhoun.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg140&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Once the French Revolution had broken out, supporting the colonists’ interests and arguments was the Massiac Club, founded in Paris in August 1789, of which Malouet was a prominent member. Likewise aligned in defence of the colonists’ right to self-government and the undisturbed enjoyment of their property (plantations and slaves) was Antoine Barnave. We are dealing with an important author who expressed his liberal convictions not only in immediately political terms, but also at the level of the philosophy of history. In him too we find the dialectic we are already familiar with: ringing condemnation of political ‘slavery’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] did not prevent him from forcefully and skilfully defending the cause of the slaveholding colonists. The ‘spirit of liberty’ (he observed) increased and strengthened with the expansion of ‘industry’, ‘wealth’ and, above all, ‘movable wealth’. That was why, even prior to England with its splendid ‘Constitution’, it emerged in Holland, ‘the country where movable wealth has accumulated most’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Slaves were an integral part of this ‘movable property’, and had already been classified among the ‘movable’ goods in Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Massiac Club and Barnave were generally considered ‘Anglomanes’ and genuinely were, in the sense that they opposed the radicalization of the French Revolution and admired and envied the country across the Channel for its orderly rule of law and strict censitary discrimination, which consecrated the untrammelled, exclusive domination of the property-owning classes. However, in another respect they were led to appeal predominantly to the American model, with its pathos of the inviolable autonomy of representative bodies and states from central power and the guarantee that derived from it of the inviolability of the institution of slavery. In the face of central government, the colonies adopted the stance of the southern states. In March 1790 the colonists won a temporary victory:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The National Assembly declared that it had not the slightest intention of updating any branch of its trade with the colonies. It placed the colonists and their property under the special protection of the nation. It declared anyone who plotted to incite uprisings against them a criminal to the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg141&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a success that was repeated about a year later: ‘The National Assembly made it a constitutional rule that no law on the condition of unfree persons in the colonies could be made except at the formal, unsolicited request of the colonial Assemblies.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the whole discourse revolved around the problem of slavery, the relevant term did not appear: the articles of the US Constitution were imitated in substance and form alike. This was the French Revolution’s second liberal inception. Just as the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; expressed the desire for self-government by the liberal nobility in the metropolis, so the colonial Assemblies gave voice to the slave-owners’ desire for self-government in the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this second liberal inception was even more precarious than the first. Following the defeat suffered during the Seven Years’ War, France had lost virtually all its colonial empire in 1763. This had imparted to the critique of colonialism and the institution of slavery a diffusion and radicalism hampered, by contrast, in the English and American world by substantial material interests and a national, chauvinistic spirit understandably reinforced by victory. We can thus understand the split that immediately occurred in the French liberal party. Aspiring to a constitutional monarchy with the right to make war and peace reserved to the king, Mirabeau, like Malouet and Barnave, looked to England. Unlike them, however, he ended up rejecting the American model when it came to regulating the relations between central power, on the one hand, and colonies and colonists, on the other. In the Constituent Assembly the latter demanded that they be represented in proportion not only to their numbers, but also to the number of their slaves, in accordance with a criterion identical or similar to that adopted by the US Constitution. Here is Mirabeau’s stinging reply:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If the colonists want the blacks and people of colour to be men, well then, emancipate them, so that all are electors and all can be elected. Otherwise, we beg them to note that, in proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have not taken into consideration the number of our horses and mules. The colonists’ claim to have twenty representatives is therefore utterly ridiculous.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was an argument that also applied in the United States, as is confirmed by a subsequent position of Mirabeau’s:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg142&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I shall not debase either this assembly or myself by seeking to prove that the blacks have a right to liberty. You decided this question when you declared that all men are born and remain equal and free. And it is not on this side of the Atlantic that corrupt fallacies will dare to maintain that blacks are not men.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The condemnation of ideologies of slavery targeted both French colonists and the English colonists who had now constituted themselves as an independent state: the polemic against the former could not but encompass the latter; the initial ambiguity, which had led French abolitionists to attribute a completely imaginary universalistic impetus to the authors of the American Revolution, was dispelled—all the more so in that it was the very ideologues of slavery who drew attention to the vitality of that institution in the United States. Brissot had believed that the example of the Quakers of Pennsylvania would act as a model; in a sense adopting an observation already present in Smith, Malouet had pointed out in 1788 that the abolition of slavery decided by it affected a fairly limited number of people and certainly did not extend to the southern states, where the presence of slaves and blacks was much more pronounced.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1802 Baudry des Lozières’ sarcasm was stinging. Precisely where ‘Brissot locates perfection’, slavery not only flourished undisturbed, but manifested itself in particularly rigid form: ‘The North Americans, those lovers of liberty, those ardent republicans, who in their books celebrate their independence so much, buy and sell slaves.’ Moreover, ‘this country of liberty is very miserly in granting freedom’ and ‘those who are freed’ were treated ‘extremely harshly’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The crisis of the English and American models and the formation of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, figures were not lacking in the abolitionist camp who continued to harbour illusions about a possible restoration of the American model to its former splendour. The abolition of an institution whose stubborn survival was incomprehensible in a country so strongly attached to the cause of liberty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg143&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;would suffice. When in 1824 Lafayette visited the United States, where nearly fifty years earlier he had fought in the War of Independence, he cautiously tried to point out ‘the disadvantages of slavery’ in Ohio. However, his speech met with no success; in fact, his good intentions had an ironic objective accompaniment, since in various southern cities public notices warned ‘people of color’ to stay away from the ceremonies in honour of the illustrious guest.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Residual illusions were also evident in Grégoire. Demonstrating political naivety, in an attempt to convince Jefferson to abandon his racial prejudices, he referred to the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture to prove the ability of blacks to achieve a level of excellence![[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French abbot was unaware of his interlocutor’s efforts, in his capacity as US president, to reduce the republic born in the wake of the black slave revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture to hunger and force it to surrender (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|§8]]). Similarly, he did not know that in 1801 the latter was lamenting in his correspondence the fact that citizens of San Domingo were abducted by American corsairs and sold as slaves.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Leading the United States in 1801 was precisely Jefferson who, some years later, wrote to a friend in ironic terms about the French abolitionist abbot.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the predicted and desired emancipation of black slaves became an ever more problematic and remote prospect, bitter disappointment set in, as demonstrated in particular by Condorcet’s evolution. On the immediate eve of the French Revolution, when the Constitution consecrating slavery was in force across the Atlantic, he still continued to draw a rather optimistic picture. The various states of the new republic and the ‘common Senate that represents them’ were unanimous in desiring the abolition of slavery; it was an ‘act of justice’ dictated by ‘humanity’, but also by ‘honour’. A severe warning was already implicit in this final observation: ‘How, without blushing, can one dare to demand these declarations of rights, these inviolable bulwarks of the liberty and security of citizens, if every day one permits oneself to violate the most sacred articles?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, where once it had been implicit, the distancing became explicit, even if it continued to be cautiously phrased. Compared with the French Revolution, the American presented itself as ‘more peaceful’, but also as ‘slower’ and ‘more incomplete’. Sooner or later, it too would end up applying &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg144&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principle of liberty and equality in its universality. But for the time being there continued the ‘crimes whose avarice soils the shores of America, Africa or Asia’, the ‘bloody contempt for men of another colour’, the slave trade between the two shores of the Atlantic, the tragedy of Africa and the ‘shameful brigandage that has corrupted and depopulated it for two centuries’. By contrast, it was a merit of the more advanced French culture to treat as ‘&#039;&#039;friends …&#039;&#039; those blacks whom their stupid tyrants disdain to rank among men’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Condorcet denounce the ‘general corruption’ of Holland and England as slaveholding societies. This denunciation increasingly tended also to encompass the country that emerged from the third liberal revolution. The Terror was already hanging over Condorcet himself, who nevertheless identified revolutionary France as the country called upon to put an end to&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the cunning and false policy which, forgetting that all men have equal rights by virtue of their very nature, wanted on the one hand to measure the extent of the rights to be granted by the size of the territory, the climate, national character, the wealth of the people, the degree of perfection of trade and industry; and on the other to sub-divide these same rights unequally between different classes of men, assigning them to birth, wealth and profession, thus creating contrary interests and opposed powers, to then establish a balance between them that is rendered necessary solely by these institutions and which does not even correct their dangerous influences.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The United States no longer represented the genuine antithesis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, construed by Condorcet as a complex system of forms of discrimination and privilege that lacerated the unity of the human race. It was necessary to overcome once and for all a political order in which, intertwined with the hierarchization of peoples on the basis of climate, geographical location or differential economic development, there was a hierarchization within any individual people on the basis of birth or membership of an estate. While the first type of discrimination found concentrated expression across the Atlantic, the second had certainly not disappeared in England. The critical or scornful reference to the argument of ‘climate’ (a position prominent in Montesquieu and often used to justify the slavery of colonial peoples), and to the argument of the ‘balance’ of powers (often invoked in England to justify the privileges of the House of Lords and the landed aristocracy), demonstrates that Condorcet &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg145&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had become critical of the American and English models alike, and had ultimately broken with both fractions of the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Fully to understand Condorcet’s mature view, it is important to take account of a peculiarity of the French Revolution. In the course of its development, the popular uprising in the metropolis against the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; was soon followed by the clash in the colonies between freemen and slaves and between blacks and whites. The two conflicts were all the more closely intertwined because sections of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, engaged against the process of radicalization underway in Paris, were sometimes simultaneously interested, as the owners of slaves in the colonies, in preventing their emancipation. Those on the opposite side were thus led to assimilate noble privilege and racial privilege, branding them conjointly as two different expressions of aristocratic arrogance. In 1791 the Jacobin Sonthonax pointed to the liberal and spokesman for the slaveholding colonies, Barnave, as the ‘protector of the aristocracy of the epidermis’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years before the outbreak of the July Revolution, although now ferociously critical of Jacobinism, Abbé Grégoire issued a firm denunciation, already encapsulated in the title of his little book, of the ‘nobility of the skin’. The analogy was now developed in all its aspects. The ban on interracial marriages in the United States was compared to the social obligation which, under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, required the aristocracy not to contaminate itself with elements alien to it, with commoners: at work in both cases was an insane concern to safeguard ‘the purity of the blood’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the nobility of the skin will suffer the same fate as the nobility of the scroll’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, the absolute power possessed by the slave-owner was certainly no more tolerable than that exercised by the monarch, and hence the ‘colonists’ were ‘similar to all despots’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this comparative perspective, the negative judgement on the United States was manifest: ‘Civilization is only dawning: five million Africans transported to America are still in chains there.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And if there was an encouraging example in the New World, it was not afforded by the ‘colonists’ and the country they had founded in North America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Simply by virtue of its existence, the republic of Haiti will be able to have a major influence on the destiny of Africans in the new world … A black &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg146&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;republic in the mid-Atlantic is a raised beacon to which the blushing oppressors and the sighing oppressed look. Seeing it, hope smiles on five million slaves scattered over the Antilles and the American continent.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the American model became even more explicit and bitter as those who wished to preserve slavery in the colonies appealed to it. Against the abolitionist projects or ambitions of Paris, the colonists invoked the spectre of a repeat of the American Revolution. They too would be forced into independence if they did not succeed in securing self-government, so as to be able to freely dispose of their slaves, without a ‘despotic’ power interfering with their legitimate property from without and above. Again, after the July Revolution, the French colonists declared themselves ready ‘to hand themselves over to the American Union if the metropolis did not permit them slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Making this observation in 1842 was Victor Schoelcher who, six years later, played a key role in the definitive abolition of slavery in the French colonies, which had been reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802. And we can then understand the bitterness of the polemic against the transatlantic republic. ‘Skin prejudices’ remained particularly ‘inveterate among the Americans’; they could be considered ‘the most ferocious masters on the earth’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] authors of ‘one of the most upsetting spectacles the world has ever offered’. Not only blacks, but also white abolitionists, were hit by the most savage violence. Lynching threatened anyone who dared to challenge the ‘iniquitous property’ and ‘demand freedom for all members of the human race’. ‘There is no cruelty of the most barbarous age that has not been committed by the slave states of North America.’ Hence the hope for a revolution from below: ‘I hope that these brusque lynchers will one day all be hung by rebellious slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance, Schoelcher, in condemning the crimes committed by ‘us other barbarians of the West’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] expressed his admiration for the ‘colossal revolution of S. Domingo’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and for the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture, to whom he devoted a sympathetic biography.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gulf separating the new political current forming in France from the two fractions of the liberal party is clear. Like Schoelcher, Brissot, who had played a significant part in founding the French–American Society, did not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg147&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hesitate to justify armed rebellion by black slaves and their right to revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this point the French–American Society was dead and buried. Between the July Revolution and the 1848 Revolution, manifestly in debate with French radicalism, de Tocqueville could once again present the United States as a model or source of inspiration only on condition of dropping the analogy between noble aristocracy and racial aristocracy, between monarchical despotism and slave despotism—the analogy on whose basis the North American republic was configured not as a model of liberty and democracy, but as a variant (and then not even the best) of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The liberal inception of the revolution in Latin America and its radical outcome&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the metropolis and colonies alike, the French Revolution was transformed in a radical direction. To clarify this process further, we must begin with the definition which, in the course of the struggle against Stuart absolutism, at the start of the English liberal movement, one of its exponents gave of the ‘true liberty’ dear to him: ‘we know by a certain law that our wives, our children, our servants, our goods, are our own, that we build, we plough, we sow, we reap, for ourselves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the event, ‘our servants’ did not passively endure assimilation to ‘our goods’ and, in opposition to the ‘true liberty’ cherished by the exponent of English proto-liberalism, demanded a quite different liberty, which required the intervention of political power to abolish servitude in its various forms and promote the emancipation of the subaltern classes. This is what occurred in France, thanks to the historically auspicious context already analysed. In the metropolis, the first liberal inception of the French Revolution was immediately followed by the revolt of the peasants (with the end, sealed on the night of 4 August 1789, of the feudal system), and then the agitation of the urban popular masses. The second liberal inception, which was to have consecrated self-government by slave-owners, ended up inciting the revolution of the slaves themselves. The latter achieved emancipation and later managed to frustrate the terrible war machine of Napoleonic France.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar dialectic manifested itself in Latin America. Initially, the independence movement and revolution took the form of reactions against reform by the Spanish crown, which ‘reversed the old policy of segregating the Indians and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg148&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;urged them to assimilate by speaking Spanish and dressing in European style’. Such integrationist measures soon provoked the hostility of the Creole elite. The latter professed liberalism, and was liberal: it read Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith; it sometimes sought to enter into relations with Jefferson; it protested against central government interference and the obstacles it placed in the way of developing local industry; it aspired to emulate the example of the American Revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the English colonists in the North, so for the Latin American Creoles in the South, the slave, as the planter’s private property, did not pertain to the public sphere. In the various manifestos that signalled the start of the war of independence against Spain, no positions in favour of abolishing slavery were adopted.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where the English colonists had indignantly rejected London’s attempt to block their expansion beyond the Allegany Mountains, and proudly declared that they did not want to be treated ‘like negroes, the Latin American Creoles claimed equality with the peninsula’s ruling class and superiority to the Indians and, obviously, slaves deported from Africa. To this end they reminded Madrid that they were descendants of the conquistadores and, ultimately, artisans of the grandeur of the Spanish Empire. We are reminded of Franklin who, in the course of the controversy with the London government, had stressed the merits earned by the American colonists, ‘hazarding their Lives and Fortunes in subduing and settling new Countries, extending the Dominion and encreasing the Commerce of their Mother Nation’, enhancing the glory, ‘the Grandeur and Stability of the British Empire’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not long before the two roads diverged sharply. The fact is that in Spanish America, together with the Creole revolution but counter to it, an Indian revolution developed. In fact, the latter had announced itself decades earlier, as demonstrated by the series of revolts culminating in 1780–81 in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, which sought to win the blacks to its cause, liberating them too from the shackles of slavery. By contrast, the Creoles initially rose up with liberal slogans, demanding self-government, challenging interference by central power, aiming, like the North American colonists, to strengthen their control over the native populations and blacks. It was precisely this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg149&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political project that formed the main target of the struggle by the Latin American Indians. Their revolution brings to mind the one that later erupted in San Domingo, and which issued in the formation of a new country: Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt: it was San Domingo–Haiti that gave the Creole independence movement a decisive turn. To overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish troops, Simón Bolívar sought to secure the support of the rebel ex-slaves of the Caribbean state, which he personally visited. The president at the time was Alexandre Pétion, who immediately received the Latin American revolutionary. He promised him the aid he requested on condition that he freed the slaves in areas as they were wrested from Spanish control. Transcending the class and caste limits of the social group he belonged to, and demonstrating intellectual and political courage, Bolívar accepted. Seven ships, 6,000 men with arms and munitions, a printing press and numerous advisors set out from the island.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the beginning of the abolition of slavery in much of Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolívar started out as a liberal, appealing to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] underlining the need for ‘a liberal Constitution’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] with ‘eminently liberal provisions’, which were to sanction ‘the rights of man, the freedom to act, think, speak and write’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as well as ‘the division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience, a free press’—in short, ‘everything sublime that there is in politics’. He celebrated the ‘British Constitution’ and, above all, the American, the ‘most perfect of Constitutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, when he demanded not only liberty, but the ‘absolute freedom of the slaves’, Bolívar in fact took his distance from the United States, where, even in the North, blacks were confined to a caste which was not that of genuinely free men. And this distancing from the North American republic was confirmed by a further observation that ‘it is impossible to be free and slaves at the same time’. But especially significant was another element: the slave revolution from below, which in the United States represented a general nightmare, now became an object of explicit celebration. Bolívar not only appealed to the ‘history of the helots, Spartacus and Haiti’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] but in so doing defined Venezuelan and Latin American identity in a way that is worth reflecting on:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg150&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Let us bear in mind that our people is neither European nor North American. Rather than an emanation of Europe, it is a mixture of Africa and America because Spain itself ceased to be Europe on account of its African blood, its institutions and its character. It is impossible to determine exactly which human family we belong to. The majority of the indigenous population has been destroyed, the Europeans have mixed with Americans and Africans, and the latter with Indians and Europeans. All born from the breast of one and the same Mother, our fathers, different by origin and blood, are foreigners to one another and all visibly differ in their skin. Such diversity entails a consequence of the greatest importance. Thanks to the Constitution, interpreter of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The countries formed out of the independence struggle against the Madrid government thus acquired a political, social and ethnic identity characterized by an admixture of black and Indian, and hence very different from US identity. While the North American colonists identified with the chosen people who sailed across the Atlantic to conquer the promised land, to be wrested from its unauthorized inhabitants and cleansed of their presence (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|§5]]), the Latin American revolutionaries, in the wake of their argument with Spain, tended to denounce the genocidal practices of the conquistadores, Spanish in particular and European in general. Here too the road had been indicated by the black slaves of San Domingo who, after having broken with Napoleonic France and defeated its attempts to re-conquer it and reintroduce slavery, had assumed the Indian name of Haiti. For Bolívar miscegenation—the mixing denounced in the United States, and sometimes with particular fervour by abolitionist circles—became a political project, which rejected any racial discrimination, and an essential element in a new, proud identity. However, precisely on account of its radicalism, this project found itself confronting almost insurmountable difficulties. Thanks to the politico-social homogeneity (strengthened by the availability of land and westward expansion) of its dominant class, and thanks also to the confinement of much of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery, the North American republic soon succeeded in achieving a stable structure. It took the form of a ‘master-race democracy’ and a racial state, based on the rule of law within the white community and among the chosen people. The situation in Latin America was very different: between liberal beginnings and radical outcomes, the revolution had mobilized a front stamped with profound social and ethnic contradictions. Thus two contrasting &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg151&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ideas of liberty confronted one another: one calls to mind the English gentleman determined to dispose freely of his servants; the other ultimately refers to the struggle that had put an end to black slavery in San Domingo—Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. The United States and San Domingo—Haiti: two antagonistic poles&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Around 1830 the American continent presented a rather telling picture. While it had disappeared in a considerable part of Latin America, slavery remained in force in the European colonies, including British and Dutch ones, and above all in the United States. We can say that from the slave revolution onwards there developed a pent-up confrontation, a kind of cold war, between San Domingo and the United States. On one side, we have a country that saw ex-slaves in power, authors of a revolution that was possibly unique in world history; on the other, a country almost always led in the early decades of its existence by slave-owning presidents. On one side, we have a country that sanctioned the principle of racial equality to the point where, at least when it was ruled by Toussaint L’Ouverture, whites could play a leading role in the plantations; on the other, a country that constituted the first historical example of a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the tension between those two poles is understandable. When, in 1826, Abbé Grégoire pointed to Haiti as the ‘beacon’ looked to by slaves, he clearly had in mind the island’s contribution to the abolition of slavery in Latin America. On the other side, with the emergence and advance of the slave revolution, the French colonists of San Domingo responded by entertaining the idea, and brandishing the threat, of secession from France and adhesion to the North American Union. Once the new revolutionary power had consolidated itself, it was a constant concern of the United States, where not a few ex-colonists took refuge, to overthrow or at least isolate it through a cordon sanitaire. It would be dangerous, observed Jefferson in 1799, to enter into commercial relations with San Domingo. That would result in ‘black crews’ disembarking in the United States, and these emancipated slaves could represent ‘combustion’ for the slaveholding South.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such concerns, South Carolina banned the entry into its territory of any ‘man of colour’ from San Domingo or any of the other French islands, which might in some way have been infected by the new, dangerous ideas of liberty and racial equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg152&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Regardless of commercial exchanges, stressed influential political figures in the North American republic, by its very example the island risked challenging the institution of slavery far beyond its borders. Its inhabitants would in fact be ‘dangerous neighbors to the Southern States, and an asylum for renegades from these parts’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro revolution to be exhibited among them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Jefferson’s support for Napoleon’s attempt to re-conquer the island and reintroduce slavery. The US president assured the representative of France that ‘nothing will be easier than to furnish your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having succeeded Jefferson, Madison was likewise in no doubt as to the position to adopt: France was ‘the sole sovereign of Saint Domingue’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the consolidation of black power and the emergence of Haiti, the conflict did not come to an end. It also extended to the Caribbean islands under British control. Unrest spread among the black slaves and the governor of Barbados was well aware of ‘the dangers of insurrection’. For this reason, projects to reform and moderate the institution of slavery were entertained in London. This was a prospect immediately opposed by the colonists of Jamaica, who, sheltering behind defence of ‘their undoubted and acknowledged rights’ to self-government, threatened revolt against royal despotism and secession and adhesion to the North American republic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the example of San Domingo—Haiti had its most profound influence on Latin America. In 1822 the president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, proceeded to the annexation (which proved short-lived) of the Spanish part of the island, with the consequent emancipation of several thousand blacks, who along with freedom experienced notable social ascent, becoming small landowners. Slaves and free blacks in Cuba, who secretly kept the image of the Haitian leader, hoped for something similar. On the opposite side, sensing the danger, slave-owners of a liberal persuasion had already made contact with the US consul in Havana a decade earlier and outlined a project for joining the United States, which elicited the interest of Madison and Jefferson. In Calhoun’s view the annexation desired by him was a sort of pre-emptive counter-revolution: it would put paid for ever to the danger of a Cuba ‘revolutionized by Negroes’, which would have increased or doubled the threat already posed by Haiti.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg153&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Later, while the island of black power helped spread black emancipation in much of Latin America, the United States reintroduced slavery in Texas, which had previously been taken from Mexico. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, an attempt was made to expand the territory of the North American republic and, with it, the institution of slavery into other parts of Mexico and, above all, Nicaragua. One participant in this adventure, which after initial successes ended in dramatic failure, was William Walker. He considered himself—and in his own way was—a liberal, who enjoyed significant support in the United States. He proposed to fight the despotic legacy of Spanish power and extend his country’s free institutions, but exclusively for the benefit of the authentic white community. For those alien to the ‘strong, haughty race, bred to liberty’ who were the custodians of ‘a mission to place Americans under the rule of free laws’, slavery was indicated. The decree of abolition promulgated in the wake of a movement that had found inspiration and support in Haiti was therefore cancelled.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only after the end of the Civil War did the United States agree to open diplomatic relations with Haiti. But it was a move bereft of any warmth, and in fact functional for a project of ethnic cleansing. The idea, also entertained by Lincoln, of depositing on the island of black power the ex-slaves, who were to be deported from the republic that continued to be inspired by the principle of white supremacy and purity, had not yet been abandoned.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Liberalism and the critique of abolitionist radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Hence a distinguished historian of slavery has appropriately warned against the tendency ‘to confuse liberal principles with antislavery commitment’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Let us examine the reaction of various authors and sections of the liberal movement to the conflict that issued in the Civil War. We shall set aside Calhoun and the other theorists of the slaveholding South. And we already know Disraeli’s denunciation of the catastrophe of abolishing slavery in English colonies. On the point of the Confederacy’s military collapse, Lord Acton wrote to the general who had commanded its army:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg154&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I saw in States Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy … Therefore I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of the liberalism embodied in the Confederacy weighed more than the victory won some decades earlier by liberal England over Napoleonic despotism. Why? On the outbreak of the Civil War, although acknowledging ‘all the horrors of American slavery’, Lord Acton had unhesitatingly rejected ‘the categorical prohibition of slavery’ demanded by the abolitionists, as informed by an ‘abstract, ideal absolutism’ quite contrary to ‘the English spirit’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and to the liberal spirit as such, characterized as it was by flexibility and practical common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years earlier, Lieber had expressed himself in similar terms. He condemned the abolitionists as ‘jacobins’, followers of the ‘fifth monarchy’, incorrigible visionaries and fanatics: ‘if people must have slaves it is their affair to keep them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were such a declaration to be interpreted literally, not only would the right of states to self-government be inviolable, but also the right of each individual citizen to choose the type of property he preferred: let us not forget that at the time Lieber was himself a slave-owner! And hence while Disraeli ironized about the naive, misinformed ‘philanthropy’ of ‘the pure abolitionists’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the American liberal took his distance from such circles even more clearly: ‘I am not an abolitionist.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lieber was on excellent terms with de Tocqueville, who in his turn declared: ‘I have never been an abolitionist in the ordinary sense of the term’; ‘I have always been strongly opposed to the abolitionist party’. What was meant by these declarations, contained in two letters from 1857? ‘I have never believed it possible to destroy slavery in old states’: the abolitionists’ error was to seek ‘to effect a premature, dangerous abolition of slavery in countries where this abominable institution has always existed’. We are dealing with a firm &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg155&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery at a theoretical level, but one without results on the practical level. The situation in the South could only be altered through an initiative from above and from the centre, thereby throwing ‘the great experiment of Self-Government’ into crisis. And so? Preservation of the status quo was appropriate. However regrettable, people must resign themselves to the continuation of slavery in the South for a long time. However,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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to introduce it into new states, to spread this horrible plague over a large area of the earth that has hitherto been immune to it, to impose all the crimes and all the miseries that accompany slavery on millions of men of future generations (masters or slaves), who could avoid this, is a crime against the human race, and this seems to me horrendous and inexcusable.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, an expansion of the zone of slavery had already occurred at the time of the annexation to the Union of Texas, seized from Mexico. De Tocqueville seemed to be ready to accept a compromise even more favourable to the slaveholding South, as emerges from a letter of 13 April 1857, once again sent to a transatlantic interlocutor:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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I agree with you about the fact that the greatest internal threat to the northern states today is not so much slavery as the corruption of democratic institutions … As for the policy permitting slavery to develop in a whole portion of the territory where it was hitherto unknown, I will concede, as you argue, that one can do nothing but tolerate this extension in the special, current interests of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this could not go on indefinitely. It was inadmissible that there ‘can be contained in the clauses of any contract the destruction of the right and duty of the present generation to prevent the spread of the most horrible of all social evils to millions and millions of men of future generations’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condemnation of slavery was passionate, but it was possibly necessary to tolerate the preservation and even the extension of the institution for some time. The reason emerges from a letter sent to the English economist Senior: dismemberment of the country which, more than any other, embodied the cause of liberty, ‘would inflict a serious wound on the whole human race, stoking up war in the heart of a great continent from which it has been banished for more than a century’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg156&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville was ready to sacrifice the cause of abolishing slavery to the objective of preserving the unity and stability of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although powerfully encouraged first by French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of many of its colonies, and then by the revolution in San Domingo, radical abolitionism was a short-lived affair in France itself. Immediately after Thermidor, and in fact even at the moment of its preparation, the colonists’ agitation in defence of the liberal principle of self-government (and white supremacy) resumed: it must be local assemblies that determined people’s status and hence the condition of the blacks in the colonies. As we know, this was the position of the liberal Massiac Club. Those who resisted the Thermidorian turn were immediately branded traitors and renegades to the white race (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|§12]]). The ‘Anglomane’ and pro-slaveholding Malouet returned to hold positions of power under Napoleon,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who reintroduced colonial slavery and the black slave trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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The liberal movement certainly did not respond to this restoration, terminated only by the revolution of February 1848, with united, decisive opposition. There were some (including Granier de Cassagnac) who defended the institution of slavery in the name of liberalism, who in fact (polemically observed an ardent abolitionist) even claimed ‘a monopoly on liberalism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be precise, along with ‘liberalism’, Cassagnac also professed himself a follower of ‘democracy’: positions no different from those maintained across the Atlantic by Calhoun, with the difference that the former regarded slavery as ‘a provisional and empirical means of creating order’ and ‘maintaining the blacks in the apprenticeship of Christianity, work and the family’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side of the scale it is to be noted that, at least in his opponents’ view, the French author was mistaken in having developed in justification of slavery a philosophy of history that did not maintain the spatial or racial delimitation of the institution, with a tendency hence to regress to positions à la Fletcher, who was now alien to the liberal movement. By contrast, an integral part of it was Thiers, who, drawing up a catastrophic balance sheet of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies, pointed to the ‘base and barbarous idleness [of] Negroes left to their own devices’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg157&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Guizot seemed more susceptible to abolitionist ideas. Nevertheless, he stressed their impracticality with an argument that is already familiar from US history: it would be necessary to compensate the owners of a legitimate form of property, but there were insufficient funds for this operation.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Le Courier de la Gironde&#039;&#039; came out in favour of a gradual abolitionism which, avoiding the ‘savage liberty’ of ‘brutalized beings’, would take the form of an extended phase of ‘liberal slavery’ (&#039;&#039;esclavage libéral&#039;&#039;)—i.e. a somewhat mitigated slavery.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise opposed to hasty measures was de Tocqueville. In May 1847, noting that the ‘Bey of Tunisia’ had already abolished the ‘odious institution’—which in Muslim countries, by the French liberal’s admission, took a ‘milder’ form—de Tocqueville expressed the opinion that ‘we should doubtless only proceed to the abolition of slavery with care and moderation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can conclude with a general consideration relating to the France of the July Monarchy: ‘Immediate and complete emancipation was not even considered as an abolitionist program until less than a year before the Revolution of 1848.’ In fact, the golden age of French liberalism, far from involving the abolition of slavery, saw its expansion: ‘as a result of the expanding French conquest of Algeria, there was far more territory with slaves under French sovereignty by the mid-1840s than there had been at the time of the July Revolution in 1830.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. The enduring effectiveness of the black revolution from below&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
But if things stood thus, how was the abolition of slavery achieved? Although firmly opposed by a formidable international coalition and the liberal movement as a whole, the San Domingo revolution had a lasting influence, which proved all the stronger when conflicts within the community of the free and the white community as a whole intensified. We already know the decisive role played by the country governed by ex-slaves in propelling the independence movement in Latin America towards abolitionist positions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside the southern United States, slavery continued to be very much present in the European colonies in the Caribbean. However, here too Haiti’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg158&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;presence made itself felt. Proceeding in 1822 to annexation of the Spanish part of the island, the ex-slaves now in power delivered a further serious blow to the institution of slavery. The following year, the revolt of the black slaves in Demerara (today’s Guyana) erupted. This was a colony that had been affected by the upheavals which had reverberated in San Domingo from France. In 1794–95 a revolution exported and imposed by French forces had transformed Holland into the Batavian Republic and forced the Prince of Orange to flee to England. In the wake of events in Demerara, at the time under Dutch control, liberal agitation had developed, promoted by slave-owners who, witnessing the emergence of the prospect of black emancipation on the San Domingo model, had rapidly abandoned any sympathy for France and sought Britain’s intervention and protection.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But the incorporation of Demerara into the British Empire did not extinguish the fire, which smouldered under the ashes. A black revolt broke out in 1823 and led to the death of three whites; martial law was proclaimed and 250 slaves were killed or executed. And yet, repressed in one place, revolts exploded again some years later and only a short distance away—this time in Jamaica, in 1831. In both cases Methodist and Baptist missionaries played a significant role. By converting the slaves to Christianity, they furnished them with a culture, consciousness and the possibility of meeting and communicating that clashed irreconcilably with the de-humanization and commodification of human livestock upon which the institution of slavery was based. The first revolt saw the death sentence for the Reverend John Smith, and his death in prison shortly before execution of the sentence and the arrival from London of a notice of pardon. The second became known as the ‘war of the Baptists’. In both cases, in addition to rebellious slaves, the repression by the white dominant class struck the Baptist and Methodist community. In Jamaica hundreds of black Christians were flogged, tortured or shot; and English missionaries also suffered arrest and humiliation of every kind. In fact, in neighbouring Barbados churches were sacked and destroyed and there were riots and attempted pogroms against the Methodist community. The colonists’ hatred of the non-conformist churches, accused of encouraging the slave revolt, could not be contained.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a danger that seemed all the more real and immediate because of Haiti’s proximity and the processes of emancipation underway in Latin America. Thanks to this geographical proximity, there now intervened in the struggle (wrote &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg159&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a white Jamaican to his governor) a ‘third party’ (in addition to the Crown, prompted in a reformist direction by Christian abolitionism, and the colonists, engaged in defence of self-government and their property). And this ‘third party’ comprised the slave, who ‘knows his strength, and will assert his claim to freedom’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the abolition of slavery in the colonies presented itself to the dominant class of liberal England as the requisite way out in the face of two challenges: the first consisted in the black slaves’ revolution from below; the second in the indignation that was widespread in the British Christian community which, with growing impatience, demanded decisive measures against the colonists, guilty of enslaving blacks and persecuting Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The role of Christian fundamentalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This second challenge brings us to a movement we have not hitherto been concerned with, and which cannot be confused with either the liberal tradition or French-style radicalism. While the crisis that soon led to the black revolution in San Domingo was deepening, at a time when the campaign to suppress the slave trade seemed to be at an impasse, the dying John Wesley wrote a heartfelt letter to William Wilberforce:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Unless the Divine power has raised you up to be an Athanasius contra mundum, I see not how you can go through your glorious enterprise, in opposing that execrable villainy which is the scandal of religion, of England, and of human nature. Unless God has raised you up for this very thing, you will be worn out by the opposition of men and devils; but if God be for you who can be against you? Are all of them together stronger than God? Oh be not weary of well-doing. Go in the name of God, and in the power of His might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The recipient of this letter was unquestionably one of the major actors in the struggle that led to the abolition first of the slave trade and then of slavery as such. A fervent Christian, member of the House of Commons and on close &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg160&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terms with Pitt the Younger, while he received honorary French citizenship in 1792 for his anti-slavery campaign, he had nothing to do with the revolution of 1789 or, a fortiori, with radicalism. Far from welcoming the black slave revolt in San Domingo, he continued in his unwavering support for the British government, which, during the war against France, was the guarantor in the West Indies of the repression of slave revolts and the preservation of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if he identified with the England of the time and its dominant class, Wilberforce can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. Prior to directing his efforts against slavery, his religious zeal was engaged in the ‘reform of public manners’, to be advanced through the foundation of a new society intended as the ‘guardian of the religion and morals of the people’, which proposed to struggle ‘against Vice and Immorality’ and even aspired to the ‘suppression of Vice’. Hence the crusade launched against publications branded blasphemous and indecent, against rural feasts considered licentious, against the non-observance of the Sabbath among the popular classes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only subsequently did Christian fervour target the particular sin that was slavery—an institution completely unacceptable not only because of the obstacles it often put in the way of the spread of Christianity among slaves, but also because of the sexual libertinism in which it permitted their masters to indulge. Thus, another prominent supporter of English abolitionism (James Ramsay), along with slavery, called for an attack on ‘arbitrary divorces and bigamy’. Similarly, Granville Sharp combined abolitionist campaigning with a struggle against divorce legislation which, in flagrant violation of divine law, allowed the guilty couple to proceed to new weddings; and from this he moved on to announce that, together with those responsible for the slave trade and their accomplices, adulterers and those guilty of immorality would not escape divine punishment.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Sharp’s view, defenders of the institution of slavery were ‘refined modern Sadducees’. The Sadducees of Biblical fame had not hesitated to come to terms with Hellenistic and Roman culture, thereby contaminating Judaism and the word of God, and depriving them of their purity. Caught up in the enjoyment of wealth and the material world, they had forgotten or denied spiritual, otherworldly values. According to the English abolitionist, the modern Sadducees were no different. Ultimately, they were susceptible to the blandishments of the Demon, or the ‘Demon of Demons’. But the Bible must not be venerated in church, while remaining a dead letter in real life. On the contrary, it must serve as a guide in all political questions and the smallest problems of everyday &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg161&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life. All the more so in that the turning point was at hand: the times in which slavery continued to survive were the ‘latter days of Infidelity &amp;amp;amp; Deism’, representing the agony of the apocalyptic ‘Beast’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt that here we have an attitude which, in contemporary terms, we would define as fundamentalist. It is a trait that was even more clearly exhibited in the United States. Here too Christian abolitionism had a programme which, along with slavery, wanted to attack vice and immorality as such. Theodore Parker denounced as contrary to the Scriptures and divine law (the only truly valid law) the ‘usury’ by which ‘banking capital’ was stained, the ‘brothels’ and bars that sold rum, and which the police not only did not target, but in fact frequented more assiduously than the ‘house of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compared with Britain, there was in fact a novel element. In the United States, where the law on the return of fugitive slaves required all citizens to be complicit with an institution that became ever more odious, a delicate dilemma of conscience emerged. The ‘higher laws’ of Holy Scripture must not be forgotten. For a true Christian, admonished the English abolitionist Sharp in an indignant letter to Franklin, the other laws were ‘so clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a &#039;&#039;crime&#039;&#039; to regard them as law’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Along with its fundamentalist character, the radicalism of Christian abolitionism was strengthened in the United States. ‘When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law that treads down the inalienable rights of man’, declared Parker, the Christian must know how to go to the limit: ‘I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice … I am not afraid of men. I can offend them. I care nothing for their hate or their esteem. But I should not dare to violate His laws, come what may come …’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sanctioned by Holy Scripture, divine, eternal, natural law was, in any event, inviolable: ‘To say that there is no law higher than what the State can make is practical atheism … If there is no God to make a law for me, then there is no God for me.’ The challenge to constituted authority was open and declared: ‘REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The federal Constitution, which obliged the Union as a whole to defend the slaveholding states against any potential slave revolution, seemed to William Garrison ‘An Agreement with Hell’ and a ‘Covenant with Death’. In 1845 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg162&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;another abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, drew attention to slave-owners’ purchase of the most important public offices and the tripling of slavery that had occurred since the ratification of the federal Constitution, which came to be branded as a ‘pro-Slavery Compact’. The coexistence of slaveholding states and free states was no longer licit, unless the latter wanted to become ‘partners in the guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Street demonstrations in which the American Constitution was burnt were understandable. In the years preceding the Civil War, when he briefly harboured the illusion that the South was on the point of giving in, Parker exulted in these terms: ‘The Devil is in great wrath because he knoweth that his time is short.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this view, no compromise was possible. And Garrison explicitly stated as much. His polemic against defenders of the institution of slavery and their accomplices assumed openly threatening tones. But also unequivocal was his condemnation of theorists of &#039;&#039;‘gradual&#039;&#039; abolition’ and ‘moderation’, and even of those in the North who displayed ‘apathy’ or limited enthusiasm for the ‘standard of emancipation’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the struggle against slavery, that ‘heinous crime in the sight of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Abolitionist radicalism and Christian fundamentalism were closely interwoven, as emerges from the summons to a crusade against ‘the governments of this world’, which ‘in their essential elements, and as present administered … are all Anti-Christ’. This involved achieving&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the emancipation of our whole race from the dominion of man, from the thraldom of self, from the government of brute force, from the bondage of sin—and bringing them under the dominion of God, the control of an inward spirit, the government of the law of love, and into the obedience and liberty of Christ …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamentalist character of such positions did not escape Calhoun. He thundered against ‘the rabid fanatics, who regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it, deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union’. For them abolition was a conscientious obligation; only thus did they conceive it possible to liberate &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg163&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;themselves from the agonizing sense of being accomplices of the unforgivable ‘sin’ allegedly represented by slavery, against which they then proclaimed a full-scale ‘crusade’, ‘a general crusade’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of southern theorists, these Christians blinded by abolitionist fury were alien to the liberal world and substantially akin to Jacobins. In fact, a movement similar to French radicalism tended to emerge in the United States, at various times and in various modes, but always on the basis of the crisis of the English and American models. The crisis of the first coincided with the rebellion against the London government. What provoked or intensified the crisis of the second was the progressive isolation of the North American republic as a slaveholding state, engaged not only in the defence of slavery but also its expansion, and which resisted unperturbed, despite the disappearance of that institution first in much of Latin America and subsequently in British and French colonies. At this point, the country that at its birth had celebrated itself as the land of liberty appeared as the champion of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There thus developed in the United States as well a radicalism that drew on Christianity. Such a ‘party’ no longer identified with either the English or the American model. It rejected both the spatial and the racial delimitation of the community of the free, and thus regarded the exclusion clauses that characterized the English and American models as unacceptable. And in order to change things, it did not preclude appeals to the revolutionary initiative of the excluded. This was the religious and political climate in which John Brown’s armed raid into Virginia in 1859 matured, intent on inciting a slave uprising and convinced that, without the shedding of blood, there was no remission of sins. The attempt failed miserably and ended with the protagonist being hanged, but Parker reiterated the slaves’ right to armed rebellion: sooner or later, ‘the Fire of Vengeance may be waked up even in an African’s heart’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. What is radicalism? The contrast with liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Formed in the wake of disappointment in the English and American models, how did ‘radicalism’ differ from liberalism? The answer is obvious, if we refer to authors like Locke and Calhoun, profoundly liberal and yet at the same time without any doubts as to the legitimacy of black slavery. The answer is not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg164&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even difficult if we draw a comparison with authors such as Burke, Jefferson and Acton who, notwithstanding reservations and criticisms of the institution, on various grounds represented ideological and political reference points for the slaveholding South, or even continued to defend it to the end. The line of demarcation also proves sufficiently clear if we compare authors like Blackstone and Montesquieu, who tended to contest ‘slavery among ourselves’ rather than slavery as such, with a radicalism committed to rejecting both the spatial delimitation (the English model until 1833) and the racial delimitation (the American model until 1865) of the community of the free. But how is de Tocqueville clearly distinguished from authors like Diderot, Condorcet and Schoelcher, whom I have included in the process of French radicalism’s formation and development? What sense does it make to situate in two different, even opposed formations de Tocqueville and Condorcet, who were, respectively, one of the great critics of the Terror and one of its most illustrious victims? Is it right to include in the same party French and American radicals who adopted such a different attitude towards Christianity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Before answering these questions, it is worth lingering over something that characterized the liberal tradition from its outset. Let us take authors like Montesquieu, Smith and Millar. Although condemning slavery more or less sharply, all three continued to regard England—a country in the front rank in the slave trade—as a model. In no instance did criticism or condemnation of slavery involve exclusion of the beneficiaries or theorists of the institution from the community of the free and the liberal party. On more than one occasion, Burke distanced himself from the institution of slavery, but when the conflict between the two Atlantic shores erupted he not only celebrated the love of liberty which particularly animated southern colonies, but disdainfully rejected the idea that, in an attempt to suppress the rebellion, appeal might be made to ‘servile hands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, the British Whig continued to include slave-owners in the community of the free while excluding a priori their victims.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Criticism of the institution of slavery was clear and firm in Hume. But this did not prevent him from asserting that ‘European nations’ represented ‘that part of the globe [which] maintain[s] sentiments of liberty, honour, equity and valour superior to the rest of mankind’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, there was reason to believe that blacks were ‘naturally inferior to the whites’ and inferior to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg165&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the point of lacking any ‘symptoms’ of ‘ingenuity’ and free spirit.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So once again, despite the condemnation of slavery, it was its beneficiaries—not its victims—who formed an integral part of the community of the free and the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The boundaries of the community of the free could lose something of their naturalistic rigidity; but the rituals of self-celebration, and the enormous repression it was based on, persisted. In 1772 Arthur Young calculated that, out of 775 million global inhabitants, only 33 million enjoyed liberty; and they were concentrated in a fairly restricted zone of the planet, excluding Asia, Africa and virtually all of America, as well as the southern and eastern parts of Europe itself.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a theme subsequently taken up and eloquently developed by Adam Smith:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In similar vein, Millar contrasted ‘Great Britain, in which liberty is generally so well understood, and so highly valued’, with ‘all those tribes of barbarians, in different parts of the world, with which we have any correspondence’ and among whom ‘the practice of domestic slavery’ continued to rage.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Europe and the West were complacently depicted as a tiny island of liberty and civilization in a tempestuous ocean of tyranny, slavery and barbarism. In order to indulge in such self-celebration, Young, Smith and Millar were in fact obliged to overlook a far from trivial detail: the slave trade, which involved the most brutal form of slavery—chattel slavery—and in which western Europe, starting precisely with liberal England, was engaged for centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was not very different. When he published &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, there were few countries or colonies in the western hemisphere where slavery persisted, since it had been abolished in much of Latin America and the British colonies. In the interval between the publication of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg166&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;first and second volumes of the work, the United States introduced into Texas the institution that should have been synonymous with the absolute power of man over man. But this prompted no uncertainty in the French liberal when it came to identifying the American continent as the locus of liberty. Volume One of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; appeared shortly after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. But that would appear to have been an irrelevant event in the opinion of de Tocqueville, who, when it came to comparing England and the United States, had no doubt that the latter country most fully embodied the cause of liberty. And Jefferson, the president slave-owner and unyielding opponent of the country born out of a revolution by black slaves, seemed to the French liberal to be ‘the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln himself initially conducted the Civil War as a crusade against rebellion and separatism, not for the abolition of slavery, which could continue to survive in states loyal to central government. It was only later, with the recruitment of blacks into the Union army and hence with the direct intervention of slaves and ex-slaves in the conflict, that the civil war between whites was transformed into a revolution, conducted partly from above and partly from below, making the abolition of slavery inevitable. But in the first phase of the war the Union did not a priori exclude slave states from its bosom, just as liberal critics of the institution of slavery did not expel those who had a different and even contrary position on the problem from the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tendency we are examining finds fullest expression in Lieber. Cautious criticisms of the institution of slavery did not prevent him, even on the immediate eve of the Civil War, from attributing to the United States—the country that even more than England embodied the great cause of ‘liberal institutions’ and ‘self-government’—the ‘great mission’ of spreading liberty throughout the world. ‘[E]very American’ must always bear in mind the grandeur of the constitutional principles and texts of his country. Otherwise, they would resemble ‘the missionary that should proceed to convert the world without bible or prayer-book’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it was the sacred text of liberty for the liberal author, for the radicals Garrison and Phillips the US Constitution, which sanctioned slavery and the racial state, was an instrument of Satan. Over and above the very different significance assigned to the problem of slavery, here we have two opposed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg167&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;delimitations of political geography, of the camp of friends and enemies. Notwithstanding the argument and conflict over slavery, liberalism’s various exponents continued to recognize themselves as members of the same party and the same community of the free. By contrast, excluded from it were blacks, whom at an interval of decades Jefferson and Lincoln intended to deport from the Union and who, not by chance, after emancipation first in the North and then in the South did not come to enjoy either political or civil equality. Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, not to mention Lieber and Acton, could indeed criticize slavery, but it was understood that that their interlocutors were not black slaves but their masters. The latter were called upon to demonstrate moral sensitivity and political consistency and hence agree to expunge a stain that affected the credibility of the community of the free as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet’s attitude was very different. Here is how he addressed the black slaves in 1781:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dear friends, although I am not the same colour as you, I have always regarded you as my brothers. Nature has fashioned you to have the same spirit, the same reason and the same virtues as whites. I am only speaking here of whites in Europe, for when it comes to whites in the colonies, I shall not insult you by comparing them to you … Should one set off in search of a man in the islands of America, one would certainly not find him among the populations of white flesh.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The French philosopher was not yet aware of it, but the ruling group in the North American republic was on the point of being situated outside not only the party of liberty, but even the human race. What we have here is a political and ideological current different from liberalism—the radicalism that had been formed or was in the process of being formed. It might seem debatable to apply this category to an author who recommended extreme gradualism in the process of abolishing slavery. But that is not the main point. Marat himself, in 1791, proposed ‘gradually to prepare the transition from slavery to liberty’. And yet, already unequivocally condemning ‘the barbarism of the colonists’, it was not to them that he looked to make the desired change, and not even to the National Assembly which, coming to terms with the slaveholders, rode roughshod over the rights of man and ‘the sacred foundations of the Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The actual interlocutors tended to be the black slaves themselves, as would &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg168&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become clear in the course of Marat’s subsequent evolution. As for Condorcet, despite the gradualist character of his abolitionism, he deflected back onto slaveholding whites the de-humanizing drive they had mobilized against blacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was an attitude that could also develop on the basis of a profoundly Christian consciousness. Here is how Garrison expressed himself in 1841 on the subject of slave-owners:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No political, no religious copartnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the convicts at Botany Bay and New Zealand … We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But some decades earlier the English abolitionist Percival Stockdale had already declared: &#039;&#039;‘We&#039;&#039; are the savages; the Africans act like men; like beings endowed with rational and immortal minds’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, indignation at the treatment inflicted on the black slaves could even conduce to a de-humanization of the de-humanizers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regarding slaves as their interlocutors, radicals did not hesitate to appeal to a revolution from below by victims of the institution it was intended to abolish. Even prior to the revolution by San Domingo’s slaves, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; evoked a massive uprising, led by a black Spartacus, which might involve replacing the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in force by a &#039;&#039;‘Code blanc’&#039;&#039; that repaid the slaveholders for the injustices they had committed.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the liberal tradition, in Smith we can come across evocation of a dictatorship from above putting an end to the scandal of an institution that sullied the community of the free, but certainly not hopes for a revolution from below. We know the sympathy or admiration with which Grégoire and Schoelcher viewed Toussaint L’Ouverture and Haiti. These are two names that do not appear in de Tocqueville. In connection with San Domingo, he limited himself to mentioning the ‘bloody catastrophe that has put an end to its existence’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Paradoxically, the island ceased to exist the moment it put an end, for the first time in the Americas, to the institution of slavery!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg169&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Finally, Diderot reported an observation by Helvétius: ‘What is the cause of England’s extreme power? Its government.’ He followed up this assessment with a polemical question: ‘But what is the cause of the extreme poverty of Scotland and Ireland?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Judgement of the metropolis could not be separated from judgement of the colonies and semi-colonies. From the standpoint of authors like Diderot and Schoelcher, England and the United States, the holy sites of liberty in de Tocqueville’s view, were responsible for the most ferocious and barbarous despotism. Even when it criticized slavery, the liberal tradition did not question the identification of the West with civilization and of the colonial world with barbarism. Radicalism’s position was different: in the first instance, it identified and denounced barbarism in those responsible for, and complicit with, the most macroscopic violation of the rights and dignity of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels may be regarded as critical inheritors of radicalism. For the first in particular, not only was it epistemologically and politically arbitrary to ignore the politico-social reality of the colonies, but (as we shall see) those colonies were the requisite starting-point for understanding the ‘barbarism’ of bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. Liberalism, the self-celebration of the community of the free and repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The discourse developed by liberalism is profoundly marked by repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples. The self-celebration of the land of the free or the people of the free proved all the more persuasive in that it overlooked the slavery inflicted on colonial populations or populations of colonial origin. Only on this condition could Montesquieu, Blackstone and the American revolutionaries point to England or the United States as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This also applies to de Tocqueville. He lucidly and unsparingly described the inhuman treatment meted out to Indians and blacks. The former were forced to endure the ‘frightful sufferings’ attendant upon ‘forced migrations’ (the successive deportations imposed by the whites), and were even close to being wiped off the face of the earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the blacks, let us leave to one side the specifically slaveholding states of the South: What was the situation in the rest? Over and above harsh material living conditions, ‘a wretched and precarious &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg170&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;existence’, desperate poverty and a higher mortality rate than among slaves,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the notionally free black also weighed exclusion from the enjoyment of civil rights (as well as political rights): he was subjected to the ‘tyranny of the law’ and the ‘intolerance of customs’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|§7]]). And so, discounting the Far West and the South, even in the case of the free states we cannot speak of democracy or even strictly of the rule of law. But that was not the conclusion reached by de Tocqueville, who celebrated the democracy, ‘alive, active, triumphant’, he saw operative in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will see there a people among whom conditions are more equal than they have ever been among us; among whom the social structure, the customs, the laws, everything is democratic; among whom everything comes from the people and returns to it, and where, nevertheless, each individual enjoys an independence that is fuller, and a liberty that is greater, than in any other time or place on earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While he felt sympathy for the tragedy of the Indians and blacks, their fate had no epistemological relevance and in no way altered his overall political judgement. The programmatic declaration made by de Tocqueville at the start of the chapter devoted to the problem of ‘the three races that inhabit the territory of the United States’ is unequivocal: ‘The principal task that I had imposed upon myself is now performed: I have shown, as far as I was able, the laws and the customs of the American democracy. Here I might stop’. It was only in order to avoid possible disappointment on the reader’s part that de Tocqueville spoke of relations between the three ‘races’: ‘These topics are collaterally connected with my subject without forming a part of it; they are American without being democratic, and to portray democracy has been my principal aim.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Democracy could be defined and liberty lauded focusing exclusively on the white community. If, instead, we regard this abstraction as arbitrary, and bear in mind the entanglement of slavery and liberty revealed by authoritative US scholars, we cannot but be even more surprised by de Tocqueville’s epistemological than his political naivety. He celebrated as the locus of liberty one of the few countries in the New World where racial chattel slavery reigned and flourished and which, at the time of the French liberal’s journey, had as its president Andrew Jackson, slave-owner and protagonist of a policy of deporting and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;decimating the Indian; a president, moreover, who, blocking the circulation of abolitionist material by post, also struck at the freedom of expression of significant sections of the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such naivety reached its culmination in a French follower of de Tocqueville—namely, Édouard Laboulaye. He too contrasted the United States with a France plagued by constant revolutionary upheavals. In the former, he observed in 1849 in the inaugural lecture (published separately the following year) of a course devoted to US history, a Constitution characterized by extraordinary ‘wisdom’ and rejection of any ‘demagogic’ element made it possible to enjoy peace and, at the same time, the greatest liberty and ‘the most absolute political equality’—an equality that was ‘complete, absolute, in laws and customs alike’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the problem of the relations between the three races referred to by de Tocqueville, nothing remains in the text we are examining but the celebration of the remarkable successes achieved by ‘a nation of European race’, by this ‘strong race of emigrants’ or this ‘people of Puritans’—in other words, the ‘American race’. Even if it was a story that had unfolded across the Atlantic, it covered ‘our race’ (European and white) as a whole in glory.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a view reiterated ten years later, in an emotional essay published on the occasion of de Tocqueville’s death: the homage paid to the author of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; ended with homage to the ‘beautiful federal Constitution that has protected the liberty of the United States for seventy years’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are on the eve of the Civil War. But even its outbreak does not seem to have prompted any second thoughts in Laboulaye: it was understood that ‘complete, candid, sincere liberty’ reigned in the United States. The bloody conflict underway demonstrated the ‘courage’ of a ‘free people who sacrificed everything to maintain the unity’ of the country.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when reconstructing the history of America in the colonial period did Laboulaye feel obliged to confront the issue of slavery. Although mitigated by reference to ‘climate’ (which rendered work intolerable for whites but not blacks), historical circumstances (at the time it was at its height, ‘the slave trade was regarded as a pious undertaking’), and the particular characteristics of the people subjected to it (it involved a ‘race of eternal minors’),[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] condemnation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg172&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the institution was sharp. In the first volume, whose Preface is dated 1855, we read:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In half of the United States there are two societies established on the same soil: the one powerful, active, united and prudent; the other weak, disunited, indifferent and exploited like cattle. And yet this despised herd is a constant threat to America … The stain that soils this great society places it beneath Europe.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although sketching this realistic picture, the Preface continued to celebrate the United States indiscriminately as the privileged site of liberty, guaranteed and guarded by an ‘admirable Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However hard the lot of the blacks—silence persisted about the Indians—it was irrelevant when it came to formulating an overall judgement of the country under investigation. But there is more. Laboulaye acknowledged that slavery made its oppressive influence felt on the white master himself: he was denied the right to educate and emancipate his own slave, even if he or she was a child born from a relationship with a slave. He was required by law to inflict even the most drastic of punishments, including castration, on the guilty slave.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although criticized, these serious interferences with the individual freedom of white property-owners did not in the slightest darken the bright picture we already know.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1864 Laboulaye denounced the privilege granted by the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision to the ‘particular, superior race’ made up of the ‘great lords’ of the South who were the slave-owners (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). But if things stood thus, if inequality marked relations within the elite itself, if even within the white community there was a privileged ‘particular race’, what was the meaning of the claim that the United States was characterized by ‘the most absolute political equality’? Laboulaye felt no need to revise his positions. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to reiterate them in the Preface to the third volume, which continued to celebrate the American Revolution as the sole genuinely democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like colonies in the strict sense, Ireland continued to be ignored. In the course of his journey to the British Isles, de Tocqueville visited the unhappy island and described its desperate situation unsparingly. It was not simply that ‘the poverty is horrible’; denied here was liberal freedom itself, crushed by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg173&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘military tribunals’ and a ‘large gendarmerie hated by the people’. At this point a comparison between England and Ireland occurred: ‘The two aristocracies I have referred to have the same origin, the same customs and almost the same laws. Yet the one has for centuries given the English one of the best governments in the world, while the other has given the Irish one of the most detestable imaginable’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is an astonishing statement: not only are readers not informed that the aristocracy dominant in Ireland was itself British or of British origin, but they have the impression that they are dealing with two different countries, not two regions of a single state, subject to the authority of the same government and the same crown.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can then understand de Tocqueville’s admiring conclusion: ‘I see the Englishman secure under the protection of his laws’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, the Irish were not subsumed under the category of ‘English’, but such non-subsumption does not seem to be a problem, does not affect the laudatory judgement passed on the country visited and held up as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The colonial question and the differential development of radicalism in France, England and the United States&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Reference has sometimes been made to ‘philosophic radicalism’ in connection with Bentham and his school.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theorist of utilitarianism adopted a debunking tone towards his country’s political, legal and ideological tradition. He did hesitate to denounce the ‘almost universal corruption’ that raged in England and the ill-starred role of a ‘corrupted and corrupting aristocracy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He did not even spare the Glorious Revolution, despite the religious aura habitually surrounding it: the &#039;&#039;‘original compact&#039;&#039;—the compact between king and people—was a fabulous one—the &#039;&#039;supervening&#039;&#039; compact—the compact between King, Lords, and Commons, was but too real a one’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and sanctioned the domination of an oligarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is sufficient to look at the attitude Bentham took towards the liberal tradition’s exclusion clauses to realize that we are very far removed from &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg174&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;radicalism in the sense specified here. Of the refuse and ‘dross’ and those confined in workhouses, we have already spoken. We must now concern ourselves with the condition of the blacks. Bentham included ‘the still unabrogated sanction given to domestic slavery on account of difference of colour’ among the ‘imperfections of detail’ to be found even in the ‘matchlessly felicitous system’ of the United States.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from this rather euphemistic description of the institution of slavery, the English liberal stressed that a project of emancipation must proceed with extreme gradualism, and be implemented exclusively from above. In a text from 1822, we come across a significant declaration: ‘The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are led to think of the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. But instead, as a note makes clear, the reference is to Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for gradualism, this was necessary for the purposes not only of respecting ‘rights of property’ (which must be compensated for the loss suffered), but also of educating slaves for liberty.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bentham wanted an emancipation ‘lottery’ that might occur at the moment of hereditary transmission of this special property, and from which one-tenth of the slaves owned by the deceased could benefit. An appeal to masters to demonstrate flexibility was the counterpart of indignant condemnation of any initiative from below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The injustice and the calamity which have accompanied precipitate attempts, form the greatest objection against projects of emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This operation need not be suddenly carried into effect by a violent revolution, which, by displeasing every body, destroying all property, and placing all persons in situations for which they were not fitted, might produce evils a thousand times greater than all the benefits that can be expected from it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Unquestionably, the prime site of the formation of radicalism, in the sense I have defined it, was France. It is easy to see why. The country was favourably disposed to accommodate it following defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of a large number of colonies. Subsequently, the controversy that developed either side of the Atlantic on the occasion of the English colonists’ rebellion ended up discrediting both fractions of the liberal party. The American Revolution, with its development of relations of equality within the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg175&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;white community and clear demarcation from the world of feudal privilege, galvanized harsher criticism of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France and the crisis of the English model. Disenchantment with the non-abolition of slavery in America and the emergence of an unprecedented racial state also threw the American model into crisis. The roots of French radicalism lay in this dual crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what was its influence across the Channel and the Atlantic? The problem can be reformulated as follows. Liberal England, derived from the Glorious Revolution, and especially the American Revolution, made a powerful contribution to the ideological preparation of the French Revolution and subsequently, through the crisis of the two models, to the formation of radicalism. But why did the latter not seem to take deep root in the two classical countries of the liberal tradition? Obviously, the vexed course of the revolution and the explosion of the Terror immediately damaged France’s powers of attraction. A far from negligible role in frustrating the diffusion of radicalism was also played by repression. In England in 1794 habeas corpus was suspended for eight years; a further suspension followed in 1817; while two years later there occurred what has passed into history as the Peterloo Massacre or (to put it in the indignant words of an English paper of the time) the ‘slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, unprovoked and unnecessary’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Suffering deportation to Australia and meeting with a horrible fate, sometimes dying under the lashes of merciless flogging, were members of workers’ societies, clubs that were or more or less Jacobin in orientation, and Chartists engaged in the struggle to extend the suffrage, not to mention ‘Irish dissidents’ for whom ‘Australia was the official Siberia … at the turn of the century’. In total, ‘between 1800 and 1850 … about 1,800 were deported for political “crimes”. Among them were representatives of nearly every protest movement known to the British Government’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, the repression also struck circles that regarded violent revolution by black slaves as legitimate, or even invoked it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1798 the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in the United States, containing serious restrictions on constitutional liberties, granting the president a wide range of discretionary power and particularly hitting followers of ideas suspected of being influenced by the French Revolution. And we already know about the violence, predominantly from below, to which abolitionists were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, neither the Terror in France nor the repression in Britain and the United States suffice to explain the weakness of radicalism across the Channel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg176&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or the Atlantic. The analysis must be taken further. In England the outbreak of war made it possible for the dominant class to present as a patriotic duty the struggle against the revolutionary fanaticism raging in France, and which threatened to spread to Ireland, posing a mortal risk to the British Empire. As for the United States, it is interesting to observe the debate which, on the eve of the war against Britain that broke out in 1812, involved two prestigious representatives of the South. The first, Randolph, declared himself against the opening of hostilities. The situation was full of peril on the home front, where the ‘infernal principles of French liberty’ risked provoking a revolt by slaves; ‘[t]he French Revolution has polluted them.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Calhoun, by contrast, did not share these concerns. Certainly, attention should be paid to the slaves’ moods, but happily ‘more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So radicalism, with its recognition of the right of black slaves or Irish semi-slaves to take up arms against their masters, posed a serious threat to the stability of the United States and the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The lesser weight of the colonial question, or of populations of colonial origin, also helps explain the greater diffusion of radicalism in France. When the black revolution in San Domingo broke out, radical circles in Paris had no great difficulty recognizing and legitimating the fait accompli. Even if there was a risk of losing the remaining colonies, as anti-abolitionists never tired of warning, that would not be an irreparable tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation was different when it came to Britain and the United States. The black revolution in San Domingo provoked a wave of indignation in both countries. ‘A Black State in the Western Archipelago’, wrote &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, ‘is utterly incompatible with the system of all European colonisation.’ And hence ‘Europe will, of course, recover in that quarter the ascendancy and dominion which it justly claims from the superior wisdom and talents of its inhabitants’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The United States not only refused to recognize the country born of a black revolution, but did everything it could to isolate, weaken and overthrow it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson distinguished himself in this operation. At first sight he seems closest to radicalism. In January 1793, without allowing himself to be impressed by the charges against the Jacobins levelled by his former private secretary (referring to Paris, he spoke of ‘streets … literally red with blood’), he continued passionately to defend the ‘cause’ of the French Revolution: ‘rather than it &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg177&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam &amp;amp;amp; an Eve left in every country, &amp;amp;amp; left free, it would be better than it now is.’ Moreover, Jefferson positively contrasted France with the United States, where Anglophiles regarded the 1787 Constitution, with the very wide powers it conferred on the president and executive, as a first step towards the establishment of a monarchy.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the picture changed markedly following the black revolution in San Domingo. We know that Jefferson interpreted the principle of equality in radical fashion, but always within the ambit of the white community. He never believed in the possibility of whites and blacks coexisting on an equal basis: it would represent an unjustifiable challenge to ‘the real distinctions which nature has made’ and end in ‘the extermination of the one or the other race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the conflict between white owners and black slaves exploded on the Caribbean island, the North American statesman’s sympathy immediately went to the former; his anxiety about ‘the revolutionary storm now sweeping the globe’ was profound. Hence his support for the invading army sent by Napoleon, which did not cease even in the face of recourse to revolting practices, such as the introduction of trained dogs to tear blacks to pieces and the organization around such events of mass spectacles, at once thrilling and educative.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. The liberal ebb of Christian radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States radicalism took shape on a Christian basis. Interpretation of the conflict in religious terms in fact involved serious limitations. Scarce attention was paid to the humiliation and oppression blacks also suffered in the North: this was a condition which did not take the immediately obvious form of slavery and sin. With the end of the Civil War, the abolitionist movement soon split, and thus was not in a position to offer theoretical, and still less practical, resistance to the regime of terroristic white supremacy that asserted itself in the South after the (anti-black) compromise of 1877 between the two sections of the white community. The weight of racial prejudice was too strong, and only the massive, prolonged presence of Union troops could have &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#page178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#pg178&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;guaranteed blacks the enjoyment of political rights and full recognition of their civil rights. But all this would have involved too serious a violation of the liberal principle of self-government. Among the theorists of abolitionism, possibly the only one who was inclined to go the whole way on the road of imposing the principle of racial equality by force of arms was Wendell Phillips. But when in 1875 he sought to set out his reasons at an assembly in Boston, he was brusquely silenced. The previous year, a senator from the South had observed with satisfaction: &#039;&#039;‘Radicalism&#039;&#039; is dissolving—going to pieces’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, local self-government was reasserted, but radical democracy disappeared and the Calvary of the blacks resumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, what prompted Anglo-American Christian abolitionism to condemnation of the sin of slavery was sympathy for a people largely converted to Christianity, who regarded Christianity as an instrument with which to overcome the condition of total de-humanization and achieve a minimum of recognition. Liberated from an obsession with sin and complicity in sin thanks to the abolition of slavery, Parker believed that there was no political solution to the persistent problem of the discrimination and injustice suffered by blacks: one could only place hope in the matrimonial fusion of the two races or the beneficent effects of the infusion of ‘dreadful Anglo-saxon blood’ in black veins. In a sense, this was a radical perspective, strongly counter to the dominant ideology. However, rather than on organizing the oppressed blacks, attention focused on overcoming the prejudices on the part of the oppressors that cemented barriers of race and caste. Radicalism thus tended to be reabsorbed by liberalism. Things were even worse for the Indians, regarded as savages and pagans. Parker had no hesitation in justifying the policy of ‘continual aggression, invasion, and extermination’ pursued by the indomitable people that were the Anglo-Saxons.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the end of the Civil War gave new impetus to the march into the Far West. The influence of the colonial question once again intervenes to explain the weakness of American radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. Liberal socialism and radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Much more so than Bentham, it was Kant who came close to radicalism. His clear adoption of a position favourable to revolutionary France is not so significant. More relevant is the fact that, intervening in 1795, a year after the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, with clear critical reference to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg179&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;England, &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039; identified ‘the sugar cane islands’ as the ‘site of the cruellest slavery that has ever been imagined’. There were two further decisive elements. Like the French radicals—we must not forget that the colonial question weighed even less heavily on Germany than France—Kant problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism: it was England that now represented the cause of ‘slavery and barbarism’. Finally, quite unlike the liberals, he did not confine himself to criticizing Pitt, whom he said was rightly ‘hated as an enemy of the human race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The German philosopher’s radicalism did not escape his contemporaries: while Goethe regarded his attitude towards England as scarcely ‘liberal’, Wilhelm von Humboldt sharply distanced himself from the ‘democratism’ pervading &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, rather than Bentham, it was John Stuart Mill who approximated to radicalism, when he identified slavery as ‘the most flagrant of all possible violations’ of liberal principles and branded those who defended it ‘the powers of evil’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, along with ‘the noble body of Abolitionists’, Mill also celebrated John Brown, author of the failed attempt to get the slaves of the southern United States to rise up.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a text of 1824 the English philosopher expressed his sympathy for the cause of the blacks of San Domingo–Haiti, whom the Napoleonic expedition vainly sought half to ‘exterminate’ and half to reduce to conditions of slavery once again.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Putting clear distance between himself and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries, Mill did not seem to recoil in horror from the prospect of a revolution from below by black slaves. And yet, in another respect, he was the theorist of a new ‘slavery’, temporary and pedagogical in kind, for ‘savages’ (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English author asserted that the final stage of his development was characterized by gravitation towards ‘socialism’ and, at the same time, renewed distrust of ‘democracy’. What caused and justified the latter was ‘the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Already problematic in the metropolis, democracy proved decidedly dangerous and inadvisable when it came to the colonies and peoples of colonial origin (including Afro-Americans). Theorist of the planetary despotism of the West, Mill seems equally remote from radical, ‘abolitionist democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg180&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused. Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ can be envisaged restrictively for the ‘master race’ and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin. At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism, but without crossing it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference to Zionism, Arendt drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a peculiar tendency. It was characterized, on the one hand, by support for ‘chauvinist’ objectives and, on the other, by commitment to pursuing collectivist experiments and a ‘rigorous realization of social justice’ within its own community. Thus crystallized ‘a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach and revolutionary social reforms domestically, with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy’, and in the field of relations with colonial peoples.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, ‘master-race democracy’ can also go further and take the form of ‘master-race socialism’, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as ‘master race’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in 1860, during the Second Opium War, a Franco-British expedition destroyed the Summer Palace, it was Victor Hugo who proved to be the inheritor of radicalism with his denunciation of the barbarity committed by self-styled civilizers, while for Mill, as for the liberal culture of the time, there continued to be few doubts about the complete identity between the West and civilization (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|§3]] and [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn1a|1]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, trans. Ernest Dilworth, New York: Mineola, 2003, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn3a|3]] Claude-Adrien Helvétius, &#039;&#039;De l’homme&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vols 7–12, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–69, vol. 8, p. 86. For the criticism of Helvétius, cf. Denis Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘L’homme’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Laurent Versini, vol. 1, Paris: Laffont, 1994, p. 862.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn4a|4]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Paul Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1963, p. 41 (article on &#039;&#039;Représentants&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn6a|6]] Cf. Gabriel Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1931, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn7a|7]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 47, 49, 55.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn8a|8]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn9a|9]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 230–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn10a|10]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 47–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn13a|13]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 55–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn17a|17]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. 2–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn18a|18]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn19a|19]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 167, 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn20a|20]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, pp. 31, 106.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Manuskripte über die polnische Frage&#039;&#039;, ed. Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1961, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn22a|22]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn23a|23]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Gedanken und Erinnerungen&#039;&#039;, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1928, pp. 51–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn24a|24]] Furet and Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn25a|25]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 384–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn26a|26]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn27a|27]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn29a|29]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn30a|30]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, p. 1078.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn31a|31]] Franco Venturi, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90, vol. 3, pp. 383, 398–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn32a|32]] Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique&#039;&#039;, pp. 133ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn33a|33]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 8, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn36a|36]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Saggio sui regni di Claudio e di Nerone e sui costume e gli scritti di Seneca&#039;&#039;, trans. Secondo Carpanetto and Luciano Guerci, Palermo: Sellerio, 1987, pp. 327–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn37a|37]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, pp. 31, 34, 33; Bernard Faÿ, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1925, p. 62 (for the translation of substantial extracts in France).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn38a|38]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 957–8 (letter to Diodati, 3 August 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn39a|39]] Étienne Clavière and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1996, pp. 64, 95 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 340.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn42a|42]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn43a|43]] Cf. Joel H. Wiener, &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983, vol. 1, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn44a|44]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 7, pp. 162–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn45a|45]] François-Noël Babeuf, &#039;&#039;Écrits&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Mazauric, 1988, p. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn46a|46]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn48a|48]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant&#039;&#039;, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn49a|49]] Clavière and Brissot, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, pp. 324–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn50a|50]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn52a|52]] Fay, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire&#039;&#039;, pp. 132–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn53a|53]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française et la fin des colonies&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1988, pp. 189–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn54a|54]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 27, 33–4. Cf. Carminella Biondi, &#039;&#039;Mon frère, tu es mon esclave&#039;&#039;, Pisa: Libreria Goliardica, 1973, pp. 23–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn56a|56]] Antoine-P.-J. M. Barnave, &#039;&#039;Introduction à la révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Fernand Rude, Paris: Colin, 1960, pp. 13, 18, 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn58a|58]] See articles 44–46 of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 178–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn59a|59]] Jean-Pierre Biondi and François Zuccarelli, &#039;&#039;16 pluviôse an II&#039;&#039;, Paris: Denoël, 1989, pp. 48, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn60a|60]] Mirabeau, quoted in Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 86 n. 4 (speech in National Assembly, 3 July 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn61a|61]] Mirabeau, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn62a|62]] Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 43–4; Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 388.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn63a|63]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 82–3, 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn64a|64]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 47.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn65a|65]] See Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes&#039;&#039;, trans. David Bailie Warden, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1997, pp. 42–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn66a|66]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn67a|67]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn68a|68]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 471.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 194–202 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;, 239–40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn71a|71]] Sonthonax, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 82.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn72a|72]] Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau&#039;&#039;, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996, pp. 50–1, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., p. 83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., p. 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn77a|77]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Des colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998, p. 242 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., pp. 166, 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn80a|80]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Esclavage et colonisation&#039;&#039;, ed. Émile Tersen, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn82a|82]] Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution francaise&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn83a|83]] Sir Thomas Aston, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn84a|84]] Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 161–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn85a|85]] Richard Hocquellet, ‘Crise de la monarchie hispanique et question coloniale ‘, in Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny, eds, &#039;&#039;Rétablissement de l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn86a|86]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 407, 760.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn87a|87]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 345–7; Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn88a|88]] Simón Bolívar, &#039;&#039;Obras completas&#039;&#039;, ed. Vicente Lecuna, Caracas: Ministerio de Educación nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; vol. 3, p. 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 170.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 679.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 685, 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 694.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 682.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn94a|94]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 381.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn95a|95]] Michael Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn96a|96]] Albert Gallatin, quoted in Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Hart Benton, quoted in ibid., p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn98a|98]] Jefferson, quoted in Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn99a|99]] Madison, quoted in ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn100a|100]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 202, 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn101a|101]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 388, 395–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn102a|102]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 245–61, in particular p. 257 (for the quotation from Walker).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn103a|103]] Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 270.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn104a|104]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn105a|105]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, pp. xx–xxi (letter to Robert E. Lee).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn107a|107]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn108a|108]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 324, 327.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 125.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 189–90 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 10 January 1857), p. 193 (letter to E. V. Childe, 2 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 195–6 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 13 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 190 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 4 September 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn113a|113]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 260–3, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn114a|114]] Henri-Alexandre Wallon, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974, p. v.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn115a|115]] See the letter from Granier de Cassagnac published in &#039;&#039;Journal des Débats&#039;&#039;, 23 July 1841.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn116a|116]] Thiers, quoted in Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn117a|117]] Cf. ibid., pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn118a|118]] André-Jean Tudesq, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 842.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn119a|119]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn120a|120]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 163, 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn121a|121]] Emília Viotti da Costa, &#039;&#039;Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn122a|122]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 195–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn123a|123]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn124a|124]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from Wesley to Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn125a|125]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn126a|126]] Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 387, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn127a|127]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, Ibid., pp. 387–90, 395.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn128a|128]] Parker, quoted in Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1978, p. 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn129a|129]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn130a|130]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn131a|131]] Parker, quoted in ibid., pp. 208, 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn132a|132]] Phillips, quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 1–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn133a|133]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn134a|134]] Garrison, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn135a|135]] Garrison, quoted in Aileen S. Kraditor, &#039;&#039;Means and Ends in American Abolitionism&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn136a|136]] Garrison, quoted in ibid., p. 86.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn137a|137]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 528–31, 261–2, 469.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn138a|138]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn139a|139]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn140a|140]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 1, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn141a|141]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1987, p. 208 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn143a|143]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 451–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn144a|144]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289, 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn145a|145]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn146a|146]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 264, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn147a|147]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn148a|148]] Cf. &#039;&#039;L’Ami du peuple&#039;&#039;, 18 May 1791, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, pp. 120–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn149a|149]] Garrison, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn150a|150]] Stockdale, quoted in David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn151a|151]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn152a|152]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn153a|153]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn154a|154]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 339, 354–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368 and n. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn156a|156]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 174 (speech to the Constituent Assembly, 12 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn157a|157]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn158a|158]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;De la Constitution américaine et de l’utilité de son étude&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hennuyer, 1850, pp. 10–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., pp. 6, 9–10, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn160a|160]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;L’état et ses limites suivi d’essais politiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn161a|161]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. viii–ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn162a|162]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, pp. 420–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn163a|163]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 431.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn164a|164]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. vi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn165a|165]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 425–7, 430.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn166a|166]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94, 128, 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn167a|167]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn168a|168]] See Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn169a|169]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 3, p. 442.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn170a|170]] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn172a|172]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn173a|173]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn174a|174]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 346.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn175a|175]] The text, taken from &#039;&#039;Sherwin’s Weekly Political Register&#039;&#039;, 18 August 1819, is quoted in Paola Casana Testore and Narciso Nada, &#039;&#039;L’età della Restaurazione&#039;&#039;, Turin: Loescher, 1981, pp. 226–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn176a|176]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, pp. 181, 195.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn177a|177]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 325–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn178a|178]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn179a|179]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 293.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn180a|180]] Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn181a|181]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1004 (letter to William Short, 3 January 1793). On all this, see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, &#039;&#039;The Age of Federalism&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 316–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn182a|182]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn183a|183]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 386; Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, pp. 197, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn184a|184]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1989, pp. 554, 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn185a|185]] Slotkin, &#039;&#039;Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, pp. 232, 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186a|186]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso&#039;&#039;, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187a|187]] Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 177, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188a|188]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 1, pp. 266–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189a|189]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190a|190]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 304–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191a|191]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192a|192]] Tocqueville mentions this critically in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193a|193]] Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, &#039;&#039;The Menorah Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 33, October 1945, pp. 171, 169, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SIX ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg181&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The excluded and the struggle for recognition&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the liberal tradition is shot through with two macroscopic exclusion clauses. In reality, there is a third—that directed at women, which in fact presents peculiar characteristics. When they belonged to the upper classes, they formed part, albeit in a subordinate role, of the community of the free; one thinks, in particular, of female slave-owners. The women’s liberation movement was only able to acquire a mass social base later, when women previously confined to a position of slavery or restricted to the inferior levels of a caste society were able to participate in it. The development of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is explained, in the first instance, by the struggle waged by the bipedal machines of the metropolis, on the one hand, and slaves and colonial populations or populations of colonial origin, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In both cases, even more than for the achievement of specific objectives, the excluded protested against the fact that the dignity of man was denied them. This was a struggle for recognition—in the sense specified by Hegel in a celebrated chapter of &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;. The shackled black depicted by abolitionist propaganda demanded freedom, stressing (in the text attached to the image) that he too was a ‘man’. In his turn, Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the San Domingo revolution, invoked ‘the absolute adoption of the principle that no man, whether red, black or white, can be the property of his fellow being’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similar accents could be heard in Paris immediately &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg182&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;following the July Revolution, when popular periodicals accused ‘bourgeois notables’ of insisting on viewing workers not as ‘men’ but ‘machines’, nothing but ‘machines’ called upon to produce exclusively for the ‘needs’ of their masters. After the revolution of February 1848, the achievement by proletarians of political rights demonstrated in their view that they too were finally beginning to be raised to the ‘rank of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Condorcet emphatically recognized this status in black slaves, but denied it to their white masters. Similarly, Engels, referring to the English workers whom he was ‘happy and proud’ to have known and who suffered a ‘slavery worse than that of the American negroes’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] exclaimed: ‘I have found you to be men, members of the great, universal family of humanity’ who proclaimed ‘the cause of humanity’, trampled underfoot by capitalists engaged in an ‘indirect trade in human flesh’, in a barely disguised slave trade.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corresponding to the struggle of the excluded to be recognized in their dignity as men was the polemic against the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the other side. In the liberal camp the most celebrated intervention was Burke’s. His condemnation of this subversive theory was absolute: it paved the way for the political and social demands of ‘hair-dressers’ and ‘tallow-chandlers’, ‘to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments’, for the demands of the ‘swinish multitude’, or at any rate people whose ‘sordid mercenary occupation’ entailed ‘a mean contracted view of things’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades later, in Bentham’s view the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was nothing but a pile of ‘anarchical fallacies’. It sanctioned &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; between all men? The English liberal’s comment was sarcastic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;All men&#039;&#039; (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) &#039;&#039;remain equal in rights&#039;&#039;. The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master; he has as much liberty with relation to the master, as the master has with relation to him; he has as much right to command and to punish him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And hence the ‘absurd principle of &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; can only please “fanatics” and the “ignorant multitude”‘. The Declaration referred to law as an expression of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg183&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘general will’? But it is clear that therewith censitary restrictions of the vote could not be justified. The very theorization of property right contained in this solemn text was suspect to Bentham: the concrete object of such right was not clearly specified, and hence it involved a right which, once again, belonged ‘to every individual, without any limit’, even the propertyless person suffering from hunger:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, a universal property right is established—that is, everything is common to everyone. But because what belongs to everyone belongs to no one, what follows from it is that the effect of the Declaration is not to establish property but to destroy it. And that is how it was understood by Babeuf’s supporters, those true interpreters of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, who can be criticized for nothing but being consistent in applying the most false and absurd of principles.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Condemning these abstract ‘general principles’, for which Britain rightly displayed ‘extreme repugnance’ and which, when pronounced by ‘famished mouths’, could only result in catastrophe, Bentham referred to Malouet, one of the few in France to have attempted to dispel ‘the cloud of confused ideas’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, it was the Anglomanes who sought to block the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In appealing to ‘general principles’ and ‘metaphysical’ concepts, Malouet warned, people were playing with fire: they risked inciting the ‘immense multitude of propertyless men’, ‘the unfortunate classes of society’, ‘the men placed by fate in a condition of dependency’ and ‘lacking enlightenment and means’. They must be taught ‘just limits’, rather than the ‘extension of natural liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that one of those to adopt a clear position against the category of rights of man was Malouet, who subsequently played a prominent part in the argument against abolitionism. It was this second aspect that played a central role in the United States, where within the white community the social question did not have the significance it possessed in France, but where the conflict over black slavery became increasingly impassioned. A particular target was the statement (contained in the Declaration of Independence) that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg184&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all men are created equal’, with the right to enjoy ‘certain unalienable Rights’. Present in it was the ‘metaphysical folly’ that subsequently found more concentrated expression in the French Revolution. This was the charge formulated by the ‘American Burke’—namely, Randolph—who in this context explicitly appealed to the British liberal.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Born in the wake of the revolt against the alleged ‘imprescriptible rights of the king’ invoked by the British Crown, the United States now risked succumbing to the folly of the ‘imprescriptible rights of black slaves’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In similar fashion, Calhoun drew attention to the ‘poisonous fruits’ of that ‘place in the declaration of our independence’ which claimed to confer ‘the same right to liberty and equality’ on all men. This was the abolitionists’ starting-point in the fanatical struggle they had unleashed against black slavery and ‘Southern institutions’ as ‘outrageous on the rights of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, it was with his focus mainly on the colonies that Disraeli characterized the ‘rights of man’ as ‘nonsense’ in 1880.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The struggle for recognition waged by colonial populations or populations of colonial origin proved particularly long and complex. It would only achieve decisive results in the twentieth century. For now we must turn our attention to the struggle waged by the bipedal machines in the capitalist metropolis and within the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The instrument of labour becomes a passive citizen&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The social and political milieus which, on either side of the Atlantic, celebrated themselves as the community of the free understood by liberty not only the undisturbed enjoyment of the private sphere. Exclusion from representative bodies and political life was also perceived as an expression of despotism. On the other hand, denial of political rights to those with no title to be recognized as members of the community of the free seemed self-evidently proper. How could the ‘horse’ or ‘beast of burden’ to which Locke and Mandeville compared the wage-labourer, or the ‘speaking instrument’, ‘bipedal instrument’ or ‘work machine’ that Burke and Sieyès referred to, claim to form part of it? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg185&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In other words, those who continued to be defined via the categories used by Aristotle to conceptualize the figure of the slave could not enjoy political citizenship. If they were men, they were members of a different, inferior people; they were barbarians (the quintessential slaves).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the French case at least, the picture began to change significantly with the revolution. For some time Sieyès spoke nonchalantly of wage-labourers as the set of ‘work machines’ and ‘bipedal machines’, or of the ‘always childlike multitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But after 14 July 1789, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed, he felt a new need—the need for greater ‘clarity of language’. Hence a distinction between ‘natural and civil rights’, or ‘passive rights’, on the one hand, and ‘political rights’, or ‘active rights’, on the other. The first, which included the protection of the ‘person’, ‘property’ and ‘liberty’, applied to every man. The former bipedal machine now saw his dignity not only as a man but also as a citizen recognized, albeit a ‘passive citizen’ excluded from participation in political life, like ‘women’, ‘children’ and ‘foreigners’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are in the presence of a significant innovation. Just as ‘free labour’ had long been an oxymoron, because labour was in reality synonymous with &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, so the category of ‘passive citizen’ had long sounded like an oxymoron. He who was subject to the necessity of labour, and hence to &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, was by definition excluded from the group of freemen, who enjoyed liberty and citizenship to the full. For Locke it was meaningless to grant political rights to those who, as we have seen, were ‘made slaves’ by destitution, need, labour and the servitude implicit in this—and who did not form part of civil society, whose purpose was the defence of property. Blackstone argued in similar fashion: the right to vote could not be extended to ‘persons of indigent fortunes’, who by that token were ‘under the immediate domination of others’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, Constant resorted to the same justification when he excluded the wage-labourer from the enjoyment of political rights: he lacked ‘the necessary revenue to subsist independently of any external will’ and ‘property holders are the masters of his existence, since they may refuse him work.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is especially interesting to observe the development of the first major theorists of passive citizenship. In September 1789 Sieyès still did not hesitate to define as ‘forced’ the labour of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg186&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘uneducated multitude’, which was therefore ‘lacking freedom’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to pose the problem of conferring political liberty on someone destined to be deprived of liberty as such. On the contrary, it might be asked if it was not appropriate to transform the actually existing ‘slavery of need’ into a ‘legally sanctioned slavery’, in accordance with the model adopted in America for indentured white servants.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French Revolution challenged the configuration of the servant as a mere instrument of labour. The figure now emerged of the purely passive citizen, which in fact had a long gestation period behind it. A significant role was played by an exigency internal to the community of the free, interested in imparting credibility to its discourse and self-celebration. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone on the one hand recognized and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, even highlighted the &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; to which the wage-labourer was—and must be—subject. On the other, they celebrated England as the land of the free, where there was no place for ‘perfect slavery’ (Locke), ‘slavery in the strict sense’ (Blackstone), or colonial slavery (Mandeveille). In the nineteenth century Burke observed that among the subaltern classes the ‘common blessing’ of liberty ‘may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is here an obvious concern to stress the liberty of the wage-labourer, who is called upon not to let himself be vexed and misled by the harshness of his material living conditions, but to identify with an order that, despite everything, guarantees him liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ideological dimension of this discourse clearly emerges from reading an eighteenth-century English author. Compared with legal coercion of the labourer–slave, Joseph Townsend regarded economic compulsion as more effective. It silently but unfailingly imposed obedience on servants, terrorized by the prospect of death from starvation. Taken for granted was the power exercised by ‘the more delicate’, who were excused work and ‘left at liberty, without interruption’, over those who, in one way or another, must be forced to perform ‘the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the transition from one condition to the other, coercion had not disappeared, but become more imperious. This did not prevent the English liberal pastor from painting an edifying picture of his country: even the poorest was a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg187&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘freeman’, who supplied ‘free service’ on the basis of ‘his own judgement and discretion’, without the ‘compulsion’ to which the ‘slave’ was subjected.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the figure of the passive citizen there is something more. It is the expression of an exigency internal to the community of the free, but also and above all a response to the struggle for recognition waged by servants in the metropolis. At least potentially, the idea of universal citizenship, even if merely passive in a majority of cases, called into question the caste ordering of society with which Townsend continued to identify. Precisely on account of its novelty, the category of citizen did not impose itself at a stroke on Sieyès, who compared non-property-owners to ‘foreigners’ and ‘children’: the slave too was a foreigner—in fact, the foreigner par excellence, the barbarian. Or he was a child, and as such formed part of the master’s extended family. In this sense, Constant was less shrewd than Sieyès, given that he continued to refer to non-property-owners excluded from political rights primarily as ‘foreigners’ and ‘minors’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The category of ‘passive citizenship’ possessed the further advantage of answering Rousseau’s objection, subsequently taken up by Robespierre. In a well-ordered state, the Genevan philosopher had stressed, no-one should be able to feel himself a ‘stranger’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly distancing himself from absolute monarchy and aristocracy, where a single individual or a few individuals could say they had a ‘homeland’, while everyone else was stateless, it was a question of constructing a society, a ‘democratic regime’, the Jacobin leader later reiterated, where ‘the state is genuinely the homeland of all individuals’, all of them admitted on an equal footing ‘to the rights of the citizen in full’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, if not exactly in the strict sense of the term, the proletarian was likewise a citizen, a member of the ‘nation’ dear to Sieyès that Boulainvilliers and the nobility had wrongly wanted to divide into an aristocratic people, descended from the victorious Franks, and a plebeian people, descended from the vanquished Gallo-Romans.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The invention of passive citizenship and negative liberty and the restriction of the political sphere&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg188&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Compelled by the struggle waged by the excluded to grant them at least passive citizenship, the community of the free now found itself facing a new challenge to its exclusivism. Already in June 1790, Marat had a representative of the ‘unlucky ones’ to whom political citizenship was denied argue thus against the ‘aristocracy of the rich’: ‘In your eyes we are still the rabble’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And we have seen Robespierre compare non-property-owners excluded from political rights to slaves: the concession of passive citizenship did not end the struggle for recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Constant sought to answer the objections of the most radical currents that had emerged during the French Revolution. No, the non-property-owner excluded from the enjoyment of political rights could not be confused with the slave.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the latter, the former, in common with all other citizens, was protected by laws and enjoyed full liberty within his private sphere. And this was what modern liberty consisted in. During the conflict with the monarchy, the community of the free in England and America had demanded a very different liberty, since it was in no way prepared to renounce administering public affairs. But it is clear that this platform could not survive the emergence of a struggle by the popular masses, which protested against exclusion from political rights and at the same time sought to change their labour relations and material living conditions. The dominant elite now developed a very different discourse: participation in political life was not an essential element of liberty; and, in the second place, labour relations and material living conditions pertained to an eminently private sphere, so that it was absurd and illegitimate to seek to change them through political action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new discourse did not impose itself at a stroke and wholly consistently. Constant let slip the admission that the provider of work was in fact ‘master’ of the worker’s ‘existence’. But even more significant is the oscillation we find in Macaulay. Fighting in 1831 for the political emancipation of Jews, the British liberal unhesitatingly rejected the thesis that a distinction should be made between civil rights and political rights, and that exclusion from the latter was not a factor of ‘mortification’ and discrimination. In reality, this was sophistry designed to justify ‘a system full of absurdity and injustice’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg189&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;polemic was incisive and effective, but the liberal author was careful not to intervene on behalf of the British popular masses as well as of property-owners whose religion was Judaism!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar consideration applies to other exponents of the liberal tradition. In regarding the enjoyment of political rights as an essential element of liberty, the Jacobins argued no differently from the American revolutionaries. But in Burke the proposal of ‘conciliation’ of the rebel colonists, who with their demand for the right to representation had confirmed that they were worthy members of the community of the free, was followed by the proclamation of a crusade against a revolution led by the mob, which had demanded and wrested political rights. As to de Tocqueville, his notes on his travels in England were almost coeval with the publication of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;. But the warm appreciation of widespread political participation in the North American republic was certainly not matched by bitter denunciation of strict censitary discrimination in Britain, or the slightest support for the Chartist demand for an extension of the suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s intervention was especially significant as regards the second point in the new liberal ideological platform, which drastically restricted the political sphere. In a text of 1842 he observed: ‘Equality is everywhere extending its dominion, except in industry, which is daily organized in increasingly aristocratic form’. The wage-labourer found himself in a ‘strict dependency’ (&#039;&#039;étroite dépendance&#039;&#039;) on the provider of work. Despite the charming appearance of ‘great French society’ as a whole, ‘industrial society’ (&#039;&#039;société industrielle&#039;&#039;) in the strict sense continued to be characterized by a strict hierarchy, which left little room not only for equality, but also for the individual liberty of those placed on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The harshness of the relations obtaining in factories was further confirmed by de Tocqueville’s comparison between working conditions and prison conditions, even if it was made not to challenge the former but to reject naively philanthropic projects for reform of the latter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of free workers, who in France painfully earn a living, have no rest but that taken at meal times, and cannot understand why criminals punished by society arouse so lively an interest that it gives way to tenderhearted exclamations and is on the verge of shedding tears at the idea of inflicting on them a deprivation suffered by all honest labourers.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg190&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Besides, we should not forget that the panopticon theorized by Bentham, a building designed to achieve surveillance from which there was no escape, could serve as prison, workhouse or even factory.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the ‘immediate dominion’ or ‘forced labour’ to which Blackstone and Sieyès, respectively, refer. However, this coercive relationship was no longer explicitly highlighted to justify censitary discrimination in political rights (whose enjoyment belonged only to freemen in the full sense of the term). Instead, the condition that subjected the worker to a ‘strict dependency’ (de Tocqueville), compelled him to work in prison-like institutions (Bentham and de Tocqueville), and to sell his labour power to buyers who were ultimately the ‘masters of his existence’ (Constant), was now recognized reluctantly, declared to be without political relevance and hence not corrosive of negative liberty, from which no one in the metropolis was excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can read the notes written by de Tocqueville during his trips to England in 1833 and 1835. The picture that emerges is no less dramatic than the one Engels was to draw some years later. The industrial region of Manchester and the working-class districts appeared as an ‘infected labyrinth’, an ‘inferno’: the miserable little cottages were like&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the last asylum man can occupy between misery and death. Yet the unfortunate beings that inhabit such cubby-holes arouse the envy of their fellows. Under their wretched abodes one finds a row of cellars to which a semi-underground corridor leads. In each of these damp, repugnant places, ten or fifteen human creatures are massed higgledy-piggledy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The appalling mass poverty formed a shocking contrast to the opulence of a few: ‘the organized forces of a multitude produce for the benefit of a single one’. Such a spectacle elicited a significant exclamation: ‘Here the slave, there the master; here the wealth of some, there the poverty of the greatest number’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On another occasion, de Tocqueville even warned against the danger of ‘slave wars’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby indirectly comparing modern proletarians with ancient slaves. We thus encounter the reality of unfreedom, and of unfreedom in its most drastic form. Yet this realistic analysis disappears as if by magic when it comes to drawing up an overall political balance sheet. We are dealing with the country that France was called upon to regard as a model, if it wished to save ‘the future &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg191&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of free institutions’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] English liberal society realized liberty as such, regardless of the conditions of the kind of slavery had had to register in the inferno of the industrial regions. The fact is that this inferno had nothing to do with the political sphere proper. And once poverty or even a condition of tangible slavery had been confined to a sphere lacking political relevance (for pertaining to private life), in a sphere where it was not legitimate or possible to intervene politically, the initially slimy and repugnant portrait of Manchester turned into its opposite:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the external appearance of the city, everything attests to the individual power of man and nothing to the regulatory power of society. At every step, liberty reveals its capricious, creative force there. Nowhere is the slow, continuous action of the government to be seen.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. ‘Civil laws’ and ‘political laws’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The restriction of the political sphere is so radical as to seem paradoxical. Analysing the prison system in the United States, de Tocqueville drew attention to legislation that threw the poor into prison even for utterly insignificant debts. In Pennsylvania the number of individuals annually incarcerated for debt amounted to 7,000. If to this figure was added the number of those condemned for more serious crimes, it turned out that for every 144 inhabitants virtually one a year ended up in prison. But this was not the most important aspect. The French liberal was obliged to acknowledge the influence, direct as well as indirect, exercised by the wealthy over the administration of justice. The ‘vagrant’ or someone suspected of vagrancy was locked up in prison without having committed any offence. Worse, while awaiting legal proceedings, the poor witness or plaintiff lost his liberty, while the thief capable of standing bail retained his (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). Clearly, the very principle of equality before the law ended up being travestied. But this was not de Tocqueville’s conclusion: ‘Of all modern peoples, it is the English who have instilled the greatest liberty in their political laws and made most frequent use of prison in their civil laws’. In their turn, although having largely altered the ‘political laws’, Americans had ‘preserved most of the civil laws’ of England.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#page192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#pg192&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;With this distinction we have reached a key point. The liberal author formulated his judgement on the countries visited by him exclusively on the basis of their &#039;&#039;lois politiques&#039;&#039;, while the &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039; were by definition politically irrelevant. Not by chance, there is little trace in &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; of the data gathered in the course of the inquiry into the US prison system. It might be said that de Tocqueville’s most interesting pages are those that did not make it into the work which sealed his fame. The almost triumphant conclusion then becomes explicable: in the transatlantic republic liberty had been comprehensively diffused, and did not constitute a privilege. Accustomed as he was to very different &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039;, the traveller from France expressed his disappointment at legislation in the United States that seemed to him ‘monstrous’. But ‘the mass of [American] men of law’ found no fault with it and did not regard it as contradicting the ‘democratic constitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was precisely the standpoint de Tocqueville ended up adopting—though not without contradictions and embarrassment. We can glimpse the former if we give the French liberal the floor once again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be acknowledged that the American prison regime is severe. While US society affords the example of the most extensive liberty, this country’s prisons offer a spectacle of utter despotism. The citizens subject to the law are protected by it; they cease to be free only when they become felons.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, by de Tocqueville’s own admission, vagrants and poor witnesses also suffered ‘severe’ treatment in prisons, or workhouses similar to prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us observe the embarrassment. We have already encountered the protests of vagrants locked up in prison by a society that cannot solve the problem of unemployment in any other way. What was de Tocqueville’s reaction? Just as it did not come within his ‘tasks’ to investigate possible remedies for unemployment, so it did not fall to him ‘even to investigate to what extent the society is just that punishes the man who does not work and lacks work, and how it might furnish means of subsistence without putting him in prison’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of politics and ‘political laws’ was so narrowly defined as to exclude not only material living conditions and relations of dependency in factories, but even the censitary discrimination that pervaded the administration of justice in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The de-politicization and naturalization of economic and social relations&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg193&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Any expansion of the political was utterly intolerable to the liberal tradition, because it would involve relations that were not only private in character, but whose immutability was consecrated by nature or Providence. In Burke’s view it was at once mad and blasphemous to believe that among ‘the competence of government’ was ‘supply[ing] to the poor, those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them’. Poverty was the result of ‘Divine displeasure’ and the latter could certainly not be placated by challenging ‘the laws of commerce’, which were ‘the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville argued no differently. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, he noted with concern the behaviour of the ‘working classes’. They seemed calm, no longer ‘bedevilled by political passions’. Unfortunately, however, ‘where once they had been political, their passions have become social’. Rather than the make-up of this or that ministry, they tended to question property relations themselves and hence the natural order of ‘society’, tearing ‘to shreds the basis on which it rests’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the revolution broke out, the French liberal regarded it as socialist or infected with socialism as early as February, because prominent in it were ‘the economic and political theories’ which would have people ‘believe that human miseries are the work of the laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be abolished by changing the social order’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ranging beyond the political sphere, the ‘threat of change in the social constitution’ was configured as an attack on the ‘ancient, holy laws of property and family on which Christian civilization is based’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, on the one hand political economy was merged with theology, while on the other it tended to take its place, in the sense that ‘science’ was now called on to sanction and sanctify existing social relations. According to Malthus, it was wholly desirable that political economy be ‘taught to the common people’. Thanks to it, the poor would understand that they must attribute the cause of their privations to Mother Nature or their own improvidence. Indeed, ‘[p]olitical economy is perhaps the only science of which it may be said that the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg194&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great evil.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was also the opinion of de Tocqueville, who believed it necessary&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to diffuse among the working classes … some of the most elementary and certain notions of political economy, which would make them understand, for example, what is constant and necessary in the economic laws that govern the wage rate. Because such laws, being in some sense of divine law, in that they derive from the nature of man and the very structure of society, are situated beyond the reach of revolutions. [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While for Burke, ‘Divine displeasure’ explained the misery of the popular masses, for Malthus it was the immorality of their behaviour, the sexual incontinence that brought into the world beings whose subsistence people were not in a position to ensure. Referring to ‘Malthus’s principle of population’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville reprehended ‘all the excesses of intemperance’ widespread among ‘the lower classes’, their ‘improvidence’, or their tendency to live ‘as if there will be no tomorrow’, and above all ‘these early, imprudent marriages that seem to have no other purpose than multiplying the number of unfortunates on earth’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notwithstanding the radical attitudes he liked to adopt, Bentham did not reach very different conclusions: ‘with respect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws’; the poor man was like a ‘savage’ who had not succeeded in transcending the state of nature. Or, to put it in the words of a French disciple and collaborator of the English philosopher, ‘Poverty is not a result of the social order. So why rebuke it? It is a legacy of the state of nature’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing against natural law, the English philosopher waxed ironic about the recourse to nature to ground rights that only made sense in society. But now nature popped up again to remove responsibility for poverty from the politico-social order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this elevation of existing social relations to the status of nature, and to nature sanctioned by Providence, attempts to alter them could only be an expression of madness. Burke expressed his utter ‘horror’ at revolutionaries or hasty reformists, who did not hesitate ‘to hack that aged parent [their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg195&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;country] in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, for de Tocqueville the illusion that there was a political ‘cure for this hereditary, incurable ill of poverty and work’ provoked the incessant, ruinous &#039;&#039;expérimentations&#039;&#039; that characterized the French revolutionary cycle,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or ‘the great social revolution’ begun in 1789.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Liberalism and radicalism: two different phenomenologies of power&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In pronouncing his judgement on England and the United States, de Tocqueville ignored, in addition to colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, material living conditions, labour relations and even ‘civil laws’. Extraneous to his research and analysis of democracy, he declared, was not only the oppression of blacks and Indians, but also the detention of white citizens (‘vagrants’ or poor people summoned to testify in a trial) who were not guilty of any offence. The cult of the &#039;&#039;‘holy&#039;&#039; thing’ that was liberty[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ignored the fate of the excluded in their entirety, whether they lived in the colonies or the metropolis. And, once again, the divergence between liberalism and radicalism—of which Marx and Engels were the critical heirs—is already apparent at an epistemological level. In England, observed Engels, the ‘aiding and abetting of the rich is explicitly recognized even in the law’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Analysing the English ‘civil laws’ inherited by the United States, de Tocqueville arrived at the same conclusion. But this fact had political relevance only for Engels. And like the authors of the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the French liberal compared the worker of the time to the slave, forced to suffer a ‘strict dependency’ inside the factory and a degrading, oppressive poverty outside it. But de Tocqueville considered all this foreign to the political sphere proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely the drastic restriction of the political, and the consequent exclusion from it of the most profound dimension of the social totality, that prompted Marx’s criticisms. From the standpoint of bourgeois society and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg196&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political theory, he observed in his early writings, social relations ‘have only a private significance, not any political significance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited itself ‘to closing its eyes and declaring that certain &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; oppositions do not have a &#039;&#039;political character&#039;&#039;, that these do not bother it’. While regarded as lacking political relevance, bourgeois social relations and power relations in the factory and society could develop without inhibition or external impediment.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above poverty, the reality of the factory (stressed the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;) highlighted the ‘despotism’ that hung over workers, ‘organised like soldiers’ and ‘[a]s privates of the industrial army … placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s conclusion was scarcely milder. But now the despotism identified and denounced was not this reality, but attempts by political power to change or alleviate it. Against demands to put ‘the prescience and wisdom of the state in the place of individual prescience and wisdom’, the French liberal proclaimed that ‘nothing authorizes the state to interfere in industry’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the famous speech of 12 September 1848, made to persuade the Constituent Assembly to reject demands for the ‘right to work’ that had already been drowned in blood in the June Days. De Tocqueville went so far as to attribute to ‘socialist doctrines’ the regulation and reduction of working hours (‘the twelve-hour day’), which therefore became an object of unequivocal condemnation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise dismissed as an expression of socialism and despotism was any legislative measure to alleviate the misery of the ‘lower classes’ through rent controls.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French liberal insisted on this intransigently. Immediately after the bloody June Days, he did not hesitate to accuse the Interior Minister of being inconsistent and soft: ‘While Cavaignac and Lamorcière fought socialism in the streets, Sénard supported socialist doctrine as regards the twelve-hour day’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some months later, in his draft electoral circular of May 1849, de Tocqueville advertised as a badge of merit the fact that he had voted, &#039;&#039;inter alia&#039;&#039;, ‘against the limit it was proposed to place on the working day, against progressive taxation, and finally against the abolition of military substitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The last point was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;no less significant than the others. In de Tocqueville’s view, the option the rich man had of hiring a poor man to replace him when it came to performing the duty of military service did not involve an inequality, based on wealth and sanctioned by law, even in the face of the danger of death. Rather, it was a contract between individuals, which pertained to the private sphere and hence did not infringe the principle of legal equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in his capacity as a historian, when reconstructing the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, de Tocqueville stuck to this restriction of the political sphere and this peculiar phenomenology of power, which identified dominion and oppression exclusively with the intervention of political power in a private sphere that had been unduly expanded. He drew a terrible picture of the conditions of the popular classes. ‘Beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ were sometimes proceeded against ‘in the most violent way’, with the arrest and condemnation of thousands of people to forced labour without trial. Not much better was the treatment reserved for peasants. While, materially and socially, they lived in an ‘abyss of misery and isolation’, in terms of civil rights they were deprived of any protection: they ‘were constantly arrested in connection with the levies of forced labour or the militia; for begging, for misdemeanours, and countless other minor offences’. In conclusion, the peasants were viewed rather like ‘the Negroes in our colonies’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Was the revolution therefore legitimate and necessary? Such was not de Tocqueville’s opinion. France, which with the economists radically criticized and readied itself to overthrow the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, ‘wanted not so much a recognition of the “rights of man” as reforms in the existing system’![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An organ of the titled aristocracy and hence jointly responsible for the degradation of the peasants to ‘negroes’, the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; were the body which, before unfortunately being dissolved by the revolution, embodied the whole cause of liberty. In the years preceding the fatal 1789, ‘our judicial institutions were still those of a free people.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The new self-representation of the community of the free as a community of individuals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
To the revolutionary demand for the rights of man and the equal dignity of every individual, which risked grinding society ‘into the dust and powder of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’, Burke opposed the sacredness of a community: ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, in ‘the great primaeval contract of eternal society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thanks to a ‘relation in blood’ that united and founded in an indivisible unity ‘our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, as against the individualism reprehended in the French revolutionaries, the British liberal vindicated an emphatic organicism. Not by chance, the partnership celebrated by him subsequently became in German culture the &#039;&#039;Gemeinschaft&#039;&#039; that played such an important role in nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative and reactionary thinking.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the dissolvent charge contained in revolutionary individualism can also be found in de Tocqueville, who in 1843 observed: ‘For some years, doubt and individualism have made us such progressives that the nation will soon no longer offer any foothold for resistance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But already during the French Revolution a different attitude had begun to emerge. Barnave warned as follows against the demand for an extension of political rights to non-property-owners: ‘Another step on the road of equality would mean the destruction of liberty.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to Constant, too, the diffusion among the popular masses of the demand for political rights and stress on their enjoyment risked making people lose sight of the centrality of ‘private independence’ or ‘individual independence’, leading to the subjection of individual existence to the collective body.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albeit in a different idiom, Barnarve’s argument was reintroduced: the generalization of political rights had a levelling, homogenizing effect at the expense of individual liberty. Later, Guizot declared that to fight for a society where everything revolved around ‘order’, ‘well-being’ and the ‘equitable distribution … of the means of life’ meant forgetting ‘the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties’, and aspiring to an ‘ant-hill or bee-hive’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a theme that enjoyed enormous success after 1848. The more the struggle for recognition developed as a struggle for the conquest of political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg199&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rights and of economic and social rights, the more the popular and socialist movement was accused of not understanding the autonomous dignity of the individual, and in fact of wanting to trample it underfoot. Rejecting the social demands that issued from the February Revolution, de Tocqueville gave full vent to his disgust at the emergence on the horizon of the spectre of a ‘levelled society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a ‘society of bees and beavers’, composed ‘more of sapient animals than free, civilized men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so in his turn did John Stuart Mill: ‘At present individuals are lost in the crowd … The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence, in a reversal of positions compared with Burke, liberalism now rebuked the most radical currents not for their individualism, but for riding roughshod over the rights of the individual. De Tocqueville sought to provide this accusation with an epistemological foundation: conferring ‘a separate existence on the species [espèce]’, and expanding ‘the notion of genus [&#039;&#039;genre&#039;&#039;]’, radicalism and socialism were simply the application to politics of the ‘doctrine of the realists’ of scholastic fame. It entailed ‘contempt for particular rights’ and devaluation of the individual as such.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But what is the value of this theoretical construct? It is interesting to see how de Tocqueville rejects proposals for reforming the prison system promoted primarily by the radical and socialist movement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philanthropy elicits our pity for an isolated unfortunate, we must not forget to reserve a little of our sympathy for a yet greater interest—that of the whole society. Let us distrust these narrow, ungenerous views that notice the individual but never the mass of men and let us eternally remember this thought of a great philosopher: pity for the wicked is a great cruelty to the good … The social interest, which is nothing if not the interest of the honest mass, requires that the wicked be severely punished.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Even the troubled diagnosis of massification was made with an eye to the fate of ‘[t]he nation, taken as a whole’, which now risked turning out to be ‘less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was also in the name of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg200&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an emphatic (and chauvinist) idea of the nation that de Tocqueville invoked ‘terror’ against those who risked compromising the honour of France (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a concrete level, too, de Tocqueville was concerned to see what were for him the requirements of society prevail. In the years of the July Monarchy, faced with the spread of mass misery, he proposed nothing to prevent it except police measures gravely corrosive of the liberty of the individual (the poor individual): ‘Could we not prevent the rapid movement of the population, so that men do not abandon the earth and move to industry, except to the extent that the latter can readily meet their needs?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Restrictions on freedom of movement should also be imposed on ‘vagrants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although committed to denouncing the expansion of the state—‘the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power’—Mill did not hesitate to assert: ‘The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’; they were ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The view that any ‘interference’ in the procreation of human life was illegitimate was ‘a superstition which will one day be regarded with as much contempt, as any of the idiotic notions and practices of savages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can understand Proudhon’s irony in connection with the liberal school:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It, which in all circumstances and places professes &#039;&#039;laissez-faire, laissez-passer&#039;&#039;, which reprehends socialists for substituting their convictions for the laws of nature, which protests against any state intervention, and which demands liberty here, there and everywhere, nothing but liberty, does not hesitate when it comes to conjugal fertility to cry to the spouses: Stop there! What devil incites you![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the conflict between liberalism and its critics, an inversion of positions has occurred as regards laissez-faire for the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disgusted by the radicalism of the 1848 revolution and Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, de Tocqueville arrived at a bitter conclusion: ‘The revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg201&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in England was made solely with a view to liberty, while that in France was made principally with a view to equality.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The criticism also encompassed the Enlightenment culture that had prepared and promoted the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime:&#039;&#039; in it a sure ‘zeal for equality’ was matched by a rather ‘tepid’ ‘desire for liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we know, the first to counterpose liberty and equality and denounce the demand for political equality as an attack on liberty was Barnarve, who was nevertheless a defender of slavery. This institution continued to be alive and well in the United States when de Tocqueville held up the transatlantic republic, together with England, as the model country for love of liberty to a France devoured by the passion for equality. It was precisely here that slavery was justified and even celebrated by southern theorists as an instrument to ensure, along with their liberty, the equality of members of the white community. For confirmation of the problematic character of the opposition between liberty and equality, we might adduce the pre-1848 de Tocqueville, who criticized England for an erroneous conception of liberty in as much as it was based on ‘privilege’ (and inequality), and who attributed to the French Revolution the merit of having, in the name of equality, promoted the cause of the abolition of slavery and the freedom of the blacks (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]; below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|§7]]). At this time, far from being in opposition, liberty and equality were fully in accord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposition was represented, in significantly different form, in the work of another important representative of the liberal tradition. In Bentham we read: ‘When security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the very country held up by de Tocqueville as a model for its ability to understand the absolute priority of the value of liberty, we see that the reassertion of the subordinate value of equality occurs, in the first instance, in the name of the ‘security’ of society and the existing order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Economic and social rights, the socialist ‘ants’ nest’ and liberal ‘individualism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point it is appropriate to analyse nineteenth-century liberals’ individualist profession of faith at greater length. Especially after 1848, in the midst &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg202&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the massification they reprehended in socialism, they sometimes seemed to consider individualism a pre-modern reality, which had, alas, faded in the course of subsequent historical developments. According to Mill, ‘[i]n ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself’; he was not ‘lost in the crowd’ and the ‘masses’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville likewise paid homage to the ‘individualism of the Middle Ages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Manifestly, he did not take into consideration the fate of serfs, just as he did not take account of the fate of slaves and blacks in general when he pointed to the United States as the country where &#039;&#039;‘every&#039;&#039; individual’ enjoyed unprecedented ‘independence’. When he subsequently asserted that in colonized Algeria, ‘the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the motherland’, de Tocqueville ignored the Arabs, who, by his own admission, were often equated with the occupying forces to ‘evil beasts’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]; below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|§6]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus emerges the somewhat problematic character of the pathos of the individual, which was the flag waved by liberalism in its conflict with radicalism and socialism. Who was more individualist? Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the slave revolution? Or Calhoun, the great US theorist of the slaveholding South? Who demonstrated respect for the dignity of the individual as such? The black Jacobin who, taking the Declaration of the Rights of Man seriously, considered that it was always inadmissible to reduce a man to an object of ‘property’ of one of ‘his follow men’? Or Jefferson, who kept silent about his doubts about slavery out of a conviction of white superiority and his concern not to endanger the peace and stability of the South and the Union? Who expressed individualism better? Mill and his English and French followers, who considered the subjection and even slavery (albeit temporary) of colonial peoples beneficial and necessary? Or the French radicals who began to question colonial despotism as such (‘Let the colonies perish if they are to cost honour, freedom’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]])?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doubts are not dispelled even if we ignore the colonies and peoples of colonial origin. Prominent in the liberal tradition (for example, Laboulaye) is the polemic against the fanaticism of the French revolutionaries, who regarded access to the vote and representative office as a ‘natural, absolute right’ of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg203&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;every individual, rather than a ‘political function’ of society.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So which of the two positions better expressed individualism? On the other hand, if the generalization of political rights imperilled ‘individual independence’, as Constant seemed to believe, why direct such a reproof solely against French radicalism and not also against the American Revolution (which erupted in the wake of the demand for the colonists’ right to political representation)?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Examined more closely, the cry of alarm at the danger of the disappearance of individuality, and the impeding ‘ants’ nest’, expressed the disquiet of the restricted community of the free first at the extension of political rights and then, increasingly, at the extension of economic and social rights. Yet it was de Tocqueville himself who compared the hungry man to a slave—that is, a man or an individual deprived of liberty and recognition. Compared with the liberal tradition, Nietzsche proved much more lucid and consistent. Although inspired by an implacable hatred of socialism and the social state demanded by it, and in fact precisely because inspired by such hatred, the brilliant reactionary thinker understood that, with its ‘individualistic agitation’, socialism aimed to ‘render many individuals possible’, raising them above their condition as instruments of labour and their herd-like relationship to the masters. With its universalistic charge, socialism issued in the recognition of every individual, independently of wealth, sex or race, as a subject endowed at a moral level with equal human dignity and possessor, politically, of inalienable rights. That was why Nietzsche indignantly condemned individualism and socialism. Albeit with a converse value judgement, Oscar Wilde also connected the two terms: ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming the ambiguous character of the liberal tradition’s individualism, it is worth noting that, in criticizing the French Revolution and the danger of subversion represented by the working-class and socialist movement, it liked positively to oppose the countryside to the city. This is readily intelligible in the case of the theorist of organicist ‘partnership’, Burke, who with utter consistency celebrated the ‘agricultural class’ that ‘of all others is the least inclined to sedition’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his attention still fixed on the French Revolution and the role in it played by Paris, Constant stressed the danger of ‘[a]rtisans, crowded into the towns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the theme of distrust or hostility towards the city, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg204&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the prime site for development of the individual, runs deep in the liberal tradition. In Mandeville’s view, ‘London is too big for the Country’, and it was precisely there that disturbing phenomena of social insubordination were emerging. Much more reassuring were rural areas, where it was possible to count on ‘the poor silly Country People’, who in fact were conspicuous for their ‘Innocence and Honesty’ and who, ‘from their very Infancy’, could be educated into obedience to authority and respect for customs and tradition.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain regret for this world can also be observed in de Tocqueville, when in 1834 he described the condition of the poor man in the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. Characterized by ‘limited’ desires and calm indifference to ‘a future that did not belong to him’, his lot ‘was less to be felt sorry for than that of men of the people of our days’. Accustomed to their condition from time immemorial, the poor under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; ‘enjoyed the kind of vegetative happiness whose attractiveness is so difficult for the civilized man to understand that he denies its existence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the resumption of revolution in France, against those who sought to ‘stir up the working population of the city’, Tocqueville called for reliance on ‘the inhabitants of the countryside, [who] are full of good sense and, thus far, of balance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The first person to take this recommendation to heart was de Tocqueville himself, who described how he organized the elections in his native village as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We all had to go to vote together in the village of Saint-Pierre, a league from our hamlet. The morning of the election, all the electors (that is, the whole male population over the age of twenty) met in front of the church, and all these men formed a queue in twos in alphabetical order … I reminded these good folk of the seriousness and importance of the act they were performing and recommended that they not allow themselves to be approached or led astray by those who, on our arrival in the village, might seek to mislead them, but instead proceed in a group and stay together, each in his place, until we had voted. ‘Let no one—I said—go home either to eat something or to dry himself (it rained that day) before he has done his duty’. They shouted that they would do this and did it. All the votes were cast at the same time, and I have reason to believe that virtually all of them were given to the same candidate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg205&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It is hard to regard as a manifestation of individualism the events narrated here by the French liberal, beneficiary of the plebiscitary vote of the village whose lord he remained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as the dichotomy between English love of liberty and French egalitarianism proves unfounded, so the opposition between the individualism of the liberal tradition (whose favoured site was England) and the anti-individualism of radicalism (whose centre was in France) does not withstand critical analysis. To the French revolutionaries, who with their Declaration of the Rights of Man aimed simply ‘to excite and keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of insurrection against all governments’, Bentham opposed his principle of social utility: ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the view condemned by Marx, who indignantly reported the reasons with which the prime minister, Palmerston, had once justified his distrust or hostility towards the demand for emancipation advanced by Irish Catholics: ‘because the legislature of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare of the whole’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Criticism of liberalism as anti-modern reaction?&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, we encounter a paradoxical phenomenon. While, on the one hand, it cultivated pre-modern nostalgia, on the other, liberalism contested the movement engaged in the demand for political rights and economic and social rights, accusing it of a basic inability to understand and accept modernity. The first to set off in this direction was Constant. Clinging to the idea of unanimous participation in political life and hence to ‘ancient liberty’, the Jacobins forgot that the latter was based on slavery, the institution that made it possible for freemen to enjoy the &#039;&#039;otium&#039;&#039; required for them to be genuinely active citizens in every respect.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was 1819 when the French liberal argued thus. At this time, in every country where modern liberty flourished, slavery continued in one form or another to be a living reality and, what is more, had assumed a harshness and naturalistic rigidity unknown in classical antiquity. Certainly, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg206&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;although it had not ceased to play a significant role, the institution was mostly isolated and concealed in the colonies. But that was not the case in the United States. There slavery was not only highly visible but, according to the analysis of not a few southern theorists (who took up and developed a suggestion of Burke’s), it encouraged the republican spirit of the free. In other words, ‘ancient liberty’ continued to survive in some sense in the United States, which was nevertheless pointed to by Constant as a ‘great example’ of the modern liberty dear to him.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, in stressing the invigorating function that the presence of slaves had on the spirit of liberty of free citizens, Burke explicitly referred to the example of the ‘ancient states’ (above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Hence Constant’s theoretical construct is based on a colossal repression, which is all the more amazing if we bear in mind the bitter struggles over slavery that developed in France. Abolished by the Jacobins, it had been restored by Napoleon, who arrived in power with the support not only of Sieyès, but also (as we shall see) of Constant himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than emulating a model from antiquity, the French Revolution and the most radical currents thrown up by it were sometimes accused of encouraging nostalgia for the Middle Ages. Spencer compared progressive taxation to a corvée (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|§4]]). This was a theme subsequently developed by him with the observation that ‘national charity’ (i.e. laws benefiting the poor) was merely a new version of the pre-modern ‘established church’. And just as the old dissenter had fought for respect for the spontaneity of authentic religious sentiment, so the new ‘dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary’. While the old dissenter denied any authority the right to dictate laws to his religious conscience, the new ‘dissenter from established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in between him and the &#039;&#039;exercise&#039;&#039; of his religion’, and indignantly rejected ‘the interference of the state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of [the] gospel’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the last analysis, the demand for economic and social rights, to be legally ratified in the name of moral and religious values such as compassion and human solidarity, were simply a claim to restore life to a state religion! And the prophets of this state religion likewise referred to a pre-modern world. From the French Revolution onwards, as we shall soon see, the liberal tradition was fond of equating trade unions with medieval corporations. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Lecky reproved trade unions and the working-class movement for aspiring to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg207&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an ‘industrial organization’ similar to that of the Middle Ages and the Tudor period.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Trade unions, Pareto stressed some years later, claimed to enjoy (and did enjoy) a kind of ‘Mediaeval immunity’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Lord Acton’s view, even more so than the demand by unions for alleged economic and social rights, it was that for universal suffrage that amounted to a pre-modern, regressive phenomenon. It was ‘absolutist and retrograde’, since it favoured the expansion of the state and of despotism that had happily been transcended by liberalism.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, rather than classical antiquity as for Constant, Jacobinism, socialism and sometimes democracy itself were now accused of cultivating nostalgia for the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, whether it was of the Middle Ages or absolute monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The latter theme found fullest expression in de Tocqueville, according to whom, with their statist pathos, radicalism, Jacobinism and socialism were in a line of continuity with the statism, ‘administrative centralization’ and ‘paternal government’ of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this was an argument which, albeit with timely variations, proved especially dear to defenders of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; themselves! In Berlin the &#039;&#039;Berliner politische Wochenblatt&#039;&#039; never tired of repeating that revolution and absolutism were ‘identical, when regarded from a higher viewpoint’. In citing Louis XIV’s motto (‘L’état c’est moi!’), the journal observed that ‘revolutionary freedom … is reconciled with this centralization, this bureaucratic despotism, with this tutelage through ministerial assistants of the provinces and the community, with this Hobbesian governmental omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville stressed the revolutionary role played, even before 1789, by the figure of the ‘intendant’ and ‘public administration’, which had in fact already expelled the nobility.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The periodical cited above arrived at the same conclusion, identifying and branding in the figure of the ‘civil servant’ the author of the cancellation of ‘local liberties’ and all intermediate bodies liable to overshadow ‘state power’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to de Tocqueville, ‘those peoples who are so constituted as to have the utmost difficulty in getting rid of despotic government for any considerable period are the ones in which aristocracy has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg208&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ceased to exist and can no longer exist’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was precisely the guiding thread of the condemnation of the French Revolution pronounced by the organ of the Prussian nobility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after the publication of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the Revolution&#039;&#039;, expressing his agreement and admiration, Lieber observed that the book as a whole was a historical running commentary on the analysis of ‘Gallican’ political tendencies he had already developed.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, a degree of boasting is not absent. Yet we should understand the German-American liberal’s point of view. In 1849 he had underlined the continuity between Louis XIV and the 1789 revolution, and between it and Napoleon Bonaparte and the 1848 Revolution. It was a history utterly pervaded by the ideal of ‘equality’ and the ‘concentration’ and ‘centralization of power’, the ‘organization’ and generalized ‘interference of public power’, with a consequent inevitable sacrifice of freedom, ‘individualism’ and the principle of the ‘limitation of government’. By contrast, the latter was at the heart of the concerns and aspirations of the ‘Britannic race’ or ‘Anglican race’—i.e. England and the United States.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are, I repeat, in 1849; and at this time de Tocqueville confined himself to an indictment of socialism. While ‘on many points’ it had a different orientation from the ‘&#039;&#039;ancien régime’&#039;&#039;, it had inherited ‘the opinion that the only wisdom lies in the state’. But the partial and limited continuity established here did not in any way include the French Revolution. In fact, in his anti-socialist polemic, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to refer to Robespierre:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Flee … flee the old mania … of wanting to govern excessively; allow individuals, allow families the right freely to do anything that does not harm others; allow the communes the right to manage their own affairs; in a word, restore to the liberty of individuals everything that has illegitimately been taken from them, everything that does not of necessity pertain to the public authority.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, far from formulating the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution, de Tocqueville was refuting it in advance. Someone who did support it was Lieber, who was in a sense justified in claiming priority. In fact, it must be added that, by his own explicit admission, he had derived the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg209&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thesis from Niebuhr, whose disciple he considered himself to be,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and, more generally, from the German culture he had absorbed before leaving Prussia at the age of twenty-seven. In the first instance, the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution met with great success in the country where the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; proved most tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are clearly dealing with a rhetorical strategy: the revolutionary movement that claimed to be constructing a new world was branded as antiquated. Yet the strains are obvious. If we analyse the arguments of the various exponents of the liberal tradition, we see that the French Revolution and Jacobinism are variously situated in a line of continuity with classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and monarchical absolutism. The past to which the new is returned and reduced can assume the most diverse forms. Thus, the revolution was criticized with arguments that are difficult to reconcile with one another, and which are even opposed. On the one hand, it was accused of having destroyed the intermediate bodies that predated the advent of the absolute state; on the other, of wanting to preserve or reintroduce bodies, such as trade unions, that pertained to feudal particularism and that tended to take the form of a state within the state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the light of subsequent historical experience, it is difficult to regard the demand for economic and social rights (in our day also ratified by the UN) as pre-modern and, contrariwise, the view, which was not foreign even to de Tocqueville, regarding mass poverty as a datum of nature pertaining to Providence, rather than determinate politico-social relations, as modern. And, still with reference to the French liberal, it is difficult to reconcile condemnation of Jacobinism and socialism as movements situated in the wake of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, with alarmist and apocalyptic denunciation of the ‘new race’ of delirious ideologues and agitators,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who menaced ‘European civilization’, in fact civilization as such, with an unprecedented danger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Individualism’ and the repression of working-class coalitions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg210&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In some instances, the individualist profession of faith played a manifestly repressive role. Together with the phenomenology of power and the restriction of the political sphere we are already familiar with, it operated to justify the proscription of working-class coalitions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mandeville expressed his utter consternation at a new, disturbing phenomenon:&lt;br /&gt;
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I am credibly inform’d that a parcel of Footmen are arriv’d to that height of Insolence as to have enter’d into a Society together, and made Laws by which they oblige themselves not to serve for less than such a Sum, nor carry Burdens or any Bundle or Parcel above a certain Weight, not exceeding Two or Three Pounds, with other Regulations directly opposite to the Interest of those they Serve, and altogether destructive to the Use they were design’d for.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What prompted the ban at this time was simply a refusal of recognition, as emerges from the contempt, in fact the disgust, provoked by the unheard of behaviour among servants. Organizing themselves autonomously, as if they were gentlemen, they pretended to raise themselves to the level of masters or even to usurp their rights (above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). The absence of recognition continued to play a role in Burke. Certainly, in regarding only contracts drawn up outside any ‘collusion or combination’ as valid [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the allusion to and support for the Combination Acts, which banned and penalized working-class coalitions in these years, are transparent—he appealed to the principle of freedom of trade, which did not tolerate impediments of any kind. But it is clear that the wage labourer, unrecognized in his autonomous subjectivity and dignity and degraded to an &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;, was to see himself denied the right of autonomous organization from below.&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith’s position was more tortured. He recognized that what led to the formation of workers’ coalitions was the desperate attempt to counter the de facto coalition whereby suppliers of work lowered wages, and to escape the threat of death from starvation. However, these ‘enlarged monopolies’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg211&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be prevented and repressed in order to assert the rights not only of the market, but also of the individual. It was necessary to ‘allow … every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice’;[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in accordance with ‘the system of natural liberty’, every man must be able to contribute and bring into competition ‘both his industry and his capital’, without any obstacles whatsoever.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case could ‘violations of natural liberty [and justice]’ be tolerated.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, the Le Chapelier law, which banned workers’ coalitions in France in 1791, was also said to be aimed at defending individual freedom. In the name of ‘alleged common interests’, such coalitions violated the freedom to work possessed by every individual.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And de Tocqueville referred to this law when, after 1848, he condemned the working-class and socialist movement thus: while ‘the revolution has swept away all the obstructions that impeded the liberty of the citizen, that is, corporations and craft associations [&#039;&#039;les maîtrises, les jurandes&#039;&#039;]’, the socialists proposed to reintroduce this junk, albeit ‘in a new form’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Perhaps Marx had in mind the liberalism of his time, as well as the French Revolution, when he criticized the Le Chapelier law for having banned ‘working-class associations of any kind’, on the pretext that they represented the ‘re-establishment of the mediaeval guilds’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theme, which stigmatized trade unions as a residue or reminiscence of the Middle Ages and the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, was widely diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century. In England, while Lecky condemned resumption of the ‘guilds’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more vehement: acting as new tyrants and taking the place of monarchical despotism, trade unions suffocated individual autonomy and liberty in every way. It was true that they could also be consenting, but this did not alter the terms of the problem: ‘If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The picture was the same across the Atlantic. Lieber condemned unions in the name of economics and morality alike: they were guilty of encouraging &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg212&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sloth and, ultimately, vice.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Laboulaye demonstrated an attitude of cautious openness,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while Mill continued to be fundamentally hostile. He targeted the ‘moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one’, exercised by the trade-union movement: ‘the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry’ tried to block ‘piecework’ and thus oppressed workers of ‘superior skill or industry’, who sought to earn more. In reality, the consequences of piecework had been described as follows by Smith some decades earlier: the workers subjected to it ‘are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years’; if they listened to ‘the dictates of reason and humanity’, it would be the masters themselves who restricted this type of remuneration. But philanthropic intervention from above was one thing. Quite another was intervention from below by organizations that trampled over individual rights and arbitrarily interfered in what Mill too continued to regard as ‘private concerns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While they sought to impose intervention from above on bourgeois government itself, workers promoted an autonomous movement of transformation from below. However, in the sphere sovereignly declared by it to be ‘private’, the liberal bourgeoisie did not tolerate the intervention of political power, or even that deriving from civil society. Theoretically legalized in England in 1825, following a phase of persecution that even saw culprits condemned to deportation, trade unions continued to be attacked by the judiciary, in as much as they were defined as corporations hampering free enterprise. They acquired full legitimacy in 1871. However, ‘what Gladstone’s government gave with one hand it took away with another.’ If not trade unions as such, it was individual workers who could be dragged before the courts on the basis of a new law: ‘ “Watching and besetting”, that is “picketing” workmen continuing at work during a strike, was made illegal even when done only by a single person.’ This law was repealed by Disraeli in 1875.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In France, the Le Chapelier law was only repealed in 1887. What lay behind full recognition of the legitimacy of workers’ coalitions and organizations was the gigantic struggles that culminated in the Paris Commune. Hence we are beyond 1870, the date that according to Hayek marks the beginning of ‘the decline of the liberal movement’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg213&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself thus is an author who, not by chance, seems to want to call everything back into question. In his view, by destroying ‘the competitive determination of the price’ of labour power, and claiming to interfere in the ‘game’ of the market, trade unions undermined the liberal system at its roots; and it was ‘the clear moral duty of government’ to prevent this happening.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Paris Commune was a watershed in Europe, but not across the Atlantic. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was ‘applied first and most effectively to labour’, which was guilty of combining in trade-union ‘monopolies’ that did not respect individual initiative and freedom. By contrast, so-called yellow-dog contracts were long considered perfectly respectful of the rules of the market and individual liberty: on the basis of them, when hired, workers and employees committed themselves (were forced to commit themselves) not to join any trade-union organization.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The demand for economic and social rights and the transition from paternalistic liberalism to social-Darwinist liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
A social-Darwinist streak ran through liberal thought from the start. The arguments used by Joseph Townsend in England in the second half of the eighteenth century against any attempt to introduce legislation in favour of the poor are eloquent: it would only end up destroying the balance of nature, cancelling the ‘peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure’ that was hunger and encouraging the growth of an idle, redundant surplus population. Left to itself, without the artificial interference of law-makers moved by false compassion, nature would restore its own balance, just as occurred on an island inhabited solely by goats and dogs. The struggle for survival selected the strongest, most vital elements, condemning the rest to their fate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the outset, the tendency to naturalize social conflict, and to present the wealth and power of the dominant classes as the expression of an immutable natural law (in this sense Burke referred to a &#039;&#039;‘natural&#039;&#039; aristocracy’ consecrated by ‘Nature’),[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] contained a social-Darwinist element &#039;&#039;avant la lettre&#039;&#039;. We are familiar with Franklin’s criticisms of doctors &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg214&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for their commitment to saving lives ‘not worth saving’. The ‘disease’ such people suffered from was the manifestation of divine anger at ‘Intemperance, Sloth, and other Vices’; and it was fitting that all this met with the ‘punishment’ provided for by nature and Providence.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] God’s higher design must not be hindered, especially if colonial populations were the target. This applied not only to the Indians. The terrible famine that decimated an Irish population already severely tried by the British colonizers’ plundering and oppression in the mid-nineteenth century seemed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan—charged by the London government with following the situation—to be the expression of ‘omniscient Providence’, which thereby solved the problem of overpopulation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the social-Darwinist element was accentuated as the popular classes, shaking off their traditional subalternity, intervened directly on the political scene to assert their rights. In the United States, following the abolition of slavery, paternalism rapidly gave way to an explicitly violent attitude towards blacks, subject to the terror that threatened anyone who dared to challenge white supremacy. Something similar occurred in Europe. Large sections of the dominant class reacted to the new situation achieved by the struggle for recognition by brandishing the law of natural selection, which condemned the unfit to an early death.&lt;br /&gt;
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The most conservative sections of the liberal movement responded to the demand for economic and social rights with a radical, uncompromising liberalism. The state must not in any way interfere with the kind of divine judgement, or struggle for existence, to which Spencer had referred before Darwin. The English political and economic liberal condemned any state interference in the economy with the argument that one should not frustrate that cosmic law which required the elimination of the unfit and life’s failures: ‘the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better’. All men were as if subject to a divine judgment: ‘If they are sufficiently complete to live, they &#039;&#039;do&#039;&#039; live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was necessary to respect ‘that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg215&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Distancing himself from attempts to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the popular classes, Lecky observed that, in reality, ‘in not a few cases’, infant mortality was ‘a blessing in disguise’. Indeed,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Sanitary reform is not wholly a good thing when it enables the diseased and feeble members of the community, who in another stage of society would have died in infancy, to grow up and become parent stocks, transmitting a weakened type or the taint of hereditary disease.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing thus, Lecky aligned himself with eugenics, the new ‘science’ that had made its appearance in England and met with extraordinary success in the United States, where between 1907 and 1915 as many as thirteen states passed legislation for compulsory sterilization. According to the legislation of Indiana (the first state to move in this direction), subject to it were ‘habitual delinquents, idiots, imbeciles and rapists’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like eugenics, Spencer celebrated his greatest triumph in the transatlantic republic.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here William G. Sumner, often regarded as a kind of US Spencer, warned people not to forget the ‘struggle for existence’, as ‘poets and sentimentalists’ liked to.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Socialism’s mistake primarily consisted in its claim ‘to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of “the state”‘.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Anti-statism and Social Darwinism went hand in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Germany Heinrich von Treitschke drew attention to the example of the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us examine the most delectable common people in the world, that of New York. It is a set of rejects who have merged from all over the whole earth. Yet left to themselves, these corrupted elements are compelled to control themselves. Do you think there is a Prussian police capable of keeping them at bay in the same way that they are held at bay by the harsh law of necessity? All are well aware: nobody takes any notice if someone dies of hunger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg216&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Still in Germany, in August L. von Rochau’s view the United States had the merit of applying the principle that every individual must, in the first instance, know how to help himself, unlike revolutionary, centralist France, which delegated care of individual well-being to the state, transforming the latter into a ‘hospital’ for ‘sickly, deformed people’ (&#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039;). The country across the Atlantic also asserted its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in its foreign policy, taking territory after territory from Mexico or the Indians, the latter a people now doomed to an ‘unstoppable decline’, and thus the equivalent on the international plane of the &#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039; who demanded state aid.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It makes no sense to seek to exclude Treitschke and Rochau from the liberal tradition by looking forward to the Third Reich and presupposing a variety of infernal negative teleology at work in Germany. In reality, both authors, especially the first, viewed England and the United States with sympathy and admiration and, echoing a theme widely diffused in the liberal culture of the time, unstintingly denounced the statist and anti-individualist tradition that revolutionary, socialist and Bonapartist France had inherited from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. In particular, the presence in Treitschke of the influence of Constant and de Tocqueville is immediately obvious. One thinks of his condemnation of the ‘deification of the state’ and the subsequent expansion of the political sphere. From ‘semi-ancient concepts’ and ‘Rousseau’s enthusiasm for the civic sense of the ancients’ derived the ‘omnipotent state power’ constructed by the Jacobins, who were likewise oblivious of the cost of the unanimous participation of citizens in political life: ‘the civic splendour of Athens rested on a vast foundation of slavery’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This inability to understand modern liberty led to tragedy: from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to the revolution, from Napoleon I to Napoleon III, ‘under all the regimes, the state’s excessive activity has remained the hereditary disease of France’, whose ideal was ‘the state’s providential omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can understand why social Darwinism established itself above all in Britain, the United States and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, these were three countries on the crest of a wave of economic development and international influence and prestige. If the first two were able to boast powerful expansion overseas or continentally, the third was already engaged in a frenetic scramble for colonies. We shall see that all three regarded themselves &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg217&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as members of a single family or race which, setting out from Germany, had first crossed the Channel and then the Atlantic. And all three tended to regard Latins (not to mention colonial peoples) as failures, and to attribute their own success to the action of natural selection, which rewarded the best within any individual state, but especially at an international level.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn1a|1]] L’Ouverture, quoted in Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn2a|2]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn3a|3]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 229, 400.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 230–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn5a|5]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, pp. 154, 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn6a|6]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Étienne Dumont, Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1840, vol. 1, pp. 509–21. The text quoted here was subsequently reprinted with alterations in Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 2, pp. 491ff.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn7a|7]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 524–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn8a|8]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 104–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn9a|9]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 63–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn10a|10]] Randolph, quoted in ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 568–9, 464.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn12a|12]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn13a|13]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn15a|15]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 165.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn16a|16]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn17a|17]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn19a|19]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn20a|20]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn21a|21]] Ibid., p. 24. On Townsend, cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 800–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn22a|22]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn23a|23]] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, vol. 3, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn24a|24]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 10, pp. 352–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn25a|25]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn26a|26]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn27a|27]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn28a|28]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, pp. 291–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn29a|29]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 3, pt 2, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn31a|31]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn32a|32]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 80–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn33a|33]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 2, p. 727.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn40a|40]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 404.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 750 (speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 27 January 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 92–4, 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 221, 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 2, p. 152 n. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn45a|45]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 241 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 283 (letter to L. von Thun, 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn48a|48]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 309; Étienne Dumont, Introduction to Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn49a|49]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn50a|50]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 240 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn53a|53]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 284.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 101, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn56a|56]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 179–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 November 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 182 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, pp. 155, 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn65a|65]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 79–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §1; ch. 7, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn68a|68]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn69a|69]] Barnarve, quoted in François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, p. 168.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn70a|70]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 316–17, 318–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn71a|71]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;General History of Civilisation in Europe&#039;&#039;, Oxford and London: D. A. Talboys, 1837, pp. 13–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn72a|72]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 12, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 544.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn74a|74]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1 (letter to H. Reeve, 3 February 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn80a|80]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 165, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn81a|81]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 20, p. 350.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn82a|82]] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, &#039;&#039;La giustizia nella rivoluzione e nella Chiesa&#039;&#039;, ed. Mario Albertini, Turin: UTET, 1968, p. 408.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn83a|83]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, p. 334.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn85a|85]] Bentham, quoted in Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn86a|86]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn87a|87]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn88a|88]] Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 85 n. (this is an assertion which, with some variations, can be found in Dupont de Nemours as well as Robespierre).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn89a|89]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn90a|90]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 33, §1 (for Nietzsche); Alain Laurent, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’individualismo&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, p. 66 (for Wilde’s &#039;&#039;The Soul of Man under Socialism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn91a|91]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn92a|92]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn93a|93]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 269, 306–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 121.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn95a|95]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 242 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 3 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn97a|97]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn98a|98]] Palmerston, quoted in Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston&#039;&#039;, ed. Lester Hutchinson, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn99a|99]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 309–28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn100a|100]] Ibid., p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn101a|101]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 197–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn102a|102]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, p. 218; vol. 2, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn103a|103]] Vilfredo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et ideologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1999, pp. 14, 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn104a|104]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 3, pp. 554–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 61, 70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn106a|106]] Wolfgang Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’ und die politische und soziale Revolution in Frankreich und England&#039;&#039;, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, pp. 74, 80–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn107a|107]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 214, 217, 220.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn108a|108]] Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’&#039;&#039;, p. 78.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn109a|109]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn110a|110]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, p. 259 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn111a|111]] Francis Lieber, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty’, &#039;&#039;New Individualist Review&#039;&#039;, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 718–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn112a|112]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 173; Robespierre &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 501–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn113a|113]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 51, 326; on his relations with Berthold Georg Niebuhr, cf. Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Erinnerungen aus meinem Zusammenleben mit Georg Berthold Niebuhr&#039;&#039;, trans. Karl Thibaut, Heidelberg: Winter, 1837.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 337 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 16 May 1858).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 292.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn117a|117]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn118a|118]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., p. 664.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., p. 687.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn121a|121]] Ibid., p. 530.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn122a|122]] The text of the Le Chapelier law is quoted in Jean-Pierre Potier, ‘L’Assemblé constituante et la question de la liberté du travail’, in Jean-Michel Servet, &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn123a|123]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn124a|124]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 31, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn125a|125]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn126a|126]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 512–13, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn127a|127]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn128a|128]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. 25–6, 310.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn129a|129]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 144; Smith, &#039;&#039;Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn130a|130]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn131a|131]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 146; Hayek, &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn133a|133]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 318; Valerie Jean Conner, &#039;&#039;The National War Labor Board&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134a|134]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 36–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135a|135]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136a|136]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 803 (letter to J. Fothergill, 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137a|137]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 5, §10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138a|138]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;Social Statics&#039;&#039;, New York: Appleton, 1877, pp. 414–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 32–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140a|140]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141a|141]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142a|142]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism in American Thought&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. 18–36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143a|143]] William Graham Sumner, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 187, 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144a|144]] Sumner, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145a|145]] Heinrich von Treitschke, &#039;&#039;Politik&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, vol. 2, p. 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146a|146]] Augus Ludwig von Rochau, &#039;&#039;Grundsätze der Realpolitik&#039;&#039;, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 150, 186, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147a|147]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886, pp. 9–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148a|148]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER SEVEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg219&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Self-government by white communities and deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Asserting the principle of consent by the governed as a condition of the legitimacy of political power, liberalism galvanized national independence movements. This initially occurred with the American Revolution. And it immediately offered an example. Some years later, it was the French colonists of San Domingo, determined to defend their property in slaves against interference from central power, who entertained projects of independence or adhesion to the North American Union. However, the colonists’ agitation had an utterly unanticipated consequence, in the emergence on the American continent of a new independent state ruled by blacks and which was the first to abolish the institution of slavery. But San Domingo–Haiti was the exception—and an exception that filled the liberal world in its entirety with horror and scandal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The outcome of the war of independence against Spain also induced perplexity and unease. It was crowned with success thanks to the aid of the ex-slaves of San Domingo and, albeit amid bitter conflicts, witnessed the emergence of a new identity stamped by a restoration of pre-Columbian ancestry and a mixing of races. Giving vent to a widespread sentiment, at the start of the Latin American revolution a senator from South Carolina (Robert Y. Hayne) scornfully referred to its leaders as ‘men of color’, who were ‘looking to Hayti … with feelings of the strongest confraternity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They admired the island which, in Jefferson’s view, could serve only as a dumping ground where blacks could &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg220&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be deported and deposited. For the purposes of that operation—i.e. ‘the definitive disappearance of the black race from our borders’—John O’Sullivan, the theorist of ‘manifest destiny’, thought above all of the Latin American continent: ‘The Spanish-Indian-American population of Mexico, Central America and South America, afford the only receptacle capable of absorbing that race … [They are] themselves already of mixed and confused blood’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of Elam Lynds, ‘father of the prison system’ then in force and a prominent US figure, ‘whose practical talents are universally acknowledged’ (the characterization is de Tocqueville’s) ‘the Spanish of South America’ formed ‘a race closer to the ferocious beast and the savage than civilized man’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The category traditionally employed to define Indians was now also applied to the populations that had committed the error of mixing with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While white colonists in the British Commonwealth saw their right to self-government recognized, the Latin American peoples, excluded from the white community and the community of the free strictly defined, became part of the colonial world. This explains the Monroe Doctrine. Reinterpreted and radicalized in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, it conferred an ‘international police power’ on ‘civilized society’ in general, and the United States in particular, in relation to Latin America.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The white colonists of the British Empire encountered no serious difficulty achieving recognition. Having learnt the lesson implicit in the American Revolution, the London government decided to pursue the policy of ‘conciliation’ formerly suggested by Burke in its relationship with peoples ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. Thus, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa first achieved significant autonomy inside the Commonwealth and subsequently attained complete independence. It was a well-founded principle (observed John Stuart Mill in 1861) that, at least in domestic policy, the ‘colonies of European race’ were fully entitled to self-government.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, self-government by the colonists could entail a drastic deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, now subject to the exclusive, unhampered control of their direct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg221&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;oppressors. We are familiar with Smith’s observation about the catastrophic consequences that ‘free’ representative bodies monopolized or controlled by slave-owners could have for black slaves. Several decades later, in 1841, James Stephen, one of the actors in the struggle that had led to the abolition of slavery in British colonies, declared himself in favour of their firm control by the Crown: ‘popular franchises in the hands of a great body of owners of slaves were the worst instruments of tyranny which were ever yet forged for the oppression of mankind’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pertinence of this warning was tragically confirmed by subsequent developments. In 1864, referring to New Zealand, which for some years had been able to count on ‘responsible government’—that is, ultimately, self-government by the white community&#039;&#039;—The Times&#039;&#039; observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lost all imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Australia the extermination of the Aborigines had already begun some time earlier. But in this case too it was the de facto self-government which the colonists succeeded in exercising that pressed on the accelerator, whereas expressing concern in 1830 about the ‘indelible stain’ being imprinted ‘upon the character of the British Government’ was the Colonial Secretary.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, according to the observation made at the start of the twentieth century by an English liberal whose position was highly anomalous—namely, John Hobson—what was occurring was a kind of ‘private slaughter’, carried out by colonists who had wrested self-government or substantial freedom of action.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of South Africa, once the government had defeated the Boer settlers and subjected them to the Empire, it reassured them: ‘Your fate is in your own hands … the good sense of the British people will never tolerate any intermeddling in the purely domestic concerns of the people to whom it has conceded the fullest liberties of government.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Self-government by white &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg222&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;settlers involved the emergence of a racial state, which segregated blacks in a semi-servile condition and remained in place for almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Significantly, this regime took the South of the United States as its model.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There, following a brief interlude (so-called Reconstruction) immediately after the Civil War, when African Americans were genuinely able to enjoy civil and political rights, the reconciliation between the former enemies in 1877 reestablished in the southern states the self-government of whites, who subjected the recently emancipated slaves to a terroristic dictatorship based on the principle of white supremacy. As in South Africa with the compromise between the British and the Boers, in the United States the compromise between central government and the dominant class in the South, which re-acquired the right to self-government, paved the way for the reassertion of ‘master-race democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The abolition of slavery and the development of servile labour&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a question suggests itself. The military defeat of the South was clear and irreversible, but had the principle of the racial delimitation of the community of the free really been overcome? Scorning abolitionism, Calhoun summarized the change that had occurred in Britain’s colonies following the desired emancipation: blacks were ‘forced to labor, not by the authority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This statement dates from 1837. Laws against vagrancy forced the former slaves to work as ‘apprentices’. In what conditions? A year prior to the intervention of the theorist of the slaveholding South, a representative of the British colonial administration, inspired by evangelical sentiments, had observed in a letter to the governor of the island of Mauritius:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than that of slavery itself.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg223&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville would later observe that ‘having nominally abolished slavery, the British have reintroduced it under the rubric of apprenticeship for a certain period of time’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the apprenticeship only lasted a few years, even if much time had to pass before the ex-slaves could shake off the negative discriminations of every kind they continued to suffer. In any event, even before the abolition of slavery in its colonies, Britain was concerned to replace the blacks, importing indentured servants from Africa and Asia. Here we see at work Indian and Chinese coolies in particular. On their arrival in the British colonies, they were settled in the accommodation reserved for slaves. It is true that this involved indentured servants, but in fact many of them did not survive until the expiry of their contract. Even the sexual exploitation of women was not lacking. In the popular art of the time, the coolie was represented in chains, exactly like a slave. Obviously, there was no longer a hereditary transmission of the servile condition; in a sense, there was not even any need for it. British ships could continue to transport coolies from Asia in a voyage that resembled the classic slave trade. Conditions were harsh and the mortality rate high.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the losses could rapidly be made up. A distinguished American historian of the institution of slavery has offered a summary of the golden age of liberalism that is worth quoting:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, as in 1760, non-European compulsory labor was still the labor of choice for rational capitalists who chose to cultivate the vast undeveloped parts of the tropics … The 20 millions who left India alone, mostly as indentured servants, between the 1830s and the 1910s, amounted to twice the number of Africans forcibly landed in the Americas during the four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain in 1840 a political figure of the first importance—Lord John Russell—expressed his unease at the advent of a ‘new system of slavery’. Initially, it met with resistance from the abolitionist movement, which was still fairly strong. However, as a result of the already noted weakness of abolitionism inspired by Christianity, demands for the import from Africa and Asia of indentured servants, who in reality were a more or less compulsory labour force, soon got the upper hand.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg224&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;As well as in British colonies, this new servile labour force also made its appearance in the United States. Around 10,000 coolies imported from China were engaged in building inaccessible railroads, intended to consolidate the conquest of the Far West.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As Engels put it, this was an attempt to replace black slavery with the ‘disguised slavery of Indian and Chinese coolies’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was this confirmation of the thesis maintained by Calhoun of the inseparability of work and slavery? In North America, prior to being overshadowed and then definitively supplanted by more profitable black slavery, Indian slavery had long persisted here and there, even after the Glorious Revolution. In 1767 Sharp, the abolitionist we have already encountered, felt obliged to denounce it. In the case of Virginia it was only in 1808 that the Supreme Court definitively pronounced its illegality.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the American Revolution onwards, the indentured servant or temporary white slave was completely replaced by the black slave, who in turn, after the end of the Civil War, gave way to the coolie from China or India—another temporary slave, even if the skin colour was now yellow. In 1834, the same year as the abolition of slavery in British colonies, the liberal Wakefield acknowledged that ‘yellow slaves’ were beginning to take the place of ‘blacks’, just as the latter had taken over from ‘red’ (Indian) slaves.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, ‘red’ slavery or semi-slavery would have a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century in Texas and California, taken from Mexico (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|§2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, it can reasonably be objected to Calhoun that semi-slavery or slavery for a specified period of time is not the same thing as perpetual and hereditary slavery. But let us note the further development of the argument by the theorist of the slaveholding South. In any ‘wealthy and civilized society’, part of the population ‘live[s] on the labor of the other’. This was a manifestly conflictual relationship: the best way of regulating it was achieved when ‘the labor of the African race is, [as] among us, commanded by the European’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The expansion of Europe in the colonies and the diffusion of ‘master-race democracy’ in Europe&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg225&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Not even Mill had any doubts about the dominion the ‘European race’ was called upon to exercise over the rest of the world. Certainly, he declared for recognition of the right of self-government by the ‘colonies of European race’. But only for them. As for the rest,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear: freedom applied ‘only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’ and could not be demanded by minors or ‘those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No different was the position of Lecky, who at the start of the twentieth century celebrated the glory of the United Kingdom thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Nothing in the history of the world is more wonderful than that under the flag of these two little islands there should have grown up the greatest and most beneficent despotism in the world, comprising nearly two hundred and thirty millions of inhabitants under direct British rule, and more than fifty millions under British protectorates …[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘despotism’ theorized here was certainly synonymous with slavery from the standpoint of Locke and the protagonists of the American Revolution, all the more so in that it seemed to know no limits. In Mill’s view, ‘a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Political ‘slavery’ could not be equated with slavery in the strict sense. Yet Mill went further. He demanded the barbarians’ ‘obedience’ for the purposes of their education for ‘continuous &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg226&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;labour’, which was the foundation of civilization. And, in this context, he did not hesitate to theorize a transitional phase of ‘slavery’ for ‘uncivilized races’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The point was forcefully reiterated: there were ‘savage tribes so averse from regular industry, that industrial life is scarcely able to introduce itself among them until they are … conquered and made slaves of’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the slave had no cause for complaint; he was ‘one step in advance of a savage’, and thanks to the conditions imposed on him had already achieved a certain progress. We are put in mind of Calhoun and the slaveholding South, all the more so when Mill refers to &#039;&#039;‘born&#039;&#039; slaves’ recalcitrant to work and discipline.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, despite his employment of the expression just noted, the English liberal envisaged a temporary slavery. This would in fact seem to hang over ‘the great majority of the human race’, which unfortunately was ‘in a savage or semi-savage state’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the condition dictating slavery. While, on the one hand, Mill sided decisively with the Union during the Civil War, on the other, he legitimized the practice of forced labour imposed by colonial powers on subject populations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the coin of this opposition between civilized, adult England and savage races of minors was the process whereby the barrier separating servants from masters in the metropolis tended to lose its caste rigidity. The attitude adopted in the mid-nineteenth century by Disraeli, champion of the colonial expansion of ‘superior’ races and major theorist of race as the ‘key to history’ (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|§10]]), was significant. He denied that it was possible to speak of the existence in England of ‘two nations’—‘the rich and the poor’—as the Chartists claimed. On the basis of his assertion of the unity that now characterized the ‘privileged, prosperous English people’, Disraeli promoted the Second Reform Act, which extended political rights to significant sections of the popular masses.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Class differences within the white community remained, but were being reduced even at a social level. The exploitation of Chinese coolies and other more or less servile labour forces created the possibility of ‘raising to the position of “independent gentlemen”‘, if not ‘whole white populations of the West’, as Hobson maintained,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] then at least a significant proportion of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg227&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The decisive barrier now lay elsewhere. The three ‘castes’ had become two—in the United States thanks to the abolition of slavery, and in Europe thanks to the reduction of differences within the white community, which was tending to develop more egalitarian internal relations than in the past, similar to those of the white community across the Atlantic. In this sense, ‘master-race democracy’ now characterized the overall relations between the West and the colonial world, whether internal or external.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Hobson could denounce the extreme expansion of ‘the area of British despotism’. The London government resorted to ‘distinctively autocratic methods’ in its relations with an enormous number of human beings:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the three hundred and sixty-seven millions of British subjects outside these isles, not more than eleven millions, or one in thirty-four, have any real self-government for purposes of legislation and administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political freedom, and civil freedom, so far as it rests upon the other, are simply non-existent for the overwhelming majority of British subjects.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Essentially, this was the same analysis as Mill’s (and Lecky’s), with the difference that ‘despotism’ now had a negative connotation. Suffering it (stressed Hobson) were populations coerced into forced labour. And here too we have a convergence with Mill as regards factual analysis, but a sharp contrast when it comes to value judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. De Tocqueville, Western supremacy and the danger of ‘miscegenation’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The model of ‘master-race democracy’ also had a clear influence on de Tocqueville. It is true that during the July Monarchy he stood for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. But how were the ex-slaves to be treated once they had been emancipated? It was necessary ‘to prevent the negroes of our colonies imitating those of the English colonies and, like them, abandoning the major industries to retire to a piece of fertile soil, which has been bought cheaply or grabbed’. Hence emancipated slaves could be permitted to choose their ‘master’, but not to ‘remain idle or to work exclusively for themselves’. That could not be tolerated:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg228&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In temporarily banning negroes from owning land, what are we doing? We are artificially placing them in the position in which the European labourer naturally finds himself. This is certainly not tyranny and the man this obstacle is imposed on when he escapes slavery would not seem to have any right to complain.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the measure suggested here was the one historically implemented in the colonies, making it possible to transform slavery proper into a semi-servile labour relationship. In any event, in addition to their political rights, notionally emancipated blacks were thus also deprived of civil rights, by its ‘artificially’ being made impossible for them to own a piece of land and freely choose their occupation. While he condemned legal regulation of working hours as ‘despotism’, de Tocqueville had nothing against the creation from above of a caste of wage-labour denied any possibility of social mobility. When he referred to workers from India or other parts of the world, called on by England to replace the emancipated black slaves, the French liberal also made indirect mention of the coolies.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, however, he ventured no critical remarks about a labour relationship construed even by influential representatives of the liberal world as a recreation of the institution of slavery in a different form. As in Mill, so in Tocqueville, the supremacy pertaining to Europeans was not only political, but also had direct consequences economically and socially. In any event, the gulf separating dominant and dominated was unbridgeable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European race has received from heaven, or acquired by its own efforts, such incontestable superiority over the other races which compose the great human family that the man placed by us, on account of his vices and ignorance, on the bottom rung of the social scale is still first among the savages.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was fitting that such colossally different races continued to remain clearly distinct. De Tocqueville referred with horror to the behaviour of some prisoners deported to Australia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The condemned have fled in large numbers into the woods. There they have formed companies of looters; they have allied with the savages, married their children and partially adopted their customs. Out of this crossbreeding, a race of half-castes has been born that is more barbarous than the Europeans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg229&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but more civilized than the savages, and whose hostility has constantly disturbed the colony and sometimes caused it to run the greatest dangers. [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This denunciation of miscegenation, which imperilled European or white supremacy, is a theme that takes us back to the United States and, above all, to the ideology that continued to inspire the South even after the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The ‘empty cradle’ and the ‘destiny’ of the Indians&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others ‘master-race democracy’, which was now on the point of becoming established on a planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. Leading the Union’s war against the secessionist states and promoting the abolition of slavery was a figure (Lincoln) who, like Jefferson before him, toyed with the idea of deporting the blacks to Africa or Latin America, and who was a veteran of the wars against the Indians, against ‘men, women, and children … mercilessly cut to pieces’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1871 General Francis C. Walker, commissioner for Indian affairs, proposed to treat ‘wild men’ no differently from ‘wild beasts’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison we have already encountered in Washington, and which presided over the substantial erasure of the Indians (and the natives of Australia and New Zealand) from the face of the earth, thus makes its reappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A genealogical myth derived from the Old Testament was called upon to legitimize these genocidal practices. A major modern historian, Arnold Toynbee, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated. Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent … [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg230&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This genealogical myth, which presided over the expropriation, deportation and decimation of the Irish and the Indians, was explicitly present in Lieber: ‘[God] has given [this great country] to us, as much as He gave Palestine to the Jews’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention was made of the Indians, even if they seem to be implicitly compared to the populations that occupied the Promised Land without authorization prior to the arrival of the chosen people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; seems to support this deadly genealogical myth. De Tocqueville underlined the religious fervour of New England’s founders, who regarded themselves as descendants from ‘Abraham’s stock’. In the writings and documents left behind by them, one sensed ‘the very savor of Gospel antiquity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was an aroma that in a way ended up turning the head of the French liberal himself. He uncritically adopted and subscribed to the description Nathaniel Morton, one of the colony’s founders and first leaders, gave of the Pilgrim Fathers’ arrival in America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men? [A]nd what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not … the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, as in the Old Testament description of the unauthorized inhabitants of Canaan, those destined to be subjugated or wiped out by the chosen people—or, as de Tocqueville characterized it, ‘the germ of a great nation wafted by Providence to a predestined shore’—are completely confounded with nature.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This providential design is all the more clear because, ultimately, it involved a desert. It is a theme &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; returns to repeatedly: the Indian ‘has nothing to oppose to our perfection in the arts but the resources of the wilderness’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One phrase is especially significant: ‘the Indians were the sole inhabitants of the wilds whence they have since been expelled’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The desert ceased to be such, becoming a place inhabited by humans, only with the entry of the Europeans and the flight or deportation of the indigenous population. As we know, Locke and Montesquieu preferred to speak of ‘virgin &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg231&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;forests’. But even though the two metaphors are different, their meaning is identical: we are dealing with places where there is no human trace, an area that is (as Locke put it) ‘vacant’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When subsequently forced to register the presence of the Indians, de Tocqueville hastened to stress that they had no right to the land occupied by them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the vast country that I have been describing was inhabited by many indigenous tribes, it may justly be said, at the time of its discovery by Europeans, to have formed one great desert. The Indians occupied without possessing it. It is by agricultural labor that man appropriates the soil, and the early inhabitants of North America lived by the produce of the chase.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For Locke already, the sole possible foundation of property right was labour, of which a people dedicated exclusively to hunting were incapable. But an explicitly theological justification was added by de Tocqueville to seal the fate of the Indians:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; those wide and deep rivers; that inexhaustible valley of the Mississippi; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, de Tocqueville ended up legitimizing the policy of deportation implemented by Jackson, president of the transatlantic republic when the French liberal visited it. The argument of the ‘empty cradle’ was widespread in the US culture of the time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a ‘freethinker’ aligned with the liberals and a writer and intellectual who enjoyed undisputed prestige in Boston,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] had no doubts in interpreting God’s will. Only pending the arrival of a superior stock had the Indians been placed on American soil. Thereafter &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg232&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they were clearly marked out for ‘destruction’ or ‘extermination’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Franklin had not argued very differently, when he attributed to a providential design the devastating effect of alcohol on a population destined to be wiped off the face of the earth (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was more pained. He did not shut his eyes to the horrors that were occurring. Yet, however distressing, the tragedy of the Indians expressed both the progress of civilization and a providential design. In any event, it was ineluctable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their implacable prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction. The ruin of these tribes began from the day when Europeans landed on their shores; it has proceeded ever since, and we are now witnessing its completion.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
True, de Tocqueville expressed unease at the ‘cold egotism’, ‘utter insensitivity’ and ‘ruthless sentiment’ with which the white population of the United States, so attached to its morality and Christianity, viewed the fate of the Indians. Yet the French liberal’s description of the ‘savages’, more than ever recalcitrant to ‘civilization’, certainly did not conduce to the cause of their salvation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a general rule, their mouth was disproportionately large and their facial expression ignoble and wicked … Their physiognomy exhibited that deep depravity which can only derive from a long abuse of civilization, and yet they were still savages. Mixed with the vices they have adopted from us is something barbaric and uncivilized, making them a hundred times more repugnant … Their movements were rapid and uncoordinated, their voice shrill and tuneless, their glance worried and savage. On first contact, one would be tempted to regard them as nothing but a beast of the forest on which education has been able to confer a semblance of humanity, but which has nevertheless remained an animal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We can now understand the question de Tocqueville posed to his US interlocutors: ‘Do the Indians have an idea that sooner or later their race will be destroyed by ours?’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg233&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The Indians’ deportation and decimation made explicit the fact that the North American territory was an ‘empty cradle’, awaiting the white settler committed from the time of his arrival to ‘struggl[ing] against the obstacles that nature opposes to him’, against ‘the wilderness and savage life’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, what ends up emerging is the process of de-humanization of the natives, reduced, even more than to barbarism, to inanimate nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. De Tocqueville, Algeria and ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In de Tocqueville the American model asserted itself with particular clarity when he confronted the problem of Algeria. The letter sent to Francis Lieber on 22 July 1846 is revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time I am very concerned about our affairs in Africa, which assume greater importance with every passing day. For us &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; has become, and will remain, the secondary aspect as long we do not have quarrels in Europe. The principal aspect today is colonization, is how to attract a major &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; population of cultivators to Algeria and, above all, keep them there. We already have 100,000 &#039;&#039;Christians&#039;&#039; in Africa, not counting the army. But they have almost all settled in the towns, which are becoming large, beautiful cities, while the countryside remains a &#039;&#039;desert&#039;&#039;. It is impossible to consider colonization in Africa without thinking of the great examples furnished by the United States in this field. But how to study them? Have books or documents of any kind been published in the United States that can enlighten us on this point and tell us how things unfolded? Can this information be found in official or other kinds of reports? Anything you could provide in this connection would be received with great gratitude.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
I have highlighted four phrases in italics. Let us begin with the last of them. Like the lands inhabited or, rather, occupied without authorization by the Indians, Algeria was a desert prior to the arrival of the French or ‘Christians’. A sort of Biblical aroma begins to make itself felt in connection with the landing in North Africa of a civilized people, who likewise seem invested with a providential mission. It was a people at once European and Christian: the colonial war tended to assume a religious character. Certainly, expelling the Algerians &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg234&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from their ‘desert’ was an operation that met with fierce resistance, but de Tocqueville was careful in this instance not to speak of ‘war’. That was a category which could only be applied to armed conflicts in Europe and between civilized peoples. It somehow implied recognition of the enemy, which was something denied Arabs and Indians alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precisely because of this lack of recognition, the campaign of colonial conquest could resort to pitiless violence that did not spare the civilian population. On account of their brutal, indiscriminate character, the methods used to subjugate Algeria ended up eliciting reservations and disquiet in France. De Tocqueville was not among the ‘excellent philanthropists’ about whom Bugeaud, the general in charge of military operations,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ironized:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often heard in France men whom I respect, but do not support, consider it reprehensible that crops are burned, silos emptied, and lastly that unarmed men, women and children are seized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For me, this is a regrettable necessity, but one to which any people that wants to make war on the Arabs will have to submit.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
According to de Tocqueville, the head of military operations in Algeria had the merit of having understood all this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is the first who has known how to apply ubiquitously and simultaneously the kind of war which, in my view as in his, is the only kind of war that is feasible in Africa. He has pursued this system of war with incomparable energy and vigour.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This was a ‘new science’ that must be taken to heart.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In order to starve them, and confront them with the clear alternative of capitulation or death from starvation, Arabs who insisted on resisting must be deprived not only of their harvest, but also of the possibility of trading with neighbours: ‘They suffer greatly from being parked between our bayonets and the desert’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we are explicitly referred to the American model; this is how ‘the most barbaric Indian tribes’ were disciplined: ‘the tribe from which a robbery or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg235&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;murder has been committed’ was subjected to collective punishment, which excluded it from the trade with Europeans absolutely vital to it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the rebel Arabs must by all means be prevented from the possibility of combining or settling anywhere:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the passionate taste they display for a nomadic existence, they need settlements. It is of the utmost importance to prevent them being able to establish a single one. All expeditions whose aim is to occupy or destroy existing towns and emerging towns seem to me useful.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville had no hesitation in issuing a radical watchword:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To destroy anything that resembles a permanent gathering of population or, in other words, a town: I believe it is of the utmost importance not to allow any town to survive, or arise, in the regions controlled by Abd el-Kader [the leader of the resistance].[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the modality of the war. But what results was it intended to achieve? We know the model that inspired de Tocqueville. In May 1841, while visiting Philippeville, founded on land acquired at a derisory price from the indigenous inhabitants, he was pleased by the ‘American aspect of the city’, which was rapidly expanding.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expropriation and colonization were proceeding apace. Once the process had been completed, what kind of society should be built? What relations might be developed between the Arabs and the French? De Tocqueville was in no doubt:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fusion of these two peoples is a chimera that can be dreamt of only when one has not been on the spot. Hence it is possible and necessary that there be two clearly distinct sets of laws in Africa, because we are faced with two clearly separate societies. When one is dealing with Europeans, &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; nothing prevents us from treating them as if they were alone; the laws enacted for them must always be applied exclusively to them.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg236&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to scrupulous protection of the invaders’ civil liberties was a terroristic law of suspects directed at the indigenous population. During his visit to Philippeville, the French liberal was invited to lunch by a colonel in the occupying army, who painted an eloquent picture of the situation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir, only force and terror work with these people … The other day, a murder was committed in the street. An Arab was brought before me who was a suspect. I interrogated him and then had him beheaded. You will see his head on the gate of Constantine.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville seems to have betrayed no emotion. He repeated the idea of two sets of laws. As regards criminal trials of ‘natives’, ‘if it is thought that our forms are too slow (which I do not think), war tribunals could be set up for them’. And even for ‘civil trials’, the ‘emergency procedure’ already in force could be retained.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs must also be discriminated against economically, as well as legally: ‘Allow free entry into France of all produce from Algeria, especially that derived not from native industry but colonial industry’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only on these conditions would French settlers in North Africa genuinely be able to develop on the American model:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no easy thing to instil in Europeans the desire to abandon their country, because they are happy there and enjoy certain rights and certain goods that are dear to them. It is even more difficult to attract them to a country where from the outset they encounter a torrid, unhealthy climate and a formidable enemy, who incessantly hangs around you to take your property or your life. To get inhabitants to come to such a country, it is first of all necessary to give them great opportunities to make their fortune; in the second place, they must find social conditions that conform to their habits and tastes.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen de Tocqueville celebrate the unprecedented zone of liberty enjoyed by the individual in the United States (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]). But now something similar is to be found in the African space conquered by France: ‘The colonies of all the European peoples afford the same spectacle. Rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg237&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;than being smaller, the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the mother country. His freedom of action is less restricted’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, the other side of the coin was a drastic deterioration in the condition of the Arabs. De Tocqueville did not hide the fact: ‘We have decimated the population’ and the survivors were being exterminated by the starvation caused by the methods of war we have noted; ‘at this moment Abd el-Kader is &#039;&#039;literally&#039;&#039; dying of hunger’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It had to be admitted that ‘we have made Muslim society much more miserable, disorganised, ignorant and barbarous than it was before it knew us’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So what was to be done? The French liberal distanced himself from the attitude of not a few officers and soldiers of the French army: in their view, ‘the Arabs are like noxious beasts’ and ‘the death of each and every one of them seems a good thing’. No, ‘it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable to want to snuff out or exterminate the natives’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a second, de Tocqueville lets slip an admission: ‘At this time we are making war in much more barbarous fashion than the Arabs themselves. Currently, civilization is to be found on their side.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Immediately afterwards, however, we find the declaration we have already noted: there was no room for humanitarian scruples in a colonial war that directly targeted the civilian populations, who were denied means of subsistence and the possibility of combining. Or: ‘Once we have committed the major violence of the conquest, I believe we must not shrink from the minor forms of violence absolutely required to consolidate it.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the conquest had been completed, it was necessary to promote self-government by civil society (French and white). It was called on to free itself altogether of military control, which must continue to be deployed with the requisite firmness over the Arabs. The conflict across the Atlantic, which during the War of Independence against Britain and in subsequent decades saw local self-government reject any interference by central political power—be it in London or Washington—in the colonists’ expansion or slave-owners’ enjoyment of their legitimate property, also manifested itself in Algeria. On one side were the colonists, who demanded complete freedom of action and expropriation, and on the other the political and military authorities, called upon to administer a ruthless colonial conquest with a minimum of prudence. How &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg238&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;many colonists could Africa absorb and how far could the process of expropriation of the indigenous population be pushed? De Tocqueville criticized hesitations and doubts: ‘It is not correct to say that the introduction of European farmers is a measure whose implementation is impractical’, or feasible only to a limited extent. At issue was a territory over which ‘the indigenous population is fairly scarce or fairly dispersed’. In any event, ‘the common property of the tribe is not founded on any title’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The colonel encountered by de Tocqueville, who did not hesitate to have Arabs decapitated on the basis of mere suspicion, on the other hand expressed his contempt for the colonists, a ‘mass of scoundrels’ and ‘thieves’, for whom the army was nothing more than a tool for accumulating a ‘fortune’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The date is 30 May 1841. The previous year, Bugeaud had set out his policy to the Chamber of Deputies: ‘Wherever there is clean water and fertile soil, it is necessary to settle colonists, without worrying about whom the land belongs to. It must be distributed to them so that it is enjoyed as rightful property’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, in the previously cited article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039; on 25 December 1843, he observed that, although conducting the merciless war dictated by circumstances, his army demonstrated generosity towards the Arab who finally decided to surrender: ‘We return to him all his world and sometimes part of his herd’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This attitude seems to have prompted reservations in de Tocqueville, judging at any rate from his intervention in the Chamber in June 1846:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some localities, rather than reserving the most fertile land, the best irrigated and most adapted for government property for Europeans, we have given it to the natives … After betrayals and rebellions, the natives have often been received by us with singular magnanimity. There are some who, having indulged in soaking their hands in our blood, have had their goods, their honour and their power restored to them, thanks to our generosity. There is more. In many places where the civilized European population is mixed with the indigenous population, there are not unfounded complaints that in general it is the native who is better protected, while the European obtains justice with greater difficulty.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg239&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a letter from the same period, de Tocqueville even ended up ironizing about ‘the tenderness towards the Arabs that came over Monsieur Bugeaud at the point when he saw in it a powerful means of blocking the development of civilized colonization’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We seem to hear once again the laments and protests of the American colonists against the London government, or of the southern planters of the United States against the threat of interference by federal government. And, in fact, de Tocqueville elaborated on his indictment of the political and military authorities. At issue was not only the assignment of land:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lavished honorific distinctions on the Arab, which are intended to indicate the merit of our citizens … One is led to conclude that our government in Africa is taking softness towards the vanquished so far as to forget its conquering position … It is neither useful nor obligatory for us to permit exaggerated ideas of their own importance in our Muslim subjects, and not even to persuade them that we are obliged in any circumstances to treat them as if they were our co-citizens and equals. They know that we have a dominant position in Africa and they expect us to retain it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of human equality could not be extended to embrace ‘semi-civilized peoples’ located outside the West: it was absolutely vital to avoid occasioning ‘astonishment and confusion in their spirits, filling them with erroneous and dangerous ideas’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case was it permissible to lose sight of the objective of building a society based on the legally sanctioned domination of French, Christian and European colonists. The attainment of this objective was now close at hand: ‘The Arab element is ever more isolated and little by little is dissolving. The Muslim population is tending to decline relentlessly, while the Christian population is growing relentlessly’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed: ‘Our weapons have decimated some tribes … On the other hand, our cultivators willingly use native manpower. The European needs the Arab to make the most of his land; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high wage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville had not lost sight of the American model. The Algerians were part Indians, forced to suffer expropriation, and part blacks. In the latter guise, Arabs could not claim to enjoy the rights of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg240&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;citizenship either on a civil level or, still less, politically. Without being slaves, now deprived of land they could earn a living only by supplying ‘manpower’ to the new property-owners. The society hoped for here was not very different from the one that would be realized in the southern United States after the Civil War. In Algeria, French and Western supremacy took the place of ‘white supremacy’. For the rest, there continued to exist two sets of laws, separated by a racial barrier, and the prejudice, on a more or less accentuated racial basis, called upon to justify these relations. Already at the beginning of the conquest, writing to de Tocqueville, Kergolay (his cousin and a life-long friend) had spoken of the Arabs as an ‘infamous, despicable race’, to be kept under constant control ‘by force combined with simple, uncomplicated equity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The recipient of this letter seems not to have seen things very differently. After a notable interval of time, we find him using, in slightly different form, some of the expressions we have just noted: ‘semi-civilized peoples’ were only capable of understanding the discourse of ‘correct but strict justice’; hence France should beware of indulging in ‘magnanimity and leniency’—virtues that would be incomprehensible and, worse, might produce dangerous results.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, writing precisely to Kergolay, de Tocqueville denounced the ‘greed’ and ‘fanaticism’ of the Arabs,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who, by his own admission, were suffering the systematic expropriation carried out by occupying forces inclined to regard their enemies as ‘noxious beasts’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To complete this picture, it is appropriate to mention a final detail. There was a moment in 1833 when the French liberal thought of settling as a colonist in Algeria.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Identification with the regime of white or Western supremacy, or ‘master-race democracy’, seems to have been total.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn1a|1]] Hayne, quoted in Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn2a|2]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn3a|3]] Lynds, quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn4a|4]] Roosevelt, quoted in Jean-Pierre Martin and Daniel Royot, &#039;&#039;Histoire et civilisation des États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn5a|5]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn6a|6]] Stephen, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn7a|7]] Quoted in Henri Grimal, &#039;&#039;De l’Empire britannique au Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, Paris: Colin, 1999, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn8a|8]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 420.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn9a|9]] J. A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn10a|10]] Chamberlain, quoted in Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn12a|12]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lene, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn13a|13]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn14a|14]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 92, 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn15a|15]] Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 176–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn16a|16]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn17a|17]] Cf. Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. vii; Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn18a|18]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 246.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn19a|19]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 4, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn20a|20]] Almon Wheeler Lauber, &#039;&#039;Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States&#039;&#039;, Williamstown (MA): Corner House, 1979, pp. 306–7, 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn21a|21]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 473ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn22a|22]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn23a|23]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn24a|24]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn25a|25]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn28a|28]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn30a|30]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn31a|31]] Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., pp. 124, 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn33a|33]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 103, 105.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 271–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn37a|37]] Nevins and Commager, &#039;&#039;America&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn38a|38]] Walker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn39a|39]] A. J. Toynbee, &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 211–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn40a|40]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 317.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn41a|41]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 25, 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 335.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn45a|45]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 337.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn46a|46]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn47a|47]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn49a|49]] Vernon L. Parrington, &#039;&#039;Main Currents in American Thought&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn50a|50]] Thomas F. Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 243.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn51a|51]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn52a|52]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 73–6, 223–5; cf. pp. 343–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn53a|53]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 434.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54a|54]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (letter to Francis Lieber, 22 July 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55a|55]] In an article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039;, 25 December 1843: ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 226–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 316.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 280.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 323.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72a|72]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 226.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74a|74]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 304 (unpublished letter to C. L. L. J. de Lamorcière, 5 April 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 380–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77a|77]] Bugeaud, quoted in Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi and André Prenant, &#039;&#039;L’Algérie, passé et présent&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1960, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78a|78]] Bugeaud, quoted in Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80a|80]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 220 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2, 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84a|84]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 1, pp. 193, 199 (letters of 22 June and 8 July 1830).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86a|86]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87a|87]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 2, p. 86 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 23 May 1841).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88a|88]] Cf. Jean-Jacques Chevallier and André Jardin, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER EIGHT ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg241&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Return to the question: What is liberalism? The well-born, the free and the liberals&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Having briefly reconstructed periods in the history of liberalism and the concrete politico-social relationships developed in its name, we must now return to our opening question. Use of the term ‘liberal’ is usually dated to the political struggles that developed in Spain in the wake of the 1812 revolution and the opposition that emerged between ‘liberals’, engaged in defending the constitution, and their opponents, whom they branded ‘servile’. Only now was the adjective transformed into a substantive. In fact, in revolutionary America the author of an article opposed to the institution of slavery had already signed himself ‘A Liberal’ (see [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|§10]]). But that is not the key point. When we come across a text from 1818 in which Constant sets out and supports the programme of the ‘liberal party’, it can be said that we are dealing with an adjective.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The political meaning of the term is clear; and implicit in it is the transition to the noun employed to define members of the party in question. On the other hand, there is not much difference between this stance in favour of the ‘liberal party’ and the stance in favour of the ‘liberal political system’ that we have seen make its appearance in a text by Washington as early as 1783. Hence the real problem is to identify the moment when, partly inheriting and partly transforming the meaning bequeathed by a long tradition, the term ‘liberal’ began to assume its modern political meaning. This was the precondition for the transition from the adjective to the substantive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg242&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a semantic event that cannot be uncoupled from the actual history of the liberal movement and liberal revolutions. We can start with the Glorious Revolution. Arguing against Robert Filmer, defender of the thesis that the Almighty had conferred exclusive ownership of, and dominion over, the earth to Adam, the first absolute monarch, Locke objected that God had bestowed his blessings ‘with a liberal hand’. The hypothetical absolute property-owner or monarch who, rather than displaying ‘liberal allowance’, sought to exploit the needy situation of all other men in order to reduce them to ‘hard service’ or even the condition of a ‘vassal’, would be acting no differently from the bandit who threatened a man with death in order to reduce him to ‘slavery’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, ‘liberal’ is synonymous with generous here. However, God’s liberal generosity is in contradiction with the political slavery that Filmer would like to impose on all men. The, as it were, constitutional and liberal God presupposed here refutes the claims of absolute monarchy. The vile, miserable condition of the ‘vassal’, of the individual subjected to ‘hard service’, of the servant or ‘slave’, was incompatible with the mode of being and feeling, in the first instance, of an Englishman and ‘gentleman’, who scornfully rejected the servile view that ‘we are all born slaves’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his turn, Hume on the one hand used the term ‘liberal’ synonymously with ‘disinterested’ and ‘generous’, and on the other criticized as ‘illiberal’ the popular agitation and plebeian riots that characterized the first English revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Smith distinguished in the moral field between the ‘liberal’ view peculiar to the well-off classes, restive at overly rigid bans on ‘luxury’ and the other pleasures of life, and the ‘strict or austere’ view peculiar to poorer classes, who by force of circumstance could not indulge in ‘thoughtlessness and dissipation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the context of the ‘liberal’/‘servile’ opposition that was crystallizing, the ‘liberal’ attitude was defined by antithesis either to the absolute power of the monarch or the servile or even merely plebeian condition. The liberal/illiberal dichotomy referred to a difference and conflict between two world-views, but also between two social conditions. In the course of the American Revolution, adopting a position in favour of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Burke deplored the restrictions on individual liberty introduced in Britain on account of the war, and regretted the fact that ‘the liberal government of this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg243&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and vassals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the liberal profession of faith criticized the unwarranted expansion of the Crown’s power, on the one hand, and distanced itself from the subaltern classes, subjected to work and hence servile, on the other. We can now understand the British Whig’s scorn for those who, in the name of a so-called ‘indiscriminate’ freedom, wished to appeal to the servile hands of slaves or emancipated slaves to suppress the revolt of colonists who, precisely as slaveowners, nurtured with particular sincerity the love of liberty that must dwell in any non-servile soul. And we can also understand why as early as 1790, on account of the restructuring of the nobility’s political influence, the ‘liberty’ of the French seemed to the British statesman to be contaminated with ‘coarseness and vulgarity’: it ‘is not liberal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Opposed to anything vulgar and plebeian, ‘liberal’ tended to be synonymous with aristocratic. In fact, among Virginia’s slave-owners the ‘aristocratic spirit’ was intimately bound up with ‘a spirit of liberty’ distinguished by its ‘more noble and liberal’ character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While paying homage to the ‘liberal government of this free nation’, Burke declared himself a member of the ‘aristocratick Party’—the party ‘connected with the solid, permanent long possessed property of the Country’—and felt committed to fighting with all his energy for ‘aristocratick principles, and the aristocratick Interests connected with them’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the American Revolution, along with the celebration of the ‘liberal political system’ we have already noted, we find in Washington a celebration of patrons of the ‘liberal arts’, contrasted with ‘mechanics’, with immigrants of a modest social condition from Europe.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But particularly illuminating is the discourse of John Adams. For a well-ordered liberty to be achieved, it could not be ‘mechanics’ and the ‘common people’, ‘without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences’, who exercised power. Instead, it must be those who had ‘received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences’; and they were the ‘well-born and wealthy’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg244&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In France, too, the liberal party, which was in the process of being formed, defined itself during the polemic against the absolute monarchy but also, and possibly above all, against the popular masses and their vulgarity. Attention was turned to the Third Estate, to those circles where ‘a sort of affluence allows men to receive a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was Sieyès, who subsequently played an important role on the occasion of the 18th Brumaire in 1799. Sealing the coup d’état was the ‘proclamation of general-in-chief Bonaparte’, who announced the ‘disbandment of factions’—i.e. of popular and plebeian agitation—and the triumph of ‘conservative, tutelary, liberal ideas’ (&#039;&#039;idées conservatrices, tutélaires, libérales&#039;&#039;). This language was not the invention of a general, however brilliant: he enjoyed the support of the liberal circles of the time. The adjectival usage just noted refers to them. Constant, who later (as we know) declared himself a member of the ‘liberal party’, had already been recommended by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1797 as a man ‘passionate about liberty’ and as an ‘unshakeable, liberal republican’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The following year, Constant had underlined the Directory’s merit in having ‘proclaimed its unshakeable attachment to the conservative system’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, shortly after the coup d’état, he paid homage to ‘France’s tutelary genius which, from 9 Thermidor, has rescued it from so many dangers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ in Burke, ‘liberal’ was now synonymous with ‘conservative’ (and tutelary). For Constant (as for Madame de Staël), the cause of liberalism found expression in ‘respectable people’ (&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;),[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or (as Necker made clear in a letter to his daughter) well-off, ‘decent people’ (&#039;&#039;gens de bien:&#039;&#039; see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in England and America, so too in France it was the property-owning classes, proud of their non-servile condition and spirit, who tended to define themselves as liberals. This is further confirmed, even after the mid-nineteenth century, by de Tocqueville’s stance. Those genuinely capable of defending the cause of liberty against Louis Bonaparte’s ‘illiberal’ government were not ‘the people strictly speaking, with their incomplete education’, but the ‘property-owners’, the ‘bourgeoisie’, the ‘men of culture’—‘in a word, all those who have received a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg245&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Under the spur also of popular struggles, the liberal/servile dichotomy gradually tended to lose its class connotation and came to refer exclusively to political ideologies. But at moments of acute struggle the original meaning re-emerged with all its discriminatory charge. For de Tocqueville, as we shall see, anyone who wanted to endow the ideal of liberty with a social content was ‘made for serving’!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bitter conflicts could, and did, develop within the property-owning classes. Debating with Burke, who suspected wealth not rooted in the mother country’s land and soil of lacking in patriotism and even of subversive tendencies, Mackintosh declared that ‘[t]he commercial, or monied interest, has … been less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent, than the landed gentry.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in France, Sieyès saw ‘liberal education’ embodied in the Third Estate, and certainly not in an aristocracy used to pursuing ‘the favour of servitude’ at court.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Invitations not to discriminate, and create conflicts, between the different types of property were more frequent. In the view of the anti-Jacobin Jean-Joseph Mounier, in addition to the United States, the country that had diffused ‘in the France the idea of liberty’ was England, construed in fact as the country where ‘a liberal education without genealogical tests confers the quality of gentleman’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear that the term ‘liberal’ was generated by a proud self-consciousness, which had a simultaneously political, social and even ethnic connotation. We are dealing with a movement and party that intended to rally persons furnished with a ‘liberal education’ and genuinely free, or people who had the privilege of being free, the ‘chosen race’ (as Burke put it), the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of liberty circulates’. All this is not surprising. As has been made clear by distinguished scholars of the Indo-European languages, ‘freemen’ is a ‘collective notion’—a sign of distinction that applies to the ‘well-born’ and them alone. For this very reason, outside the community of the free and the well-born, not only was service or slavery not excluded, it was even presupposed. In Cicero’s view, at the head of the &#039;&#039;liberi populi&#039;&#039; was Rome, which engaged in the mass enslavement of defeated peoples considered unworthy of freedom.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in eighteenth-century liberal England what became a popular song (‘Rule Britannia’) lauded in these terms the empire that had just wrested the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg246&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;, a monopoly on the slave trade, from Spain: ‘This was the charter of the land, / And guardian angels sang this strain: / “Rule, Britannia! rule the waves: / Britons never will be slaves.”‘&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The pyramid of peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
This was a self-proclamation that was simultaneously an act of exclusion. It was not only colonial peoples who were affected by it. Even before the American Revolution, Franklin had established a hierarchy of nations on the basis of skin colour, which claimed to classify the whole human race: ‘All &#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039; is black or tawny. &#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039; chiefly tawny.’ The same applied to pre-Columbian America; it was ‘wholly so’. The quantitative prevalence of peoples of colour was evident. In a way, their presence even made itself felt in Europe: ‘the &#039;&#039;Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Swedes&#039;&#039;, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion’. The inhabitants of Germany did not come off much better. Representing the highest form of humanity were the English settled on both shores of the Atlantic, ‘the Principal Body of White People’, of ‘purely white People’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the only community to embody the cause of liberty. The classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theme of the great chain of Being[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] becomes here the great chain of Colour. And it excluded the non-European peoples from the sacred space of civilization, relegating much of the West to its margins.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it rarely took such a naively naturalistic form, the pyramid dear to Franklin continued, in one shape or another, to be present in liberal culture. We find it again in Lieber. At its apex, obviously, was the ‘Anglican race’, which fully expressed authentic liberty, while forming the base were the colonial peoples (not only the blacks, but also the Chinese). In the middle we find jostling Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitans, who had hitherto proved incapable of elevating themselves to the principle of self-government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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John Stuart Mill employed a language that was scarcely different. The apex continued to be composed of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (to be precise, England and the United States), peerless champions of representative government and ‘the general improvement of mankind’, while at the base, in addition to more or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg247&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;less savage peoples,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we find the Chinese. It is true that the latter could boast a very ancient civilization. Yet ‘they have become stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland could be assimilated to the other colonies or semi-colonies. ‘[H]alf civilized’, in Bentham’s view,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland for Mill was not only incapable of self-government, but also in need of ‘a good stout despotism’, exactly like India.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not much better was the situation of Greece: situated as it was at the confines of Europe, it was still ‘too Oriental’ in many respects to be able to govern itself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, at the centre of the pyramid we have the people of ‘southern Europe’, whose ‘inactivity’ and ‘envy’ prevented the development of industrial society, the establishment of a strong ruling group and the orderly functioning of institutions. By comparison with them, too, the Anglo-Saxons proved superior, free as they were of those characteristics (‘submission’, ‘endurance’, statism) typical of the French and ‘continental nations’, all of them rendered gangrenous by ‘bureaucracy’ and an envious craving for equality.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the ‘continental nations’ were not some homogenous whole. With its geographical location close to Africa and an Arabic past behind it, Spain came out of things badly. In the list Mill drew up of ‘envy’ of grandeur and ‘inactivity’, its inhabitants came immediately after ‘Orientals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Visiting Spain in 1836, at a time when it was plunged in a civil war, Richard Cobden, rather than taking sides with one of the parties, reached a general conclusion about ‘barbarians beyond the Bay of Biscay’: Spain was ‘a nation of bigots, beggars and cut-throats with a government of whores and rogues’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Spanish of Latin America were not worth speaking about because, from the standpoint of the dominant ideology in the United States at any rate, they formed part of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg248&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;colonial world. Finally, distinguishing themselves negatively in Senior’s view were also the Neapolitans: ‘I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.’ Moreover, no barrier separated the plebs from the upper classes.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The community of the free and its dictatorship over peoples unworthy of liberty&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the charge of exclusion implicit in the self-proclamation of the community of the free displayed its full force in the relationship with colonial peoples. In most cases, far from being perceived as a contradiction, the theorization and practice of slavery at the expense of the excluded further strengthened the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free, who lauded themselves for their immunity from the servile spirit attributed to the barbarians subjugated by them. That was why Locke could set himself up as a champion of liberty and, at the same time, legitimize the absolute power the community of the free was called upon to exercise over black slaves. In 1809 Jefferson celebrated the United States as ‘an empire for liberty’, founded on a constitution that guaranteed ‘self government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was a slave-owner, who exercised power over his slaves brutally, if need be selling the individual members of the family of his property as separate pieces or chattels. And he indulged in this celebration in a letter sent to another slave-owner, who had just taken his place in the US presidency. The Constitution held up as a model consecrated the birth of the first racial state, while the self-government extolled here guaranteed southern slave-owners legitimate enjoyment of their property without interference by the federal government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from hereditary slavery to semi-slavery, still at the expense of colonial peoples, did not radically change the overall picture. Albeit in different forms, the phenomenon we are already familiar with emerged. Thus, major authors such as Mill, de Tocqueville and Lecky passionately denounced monarchical or Jacobin absolutism, and at the same time enthusiastically saluted despotism at the expense of colonial peoples. This was a power relationship which, for a whole historical period, far from being fought or contained, was to be extended and generalized. Given that a ‘vigorous despotism’ was the only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg249&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;method capable of raising backward peoples or ‘barbarians’ to a higher level, the interests of civilization and peace were served by colonial conquests, which must therefore be expanded to embrace the entire globe. Already ‘common’, ‘direct subjection’ of ‘backward populations’ by ‘the more advanced’ was becoming ‘universal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So proud and self-confident was the self-consciousness of the community of the free that it could face down possible refutations from the history or empirical analysis of society without difficulty. In the years of the July Monarchy, unperturbed, de Tocqueville registered a disconcerting fact: in the Islamic world and ‘the whole East’, slavery presented itself in a ‘milder’ form than in the West. Tunisia was engaged in abolishing this institution, which by contrast continued to survive in the colonies of liberal France (and democratic America).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The balance-sheet drawn up by Mill on the morrow of the American Civil War was significant. In the United States a ‘[h]opeless slavery’ that ‘brutifies the intellect’, and where ‘it was a highly penal offence to teach a slave to read’, had only just been abolished. Even worse, added the English liberal, was the situation at the time of the slave trade in ‘our slave colonies’, where slaves were in practice condemned to work themselves to death, to be rapidly replaced through the ‘importation’ of other unfortunates, who in their turn were soon doomed to be consumed. In the British colonies and the United States a form of slavery had prevailed with particularly repugnant characteristics, which was largely unknown ‘in the ancient world and the East’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here the phenomenon of the twin birth of liberalism and racial chattel slavery seems to be perceived or intuited. And yet, like de Tocqueville, Mill had no doubts about the complete coincidence of the West and the cause of liberty, or about the West’s right to exercise despotism over Islamic peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The English liberal had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and for liberty as such: ‘the prohibition of the importation of opium into China’ violated ‘the liberty … of the buyer’, rather than that of ‘the producer or seller’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The lesson taught to the Chinese ‘barbarians’ could only be salutary. This was not the time to split hairs over forms: ‘appeals to humanity and Christianity in favour of ruffians, &amp;amp;amp; to international law in favour of people who recognize &#039;&#039;no&#039;&#039; laws of war at all’, were ‘ridiculous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are in 1857–58: even if we pass over the lot of the coolies in silence, in these years &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg250&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Britain had stained itself with the ‘barbarism’ referred to by de Tocqueville in connection with the repression of the sepoys’ mutiny in India; in China it gave decisive support to the liquidation of the attempt by the Taiping to reverse the autocratic and decrepit Manchu dynasty; in Ireland a ferocious dominion continued to obtain (‘in no country have I ever seen so many gendarmes’, observed Engels);[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] finally, in the United States, Britain contributed to the wealth of the South, absorbing much of the cotton produced by the labour of black slaves. Yet Mill was in no doubt: his country promoted the cause of liberty in the world, imposing on China by force of arms the importation of opium produced in India on the initiative of the colonial power!&lt;br /&gt;
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When the sepoys’ revolt broke out in India, de Tocqueville did not conceal the fact that ‘massacres by the [Indian] barbarians’ were followed by ‘the barbarism of the civilized’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prevent him from arriving at a Manichaean conclusion: ‘these Hindus are beasts who are as brutal as they are ferocious’; their victory would mean ‘the restoration of barbarism’, the victory of ‘savages’ and the defeat of the ‘only surviving country of political liberty in Europe’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The aspiration of the Chinese or Indians to maintain or recover their national independence, the desire to liberate themselves from colonial domination, were not even taken into consideration. Precisely because it assumed the position of exclusive representative of the cause of liberty, the community of the free interpreted the challenges it occasionally had to confront as attacks on liberty, as expressions of the servile spirit as well as barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Macaulay acknowledged that the English colonists in India behaved like Spartans confronting helots: we are dealing with ‘a race of sovereigns’ or a ‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prompt any doubts about the right of free England to exercise dictatorship over the barbarians of the colonies. It was a dictatorship that could take the most ruthless forms. Macaulay powerfully describes how the governor of India, Warren Hastings, proceeded when, at a difficult moment for Britain, already engaged in the struggle against the American colonists and their French allies, he had to confront the colony’s native population:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg251&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;A reign of terror began, of terror heightened by mystery; for even that which was endured was less horrible than that which was anticipated. No man knew what was next to be expected from this strange tribunal … It consisted of judges not one of whom was familiar with the usages of the millions over whom they claimed boundless authority. Its records were kept in unknown characters; its sentences were pronounced in unknown sounds. It had already collected round itself an army of the worst part of the native population …&lt;br /&gt;
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A wave of arrests without any charge was unleashed, not even sparing the elderly of ‘the most venerable dignity’. There was an orgy of violence that did not respect sanctuaries and unchained the most bestial instincts. There were Indians who ‘shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women’. In conclusion: ‘All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the Supreme Court.’ And yet, despite this horrifying description, Macaulay concluded that, for having saved England and civilization, Hastings deserved ‘high admiration’ and to rank among ‘the most remarkable men in our history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. How to confront the barbarian threat in the metropolis in timely fashion&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The challenge to the community of the free could arise in the metropolis as well as from the colonies. The status of the popular classes, whom the dominant elite often tended to assimilate to ‘savages’, long remained uncertain. The assimilation became a veritable identification on the occasion of rebellions and revolutions. And as in the case of external barbarism, the remedy for the internal variety was dictatorship. Montesquieu was in no doubt about the fact that ‘the usage of the freest peoples that ever lived on earth makes me believe that there are cases where a veil has to be drawn, for a moment, over liberty, as one hides the statues of the gods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is what occurred in a state of emergency: in facing it, it was necessary to take to heart the ‘admirable institution’ that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg252&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the Roman dictatorship.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However ‘terrible’, at the opportune moment it ‘violently return[ed] the state to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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People argued no differently across the Atlantic. The &#039;&#039;Federalist&#039;&#039; maintained that, with the onset of a state of emergency, the powers granted to the federal authorities ‘ought to exist without limitation’ and without ‘constitutional shackles’. Hamilton pointed out that even the Roman republic did not hesitate ‘to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator’, when this was required to confront grave dangers and defend Rome against ‘the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘existence of all government’ mentioned by Hamilton took the form of ‘the public good’ in Locke. When it was imperilled, ‘prerogative’ legitimately enabled the ‘prince’ to safeguard it through ‘an arbitrary power’, or ‘discretion’, which could be exercised ‘without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In favour of granting emergency powers to General Cavaignac, during the crisis of 1848, was de Tocqueville (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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It is particularly interesting to note that what prompted an energetic reaction from the community of the free was not necessarily an actual revolt. An indirect, potential threat was enough. For Locke the right to employ force already existed in the event of the imposition of a tax not authorized by those directly affected: ‘the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if mediated by the intervention of the legislative power, the intrusion of non-property-owners in the sphere of property was always an act of illegality and plunder, of violence, and hence one that could legitimately be countered with violence by the person under attack. There is more: paving the way for unlawful interventions in property, any alteration in the composition of the legislative power, with the restructuring, for example, of the House of Lords or abolition of the hereditary transmission of its seats, betokened ‘the dissolution of government’ and hence the unavoidability of a test of arms.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Montesquieu was fairly explicit on the subject:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg253&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a state there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth or honors; but if they were mixed among the people and if they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions would be against them. Therefore, the part they have in legislation should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state, which will happen if they form a body that has the right to check the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to check theirs … The nobility should be hereditary.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While Montesquieu denounced any interference that abolished the hereditary privileges of the nobility as illiberal and despotic, Constant regarded any challenge to a property-owners’ monopoly on representative bodies as inadmissible. Since ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them are sure to be used for this purpose’; and political rights ‘will inevitably serve to encroach upon property’. It was sufficient for non-property-owners to be admitted into ‘representative assemblies’ for ‘[t]he wisest of laws’ to be ‘suspected and consequently disobeyed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicitly, the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas, having warned against the ‘fatal taxes’ that would inevitably be imposed by the legislative power once it was at the mercy or under the influence of non-property-owners, added: ‘A country governed by property-owners is in the social order; by contrast, one where non-property-owners govern is in the state of nature.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in a situation without a legal order and legal norms, arms obviously came to the fore.&lt;br /&gt;
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Constant’s reasoning continued to resonate in de Tocqueville: ‘For various reasons, all governments can be led to maintain the poor at state expense, but the democratic form of government is led by its very &#039;&#039;nature&#039;&#039; to act in this way.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Encouraged by democracy more than by any other political regime, ‘legal charity’ (i.e. aid to the poor through the use of resources procured by the state through taxes on the wealthy) could only be synonymous with despoliation in the view of its victims: ‘The rich man whom the law, without consultation, strips of part of his surplus regards the poor man as nothing but a grasping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg254&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;foreigner summoned by the legislator for the division of his goods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In effect, this was an expropriation: if prolonged, laws in favour of the poor would end up transforming ‘proletarians’ into effective beneficiaries of the land and ‘property-owners’ into their mere ‘farm managers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Mill fluctuated more. On the one hand, he reiterated positions we have already encountered: ‘any power of voting’ in the hands of those who did not pay taxes was ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of free government’; to assign political rights, and hence participation in legislative power, to poor citizens, not subject to taxation, ‘amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the English left-liberal expressed a more flexible position:&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them … It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a distinction that would seem to pave the way for a policy of income redistribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any such prospect was violently opposed by the most conservative wing of liberalism. According to Spencer, taxation aimed at income redistribution ultimately introduced a sort of ‘state &#039;&#039;corvée’&#039;&#039;, which was no less iniquitous and slave-like than the medieval one just because it imposed payment of a determinate sum of money, rather than the provision of free services to the master.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Lecky, having adopted the thesis already noted in Constant, according to which non-property-owners with political rights would inevitably be led to pursue ‘predatory and anarchic purposes’ and even ‘break up society’, defined the system that enabled non-property-owners to burden the well-off with taxes as ‘a system of veiled confiscation’. In this way, the latter would in fact end up being ‘completely disenfranchised’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The unwarranted political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg255&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;emancipation of the popular classes involved the dis-emancipation of the only classes qualified to run the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The liberal tradition and its three theories of dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
As well as averting the real or potential threat of the barbarians in the colonies or metropolis, dictatorship could also be useful and indispensable in confronting the most serious problems that the community of the freemen could not resolve by ordinary means. To abolish the institution of slavery, to which representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners proved stubbornly attached, Smith looked to ‘despotism’, which effectively took shape during the Civil War and in the early post-war years. The attitude adopted in these circumstances by Lieber was significant. In publishing his principal work, he certainly foresaw the possibility of recourse to ‘martial law’ to confront a possible state of emergency, but was concerned to specify that it would not be the executive power which declared it. But with the outbreak of hostilities, he discarded his previous constitutional scruples: the suspension of habeas corpus must be implemented in any event and as extensively and radically as possible. In silencing his critics, Lincoln declared: ‘Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?’ Lieber was not only in full agreement, but as early as January 1862 was amazed and angry at the fact that no traitor or spy had as yet been hanged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory of temporary modernizing dictatorship can also be found in de Tocqueville. Reconstructing the catastrophe of the French Revolution, he arrived at a conclusion: given the irreversible crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, the radical transformation of society was inevitable, but it would have been better if, ‘instead of being carried out by the masses on behalf of the sovereignty of the people, [it] had been the work of an enlightened autocrat’; indeed, ‘[a]n absolute monarch would have been a far less dangerous innovator.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He would have been able to exercise against the most reactionary feudal aristocracy the temporary dictatorship over slave-owners invoked by Smith. Modernizing dictatorship was not evoked by de Tocqueville solely with a view to the past. The French liberal asked himself, and one of his English interlocutors, whether a ‘temporary dictatorship, exercised in firm, enlightened fashion like that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg256&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire, is not the only way of saving Ireland’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The dictatorship hypothesized here is different from that theorized by Locke against ‘papists’, which was directly exercised by the British Protestant settlers, albeit with the support of central government. De Tocqueville seems to envisage a power imposed from London that would be above the parties (Catholic peasants and Anglo-Protestant property-owners), just as in Smith ‘dictatorship’ is called upon to situate itself above both property-owners and their slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By contrast, the position taken by Mill was more general in character: ‘I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.’ The dictator could, ‘for a time strictly limited’, ‘employ … the whole power he assumes in removing obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An integral part of the self-celebration of the community of the free (and the liberal tradition) was the opposition between intransigent, unconditional guardianship of the liberty it assigned itself and the inclination to despotism reprehended in opponents. In reality, we have seen three theories of dictatorship emerge: the dictatorship of civilized peoples over barbarians in the colonies; the dictatorship that suppresses popular subversion in the metropolis; and the dictatorship which, in a situation of stalemate, imposes the requisite reforms from above. A contrast with authors not within the liberal tradition, or even foreign to it, might prove useful. Mazzini invoked ‘a highly centralized dictatorial Power’, which proceeded to the ‘suspension’ of the bill of rights and finished its work only with the achievement of national independence and the final victory of the national revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Marx applied this perspective to the social revolution as well as the national revolution. In both cases a dictatorship is envisaged that emerges in the wake of a popular revolution from below. But for de Tocqueville (and the liberal tradition as a whole), it was precisely ‘revolutionary dictatorship’ from below that was ‘most hostile to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although not free of uncertainties, in Marx criticism of the pedagogical dictatorship that the community of the free claimed to exercise over barbarians was recurrent. In reality, it was precisely in the colonies that the ‘profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg257&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This also applied to Ireland: it groaned under ‘police terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘English terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a regime that kept the population under control ‘solely by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] resorting to summary executions and the most drastic war measures.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The ills of the community of the free: the psychopathology of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the central area of the pyramid of peoples, Mill also inserted the French. Likewise, along with the Spanish, Portuguese and Neopolitans despised by him, Lieber combined the people who more than any other embodied the spurious and wicked ‘Gallic’ or ‘Gallican’ freedom, which in reality was synonymous with extreme centralization and despotism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The combination is surprising. According to Burke, at the point when the Estates General was summoned France was already in possession of a good legal order. Rid of the absolute monarchy, it had become a full member of the community of the free. What had occurred in the intervening years to provoke such a ruinous descent and consequent confinement to the grey border area between civilization and barbarism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Unfortunately, Burke observed on 9 February 1790, with the transformation of the Estates General into a constituent National Assembly, and hence with the restructuring of the political influence of the nobility and clergy, the French had turned out to be infected with a ‘disease’. Passing from despotism to anarchical subversionism, they had proved that they were ‘a people, whose character knows no medium’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and (added the British Whig a year later) ‘[i]t is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.’ Lecky referred to this analysis some years later, repeating it: ‘It was … in the opinion of Burke a total mistake to suppose that political liberty of any kind can be, or ought to be, possessed by all nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg258&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The further radicalization of the revolution that had been sparked off in Paris confirmed this diagnosis. While the outbreak and manifestation of the disease could be variously dated, it was understood that the French lacked the ‘practical good sense’ that had enabled the Anglo-Americans and the United States in particular to avoid ‘revolutionary times’, the devastation and ‘adventure’ of civil war. This was a point tirelessly stressed by de Tocqueville and, in his wake, by Laboulaye and Guizot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, on inspection, it was not merely good sense and practical spirit that were wanting. In Anglo-Americans these qualities were a constitutive element in a more general mental disposition, whereby ‘a man by following his own interest, rightly understood, will be led to do what is just and good’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We know that, although de Tocqueville deplored it, the fate of Indians and blacks was irrelevant when it came to forming an overall judgement on the republic across the Atlantic. What promoted the undisturbed flourishing of liberty here was the mature personality of its inhabitants, who displayed manifest political and moral superiority to the French. De Tocqueville found the explanation suggested by his fellow countryman Victor Lanjuinais ‘profound and original’: ‘socialism is our natural disease’. And socialism was synonymous with abstraction, but also with something worse. The French were ‘afraid of isolation’ and harboured a ‘desire to be in the crowd’; they felt themselves members of a ‘nation that marches to the same step in perfect alignment’; they regarded liberty as ‘the least important of their possessions, and thus are always ready to offer it up with reason at moments of danger’. Hence a France irremediably ‘revolutionary and servile’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, having stressed that it was ‘contained in germ in the February revolution’, when ‘socialism had been seen to make its appearance’, de Tocqueville offered a kind of epitaph on the French nation: ‘It is incapable and, I say it certainly with regret, unworthy of being free’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The oscillation between anarchical revolutionism and submission to despotism, and an inclination to surrender to passing impulses and moods, confronted one with a people whose ‘basic characteristics are so constant that we can recognise the France we know in portraits made of it two or three &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg259&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousand years ago’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact that the process begun in 1789 or 1787 had finally issued in the establishment of the Bonapartist dictatorship, dragging the country down to the level of the ‘nations best made for servitude’, clarified everything. In France, ‘what at first seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant. But what a nation with a real instinct for freedom cannot endure is the feeling of not being its own master.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The closing chapters of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; are a bravura rhetorical performance. Rarely has the love of liberty been hymned in such impassioned terms. And the beauty and power of these passages prove all more the engaging if we bear in mind the polemic, allusive but transparent and courageous, against Napoleon III’s despotism. However, read more coolly, this hymn to liberty proves problematic and even disturbing, with the opposition it sets up between ‘peoples made to be free’ and ‘nations best made for servitude’. It was a divide reproduced within France at the level of social classes. The enlightened love of liberty, which had manifested itself at the start of the revolution, was rapidly overwhelmed by the blind passion for equality, from which the Terror and the equal enslavement of all to an unprecedented despotic power derived. How was this distortion to be explained? De Tocqueville had no doubts: it became ‘less startling when we remember that the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A disdainful warning was issued to the latter, intent on pursuing ‘material benefits’ and incapable of appreciating liberty in and for itself: ‘The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave.’ Once again we are presented with an opposition between those born for liberty and those born for servitude, between freemen and servants, between liberals and serviles. And for de Tocqueville it was futile to try to explain the presence or absence, or variable intensity, of the ‘desire’ for liberty by the level of historical development and material living conditions of particular peoples and social classes. It was ultimately of little use even to challenge the influence of erroneous theories; or rather, these referred to something more profound. The ‘lofty aspiration’ to liberty was a thing that some men are capable of feeling, while others are not: ‘[i]t is a privilege of noble minds which God has fitted to receive it, and it inspires them with a generous fervour.’ The discourse has hitherto focused on a few noble souls: ‘to meaner souls, untouched by the sacred flame, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg260&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it may well seem incomprehensible’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An original curse, which cannot be lifted, seems to hang over the men, classes or peoples who, on account of their vulgarity or coarseness, are excluded or expelled from the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, in its sad destiny France was not alone. Some years earlier—in September 1848, to be precise—de Tocqueville had seen the spectre of socialism lurking across the Alps and had not hesitated to conclude that the Italians ‘have likewise shown themselves unworthy of liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘Likewise’: which country is being alluded to? At this time, not yet invested by a coup d’état, France was still part of the community of the free. The reference is to Germany: as in much of Europe, there too the revolution continued to flare up and pursue radical objectives. The ambit of countries deserving of liberty thus risked being extremely restricted.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Interpretations of the interminable French Revolutionary cycle: from ‘disease’ to ‘race’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It is not by chance that politico-social conflict came to be interpreted in a psychopathological register. Immediately after the February revolution, de Tocqueville was concerned to specify that ‘[i]t is not needs but ideas that have led to this great upheaval’ and made the French ‘so ill’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was madness that encouraged the socialist pretension to alter not only ‘political laws’, but even social and ‘civil laws’—in particular, relations of property and production consecrated by nature and Providence. In the course of his journey in England, de Tocqueville compared workers to slaves and drew attention to the relations of ‘strict dependency’ that were being established within the factory. On the basis of this analysis, the struggle to overcome or alleviate the condition of slavery or ‘strict dependency’ could be construed as a struggle for freedom. But, as we know, this was not how the French liberal argued, as he denounced the ‘despotism’ of those who sought to regulate working hours and the servile spirit of those who contaminated the ideal of liberty with economic and social demands. The community of the free claimed the merit of pursuing the ideal of liberty in all its purity and in any circumstances for itself. Hence it interpreted not only challenges from the colonial and barbaric world, but also challenges &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg261&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arising in the zone of civilization itself, as an attack on the ideal of liberty, which was lashed out at by those not in a position to appreciate its grandeur and beauty. Wholly understandable and, indeed, natural among savages, such deafness was construed as a pathological anomaly in a civilized people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this sense, the resort to explaining conflict in a psychopathological register was immanent in the liberal tradition. Burke spoke of French ‘disease’ in the very first stages of the revolution. And it should be added that for a time it was in fact the ‘American inoculation’, and hence a disease from across the Atlantic, which was held responsible for the contraction and contagious spread of ideas marked by abstract, insane extremism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the disease and psychopathological diagnosis of the adversary could occur in the converse direction. As the abolitionist movement developed, it became a commonplace in the United States to condemn it as an expression of an illiberal spirit, fanaticism and madness. However, at the time of the British colonists’ revolt in America, we find Josiah Tucker inviting the London government to accept and even encourage the secession, so as to avoid the ‘contagion’ of a ‘mad, &#039;&#039;fanatical&#039;&#039; liberty’, which was sweeping through slaves or serfs, the contagion of a ‘republicanism’ that was indeed ‘American’, but which ultimately dated back to Locke and the ‘Lockian Sect’ and could count on the sympathy of Burke himself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After 1848, following the umpteenth return of revolution with yet more radical slogans, the tendency to warn against the disease raging in France dramatically intensified. Underlining the rootedness in the United States of the rule of law and liberal institutions, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; attributed much more weight to history and geography than &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;. Why had Napoleon Bonaparte’s military dictatorship been imposed on France?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government … If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg262&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The situation across the Atlantic was very different: ‘Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While we once again encounter the dubious assimilation of the Indians (and even Mexico) to a ‘wilderness’, we are far removed from the explanation that peremptorily and definitively opposes a ‘sublime desire’ for freedom to vulgar indifference to it, ‘noble souls’ to ‘mediocre souls’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By way of confirming the anthropological drift that manifested itself with 1848, we can adduce the long letter (a small essay) sent by de Tocqueville twenty years earlier to his friend de Beaumont. The history of Europe was conceived here in such a unitary way that the terminology became interchangeable: mention was made of the ‘Commons’ in the case of France and the ‘Third Estate’ in the case of England. In the two countries the victory of the bourgeoisie had been achieved in different ways, which were in fact the ‘forced result of the state of things’—that is, of the different configuration of power relations between the contending politico-social subjects.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were statism and despotism the hereditary disease of the country where Jacobinism and Bonapartism had made their appearance? In truth, England had not only succeeded in constructing a strong state and military apparatus before France, but at the time of the Tudors had suffered an unlimited despotism: ‘I know of no tyranny in history more complete than that of … Henry VIII’; the Commons, ‘which had denied the king’s will a man’s life’, now ended up ‘condemning without even giving a hearing’. A worse terror than the Jacobin version had manifested itself, as demonstrated by ‘ “bills of attainder”, a diabolical invention that not even the revolutionary Tribunal called into being’. Yet it was nonetheless a revolution that had played a positive role. It nurtured the ‘first fruit of civilization’ as a result of the fact that, albeit in its terrible absolutism, in England royal power attacked the ‘vices of the feudal system’ and subdued ‘oligarchical liberty’. This was a general tendency, though in no country did ‘despotism prove more terrible’. Was the island across the Channel, unlike France, characterized and blessed by a gradualism of historical evolution? The letter/essay we are examining explicitly argued against the thesis that the English Constitution had passed through ‘successive, regular stages, before reaching the point it has arrived at today’, so that it could be considered ‘a fruit which has matured over &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg263&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;successive centuries’. In truth, de Tocqueville observed, from Henry VIII onwards, ‘I see the English people change religion four times according to the will of their master’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, one might try to devalue the letter/essay of 1828 as ‘youthful’. However, even in subsequent years, if there was a contrast between France and England, it was often to the detriment of the latter, which continued to interpret liberty as a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘common right’, as occurred in the country that was the protagonist of the 1789 revolution (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]). In 1843, having compared slave-masters in the colonies with the ‘aristocracy’ overthrown by the French Revolution, de Tocqueville celebrated ‘the great principles’ of the revolution, ‘which was carried out entirely in the name of equality’, in the name of the equality of the ‘human race’, and which had the further merit of being first to abolish slavery.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from the 1848 revolution, under the impression made by the spectre of socialism, it was precisely the pathos of equality that defined the failure of the French Revolution and the disease of an entire people, who now prostrated themselves before Louis Napoleon.&lt;br /&gt;
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The psychopathological interpretation of developments in the French situation had the advantage of dispelling possible anxieties in the community of the free, which absolved itself of any responsibility for the Bonapartist outcome of the 1848 revolution. De Tocqueville might have drawn up a critical balance-sheet of the conduct of the liberal party and himself. After the dictatorship’s advent, with some exaggeration he denounced the limited resistance met with by Louis Napoleon in French society. Had the disappointment they experienced with the exclusion of three million Frenchmen from political rights contributed to the passivity of the popular masses? This was a measure the liberal bourgeoisie had been guilty of in 1850, thereby furnishing the dictator with the possibility of elevating himself into a champion of universal suffrage and the struggle against privilege and discrimination.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And what role in undermining the Second Republic had been played by intransigent liberalism à la de Tocqueville, who had branded the reduction of working hours and any intervention by political power in favour of the most deprived as intolerable ‘despotism’? The Bonapartist regime had its stronghold in the countryside: had it not been primarily the liberal bourgeoisie, with de Tocqueville’s active participation, which stirred it up against the city and mobilized it in the name &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg264&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the terrible threat that hung over civilization, dictating extraordinary measures commensurate with the situation? And again: Had the discrediting of institutions and the rule of law been aided by the supreme contempt for the Constitution displayed by de Tocqueville, when in his capacity as foreign minister he demanded ‘the right, in spite of our Constitution, to overthrow the Roman Republic’?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, a basic contradiction ran through the French liberal’s attitude. On the one hand, on an immediate political level, he vigorously condemned the Bonapartist regime; on the other, as an historian he regretted the fact that the requisite modernization of France had not been completed by an ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’, rather than a popular revolution (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|§5]]). But a modernizing ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’ is precisely what Napoleon I had wanted to be and what Napoleon III aspired to be! Rather than engage in an examination that was possibly too painful at a personal level, the author of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; preferred to come to blows with a mythical, eternal France.&lt;br /&gt;
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A not dissimilar evolution is found in Mill. In 1849 he vigorously defended the February Revolution of the previous year. Thereafter, he continued to make an important acknowledgement of ‘the heroic and calumniated Provisional Government of France’ for having promptly abolished slavery in the colonies, in an implicit contrast not only with the North American republic, but also with England, on whose history ‘a lasting blot’ was left by the support of ‘the leading portion of our higher and middle classes’ for the South’s pro-slavery secession from the United States.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, reminiscing about the debate that developed in Europe over the American Civil War, having denounced the ‘furious’ pro-Southern position of much of the English liberalism of the time, Mill added: ‘None of the Continental Liberals committed the same frightful mistake.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet in 1861 we have seen him inclined to exclude the French people and ‘continental nations’ in general from the community of the free in the strict sense. These were years when, not altogether in jest, people liked to say that ‘negroes begin in Calais’, just across the Channel.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, if not skin colour alone, ‘race’ was now called on to explain the differential development of European countries. What must not be overlooked, observed Lieber, still pointing a finger at France, was ‘the Celtic spirit of being &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg265&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swayed by masses’ and hence surrendering to political, religious and literary ‘centralization’. Absent there was ‘the original Teutonic spirit of individual independence’, which exhibited itself with particular vigour in the ‘Anglican race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. ‘Disease’ as a symptom of racial degeneration&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From ‘disease’ we have passed to ‘race’. Were these two interpretations of politico-social conflict compatible? Burke, who denounced the outbreak of ‘disease’ across the Channel, celebrated the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, the ‘chosen race of the sons of England’. It was a ‘nation’ and a ‘race’ possibly less vulnerable than others to the pathological manifestations raging in France. In other words, the question is whether the servile, herd spirit and inability to enjoy a regular, orderly liberty were a passing disturbance in the personality of a civilized people or possessed an ethnic origin that was yet to be identified.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the United States, from the mid-nineteenth century the threat represented by the immigration of yellow skins—the coolies—was added to the traditional peril of miscegenation with blacks. The coastal region of the Pacific, warned Lieber, risked being ‘mongolized’ by Chinese, whose proliferation resembled that of ‘mice’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more drastic. Large-scale settlement by the Chinese (or Japanese) in America would result in catastrophe: ‘they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approximating to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid.’ The upshot would be individuals with a ‘chaotic constitution’ internally, as was sadly demonstrated by ‘the Eurasians in India, and the half-breeds in America’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitherto we have been dealing with populations of colonial or semi-colonial origin, and hence extraneous to the West. And Lieber and Spencer’s agreement with legislation that prohibited non-whites from access to the land of liberty is not surprising. Although an enthusiastic expansionist, the former declared himself opposed to the annexation of any territory that involved a further incorporation of peoples of colour. But, as his biographer observes, he went further. He feared that an influx of immigrants from southern Europe &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg266&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belonging to the ‘Latin Race’ might also cause a ‘dilution of American blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, likewise focusing on the United States, another distinguished representative of liberalism—Lecky—drew attention to the effect of ‘the contamination of the immigrant vote’, since immigrants were often ‘revolutionary elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These are concerns that were powerfully echoed by de Tocqueville. As the storm clouds gathered over the North American republic that would shortly lead to the Civil War, the French liberal posed an anxious question: How was the fading of the ‘practical good sense’ that had hitherto spared the transatlantic republic the catastrophe of France and continental Europe to be explained? What had provoked the crisis was the ‘rapid introduction into the United States of men alien to the English race’, who for that very reason caused America to run ‘the greatest danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Its inhabitants were now no longer so ‘united by … common opinions’ as to render a bloody division inconceivable, as &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; had believed.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville warned his US friends and interlocutors that ‘however great your capacity for assimilation, it is very difficult for so many foreign bodies to be digested’ with such rapidity as to avoid their disturbing ‘the economy and the health of your social body’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The looming civil war was put down to the new immigrants from southern or eastern Europe: they were configured as a pathogenic element, attacking from without a social organism that was in itself healthy. In the face of such a danger, de Tocqueville tirelessly warned his transatlantic friends and interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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Alas, every day brings you so many foreign elements that you will soon no longer be yourselves: all the arguments that could be made about your nature become ever more uncertain. In fact, mixed as you are today with so many races, who could now say what your nature is?&lt;br /&gt;
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And again: ‘What frightens me is the prodigious number of foreigners that makes of you a new people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The waves of migration condemned here obviously involved the North of the United States. Did they lead to the emergence of radical abolitionism? In that case, de Tocqueville’s position would not be very different from that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg267&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the theorists of the South. They branded as fundamentally alien to America, and ultimately reducible to radicalism of a European (and French and Jacobin) variety, the positions of those who, to abolish slavery, did not even shrink at the prospect of a bloody conflict. At all events, de Tocqueville’s tendency in explaining the impending civil war is clear: he assigned responsibility for it to the growing presence of ethnic groups traditionally lacking in the political and moral qualities attributed to Anglo-Americans.&lt;br /&gt;
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This type of explanation obviously proves impossible when dealing with an ethnically homogenous country. Or should we assume that such homogeneity is merely apparent? To this question de Gobineau replied decisively in the affirmative. But let us observe his starting-point. He fully shared the pitiless psychopathological diagnosis of the French people made by de Tocqueville. It was necessary to register the raging of an age-old disease in France that rendered the functioning of ‘free institutions’ impossible and which, in the name of ‘public utility’ or the ‘monstrosity’ that was alleged ‘social right’, constantly promoted ‘the absorption of private rights into single state right’. We are dealing with ‘a people for whom absolute centralization is the height of good government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, the same ideological themes and even the same language we have heard in de Tocqueville, Lieber and Mill recur.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was in fact something new. The disease now had a specific ethnic base. The carriers of it in France and the rest of the world were non-Aryans. Given the importance of such an innovation, it is an exaggeration to claim that de Gobineau was ‘not so far removed from Alexis de Tocqueville, at one time his mentor and superior, as might be supposed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, there is no doubt they moved in a cultural and political circle with not a few points of contact and commonality. On close epistolary and intellectual terms, de Tocqueville and Lieber were in full agreement in their diagnosis of the disease raging in France and which, as a result of waves of migration, also risked having a harmful impact on the United States. Advancing further down the road of interpreting history in an ethnic key, Lieber counterposed to the herd and servile spirit of the ‘Celts’ the jealous sense of individuality peculiar to the ‘Teutons’. The latter were the vanguard of the West, or the ‘western Caucasian portion of humanity’. Perhaps, concluded Lieber, for brevity’s sake one could speak of ‘cis-Caucasians’, while the phrase ‘Japhetics’ had the drawback of being too broad.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, we are on the threshold of the Aryan mythology: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg268&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘Japhetics’ were the descendants of Japheth, by contrast with the progeny of Sem (‘Semites’) and Ham (‘Hamites’). And the American liberal expressed reservations about the category of Japhetics or Aryans solely because it referred to the mythical deeds of a people that had started out from India—in other words, a region foreign to the West. Hence the distance from de Gobineau was not great, even if the latter preferred to speak of Aryans, rather than employing what he regarded as the less rigorous categories of ‘Japhetics, Caucasians and Indo-Germans’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. De Gobineau, liberalism and the genealogical myths of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
From the outset, the self-proclamation of the community of the free felt the need to resort to genealogical myths that endowed this distinguishing gesture with a foundation. Montesquieu pointed to ‘the forests’ inhabited by ‘the Germans’ as the birthplace of free, representative government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The origin was not accidental: if slavery was at home among ‘the peoples of the south’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|§4]]), by contrast ‘the peoples of the north have and will always have a spirit of independence and liberty that the peoples of the south do not’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘the peoples of the north’, who had demonstrated ‘remarkable wisdom against the Roman power’ they ultimately destroyed, were also distinguished by ‘good sense’, courage, ‘generous sentiment’, and ‘the strength of spirit necessary to guide one’s own conduct’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘northern nations’ were referred to in England by Sidney and Hume, who celebrated as ‘extremely free’ the ‘government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations’, which was established on the ‘ruins of Rome’ and its ‘military despotism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, for the Mill of 1861, the French were excluded from the community of the free because they were ‘essentially a southern people’, stamped by ‘the double education of despotism and Catholicism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Burke instead preferred to glory in descent from ‘our Gothic ancestors’, as well as in belonging to the English &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#page269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#pg269&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘chosen race’ of liberty, while Lieber worked ‘Teutonic’ ancestors into the coat of arms of the United States and the Anglican race.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the Teutonic genealogical myth met with great success. Notwithstanding the stabilization achieved with the Third Republic, the memory of the Paris Commune and of the interminable revolutionary cycle behind it influenced France’s image. The scourge of brigandage in the south, and the geographical location (not properly Nordic) especially of its southern regions, affected the image of Italy. The Second Reich, by contrast, seemed to stand unproblematically alongside England and the United States in enjoying representative bodies, a liberal order and economic development. These were the three countries now celebrated as the vanguard of the community of the free, or as the peoples who best embodied the cause of liberty. In England, as early as 1860 Lord Robert Cecil—future Marquis of Salisbury and prime minister—contrasted ‘the people of a southern climate’ with those of ‘Teutonic parentage’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1889 Joseph Chamberlain (the colonial secretary) officially called on the United States and Germany to form a ‘Teutonic’ alliance with his country.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a position shared across the Atlantic by Alfred T. Mahan, the great theorist of geopolitics, who likewise declared for the unity of the ‘Teutonic family’, of peoples belonging to the same Germanic ‘stock’. Mahan was on excellent terms with Theodore Roosevelt who, going still further in his celebration of ‘German’ and ‘Teutonic’ peoples, hymned the ‘war-like prowess of the stalwart sons of Odin’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideological climate prompted a reinterpretation of the category of Anglo-Saxons, which now tended to include Germany—the starting-point for the great adventure of the emigration of the descendants of liberty, praiseworthy for having rebelled against first Roman despotism and then Papal despotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Disraeli, de Gobineau and ‘race’ as the ‘key of history’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The cultural and political universe to which de Gobineau belonged is becoming clear. With him, the approach chosen by de Tocqueville to explain the crisis &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg270&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the United States became a key to understanding universal history. Why did ‘liberal institutions’ in the North American republic exhibit a vitality unimaginable in Latin America? Because in the latter Europeans had mixed with the defeated natives. And as for Europe, why had France suffered a catastrophe unknown to England? Because the mixing of races had been much more radical in the former than the latter, ‘that of all the countries of Europe where modifications of blood have been slowest and hitherto least varied’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And why was an unprecedented crisis impending in the United States? De Gobineau’s answer was substantially identical to de Tocqueville’s: as a result of massive waves of migration that were heterogeneous in origin, the original Anglo-Saxon element was on the point of losing its identity.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that in de Gobineau the anthropological explanation underwent such a naturalistic rigidification as to prompt de Tocqueville to ironize about the decisive role of ‘blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Must we then regard the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039; as foreign to the liberal tradition? In reality, even if we ignore the South of the United States, where the theory and practice reigned whereby a single drop of black blood was enough to exclude a person from the community of the free (and the enjoyment of political and civil rights), in Europe itself and, what is more, in the other classic country of the liberal tradition, voices echoed that were not very different from that just heard. Declaring himself in favour of a legal ban on miscegenation, Spencer stressed: ‘It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the inter-marriages of human races and by the inter-breeding of animals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But in this context the figure of Disraeli assumes particular prominence. The positions he adopted were clear: race was ‘the key of history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to speak of ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’: in reality, ‘[a]ll is race’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[a]ll is race; there is no other truth.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only thus could it be understood how, although fairly small in numbers, the Spanish conquistadores (or ‘Goths’, as Disraeli preferred to call them) had managed to triumph in America and the English in China.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was how the constant ravages devastating France &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg271&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;were to be explained: we were witnessing ‘the great revolt of the Celts’, or the ancient ‘conquered races’, against ‘the northern and western races’, who had assimilated ‘the Semitic principle’ (the Old and New Testaments) and embodied civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The principal and primary aspect of these processes was not culture: the ‘greatness’ of a race ‘results from its organisation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a physiological fact, and it was therefore necessary to ‘study physiology’, [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] so as to be able to orientate oneself correctly in the conflicts of the historical and political world: ‘Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which makes a race, and that is blood.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this blood mythology, Disraeli too insisted on the superiority of the ‘pure races of the Caucasus’, to which the Jewish race belonged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a purity to be jealously guarded: ‘that pernicious doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man’, the doctrine of ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ which led to mixing and contamination, was condemned out of hand; if really implemented, it ‘would deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the partial difference of idiom, we are not removed from the ideological universe of de Gobineau. The latter, who celebrated the Aryans in the first instance for their liberal and individualistic ‘traditions’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] not by chance dedicated his book ‘to His Majesty George V, King of Hanover’. Along with England, de Gobineau took the other classical country of the liberal tradition, the United States, as his model. It was an ‘essentially practical land’, as had been confirmed by the fact that, without allowing themselves to be fettered by the abstractions rampant in France, even the ‘abolitionist papers had acknowledged the correctness’ of the thesis of the natural inequality of races.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The celebration of racial purity was the celebration primarily of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, the branch of the ‘Aryan family’ that more than any other had resisted the general bastardization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg272&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There is no reason to include Disraeli in the liberal tradition while excluding the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039;, all the less so given that the latter drew considerable inspiration from the English writer and statesman.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If de Gobineau ceased to be a liberal, it was when, now discouraged, he ended up accommodating, in de Tocqueville’s harsh but accurate judgement, to the ‘government of the sabre, and even of the baton’—that is, to the dictatorship of Napoleon III.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should not be forgotten that in these same years Disraeli believed the ‘government of the sword’ and the ‘military camp’ inevitable and legitimate, for France and continental Europe (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]). In any event, as a theorist of race, admirer and collaborator of de Tocqueville, and follower of Disraeli, the author, disgusted by the French revolutionary cycle and statism, and filled with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon world and the ‘liberal traditions of the Aryans’, fitted into the milieu of liberalism without difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the Aryan mythology was explicitly present in other exponents of this intellectual tradition should not be overlooked. Here is how Lecky came to the defence of Ireland, from which he originated: while they were Celts, the Irish were nevertheless part of ‘the great Aryan race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer reached the same conclusion in the course of his visit to the United States: ‘descendants of the immigrant Irish lose their Celtic aspect, and become Americanised’; they had fused with the other ‘varieties of the Aryan race’ and, in this instance, the admixture had proved beneficial.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things stood differently in the case of France. What explained its defeat in the war with Prussia and the raging of the Paris Commune was ‘race’, which seemed to have remained stubbornly Celtic (unlike Lecky, Spencer considered the Celts wholly alien to the Aryan race).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the authors we have just cited might be added Renan, who also regarded himself as a liberal, was ‘in regular contact’ with de Gobineau,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was a no less passionate cantor (as we shall see) of the excellence of the Aryan race and, more generally, the ‘Aryan–Semitic races’. Finally, it should be noted that across the Atlantic the Aryan mythology was prominent, and in fact so widespread as to go beyond the circle of ideologies. In 1902 Arthur &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg273&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, demanded the United States’ right to dominion on the grounds that it belonged to the ‘magnificent Aryan people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The repression of conflict, the search for the pathogenic element, and conspiracy theory&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Even if he rejected the facile Aryan solution, this did not make de Tocqueville any less obsessed than de Gobineau with the problem of identifying the pathogenic element attacking a social organism that was healthy in itself. After 1848 there was no doubt: the carrier of the ‘revolutionary disease’, the ‘permanent disease’, the ‘virus of a new and unknown kind’, which raged incessantly in France, was a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;): ‘we are always dealing with the same men, even if the circumstances vary’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is to be added that this ‘virus’ or ‘race’ was spreading alarmingly throughout the world. Having made their appearance in France, these ‘[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown breed came on the scene … They were the first of a new race of men who subsequently prospered and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What once again leaps to the eye is the transition from ‘disease’ or ‘virus’ to ‘race’. Likewise in Constant, ‘cold in their delirium’, subversive intellectuals, those ‘jugglers of sedition’ (&#039;&#039;jongleurs de sédition&#039;&#039;), never tired of undermining not just a particular society, but ‘the very foundations of the social order’. They were ‘beings of an unknown species’ (&#039;&#039;êtres d’une espèce inconnue&#039;&#039;) and in fact formed a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;), a ‘detestable race’ (&#039;&#039;déstestable race&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a crescendo, an anthropological type of explanation tends to become a racial type of explanation—the transition from the category of &#039;&#039;espèce&#039;&#039; to that of &#039;&#039;race&#039;&#039; is symptomatic. At this point the idea of a radical solution emerges. One could only hope for the ‘eradication’ of this ‘detestable race’ composed of pathogenic agents:[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] such was the precondition for restoring the health and safety of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The term ‘race’ does not possess a genuinely ethnic connotation in either Constant or de Tocqueville. Yet its recurrence is a symptom of a tendency to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg274&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;racialize the intellectuals who were carriers of the virus of subversion. Burke went significantly further. In addition to a clearly defined social stratum (non-property-owning intellectuals, who were not connected with the land and lacked roots), the ideological ‘intoxication’ of which radicalism was culpable[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] pertained to a social bloc that began to exhibit an ethnic dimension. What explained the catastrophe of the French Revolution was an alliance between two significantly different social strata: on the one hand, ‘political men of letters’ and, on the other, the ‘new monied interest’. The reasons for this alliance, at first sight so strange, were readily understandable. To begin with, the two parties shared a hatred of Christianity: ‘[t]he literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the irreligiousness and atheism of intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment were well-known, one should not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Jews in Change-alley’, already alien to Christianity for religious and ideological reasons, also had a material interest in undermining or destroying it: they were hoping for ‘a mortgage on the revenues belonging to the see of Canterbury’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attack on the Church was also an attack on ‘the landed property of ecclesiastical corporations’, on landed property as such. The revolutionaries’ programme was sinister: ‘Is the house of lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers[?]’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Intent on destroying a society whose pillars were Christianity and the landed aristocracy was an alliance between subversive intellectuals gathered in ‘the revolution society’ and ‘the pulpit of the Old Jewry’, or the ‘gentlemen of the Old Jewry’, engaged in distorting the real meaning of the Glorious Revolution and spreading ‘the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, Burke did not tire of stressing the role of the Jews. These two components of the revolutionary bloc were linked by multiple affinities. Over and above hatred of the Church and the agrarian, Christian nobility, an important role was also played by their fundamental foreignness to the nation. The intellectual stratum was itself stateless, because intellectuals displayed ‘attachment to their country’ only to the extent that it conduced to their ‘fleeting projects’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg275&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But whence did subversion draw its shock force? To overthrow the existing order, intellectuals and usurers were insufficient. In reality, an integral, albeit subaltern, part of the subversive attack was ‘the Tavern’, the inebriated, bloodthirsty rabble. How was the unnatural union repeatedly denounced by Burke as the social bloc between ‘Old Jewry’ and ‘the London Tavern’ formed and sealed?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Who enrolled the most desperate in the retinue and service of the wealthiest, and in fact of the most parasitic, repugnant wealth—the wealth which, rather than being based on the land and love of the land, pertained exclusively to speculation and usury? It was the intellectuals—more precisely, rootless intellectuals of humble origin. It was ‘feathered scoundrels’ [&#039;&#039;gueux plumées&#039;&#039;],[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] wretches like the scoundrels of the Tavern whom they were constantly inciting. Wanting in religion, faith and genuine ideals, they called on the scoundrels, of whom they were an integral part, to rise up against wealth, but only against the most respectable wealth—landed wealth—while financial (and Jewish) wealth was spared. In France these intellectuals ‘pretended to a great zeal for the poor … They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In their turn, the Jews were perfectly content to support the French rabble’s attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, on the pillars of Christianity. The revolutionary atrocities seemed to Burke ‘Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of the subversive social bloc were now clear. Thanks to the work of plebeian, subversive intellectuals, here were the propertyless in the retinue of the usurers, the Tavern in the service of Old Jewry, or ‘Jewish brokers contending with each other who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Jews were ultimately at the head of the variegated social bloc of subversion. It was enough to observe the development of the revolution in France: ‘The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will be always their fellows, sometimes their masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Levelling and homogenizing everything, the French Revolution ended up making a single ‘difference’ prevail, that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg276&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;constituted by ‘money’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and hence sanctioning the predominance of finance (largely controlled by Jews). If remedial action was not promptly taken, a ‘general earthquake’ threatened to flatten the social order and civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, we are dealing with the first organic theory of revolution as a Jewish conspiracy. The &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; and the denunciation of the infamous role of Old Jewry date from 1790. Only later did Abbé Barruel set himself to work. Exiled in England, he was received with honour by Burke, who warmly greeted him and the work that was taking shape: ‘The whole of the wonderful narrative is supported by documents and proofs with almost juridical regularity and exactness.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to chronological priority, another, more important characteristic highlights the novelty and perilousness of the conspiracy theory in Burke. While the &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; also referred to the disturbing role of Enlightenment ‘confederacies’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it was now no longer a question of pointing a finger at this or that sect or at freemasonry, as did Barruel, and exposing the role of Jews therein. Foremost among the charges against the latter was not hostility towards the dominant religion or throne and altar, as in the traditional Christian polemic. Burke, who was himself a mason,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] aimed to explain a new politico-social conflict that was destined to last a long time. In the British Whig’s view, we have on the one hand the countryside, as the site embodying the natural order of society and the values of attachment to the land, and a national community cemented (as we know) by a ‘relation in blood’; on the other, the city as the site of rootlessness and stateless subversion, jointly promoted by Jewish finance, abstract, revolutionary intellectuals and the rabble. For the first time, the Jews were accused of simultaneously operating through rapacious, parasitic finance and a plebeian movement inspired by blind, destructive fury.&lt;br /&gt;
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This motif reappeared in the liberal tradition after another major revolutionary upheaval. On the outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, Disraeli immediately put them down to the ‘manoeuvres’ of ‘secret associations’, which were ‘always vigilant and always prepared’ to take ‘society by surprise’ and ‘strik[e] at property and Christ’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, the English statesman of Jewish origin drew up a more sophisticated, highly surprising balance-sheet. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg277&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;account of ‘their accumulated wealth’, attachment to their religious tradition and proud racial self-consciousness, Jews tended to be hostile to ‘the doctrine of the equality of man’ and ‘conservative’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although shaking off oppression, they were not averse to the most unscrupulous operations and alliances: ‘you find the once loyal Hebrew invariably arrayed in the same ranks as the leveller and the latitudinarian’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There then spread the ‘destructive principle’ and ‘insurrection … against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property’. Fuelling all of this was an unexpected ethnic and social group: the destruction of Christianity, ‘the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them’. There was no doubt: ‘If the reader throws his eye over the provisional governments of Germany, and Italy, and even of France, formed at that period, he will recognise everywhere the Jewish element.’ Thus, ‘[t]he people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skilful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not difficult to hear in this discourse an echo of the resentment of the Jew at humiliations and persecution suffered. But it remains the case that we are once again dealing with a new conspiracy theory destined to enjoy fatal success in the twentieth century. What encouraged such a theory was the tendency, widespread in the liberal culture of the time, to repress the objectivity of politico-social conflict. The picture Disraeli paints of the great revolutionary wave of 1848 is eloquent. Had it not been for the occult Jewish leadership, ‘the uncalled for outbreak would not have ravaged Europe.’ Not objective social needs, but ‘the fiery energy and teeming resources of the children of Israel maintained for a long time the unnecessary and useless struggle’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, still within the ambit of the liberal tradition, the cry of alarm at ‘conspiracy’ also resounded during another great revolutionary upheaval. When Napoleonic France’s attempt to reintroduce slavery into San Domingo was defeated by the fierce resistance of the ex-slaves, Malouet warned against the ‘universal plot of the blacks’ who, with the complicity of the abolitionists, aspired to dominate and massacre the whites.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this theme was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg278&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;widely diffused in the South of the United States. Obsession with ‘conspiracy’ runs deep in the history of that country and both the contending alliances, in different forms, were constantly concerned to uncover and fight it. For example, in the years leading up to the Civil War, while the South denounced the North’s ‘abolitionist conspiracy’, the latter endlessly warned against the plot that aimed to impose slaveholding power at a federal level. For this reason, reference has been made to a widespread ‘paranoid style’ in connection with the history of the North American republic.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this mythology of the conspiracy, one element was especially significant and pregnant with consequences. The actor in the black, abolitionist plot, the anti-slavery militant, tended to be delineated in accordance with the model generally used to stigmatize the Jew: ‘Essentially weak and cowardly, he would pose no threat in a fair and open fight’; but this was where deception, intrigue and, precisely, conspiracy came in.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. The conflict of the two liberalisms, and mutual accusations of betrayal&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In confronting the challenges represented by the struggle for recognition waged by the excluded, obviously the community of the free did not always react as one. On more than a few occasions, there were internal clashes and divisions. In broad terms, we can distinguish two tendencies. One fraction more or less stubbornly identified with the positions of the representatives of English proto-liberalism, who equated ‘true liberty’ with untrammelled control by the master over &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; family, as well as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; servants and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; goods. By contrast, another fraction sought to come to terms with the idea of liberty originally mobilized by servants, who refused to let themselves be assimilated to the master’s belongings and pursued emancipation through intervention by political power on their behalf, be it existing political power or that formed in the wake of a revolution from below. The struggles waged by servants aggravated the sense of unease in some sections of the community of the free, who soon sought to acquire a good conscience by repressing slavery to the colonies and changing or masking the politico-social relations that most blatantly gave the lie to their proclaimed attachment to the cause of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entanglement of, and clash between, these two different ideas of liberty, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg279&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and of the politico-social subjects who appealed to them, explains the especially complex and tortuous character of the first English revolution and the French Revolution as such. Not even the United States was spared this conflict. In fact, it flared up there in the most violent and bloody way during the Civil War, in a clash between, on the one hand, the idea of liberty understood as self-government by the dominant class and race and, on the other, the idea of liberty that experienced increasing disquiet because of the persistence of the institution of slavery. Defeated militarily, in slightly different form, as a regime of terroristic white supremacy, the idea of liberty dear to the South ended up achieving a political success in the United States that lasted beyond the mid-twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two liberalisms we are referring to are to be construed in an ideal-typical sense: within the same author, it is possible to register fluctuation from one to the other. In condemning as contrary to liberty coalitions composed of ‘desperate men’, who sought to escape death from starvation, Smith clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the very wealthy. On the other hand, in calling for a ‘despotic government’ to abolish slavery, he was embracing a different theoretical paradigm, which identified liberty with the abolition of oppressive relations existing within civil society itself. And the great economist adhered to this second paradigm when he observed that in eastern Europe ‘serfdom’ continued to exist in ‘Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority’, and thus was not in a position to foil the resistance of feudal lords.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an observation which, albeit to a lesser extent, also applies to de Tocqueville. When he condemned the reduction of the working day in factories to twelve hours as an expression of despotism, he clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the bourgeoisie. But on other occasions the French liberal argued differently. In a letter of 1840 to an American correspondent, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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For me it is a rather melancholy reflection to think that your nation has incorporated slavery to such an extent that they expand together … In practice, there are no precedents for an abolition of slavery on the master’s initiative. It has only been abolished thanks to the power of a government that dominated master and slave alike. That is why, precisely because you are completely independent, slavery will last longer among you than anywhere else.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg280&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Rather than the locus of liberty, here self-government is the condition for the perpetuation of the evil of slavery. Only a strong government would be able to abolish it. More concerned about the stability of the United States than the freedom of blacks, de Tocqueville, unlike Smith, did not go so far as to come out in favour of a ‘despotic government’. But in the case of Ireland, the same French liberal harboured the idea of a temporary dictatorship that would put an end to the terrible ills visited on the native population by the self-government of Anglo-Irish, Protestant property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although convinced that ‘public education is salutary, above all in free countries’, Constant was firmly opposed to the introduction of compulsory schooling, since he considered unacceptable any form of ‘restriction’ that violated the ‘rights of individuals’, including ‘those of fathers over their children’. True, poverty meant that in poor families children were taken out of school and put to work early. Yet it was necessary to renounce any restrictions and wait for poverty to fade away.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of this logic, in addition to rejecting compulsory schooling, Constant did not even entertain the hypothesis of state intervention against the scourge of child labour. Some decades later, by contrast, declaring himself in favour of compulsory schooling, Mill argued against the ‘misplaced notions of liberty’ of parents and added: ‘The State … is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his [the individual’s] exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this different judgement, we see the transition from one theoretical paradigm to another; and the transition was also the result of the struggle of those who were excluded from liberty construed simply as self-government by civil society.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reacting to the protests and challenge of the working-class movement, it was liberal England that regulated working hours and conditions in factories, abolishing or tempering the most odious aspects of what Marx and Engels branded as employers’ ‘despotism’. This aroused the protests of not a few liberal representatives and English capitalists themselves, who (observed &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;) ‘denounced the factory inspector as a species of revolutionary commissioner reminiscent of the [Jacobin] Convention’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Bismarck made a profession of liberalism and thundered against the ‘Royal Prussian Court Jacobin’, who claimed to interfere in the relationship between masters and servants and hence to ride roughshod over the principle of self-government by civil society, hegemonized in this instance by feudal property and not an aristocratic—bourgeois &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg281&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;coalition, as in the British case. And it was precisely the Prussian–German statesman who distinguished between two types of liberalism in this connection. The first was characterized by ‘repugnance at the power of bureaucracy’, on the basis of ‘liberal caste sentiments’ widely diffused among the Junkers and nobility of pre-revolutionary Prussia; the second, utterly odious in Bismarck’s view, was ‘Rhineland–French liberalism’, or the ‘liberalism of civil servants’ (&#039;&#039;Geheimratsliberalismus&#039;&#039;), inclined to incisive anti-feudal reforms from above, which inspired an oppressive, suffocating state bureaucracy with its ‘tendency … to levelling and centralization’ and even ‘bureaucratic omnipotence’ (&#039;&#039;geheimrätliche Allgewalt&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is interesting to note that a similar distinction occurs in the young Marx. The &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; edited by him defined itself as a ‘liberal paper’, but was careful to specify that its liberalism was not in any way to be confused with ‘vulgar liberalism’ (&#039;&#039;gewöhnlicher Liberalismus&#039;&#039;). While the latter saw ‘all good on the part of representative bodies and all evil on the part of government’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039;, by contrast, was characterized by its attempt to analyse relations of domination and oppression in their concrete form, without hesitating in particular circumstances to underline ‘the general wisdom of the government against the private egotism of representative bodies’ (often monopolized by feudal strata and a narrow-minded, short-sighted big bourgeoisie). Contrary to ‘vulgar liberalism’, far from fighting ‘bureaucracy one-sidedly’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; had no difficulty acknowledging the merits of its struggle against the ‘romantic’ or ‘romantic–feudal’ current.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Despite the contrasting value judgements, in both Bismarck and Marx we witness a distinction between a liberalism inclined to consecrate the self-government of a civil society hegemonized by the feudal aristocracy or grand bourgeoisie, and a liberalism ready to intervene in the relations of domination and oppression that manifest themselves within civil society itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they are located in this historical and theoretical context, we can understand two significant turns that occurred in the course of the liberal tradition. We know that, initially, the liberal/servile dichotomy had a strong social and ethnic connotation. This connotation tended to weaken as the struggle for recognition intensified and the concessions that the community of the free was forced to make became more significant. We can then understand the attempt &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg282&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by some sections of the liberal movement to differentiate between political liberalism and economic liberalism, and thus distance themselves from those (economic-liberal) sections which, crying scandal at any state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, refused to question the relations of domination and oppression present within civil society, within the ‘private sphere’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, with every significant concession that the community of the free (or its most advanced sectors) found itself obliged to make to the excluded, engaged in the struggle for recognition, there were denunciations of ‘betrayal’ from the most intransigent sectors, with a consequent laceration and division of the liberal movement. Clearly distancing himself from those who refused to follow him in the crusade against the French Revolution, in 1791 Burke, in the name of loyalty to the ‘Old Whigs’, authors of the Glorious Revolution, broke with the ‘new Whigs’, guilty of having derived ideas and ideals ‘from a French die, unknown to the impress of our fathers in the constitution’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, at the heart of the conflict was the idea of representation, which the French revolutionaries and their followers on British soil, in the name of the imaginary, ‘pretended rights of man’, interpreted in a merely quantitative sense, invoking the principle of calculating a majority by head, ignoring the special function of the aristocracy and trampling the healthy arrangement of society into estates underfoot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A century or so later, the struggle for recognition was continuing to develop in new, more advanced conditions. Over and above political citizenship, the ‘multitude’, previously branded ‘swinish’, demanded the right to health, education and a minimum of free time. It succeeded in wresting more or less sizeable concessions and enjoyed support from significant representatives of liberalism. In Britain this was true above all of T. H. Green, who theorized ‘freedom in the positive sense’ in controversy with the economic liberals of his time. They condemned state regulation of working hours in factories or of female and child labour, in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ and liberty understood exclusively as non-interference by political power in the private sphere of production and labour relations.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, responding to the attempts at adaptation and reconciliation by some sectors of liberalism were cries of scandal from the movement’s most intransigent sections. Spencer, Acton and Henry S. Maine were among the many to denounce the ‘betrayal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg283&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Spencer particularly stood out. Those who, under the pretence of improving popular living conditions, banned the employment of children under the age of twelve, forced parents to send their children to school, subjected factory work (especially female labour) to a whole variety of regulations, and introduced compulsory insurance for illness and old age had ceased to be liberals: they had arrived at a ‘New Toryism’. In effect, they were simply inflating the state, enlarging the zone of coercion and limiting that of freedom of contract and the autonomous development of the individual.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As in the case of Burke with the ‘new Whigs’, so Spencer branded the ‘New Toryism’: albeit in a different idiom, what was targeted was a spurious liberalism forgetful of its own noble past; a liberalism guilty of abandoning the cause of self-government by civil society (whether aristocratic or bourgeois) and of the spontaneity of the market, giving way to the blandishments of statism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Celebration of the spontaneity of the market, as if its historically determinate form was not the result of political action, was philosophically ingenuous enough. For centuries the market of the liberal West had involved the presence of chattel slavery and the buying and selling of indentured white servants. Even the borderline that separated commodities on the one hand, and the figure of the buyer/seller on the other, was the result of political and even military intervention, abhorred for centuries as being synonymous with artificial, violent constructivism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us ignore the peculiar ‘commodities’ long represented by slaves and indentured servants. When can the market be regarded as free of external disturbance, and hence such that the parties to any exchange find themselves in a position of liberty and equality? Locke regarded the truck-system, whereby workers were paid not in money but in commodities produced by the factory they worked in, as perfectly legitimate. In agreement with him was Frederick William III, who in 1832 silenced voices raised in protest against this system with the argument that the state did not have the right to intervene in a ‘relationship of private right’, trampling over ‘civil liberty’ or arbitrarily restricting it. For Smith, by contrast, ‘the law which obliges the masters … to pay their workmen in money and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the liberal philosopher and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg284&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prussian monarch, the great economist was of the opinion that the truck-system violated the principle of equality between the contracting parties and therefore justified legal intervention that would have seemed intolerable to Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much later liberal authors like Lecky and others condemned state regulation of working hours as an inadmissible interference in the market sphere.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In our times, by contrast, Hayek believed that the promulgation by the state of ‘general, equal, and known rules’, of ‘general conditions’ which must be fulfilled by any contract, was not in itself a violation of the principle of liberty. But the Austro-American author, who distinguished himself by thundering against any form of statism and constructivism, would have seemed statist and constructivist to Lecky, whom Hayek regarded as a classic proponent of liberalism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Potentially a traitor in the eyes of economic liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, Hayek elsewhere identified and denounced the betrayal of liberalism. Although in favour of the social state and hence aligning himself with Green, Hobhouse continued to profess himself a follower of that intellectual current. &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, read the title of his book, which in fact, according to Hayek, would more accurately have been entitled Socialism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years earlier, von Mises had reached the same conclusion: most British ‘liberals’ were ‘so in name only. In fact, they are rather moderate socialists.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The charges of treason against the wing of liberalism disposed to make concessions to colonial peoples were even more violent. In France, immediately after Thermidor, anyone who resisted the turn intended to re-establish if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy in the colonies, was branded ‘African’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States of the 1820s, arguing against abolitionist tendencies, Randolph declared that the term ‘liberal’ now risked becoming synonymous with ‘black alliance’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The polemic against the ‘black republicans’ subsequently became the guiding thread of the struggle against the abolitionist tendencies that were coagulating in Lincoln’s Republican Party, as emerges in particular from the debate which, a few years before the Civil War, pitted the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg285&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;future president against Senator Stephen A. Douglas.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In subsequent years, Lecky was among those crying treason. The brief period of interracial and multi-ethnic democracy experienced by the South—Reconstruction—was, in his view, the triumph of the ‘negro vote’ and the disappearance of ‘the influence of property and intelligence’; it was the advent, ‘under the protection of the Northern bayonets’, of ‘a hideous orgie of anarchy, violence, unrestrained corruption, undisguised, ostentatious, insulting robbery, such as the world had scarcely ever seen’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. The community of the free as a community of peace? Policing operations and colonial wars&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto concentrated on the challenges to the community of the free that might be mounted by the barbarians in the colonies or the metropolis, and on the acute crisis situations that could arise within an individual country. But what were the relations between the various countries into which the community of the free was divided? Precisely because it was inclined to repress the genesis of the conflict and situate it outside itself, it tended to present itself as the community of peace, deaf to the sirens of war and bellicose adventures, which were a pre-modern legacy, and as wholly absorbed in the production, exchange and peaceful enjoyment of the goods that constituted civilization. George Washington expressed the hope that the development of ‘free commerce’ and civilization, ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, would put a stop to ‘the devastations and horrors of war’, uniting humanity ‘like one great family in fraternal ties’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, repeated Constant, in ‘the age of commerce’ even ‘a successful war always costs more than it brings in’: having become obsolete as a tool for acquiring wealth, war was destined to disappear; ‘the uniform tendency is towards peace’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn194|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;194&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This ideal of perpetual peace, produced by freedom of industry and trade, was sometimes so deeply felt that it prompted harsh criticism of the realpolitik of war and conquest pursued, for example, by England. Thus authors like Cobden and Spencer, bitter critics of their country’s foreign and military policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg286&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In the mid-nineteenth century, the former exclaimed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have been the most combative and aggressive community that has existed since the days of the Roman dominion. Since the Revolution of 1688 we have expended more than fifteen hundred millions of money upon wars, not one of which has been upon our own shores, or in defence of our hearths and homes … this pugnacious propensity has been invariably recognized by those who have studied our national character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn195|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;195&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the self-proclamation of the community of the free as a community of peace could generate a different line of argument. However pitiless, the struggle against the ‘savage beasts’ represented (in Washington’s view) by Indians was not an act of war, but a policing operation. This applied to conflicts with those peoples or, rather, those hordes that had not yet attained the stage of civilization and peace. Against barbaric pirates it was necessary to organize an expedition that ‘would crush them into non-existence’; sooner or later, it would be necessary to ‘exterminate those nests of Miscreants’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn196|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;196&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville likewise tended to liken conflict with barbarians to a policing operation. In September 1856 he expressed the fear that the clash between North and South in the United States would end up provoking ‘war in the heart of a great continent whence it has been banished for more than a century’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]). Clearly, subsumed under the category of war were neither the expeditions that had decimated and were decimating the Indians, nor the armed conflict that had involved a significant amputation of Mexican territory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the growing colonial expansion of Europe, and primarily of Britain, which now also encompassed a country of ancient civilization like China, made resort to the category of policing operation problematic. On the other side, recognizing the reality of war might also play a positive role at the level of domestic policy, might serve to overshadow the worsening social conflict, and counter the vulgarly hedonistic ideology in whose wake radical and socialist agitation had developed. The ideal tension that presided over war was thus positively contrasted with the pettiness of material demands advanced by popular protest movements: ‘The masses want tranquillity and earnings’, and hence peace, but the merit of war precisely lay in throwing this philistine view of life &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg287&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into crisis, observed Burckhardt, who in this connection quoted Heraclitus’ motto (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn197|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;197&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For de Tocqueville war and ‘great events’ could form a useful antidote to ‘our mediocre democratic and bourgeois soup’, which was the breeding ground of sensualism and socialist hedonism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn198|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;198&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; forcefully asserted that ‘I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and elevates their character.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn199|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;199&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it involved an advance by the West, and hence by the cause of liberty, war revealed its true nobility and beauty. De Tocqueville expressed himself in lyrical terms on the first Opium War (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|§6]]), in a letter whose addressee was the English liberal Reeve. He in turn, on the occasion of the Crimean War (which saw England allied with Bonapartist France), expressed himself no less magniloquently in the course of correspondence with the French liberal:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We live at a time when it is necessary to know how to suffer and witness suffering. The sword of war cuts to the heart. But what a mighty influence this struggle has on the political and social body! What a unity of sentiment and endeavour it creates! What a reawakening of the forces which, after all, make up the greatness of a people. I willingly accept all the anguish and all the ills of war for what it brings morally even more than politically.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn200|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;200&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The proud self-consciousness of the community of the free and the emergence of ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
War against barbarians in the colonies, or against countries situated on the margins of civilization, had hitherto been a subject for appreciation or celebration. At first sight, no cloud seemed to trouble the unity of the community of the free. However, after having desired the extension to the entire planet of the enlightened ‘despotism’ of civilized countries, Mill continued as follows: the gigantic ‘federation’, albeit ‘unequal’, that was the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg288&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Backward populations had an interest in becoming part of the British Empire, in order to avoid ‘being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn201|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;201&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years of the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville had responded prematurely and indirectly to Mill’s claim to raise the British Empire to the status of unique, privileged representative of a universal cause. The English were characterized by&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
their constant commitment to seek to demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of a principle, or for the good of the natives, or even for the benefit of the sovereigns whom they subjugate; honest is their indignation at those who put up resistance; these are the procedures with which they always cover up violence.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn202|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;202&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
With the disappearance of the semblance of complete unity, rivalry emerged between the different countries that made up the community of the free—rivalry that became all the more intense as the liquidation of despotism and, more generally, the construction of a new political regime deemed more advanced reinforced the self-consciousness of the individual protagonists. This was soil wherein was rooted the celebration, dear to Burke, of the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. The most lucid exponents of liberalism were perfectly well aware of this. While it also made itself felt in the works of authors such as Constant and, above all, Spencer, in this intellectual tradition the illusion that the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; betokened the advent of perpetual peace did not play the role it had in the French Revolution and radicalism. A source of possible conflicts between the various countries, observed Hamilton, was not only the diversity of political orders and interests:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg289&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? … Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn203|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;203&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of the representative regime and the transfer of power from absolute monarchy to the nation were not in themselves an antidote to war. Holland and England, the first two nations to have equipped themselves with liberal orders, had turned out to be ‘frequently engaged in war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn204|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;204&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hamilton felt great admiration for Britain: ‘I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn205|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;205&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet on the level of international policy, Britain remained an enemy to be defeated. The American statesman rebuked Europe, which wanted ‘to plume herself as the Mistress of the World’ and tended ‘to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit’. This was a pretence that must be countered with force: ‘It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.’ Sooner or later, the new Union would be the one ‘able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn206|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;206&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the enemy was generically identified as Europe and the Old World, the particular reference was to Britain which at this time (1787), following France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, was the only great imperial power. Jefferson was more explicit. The ‘empire for liberty’ desired by him presupposed Britain’s defeat: not only was it called upon to be the most grand and glorious ‘since the creation’, and hence to outclass the British Empire, but it also presupposed the annexation of Canada (in addition to Cuba), ‘which would be of course in the first war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn207|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;207&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For de Tocqueville, too, shared membership of the community of the free by certain countries did not guarantee permanent relations of friendship and peace between them. In defining its foreign policy, France must not exclusively assert its ‘interest in developing the principles of liberty in the world’. Only the naive could believe that their spread meant the simultaneous disappearance of the threat of war:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg290&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Will anyone go so far as to claim that two peoples must necessarily live in peace with one another just because they have similar political institutions? That all the causes of ambition, rivalry, jealousy, all the bad memories have been abolished? Free institutions render these feelings even more vital.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn208|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;208&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; stressed that ‘[a]ll free nations are vainglorious’; the ‘restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people’ was self-evident. This was confirmed, in particular, by the transatlantic republic: ‘The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise … Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn209|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;209&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an excessive ‘national pride’, an ‘irritable patriotism’ (&#039;&#039;patriotisme irritable&#039;&#039;), which did not tolerate criticism of any kind.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn210|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;210&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a demand for primacy that sought utter exclusivity. If a foreigner admired the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by Americans, they would react by accepting the compliment, but immediately rendering it more emphatic and more exclusive: ‘few nations are worthy of it’. If a foreigner admired their ‘purity of morals’, the American interlocutor would react by denouncing ‘the corruption that prevails in other nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn211|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;211&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he turned to the international rivalry between the countries making up the community of the free and the West, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to speak harshly of the United States. Writing to an American interlocutor, and referring to attempts to expand southwards also made by ‘private’ adventurers (he was thinking of William Walker), the French liberal wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not without concern, I have seen this spirit of conquest, even of rapine, exhibited among you for some years. It is not a sign of good health in a people that already has more territory than it can fill. I confess that I could not but be sad if I came to learn that the [American] nation had embarked on an operation against Cuba or—even worse—entrusted it to its lost sons.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn212|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;212&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The American interlocutor might easily have retorted by recalling de Tocqueville’s enthusiastic support for France’s policy of ‘conquest’ and ‘rapine’ in Algeria. But the key point is different. Far from damping it down, the common waving of the flag of liberty further fuelled international rivalry. After &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg291&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the February Revolution, de Tocqueville declared that ‘starting from 1789’ France once again donned the ‘role’ of ‘saviour’ ‘of peoples whose liberty is in danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn213|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;213&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An ‘empire for liberty’ was thus evoked whose capital was Paris, and which tended to come into conflict with the ‘empire for liberty’ cherished by Jefferson.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. De Tocqueville’s ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The realism with which the most lucid representatives of the liberal tradition analysed the persistence of national rivalries, despite their shared reference to the ideal of liberty, had another aspect to it: the candid, avowed chauvinism presiding over the international policy programme. This applies to de Tocqueville in particular. The principle of consent by the governed as a criterion for legitimizing political power gave impetus to national movements in Europe as well. Prima facie, it would seem that the liberal world as a whole should have felt unequivocal sympathy for them. In this case, we are dealing not with colonial peoples, but with peoples regarded as more or less civilized, who primarily came into conflict with the Habsburg Empire—that is, a power which had remained foreign to liberal development. Yet de Tocqueville proved cool, or frankly hostile. A partial explanation of this attitude can be found in the social demands that contaminated such movements and imperilled the traditional liberal delimitation of the political sphere. The Mazzinian republic established in Rome was ‘the red republic’ and against it, and ‘the anarchical party in Rome and the rest of the world’, no blows should be spared. Ideological fury impelled the French liberal to speak of his political opponents in Italy as ‘a whole category of political criminals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn214|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;214&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville proved harsh and even cynical about one of the protagonists of the Hungarian national revolution: rather than agitating to save ‘Kossuth’s skin’, it might happily be made into a ‘drum’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn215|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;215&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above rejection of radicalism, what motivated this attitude was ‘irritable patriotism’, concerns of a chauvinistic kind, as emerges in particular from de Tocqueville’s furious polemic against ‘our imbecile agents’ in Germany, who were guilty of not countering the prospect of that country’s ‘political unification’ more firmly and effectively. Certainly, ‘the population’s passion for this idea seems sincere and profound’; but ‘nothing would be more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg292&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;frightful for us’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn216|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;216&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But did this not ride roughshod over the liberal principle of self-government and consent by the governed as a criterion of the legitimacy of any government? That was a problem de Tocqueville did not pose. He hoped for ‘the victory of the princes’ and the Prussian army to put paid to ‘excessive decentralization’ that encouraged the swarming of ‘revolutionary breeding grounds’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn217|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;217&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to Italy, chauvinistic concerns should have played a more modest role. Yet in September 1848, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville summarized his position as follows: ‘preservation of the old territories … and real, significant changes in institutions’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn218|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;218&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, there was no place for demands for national unity. And the principle of consent by the governed? Having invited the organization of ‘a &#039;&#039;Roman demonstration’&#039;&#039; in favour of restoring the Pope’s temporal power, de Tocqueville continued as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In my opinion, this is &#039;&#039;indispensable&#039;&#039;. And, in order to achieve this result, if we do not also have the reality, it is &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; necessary to produce at least the semblance. This is the only way to connect the expedition with one of the main objectives we have always assigned it and on which the National Assembly has always wished to stand firm—coming to the aid of the real will and hidden desires of the people of Rome.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn219|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;219&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage the roles of appearance and reality are reversed rapidly and inadvertently. The ‘semblance’ of a demonstration to be organized at all costs expressed the ‘hidden’ but nevertheless ‘real’ will of the Roman population, whose interpreter was the government of the occupying power. At this point it was also possible to resort to radical measures with a clear conscience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I cannot really understand why, in the twenty-four hours following the city’s capture, we did not, with utmost rapidity and energy, close the clubs, tear down the flag of the Republic, disarm the citizens and soldiers, arrest all those who, in their attitude, indicated that they disapproved of our presence [&#039;&#039;tous ceux qui faisaient mine de trouver mauvais notre présence&#039;&#039;]—in a word, strike our enemies with terror in order to conquer the terror that had gripped our friends.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn220|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;220&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg293&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;So here we have an invitation to make arrests even on the basis of mere suspicion. Not by chance, reference is made to terror. It is a term that recurs frequently; it amounts to a veritable watchword: ‘strike the demagogic party with terror and lift the liberal party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn221|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;221&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But another watchword was immediately added: ‘negate the rigours of the past, although leaving terror to waft over the future’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn222|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;222&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, European public opinion, which already felt ‘deep repulsion’ at France’s conduct, must not be unduly ruffled. Yet it was a question of ‘advancing and advancing with the most extreme rigour’; all the more so because the country’s honour was at stake. It found itself faced with a ‘terrible alternative’—a Hobson’s choice:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Either to deliver Rome over to all the horrors of war or to retreat shamefully, beaten by the same men who for eighteen months fled all the battlefields of Italy. The first would be a great misfortune, but the second would be a fearful disaster and, as far as I am concerned, I have no hesitation.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn223|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;223&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, chauvinism took priority over any other concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. The conflict of ideas of mission from the American Revolution to the First World War&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
So we can understand the recurrent divisions that opened up in the community of the free. The one that occurred in the two decades preceding the foundation of the United States is illuminating. The Seven Years’ War was also experienced and fought by the English colonists in America, and in fact primarily by them, not only as a war for the defence of English liberty, but also (as the sermons of Protestant ministers never tired of repeating) as a holy war in which it was God himself who guided and saved England–Israel from the threat represented by France. The victory achieved over the enemies of Israel was proof of the ‘favourable providential presence of God with his people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;224&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years later, it was England’s turn to form the core of the alliance of the ‘enemies of God’, while the rebel American colonists continued to be ‘true Christians, good &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg294&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;soldiers of Jesus Christ’, called upon to cultivate ‘a martial spirit’ and ‘the art of war’, so as to accomplish ‘the work of the Lord’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;225&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the first major conflict to convulse the community of the free, and it spans the period that extends from the American Revolution to the war of 1812–15. As the latter was coming to an end, Jefferson expressed the opinion that Great Britain was no less despotic than Napoleon. Moreover, while the latter would take ‘his tyrannies’ to the grave with him, a whole ‘nation’ was seeking to impose its absolute domination over the seas; and it was an ‘insult to the human understanding’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;226&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Such was his ideological fury that the American statesman ended up declaring: ‘Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents from Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military and manufacturing one.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;227&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having heard the news of the end of hostilities, Jefferson wrote that it was ‘an armistice only’. So radical was the antagonism not only of interests, but also of principles, that the two countries were in fact engaged in an ‘eternal war’, which would terminate or was destined to end with the ‘extermination of the one or the other party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;228&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major conflict was the one that exploded with the American Civil War. The dialectic we have already encountered was on display once again. The fact that for decades the antagonists had regarded themselves as members of the chosen people of liberty, far from reducing the bitterness of the clash, accentuated it. Both sides were convinced that they were fighting a holy war; they appealed to Holy Scripture and half of their propaganda texts were written by ecclesiastics.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;229&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major conflict survived the second, which was eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century by the rising tide of chauvinism that invested the United States as a whole, without significant distinctions between North and South. In 1889 Kipling noted with disappointment that the 4 July celebrations in San Francisco were the occasion for official speeches against what the Americans defined as ‘our natural enemy’, represented by Great Britain ‘with her chain of fortresses across the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;230&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, this antagonism too was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg295&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;being damped down, because a completely new international situation was maturing. More than ever engaged in colonial expansion, and increasingly taken in by the idea of the freedom mission they assigned themselves in competition with one another, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the various national centres of the community of the free turned out to be on a collision course. This is the context in which we can situate the third major conflict in the history of liberalism. Starting with the First World War, in particular it saw ranged against one another Britain (and the United States) and Germany—the most recent and ambitious recruit to the community of the free, which at the end of the nineteenth century had likewise begun to cherish the idea of an empire for liberty, putting itself at the head of a crusade for the abolition of slavery in the colonies.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;231&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interpretation of the third major conflict suggested here might occasion astonishment. What obstructs an understanding of this event is the negative teleology that tends to interpret German history in its entirety as a series of stages leading inexorably to the horror of the Third Reich. In reality, on the eve of the First World War Germany was not obviously less ‘democratic’ than the United States, where racial oppression raged, or than Great Britain, which completely disregarded universal male suffrage (on which elections to the Reichstag were based), and exercised imperial domination on a global scale and even in Europe itself, at the expense of Ireland. Above all, it must not be forgotten that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in England and America, Germany was regarded as a full member of the exclusive club of free peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So the by now familiar dialectic emerges once again. Confronting one another in a total war, which required the mobilization of culture as well as armies, were antagonists who had previously congratulated one another on being members, or even especially influential members, of the community of the free—in this case, of the great Teutonic or Aryan family, united by a jealous custodianship of individual autonomy and love of self-government and liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn1a|1]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Recueil d’articles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Éphraim Harpaz, Geneva: Droz, 1972, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn2a|2]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 29–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn4a|4]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 6, p. 84; vol. 5, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn5a|5]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1981, p. 794.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn6a|6]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 155–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn8a|8]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn9a|9]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, ed. Thomas W. Copeland and John A. Woods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 7, pp. 52–3 (letter to William Weddell, 31 January 1792).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn10a|10]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 397 (letter to La Fayette, 28 May 1788), 455 (fragments of the discarded first inaugural address, April 1789)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn11a|11]] Adams, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn12a|12]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn13a|13]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., pp. 194–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn15a|15]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel de France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier&#039;&#039;, ed. Philippe Raynaud, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn16a|16]] Constant, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 183, 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn17a|17]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 7, pp. 144–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn18a|18]] James Mackintosh, &#039;&#039;Vindiciae gallicae&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Woodstock, 1989, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn19a|19]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn20a|20]] Jean-Joseph Mounier, &#039;&#039;De l’influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-maçons et aux illuminés sur la révolution de France&#039;&#039;, Tübingen: Cotta, 1801, pp. 31, 36–7, 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 33, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn22a|22]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn23a|23]] Arthur O. Lovejoy, &#039;&#039;The Great Chain of Being&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn24a|24]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn25a|25]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn27a|27]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn28a|28]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 12, p. 365 (letter to J. P. Nichol, 21 December 1837). On this see Eileen P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983, p. 606.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn29a|29]] Pasquale Villari, &#039;&#039;Dai cargeggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984, p. 151 (letter from Mill to Villari, 11 June 1862).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn30a|30]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn32a|32]] Cobden, quoted in Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 25–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn33a|33]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in Italy and France from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn34a|34]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. James Morton Smith, New York: Norton, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 1585–6 (letter to James Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn35a|35]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 382.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn36a|36]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn37a|37]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 245–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn38a|38]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn39a|39]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 21, p. 528 (letter to Edwin Chadwick, 13 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn40a|40]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 29, p. 26 (letter from Engels to Marx, 23 May 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 496 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 17 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 18, p. 424 (letter to A. de Circourt, 25 October 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn43a|43]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, London: Penguin, 1986, pp. 301–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 4, pp. 273–4, 266, 300–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn45a|45]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn48a|48]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, pp. 253, 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn49a|49]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 223, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., pp. 224, 242.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn52a|52]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn53a|53]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 215–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn54a|54]] Boissy d’Anglas, quoted in Georges Lefebvre, &#039;&#039;La France sous le Directoire&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1984, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn55a|55]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 2, p. 70 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 21 February 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn57a|57]] Ibid. vol. 4, pt 1, p. 321.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn58a|58]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 281.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn59a|59]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn60a|60]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Principles of Ethics&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Tibor R. Machan, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn61a|61]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 2, 21, 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn62a|62]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 309–19 (for the quotation from Lincoln, see p. 312).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn63a|63]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn64a|64]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 131.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn65a|65]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn66a|66]] Giuseppe Mazzini, &#039;&#039;Note autobiografiche&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Pertici, Milan: Rizzoli, 1986, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn67a|67]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 234 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn68a|68]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn69a|69]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 863.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn72a|72]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 11, p. 392 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn73a|73]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn74a|74]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 64; William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 5, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn76a|76]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 19 August and 14 October 1856); Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, p. xviii; and on Guizot, cf. Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 331–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn79a|79]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 437 (letter of 14 December 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn80a|80]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 101 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 10 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn86a|86]] François-Alphonse Aulard, &#039;&#039;Histoire politique de la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1977, p. 19 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn87a|87]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 4, pp. 65, 100, 140; vol. 5, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn88a|88]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 268–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn90a|90]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 57–8 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 5 October 1828).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 64, 67–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 124–5, 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn93a|93]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 15, pt 1, p. 342 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn95a|95]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 20, pp. 319–63; and vol. 2, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn97a|97]] Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Britannica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 2, p. 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn98a|98]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 55 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn99a|99]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn100a|100]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 322–3 (letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn101a|101]] Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, pp. 393–6, 409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn102a|102]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 78, 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn103a|103]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 229 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 6 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn104a|104]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 159 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 14 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 29 August and 14 October 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 272–4 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 29 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn108a|108]] Ernst Nolte, &#039;&#039;Three Faces of Fascism&#039;&#039;, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Mentor, 1969, p. 635 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 55 n. 1 and 22 n. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn110a|110]] Arthur de Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie de Paris, vol. 1, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn111a|111]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn113a|113]] Ibid., pp. 235, 234.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn114a|114]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 103, 167; Hume, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn115a|115]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn116a|116]] David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn117a|117]] Chamberlain, quoted in Henry Kissinger, &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1994, p. 186.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn118a|118]] Alfred Thayer Mahan, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Asia&#039;&#039;, New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 125–6; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, pp. 55–7, 48–50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn119a|119]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 41ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 536–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn121a|121]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn122a|122]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, p. 322 (letter to Kentaro Kaneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn123a|123]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn124a|124]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn125a|125]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1847, vol. 1, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn126a|126]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn127a|127]] Ibid., pp. 508–9, 553.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn128a|128]] Ibid., p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn129a|129]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn130a|130]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 361.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn131a|131]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, pp. 221, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn132a|132]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn133a|133]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn134a|134]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 260–1 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 20 March 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn135a|135]] See Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 520–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn136a|136]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The History of Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, Natalie Gerardie and Mirian Kochan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974–75, vol. 3, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn137a|137]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 280 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 24 January 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn138a|138]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, pp. 151–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn140a|140]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, pp. 154–5 (letter to E. Cazelles, 3 May 1871).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn141a|141]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 305 (letter of 21 March 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 20, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn143a|143]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 348–9; vol. 13, pt 2, pp. 337–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn144a|144]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn145a|145]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14, 84, 194; Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn146a|146]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn147a|147]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn148a|148]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn149a|149]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn150a|150]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 211, 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn151a|151]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 75, 50–51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn152a|152]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 169–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn153a|153]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn154a|154]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn156a|156]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn157a|157]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 102.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn158a|158]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 18–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn160a|160]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn161a|161]] Burke, quoted in Johannes Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These von der Verschwörung&#039;&#039;, Bern and Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1976, p. 111 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn162a|162]] See Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn163a|163]] Cf. Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These&#039;&#039;, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn164a|164]] Disraeli, quoted in George E. Buckle and William F. Monypenny, &#039;&#039;The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, New York: Macmillan, 1914–20, vol. 3, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn165a|165]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn166a|166]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn167a|167]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 497–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn168a|168]] Ibid., p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn169a|169]] Malouet, quoted in Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn170a|170]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 38 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn172a|172]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 455.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn173a|173]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 83 (letter to J. Sparks, 13 October 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn174a|174]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn175a|175]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 159–60, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn176a|176]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 396.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn177a|177]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Die großen Reden&#039;&#039;, ed. Lothar Gall, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1984, p. 137; Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Werke in Auswahl&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, ed. Gustave Adolf Rein, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, p. 354 (speeches in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 18 October 1849 and 14 February 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn178a|178]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 424.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn179a|179]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn180a|180]] See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 89, 248, 257, 220, 228.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn181a|181]] Thomas Hill Green, ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard L. Nettleship, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1973, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn182a|182]] George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classsics, 1981; Henry S. Maine, &#039;&#039;Popular Government&#039;&#039;, ed. George W. Carey, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn183a|183]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 5–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn184a|184]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 3, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn185a|185]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn186a|186]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 230, 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn187a|187]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Conceit&#039;&#039;, ed. William Warren Bartley III, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn188a|188]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. xviii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn189a|189]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 262–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn190a|190]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn191a|191]] Cf. Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 498–504 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn192a|192]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn193a|193]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, p. 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn194a|194]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn195a|195]] Cobden, quoted in Daniel Pick, &#039;&#039;War Machine&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn196a|196]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, p. 401 (letter to La Fayette, 19 June 1788).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn197a|197]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, pp. 150, 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn198a|198]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, p. 421 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 9 August 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn199a|199]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn200a|200]] Reeve, quoted in de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn201a|201]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn202a|202]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 505.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn203a|203]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn204a|204]] Ibid., p. 180.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn205a|205]] Hamilton, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, ed., &#039;&#039;Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn206a|206]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn207a|207]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1586 (letter to Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn208a|208]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn209a|209]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 225–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn210a|210]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn211a|211]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 225.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn212a|212]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 147 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 4 December 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn213a|213]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn214a|214]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 249, 277, 399 (letters to F. de Corcelle, 10 and 20 June and 12 September 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn215a|215]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 92 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 January 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn216a|216]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 29, 38 (letters to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August and 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn217a|217]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 133–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 18 May 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn218a|218]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn219a|219]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 276 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 20 June 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn220a|220]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn221a|221]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn222a|222]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 294 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 2 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn223a|223]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 293 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224a|224]] Ellis Sandoz, ed., &#039;&#039;Political Sermons of the American Founding Era&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991, pp. 216–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225a|225]] Ibid., pp. 623–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226a|226]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 1272–3 (letter to Madame de Staël, 24 May 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227a|227]] Ibid., p. 1357 (letter to William Short, 28 November 1814).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228a|228]] Ibid., p. 1366 (letter to La Fayette, 14 February 1815).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229a|229]] Eugene D. Genovese, ‘Religion in the Collapse of the American Union’, in Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds, &#039;&#039;Religion and the American Civil War&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 74–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230a|230]] Kipling, quoted in Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, p. 322.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231a|231]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 17, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER NINE ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page296&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg297&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Historiography and hagiography&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Our history of liberalism ends with the outbreak of the First World War, when (according to Weber) even in countries with the most stable liberal tradition the state was assigned ‘ “legitimate” power over the life, death and liberty’ of individuals, and ‘unlimited disposition over all the economic goods accessible to it’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, as Furet puts it, ‘in virtually all of Europe, the canons of August 1914 literally and metaphorically buried liberty in the name of country’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is appropriate to take a look back from this watershed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following the prelude of the revolt against Philip II’s absolutism by the Netherlands, liberalism asserted itself in two counties so positioned that they were sheltered from the threats to which continental European states were exposed. It should be added that, not by chance, the Glorious Revolution succeeded England’s victory first over Spain and then over France, while the American colonists’ revolt only began with the defeat of France in the Seven Years’ War. Thus, the two liberal revolutions both presupposed a clear improvement in the geopolitical situation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As regards continental Europe, we can distinguish two phases: after the defeat of Turkey at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and the fading of the Ottoman threat, criticism of absolutism became widespread. The second phase was the so-called hundred years’ peace, which extended from the end of the Napoleonic &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg298&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This was the period when liberalism also asserted itself at a concrete political level. And just as the institutions that emerged from the 1789 revolution did not survive the war which engulfed revolutionary France, from 1914 the liberal institutions that had flourished in continental Europe during the hundred years’ peace experienced a dramatic crisis. Taken as a whole, as well as enjoying a more or less high degree of peace and geopolitical security, the liberal countries had another characteristic in common: in the period under investigation here, they had marked possibilities of defusing politico-social conflict in the metropolis through colonial expansion, whether continentally or overseas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the epochal rupture of 1914 there erupted in all its horror the second Thirty Years’ War, as the two global conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, separated by a fragile armistice, have often been defined. What is the relationship between all this and the preceding historical period? Or are we to believe that there is no relationship and that the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; came to an unanticipated end, brought about exclusively by circumstances altogether foreign to the liberal West? This is the conclusion that seems to be suggested by an eminent English historian of the modern world, A. J. P. Taylor:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit … Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service … It left the adult citizen alone.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Citing this picture, already problematic enough in itself, a contemporary British liberal scholar elevates it into ‘the historical paradigm of a liberal civilization’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, a couple of pages later, Taylor himself observes that ‘[s]ome 50 million Africans and 250 million Indians were involved, without consultation, in a war of which they understood nothing’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us ignore the colonies, and even Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom and experienced such political and military oppression from the London government that it was (again in Taylor’s words) the protagonist of ‘the only national rebellion in any &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg299&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;European country during the First World War—an ironical comment on the British claim to be fighting for freedom’ and to represent the cause of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for England specifically, I do not know if Cobden ‘noticed’ the state that inspected his mail, but it was certainly on its guard against a citizen who was unquestionably ‘sensible and law-abiding’, but whose fault was to be suspected of Chartist sympathies.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the state even more readily ‘noticed’ the Chartism and the working-class movement in general, which faced repeated suspension of habeas corpus and recourse to the use of &#039;&#039;agents provocateurs&#039;&#039; who elicited horror not only in the liberal Constant, but also in a ‘statist’ like Hegel.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the England of the time, ‘a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers’ was at work.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even the contrast with the continent as regards military conscription is mistaken: this had already made its appearance some years earlier in the United States during the Civil War and, in order to impose it, Lincoln, putting down violent resistance, had no hesitation in having an army corps march on New York.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Military conscription was not a practice imposed on the liberal world from without, from the continent!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historiography tends to shade into hagiography. I use this term in a technical sense: it involves a discourse completely focused on what, for the community of the free, was the restricted sacred space. It is enough, however briefly, to introduce the profane space (slaves in the colonies and servants in the metropolis) into the analysis, to realize the inadequate, misleading character of the categories (absolute pre-eminence of individual liberty, anti-statism, individualism) generally used to trace the history of the liberal West. Was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain the land of religious freedom? Referring to Ireland, the liberal de Beaumont, who was de Tocqueville’s companion during his trip to America, spoke of ‘unimaginable religious oppression’. We are dealing with a people not only deprived of its ‘religious freedom’, but also forced, notwithstanding its poverty, to subsidize the wealthy Anglican Church that oppressed it with tithes. The vexations, humiliations and suffering inflicted by British ‘tyranny’ on this ‘slave people’ proved that ‘a degree of egotism and madness is present in human institutions whose limits cannot be defined’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg300&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But let us concentrate on the metropolis. Celebrating the individualism and anti-statism attributed to the liberal tradition, Hayek pays homage to Mandeville, for whom the ‘arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In truth, the author elevated into a model here was not only completely undisturbed by the spectacle of hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’, but invoked summary trials and an acceleration in death sentences—and demanded state intervention even in the private life of these poor people, on whom the observance of Sunday worship should be imposed from infancy (see above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). It is clear that what held Hayek’s attention was neither the colonies nor metropolitan servants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Things do not fall out right even if such neglect is regarded as innocuous. The experience of the British colonies in America that subsequently became the United States is particularly revealing. Servile, semi-servile and free labourpower came from across the Atlantic in ways and in accordance with rules fixed by the political authorities, which also played a decisive role in delimiting the area opened up to colonization from time to time. The slavery or marginalization and degradation imposed on blacks ended up impinging on the ‘modern liberty’ of the whites themselves—and so seriously that the wrong choice of sexual or marriage partner risked transforming the culprit into a ‘felon’, a traitor to his own country and race! The white population as a whole, and slave-owners themselves, were subject to a whole series of laws that gravely interfered in even the most intimate aspect of private life. The political authorities exercised comprehensive surveillance so that miscegenation and, above all, the potential fruit of such noxious mixing did not lead to emancipation and did not threaten the purity of the community of the free with its false presence. It was a crime to give or even merely furnish writing materials to slaves. The postal administration prevented the circulation of materials vaguely critical of the institution of slavery. In the South a climate of terror reigned over citizens suspected of harbouring abolitionist ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was not only the race issue and the dark cloud it suspended over the civil rights of the white community itself. We can take a key state in the history of the North American revolution and republic: ‘Pennsylvania was … renowned in the nineteenth century for its stringent laws against blasphemy, profanity, and desecrating the sabbath’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Independently of the prohibition of miscegenation, which remained in force beyond the mid-twentieth century, sexual &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg301&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;freedom in the United States was restricted in ways that were largely foreign to the despised, ‘statist’ continental Europe. Here is the picture drawn in 2003 by a distinguished US newspaper:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
All 50 states had laws banning sodomy until 1961 … The number had dwindled to 24 states by 1968 and stands at 13 today … Most of the remaining states with anti-sodomy laws forbid anal or oral sex among consenting adults no matter their sex or relationship.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
To this we must add the constitutional amendment of 1919 that sought to prevent the production and consumption of ‘intoxicating liquors’—a further intervention in the private life of citizens with few parallels in other Western countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the history of the English colonies in America and then of the United States—both classical countries of the liberal tradition are thus involved to differing degrees—is better explained by the complexity of the process of constructing and protecting the sacred space, than by the categories of anti-statism and individualism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The liberal revolution as a tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Once the field of hagiography has been evacuated, in reconstructing the history of liberalism it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: ‘We won’t be their Negroes!’ On the one hand, the rebellion began by demanding equality, while on the other it reasserted inequality and further deepened it. The two demands were indissolubly linked: precisely because they established a marked superiority over blacks and Indians, the colonists felt themselves completely equal to gentlemen and property-owners residing in London, and demanded that such equality be recognized and consecrated at every level. The dialectic that issued in the Glorious Revolution was not very different. We have seen an exponent of English proto-liberalism demanding, in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of his own possessions and servants. Far from questioning it, ‘true liberty’ consecrated the existing relations of service (and, in the colonies, slavery) as belonging to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg302&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an inviolable private sphere. The equality property-owners demanded with the sovereign, who could now be nothing but &#039;&#039;primus inter pares&#039;&#039;, went hand in hand with the reification of servants, who tended to be likened to other objects of property. That is why liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we should analyse as a whole the three revolutions from which we started out. Of the first, which occurred in Holland, Huizinga observed that ‘the revolt against the Spanish government was a conservative revolution and could not have been otherwise’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same conclusion has been reached by other eminent historians. Philip II was concerned to ‘require that bishops be technically skilled (that is, theologians rather than sons of great lords)’ and was opposed to the nobility’s attempt to transform the Council of State into ‘an exclusively aristocratic executive body’. We can then understand that ‘large parts of the “Netherlands” nobility were suddenly afraid that the prince was not their &#039;&#039;agent&#039;&#039;, that his policies would in the short and medium run threaten their interests significantly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So, on the one hand, we have Philip II, who surrounded himself with ‘secretaries who were generally from modest origins, passive instruments of his will’; on the other, ‘an oligarchic princely republic of communal cities and feudal lordships’, a ‘grand aristocracy’, a ‘feudal oligarchy’ engaged in defending ‘privileges and customs’ that consecrated its power and prestige.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is as if the nobles of the Netherlands, like large English property-owners and the English colonists in America subsequently, declared: ‘We don’t want to be treated as your servants!’ In its initial stages, the revolt against Philip II was not very different from the contemporaneous agitation of the Fronde in France.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, what ignited the powder was the clash between the high nobility’s autonomist and in some sense liberal aspirations and the Crown’s centralizing tendencies—except that, in the second case, the influence of the struggle for national independence and the intervention of the popular masses in it profoundly altered the initial picture.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have already seen the impetus given by the Glorious Revolution to the slave trade and the development of racial slavery in the colonies. The aspect of dis-emancipation also emerges with clarity in Ireland. Systematic expropriation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg303&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the natives intensified; in 1688 Catholics still owned 22 per cent of Irish land, but the figure fell to ‘14 per cent in 1703 and a mere 5 per cent in 1778’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that is not all: ‘Catholics—the overwhelming majority of the Irish population—were excluded from all public offices and from the legal profession.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England itself, the Glorious Revolution swept away the obstacles that still stood in the way of enclosures. As Marx put it, having attained full control of power, land-owners and capitalists ‘inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale the thefts of state lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the extent that rural labourers had found an ear more or less attentive to their lamentations, it was from the Stuart monarchy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Up to 1688, by dint of the control over them exercised from above, Justices of the Peace had some autonomy from the landed aristocracy. They subsequently lost it, becoming ‘virtual dictators of local government’ and answering only to the members of their own class who sat in parliament.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, we must not lose sight of the incredible increase in the number of crimes against property that carried the death penalty, with the establishment of a regime of terror over the popular masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The dimension of dis-emancipation is even more obvious in the American Revolution. The terms in which Theodore Roosevelt celebrated it at the start of the twentieth century are revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The chief factor in producing the Revolution, and later in producing the War of 1812, was the inability of the motherland country to understand that the freemen who went forth to conquer a continent should be encouraged in that work … The spread of the hardy, venturesome backwoodsmen was to most of the statesmen of London a matter of anxiety rather than of pride, and the famous Quebec Act of 1774 was in part designed with the purpose of keeping the English-speaking settlements permanently east of the Alleghanies, and preserving the mighty and beautiful valley of the Ohio as a hunting-ground for savages …[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg304&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Indians was dramatically hastened by the foundation of the United States.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Great Britain’s interests in its transatlantic possessions were commercial rather than territorial; and, as we know, it was loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada who accused the insurgents of a systematic policy of genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If Indians gained nothing from the American Revolution, what about blacks? The foundation of the United States involved the advent of a racial state and an unprecedented consolidation of racial chattel slavery. It is true that, in line with the watchword of the struggle against (political) slavery advanced during the revolt against Britain, the Northern states abolished slavery in the strict sense. But blacks did not thereby acquire freedom, confined as they were to a ‘caste’ different from that of freemen. In any event, there is a fact that provides food for thought: Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1834, while it survived in the United States for another three decades. Even the condition of free blacks was worse there, for example, than in Canada. In that British colony between 1850 and 1860, 20,000 blacks found refuge who had abandoned the United States, where they feared that laws on the return of fugitive slaves to their legitimate owners might furnish pretexts for the enslavement even of free blacks. But already, some decades earlier, more than a thousand black slaves had sought refuge in Canada after their delegation had been benevolently received by the local authorities with a stinging polemic against the United States: ‘Tell the Republicans on your side of the line that we royalists do not know men by their colour. Should you come to us you will be entitled to all the privileges of the rest of His Majesty’s subjects.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this declaration was not free from an ideological, self-serving element. But it remains the case that blacks in the US looked to Canada as the promised land of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most significant steps in the expansion of the United States simultaneously sealed the extension of the democracy and domination, in its harshest forms, of the ‘master race’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1803 Napoleon sold Louisiana. Although already in force, slavery had not yet assumed a clearly racial form. There were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg305&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;20,000 half-castes, who to all intents and purposes were free and sometimes engaged in the liberal professions. They might even be very wealthy, and thus form part of the dominant elite. Transfer to the United States involved the consecration of local self-government and the power, in the final analysis, of white property-owners (French and Anglo-American). The result was a deterioration in the conditions not only of slaves—emancipation became increasingly difficult—but, above all, of freemen of colour. Their numbers diminished in absolute terms, and even more appreciably in percentage terms (their immigration was discouraged, while that of whites was encouraged). Hit by a series of discriminatory measures, freemen of colour now began to form an intermediate caste closer to slaves than freemen proper. In Louisiana, annexed to the United States, the twin birth of free representative bodies and racial chattel slavery was also seen in due course.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A new, considerable expansion of US territory occurred some decades later with the drastic amputation of Mexico. We already know about the introduction of slavery into Texas. But even more significant was the tragedy that struck the Indians in both Texas and California. Subjected to forced labour and a thinly disguised slavery, their children in effect became &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;. Particularly desirable were young girls because, as a local paper put it, they served the dual purpose of ‘work and lust’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was only one chapter in a horrific story: ‘The destruction and degradation of the California Indians is one of the sorriest blotches on the honor and intelligence of a nation. It was less a matter of war than of “sport”.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;and comparativism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Viewed comparatively and from the perspective of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, the American Revolution appears as the start of a long series of attempts by white colonists to rid themselves of the obstacle represented by central power, whether ecclesiastical or monarchical. In 1537 Pope Paul III declared that the sacraments must be forbidden to colonists who, denying the humanity of Indians, reduced them to slavery. ‘Moralistic interference’ was also carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Thus, a ‘continuing tension between slavery and Christian ideals’ made itself felt. But the colonists, for whom forced labour was an &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg306&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unavoidable necessity, responded by expelling the Jesuits from Brazil or provoking veritable ‘colonial insurrections’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the first rebellions by black slaves tended to appeal to the Crown and to look to central government for a counter-weight to the despotism of local masters.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for British America, the revolt that developed in Virginia a century before the American Revolution, and which was led by Nathaniel Bacon, must be borne in mind. While on the one hand targeting the privileges of the governing faction, on the other the rebels ‘demanded land, without regard to the rights or needs of the border Indians’, who in fact were exterminated in some instances.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conflicts that subsequently emerged in the American Revolution are present here &#039;&#039;in nuce:&#039;&#039; on the one hand, the polemic against central government arrogance and interference; on the other, the demand for complete freedom vis-à-vis ‘savages’. And in fact, when we read in Bacon’s manifesto his denunciation of the collusion, in the course of the struggle against the champions of liberty, between the governor of Virginia and the ‘barbarous’, bloodthirsty Indians,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we are reminded of the Declaration of Independence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We know that the French and English colonists also waved the flag of self-government, independence and imitation of the US model against the policy of emancipating slaves, for which they criticized the central political power. But events in Southern Africa are especially significant. Here, too, whether the colonies were controlled by the Dutch or British, the development of self-government by civil society went hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of racial slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolts erupted which, in the name of liberty and the struggle against despotism, denounced interference by central government and its claim to limit the right of masters to punish their slaves.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The civil society referred to was, obviously, the white community. The natives were descendants of Ham, condemned to perpetual slavery by the Old Testament, or were assimilated to the inhabitants of Canaan, doomed to destruction by the chosen people, the Boer settlers who embodied the cause of liberty and self-government.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg307&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The crucial question posed by eminent US historians in connection with the English colonists’ revolt in America is thus wholly understandable: Was the ‘movement of political emancipation by a section of the white settlers against control from England’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] really a revolution? Or are we dealing with ‘a reactionary slaveholders’ rebellion’? In the case of the South at least, this was the principal aspect: ‘With the threat of British interference removed and a relatively weak central government to contend with, the road to regional power lay open before the slaveholders, who constituted the only class capable of treading it.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A not dissimilar conclusion has been reached on the basis of an analysis of the relationship the Union as a whole had with the Indians: the American Revolution ‘had some of the character of a white settlers’ revolt against imperial policy’, which afforded relative protection to the natives.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can draw a comparison between the role played by the ‘redskin question’ in the colonists’ rebellion that issued in the American Revolution and the part the ‘negro question’ played in the sparking off the Civil War:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]he British authorities prior to 1776, by promulgating regulations restricting the colonists’ geographic expansion beyond the Appalachians, also alienated wealthy planters and merchants with speculative investments in western territory, as well as less affluent farmers who hoped for a new and inexpensive start on fresh lands … In 1860–61, when a newly elected Republican administration promised to prohibit the further westward expansion of slavery, the response from most white Southerners was another revolution for political autonomy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
If this is the case, the history of the United States is characterized by two reactionary secessions (or secessions with more or less strong reactionary components), the one victorious, the other defeated. And, although defeated, the second would be situated in a line of substantial continuity with the first.&lt;br /&gt;
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The triumphal rise of the United States created an ideological climate in which, when reconstructing the American Revolution, historians tended to identify directly and naively with the rebel colonists’ arguments. But today it is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg308&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inadmissible to continue to ignore the voices of their opponents, in particular those (for example, Samuel Johnson and Josiah Tucker) who from the outset highlighted the significance of the black and Indian questions in the divisions that occurred between the two shores of the Atlantic. When the subsequent clash between the two sections of the Union loomed, claiming the legacy of the American Revolution were also, and perhaps primarily, the theorists of the South. Calhoun referred to Washington the ‘slave-owner’. An utterly instrumental attitude? It was in fact endorsed by the most radical currents in abolitionism, which had no hesitation in publicly burning a Constitution branded as intrinsically pro-slavery and hence, ultimately, satanic. In their interpretation of the American Revolution, Calhoun and Garrison in a way vindicated Johnson and Tucker. Just as the Declaration of Independence accused George III of seeking to incite black slaves against the colonists, so the Confederacy accused Lincoln of wanting to provoke a slave war in the South. In both cases the rebels criticized central political power for misunderstanding the self-government that was due to free, civilized men and for attempting to erase the boundary line between civilization and barbarism. Not by chance, the attempted secession could count on passionate support from prominent representatives of the liberal world and culture even in England. One thinks, in particular, of Lord Acton, who to the end believed he was supporting an authentic, great liberal revolution, just as the leaders of the secessionist, slaveholding South thought they were promoting an authentic, great liberal revolution (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further developing a comparative perspective and the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, it might be observed that in the twentieth century the process of decolonization was itself accompanied by secessionist movements, initiated by colonists who sought to maintain control over the natives and colonial populations in general, waving the flag of self-government and continuing to be inspired by the model of ‘master-race democracy’—one thinks, in particular, of South Africa and Rhodesia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039; and a comparative perspective that expose the reductive, misleading character of the view which conceives the American Revolution as a mere ‘reactionary rebellion’. To begin with, we are dealing with a more general problem. We find Marx defining the Glorious Revolution as a ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, thanks to which the English landed aristocracy succeeded in consolidating its domination over the unfortunate Irish (the Indians and blacks of the situation) and giving impetus to the enclosure of common land and the expulsion of the peasantry. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the other side of the coin. The conquest of self-government by civil society had a genuine revolutionary significance. Liberated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg309&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from an arbitrary power, the members of the class that had assumed power granted one another liberty and respect for the rules, with the construction of the constitutional state and the advent of the liberal rule of law. The first to achieve this novel phenomenon were precisely the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, which therefore cannot be put on the same level as subsequent historical movements inspired by them. In other words, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that characterized the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution subsequently saw the second aspect prevail ever more markedly.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Realization of the rule of law within the sacred space and the widening of the gulf with the profane space&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented in the metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘original capitalist accumulation’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Against monarchical despotism and central power, this class demanded self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law. We can then say that this liberalism was the intellectual tradition which most rigorously circumscribed a restricted sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power obtained. It was an intellectual tradition characterized more by celebration of the community of free individuals that defined the sacred space than by celebration of liberty or the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident, the classical countries of the liberal tradition were those where, through Puritanism, the Old Testament had the deepest impact. This already applies to the Dutch Revolution or, at least, to the Boers of Dutch origin, who identified themselves with the ‘chosen people’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it applies a fortiori to England. Especially from the Reformation, the English regarded themselves as the new Israel, ‘the people chosen by the Almighty for a special and at the same time a universal mission’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideology and missionary consciousness were diffused, in accentuated form, across the Atlantic. It is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg310&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enough to think of Jefferson, who suggested that the US coat of arms should represent the children of Israel guided by a ray of light.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the distinction between sacred space and profane space is seen in all its radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the Old Testament beloved of the dominant elite, which liked to identify with the chosen people that conquered Canaan and destroyed its inhabitants, or which recruited its slaves from gentiles, two strict, drastic delimitations are operative. Anthropocentrism sharply separates from circumambient nature the human world, wherein an absolutely privileged and unique role is reserved for the ‘chosen people’. The sacred space, the tiny sacred island, is thus delimited with the utmost clarity from the infinite profane space. We might say that outside the chosen people everything tended to be reduced to deconsecrated nature, within whose orbit also came the populations condemned by Jehovah to be wiped off the face of the earth. The destruction fell upon ‘both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass’; or, in more pregnant terms, ‘all the souls’, ‘all that breathed’, ‘all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the specifically profane space, the distinction between man and nature does not seem to emerge, or does not play a prominent role.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the exclusive restriction of the sacred space also performs an enormously positive function. Among the chosen people specific rules are in force, so that there is room for servitude but not for slavery in the strict sense. Thousands of years later, this was the viewpoint of Locke who, explicitly appealing to the Old Testament, distinguished between the servitude of wage-labourers (in the metropolis) and slavery in the colonies. And the continuity turns out to be even more striking when we bear in mind that destined for slavery were blacks, whom the theology and ideology of the time regarded as the descendants of Ham and Canaan, condemned in perpetuity by Noah, according to Genesis, to wear chains.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at a paradoxical result, at least with respect to the dominant ideology. The West is at once the culture which most rigorously and effectively theorizes and practises the limitation of power, and which, with the greatest success and on the largest scale, is engaged in the development of chattel slavery—an institution that involves the full deployment of the master’s power over slaves reduced to chattels and ‘nature’. And this paradox is exhibited in especially striking fashion precisely in the countries with the most established liberal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg311&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Certainly, already within Judaism the exclusivist pathos of the sacred space tended to take the form of a universalism that relied sometimes on the subjugation (or destruction) of the profane, and sometimes on its co-option. As becomes apparent above all in post-exile Judaism, the absolute transcendence of Jehovah prompted a process of de-naturalization of the sacred space/profane space dichotomy. The mobility of borders, and hence the possibility of effecting co-options within the sacred space and civilization, applies a fortiori to the Puritans and the liberal tradition, which inherited Judaism filtered through Christianity. On the other hand, the albeit partial amplification of the sacred space was a necessary response to the struggles waged by the excluded, who often derived different motifs from the Old Testament opposed to those dear to the dominant elite. They were inspired by the story of the people reduced to slavery in a foreign land who finally managed to free themselves from the Pharaoh’s domination. This was the ideology that inspired the slave revolt which broke out in 1800 in Virginia, whose leader posed as a new Moses.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The slaves’ ability to derive justifications for rebellion from the dominant culture itself led property-owners to regard even religious education with suspicion.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. Delimitation of the sacred space and theorization of a planetary dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space. The element of regression in this is clear. A comparison will suffice to account for it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the most exalted texts of its culture, Europe long strove to maintain a lucid and self-critical view of itself, refusing to allow itself to be intoxicated and carried away by euphoria on account of the irresistible march begun with the discovery–conquest of America. And this approach continued to display its vitality in the Enlightenment and the culture that became part of the inheritance of French radicalism. Let us read Raynal and Diderot: ‘The conquistadores’ first steps were marked by rivers of blood … In the inebriation of their success, they took the decision to exterminate those they had robbed. Countless people vanished from the face of the earth on the arrival of these barbarians’, who took to ‘treating the brothers they had just discovered without remorse, as they treated the wild beasts of the old hemisphere’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg312&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;extermination of the Indians was rounded off with condemnation of the trade in slaves called upon to replace them as labour.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, it was not only in the New World that the ‘European barbarians’ stained themselves with genocide;[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the ‘unhappy Hottentots’ likewise suffered a ‘pitiless’ massacre.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to the colonial conquest, Louis-Sébastien Mercier drew attention to further dark pages in Europe’s history in the second half of the French eighteenth century. His utopian novel imagined a ‘singular monument’ in which ‘the nations represented … asked humanity’s pardon’ for the cruelty shown by them. Along with the genocide of the Indians, the expiatory monument recalled forced labour, or ‘the slow torture of so many unfortunates condemned to the mines’, and the subsequent black slave trade symbolized by ‘numerous mutilated slaves’. Incontestably responsible for all this were ‘the Europeans’, also charged with ‘the atrocity of the crusades’, ‘the horrible Saint Bartholomew’s night’ and the wars of religion.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, let us now observe the way Edgar Quinet argues. In 1845, sketching in broad outline the history of the West, the French liberal historian came to the Spanish conquest of America. He could not ignore the extermination of the indigenous populations, but hit upon an explanation that was simultaneously ingenuous and reassuring. True, it had been carried out by Spain, a country that was an integral part of the West. But at the time Spain had experienced a decisive influx of the culture and religion of Islam, which was thus the actual, if indirect, executioner of the Indians.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same line of argument was adopted for other black pages in the West’s history. Had not the Inquisition had its centre in a Spain widely influenced by barbarians? And as to the crusade that destroyed the Albigensian heretics, without distinction of age and sex, was it not perhaps prepared by the prayers of the Spaniard San Domenico di Guzmán?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Via Spain, all signs pointed to Islam, at whose door could be laid even the Crusades, which precisely had as their stated target the Muslim ‘infidels’. Quinet passed judgement: ‘In the Crusades the Catholic Church enacted the principle of Islamism: extermination.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg313&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But not only Islam was stigmatized as synonymous with barbarism. European high culture had long regarded China with curiosity and interest. Where were the wars of religion that had covered Europe with blood? They were prevented by a religion that shunned mystery and dogma, resolving itself into an ethics.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; it was easier to recognize themselves in the mandarins than the Catholic clergy or Protestant ministers. The importance of the role played by a layer of secular intellectuals in the great Asiatic country was confirmed by the fact that the highest administrative public offices were often allocated through public competition, rather than being the monopoly (as in France) of a titled aristocracy, allied and intertwined with the clergy. In any event, in China the secular, modern principle of merit prevailed over the obscurantist principle of privilege based on birth and blood. The Enlightenment’s sympathetic attention to non-European cultures, employed as a critical mirror of Europe, became a charge in the indictment drawn up by de Tocqueville: the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; had turned for a ‘model’ to China, ‘[t]hat unenlightened, barbarian government which lets itself be manipulated at will by a handful of Europeans’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The feudal aristocracy’s prevalence in Europe was also the prevalence of bellicose values, while China (observed Leibniz, an author already completely infused with the pathos of Enlightenment) was distinguished by its aversion to anything that ‘creates or nourishes ferocity in men’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby constituting a reference point for &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; engaged in criticizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;‘s privy wars. Thus the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; applauded the pacific spirit exhibited by Chinese culture.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this became off-key at the moment of the triumph of colonial expansionism. And so in de Tocqueville, corresponding to the celebration of war as an expression of the nation’s grandeur and an antidote to the socialist movement’s vulgar hedonism, we find an intensification of the indictment against China, also reproved for its unwarlike character. The French liberal displayed his contempt for a country whose army enjoyed ‘peacefully scraping a living’, overwhelmed as it was by the ‘general softness of ideas and desires’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, all this facilitated the conquest of China: ‘It would be &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg314&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;difficult for me to console myself if, before dying, I did not see China opened and the eye of Europe penetrate there with its arms’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now there was nothing to be learnt from non-European civilizations. In 1835 Macaulay declared that ‘a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, we can understand the indifference with which the destruction of the Summer Palace, in all its incomparable beauty, by English and French troops during the second Opium War was viewed. Expressing his indignation was Victor Hugo: ‘We Europeans are the civilized ones and for us the Chinese are barbarians. And here is what civilization has done to barbarism. In history’s eyes, one bandit will be called France, the other will be called England’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, on the occasion of the Commune, the good liberal Bagehot expressed his contempt for the behaviour of the rebels, whom he criticized for having wanted to destroy everything worth seeing and admiring in Paris, any testament to ‘culture’ and civilization.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus was credited the rumour, which subsequently proved unfounded, that the communards had destroyed the Louvre. But no mention was made here of the destruction of the Summer Palace in Peking, which actually occurred roughly ten years earlier, with the decisive participation of the country that for Bagehot was the privileged embodiment of the cause of liberty and civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Authors like Las Casas and Montaigne had problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism and made them fluid. In this perspective civilization advanced through exchanges between different cultures. Developing their thinking in the years when missionaries from Christian Europe were received with respect and benevolence in China, while in France Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and resumed persecution of the Huguenots, Bayle and Leibniz reached a radical conclusion. It was a pity that the relationship between China and European was marked by its one-sidedness; the presence of Chinese missionaries in Europe would definitely be beneficial![[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; assigned a black Spartacus the task of advancing the cause of freedom, breaking the chains of slavery and putting an end to the barbarism of which Europeans were the agents. But this attempt to cast a glance at &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg315&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Europe, as it were, from without, recognizing the contributions of different cultures to the cause of advancing civilization, did not survive the irresistible march of colonial expansionism. Having triumphed on a planetary scale, the liberal West saw fit to identify itself permanently with the cause of civilization and liberty. On the basis of this absolute and immutable pre-eminence, we see an exclusive elite—the restricted community of the free—explicitly formulate the claim, hitherto unknown and unheard of, to exercise a planetary dictatorship over the rest of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The triumph of colonial expansionism: liberalism as an ideology of war&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The celebration of civilization and liberty now took the form of an ideology of war. It was an ideology refuted by Raynal and Diderot who, addressing the ‘monsters’ or European conquistadores, expressed themselves as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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You are proud of your &#039;&#039;lumières&#039;&#039;, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot? … If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable to his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer’s lash.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This criticism is all the more apt if we bear in mind Washington’s characterization of the Indians as an ‘unenlightened race’ (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So exalted was the self-consciousness of the liberal West in the nineteenth century that sometimes it did not even feel the need to confer ideological legitimacy on its wars. Unlike John Stuart Mill, de Tocqueville did not present the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and liberty as such. For the French liberal the main cause for celebration was the West’s overwhelming power, and this power was also configured as a war machine ideologically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Here finally we have Europe’s mobility at grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, above all if one believes that it is merely the sequel, the latest step in a multiplicity of events of the same kind that are gradually impelling the European race beyond its borders and successively subjecting all the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg316&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;other races to its empire and influence. It is the enslavement of four-fifths of the world by the other fifth. Hence it is best not to be unduly despairing about our century and ourselves; the men are petty, but the events are great.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s attitude left de Gobineau puzzled. The first ridiculed the mythology of blood entertained by the second. There was in fact another side to the coin. Once adopted as the key to explaining universal history, racial contamination cast its fatal shadow over the West itself, which was likewise condemned to decadence. Hence for de Gobineau there was no insurmountable barrier between conquerors and colonial peoples. As for the economy, the latter would sooner or later manage to develop the textile industry (the key industry of the period) and defeat British and European competition in general.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Morally, there was no reason to idealize the conquerors: in Persia and the Middle East ‘their immorality and rapacity’ were manifest. If the natives ‘are rogues’, ‘in some respects they can be considered our cousins’; ‘this is how we will be tomorrow’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s criticism focused precisely on this point: ‘You say that one day we shall resemble the rabble you see before you: maybe. But before this happens, we shall have been its masters.’ As we can see, from the ‘rogues’ they were in de Gobineau, the peoples of the Middle East have now been transformed into a ‘rabble’, with this fully legitimizing the domination exercised over them by European ‘masters’. It is with reference to the latter that de Tocqueville employs the more indulgent term ‘rogues’: ‘If, as I agree, they are often great rogues, at least they are rogues to whom God has given strength and power and whom He has manifestly placed, for a certain period, at the head of the human race’. Faced with this, de Gobineau’s reservations about the ‘immorality’ and ‘rapacity’ of the conquerors, and the thesis of their basic kinship with subject peoples, seemed to lose any significance. De Tocqueville continued:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are in the heart of the Asiatic and Muslim world: I would be curious to know to what you attribute the rapid and seemingly unstoppable decadence of all the races you have seen passing through … Some millions of men who, a few centuries back, lived virtually without shelter, in the forests and marshes, will in less than one hundred years be the transformers of the globe they inhabit and the dominators of their whole species. Nothing is more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg317&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly preordained in the sight of Providence … Nothing will resist them on the surface of the earth. I have no doubt of it. I fear that all this might sound to you like a philosophical heresy. But if you have theory on your side, I am confident that I have the facts on mine—a not unimportant detail.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Gobineau, who regarded himself as a ‘citizen of the world’, refused to give in: ‘I take an extraordinary interest in my daily conversations with the natives, and am very far from having the bad opinion of them people are pleased to entertain in Europe’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not a viewpoint de Tocqueville could share. We already know his opinion that the ‘last’ member of the ‘European race’ was always ‘first next to the savages’—that is, in the last analysis, next to ‘all the other races’. Of his daughter, de Gobineau remarked: ‘She has made herself a true Turkoman, save for her colour, which is that of an Abyssinian’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville did not respond to this observation, but it should not be forgotten that for him it was precisely ‘half-breeds’ who represented the most serious threat to the West’s supremacy and civilization as such (see above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|§4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt about the greater intellectual and political subtlety of de Tocqueville who, criticizing the blood myth, distanced himself from the ideology increasingly prevalent in the South of the United States, where de Gobineau’s views about the natural and eternal inequality of races met with understandable success. Yet it is to be noted that, much more so than the latter, it was the former who created an unbridgeable gulf between the West and colonial peoples. How are we to explain this fact?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Straddling the American Revolution, ‘[r]acism became an essential, an unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology’—that is, of the ideology which presided over the construction of ‘master-race democracy’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century this regime tended to characterize the relationship between the West as a whole and colonial peoples. Certainly, in order to impart credibility to its self-proclamation, the community of the free was ever more inclined in this period to abolish slavery in the strict sense—hereditary slavery—which was in fact replaced by other forms of forced labour. But the model of a ‘master-race democracy’ remained unchanged. The gradual abolition of censitary discrimination in the metropolis gave further impetus &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg318&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to colonial expansion, which now in fact enjoyed the consent of the popular classes in the metropolis. These, like the poor whites in the North American republic, aspired to be co-opted into the bloc of ‘masters’. And once again what explained and legitimized the barrier dividing masters and servants was a more or less marked, and more or less crude racial ideology, which was now pervasive. This was a trend that also made its influence felt on de Tocqueville.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having been asserted in countries (Holland, England and the United States) more involved than any others in the slave trade and colonial expansion (overseas in the case of the first two, continentally in that of the third), liberalism spread in the West at a time when it seemed destined by Providence itself to dominate the whole world and wipe out all other cultures. In these circumstances, the self-critical thinking and awareness of limits that had characterized the pre-eminent voices of European and Western culture tended to disappear. The inheritors of that tradition were French radicalism, and then Marx. The latter waxed ironic about the ‘civilizing wars’ of the colonial powers. In reality, during the Opium War, while China, ‘the semi-barbarian[,] remained faithful to the principles of the moral law’, the ‘civilized’ opposed to it the principle of free trade,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the principle so eloquently defended by Mill. But especially significant are the pages of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; devoted to original capitalist accumulation and denunciation of ‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population’, and the transformation of Africa into ‘a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a chapter of history that was extended in the subsequent colonial expansion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Oscillations and limitations of the Marxian model&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly distancing himself from the apologetics more dominant than ever today, Marx drew attention to the ‘conservative character of the English revolution’. While, on the one hand, it marked ‘the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy’, and promoted the development of industry and the bourgeoisie,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the other, it gave impetus to a gigantic, ruthlessly implemented expropriation of peasants. Examined closely, the Glorious Revolution emerged as ‘a parliamentary coup d’état for [the] transformation of [communal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg319&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;property] into private property’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus encounter a formula that in a way evokes the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation I have stressed: the mention, albeit vague, of parliament’s decisive role in this event draws attention to the disappearance of the absolute monarchy, while making clear reference to the tragedy of the peasantry. Someone who distinguished himself in the ideological legitimation of the colossal expropriation and ruthless repression that struck its victims was Locke. This ‘most particular supporter of the lash for vagrants and paupers’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was in fact, at the same time, the ‘father’ of ‘free-thinking’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the protagonist of the great ideological battle that deconsecrated absolute monarchy and stripped it of its Christian and Biblical cover. And once again, as in the Glorious Revolution, so in the liberal philosopher in whom it found theoretical expression, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation reveals itself. Finally, Marx recalled that corresponding to the advent of constitutional monarchy in England was a further intensification of the dictatorship exercised by English property-owners over Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above any particular country, what should especially be borne in mind are the general considerations offered by &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;. With the disappearance of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, corresponding to the dissolution of the ‘political existence’ of property was its ‘more potent existence’, which could now unfold ‘the full scale of its own existence’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, as &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; put it: ‘The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the &#039;&#039;appearance&#039;&#039; of a universal content.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx brought out the entanglement of emancipation and dis-emancipation. The ‘more potent existence’ injected into property was also the autonomization of property in human cattle from the controls, albeit vague, of the Church and Crown, with the consequent crystallization of racial chattel slavery. And it was also the disappearance of the restrictions placed by the Crown on the expansion of the colonists, who could now proceed unhindered, without being in any way concerned with the terrible human costs inflicted on the Indians. In England, enclosure of common land was followed by the new law of 1834 which, abolishing any other form of assistance, confronted the poor with a brutal alternative: death from starvation or internment in a total institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg320&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are not dealing with an autonomization of property as such. What corresponded to the ‘more potent existence’ of the colonists’ property was the death-agony of another form of property. It was a gigantic process of expropriation (justified and theorized by Locke and de Tocqueville alike), which unfolded at the expense not only of colonial peoples—in America or Ireland—but also of English peasants. The same reasons that led me to regard the category of ‘proprietorial individualism’ as inadequate and misleading now prompt me to seek to clarify Marx’s analysis. The process we are examining was the autonomization of the property of those who already enjoyed recognition, of those who aspired to form themselves into the community or caste of freemen. Liberated from the fetters of control by Crown and Church was not only bourgeois property, but also traditional noble property. In the England that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, the landed aristocracy consolidated its enjoyment of certain privileges (hunting, for example) and consecrated its political power in representative bodies—in the first instance, the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Marx we can say that ‘[t]he political revolution is the revolution of civil society.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should be added that civil society can be hegemonized by the bourgeoisie or the landed aristocracy, or can be characterized by a compromise between these two classes. And the liberal revolution consists in this political revolution. Up to this point we can only subscribe to Marx’s analysis and admire it for its acuteness. But he continues by opposing the ‘political revolution’ to the ‘social revolution’, or ‘political emancipation’, which is the objective of the first, to ‘social emancipation’ (the end of class domination), which is the objective of the second. The limitation of this conceptual couplet is that it does not take account of the fact that for some social or ethnic groups the liberal revolution did not involve any kind of emancipation, but in fact meant the reverse. Is it really correct to define the United States of 1844 (the year &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; was published) as ‘the country of complete political emancipation’?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the reference is to the rapid disappearance of censitary discrimination, which continued to be marked in France under the July Monarchy, and in Britain. However, what induced this differential development in the case of the North American republic was the availability of land (taken from the Indians) and the confinement of a large part of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery. In other words, the property barrier proved much weaker because the race barrier was much more rigid. Differently put, in the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg321&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States democracy emerged first because it emerged as a &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy, as a ‘master-race democracy’, and this specific form proved so tenacious that it survived the Civil War by many decades. It is highly problematic to regard &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy as complete political emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we restrict the comparison to New World countries, some questions are indicated: Was political emancipation more advanced in the North American republic, which saw slavery flourish in these years and which a little earlier had extended that institution to the Texas taken from Mexico? Or was political emancipation more advanced precisely in Mexico and those Latin American countries that had abolished the institution of slavery some decades before? In these years US leaders and ideologues liked positively to contrast the ban on miscegenation imposed by them with the cross-breeding that was spreading in Latin America: Where was political emancipation more advanced?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot even unreservedly endorse Marx’s thesis that ‘&#039;&#039;[p]olitical&#039;&#039; emancipation is certainly a big step forward.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We already know that the most tragic chapter in the history of the Indians began with the American Revolution, and that the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution witnessed the emergence of a racial chattel slavery of unprecedented harshness. In the case of Britain, it was Marx himself who drew attention to the far from positive consequences of the ‘coup d’état’ of 1688–89 for English peasants and the Irish population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more debatable is the subsequent identification of political revolution with bourgeois revolution. The latter category is at once too narrow and too broad. As regards the first aspect, it is difficult to subsume under the category of bourgeois revolution the Glorious Revolution and the parliamentary revolt that preceded the upheavals that began in France in 1789, not to mention the struggles against monarchical absolutism, explicitly led by the liberal nobility, which developed in Switzerland and other countries. On the other hand, the category of bourgeois revolution is too broad: it subsumes both the American Revolution that sealed the advent of a racial state and the French Revolution and the San Domingo Revolution, which involved complete emancipation of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model proposed here is different. It equates ‘political revolution’ qua ‘revolution of civil society’, referred to by Marx, with the liberal revolution in the strict sense. Certainly, in order to be able to promote its emancipation from absolute power, civil society had to have achieved a certain level of development. Analysed in their initial phases, the revolutions that occurred in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg322&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Netherlands, England, America, France and Latin America were not very different from one another: they were all liberal revolutions. What clearly differentiated them were three factors: the varying configurations of civil society; the social, political and ideological conflicts that developed within it (one thinks in the French case of the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie); and the irruption in the struggle of servants and slaves. With the emergence of the last factor, the struggle for the emancipation of civil society waged by the property-owning classes became entangled with the struggle waged against them by those who did not want to be regarded as objects of property and who sought to secure recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The secessionist revolt of the slaveholding South also presented itself as a liberal revolution: it was a new struggle for self-government by civil society, like the one that had sanctioned the independence of the United States. Was the Confederacy a liberal country? If we regard the country born from the War of Independence against England and long led by slave-owners as liberal, it is hard to see why such recognition should be denied to the Confederacy. Yet, rather than at a conceptual level, the solution to the problem is to be sought at a historical level. At the point when the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ was imposed in the liberal world, an author like Fletcher, who also recommended slavery for white vagrants, ceased to be a liberal. Almost a century after its first turn, the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery as such was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the racial state largely survived. And once again the question arises: Was the United States, where discrimination and oppression raged against blacks and genocidal practices against Indians, a liberal country? The principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The racial state continued to exist for some decades in South Africa. However, although historically inspired by Britain in the area of self-government and representative bodies, and by the southern United States in that of race relations, it was henceforth regarded as alien to the liberal world.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn1a|1]] Max Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968, p.276.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn2a|2]] François Furet, &#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione&#039;&#039;, ed. Marina Valensise, Milan: Mondadori, 1995, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn3a|3]] A. J. P. Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History 1914–1945&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn4a|4]] John Gray, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn5a|5]] Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn7a|7]] Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 111.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn8a|8]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn9a|9]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins, Harvill, 1987, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn10a|10]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn11a|11]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 1, p. 331; vol. 2, pp. 306, 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn12a|12]] Nathan Rosenberg, quoted in Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn13a|13]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn14a|14]] Joel Brinkley, ‘US Court Strikes Down Sodomy Ban’, &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, 27 June 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn15a|15]] Huizinga, quoted in Hans-Christoph Schröder, &#039;&#039;Die Revolutionen Englands im 17. Jahrundert&#039;&#039;, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn16a|16]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 1, pp. 203–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn17a|17]] Giorgio Spini, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’età moderna&#039;&#039;, Turin: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 272, 276–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn18a|18]] Charles Tilly, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1993, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn20a|20]] Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 884.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn22a|22]] Barrington Moore Jr, &#039;&#039;The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy&#039;&#039;, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn23a|23]] Hill, &#039;&#039;Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn24a|24]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;The Strenuous Life&#039;&#039;, New York: Century, 1901, pp. 246–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn25a|25]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn26a|26]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 249, 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn27a|27]] Reginald C. Stuart, &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 167ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn28a|28]] Ronald Creagh, &#039;&#039;Nos cousins d’Amérique&#039;&#039;, Paris: Payot, 1988, pp. 248–9; Joseph Zitomersky, ‘Culture, classe ou État?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson and de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001, pp. 77–84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn29a|29]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn30a|30]] Wilcomb E. Washburn, &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn31a|31]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165, 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn32a|32]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;From Rebellion to Revolution&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn33a|33]] Bernard Bailyn &#039;&#039;et al., The Great Republic&#039;&#039;, Lexington (MA): D. C. Heath, 1977, p. 149.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn34a|34]] Bacon, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 1, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn35a|35]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 40–6, 146–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn37a|37]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 77.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn38a|38]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;The World the Slaveholders Made&#039;&#039;, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn39a|39]] Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn40a|40]] Shearer David Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn41a|41]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 873ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn42a|42]] Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn43a|43]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard, London: Sussex University Press and Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn44a|44]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn45a|45]] Joshua 6, 25; 10, 35 and 40; Genesis 19, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn46a|46]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn49a|49]] Ibid., p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., pp. 54–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn51a|51]] Louis-Sébastien Mercier, &#039;&#039;L’An deux mille quatre cent quarante&#039;&#039;, ed. Raymond Trousson, Bordeaux: Ducros, 1971, pp. 201–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn52a|52]] Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Christianisme et la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1984, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 137 (Quinet had already expressed himself to this effect in the subtitles to the eighth lecture).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn55a|55]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 69, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn56a|56]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn57a|57]] Leibniz, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, Norton: New York, 1998, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn58a|58]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 19, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn59a|59]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 15, pt 2, p. 54 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 13 May 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 199 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn61a|61]] Quoted in Ramsay Muir, ed., &#039;&#039;The Making of British India 1756–1858&#039;&#039;, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn62a|62]] Hugo, quoted in Nora Wang, Xin Ye and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savantes, 2003, pp. 9–10 (letter to Captain Butler, 25 November 1861).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn63a|63]] Walter Bagehot, ‘The Destruction in Paris of What the World Goes to See in Paris’, in &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman St John-Stevas, vol. 8, London: The Economist, 1974, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn64a|64]] Cf. Giorgio Borsa, &#039;&#039;La nascita del mondo modern in Asia orientale&#039;&#039;, Milan: Rizzoli, 1977, pp. 84, 89; Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn65a|65]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn66a|66]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 58 (letter to Henry Reeve, 12 April 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 254–6 (letter of 15 January 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 243–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 241.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 231 (letter of 7 July 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn72a|72]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn73a|73]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 13, p. 516; vol. 12, p. 552.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn74a|74]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 915.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75a|75]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 209–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76a|76]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 886.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77a|77]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 510–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80a|80]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82a|82]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 352.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83a|83]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
== CHAPTER TEN ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The struggle for recognition and coups d’état: the conflict in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The catastrophic crisis that struck Europe and the whole planet with the outbreak of the First World War was already maturing within the liberal world. To account for it, we must take stock of the situation on the eve of 1914. Let us deal with the metropolis first. There is no doubt that the struggle for recognition had achieved important successes. True, we are still a long way from the universal assertion of the principle ‘one person, one vote’—and not only because women continued to be excluded from the enjoyment of political rights. More or less conspicuous traces of censitary discrimination still survived. But the fact remains that the vote was no longer the exclusive privilege of wealth. Also largely defeated was the attempt to reintroduce through the back window the censitary discrimination that had been shown the door, in the shape of plural votes to be granted to the more ‘intelligent’ (this was a solution entertained above all by John Stuart Mill!). Here and there the first elements of a social state began to emerge; and if this involved fairly modest results, we should bear in mind the legalization of workers’ coalitions and trade unions, determined to wrest much more substantial concessions. Even in this milieu, the long road travelled by the former instruments of labour leaps to the eye![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it must immediately be added that this was quite the reverse of a pacific development. Each of its stages was marked not only by intense struggles, but also by profound divisions in the liberal alliance. While one &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg324&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wing of it was open to concessions, the other proved intransigent and sought confrontation. Thus, we witness a succession of coups d’état which, prior to issuing in the establishment of an open dictatorship at any rate, could count on the support or sympathy of distinguished representatives of the liberal world. Availing itself of Sieyès’ active participation, Napoleon’s 18th Brumaire elicited the ‘enthusiasm’ of Madame de Staël, as emerges from the letter her father sent her a few days later: ‘You paint for me in lively colours the part you take in the power and glory of your hero’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Constant too viewed the turn with confidence. Thirty years later, he recalled having on its eve been in daily contact with Sieyès, ‘the true author of the 18th Brumaire’, or the ‘main motor’ of the novelty that was already foreshadowed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As early as 1795, Constant had made it clear that it was necessary to go beyond Thermidor: the taxation that continued to weigh on property for the benefit of the poor, who were now turning into ‘a privileged caste’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was excessive. In fact, according to various pieces of evidence (including Madame de Staël’s), the combined effect of famine and inflation was reducing ‘the last class of society to the most wretched condition’, visiting ‘unheard of ills’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on it, up to and including ‘starvation’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, for the liberalism of the time there was no doubt: the risks run by property legitimized the coup d’état. After the homage already noted to ‘conservative, liberal, tutelary ideas’, in the days immediately afterwards the new government hastened to abolish any trace of progressive taxation. On 24 December 1799, the same day Bonaparte became First Consul, Constant entered the Tribunate. But Madame de Staël harboured the idea of an even more ambitious political career for him, in the shadow of the one who (wrote Necker to his daughter at the end of 1800) promised to be ‘the protector of all respectable’ and well-off folk, finally liberated—such was Constant and Madame de Staël’s sigh of relief—from the threat of the ‘riffraff’ (&#039;&#039;populace&#039;&#039;).[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The significance of the initial hopes and subsequent disappointment in liberal circles was clarified by Guizot in 1869. Acquitting the task of ‘putting an end to anarchy’, Napoleon’s ‘dictatorship’ was ‘natural, urgent’—in fact, ‘beneficial and glorious’. However, contrary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg325&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to expectations, ‘this accidental, temporary regime’ transformed itself into ‘a dogmatic and permanent system of government’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A not dissimilar dialectic emerged after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, greeted with ‘indecent haste’ (the phrase is Marx’s) by liberal England.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not opportunism: once the beneficent ‘traditionary influences’ had disappeared, wrote Disraeli in 1851, what checked anarchy and dissolution was ‘the government of the sword’. Indeed, ‘the state quits the senate and takes refuge in the camp’; only thus was it possible to avoid the catastrophe of the domination of ‘secret societies’ and a ‘convention’ of the Jacobin variety.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of France, setting aside a figure like Granier de Cassagnac, who declared himself a ‘liberal’ and openly sided with Louis Napoleon,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it is worth dwelling on de Tocqueville’s participation in the various stages of the ideological and political reaction that ended up de-legitimizing and then overthrowing the Second Republic. In the French liberal’s view, it was the product of a revolution—that of February 1848—which had developed in a socialist and hence despotic spirit, and which had unfolded throughout continental Europe. In Germany and Italy, de Tocqueville desired and promoted ‘the victory of the princes’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]). But was his attitude towards France very different? As early as March, even before the working-class revolt of June, de Tocqueville thundered against ‘this ultra-democratic revolution, which has extended the right to vote beyond all the limits known even in America’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While the clouds that presaged the June storm were gathering, the French liberal expressed his opinion that ‘the National Guard and the army will be without pity this time’. In order to achieve the objective of maintaining or restoring order and destroying the ‘anarchical party’, one should not hesitate to recruit into the police unscrupulous types and rabble—‘outlaws’, ‘thieves’, ‘scoundrels’ and all the ‘rejects of society’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Evoked with precision here is the politico-social formula that subsequently presided over Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, which was successful thanks to the support not only of the property-owning classes and traditional state apparatuses, but also of a sub-proletariat happy to perform the function of gang intimidation entrusted to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg326&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;After the outbreak of the workers’ revolt, de Tocqueville was not only in favour of conferring emergency powers on Cavaignac, but recommended shooting on sight anyone caught ‘in a posture of defence’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The bloody repression of the June Days was not enough to assuage anxiety; and so we have the invocation of an ‘energetic and definitive reaction on behalf of order’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] required to put an end to revolutionary and anarchic chaos not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. In any event, ‘France is among those who will restore order’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and terminate the ‘follies of 1848’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More than a year after the desperate working-class revolt, when pitiless repression seemed to have averted the Jacobin and socialist peril for good, the French liberal believed that an iron fist was still required: it was necessary to proceed ‘as far as reaction’; ‘palliatives’ would not do; to sweep away not only the Mountain, but also ‘all the surrounding hills’, it was necessary ‘courageously to take the lead of all those who want to re-establish order, whatever their complexion’. There should be no hesitation even over ‘a heroic … remedy’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What is indirectly suggested is the need for emergency measures with the suspension of constitutional liberties. If as a historian he tirelessly condemned the Jacobin Terror, as a politician de Tocqueville had no hesitation invoking ‘terror’ for the purposes of suppressing ‘the demagogic party’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, every so often a shudder ran through the liberal self-consciousness: perhaps there was a risk of the ruthless methods used to subjugate barbarians in the colonies spreading in Europe. Although warmly applauding the pitiless energy with which the conquest of Algeria was conducted, de Tocqueville let slip a sort of exclamation: ‘God spare us ever seeing France led by an officer of the army of Africa’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, Cavaignac, having implemented the ‘new science’ called on to liquidate Arab resistance at any cost, was subsequently the author of the bloody, ruthless repression that struck the barbarians of the metropolis, the Parisian workers who rose up demanding the right to work and life. Notwithstanding the preceding admonition, however, de Tocqueville offered him constant, unwavering support.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Later, starting with the Paris Commune, there spread throughout the liberal West a tendency to challenge not only the democratic concessions wrested by the popular masses, but also the rule of law itself. In the United States &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg327&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Theodore Roosevelt stated an expeditious method for putting down strikes and social conflicts: ‘The sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be suppressed … by taking ten or a dozen of their leaders out, standing … them against a wall, and shooting them dead.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These tendencies underwent further radicalization after the October Revolution. We can now fully understand the fascist coup d’état in Italy in 1922. Numerous figures who professed themselves liberals, and who in fact claimed to be restoring genuine liberalism, supported it for a more or less extended period of time. This was true of Luigi Einaudi, who saluted the return of ‘classical liberalism’. For a while Croce likewise viewed the attempt to return to ‘pure liberalism’, not to be confused with insensate ‘democratic liberalism’, with sympathy. Even in 1929, implicitly endorsing Mussolini’s condemnation of any ‘demo-liberal regime’, Antonio Salandra defined himself as an ‘old liberal of the right (without the demo)’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, a benevolent attitude towards the fascist coup d’état is not explicable solely by the severe social and political crisis of the time. Instead, at issue was cancelling, or more or less drastically reducing, the democratic concessions won from liberal society by the popular movement. While the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; still persisted, in 1909 Einaudi had branded progressive taxation a kind of ‘organized brigandage to steal money from others through the state’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Mussolini hastened to put an end to such ‘brigandage’, thereby eliciting applause from not a few liberals. In the preceding decades Pareto had, as a liberal, developed a sharp polemic against the ‘myth’ of the social state, had agreed with the positions of Spencer and Maine, and had adhered, still as a liberal, to the Liberty and Property Defence League.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1922–23 he breathed a sigh of relief at the coup d’état that finally averted threats, if not to liberty, in any event to property.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the other hand, von Mises seemed to be referring exclusively to the state of emergency when, in 1927, he pointed to fascist &#039;&#039;squadrismo&#039;&#039; as ‘an emergency makeshift’ adequate to the task of saving ‘European civilization’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, five &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg328&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years earlier, having distanced himself from the democratic and even socialist contaminations liberalism had undergone in England, he had thundered against the ‘destructionism’, the ‘destructionist policy’ and ‘terrorism’ of the trade unions with their strikes.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to Mussolini, all this had ceased in Italy. The fact remains that, in a book whose very title is devoted to the celebration of liberalism, we can read an emphatic eulogy of the coup d’état which, albeit with rough and ready methods, had saved civilization: ‘The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The struggle for recognition by colonial peoples and threats of secession&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
While the struggle for recognition waged by the servants in the metropolis was constantly countered by the threat or implementation of a coup d’état, the more intransigent sectors of the liberal and bourgeois world reacted to the struggle for recognition waged by colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin with the threat or implementation of secession. This is a dialectic we have already analysed in relation to San Domingo in the late eighteenth century and the British West Indies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville observed that the colonists, in rejecting any abolitionist project, were denying the French parliament and government ‘the right to take this great work in hand and carry it through’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, in this context the most striking case was the secession of the South of the United States, which effected advancing liberal slogans in defence of the natural right to self-government and the peaceful enjoyment of property. The North’s military victory did not terminate the conflict. Supporters of white supremacy immediately reacted to the fleeting advent of multiracial democracy not only with the lynchings and anti-black terrorism unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan, but by resorting to guerrilla warfare and armed violence. In 1874 an appeal circulated in the South to found a White League to foil by any means attempts by Congress to make black emancipation effective: ‘our war [will be] interminable and merciless’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[a]s surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865 to 1877, with all the more bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#page329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#pg329&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This second stage in the Civil War ended in a substantial victory for the South. While slavery in the strict sense was not reintroduced, a regime of terroristic white supremacy was imposed. Although formally emancipated, the Afro-Americans now embarked on one of the most tragic phases in their history. It might even be said that their condition touched a ‘nadir’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, racist ‘dogmas’ and ‘racial fundamentalism’ reached their zenith.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A sequence of events with notable similarities to the American Civil War unfolded in Great Britain. Here what was at stake was the emancipation not of the blacks but of the Irish. The dominant class in Ulster reacted to the London government’s decision to introduce Home Rule for the island as had the southern US to the challenge of central power, even when democratically elected. It threatened and prepared secession, arming a militia tens of thousands strong. While the planters across the Atlantic could not tolerate the loss of the domination guaranteed to them by the possession of human cattle, the Protestant property-owners in Ireland rejected with horror the prospect of being governed at a local level by Catholic ragamuffins. In both cases the self-government demanded was the self-government that the descendants of the settlers were summoned to enjoy, and which sanctioned white supremacy or Anglo-Protestant supremacy. In both cases the secessionists proclaimed that they were the true inheritors of the American Revolution and the Glorious Revolution, respectively. And only the outbreak of the First World War blocked an impending war of secession in Britain: in Northern Ireland thousands of men armed to the hilt and organized militarily were ready to go into action.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The de-humanization of colonial peoples and ‘social cannibalism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First World War, unlike that waged by the servants in the metropolis, the struggle for recognition by colonial servants or servants of colonial origin could boast very few successes. In fact, the advances made by the former on the road of emancipation were often used to widen still further the gulf that separated the dominant ‘European race’ from the rest. In the late nineteenth century, while a sign was displayed at the entrance to some public parks in the southern United States reading ‘No Dogs and Niggers Allowed’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg330&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Shanghai the French concession defended its purity by clearly drawing attention to the notice ‘No Entry for Dogs and Chinese’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What made the comparison between colonial populations and domestic animals more credible was certain collective punishments, like that provided for by the British government in India in 1919:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he most degrading measure was a ‘crawling order’ imposed on all Indians who passed a narrow lane in the city where a medical missionary, Miss Sherwood, had been assaulted during the disturbances. The humiliation of crawling on all fours to and from one’s home, for many lived in this lane, was not to be forgotten or forgiven by those who were subjected to this indignity, or indeed, by any sensitive Indian.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was only in 1920, after the First World War and the October Revolution, that the chapter of history involving the coolies was definitively concluded, in the wake of a movement of anti-colonial struggle which no longer intended to tolerate ‘the blot of indentured labour’ imprinted by that institution on the whole Indian race.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that, having played a central role in black enslavement and the black slave trade, and then in the promotion of the semi-slavery of the coolies, the liberal West presented itself as the champion of the struggle against slavery. It was precisely with this watchword that it promoted colonial expansion. But this is how a missionary described the work the indigenous population was forced to perform in the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Each town and district is forced to bring in a certain quantity to the headquarters of the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; every Sunday. It is collected by force; the soldiers drive the people into the bush. If they will not go, they are shot down, and their left hands cut off and taken as trophies to the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; … these hands, the hands of men, women and children [are] placed in rows before the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039;.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The imposition of forced labour was sometimes bound up with genocidal practices, while on other occasions it gave way to them. In the late nineteenth century Theodore Roosevelt issued a general warning to ‘inferior races’: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg331&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should one of them attack the ‘superior’ race, the latter would be entitled to react with ‘a war of extermination’, destined ‘to put to death man, woman and child, exactly as if they were crusaders’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, there were races whose disappearance was desired regardless of their actual behaviour. Franklin greeted as a providential design the slaughter that the rum diffused by the conquerors was wreaking among the Indians. However, according to the charge formulated by loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada, the rebel colonists proceeded directly to the annihilation of entire ethnic groups (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]). In 1851, while the hunt for individual Indians was raging, the governor of California pronounced judgement:&lt;br /&gt;
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That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the two races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected; while we cannot anticipate this result with but painful regret, the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power and wisdom of man to avert.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The programme set out by General Sherman was unambiguous: ‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of the case.’ In the course of his two expeditions against the Cheyenne and the Arapaho, a colonel ordered that even the new-born should be killed and scalped: ‘Nits make lice!’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this would not seem to have particularly disturbed Theodore Roosevelt: ‘I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians. But I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that this sinister ideology, in its variations and different gradations, caught on exclusively in the United States, where, for obvious historical reasons, the racial question was more acutely felt. Let us take a look at Europe. Lord Acton coldly observed: ‘The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There were races, Disraeli in turn believed, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg332&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;experienced ‘exterminat[ion] without persecution, by that irresistible law of Nature which is fatal to curs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, this was not a completely spontaneous process, as Disraeli ended up acknowledging, when he mentioned the tragic end of the ‘Aztecs’, ‘overthrown by Cortez and a handful of Goths’, in accordance with ‘the inexorable law of nature’ that sanctioned the complete victory of ‘a superior race’ and the irrevocable defeat of ‘an inferior’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicit was Burckhardt, for whom the ‘erasure or enslavement of the weakest races’ seemed to pertain to the ‘great economy of world history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Renan, an author who liked to situate himself among the ‘enlightened liberals’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and who was appreciated by Hayek for his ‘important’ contribution to this intellectual tradition),[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] reached the same conclusion: the ‘semi-savage races’ were destined to be subjugated or exterminated by the ‘great Aryan-Semitic family’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not even the greatest figures in the liberal tradition succeeded in mounting effective resistance to this view. This applies to de Tocqueville who, while he drew a decidedly repugnant picture of the Aborigines, was a passionate cantor of the motif of the ‘empty cradle’—that is, of the deadly genealogical myth dear to colonists. And, to a lesser extent, it applies to Mill. His discourse could hardly arouse a strongly sympathetic interest in the victims. The Indians seemed to belong to the ‘community’ whose state, ‘in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’. In any event, ‘[n]othing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention is made here of the fated disappearance, still less of the destruction, of the Indians; instead, a temporary pedagogical dictatorship is theorized. However, as emerges from the stance of another distinguished exponent of English liberalism, on the occasion of bitter conflicts the dictatorship over barbarians, having been pedagogical, risked turning exterminatory. After the rebellion that challenged the British Empire in India, Macaulay wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg333&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the Nation to a degree unprecedented within my memory. Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and societies for the reformation of criminals are silent. There is one terrible cry to revenge … The almost universal feeling is that not a single Sepoy within the walls of Delhi should be spared, and I own that is a feeling with which I cannot help sympathizing.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Expressing genuine dissent were unexpected representatives of the liberal tradition or figures who moved on its margins. While he interpreted the social conflict in the metropolis in a social-Darwinist register, Spencer protested against ‘the barbarous maxim’ that the strongest ‘have a lawful right to whatever territories they can conquer’. What followed the expropriation of the defeated was in fact their ‘extermination’. Paying the price were not only the ‘North American Indians’ and the ‘natives of Australia’; in India ‘whole regiments of [natives] have been put to death, for daring to disobey the tyrannical commands of their oppressors’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unfortunately, ‘we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker’; it could now indeed be said that ‘the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, Spencer pointed an accusing finger at the state ‘system of colonisation’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] at the statism that was now expanding at every level—as if this statism had not accompanied the history of the liberal West from the outset, and as if the terrible practices denounced by Spencer had not often actually been promoted in the name of the self-government and free disposal of property, and had not taken the form (to use Hobson’s phrase) of ‘private slaughter’! (See above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The ‘final and complete solution’ of the Indian and black questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely Hobson (an author close to the liberal circles branded ‘socialist’ by von Mises and Hayek) who effectively summed up the attitude to barbarians adopted by the West, and in the first instance the liberal West, which was in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg334&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the forefront of colonial expansion in the Far West and overseas. The populations that were susceptible to ‘profitable exploitation by the superior white settlers’ survived, while the rest ‘tend[ed] to disappear’ or be destroyed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, from the late nineteenth century the theme of the inevitable disappearance of savages and peoples who could not be used as forced labour became an obsession. Articulating it were often authors who at the same time saluted the triumph of liberal institutions and ideas in the civilized world. In 1885 a book by a Protestant minister, Josiah Strong, enjoyed extraordinary success. His celebration of ‘liberty’, of ‘self-government’, of ‘the right of the individual to himself’, was passionate.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He frequently appealed to Burke, de Tocqueville, Guizot, Macaulay and Spencer. Strong and emphatic was his assertion of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon world, which had the merit of quintessentially embodying both ‘love of liberty’ and a ‘genius for colonizing’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] that expanded the zone of freedom. But this expansion also entailed the inexorable ‘extinction of inferior races’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albert J. Beveridge, a Republican senator and prominent US political figure, argued in similar fashion at the start of the twentieth century. The homage paid to the ‘gospel of liberty’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the sons of liberty and, in particular, the United States as the country and people that were ‘leading the world to liberty’ went hand in hand with the assertion that ‘a part of the Almighty’s infinite plan [was] the disappearance of debased civilisations and decaying races before the higher civilisation of the nobler and more virile types of man’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A watchword even emerged that was to assume an unambiguously genocidal meaning in the twentieth century and know tragic success. While Strong invoked ‘God’s final and complete solution of the dark problem of heathenism among many inferior peoples’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in 1913 a book published in Boston evoked the ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘negro problem’ in its title. Even in this instance, it did not involve an author foreign to the liberal world, and not only because he lived and worked in the United States, advancing ideas diffused and echoed even by influential political figures of the time. Far from regretting the ‘abhorrent practice’ of slavery, he identified with the ‘comparatively few liberal and enlightened men’ or ‘liberal intellects’ who had wanted to abolish it when deliberating the ‘splendid instrument’ that was the Constitution of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg335&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United States, ‘the guiding star of the greatest temporal power in history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nevertheless, in the land of liberty there was no room for races intellectually incapable of participating in the superior ‘Caucasic civilization and culture’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reaching this conclusion, the author knew that he was situated in the wake of Franklin and Jefferson. Happily, nature and the law of the ‘survival of the fittest’ were already acting on their behalf: Afro-Americans were being wiped out by tuberculosis, pneumonia, venereal disease and other illnesses that confirmed the natural inferiority of this people. ‘[F]ew Negro children are born without scrofulous tendencies, rickets, blindness, or other transmitted evidence of ancestral infection’. The ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘Negro problem’ was in sight, and it would be a happy repeat of the already accomplished final solution of the Amerindian question.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the words of a southern senator who was on the same wavelength, ‘God’s law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, and the extinction of the unfit is operating’, and would bring about ‘a gradual whitening of the South’ and the United States as a whole[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the touch of white already dreamt of by Franklin.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the Indians had largely been wiped off the face of the earth. In 1876, to celebrate its centenary as an independent country, the United States organized an exhibition in Philadelphia that drew the world’s attention to its extraordinary development. Along with marvels of industry and technology, sideshows exhibited ‘wild children from Borneo, a five-legged horse, and wax figures of famous Indian chiefs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In summer 1911, in a remote part of California, an Indian was discovered who could not communicate in English or Spanish. Ethnological experts subsequently verified that he was a survivor of the Yahi tribe, largely exterminated over the course of a generation. The unknown, who refused to give his name or recount the history of his destroyed family, was put in a museum, where he became an object of much amused curiosity on the part of adults and children, all the more so in that the local press drew attention to the ‘last aborigine’, the ‘wild man of California’, a ‘genuine survivor of Stone Age barbarism’. After his death, his brain was conveniently preserved for further study.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A great philosopher, Edmund Husserl, who was certainly liberal and democratic in orientation, observed twenty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg336&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years later, alas without any critical accent, that totally foreign to Europe and the West, the Indians (or rather the surviving ones) ‘are exhibited in fairground booths’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. From the nineteenth to the twentieth century&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
In the years leading up to the outbreak of the second Thirty Years’ War, we witness the accumulation of a mass of explosive material. At the end of the nineteenth century, corresponding to the formation of the Liberty and Property Defence League in England was the formation of the White Leagues (and the Ku Klux Klan) in the United States. At stake was halting or reversing the two struggles for recognition with which we are familiar. Across the Atlantic the restoration of white supremacy registered its triumph as early as 1877; in Europe the Liberty and Property Defence League would have to wait until 1922 to record its first victory, in Italy. The persistent unrest of servants or ex-servants in the metropolis, and of slaves or ex-slaves in the colonies or of colonial origin, and the increasing aggressiveness of the social and political circles that felt threatened by these two agitations, were compounded by contradictions within the community of the free and of Teutonic stock (previously celebrated in its entirety as the chosen people or race of liberty), which now tended to assume an antagonistic form. Moreover, these multiple conflicts were further exacerbated by an ideological climate marked by the assertion of trends—social Darwinism, a racial interpretation of history and conspiracy theory—present from the outset in the liberal tradition, but which now met with ever weaker resistance, rendering a rational understanding and limitation of the conflict impossible. Not by chance have we heard two deadly slogans echo: the first declared that ‘race is everything’; the second invoked the ‘ultimate solution’, or the ‘final and complete solution’, of the racial question!&lt;br /&gt;
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The degree of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not escaped a whole series of scholars who cannot be suspected of preconceived hostility to the liberal world. While she generously overlooked the North American republic (which had had the merit of offering her refuge), Hannah Arendt explained the genesis of twentieth-century totalitarianism commencing with the colonies of the British Empire. It was here that ‘a new form of government’, ‘a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg337&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arbitrariness’ saw the light of day,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and where the temptation of ‘administrative massacres’ as an instrument for maintaining domination began to emerge.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But especially interesting in this context is the fact that not a few US scholars, in order to explain the history of their country, have turned to the category of ‘master-race democracy’ or &#039;&#039;‘Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’, in an eloquent linguistic admixture of English and German, and a German that in several respects refers to the history of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only the concentration-camp universe as a whole, but also the individual total institutions of the twentieth century, began to take shape well before the end of the supposed &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039;. We may begin with deportation. The successive bloody deportations of Indians, starting with the one implemented by Jackson’s America (held up as a model of democracy by de Tocqueville), recall the ‘horrors created by the Nazi handling of subject peoples’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Indians were not the only victims of this practice. The slave trade represented ‘the largest involuntary movement of human beings in all history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The deportees were subsequently forced to work in a slave plantation that bore some similarities to the concentration camp.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison does not seem exaggerated. Precisely in this context the process of de-humanization reached levels that were difficult to match. In Jamaica, in the liberal British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, we find a type of punishment at work that speaks volumes: ‘a slave was forced to defecate into the offending slave’s mouth, which was then wired shut for four or five hours’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even his completely innocent fellow slaves were forced to participate in the de-humanization of the victim and, with him, of the ethnic group. Should all this not seem sufficiently cruel, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, white supremacy was imposed in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
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Notices of lynchings were printed in local papers, and extra cars added to trains for spectators from miles around, sometimes thousands of them. Schoolchildren might get a day off school to attend the lynching.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg338&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The spectacle could include castration, skinning, roasting, hanging, and shooting. Souvenirs for purchasers might include fingers, toes, teeth and bones, even genitals of the victim, as well as picture postcards of the event.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again we encounter a process of de-humanization difficult to emulate.&lt;br /&gt;
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First in the North and then, after the Civil War, in the South, notionally ‘free’ blacks suffered humiliation and persecution of every kind. In fact, stresses a historian in language that once again demands our attention, they became the target of veritable ‘pogroms’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carrying them out were gangs already active in the North in the 1820s and 1830s and which later, in the South, achieved consummate form in the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that seems to anticipate the ‘Blackshirts’ of Italian fascism and the ‘Brownshirts’ of German Nazism.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No less brutal than extra-legal violence was official justice: in the South blacks continued to be subject to a prison system so sadistic that it calls to mind ‘the prison camps of Nazi Germany’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, the two situations were united by the violence of racist ideology. Theodore Roosevelt can calmly be approximated to Hitler.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over and above individual figures, we must not lose sight of the general picture: ‘The effort to guarantee “race purity” in the American South anticipated aspects of the official Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.’ If we bear in mind the rule whereby a single drop of impure blood was enough for someone to be excluded from the white community in the South of the United States, a conclusion dictates itself: ‘the Nazi definition of a Jew was never as stringent as “the one-drop rule” that prevailed in the categorization of Negroes in the race-purity laws of the American South.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Again, two US scholars have recently referred to the ‘Nazi Connection’, or the ‘American legacy’ present in Nazism, to explain the parabola of eugenics, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg339&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘science’ born in liberal England and massively diffused in the other classic country of that intellectual tradition, which experienced its greatest triumphs in the Third Reich![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this connection we in fact encounter a paradox. Having disappeared together with Hitler’s Germany, eugenic measures continued to survive for some time in the United States. Let us observe the situation in 1952: ‘At the present time some thirty states in the Union legally forbid “interracial marriage.” In almost all these states miscegenation is a felony; in many a crime.’ Regarded as elements of contamination were not only ‘Negroes’ but also, in this or that state, ‘Mulattoes’, ‘Indians’, ‘Mongolians’, Koreans, ‘members of the Malay race’, Chinese, or ‘[any] person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation inclusive’, or even anyone ‘having one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood’, or even someone with ‘one-fourth or more’ ‘Kanak [Hawaiian] blood’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Reporting these facts is a US scholar who feels obliged to draw a bitter conclusion in respect of ‘racism’ (and Nazism): ‘The monster that has been let loose upon the world is to a large extent of our own making, and whether we are willing to face the fact or not we are, all of us, individually and collectively, responsible for the ghastly form which he has assumed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, genocide. An eminent scholar, Tzvetan Todorov, has defined the destruction of the Indians, whose final chapter was written in the English colonies in America and then in the United States, as ‘the greatest genocide in human history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the tragedy of the natives in America, Australia or the British colonies in general, other authors have referred, respectively, to the ‘American holocaust’ (or the ‘final solution’ of the Amerindian question), the ‘Australian holocaust’ and ‘late Victorian holocausts’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not to mention the ‘black holocaust’—the deportation and enslavement of the survivors, who numbered one in three or four—that Afro-Americans seek to draw attention to, and whose main protagonist was the liberal world. Finally, branded as the author of a tragedy to be regarded as the prototype of twentieth-century genocides, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg340&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principal official (Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan) of the British policy that led to the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Irish in the mid-nineteenth century has sometimes been defined as the ‘proto-Eichmann’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not the place to proceed to a comparative history of massacres, decimations and genocides, or to discuss the pertinence of the categories employed to describe them. But one point seems to me to be settled: it is banally ideological to characterize the catastrophe of the twentieth century as a kind of new barbarian invasion that unexpectedly attacked and overwhelmed a healthy, happy society. The horror of the twentieth century casts a shadow over the liberal world even if we ignore the fate reserved for peoples of colonial origin. ‘Totalitarian society’: thus has been defined the one that swallowed up deportees from Britain in Australia.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, with particular reference to the ‘development of industrial capitalism’ in England, it has been claimed that ‘the gulag is not a twentieth-century invention’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The usual hagiography proves unfounded even when, in reconstructing the liberal world, we restrict ourselves to analysing the metropolis and the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us take an author celebrated by de Tocqueville as the apex of the liberal tradition. Jefferson raised the spectre of genocide in three very different contexts. He referred to ‘extermination’ in connection with the Indians as a process that was underway in the United States, could not be stopped, and was in fact to be attributed exclusively to the British. He pointed to the ‘extermination’ of the blacks as the inevitable outcome of the utopia of constructing a multiracial society. Finally, he experienced the clash with Britain as a total war, destined to issue in the ‘extermination’ of one of the contending parties (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]; [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|§14]]; and [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). As we can see, even a conflict completely internal to the community of the free provoked an ideological violence that might well bring to mind the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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==== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. After the catastrophe and beyond hagiography: the enduring legacy of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ====&lt;br /&gt;
The horror of the twentieth century was not something that burst into a world of peaceful coexistence suddenly and from without. At the same time, being dissatisfied with the edifying picture of the habitual hagiography and situating oneself on the firm ground of reality, with its contradictions and conflicts, does &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg341&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not in any way mean denying the merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination. But we certainly must bid farewell once and for all to the myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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Meanwhile, the presupposition of that discourse turns out to be wholly imaginary: the community of the free asserted itself demanding both negative and positive liberty, while excluding populations of colonial origin and metropolitan semi-slaves and servants from both. In addition, I would like to adduce a series of reasons, which I shall set out in ascending order of importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first place, it should not be forgotten that not only did the classics of the liberal tradition refer to democracy with coldness, hostility and sometimes frank contempt, but regarded its advent as an unlawful, intolerable rupture of the social contract and hence as a legitimate cause for the ‘appeal to Heaven’ (in Locke’s words) or to arms.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the exclusion clauses were not overcome painlessly, but through violent upheavals of a sometimes quite unprecedented violence. The abolition of slavery in the wake of the Civil War cost the United States more victims than both world wars combined. As for censitary discrimination, a decisive contribution was made to its abolition by the French revolutionary cycle. Finally, in major countries like Russia, Germany and the United States the accession of women to political rights had behind it the war and revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, in addition to not being painless, the historical process that resulted in the advent of democracy was quite the reverse of unilinear. Emancipation—that is, the acquisition of rights previously not recognized or enjoyed—might well be followed by dis-emancipation—that is, deprivation of the rights whose recognition and enjoyment the excluded had won. Asserted in France in the wake of the February 1848 revolution, universal (male) suffrage was abolished two years later by the liberal bourgeoisie and was shortly afterwards reintroduced not as a result of the maturation of liberalism, but by the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon, who used it to stage the ritual of plebiscitary acclamation. In this context the most striking example is provided by the United States. The end of the Civil War inaugurated the happiest phase in the history of Afro-Americans, who now won civil and political rights and began to participate in representative bodies. But this was a kind of brief interlude in the tragedy. The 1877 compromise between the whites of the North and South involved the loss of political and, often, civil rights for blacks, as is attested by the regime of racial segregation and the savage violence of pogroms and lynching. This phase &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg342&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of dis-emancipation, which developed in a society that continued to define itself as liberal, lasted almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is then a fourth reason. The process of emancipation very often had a spur completely external to the liberal world. The abolition of slavery in British colonies cannot be understood without the black revolution in San Domingo, which was viewed with horror, and often combated, by the liberal world as a whole. Around thirty years afterwards, the institution of slavery had been abolished even in the United States. But we know that the most ardent abolitionists were accused by their opponents of being influenced or infected by French and Jacobin ideas. The brief experience of multiracial democracy was followed a long phase of dis-emancipation marked by a terroristic white supremacy. When was the turning point? In December 1952 the US Justice Secretary sent the Supreme Court, which was engaged in deliberating on the issue of integration in public schools, an eloquent letter: ‘Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.’ Washington, observes the American historian who has reconstructed this story, ran the risk of alienating the ‘colored races’ not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States. Even there communist propaganda met with considerable success in its attempt to win blacks to the ‘revolutionary cause’, making them lose ‘faith in American institutions’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On close examination, first slavery and then the terrorist regime of white supremacy were thrown into crisis by the San Domingo revolt and the October Revolution, respectively. The implementation of an essential principle, if not of liberalism then of liberal democracy (in the usual sense of the term), is inconceivable without the decisive contribution of two of the chapters of history most hated by the liberal culture of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fifth and final reason is the most important. I refer to the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that distinguishes the individual stages in the process of overcoming the exclusion clauses characteristic of the liberal tradition. In the United States the disappearance of censitary discrimination, and affirmation of the principle of political equality, were aided by the quantitative containment and political and social neutralization of the ‘dangerous classes’, thanks to the expropriation and deportation of Indians—which for a long time made it possible to enlarge the class of landowners—and the enslavement of blacks. In Europe extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg343&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;century proceeded in tandem with colonial expansion and the imposition of forced labour on peoples or ‘races’ deemed barbarous or childlike. This tangle sometimes presented itself in a decidedly tragic form. Subject to humiliation, discrimination and persecution of every kind in the South, Afro-Americans sought to win recognition by participating in the front line in the Union’s wars. And so in some circles homage began to be paid to the courage displayed by soldiers of colour in the Battle of Wounded Knee.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, blacks’ hopes for emancipation took the form—were obliged to take the form—of their active participation in destroying Indians!&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely from such historical reconstruction, remote from any apologetic, edifying tones, that the genuine merits and real strong points of liberalism emerge. Demonstrating an extraordinary flexibility, it constantly sought to react and rise to the challenges of the time. It is true that, far from being spontaneous and painless, such transformation was largely imposed from without, by political and social movements with which liberalism has repeatedly and fiercely clashed. But precisely in this resides its flexibility. Liberalism has proved capable of learning from its antagonist (the tradition of thinking that, starting with ‘radicalism’ and passing through Marx, issued in the revolutions which variously invoked him) to a far greater extent than its antagonist has proved capable of learning from it. Above all, the antagonist has proved incapable of learning what constitutes the second major strong point of liberalism. Certainly, liberalism’s learning process was quite the reverse of smooth, at least for those who wanted to overcome the exclusion clauses that run deep in this intellectual tradition. None has been as committed as it to thinking through the decisive problem of the limitation of power. However, historically, this limitation of power went hand in hand with the delimitation of a restricted sacred space: nurturing a proud, exclusivist self-consciousness, the community of the freemen inhabiting it was led to regard enslavement, or more or less explicit subjection, imposed on the great mass dispersed throughout the profane space, as legitimate. Sometimes they even arrived at decimation or annihilation. Has this dialectic on the basis of which liberalism was transformed into an ideology of domination, and even an ideology of war, wholly disappeared?&lt;br /&gt;
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In economics, clearly distancing itself from an insipid ideology of social harmony miraculously lacking any element of contradiction, conflict and tension, liberal thought has vigorously insisted on the need for competition between individuals in the market, in order to develop social wealth and the productive forces. This is a further, major historical merit to be acknowledged. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg344&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, at this level, too, there emerged the awful exclusion clauses we are already familiar with. Far from being a site where all individuals freely meet as sellers and buyers of commodities, for centuries the liberal market was a site of exclusion, de-humanization and even terror. In the past the ancestors of today’s black citizens were commodities, not autonomous buyers and sellers. And for centuries the market functioned as an instrument of terror: even more than the lash, what imposed total obedience on the slave was the threat of being sold, like a commodity exchanged on the market, separately from other family members.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a long time indentured white servants were also bought and sold on the market, and thus condemned to a fate not very different from that of black slaves. And in the name of the market, workers’ coalitions were repressed and economic and social rights ignored and denied, with a consequent commodification of essential aspects of the human personality and human dignity (health, education, and so on). In extreme cases the superstitious cult of the Market sealed huge tragedies, like the one which in 1847 saw Britain condemn an enormous mass of actual (Irish) individuals to death from starvation. Is all this a definitively concluded chapter of history? Moreover, has liberalism definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, with the dangers of regression and restoration implicit in it? Or is this dialectic still alive and well, thanks to the malleability peculiar to this current of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet however difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task. On the other hand, liberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it. If one starts out from such a presupposition, the tragedy of peoples subjected to slavery or semi-slavery, or deported, decimated and destroyed, becomes utterly inexplicable. This was a tragedy which, far from being impeded or prevented by the liberal world, developed in close connection with it. Unfounded on a historiographical level, the habitual hagiography is also an insult to the memory of the victims. Only in opposition to the pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a ‘counter-history’: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn1a|1]] On all this, cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §7 (on the plural vote) and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn2a|2]] Necker, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant et Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn3a|3]] Constant, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 ibid., p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn4a|4]] Constant, quoted in ibid., pp. 76–7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn5a|5]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, p. 347.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn6a|6]] According to the testimony of J. Mallet du Pan, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn7a|7]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël&#039;&#039;, pp. 8–19 and &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 29, 63n.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn8a|8]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn9a|9]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 17, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn10a|10]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 554–6.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn11a|11]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, §1; ch. 3, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, (1951–), vol. 6, pt 2, p. 108 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn13a|13]] This emerges from a conversation of 25 May 1848 reported by Nassau William Senior: cf. ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 176.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 52 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 31 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn17a|17]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 143 (letter to Francis Lieber, 4 August 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 53 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn20a|20]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;La Seconda Repubblica&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, ch. 2, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn22a|22]] Einaudi, quoted in Paolo Favilli, &#039;&#039;Riformismo e sindicalismo&#039;&#039;, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1984, pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn23a|23]] See, especially, Vilfedo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et idéologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1966, pp. 224–5; Thomas Mackay, Introduction to George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. vii, xii (on Pareto’s adhesion to the League).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn24a|24]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn25a|25]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Die Gemeinwirtschaft&#039;&#039;, Jena: Fischer, 1922, pp. 469ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn26a|26]] Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn27a|27]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn28a|28]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 3, p. 43–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn29a|29]] John Hope Franklin, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 328.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn30a|30]] Rayford W. Logan, &#039;&#039;The Betrayal of the Negro&#039;&#039;, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, p. xxi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn31a|31]] Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 13, 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn32a|32]] Cf. Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Brittanica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 3, pp. 179–85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn34a|34]] Office d’Information, &#039;&#039;Les droits de l’homme en Chine&#039;&#039;, Beijing, 1991, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn35a|35]] Michael Brecher, &#039;&#039;Nehru&#039;&#039;, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn36a|36]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 364.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn37a|37]] Colm Tóibín, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May 2004, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn38a|38]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;Letters&#039;&#039;, ed. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum, 8 vols, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1951–54, vol. 1, p. 377 (letter to Charles Henry Pearson, 11 May 1894).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn39a|39]] Reginald Horsman, &#039;&#039;Race and Manifest Destiny&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn40a|40]] Dee Brown, &#039;&#039;Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee&#039;&#039;, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn41a|41]] Roosevelt, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn42a|42]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn43a|43]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn44a|44]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn45a|45]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn46a|46]] Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–, vol. 1, p. 443.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn47a|47]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 435 n. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn48a|48]] Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 585.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn49a|49]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 197, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn50a|50]] Macaulay, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn51a|51]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn52a|52]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 410 (letter to Moncure D. Conway, 17 July 1898).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn53a|53]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn54a|54]] J.A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1963, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., pp. 200, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn58a|58]] Albert J. Beveridge, &#039;&#039;The Meaning of the Times&#039;&#039;, Freeport (NY): Books for Libraries Press, 1968, pp. 50, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn60a|60]] Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn61a|61]] Edward Eggleston, &#039;&#039;The Ultimate Solution of the American Negro Problem&#039;&#039;, New York: AMS Press, 1973, pp. 133–5, 141–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., pp. 183–5, 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn64a|64]] John Sharp Williams, quoted in George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn65a|65]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn66a|66]] Clifford Geertz, ‘Morality Tale’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 7 October 2004, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn68a|68]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 186, 212–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., pp. 131, 133–4, 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn70a|70]] Thus William T. Hagan, quoted in agreement by Laurence M. Hauptman, &#039;&#039;Between Two Fires&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn71a|71]] Davis, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November 2004, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn72a|72]] Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn73a|73]] Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn74a|74]] C. Vann Woodward, ‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February 1998, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn75a|75]] Richard Maxwell Brown, &#039;&#039;Strain of Violence&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn76a|76]] Nancy MacLean, &#039;&#039;Behind the Mask of Chivalry&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn77a|77]] Fletcher M. Green, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn78a|78]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 13; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, p. xiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn79a|79]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;Racism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 2, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn80a|80]] Stefan Kühl, &#039;&#039;The Nazi Connection&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Edwin Black, &#039;&#039;War against the Weak&#039;&#039;, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003, pp. 385–409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn81a|81]] Ashley Montagu, &#039;&#039;Man’s Most Dangerous Myth&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966, pp. 302ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 265.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn83a|83]] Tzvetan Todorov, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn84a|84]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Philippe Jacquin, &#039;&#039;Storia degli indiani d’America&#039;&#039;, trans. Franco Moccia, Milan: Mondadori, 1976; Thomas Schmid, ‘Australiens Holocaust’, &#039;&#039;Die Zeit&#039;&#039;, 31 May 2000; Mike Davis, &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn85a|85]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalism al ‘comunismo critico’&#039;&#039;, Rome: Gamberetti, 1997, ch. 5, §§10, 13; Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, pp. 317–18 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn86a|86]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn87a|87]] Robert Castel, &#039;&#039;Les métamorphoses de la question sociale&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88a|88]] C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 131–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89a|89]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90a|90]] Walter Johnson, &#039;&#039;Soul by Soul&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 19, 22–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Stalin:_History_and_Critique_of_a_Black_Legend&amp;diff=59295</id>
		<title>Library:Stalin: History and Critique of a Black Legend</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Stalin:_History_and_Critique_of_a_Black_Legend&amp;diff=59295"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T10:08:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added initial upload&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;titled-chapter&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;Introduction: The Turning Point in the Historical Depiction of Stalin&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== From the Cold War to the Khrushchev Report ===&lt;br /&gt;
Impressive demonstrations of grief accompanied Stalin&#039;s passing. In his death throes, “millions of people crowded the center of Moscow to pay their last respects” to the dying leader. On March 5th, 1953, “millions of citizens cried over his loss as if they were mourning for a loved one.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1|1]] The same reaction took place in the most remote corners of this enormous country, for example, in a “small village” that, as soon as it learned of what had happened, fell into spontaneous and collective mourning.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn2|2]] The generalized consternation went beyond the borders of the USSR: “Many cried as they passed through the streets of Budapest and Prague.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn3|3]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thousands of kilometers away from the socialist camp, in Israel the sorrowful reaction was also widespread: “All members of MAPAM, without exception, cried”, and this was a party in which “all the veteran leaders” and “nearly all the ex-combatants” belonged to. The suffering was mixed with fear. “The sun has set” was the title of Al Hamishmar, the newspaper of the Kibbutz movement. For a certain amount of time, such sentiments were shared by leading figures of the state and military apparatus: “Ninety officers who had participated in the 1948 war, the great war of Jewish independence, joined a clandestine armed organization that was pro-Soviet and revolutionary. Of these, eleven later became generals and one became a government minister, and are now honored as the founding fathers of Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn4|4]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the West, it’s not just leaders and members of communist parties with ties to the Soviet Union who pay homage to the deceased leader. One historian (Isaac Deutscher) who was a fierce admirer of Trotsky, wrote an obituary full of acknowledgements:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;After three decades, the face of the Soviet Union has been completely transformed. What’s essential to Stalinism’s historical actions is this: it found a Russia that worked the land with wooden plows and left it as the owner of the atomic bomb. It elevated Russia to the rank of the second industrial power in the world, and it’s not merely a question of material progress and organization. A similar result could not have been achieved without a great cultural revolution in which an entire country has been sent to school to receive an extensive education.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In summary, despite conditioned and in part disfigured by the Asiatic and despotic legacy of Tsarist Russia, in Stalin’s USSR “the socialist ideal has an innate and solid integrity.”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this historical evaluation there was no longer a place for Trotsky’s harsh accusations directed at the deceased leader. What sense was there in condemning Stalin as a traitor to the ideals of world revolution and as the capitulationist theorist of socialism in one country, at a time in which the new social order had expanded in Europe and in Asia and had broken “its national shell”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn5|5]] Ridiculed by Trotsky as a “small provincial man thrust into great world events, as if by a joke of history”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn6|6]] in 1950 Stalin had become, in the opinion of an illustrious philosopher (Alexandre Kojève), the incarnation of the Hegelian spirit of the world and called upon to unify and lead humanity, resorting to energetic methods, in practice combining wisdom and tyranny.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn7|7]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outside communist circles, or the communist aligned left, despite the escalating Cold War and the continued hot war in Korea, Stalin’s death brought out largely “respectful” or “balanced” obituaries in the West. At that time, “he was still considered a relatively benign dictator and even a statesman, and in the popular consciousness the affectionate memory of “uncle Joe” persisted, the great war-time leader that had guided his people to victory over Hitler and had helped save Europe from Nazi barbarity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn8|8]] The ideas, impressions and emotions of the years of the Grand Alliance hadn’t yet vanished, when―Deutscher recalled in 1948―statesmen and foreign generals were won over by the exceptional competence with which Stalin managed all the details of his war machine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn9|9]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Included among the figures “won over” was the man who, in his time, supported military intervention against the country that emerged out of the October Revolution, namely Winston Churchill, who with regards to Stalin had repeatedly expressed himself in these terms: “I like that man.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn10|10]] On the occasion of the Tehran Conference in November, 1943, the British statesman had praised his Soviet counterpart as “Stalin the Great”: he was a worthy heir to Peter the Great; having saved his country, preparing it to defeat the invaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn11|11]] Certain aspects had also fascinated Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to Moscow between 1943 and 1946, who always positively painted the Soviet leader with regard to military matters: “He appears to me better informed than Roosevelt and more realistic than Hitler, to a certain degree he’s the most efficient war leader.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn12|12]] In 1944 Alcide De Gasperi had expressed himself in almost emphatic terms, having celebrated “the historic, secular and immense merit of the armies organized by the genius, Joseph Stalin.&amp;amp;quot; The recognition from the eminent Italian politician isn’t merely limited to the military sphere:&lt;br /&gt;
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When I see Hitler and Mussolini persecute men for their race, and invent that terrible anti-Jewish legislation that we’re familiar with, and when I see how the Russians, made up of 160 different races, seek their fusion, overcoming the existing differences between Asia and Europe, this attempt, this effort toward the unification of human society, let me just say that this is the work of a Christian, this is eminently universalistic in the Catholic sense.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn13|13]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No less powerful or uncommon was the prestige that Stalin had enjoyed, and continued enjoying, among the great intellectuals. Harold J. Laski, a prestigious supporter of the British Labour Party, speaking in the fall of 1945 with Norberto Bobbio, had declared himself an “admirer of the Soviet Union” and its leader, describing him as someone who is “very wise.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn14|14]] In that same year, Hannah Arendt wrote that the country led by Stalin distinguished itself for the “completely new and successful way of facing and solving national conflicts, of organizing different peoples on the basis of national equality”; it was a type of model, it was something “that every political and national movement should pay attention to.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn15|15]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For his part, writing just before and soon after the end of World War II, Benedetto Croce recognized Stalin’s merit in having promoted freedom not only at the international level, thanks to the contribution given to the struggle against Nazi-fascism, but also in his own country. Indeed, who led the USSR was “a man gifted with political genius”, who carried out an important and positive historical role overall; with respect to pre-revolutionary Russia, “Sovietism has been an advance for freedom,&#039;&#039; just as, “in relation to the feudal regime”, the absolute monarchy was also “an advance for freedom and resulted in the greater advances that followed.&amp;amp;quot; The liberal philosopher’s doubts were focused on the future of the Soviet Union; however, these same doubts, by contrast, further highlighted the greatness of Stalin: he had taken the place of Lenin, in such a way that a genius had been followed by another, but what sort of successors would be given to the USSR by “Providence”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn16|16]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Those that, with the beginning of the Great Alliance’s crisis, started drawing parallels between Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany had been severely criticized by Thomas Mann. What characterized the Third Reich was the “racial megalomania” of the self-proclaimed “master race”, which had carried forth a “diabolical program of depopulation”, and before that the eradication of the culture of the conquered territories. Hitler stuck to Nietzsche’s maxim: “if one wants slaves, it’s foolish to educate them like masters.&amp;amp;quot; The orientation of “Russian socialism” was the precise opposite; massively expanding education and culture, it had demonstrated it didn’t want “slaves”, but instead “thinking men”, therefore placing them on the “path to freedom.&amp;amp;quot; Consequently, the comparison between the two regimes became unacceptable. Moreover, those that made such an argument could be suspected of complicity with the fascist ideology they sought to condemn:&lt;br /&gt;
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To place Russian communism and Nazi-fascism on the same moral place, in the measure that both are totalitarian, is superficial at best; fascism at worst. Anyone who insists on this comparison could very well be considered a democrat, but deep in their heart a fascist is already there, and naturally they will only fight fascism in a superficial and hypocritical way, while they save all their hatred for communism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn17|17]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After the outbreak of the Cold War, and upon publishing her book on totalitarianism, Arendt would do in 1961 that which was precisely denounced by Mann. And yet, almost at the same time, Kojève had pointed to Stalin as the protagonist of a decidedly progressive historical turning point of planetary dimensions. In other words, even in the West this new truth, or this new ideological motive in the two-sided struggle against the different manifestations of totalitarianism, had a hard time in asserting itself. In 1948, Laski had to some degree accentuated his expressed point of view from three years earlier. To define the USSR, he had again used a category utilized by another leading figure of British Labourism, Beatrice Webb, who as early as 1931, but also during the Second World War and up until her death, had referred to the Soviet nation as a “new civilization.&amp;amp;quot; Yes―Laski confirmed―with a formidable effort given to social promotion of the classes that for so long had been exploited and oppressed, and with the introduction into the factory and workplaces of new social relations, no longer rooted in the sovereign power of the owners over the means of production, the country led by Stalin emerged as the “pioneer of a new civilization.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, both were quick to make clear that “barbarian Russia” still weighed upon the “new civilization” that was emerging. It expressed itself in despotic ways, but―Laski in particular stressed―to formulate a correct judgement on the Soviet Union, it was necessary not to lose sight of an essential fact: “Its leaders came to power in a country accustomed to having a bloody tyrant” and they were forced to govern in a situation characterized by a more or less permanent “state of siege” and by a “potential or ongoing war.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, in situations of intense crisis, Britain and the United States had also limited traditional liberties in more or less drastic ways.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn18|18]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In relaying the admiration by Laski toward Stalin and the country led by him, Bobbio much later wrote: “After the victory against Hitler, to which the Soviets had made a decisive contribution with the battle of Stalingrad [such a declaration] doesn’t really surprise me.&amp;amp;quot; In truth, for the British Labourite intellectual, the acknowledgements made to the USSR and its leader went well beyond the military sphere. On the other hand, would the position of the Turinese philosopher be all that different at that time? In 1954, he published an essay that attributed to the Soviet Union (and the other socialist states) the merit of having “initiated a new phase of civil progress in politically backwards countries, introducing traditionally democratic institutions, from formal democracy, like universal suffrage and elected positions, as well as substantial democracy, like the collectivization of the means of production”; it was a matter then of pouring “a drop of [liberal] oil on the machinery of the now completed revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn19|19]] As you can see, the judgement formulated on the country that was still in mourning over Stalin’s death was by no means negative.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1954, the legacy of liberal socialism still resonates in Bobbio. Despite forcefully stressing the indispensable value of freedom and democracy during the years of the war in Spain, Carlo Rosselli had negatively compared the liberal countries (“the British government is on the side of Franco, starving Bilbao”) to the Soviet Union, committed to helping the Spanish Republic under attack by Nazi-fascism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn20|20]] Nor was it merely a matter of international politics. In a world characterized by the “era of fascism, of imperialist wars and capitalist decadence”, Carlo Rosselli raised the example of a country that, despite being far from the objective of a mature democratic socialism, had left capitalism behind and represented “a capital of invaluable experiences” for those who were committed to the construction of a better society: “Today, with the enormous Russian experience [...] we can make use of an immense volume of positive material. We all know what the socialist revolution and the socialist organization of production represent.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn21|21]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, for an entire historical period, in circles that went far beyond the communist movement, the country led by Stalin and Stalin himself could enjoy sympathetic curiosity, respect and, at times, even admiration. It’s true there was serious disappointment caused by the pact with Nazi Germany, but soon Stalingrad had managed to erase it. That is why in 1953, and in the years immediately following, homage to the deceased leader united the socialist camp, appeared to strengthen the communist movement―despite its earlier divisions―and to a certain extent was felt even in the liberal West, which was then engaged in a Cold War uncompromisingly carried out by both sides. It’s no coincidence that in the Fulton speech which officially started the Cold War, Churchill expressed himself as follows: “I have great admiration and respect for the courageous Russian people and for my war time companion, marshal Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn22|22]] There’s no doubt that, as the Cold War grew more intense, the rhetoric became increasingly hardened. However, in 1952, a great British historian who had worked in the Foreign Office, namely Arnold Toynbee, could still compare the Soviet leader to “a brilliant man: Peter the Great”; yes, “the test of battle ended up justifying the tyrannical drive toward technological westernization carried out by Stalin, just as it had happened earlier with Peter the Great.&amp;amp;quot; It continued being justified even after the defeat dealt to the Third Reich: after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Russia once again “needed a forced march to catch up with the West’s technological level” that had once again “leaped ahead.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn23|23]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Toward an Overall Comparison ===&lt;br /&gt;
Maybe even more than the Cold War, there’s another historical event that forces a radical turn in the history of Stalin’s image; Churchill’s speech from March 5th, 1946, has a less important role than another speech, the one given ten years later, on February 25th of 1956 to be exact, by Nikita Khrushchev during the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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That Report, which paints a picture of a mad and bloodthirsty dictator, who’s vain and either mediocre or completely laughable on the intellectual level, satisfied nearly everyone for more than three decades. It allowed for the USSR’s new leadership group to present themselves as the only source of revolutionary legitimacy within the country, the socialist camp and the international communist movement that saw Moscow as its center. Strengthened in their old convictions and with new arguments available to wage the Cold War, the West also had its motives to be satisfied (or enthusiastic). In the United States, sovietology had demonstrated its tendency to develop around the CIA and other military and intelligence agencies, early on removing the elements suspected of having sympathies to the homeland of the October Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn24|24]] A process took place which militarized a key-discipline for the conduct of the Cold War; in 1949, the president of the American Historical Association had declared: “we can’t allow ourselves to be anything but orthodox”, a “plurality of objectives and values” is not permitted. It’s necessary to accept “ample measures of enlistment” because the “total war, be it hot or cold, recruits every one of us and calls on every one of us to do their part. The historian is no more free of this obligation than the physicist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn25|25]] None of this ends in 1956, but now a more or less militarized sovietology can enjoy the accommodation and support coming from within the communist world itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true, rather than communism as such, the Khrushchev report pointed the finger at a single person, but in those years it was opportune, including from the point of view of Washington and its allies, not to expand the target too greatly, and instead concentrate fire on Stalin’s country. With the signing of the “Balkan Pact” of 1953, signed by Turkey and Greece, Yugoslavia became a type of external member of NATO, and nearly twenty years later China also made a de facto alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union. It was above all else a matter of isolating that superpower, which is forced into an increasingly radical “de-stalinization”, until leaving it without any form of identity and self-esteem, resigned to capitulation and its final dissolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, thanks to the “revelations” coming from Moscow, leading intellectuals could easily forget their interest, sympathy, and even the admiration that they had for Stalin’s USSR. Those intellectuals that had Trotsky as their reference point found particular comfort in those “revelations.&amp;amp;quot; For a long time it had been Trotsky who had embodied, in the eyes of the Soviet Union’s enemies, the infamy of communism, and he had particularly represented the “exterminations” or even the “Jewish extermination” (infra, ch. 5, § 15); as late as 1933, when he had already been in exile for several years, for Spengler, Trotsky continued to represent the “Bolshevik mass murderer” (Bolschewistischer Massenmörder).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn26|26]] Beginning with the turning point at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, it was only Stalin and his closest collaborators who should be confined to the museum of horrors. Making its influence felt far beyond Trotskyist circles, the Khrushchev Report played as especially comforting role for certain Marxist left groups, who felt exonerated of the painful task of rethinking the theory of the Teacher [Marx] and its concrete impact on history. Certainly, instead of withering away in the countries governed by communists, the State appeared to be excessively all encompassing; far from disappearing, national identities played an increasingly important role in the conflicts that would lead to the division and, finally, to the end of the socialist camp; no one could make out any sign of the dissolution of money or the market, which tended to expand with economic development. Yes, all of this is beyond debate, but it’s the fault...of Stalin or of “Stalinism”! Therefore, there was no reason to question the hopes and certainties that had accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution, or that had their origin in Marx.&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite opposing one another, those political-ideological fields developed their portraits of Stalin based on colossal and arbitrary abstractions. On the left, they proceed to the virtual elimination of the history of Bolshevism, and even more so the elimination of the history of Marxism, of the man who had for more time than any other exercised power in the country that emerged out of a revolution that was prepared and carried out according to the ideas of Marx and Engels. For their part, the anti-communists comfortably leave out both the history of Tsarist Russia as well as the history of the Second Thirty Years’ War, the context in which the tragic and contradictory development of Soviet Russia and the three decades of Stalin take place. And thus, each of the different political-ideological fields set off from Khrushchev’s speech to cultivate their own mythology, whether it’s the purity of the West or the purity of Marxism or Bolshevism. Stalinism was the terrible comparative term that allowed each of the antagonists to congratulate themselves, counterposing their own infinite moral and intellectual superiority.&lt;br /&gt;
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Based on their notably different abstractions, these readings still end up producing some methodological convergences. In examining the terror without paying too much attention to the objective situation, they reduce it to the initiative of a single individual or of a limited leadership class, determined to reassert their absolute power by any means necessary. Beginning with that assumption, if Stalin could be compared to another leading political figure, it could only be to Hitler; consequently, in the aim of comprehending Stalin’s USSR, the only possible comparison was with Nazi Germany. It’s a theme that already emerged toward the end of the 1930s with Trotsky, who repeatedly resorts to the category of “totalitarian dictatorship” and, in the context of this genus, on the one hand he highlights the “Stalinist” type, and on the other hand the “fascist” type (and the Hitlerian type especially),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn27|27]] resorting to a contextualization that later becomes the conventional thinking of the Cold War and the ruling ideology of today.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this line of argument convincing, or would it be better to turn to an overall comparison, without losing sight of either the history of Russia in its totality or the countries involved in the Second Thirty Years’ War? It’s true that this leads us to a comparison of countries and leaders that have very different characteristics among them; but is that diversity exclusively on account of their ideologies, or does the objective situation also play an important role, namely, the geopolitical location and past history of each country involved in the Second Thirty Years’ War? When we discuss Stalin, our thoughts immediately jump to the personalization of power, to the concentrationary universe, to the deportation of entire ethnic groups; but do these occurrences, aside from the USSR, only show themselves in Nazi Germany, or do they manifest themselves to different degrees―according to the greater or lesser severity of the state of emergency and its more or less prolonged duration―in other countries as well, including those with a more consolidated liberal tradition? Obviously, it’s necessary not to lose sight of the role of ideology; but can the ideology followed by Stalin really be compared to that which inspires Hitler? Or does the ideological comparison―when free of preconceptions―lead to completely unexpected results? Contrary to the theorists of purity, a political movement or a political regime can’t be judged based on the excellence of their declared motivating ideals; in the evaluation of these same ideals, we can’t ignore Wirkungsgeschichte, the “history of the effects” caused by them; but should that approach be applied to all sides, or only for the movement that found inspiration in Lenin and Marx?&lt;br /&gt;
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These questions appear superfluous and even deceiving to those that overlook the problem of the inconsistency of Stalin’s image, basing themselves on the belief that Khrushchev had finally brought to light the hidden truth. However, a historian would show a total lack of methodological rigor if they sought to find in 1956 the year of the definitive and final revelation, ignoring the conflicts and interests that had driven the de-stalinization campaign and its diverse aspects, and that even earlier had motivated the sovietology of the Cold War. The radical contrasts between the different images of Stalin should encourage the historian to not only not absolutize a single one, but rather, to scrutinize them all.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;1. How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A “Huge, Grim, Whimsical, Morbid, Human Monster” ===&lt;br /&gt;
If today we analyze On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences, read by Khrushchev at a closed door session during the Congress of the CPSU, and later hailed as the Secret Report, one detail immediately draws our attention: what’s before us is a condemnatory speech that intends to liquidate Stalin in all his aspects. The man guilty of so many horrendous crimes was an individual worthy of contempt both at the moral and intellectual level. Aside from being ruthless, the dictator was also an absurd figure: he learned about the country and the agricultural situation “only through movies”; films that, moreover, embellished reality to the point of making it unrecognizable.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn28|28]] Instead of being driven by political logic or Realpolitik, the bloody repression unleashed by him was dictated by his capriciousness and his pathological lust for power (libido dominandi). Thus emerged―Deutscher observes with satisfaction in June of 1956, astonished by Khrushchev’s “revelations” and having forgotten the respectful and at times admiring portrait of Stalin he himself made three years earlier―the depiction of “the huge, grim, whimsical, morbid, human monster.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn29|29]] The despot so lacked moral qualms that he was suspected of having plotted the assassination of the man who appeared to be his best friend, Kirov, in order to denounce and liquidate his real, potential or imaginary opponents one after another for that crime.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn30|30]] The merciless repression didn’t only fall upon individuals or political figures. Instead, it would include “the mass deportations of entire peoples”, arbitrarily accused and collectively condemned for connivance with the enemy. But at least Stalin had contributed to saving his country and the world from the horrors of the Third Reich? On the contrary―Khrushchev insisted―the Great Patriotic War was won despite the dictator’s madness: it was only because of his shortsightedness, his stubbornness, the blind trust he placed in Hitler, that the Third Reich’s troops had initially managed to enter deep into Soviet territory, causing death and destruction on a massive scale.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, it’s Stalin’s fault that the Soviet Union had been unprepared and poorly defended for the tragic encounter: “We had only started to modernize our military equipment on the eve of war [...]. At the start of the war we didn’t even have a sufficient number of rifles to arm all the soldiers called up.&amp;amp;quot; As if that wasn’t more than enough, “after the first defeats and first disasters on the frontlines”, the man responsible for all this had given into despair and even apathy. Overtaken by a sense of defeat (“we have forever lost all that Lenin had created”) and unable to react, “Stalin refrained from overseeing military operations and stopped dealing with anything.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn31|31]] It’s true that, after some time had passed, and finally ceding to pressure from other members of the Politburo, he returned to his post. If only he hadn’t! At the time when it faced a mortal threat, the man who had despotically ruled the Soviet Union had been such an incompetent dictator that he didn’t have “any familiarity with the conduct of military operations.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a charge that the Secret Report firmly insists on: “We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. Yes, comrades, he used to take a globe and trace the front line on it.&amp;amp;quot; Despite everything, the war had ended favorably, but still the bloody paranoia grew worse. Now the Secret Report&#039;s portrait of the “morbid, human monster”―according to Deutscher&#039;s observations―can be considered complete.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only three years had passed since the demonstrations of grief provoked by Stalin&#039;s death, and his popularity was still so solid that, at least in the USSR, the campaign launched by Khrushchev was initially met by “strong resistance”:&lt;br /&gt;
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On March 5th, 1956, students in Tbilisi took to the streets to place flowers at the monument to Stalin on the occasion of the third anniversary of his death, and that gesture in honor of Stalin turned into a protest against the deliberations of the Twentieth Congress. The demonstrations and assemblies continued for five days, until the afternoon of March 9th, when tanks were sent into the city to restore order.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn32|32]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That possibly explains the characteristics of the text we are examining. In the USSR and in the socialist camp, a hard political struggle was taking place, and the absurd depiction of Stalin would ideally serve to delegitimize the “Stalinists” who could overshadow the new leadership. The “cult of personality” that had reigned until that moment didn’t allow for nuanced judgments: it was necessary to cast a god into hell. Some decades earlier, during another political battle with different characteristics, but no less tough, Trotsky had also painted a picture of Stalin that sought not only to condemn him at the political and moral level, but also ridicule him at a personal level: he had been a “small provincial man”, an individual characterized from the beginning by an irredeemable mediocrity and pettiness, which he regularly demonstrated in the political, military and ideological fields, who was never able to overcome “his peasant rudeness.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, in 1913 he had published a work of undeniable theoretical value (Marxism and the National Question), but the true author was Lenin, and the man whose signature is on the text should be considered a “usurper” of the great revolutionary’s “intellectual rights.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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There was no lack of similarities between the two depictions. Khrushchev insinuated that the real instigator of Kirov’s assassination had been Stalin, and Stalin had been accused (or at least suspected) by Trotsky of having hastened Lenin’s death with his “Mongolian ferocity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn33|33]] The Secret Report denounced Stalin for the cowardly neglect of his responsibilities at the start of Hitler’s invasion, but already on September 2nd, 1939, while anticipating Operation Barbarossa, Trotsky wrote that “the new aristocracy” in power in Moscow was characterized, among other things, for “its inability to conduct a war”; the “ruling caste” in the Soviet Union was destined to assume the attitude “proper to all regimes destined to die: ‘after us, the deluge’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn34|34]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With great similarities between them, to what point do these two depictions withstand historical examination? It’s worthwhile to begin analyzing the Secret Report which, made official by a CPSU party congress and by the party’s top leadership, immediately imposed itself as a revelation of a long suppressed but now incontestable truth.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Great Patriotic War and Khrushchev’s Inventions ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with Stalingrad and the defeat inflicted on the Third Reich (the latter with a might that had seemed unbeatable), Stalin acquired enormous prestige around the whole world. And, not by chance, does Khrushchev give particular attention to this matter. He describes in catastrophic terms the lack of military preparedness by the Soviet Union, whose army in some cases lacked the most basic armaments. Arguing against this is the overview that emerges from a study that appears to come from those connected to the Bundeswehr and makes ample use of their military archives. In it they speak of the “numerical superiority of the Red Army in armored cars, planes and artillery pieces.” Further, “the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union had reached such dimensions that they could supply the Soviet armed forces with an almost unimaginable amount of weaponry.&amp;amp;quot; It rises at an ever-increasing rate as Operation Barbarossa approached. One stat is particularly eloquent: while in 1940 the Soviet Union produces 358 advanced armored cars, measurably superior to those available to other armed forces, in the first half of the following year 1,503 are produced.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn35|35]] For their part, the documents from the Russian archives demonstrate that, at least during the two years before the Third Reich’s aggression, Stalin was literally obsessed with the problem of the “quantitative increase” and the “qualitative improvement of the entire military apparatus.&amp;amp;quot; Some data speaks for itself: while in the first five-year plan the defense budget reached 5.4% of total state spending, in 1941 the military budget increased to 43.4% of spending; “In September of 1939, by order of Stalin, the Politburo made the decision to construct in the year of 1941 nine new factories for the production of planes.&amp;amp;quot; By the time of the Nazi invasion, Soviet “industry had produced 2,700 modern planes and 4,300 armored cars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn36|36]] Judging by this data, we can say that the USSR arrived anything but unprepared for the tragic confrontation.&lt;br /&gt;
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A decade earlier, an American historian dealt a substantial blow to the myth of the despair and abandonment of responsibilities by the Soviet leader soon after the start of the Nazi invasion: “for however shocked he was, on the day of the attack Stalin had an eleven-hour meeting with leaders of the party,, government and military, and did the same the following day.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn37|37]] But now we have at our disposal the registry of those that visited Stalin in the Kremlin, discovered at the beginning of the 1990s: it appears that, in the hours immediately following the military aggression, the Soviet leader was immersed in a series of uninterrupted meetings and initiatives to organize the resistance. They are days and nights characterized as “strenuous” but organized. In any case, “the entire episode [narrated by Khrushchev] is a complete invention”, this “story is false.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn38|38]] In reality, from the start of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin not only makes challenging decisions, giving the order for the relocation of residents and industrial installations from the frontline areas, but “he controls everything in a meticulous way, from the size and shape of the bayonets, to the authors and titles of the articles in Pravda.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn39|39]] There is no sign of panic or hysteria. Dimitrov offers the following account in a diary entry: “At seven in the morning they urgently called me to the Kremlin. Germany has attacked the USSR. The war has started [...]. It’s surprisingly calm, with resolve and confidence in Stalin and all the others.” More impressive yet is the clarity of ideas. It’s not only a matter of carrying out “the general mobilization of our forces.” It’s necessary as well to define the political situation. Yes, “only communists can defeat the fascists,” and put an end to the apparently irresistible rise of the Third Reich, but it’s necessary not to lose sight of the real nature of the conflict: “The [communist] parties develop locally a movement in defense of the USSR; not putting forward the question of the socialist revolution. The Soviet people fight a patriotic war against fascist Germany. The question is the defeat of fascism, which enslaved a series of nations and tries to enslave other nations as well.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn40|40]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The political strategy that had presided over the Great Patriotic War is well defined. Already some years earlier Stalin had stressed that the expansionism carried out by the Third Reich “is in pursuit of the enslavement and submission of other nations.” These nations respond with just wars of resistance and national liberation. To those that academically counterpose patriotism and internationalism, the Communist International had responded once again before Hitler’s aggression, as is shown in the entry in Dimitrov’s diary from May 12th, 1941, that:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It is necessary to develop a line of thought that combines wise nationalism, properly understood, with proletarian internationalism. Proletarian internationalism should be based on the nationalism of individual countries [...], between that properly understood nationalism and proletarian internationalism there can be no contradiction. Nationless cosmopolitanism, which denies national sentiment and the idea of the nation, doesn’t have anything in common with proletarian internationalism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn41|41]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Far from being an improvised and desperate reaction to the situation created by the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the strategy of the Great Patriotic War expresses a theoretical orientation of a general character maturing for some time: internationalism and the international cause of the emancipation of nations led directly to the wave of wars of national liberation, made necessary by Hitler’s intention to seize and radicalize the colonial tradition, by first subjecting and enslaving the supposedly inferior races of Eastern Europe. These are the recurring themes in the speeches and statements delivered by Stalin during the war: they constituted “important cornerstones in the clarification of Soviet military strategy and its political objectives, and played an important role at the hour of restrengthening popular morale.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn42|42]] They took on international importance as well, as Goebbels observed to his own annoyance: [Stalin’s] radio speech on July 3rd, 1941 “earned enormous admiration in England and the United States.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn43|43]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Series of Disinformation Campaigns and Operation Barbarossa ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even in the strict realm of military conduct, the Secret Report has lost all credibility. According to Khrushchev, Stalin paid no attention to the “warnings” coming from many directions regarding the imminent invasion and went irresponsibly toward disaster. What is there to say about this accusation? Even the information coming from a friendly country can be wrong. For example, on June 17th, 1942, Franklin Delano Roosevelt warned Stalin of an imminent Japanese attack that never materialized.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn44|44]] Especially in the lead-up to Hitler’s aggression, the USSR was forced to navigate around enormous diversion and disinformation operations. The Third Reich was determined to make it appear that the gathering of troops in the East was aimed only at camouflaging the crossing of the English Channel, and this seemed very possible after the conquest of the island of Crete. “The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized”, Goebbels notes with satisfaction in his diary (May 31st, 1941), to stage the “first great round of misdirection” in Operation Barbarossa. Thus, “14 divisions are transported to the West.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn45|45]] On top of this, all the troops stationed on the Western front were placed on the highest state of alert.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn46|46]] Nearly two weeks later, the Berlin issue of Völkischer Beobachter published an article that indicated that the occupation of Crete was a model for the coming settling of accounts with England; a few hours later the journal was censored with the aim of giving the impression that it had betrayed secret information of great importance. Three days later Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The English radios announce that our maneuvers against Russia are only a bluff, that behind them we seek to hide our preparations for the invasion [of England].”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn47|47]] In addition to this disinformation campaign, Germany spread rumors according to which the military maneuvers in the East were aimed at pressuring the USSR, eventually resorting to an ultimatum so that Stalin agrees to the revision of the German-Soviet pact and to export greater quantities of grain, petroleum and coal which the Third Reich lacked, involved in a war with an unpredictable outcome. They therefore wanted to give the impression that the crisis could be resolved with new negotiations and additional concessions on Moscow’s part.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn48|48]] The British intelligence services arrived at that conclusion and the military, as late as May 22nd, warned the Minister of War: “Hitler still hasn’t decided to pursue his objectives [in the direction of USSR] either by persuasion or by force of arms.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn49|49]] On June 14th Goebbels writes with satisfaction in his diary: “Overall, they still believe in the bluff or in the attempted blackmail.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn50|50]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s also important not to underestimate the disinformation campaign carried out on the other side and initiated two years earlier. In November of 1939, the French press published a fabricated speech (supposedly delivered before the Politburo on August 19th of the same year) in which Stalin had revealed a plan to weaken Europe, encouraging a fratricidal war in order to Sovietize it later. There are no doubts about it: this was a forgery that sought to unravel the pact of German-Soviet non-aggression and redirect the Third Reich’s expansionist fury to the East.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn51|51]] According to a much circulated legend of history, on the eve of Hitler’s aggression, London had warned Stalin without success, for Stalin―as to be expected of a dictator―only trusted in his counterpart in Berlin. However, while Great Britain informs Moscow of information related to Operation Barbarossa, they spread rumors about an imminent USSR attack against either Germany or territories occupied by it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn52|52]] Their interest in making inevitable, or in precipitating as quickly as possible, the German-Soviet conflict is both evident and understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there’s the mysterious flight by Rudolf Hess to England, clearly motivated by the hope of reconstructing the West’s unity in the struggle against Bolshevism, and thereby putting into motion the program described in Mein Kampf of an alliance and solidarity between the Germanic nations in their civilizing mission. Soviet agents abroad inform the Kremlin that the number two in the Nazi regime took the initiative with the full agreement of the Führer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn53|53]] Moreover, personalities of particular importance in the Third Reich continued believing until the end the theory that Hess had acted at the encouragement of Hitler. In any case, Hitler felt the need to immediately send to Rome the minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop for the purpose of reassuring Mussolini that Germany wasn’t planning a separate peace with Great Britain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn54|54]] Obviously, even stronger is the concern in Moscow caused by this suspected stagecraft, especially as the British government’s attitude encourages it. It doesn’t exploit the “capture of the deputy-Führer” for the purposes of getting “the maximum propaganda value, something that both Hitler and Goebbels feared”; instead of this, the interrogation of Hess―as Stalin was told by the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maiski―is entrusted to a supporter of appeasement. While they left the door open to an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, the secret services of His Majesty concentrate on spreading rumors of a separate peace that is imminent between London and Berlin. All of this with the aim of adding pressure on the Soviet Union (that maybe had sought to prevent the feared alliance between Great Britain and the Third Reich with a preemptive attack by the Red Army against the Wehrmacht) and thereby strengthening England’s position.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn55|55]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Kremlin’s caution and distrust is well understood: the imminent threat of a second Munich on a larger and far more tragic scale. One can also raise the hypothesis that the campaign of disinformation promoted by the Third Reich had played a role, based on the transcripts found in the archives of the Soviet communist party. Expecting the imminent involvement of the USSR in the conflict, in his speech on May 5th, 1941, given to graduates of the military academy, Stalin stressed how historically Germany achieved victory when it was focused on only one front, while it suffered defeat when forced to simultaneously fight in the East and the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn56|56]] Yes, maybe Stalin had underestimated the possibility that Hitler was ready to attack the USSR. On the other hand, he knew very well that a premature total mobilization would have given the Third Reich a casus belli on a silver plate, as had happened at the start of World War I. In any case, one point is clear: even while acting with caution in a very complicated situation, the Soviet leader moved toward an “acceleration in war preparations.” In fact, “between May and June 800,000 reservists were called up, in mid-May, twenty-eight divisions are relocated to the western districts of the Soviet Union, while work on the border fortifications and the camouflaging of sensitive military objectives are accelerated. “On the night between the 21st and 22nd of June, that vast force is placed on alert and ordered to prepare for a surprise attack by the Germans.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn57|57]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To discredit Stalin, Khrushchev stresses the spectacular initial victories by the invading armies, but leaves out the predictions made at the time by the West. After the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the entrance of the Wehrmacht into Prague, Lord Halifax continued to reject the idea of a rapprochement between England and the USSR, resorting to the following argument: it didn’t make sense to ally with a country whose armed forces were “insignificant.” On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, or at the moment when its unleashed, the British secret services had calculated that the Soviet Union would be “liquidated in 8-10 weeks”; the advisor of U.S. Secretary of State (Henry L. Stimson) had predicted on June 23rd that it would all be over within one to three months.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn58|58]] Moreover, the lightning breakthrough by the Wehrmacht―as observed in our days by an illustrious scholar of military history―is easily explained by geography:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The width of the front―1,800 miles―and the absence of natural obstacles gave the aggressors immense advantages for penetration and maneuvers. Despite the colossal dimensions of the Red Army, the relation between its forces and the territory was so unfavorable that German mechanized units could easily find opportunities to indirectly maneuver into the adversary’s rear. In addition, remote cities where roads and railways converged offered the aggressors the possibility of targeting alternative objectives, leaving the enemy in the difficult situation of having to predict the advance&#039;s real direction and where to face one challenge after the next.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn59|59]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Quick Unraveling of the Blitzkrieg ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s important not to fall for appearances. Looking closely, the Third Reich’s project of repeating the Blitzkrieg&#039;s victory in the West, but this time in the East, started to show problems in the very first weeks of the gigantic confrontation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn60|60]] On this, the diaries of Joseph Goebbels are revealing. In the immediate lead-up to the assault he stresses the unstoppable might of the imminent German attack, “without a doubt the most powerful the world has ever known”; no one could seriously oppose “the strongest army in all of history.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn61|61]] Therefore, “we are before a triumphal march without precedent[...]. I consider the Russian military force to be very weak, even weaker than the Führer believes. If anything is a sure thing, it is this.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn62|62]] In fact, Hitler is no less confident, some months earlier with a Bulgarian diplomat he referred to the Soviet Army as but a “joke.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn63|63]]&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
However, from the start the invaders found, despite everything, unpleasant surprises. “On June 25th, during the first aerial attack on Moscow, the anti-aircraft defenses proved to be so effective that the Luftwaffe is forced to limit itself to a reduced amount of night raids.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn64|64]] It took only ten days of war for the pre-war assumptions to be shaken. On July 2nd, Goebbels writes in his diary: “overall, the fighting is hard and stubborn. We can in no way speak of a walk in the park. The red regime mobilized the people.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn65|65]] This course of events continued on and the mood of the Nazi leaders changed radically, as is repeatedly demonstrated in the diary written by Goebbels.&lt;br /&gt;
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July 24th:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We can have no doubt whatsoever about the fact that the Bolshevik regime, which has existed for nearly a quarter of a century, left its mark on the peoples of the Soviet Union [...]. Therefore, It would be right to announce and with great clarity, before the German people, the difficulty of the struggle that rages in the East. It’s necessary to say to the nation that this operation is very difficult, but that we can overcome it and that we will overcome it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn66|66]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 1st:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In the Führer’s headquarters [...] it’s also openly admitted that they were somewhat mistaken in their evaluation of the Soviet military force. The Bolsheviks reveal a greater resistance than we had suspected; in particular, the material resources available to them were greater than we thought.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn67|67]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 19th:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Privately, the Führer is very irritated with himself for having been misled to such an extent―regarding the strength of the Bolsheviks―by the reports [by German agents] coming from the Soviet Union. In particular, the underestimation of the enemy’s armored vehicles and planes caused us many problems. He suffers a lot because of this. We’re dealing with a grave crisis [...]. Put in comparison, the previous campaigns were like a walk in the park [...]. Regarding the West, the Führer has no reason to worry [...]. With rigor and objectivity, we Germans always overestimated the enemy, except in this case with the Bolsheviks.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn68|68]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;September 16th:&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
“We have totally underestimated the strength of the Bolsheviks.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn69|69]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Scholars in military strategy stress the unforeseen difficulties that soon challenge that powerful war-machine, experienced and cloaked in the myth of invincibility upon its entry into the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn70|70]] ”The battle of Smolensk, in the second half of July 1941, is particularly significant for the success of the Eastern Front (up until now it has been overshadowed by research into other events).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn71|71]] The observation is from an illustrious German historian who passes on these eloquent entries from a diary written by general Fedor von Bock from the 20th and 26th of July:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The enemy seeks to recapture Smolensk at all costs and is constantly sending in new forces. The theory expressed by some that the enemy acts without plans is not reflected in the facts [...]. We’ve verified that the Russians have brought up across the front a new and compact deployment of forces. In many areas they seek to go on the offensive. It’s surprising for an adversary which suffered so many blows; they must possess an unbelievable amount of resources, in fact our troops still lament the power of the enemy artillery.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more worried, or even decidedly pessimistic, is admiral Wilhelm Canaris, leader of counter-espionage, who, in speaking with General von Bock on July 17th, says: “I see it as very bleak.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn72|72]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only does the Soviet army not break down in the first days and weeks of the assault but, to the contrary, it offers “tenacious resistance”, and is also well commanded, as revealed by, among other things, the “decision by Stalin at the time of halting the German advance at a point decided by him.” The results of this astute military command are revealed as well in the diplomatic sphere: it is precisely because it is “impressed by the fierce battle around Smolensk” that Japan, present there as an observer, decides to reject the request by the Third Reich for it to join the war against the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn73|73]] The analysis of the vehemently anti-communist German historian is fully confirmed by Russian scholars who distinguished themselves as champions in the struggle against “Stalinism” in the wake of the Khrushchev report: “The plans of the Blitzkrieg were already sunk by the middle of July.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn74|74]] In this context, in no way formal is the tribute paid to the Soviet army&#039;s &amp;amp;quot;splendid defense” by Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt on August 14th, 1941.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn75|75]] Even outside diplomatic and governing circles, in Great Britain―we are informed by a diary entry from Beatrice Webb―common citizens, including those of a conservative orientation, show “lively interest in their surprising courage and initiative, as well as the magnificent equipment of the Russian armed forces, the only sovereign state able to oppose the almost mythical power of Hitler’s Germany.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn76|76]] In Germany itself, just three weeks after the start of Operation Barbarossa, rumors start to circulate which deeply question the regime’s triumphalist line. It’s what appears in the diary of an eminent German intellectual of Jewish origin: judging by appearances, in the East “we suffer immense loses, we had underestimated the strength of the resistance by the Russians”, which “was inexhaustible in terms of men and military resources.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn77|77]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For a long time read as an example of political-military ignorance or even blind faith in the Third Reich, the extremely cautious approach by Stalin in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of hostilities now appears under new light: “The concentration of forces by the Wehrmacht along the entire front with the USSR, the violation of Soviet airspace, and another number of provocations had a single aim: attract the bulk of the Red Army as close as possible to the border. Hitler intended to win the war in a single, gigantic battle.” Even valiant generals were enticed by this trap, and expecting the onslaught of the enemy, insisted on a massive relocation of troops toward the border. “Stalin categorically rejected the request, insisting on the necessity of maintaining plenty of reserves at a considerable distance from the frontline.” Later, after reading the strategic plans by Operation Barbarossa’s architects, marshall Georgy K. Zhukov recognized the correctness of the line pursued by Stalin: “Hitler’s orders counted on the relocation of the bulk of our troops toward the border, with the intention of surrounding them and destroying them.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn78|78]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As a matter of fact, in the months following the invasion of the USSR, arguing with his generals, Hitler observed: “The problem of the Russian territory. The infinite width of the territory makes concentrating on decisive points necessary.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn79|79]] Later, in a conversation he clarified his thinking about the already initiated Operation Barbarossa: “In world history there had been until now only three battles of annihilation: Cannae, Sedan, and Tannenberg. We can be proud of the fact that two of them had been victoriously fought by German armies.” However, for Germany the third and greatest battle of annihilation and submission, which Hitler had longed for, is increasingly complicated, and one week later he sees himself obligated to recognize that Operation Barbarossa had seriously underestimated the enemy. “The military preparations by the Russians must be considered incredible.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn80|80]] The desire by the chess player to justify the failure of his forecasts is apparent here. However, the previously cited English military scholar reaches the same conclusions: the reason for the French defeat lies “not in the quantity or quality of their resources, but in their military doctrine”; further, an excessively advanced deployment of the army had a disastrous effect, because it “gravely compromised their strategic flexibility; a similar mistake was made in Poland as well, driven by “national pride and overconfidence in the soldiers.” None of this happened in the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn81|81]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More important than the individual battles is the overall picture. “The Stalinist system was able to mobilize the immense majority of the population and nearly all resources”; particularly “extraordinary” was “the Soviet ability”―in such a difficult situation as the one that arose in the first months of the war―“of evacuating and later reconverting to military production a considerable number of industries.” Yes, “created two days after the German invasion, the Evacuation Committee managed to move to the East 1,500 major industrial companies, after titanic operations of great logistic complexity.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn82|82]] Moreover, that process of relocation had already begun in the weeks or months before Hitler’s aggression (infra, pp. 235-236), which is another confirmation of the fanciful character of the accusation delivered by Khrushchev.&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s more. To some degree, The Soviet leadership understood the scenario of the war looming on the horizon as they were promoting the industrialization of the country. With a radical turn with respect to the previous situation, they identified “Asian Russia as a key point”, at a distance to and sheltered from possible aggressors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn83|83]] In fact, Stalin had insisted repeatedly and vigorously on this. On January 31st, 1931, he pushes forward the “creation of a new and well-equipped industrial base in the Ural Mountains, Siberia and Kazakhstan.” A few years later, the report read on January 26th, 1934, at the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU had with satisfaction called attention to the powerful industrial development that has been achieved “in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, in the Tatar, Buryat and Bashkirian republics, in the Ural mountains, in Eastern and Western Siberia, in the Far-East, etc.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn84|84]] Trotsky didn’t miss the implications of all this a few years later while analyzing the dangers of war and the Soviet Union’s level of preparation, and in highlighting the results achieved by the “planned economy” in the “military” sphere, he observed: “The industrialization of remote regions, especially Siberia, gives the steppes and forest regions new importance.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn85|85]] Only now does the great territorial expanse assume its full value, making the lightning warfare traditionally favored and prepared for by the German high command more difficult than ever.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely in the field of the industrial apparatus built in preparation for the war where the Third Reich is confronted with even more bitter surprises, as shown in Hitler’s notes:&lt;br /&gt;
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November 29th, 1941:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“How is it possible that such a primitive people can reach such technical objectives in such a short period of time?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn86|86]]&lt;br /&gt;
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August 26th, 1942:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“With respect to Russia, it is incontestable that Stalin raised the standard of living. The Russian people don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t on the maps.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn87|87]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, it’s worthwhile to consult three scholars, each very different (one Russian and the two others Western). The first, who was director of the Soviet Institute of Military History and who participated in the militant anti-Stalinism of the Gorbachev years, appears motivated by the intention of furthering and radicalizing the investigations by the Khrushchev report. However, from the results of the study he feels obligated to formulate a much more nuanced judgment: without being an expert, much less the genius portrayed by official propaganda, even in the years before the start of the war, Stalin gives particular attention to issues of defense, the defense industry, and the war economy as a whole. Yes, at the strictly military level, only through effort and mistakes, including serious mistakes, and “thanks to the hard practice of daily military life,” he “gradually learns the principles of strategy.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn88|88]] In other fields, his thinking proves to be “more developed than many Soviet military leaders.” Thanks as well to the long experience of managing political power, Stalin never loses sight of the central role of the war economy and he contributed to strengthening the USSR’s resistance with the relocation of war industry to the interior: “it’s almost impossible to overestimate the importance of that enterprise.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn89|89]] Finally, the Soviet leader paid great attention to the moral-political dimension of the war. In that field, he “had totally unconventional ideas”, as shown by the “courageous military” decision “of celebrating the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7th of 1941, in a besieged Moscow harassed by the Nazi enemy.” In conclusion, one can say that, with respect to career military officers and his inner circle, “Stalin demonstrated his more universal mindset.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn90|90]] It is a mindset―we can add―that doesn’t neglect any of the smallest aspects of the life and morale of the soldiers: informed that they didn’t have cigarettes, and thanks as well to his ability to handle “an enormous workload”, “at a crucial moment in the battle of Stalingrad, [Stalin] found time to call Akaki Mgeladze, party chief in Abkhazia, the principal region for the production of tobacco: ‘Our soldiers can no longer smoke! Without cigarettes, the front won’t hold!’”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn91|91]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In their positive evaluation of Stalin as a military leader, two Western authors go further. While Khrushchev stresses the overwhelming initial successes of the Wehrmacht, the first of the aforementioned experts references these same facts in very different terms: it’s not shocking that the “largest invasion in military history” had achieved initial successes; the response of the Red Army after the devastating blows by the German invasion in June of 1941 was “the greatest feat of arms that the world had ever seen.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn92|92]] The second scholar, a professor at an American military academy, starting from the understanding of the conflict in terms of its long duration, the attention given to the rear and the front, its economic and political dimension, as well as the military aspect of the war, speaks of Stalin as a “great strategist”, and “the first true strategist of the twentieth century.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn93|93]] Obviously we can debate and qualify these flattering judgments; it’s true however, at least as it relates to the topic of war, that the evaluation made by Khrushchev loses all credibility.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more so because, at this crucial moment, the USSR proved itself quite prepared from another essential point of view. Let us again consult Goebbels, who upon explaining the unforeseen difficulties of Operation Barbarossa, points to another factor besides the enemy’s military power:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;For our men of confidence and our spies, it was almost impossible to penetrate the Soviet interior. We couldn’t get a precise overview. The Bolsheviks made a great effort in fooling us. Of the kinds of arms that they possessed, especially heavy weapons, we didn’t have a clue. It was the exact opposite to what had taken place in France, where we knew everything in practice and couldn’t be surprised in any way.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn94|94]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Lacking “Common Sense” and “The Mass Deportations of Entire Populations” ===&lt;br /&gt;
As the author of a book in 1913 that would earn him recognition as a theorist on the national question, and as the people’s commissar for nationalities not long after the October Revolution, Stalin had earned the recognition from such a diverse set of personalities as Arendt and De Gasperi for the way in which he had done his job. His thoughts on the national question had finally led to an essay on linguistics aimed at demonstrating that, far from disappearing after a determined social class is overthrown, the language of a nation has notable stability, just as a nation using it enjoys notable stability. That essay would also contribute to consolidating Stalin’s reputation as a theorist of the national question. Even in 1965, despite in the context of a strong condemnation of Stalin, Louis Althusser will attribute to him the merit of having opposed the “madness” that sought “at all costs to turn language into an” ideological “superstructure”: thanks to these “simple pages”―the French philosopher will conclude―”we understand that the use of the class criterion wasn’t without its limits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn95|95]] In the 1956 campaign to delegitimize and liquidate him, Khrushchev couldn’t ignore Stalin as a theorist and politician who paid particular attention to the national question. In condemning the “mass deportations of entire nationalities”, the Secret Report declares:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s not necessary to be a Marxist-Leninist to understand that any common-sense person would ask how is it possible to make entire nations responsible for hostile acts, without exception for women, children, elderly, communists and members of the Komsomol [communist youth], reaching the point of enforcing a generalized repression against them, sending them into misery and suffering without any other motive but vengeance for some crime perpetrated by individuals or isolated groups.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn96|96]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The horror of collective punishment and deportation imposed on populations suspected of lacking patriotic loyalty is beyond question. Sadly, far from referencing the madness of a single individual, this practice deeply characterizes the Second Thirty Years’ War, starting with Tsarist Russia that, although allied to the liberal West, experiences “a wave of deportations” of “dimensions unknown in Europe” during the First World War, in which around a million people are caught up (especially those of Jewish or Germanic origin).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn97|97]] Of lesser dimensions, but much more significant, are the measures during the Second World War that affect Japanese Americans, deported and enclosed in concentration camps (infra, ch. 4, § 7).&lt;br /&gt;
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The expulsion and deportation of entire populations, aside from having the aim of removing a potential fifth column, could be pursued for the purpose of remaking or redefining political geography. During the first half of the twentieth century, this practice is widespread across the planet, from the Middle East, where Jews who had just escaped the “final solution” force Arabs and Palestinians to flee, to as far as Asia, where the partition of the British Empire’s crown jewel into India and Pakistan is achieved through the “century’s largest forced migration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn98|98]] Sticking to the Asian continent for now, it&#039;s worthwhile to look at what happened in a region administered by a figure, or in the name of a figure (the fourteenth Dalai Lama), who would later obtain the Nobel Peace prize and become synonymous with non-violence: “In July of 1949, all the Han residents [there for many generations] in Lhasa were expelled from Tibet”, with the aim both to “confront the possible activity of a ‘fifth column’”, as well as to make its demographic make-up more homogeneous.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn99|99]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us is a practice not only realized in the most varied of geographic and political-cultural locations, but supported theoretically in those years by leading political figures. In 1938, David Ben Gurion, the eventual founding father of Israel, declared: “I am in favor of the forced relocation [of Arab Palestinians]; I see nothing immoral in this.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn100|100]] In fact, coherent to that program, he will put into practice ten years later.&lt;br /&gt;
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But here it’s necessary to concentrate our attention on East-Central Europe, where a little discussed tragedy takes place, yet it’s among the largest of the twentieth century. In total, around sixteen and a half million Germans were forced to abandon their homes, and two and a half million of them didn’t survive this enormous ethnic cleansing―or counter ethnic cleansing― operation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn101|101]] In this case it’s possible to make a direct comparison between Stalin on the one hand, and the Western and pro-Western statesmen on the other. What position did the latter take in that situation? As always, we’ll analyze it by beginning with a historiography that can’t be suspected of sympathies toward the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Starting in 1942, it was the British government that encouraged a generalized transfer of populations from the eastern German territories and from the Sudetenland [...]. It was the deputy under-secretary who went further than anyone else, in requesting an investigation to determine “if Great Britain should encourage the transfer to Siberia of the Germans from East Prussia and Upper Silesia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn102|102]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Speaking in the House of Common on December 15th, 1944, on the planned “transfer of several million” Germans, Churchill clarified his thinking as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From what we are able to understand, expulsion is the most satisfactory and long lasting solution. There will no longer be a mixing of populations provoking endless disorder, as happened in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. A clean cut will be made. I’m not alarmed by the expected separation of populations, nor am I alarmed by the massive relocations, which in modern conditions are much easier than they were in the past.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn103|103]]&lt;br /&gt;
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F.D. Roosevelt later adhered to the deportations plans in June of 1943; “almost at the same time Stalin gave into pressure from Beneš to expel the Germans from the Sudetenland upon its restoration to Czechoslovakia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn104|104]] An American historian comes to the following conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In the end, on the question of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and post-war Poland, in practice there wasn’t any difference between communist and non-communist politicians; on this issue Beneš and Gottwald, Mikolajczyk and Bierut, Stalin and Churchill all spoke the same language.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn105|105]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This conclusion is already enough to refute the black and white position implicit in the Khrushchev report. In truth, at least with regard to the Germans of Eastern Europe, it wasn’t Stalin who took the initiative with respect to the “mass deportations of entire peoples”, the blame was not given out in an equal manner. The same American historian just cited ends up recognizing this. In Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk expressed his conviction according to which “the Germans don’t have a soul, and the words they best understand are the bursts of a machine gun.&amp;amp;quot; Nor is this a remotely isolated attitude: “Even the Czech Catholic church made its voice heard. Monsignor Bohumil Stašek, the priest of Vyšehrad, declared: “After a thousand years, the moment has arrived to settle matters with the Germans, who are evil and for whom the commandment to ‘love your neighbor’ doesn’t apply.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn106|106]] In those circumstances, a German witness recalls: “We often had to seek help from the Russians against the Czechs, which the Russians frequently offered, so long as it didn’t involve laying a hand on a woman.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn107|107]] There’s more, however. Again we turn to the American historian: “In the former Nazi-camp of Theresienstadt, the interned Germans asked themselves what would have happened to them if the local Russian commander hadn’t protected them from the Czechs.&amp;amp;quot; A secret report sent to the central committee of the communist party in Moscow relayed requests made for the Soviet soldiers to stay: “‘if the Red Army leaves, we are finished’. The demonstrations of hate toward the Germans are evident. [The Czechs] don’t kill them but they torment them as if they were wild animals. They consider them animals.&#039;&#039; In effect―the American historian cited here continues―”the horrible treatment by the Czechs lead them to desperation. According to Czech statistics, in 1946 alone, 5,558 Germans committed suicide.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn108|108]] Something similar happens in Poland. In conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Germans thought the Russian military personnel were much more humane and responsible than the local Czechs and Polish. On occasions, the Russians gave food to hungry German children, while the Czechs would let them die of starvation. Sometimes, the Soviet troops gave a ride in their vehicles to exhausted Germans on the long journey to leave the country, while the Czechs only looked at them with disdain or indifference.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn109|109]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The American historians speaks generally of “Czechs” and “Polish”, but isn’t completely correct in doing so, as emerges in his very own account:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The question of the Germans’ expulsion caused serious problems for the Czech communists―as well as for communists in other countries. During the war, the communist position, as articulated by Georgi Dimitrov in Moscow, was that the Germans responsible for the war and for its crimes should be put on trial and condemned, while the German workers and peasants should be reeducated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn110|110]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, “in Czechoslovakia it was the communists, upon taking power in February of 1948, who put an end to the persecution of the few ethnic minorities who had remained.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn111|111]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Contrary to what Khrushchev insinuates, in comparison to the bourgeois leaders of Western and East-Central Europe, at least in this case, Stalin and the communist movement led by him prove to be less lacking in “common sense.”&lt;br /&gt;
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That was not by chance. While toward the end of the war F.D. Roosevelt insists he’s “more thirsty than ever for German blood” because of the atrocities they committed, and even entertains the idea, for some time, of “castrating” such a perverse people, Stalin’s position is quite different; and just after Operation Barbarossa is unleashed he states that the Soviet resistance can count on the support of “all the best men in Germany” and even the “German people under the command of Hitler’s officers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn112|112]] The statement made in February of 1942 is particularly solemn:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It would be ridiculous to see in the Hitlerite clique the German people or the German state. Historical experience proves that Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state, remains. The strength of the Red Army resides in the fact that it doesn’t nurture, nor could it nurture, any hatred toward other people, and therefore couldn’t even nurture hatred for the German people; it is educated in the spirit of the equality of all peoples and all races, in the spirit of respect for the rights of other peoples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn113|113]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even an uncompromising anti-communist like Ernst Nolte is forced to recognize that the position taken by the Soviet Union in relation to the German people doesn’t carry those racist tones that are sometimes found in the Western powers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn114|114]] To finish this point: if not equally distributed, the lack of “common sense” was quite widespread among the political leaders of the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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So far I have concentrated on the deportations caused by war or by the risk of war, or by the reorganization and revision of political geography. At least until the forties, in the United States, the deportations carried out in urban centers are widespread, urban centers that seek to be for whites only, as the posters warn upon entry. Aside from African Americans, Mexicans are also targeted, reclassified as non-whites in the 1930 census; thus “thousands of workers and their families, including many Americans of Mexican origin,” are deported to Mexico. The expulsion and deportation measures in the cities that seek to be “for whites only”, or “for Caucasians only”, don’t even spare Jews.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn115|115]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Secret Report depicts Stalin as a tyrant so lacking a sense of reality that, in taking collective measures against determined ethnic groups, he didn’t hesitate in punishing the innocent or even party comrades. What comes to mind is the case of the German exiles (the majority of them declared enemies of Hitler) who, soon after the war begins with Germany, are collectively confined to French concentration camps (infra, ch. 4, § 7). But it’s useless to search for any effort at a comparative analysis in Khrushchev’s speech.&lt;br /&gt;
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His goal is to upend two themes that until that moment had been widespread not only in official propaganda, but also in journalism and international public opinion: to transform the great leader―who had decisively contributed to the destruction of the Third Reich―into a foolish amateur who has trouble figuring out a world map; that this eminent theorist of the national question is revealed to have lacked the most elementary “common sense” in that field. The acknowledgements previously given to Stalin are all blamed on a cult of personality that now must be eliminated once and for all.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
The denunciation of the cult of personality is Khrushchev’s principal argument. However, in his report the question that ought to seem obligatory doesn’t show up: are we faced with the vanity or narcissism of a single political leader, or with a phenomenon of a more general character that takes hold in a determined, objective context? It may be interesting to read the observations made by Bukharin while in the United States, as they finalized the preparations for their entry into the First World War:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;So that the state machinery was as prepared as possible for military affairs, it itself became a military organization, which is commanded by a dictator. This dictator is president Wilson. Emergency powers were given to him. He has nearly absolute power. And in the people they seek to encourage submissiveness toward the “great president”, like in the Byzantine Empire of old where they deified their monarch.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn116|116]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In situations of acute crisis, the personalization of power is often combined with the veneration of the leader who holds power. When he arrives in France in December of 1918, the victorious American president is hailed as the savior and his Fourteen Points speech is compared to the Sermon on the Mount.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn117|117]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The political developments that take place in the United States between the Great Depression and the Second World War are worth considering. Having ascended to the presidency on the promise of solving a deeply troubling social-economic situation, F.D. Roosevelt is elected for four consecutive terms (although he died at the start of the fourth term), a unique case in the history of his country. Aside from the long duration of this presidency, what’s unusual are the hopes and expectations placed on it. Leading figures speak of a “national dictator” and invite the new president to demonstrate all his strength: “Become a tyrant, a despot, a true monarch. During the Great War we took our constitution and put it aside until the end of the war.&amp;amp;quot; The continuation of the state of emergency demands we don’t allow ourselves to be impeded by excessive legal scruples. The nation’s new leader is called upon to be, and is soon defined as, an “individual of providence”, that is, in the words of cardinal O’Connell: “a man sent by God.&amp;amp;quot; The average person writes to and expresses themselves to F.D. Roosevelt in even more emphatic terms, declaring that they look to him “almost as if they were looking to God” and hope to one day place him “in the immortal Pantheon, alongside Jesus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn118|118]] Invited to behave as a dictator or a man of providence, the new president makes ample use of his executive power from the first hours of his mandate. In his inaugural message he demands “ample executive power [...] as great as that which would be conceded to me if we were really invaded by a foreign enemy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn119|119]] With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, even before Pearl Harbor, F.D. Roosevelt begins, on his own initiative, dragging the country toward war on the side of Britain; subsequently, with a unilateral executive order, he imposes the confinement of all Japanese American citizens in concentration camps, including the women and children. It’s a presidency that, while it enjoys widespread popular support, leads to warnings of the danger of “totalitarianism”: this happens during the Great Depression (it’s former president Hoover in particular who makes that accusation)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn120|120]] and it especially happens in the months that precede the entry into the Second World War (when senator Burton K. Wheeler accuses F.D. Roosevelt of exercising dictatorial power and of promoting a “totalitarian form of government”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn121|121]] At least from the point of view of the president’s adversaries, totalitarianism and the cult of personality had crossed over the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the phenomenon that we are investigating here (the personalization of power and the cult of personality linked to it) is present only in embryonic form in the American Republic, protected by the ocean from any attempted invasion and with a political tradition quite different from Russia’s. One must concentrate on that country. Let’s see what happens between February and October of 1917, therefore, before the Bolshevik ascension to power. Driven by his personal vanity, but also by his desire to stabilize the situation, we find Kerensky “taking Napoleon as a model.&amp;amp;quot; He inspects the troops “with a hand tucked into the front of his jacket”; meanwhile “on the desk in his office in the war ministry stood a bust of the Emperor of the French.&amp;amp;quot; The results from this performance don’t take long: poetry paying homage to Kerensky as the new Napoleon flourish.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn122|122]] In the lead-up to the summer offensive, that was supposed to reverse the fortunes of the Russian army, the cult dedicated to Kerensky (in certain circles) reaches its high point:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Everywhere he was proclaimed a hero, the soldiers lifted him on their shoulders, showered him with flowers, throwing them at his feet. A British nurse had the opportunity to witness it, surprised at the scene of army men “kissing him, his car and the ground he walked on. Many fell to their knees and prayed, others cried.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn123|123]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, it doesn’t make much sense to blame Stalin’s narcissism, as Khrushchev does, for the exalted state that the cult of personality reaches in the USSR after a certain amount of time. In fact, when Kaganovich suggests substituting the term Marxism-Leninism for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the leader to whom that tribute is directed responds: “you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn124|124]] At least when compared to Kerensky, Stalin appears more modest. It’s confirmed by the attitude he takes in concluding a war that’s actually been won, not in his imagination like in the case of the Menshevik leader, the lover of Napoleonic poses. Immediately after the victory parade, a group of marshals reach out to Molotov and Malenkov: they propose to them the commemoration of the victory achieved in the Great Patriotic War by offering the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” to Stalin, who nonetheless rejects the offer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn125|125]] The Soviet leader also sought to escape rhetorical excesses on the occasion of the Potsdam Conference: “Both Churchill and Truman took their time walking among Berlin’s ruins; Stalin showed no such interest. Without drawing attention, he arrived by train, and even ordered Zhukov to cancel any welcoming ceremony with a military band and an honor guard.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn126|126]] Four years later, on the eve of his seventieth birthday, a conversation took place in the Kremlin that’s worth sharing:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;He [Stalin] called in Malenkov and warned him: “Don’t even think about honoring me again with a ‘star’.&amp;amp;quot; “But comrade Stalin, on an anniversary like this? The people would not understand.” “It’s not up to the people. I don’t want to argue. No personal initiative! Understand me?” “Of course, comrade Stalin, but the politburo members think…” Stalin interrupted Malenkov and declared the discussion closed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, one can say that in the circumstances referred to here political calculation plays a more or less important role (and it would be extremely odd if it didn’t); it’s a fact, however, that personal vanity didn’t win out. And even less so when decisions of vital political character are at stake: over the course of the Second World War, Stalin invites his colleagues to express themselves frankly, he actively argues and even fights with Molotov, who for his part, despite being careful so as not to put the hierarchy in doubt, remains unchanged in his opinion. Judging by the testimony of admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, the supreme leader “particularly appreciated those comrades who thought for themselves and didn’t hesitate in frankly expressing their point of view.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn127|127]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Interested as he is in pointing to Stalin as the only one responsible for the catastrophes that struck the USSR, far from eliminating the cult of personality, Khrushchev only transforms it into a negative cult. The vision based upon in principio erat Stalin [in the beginning there was Stalin] remains unshaken. Further, in confronting the most tragic chapter of the Soviet Union’s history (the terror and the bloody purges that were widespread and didn’t even spare the communist party itself), the Secret Report has no doubt: it’s a horror to be exclusively blamed on a person with a thirst for power and possessed by bloody paranoia.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;2. The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Russian Revolution and the Dialectic of Saturn ===&lt;br /&gt;
In the eyes of Khrushchev, Stalin is tarnished by the horrendous crimes against comrades from his own party, having deviated from Leninism and Bolshevism and having betrayed the ideals of socialism. But it’s precisely the reciprocal accusations of betrayal that contributed in a very important way to the tragedies which struck Soviet Russia; accusations that hasten or deepen the internal divisions in the leadership group from October 1917. How to explain these divisions? The dialectic of “Saturn devouring her own children” is certainly not a trait exclusive to the October Revolution: the consensus that presides over the overthrow of an old regime rejected by the majority of the people can inevitably crumble or wither at the moment in which they try to determine how the new order should be constructed. This is also true for the English and American Revolutions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn128|128]] But this dialectic in Russia is felt in a particularly violent and prolonged way. Even at the time of the Czarist autocracy’s collapse, while the attempts to restore the monarchy or to establish a military dictatorship persist, there’s a painful decision imposed on those who are determined to avoid a return to the past: to concentrate on peace first or, as the Mensheviks argue, to continue or even intensify the war efforts, rallying Russia behind the slogan of democratic interventionism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The consolidation of the Bolshevik victory in no way ends the dialectic of Saturn, which gets further intensified, in fact. Lenin’s call for the conquest of power and the revolution’s transformation in a socialist direction is considered an intolerable deviation from Marxism in the eyes of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who alert the Mensheviks to the situation and therefore invite upon themselves the accusation of betrayal from the majority of the Bolshevik party. It’s a debate that extends beyond Russia’s borders and the communist movement itself. The social democrats are the first to cry out against the scandalous abandonment of orthodoxy, which excluded the possibility of a socialist revolution in a country that hadn’t yet passed through full capitalist development; while both Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg condemned Lenin’s embrace of the slogan “land to the peasantry” as an abandonment of the path toward socialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Here, however, it’s worth concentrating on the divisions that occur within the Bolshevik leadership group itself. The millenarian expectations that arise from a combination of circumstances, both objective and subjective, explains the particularly devastating strength demonstrated by the dialectic of Saturn. Fear and indignation, universally shared, caused by the unspeakable carnage and conflict between different states as if it they were Moloch, determined to sacrifice millions and millions of men on the altar of national defense, when in reality they are competing in an imperialist race for world hegemony, all of this strengthens the demand for a completely new political and social order: it’s a matter of once and for all ripping out the roots from from which all the horrors since 1914 had emerged. Nurtured by a world view (which with Marx and Engels appears to call for a future without national borders, market relations, a state apparatus, and even judicial coercion) and by an almost religious approach to the texts of the communist movement’s founders, that demand could only be a disappointment once the structure of the new order begins to take form.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, well before being central to Trotsky’s thoughts and the criticisms he made, and after having already manifested itself during the collapse of the Tsarist autocracy, the theme of the revolution betrayed looms like a shadow over the history that begins with the Bolshevik rise to power. The accusation or the suspicion of betrayal emerges at every turn of this particularly tortured revolution, driven by the government’s need to reconsider some of the original utopian motives, and in any case forced to moderate their grand ambitions given the extreme difficulties of the objective situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first challenges faced by the new political order is that represented by the dissolution of the state apparatus and by the continued widespread anarchy among the peasantry (who lack any state or national vision, and are therefore quite indifferent to the plight of the cities, which lack any sources of food) inclined to establish short lived “peasant republics”; anarchy was also present among deserters, already hostile to all forms of discipline (as is confirmed by the rise of a “Free Republic of Deserters” in a district of Bessarabia). In this case, it’s Trotsky who’s labeled a traitor, who as leader of the army is on the front line in the restoration of centralized power and the very existence of the State: at this time it’s the peasantry, the deserters (among them deserters from the Red Army) and outcasts who lay claim to the “authentic” socialism and the “true” soviets, and who long for Lenin (who had endorsed or encouraged the revolt against state power) and who consider Trotsky and the Jews to be vile usurpers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn129|129]] One can place in that same context the revolt in 1921 by sailors in Kronstadt. From what it appears, on this occasion Stalin had spoken in favor of a more cautious approach, that is, waiting for the depletion of fuel and food provisions available to the besieged fortress; but in a situation in which the danger of civil war and intervention by counter-revolutionary powers had not yet vanished, a quick military solution ends up being imposed. Again, it’s Trotsky, the “police officer” or marshall, who is considered the “defender of bureaucratic organization”, “dictator”, and, in the last analysis, traitor to the original spirit of the revolution. Trotsky, for his part, suspects Zinoviev of having for weeks encouraged the agitation that then turns into a revolt, demagogically wielding the banner of “worker democracy [...] like in 1917.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn130|130]] Judging from these events, the first accusation of “betrayal” is an inevitable step in all revolutions, but it’s especially painful when it’s a revolution carried out in the name of the state’s withering away, from the moment of the old regime’s overthrow up until the construction of the new order, from the “libertarian” phase up until the “authoritarian” phase. Naturally, the accusation or suspicion of “betrayal” is tied to personal ambitions and the struggle for power.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Foreign Ministry “Closes Up Shop” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The jingoistic rhetoric and national hatreds, in part “spontaneous”, in part intentionally fanned, led to the nightmare of imperialist war. The need to put an end to all this takes on an all consuming importance. Thus, a totally unrealistic internationalism emerges in certain parts of the communist movement, which tends to dismiss different national identities as mere prejudices. Let’s see in what terms, at the start of 1918, Bukharin opposes not only the peace of Brest-Litovsk, but any attempt on the part of Soviet power to exploit the contradictions among the various imperialist powers, whether by stipulating agreements or doing deals with one or the other: “What are we doing? We are turning the party into a dung heap [...]. We always said [...] that sooner or later the Russian Revolution would have to clash with international capital. That moment has now come.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn131|131]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s easy to understand the deception and unease of Bukharin who nearly two years earlier―against a war to the last drop of blood between the great capitalist powers and between different nation states, and against the chauvinist turn by social democracy―had supported a vision of humanity finally united in brotherhood thanks to the “social revolution of the international proletariat, that through arms toppled the dictatorship of financial capital.&amp;amp;quot; With the defeat of “the socialist epigones of Marxism” (guilty of having forgotten or repressed “the well known thesis from the Communist Manifesto”, according to which “the workers have no fatherland”), “thus ends the final way of limiting the proletariat&#039;s conception of the world: the limitations of its nation state and its patriotism”; “the slogan for the abolition of state borders and the convergence of the peoples into a single socialist family.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn132|132]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not a matter of a single person’s illusions. Upon taking the position as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky would declare: “I shall publish some revolutionary decrees to the peoples of the world, then I will close up shop.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn133|133]] With the arrival of a unified humanity across the world following the ruins of war and a wave of global revolution, the ministry that would prove to be superfluous is that which would normally handle relations between different states. Compared to this enthusiastic perspective, reality and the political project―as revealed by the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, with the return of state and national borders and even the return of the state’s raison d&#039;être―must appear mediocre and disappointing! It’s not a small number of Bolshevik members and leaders who experience that event as the fall, or even the vile abandonment and betrayal of an entire world of ideals and hopes. Certainly, it would not be easy to resist Wilhelm II’s armies, but to make concessions to German imperialism just because the Russian peasantry, self absorbed in their own interests and ignorant of the responsibilities imposed on them by world revolution, refuse to continue fighting? Is that not proof of the nascent “peasant degeneration within our party and Soviet power”? Toward the end of 1924 Bukharin describes the common sentiments among “the ‘pure blooded’ left communists” and the “circles that sympathized with comrade Trotsky” during the Brest-Litovsk period: “comrade Riazanov stood out in particular, who at the time quit the party because, in his opinion, we had lost revolutionary purity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn134|134]] Apart from individual figures, there are important party organizations that declare: “In the interest of the international revolution, we judge it opportune to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power, which has now become something purely formal.&amp;amp;quot; They are “strange and monstrous” words from Lenin’s perspective,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn135|135]] who’s suspected and accused of treason, and even becomes the target of a coup plot by Bukharin, however vague it may have been.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn136|136]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All of the prestige and energy of the great revolutionary leader is needed to overcome the crisis. But it emerges again some years later. With the defeat of the central powers and the outbreak of revolution in Germany, Austria, Hungary and its potential outbreak in other countries, the outlook the Bolsheviks were forced to abandon with Brest-Litovsk appears to again acquire new vitality and relevance. At the conclusion to the First Congress of the Communist International, it’s Lenin himself who declares: “The victory of the worldwide proletarian revolution is guaranteed. The founding of the International Soviet Republic draws near.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn137|137]] Therefore, the imminent defeat of capitalism around the world would have been rapidly followed by the fusion of different nations and different states into a single entity: again, the foreign ministry was about to become superfluous!&lt;br /&gt;
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The twilight of that illusion coincides with Lenin’s illness and death. The new crisis is even more serious because now, inside the Bolshevik party, there’s no indisputable authority. From the point of view of Trotsky, his allies, and his followers, there can be no doubt: what had dictated the choice of “socialism in one country” and the consequent neglect of the idea of world revolution, wasn’t political realism and a calculation of the balance of forces, but bureaucracy, opportunism, cowardice, and in the last analysis, betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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The first to face this accusation is Stalin, who from the start had dedicated special attention to the national question, looking toward the victory of the revolution at an international level, but thinking first of Russia. Between February and October of 1917, he had presented the proletarian revolution not only as the necessary instrument to build the new social order, but to also reaffirm Russia’s national independence. The Entente tried to force Russia, through all possible means, to continue fighting and bleeding, and similarly tried to transform it into some type of “colony of Britain, America and France”; worse yet, they behaved in Russia as if they were “in Central Africa”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn138|138]] complicit in this operation were the Mensheviks, who with their insistence on the war’s continuation, accepted the imperialist &#039;&#039;diktat&#039;&#039;, and were open to the “gradual sale of Russia to the foreign capitalists”, leading the country “to ruin” and revealing themselves, therefore, as the true “traitors” to the nation. Against all this, the completion of the revolution not only promoted the emancipation of the popular classes, but cleared “the way to the effective liberation of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn139|139]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After October, the counter-revolution, unleashed by the Whites and supported or encouraged by the Entente, was also defeated due to the appeal to the Russian people by the Bolsheviks to resist the invasion by the imperialist powers determined to reduce Russia to a colony or semi-colony of the West; it’s for that reason even officers from the nobility had given their support to the new Soviet order.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn140|140]] And Stalin had distinguished himself once again in promoting this line, describing the situation during the civil war as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A victory by Denikin and Kolchak means the loss of Russia’s independence, the transformation of Russia into a rich source of money for the Anglo-French capitalists. In that sense, the Denikin-Kolchak government is the most anti-popular and anti-national government. In that sense, the soviet government is the only popular and national government in the best meaning of this term, because it carries with it not only the liberation of the workers from capital, but also the liberation of all of Russia from the yoke of world imperialism, and the transformation of Russia from a colony into a free and independent country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn141|141]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the battlefield, “Russian officers who’ve sold out, who’ve forgotten Russia, who have lost their honor and are ready to switch to the side of the enemy of workers’ and peasants’ Russia” confront soldiers of the Red Army, who are aware that “they fight not for capitalist profit, but for the liberation of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn142|142]] From this perspective, the social struggle and the national struggle are interlinked: replacing “imperialist unity” (that’s to say the unity based on national oppression) with a unity founded on the recognition of the principle of equality between nations. The new Soviet Russia had put an end to the “disintegration” and the “complete ruin” represented by the old Tsarist Russia; at the same time, while increasing its “strength” and its “weight”, the new Soviet Russia had contributed to the weakening of imperialism and the victory of the revolution around the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn143|143]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, when the course of the civil war and the struggle against foreign intervention started to improve, illusions had taken hold about a rapid expansion of socialism in the wake of the Red Army’s successes, and its advance far beyond the borders established in Brest-Litovsk. Due to his realism and profound sensitivity to the national question, Stalin noted the dangers that would arise from entering far into Polish territory:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The rear of the Polish armies [...] differ notably to those of Kolchak and Denikin, to Poland’s great advantage. Different from the rearguard of Kolchak and Denikin, the Polish troops are homogeneous and have a single nationality. From there arises their unity and stability. “Patriotic sentiment” prevails in the spirit of their people, which reaches the frontlines in a number of ways, creating a sense of national unity and steadfastness among the troops.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, it was one thing to defeat in Russia an enemy discredited in national terms, but it was another matter to confront outside of Russia a nationally motivated enemy. Therefore, proclamations in favor of a “march on Warsaw”, and the declarations according to which one could “only accept a ‘red and soviet Warsaw’”, were expressions of empty “bluster” and a “self satisfaction damaging to the cause.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn144|144]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The failed attempt to export socialism to Poland, that until not long before had been part of the Tsarist empire, had strengthened Stalin’s convictions. In 1929, he pointed to a phenomenon in large part unexpected by the protagonists of the October Revolution: “the stability of nations is tremendously solid.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn145|145]] They appear destined to be a vital force for a long time in history. As a consequence, for a long period of time humanity would have to remain divided not only between different social systems, but also between different linguistic, cultural and national identities. What relations would have to be established between them? In 1936, in an interview with Roy Howard (of the Times), Stalin states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Exporting revolution is nonsense. Each country can have its revolution if it wishes, but if it doesn’t want it, there won’t be a revolution. Our country wanted to have a revolution and it did.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outraged, Trotsky comments:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We cite word by word. The theory of revolution in one country is the natural next step after the theory of socialism in one country [...]. We have proclaimed an infinite number of times that the proletariat in the country with the victorious revolution is morally obligated to help the revolting and oppressed classes, and not only in the realm of ideas, but also with weapons, if possible. And we haven’t limited ourselves to declaring it. We have defended with weapons the workers of Finland, Estonia and Georgia. We tried, by marching on Warsaw with the Red Army, to offer the Polish proletariat the opportunity to have an insurrection.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn146|146]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Having exhausted the vision of an “International Soviet Republic”, and with it the final disappearance of state and national borders, Stalin makes use of the principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. But this new principle, that was the result of a learning process and that guaranteed the Soviet Union the right to independence in a world that was hostile and militarily stronger, in the eyes of Trotsky appeared to be a betrayal of proletarian internationalism, as well as the abandonment of the duty of mutual and active solidarity between the oppressed and exploited around the whole world. His polemic against the political turn is unending, against the transformation of the initial “internationalist revolutionary” program into a “conservative-national” program; against “the national pacifist foreign policy of the Soviet government”; against ignoring the principle based on the idea that a single workers state should alone carry out the role of “leading the world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn147|147]] In any case, since the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism is impossible, “a socialist state can’t peacefully integrate and develop (&#039;&#039;hineinwashsen&#039;&#039;) within a world capitalist system.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a position that Trotsky stresses still in 1940: it would have been better not to have started the war against Finland, but once started, it should have been “seen through until the end, that is, until the sovietization of Finland.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn148|148]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The End of “the Money Economy” and “Market Morality” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The dialectic of Saturn is demonstrated in a number of other political and social settings. Internally, how should equality be understood by the regime born out of the October Revolution and that was called upon to realize it? War and hardship had produced a “communism” founded on the more or less egalitarian distribution of quite miserable food rations. With respect to that practice and the ideology that had developed upon it, the NEP [New Economic Policy] was an upsetting shock, with the emergence of new and stark inequalities, made possible by the toleration of certain sectors of the capitalist economy. The sense of “betrayal” is a widespread phenomenon, and it heavily affects the Bolshevik party: “In 1921 and 1922, literally tens of thousands of Bolshevik workers ripped up their membership cards, so disgusted by the NEP they had renamed it the New Extortion of the Proletariat.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn149|149]] Outside of Soviet Russia, we see a French communist leader accept the radical change, but not without adding, while writing in &#039;&#039;L’Humanité&#039;&#039;: “The NEP has brought with it some of the capitalist rot that had completely disappeared during war communism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn150|150]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At times, one has the impression that it’s not specific aspects of the economic reality that are looked at with distrust or indignation, but that very reality as a whole. It’s necessary not to lose sight of the millenarian expectations that characterize revolution for the lower strata of the people, and which persist after a crisis of long duration. In France 1789, even before the storming of the Bastille, the meeting of the Estates General and the agitation by the third estate awaken “the popular spirit of the old millenarism, the anxious expectations for the revenge of the poor and the happiness of the humiliated: it will deeply permeate the revolutionary mentality.&amp;amp;quot; In Russia, driven by tsarist oppression and especially by the horrors of the First World War, millenarism had already demonstrated its strength during the February Revolution. Welcoming it as the Easter Resurrection, Christian circles and important sections of Russian society had expected a complete transformation, with the emergence of an intimately unified community and with the disappearance of the division between rich and poor, even theft, lies, gambling, blasphemy, and drunkenness.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn151|151]] Disillusioned with the Menshevik program and by the continuation of the war and its carnage, these millenarian expectations had ultimately brought no small number of supporters to the Bolshevik cause.&lt;br /&gt;
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For example, that’s the case with Pierre Pascal, a French catholic who will later be deeply disappointed with the move toward NEP, although he had initially welcomed the events of October 1917 as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s the realization of Psalm Four from Sunday Vespers and the Magnificat: the powerful are toppled from their thrones and the poor are rescued from misery [...] There’s no longer any rich, only the poor and the very poor. Knowledge does not confer privilege or respect. The former worker promoted to manager gives orders to the engineers. The gap between higher and lower salaries is narrowed. The right to property is reduced to personal possessions. The judge is no longer obligated to apply the law if his sense of proletarian equality contradicts it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn152|152]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon reading this fragment Marx’s affirmation comes to mind, according to which there’s “nothing easier than to give Christian asceticism a socialist tinge.&amp;amp;quot; One shouldn’t think that this vision exists only within openly religious circles. As always, the Manifesto of the Communist Party notes that the “first proletariat movements” are often characterized by demands along the lines of “a universal asceticism and a rough egalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn153|153]] It’s what takes place in Russia after the catastrophe of the First World War. In the 1940s, a Bolshevik effectively describes the pervading spiritual climate in the period immediately following the October Revolution, having emerged from a war caused by imperialist competition to plunder the colonies, the drive to conquer new markets and natural resources, and by the capitalist search for profits and super profits:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We, communist youths, all grew up with the conviction that money would disappear once and for all [...]. If money returned, wouldn’t the rich also reappear? Would we not find ourselves on a slippery slope that leads us to capitalism?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn154|154]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a spiritual climate that’s also expressed in the work of eminent Western philosophers. In 1918, the young Bloch invites the Soviets to put an end not only to “all private economic activity”, but also the entire “money economy”, and with it the “market morality that blesses all the evil that there is in man.&amp;amp;quot; Only by liquidating such rottenness in its entirety was it possible to once and for all end the pursuit of wealth and domination, the conquest of colonies and hegemony, that lead to the catastrophe of war. On publishing in 1923 the second edition of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of Utopia&#039;&#039;, Bloch considers it opportune to remove those previously cited excerpts marked by millenarianism. However, the state of mind and the vision that had inspired them didn’t disappear, not in the Soviet Union or outside it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn155|155]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While on the one hand they attenuate it, this moral crisis is nonetheless reignited by the healing of the wounds opened by the First World War and the two civil wars (against the Whites and the kulaks), as well as by the economic recovery. Especially after the completion of the collectivization of agriculture and the consolidation of the new regime, it’s no longer possible to blame the remnants of capitalism or the danger of an immediate collapse to explain the continued differences in wages. Were they to be tolerated, and to what point?&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;, Hegel demonstrates the aporia contained in the idea of material equality that’s rooted in the demand for a “community of goods.&amp;amp;quot; When an equal satisfaction of the different needs of individuals is put into practice, it’s obvious that the result will be an inequality in relation to the “quota of participation”, in other words, the distribution of goods; if there’s an “equal distribution” of goods, however, then it’s obvious that the “satisfaction of necessities” for individuals become unequal (as needs are always different). In any case, the “community of goods” is unable to maintain the promise of material equality. Marx, who was quite familiar with &#039;&#039;Phenomenology&#039;&#039;, solves the problem (in the &#039;&#039;Critique of the Gotha Programme&#039;&#039;) by matching the two different approaches to rejecting “equality” (which always seemed partial and limited) to two different phases of development in the post-capitalist society: in the socialist phase distribution is according to “equal right”, in other words, redistribution according to the same measurement of work realized by each individual. It’s always different for each individual, producing an evident inequality in total redistribution and in income; in that sense, “equal right” is nothing else but the “right to inequality.&amp;amp;quot; In the communist phase, the equal satisfaction of different needs also brings with it an inequality in the distribution of resources, except that the enormous development of the productive forces, completely satisfying the needs of all, makes such inequalities lose their importance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn156|156]] In other words, in socialism material equality is not possible; in communism it no longer has any meaning. With the permanence of inequality in the distribution of resources, the transition from unequal satisfaction to equal satisfaction presupposes, aside from the overthrow of capitalism, the prodigious development of the productive forces, and this can be achieved solely through the affirmation, during the socialist stage, of the principle of redistribution to every individual based on the different work carried out by them. It’s here that Marx’s insistence arises on the fact that, once having seized power, the proletariat is called upon to commit themselves to the development of the productive forces, in addition to committing themselves to the transformation of social relations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn157|157]] On the other hand, however, in praising the Paris working class for confronting the French bourgeoisie, which enjoys its luxuries while it carries out a bloody repression, Marx highlights a measure approved by the Commune as a model : “public service had to be done at workman’s wage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn158|158]] In that case, redistributive and material equality becomes an objective of a socialist society.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not easy to reconcile those two perspectives, and their divergence will play a non-negligible role in irremediably dividing the Bolshevik party’s leaders. As it’s consolidated, Soviet power is forced to address the growing problem of economic development, for the purpose of establishing social consensus and achieving national legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people, as well as a means to defend “the homeland of socialism” from the threats growing on the horizon. Referring to the polemic already found in the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;, against “universal asceticism” and its “egalitarian tinge”, Stalin insists: “It’s time to understand that Marxism is the enemy of egalitarianism”, The equality achieved by socialism consists in the elimination of class exploitation, certainly not in the imposition of uniformity and equalization, which is what religious primitivism aspires to:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Leveling in the context of necessities and personal life is a reactionary and petty-bourgeois absurdity, worthy of any primitive ascetic sect, but not for a socialist society organized in the Marxist spirit, because one can’t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model [...]. In terms of equality, Marxism no longer understands it as leveling in the context of personal necessities and living standards, but as the elimination of classes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn159|159]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Religious primitivism can only be expressed through the aspiration for a communal life, in which individual differences are meant to disappear, with serious damage to the development of the productive forces as well:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The idealization of agricultural communes was encouraged at a certain time, going as far as to introduce workshops and factories into the communes, where skilled and unskilled workers, working each according to their vocation, had to put their salary in the common fund, and later divide it in equal parts. It’s well known how much damage was caused for our industry by these puerile exercises in leveling due to “left” bunglers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn160|160]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin’s long term objective is quite ambitious, both at the social and national level: “To make our Soviet society the society with the greatest standard of living”; to complete the “transformation of our country into the most advanced country”; but to achieve this result “it’s necessary that in our country labor productivity surpass the labor productivity of the most advanced capitalist countries”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn161|161]] which once again requires material incentives in addition to moral incentives, and therefore the need to overcome that egalitarianism, considered by the Soviet leader to be crude and mechanistic.&lt;br /&gt;
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And again, and more than ever, the religious primitivism makes itself felt, with its distrust not only in relation to difference in income, but above all else in relation to wealth as such: “if everyone becomes rich and the poor cease to exist, who will then have need of the Bolsheviks and our work?”: thus, according to Stalin, argue the “‘left’ bunglers who idealize the poor peasants as the eternal supporters of Bolshevism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn162|162]] This causes us to think of the critical observations developed by Hegel with regards to the evangelical commandment that obligates one to help the poor. Losing sight of the fact that it’s “a conditional rule”, and instead absolutizing it, Christians then end up absolutizing poverty, which alone can give meaning to the rule that demands aid to the poor. Instead, the quality of aid to the poor ought to be measured by the contribution given to overcoming poverty as such..[[footnotes.xhtml#fn163|163]] In the state of horror caused by capitalism’s butchery and by the &#039;&#039;auri sacra fames&#039;&#039;, a religious distrust for gold and wealth as such is created, and the idealization of misery, or at least of scarcity, understood and experienced as an expression of spiritual fulfillment or of revolutionary rigor. And Stalin feels obligated to stress a key point: “It would be stupid to think that socialism can be built on top of misery and deprivation, by reducing personal needs and everyone’s standard of living to that of the poor”; on the contrary, “socialism can be built only on the basis of a relentless development of society’s productive forces” and “on the basis of a comfortable life for the workers”, or better yet, “a comfortable and civilized life for all members of society.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn164|164]] Just like the Christian doctrine of helping the poor, the revolutionary doctrine, that insists that communist parties first place themselves among the exploited and the poor, is also “conditioned”, and it is only taken seriously once it is understood for its conditionality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, for Stalin it was necessary to intensify efforts with the aim of decisively increasing social wealth, adding “new energy” to “socialist emulation”; it would demand resorting to both material incentives (making use of the socialist principle of redistribution according to work) as well as moral incentives (for example, granting “the highest honor” to the most eminent Stakhanovites).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn165|165]] Both different and opposed is Trotsky’s orientation: in “restoring ranks and decorations” and in liquidating “socialist equality” as such, the bureaucracy also lays the groundwork for changes in “property relations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn166|166]] While Stalin explicitly makes reference to the polemic from the Manifesto against a socialism understood as synonymous with “universal asceticism” and “crude egalitarianism”, the left opposition knowingly and unknowingly makes use of the thesis found in &#039;&#039;The Civil War in France&#039;&#039;, according to which even the highest ranking leaders should be paid according to “workers salaries.&amp;amp;quot; Trotsky insists that, to justify their privileges, the bureaucracy and Stalin mistakenly reference the &#039;&#039;Critique of the Gotha Program&#039;&#039;: “Marx didn’t speak of creating a new inequality, but in the gradual elimination of inequalities in income, preferable to its abrupt elimination.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn167|167]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Based on that political line (the leveling of wages both in the factories and in the state apparatus), it was quite difficult to promote the development of the productive forces, and Stalin stressed that salary differentiation did not mean the restoration of capitalism. It was necessary not to confuse social differences that exist within the new regime with the old antagonism between exploiting classes and exploited classes. But from Trotsky’s perspective, it was a clumsy simplification: “the contrast between misery and luxury is all too apparent in the urban centers.&amp;amp;quot; In conclusion:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Whether “radical” or “superficial”, the differences between the worker aristocracy and the proletarian masses matter little from the perspective of Stalinist sociology; in any case, it’s this difference that gave birth in its time to the need to break with social democracy and to found the Third International.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn168|168]]&lt;br /&gt;
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According to Marx, socialism was also called upon to overcome the distinction between intellectual and manual labor. Here again the problem would reappear: how to achieve such an ambitious objective? And once again the Bolshevik leadership group is divided; in this case as well, the stance elaborated by Stalin in the thirties stands out for its caution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;There are some who think that the suppression of the antagonism between intellectual labor and physical labor can be achieved through a certain cultural and technical leveling of intellectual and manual workers, that it could be attained by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and specialists, of the intellectual workers, and even the level of moderately skilled workers. That is absolutely wrong.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn169|169]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Instead, it’s a matter of encouraging access to education for all social strata who had been excluded up until then. On the opposing side, Trotsky recognized that there had been a process of “training scientific cadre originating from the people”, and yet he claimed: “The social gap between manual and intellectual labor has increased during the last few years instead of decreasing.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn170|170]] The continuation of the division of labor and the continuation of social and economic inequalities were two sides of the same coin; in other words, it’s the return of capitalist exploitation and, therefore, of the complete betrayal of socialist ideals:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The new constitution, in declaring that “exploitation of man by man is abolished in the USSR”, says the opposite of the truth. The new social differentiation created the conditions for a rebirth of exploitation under the most barbaric forms, like the hiring of a man for another’s personal service. Servants are not counted in the census, having evidently been included under the category of “workers.&amp;amp;quot; The following questions are not made: does the Soviet citizen have servants and what kind (maid, cook, nurse, governess, driver)? Do you have an automobile? How many rooms do you have? Nor does it even speak of the amount of their salary! If the Soviet rule that deprived political rights to those who exploited the work of others was restored, you would suddenly see that the top leaders of Soviet society ought to be deprived of their constitutional rights! Fortunately, a complete equality has been established… between master and servant.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn171|171]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, the very presence of the “maid” as a social figure, and the servant in general, was synonymous not only with exploitation, but “exploitation under its most barbaric forms”; and how do you explain the continuation or the reemergence in the USSR of such relations, if not by the abandonment of an authentically socialist perspective, in other words, by betrayal?&lt;br /&gt;
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The long reach of millenarianism, certainly already implicit in Marx’s more utopian thinking, but frighteningly increased in reaction to the horrors of the First World War, continues to make itself felt. In his Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress of the CPSU (January 26th, 1934), Stalin feels it necessary to warn against “the leftist chatter, that in part exists among our militants, according to which Soviet commerce is a stage that’s been surpassed, and that money should soon be abolished.&amp;amp;quot; Those who make that argument, “with their haughty attitude toward Soviet commerce, don’t express a Bolshevik point of view, but a point of view belonging to decadent nobles, full of pretensions, but without a cent in their pocket.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn172|172]] While Trotsky doesn’t miss the opportunity to condemn the previously mentioned “economic adventurism” rejected by Stalin, he still mocks the “rehabilitation of the ruble” and the return of “bourgeois methods of distribution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn173|173]] In any case, he insists that they are destined to disappear under communism, together with the state, but also “money” and markets in all their forms.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn174|174]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “No More Distinctions Between Yours and Mine”: The Disappearance of the Family ===&lt;br /&gt;
Along with imperialism and capitalism, the October Revolution was called upon to put an end to the oppression of women. To make possible their equal participation in social and political life, it was necessary to liberate them by developing social services as much as possible, by freeing them from domestic reclusion and a division of labor that humiliated and hampered them; the criticism of traditional morality and its duplicity would then guarantee sexual emancipation for women as well, up until that time reserved―though in a partial and distorted form―to men alone. Following these grand transformations, would the family institution still have meaning, or was it destined to disappear? Alexandra Kollontai has no doubts: “the family is no longer necessary.&amp;amp;quot; It was thrown into crisis by women’s complete emancipation, and by the spontaneity and “fluidity” that now characterize sexual relations. The family, aside from inconvenient, also proves to be superfluous: “the raising of children passes gradually into the hands of society.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, there was no cause for despair: the family was a privileged place for the cultivation of egotism, going hand in hand with the attachment to private property. In conclusion: “The socially conscious mother will revolt to the point of no longer making a distinction between yours and mine and, therefore, remembering that there are only &#039;&#039;our&#039;&#039; children, the children of communist Russia and its workers.&amp;amp;quot; These ideas are strongly criticized by the Bolshevik leadership group in its entirety. In particular, in a speech in 1923, Trotsky wisely notes that such a vision ignored “the responsibility of the father and mother toward their child”, thus encouraging the neglect of children and, therefore, worsening a scourge that was already widespread in Moscow during those years.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn175|175]] However, in one form or another, those ideas were “quite popular within party circles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn176|176]] Even at the start of the 1930s, a close collaborator of Stalin’s, namely Kaganovich, is forced to confront them. We turn to his biographer:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Despite completely adhering to the principle of women’s liberation, Kaganovich vehemently charged against extremist positions that sought the elimination of individual kitchens and wanted forced cohabitation in communes. Sabsovich, one of the leftist planners, had even proposed ending all spaces of cohabitation between husband and wife, with the exception of a small bedroom at night. He pushed the idea of large beehive like structures for two thousand people with all the services shared to encourage the “communal spirit” and suppress the bourgeois family unit.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn177|177]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Kaganovich’s (and Stalin’s) position drew strong criticism from Trotsky, who at that time was the opposition’s leader: “The totally recent cult to the Soviet family did not fall from the sky. The privileges that can’t be bequeathed to children lose half their value. Now, the right to leave inheritance is inseparable from that of private property.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn178|178]] Therefore, the restoration of the family institution (and the rejection of the commune destined to absorb and dissolve them) meant the defense of the right to inheritance and the right to property, and consequently takes on a clear counter-revolutionary meaning. In fact, by a “divine coincidence”―Trotsky mocks―”the solemn rehabilitation of the family” takes place at the same time that money becomes respected again; “the family is reborn at the same time in which the coercive role of the ruble is reaffirmed.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn179|179]] The consecration of marital fidelity goes hand in hand with the consecration of private property: to put it in religious terms, “the Fifth Commandment comes back into force at the same time as the Seventh, without invoking divine authority, for now.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn180|180]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, when looking closely, that invocation already appears on the horizon. In his speech on the drafting of the Constitution of 1936, Stalin criticizes those who want “to prohibit the holding of religious ceremonies” and “deprive clergymen of their right to vote.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn181|181]] And again Trotsky intervenes to denounce that unacceptable retreat with respect to the initial project for the definitive liberation of society from the shackles of superstition: “The assault on the heavens has ceased [...]. Worried about their good reputation, the bureaucracy ordered the atheist youths to hand over their weapons and get on with reading. It’s only the start. A regime of ironic neutrality is being slowly instituted with regards to religion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn182|182]] Along with the family, the right to inheritance and to property, the opiate of the masses that Marx spoke of can’t be allowed to return.&lt;br /&gt;
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Behind this new chapter scrutinizing the revolution’s “betrayal” is the dialectic we came across earlier. Doing away with the bourgeois family, its ingrained prejudices, and its dead laws, the revolution would have allowed love, freedom, and spontaneity into a previously private space. And yet, it’s interesting to note that what causes Trotsky’s protests and anger was still the idea of a juridical regulation of family relations:&lt;br /&gt;
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The authentic socialist family, freed by society from the heavy and humiliating daily burdens, will not need any regulation, and the very idea of laws on divorce or abortion will be no more than the memory of houses of pleasure or of human sacrifice.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn183|183]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Condemnation of “Führerpolitik”, or the “Transformation of Power into Love” ===&lt;br /&gt;
Therefore, more than the concept of family (and the right to inheritance and to property) and the religious consecration of power (of the family head and the property owner), Trotsky’s polemic attacks the question of society’s juridical organization as a whole, the question of the state. It’s the central question on which all the different questions previously analyzed converge: predicted by Marx after the overthrow of capitalism, when and under what conditions can the process of the state’s withering away begin? The victorious proletariat―&#039;&#039;The State and Revolution&#039;&#039; affirms on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution―”only has need of a State in the process of withering away”; however, carrying out an enormous wave of nationalizations, the new power gives an unprecedented impulse to the expansion of the state apparatus. In other words, as they move towards building a new society, Lenin is forced, whether consciously or not, to move increasingly further away from anarchism (and the positions he had initially taken). To better understand this, it’s enough to look at an important intervention―&#039;&#039;Better Fewer, but Better&#039;&#039;―published in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; on March 4th, 1923. What immediately stands out are the new slogans: “to improve our state apparatus”, seriously committing to the “construction of the state”, “to construct a truly new apparatus that truly deserves the socialist and soviet name”, to improve “administrative work” and to do all this without hesitation, learning from “Western Europe’s best examples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn184|184]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But does massively expanding the state apparatus and focusing on the question of its improvement not mean, in fact, renouncing the ideal of the state’s withering away? Of course, the realization of that ideal can be delayed to a far distant future, but meanwhile, how should state owned property be managed, which had now experienced an enormous expansion, and what forms should state power take on in Soviet Russia as a whole? Even in &#039;&#039;The State and Revolution&#039;&#039;, written at a moment when Lenin was harsh, and couldn’t not be, in his denunciation of the representative regimes responsible for the war, we can read that even the most developed democracy can’t do without “representative institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn185|185]] Meanwhile, the expectation for the withering away of the state continues to fuel distrust in relation to the idea of representation, at the exact same time that the leaders of Soviet Russia increase the number of representative bodies (as the soviets undoubtedly are), not even neglecting a second and third level of representation: the soviets from a lower level elect their delegates to the soviet at the higher level. It would not take long for the controversy to break out.&lt;br /&gt;
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The question of reestablishing order and the revitalization of the productive apparatus, with its recognized link to the principle of competency, is also raised in the factories: from the new regime’s beginning, social and political circles hesitant about the changes denounce the rise to power of “bourgeois specialists” and a “new bourgeoisie”, and again the target of their criticism is Trotsky, who at that time occupies a very prominent role in the leadership of the state-military apparatus.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn186|186]] It’s a controversy that extends beyond Russia. There’s significant criticism directed at Gramsci, who celebrated the new state that’s taking form in the birthplace of the October Revolution, and pays tribute to the Bolsheviks for being “an aristocracy of statesmen”, and Lenin for being “the greatest statesman in contemporary Europe.&amp;amp;quot; They knew how to put an end to the “profound abyss of misery, barbarity, anarchy, and disorder” created “by a long and disastrous war.&amp;amp;quot; But―an anarchist objects―”that apology, full of lyrical praise” for the state, “statolatry”, and the “authoritarian, legalistic, parliamentarian state socialism” is in contradiction with the Soviet constitution itself, committed to installing a regime under which “there will no longer be class divisions, &#039;&#039;nor state power&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn187|187]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only openly declared anarchist circles and authors who adopt a critical position. Even supporters of the international communist movement express their clear dissatisfaction, disappointment and dissension. Let’s turn to one of them, namely Pannekoek, who is no longer able to identify with the Bolshevik political program: “specialists and managers in the factories exercise a power greater than that which should be compatible with communist development [...]. From among the new managers and administrators emerges a new bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn188|188]] “The bureaucracy”, the Workers Opposition Platform in Russia insists in the following year, “is a direct negation of mass action”; unfortunately, it’s an “ailment” that “has now invaded the most intimate fibers of our party and our Soviet institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn189|189]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Beyond Russia, such criticisms are also directed at the West. They call for an end “to the bourgeois representative system, to parliamentarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn190|190]] More so than the Bolshevik dictatorship, the target of condemnation is the principle of representation. Yes, “that someone decides your destiny, that is the essence of bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn191|191]] The degeneration of Soviet Russia resides in the fact that a single person takes charge of a determined position: “individual management” is taking the place of “collective management” in the factories, and at all levels; and this “is a product of the individualistic mentality of the bourgeois class” and “fundamentally” expresses “an unlimited and remote free will, unbound by the collective.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn192|192]] Rather than “mass politics” (&#039;&#039;Massenpolitik&#039;&#039;), the Third International now “practices top-down politics” (&#039;&#039;Führerpolitik&#039;&#039;).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn193|193]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, the accusation of betrayal to the original ideals, more than being directed at abuse of power, is directed against the organs of power, founded on the distinction/opposition between leaders and those who are led, and therefore founded to the exclusion of direct action and “mass politics.&amp;amp;quot; While the soviets are not free of suspicion, explicit is the disgust directed toward parliament, unions, and parties, sometimes even the communist party that is itself based on the principle of representation, and therefore infected by the bureaucratic virus. Ultimately, more so than organs of powers, it is power itself that is the subject of criticism. “It’s the curse of workers power: having barely taken some ‘power’, it seeks to increase that power through unprincipled means.&amp;amp;quot; Thus, it ceases to be “pure”: it’s what happens to German social democracy, and it’s also what’s happening to the Third International.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn194|194]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can place the young Bloch in this context; apart from overcoming the market economy, the mercantile spirit and of money itself, he also hopes the revolution and the soviets “transform power into love.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn195|195]] While the German philosopher, in removing these lines and unrealistic expectations from the second edition of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of Utopia&#039;&#039;, distances himself from the most millenarian aspects of his thinking, there are none too few communists, in Soviet Russia and outside it, who ultimately cry out in outrage because the miracle of the “transformation of power into love” doesn’t take place.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first years of Soviet Russia, more so than with Stalin, the anti-”bureaucratic” polemic primarily attacks Lenin and even Trotsky, included among the most prominent “defenders and crusaders of the bureaucracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn196|196]] The situation noticeable changes in the following years. Before even considering its contents, the approval of the constitution of 1936 alone represents a radical change, just for the fact of breaking with anarchist notions stubbornly attached to the ideal of the withering away of the state, on the basis of which “laws are the opiate of the masses” and “the very idea of a constitution is bourgeois.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn197|197]] In Stalin’s words, the constitution of 1936 “does not stop at determining the formal rights of citizens, but shifts the focus toward guaranteeing these rights, toward the means of exercising these rights.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn198|198]] Although insufficient and not constituting its key aspect, the “formal” guarantee of rights doesn’t appear to be irrelevant here. With satisfaction, Stalin stresses the fact that the new constitution “guaranteed the application of universal suffrage, direct and equal, with secret ballot voting.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn199|199]] But it’s precisely this point that draws Trotsky’s criticism: in bourgeois society, the secret ballot is used to “shield the exploited from intimidation by the exploiters”; the reappearance of that institution in Soviet society is proof that even in the USSR the people must be protected from intimidation, if not from an authentic exploiting class, than from the bureaucracy at the very least.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn200|200]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To those that demanded that the question of the state’s withering away be addressed, Stalin responded in 1938 by encouraging them not to transform the lessons of Marx and Engels into an empty scholastic dogma; the setback in the ideal’s realization was explained by the permanent capitalist encirclement. However, in listing the functions of the socialist state, aside from the traditional ones of defense against the enemy class both internal and external, Stalin called attention to a “third function, namely, the work of economic organization and the cultural and educational work by our state organs”, a work carried out with the “aim of planting the seeds of the new socialist economy and of reeducating everyone in the spirit of socialism.&amp;amp;quot; It was a point on which the Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPSU strongly insisted: “Now, the fundamental task of our state, inside the country, consists of the peaceful work of economic organization, and a cultural and educational work.&amp;amp;quot; The theorization of this “third function” was already by itself an important breakthrough. But Stalin would go further, in declaring: “The repressive task has been substituted by the task of safeguarding socialist property against thieves and those who squander the people’s property.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn201|201]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, it’s a declaration that’s somewhat problematic, even mystifying: certainly it doesn’t concretely reflect the situation of the USSR in 1939, when the Terror rained havoc and the Gulag expanded monstrously. But here we are dealing with another aspect: is the thesis of the state’s withering away valid, and if so, up to what point? Will we also retain the state under communism? “Yes, it will be retained, if the capitalist encirclement is not eliminated, if the threat of foreign military aggression is not eliminated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn202|202]] Thus, the realization of communism in the Soviet Union or in a select number of countries would have meant the fading away of the first function of the socialist state (the defense against the danger of counter-revolution from within), although not the second function (the protect against external threats) that, with the presence of powerful capitalist countries, would have continued being vital even “in a communist era.&amp;amp;quot; But why would the third function―”economic and cultural work”, as well as the “safeguarding of socialist property from thieves and those who squander the people’s property”― have to end following the collapse of the capitalist encirclement and the absence of the second function? There’s no doubt that Stalin shows indecision and contradiction, likely driven by the necessity of moving with caution through a political minefield, where any deviation with respect to the classic thesis of the state’s withering away would expose him to the accusation of betrayal.&lt;br /&gt;
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From the start, The leadership group that takes power in October 1917 proves to be profoundly divided around the most important domestic and international political questions. That division, contained only while Lenin was still alive, becomes unbridgeable following the passing of the charismatic leader. Will the clash remain isolated to the political-ideological realm?&lt;br /&gt;
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Long gone are the times in which, with regards to the Sergei M. Kirov case (frontline leader of the CPSU, shot and killed at his office’s front door by a communist youth, Leonid Nikolaev, December 1st, 1934, in Leningrad), one could write that “there’s no doubt about the fact that the assassination was organized by Stalin and executed by his police agents.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn203|203]] The account and the insinuations contained in the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; had already raised strong doubts in the middle of the 1990s.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn204|204]] But now we can make use of the work by a Russian researcher, published in French by Stéphane Courtois and Nicolas Werth―the editors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;. We have before us research that is presented with the most anti-Stalinist credentials possible. And yet, while denying that there was a vast conspiracy behind the assassination, it rips apart the account contained or raised by the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev’s report proves to be somewhat “inexact” on a number of details; at the same time, its author “knew that he needed powerful arguments to provoke a psychological shock among the supporters of the ‘peoples’ father’”; thus, the theory of “Stalin’s plot against Kirov perfectly answered that need.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn205|205]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The truly cooperative and friendly relationship that exist between the leader and his colleague become apparent in the account written on Kirov by the Russian historian:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This open man had no love for intrigue, lies, or trickery. Stalin had to have appreciated these character traits that were the basis of their relationship. According to those who knew him at the time, Kirov was in fact capable of raising objections to Stalin, and softening his distrustful and rude spirit. Stalin sincerely cared for him and trusted him. Loving to fish and hunt, he often sent fresh fish and meat from animals he caught. Stalin had such trust in Kirov that he often invited him to the sauna, an “honor” that was conceded to only one another living man, general Vlassik, head of his personal guard.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn206|206]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Until the very end, nothing intervened to disturb that relationship, as is confirmed by the investigations of another Russian historian. In the archives there’s nothing to suggest a political split or a rivalry between the two. This theory is even more ridiculous for the fact that Kirov only participated irregularly “in the activities of the party’s highest organizational body”, the Politburo, in order to concentrate on the administration of Leningrad.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn207|207]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But while “the idea of a rivalry between Kirov and Stalin has no basis”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn208|208]] the reaction from Trotsky, on the other hand, raises questions:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The right-wing political turn on both the internal and external front couldn’t not alarm the most class conscious segments of the proletariat [...]. The youth are also overtaken by a profound unease, especially those that live close to the bureaucracy and observes its arbitrariness, its privileges, and its abuse of power. It’s in this atmosphere that Nikolaev’s gun was fired [...]. It’s extremely probable that he wanted to protest against the existing regime within the party, against an unaccountable bureaucracy and against the turn to the right.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn209|209]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The sympathy or understanding for the author of the attack is transparent, and the disdain and hatred for Kirov are explicit. Far from mourning him as a victim of the dictator in the Kremlin, Trotsky classifies him as the “skilled and unprincipled dictator of Leningrad, a typical personality in his organization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn210|210]] And he goes on to add: “Kirov, the brutal satrap, stirs no compassion in us.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn211|211]] The victim was an individual who, for sometime, inspired the wrath of the revolutionaries:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Those who resort to the new terrorism are neither the old ruling classes nor the kulaks. The terrorists in the past few years have been recruited exclusively among the Soviet youth, in the ranks of the communist party’s youth organization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn212|212]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At least at this time―between 1935 and 1936―the attack on Kirov is in no way discussed as a set-up. It’s stated, yes, that anything can be exploited by the “bureaucracy as a whole”, but at the same time it’s stressed, with some satisfaction, that “every bureaucrat trembles before the terrorism” arising from below.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn213|213]] Despite not having the “experience of the class struggle and the revolution”, these youths, who are inclined “to enter clandestine struggle, learning to fight and prepare themselves for the future”, give reason to hope.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn214|214]] Trotsky appeals to the Soviet youth, who have already started to spread fear among the members of the ruling elite, calling on them to join the new revolution that draws near. The bureaucratic regime has fought a “battle against the youth”, as has already been denounced in the title of a central paragraph in &#039;&#039;The Revolution Betrayed&#039;&#039;. Now, the oppressed will topple the oppressors:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Any revolutionary party will first find support from the ascendant class’s generation of youth. Political senility is expressed by the loss of their capacity to carry the youth [...]. The Mensheviks got their support from the higher and more mature strata of the working class, and for this reason they became haughty and looked down upon the Bolsheviks. Events ruthlessly demonstrated their errors: at the decisive moment, the youths dragged along the mature and even older men.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn215|215]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a dialectic destined to be repeated. However immature the initially forms may be, a revolt against oppression always has a positive value. After having made clear his disdain and hatred for Kirov, Trotsky adds:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We remain neutral in relation to the one who killed him only because we don’t know his motives. If we learned that Nikolaev consciously fired his gun with the intention of avenging the workers whose rights have been trampled on by Kirov, without reservations our sympathies would lie with the terrorist.&lt;br /&gt;
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Like the “Irish terrorists” or those of other countries, the “Russian” terrorists also deserve respect.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn216|216]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Initially, the investigations by authorities centered on the “White Guards.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, in Paris these groups were well organized; they have had success in carrying out a “certain number of terrorist attacks in Soviet territory.&amp;amp;quot; In Belgrade similar groups operated: their monthly publication specified, in the November 1934 edition, that, in the aim of “toppling the leaders of the Soviet nation”, it’s worthwhile “to utilize the weapon of terrorism.&amp;amp;quot; Among the leaders to be assassinated was Kirov himself. However, those investigations were not making progress; Soviet authorities then began looking in the direction of the left opposition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn217|217]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As we have seen, it’s Trotsky who corroborates the new investigative lead, and he does not stop at highlighting the revolutionary fervor of the Soviet youth, but he also clarifies that those who resort to violence are not, and couldn&#039;t be, a definitively defeated class that’s close to surrender:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The history of individual terrorism in the USSR strongly characterizes the country’s general evolutionary stages. At the dawn of Soviet power, the Whites and the socialist revolutionaries organized terrorist attacks in the context of civil war. When the old property owning classes lost all hope for restoration, the terrorism stopped. The attacks by kulaks, that continued on until recently, had a local character; they fought an insurgency against the regime. The most recent terrorism does not get its support from either the old ruling classes or the rich peasantry. The latest generation of terrorists are drawn exclusively from the Soviet youth, from the communist youth wing and from the party, and frequently from the children of party leaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn218|218]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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While the old ruling classes, swept away by the October Revolution and later with the collectivization of agriculture, have given up, the same does not occur with the proletariat, the protagonists of the revolution, but which is momentarily obstructed and oppressed by the Stalinist bureaucracy. It’s the latter who should be afraid: the attack against Kirov and the increase in terrorism by the Soviet youth are symptomatic of the isolation and the “hostility” that surrounds and harasses the usurpers of Soviet power.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn219|219]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true that Trotsky is quick to clarify that individual terrorism is not really effective. But it’s a classification that’s not all that convincing, and possibly said without much conviction. Meanwhile, under the existing conditions in the USSR, it’s an inevitable phenomenon: “terrorism is the tragic outcome of Bonapartism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn220|220]] Moreover, while it’s not able to resolve the problem, “individual terrorism nevertheless has the importance of being a symptom, as it characterizes the severity of the antagonism between the bureaucracy and the vast popular masses, and particularly the youth.&amp;amp;quot; Regardless, the critical mass is rising for an “explosion”, that’s to say a “political cataclysm”, destined to inflict on the “Stalinist regime” the same fate suffered by the regime “led by Nicholas II.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn221|221]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Terrorism, Coups and Civil War ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Fall of the Romanov dynasty was preceded by a long series of attacks promoted by organizations which, despite heavy blows from repression, always managed to reconstitute themselves. In Trotsky’s opinion, a similar process was unfolding in the USSR in response to the ‘betrayal’ consummated by the bureaucracy. What threatens it aren’t individual acts of terrorism, but precursors of another great revolution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;All indications lead us to believe that events are headed toward a conflict between the popular forces, motivated by cultural promotion and the bureaucratic oligarchy. This crisis doesn’t allow for a peaceful solution [...]; the country is clearly headed toward a revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn222|222]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A decisive civil war appears on the horizon and, “in the atmosphere of civil war, the assassination of some oppressors is no longer a matter of individual terrorism”; in any case, “the Fourth International supports a struggle to the death against Stalinism”, destined to eliminate “a faction already condemned by history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn223|223]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the attack against Kirov evokes the spectre of civil war among the forces that had toppled the old regime. In reality, this spectre follows the history of Soviet Russia like a shadow from the moment it is established. To sabotage the peace of Brest-Litovsk, interpreted by Bukharin as a capitulation to German imperialism and a betrayal of proletarian internationalism, he harbors for a moment the idea of a type of coup d’état that would see removed from power, at least for some time, the man who was until that moment the undisputed leader of the Bolsheviks. If it was already out in the open while Lenin was still alive, despite his enormous prestige as a leader, the spectre of the division of the Bolshevik leadership group, and of civil war within that same revolutionary bloc, took complete form in the following years. It’s what unequivocally appears in the important testimony from within the anti-Stalinist opposition and from the deserters of the communist movement, in whom the old faith had transformed into unrelenting hatred. Let’s see how Boris Souvarine describes the situation created in the CPSU around ten years after the October Revolution:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The opposition considers forming its own organization as a clandestine party within the one party, with its miniature hierarchy, its Politburo, its central committee, its regional and local agents, its groups on the ground, its participation quotas, its memos, and its code for correspondence.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn224|224]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The expectations were not just for a political clash, but a military one as well. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the memoirs of Ruth Fischer are published in the United States, at the time a leading figure within the German communist movement and member of the presidium of the Comintern from 1922 to 1924. In this memoir she explains the way in which, in her time, she participated in the “resistance” organization in the USSR against the “totalitarian regime” that had been installed in Moscow. This is in 1926. After breaking with Stalin the year before, Zinoviev and Kamenev drew close to Trotsky: they organize the “bloc” to win power. They then develop a clandestine network that reaches “as far as “Vladivostok” and the Far East: messengers distribute classified party and state documents, transmit coded messages, armed guards provide security to secret meetings. “The leaders of the bloc made preparations for definitive steps”; based on the assumption that the clash with Stalin could only be resolved with “violence”, they met in a forest in the outskirts of Moscow with the aim of analyzing in depth “the military aspect of their program,” starting with the “role of those army units” willing to support the “coup d’état.” Fischer continues:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It was a question that was mostly technical, which should be discussed between the two military leaders, Trotsky and Lashevich [vice-commissar for War, who died soon after, before the purges]. Since as vice-commissar of the Red Army he was still in a favorable legal position, Lashevich was tasked with planning the military action against Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn225|225]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The street demonstrations the following year, to mark the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, should be read in that context: from Moscow and Leningrad they extended to “other industrial centers” so as to “force the party hierarchy to give in.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn226|226]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In Europe during those years, it wasn’t a mystery to anyone the severity of the political battle that went on in Soviet Russia: “The history of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky is the history of the attempt by Trotsky to take power [...], it is the history of a failed coup d’état.&amp;amp;quot; The brilliant organizer of the Red Army, still enjoying “immense popularity”, certainly didn’t accept defeat: “His violent polemic and cynical and foolhardy pride made him a type of red Bonaparte backed by the army, the popular masses, and by the rebellious spirit of the young communists against the old Leninist guard and the high clergy of the party.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, “the high tide of sedition advances upon the Kremlin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn227|227]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The author, Curzio Malaparte, who was in Moscow and had interviewed figures at the highest level, gives a reading of the tensions of 1927 which is confirmed by Ruth Fischer, that’s to say, by an authorized representative of the anti-Stalinist opposition:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;On the eve of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the imprisonment of Trotsky would provoke an unpleasant reaction [...]. The occasion chosen by Trotsky to seize state power couldn’t be any better. Like the good tactician he is, he stayed in the shadows. To not appear as a tyrant, Stalin wouldn’t dare arrest him. When he would dare to, it would be too late, thought Trotsky. By the time the lights would go off on the tenth anniversary of the revolution, Stalin would no longer be in power.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn228|228]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As is already known, these plans fail and Trotsky, expelled from the party, sees himself obligated to transfer first to Alma Ata and later to Turkey. There “the Soviet consulate authorities” pay him $1,500 for ‘royalties’ as an author.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn229|229]] Although it’s a “ridiculous quantity”, as affirmed by a supporter, historian, and biographer of Trotsky,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn230|230]] the gesture could be read as an attempt to not sharpen the contradiction any further.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Conspiracy, Infiltration of the State Apparatus, and “Aesopian Language” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The exiled revolutionary didn’t renounce his plans. But how would he seek to carry them out? Malaparte writes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The acts of sabotage on the railways, power stations, telephone and telegraph lines increase every day. Everywhere Trotsky’s agents worm their way in. Screwing with the gears of the state’s technical organization, they provoke once in a while the partial paralyzation of sensitive agencies. They are the skirmishes that proceed the insurrection.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn231|231]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is this a matter of mere illusions or the echo of the regime’s propaganda? The book cited here, after being published, circulated widely in Europe and the thesis within it did not appear to provoke contemptuous smiles or scandalized laughter. Just like with “terrorism”, so we must not lose sight of the particular history of Russia when it comes to “sabotage.&amp;amp;quot; In 1908, both the petroleum executives and Stalin repeatedly condemned, with obviously different motives, the certain tendencies within the working class to achieve their demands by resorting to “economic terrorism.&amp;amp;quot; Despite stressing that the ultimate cause of this phenomenon was capitalist exploitation, the Bolshevik leader had welcomed “the latest resolution by the strikers from the Mirzoiev [factory], directed against the fires and ‘economic’ assassinations”, and against “the old terroristic” and anarchist tendencies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn232|232]] By the start of the 1930s, had this tradition totally disappeared, or did it continue to manifest in new forms? In any case, we saw the White Guards take advantage of it. What of the left opposition?&lt;br /&gt;
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The “insurrectionary” plans that Malaparte mentions reveal an important confirmation, at the very least. Here Trotsky’s biographer describes the attitude his hero continued to maintain while in exile: “The instructions are simple: the opposition must take on a solid military training, with a serious commitment to the party and, once expelled from it, in the proletarian and soviet organizations in general, referring always to the International.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn233|233]] Here he turns against Soviet power the tradition of conspiracy which greatly contributed to its establishment. In &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; Lenin especially emphasizes that: We, the revolutionaries, “have to give maximum attention to propaganda and agitation among the soldiers and officers, and the creation of ‘military organizations’ belonging to our party.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn234|234]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Taking note of that lesson, the opposition organizes a clandestine network that gives particular attention to the military apparatus. The tortured process of its creation made the task of infiltrating it easier. What happened at the time the Cheka―the first political police force in Soviet Russia―was created is significant. On July 6th, 1918, an attack takes the life of the German ambassador: the perpetrator was Yakov G. Blumkin, a socialist revolutionary who sought to protest the Brest-Litovsk treaty and reopen the debate on it. When the chief of the Cheka, Felix E. Dzerzhinsky, went to the German embassy in Moscow to offer the apologies of the Soviet government, he is informed the authors of the attack appeared with the Cheka’s credentials. To discover the truth, he proceeds to the headquarters of that institution where he is then arrested by “Cheka dissidents”, themselves either members or close to the Revolutionary Socialist party. Later freed by the Red Guard, Dzerzhinsky then purges the political police and orders the execution of those responsible for the conspiracy and the mutiny. In conclusion, the first victims of the “purge” are members of the Cheka, although they formed part of the opposition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn235|235]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The perpetrator of the attack managed to flee, but doesn’t yet exit the scene: “Trotsky publicly recognized, toward the end of 1929, having received Blumkin as a guest, while still an agent of the intelligence services of the Red Army.” Lev Sedov, son and colleague of Trotsky, sought to make it appear as something casual, however a document archived in Stanford “shows that the contact between Trotsky and Blumkin didn’t come about by coincidence, but from an organized link within the USSR”; in this content “the secret agent evidently had an important role.&amp;amp;quot; It would be this link that pushes Stalin “to order Blumkin’s execution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn236|236]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the opposition “agents infiltrate everywhere.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn237|237]] Even “in the GPU” a “small nucleus of Trotsky’s loyalists” remain hidden for a time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn238|238]] According to a contemporary American historian, it’s possible that Genrikh G. Yagoda played a role as a double agent, the man who led the first phase of the Great Terror, before even he is consumed by it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn239|239]] According to the accounts of militant anti-Stalinists, it’s known that “some [opposition] documents were printed in the typography of the GPU”; looking closely, there’s “permanent tension within Russia’s [state] terrorist apparatus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn240|240]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The infiltration is made easier by the regime’s cautious opening. Upon calling for struggle against the “bureaucratic dictatorship”, Trotsky points out that “the new constitution offers at the same time a semi legal trench from which to fight against it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn241|241]] It is best fought with camouflage, disguising their intentions of seeking to undermine and topple state power. On this point, the leader of the opposition leaves no room for doubt: “the subversive work demands some conspiratorial precautions”; it’s necessary “to observe in the struggle [...] the rules of the conspiracy.&amp;amp;quot; Further:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This life and death struggle can’t be conceived without the cunning of war, in other words: without lies and deceptions. Could the German workers possibly avoid deceiving Hitler’s police? Would Soviet Bolsheviks be unethical in deceiving the GPU?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn242|242]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Again the Bolshevik conspiratorial tradition is turned against the regime that emerged out of the revolution. In 1920, Lenin had called for the revolutionaries’ attention to “the obligation of combining illegal forms of struggle with legal forms, with the obligatory participation in the most reactionary parliament and a certain number of other institutions under reactionary laws.&amp;amp;quot; And that’s not all: revolutionaries should know how to “face all sacrifices and―in case of necessity―resort to all sorts of tricks and illegal methods, and to silence and to hide the truth with the objective of infiltrating the unions and remaining in them, and realizing there, at whatever cost, the work of a communist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn243|243]] It’s exactly how the opposition conducts itself in relation to the political and social organizations of the hated “Thermidorian” regime. The conspirators follow a precise rule of conduct:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Carry out self criticism, recognize your “errors” and that they are generally corrected. Those called “two faced men” by the Stalinist press, or even the “left-right faction”, from this moment on seek contacts which would allow the broadening of the resistance front to Stalin’s policies. Meet up with other groups on this path...[[footnotes.xhtml#fn244|244]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s understandable then the obsession over “duplicity”, the obsession for which Khrushchev condemned Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn245|245]] Meanwhile, the abandonment of NEP culminates in the rupture with Bukharin. Due to the position assumed by the latter, it’s interesting to read the testimony of Humbert-Droz, leader of the Comintern who was expelled from the Communist Party of Switzerland in 1942 over his differences with Stalin. On a trip to the First Conference of the Revolutionary Labor Unions of Latin America in the spring of 1929, he meets with Bukharin and has a meeting with him, which he recalls in these words: “He got me up-to-date on the contacts his group made with the Zinoviev-Kamenev faction to coordinate the struggle against Stalin’s power”, that he anticipated the struggle including “individual terrorism”, whose central objective “was eliminating Stalin” and, to be clear, “eliminate him physically.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn246|246]] Three years later, it is another representative of the “right”, Martemyan N. Ryutin, who draws up and circulates a document that passes from hand to hand and which classifies Stalin as a “provocateur” who they must rid themselves of, resorting even to tyrannicide.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn247|247]] When Bukharin reveals his plans, Humbert-Droz objects that “the introduction of individual terrorism in the political struggles born out of the Russian Revolution would run the risk of turning against those that used it”, but Bukharin isn’t persuaded.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn248|248]] On the other hand, it would be difficult for the objection just seen to persuade a man who, as we now know―as he himself secretly revealed in 1936―harbored a profound “hatred” toward Stalin, in fact, the sort of “absolute” hatred that is reserved for a “demon.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn249|249]] While he expressed himself like this in private, Bukharin was in charge of &#039;&#039;Izvestia&#039;&#039;, the newspaper of the Soviet government. Are we dealing with obvious incoherence? Not from the point of view of the Bolshevik leader, who continued to combine legal and illegal work, with the aim of toppling a regime that he considered detestable, and who valued another of Lenin’s lessons. In reference to Tsarist Russia, we can read in &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; that:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In a country ruled by an autocracy, with a completely enslaved press, in a period of desperate political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is persecuted, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the &#039;&#039;censored&#039;&#039; literature and, though expounded in aesopian language, is understood by all “interested” parties.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn250|250]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is exactly how Bukharin uses the Soviet government’s newspaper. The condemnation of the “all-seeing total state”, founded on “blind discipline”, “Jesuit obedience”, and on “the glorification of ‘leader’” pretends to alone make reference to Hitler’s Germany, but in fact points to the USSR as well. The “aesopian language” recommended by Lenin becomes immediately transparent when the denunciation refers to “cruel and uncultured provincialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn251|251]] It’s clearly the portrait of Stalin painted by the opposition. We saw Trotsky refer to him as a “small provincial man”, and in discussions behind closed doors it is Bukharin himself that expresses his disdain for the leader that has succeeded Lenin, despite not knowing any foreign languages.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn252|252]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Continuing on the effectiveness displayed in Tsarist Russia by the revolutionary message expressed in “aesopian language”, &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; proceeds as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Quite a considerable time elapsed (by our Russian standards) before the government realized what had happened and the unwieldy army of censors and gendarmes discovered the new enemy and flung itself upon him. Meanwhile, Marxists books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist; Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn253|253]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Bukharin and the opposition hoped that a similar phenomenon would create a climate favorable to Stalin’s overthrow. But Stalin also read &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; And knew the rules of Bolshevik conspiracy well. In conclusion, we witness a prolonged civil war. The clandestine network organizes itself, or seeks to reorganize itself despite successive rounds of repression that become increasingly unforgiving. According to the words of an active militant in the struggle against Stalin: “Despite being stomped on and annihilated, the opposition survived and grew; in the army, in the administration, in the party, in the cities, in the rural areas, every terrorist wave [from Stalin’s regime] brought forth a resistance movement.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn254|254]] The leading Bolshevik group now appears divided in a conflict that doesn’t exclude coups and that, at least in the expectations and hopes of Stalin’s enemies, from one moment to another could become open and generalized, involving the entire country. While the opposition turns to Lenin’s lessons and to the conspiratorial tradition of Bolshevism to weave their plans in the shadow, this double game provokes the outrage of Soviet power, which identifies in false friends the most dangerous and insidious enemy: the tragedy heads toward its conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Infiltration, Disinformation, and Calls for Insurrection ===&lt;br /&gt;
The “rules of the conspiracy” theorized by Trotsky, do they only imply the concealment of one’s own political identity, or could they include the recourse to false denouncements, in order to spread confusion and chaos in the enemy camp and to make more difficult the identification of the clandestine network struggling to topple Stalin’s regime? In other words, do the “rules of the conspiracy” include just the rigorous protection of private information, or do they also allow the use of disinformation? It’s not just the American journalist Anne Louise Strong, sympathetic to the government, who raises such suspicions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn255|255]] In the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; itself it speaks of false charges and “provocations” realized by “authentic Trotskyists”, thereby carrying out their “revenge”, but also “careerists without a conscience” willing to clear the way by using the most contemptible means.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn256|256]] Noteworthy is an episode that takes place when the assassination of Kirov is made public. Most reactions―according to Andrew Smith, who at the time worked in the Kuznecov Elektrozavod factory―are of shock and concern in relation to the future; but there’s also those who express regret that it wasn’t Stalin who was shot. Later an assembly is held, during which the workers are encouraged to denounce enemies or possible enemies of Soviet ruling.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Smith recalls his surprise at how, during the debate, the dissident group he was in contact with proved to be the most active in attacking the opposition and deviationists, and seeking the most severe measures against them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn257|257]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Indicative as well is an episode that occurs outside the USSR, but could help in understanding what occurs inside that country. When general Alexandr M. Orlov, a former high-level collaborator with the NKVD (and in 1938 sheltering in the United States), is accused by the journalist Louis Fischer of having participated in the liquidation of anti-Stalinist communists during the Spanish Civil War, he responds with the false revelation that it was his accuser, in fact, who was a spy in service to Moscow.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn258|258]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Soviet Union of the 1930s, we have seen the opposition infiltrating the repressive apparatus at the highest levels: it would be very strange if, after having achieved this objective, it limited itself to obeying Stalin’s orders. Disinformation carries the double advantage of obstructing the machinery of repression and redirecting it against an especially hated enemy; it’s an integral part of war: and that’s what it’s about, at least judging by Trotsky’s argument in July of 1933, when he considers the counter-revolutionary civil war carried out by the “Stalinist bureaucracy” to be “already underway”, and which culminated in the “infamous annihilation of the Leninist-Bolsheviks.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore it’s necessary to be aware of the new situation. “The slogan for the reform of the CPSU” doesn’t make sense anymore. A head-on struggle is imposed: the party and the International led by Stalin, now on their last leg, “can only bring misfortune and nothing but misfortune” to the “world proletariat”; on the opposing side, the authentic revolutionaries certainly can’t be inspired in their actions by “petty bourgeois pacifists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn259|259]] There can be no doubt: “Only with &#039;&#039;violence&#039;&#039; can the bureaucracy be forced to return power to the hands of the proletarian vanguard.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn260|260]] Hitler’s rise to power for Trotsky doesn’t mean that unity is necessary, in the aim of confronting the enormous danger which looms, starting from Germany; it means that they can’t stop half-way in the struggle against a power, Stalinism, which had led to the defeat of the German and international proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, it’s the very leader of the opposition who speaks of “civil war” within the party that he in part led during the October Revolution and in the first years of Soviet Russia. Before us is the topic which constituted the starting thread of the investigation by a Russian historian who is a convinced and self-declared Trotskyist, author of a monumental and multi-volume work, dedicated precisely to the detailed reconstruction of this civil war. He speaks, regarding Soviet Russia, of a “preventive civil war” carried out by Stalin against those who had organized to topple him. Even outside the USSR, this civil war takes shape and at times intensifies within the front that fought against Franco; in fact, referencing Spain from 1936-1939, he speaks not of one, but “two civil wars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn261|261]] With great intellectual honesty and taking advantage of new and rich documentary material available thanks to the opening of Russian archives, the author cited here reaches this conclusion: “The Moscow trials weren’t a crime without motive nor in cold blood, but more accurately Stalin’s reaction during an acute political struggle.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn262|262]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In arguing against Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who paints the victims of the purges as a bunch of “rabbits”, the Russian Trotskyist historian cites a pamphlet which in the 1930s called for the Kremlin to be cleared of “the fascist dictator and his clique.&amp;amp;quot; He then comments: “including from the perspective of Russian legislation in force today, this pamphlet would be judged as a call for the violent overthrow of the government (the ruling elite to be more precise).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn263|263]] In conclusion, far from being an “irrational and senseless outbreak of violence”, the bloody terror carried out by Stalin is in fact the only way he could defeat the “resistance of the true communist forces.&amp;amp;quot; “The party of the executed”, is how he defined those targeted, “in an analogy to the expression used to identity the French Communist Party, the principal force of anti-fascist resistance and privileged target of Hitler’s terror.&amp;amp;quot;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn264|264]] Thus, Stalin is compared to Hitler; highlighting the fact that the communist and French partisans didn’t limit themselves to a passive or nonviolent resistance while opposing the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Civil War and International Maneuvers ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s no surprise that, from time to time, this or that superpower had sought to take advantage of the latent civil war in Soviet Russia. Who solicits or hopes to provoke foreign intervention is, sometimes, the defeated faction, which believes it has no other hope for success. Such a dynamic unfolds starting from the first months of Soviet Russia. Let’s return to the attack of July 6th of 1918. It is an integral part of a very ambitious project. On one end, the Left Revolutionary Socialists promote “counter-revolutionary uprisings in a number of urban centers against the Soviet government”, or rather “an insurrection in Moscow which hoped to topple the communist government”; on the other end, they also propose to “assassinate various German representatives” with the aim of provoking a military reaction from Germany and the subsequent resumption of the war. It would be confronted with a &#039;&#039;levée en masse&#039;&#039; by the Russian people, which would inflict a simultaneous defeat to the traitorous government and the enemy invader.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn265|265]] The perpetrator of the attack against the German ambassador is a sincere revolutionary: well before entering into contact with Trotskyist circles, he intends to emulate the Jacobins, protagonists of the most radical phase of the French Revolution and of the heroic mass resistance against the invasion by the counter-revolutionary powers. However, in the eyes of Soviet authority, Blumkin could very well be a provocateur: the success of his plan would have resulted in a new advance by the armies of Wilhelm II and, perhaps, the toppling of the authority born out of the October Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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The interaction between internal and international politics appears in all historical changes. Hitler’s rise to power, with the annihilation or decimation of the German section of the Communist International, represents a hard blow to the Soviet Union: what consequences would it have for internal political stability? On March 30th, 1933, Trotsky blames the ruling bureaucracy in the USSR for the defeat of the communists in Germany, and writes that “the liquidation of Stalin’s regime” is “absolutely inevitable and [...] isn’t far off.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn266|266]] In the summer of that same year, Daladier’s government in France allows Trotsky to visit: only a few months after the previous rejection by Herriot, and doubts arise about the reasons for this change. Ruth Fischer thinks that the French government did so on account of “Stalin’s weakened position”, the “reorganization of the opposition against him”, and Trotsky’s nearing return to Moscow with leading responsibilities at the highest level.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn267|267]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A new and dramatic turn of events arises with the outbreak of the Second World War. In the spring of 1940, the Soviet Union is still outside the gigantic conflict, and it even remains committed to the non-aggression pact with Germany. It is an intolerable situation for the countries already facing Hitler’s aggression; taking the Finno-Russian conflict as a pretext, they consider a plan to bombard the petroleum centers in Baku. It’s not just a matter of striking the Third Reich’s energy supply line: “the Franco-British military plans sought to break the military alliance between the Soviet Union and Germany through attacks against the oil industries in the Caucasus region and bringing a post-Stalinist regime to their side against Germany.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn268|268]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return for a moment to the attack against German ambassador Mirbach. The perpetrator certainly had in mind triggering a German attack, but not because he hopes for their victory: on the contrary, he hoped the assault would awaken Russia, leading it to a decisive response. Later we see Blumkin participating in the conspiracy led by Trotsky. And the latter, for his part, in clarifying his position, compares himself in 1927 to French Prime Minister Clemenceau who, during the First World War, assumed leadership of the country after denouncing the lack of military effectiveness by his predecessors, and therefore proposing himself as the only statesman capable of leading France to victory against Germany.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn269|269]] Of the many number of possible interpretations and reinterpretations for this analogy, only one thing was made clear: not even the invasion of the Soviet Union would have put an end to the attempts by the opposition to seize power. Even more disturbing is the already cited comparison of Stalin to Nicholas II: during the First World War, read and denounced as an imperialist war, the Bolsheviks had put forth the slogan of revolutionary defeatism and had identified the tsarist autocracy as the internal and principal enemy, that which they first sought to combat and defeat.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the years to follow, Trotsky goes way beyond evoking the spirit of Clemenceau: on April 22nd, 1939, he declares his support for “the liberation of so-called Soviet Ukraine from the Stalinist yoke.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn270|270]] Once independent, it would later be unified with western Ukraine upon being separated from Poland, and with Carpathian Ukraine, annexed earlier by Hungary. Let’s reflect on the moment in which this position is taken. The Third Reich had just carried out the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and rumors grow which indicate that the Soviet Union (and especially Ukraine) is Germany’s next objective. In these circumstances, in July of 1939, it is even Kerensky who takes a stand against Trotsky’s surprising project which, according to the Menshevik leader, only favors Hitler’s plans. “It’s the same opinion from the Kremlin” was the quick response from Trotsky who, on the other hand, in an article from April 22nd had written that with Ukraine’s independence “the Bonapartist clique will reap what they have sown”; it’s good for the “current Bonapartist caste to be undermined, shaken, destroyed and swept away”; only that way is the road paved for a real “defense of the Soviet Republic” and its “socialist future.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn271|271]] Soon after the invasion of Poland begins, Trotsky goes even further. In foreseeing the final ruin of the Third Reich, he adds: “However, before going to hell, Hitler could inflict such a defeat on the Soviet Union that it could cost the head of the oligarchy in the Kremlin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn272|272]] That prediction (or that desire) of the liquidation (physical as well) of the “Bonapartist clique” or “caste” carried out by a revolution from below, or even by a military invasion, couldn’t not be seen in the eyes of Stalin as confirmation of the suspicions about the convergence, at least the objective convergence, between the Nazi leadership and the Trotskyist opposition; both had an interest in provoking the collapse of the internal front in the USSR, even if the first saw that collapse as the precondition for the Slavic nation’s enslavement, and the second saw it as the precondition for the outbreak of a new revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also, it’s not a particularly ignominious suspicion: acting like the new Lenin, Trotsky aspired to use to his advantage the dialectic that had led to the defeat of the Russian army, the toppling of the tsarist autocracy and the victory of the October Revolution. Once again, the past history of Bolshevism is turned against Soviet power. Kerensky, who in 1917 had denounced the treason by the Bolsheviks, now warns of the treason by those who define themselves as “Bolshevik-Leninists.&amp;amp;quot; From Stalin’s point of view, there’s been a radical change with respect to the First World War: now it’s a matter of confronting a political party or faction which, at least with respect to the first phase of the conflict, hopes for the collapse of the country and the military victory of a Germany not yet depleted from three years of war, as was the case with Wilhelm II, but at the height of its power and explicitly dedicated to building its colonial empire in the East. Given this context, it’s certainly not surprising that the accusation of treason is raised. Let’s return to the article by Trotsky from April 22nd, 1939. In it there’s but a single affirmation which could have received Stalin’s agreement: “The impending war will create a favorable atmosphere for all sorts of adventurers, miracle-hunters and seekers of the golden fleece.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn273|273]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the flames of the Second World War burn ever higher, destined as well to reach the Soviet Union according to the same prediction by Trotsky, he continues making declarations and statements that are anything but reassuring. Let’s see a few of them: “Soviet patriotism can’t be separated from the irreconcilable struggle against the Stalinist clique” (June 8th, 1940); “The Fourth International has recognized for some time now the need to topple the bureaucracy [in power in Russia] through a revolutionary uprising by the workers” (September 25th, 1939); “Stalin and the oligarchy led by him represent the principal danger to the Soviet Union” (April 13th, 1940).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn274|274]] It is quite understandable that the “bureaucracy” or the “oligarchy”, branded as the “principal enemy”, is convinced that the opposition, if not at the direct service of the enemy, is in any case ready from the start to follow-up its actions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any government would have found organizations of this orientation to be a threat to national security. Only to fuel Stalin’s concerns and suspicions is the prediction by Trotsky (September 25th 1939), of an “imminent revolution in the Soviet Union”: only “a few years or perhaps months away from the inglorious collapse” of the Stalinist bureaucracy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn275|275]] Where does such certainty come from? Is it a prediction formulated while only taking into account the internal developments within the country?&lt;br /&gt;
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It becomes even more complicated upon analyzing the interplay between internal political conflict in Russia and international tensions; the suspicions and accusations are in fact encouraged by the existence of a fifth column and by disinformation operations carried out by Nazi Germany’s intelligence services. In April of 1939, Goebbels writes in his diary: “Our clandestine radio station in Eastern Prussia which broadcasts into Russia has caused an uproar. It operates in Trotsky’s name and causes trouble for Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn276|276]] Immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa, the leader of the Third Reich’s propaganda services is even more pleased: “now we are using three clandestine radio stations in Russia: the first is Trotskyist, the second separatist, the third Russian-nationalist, all are critical of the Stalinist regime.&amp;amp;quot; It’s an instrument the aggressors give great importance to: “We work with all methods, especially the three clandestine radio stations in Russia”; these “are a model of cunning and finesse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn277|277]] On the role of “Trotskyist” propaganda, the diary entry from July 14th is especially significant, which references the treaty between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the joint statement by the two countries, it proceeds as follows: “This is an excellent occasion to show the compatibility between capitalism and Bolshevism [here a synonym for official Soviet authority]. The statement will find scarce acceptance among Leninist circles in Russia” (having in mind that Trotskyists like to define themselves as “Bolshevik-Leninists”), in contrast to the “Stalinists”, considered traitors to Leninism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn278|278]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, the intention by Stalin and his collaborators to collectively condemn the opposition as a den of enemy agents appears grotesque today, but it’s important not to lose sight of the historical context broadly presented here. It’s especially necessary to have in mind that similar suspicions and accusations were raised against the Stalinist leadership. After having labelled Stalin as a “fascist dictator”, the pamphlets which the Trotskyist network circulated in the Soviet Union added: “The leaders of the Politburo are either mentally ill or mercenaries of fascism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn279|279]] Even official documents of the opposition insinuated that Stalin could be the protagonist of a “gigantic and deliberate provocation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn280|280]] On both sides, instead of committing to an exhaustive analysis of the objective contradictions, and how political conflicts interrelate with them, they prefer to quickly resort to the category of treason and, in its extreme form, the traitor becomes a conscious and valuable agent for the enemy. Trotsky doesn’t tire in denouncing the “plot of the Stalinist bureaucracy against the working class”, and the plot is even more despicable because the “Stalinist bureaucracy” is nothing more than “imperialism’s transmission device.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn281|281]] It’s not necessary to say that Trotsky is on the receiving end as well: he laments at seeing himself described as an “agent of a foreign power”, but in turn labels Stalin as an “agent provocateur at Hitler’s service.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn282|282]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The most infamous accusations are exchanged by both sides; on closer examination, the most incredible are those coming from the opposition. The conflicted and tormented mood of its leader was carefully analyzed by a Russian historian not suspected of having Stalinist sympathies:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Trotsky didn’t want the defeat of the Soviet Union, but Stalin’s collapse. In his predictions on the imminent war, his unease is evident: the exile knew that only his country’s defeat could put an end to Stalin’s power [...]. He desired war, because in that war he saw the only possibility of toppling Stalin. But Trotsky didn’t want to admit this even to himself.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn283|283]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “Bonapartist Reaction”, “Coup d’Etats” and Disinformation: The Tukhachevsky Case ===&lt;br /&gt;
With a civil war (latent or in the open) within the new leadership group born out of the toppling of the old regime, with mutual accusations of betrayal and collaboration with the imperialist enemy and the extensive activities of their intelligence services, dedicated both to the recruitment of agents as well as to subversion, it’s in this context that we must place the events that in 1937 led to the prosecution and execution of marshal Tukhachevsky and a number of other leading officers in the Red Army.&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s a long history behind this case. Years earlier Lenin saw the Bonapartist danger threatening Soviet Russia and also expressed his concerns to Trotsky: would civil authority really be able to subordinate military authority? In 1920, Tukhachevsky seems to have wanted to make the decision regarding the march on Warsaw―a dream of his. There clearly emerges―a leading historian from our time observes―the possibility of the brilliant general “becoming the Bonaparte of the Bolshevik Revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn284|284]] Ten years later, Stalin is warned by the GPU about the schemes that are being forged by military elements opposed to him. Was there no cause for alarm?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn285|285]] In April of the following year, it was Trotsky who expresses his great doubts regarding Tukhachevsky, offering the following analysis of the situation created in the USSR after the political defeat of Bukharin and his allies on the “right”: the principal danger for socialism is represented not by “Thermidorian reaction”, which would formally conserve the country’s Soviet character and the communist character of the ruling party, but by “Bonapartist reaction”, that will take “the most open, ‘most mature’ form of the counter-revolution, that will be waged against the Soviet system and the Bolshevik party as a whole, unsheathing the saber in the name of bourgeois property.&amp;amp;quot; In such a case, “the most adventurous praetorian elements like Tukhachevsky” could play a role of great importance. Those opposing them “with weapons in hand” would be the “revolutionary elements” of the party, the state and―take note―”the army”, reunited around the working class and the “Bolshevik-Leninist faction” (that is, the Trotskyists).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn286|286]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This stance constitutes a new factor in the conflict between the Bolsheviks. Despite having “the armed forces under his control”, Stalin “was careful not to get them too closely involved in the controversies and intrigues that shook the party and the state”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn287|287]] now, clearly, the opposition seeks to gain entry or to consolidate its presence in the army in the name of the struggle against the Bonapartist threat; after all, only it would be able to meaningfully oppose it. However, not allowing himself to be intimidated by this Bonapartist threat, in 1935 Stalin grants Tukhachevsky and four other military officers the title of marshal. It’s a promotion made in the context of a reform that sees the army abandon its “predominantly territorial militia character”, becoming “a true standing army” and restoring “the old pre-revolutionary discipline.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn288|288]] On December 21st of the same year, together with other members at the apex of Soviet political and military leadership, the new marshall celebrates Stalin’s birthday at the latter’s home “until 5:30 in the morning!”, Dimitrov emphasizes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn289|289]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely that reform which draws Trotsky’s outrage, who, on the one hand, returns to the old denunciation: the Red Army “was not spared in the Soviet regime’s degeneration; on the contrary, that degeneration found in the army its highest expression.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, Trotsky takes on a new tone, mentioning the “formation of a new kind of opposition faction in the army”, which, from the left, laments the abandonment of the “focus on world revolution.&amp;amp;quot; And the text cited here, it somewhat suggests that this opposition could have lured in Tukhachevsky himself: a man who in 1921 had fought with “excessive zeal” for the formation of a “world high-command” could hardly have supported the abandonment of internationalism and the “cult to the status quo” that had taken hold in the USSR. What to say of this text? The agitation in the army continues and appears to be strengthening; only that now the approaching struggle doesn’t oppose a “Bolshevik-Leninist faction” against the Bonapartist generals, but a reliable part of the army and its leadership against the Thermidorian leaders and traitors in the Kremlin. The resistance by the Red Army, and its rebellion against state power, would be further justified by the fact that its new political course constituted a “double coup d’état” that, in breaking with the Bolshevik October, arbitrarily proceeded to the “elimination of the militias” and the “restoration of the officer caste, eighteen years after its revolutionary suppression”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn290|290]] rising up against Stalin, the Red Army would have, in fact, prevented the coup d’états he was planning and would have reestablished revolutionary legitimacy. As if all of that wasn’t enough, the Trotskyist &#039;&#039;Opposition Bulletin&#039;&#039; announces an imminent revolt by the army.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn291|291]] Perhaps a measure taken in Moscow some months before the trials aimed to confront that possible threat. “On March 29th, 1937, the Politburo debated the removal from the Red Army of all commanders and officers who had been expelled from the party for political motives, transferring them to the economic ministries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn292|292]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The rumors spread by White Russian exiles in Paris about a military coup d’etat that was being prepared in Moscow fueled even more the climate of suspicion and concern.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn293|293]] Finally, during the latter half of January 1937, the Czechoslovakian president, Edvard Beneš, receives intelligence about the secret “negotiations” underway between the Third Reich and “the anti-Stalinist clique in the USSR of marshal Tukhachevsky, Rykov and others”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn294|294]] was there some basis to the accusation, or was it all a set-up by German intelligence services? Yet early on in 1937, in speaking with his foreign minister, Konstantin von Neurath, Hitler rejects the idea of an improvement in relations with the USSR, but adds: “It would be different if things in Moscow developed in the direction of an absolute despotism under the control of the military. It that case it would be wrong to miss the opportunity to make our presence felt again in Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn295|295]] Beneš also keeps the French leaders up to date on those “negotiations”, thereby “notably weakening confidence in the French-Soviet pact.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn296|296]] Therefore it wasn’t Stalin alone who believed the information shared by the Czechoslovakian president. Moreover, even after the end of the Second World War, Churchill appears to confirm Moscow’s version, stressing, as we will see (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 7, § 2), that the purge struck the “pro-German elements”, adding: “Stalin felt he owed a great deal of gratitude to president Beneš.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn297|297]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At any rate, the question remains without an answer, and to conclusively answer it only a private conversation of Hitler’s in the summer of 1942 offers some assistance. Despite not mentioning a concrete military conspiracy, he observes that Stalin had serious reasons to fear being killed by Tukhachevsky’s inner circle.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn298|298]] If it had all been a set-up with Hitler’s direct supervision or approval,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn299|299]] he would have perhaps boasted of it at a time in which the memories were still fresh of the initial and unstoppable advances by the Wehrmacht.&lt;br /&gt;
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In asking the key question (“was there really a military conspiracy?”) about the then recent “trials” and executions, Trotsky gives an answer that raises more questions. “It all depends on what one considers to be a conspiracy. Any sign of discontent and any contact made among those who are disgruntled, any criticism and any consideration about what to do, or how to oppose the government’s shameful policies, all of this, from Stalin’s point of view, is a conspiracy. It’s a totalitarian regime, all opposition is undoubtedly the seed of a conspiracy”; in that sense, the “seed” was the generals’ aspirations to protect the army from the “demoralizing intrigues of the GPU.&amp;amp;quot; Is it his rejection of the conspiracy theory, or is it his corroboration of it, expressed in the “Aesopian language” imposed by circumstances? Who calls attention to that ambiguous declaration is the fervent Trotskyist and Russian historian we’ve already encountered (Rogowin), who ends up accepting the thesis of the “anti-Stalinist conspiracy” by Tukhachevsky, putting it in a “Bolshevik” political context rather than a bourgeois one.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn300|300]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, doubts remains, but it seems difficult to explain all that had happened with the usual &#039;&#039;deux ex machina&#039;&#039;, the power hungry and bloodthirsty dictator, eager to surround himself with puppets, blind and unconditional in their loyalty. This explanation is all the more fragile for the fact that in 1932 Stalin had no issues in attending, together with Molotov, classes by the commandant of the Military Academy, Boris M. Shaposhnikov; and Stalin gained a lot from these classes, given by a highly decorated strategist, yet who was not a member of the communist party.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn301|301]] Moreover, “military science was one of the few politically important fields in which Stalin favored originality and innovation”, to the extent that “the officer corps” could exercise considerable “spiritual independence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn302|302]] Taking the place of Tukhachevsky and his subordinates are generals who, far from being passive yes-men, frankly expressed their opinions and made arguments according to their own judgment,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn303|303]] not hesitating to contradict the supreme leader, who, moreover, encourages and sometimes rewards that attitude (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 6).&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Three Civil Wars ===&lt;br /&gt;
If we don’t want to be held prisoners to the caricatures of Stalin drawn by Trotsky and Khrushchev during two different but equally intense political struggles, it’s necessary not to lose sight of the fact that the events that began in October 1917 are marked by three civil wars. The first war saw the confrontation between the revolution on one side, and the coalition of its enemies on the other, supported by capitalist powers committed to containing the Bolshevik contagion by any means possible. The second war is more or less the collectivization of agriculture, which is driven by a revolution from above or from afar, despite in part being driven by the peasantry from below. The third is that which divided the Bolshevik leadership group.&lt;br /&gt;
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The last one is even more complex because it’s characterized by great mobility and by the dramatic shifts in its frontlines. We saw Bukharin, on the occasion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, momentarily flirt with the idea of a type of coup d’état against Lenin, who he condemns for wanting to transform “the party into a dung heap.&amp;amp;quot; While at that moment Bukharin’s position is similar to Trotsky’s, in the eyes of the latter he becomes, ten years later, the privileged incarnation of Thermidorian reaction and betrayal by the bureaucracy: “With Stalin against Bukharin? Yes. With Bukharin against Stalin? Never.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn304|304]] It’s a moment when Trotsky appears to predict Stalin’s turn against Bukharin: the latter would have immediately “toppled Stalin as a Trotskyist, exactly how Stalin had toppled Zinoviev.&amp;amp;quot; We are in 1928 and there’s already hints of the split between Stalin and Bukharin, who in fact, because of the abandonment of NEP, begins “privately describing Stalin as the representative of neo-Trotskyism” and as “an unprincipled schemer”; in the last analysis, as the worst and most dangerous enemy inside the party.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn305|305]] Thus, the former member of the duumvirate proceeds down the path that will unite him with Trotsky. Ultimately, the opposing sides form coalitions against the victor; it becomes clear that in the mortal conflict between the Bolsheviks, the alignments change rapidly until the very end.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fought in a country without a liberal tradition and characterized both by the prolonged state of emergency and by the persistence of an ideology prone to liquidating as merely “formal” the norms that govern the rule of law, the third civil wars take on the ferocity of a religious war. Trotsky, who “considers himself the only man able to lead the revolution”, is inclined to use “any means available to make the ‘false messiah’ fall from his throne.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn306|306]] A “zealous faith” inspires the opposing side as well (&#039;&#039;infra,&#039;&#039; ch. 4, § 4). And the more Stalin is determined to eliminate all conspiratorial threats, including the most unlikely, the more heavily loom the clouds of a war that threatens the very existence of Russia and the homeland of socialism, and which therefore represent a mortal threat both to the national cause as well as the social cause, two causes Stalin is determined to lead.&lt;br /&gt;
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While their distinctions are hard to make out (acts of terrorism and sabotage can be the expression of a counter-revolutionary project or of a new revolution), the three civil wars become tied up in the interventions by this or that great power. The entirety of these convoluted and tragic conflicts vanish in the differing accounts, described first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev, that tell simple fables and construct a monster who at his mere touch transforms gold into blood and dirt.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;3. Between the Twentieth Century and The Longue Durée, from the History of Marxism to the History of Russia: the Origins of &amp;amp;quot;Stalinism&amp;amp;quot;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Catastrophe in the Making ===&lt;br /&gt;
Up until now we have concentrated on the ideological, political and military contradictions in the revolutionary process and their interaction with international conflicts. But the picture wouldn’t be complete without the inclusion of another factor: the long history of Russia. The approaching catastrophe was noticed by observers from a broad range of political orientations, well before 1917 and even before the founding of the Bolshevik party. In 1811, in a Saint Petersburg still shaken by the peasant revolt led by Pugachev (illiterate, yet a figure of great political talent) that was crushed a few decades earlier at great difficulty, Joseph de Maistre expresses his concern that a new “European” kind of revolution could break out, led this time by an intellectual class of popular origin or sentiment, by a university educated Pugachev. By comparison, the disorder witnessed in France would be child’s play: “there’s no words to express what I fear could come to pass.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn307|307]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s skip ahead by half a century. An even more accurate prediction, and quite admirable for its foresight, can be read in an article on Russia by Marx published in an American newspaper (the New York Daily Tribune, January 17th, 1859): if the nobility continues to oppose the emancipation of the peasantry, a grand revolution will break out; and from it will arise a “reign of terror by these half-Asiatic serfs, unequaled in history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn308|308]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the revolution of 1905, it’s the prime minister himself, Sergei Witte, who stresses that the current situation in Russia was unsustainable and warns the tsar of the danger represented by the &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039;, the peasant revolt:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;One can not halt the forward march of humanity. If it doesn’t triumph through reform, the idea of human freedom will triumph by means of revolution. But in the latter case, it’ll be born from the ashes of a thousand years of calamities. The Russian &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039;, blind and unforgiving, will destroy all in its wake, it will reduce everything to ash [...]; the horrors of the Russian &#039;&#039;bunt&#039;&#039; will surpass all those known in history.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn309|309]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it’s Witte himself who is involved in the ferocious repression that’s used to confront the revolution of 1905 and the often brutal jacqueries who take part in it. The interior minister, P. N. Durnovo, orders “the governors to ‘immediately proceed to the execution’ of the rebels, and to burn and level the villages where the disturbances originate from.&amp;amp;quot; It’s followed by “military courts”, “collective punishment”, death squads, and pogroms against Jews, blamed as the source of subversion. It’s a situation that continues on until the start of the First World War. It’s precisely the interior minister who warns: “The revolution in its most extreme form, and an irreversible state of anarchy, will be the only predictable outcome of an unfortunate conflict with the Kaiser.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn310|310]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s what will happen soon enough. Let’s look at Russia’s situation on the eve of the Bolsheviks rise to power. Soon shaken is the myth of a country that, after the overthrow of autocracy, would happily proceed in the direction of liberalism and democracy. It’s a myth encouraged by Churchill who, to justify his interventionist policy, accuses the Bolsheviks―sustained by “German gold”―of having violently overthrown the “Russian Republic” and the “Russian parliament.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn311|311]] It would be easy to accuse the British statesman of hypocrisy: he knew very well that between February and October London had continually supported coup attempts that sought to restore the tsarist autocracy or impose a military dictatorship. It’s Kerensky himself who points out that “the governments of France and Britain took advantage of every opportunity to sabotage the provisional government” of Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn312|312]] However, from his exile in the United States, the Menshevik leader never gives up cultivating this myth in question, accusing the Bolsheviks of a double treason, against the homeland and against the “recently born Russian democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn313|313]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the accusation of treason to the nation becomes obsolete with the end of the Second World War and the rise of the USSR as a superpower―Kerensky was one of the few defeated Menshevik leaders who clung to it―, still today the topic of the Bolshevik’s betrayal of democracy is commonplace, a betrayal that culminates in the Stalinist terror. But that general line of thinking doesn’t stand up to historical analysis. It’s not just a matter of the obstinacy of the leaders who arose out of the February days of the revolution (Kerensky especially), determined to remain in a bloodbath that the great majority of the people are determined to end; it’s a political line that can only be carried forth by resorting to terror and an iron-fist discipline on the frontlines and in the rear. And not even the repeated attempts to install a military dictatorship (attempts that Churchill is no stranger to) constitute the principal aspect. There’s much more: “The idea that the February Revolution had been a ‘bloodless revolution’ and that mass violence had only broken out with the October Revolution was a liberal myth.&amp;amp;quot; It’s ”one of the most stubborn myths around 1917”, but “has now lost all credibility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn314|314]] Let’s examine the real timeline of events: “The rebels took terrible revenge on the officials of the old regime. There was a hunt for police officers in order to lynch and kill them without mercy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn315|315]] In Saint Petersburg, “after a few days the death toll reached around 1,500”, with the ferocious lynching of the most hated representatives of the old regime; “the worst violence was to be committed by the Kronstadt sailors, who mutilated and killed hundreds of officers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn316|316]] Those who mutinied were the younger recruits; “the standard disciplinary norms didn’t apply” to them, and the officers took advantage of this to treat them “with a brutality even more sadistic than usual”; and now they have unleashed a vengeance of “unprecedented ferocity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn317|317]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Things worsen later in September, after the attempted coup d’état by general Lavr Kornilov. Executions and assassinations by crowds break out and are accompanied by “unprecedented violence.&amp;amp;quot; “The officers were tortured and mutilated before being killed (eyes and tongues ripped out, ears cut, nails driven into shoulders, in the place of epaulettes), hung upside-down, impaled. According to general Brusilov, a large number of young officers killed themselves to escape a horrible death.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn318|318]] Further, “the methods of killing their superiors were so brutal (the men under their command went as far as cutting off their victim’s limbs and genitals, or skinning them alive), that no one could really condemn such a suicide.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn319|319]] Moreover, the rage already made itself felt before October, and “In the resolutions by the soviets, then in large part dominated by the socialist revolutionaries, they branded as ‘enemies of the people the bloodthirsty capitalists, the bourgeoisie who drink the blood of the people’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn320|320]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, “the crisis in commerce between the city and the countryside, well before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks”, caused a new round of intense violence. In the tragic situation that had arisen after the catastrophe of the war, with the fall in agricultural production and the hoarding of what scarce food is available, the survival of urban residents depends on quite drastic measures: even before the October Revolution, a government minister, despite being a “prominent liberal economist”, argues in favor of requisition by “force of arms” should market incentives fail; the fact is that “the practice of requisition” is common to “all parties during war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn321|321]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The combination of these multiple contradictions causes a bloody state of anarchy with the “collapse of all authority and all administrative organization”, with an explosion of savage violence coming from below (in which millions of deserters or disbanded soldiers are the primary protagonists), and with a “militarization and an overall brutalization of social behavior and political practices.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn322|322]] It’s a “brutalization without possible means of comparison to that known in Western societies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn323|323]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand this tragedy, it’s necessary to keep in mind the “way in which social violence spreads; beginning in the areas where military violence takes place”, the &amp;amp;quot;rear is engulfed in the violence by peasant-army deserters outside the confines of the military&amp;amp;quot;, by the “millions of deserters from the crumbling Russian army”, by the fact that the “distinctions between the front and rear, between the civilian and military sphere”, become increasingly narrow. In conclusion, “the violence from the military zones spreads everywhere” and society as a whole not only falls into chaos and anarchy, but becomes hostage to an “unprecedented brutalization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn324|324]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, it’s a question that begins with the First World War and the crisis and breakdown of the Russian army. Perhaps it would even be better to go even further back. The exceptional level of violence that strikes twentieth century Russia is explained by shedding light on the two interlinked processes: “the grand &#039;&#039;Jacquerie&#039;&#039; of October 1917” that had been gathering force for centuries, and precisely for that reason unleashes a wave of blind and indiscriminate violence against the landowners, against their property, their homes, and their very lives; in addition to this, there’s powerful resentment toward the city itself. The second process is the “collapse of the tsarist military, the most numerous army in history, 95% of whom were peasants.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn325|325]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The oppression, exploitation and humiliation of an immense mass of peasantry by an exclusive, aristocratic elite, who considered themselves foreign in relation to their own people, considered a different and inferior race, were precursors to a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. Especially because the social conflict became even more acute with the outbreak of World War I, in which the noble officers on a daily basis exercised a true power of life and death over peasant soldiers; it’s no coincidence that at the first signs of crisis they sought to maintain discipline on the front and in the rear by resorting to the use of artillery.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn326|326]] The collapse of the old regime is the moment for revenge and vengeance, cultivated and sown over centuries. The prince G. E. Lvov self-critically recognizes this: “the vengeance of the peasant servants” was a settling of accounts with those who for centuries had refused to “treat the peasants as people, rather than as dogs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn327|327]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, precisely because it was a matter of vengeance, it took on forms not only brutal, but also purely destructive: “thousands of drunk workers and soldiers wandered through the cities, looting warehouses and shops, breaking into homes, beating and robbing peasants.&amp;amp;quot; Still worse is what would happen in the countryside: “near the front, large groups of deserters wandered through the countryside and engaged in banditry.&amp;amp;quot; The combined agitation of the disbanded soldiers and peasantry provokes throughout Russia a devastating fire, not only similar to the jacquerie (the homes of the nobles were burned and their owners were frequently killed), but to luddism as well (agrarian machinery was destroyed, machinery that in previous years reduced the need for wage labor), and included vandalism ( they destroy and ruin “anything that could hint of excessive wealth: paintings, books, and sculptures”). Indeed, “the peasantry destroyed noble homes, churches and schools. They set libraries and priceless works of art aflame.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn328|328]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Russian State Saved by Those Who Sought the &amp;amp;quot;Withering Away of the State&amp;amp;quot; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, the situation created after the February Revolution and the fall of the old regime can be described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In short, Russia was enduring a process of Balkanization [...]. If 1917 proved anything, it was that Russian society wasn’t strong enough, nor was it sufficiently united, to sustain a democratic revolution. Without the state, there’s nothing to hold Russia together.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn329|329]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An irony of history, the state was restored by a party that worked for and desired the final extinction of the state! It requires ruthless energy to restore order to a world that, having been ruined through centuries of isolation and oppression, experiences a new period of anarchy and chaos which breaks out after the war and the collapse of the old regime. But it would be ideologically superficial to focus on the recourse to terrorist violence by only one of the actors. Let’s see how the new authority is challenged:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We’re dealing with a terrible, vengeful war against the communist regime. Thousands of Bolsheviks were brutally killed. Many of them victims of horrible (and symbolic) torture. Ears, tongues and eyes ripped out; limbs, heads and genitals cut off; stomachs emptied and filled with sand; foreheads and chests branded with crosses; people crucified upon trees, burnt alive, drowned in freezing water, buried up to their necks and fed upon by dogs and rats as a spectacle to joyous crowds of peasants. Police stations and courthouses were destroyed. Schools and propaganda centers trashed [...]. Simple banditry played a role as well. Nearly every gang attacked trains. In the Donbass, it is said that in the spring of 1921 these robberies were “almost daily.&amp;amp;quot; Incursions into town centers and sometimes even remote farms were another regular source for provisions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn330|330]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What caused this brutal violence? The policies carried out by the Bolsheviks? Only in part: in 1921 and 1922 “a terrible famine” ravaged the countryside, “directly caused by a year of drought and freezing temperatures.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn331|331]] Yet the peasant revolt was also a protest against “a state that took their sons and horses to the army, that prolonged the devastation caused by the civil war, that forcibly conscripted peasants into work crews, that looted their food supplies”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn332|332]] this was also a protest against a catastrophe that began in 1914.&lt;br /&gt;
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With respect to Bolshevik policies it’s necessary to know how to distinguish between measures that unreasonably struck against the peasantry, from those that had a completely different character. Let’s consider the collective farms that had already started in 1920, and were often formed by communist militants arriving from the city, driven not just by ideology but also by the hunger that ravaged the urban centers: “They ate and worked collectively. The women did the difficult field work alongside the men, and in certain cases nurseries were established to take care of the children. On top of this, there was a total absence of any religious observance.&amp;amp;quot; In this case as well, the hostility of the peasantry was insurmountable, given “that they were convinced that they [the communists] sought to collectivize not only the land and the tools, but also the women and daughters, and for all of them to sleep together under one big roof.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn333|333]] Still, more bitter was the experience of the populists who at the turn of the century were determined “to go to the people” and help them create cooperatives, but were quickly forced to abandon their idealistic image of the Russian peasantry. Here we see Mikhail Romas’s experience:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;From the start, the peasants were suspicious of the cooperative, not being able to understand how the prices of the new company would be lower than other sellers. The more successful farmers connected to the merchants in the region started to harass Romas and his people with a series of acts meant to intimidate them: putting gunpowder in the firewood used for the fireplace, threatening poor farmers who showed some interest in the cooperative, until going as far as brutally killing a poor peasant from the cooperative, horrendously dismembering his body and then scattering it along the riverbank. Finally, they set fire to the kerosene deposit, making the cooperative (and part of the village) go up in flames.&lt;br /&gt;
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The naive populists were barely able to escape with their lives.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn334|334]] Once again, we see the extent of the violence that is unleashed in a Russia consumed by crisis. This is true as well for the horrific pogroms directed against Jews and Bolsheviks, the first especially, who are suspected of being behind the Bolsheviks, using them as puppets. Let’s again turn to the English historian previously quoted:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In some areas, in Chernobyl for example, the Jews were gathered in the synagogue that was then set on fire. In other towns, like in Cherkassy, hundreds of girls, not yet ten years old, were raped, many of whom were later found to have wounds in their vaginas from bayonets and swords [...]. The Cossacks from Terek tortured and mutilated hundreds of Jews, mostly women and children. Hundreds of bodies were discarded in the snow, food for the dogs and pigs. In this grim atmosphere, Cossack officers had a party at the post office, with dancing, evening wear, an orchestra, with the local magistrate in attendance, and a group of prostitutes brought from Cherson. And while the soldiers continued to massacre Jews for pure entertainment, officers and women spent the night drinking champagne and dancing.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding this, “the final report of an inquiry done in 1920 by the Jewish Agency in Soviet Russia speaks of ‘over one hundred and fifty thousand documented deaths’ and nearly three hundred thousand presumed victims, including the dead and injured.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn335|335]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;font-size: 1.33rem&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Stalin and the Conclusion of the Second “Time of Troubles”&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt; ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Russian Revolution is now seen under new light: “Without a doubt, the success of the Bolsheviks in the civil war was ultimately due to their extraordinary ability to ‘build the state’, an ability that their adversaries lacked.&amp;amp;quot;336 Those who called attention to this question were, in the Russia of 1918, some of the declared enemies of the Bolsheviks. Pavel Milyukov recognized their merit in having known how to “reestablish the state.&amp;amp;quot; Vasily Maklakov went further: “The new government has begun restoring the state apparatus, reestablishing order, and combating chaos. On this front the Bolsheviks have shown energy, and―I’ll add―undeniable skill.&amp;amp;quot;337 Three years later, in a conservative American newspaper, we can read that: “Lenin is the only man in Russia who has the power to maintain order. If he were toppled, only chaos would reign.&amp;amp;quot;338 &lt;br /&gt;
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The revolutionary dictatorship born out of the October Revolution performed a national function as well. Gramsci understood this well when, in July of 1919, he celebrates the Bolsheviks as protagonists of a great revolution, but also for having shown their revolutionary greatness in the form of a leadership group made up of excellent “statesmen”, capable therefore of saving the entire nation from the catastrophe caused by the old regime and the old ruling class. A year later, Lenin himself would indirectly reference this in a polemic against extremism, stressing that “the revolution isn’t possible without a crisis of the entire nation (which therefore implies exploited and exploiters)”; the political force that demonstrates its ability to resolve that conflict is the one which conquers hegemony and achieves victory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn339|339]] It&#039;s on these grounds that Aleksei Brusilov, a brilliant general of noble origin who tried in vain to save his officers driven to suicide by the savage violence of revolting peasant-soldiers, joins the side of Soviet Russia: “my sense of duty to my nation has often forced me to disobey my natural social inclinations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn340|340]] A few years later, in 1927, while offering an overview of Moscow, Walter Benjamin stressed “the strong national identity which Bolshevism has developed among all Russians, without exceptions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn341|341]] Soviet power had achieved a new identity and a new self-esteem for a nation not only terribly tested, but also in some ways lost and adrift, without any solid reference point.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the “crisis of the entire Russian nation” hadn’t truly ended. It had exploded with all its violence in 1914, but with a long period of incubation behind it, at times it is defined as a Second “Time of Troubles”, in an analogy to the crisis that raged in 17th century Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn342|342]] The struggle between claimants to the throne develops and combines with the economic crisis and peasant revolt, and with the intervention of foreign powers, it escalates in the 20th century to a conflict between a number of actors claiming political legitimacy. According to Weber’s classic “Tripartite”, traditional power follows the tsar’s family to the grave, even if this or that general desperately seeks to recover it; charismatic power, already weakened after the difficult conflict sparked by the Brest-Litovsk treaty, doesn’t survive Lenin’s death; finally, legal power finds great difficulty in asserting itself, after a revolution that triumphs with an ideology marked by the utopian idea of the state’s extinction in a country where the hatred of the peasants for their masters is traditionally expressed in violent, anti-statist terms.&lt;br /&gt;
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To the extent that a charismatic power was still possible, its most likely realization took shape in the figure of Trotsky, the great organizer of the Red Army, brilliant speaker and writer, who sought to embody the hopes for the victory of the world revolution, and thereby legitimize his aspirations of governing the party and the state. Stalin, however, embodied traditional-legal power which tried to solidify itself with great effort: different from Trotsky, who arrived late to Bolshevism, Stalin represented historical continuity for the party that led the revolution, and was therefore the holder of the new legality. Moreover, affirming that socialism could be achieved in one (large) country, Stalin gave new dignity and identity to the Russian nation, thus overcoming the frightening crisis―ideological but also economic―suffered after the defeat and chaos of the First World War, to find historical continuity at last. But for that very reason his adversaries denounced him for “treason”, while for Stalin and his supporters the traitors were those who, with their adventurism, facilitated the intervention of foreign powers, and in the last analysis, put in danger the survival of the Russian nation that was at this time the vanguard of the revolutionary cause. The clash between Stalin and Trotsky is the conflict not only between two political programs, but also between two forms of legitimacy.&lt;br /&gt;
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For all these reasons, the Second Time of Troubles ended not with the defeat of the supporters of the old regime, or with the defeat of the intervention by counter-revolutionary foreign powers as is often thought, but with the end of the third civil war (that which divided the Bolshevik ruling group itself), and also with the end of the conflict between the two opposing forms of legitimacy; therefore not in 1921, but in 1937. Despite the fact that the rise of the Romanov dynasty meant the end of the Time of Troubles, 17th century Russia found its definitive consolidation only with the crowning of Peter the Great; after having passed through its most acute phase in the years following the outbreak of the First World War until the end of the Entente’s intervention; the Second “Time of Troubles” ends with Stalin’s consolidation of power and the industrialization and “westernization” pushed forward by him in preparation for the approaching war.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Exalted Utopia and the Prolongation of the State of Emergency ===&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, the long duration of the Second “Time of Troubles” isn’t just an objective fact. What role was played in its prolongation by the intelligentsia, politicians and the ideology which inspired them? One line of thought, with Arendt as its reference, dedicates itself to the search for the original ideological sin committed by the revolution that unfolded in the most tormented way. A different approach seems more fruitful to me, which is based on a comparative sociology of the political and intellectual classes. In the movements unleashed by a revolution, whether in France or in Russia, we see the “feathered scoundrels” in action, the &#039;&#039;Gueux Plumées&#039;&#039;, according to Burke’s definition, or the “Pugachev from university”, according to Maistre’s definition. In short, we’re dealing with non-propertied intellectuals, ridiculed as “abstract” by their adversaries. There’s no doubt that the propertied intellectuals already had real political experience, including experience in exercising political power by the time the old regime collapsed. In the United States, the slave-owners, from whose ranks came eminent intellectuals and statesmen (slave-owners are president during thirty of the first thirty-six years of the American Republic), not only enjoy their wealth as a “particular” type of private property, alongside the others; they simultaneously exercise executive, legislative and judicial power over their slaves. Similar considerations could be made with respect to England and the Glorious Revolution: landed property (from which intellectuals and liberal leaders often came) is very much present in the House of Lords and the House of Commons; and together with the gentry, they directly appoint judges, and therefore retain judicial power. Less prepared for taking power are the non-propertied intellectuals. Their abstraction contributed to making the process of consolidating the revolution more difficult and painful. But there’s another side to the coin: it’s exactly this “abstraction” and this distance to property which make it possible for these “feathered scoundrels” to support the abolition of slavery in the colonies, and for the “Pugachevs from university” to give their support to the process of decolonization that would later play out across the planet.&lt;br /&gt;
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Over the long duration of the Second “Time of Troubles”, the role played by ideology is beyond question. However, it’s necessary to then add that it’s not just a matter of Bolshevik ideology. We have seen the millenarian hopes that accompanied the fall of the tsarist autocracy, and we also know that the theme of the betrayed revolution goes beyond the borders of Russia and the communist movement. Just a few months or weeks after the October Revolution of 1917, without wasting any time, Kautsky stressed how the Bolsheviks haven’t kept―or are unable to keep―any of the promises made upon seizing power:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Soviet government has already seen itself forced into a number of compromises toward capital [...]. But even more so than with Russian capital, the Soviet Republic had to make concessions to German capital and recognize its demands. It’s still unclear when the Entente’s capital will be introduced into Russia; everything indicates that the dictatorship of the proletariat has liquidated Russian capital, only to give its place to German and American capital.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn343|343]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Bolsheviks had taken power promising “the spread of the revolution to the capitalist countries, under the impetus of the Russian experience.&amp;amp;quot; But what became of this “grandiose and unrealistic” perspective? It had been replaced by a program of an “immediate peace at any cost.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn344|344]] It is 1918 and, ironically, Kautsky’s critique of Brest-Litovsk isn’t very different from what we’ve already seen, from Bukharin in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from international relations, the record of the October Revolution within Russia itself is even more catastrophic from Kautsky’s perspective:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;By removing the remains of feudalism, it has given stronger and more definite expression to private property than the latter had previously. It has now made the peasants, who were formerly interested in the overthrow of landed private property―namely, the big estates―into the most energetic defenders of the newly created landed private property. It has strengthened private property in the means of production and in the production of commodities.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn345|345]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Again we are reminded of those, including within the Bolshevik party, who describe the persistence of landed private property and NEP as a shameful abandonment of the socialist course.&lt;br /&gt;
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The collectivization of agriculture later on doesn’t put an end to the denunciation of treason; which, in the middle of the 1930s, finds its organic expression in Trotsky’s book dedicated to the “Revolution Betrayed.&amp;amp;quot; It is interesting to observe how the fundamental charges of this accusation are in some form already present in Kautsky’s book from 1918. Let’s see how the eminent social democratic theorist makes his argument: if individual private property is also substituted by cooperative property, one must not forget that the latter is only “a new form of capitalism.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, the “state economy still isn’t socialism”, and not just for the fact that the market and commodity production continue to exist.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn346|346]] There’s something more: the liquidation of a determined form of capitalism doesn’t necessarily mean the liquidation of capitalism as such; the new power “could abolish many forms of capitalist property”, but this still isn’t the “establishment of socialist production.&amp;amp;quot; As a matter of fact, a new exploiting class emerged in the Soviet Union, or is emerging: “In the place of those who were until this moment capitalists, now transformed into workers, enter intellectuals or workers, now transformed into capitalists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn347|347]] While Trotsky, contrary to some of his more radical followers, prefers to speak of a “bureaucracy” instead of a new capitalist class, the similarities between these two discourses remain, even more so because in the Russian revolutionary’s analysis, the “Soviet bureaucracy” apparently seeks “to rival the Western bourgeoisie.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn348|348]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, there are differences. For Kautsky, it’s the Bolshevik leadership as such that has abandoned and betrayed the noble ideas of socialism in some form; more than a subjective and conscious decision or renunciation, this desertion is the expression of the “impotence of all revolutionary endeavors carried out without taking into consideration the objective social and economic conditions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn349|349]] In comparison to Trotsky, Kautsky’s reasoning appears more persuasive. He doesn’t commit the fallacy of explaining gigantic objective social processes (which, on top of Russia, affected a number of other countries) by railing against the betrayal by a limited political stratum or by a single individual―a single individual that plays the role of &#039;&#039;deus ex machina&#039;&#039;! However, there’s a moment in which the German social democratic leader also brings in the category of subjective and conscious betrayal. The Bolsheviks had committed it when, voluntarily ignoring the immaturity of the objective conditions, they deserted to the “cult of violence” which “Western Marxism strongly condemns.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn350|350]] It is but the initial choice of carrying out the October Revolution which is synonymous with the renunciation of the noble ideas of Marx and socialism; in this case, however, the accusation of betrayal includes Trotsky as much as Lenin and Stalin. It remains to be seen if Kautsky’s condemnation of the Bolsheviks’ “cult of violence” is compatible with the criticism he directed at them for having sought in Brest-Litovsk “an immediate peace at any cost.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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More important than the differences are the similarities that are shared between the two Marxist theorists under examination here. In both discourses, the millenarian vision of the future society opens up an abyss between the beauty of authentic socialism and communism on the one hand, and on the other hand the irredeemable mediocrity of what’s present and what’s real. They try to fill this abyss by resorting, in the case of Trotsky, to the category of betrayal and, in the case of Kautsky, to the category of the objective immaturity of Russia, which inevitably ends up provoking the disfiguration and betrayal of the original ideas. In the eyes of the German social democratic leader, given the “economic backwardness” of a country that “isn’t among the developed industrial states”, the failure of the socialist project was inevitable: “in reality, Russia is completing the last of the bourgeois revolutions, not the first socialist revolution. This is clearer by the day. The current Russian Revolution could only take on a socialist character when it coincides with the socialist revolution in western Europe.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn351|351]] Again we come across Trotsky’s desires and predictions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Indeed, having emerged from the February Revolution, the millenarian vision of the new society yet to be built ends up being defended, in different and contradictory ways, by quite a broad group of people. It’s a dialectic that manifests itself with particular clarity with the introduction of NEP. Those outraged aren’t just important sectors of the Bolshevik party, nor is the indignation always motivated by concerns over fidelity to Marxist orthodoxy. While the Christian Pierre Pascal laments the arrival of a new “aristocracy” and the emergence of a “counter-revolutionary” process, the great Joseph Roth speaks disappointingly of an “Americanization”, which sees Soviet Russia losing not only socialism, but its own soul as well, thus falling into a “spiritual vacuum.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn352|352]] The outraged cries caused by defrauded and betrayed millenarian hopes are met in turn by declarations of victory in the bourgeois camp for the fact that, with the introduction of NEP, even Lenin―so the argument goes―sees himself obligated to turn his back on Marx and socialism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn353|353]] Again we come across the category of betrayal, though this time met positively.&lt;br /&gt;
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Paradoxically, what in someway pushed the Bolsheviks toward another revolution was an unprecedented, ample and diverse front. The horrors of the war had led Pascal to apocalyptically predict in August of 1917 “a social and universal revolution” of unprecedented radicalness.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn354|354]] On the opposing side, adversaries and enemies of the October Revolution were ready to celebrate its failure every time plans were drawn up to move on from the phase of millenarian expectations, to the less enthusiastic but more realistic phase of building a new society. All of this could only strengthen the already existing tendency in the Bolshevik party, itself a consequence of the spiritual climate whipped up by the war, in favor of radicalizing the utopian themes found in Marx’s thinking. In that sense, the ideology which contributed to the prolongation of the Second “Time of Troubles” appears to be rooted in an objectively concrete situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From Abstract Universalism to the Accusation of Betrayal ===&lt;br /&gt;
Now let’s take an overall look at the charges involved in the accusation of “betrayal.&amp;amp;quot; Formulating the problem in philosophical terms, we find that despite being considerably different and despite arising out of quite different ideological and political positions, these accusations share a vision of universalism which requires further examination. Driven by the need to counter and surpass the domestic egoism of the bourgeois family, which concentrates its attention exclusively on its restricted unit while avoiding the tragedies that unfold all around it, Kollontai calls upon communists to cultivate a universal sense of responsibility; moving past, even with regard to children, the distinction between “yours” and “mine”, struggling alongside others for that which is common to all, for that which is “ours.&amp;amp;quot; We have seen Trotsky rightly point out the catastrophic consequences when parents ignore their &#039;&#039;particular&#039;&#039; responsibilities toward their own children. In other words, bypassing the responsibilities within the immediate family unit, without starting first from a particular and unavoidable responsibility, universal responsibility proves to be empty, and even becomes a tool to avoid responsibility. In this sense, according to Lenin, Kollontai’s theory was “anti-social.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn355|355]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But while they appreciate it in relation to the family question, the Bolshevik leaders tend to forget the unity of the universal and the particular when confronting the national question. At the moment of its founding, the Third International starts from the assumption that a single party of the international proletariat is called upon to achieve the universal emancipation of humanity, without getting confused by “so-called ‘national interests’”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn356|356]] we have seen Kollontai in a similar way theorize a type of universal family where “mine” and “yours” seamlessly dissolve into “ours.&amp;amp;quot; Soon after, the Third International goes through a difficult learning process that would lead to Dimitrov’s report before its Seventh Congress in 1935, which denounces any kind of “national nihilism” as dangerous.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn357|357]] But isn’t the rediscovery of the nation a betrayal to internationalism? While for Kollontai the continuation of the family institution, and giving particular attention to one’s own children, are synonymous with egotistical pettiness and disinterest for the welfare of all children, for Trotsky “examining the perspectives of social revolution within the limits of a single nation” means ceding to or indulging in “social-patriotism” and social-chauvinism, responsible among other things for the bloodbath of the First World War. Also, “the idea of a socialist revolution that is carried out and completed in a single country” is a “point of view that is fundamentally national-reformist; it is neither revolutionary nor internationalist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn358|358]] These are statements from 1928; ten years later the Fourth International is founded, which takes up (and then radicalizes) the abstract universalism from earlier, and therefore defines itself as the “party of the world socialist revolution.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be easy to use against Trotsky his own argument from the polemic against Kollontai. Just as ignoring and avoiding personal responsibilities in relation to one’s own kids and relatives doesn’t represent a true overcoming of domestic responsibilities, neither is it synonymous with internationalism to lose sight of the fact that the concrete possibilities and tasks of revolutionary transformation are first centered in a determined national terrain. Distance and indifference to one’s own country can certainly have a non-progressive meaning: in Tsarist Russia, Herzen, an author dear to Lenin, observed that the aristocracy was much “more cosmopolitan than the revolution”; far from having a national base, their dominion was rooted in the denial of the very possibility of a national base, in the “deep division [...] between the civilized classes and the peasantry”; on one side, a restricted elite inclined to behaving themselves as a superior race, and the immense majority of the population on the other.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn359|359]] Without eliminating the racialization of the subaltern classes, and without upholding the ideas of the nation and national responsibility, one isn’t a revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin understands this well, as the speech delivered on February 4th, 1931 demonstrates. On this occasion, he presents himself as a revolutionary and internationalist leader, who is at the same time a statesman and Russian national leader, committed to resolving the problems that have held back the nation for some time: “we Bolsheviks, who have carried out three revolutions, who have emerged victorious from a hard civil war”, must also deal with the problem of overcoming Russia’s traditional industrial backwardness and military weakness. “In the past we had no nation, nor could we have one”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn360|360]] with the overthrow of the old regime and the arrival of Soviet power, national nihilism is more unwise than ever, the revolutionary cause is at the same time the cause of the nation. The emphasis now appears to shift from the class struggle (with its internationalist dimension) to the construction of the national economy. But more precisely, in the concrete political situation that’s been created, the class struggle becomes the task of achieving technological and economic development for the socialist country, putting it in the position of confronting the terrible challenge that’s approaching, and offering a real contribution to the emancipatory and internationalist cause. The class struggle not only takes on a national dimension, but it appears to configure itself in Soviet Russia as a banal and routine task: “in the period of reconstruction, expertise decides everything”; therefore, it is necessary “to learn skills” and become “masters of science.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, this new task is no less difficult and demanding than the storming of the Winter Palace: “We Bolsheviks must conquer science” and becomes “specialists”; it’s certainly not an easy objective to reach, but “there’s no fortress Bolsheviks can’t storm.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn361|361]] The policy during the Great Patriotic War finds its first expression in the years when Soviet Russia is committed to a colossal endeavor of industrialization and reinforcing national defense.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the lead-up to Nazi aggression, we have seen Stalin stress the need link “national sentiment and the idea of the nation” to “a healthy nationalism, correctly understood, with proletarian internationalism.&amp;amp;quot; In the concrete situation that arose following the Third Reich’s expansionist offensive, universalism’s advance passed through the concrete and individual struggles of the nations determined not to let themselves be reduced to slavery at the service of Hitler’s master race; truly advancing internationalism was the resistance by nations most directly threatened by the Nazi empire’s program of enslavement. Just three years earlier, as confirmation of the fact that we are in the middle of a learning process that’s encouraged or imposed by the concrete necessity of developing the struggles of national resistance against imperialism, Mao Zedong states: “To separate the content of internationalism from its national form is the habit of those who don’t understand anything about internationalism. With regards to us, however, we must closely link them together. Some of our worst errors were committed because of it, and they must be corrected with the utmost dedication.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn362|362]] Gramsci similarly distinguishes between “cosmopolitanism” and an “internationalism” which knows―and in fact must know―how to be “profoundly national” as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from the rejection of the nuclear family and the theorization of a type of collective parenthood (“our children”), at the general political level, abstract universalism is clearly seen in the proposal of a “collective management”, seen once again as the dissolution of personal responsibilities and duties taken on individually. It’s not a coincidence that Kollontai is for some time part of the Workers’ Opposition, whose slogans at the factory level and in the workplaces of the party, and in union and state administration, are “power to a collective organ”, “collective will”, “common deliberation”, “collective management.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn363|363]] The millenarian expectations for the disappearance of “mine” and “yours” again makes its appearance in the economic sphere, with the subsequent condemnation of more than just a determined system of production and distribution of wealth, but the condemnation of the “money economy”, the market as such, and private property, no matter how limited and restricted it may be. In all these cases, the universalism that’s aspired to is that which immediately appears in its uncontaminated purity, without being mediated by or interlinked with particular concerns. It is this cult of abstract universalism which yells treason every time particularity has its rights or power recognized.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Dialectic of the Revolution and the Genesis of Abstract Universalism ===&lt;br /&gt;
But how to explain the emergence of an outlook and a purism that, at first glance, is so naive and detached from reality? It wouldn’t be less naive or unrealistic to assign blame to one individual or another. In reality, there’s an objective dialectic at work here. In the wake of the struggle against inequality, privileges, discrimination, injustices―and against the oppression of the old regime and its particularisms and exclusivism, with the old ruling class condemned for its pettiness and egoism―the most radical revolutionaries are driven to express a strong, inspiring and high-sounding vision of the principles of equality and universality. It is a vision that, on the one hand, carries the energy and enthusiasm that facilitate the overthrow of the old social relations and the old political institutions; and on the other hand, it makes the construction of the new order more complex and difficult.&lt;br /&gt;
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Will the new order live up to the hopes, promises and ambitions which preceded its birth? Does it not run the risk of reproducing under a new form the injustices so passionately denounced under the old regime? This is an especially delicate question for the fact that the most radical revolutions cultivate ambitious projects of political and social transformation, while precisely because of this unfamiliarity and distance to the existing order they bring to power a leadership group without solid political experience behind them. Moreover, they need to construct and even invent not just a new political order, but a new social order as well. In these circumstances, the thin lines separating an ambitious political project from high-sounding yet empty rhetoric become evident; separating a concrete utopia (a certainly distant horizon, but which orients and stimulates the real process of transformation) from an abstract and deceptive utopia (in the last analysis, a synonym for escaping and avoiding reality).&lt;br /&gt;
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To be victorious, not only in the short term but in the long term as well, a revolution must be able to give concrete and lasting content to the ideals of equality and universality that have accompanied it in attaining power. And to do it, the new leadership group is called upon to let go of those naive ideas which they tended to hold on to in the moments of enthusiasm; and they are called upon to accomplish such a task not in a vacuum, but in a historically charged space where those ideas weigh upon economic and political limits, the relation of forces, and have their presence felt in the contradictions and the conflicts which inevitably emerge. It’s in journeying through this difficult passage where the revolutionary front, which up until this moment has at least appeared united, starts showing its first internal cracks and fractures, and where disillusionment, discontent and accusations of betrayal make their appearance.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a process and dialectic which Hegel analyzes with great clarity and depth with regards to the French Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn364|364]] It develops while waving the banner of the “universal subject”, “universal will” and “universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; In this phase, in the moment of the old regime’s destruction, one witnesses the “abolition of different spiritual masses and the limited lives of individuals”; “therefore all social strata are abolished, which are the spiritual essence in which Everything is articulated.&amp;amp;quot; It’s as if society, dissolved of all intermediary governing bodies, had broken down completely into a myriad of individuals who, rejecting all traditional authorities now left without legitimacy, demand not only liberty and equality, but also participation in public life and in all phases of decision-making. In the wake of this enthusiasm and exuberance, in a situation in which it is as if authority and power as such have been suspended into nothingness, emerges an anarchistic millenarianism, that demands “absolute liberty”, that is prepared to denounce as treason all contamination and restrictions, real or presumed, on universality.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new order assumes a reorganization of individuals within the “spiritual masses”, in social organizations, intermediary bodies, although constituted and organized according to new and different arrangements that respect the principles of the revolution. However, for the anarchistic millenarianism, society’s new formulation, whatever it may be, is seen as the negation of universality. In fact, “their activity and the personality’s state of being find themselves restricted to one subsection of Everything, limited to just one type of activity and state of being.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, “limited to the element of being, the personality would thus take on the meaning of a determined personality and would in truth cease to be a universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; It’s an analysis that sheds light on the dialectic that plays out for the duration of the French Revolution, but is even more clearly evident in the October Revolution, when the &#039;&#039;Pathos&#039;&#039; of universality is felt even more strongly, both in its more naive forms and in its more mature forms. In the situation of exalted universalism, which presides over the toppling of the old regime, all divisions of labor, no matter their form, become a synonym for exclusivity and the sequestering of “universal self-consciousness” and “universal will” by a bureaucratic and privileged minority.&lt;br /&gt;
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This is true for social relations as well as for political institutions. There’s no order that could satisfy anarchistic millenarianism’s aspiration for direct and unmediated realization of universality. The manner in which anarchistic millenarianism acts is clarified again in the memorable pages of &#039;&#039;Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Not to be fooled by either the comedy (&#039;&#039;Vorstellung&#039;&#039;) of obedience to laws that pretend to be the expression of self government, and to which are assigned only a part, or for the fact of enjoying representation in legislation and universal activities, self-consciousness won’t be deprived of the reality which consists of the writing of its own laws and its completion of not individual work, but more precisely a universal work. In fact, when found only in the form of representation and theatrical representation, the individual isn’t real; where there’s someone who is the representative of the individual, there is no individual.”&lt;br /&gt;
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We are reminded of the definition that The Workers’ Opposition gives to the bureaucracy in Soviet Russia: “someone else decides your destiny.&amp;amp;quot; Against this inadmissible expropriation, they demand a “leadership” that is “collective” in each phase of decision making, with the subsequent condemnation of all representative organization. Moreover, any drafting of a constitutional order and even juridical regulation is labeled &#039;&#039;a priori&#039;&#039; as an attempted confinement of or rupture with universality, and therefore as the expression of an old regime that’s hard to kill.&lt;br /&gt;
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To come into “action”, to become real and effective and to transform into the “true will”― Hegel continues―universality must find expression in concrete individuals, it must “place at the top an individual self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; Here millenarianism and anarchism cry out against that scandal: “In that approach, the remaining individuals are excluded from the totality of action and play only a limited role; therefore, the action wouldn’t be an action of effective universal self-consciousness.&amp;amp;quot; The tragedy of the French Revolution (but also, on a greater scale, the October Revolution) is this: if one wants to avoid reducing it to an empty phrase, the pathos of universality must be given a determined and concrete content, but it’s precisely this determined and concrete content that is seen as a betrayal. In fact, it’s particularity as such that is labeled as an element of contamination and negation of universality. While this vision prevails, the liquidation of the old regime can’t be followed by the construction of a new and solid order: “Universal liberty, therefore, can’t produce any work or any positive action, only negative action. Universal liberty is only the rush to erase.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Abstract Universalism and Terror in Soviet Russia ===&lt;br /&gt;
In Hegel’s analysis, to the degree that terror is the result not of the objective situation, but of an ideology, then it’s primarily the responsibility of anarchistic millenarianism and abstract universalism that, in their flight from any particular or determined elements, are only able to express themselves through their “rush to erase.&amp;amp;quot; With regard to the Bolshevik Revolution, one must not lose sight of the permanent state of emergency provoked by imperialist intervention and siege. Yet the most properly ideological component of the terror relates to the cult of universality and abstract utopia, which hinders the action of the new leadership group and ends up provoking its division. It’s interesting to see the way Trotsky, in the middle of the 1930s, casts aside his wise critiques of Kollontai and mocks Stalin’s rehabilitation of the family:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Since the State had been entrusted with the education of the younger generation, political power, far from concerning itself with supporting the authority of those who are older, the father and mother in particular, has instead concentrated in separating the children in order to isolate them from old customs. Also, done openly in the period of the first five-year plan, schools and the communist youth had frequently appealed to children with the aim of denouncing the drunk father and the religious mother, in order to shame them and to attempt to ‘reeducate them’. It’s another matter to know to what success. In any case, this method has shaken family authority itself.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn365|365]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In participating in the spread of the “old customs”, and therefore of the ideology and particularism of the old regime, the family is identified as one of the obstacles that the forward march of universality is called upon to strike at or topple. The denunciation of “family authority” causes not a reduction of violence, but an increase of it. The condemnation of the Constitution and of law as instruments of bourgeois domination has the same result. Working from these conclusions, it becomes impossible to put form to and even think of a socialist state and law. Naturally, there’s a contradiction between the reverence to the ideal of the withering away of the State and the appeal to the State to intervene as well in the sphere of family relations, but it’s a contradiction that invariably manifests itself in the anarchistic rhetoric of abstract universalism and the violent practices it ends up encouraging.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this moment, we are obligated to raise another consideration. This tendency, to see the particularities themselves as a disruptive element that contaminates the universal, manifests itself far beyond the Bolshevik leadership group. We can think of the distrust or the hostility with which Rosa Luxemburg generally viewed nationalist movements, whose neglect of the international cause of the proletariat is denounced. After the October Revolution, the great revolutionary, on the one hand, criticizes the Bolsheviks for their lack of respect for democracy and its liquidation, yet on the other hand, she encourages them to “to crush with an iron fist any nationalist tendencies” arising from the “peoples without history”, “rotten corpses that arise from their secular graves.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn366|366]]&lt;br /&gt;
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And now let’s see how Stalin describes the effects of the “socialist revolution” on the national question:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Shaking the lowest stratum of humanity and driving them into the political scene, it brings new life to a whole series of new nationalities, previously unknown or poorly known. Who could have thought that the old Czarist Russia represented nothing less than fifty nations and national groups? However, the October Revolution, in breaking the old chains and putting on stage a whole series of nationalities and forgotten peoples, gave them a new life and new development.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn367|367]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We now reach a paradoxical conclusion, at least from the point of view of the usual historical evaluations and the ideological stereotypes dominant nowadays. In relation to the peoples who “emerge from their secular graves”, according to Luxemburg’s wording, or the “forgotten peoples”, according to Stalin’s wording, it’s the first who reveals a much more threatening and repressive attitude. Naturally, with regards to the judgement on those who actually wielded power, it’s a matter of seeing if, and up to what point, praxis corresponded to theory. It remains true that Luxemburg’s abstract universalism is shown to be potentially more loaded with violence, for in the course of her evolution she has tended to read national demands as a deviation from the real path of internationalism and universalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We will reach a similar conclusion, again on the topic of the national question, if this time we compare Stalin and Kautsky. Against the theory formulated by the German social democratic leader, on the basis of which, with the victory of socialism in a country or group of countries, and even just with the development of bourgeois democratic society, national differences and particularities would disappear, or tend to disappear. The former objects: Such a vision, that superficially ignores the “stability of nations”, ends up opening the door to a “war against national cultures”, national minorities, oppressed peoples, and to a “policy of assimilation” and “colonization”, to a policy desired, for example, by the “Germanizers” and “Russiafiers” of Poland.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn368|368]] In this case as well, it is a universalism unable to accept the particular that encourages violence and oppression. Still in the context of comparing different theories, this abstract universalism is closer to Kautsky than to Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar to the German social democratic leader, Luxemburg also strongly criticizes the Bolsheviks for their “petty-bourgeois” agrarian reform, which conceded land to the peasantry. To this outlook, one can counterpose Bukharin, according to whom, in the conditions of Russia at that time, with a monopoly on political power solidly in the hands of the Bolsheviks, it is precisely “private interests” and the drive of the peasantry and others to enrich themselves that could contribute to the development of the productive forces and, in the last analysis, to the cause of socialism and communism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn369|369]] A significant transformation occurred with Bukharin: if during Brest-Litovsk, with regard to the national question, he had shown an abstract universalism, here in relation to NEP and the agrarian question, the process of building universality must also advance through the opportune utilization of particular interests. We are witnessing a learning process and self-critical reflection of extraordinary interest, and that helps us understand what has happened in countries like China and Vietnam in our time. Bukharin goes on:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We imagined things in the following form: we take power, we take nearly everything into our grasp, we immediately put into motion a planned economy, it doesn’t matter if difficulties arise, some we eliminate, others we overcome, and the whole thing has a happy ending. Today we clearly see that the question is not solved this way.&lt;br /&gt;
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The aspiration to “organize production coercively, by way of orders”, leads to catastrophe. In overcoming that “caricature of socialism”, communists are obligated by experience to take into account the “enormous importance of private individual incentive” with the development of the productive forces in mind, and of course a “development of the productive forces that leads us to socialism and not to a full restoration of a so-called ‘healthy’ capitalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn370|370]] To protest, however, like Trotsky and the opposition would do, against the “degeneration” of Soviet Russia due to the persistence of the private economy in the rural areas and of a “class collaboration” by communists with the peasantry (and with the bourgeois strata tolerated under NEP), would have led to the end of “civil peace” and an enormous “Saint Bartholomew&#039;s night.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn371|371]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Was Bukharin’s defeat crucial only because of the need to accelerate the country’s industrialization as much as possible in preparation for war, or did the stubborn hostility to all forms of private property and the market economy also contribute to it? It’s a question that we will deal with later. For now, we can have one point of reference: the concentrationary universe reaches its peak during the forced collectivization of agriculture, and with an iron fist treatment of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies within the peasantry, generally members of the “peoples without history”, to use the unfortunate language that Luxemburg borrowed from Engels. Aside from the brutality of this or that political leader, there can be no doubt about the fatal role played by a universalism incapable of integrating and respecting the particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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The pages that we’ve used from Hegel (the author in whom Lenin identifies the “roots of historical materialism”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn372|372]] are like a refutation in advance of the explanation of “Stalinism” contained in the so-called “&#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;” of 1956, presented at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It would be, of course, dishonest to pretend that Khrushchev was at Hegel’s level, but it’s curious that the tragedy and the horror of Soviet Russia continued to be the responsibility of a single figure, in fact, of a single scapegoat, as if the extraordinary analysis that the &#039;&#039;Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039; dedicates to “absolute liberty” and the “terror” had never existed.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== What it Means to Govern: A Painful Learning Process ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s return to the Hegelian analysis of the French Revolution’s dialectic (and of the great revolutions in general). Starting from the concrete experience of the disastrous consequences to which the “rush to erase” leads, individuals understand the necessity of giving concrete and specific content to universalism, putting an end to universalism’s mad pursuit of immediate realization and purity. Renouncing absolute egalitarianism, individuals “again accept negation and difference”, that is “the organization of the spiritual masses in which the multitude of individual consciences express themselves.&amp;amp;quot; These, moreover, “return to a particular and limited work, but precisely for this, they return to their meaningful reality.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, it’s understood now the unproven and disastrous myth of a “universal will”, or to use language from someone other than Hegel (used by no small number of Russian revolutionaries): of direct democracy, of “collective leadership” that, without mediation and bureaucratic limitations, expresses itself directly and immediately in the factories, in work places, in political organizations.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, aside from Jacobinism, the target of Hegel’s criticisms are anarchistic radicalism and millenarianism. This is confirmed by his reflections on the other great revolution, namely the puritan revolution that breaks out in the middle of the seventeenth century. Putting an end to an unsuccessful and pseudo-revolutionary period of religious exaltation, and offering a positive political conclusion to years of work, Cromwell demonstrates that “he knew very well what it means to govern.&amp;amp;quot; “Taking firm control of the reins of government, he dissolved the parliament that had been consumed by prayer and he commanded the throne with great splendor, as Protector.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn373|373]] To know how to govern means to be able to offer concrete content to the ideals of universalism that inspired the revolution, for example: distancing itself from the first English Revolution, from the followers of the “fifth monarchy”, the hollow utopia of a society that didn’t have or need juridical norms, for the fact that individuals are enlightened and allow themselves to be guided by grace. To the degree that he knew how to distance himself from a failed abstract utopia, Robespierre also showed that he in some ways knew the art of governing, or sought to learn it.&lt;br /&gt;
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After a great revolution, especially when its protagonists are from ideological and political strata deprived of property and the political experience connected to the enjoyment of property, to learn how to govern means to learn how to give concrete content to universality. But it’s above all else a process of learning by experience. With regard to the socialist revolution, that process doesn’t begin or end with Stalin. Rather, the most serious limitation of this statesman (but also, to a different degree, of other statesman of our time associated with socialism) is having left incomplete, or even gravely incomplete, that learning process.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s take the national question. In Lenin, we can read the thesis according to which the “inevitable fusion of nations” and of “different nationalities”, including with regard to language, passes through a “transitory period” of full and free development of nations and their different languages, cultures and identities. At least in relation to the “transition period”, here it’s evident the awareness that the universal must know how to embrace the particular. A significant learning process had already begun: we are already past the abstract universalism that is expressed, for example, in Luxemburg, for whom the particular nationalities are in themselves a negation of internationalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet Lenin, in speaking of the national question, appears to grasp the unity between the universal and the particular only in relation to the “transition period.&amp;amp;quot; Stalin is sometimes more radical:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Some, Kautsky for example, speak of creating a single language for all humanity under socialism and doing away with all other languages. I don’t really believe in this theory of a single language for all of humanity. In any case, experience doesn’t speak in its favor, but against this theory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn374|374]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by this passage, not even communism should be characterized by a “single language for all of humanity.&amp;amp;quot; It’s as if Stalin was afraid of his own courage. Moreover, he prefers to delay the “fusion of nations and national languages” to the moment in which socialism has triumphed on the world stage.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn375|375]] Maybe only in the last years of his life, when at that point he had indisputable authority within the international communist movement, does Stalin prove to be more daring. He doesn’t limit himself to stressing that “history shows a great stability and an enormous resistance by languages to forced assimilation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn376|376]] Now his theoretical elaboration goes yet further: “language is radically different from a superstructure”; it “isn’t created by any single class, but by a society as a whole, by all the classes of society, thanks to the efforts by hundreds of generations”; therefore, it’s absurd to speak of a “language’s ‘class nature’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn377|377]] But then why should national languages disappear? And why should the nations as such disappear, if it’s true that “the language community represents one of the most important signs of a distinct nation”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn378|378]] However, despite all this, orthodoxy ends up coming out on top: communism continues to be thought of as the triumph of the “common international language”, and ultimately as a single nationality.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn379|379]] At least with regard to that mythical final stage, the universal can again be thought of in its purity, free of the contamination of the particularities of languages and national identities. It’s not solely an abstract problem of theory. The attachment to orthodoxy certainly didn’t contribute to the understanding of the permanent contradictions between nations that aimed for socialism and considered themselves committed to the construction of communism. It’s these contradictions that played a primary role in the process of crisis and dissolution of the “socialist camp.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In other fields of social life we again see Stalin take part in a difficult struggle against an abstract utopia, but stopping half-way, to avoid compromising traditional orthodoxy. In 1952, therefore on the eve of his death, he feels obligated to criticize those that want to liquidate the “market economy” as such. In a polemic on this, Stalin wisely observes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“They say that market production in any condition must necessarily lead to capitalism. That’s not true. Not always, not in any condition! One cannot identify capitalist production with market production. They are two different things.”&lt;br /&gt;
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There could very well be “market production without capitalists.&amp;amp;quot; However, again in this case, orthodoxy proves to be an insurmountable barrier: the disappearance of the market economy is delayed until the moment in which “all the means of production” are completely collectivized, with the surpassing, therefore, of cooperative property itself.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn380|380]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At last, the problem that’s perhaps decisive. We saw Stalin theorize a “third function” in addition to repression and class struggle at the national and international level. A prominent jurist was right to point out that the report to the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CPSU had put before us “a radical change in the doctrine developed by Marx and Engels.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn381|381]] It was a change that Stalin had reached from his experience in government, from a concrete process of learning that had already left its traces in Lenin’s final thoughts and political decisions, but that had now taken another step forward. Trotsky had argued very differently. He had hoped to synthesize the positions of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the following form: “The generation that had conquered power, the old guard, began the liquidation of the State; the following generation will complete this task.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn382|382]] If this miracle did not come to pass, who could be blamed if not the traitorous Stalinist bureaucracy?&lt;br /&gt;
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It may seem misleading to use these philosophical categories to explain the history of Soviet Russia, but it’s Lenin himself who legitimizes this approach. He cites and supports the “excellent formula” in Hegelian logic, according to which the universal must be able to embrace “the richness of the particular.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn383|383]] In expressing himself in that way he’s thinking, above all else, of the revolutionary situation, that is always determined by and reaches its point of rupture at the weakest link, in a particular country. Nevertheless, this “excellent formula” was not considered for the phase following the seizure of power by either Lenin or the Bolshevik leadership group. When they are confronted with the problem of building a new society, these efforts to bring “the richness of the particular” into the universal run into the accusation of betrayal. It’s well understood that that accusation is aimed at Stalin in particular. Having governed the country born out of the October Revolution for more time than any other leader, it’s precisely from this experience in government that he realized the emptiness of the millenarian expectations for the disappearance of the state, nations, markets, and money; and he also directly experienced the paralyzing effect of a universalist vision that tends to classify as a contamination the attention given to the particular needs and interests of a state, a new nation, a family or a determined individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it’s true that ideology plays a significant role in the prolongation of the Second Time of Troubles, it’s necessary, then, to point out that Stalin’s antagonists are particularly guilty of this. Stalin, thanks also to his concrete experience in government, seriously committed himself to the learning process through which, according to Hegel’s teachings, the leadership group of a grand revolution is forced to pass through.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;4. The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From a New Attempt at “Soviet Democracy” to “Saint Bartholomew&#039;s Night” ===&lt;br /&gt;
In any case, It’s important to stress―as one of the authors of the &#039;&#039;Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039; ironically recognizes―the need for the “contextualization of Bolshevik political violence at first, and Stalin’s violence later on, within the ‘long duration’ of Russian history”: it’s important not to lose sight of “Stalinism’s ‘matrix’ which was the First World War, the revolutions of 1917, and the civil wars as a whole.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn384|384]] And therefore, emerging when no one could yet predict Stalin’s rise to power, and even before the Bolshevik Revolution, “Stalinism” isn’t the result of an ideology or an individual’s thirst for power, but more precisely the result of the permanent state of emergency which consumes Russia in 1914. As we’ve seen, from the start of the nineteenth century a number of very different personalities didn’t miss the troubling signs of a gathering storm over the country that sits between Europe and Asia; the storm manifests itself in all its violence with the outbreak of the First World War. One must start from here, and from the incredibly long duration of the Second Time of Troubles. It’s not by chance that we’re dealing with a phenomenon that unfolds in a totally non-linear manner: we see it ease in moments of relative normalization and we see it manifest in all its severity when the state of emergency reaches its zenith.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s start with a preliminary question: at what point could we refer to Soviet Russia as a personal and absolute dictatorship? Respectable historians appear to be in agreement on an essential point: “At the start of the 1930s Stalin was not yet an autocrat. He was not free from criticism, dissension, and authentic opposition within the communist party.&amp;amp;quot; The absolute power of a leader shielded by a cult of personality had not yet emerged: the Leninist tradition of the “dictatorship of the party” and oligarchic power persisted.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn385|385]] The historians cited here use the two terms interchangeably; by all measures the second poorly describes a regime that encourages an incredibly strong level of social mobility for the subaltern classes and that opens political and cultural life to social strata and ethnic groups that were totally marginalized up until then. It seems evident that, at least starting from 1937, and starting with the outbreak of the Great Terror, the dictatorship of the party gives way to autocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Should we then identify two phases within “Stalinism”? Despite questioning the traditionally “monolithic” interpretation, this periodization doesn’t represent a genuine step forward in the comprehension of those years. In any case, the transition from the first phase to the second, and the concrete configuration of both, require explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand the problem, let’s see what happened in the middle of the 1920s, at a time in which, having survived the severe crisis represented by foreign intervention and civil war, NEP has achieved significant results: not only is there no autocracy, but despite the communist party’s continued dictatorship, the management of power tends to become more “liberal.&amp;amp;quot; Bukharin appears to go as far as encouraging a rule of law, of sorts. “The peasantry should have before them Soviet order, Soviet rights, Soviet legality and not arbitrary Soviet authority moderated by a ‘complaints office’ whose location is unknown.&amp;amp;quot; “Solid legal norms” are required, obligatory for communists as well. The state must now commit itself to “peaceful organizing work” and the party, in its relations with the masses, must “apply persuasion and only persuasion.&amp;amp;quot; Terror no longer makes sense: “it now belongs to the past.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn386|386]] In its place, the task is making space for the “initiative of the masses”; in this context, it’s necessary to look positively on the flourishing of “popular associations” and “voluntary organizations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn387|387]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us are not merely personal opinions. These are the years of the “duumvirate.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn388|388]] Bukharin manages power alongside Stalin, who in 1925 constantly seeks the “liquidation of the remnants of war communism in the countryside” and condemns the “deviation” which denounces an imaginary “restoration of capitalism” and “risks inciting the class struggle in rural areas” and “civil war in our country”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn389|389]] they must realize that “we are in the phase of economic development.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn390|390]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The shift in emphasis from the class struggle to economic development carries important consequences for the political sphere as well: the primary responsibility for communist students is to “become masters of science.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn391|391]] Only this way can they aspire to carry out a leadership role: “competence” matters; “solid, practical management is now required.&amp;amp;quot; And therefore: “to truly lead it’s necessary to understand your own work, it’s necessary to study it conscientiously, patiently, and with perseverance.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn392|392]] The centrality of economic development, and therefore of competence, makes the party monopoly less rigid: “it’s critical that a communist act as an equal to those outside the party”, especially because “the control of party members” over the work of those “outside the party” could produce very positive results.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn393|393]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, a radical political change is unavoidable according to Stalin: “Today it’s no longer possible to lead through military methods”; “it’s not maximum pressure that’s needed now but maximum flexibility, both in policy and in organization, maximum flexibility in both policy direction as in organizational management”; what’s needed is dedication in receptively capturing “the aspirations and needs of the workers and peasants.&amp;amp;quot; And with respect to the peasants, who often prove to be more backward than the workers, the task of communists and cadres is “to learn how to convince them, sparing neither time nor effort for this purpose.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn394|394]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of embracing a more sophisticated political pedagogy. What’s necessary is doing away with merely formal elections conducted from above, and bad practices which included “lack of rigor, abuse of power, and arbitrary behavior by administrators.&amp;amp;quot; A radical shift is required: “the old electoral practices were a remnant of war communism which should be liquidated as a harmful practice, rotten from top to bottom.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn395|395]] Now it’s a matter of “reactivating the soviets, transforming the soviets into true elected bodies, and establishing in rural areas the principles of soviet democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn396|396]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even before October, the soviets had started to transform into “bureaucratic structures”, with an observable decrease in “the frequency and consistency of the assemblies”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn397|397]] but now, returned to their original function, the soviets are called upon to guarantee “the participation of the workers in the daily work of state administration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn398|398]] How does this take place?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It takes place through organisations based on mass initiative, all kinds of commissions and committees, conferences and delegate meetings that spring up around the Soviets; economic bodies, factory committees, cultural institutions, party organisations, youth league organisations, all kinds of co-operative associations, and so on and so forth. Our comrades sometimes fail to see that around the low units of our Party, Soviet, cultural, trade-union, educational, Y.C.L. and army organisations, around the departments for work among women and all other kinds of organisations, there are whole teeming ant-hills―organisations, commissions and conferences which have sprung up of their own accord and embrace millions of non-Party workers and peasants―ant-hills which, by their daily, inconspicuous, painstaking, quiet work, provide the basis and the life of the Soviets, the source of strength of the Soviet state.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn399|399]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For all these reasons, it’s wrong to “identify the party with the state.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, to do so “is a distortion of Lenin’s thinking.&amp;amp;quot; Further, once the position of the new state is consolidated, both internally and internationally, it’s necessary “to extend the Constitution to the entire population, including the bourgeoisie.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn400|400]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this moment, taking up some of the formulations used by Marx to celebrate the Paris Commune, Stalin takes an interest in the idea of the reduction and even the withering away of the state apparatus. The revitalization of the Soviets and political participation could be a step in that direction. It’s a matter of “transforming our state apparatus, linking it to the popular masses, and making it sound and honest, simple and inexpensive”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn401|401]] on top of this, associations that emerge from civil society should be encouraged: they “unite the soviets with the ‘rank and file’, they &#039;&#039;merge&#039;&#039; the state apparatus with the vast masses and, step by step, destroy everything that serves as a barrier between the state apparatus and the people.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn402|402]] In conclusion: “The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself. The dictatorship is a means, a way of achieving socialism. But what is socialism? Socialism is the transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat to a stateless society.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn403|403]] What’s on the agenda is certainly not the end of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and the party, but rather their evident moderation.&lt;br /&gt;
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This political openness shared by Bukharin and Stalin, but classified by the followers of Zinoviev as “Bolshevism of the middle peasantry”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn404|404]] was followed by the crisis which leads to the liquidation of NEP, the coerced collectivization of agriculture and industrialization in forced stages, with the subsequent expansion of the “univers concentrationnaire” (concentrationary universe). What determines the change isn’t, as is often claimed, the ideological zealotry of the leadership group; that is, the obsession with eliminating the market and all forms of private property. At the same time, one can’t underestimate the pressure from below; in not unimportant sectors of society, nostalgia for the egalitarianism from before the introduction of NEP remains strong. Moreover, another factor comes into play.&lt;br /&gt;
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As if wanting to respond to the sort of analysis that’s widespread today, on November 19th, 1928, Stalin states that the Soviet Union is led by “sober and calm people”, concerned with the problem of how to defend the “independence” of a country significantly more backward compared to the hostile powers that encircle it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn405|405]] Thus, they are driven by their concern over the international situation, an international situation seen as increasingly hostile. At the end of November 1925, the treaty of Locarno is signed. Drawing France and Germany closer together, it mended relations between the Western powers that had fought each other during the First World War, thus formalizing the USSR’s isolation: it’s not hard to find voices seeking “a European crusade against communism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn406|406]] And in Moscow, top-level figures like Zinoviev, Radek, and Kamenev dramatically stress the rising risk of an invasion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn407|407]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Months later, the coup d’état in Poland marks Pilsudski&#039;s rise to power, a declared enemy of the Soviet Union. In his office the painting of Napoleon Crossing the Alps is prominently displayed, but Pilsudski admires him for his invasion of Russia. That last endeavour had Polish participation; the new strong man in Warsaw recalls this with pride, and hopes to take Ukraine from the USSR in order to make it a subaltern and loyal ally.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn408|408]] On August 24th, 1926, Pilsudski rejected the proposal made by Moscow for a non-aggression treaty, and later the Soviet minister of foreign affairs denounces Polish plans aimed at acquiring a protectorate in the Baltics.&amp;amp;quot; The following year, the international situation became even more ominous: Great Britain cuts off commercial and diplomatic relations with the USSR and marshal Ferdinand Foch encouraged France to do the same; in Beijing, the USSR’s embassy suffers an attack by the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, egged on from London perhaps (at least according to Moscow), while in Warsaw the Soviet ambassador is assassinated by a white Russian emigre; finally, in Leningrad there’s an explosion at the headquarters of the communist party.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, it’s Tukhachevsky, the chief of staff of the armed forces, who sounds the alarm and demands a rapid modernization of the military. NEP no longer seems capable of solving the problem: yes, the economy shows signs of recovery and in 1926-1927 it returns to pre-war levels, but, with respect to industrial production and technology, the distance between the USSR and the most advanced capitalist countries remains the same. Incisive or even drastic measures are unavoidable.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn409|409]] And the military presses for similar measures in agriculture, with the aim of guaranteeing a regular food supply for the frontline. As you can see, the policy shift in 1929 isn’t the result of Stalin’s impulsiveness, who in fact must, if not contain, at least channel the pressure coming from the military: in rejecting the unrealistic objectives demanded mainly by Tukhachevsky, Stalin warns against “red militarism” which, in concentrating exclusively on the arms industry, would run the risk of jeopardizing economic development, and ultimately jeopardizing military modernization all together.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn410|410]] Nor is the policy shift the result of a rigid ideology: aside from the power of the communist party and the prevailing social relations within the USSR, what’s at stake is the existence of the nation: this is the opinion of a large part of the Soviet leadership group, beginning with Stalin, of course.&lt;br /&gt;
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The state of alarm appears all the more justified by the ominous international horizon, both in the diplomatic sphere and in the economic sphere (1929 is the year of the Great Depression), and on top of this there’s the “grain crisis” within Russia (the sudden fall in the quantity of grain put on the market by the peasantry): “lines to acquire food become widespread in the cities”, provoking a deterioration of the crisis. It was a situation that “could only work against Bukharin’s policy aims”―Bukharin’s biographer correctly observes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn411|411]] At this point the duumvirate&#039;s fate is sealed. The rupture isn’t just explained by the moral scruples of the defeated member of the duumvirate, who astutely foresees the “Saint Bartholomew’s night” caused by the forced collectivization of agriculture. What causes the internal split is chiefly another factor. Bukharin is also worried about the risk of war, but he doesn’t believe that a solution can be found just within the national context: “Socialism’s definitive victory in our country isn’t possible without the help of other countries and the world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn412|412]] The Bolshevik leader―who had previously condemned the Brest-Litovsk treaty as a cowardly and nationalistic desertion from the international struggle of the proletariat―remains loyal to that vision of internationalism:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;If we exaggerate our possibilities, there then could arise a tendency ... ‘to spit’ on the international revolution; such a tendency could give rise to its own special ideology, a peculiar ‘national Bolshevism’ or something else in this spirit. From here it is a few small steps to a number of even more harmful ideas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn413|413]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin, however, more realistically works off the premise that the capitalist world has stabilized: the defense of the USSR is primarily a national task. It’s not just a matter of advancing the country’s industrialization through forced stages. As the “grain crisis” showed, the flow of food from the countryside and to the cities and the army is by no means guaranteed. Especially sensitive to this problem was someone like Stalin who, beginning with his rich experience from the civil war, had often stressed the key importance (in a future war) of stability in the rear and of the food supplies coming from the countryside. Here are the conclusions found in a letter to Lenin and in an interview with &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;, from summer and autumn of 1918: “the question of food supplies is naturally tied to the military question.&amp;amp;quot; In other words: “an army can’t sustain itself for very long without a stable rear. For the front to remain stable, it’s crucial that the army regularly receive supplies, military provisions and food from the rear.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn414|414]] In the lead-up to Hitler’s invasion, Stalin gives great attention to agriculture, considering it a central element of national defense.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn415|415]] One can then understand why, at the end of the 1920s, collectivization of agriculture seemed to be the mandatory route in order to significantly accelerate the country’s industrialization and to secure the stable supply of provisions needed by the cities and the army, all in preparation for war. In effect:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Putting aside the human costs, the economic results of the first five-year plan were stunning. Increasing industrial production by 250%, Soviet Russia took colossal steps in becoming a major industrial power [...]. Obviously, the “great leap forward” in Soviet Russia’s industrial economy brought with it a “great leap forward” for the arms industry, with military spending increasing by a factor of five between 1929 and 1940.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn416|416]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More modest are the results achieved in agriculture; nevertheless, centralization and the decline of subsistence farming create more favorable conditions for a large army’s regular provision.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From “Socialist Democracy” to the Great Terror ===&lt;br /&gt;
Having survived the “Saint Bartholomew’s night” that was the forced collectivization of agriculture, with the terrible social and human costs that come with it, the political relaxation that we previously encountered appears to reemerge. After the victory over the kulaks―Kaganovich observes in September of 1934―it’s necessary to “move completely toward legality” and “educate our people with socialist legal consciousness”; yes, without the massive education of “160 million people with the spirit and consciousness of the law” it won’t be possible to achieve “the consolidation of our legal system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn417|417]] All of this is even more necessary because―as Stalin emphasizes―in the USSR “there are no longer antagonistic classes.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn418|418]] Therefore, there’s no reason to delay the introduction of “universal suffrage, direct and equal, by secret ballot”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn419|419]] and “unrestricted universal suffrage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn420|420]] Therefore, the constitutional amendments which purpose “taking away electoral rights from the clergy, ex-White Guards, all the ‘exes’, as well as individuals who don’t carry out publicly useful work”, are rejected. Nor does it make sense wanting to give these groups “only the right vote, but not the right to be elected”; and it also makes sense to reject the proposal “prohibiting the holding of religious ceremonies.&amp;amp;quot; Now it’s possible to advance toward “socialist democracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn421|421]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of propaganda, which certainly plays an important role. Before us is a political vision that provokes a fierce polemic by Trotsky, who identifies in it “Stalin’s liberalism”, the abandonment of “the council system” and the return of “bourgeois democracy”, in which class differences are eliminated and the subject is the “citizen” in the abstract. This policy turn is easily understood: “the primary concern of the Soviet aristocracy is ridding itself of the soviets of workers and soldiers of the Red Army.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn422|422]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The antithesis between the two perspectives is clear. Having avoided the danger posed to the country’s independence by a backwards countryside, dominated by Kulaks capable of blocking the flow of supplies to the city and the army, and with the dictatorship of the communist party secured, Stalin has no interest in further exacerbating the political and social conflict. It’s the drive to rapidly industrialize which compels him to seek the promotion of “non-party” elements to management posts in the factory and within society. It’s unacceptable to take a closed attitude toward them: “there’s nothing more stupid or reactionary”; “our policy doesn’t consist, in any way, of transforming our party into a closed caste”; what’s needed is to make every effort to win over specialists, engineers, and technicians from the “old school” to the cause of the country’s industrial and technological development.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn423|423]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, it’s not possible to promote industrial and technological development without also providing material incentives for the training of workers and specialized technicians; and here arises the polemic against “‘leftist’ leveling of salaries.&amp;amp;quot; Only by moving away from a crude, retributive leveling is it possible to introduce a more efficient “organization of work” and put an end to fluctuations in the workforce, especially among the most qualified who move from factory to factory in search of a comparatively better salary. Aside from egalitarianism and the low morale among the most qualified and productive workers, the policy of incentives should also put an end to the lack of collective responsibility and put in its place the principle of “personal responsibility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn424|424]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s precisely at this moment when conditions mature for the outbreak of the third civil war, the one that will decimate the very ranks of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky’s position is very tough on what he defines as “neo-NEP.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the CPSU a “deviation to the right” is happening, increasingly apparent, with the favoring of the “higher strata of the people” and the counterattack by kulaks: the bureaucracy “is ready to make economic concessions to the peasantry, to their interests and their petty-bourgeois tendencies.&amp;amp;quot; More generally: also as a consequence of the “turn toward the market”, “monetary calculus” and the resulting increased cost of living, far from advancing toward socialism and the overcoming of inequality and class divisions, soviet society is increasingly characterized by “new processes of class stratification.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn425|425]] This internal retreat would be met, with respect to international politics, by the renouncing of all revolutionary and internationalist ambitions by the “conservative and petty-nationalist bureaucracy of the Soviet Union.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn426|426]] Now “the only guiding principle is the &#039;&#039;status quo!&#039;&#039;”, as confirmed by “the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn427|427]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, neither Stalin or Trotsky are oblivious to the deteriorating international situation, but their response to this problem is different and opposing. For Stalin, it’s a matter of concentrating on the industrial and technological development of Russia, mending as much as possible the divisions caused by the October Revolution and by collectivization in the countryside, and presenting the party as the guiding force for the nation as a whole. The stability that has been achieved internally could allow for, at the same time, the promotion of a policy of international alliances capable of guaranteeing the USSR’s security. In Trotsky’s opinion, however, as momentous as Soviet Russia’s industrialization may be, it can only defeat an assault by the more advanced imperialist countries if it has the support of the proletariat within the aggressor nations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn428|428]] Therefore, the accommodation with the bourgeoisie, both internally and internationally, not only constitutes a betrayal, but it prevents the homeland of the October Revolution from winning over the revolutionary international proletariat, the only force that can save it. The clash between these two perspectives is inevitable. Kirov is assassinated on December 1st, 1934; the French-Soviet pact is signed on May 2nd, 1935: between these two dates the above mentioned intervention by Trotsky takes place (“Where is the Stalinist bureaucracy taking the USSR?”), which is published on January 30th, 1935, and it’s a heavy indictment against the internal and international “neo-NEP.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From “Socialism without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” to the Cold War Clamp Down ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Great Terror, and the terrible purge that comes with it, was followed by the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat of the Third Reich, Stalin, who “predicts a great future for the great” anti-fascist “alliance” and who tries to avoid the outbreak of the Cold War,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn429|429]] repeatedly declares, including in confidential meetings with communist leaders from eastern Europe, that’s it’s not a question of introducing the Soviet political model: “it’s possible that if we didn’t have the war in the Soviet Union, the dictatorship of the proletariat would have taken on a different character.&amp;amp;quot; The situation created in Eastern Europe after 1945 is clearly more favorable: “In Poland the dictatorship of the proletariat doesn’t exist and you don’t need it”; “should Poland move toward the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat? No, it’s not obligated to do so, it’s not necessary.&amp;amp;quot; And to the Bulgarian communist leaders: it is possible “to achieve socialism in a new way, without the dictatorship of the proletariat”; “the situation has radically changed with respect to our revolution, what’s needed is to apply different methods and forms [...]. You shouldn’t fear accusations of opportunism. This isn’t opportunism, but the application of Marxism to the current situation.&amp;amp;quot; And to Tito: “in our time socialism is possible even under the English monarchy. The revolution is no longer necessary everywhere [...]. Yes, socialism is even possible under an English king.&amp;amp;quot; For his part, the historian who recorded these declarations adds: “As these observations show, Stalin was actively rethinking the universal validity of the Soviet model of revolution and socialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn430|430]] Maybe one can go further and say that he’s also reconsidering the general relationship between socialism and democracy, with even the Soviet Union in mind: to formulate the hypothesis of a socialism under an English king means to put up for discussion, in some form, if not the monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of the communist party, then at least the terrorist dictatorship and autocracy. The policy implemented in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany is instructive: “The Russians didn’t just promote socialist theater, ballet, opera, and cinema; they also promoted the bourgeois arts”, and this is done according to the program formulated in Moscow, “on the basis that the Soviet system wasn’t predestined for Germany, which should, on the contrary, be reorganized on the basis of broad, anti-fascist and democratic principles.&amp;amp;quot; Thus, “during the first three years after the war, there was no real cultural division in the capital, and the Soviet zone continued to play a vanguard role in the cultural field.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn431|431]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The start of the Cold War suddenly interrupts that experience and that reflection: the central problem now is the creation of a security cordon around a country brutalized by the Nazi invasion and occupation, with the aim of avoiding a repeat of the tragedies of the past. While “the question of the Gulag’s at least partial dismantlement is raised in the USSR even before Stalin’s passing”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn432|432]] a complete thaw becomes impossible. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union must concentrate on a new “forced march” to catch up with the new “Western technological revolution.&amp;amp;quot; It has liberated itself from “German occupation”, but it can’t “allow itself to rest”: a new terrible threat has emerged.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn433|433]] Especially because a few years later, on November 1st, 1952, the explosion of the first hydrogen bomb occurs, a thousand times more powerful than those dropped on the two Japanese cities:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When the United States government announced the results of the test, in other countries there were reactions of shock and terror. It’s obvious that a bomb of such extraordinary power couldn’t be used against military objectives. If it wasn’t a weapon of war, it could only be a weapon of genocide and political blackmail [...]. Stalin received a report on the American test in the middle of November, and it served only to confirm his conviction that the United States was seriously preparing itself for a war against the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn434|434]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not an unfounded concern if we consider January of 1952. To reverse the stalemate in military operations in Korea, Truman entertains a radical idea which he records in his diary: they could deliver an ultimatum to the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, clarifying in advance that failure to comply “means that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and all the industrial centers of China and the Soviet Union would be eliminated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn435|435]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the three decades of Soviet history led by Stalin, the principal aspect is not the transition from dictatorship of the party to autocracy, but more precisely the repeated attempts to transition from the state of emergency to a state of relative normality, attempts which fail for reasons both internal (abstract utopianism and millenarianism that prevent the recognition of what has been achieved) and international (the permanent threat that looms over the country that emerged out of the October Revolution), or better yet the combination of them. If millenarianism is, in part, an expression of tendencies intrinsic to Marxism, it’s also a reaction to the horror of the First World War, which even in circles and personalities distant to Marxism gives rise to the aspiration for a totally new world, unrelated to a reality capable of producing or reproducing such horrors. With the outbreak of the third civil war (within the ranks of the Bolsheviks) and with the approach of the Second World War (breaking out in Asia before Europe), this series of failures finally results in the arrival of autocracy, exercised by a leader who’s the object of a genuine cult of personality.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Bureaucracy or “Zealous Faith”? ===&lt;br /&gt;
What can we make of the leadership group that achieved victory during the third civil war and that sought to put an end to the Second Time of Troubles at the exact moment when new and colossal storms formed on the horizon? We saw that while Khrushchev, through tortured allusions, makes Kirov the victim of a plot organized by the Kremlin, Trotsky classifies him as an accomplice to the tyrant and a top flight defender of the hated usurper and parasitical bureaucracy―which is to be swept away once and for all by the next revolution. But is the man assassinated by Nikolaev really a bureaucrat? Let’s return to the Russian historian cited earlier, a critic of the myth of the assassination inspired by Stalin, to see how they describe the victim. So who was Kirov? He was a loyal leader, humble and devoted to the cause. And that’s not all: what characterized him was his attention to the most minor of problems in the daily lives of his colleagues, a great modesty, “tolerant of different opinions, and respectful toward cultures and traditions of other peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn436|436]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This flattering judgement ends up putting Kirov’s entire social group under a favorable light, and that ultimately puts Stalin in a favorable light, as the former was his intimate and trusted collaborator. This is absolutely not a bureaucratic elite without ideals, only interested in their careers:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Like many leaders of that era, Kirov genuinely believed in a bright future, for which he worked between eighteen and twenty hours a day: a convinced communist, like when he sang Stalin’s praises for strengthening the party and the Soviet Union, and for the country’s power and development. This zealous faith was perhaps the tragedy of an entire generation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn437|437]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any case, it’s the leadership group as a whole that demonstrates its work dedication and self-sacrifice. We previously learned of “the enormous workload” that the Soviet leader managed to take on:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[At least during the years of the war] Stalin worked fourteen or fifteen hours a day in the Kremlin or at the dacha [...]. In autumn of 1946, Stalin went to the south to enjoy a vacation for the first time since 1937 [...]. A few months before his death, and ignoring urgent recommendations from doctors, Stalin rejected the possibility of taking a break in the autumn or winter of 1952, despite the enormous amount of time and effort dedicated to organizing the XIX party congress in October.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn438|438]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar assessment can be made of one of Stalin’s close collaborators, Lazar M. Kaganovich, who displays “frenzied commitment” in overseeing the construction of the Moscow subway: “he went right down into the tunnels, including at night, to check on the conditions of the workers and to get an idea of the situation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn439|439]] To conclude, before us is a leadership group which demonstrates “practically superhuman dedication”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn440|440]] especially during the war years.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a “zealous faith” that drives them; that faith isn’t limited to that inner circle, nor is it limited to members of the communist party. “Average men and women” also demonstrated their “missionary zeal”; as a whole, “it was a period of genuine enthusiasm, of feverish effort and voluntary sacrifice.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn441|441]] You can easily understand this spiritual climate if you have in mind that the country was blowing through stages of industrial development and offering great possibilities of upward mobility for much of the population, precisely at a time when the capitalist world was in the middle of a devastating crisis. Let’s turn to another historian who makes use of an interesting memoir in his analysis:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The years of 1928-1931 were a period of enormous upward mobility for the working class. The promoters of socialist emulation and Stakhanovites not only substituted ‘unfit’ cadre, but occupied en masse the available posts in the administrative apparatus and in the learning institutions undergoing massive expansion. They were not passively promoted, but were active protagonists in their promotion (&#039;&#039;samovy dvizhentsy&#039;&#039;). They had “a clear and defined objective for the present and the future” and “sought to acquire the greatest amount of knowledge and practical experience, in order to be as useful as possible to the new society.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Stakhanovite movement and socialist emulation played an important role in the process of industrialization: they helped the political leadership accelerate the speed of that process; promoting industrial modernization; reorganizing factory management under a unified model; and selecting young, ambitious, competent, and politically trustworthy workers for promotion. The emergence of these workers as a political force had an enthusiastic effect over party, industrial and union leaders.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn442|442]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An authoritative account confirms and deepens the image sketched out above. In 1932, in Riga, capital of Latvia, a young American diplomat, destined later to become famous as the advocate for soviet &#039;&#039;containment&#039;&#039;, namely George Kennan, sends a cable to Washington which contains a very interesting analysis. First of all, he highlights that “in the Soviet Union life continues being administered in the interest of a doctrine”, that is, in the interest of communism. It’s a worldview that can count on a wide consensus; the “industrial proletariat” enjoys high social recognition, so much so that according to him it largely compensates for “material disadvantages” related to the accelerated program of economic development. The youth, or a “certain part of the youth”, appear “extremely enthusiastic and happy, as can only occur among human beings completely dedicated to tasks that have no relation to their personal lives”, that’s to say people completely immersed in the inspiring project of building a new society. In this sense, one can speak of “an unlimited self-confidence, and the happiness and mental health of the Russian youth.&amp;amp;quot; But then comes a warning that, in light of the subsequent historical experience, may be considered prescient: “From the most morally united country in the world, Russia can overnight become the worst moral chaos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn443|443]] Such a state of high moral tension could hardly withstand the passing of time, and the inevitable difficulties and failures in the project of building a new society; thus the situation could easily turn against them. But it remains true that in 1932, before Kirov’s assassination, Soviet Russia appears, in the eyes of the future advocate for &#039;&#039;containment&#039;&#039;, as “the most morally united country in the world.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, here Kennan is more familiar with the reality in the cities (where, despite the contradictions, the changes had, in fact, aroused the enthusiasm of a large part of the youth, intellectuals, and industrial workers)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn444|444]] than he is with the reality in the countryside. There the forced collectivization of agriculture had provoked, according to the far-sighted warning by Bukharin, “a ‘Saint Bartholomew’s night’ for the rich peasantry” and, more generally, for “an enormous number of peasants” often belonging to national minorities. A civil war had broken out, and it had been carried out in such a ruthless and terrible way on both sides that it drives a Soviet military officer to suicide, disturbed by an inspection during which he had repeatedly exclaimed that it wasn’t communism but “horror.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn445|445]] It was probably that “horror” that provoked Bukharin’s moral crisis, outraged by the large scale Saint Bartholomew’s night, against which he had warned in vain, and horrified by the colossal experiment in social engineering that continued on without “mercy”, without distinguishing “between a person and a scrap of wood.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn446|446]] And after the conclusion of collectivization, it’s not convincing to speak of the countryside as “morally united”, as if the memory of the civil war that fractured and bloodied it had totally disappeared.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, despite these necessary clarifications, Kennan’s insistence on the enthusiasm and the commitment to “doctrine” reminds us of the earlier references to “zealous faith” and “missionary zeal.&amp;amp;quot; Even with the outbreak of the Great Terror in 1937 the situation doesn’t change substantially, at least according to similar analysis by an American and a Russian historian. The first, while insisting on the manipulation of public opinion from above, nonetheless observes that Stalin in 1935 enjoyed great popularity: an eventual attempt to overthrow him would have faced wide resistance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn447|447]] With regard to the following year, the second historian (and militant anti-Stalinist) indicates that “the party and the soviet people remain confident in Stalin”; moreover, as a consequence of the fact that “urban and rural standards of living have improved considerably”, “a certain measure of popular enthusiasm” became widespread.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn448|448]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just rising living standards motivating such “enthusiasm.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: the “genuine development” of nations, nations until that moment marginalized; the conquest on the part of women of “legal equality with men, along with an improvement in their social status”; the emergence of a “solid social welfare system” which includes “pensions, medical assistance, protections for pregnant women, family pensions”; “the significant development of education and the intellectual sphere as a whole”, with the expansion of “the network of libraries and reading rooms” and the increasing “love for the arts and poetry”; it’s the chaotic and exhilarating arrival of modernity (urbanization, nuclear family, social mobility).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn449|449]] It has to do with processes that characterize the entire history of Soviet Russia, but that take off precisely during the Stalin years.&lt;br /&gt;
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The popular masses traditionally condemned to illiteracy burst into the schools and universities; they then become “a whole new generation of skilled workers, technicians, and expertly trained administrators”, quickly called upon to carry out a leadership role. “New cities are founded and old cities are rebuilt”; the opening of new and colossal industrial complexes goes hand in hand with the “upward mobility of skilled and ambitious citizens of working class or peasant origin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn450|450]] Ultimately, it’s referred to as “a mixture of brutal coercion, remarkable heroism, disastrous madness, and spectacular achievements.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn451|451]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Maybe it’s not even these results, and the consequent economic improvements, that constitute the principal aspect of the radical social transformation of the workplace during the transition from the old regime to the new regime.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[In Tsarist Russia] workers demanded more respectful treatment by their employers. They wanted them to call them by the polite “you” (vyi) instead of the familiar one (tyi), which they associated with the old serf regime. They wanted to be treated as “citizens.&amp;amp;quot; It was often this issue of respectful treatment, rather than the bread-and-butter question of wages, which fueled workers’ strikes and demonstrations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn452|452]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Long having sought after it in vain, the serfs obtained their recognition (in the Hegelian sense of the term) with the arrival of soviet power. And this is true not just for the workers, but for national minorities as well, as we shall see. It is this combination of “spectacular achievements” in economic development and the toppling of the old regime’s hierarchies (confirmed by the possibility of unprecedented social mobility) which encourages a sense of exaltation among the people: on top of the recognition achieved by workers is the recognition achieved by the Soviet people as a whole, a Soviet people now at the point of catching up with the most developed countries, ridding themselves of the traditional image of backwardness. This explains the feeling of exhilaration in participating in the construction of a new society and a new civilization, which advances despite the mistakes, sacrifices, and terror.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it’s interesting to reread the principal accusation made against the soviet bureaucracy’s leadership, formulated by Trotsky before the Great Terror. It’s as if suddenly the indictment gives way to acknowledgements that are so important that they turn the indictment on its head:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Gigantic achievements in industry, enormously promising beginnings in agriculture, an extraordinary growth of the old industrial cities and the building of new ones, a rapid increase in the numbers of workers, a rise in cultural level and cultural demands―such are the indubitable results of the October revolution, in which the prophets of the old world tried to see the grave of human civilization. With the bourgeois economists we have no longer anything to quarrel over. Socialism has demonstrated its right to victory, not on the pages of &#039;&#039;Das Kapital&#039;&#039;, but in an industrial arena comprising a sixth part of the earth’s surface [...]. thanks solely to a proletarian revolution a backward country has achieved in less than twenty years successes unexampled in history.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn453|453]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With economic development, not only new social strata but entire nations gain access to culture:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“In the schools of the Union, lessons are taught at present in no less than eighty languages. For a majority of them, it was necessary to compose new alphabets, or to replace the extremely aristocratic Asiatic alphabets with the more democratic Latin. Newspapers are published in the same number of languages ―papers which for the first time acquaint the peasants and nomadic shepherds with the elementary ideas of human culture. Within the far-flung boundaries of the tsar&#039;s empire, a native industry is arising. The old semi-clan culture is being destroyed by the tractor. Together with literacy, scientific agriculture and medicine are coming into existence. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this work of raising up new human strata.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn454|454]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In regards to the relationship with “backwards nationalities”, the hated bureaucracy in spite of everything carries out “a progressive work”; it is “laying down a bridge for them to the elementary benefits of bourgeois and even pre-bourgeois culture.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn455|455]] Based on this image, it remains a mystery how Trotsky could have thought the anti-bureaucratic revolution was just around the corner. But this is not of interest to us now. The acknowledgements, let slip by the opposition leader, are an indication of the prestige and consensus which the Soviet leadership still enjoyed. The spread of a “new Soviet patriotism” can’t be explained in any other way, It’s a sentiment that’s “certainly very deep, sincere, and dynamic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn456|456]]&lt;br /&gt;
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1937 and 1938 are the biennium of the Great Terror. Not even in “its worst phase” does Stalin’s regime lose its base of social consensus and its “enthusiastic supporters”, who continue to be motivated by both ideology as well as the opportunity for social advancement: it’s a “mistake” to read this permanent consensus “as merely an artifice of state censorship and repression.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn457|457]] A tragic and paradoxical interaction takes place: as a consequence of robust economic and cultural development, as well as the horrifying vacancies created by repression, “tens of thousands of Stakhanovites become factory managers”, and a similar upward mobility takes place in the armed forces.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn458|458]] In August of 1939, during the negotiations over the non-aggression pact, the chief-translator of the German foreign ministry visits Moscow and describes as follows the spectacle before him in Red Square and at the mausoleum dedicated to Lenin:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Before the mausoleum, a long line of Russian peasants waited patiently to see Stalin’s mummified predecessor in his glass tomb. Judging by their behavior and facial expression, the Russians gave me the impression of devout pilgrims. “Those who have been to Moscow and haven’t visited Lenin―an embassy staffer tells me―are worthless to the people of the Russian countryside.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn459|459]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The generalized veneration of “Stalin’s predecessor” was also an indication of the wide base of social consensus that the successor continued to enjoy. In any case, the deep divisions caused by the Great Terror are at least partially healed by the patriotic unity that takes hold during the resistance against the Nazi war of enslavement and annihilation. What’s certain is―and we cite once more a historian above suspicion of being an apologist for communism and “Stalinism”―“the victory brings about an unparalleled increase not only in the international prestige of the Soviet Union, but also in the regime’s authority within the country”, so that “Stalin’s popularity reached its apex in the years following the war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn460|460]] This “popularity” remained intact until his death, and was also felt outside the USSR, and to a certain extent, even felt outside the international communist movement.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== A Concentrationary Universe Full of Contradictions ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the terror, even the concentrationary universe produced by it doesn’t have a straightforward direction or an undifferentiated landscape: far from being a “static system”, it “continued to rotate like a spinning top”, and nevertheless “passed through relatively cruel and humane cycles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn461|461]] These are the opinions of an American historian who not only in the starkest terms describes the history that began in October 1917, but who also mocks the “Western statesmen” who let themselves be fooled by a “butcher”―albeit very shrewd as Stalin was, they felt a sense of respect for him.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn462|462]] Another book by a Russian historian committed to proving the similarity between Stalin’s USSR and the Third Reich makes a similar argument. Nevertheless, the two studies, to which I will make reference to in analyzing the concentrationary universe of Soviet Russia, tell a story very different to that intended by their authors. Indeed, the painting drawn by the American historian could here and there be confused with a product of Soviet propaganda, if it had not come from a fiercely anti-communist author! Let’s begin to examine it. In 1921, while the civil war rages on, for some time the Butyrka prison of Moscow operates as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The prisoners were allowed free run of the prison. They organized morning gymnastic sessions, founded an orchestra and a chorus, created a “club” supplied with foreign journals and a good library. According to tradition―dating back to pre-revolutionary days―every prisoner left behind his books after he was freed. A prisoners’ council assigned everyone cells, some of which were beautifully supplied with carpets on the floors and walls. Another prisoner remembered that “we strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards.” To Babina, prison life seemed unreal: “Can’t they even lock us up seriously?”&lt;br /&gt;
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Another socialist revolutionary, arrested in 1924 and sent to Savvatievo, is happily surprised to find herself in place that “didn’t resemble a prison at all.&amp;amp;quot; Not only can the political prisoners obtain abundant provisions of food and clothing thanks to their contacts, but they could turn their prison cell into the women’s branch of the socialist revolutionaries. Some years later, on the Solovetsky Islands, we see that the prisoners, many of them having been scientists in St. Petersburg, not only had access to a theater and a library with 30,000 volumes, but also had a botanical garden, including “a museum of flora, fauna, and of local art and history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn463|463]] It&#039;s true, the situation in the prison system at that moment in time was not uniform. However, the ones just stated are not isolated cases. However, even if they should be treated as isolated and happy islands, their existence in itself would be significant.&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, there was no absence of protests, but it’s interesting to read the demands (partially accepted) made during a hunger strike by political prisoners (in large part Trotskyists):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Expand the library, include newspapers published in the USSR, at least with editions of the KI [Communist International], completely update the economics, politics and literature sections, and the sections with the works of minority languages. Allow the subscription to at least one foreign newspaper. Allow the enrollment in courses by correspondence. Organize for such purposes a special cultural fund, as happens even in criminal penitentiaries [...]. Allow the introduction into prison of all foreign publications permitted in the USSR, in particular the permitted foreign newspapers, including the bourgeois ones [...]. Allow the exchange of books between prisoners and guards [...]. Acquire paper in quantities of no less than ten notebooks per person each month.”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn464|464]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in June of 1931, and the date is significant. While it brings with it a massive expansion of the concentrationary universe, Stalin’s rise to power and the campaign launched by him for the “liquidation of the Kulaks as a class” didn’t dramatically alter the situation existing within that universe. This is not just true for the political prisoners: “the beginning of the thirties [...] were almost ‘prosperous’ and even ‘liberal’ for prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; The management of the Gulag showed “a certain level of religious tolerance” and accepted the petition for a vegetarian diet put forward by the members of certain “religious sects.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn465|465]] What follows is an excerpt on the penal colonies in the far north at the start of the 1930s:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Needing hospitals, camp administrators built them, and introduced systems for training prisoner pharmacists and prisoner nurses. Needing food, they constructed their own collective farms, their own warehouses, and their own distribution systems. Needing electricity, they built power plants. Needing building materials, they built brick factories.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Needing educated workers, they trained the ones that they had. Much of the ex-kulak workforce turned out to be illiterate or semi-literate, which caused enormous problems when dealing with projects of relative technical sophistication. The camp’s administration therefore set up technical training schools, which required, in turn, more new buildings and new cadres: math and physics teachers, as well as “political instructors” to oversee their work. By the 1940s, Vorkuta―a city built in the permafrost, where roads had to be resurfaced and pipes had to be repaired every year―had acquired a geological institute and a university, theaters, puppet theaters, swimming pools, and nurseries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn466|466]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As strange as it may be, “the Gulag little by little brought ‘civilization’, if it can be called that, to remote uninhabited areas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn467|467]] Among the leaders and administrators, there were those that demonstrated humanity and intelligence:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Berzin seems to have very much approved of (or, at least, enthusiastically paid lip service to) Gorky’s ideas about prisoner reform. Glowing with paternalistic goodwill, Berzin provided his inmates with film theaters and discussion clubs, libraries and “restaurant-style” dining halls. He planted gardens, complete with fountains and a small zoological park. He also paid prisoners regular salaries, and operated the same policy of “early release for good work” as did the commanders of the White Sea Canal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn468|468]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, because of the famine, the need to increase the prisoners’ productivity, the lack of organization and often incompetence, and the rapacity of the local leaders, “tragedies abound.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn469|469]] Particularly atrocious is the tragedy that in 1933 hits the exiles who were supposed to cultivate the island of Nazino (Western Siberia). It’s a task that quickly proves desperate: lacking equipment, with medicine and food in large part used up during the journey, on a “completely virgin” island, “without any structures” or “homes”, the deportees sought to survive by eating the dead bodies or carrying out genuine acts of cannibalism. They are details taken from a letter sent by a local communist leader to Stalin and later passed on to all politburo members, who were noticeably upset by it: “the Nazino tragedy had a notable impact and was subject to investigation by a number of commissions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn470|470]] It’s evident that it wasn’t homicidal intention that caused the horror: we are dealing with “a significant example of how things could go badly due to a lack of planning.&amp;amp;quot; At least until 1937, in the Gulag “people would die by misfortune”, as a consequence of poor organization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn471|471]] What characterizes the Soviet concentrationary universe is, firstly, the fixation on development, and that fixation, if on the one hand provokes the infamy of Nazino, on the other hand has very different consequences. As in the society as a whole, they hope to encourage “socialist emulation” among the prisoners: those who stand out can enjoy “additional food” and “other privileges.&amp;amp;quot; And that’s not all:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Eventually, top performers were also released early: for every three days of work at 100 percent norm-fulfillment, each prisoner received a day off his sentence. When the [White Sea] canal was finally completed, on time, in August 1933, 12,484 prisoners were freed. Numerous others received medals and awards. One prisoner celebrated his early release at a ceremony complete with the traditional Russian presentation of bread and salt, as onlookers shouted, “Hooray for the Builders of the Canal!” In the heat of the moment, he began kissing an unknown woman. Together, they wound up spending the night on the banks of the canal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn472|472]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The pedagogical obsession is interlinked with a productive obsession, as shown by the presence in the camps of an “Educational-Cultural Department” (KVC), an institution in which “Moscovite leaders of the Gulag [...] truly believed in.&amp;amp;quot; Precisely for that reason they took “wall-newspapers very seriously.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, if we read them, we see that the biographies of the rehabilitated prisoners are written in “a language extraordinarily similar to those of good workers outside the colony”: they worked, studied, made “sacrifices and tried to improve.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn473|473]] The aim was to “reeducate” the prisoners, transforming them into “Stakhanovites”, among the first in line prepared to participate with patriotic enthusiasm in the development of the country. Let’s turn, then, to the American historian on the Gulag: “In the camps, as in the world outside, ‘socialist competitions continued to take place’, work competitions in which the detainees competed to see who could produce more. Moreover, they celebrated the Stakhanovite workers for their alleged capacity to triple or quadruple their quotas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn474|474]] It’s no coincidence that until 1937, the guard addressed the prisoner as “comrade.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn475|475]] Being confined to the concentration camp didn’t exclude the possibility of social promotion: “many prisoners ended up working as guards or camp administrators”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn476|476]] overall, as we’ve seen, no small number of them learned a profession to exercise following the moment of their release.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true that 1937 witnesses a brutal turn. While the third civil war rages and increasingly ominous clouds gather on the international horizon, the fifth column, real or assumed, becomes the objective of an increasingly obsessive hunt. In such circumstances the detainee is no longer a potential “comrade”, it’s then prohibited to refer to them as such; they are now called “citizen”, but it’s a citizen that is potentially an enemy of the people. Is it from this moment on that the Soviet concentration camp is driven by homicidal intent?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn477|477]] That is how the American researcher repeatedly cited here thinks, but yet again her research refutes her: “In the 1940s, in theory the KVC of each camp had an instructor, a small library, and a ‘circular’ where theatrical performances and concerts were organized, as well as political conferences and debates.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn478|478]] There’s more. While Hitler’s war of annihilation rages on and the country finds itself in an absolutely desperate situation, “time and money” are generously invested to strengthen and improve “the propaganda, manifestos, and the political indoctrination meetings” for the prisoners:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Within the records of the Gulag administration alone, there are hundreds and hundreds of documents testifying to the intensive work of the Cultural-Educational Department. In the first quarter of 1943, for example, at the height of the war, frantic telegrams were sent back and forth from the camps to Moscow, as camp commanders desperately tried to procure musical instruments for their prisoners. Meanwhile, the camps held a contest on the theme “The Great Motherland War of the Soviet People Against the German Fascist Occupiers”: fifty camp painters and eight sculptors participated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn479|479]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the very same year, the head of a camp with 13,000 detainees offered an important summary of their activity:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;He notes grandly that in the second half of that year, 762 political speeches were given, attended by 70,000 prisoners (presumably, many attended more than once). At the same time, the KVC held 444 political information sessions, attended by 82,400 prisoners; it printed 5,046 “wall newspapers”, read by 350,000 people; it put on 232 concerts and plays, showed 69 films, and organized 38 theatrical groups[[footnotes.xhtml#fn480|480]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, with the start of Hitler’s invasion, the detainees experience the dramatic consequences of the shortages, but that has nothing to do with the emergence of homicidal intention:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The high mortality rates in the concentration camps in certain years partly reflect the events taking place on the outside [...]. In the winter of 1941-1942, when a quarter of the Gulag population dies of hunger, maybe a million residents die of hunger in Leningrad, surrounded by the German blockade.&lt;br /&gt;
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And the shortages and malnutrition were widely felt across the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn481|481]] Yet even in such a desperate situation, in January of 1943, “the Soviet government created a ‘food fund’ specifically for the Gulag” and, at any rate, “the supply situation improved when the tide of the war turned in favor of the Soviet Union.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn482|482]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We are so far from the emergence of homicidal intention that the atmosphere of national unity brought out by the Great Patriotic War is felt even within the Gulag. In the meantime, it experiences a massive reduction in population as a result of a series of amnesties; we especially see ex-prisoners heroically take part in combat; they express their satisfaction and pride in the fact that they have access to technologically advanced weapons produced “thanks to the industrialization of the country” (which was marked by the first consistent expansion of the concentrationary universe), they have careers in the Red Army, are accepted into the communist party, and win honors and medals for their military courage.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn483|483]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With the alternation between relatively “prosperous” and “liberal” phases and clearly economically and juridically worse phases for the prisoners, the history of the Gulag reflects the history of Soviet society. The efforts to achieve “Soviet democracy” in the society as a whole, the “democratic socialism” and even a “socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat” correspond with the efforts to reestablish “socialist legality” or “revolutionary legality” in the Gulag. It’s for that reason that harsh denunciations of the Soviet concentrationary universe come from inside and from its top leadership. In 1930, it’s Yagoda who seeks to intervene in “the entire prison system, which is rotten to the core.&amp;amp;quot; In February of 1938, it’s Vinchinski himself, general prosecutor of the USSR, who denounces the “prison conditions [...] insufficient and, in some particular cases, almost completely intolerable”, that reduce men to “savage animals.&amp;amp;quot; Some months later it’s Lavrentiy Beria, chief of the secret police under Stalin, who supports a policy that encourages “severe punishment to the interrogators who consider beatings to be the principal method of investigation, and who cripple prisoners when they don’t have sufficient proof of their anti-Soviet activity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn484|484]] It’s not a question of ritual denunciations; when exposed, those guilty of “abuses” are severely punished, punishment that even includes death sentences; many are fired; there’s even conflict between magistrates and the repressive apparatus, which opposes the introduction of “rules” that seem to be “an extremely undesirable intrusion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn485|485]] With the aim of strengthening oversight, the submission of complaints and petitions by detainees is encouraged. Other times they seek to improve the situation by using amnesty and reducing overcrowding in the camps.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn486|486]] In the period between one denunciation and another, a real improvement is noticed―these are the “liberal” phases―hastened at times by the outbreak of new crises. But in the combination of objective circumstances and subjective responsibility, the Gulag, as well as society as a whole, is unable to overcome the state of emergency.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Tsarist Siberia, Liberal Britain’s “Siberia”, and the Soviet Gulag ===&lt;br /&gt;
Should we compare, or directly associate, the Soviet Gulag with the Nazi &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;? It’s a question that could be answered with another: why limit the comparison between just these two realities? In Tsarist Russia―Conquest declares (following Solzhenitsyn’s example)―the concentrationary universe was less crowded and less cruel than during Lenin’s time, and especially under Stalin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn487|487]] It’s worthwhile to recall what Anton Chekhov had written in 1890:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We have allowed millions of people to rot in prisons, to rot for no purpose, without any consideration, and in a barbarous manner; we have driven people tens of thousands of versts through the cold in shackles, infected them with syphilis, perverted them, multiplied the number of criminals...but none of this has anything to do with us, it’s just not interesting.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn488|488]]&lt;br /&gt;
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During its centuries long duration, the Tsarist concentrationary universe (that at least starting with Peter the Great, in a way similar to the Gulag, seeks to acquire the labor force necessary to development the most desolate and least developed regions) has often shown signs of extreme cruelty. A &#039;&#039;painful trail&#039;&#039; led the condemned to exile or forced labor in Siberia: “aside from being beaten with batons, many suffered mutilations of hands, feet, ears, as well as the humiliation of being branded with fire.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the nineteenth century they sought to end “the most extreme and cruel practices”, but it’s a question of half-measures that in the majority of cases weren’t successful.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn489|489]]&lt;br /&gt;
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From all this emerges how fragile the effort is to diminish the importance of Tsarist Siberia, with the aim of isolating the Soviet Gulag and associating it to the Nazi &#039;&#039;konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;. Yet there&#039;s another consideration of greater importance: it’s methodologically incorrect to compare a situation of normality to a situation of acute emergency! Read with greater scrutiny, the comparison made by Conquest can lead to a result different from that proclaimed by him: It’s only in pre-revolutionary Russia that detention and deportation by administrative means are considered a normal practice, even in the absence of conflicts and specific dangers. In Soviet Russia, however, the state of emergency has a powerful effect on the genesis and configuration of the concentrationary universe, which becomes yet more brutal as it gets further away from conditions of normality.&lt;br /&gt;
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Now it’s necessary to take one step further. Aside from (Tsarist and Soviet) Russia and Germany, it’s necessary to bring other countries into the comparison. A two part function is also inherent to liberal Britain’s concentrationary universe. With respect to the “Irish dissidents”, it was observed that “between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they had their official Siberia in Australia”, which at least up until 1868 consumed “representatives of nearly all the existing radical movements in Great-Britain.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn490|490]] That’s in relation to repression. But it’s necessary not to lose sight of the economic function of liberal Britain’s “Siberia.&amp;amp;quot; Soon after the Glorious Revolution, there’s a massive increase in the number of criminal acts subject to the death penalty. This even comes down upon those guilty of the theft of a shilling or a handkerchief, or on those responsible for cutting down a decorative plant; not even eleven year old boys are spared. This terrorist legislation, that with some attenuation lasts until the nineteenth century, offers an alternative: the ‘lucky ones’ will be placed in penal servitude, which forces them to work for a certain number of years in the underutilized and unexplored colonies, first in North America, and later in Australia. In other words, even in the economic sphere Australia became a “Siberia” for liberal Britain; its purpose diminished to the degree that labor came in, first with black slaves, and later with the Chinese and Indian &#039;&#039;coolies&#039;&#039;, as well as other colonial peoples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn491|491]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The British “Siberia” is no less cruel than the Tsarist one. On this “totalitarian society”, which is built in Australia while at the same time an extermination of the Aborigines is carried out, a summary is sketched out based on the available autobiographical literature and that proves to be especially frightening:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At unpredictable intervals, the detainees were gathered, counted, and subjected to a complete examination, with the inspection of the mouth and anus [...]. “The food was brought to the various crews on wooden plates or on tin trays and placed before them as if they were dogs or pigs, and like dogs and pigs they had to eat it” [...]. Discipline depended on the informant [...]. To not become a spy became, therefore, behavior that in itself was suspicious. A week wouldn’t pass without complex conspiracies being revealed, with lists of names, in a competition of accusations [...]. “That trafficking in human blood [...] was the only way to obtain absolution.&amp;amp;quot; The volume of information counted more than the content itself. The informants had their quotas of accusations to make and were “capable of any act of treachery or blood, it didn’t matter how vile or horrible” [...]. The normal relations between guilt and punishment became an uninterrupted story of sadism, whose only point was to continue the terror [...]. Authority was exercised in an absolute and capricious way [...]. [a punishment] of 200 lashes were divided up [over several days…]. Those doing the whipping were covered in blood just like us [...]. Suicide was the only way to make the suffering end for good.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, suicide was not only common, but was a practice that often implicated the whole community of prisoners: “Within a group of prisoners two men drew lots: it was up to the first to die, and the second the task of killing the first; for the rest, the roles of witnesses.&amp;amp;quot; In this way, during the few days of traveling and during the trial (which occurred in Sydney, some distances from “Siberia” itself), before being hanged, the murderer could enjoy the status of a normal prisoner (in truth, it was an indirect and delayed suicide). And this pause allowed the witnesses to catch their breath, before returning to hell and eventually attempting another lottery.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn492|492]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Concentrationary Universe in Soviet Russia and in the Third Reich ===&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, the concentration camp explicitly emerges in the liberal West during the Second World War as well. On the other side of the Atlantic, Franklin D. Roosevelt orders citizens of Japanese origin, including women and children, to be interned in concentration camps. However, the United States is clearly in a more favorable geopolitical situation than the Soviet Union. In any case, after the battle of Midway, no longer could one speak of military and security concerns. Yet the Americans of Japanese origin continued to be confined to the concentration camps. Beginning gradually, their freedom is only completely obtained in the middle of 1946, nearly a year after the end of the war. Even slower is the return home of Latin American citizens of Japanese origin deported to the United States from thirteen Latin American countries. Only in 1948 were the last ones freed from the “internment camp”―or concentration camp―in Crystal City, Texas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn493|493]] Certainly it would be rash, at the very least, to explain this event not from the war and the state of emergency, but with the ideology of a president accused of “totalitarianism” by his adversaries due to his economic interventionism during the Great Depression and also the loose interpretation of the constitution used to drag a very reluctant country into war (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 6).&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we encounter another aspect that the usual historical comparison hides: the concentrationary universe that’s also developed in the liberal West during the twentieth century, taking on horrible forms at times. At the outbreak of the war, the German exiles who are confined to French concentration camps have the impression that they are destined to “burn.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn494|494]] Surely outrageous is the mistreatment, when the war had already ended, inflicted on German prisoners by the United States, as documented at the time by the Canadian historian James Bacque, and would be acknowledged by the official lawyers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, even if it was done against his will and with some hesitation. More recent research has brought other details to light. I will limit myself to citing just one of them. An American commission found that, at that time, of the 139 detainees examined, 137 had “their testicles permanently destroyed from the beatings they endured.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn495|495]] We’ll also see the horror of the concentration camps in which, at the start of the Cold War, the British confined communist suspects (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 4). To conclude, it’s necessary to recall the Gulag in Yugoslavia in which, starting in 1948 and after the split with the USSR, communists loyal to Stalin are imprisoned.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn496|496]] At least in this case, the “Stalinists” are no longer the authors, but the victims of the concentrationary universe, established by a communist country, yes, but at that time allied to the West.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if one sought to start from the basis of the exceptional scale and severity of the Soviet Gulag, the principal problem still remains unresolved: It’s always necessary to distinguish the role of ideology from the role of the objective conditions (the exceptional gravity of the threat and the general hardship that characterized the USSR). Compared to such complex analysis, far easier is the deductivism that traces everything back to ideology and the similarity of the concentrationary universes produced by the two “totalitarian” ideologies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet in any case, let’s focus on Soviet Russia and the Third Reich. With regard to the first, the concentrationary universe arises while the Second Time of Troubles continued to rage. In the 1930s, political power didn’t exercise full control over its territory: “common criminality―itself caused by the serious fractures that occurred in the country, that had destroyed the traditional structures of social organization―had reached truly worrying levels.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn497|497]] Much more serious is the situation in the Far East regions, that are described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Insecure locations, poorly controlled by the authorities, where marginalized and lawless people are concentrated, where armed gangs attack the isolated kolkhozes and kill the few “representatives of Soviet power.&amp;amp;quot; Locations of arbitrary force and violence, where everyone is armed, human life has no value and the hunt of man, when it happens, substitutes the hunt of animals [...]. Locations in which the state, at least that defined by Max Weber as the “system that successfully exercises the right to legislate over a territory, while retaining a monopoly on the use of legitimate force”, is almost absent.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn498|498]]&lt;br /&gt;
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From the attack on the German ambassador in Moscow, carried out in July of 1918 “during the the session of the Fifth Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets” by a member of a party (Socialist Revolutionaries) that was part of the government, at least up until the assassination of Kirov by a young communist at his office’s front door, Soviet power is confronted by terrorism (a phenomenon with a long history in Russia) and it fears the infiltration of the state apparatus at all levels by an opposition determined to topple from power the “usurpers” and “traitors.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, only with the arrival of autocracy does Soviet power achieve full control over its territory and the state apparatus; and the terror is, firstly, a response to an unprecedented, acute and long lasting crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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Subsequently, the situation continues to be characterized by the interplay between contradictions (the worsening military threat at the international level, the latent internal civil war, industrialization in forced stages that is considered necessary for the country’s salvation, but provokes at the same time new conflicts and new tensions) that once again prolong the state of emergency. It’s precisely for that reason, as a recent study highlights, “the terror cannot be exclusively interpreted as a series of orders coming down from Stalin” and his collaborators. In fact, in it “popular elements” also operate, and there’s no lack of initiative “from below”; often it is the workers, driven by that “zealous faith” we’ve already encountered, who demand that “traitors” be sentenced to death and even denounce the “juridical rigor” of long and costly criminal trials.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn499|499]] And all of this takes place during a process of a limited democratization, yet nonetheless real, with the enhancement of popular participation in the management of power in workplaces, with the replacement of the secret ballot by the public vote, and the possibility of selecting from among a greater number of candidates in elections for labor union and factory leaders. And those newly elected often meaningfully commit to the improvement of working conditions and the reduction of workplace accidents.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn500|500]] Yes, “in the political psychology of Stalin and his followers, there’s no contradiction between repression and democracy”, and in that sense one can even speak of the “democratization of repression.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn501|501]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But it’s precisely that democratization that encourages an expansion of repression. Taking advantage of new opportunities in the factory, and in letters to the press that challenge corrupt and inefficient officials, this movement erupting from below tends to depict them as enemies of the people and identify the constant workplace accidents as a form of sabotage against this new society that they’re committed to building.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn502|502]] The awareness of the growing threat of the war, and the obsessive hunt of a fifth column that’s broadly spread out and well hidden, this generalized fear and hysteria transform the assemblies in the factories, labor unions and party into a “war of all against all.&amp;amp;quot; Sometimes, it’s Stalin and his closest collaborators who see themselves forced to intervene to contain and concentrate this rage, warning against the tendency to find traitors and saboteurs everywhere, and thus destroying party and labor union organizations.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn503|503]] The Great Terror that ravages France in 1789 comes to mind, of the weeks and months immediately following the storming of the Bastille, with the excessive exaggeration of a threat that’s by no means imagined, and when “the peasant imagination sees mercenaries of the aristocratic conspiracy and foreign invasion everywhere.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn504|504]] In the USSR in the second half of the 1930s, the danger is real and of extreme gravity, but no less real is the hysteria.&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, in Soviet Russia the terror emerges in the period of time that stretches from the First World War, which initiates the Second Time of Troubles, to the Second World War, which threatens to inflict on the country and nation as a whole an even more gigantic catastrophe: the annihilation and enslavement clearly described in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;. And the terror arises during an industrialization in forced stages that aims to save the country and the nation, during which the large scale and ferocious repression combines with real processes of emancipation (the massive expansion of education and culture, the remarkable upward social mobility, the emergence of the welfare state, the tumultuous and contradictory protagonism of social classes until that time condemned to a completely subaltern status).&lt;br /&gt;
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There are sharp differences, then, in comparison to the Third Reich, that since its rise to power can count on the complete control of its territory and state apparatus, and with the longstanding efficiency of an extensive bureaucratic network. While in Russia ideology plays a secondary role in the state of emergency (having pre-dated the October Revolution of 1917, and eventually prolonged by revolutionary millenarianism, that received partial opposition from Stalin), in Germany, the state of emergency―and the concentrationary universe linked to it―is from the start the consequence of a very determined political project and a very determined ideological vision. Hitler comes to power with an explicit program of war and territorial expansion: with the aim of avoiding the collapse of the home front that took place during the First World War, he’s determined to make use of a more ruthless terror. Nazi Germany’s expansionism also aims at reasserting across the globe the supremacy of the white and Aryan race, and to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, applying it to Eastern Europe itself; from the beginning, the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039; has in mind the likely opponents to the war and to the colonial and racial empire that Hitler intends to conquer and build. Required for the success of that program is the neutralization of the Judeo-Bolshevik virus, that sows subversion and erodes the foundations of civilization, putting into question the natural hierarchy of peoples and races. Therefore, it’s necessary to liquidate the Jews, the communist “commissars” and cadre both in the territories to be conquered as well as in Germany itself. This is how the path is laid to treat the inferior races of Eastern Europe following the example of what happened to the Native Americans, that they must be exterminated to make room for the German settlers, and also to be slaves in the service of the white and Aryan master race.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Gulag, &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039; and the Absent Third ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with the invasion, first of Poland and later of the USSR, the Nazi concentrationary universe appears to carry on and further aggravate the most tragic episodes from the history of colonial slavery. When, thanks to the trafficking of African slaves, the availability of slaves was almost unlimited, the slave owners had no economic interest at all in sparing them; they could coldly condemn them to death from overwork and replace them with others and extract from each of them the maximum profit possible. That was how―observes a nineteenth century economist cited by Marx―the flourishing agriculture of the West Indies “consumed millions of men of the African race”; indeed, “the lives of blacks are sacrificed without any scruples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn505|505]] The war unleashed by Hitler in Eastern Europe represents the new and even more brutal form of the slave trade. Captured and exploited in masse, the enslaved &#039;&#039;Untermenschen&#039;&#039; (those that survived the Germanization of the territory) are forced to die from overwork, with the aim of building the civilization of the white master race and feeding its war machine; they suffer through conditions similar to those of blacks (in the Caribbean) to whom, moreover, the Führer explicitly compares them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The prison system reproduces the relations of the society in which it is expressed. In the USSR, inside and outside the Gulag, we fundamentally see in action a developmentalist dictatorship that seeks to mobilize and “reeducate” all forces, with the purpose of overcoming secular backwardness, becoming yet more urgent due to the approaching war that, by the explicit declaration of &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, is to be one of enslavement and annihilation. In this scenario, the terror in the USSR is combined with the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities, as well as a strong upward social mobility and with access to education, culture, and even to management and leadership positions by parts of the social strata that until that time had been totally marginalized. The pedagogical concern with production and the social mobility related to it is felt, for better or for worse, even inside the Gulag. The Nazi concentrationary universe reflects, on the contrary, a racial hierarchy that characterizes the racial State, by that time established, and the racial empire to be built. In this case, the concrete behavior of those imprisoned plays an irrelevant or largely marginal role. Therefore, pedagogical concerns would make no sense. To conclude, the prisoner in the Gulag is a potential “comrade” obligated to participate in particularly hard conditions in the strengthening of production inside the country and, after 1937, they are potential citizens, though having become unclear is the line of separation from being an enemy of the people and a member of the fifth column, whose neutralization had been imposed with the approaching total war; the prisoner in the Nazi &#039;&#039;Lager&#039;&#039; is firstly an &#039;&#039;Untermensch,&#039;&#039; forever marked by their nationality or racial degeneration.&lt;br /&gt;
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In seeking to find a precise analogy for the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;, it’s necessary to bring in the concentrationary universe that profoundly marked the colonial tradition (in whose wake Hitler explicitly intended to place himself) and which targets the colonial peoples or the people of colonial origin. It’s here we have the central omission of the comparison! In that sense, we can speak of the absent third in the comparison in vogue today. Two illustrious historians both defined as “extermination camps” the “militarized work camps” of colonial India of 1877, as well as the concentration camps in which the Libyans were locked up by liberal Italy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn506|506]] Even if one considers this classification exaggerated, the concentrationary universe of the Third Reich nonetheless reminds us of the racial logic and hierarchy that dominates the colonial empires of Italy and the West, as well as the concentration camps built by them.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are also forced to think of Nazism when we read the forms in which the “Canadian Holocaust” (or the “final solution to our indigenous question”) was perpetrated. The “Commission for the Truth about the Canadian Genocide” speaks of “death camps”, of “men, women and children” who are “deliberately exterminated”, of a “system whose objective is to destroy the greatest part possible of the native people through sickness, deportation, and murder itself.&amp;amp;quot; To achieve this, the champions of white supremacy don’t hesitate in hurting “innocent children”, who die “from beatings and torture, or after having been deliberately exposed to tuberculosis and other illnesses”; others go on to suffer forced sterilization. A small “minority of collaborators” will manage to survive, but only after having renounced their own language and identity and after having been made to serve their tormentors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn507|507]] In this case as well, one may assume that righteous indignation may have overstated the case; yet it remains evident that we are faced with practices identical or similar to those in force in the Third Reich, and their application arises out of a similar ideology, and that’s again similar to that which presides over the construction of Hitler’s racial State.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s move on now to the Southern United States. In the decades following the Civil War, black prisoners (the overwhelming majority of the prison population), often rented out to private companies, were crowded into “large wheeled cages that followed the encampments of construction and railroad tycoons.&amp;amp;quot; Even the official reports states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;[...] “that the prisoners were excessively and at times cruelly punished; that they were poorly clothed and fed, that the sick were not treated because no hospital had been provided and they were closed in together with healthy patients.&amp;amp;quot; An examination done by the grand jury at the penitentiary hospital in Mississippi reported that all the patients showed “signs on their bodies of the most inhumane and brutal treatment. A great many of them have broken shoulders, with sores, scars and blisters, some with their skin cruelly ravaged from lashings [...] they lie there dying, and some of them on top of simple tables, so weak and emaciated that their bones were nearly visible beneath their skin, and many complained about the lack of food [...]. Aside from this, we see living parasites crawling across their faces, and their clothes and the little they have to sleep on are ragged and often filthy.&amp;amp;quot; In the mining camps of Arkansas and Alabama, those sentenced to forced labor were made to work all winter without shoes, with their feet in the water for long hours. In these two states a work system was in force according to which a crew of three were obligated to extract a certain quantity of coal per day under penalty of flagellation for the entire crew. Those condemned to forced work in Florida’s terebirth forests, with “their feet bound’’ and carrying “chains around their waists”, were obligated to work at a brisk pace.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn508|508]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We have before us a system that makes use of “chains, dogs, whips, and firearms” and that “creates a living hell for the prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; The mortality rate is very significant. Between 1877 and 1880, during the construction of the railroads of Greenwood and Augusta, “nearly 45%” of the forced laborers die there, “and they were youths in the prime of their lives.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn509|509]] Another statistic can be cited from the same time period: “In the first two years in which Alabama rented out its prisoners, nearly 20% died. In the following year the mortality rate jumped to 35%. In the fourth year nearly 45% died.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn510|510]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to mortality rates, a systematic statistical comparison of the concentration camps in the USSR and Third Reich would be interesting. Regarding the Gulag, it has been calculated that at the start of the 1930s, before the clampdown provoked by the attack on Kirov and by the growing threat of war, the annual mortality rate “corresponded more or less to an average of 4.8% of the camp population.&amp;amp;quot; That being said, this statistical data doesn’t include the gold mining camps around the Kolyma river. It’s also necessary to have in mind the “usual underestimations from the information by health departments”; however, even substantially inflating the official numbers, it seems difficult to approach the mortality rate we’ve just seen among African American inmates. Moreover, there’s significant reason to suspect “underestimations.&amp;amp;quot; There’s the fact that, in the USSR’s camps, “high mortality and escape rates could lead to severe punishment”; that “the health departments of the camps feared being accused of negligence and of being slow in achieving the patients’ recovery”; and that “the threat of inspections loomed constantly over camp leaders.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn511|511]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by the mortality rate of the rented out semi-slaves, it does not appear that there was a similar threat looming over the American businessmen who got rich with the construction of the Greenwood and Augusta railroad lines or with other ventures. At any rate, we should be clear about one essential point: in the Southern United States, black prisoners suffer horrible living and working conditions and die en masse during peacetime; the state of emergency doesn’t play any role, and concern with production is also either marginal or totally absent. The concentrationary universe of the Southern United States reproduces the racial hierarchy and the racial State that characterizes its society as a whole: the black prisoner is neither a potential “comrade” nor a potential “citizen”; he is an &#039;&#039;untermensch&#039;&#039;. The treatment inflicted on them by whites is the treatment that’s considered normal in relation to races removed from true civilization. And again we come across the ideology of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, there are eminent American historians who compare the prison system we just saw with the “prison camps of Nazi Germany.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn512|512]] And it’s no coincidence that the medical experiments―done to &#039;&#039;Untermenschen&#039;&#039; in Nazi Germany―in the United States have been carried out using blacks as guinea pigs.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn513|513]] Moreover, before doing it in their own territory, in the years of Wilhelm II, imperialist and colonialist Germany conducted their medical experiments in Africa at the expense of Africans; during this activity two doctors distinguish themselves and later become the teachers of Joseph Mengele,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn514|514]] who in Nazi Germany finishes the perversion of medicine and science that was already outlined in the (American and European) colonial tradition. Not only can one not separate the Third Reich from the history of the relations instituted by the West toward the colonial peoples and the people of colonial origin, but it must be added that that tradition continues to show signs of life well after the defeat of Hitler. In 1997 president Clinton felt obligated to ask forgiveness from the African American community: “In the 1960s more than 400 men of color from Alabama were used as human guinea pigs by the government. Those sick of Syphilis were not cured because the authorities wanted to study the effects of the disease on a ‘sample population’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn515|515]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The National Awakening in Eastern Europe and in the Colonies: Two Opposing Responses ===&lt;br /&gt;
Here it becomes evident the absurdity of a comparison of concentration camps based on the omission of the treatment reserved by the liberal West for the “inferior races”, and also in the separation between internal policy and foreign policy, between repressive practices and the ideologies with which they are established. If we take into consideration these elements and these often ignored connections, the usual association of the two totalitarian dictatorships turns into an antithesis. It was observed that “Stalin was very impressed” by the awakening of oppressed or marginalized nationalities within the Habsburg Empire. In reference to that, we turn to his observations made in 1921, at the tenth congress of the Russian communist party:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn516|516]] “fifty years ago all of Hungary’s cities had a German character, now they’ve been Magyarized”; the Czechs also experienced an “awakening.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a phenomenon that affects Europe as a whole: from the “German city” that it once was, Riga becomes a “Latvian city”; similarly, the cities of Ukraine are “inevitably Ukrainized”, the Russian element once predominant becoming secondary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn517|517]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As they become aware of that process, considering it progressive and irreversible, the Bolshevik party as a whole, and especially Stalin, commit themselves to a “new and fascinating experiment in governing a multiethnic State”, which can be described as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Soviet Union was the first global empire founded on affirmative action. The new revolutionary government of Russia was the first among the old multiethnic European states to face the growing wave of nationalism and to respond to it by systematically promoting the national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many institutional forms typical for nation-states. The Bolshevik strategy was to assume leadership of that decolonization process that appeared inevitable, and they carry it out as a way to preserve the territorial integrity of the old Russian empire. To that end the Soviet state created not only a dozen republics of ample dimension, but also tens of thousands of national territories spread out over the length of the Soviet Union. New national elites were educated and promoted to leadership positions in the government, schools, and in the industrial companies of these recently created territories. In many cases this made necessary the creation of written languages where previously it hadn’t existed. The Soviet state financed the mass production of non-Russian language books, newspapers, magazines, movies, operas, museums, orchestras of popular music and other cultural products. Nothing similar had ever been attempted.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn518|518]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The novelty that this policy represents stands out even more if we compare it with the obsession for uniformity that in the middle of the twentieth century dominates the United States and Canada: forced to break ties with their birth community and with their very own family, native children must also renounce their dances and their “strange” clothing, they are forced to have short hair and, above all else, avoid the use of their tribal language as if it were the plague; breaking the rule that demands exclusive use of English carries severe punishment, and in Canada they are even subjected to electric shock.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn519|519]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to the USSR, there’s an essential point on which today there’s a type of consensus:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The republics received―some before others―a flag, an anthem, a language, a national academy, and in some cases even a commissar for foreign relations, and they retained the right, later utilized in 1991, to separate from the federation, although there hadn’t been a specified procedure.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn520|520]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, Hitler is also fixated on the Slavicization and the “erasing of the German element” underway in Eastern Europe. In his eyes, however, it is neither a progressive nor irreversible process; but only the most radical measures can halt it and roll it back. It’s not a matter of pushing forth a policy of assimilation and promoting “a Germanization of the Slavic element in Austria”; no, “one can carry out the Germanization of the land, but never the men.&amp;amp;quot; It would be absurd to want to make “a black or a Chinese person into a German, just because he learned German, or is prepared to speak German in the future and vote for a German political party.&amp;amp;quot; “Such Germanization would, in truth, be a degermanization”, it would mean “the beginning of a bastardization” and, therefore, of the “annihilation of the German element”, or the “annihilation of the very characteristics, in their time, that made it possible for the conquering people (&#039;&#039;Eroberervolk)&#039;&#039; to achieve their victory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn521|521]] to Germanize the soil without Germanizing the men is possible only following a very precise model: on the other side of the Atlantic, the white race expanded to the West, Americanizing the soil, certainly not the Native Americans: this approach allowed the United States to remain “a Nordo-Germanic state” without degenerating into a “international melting pot of peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn522|522]] That same model should be followed by Germany in Eastern Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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While the Bolsheviks are concerned with promoting in the Soviet republics the most diverse national elites and local political classes possible, Hitler’s announced program for the conquest of the East is the exact opposite: “all representatives of the Polish intelligentsia must be annihilated”; all means need to be used “to prevent a new intellectual class from forming.&amp;amp;quot; Only in this way can the colonial objectives be completed: the peoples destined to work as slaves in service to the master race should not forget that “there can only be one master, the German.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn523|523]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his usual speech at the tenth congress of the Russian communist party in 1921, Stalin calls attention to another element of change that is being witnessed in world history: “During the imperialist war, the belligerent imperialist powers had been forced to turn to the colonies, from which they had extracted the manpower for their armies” and this “could only advance the cause of freedom and the struggle by these people and these populations.&amp;amp;quot; The national awakening in Eastern Europe is joined by the one taking place in the colonial world: “In general, the advance of the national question in the colonies is no coincidence, from the point of view of history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn524|524]] While in Europe the national awakening is called upon to put an end to the policies of discrimination, denationalization, and the oppression of national minorities, in the colonies it’s destined to radically put into question the concentrationary universe built by the conquerors for those races considered inferior.&lt;br /&gt;
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The novelty of resorting to troops of color did not go unnoticed by Hitler, who doesn’t hesitate in denouncing this betrayal of the white race. France is especially guilty of this, where a process of “bastardization” and “negroization” is quickly and ruinously put into practice, and where one even witnesses the “rise of an African state on European soil.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn525|525]] Before us here are not “prejudices”, before us is a precise political program, which look on in horror at the use of colored troops and also at racial intermixing in the sphere of sexual relations and marriage; because these practices―in degrading the barrier that separates the master race from the servant race―put into crisis the dominion and the concentrationary universe that the master race must impose on the servant race in the superior interest of Civilization. From the point of view of the Nazi leader, the national awakening in Eastern Europe and the use of troops of color in the West’s internal conflicts (with the subsequent growth in consciousness of the colonial peoples) constitute a terrible global threat to civilization and to the white race. The construction of a racial state and empire, and the unleashing of the war in the East, similarly represent a response to that threat; with the flow into the Nazi concentrationary universe of an immense mass of slaves drawn from the “inferior races” and destined to work and die of overwork in service to the master race.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Nazi concentrationary universe is set up to devour millions upon millions of slaves or superfluous human beings that inevitably arise out of a program that aims for the constant Germanization of the soil, excluding a priori the natives who inhabit it from Germanization. And that project would have yet devoured an infinite number of more victims, if it had not been defeated by an opposing project, based on the recognition not only of existential rights, but also the cultural and national rights of the natives. By a series of both objective circumstances and subjective responsibility, that in no way should be dismissed, that second project also produced a concentrationary universe. But, even with its horrors, it can’t in any way be associated with the first, that explicitly presupposed the continuation of the genocidal practices already underway in the colonial world itself, and its even more brutal extension to the new colonies to be built in Eastern Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Totalitarianism or Developmentalist Dictatorship? ===&lt;br /&gt;
We are now able to understand the insufficient or deceptive character of the category of totalitarianism, widely invoked to establish the association between Stalin’s USSR to Hitler&#039;s Germany. A growing number of historians are questioning it or clearly rejecting it. To explain the history of the Soviet Union, some of them begin with Peter the Great and, going yet further back, with “Moscow under siege” and its extremely fragile geopolitical situation, as Genghis Khan’s invasion had demonstrated. Stalin, therefore, had felt himself called upon by history and geography to promote the most rapid economic development possible, with the aim of saving, at the same time, the nation and the new political and social order given to it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn526|526]] This is how a developmentalist dictatorship arises and imposes itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this in the context of a society that, on the one hand, presumably hasn’t completely forgotten the warning made by Lenin in 1905 (“Whoever wants to march toward socialism on a path that isn’t political democracy will inevitably arrive at absurd and reactionary conclusions, both from an economic and a political point of view”),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn527|527]] and on the other hand, is dragged from one state of emergency to another, from one civil war to another, as a result of both objective circumstances as well as intrinsic ideological weaknesses. We are therefore faced with a society characterized not by totalitarian uniformity and alignment, but by the permanent duration and omnipresence of the civil war, that manifests itself even within families, divided as a consequence of the contrary attitudes taken by its members in relation, for example, to the process of collectivization in rural areas: “a peasant woman, who belonged to a religious sect, hacked her husband to death as he slept because he, it seemed, was an activist in favor of the kolkhoz.&amp;amp;quot; Similar bloody crimes even stain the relationship between parents and children.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn528|528]] The conflict here takes on the ferocity of a religious war; and this is true not just for those who explicitly appeal to themes taken from Christianity, but also for the zealous followers of the new society, who themselves are driven by “zealous faith.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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An analysis of the relations of production would be very much enlightening. Let’s mentally enter a Soviet factory, or one of the many construction sites that flourish in the gigantic modernization program promoted by Stalin. Yet far from being uniformly determined from above, its location is decided after a complex decision making process made up of passionate and frequently fiery discussions: “contrary to the strict centralization of the tsarist era, the anti-colonialist rhetoric of the Soviet Union gave the regional &#039;&#039;lobbies&#039;&#039; power unimaginable during the old regime.&amp;amp;quot; Particularly strong is the power of those regions that, precisely due to their underdevelopment, pressure the regime to maintain its promises to end the inequalities and the “injustices of tsarist imperialism”, with the aim of promoting industrialization and modernization at the national level.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn529|529]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon entering the production site and workplace, we realize that there’s absolutely no rigid discipline and blind obedience enforced: on the contrary, there’s no lack of unrest or heated disputes. Meanwhile, the large fluctuations in the labor force won’t go unnoticed. Stalin is forced to tenaciously struggle against that phenomenon; moreover, by 1936 “more than 87% of industrial workers leave their job post.&amp;amp;quot; They’re encouraged by a policy of full employment and by the real possibility of upward social mobility, a counterweight to the power wielded by authorities in the factory or at the construction site. But that’s not all. Overall, we see a kind of tug of war with three participants: party and labor union leaders who are committed to increasing labor productivity; the workers, primarily concerned with an increase in their wage levels; the experts, who are often stuck in the middle and undecided about what to do. In most cases it’s the workers who win out, and quite often the experts disobey “the orders coming down from Moscow.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn530|530]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Furthermore, the working class itself is divided. While it brings out enthusiasm in some, the appeal to increase productivity and to truly commit to socialist competition―with the aim of developing the productive forces and catching or surpassing the most advanced countries of the West―provokes discontent, quiet resistance or open hostility from others. While the first are classified by the second as “the forces of the Antichrist”, the first have for the second “a sacred hatred for the enemies of the new socialist life”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn531|531]] with a language that brings us back once again to the “zealous faith” that inspires a whole generation.&lt;br /&gt;
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That which opposes supporters and adversaries of the new order is by no means the only conflict. We also see the confrontation between specialists, on one side, and the mass of workers on the other. The first often struggle against the Bolsheviks and on the side of the Whites: their qualifications are appealed to, but at the same time they seek to subject them to a form of oversight. But the newly trained experts and specialists, and even those trained under the old regime, also are motivated by patriotic sentiment to loyally collaborate with Soviet power; still, they must face the challenges arising from a new social stratum, the “vanguard workers.&amp;amp;quot; And this challenge is all the more frightening in a society where “the workers are called upon to judge their leaders”; thus, one can easily comprehend that frequently the “engineers strongly resisted workers control.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn532|532]] But it’s a resistance that’s anything but easy: the workers can make themselves heard and make their voice count by displaying manifestos in their workplaces and writing to the newspapers and to their party leaders; most often, it’s the experts and factory management itself who generally feel intimidated.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn533|533]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin also refers to those conflicts when he addresses the Stakhanovite movement, that “began spontaneously, almost on its own, from below, without any kind of pressure from any part of the administration of our companies, and even doing so in opposition to them”; yes, at least at the start, the Stakhanovites are forced to do their experiments “hidden from company management, hidden away from oversight”; a worker dedicated to introducing “innovations” even runs the risk of being laid off, or stopped by the “intervention of a department chief.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn534|534]] In competition, and often in conflict with one another, we see in action a number of “industrial authorities”: from experts, administrators, political figures, to labor union officials (there’s also a distinction between “party and labor union” officials).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn535|535]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, in visiting a Soviet factory or construction site (including during the Stalin years), one doesn’t have the impression of entering in a “totalitarian” workplace. “Totalitarianism” was much more evident in the factory of Tsarist Russia, where an unmistakable rule was enforced: “the owner of the industrial establishment is sovereign and the absolute legislator who is bound by no legal limits”; in fact, he can even make use of the whip, in the case of more serious offenses.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn536|536]] Or take a country like the United States. Let’s consider the treatment reserved for prisoners (almost always African Americans), rented out, as we are familiar with, to private companies. These companies can enjoy “absolute control” in exchange for payment:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The guards had the power to chain the prisoners, to shoot at those who try to escape, to torture those who refused to submit and lash the disobedient, whether nude or dressed; an almost limitless power. For eight decades [from the seventies of the nineteenth century until the Second World War] there were almost no sentences against the buyers of these slaves for their mistreatment or their deaths.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn537|537]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly this related to prisoners, but remember that for African Americans of the south the charge of “vagrancy” was enough for them to be arrested, condemned, and to be rented out to businessmen who were determined to get rich. Other times, blacks were simply captured by landowners and made to provide forced labor. It’s no coincidence that in the title and subtitle of the book cited here, the author speaks of “slavery with another name”, and of “the reintroduction of slavery for African Americans from the Civil War to the World War II.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn538|538]] While the slaves or semi-slaves may constitute an evidently limited percentage of the total labor force, nevertheless the prolonged existence of slave or semi-slave labor relations in the workplace of American capitalist society demands reflection.&lt;br /&gt;
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Aside from this, it’s worthwhile to make a much more general consideration: looking closely, in the Soviet factory we see dynamics and relations at work that would be considered an intolerable lack of discipline in the capitalist factory found in the democratic countries. One well known work by Marx (&#039;&#039;The Poverty of Philosophy&#039;&#039;) can help to clarify that point:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While inside the modern factory the division of labor is meticulously managed by the businessman’s authority, modern society has no other rule, no other authority, to distribute labor, if not by free competition [...]. It can even be established, as a general principle, that the less state authority presides over the division of labor, the more the division of labor develops within the factory, and there it is subjected to just one authority. Thus, authority in the factory and authority in society, in relation to the division of labor, are in inverse proportion to one another.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn539|539]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It can be said that Soviet society produced, now and again, an inversion of the dialectic in capitalist society described by Marx: the absence of a rigid factory discipline (with the absence of the traditional boss’s more or less accentuated despotism) corresponded to the terror exercised by the State over civil society. But also in regard to this, it’s worthwhile to remain on guard against simplifications: we are dealing with a much more “chaotic and unorganized State” than one can imagine; “the center rarely spoke in one voice”; even the “ideological uniformity” was most often just a “facade.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn540|540]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The typical analysis of totalitarianism makes complete abstraction of the workplace, and just for this reason become unilateral and superficial. If we do away with that total and improper abstraction, totalitarianism as a category would be seen for all its inadequacy: it can’t in any way help us understand a society that in its final phase―with the disappearance of the “zealous faith”, unable to last forever as Kennan wisely predicted―is undermined by an authentic anarchy in the workplace, abandoned by its employees without impediment, who, even when present, appear to be carrying out a kind of “work to rule” slowdown, furthermore it’s tolerated; that is the impression formed, a bit perplexed and somewhat impressed, by the workers and labor union delegations visiting the USSR in its final years. In China, when it is beginning to abandon Maoism, in the public sector there continued to be in force practices that were described as followed by a Western journalist: “even the lowest employee [...] if they so wish, can decide to do absolutely nothing; stay at home for one or two years and continue to get their salary at the end of the month.&amp;amp;quot; This “culture of idleness” continued to make itself felt even in the private sector economy that was then emerging: “former state employees [...] arrived late, then read the newspaper, went to lunch half an hour early, and left the office half an hour early” and frequently missed work for family reasons: “because his wife was sick”, as just one example. And the managers and specialists who sought to introduce discipline and efficiency in the workplace are forced to confront not only the resistance and indignation of the workers (it’s an outrage to penalize a worker who misses work to take care of his wife!), but are often threatened and even face violence from below.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn541|541]] It’s very difficult to describe these relations using the category of “totalitarianism”; we are better instructed by sticking to the previously cited excerpt from Marx, &#039;&#039;The Poverty of Philosophy&#039;&#039;, which can help us understand a phenomenon that’s completely inexplicable by the theory of totalitarianism. In the USSR, in the countries of Eastern Europe and in China, the more or less radical dismantlement of the “totalitarian” system takes place alongside a drastic strengthening of discipline in the workplace; to give one example: only in 1993 does China approve a law that allows layoffs due to absenteeism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn542|542]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No doubt, especially in situations of acute crisis, workplaces are certainly not exempt from the terror in the USSR or in Maoist China; however, what characterizes daily life is a regime that’s far from totalitarianism. In summary, one could say that the usual recourse to that term is only persuasive by working off a double and arbitrary abstraction. The omission of operating relations in the workplace and in the places of production makes it possible to draw the communist dictatorship and the Nazi dictatorship closer together; the silence on the terror and the concentrationary universe that took place at the expense of the colonies and semi-colonies, as well as within the metropole itself at the expense of the peoples of colonial origin (like the Native Americans and African Americans), makes it possible to create an abyss separating the liberal West from the “totalitarian” states.&lt;br /&gt;
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In regard to the Soviet Union of Brezhnev and his successors, Stalin’s USSR presents different characteristics, but the central element that separates them is the exceptional ideological and political mobilization that, before deflating and losing all credibility, for a long period of time manages to offer an essential contribution to the functioning of the economic and productive apparatus. They are decades in which a developmentalist dictatorship is established: it has a pace that is both chaotic and ruthless, and is characterized by the “zealous faith” of which social and ethnic groups take advantage, seeing on opening toward substantial upward social mobility, and which brings the recognition that until that moment was stubbornly denied to them. It doesn’t make much sense to associate that tragic and contradictory experience to that of the Nazis, which is explicitly established for the purpose of war, colonial conquest and the reaffirmation of racial hierarchies, that from its beginning can make use of a state apparatus and a consolidated, efficient bureaucracy, and that can impose itself across all spheres of social life. Nevertheless, that association is now commonplace. It’s necessary to examine its genesis.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;5. The Distortion of History and the Construction of a Mythology: Stalin and Hitler as Twin Monsters&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cold War and the &#039;&#039;Reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; of the New Enemy ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the start of the Cold War, each antagonist seeks to classify the other as the heir to the Third Reich that had just been toppled by both sides. “No one”―observes Lukács―”would dare say today that Hitlerism, its ideology and its methods, belong completely to past history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn543|543]] Indeed, on this the two sides appear to agree without much trouble. It’s just that, while the communist philosopher makes use of the term imperialism to compare Truman and Hitler,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn544|544]] on the opposing side they resort to the term totalitarianism to unite Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union with one another.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two categories are wielded like weapons of war. The effort to associate the new enemy to the old one isn’t limited to the denunciation of imperialism or totalitarianism. After having described the ideological course that leads to the triumph of the Third Reich as the process of “reason’s destruction”, Lukács feels it necessary to also subsume in the category of irrationalism the ideology of the “free world” led by the United States. The task is not without its difficulties, and the Hungarian philosopher denounces the “new form of irrationalism hidden away under an apparent rationality.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, in the “new situation” that’s been created, “it’s completely natural that in philosophy it’s not a German type of irrationalism that’s dominant, but the Machian-pragmatic type”, whose representatives are, among others, Wittgenstein, Carnap and Dewey.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn545|545]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The difficulty of comparing the new enemy to the old is also felt on the opposing side. In sketching out &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, after having for quite some time insisted on the fatal role of imperialism, and in that sense having denounced Lord Cromer (who, by as late as the second post-war period, is included by Churchill among the heroes of the British Empire),[[footnotes.xhtml#fn546|546]] Arendt completes the comparison between Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union by referring, aside from totalitarianism, to the “pan-movements”, in such a way that another analogy emerges: the pan-Germanism of the first corresponded to the pan-Slavism of the second. This conclusion is the finish line of a &#039;&#039;tour de force,&#039;&#039; yet more foolhardy than the one seen in Lukács: we will see Churchill compare the communist movement to a church characterized by an expansionist universalism and “whose missionaries are in every country”, in every people; in any case, Stalin’s supposed pan-Slavism calls upon the peoples of the colonies to put an end to the rule of the master race, something considered natural and beneficial by the theorists of pan-Germanism.&lt;br /&gt;
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At that time, however, on both opposing sides, the principal concern is the construction of analogies and symmetries. We are forced to smile when we read in Arendt that what characterizes the “pan-movements” (and, therefore, Nazism and communism) is “the absolute pretension of having been chosen”: the celebration of the United States as God’s chosen people profoundly marks the American political tradition and continues to be heard today in the speeches by American presidents! The exigencies of the Cold War clearly take priority over any other consideration, as is confirmed by the argument made in 1950 by a prominent American historian. He would oppose Franklin D. Roosevelt and his policy of allying with the USSR; with the start of the Cold War, he felt encouraged to strengthen his thesis of the political and moral similarities between Hitler and Stalin, such that he intensely dedicates himself to the total comparison of the two dictators. The first insists on the “racial destiny of the Teutonic people”; the average reader could be reminded of the “manifest destiny” that, according to a long tradition, would oversee the unstoppable expansion of the United States; yet arguing and omitting in a similar way to Arendt, the historian cited here makes the Nazi theme of the “racial destiny of the Teutonic people” correspond to the “faith of Stalin and Lenin in the messianic role of the proletariat and the revolutionary international communist movement.&amp;amp;quot; Once again the celebration of the “master race” is central to Hitler’s ideology; the search for analogies and precedents for this ought to go in the direction of the regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; long enforced in the Southern United States, to which Nazism made reference and that, in some form, continued to exist in 1950, the year of the cited book’s publication. Yet nevertheless, the American historian discovers that similar to Hitler’s theory of the “master race” is that which is in action in Stalin’s Soviet Union, where nearly “every important discovery” is attributed to “some unknown or poorly known Russian”![[footnotes.xhtml#fn547|547]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; by the former allies also includes the accusation of genocide. Possibly the first to move in this direction is the political front over which the communist movement and the Soviet Union have hegemony. In 1951, in New York, the black lawyer William Patterson, leader of the Civil Rights Congress (an organization committed to the struggles against both McCarthyism and the regime of white supremacy) organizes the publication of a book that is also an appeal to the UN to make it aware of the tragedy affecting African Americans: in the United States (particularly in the South) the regime of racial discrimination, humiliation, oppression and social marginalization remains in force; the rapes, lynchings, and legal and extrajudicial executions haven’t ceased, and the police violence is getting worse (in 1963 Martin Luther King will speak of the “unspeakable horrors of police brutality”). In making this long list of injustices and suffering, he makes reference to the convention approved by the UN in December of 1948 against the crime of genocide, and making use of the fact that this genocide convention doesn’t necessarily mean the systematic annihilation of an entire ethnic group; the book carried the clearly provocative title: &#039;&#039;We Charge Genocide&#039;&#039;. Possibly motivated by the strong opposition faced by this convention in American politics, the denunciation is translated into a number of languages: in the USSR it appears with an introduction by Ilya Ehrenburg, an intellectual of Jewish origin, who compares the Third Reich and the US to the degree that both are affected by a racist and genocidal frenzy, or at least potentially genocidal. The book obviously provokes outrage in the United States, and they respond by returning the accusation. A member of the committee that approved the UN convention declares that: “in the communist countries it’s official policy to deport entire populations on the basis of racial or national origin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn548|548]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the start of the Cold War sees both antagonists classify the other as the new version of Nazism and its genocidal madness, with the approaching triumph of the West the game of analogies plays out exclusively to the favor of the victors. For the ruling ideology in particular, the absolutely identical comparison of Stalin and Hitler has become an obsession, reaching the point of presenting them as twin monsters.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Negative Cult of Heroes ===&lt;br /&gt;
How have we reached this outcome? While attention is fixed exclusively on the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, we will see Gandhi equate British imperialism and Nazi imperialism in his denunciation of colonial Britain and Nazi Germany. Researchers beyond suspicion of anti-Western bias have on repeated occasions compared the treatment of the colonial peoples, carried out but also justified by the liberal West, to the genocidal practices of the Third Reich. This comparison is made in relation to: the deportation of the Cherokees ordered by Andrew Jackson (the president of the United States visited and celebrated by Tocqueville); the attitude assumed by Theodore Roosevelt regarding the “inferior races” (who should be met with a “war of extermination” in case of rebellion against the “superior race”); the treatment by England inflicted on the Irish people (treated in a similar way to the Native Americans and condemned to die en masse of starvation, by as late as mid nineteenth century).&lt;br /&gt;
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There’s more. The keys words in our time used to describe the horrors of the twentieth century emerge from the studies done of the liberal world of the nineteenth century: in specific reference to the “development of industrial capitalism” in England, it’s been stated that “the Gulag is not an invention of the twentieth century”; defined as a “totalitarian society” is that which in Australia devours those deported from England (often the poor condemned over petty theft, driven to it by hunger); finally, in regard to the tragedy of the indigenous peoples in America, Australia or in British colonies in general, authoritative researchers in turn spoke of an “American Holocaust” (or of a “final solution” to the Native American question), of an “Australian Holocaust” and of a “Late Victorian Holocaust”, not to mention the “Black Holocaust” (the deportation and then the enslavement of the survivors, one in every three or four), to which African Americans seek to call attention; and finally the “Canadian Holocaust” that we’ve already come across.&lt;br /&gt;
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Even in regard to the events that have taken place under our watch, in authoritative news organizations we can read that in Afghanistan, an American protectorate, the captured Taliban members are put in a place that “resembles the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz” and that in Guantanamo there is, according to the words of Amnesty International, a kind of “Gulag in our times.&amp;amp;quot; Finally, it’s worthwhile to observe that a more impartial American historiography didn’t hesitate in making a comparison between the Anglo-American annihilation by air of entire cities (Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki) on the one hand, and the genocide of Jews on the other.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn549|549]] But all of this magically disappears in the ruling ideology and historiography, just as it disappears the reality of the concentrationary universe that during the Second Thirty Years’ War arises even in the countries of a more consolidated liberal tradition, and that these countries, even after the defeat of the Third Reich, continued to operate for some time with anti-Soviet and anti-communist purposes, and that, at any rate, are expanded in the colonies or semi-colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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However colossal it may be, that omission isn’t enough to construct the myth of the twin monsters. Working from the comparison of the USSR and the Third Reich, they introduce the comparison of Stalin and Hitler, removing both from their respective historical contexts and political projects. Once the explosive contradictions that characterize them are removed―the Second Time of Troubles on the one hand, and the Second Thirty Years’ War on the other―the Stalinian terror appears as the expression of a gratuitous violence, motivated exclusively by totalitarian ideology, or directly motivated by the bloody paranoia of a single person.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly suppressed is Hitler’s historical contextualization. He was born at the end of the nineteenth century. The “most painful” century in human history has not yet ended, the “century of colonization”, and above all else the “century of races”, which had the merit of having refuted once and for all the naive “ideas of universal brotherhood from the eighteenth century” and the mythology of the common origin and unity of mankind, the ideological tool that the “socialists” pathetically cling to, despite their explicit rejection by history and science.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn550|550]] In 1898, it’s the Anglo-German author Houston S. Chamberlain who expresses that view, and he will later become particularly admired by Hitler, but at that time he’s acclaimed across the West. That is to say that, to comprehend Nazism it’s necessary to first study the political project that’s at its roots, and that political project isn’t just in reference to a single criminal or mad personality, but has various ties to other countries and political movements besides Germany and Nazism. In that sense, regardless of the artistic judgement of it, &#039;&#039;The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui&#039;&#039; by Bertolt Brecht is unconvincing. To illustrate Hitler’s personality he makes use of a literary genre (crime fiction) which leads to misconceptions. It starts from a moral judgment, which is in fact constructed a posteriori. Nazism takes hold in a historical period in which the “evidence” in its favor consists of a racial hierarchy and a colonial expansion that often contains genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, to inherit such a tradition at a time when it begins to be strongly challenged, and to radicalize it, going to the point of seeking to put it into action in Eastern Europe as well, is a terrible development of that tradition, but it’s precisely a question of its development, not something created out of nothing. In nineteenth century culture, there’s a widespread idea that racial “extermination”―Disraeli stresses―is the expression of “an irresistible natural law.&amp;amp;quot; At the end of the century Spencer laments that: “We we are entering into an era of social cannibalism, in which the strongest nations are devouring the weakest.&amp;amp;quot; In the United States between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it’s commonplace for there to be appeals for the “final solution”, and the “complete and final solution” to the respective indigenous and black questions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn551|551]] Also around the same time in Canada, an authoritative government figure proposes the “final solution to our indigenous question.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn552|552]] The horror and infamy of this radicalization remains the same, but it arises out of the experience of the failed attempt to build an overseas colonial empire, that at the outbreak of World War I is quickly eliminated by British naval superiority, which imposes on Germany a devastating and deadly naval blockade, even on the civilian population. Therefore they asked themselves: to continue being exposed to that terrible threat, or to build at all costs a continental empire, resorting to massacres and genocidal practices at the expense of the inferior races and following, at any rate, the classic and proven model of the West’s colonial expansion?&lt;br /&gt;
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When it comes to the ruling ideology, any political project whatsoever disappears; the atrocities of the Third Reich are also expressions of a terrible madness of mysterious origins, but its name is nevertheless “totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot; That is how they set up the comparison of Stalin and Hitler. They even make the superfluous (and perhaps embarrassing) analogy between pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, something that Arendt insisted upon, though today it doesn’t appear to enjoy any noteworthy success. Everything revolves around the two (sick and criminal) personalities, on which they even sometimes trace biographical parallels.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn553|553]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What stands out the most in these writings is the absence of history, and even politics in a certain sense. Colonialism, imperialism, world wars, national liberation struggles, different and opposing political projects, they all disappear. Nor do they even ask about the relations of the liberal West with fascism and Nazism (who consider themselves the most authentic and relevant champions of the West), and with the old Russian regime, whose contradictions have for a long time been moving towards the outbreak of an enormous catastrophe. Overall, all of this is left in the shadows due to the absolute centrality given to two creative personalities, albeit evil in their creativity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Theorem of the Elective Affinities Between Stalin and Hitler ===&lt;br /&gt;
These two personalities―so the story goes―are not only morally and politically similar, but are bound together by a type of mutual attraction. To prove this they reference the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression and the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence. In reality, this pact, on the one hand, puts an end to the &#039;&#039;Diktat&#039;&#039; of Brest-Litovsk; on the other hand, it’s just one phase in a contradictory process that demarcates the spheres of influence by the great powers, something which begins in Munich and (provisionally) concludes at Yalta.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn554|554]] In 1946, a few months after the conclusion of the Second World War, Ernest Bevin, a leading figure in the Labour Party and British foreign minister, saw the world basically divided “into three spheres of influence that could be described as three large Monroe doctrines”, demanded and agreed upon by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn555|555]] While the British Monroe doctrine quickly unravels, in 1961 during a summit in Vienna, John F. Kennedy, veteran of the infamous Bay of Pigs adventure, protests to Khrushchev over the success and dynamism of the Cuban Revolution: the United States can’t tolerate a regime that seeks to alter its hegemony in the “Western Hemisphere”, in one of the “areas of our vital interests”, just as the USSR couldn’t tolerate a challenge to its hegemony in its security zone, Eastern Europe.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn556|556]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One can consider especially odious the demarcation of spheres of influence based on the secret protocols of the German-Soviet pact, and point out the cynicism of the move that allows Stalin to gain both time and space; but it’s very difficult to reconcile such a condemnation with the thesis of the mutual attraction between the two dictators, by means of the theorem of elective affinities. In truth, immediately after the start of the war by Nazi Germany, Churchill eagerly welcomes the entrance of Soviet troops into Eastern Poland. Soon after, in addressing the leaders of Latvia, Stalin explains with great clarity the reasons for his policy toward the Baltic countries: “The Germans could attack. For six years, communists and German fascists have cursed each other. Now, in spite of history, an unexpected turn has happened, but we can’t put our trust in it. We must be prepared ahead of time. Those who were not prepared have faced the consequences.&amp;amp;quot; Starting from the need to avoid the Third Reich&#039;s maneuvers in the region, the military protectorate, which Moscow initially appears satisfied with, is gradually transformed into true and proper annexation:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn557|557]] so it was again put up for discussion the loss of territory suffered by Soviet Russia at the moment of its greatest weakness, while at the same time within the leadership group, there’s a growing tendency to carry on, without much limitations, the legacy of Tsarist Russia’s international policies.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the usual evaluation of the German-Soviet pact the questions that are essential for its comprehension are completely missing: what agreements were previously signed by the Third Reich? How to explain the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union less than two years later, and what does Nazi Germany’s number two man (Rudolf Hess) have in mind when he suddenly lands in Britain on the eve of Operation Barbarossa?&lt;br /&gt;
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In the race to reach an agreement or understanding with the newly installed regime in Berlin, Stalin clearly comes last. The Concordat between Germany and the Holy See happens on July 20th, 1933, and it guarantees the loyalty of German Catholics to the new “government formed in conformity with the Constitution” &#039;&#039;(verfassungmässig gebildete Regierung&#039;&#039;): a recognition that happens soon after the approval of the emergency laws, and with it the use of terror and the rise of the racial state, and the first measures against government employees of “non-Aryan origin.&amp;amp;quot; Two weeks earlier Zentrum was dissolved, the Catholic party whose militants had committed to “positive collaboration” in “the national front led by the Reich Chancellor.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn558|558]] With respect to the Protestant faith, one can’t forget that the Deutsche Christen lined up in support of Hitler immediately after his rise to power, and did so by adapting Christianity to the needs of the Third Reich, reinterpreting the Protestant Reformation according to Nazi and even racist perspectives, theorizing a Church founded within the German “popular community” and based on the “recognition of the differences of nations and races as ordained by God.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn559|559]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Zionist movement at the time shows a similar willingness to gain the new rulers’ favor. Their press organ, Jüdische Rundschau, largely immune to the wave of prohibitions and persecutions which hit the German press immediately after the Reichstag fire, on April 7th, 1933, encourages Zionists and Nazis to be “sincere partners.&amp;amp;quot; It all results in an agreement on the “transfer” of 20,000 Jews to Palestine, who are allowed to take with them nearly 30 million dollars, a strong contribution toward colonization and to the process that would later lead to the formation of the State of Israel.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn560|560]] Later, reacting to the “transfer” agreement, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem also seeks Hitler’s favor. Now let’s look to the opposition political parties. The speech by Social Democrat MP Otto Wels is “very weak”, during the Reichstag session that concedes emergency powers to Hitler.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn561|561]] It was the “Stalinist” communist party that first raised the alarm and organized resistance to the barbarism now in power.&lt;br /&gt;
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1935 is also the year in which the naval agreement between Great Britain and the Third Reich is signed. Occurring after the start of feverish rearmament and the reintroduction of the draft, the agreement raises Hitler&#039;s hopes that they could reach a strategic understanding, with the recognition of Great Britain’s naval superiority and mutual respect between the two great “Germanic” empires: the British overseas empire and the continental German empire, which would be built through the colonization and enslavement of Eastern Europe. It’s rightly described as a “cynical attitude” from the government in London, which gives the impression of endorsing an infamous program previously and clearly described in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn562|562]] It’s not shocking that there’s growing concern in Moscow, strong irritation in Paris,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn563|563]] and unrestrained joy from Hitler, who then celebrates this as his “happiest day.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn564|564]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more disturbing is Poland’s role. As has been observed, it becomes “totally subordinated to German policy” starting from the signing of the ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany on January 26th, 1934. The following year, foreign minister Beck declares to his subordinate: “There are two political entities undoubtedly condemned to disappear: Austria and Czechoslovakia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn565|565]] The alignment with Hitler’s program is obvious, and it’s not just a matter of words. “The ultimatum to Czechoslovakia in which Poland demanded the return of Teschen led Beneš―according to his own account―to abandon any idea of opposing the Munich arrangement. Poland until that moment had been Germany’s most useful ‘attack dog’ in the East, similar to Italy’s role in the Mediterranean.&amp;amp;quot; The Munich Conference doesn’t mark the end of the Warsaw government’s collaboration with the Third Reich: “If Hitler truly sought to enter into Ukraine, he ought to pass through Poland; and in the autumn of 1938 that idea didn’t appear to be a political fantasy at all.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn566|566]] It even appeared to have the encouragement of Warsaw. In January of the following year, during a conversation with Hitler, Beck states: “Poland doesn’t attach any significance to the so-called security system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn567|567]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin has every reason to be worried and distressed. Before the Munich Conference, the American ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, observed how important it was to isolate “Asian despotism”, thereby saving “European civilization” from a fratricidal war. After the victory achieved by Hitler, an English diplomat writes in his diary: “From being a fist aimed at the heart of Germany, Czechoslovakia now quickly became a fist aimed at the vital organs of Russia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn568|568]] During the crisis caused by the Munich Conference, the USSR was the only country challenging the Third Reich and confirmed its support for the Prague government, putting more than seventy divisions on a high state of alert. Later on, after the Third Reich’s dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, Moscow delivers a strongly worded message of protest to Berlin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn569|569]] The reaction from other capitals was much more “restrained.&amp;amp;quot; As a result, the Nazi-fascist aggressors had successively devoured Ethiopia, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Albania and China thanks to the direct or passive complicity of the Western powers, inclined to direct the Third Reich’s sights and ambitions against the homeland of the October Revolution; to its east, the Soviet Union sees the pressure applied by Japan on its eastern borders. Thus emerges the danger of an invasion and war on two fronts: It’s only at this moment that Moscow begins moving toward a pact of non-aggression with Germany, noting the failure of the popular front strategy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Carried out by Stalin with conviction and decisiveness, the popular front strategy had its costs. It had strengthened the opposition and Trotskyite agitation, especially in the colonies: what credibility could an anti-colonialism have which spared―so the argument went―the leading colonial powers at that time, concentrating instead on a country, Germany, which at Versailles had lost what few colonies it previously had? For the colonized peoples themselves it was especially difficult to accept that adjustment. Britain was widely discredited. In the spring of 1919 it not only was responsible for the massacre at Amritsar, that cost the lives of hundreds of unarmed Indian civilians, but it also resorted to “public flogging” and forcing the residents of the city “to crawl on their hands and knees while entering or leaving their homes”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn570|570]] a dehumanizing collective punishment and a terrible racial and national humiliation. Later, while fighting the Second World War, the imperial government represses pro-independence demonstrations, using planes to fire upon them. These are the years when Gandhi asserts that “in India we have Hitlerian rule, however disguised it may be in softer terms”; “Hitler was ‘Great Britain’s sin’. Hitler is only the response to British imperialism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn571|571]] With the war over, Gandhi will go as far as paying tribute to Subhas Chandra Bose, who to achieve independence had fought alongside the Axis: “Subhas was a great patriot and had given his life for the good of the country.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn572|572]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, it wasn’t easy for the USSR to switch to the idea that, despite appearances, for the colonized peoples as well the principal danger was the Nazi-fascist coalition, the German, Japanese and Italian axis, and particularly the Third Reich, determined to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, resorting to the most extreme methods. For countries like Britain and France, the popular front strategy brought very little costs, yet they still sabotaged it. At this point, the USSR had no other choice but to reach an understanding with Germany, a move that was described as “a dramatic improvisation at the last moment”, which Moscow resorted to for lack of alternatives “in the immediate lead-up to a new European war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn573|573]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A radical change of course takes place that is often evaluated from an exclusively European perspective. But there’s no reason to ignore the repercussions in Asia. Mao Zedong expresses his satisfaction: “The pact represents a blow to Japan and help to China” because it “more easily allows the Soviet Union” to support “China’s resistance against Japan.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn574|574]] It’s precisely for this reason that the Japanese consider Germany’s behavior to be “treacherous and unforgivable.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn575|575]] As a result, the flow of Russian arms and munitions to China proceeds at a steady pace. The West’s position is very different:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Europe and America’s indifference left its mark on history, demonstrating that they had no notion of reality, they refused to make the most minimal effort in deterring the fascists in Tokyo; but it’s not just that, even worse is that the United States continued to send Japan petroleum and gasoline almost right up until the big attack on Pearl Harbor.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn576|576]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s leave aside Asia for the moment to concentrate on Europe. The mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich and the preparation for open conflict never ceased, not even during the months following the non-aggression pact. Even before signing, speaking in Danzig with the high commissioner of the League of Nations, Hitler explains:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Everything I do is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid and blind to understand it, I’ll be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians and then defeat the West, so that after its defeat I can concentrate all possible forces on the Soviet Union.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn577|577]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Judging by these words, the Führer’s consistent objective is the construction of a western alliance, led by the Germans, to defeat the Soviet Union; if this alliance can’t be stipulated through a pact ahead of time, then there’s no choice but to impose it on the allies after their defeat; the temporary understanding with Moscow is just a means to achieve victory and thereby realize the necessary Western alliance for the definitive settling of accounts with Bolshevism. The pact of non-aggression is an instrument to achieve the Third Reich’s principal and permanent objective, which unleashes Operation Barbarossa and presents it as a crusade for Europe, calling upon on European countries and nations to participate, and they do participate, as a matter of fact.&lt;br /&gt;
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Did Stalin count on the long or eternal duration of the pact? In truth, from the start he is aware of the inevitability of the clash with Nazi Germany: “we will be spared from the war for a little while longer.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn578|578]] He takes advantage of this time to consolidate his country’s position. As early as November of 1939, from Hitler’s perspective, the country governed by communists appears determined to strengthen itself militarily, and it’s only willing to respect the pact according to circumstances and its own convenience.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn579|579]] It’s a point argued by the Führer two months later: Stalin is cautious, he’s very aware of the balance of forces, but he’s clearly waiting for a “difficult situation for Germany”; he doesn’t even lose track of the weather, acting “more brazen” than usual during the winter months, when he feels more protected from the Third Reich’s formidable war machine.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn580|580]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Führer’s concerns are anything but imaginary. Let’s see what Moscow’s stance was in late summer of 1940, at a time when, having completed the occupation of France, the Third Reich appears to be in the position of forcing Great Britain to surrender:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;While Stalin relays to Hitler his confidence in a quick conclusion to the war, his diplomatic envoys and his agents abroad encourage all kinds of resistance to “the new order.&amp;amp;quot; The Moscow newspapers, that until then hadn’t spared the allies of ironic or scornful remarks, began taking on a more sympathetic tone toward Britain’s struggle, and encouraging French patriots in their struggle against Nazi domination. The German foreign minister was even forced to protest against anti-Nazi propaganda carried out by Mrs. Kollontai, representative of the Soviet Union in Sweden.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn581|581]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What’s revealing is the meeting that takes place in Moscow on November 25th, 1940, between two of Stalin’s closest collaborators:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Dimitrov: we will carry out a policy of bogging down the German occupation troops in various countries, and, without drawing attention, we want to take this work even further. Would this upset Soviet policy?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Molotov: Naturally, this must be done. We wouldn’t be communists if we didn’t follow this line. Only it must be done quietly.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn582|582]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin also agrees with this line;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn583|583]] he’s clearly committed to encouraging resistance to the Third Reich’s expansionism. Of course, this is heading towards a collision, and Stalin is aware of that, as shown by his observations and actions. November 7th, 1940: it’s necessary to be at the military level “of our enemies (and for us they are all capitalist states, including those who present themselves as our friends!).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn584|584]] On November 25th of the same year: “our relations with the Germans are marked by apparent courtesy, but between us there’s a lot of tension.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn585|585]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first months of 1941, the mask begins to fall off: “Currently the resistance against Hitler is encouraged [from Moscow] openly and from all parts.&amp;amp;quot; This is especially true with respect to the Balkans, where the dispute between the signatories of the non-aggression pact is increasingly intense. In the Kremlin, Stalin welcomes the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow and discusses with him the approach that should be used in opposing the Third Reich. Pleasantly surprised by this audacity toward those who aspire to rule the world, Belgrade’s representative puts forward a question: “And if the Germans, irritated, turn against you?.&amp;amp;quot; And the reply is quick: “Let them come!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn586|586]] The drafting of the friendship treaty on April 4th, 1941, between the USSR and Yugoslavia was immediately followed by Hitler’s invasion of the latter country. A few days later, in relaying the opinion of the Soviet leader, Dimitrov writes in his diary (April 18th, 1941): “The war of the Greek and Yugoslav peoples against imperialist aggression is a just war”, and on this “there’s no doubt.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn587|587]] The approaching clash with the Third Reich is increasingly apparent. May 5th, 1941, Stalin observes: “is the German army invincible, perhaps? No, it’s not invincible [...]. Germany now wages a war in the name of the enslavement and subjugation of other nations, in the name of hegemony. This is a great disadvantage for the German army.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn588|588]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While the rapprochement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union had provoked notable discomfort within the Nazi ranks, and especially for Rosenberg (“I have this feeling that the Moscow Pact will haunt national-socialism sooner or later”), Operation Barbarossa brings about a sense of relief: “the stain to our honor” has been wiped away, Goebbels writes in his diary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn589|589]] The Führer himself writes to Mussolini: “I am at peace with myself”; the “agony” and the sense of “abandoning my origins, my thinking, and the work I set out on”, these feelings that came with the pact of non-aggression have disappeared. Hitler―a contemporary historian explains―finally arrives at the “fight that for nearly two decades has been a central element of his thinking” and even his “psyche.&amp;amp;quot; Longed for since the beginning, the annihilation of Asiatic and Eastern Bolshevism would have permitted, in the conditions imposed by Berlin, the restoration of unity within the West and the white race, in particular reaching a permanent agreement with the “British Empire”, that for the Führer continued being the “supreme model of domination and exploitation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn590|590]] Arendt’s affirmation, according to which Hitler “never had the intention of defending the ‘West from Bolshevism’”, but on the contrary “he had always been willing to ally with Stalin to destroy it”, is nothing more than her tribute to Cold War ideology.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn591|591]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, the leaders of the Third Reich were not mistaken in feeling relieved by the fact that, finally, with Operation Barbarossa, they could finally confront and eliminate (so they hoped) the true adversary, the eternal enemy. Even before Nazism took power, on August 12th, 1931, Stalin had described antisemitism as a type of “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot; Upon the establishment of the Third Reich, he had reacted, on January 26th, 1934, with a firm stance against fascism and against the “German version of fascism” specifically: “Again, like in 1914, the parties of warmongering imperialism and the parties of war and revanchism take center stage.&amp;amp;quot; The “new war” that appears on the horizon would be especially barbaric: it would be the war “organized by a ‘superior race’, that’s to say the German ‘race’, against the ‘inferior race’, and especially against the enslaved.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn592|592]] Stalin defended this concept later on November 25th, 1936, in the presentation of the new Soviet Constitution, which through its “profoundly internationalist” character opposed the “bourgeois constitutions [that] implicitly work from the assumption that nations and races can’t have equal rights.&amp;amp;quot; It’s true that here the speech was of a general character, as shown by the references to the “colonies” and to discrimination based on “differences in skin color”, but it’s clear that the principal target was Nazi Germany, which embraced racial ideology as a state doctrine. It’s not by chance that Stalin insisted on the principle of equality among nations “regardless of their strength or weakness”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn593|593]] at this time the Third Reich was the champion of social-Darwinism at the international level. Still a few months from the start of the war in Europe, on March 10th, 1939, in warning the Western powers that their “dangerous political game” of redirecting the Third Reich’s expansionist drive “to the East, against the Soviet Union”, could end in “serious failure” (in other words, with a non-aggression pact between Moscow and Berlin), Stalin had called for an end to &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039;, the policy which “made one concession after another to the aggressors”, demanding the formation of a common front against the instigators of war.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn594|594]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Totally rejecting the historical context briefly outlined here, Arendt describes the theorem of the elective affinity between Stalin and Hitler: the only man who the first trusted was the second, and the only man admired by the second was the first. After what we’ve seen, to speak of trust between the two sounds unintentionally comical, yet Arendt’s thesis of “Stalin’s pro-Hitler policy” is a mere tribute to Cold War ideology.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn595|595]] In Moscow in 1937―Feuchtwanger observes―“everyone is of the mindset that a future war is an absolute certainty”, they see the “German fascist” as the enemy. The reason is obvious: “Our prosperity, the Soviets say, is in such obvious contrast with fascist theories that the fascist states, if they wish to survive, must annihilate us.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn596|596]] Accurately predicted here is the war of annihilation that will be unleashed later by the Third Reich; far from easing up, the preparations for the war continue to intensify until becoming frantic during the months of the non-aggression pact.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s correct, however, that beginning with Operation Barbarossa, Hitler occasionally highlights the political and military competence of his great antagonist: is this confirmation of the theorem of elective affinities? During the Tehran Conference, while in friendly debate with Franklin D. Roosevelt (who tends to read Hitler in psychopathological terms), Stalin stresses however that their common enemy is “very capable” and only this can explain the extraordinary results initially achieved;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn597|597]] is this another confirmation of the thesis that’s commonplace today? In fact, the Soviet leader was right, not the American president! One must have a very primitive outlook on antagonism to think that authenticity requires ignorance of the enemy’s capabilities. Historians today are in agreement in admonishing the Führer for underestimating the USSR, yet Arendt works off her late and partial change of heart to construct a theorem of the elective affinities.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitler, moreover, is cited in a one-sided way. It’s quite understandable his effort at explaining the unexpected failures and partial successes on the Eastern Front (which uncomfortably dismisses the myth of the invincibility of the Third Reich and the Wehrmacht) by detailing the unusual characteristics of the new enemy. But such characteristics aren’t always described in flattering terms. As early as July 14th, 1941, commenting on the ferocious resistance Operation Barbarossa was encountering, the Führer states: “our enemies are no longer human beings, but beasts.&amp;amp;quot; And echoing the opinions of their leader, one of his secretaries writes to a friend: “we are fighting against ferocious animals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn598|598]] Obviously Stalin is among these “beasts” and “ferocious animals”, who on another occasion is seen by Hitler as a creature from “hell” (&#039;&#039;unterwelt&#039;&#039;), confirming Bolshevism’s “satanic” character.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn599|599]] On the other end, we can note that both before and during the war, Stalin describes Hitler as the champion of antisemitic “cannibalism” and of “cannibalistic politics” based on “racial hatred.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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We can add that leading political figures of the liberal West also formulated a positive opinion of the Soviet leader, to whom Churchill also expresses a feeling of human sympathy. Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, when speaking of the “marvelous progress achieved by the Russian people”, indirectly pays tribute to the person who leads them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn600|600]] Finally, in our days leading historians stress Stalin’s extraordinary military and political capacity, without disparaging Hitler’s. Should we include all these individuals, despite their great differences, within the theorem of elective affinities? In truth, when they pronounce that theorem, Arendt and her followers abandon the field of philosophical and historical investigation, pursuing belles-lettres instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Ukrainian Holocaust as an Equivalent to the Jewish Holocaust ===&lt;br /&gt;
The two criminal personalities, mutually linked together by elective affinities, each create a concentrationary universe with great similarities between them―this is how the construction of the omnipresent political myth of our time proceeds. In truth, despite inaugurating this tradition, Arendt elaborated a more complex discourse. At one end, she mentions, although very briefly, the “totalitarian methods” of liberal Britain’s concentration camps where the Boers are confined, but also the totalitarian aspects present in the concentration camps that France’s Third Republic established “after the Spanish Civil War.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, in making the comparison between Stalin’s USSR and Hitler&#039;s Germany, Arendt points out some important distinctions: only in the second case does she speaks of “extermination camps.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: “in the USSR the guards were not like the SS, a type of elite force trained to commit crimes.&amp;amp;quot; As is confirmed by the analysis from a witness who passed through the tragic experience of both concentrationary universes: “The Russians [...] never showed the sadism of the Nazis [...]. Our Russian guards were good people and not sadists, but they scrupulously followed the rules of that inhuman system.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn601|601]] In our time, however, the references to the liberal West, and the mere mention of different kinds of concentrationary universes in which the liberal West was implicated, have now disappeared; the entire discourse centers on the similarity between the Gulag and the &#039;&#039;Konzentrationslager&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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For such a comparison to be persuasive, they must first inflate the numbers of the Stalinian terror. Recently, an American researcher calculated that the executions that actually took place reached a tenth of the usual estimates.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn602|602]] It’s clear, obviously, that the horror of that repression is always on a large scale. However, the audacity of certain historians and ideologues is significant. Nor do they limit themselves to inflating the numbers; in a political and historical void the construction of the monstrous twins can take it a step further: the Holocaust carried out by Nazi Germany against the Jews, especially starting from the stalemate on the Eastern Front, corresponds to the earlier holocaust (starting in the thirties); in this second case it was a matter of a planned “terror famine” that ended up becoming an “immense Bergen Belsen”, that’s to say an immense extermination camp.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn603|603]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was Robert Conquest who particularly distinguished himself in spreading this thesis. His critics accuse him of having worked as a disinformation agent for British intelligence services, and of having studied the Ukrainian case through the perspective of that profession.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn604|604]] Even his admirers recognize a point that doesn’t diminish in importance: Conquest is “a veteran of the Cold War” and wrote his book in the context of a “political-cultural operation” that was ultimately led by U.S. president Ronald Reagan and which achieved “numerous successes: on the one hand, significantly putting into the focus of international debate the value and limits of Gorbachev’s reforms, and on the other hand, it powerfully influenced the radicalization of separatist ambitions in Ukraine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn605|605]] In other words, the book was published in the atmosphere of a “political-cultural operation” that aimed to deliver the final and decisive blow to the Soviet Union, exposing it as responsible for shameful acts completely identical to those committed by the Third Reich, and encouraging its disintegration by making a people victimized in a “holocaust” become aware of it, thus making coexistence with their tormentors impossible. It’s necessary not to lose sight of the fact that, in the same period, together with the book on Ukraine, Conquest published another (in collaboration with a certain J. M. White), in which he gives advice to his fellow citizens about how to survive a possible (or imminent) invasion by the Soviet Union (&#039;&#039;What to Do When the Russians Come: A Survivalist’s Handbook&#039;&#039;).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn606|606]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, regardless of the underlying political motivations, a thesis must be analyzed based on the arguments it offers. And the thesis of the “terror famine” planned by Stalin to exterminate the Ukrainian people may prove to be more credible than the thesis that Reagan’s United States ran the risk of being invaded by Gorbachev’s USSR! Therefore, let’s concentrate our attention on Ukraine in the first years of the 1930s. In 1934, upon returning from a trip to the Soviet Union that had also taken him to Ukraine, the French prime minister, Édouard Herriot, denies not only its planned character, but also the extent and seriousness of the famine.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn607|607]] These declarations, made by a leader of a country that in the following year would sign an alliance treaty with the USSR, are generally considered unreliable. However, the testimony contained in the diplomatic reports by fascist Italy are beyond suspicion. Even in the period in which the repression of “counter-revolutionaries” is at its cruelest, it is combined with initiatives that go in a different and opposite direction: the soldiers “are sent to the rural areas to collaborate in the work in the fields” and “workers come to repair farming equipment”; together with “the effort to destroy any hint of Ukrainian separatism”, we witness a “policy of promoting the Ukrainian national character” which seeks to attract “the Ukrainians of Poland for a possible and sought after union with the USSR”; and this objective is pursued by favoring the free expression of the Ukrainian language, culture and tradition.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn608|608]] Did Stalin seek to attract “the Ukrainians of Poland” into uniting with Soviet Ukrainians by exterminating the latter through starvation? From what we can tell, soon after the start of World War II, the Soviet troops who stormed into the Ukrainian territory until that moment occupied by Poland were warmly welcomed by the local population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn609|609]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Now let’s see the image that arises from the statements by Stalin’s other enemies, this time from within the communist movement. Trotsky, was born in Ukraine (as it is known), and who in the last years of his life repeatedly addressed the subject of his homeland, taking a position in favor of the pro-independence movement: he condemns the ferocity of the repression but, despite not sparing Stalin of accusations (in a number of occasions comparing him to Hitler), he makes no mentions of the so-called “holocaust of hunger” organized from Moscow.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn610|610]] Trotsky stresses that “the Ukrainian masses are driven by an irreconcilable hostility toward the Soviet bureaucracy”, but identifies the reason for such hostility in the “repression of Ukrainian independence.&amp;amp;quot; Judging by this thesis popular nowadays, the Holodomor had taken place at the start of the 1930s, however according to Trotsky “the Ukrainian problem has intensified at the start of this year”, that’s to say 1939.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn611|611]] Like Stalin, the leader of the anti-Stalinist opposition also wanted to unify all Ukrainians, although this time not within the USSR, but rather in an independent state. Would it have made sense to formulate that project while remaining totally silent on the genocide that had already taken place? In Trotsky’s opinion, the treachery of the Soviet bureaucracy consists of this: it erected monuments to the great national poet, Taras Shevchenko, but only to force the Ukrainian people to pay homage to their Moscovite oppressors in the language of their national poet.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn612|612]] As one can see, he does not speak of genocide, nor even ethnocide; for however strong the condemnation of the Stalinian regime may be, he doesn’t accuse it of either the physical or cultural destruction of the Ukrainian people. Whether inside or outside the communist movement, the enemies of Stalin converge on this essential acknowledgement.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fragility and the instrumentalization of the analogy between the Holodomor and the “final solution” is starting to become clear. Hitler and other Nazi leaders explicitly and repeatedly proclaimed that it’s necessary to proceed toward the annihilation of the Jews, compared to a bacteria, a virus, a pathogenic agent, whose extermination would allow for society to become healthy again. It would be useless to search for similar declarations by Soviet leaders with regards to the Ukrainian people (or Jewish people). It could be more interesting to compare the policy of Stalin’s USSR and Hitler’s Germany in relation, in both cases, to Ukraine. Hitler proclaimed on various occasions that Ukrainians, like all “subjugated peoples”, must be kept at the proper distance away from culture and education; it’s necessary to also destroy their historical memory; it would be good if they didn’t even know how to “read and write.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn613|613]] And that’s not all. One could “do well without” 80% to 90% of the local population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn614|614]] Above all else, one could totally do well without the intellectual classes. Their liquidation is the condition for transforming the subjugated people into a hereditary caste of slaves or semi-slaves, destined to work and die in service to the master race. The Nazi program is later clarified by Himmler. It’s a matter of immediately eliminating the Jews (whose presence is important with regard to the intellectual classes) and to reduce to a “minimum” the total Ukrainian population to clear the way for the “future German colonization.&amp;amp;quot; That is how―the historian cited here comments―in Ukraine as well the “construction of the Nazi empire” and the “Holocaust” go hand and hand; and in it those very same Ukrainian nationalists take part, and they constitute the principal sources for Conquest’s book and will later act as his principal propagandists.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn615|615]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Relative to the Third Reich, Soviet power moves in the precise opposite direction. We learned of the &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; policy, promoted by Soviet power in relation to national minorities and Ukrainian “brothers and comrades”, to take the words used by Stalin soon after the October Revolution.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn616|616]] In effect, who most decisively promotes “affirmative action” in favor of the Ukrainian people is precisely that figure who today is considered responsible for the Holodomor. In 1921 he rejects the notion of those for whom “the Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian nation were an invention of the Germans.&amp;amp;quot; No; “it’s evident that the Ukrainian nation exists and that communists should develop its culture.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn617|617]] Starting from that basis, they carry out the “Ukrainization” of culture, schools, the press, publishers, party cadre and the state apparatus. Lazar Kaganovich, who is a loyal associate to Stalin, and who in March of 1925 becomes party secretary in Ukraine, gives particular attention to that policy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn618|618]] The results don’t take very long: in 1931 the publication of books in Ukrainian “reaches its peak of 6,218 out of 8,086 titles, nearly 77%”, while “the percentage of Russians in the party, around 72% in 1922, had been reduced to 52%.&amp;amp;quot; It’s also necessary to have in mind the development of the Ukrainian industrial apparatus, Stalin again insisting on its importance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn619|619]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One can seek to minimize all of this, referring to the persistent monopoly on power exercised in Moscow by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, that policy of Ukrainization has such a strong impact that it is forced to confront resistance from Russians:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The former in any case were disillusioned with the solution given to the national question in the USSR. The equalization of Russia with the other federal republics shocked them, the rights extended to minorities within the Russian Republic irritated them, the anti-Russian rhetoric of the regime angered them [...] and it weighed upon them the fact that Russians were the only nationality of the federation that didn’t have a party of their own, nor a science academy of their own.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn620|620]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only does it not make sense to compare the Soviet policies to that of the Nazis, but the first, in fact, proves to be fully superior to that of the Whites (supported by the liberal West). Conquest himself ends up recognizing this against his will. Placing himself on a line of continuity in relation to Tsarist autocracy, Denikin “refused to admit the existence of Ukrainians.&amp;amp;quot; Precisely the opposite attitude of Stalin who praises “the Ukrainization of Ukrainian cities.&amp;amp;quot; After the success of this policy a new and especially positive page has been turned:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In April of 1923, at the XII Congress of the [communist] party, the policy of “Ukrainization” obtained full legal recognition. For the first time since the nineteenth century, a stable Ukrainian government included in its program the defense and development of the Ukrainian language and culture [...]. The Ukrainian cultural figures who returned to their country did it with the real hope that a Soviet Ukraine could also give life to its national rebirth. And in large part, for some years, they were right. Poetry and prose, linguistic and historical works had a wide and intense circulation among all classes, while all past literature was reprinted on a large scale.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn621|621]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We have seen that this policy is in force, and even in full development, in Ukraine at the start of the 1930s. Of course, soon a terrible conflict and famine will follow; however, it remains a mystery how over such a short period of time it can switch from radical affirmative action in favor of Ukrainians to planning their extermination. It’s good not to forget that Ukrainian nationalist circles played an important role in the elaboration and promotion of the &#039;&#039;Holodomor&#039;&#039; thesis, after having carried out “many pogroms” against Jews during the years of the civil war,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn622|622]] often times collaborating with the Nazi invaders, immersed in the realization of the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; After having simultaneously functioned as an instrument of demonization and of convenient self-absolution, the Holodomor thesis becomes a formidable ideological weapon in the final period of the Cold War and in the program for the Soviet Union’s dismemberment.&lt;br /&gt;
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A last consideration. During the twentieth century the “genocide” accusation and “Holocaust” denunciation were utilized in the most different ways. We’ve already seen a number of examples. One more should be added. On October 20th, 1941, the &#039;&#039;Chicago Tribune&#039;&#039; reports the passionate appeal led by Herbert Hoover for an end to the blockade imposed by Great Britain on Germany. A few months earlier the war of extermination was unleashed by the Third Reich against the Soviet Union, but on this the ex-president of the United States didn’t say a word. He concentrates on the terrible conditions of the civilian populations in the occupied countries (in Warsaw, the “child mortality rate is ten times higher than the birth rate”) and he called for an end to “this holocaust”, the blockade being useless in any case, given that it wasn’t able to halt the advance of the Wehrmacht.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn623|623]] It’s apparent that Hoover is interested in discrediting the country or countries on whose side F.D. Roosevelt is prepared to intervene; and it should be said that it has been lost from memory this supposed “holocaust” for which the champion of isolationism blamed London and in part Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Terror Famines in the History of the Liberal West ===&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, besides distorting history, what completely invalidates the discourse by “the Cold War veteran” is his silence. One can start with the debate that occurs in the House of Commons on October 28th, 1948: Churchill denounces the widening conflict between Hindus and Muslims and the “horrible holocaust” that is overtaking India after independence was conceded by the Labour government, and after the dismantlement of the British Empire. Then a Labour MP interrupted the speaker: “Why don’t you talk about the famine in India?” The former prime minister tries to avoid it but his interlocutor insists: “Why don’t you speak of the famine in India, that the previous conservative government had been responsible for?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn624|624]] The reference is to the famine, stubbornly denied by Churchill, that from 1943-1944 caused three million deaths in Bengal. Neither of the two sides remember, however, the famine that took place some decades earlier, also in colonial India: in this case, it’s twenty to thirty million people who lose their lives. Often forced to carry out “hard labor” with a diet inferior to that provided to the prisoners of the “infamous Buchenwald &#039;&#039;Lager&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot; On this occasion, the racist component was explicit and declared. The British bureaucrats said that it was “a mistake to spend so much money to save a lot of black fellows.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, according to the viceroy Sir Richard Temple, those who had lost their lives were mostly beggars without any real intention of working: “Nor will many be inclined to grieve much for the fate which they brought upon themselves, and which terminated lives of idleness and too often of crime.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn625|625]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With World War II over, Sir Victor Gollancz, a Jew who arrived in England after having fled antisemitic persecution in Germany, publishes &#039;&#039;The Ethics of Starvation&#039;&#039; in 1946 and &#039;&#039;In Darkest Germany&#039;&#039; a year later. The author denounces the policy of hunger that, after the defeat of the Third Reich, befalls prisoners and the German people, continually at risk of death by starvation. Infant mortality was ten times more elevated than in 1944, a year that was particularly tragic; the rations available to the Germans are dangerously close to those enforced in “Bergen Belsen.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn626|626]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the two cases just cited, it’s not Soviet Ukraine that is compared to a Nazi concentration camp, but the work camps of British subjugated India and the occupation regime imposed on those defeated by the liberal West. The latter accusation appears more persuasive, as is confirmed by the most recent and exhaustive book published on the topic: “The Germans were much better fed in the Soviet Zone.&amp;amp;quot; The country that had suffered the genocidal policy of the Third Reich, and because of that policy continued suffering shortages, was more generous. In effect, what led the liberal West to inflict death by starvation on those it defeated was not a lack of resources, but ideology: “Politicians and the military―like Sir Bernard Montgomery―insist that no food should be sent by Great Britain. Death by starvation was the punishment. Montgomery insisted that three quarters of all Germans were still Nazis.&amp;amp;quot; For exactly that reason fraternization was prohibited: it was necessary to not give a word and much less a smile to members of a people totally and irredeemably wicked. The American soldier was warned: “In heart, body, and soul, every German is Hitler.&amp;amp;quot; Even a young woman could prove deadly: “Don’t be like Samson with Delilah; she would love to cut your hair and then your throat.&amp;amp;quot; This hate campaign explicitly sought to remove all sense of compassion and therefore guarantee the success of the “ethics of punishment by starvation.&amp;amp;quot; American soldiers should also remain unmoved when faced with starving children: “in the blonde haired German child [...] lurks a Nazi.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn627|627]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the tragedies of Bengal and Ukraine are explained by the list of priorities dictated by the approach or the intensification of the Second World War, which imposes the concentration of limited resources on the struggle against a mortal enemy,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn628|628]] then one can speak accurately of a planned terror famine with regards to Germany immediately after the defeat of the Third Reich, where the lack of resources plays no role at all, but is instead influenced to a considerable degree by the racialization of a people, who F.D. Roosevelt for some period of time has the temptation of eliminating from the face of the earth by means of “castration.&amp;amp;quot; One could even say that it was the start of the Cold War that saved the Germans (and the Japanese), or at least noticeably lessened their suffering: in the struggle against the new enemy they could be useful and valuable cannon fodder, offering their experience to their former enemy.&lt;br /&gt;
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But it is useless to search for any mention of the famine in British colonial India or of the West’s Bergen Belsen in Germany in the books by the “Cold War veteran”, dedicated to pushing through a scheme constructed &#039;&#039;a priori&#039;&#039; through historical revisionism: all the Nazi infamies are only the replica of communist infamies; therefore, the Hitlerian Bergen Belsen is modeled off the Bergen Belsen &#039;&#039;ante litteram&#039;&#039; for which Stalin is responsible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fully coherent with such a scheme, Conquest completely ignores the fact that hunger and the threat of death by starvation is a constant factor in the relations instituted by the West with barbarians, as well as with enemies that are compared to barbarians. After the Revolution in Saint-Domingue, fearing the political contagion from the first country in the Americas to abolish slavery, Jefferson declares that he’s ready to “subject Toussaint to death by starvation.&amp;amp;quot; Tocqueville demands that the crops be burnt and silos emptied should the Arabs dare to resist the French conquest in Algeria. Five decades later, with that same war tactic which condemns an entire people to hunger or death by starvation, the United States strangulates the resistance in the Philippines. Even when it’s not intentionally planned, a famine is an opportunity not to be wasted. In the time period in which Tocqueville seeks to create a desert around rebellious Arabs, a devastating disease destroys the potato harvest in Ireland and decimates a population already heavily strained by the looting and oppression by English colonizers. In the eyes of Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan (charged by the London of government with monitoring and dealing with the situation) the tragedy appears to be the expression of “divine providence”, that thus solves the problem of overpopulation (and also the endemic rebellion of a barbarian population). In this sense, British policy was, at times, classified as “proto-Eichmann”, protagonists of a tragedy that could be considered the prototype to the genocides of the twentieth century.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn629|629]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s focus on the twentieth century, however. The methods traditionally used at the expense of colonized peoples could also be useful in the struggle for hegemony between the great powers. With the outbreak of World War I, Britain subjects Germany to a criminal naval blockade, whose significance Churchill explains in these terms: “The British blockade treats all of Germany as a besieged fort and explicitly intends to reduce the entire population to starvation, thus forcing it into capitulation: men, women and children, old and young, the injured and healthy.&amp;amp;quot; The blockade continues in force for months even after the armistice, and once again it is Churchill who explains the need for the prolonged recourse to that “weapon of hunger and even starvation, that above all else impacts women and children, the elderly, the weak and the poor”; the defeated must fully accept the peace terms of the victors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn630|630]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But with the threatening emergence of Soviet Russia, there’s now a different enemy. If Jefferson feared the contagion from the Haitian Revolution, Wilson is worried about containing the Bolshevik Revolution. The methods remain the same. To prevent it possibly following the example of Soviet Russia, Austria―in the words of Gramsci―faces a “brigand’s blackmail”; “Either bourgeois order or hunger!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn631|631]] In effect, some time later it is Herbert Hoover, high representative of the Wilson administration and future US president, who warns Austrian authorities that “any disturbance of public order will make impossible the delivery of food supplies and leave Vienna facing absolute hunger.&amp;amp;quot; And later it will be the same American politician who offers this summary, in which he explicitly boasts: “fear of starving to death kept the Austrian people away from revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn632|632]] As you can see, it’s Jefferson and Hoover who explicitly theorize the very “terror famine” for which Conquest denounces Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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We are in the presence of a policy that continues unabated in our time. In June of 1996, an article by the director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights highlights the terrible consequences of the “collective punishment” inflicted on the Iraqi people through the embargo: “more than 500,0000 Iraqi children” have “died of hunger or illness.&amp;amp;quot; Many others were on the brink of suffering the same fate. An unofficial magazine of the State Department, &#039;&#039;Foreign Affairs&#039;&#039;, reaches a more general conclusion: after the overthrow of “real socialism”, in a world unified under the hegemony of the US, the embargo constitutes the weapon of mass destruction par excellence; officially imposed to prevent Saddam Hussein from gaining weapons of mass destruction, the embargo on Iraq “in the years following the Cold War, has caused more deaths than all weapons of mass destruction in history” combined. Therefore, it’s as if the Arab country has endured at the same time the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the mustard gas attacks by Wilhelm II and Benito Mussolini, and still yet other examples.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn633|633]] In conclusion: the policy of “terror famine” for which Stalin is blamed is deeply embedded in the history of the West, and in the twentieth century is first put into practice against the country that emerged out of the October Revolution, and then finds its triumph after the overthrow of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Perfect Symmetries and Self-Absolution: Stalin’s Anti-Semitism? ===&lt;br /&gt;
For however sophisticated the game of analogies may be, the construction of the myth of the two twin monsters doesn’t appear to be completed quite yet. Despite the efforts to make the Ukrainian &#039;&#039;Holodomor&#039;&#039; correspond to the Jewish Holocaust, in the consciousness of our time the name Auschwitz causes an entirely unique horror. Maybe the association of Stalin to Hitler could be considered definitive if the former was affected by the madness that led to the Judeocide carried out by the latter.&lt;br /&gt;
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Khrushchev recalls that, towards the end of his life, Stalin had suspicions that the doctors who treated the country’s leaders were in fact participants in an imperialist conspiracy that aimed at decapitating the Soviet Union. The &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; doesn’t mention it, but there was no small number of Jews among the doctors under suspicion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn634|634]] And from there one can begin adding some depth to the portrait of the Soviet monster with a new and decisive detail: “the deep antisemitism of Stalin and his followers”, Medvedev declares, “was not a secret to anyone.&amp;amp;quot; On the “official antisemitism of the Soviet State”, Hobsbawm specifies, “there are undeniable vestiges since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948.&amp;amp;quot; The American historian on ethnic cleansing and racial hatred that we’ve already encountered goes a bit further back: “By the end of the war, Stalin had shared many aspects of Hitler’s antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot; Furet goes even further: “Since the start of Hitlerism, Stalin never showed the most minimal compassion for the Jews.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn635|635]] Naturally, Conquest is the most radical of them all: “always latent in Stalin’s spirit”, the antisemitism began to show in full force “starting from 1942-1943” till becoming “generalized” in 1948.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn636|636]] It’s at this point that the construction of the myth of the two twin monsters can be considered completed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Before analyzing the extreme fragility of that construction, it ought to be noted that it’s simultaneously useful in repressing the West’s serious responsibility in the tragedy that the Jews suffer in the twentieth century. It’s a tragedy with three acts and a prologue. In 1911 Chamberlain’s book (&#039;&#039;The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century&#039;&#039;) is translated into English, entirely dedicated to reading world history from a racial perspective (Aryan and antisemitic). Now it can be truly understood the leading role played by the Anglo-German author as the &#039;&#039;maítre à penser&#039;&#039; of Nazism. Especially exalted in tone is Goebbels who, upon seeing him sick and bedridden, offers a prayer of sorts: “Good health to you, father of our spirit. Precursor, pioneer!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn637|637]] In no less inspired terms, Chamberlain, in turn, sees in Hitler a type of savior, and not just for Germany.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn638|638]] After seizing power, and while passionately absorbed in the task of leading the war that he has unleashed, the Führer warmly recalls the encouragement that Chamberlain offered to him during his time in prison.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn639|639]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So, how was this work which was crucial to the Nazi worldview and racial ideology received in the West? In Britain, the reaction from the press is enthusiastic, beginning with &#039;&#039;The Times,&#039;&#039; which endlessly applauds the masterpiece and praises it as “one of the rare books that has some importance.&amp;amp;quot; On the other side of the Atlantic, the review by an authoritative statesman like Theodore Roosevelt is overwhelmingly positive.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn640|640]] On the opposing side, it’s Kautsky who expresses his full disdain for Chamberlain and other “racial theorists”; at that time (before the start of the war) Kautsky is venerated as a maestro to the workers movement and the socialist movement as a whole, including by Stalin. The later in 1907 defines the German author as a “distinguished theorist of social democracy”, due in part to his contribution to the analysis and the denunciation of antisemitism and the “pogroms against Jews” in Tsarist Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn641|641]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s now turn to the first act of the tragedy. It unfolds in pre-revolutionary Russia, an ally of the Entente during World War I. Discriminated against and oppressed, the Jews are suspected of sympathizing with the enemy and the German invader. The Russian general-staff warns of their espionage activities. Some are kept as hostages and threatened with execution should the “Jewish community” show a lack of patriotic loyalty; alleged spies are executed.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn642|642]] That’s not all. At the start of 1915, in the areas attacked by the German army, a mass deportation is ordered. A representative in the Duma describes the details of the operation as follows: in Radom, at 11pm,&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;the population is informed that it must leave the city, under the threat that anyone found by dawn will be hanged [...]. Due to the lack of means of transportation, the elderly and the disabled must be carried out by hand. Police and soldiers treat the Jews as criminals. In one case, a train was completely sealed shut, and when it&#039;s finally reopened, most of those inside were dying. Of the half a million Jews subjected to deportation measures, one hundred thousand didn’t survive.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn643|643]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The October Revolution breaks out in the wake of the struggle against the war and the horrors that accompany it. It’s inspired by Marx and Engels, who had written in the middle of the nineteenth century: “the times of superstition have passed, when revolution was blamed on the subversion of a handful of agitators.&amp;amp;quot; Unfortunately, it’s a prediction that was catastrophically mistaken. The rise to power in Russia of a movement that’s inspired by “Marx, the Jew”, and has a strong Jewish presence in its leadership, inaugurates the age in which the conspiracy theory celebrates its triumph. In a Russia torn apart by civil war, pogroms and massacres against Jews―considered to be those controlling Bolshevism―are the order of the day. The new Soviet power is committed to stopping this horror: tough new laws are issued and Lenin demands the elimination “of hostility against Jews and the hatred of other nations” during a speech that’s recorded so that it can reach millions of illiterate people.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn644|644]] Britain, France, and the United States remained on the side of the Whites, and at times they actively participated in the bloody antisemitic agitation. In the summer of 1918, the British forces that land in Northern Russia distributed antisemitic flyers by air on a massive scale.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn645|645]] Some months later pogroms of a tremendous dimension take place in which around seventy-thousand Jews lost their lives. “They say that the allies, then concentrated on their invasion of Russia, had secretly supported the pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn646|646]] It’s a preview, authoritative historians observe, to the “crimes of Nazism” and the “extermination during World War II”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn647|647]] and it’s a preview that sees active British participation, leading the anti-Bolshevik crusade at that time.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at the third act. Despite Western aid, the Whites are defeated by the Bolsheviks and emigrate to the West, bringing with them the denunciation of the October Revolution as a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy, and &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039; confirm that understanding beyond any doubt.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of this doesn’t come without consequences. In England, the “official publishers of His Majesty” print the English edition of &#039;&#039;The Protocols&#039;&#039;, soon after cited by &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039; as the proof of a secret plot that was threatening the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn648|648]] It then develops into a campaign to which Winston Churchill is no stranger, who takes part in denouncing the role of Judaism not only in Russia, but in the whole cycle of subversion that, starting in the eighteenth century, had shaken the West:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This movement among Jews is not new. It has grown since the days of Spartakus Weishaupt [the Bavarian Illuminati] until the days of Karl Marx, and later Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany) and Emma Goldman (United States), this world conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the transformation of society into one based on restricted development, on a wicked jealousy and on an impossible equality. As has been wisely demonstrated by a contemporary author, Mr. Webster, [this movement] had a leading role in the tragedy of the French Revolution. It constituted the motor behind all subversive tendencies in the nineteenth century, and now that band of extraordinary personalities, coming from out of the slums of the major European and American cities, have grabbed the Russian people by the neck, and in practice, have become the undeniable masters of a powerful state.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn649|649]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As late as 1937, while expressing a positive opinion on Hitler, Churchill incessantly stresses the Jewish origins of a central leader of Bolshevik Russia, that is, “Trotsky, also known as Lev Bronstein.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, “he had always been a Jew. Nothing could wipe out that characteristic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn650|650]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side of the Atlantic, It’s Henry Ford who encourages the promotion of &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;. Ford declares: “The Russian Revolution has a racial origin, not a political one”, and it, in making use of humanitarian and socialist slogans, in reality expresses a “racial aspiration for world domination.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn651|651]] Aside from the American auto-industry tycoon, it’s the champions of white supremacy who stands out the most for their denunciation of the hidden Jewish control of the revolutionary movement that’s―after having overthrown the Tsarist regime―undermining the foundations of the West. Madison Grant warns of the “Semitic leadership” over “Bolshevism”, and Lothrop Stoddard classifies the “Bolshevik regime of Soviet Russia” as “largely Jewish.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn652|652]] Stoddard becomes the author of reference to two American presidents. (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 3).&lt;br /&gt;
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In this climate, voices arise in North American republic that call for radical measures with the aim of confronting “Jewish Imperialism, and its ultimate objective of establishing Jewish domination over the world.&amp;amp;quot; A hard fate―even more threatening voices rage―awaits the people responsible for this vile project: they suggest “massacres of Jews [...] such that were considered unthinkable until now”, therefore, “of an unprecedented scale in modern times.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn653|653]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Reading these recurring convictions in Churchill, Ford, and the other American authors cited above, we are led to think of the antisemitic agitation carried in even more inflammatory tones by the Nazis. From the anti-Bolshevik emigration they find not only ideas, but also the financial means, as well as an important number of militants and personnel[[footnotes.xhtml#fn654|654]] One only has to think of Rosenberg, one of the major figures who defines the October Revolution as a Jewish conspiracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, from its start, the tragedy of the Jewish people in the twentieth century has the active participation of the liberal West and both pre-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary Russia. All of that is wiped out by the accusation of antisemitism directed at the person who had for more time than any other led the country that emerged from the October Revolution, or the “Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Antisemitism and Colonial Racism: The Churchill-Stalin Polemic ===&lt;br /&gt;
The black legend that we are analyzing also allows them to hide the colonial racism and the racism of colonial origin that still raged in the West during the twentieth century. In regards to that, the significance of the historic rupture represented by Lenin is summarized in these terms by Stalin:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Before, the colonial question was usually limited to a restricted group of problems that had to do with “civilized” nations: the Irish, Hungarians, Polish, Finnish, Serbs, and some other European nationalities. That was the group of peoples, deprived of equal rights, whose fate interested the heroes of the Second International. Dozens and hundreds of millions of men belonging to the peoples of Asia and Africa, who suffered national oppression in its most brutal and ferocious forms, were generally not taken into consideration. It was decided not to put whites and blacks on the same level, “civilized” and “uncivilized” [...]. Leninism has exposed this scandalous injustice; he toppled the wall that separated whites and blacks, Europeans and Asians, “civilized” and “uncivilized” slaves of imperialism, in that way linking the national question with the colonial question.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn655|655]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is in 1924. These are in years in which an American author, Stoddard, enjoys great success on both sides of the Atlantic in denouncing the mortal threat to the West and the white race represented by the agitation of the colonial peoples (stimulated and encouraged by Bolsheviks), or the “growing tide of colored peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn656|656]] This tendency celebrating white supremacy continues to be vibrant in the following decades.&lt;br /&gt;
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While Stalin also condemns the process of racialization put in place by the West at the expense of the peoples of Asia, it’s interesting to analyze the ideology that manifests itself in the United States during the war against Japan. The press and the ever present propaganda warns against the “racial threat”: we are facing “a holy war, a racial war”, “an unending war between Eastern and Western ideas.&amp;amp;quot; There’s a recurring dehumanization of the enemy, reduced to subhumans or actual animals. And it&#039;s an ideology with which the leadership in the Roosevelt administration is not unfamiliar.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn657|657]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, colonial racism in some ways continues to manifest itself in the capitals of the West even after the collapse of the Empire of the Rising Sun and the Third Reich. In Fulton, in March of 1946, Churchill inaugurates the propaganda campaign for the Cold War, condemning not only an “Iron Curtain” and the “totalitarian control” imposed by the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe, but also celebrating, in opposition to all that, the “English speaking peoples” and the “English speaking world” as the champions of freedom and “Christian Civilization” that will lead the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn658|658]] It’s understandable then the angry response from Stalin: the British statesman is accused of having formulated a “racial theory” no different to the one embraced by Hitler; “only English speaking nations are authentic nations, called upon to decide the destiny of the whole world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn659|659]] The simplifications of the Cold War are evident in that response. However, there’s no lack of similarities between the celebration of the English speaking peoples and Aryan mythology. From a linguistic community it’s implied the unity of the race that speaks the language; and as evidence for the excellence of that race, they cite the cultural products of the Aryan languages or the English language. In his correspondence with Eisenhower, the language used by Churchill is even more unsettling: the “English speaking world” is synonymous with the “white English-speaking people.&amp;amp;quot; Its “unity” is absolutely necessary.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn660|660]] The “differences between the races closely bound to Europe” must be liquidated once and for all, differences which have caused two world wars.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn661|661]] The threat arising from the colonial world and outside the West can be confronted only in that way. Thus, it’s understood the appeal made in 1953 by Churchill, primarily to the United States: It’s necessary to support Britain in its conflict with Egypt “with the aim of preventing a massacre of white people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn662|662]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only Arabs who are alien to the white race. The communist world, that encourages the revolt of the colonial peoples against the white man, is the expression of “an aggressive &#039;&#039;semi-Asiatic&#039;&#039; totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn663|663]] Clearly, the Cold War tends to be interpreted as a clash between the West, “Christian civilization”, and the white race―led by the “English speaking world” or by the “white English-speaking people”―on the one hand, and the barbarians of the colonial and communist world on the other. In this context, the celebration of both the “British Empire” as well as the “British race” fits perfectly.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn664|664]] And given that there will be no reference to the fact that the extermination of the Jews occurred in the heart of the West and the white world, and was perpetuated by one of the “races most closely related to Europe”, so nothing will be said of the continued oppression suffered by African Americans in the United States of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Eisenhower, the celebration of the “Western world” and ”Western morality”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn665|665]] also tends to assume racial connotations at times. Speaking with Hoover and Dulles in July of 1956, he observes that, with the nationalization of the Suez canal, Nasser aims to “topple the white man.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn666|666]] Still fresh is the memory of the Korean War, carried out by Washington―an American historian recognizes―with a disdainful attitude toward “an inferior nation” (the Chinese).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn667|667]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Trotsky and the Accusation of Anti-Semitism against Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s return, however, to the accusation of antisemitism made against Stalin. Endorsed by no small number of historians, it would seem irrefutable. Yet, despite the incontestable tone, the condemnations are difficult to square with one another, given they proceed from different and opposing reconstructions of the crimes whose origin is increasingly located further back in time: 1948, 1945, 1933, or in the years before the October Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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In attempting to orient ourselves, let’s ask a different question, that in any case is a preliminary one: when was the first time Stalin was accused or suspected of antisemitism? In that case, rather than Khrushchev, we must go back to Trotsky who, in 1937, together with the “Betrayal of the Revolution”, denounces the reemergence of the barbarism of antisemitism in the Soviet Union itself: “Until this point of history, there’s been no example of a reaction that has followed a revolutionary advance that’s not been accompanied by the most foul and chauvinistic passions, including antisemitism!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn668|668]] Rather than an empirical investigation, we are dealing with a syllogism constructed a priori: reaction, whose result is necessarily antisemitism, has unfortunately triumphed in the country ruled by Stalin, so therefore… In liquidating the Bolshevik conquests, Thermidor was reopening the doors to the horrors of the old regime: together with religious superstition, the cult to private property, inheritance, and the family; unavoidable was the reappearance of animosity between nations, and especially the hatred of Jews. It’s not by chance that this denunciation is found in a work that in its very title directly and tightly links &#039;&#039;Thermidor and Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The October Revolution put an end to the outcast status of Jews. But that doesn’t in any way mean that it has forever wiped out antisemitism. The long and continuous struggle against religion doesn’t prevent thousands and thousands of the faithful from filling the churches, mosques, and synagogues. The same situation dominates the field of national prejudices. Legislation alone doesn’t change men. Their thoughts, their sentiments, their visions depend on tradition, the material conditions of life, their cultural level, etc. The Soviet regime isn’t yet twenty years old. Half the population, the oldest, were education under Tsarism. The other half, the youngest, inherited much from the older half. Nevertheless, these general and historical conditions ought to allow each thinking man to recognize this fact: despite the exemplary legislation of the October Revolution, it’s impossible that national and chauvinistic prejudices, especially antisemitism, have not stubbornly survived among the most backward segments of the population.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn669|669]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Arguing in that way, Trotsky shifted his attention from the state to civil society, from the subjective level to the objective level, from the momentary character of political action to the long duration of historical processes. By definition, the weight of a secular tradition couldn’t miraculously disappear in the segments of the population that had not yet fully adopted modern and revolutionary culture. But what sense was there, then, in accusing a regime or leadership group, who had in no way altered the “exemplary legislation” approved by the Bolsheviks, and who, in committing to a colossal process of industrialization, expanding literacy and access to culture, had continuously restricted the social and geographic areas in which “national and chauvinistic prejudices, particularly antisemitism”, were deeply rooted? Was it not Trotsky himself who spoke of the unprecedented speed with which the USSR developed the economy, industry, urbanization and culture, and verified the rise of a “new Soviet patriotism”, a sentiment “certainly deep, sincere and dynamic”, shared by the various nationalities previously oppressed or incited against one another? (&#039;&#039;Supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 4, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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In the same year that Trotsky publishes his work on &#039;&#039;Thermidor and Antisemitism&#039;&#039;, a “travel report” was published in Moscow, written by a German writer who was fleeing the Third Reich because he was Jewish. The picture that he draws is eloquent in itself: finally resolved was “the old and apparently unsolvable Jewish question”, “there&#039;s a moving consensus in support for the new State among the Jews I&#039;ve met..&amp;amp;quot; And yet more: “Like all national languages, Yiddish is lovingly cared for in the Union. There’s schools and newspapers in that language, there’s literature, and congresses are held for the supervision of Yiddish, and the performances in this language enjoy the highest consideration.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn670|670]] Even more significant is the reaction of the American Jewish community. An authoritative representative responds to Trotsky as follows: “If his other accusations are as baseless as his complaint against antisemitism, then he has absolutely nothing to say.&amp;amp;quot; Another leader states: “In relation to antisemitism, we are used to seeing in the Soviet Union our only glimmer of light [...]. Therefore, it’s unforgivable that Trotsky launches such baseless accusations against Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn671|671]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There&#039;s evident disappointment and unease in this reaction to that ridiculous effort by Trotsky, understood as an attempt to involve the international Jewish community in the power struggle that was underway in the CPSU. While in Germany the denunciation of the “Judeo-Bolshevism” that ravaged the Soviet Union became more frantic than ever, and the process that would lead to the “final solution” was quickly advancing, a strange campaign of insinuations was launched against the country that, as we shall see, more courageously than any other, classified Hitler’s antisemitism as “cannibalistic”; against the country that very often inspired those who in German territory resisted the wave of hatred against the Jews. Victor Klemperer emotionally described the insults and humiliations that wearing the Star of David meant. And yet:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A porter who has grown fond of me since the first two relocations [...] suddenly stands in front of me on Freiberger street, puts his arms around me and whispers, but in a way so that they can even hear him on the other side of the street: “so professor, don’t let them walk over you! Soon those damn Nazis will be finished!”&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jewish philologist with affectionate irony adds that those who defied the regime in such a way “were good people whose membership in the German Communist Party could be smelled from a mile away.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn672|672]] They were members or sympathizers of a party that, at the international level, had Stalin as their essential point of reference.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, if we move on from Germany to the United States, we see that communists are sometimes branded as (and persecuted both by state authorities as well as by civil society) Jews, who take advantage of the ignorance of blacks to turn them against the regime of white supremacy, tarnishing the idea of racial hierarchy and purity, and promoting the madness of equality and racial intermixing.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn673|673]] Therefore, on the other side of the Atlantic as well, anti-communism is fused with antisemitism (in addition to colonial racism), and that relation is even closer due the fact that in the (“Stalinist”) Communist Party of the United States there’s a strong Jewish presence.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn674|674]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet, aside from disappointment and annoyance, in the American Jewish community’s reaction there’s also an element of profound concern. To understand it, let’s see how Trotsky’s line of argument develops:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;More than any other regime in the world, the Soviet regime needs a high number of state employees. The state employees come from the educated urban population. Naturally, Jews represent a very large percentage of the bureaucracy, especially at the lower and middle levels [...]. Now with this reflection as starting point, one must reach the conclusion that the hatred against the bureaucracy will have an antisemitic tone, at least where Jews constitute a significant percentage of the population and clearly stand out from the rural surroundings. In 1923, at the Bolshevik Party Conference, it was proposed that employees be obligated to speak and write the language of the local population where they worked. How many ironic observations came, especially from the Jewish intelligentsia, who spoke Russian and didn’t want to learn the Ukrainian language! Of course, on this aspect, the situation improved considerably. But the national composition of the bureaucracy has barely changed, and―what is immeasurably more important―the antagonism between the people and the bureaucracy has grown enormously in the last ten or twelve years.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn675|675]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As can be seen, he calls for the struggle against the bureaucracy, and at the same time stresses that Jewish people are widely represented in it, and who are often characterized by arrogance in relation to the language and culture of the people they govern. Of course, the analysis and the denunciation operate at both the political and social level; it remains clear that they, at least from the point of view of the Jewish community, run the risk of evoking and revitalizing the specter of antisemitism that they sought to exorcise.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin and the Condemnation of Tsarist and Nazi Anti-Semitism ===&lt;br /&gt;
The accusation of antisemitism directed at Stalin is all the more unique for the fact that he is committed to denouncing that scourge during practically his entire political evolution. As early as 1901, when he is still a young twenty year old Georgian revolutionary, we see him, in one of his very first written works, indicate that the struggle against the oppression of “nationalities and religious confessions” in Russia is among the most important tasks of the “social democratic party.&amp;amp;quot; Particularly targeted were “the Jews, continually persecuted and insulted, deprived of those miserable rights that other Russian subjects enjoyed: the right to move freely, the right to attend school, the right to occupy public job positions, etc.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn676|676]] A few years after the outbreak of the 1905 revolution, he writes: the Tsarist regime reacts by encouraging or unleashing pogroms. Stalin doesn’t waste any time in calling for the struggle against a policy that seeks to reinforce the autocracy “with the blood and corpses of its citizens.&amp;amp;quot; The conclusion is clear: “The only way to eradicate the pogroms is through the destruction of the Tsarist autocracy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn677|677]] As one can see, the anti-Jewish persecution is one of the most important accusations made in the charges directed at the old regime, which the revolution is called upon to overthrow.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theme developed in the following years. On the eve of the First World War, Tsarist Russia’s “semi-Asiatic” character is demonstrated by the particularly vile persecution unleashed against the Jews; unfortunately, the recourse to pogroms is favored by the “general inclination to antisemitism by the common people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn678|678]] The collapse of Tsarist rule and the old “landed aristocracy”―Stalin later observes―between February and October of 1917, finally allows the elimination of a program of “national oppression” that “could assume, and effectively assumed, the most monstrous forms of massacres and pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn679|679]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Defeated in Russia, antisemitism becomes an ever more frightening threat in Germany. In raising the alarm, Stalin doesn’t wait for Hitler’s rise to power: in a declaration made on January 12th, 1931, to the American &#039;&#039;Jewish Telegraph Agency&#039;&#039;, he classifies “racial chauvinism” and antisemitism as a type of “cannibalism”, and the return to “the jungle”; it’s a stance that is republished in Russia, in Pravda on November 30th, 1936, at a time when it was a matter of warning governments and world opinion against the terrible threat that loomed over Europe and the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn680|680]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In that same context, one can put the stance taken by Kirov (whose wife is of Jewish origin) soon after Hitler’s rise to power: he denounces “German fascism, with its ideology of pogroms, its antisemitism, its vision of superior and inferior races”, as the successor to the Russian Black Hundreds.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn681|681]] That last observation is particularly significant. By now there’s a climate of war, the approaching clash increasingly led Soviet leaders to appeal to the history of the Russian people and its struggle against aggressors and invaders. It’s a tendency that is obviously strengthened with the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. However, on November 6th of 1941, Stalin doesn’t just put the emphasis on the “pogromist and reactionary nature” of Nazi Germany; he goes on to characterize the enemy then pressing at the gates of Moscow as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In its essence, Hitler’s regime is a copy of that reactionary regime that existed under Tsarism. It’s well known that the Nazis trampled on the rights of workers, the rights of intellectuals, and the rights of peoples, just as the Tsarist regime trampled over them, and that it unleashed medieval pogroms against the Jews, just as the Tsarist regime unleashed them.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Nazi party is a party of the enemies of democratic freedoms, a party of medieval reaction and the most sinister pogroms.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn682|682]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In other words, although he is launching an impassioned appeal for national unity against the invaders in the Great Patriotic War, just like Kirov, Stalin classifies the Nazi regime as the successor, in some essential aspects, to the Tsarism that was toppled by the October Revolution. That attitude deserves all the more attention, especially when compared to the position taken by the United States president and by his advisors, who “hesitated in publicly criticizing the German dictator’s antisemitic policies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn683|683]] Moreover, in 1922, F. D. Roosevelt himself declared his support for a reduction in Jewish attendance at Harvard and in American universities in general.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn684|684]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A statesman like Churchill would be even less able to make a public condemnation of the Third Reich’s persecution of Jews, as we saw him as late as 1937 stress the nefarious role of Judaism in Bolshevik agitation. In that same year the English statesman writes an article (that remained unpublished) that considers the Jews at least partly responsible for the hostility directed at them.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn685|685]] Stalin’s position is the complete opposite; the Nazis continued to be classified, in the speech from November 6th of 1943, as the “champions of pogroms.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn686|686]] But especially significant is the speech delivered in the following year, again on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. In this case, the usual denunciation of the “fascist champions of pogroms”, from whose barbarity the Soviet people had the credit of saving “European civilization”, is inserted in a more general context that stresses the centrality of “racial theory” and “racial hatred” in the doctrine and practices of Nazism, that led to a “cannibalistic program.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn687|687]] The speech at the end of 1944, on the eve of the collapse of the Third Reich, again took up the theme already present in the interview given to the &#039;&#039;Jewish Telegraph Agency&#039;&#039; two years before Hitler’s rise to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitler in turn, beginning with the attack on the Soviet Union, not only more obsessively takes up the slogan against the Judeo-Bolshevik threat, but it appears as if he seeks to directly respond to the public denouncement, coming from Moscow, of the “pogromist and reactionary nature” of the Third Reich. There’s Stalin speech, which we’ve already encountered, from November 6th of 1941, the anniversary of the October Revolution; and two days later, in Munich, at an equally solemn occasion for the Nazi regime (the commemoration of the coup attempt of 1923), Hitler makes an equally public denunciation of the Soviet Union:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The man that has, for the time being, become head of that state is nothing more than an instrument in the hands of the all powerful Jews; while Stalin stands on stage before the curtain, behind him are Kaganovich and that expansive network of Jews who control that enormous empire.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn688|688]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theory that’s repeated at a tableside conversation some time later: “The Jews are behind Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn689|689]] We are faced with what is a constant theme in Nazi propaganda: by 1938 Goebbels had praised a book &#039;&#039;(Juden hinter Stalin [the Jews behind Stalin]&#039;&#039;), that aimed at revealing the infamy of Judaism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn690|690]] On that basis, the war for the enslavement of the Soviet Union is, at the same time, the war for the annihilation of the Jews. The infamous &#039;&#039;Kommissarbefehl&#039;&#039;, that orders the immediate elimination of political commissars of the Red Army and the cadre of the party and the communist state, would inevitably strike with particular cruelty against the ethnic group suspected of providing the bulk of the cadre and commissars. In his speech from November 8th, 1941, Hitler speaks of power in the Soviet Union as “an enormous organization of Jewish commissars.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn691|691]] That is also the conviction of the German soldiers who, on the front, speak of the “Jewish and Bolshevik cruelty”, and constantly refer to the “cursed Jews” and the “damned Bolsheviks.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, the “struggle against Bolshevism” is simultaneously the “struggle against Judaism”; it’s a matter of annihilating once and for all “the Jewish regime in Russia”, “the base for Judeo-Bolshevik agitators determined to make the world ‘happy’.&amp;amp;quot; Considered carefully, it’s a country where “internal leadership of all institutions” is in the hands of Jews and where the people are “under the whip of Judaism.&amp;amp;quot; The so-called “Soviet paradise” is, in reality, “a paradise for the Jews”, it’s a “Jewish system”, and, to be precise, it’s “the most satanic and criminal system of all time.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn692|692]] It’s very understandable, then, that the ethnic group especially targeted by the Third Reich’s genocidal fury had distinguished itself in the fight against their tormentors: “During the war, in relation to its population, Jews earned more medals than any other Soviet nationality.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn693|693]] But is that solemn and official recognition compatible with the theory of Stalin’s antisemitism?&lt;br /&gt;
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We already saw the American Jewish community take a clear stance against this legend in 1937. Five years later, Arendt goes further: she attributed to the Soviet Union the merit of having “simply eliminated antisemitism” through “a just and very modern solution to the national question.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn694|694]] This positive evaluation is even more significant for the fact that it’s precisely this exemplary resolution of the Jewish and national question in the country governed by Stalin which is cited by Arendt to refute the thesis by Jewish publications that tend to agitate against the specter of an internal antisemitism. Three years later, the eminent Jewish thinker argues that it’s to the Soviet Union’s merit that it knew how to “organize diverse populations [including the Jewish one] on the basis of national equality.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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At least until 1945, there doesn’t appear to be traces of antisemitism in the Soviet Union, in a country that, in the eyes of Hitler―especially after Operation Barbarossa―has proven itself to be “the greatest servant of Judaism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn695|695]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin and the Support to the Foundation and Consolidation of Israel ===&lt;br /&gt;
If the assertive claim by Furet―according to which Stalin since 1933 had shown indifference with respect to the tragedy of the Jews, or an antisemitism in its most explicit form―clearly lacks any basis, will the timeline proposed by an American historian previously cited, who identifies that madness in Stalin following the Second World War, prove to be more convincing? We’ve already encountered the irritated reaction by the American Jewish community to the accusation of antisemitism directed at Stalin by Trotsky in 1937. Eight years later and the situation still hadn’t changed. Rather, there are prominent social circles and figures in the American military hierarchy who are a cause for concern. Take the example of general George S. Patton. He dreams of an immediate war against the Soviets: “We will have to fight them sooner or later [...]. Why not now while our army is still intact and while we can push all those damn Russians all the way back to Moscow in three months? We could easily do it with the German troops that we have, just arm them and take them with us. They hate those bastards.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn696|696]] Unfortunately, according to the American general, it’s the Jews who oppose this project. Full of resentment toward Germany, they harbor sympathy for the USSR: the “evident Semitic influence in the press” aims “to promote communism.&amp;amp;quot; There clearly emerges a line of continuity with the Nazi understanding of communism as a subversive Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy: the enemies continue to be the communists, the Soviets and the Jews, the latter being “lower than animals.&amp;amp;quot; After particularly imprudent statements, general Patton was relieved of his command, but he was not alone in that line of thinking.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn697|697]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While being accused of having links to Judaism, the Soviet Union does, in fact, follow a largely sympathetic policy in relation to the people that survived a horrible persecution. In reconstructing this chapter in history, I will mostly use one book, despite it being dedicated in denouncing the “antisemitism” of the socialist camp led by the USSR. We start in Hungary. The structure of the communist regime that was established following the arrival of the Red Army is made up of “cadres who had lived for some time in Moscow, nearly all of them Jews.&amp;amp;quot; The fact of the matter is that “Stalin had no other choice, as he only trusted” them. “When the first elections to the central committee are held, a third of its members are Jews.&amp;amp;quot; The highest leadership also proves to be from the same ethnic background, starting with Rákosi, “the first Jewish king of Hungary.&amp;amp;quot; The author of that flattering description is one of Stalin’s closest collaborators, namely Beria (probably of Jewish background as well).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn698|698]] The situation in the rest of the socialist camp is not very different. We will limit ourselves to another pair of examples. In Poland, the “presence of Jews in the communist ranks, especially at the highest levels of the regime”, was significant. And that’s not all. “The branch of communist authority in which the appearance of Jews was greatest is noteworthy: the security apparatus.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn699|699]] In Czechoslovakia, it’s not only Jews, but Zionists themselves who are “favored by the post-war government” and are present within it.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn700|700]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar consideration could be made for Germany: “In the Russian zone, Jews usually receive the best positions.&amp;amp;quot; Moreover, the man who leads cultural activity in the Soviet Zone is a brilliant art historian, colonel Alexander Dymshitz, also of Jewish origin. And the presence of the Jewish-German intelligentsia in Gotha is easily noticed in the cultural rebirth that begins to emerge amid the grief and ruins.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn701|701]] The situation certainly doesn’t change with the foundation of the German Democratic Republic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In communist Germany, officially born on October 7th of 1949, Jews initially enjoy favorable treatment, if not privileged treatment. As victims of persecution they have a right to special pensions for the elderly and for the sick or disabled; and the constitution guarantees them religious freedom. Peter Kirchner explains: “Pensions for Jews were much higher than for others. It had varied between 1,400 and 1,700 marks, when the average wasn’t more than 350” [...]. Jews therefore felt at ease with the policies of the new communist Germany in relation to them, especially because they were widely represented in its institutions. In the elections of 1950, fifteen Jews were elected to parliament in the lists of nearly all the parties, not counting the communist party. In addition, the minister of propaganda and information, Gerhart Eisler, the director of state information radio, Leo Bauer, the director of the communist paper “Neues Deutschland”, Rudolf Herrnstadt, and the person in charge of a branch of the health ministry, Leo Mandel, were all Jews.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn702|702]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s also for that reason that the Soviet Union enjoys great sympathy among “Zionists all over the world.&amp;amp;quot; They go as far as “admiring everything that is Russian.&amp;amp;quot; It’s Arendt who observes this, and who in 1948 expresses her disappointment toward the “pro-Soviet and anti-Western orientation” of the Zionist movement, inclined to condemn Great Britain as “antisemitic”, and the United States as “imperialist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn703|703]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attitude that’s being condemned here is very understandable. In Nuremberg, it was primarily the Soviet representatives in the prosecution who called attention to the horrors of the Judeocide and called attention to it with rhetorical emphasis, formulating a solidly intentionalist theory: “The fascist conspirators planned the extermination of the Jewish people throughout the world, to the last man, and they put it in action during the entire period of their plot, from 1933 onward” (in reality, the “final solution” begins to take form only with the deterioration of Operation Barbarossa). One of the most dramatic moments of the trial was the testimony, again promoted by the Soviet representatives in the prosecution, by four Jews, among whom one mother expressed herself as follows: “In the name of all the mothers of Europe who became mothers in the concentration camps, I ask German mothers: ‘where are our children now?’”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn704|704]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, these are the years in which the USSR strongly supports Zionism and the creation of Israel. Stalin plays a frontline role, and perhaps even a decisive role. Without him “the emergence of the Jewish state in Palestine would have been difficult”―a Russian historian goes as far as saying, using documents recently made public in his country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn705|705]] In any case, as another author (this time a Western one) observes, the speech in May of 1948 before the UN by the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Andrei A. Gromyko, appears “like something out of a Zionist propaganda manual”: the foundation of Israel is necessary for the fact that “in the territories occupied by the Nazis, the Jews suffered an almost complete annihilation”, while “no state of Western Europe was able to provide adequate assistance to the Jewish people in defense of their rights and their very existence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn706|706]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, in supporting Zionism, Stalin at times clashes with Great Britain. The latter makes use of the military forces of the former Republic of Salò and the Tenth Assault Vehicle Flotilla to bomb “a ship (perhaps it had been two ships) that, after the end of military operations, transported weapons from Yugoslavia to the Jews in Palestine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn707|707]] At this time, it’s the government in London that is considered to be “the principal enemy of the Jews”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn708|708]] the suspicion and accusation of antisemitism certainly weren’t thrust upon the Soviet Union, committed to militarily and diplomatically supporting the foundation of the State of Israel, but upon Great Britain, which in its effort to obstruct those plans, doesn’t hesitate to use political and military circles that, even within the Republic of Salò, had played an important role in the “final solution”!&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet a more general consideration can be made. After the end of the war, Stalin pursues “a fundamentally pro-Jewish policy on Palestine.&amp;amp;quot; Political and geopolitical calculations had, of course, contributed to pushing it: the desire to undermine British positions in the Middle East (an objective also pursued by Truman, whose support to the foundation of the State of Israel is no coincidence) and to gain the support or at least the sympathy of the American and European Jewish communities during the Cold War; with the added hope that the new state, founded with the decisive contribution of immigration coming from Eastern Europe and often of a left political orientation, would take a pro-Soviet attitude. It’s true that the military aid in 1945 offered to the Zionist movement through Yugoslavia was not an isolated gesture. Three years later, this time using the collaboration of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union supplied new arms to Israel, and in violating the UN Security Council Resolution of March 29th of 1948, it even organizes the influx of young Jews from Eastern Europe who reinforce the army of the Jewish State in the war with the neighboring Arab countries. Thanks as well to Moscow, in action is what was defined as the “Prague-Jerusalem axis.&amp;amp;quot; Indeed, “the weapons wielded by the soldiers of the newly born State of Israel to fight their war of independence are made in Czechoslovakia [...]. Precisely when other governments refuse to sell weapons to the Jewish State, Czechoslovakia decided to continue selling them openly, even at preferential rates [...]. Thus in Czechoslovakian territory the Israeli air force was founded: the training of paratroopers was organized there.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn709|709]] A true air-bridge is established, which supplies the Zionist army with weapons, instructors and even volunteers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn710|710]] In October of the same year, the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, in Paris at the time, happily tells prime minister Ben Gurion that the Soviet delegates at the UN conference on the question of Palestine had behaved like Israel’s lawyers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn711|711]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At the very least, it can be said that Stalin’s Soviet Union contributed in a decisive way to the foundation and consolidation of the Jewish State. There are also some interesting aspects with respect to relations with Judaism and Jewish culture in general. In the middle of what was called the “campaign against antisemitism”, a “residential suburb of Moscow” took on the name “New Jerusalem.&amp;amp;quot; There Ilya Ehrenburg has his dacha; Ehrenburg is a Jewish intellectual who plays a grand and leading cultural and political role in the Soviet Union at that time, and who, not by chance, is offered the Stalin prize, a recognition achieved by other Jewish writers as well, and by “some Jewish musicians of international fame.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn712|712]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So, what sense is there to speak of “antisemitism” with regard to Stalin? The support given by him to the foundation and consolidation of the Jewish State is at the same time a contribution given to the &#039;&#039;Nakbah&#039;&#039;, that is the national “catastrophe” for the Palestinian people, who for decades continue to languish in refugee camps and in the territories subjected to a ruthless military occupation and a rampant process of colonization. If, for the purposes of being absurd, Stalin must be accused of “antisemitism”, he should be accused of “antisemitism” toward Arabs. With regard to that, it’s necessary to specify that the Soviet Union’s preference was for “a multi-national and independent state that respected the interests of both Jews as well as Arabs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn713|713]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Cold War Turning Point and the Blackmail of the Rosenbergs ===&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of Stalin’s death, Kerensky, at that time in the United States, in a conversation with an Israeli historian, points out that the accusation of antisemitism directed at the Soviet Union in those years is just an invention of the Cold War.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn714|714]] Yes, this is the turning point, and to understand it, we ought to return to the atmosphere of those years. It&#039;s a Cold War that can turn into a nuclear holocaust at any moment, and that knows no limits in the ideological sphere. From both sides they exclaim that the other side is plagued by antisemitism. The trial and death sentences in the United States of the Rosenbergs, communists and Jews accused of treason and espionage in service to Moscow, happen almost simultaneously to the trials and death sentences that in the socialist camp strike against “Zionist” figures accused of treason and espionage in service to Tel Aviv and Washington. Suspected of disloyalty and called upon to provide clear proof of patriotism, in both cases the Jewish community is subjected to more or less explicit pressure and blackmail.&lt;br /&gt;
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The climate of suspicion was no less oppressive in the United States than in the USSR. It’s not easy to imagine that time nowadays, when everyone is aware of the special relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv, but at the start of the Cold War the situation was quite different: often the “whites only” or “Caucasian only” urban centers continued to exclude Jews as well, considered just as “stupid” as blacks. As late as 1959, the Anti-Defamation League felt it necessary to denounce the harassment suffered by Jews because of the persistence of that practice.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn715|715]] Overall, “the years of the 1940s and 1950s constituted a politically traumatic era for the Jewish minority.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn716|716]] Still active were the political circles that linked Judaism and communism, that considered Jews as foreigners on American soil and collaborators with the mortal Soviet enemy and that, alongside the writings by Henry Ford, even republished &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn717|717]] Certainly after Auschwitz, that is after the revelation of the horrors that antisemitism would lead to, this could no longer continue to enjoy the same sympathy as before. Nevertheless, “the threat represented by anti-Jewish prejudice was far from disappearing. In 1953, Jews constituted the majority of the laid-off employees, or those transferred to other positions, in the radar laboratories in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn718|718]]&lt;br /&gt;
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According to the French communist leader Jacques Duclos, active in denouncing the persecution endured by the Rosenbergs in the United States, antisemitism didn’t play any role in the trials that in Czechoslovakia accurately target “Zionist traitors” in service to the war policies of Washington.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn719|719]] Dramatically opposed is the version that the enemies of the Soviet Union are determined to spread. In rejecting the accusation of antisemitism launched by Duclos at the United States, the American Jewish Committee unhesitatingly pronounces itself in favor of the execution of the Rosenbergs and opposes any degree of clemency: everyone in the United States must know that “the American Jewish ranks feel only horror at the sight” of the spies and communist agitators (whether they be gentiles or Jews);[[footnotes.xhtml#fn720|720]] it’s not by chance that among McCarthy’s collaborators are two Jews, committed not just to fighting communism, but also in demonstrating the patriotic loyalty of their community.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn721|721]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of defending the United States from the accusation of antisemitism. The FBI elaborates a plan that is turned over to a Jewish lawyer; he is entrusted with a very specific task:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Win over the confidence of the Rosenbergs in prison and try to persuade them that, in truth, the USSR is an antisemitic power with intentions of exterminating the Jews. Once dispelled of their illusions toward the Soviet Union, the Rosenbergs could take advantage of clemency in exchange for an “appeal to Jews of all countries to quit the communist movement and seek to destroy it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn722|722]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Ineffective in the case of the two communist militants who courageously faced the electric chair on June 19th, 1953, the blackmail achieves the desired result on other occasions: “in the intimidating atmosphere of the Cold War, it isn’t that surprising that some of the most respected Jewish intellectuals in the nation, including some of those previously on the left, felt obligated to seek protection or even change sides”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn723|723]] no small number of them agreed to denounce Stalin’s and the Soviet Union’s “antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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However, before this black legend takes hold, it comes across a number of difficulties. Still in 1949, we see one of the Cold War paladins, Churchill, repeatedly make a remarkable comparison between Nazism and communism: the first was less dangerous, given that it could rely “only on &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; pride and antisemitic hatred”; that’s not the case with the second, which can count on “a church of communist faithful, whose missionaries are in every country” and in every people. Therefore, on one side we have the stoking of national and racial hatred, from which there’s the hatred directed at the Jewish people; on the other side, a denunciation of universalism, although it’s instrumentally exploited by an “expansionist, imperialist” design.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn724|724]] Maybe even more significant is the speech by Adorno in 1950. In publishing his research about the “authoritarian personality”, he highlights the “correlation between antisemitism and anti-communism” and then adds: “in recent years all propaganda organs in America were dedicated to developing anti-communism in the sense of an irrational ‘terror’, and probably few people―apart from the followers of the ‘party line’―are able to resist the incessant ideological pressure.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn725|725]] At this time, far from being directed at Stalin and his followers, the accusation of antisemitism continues to target the anti-communists.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unbalanced from the start, the balance of forces between the two sides of the Cold War increasingly sees the West prevail both at the military level, as well as with respect to the ideological offensive and its multimedia firepower. Nowadays, only one of the two opposing accusations of antisemitism remains standing: the other has been lost even in memory. It must be added that, aside from Stalin, that accusation reaches his successors, starting with Khrushchev, who is also said to have shown signs―it’s not really known why―of “evident antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn726|726]] Nevertheless:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In 1973 Jews, who constituted 0.9% of the Soviet population, represented 1.9% of all university students in the country, 6.1% of all scientific personnel, and 8.8% of all scientists.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn727|727]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, a British historian who’s also determined to label Stalin as antisemitic, starting from at least the 1930s, not only recognized that the people frequented by the Soviet leader―and even “many” of his “most intimate associates”―were of “Jewish origin”, but adds that in 1937, “Jews formed the majority in the government” (or in the governmental apparatus). It’s very hard for these figures and this empirical research to be cited in support of the thesis of Stalin’s and Soviet antisemitism!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin, Israel, and the Jewish Community of Eastern Europe ===&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the Jewish community was not exempt from the conflicts that marked the history of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp overall. Let’s first focus on the situation created in Eastern Europe with the end of World War II and Israel’s establishment. We have seen the strong presence of Jews in the state apparatus and the government. Aside from the composition of the institutions, it’s necessary to have in mind the sense of gratitude shown by Jews, for example in Hungary, because―an authoritative witness states―”it was the Soviet soldiers who freed us from certain death and no anyone else.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn728|728]] However, the honeymoon that appeared to last for some time proved to be short lived. The conflict doesn’t take long in manifesting itself: for the Jews who had returned to Hungary, and who had been able to escape the genocidal program of the Third Reich and its henchmen, should they to commit to the reconstruction of a destroyed country, or emigrate to the Jewish state that was taking shape in the Middle East? Initially, the supporters of that second option operate undisturbed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Zionist staff [...] led the Hungarian branch of the American Jewish Joint Committee that in the post-war period donated enormous sums of money to the reconstruction of Jewish communities. That was the most important economic lifeline for the survivors. A Zionist supporter, doctor Fabbian Herkovitz, became the rabbi of the most prestigious synagogue in Budapest, on Dohány street; and there every week he offered speeches in favor of emigration to Israel [...]. It was said that the Zionists made use of a more extensive and effective organization than that of the Hungarian communists [...]. It’s calculated that nearly a fifth of the Jewish population picked the path of emigration.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn729|729]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That mass emigration, an authentic brain-drain especially in qualitative terms, that deprived the country of the personnel it desperately needed to recover from the ruins of war, could not be ignored by the government and the party (including the Jews who had rejected the Zionist option):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The communists [...] in 1948 not only blocked the exodus of Jews, but were also able to assert their very hegemony within the Jewish world. The Zionist leader Arie Yaari recalls: “For us it was very difficult to convince people to relocate to Palestine. Especially the oldest, who feared starting a whole new life, with a new language. The regime, for its part, offered them political positions that Jews had never had before. They could become judges, officials, enter the government. The communist movement was very weak and needed a lot of personnel. How could Jews resist the temptation?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn730|730]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As one can see, it makes no sense to speak of antisemitism. Not only are there no vestiges of negative discrimination at the expense of Jews, but they eventually enjoy preferential treatment when they decide to stay in Hungary. It must be added that, before it pits the Jewish community and the communist community against one another, the battle that’s being discussed divides the Jewish community itself. Defeated by the Jews who decided to integrate themselves in the country in which they are citizens, the Zionists, despite all their efforts, are unable to plant among Jews the idea of ethnic separation. When at the end of the 1940s the Zionist movement is declared illegal, the overwhelming majority of Jews showed they had in no way internalized the discourse around Jewish national identity. The idea that the Jewish community should define itself as a national minority was the last thing that passed through the minds of Jews, who once again orient themselves toward seeking a new level of assimilation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn731|731]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar crisis is witnessed in the Soviet Union; and in this case as well the conflict ends up taking place within the Jewish community. It’s Ilya Ehrenburg, a writer of Jewish origin, who warns against the danger posed by Zionism (blamed for impeding the reconstruction of a country devastated and martyred by the Nazi army, and reopening the Jewish question already happily resolved in the Soviet Union) in &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;’s columns from September 21st, 1948;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn732|732]] the position taken against Zionism is linked to the condemnation of antisemitism, crucially described, according to the words of Stalin, as the expression of “racial chauvinism” and “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn733|733]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The conversation that takes place in Moscow in 1948 between Golda Meir and Ilya Ehrenburg is remarkable. The former expresses her displeasure over assimilated Jews (“it disgusts me to see Jews who don’t speak Hebrew or at least Yiddish”), the latter responds angrily: “you’re a servant of the United States.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn734|734]] In speaking with another interlocutor the Soviet writer states:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The State of Israel must understand that in this country the Jewish question no longer exists, that the Jews of the USSR must be left in peace and that all attempts to induce them to Zionism and to repatriation must stop. It will be met with resistance not only by the [Soviet] authorities, but by Jews themselves.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn735|735]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s beyond any doubt, the colossal brain-drain that approached would open another point of contention in addition to the Cold War, especially for the fact that to achieve their objective, Israeli diplomatic representatives in Moscow went behind the backs of Soviet authorities and established direct contact with the Soviet Jewish community.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn736|736]] In any case, the point of contention had become more serious to the degree that Israel aligned more clearly with the West: numerous and valued Soviet scientists of Jewish origin were encouraged by Zionist propaganda to emigrate and join a bloc committed to crushing the country that made possible their emancipation and social promotion. However, “despite the growing fiction, authoritative representatives from the USSR had repeatedly guaranteed Soviet support to Israel, but they had made it dependent on the neutrality of the Israeli government within the confrontation between the West and the East.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn737|737]] Nevertheless, the last of Moscow’s illusions quickly vanish. The rupture with the Jewish state is also a frontal clash with Zionist circles still very active in the socialist camp and which would be ruthlessly repressed. In Czechoslovakia, Slánsky is imprisoned and sentenced to death because, according to the testimony of his daughter, “he had favored emigration to Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn738|738]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In Romania, Ana Pauker had better luck, she gets off with a few months in prison. However, we are faced with a similar situation: “For some time Zionism had been an ideology condemned by the regime, but this hadn’t impeded the flow of Romanian Jews to Israel until the expulsion of Pauker in 1952, who had discreetly kept open the path to the Promised Land”; thanks to her, “no less than one hundred thousand Jews left Romania to settle down in Israel.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn739|739]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s then understandable Stalin’s growing distrust, to whom is attributed the statement according to which “every Jew that is a nationalist is an agent of American espionage.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn740|740]] The change that happened in the behavior of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe must have made many communists recall the “betrayal” the German Social Democratic Party was criticized for at the start of World War I. Must we read the conflict that breaks out as “Stalin’s war against the Jews”? That’s what’s suggested in the very title of a book dedicated to the subject by a &#039;&#039;Jerusalem Post&#039;&#039; journalist. But will this reading be truly more convincing than that given by Stalin, who denounced “the war by Zionists against the Soviet Union and the socialist camp”? One historian (Conquest), despite being determined to reduce Bolshevism and communism to a criminal phenomenon, recognizes that in the Soviet Union “antisemitism as such was never an official doctrine”, that “the open persecution of Jews as Jews was prohibited” and that there hadn’t been any reference to “racial theory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn741|741]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Then what sense is there in comparing Stalin with Hitler? The historian just cited adds that the first “had hoped to use Israel against the West and had continued to accuse the West of antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn742|742]] But it doesn’t appear that the Nazi leader classified his enemies as anti-Semites! Conquest works off the assumption that the accusations of antisemitism made by Stalin about the West are totally ridiculous, but he doesn’t even raise the question of the validity of Western accusations of antisemitism directed at Stalin. In the end, why should it be instrumentalized by only one side? And why the country that had been described by Hitler (but also by other important segments of Western public opinion) as the incarnation of the “Judeo-Bolshevik plot” and the definitive confirmation of the validity and seriousness of the conspiracy revealed by the publication of &#039;&#039;The Protocols of the Elders of Zion&#039;&#039;? In any case, numerous and prominent Israelis didn’t believe in the myth of “Stalin’s war against the Jews”; at the news of the Soviet leader’s death, they mourn him and pay tribute to him as the “sun” that “has set.&amp;amp;quot; (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, intro, § 1).&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Israel’s victory in the Six Day War and the worsening of the Palestinian tragedy further widens that gap that in Eastern Europe divides communist authorities from the Jewish community and the pro-Israeli and pro-Western circles that are organized with it. But must we speak of antisemitism? Trusting in the account by two historians of Jewish origin previously cited, we see what happens in Prague in 1967: “The sympathy of Czech students for Israel has [...] a very trivial motivation: the antipathy they nurture toward the thousands of Arab students enrolled there in university.&amp;amp;quot; Something similar happens in Warsaw: “Suddenly people remembered that many Jews that lived in Palestine had come from Poland.&amp;amp;quot; A taxi driver exclaims: “Our brave Polish Jews are teaching a lesson to those fucking Russian Arabs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn743|743]] In the clash that takes place with communist authorities, aligned with the Arab countries, who shows signs of racism? Are we faced with an anti-Jewish racism, or rather an anti-Arab racism?&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Question of “Cosmopolitanism” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The “doctors plot” itself, widely used to confirm Stalin’s antisemitism, eventually demonstrates the opposite: after everything, and until the very end, he trusted Jews with taking care of his health. Moreover, only some of the doctors accused are Jews, and the “plot” as a whole is classified by Soviet leaders and the press as “more capitalist and imperialist than Zionist.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn744|744]] Was the suspicion caused just by paranoia? One detail to consider: “The CIA became more friendly [in relation to the Jewish state] starting from the moment it which it gained use of Israeli intelligence sources in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. For example, Mossad agents were the first abroad to receive the complete text of Khrushchev’s secret speech on Stalin’s crimes”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn745|745]] and passed it onto the American intelligence services.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s necessary to remember that the “age of suspicion”, as it was correctly defined, encourages the witch hunts in both blocs, in obviously different ways.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn746|746]] Furthermore, it’s not a secret to anyone that American intelligence services were committed to the physical elimination of Stalin, as well as Castro, Lumumba, and other “mad dogs.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn747|747]] How to reach the undisputed leader of the international communist movement if not by making use of the individuals close to him and susceptible of being recruited by Western intelligence services in the wake of a recent conflict, like the one unleashed following the foundation of the Jewish state and the program of Jewish immigration pursued by it? At the time when the “plot” was revealed, “at least one leading western diplomat present in Moscow, the British diplomat Sir A. (“Joe”) Gascoigne [...], had thought the Kremlin doctors were really guilty of political treason.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn748|748]] Furthermore, the suspicion toward doctors appears to be a recurring theme in Russian history: an Israeli historian of Russian origin attributed the death of Tsar Alexander III to the German doctors who had treated him. &#039;&#039;(infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 1).&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that a book recently published in the United States formulates a theory that it was medical “treatment” that caused the death of Zhdanov. Must we then conclude that Stalin’s concerns were baseless? Without presenting any proof and even recognizing that there’s no document that supports their theory, the authors of the book are quick to clarify that it wasn’t the enemies of the Soviet Union who manipulated the doctors, but the dictator in the Kremlin himself! Moreover, apart from a radiologist, none of the doctors who treated Zhdanov were Jewish![[footnotes.xhtml#fn749|749]] It’s now clear: we are in the field of mythology, and a mythology with an unsettling subtext: it’s permissible to be suspicious of doctors just for being Germans or “gentile” Russians! Let’s return, then, to the field of historical research: it must be kept in mind that Stalin himself could have been the one who suspended the investigation, aware perhaps of the mistake he had made..[[footnotes.xhtml#fn750|750]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Lacking other arguments, they cite Stalin’s condemnation of “cosmopolitanism” to cling to the theory of his antisemitism: who would be the cosmopolitans if not the Jews? In reality, the accusation of cosmopolitanism is inserted in the context of a sharp debate by both sides. Those that first decided to commit to the construction of socialism in the country born out of the October Revolution of 1917, renouncing the millenarian expectations of the arrival or the exporting of the revolution throughout the world, are accused of “national pettiness” and being “nationally confined”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn751|751]] as well as being provincial; while Stalin is the “small provincial man” with “peasant rudeness” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, preface § 1, and ch. 1, § 1), Molotov doesn’t come out any better in Trotsky’s opinion, as “he hadn’t visited any foreign country and didn’t know any foreign language.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn752|752]] Both of them have the same defect of remaining stubbornly attached, in a provincial and obscurantist way, to the “reactionary role of the nation state.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn753|753]] Those who are attacked in this way respond by defining their accusers as abstract cosmopolitans, incapable of building a truly new social order.&lt;br /&gt;
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To read the condemnation of “cosmopolitanism” in anti-Semitic terms means neglecting a problem that is at the center of all the great revolutions driven by a universalist charge. Rejecting the theory of exporting the revolution cherished by the supporters of the “Republic, one and universal”, or more precisely the “universal conflagration”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn754|754]] Robespierre clarifies that the new France would not contribute to the cause of the revolution by behaving like the “capital of the world”, from which would be sent “armed missionaries” for the conversion and the “conquest of the world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn755|755]] No, what puts the old regime in Europe in crisis won’t be the “exploits of war”, but the “wisdom of our laws.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn756|756]] In other words, revolutionary authority will play a real internationalist role to the degree that in knows how to complete its national task of building a new order in France.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a problem to which German idealism gave great consideration. In Kant’s opinion, writing in 1793-1794 and outlining in some form a philosophical and historical evaluation of the French Revolution, while patriotism runs the risk of slipping into exclusivism and losing sight of universalism, abstract love for men “loses its balance due to its excessively broad universalism.&amp;amp;quot; It’s a question then of reconciling “world patriotism” (&#039;&#039;Weltpatriotismus&#039;&#039;) with “local patriotism” &#039;&#039;(Localpatriotismus&#039;&#039;) or with “love for the homeland”; that which is authentically universalist “in its attachment to its own country must be inclined to promoting the well-being of the entire world.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn757|757]] It’s a line of thought later developed by Hegel: after having celebrated as a great historic conquest the formulation of the concept of the universal man (possessor of rights “as a man and as a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc”), the &#039;&#039;Philosophy of Right&#039;&#039; (§ 209 A) adds that it must not lead to “cosmopolitanism” and indifference or opposition with respect to the “concrete state of life” in the country in which one is a citizen. &amp;amp;quot;The universal love for men&amp;amp;quot; risks becoming an &amp;amp;quot;empty universality&amp;amp;quot; and devoid of content (§ 126 Z): the individual contributes to the universal first by concretely engaging the specific circle (the family, the society, the nation) in which he lives. Otherwise, the acclaimed “universal love for men” is at best a declaration of noble intentions; at worst, it’s a way of evading the field of concrete responsibilities.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a problem that, with its even more emphatic universalism, the October Revolution inherits in a more acute form from the French Revolution. Well before Stalin, Herzen, while exiled in Paris, shows great distrust and criticism toward a cosmopolitanism that doesn’t recognize the idea of the nation and national responsibility (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 3, § 5). It’s a controversy that goes beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. In rejecting the “accusations of nationalism” made against the CPSU majority, and primarily against Stalin,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn758|758]] Gramsci takes a clear position against a “so-called internationalism” that’s, in reality, similar to a “vague ‘cosmopolitanism’.&amp;amp;quot; The principal target here is Trotsky, criticized as “cosmopolitan” for being “superficially national”, and therefore incapable of “cleansing internationalism of every vague and purely ideological (in its negative sense) element”; and he’s opposed to Stalin and Lenin especially, who embody a mature internationalism precisely by proving to be “profoundly national” at the same time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn759|759]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the USSR, the criticism of cosmopolitanism becomes sharper to the degree that the threat represented by fascism and Nazism worsens. We know the passionate appeal, two years before Hitler’s rise to power, directed by Dimitrov to revolutionaries for them to reject “national nihilism.&amp;amp;quot; Cosmopolitanism is an internationalism that leads to national nihilism. We also saw Stalin, on the eve of Operation Barbarossa, stress that, contrary to a “cosmopolitanism” incapable of assuming its national responsibilities, internationalism must know how to be combined with patriotism. That means that, far from being synonymous with antisemitism, the criticism of cosmopolitanism is an essential element in the struggle against Nazi-fascism (and antisemitism). That critique becomes urgent again with the start of the Cold War, when a new terrible threat loomed over the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stronger yet is the critique of cosmopolitanism when the country immersed in revolution is engaged in a struggle for national survival. In China Sun Yat-sen writes: “The nations that make use of imperialism to conquer other peoples, and thereby try to strengthen their position as masters of the world, are in support of cosmopolitanism”, and they try by all means to discredit patriotism as “something petty and anti-liberal.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn760|760]] Mao aligns himself with that view, according to him internationalism doesn’t in any way make patriotism obsolete: “the universal truths of Marxism must be integrated with the concrete conditions of different countries, with the unity between internationalism and patriotism.&#039;&#039;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn761|761]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the USSR, did Jews make up the majority of “cosmopolitans”, and therefore anti-cosmopolitanism is only a camouflaged form of antisemitism? It’s worthwhile to observe that, in elaborating his polemic against cosmopolitanism, Sun Yat-sen encourages the Chinese people to take the Jews as their example because, despite millennia of oppress and exile, they never lost their sense of identity, and therefore of the obligation of reciprocal solidarity.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn762|762]] But let’s focus on the Soviet Union: the Jewish presence is numerous within the ranks of the CPSU majority. And among the first to throw the accusation of cosmopolitanism at the leader of the opposition is the German writer of Jewish origin (Feuchtwanger) who we have previously cited: “Trotsky was never a Russian patriot”, his only concern was the “world revolution.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn763|763]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, to use the hermeneutics found in the accusations targeting Stalin, not even Trotsky could escape the accusation of antisemitism. In developing his analysis of pre-revolutionary Russia, he highlights how the “market aristocracy” had “transformed the Tsar’s government into its financial vassal” which guaranteed “usurious profits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn764|764]] It must be added that “the dominion of the market” is represented “by Rothschild and Mendelssohn”, in fact, by the “Mendelssohn international”, that’s to say by individuals committed to respecting “the laws of Moses to the same extent as those of the markets.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn765|765]] As one can see, in this case the reference to the Jewish world is explicit. Must we then conclude that the polemic against the “market aristocracy” is in fact aimed at Jews as such, to the point that we find ourselves before the umpteenth manifestation of antisemitism? Such an argument would be absurd not only for Trotsky’s Jewish origins: more significant is the fact that, in the same text, he dedicates pages to the powerful description of the “bestial bacchanal” of blood spilled by the anti-Semitic gangs, tolerated and encouraged by the authorities and by “Nicolas Romanov, the Augustinian protector of the pogromists”, which fortunately faced the courageous and determined opposition of the revolutionary and socialist movement.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn766|766]] But no less resolute in condemning that anti-Semitic “cannibalism” is Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin in the Jewish “Court”, the Jews in Stalin’s “Court” ===&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR is the “country that saved the greatest number of Jews.&amp;amp;quot; This observation is from a journalist and researcher of Trotskyist orientation who, as a “witness of those years”, thought it necessary to stand against the campaign underway today in the West. He continues as follows: “no country had anything comparable to the Red Army, with Jews in the highest military positions.&amp;amp;quot; That’s not all: “One of Stalin’s sons marries a Jew, and his daughter does the same.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn767|767]] It can be added that, within Stalin’s leadership group, Jews were well represented and at the highest levels until the very end. To remain standing, however weak and staggered, the theory of Stalin’s “antisemitism” requires the dejudification of the Jews who work closely with him. That’s precisely what happens. It’s true that “Yagoda, Kaganovich and many others in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe” played an important role alongside a ferocious dictator, but it’s a matter of “apostate Jews”: that’s the consideration from a Jewish intellectual, using language that clearly recalls the history of religions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn768|768]] Other times, the weight of religious tradition is noted in a more measured or involuntary way: there’s a journalist who denounces, in the most circulated Italian newspaper, the “renegade Jews in Stalin’s court.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn769|769]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In reality, the rhetoric regarding “apostates” and “renegades” (or regarding “court Jews”) constituted an implicit negation of the accusation of antisemitism; antisemitism that, as a form of racism, is directed against an ethnic group regardless of the religious and political conduct of its individual members. To recognize the presence of Jews in leadership positions in Stalin’s USSR, and the socialist camp led by him, means admitting that in those countries access to power and social and political stature were determined not by their immutable racial background, but by their mutable political conduct. But the dejudification of Jews (as “apostate”, “renegades”, “court” or inauthentic Jews) who are today considered politically embarrassing allows the transformation of antisemitism into a category capable of resisting any negation arising from empirical analysis, and therefore it’s applicable not only to Stalin, but to the whole history of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after the October Revolution, the campaign against obscurantism denounced within different religions (including Judaism) is carried out with the participation of important Jewish circles in leading positions. Here’s the commentary by the previously cited journalist from &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039;: “it was Yevektia, of the Jewish branch of the CPSU, who fomented the new antisemitism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn770|770]] A professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem makes a similar argument: “during the Bolshevik revolution [...] many Jewish Bolsheviks were so dedicated to the cause of revolutionary Russian nationalism that they became anti-Semites.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn771|771]] Already classified as “apostates” and “renegades”, the Jews of communist orientation now become “anti-Semitic” &#039;&#039;tout court&#039;&#039;. At this time, apart from Stalin, the accusation of “antisemitism” reaches Lenin himself, the supreme leader of these “anti-Semitic” campaigns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nevertheless, it’s the same Israeli historian just cited who writes: “Most likely, Lenin was always very skeptical of the organizational capacity of Russians. In one conversation with Gorky, he observes that there hadn’t been intelligent Russians who weren’t Jews, or at least had Jews among their ancestors and a little Jewish blood in their veins.&amp;amp;quot; The opinion of the Soviet leader is also the opinion of his interlocutor: “It would not have displeased Gorky if it had been Jews who had taken control over the Russian economy, and in 1916, he goes as far as writing that ‘the genius of Jews for their organization, their flexibility, and their indomitable energy must be taken properly into account in a country so poorly organized like our Russia’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn772|772]] Therefore, going by this text, Lenin and Gorky (who also adheres to the Communist Party), could eventually be accused of anti-Russian racism and not antisemitism.&lt;br /&gt;
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The leading role played by Jews isn’t limited to the overthrow of the old regime in Russia. The Jewish historian continues as follows: Lenin attributes to the “omnipresent Jewish minority” the role of being the “guardians of communism.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, “it wasn’t the Slavs, but the Jews that became the principal spearhead of the Russian advance in the international arena, and therefore against Europe and the rest of the world. Lenin showed great intuition in trusting the success of the revolution to them and other ethnic minorities.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn773|773]] As one can see, “anti-Semitic” Jews make an important contribution, maybe even a decisive contribution, to the expansion of communism; the Judeo-Bolshevik plot that the Nazis speak of is here understood as the unrest or plot orchestrated by Jews, yes, but by anti-Semitic Jews!&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a matter of upheaval or a plot with a long, long history. Again according to the historian previously cited, Lenin would have used the Jews who had broken with their community of origin, just as Christianity had done earlier.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn774|774]] And again emerge the similarities to the historical reading dear to Nazism, that had denounced the role of Jews in the destructive cycle that stretches from Christianity to Bolshevism. What’s new here is that the Jews who played that role, having adhered first to Christianity and later to Bolshevism, should ultimately be considered “apostates”, “renegades” and “anti-Semites.&amp;amp;quot; In trying to strike at the Soviet experience as a whole, together with Stalin, the accusation of antisemitism ends up reproducing, with some modest variations, the Nazi philosophy of history!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From Trotsky to Stalin, From the “Semite” Monster to the “Anti-Semitic” Monster ===&lt;br /&gt;
The theory of Stalin’s antisemitism proves unsustainable in light of conceptual and historical reflection. Whatever the date may be for the emergence of that sickness (whether identified in 1948, in 1945, or in 1879, the year of Stalin’s conception and birth), the diagnosis proves not only baseless, but also quite offensive to Jews, who in great numbers until the last moment continued to pay tribute to their supposed executioner. How is the origin of this black legend explained, then? Let’s return to the years immediately following the October Revolution. On October 4th of 1919, the &#039;&#039;Völkischer Beobachter&#039;&#039;, at that time not yet the official organ of the National-Socialist party (not yet founded), blames the Bolshevik horror on a “Jewish terrorist horde”, and on “circumcised Asians”, and to that end stresses that Jewish blood also runs through Lenin’s veins. Similar denunciations are also heard in Britain and in the West in general.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn775|775]] With this in mind, it’s understandable that, more so than Lenin, Trotsky is “the principal Mephisto-like subject of the anti-Bolshevik manifestos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn776|776]] A leaflet of anti-communist propaganda handed out during the Soviet-Polish war of 1920 depicts him with anything but human-like features, with the Star of David around his neck, observing from on high a pile of bodies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn777|777]] “Trotsky or Bronstein”, that is the Bolshevik Jew par excellence, in 1919 is, in Goebbels opinion, the figure that “possibly has on his conscience the greatest number of crimes that a man has ever been responsible for.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn778|778]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, during the invasion of the Soviet Union, announced as crusade for the salvation of European and Western civilization from Bolshevik barbarism―Asiatic and Jewish―we saw Hitler depict Stalin as a puppet of international Judaism, as a Jew, if not by blood, then at least in spirit. During the years in which antisemitism was widespread or found ample support in the West, the monster par excellence couldn’t take on anything but Jewish features. The situation is different after the collapse of the Third Reich and the infamous revelation of the “final solution”: today, the monster that’s able to provoke horror, or at least more so than any other, tends to be the anti-Semitic monster. However, despite its variations, its continued flaws are evident, and the depiction of the anti-Semitic Stalin is not much more convincing than that which painted Trotsky openly wearing the Star of David and happily contemplating his immense pile of victims.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;6. Psychopathology, Morality, and History in the Reading of the Stalin Era&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Geopolitics, Terror, and Stalin&#039;s &amp;amp;quot;Paranoia&amp;amp;quot; ===&lt;br /&gt;
What approach would help us better understand the origin, characteristics, and meaning of Stalinism? According to Arendt, the obsession with the “objective enemy” had driven Stalinist totalitarianism (as well as Hitlerism) to always search for new objectives for their repressive apparatus: after “the descendants of the old ruling classes” it’s the kulaks’ turn, then the traitors within the party, the “Volga Germans”, etc.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn779|779]] To comprehend the futility of this formula, all that’s required is to reflect on the fact that it could easily be applied to the history of the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States participates in the celebration of the community of Germanic nations and races (U.S., Great Britain, Germany) as the vanguard of civilization; in the decades following its intervention in the First World War, the Germans (and Americans of German origin) become the enemy par excellence; it’s the period of the Grand Alliance with the Soviet Union. However, after the Third Reich’s overthrow, the USSR becomes the enemy par excellence, thus Americans of German (or Japanese origin) are no longer the subject of persecution, instead it’s those Americans suspected of sympathizing with communism; yet in the last stage of the Cold War, Washington makes use of both China’s collaboration and the Islamic &#039;&#039;freedom fighters&#039;&#039; who sustain the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan; but with the defeat of the Evil Empire, it’s the former allies who represent the new incarnation of Evil: the &#039;&#039;freedom fighters&#039;&#039; (and their sympathizers in United States territory and everywhere else in the world) are sent off to Guantanamo. There’s one detail that reveals the weakness of Arendt’s formula, the formula that blames the obsession with the “objective enemy” for the deportations of the “Volga Germans” during the Second World War: in reality, similar measures had been taken in 1915 by Tsarist Russia, at that time allied to the liberal West; also immediately after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt acts in a similar way toward the “objective enemy”, represented this time by American citizens of Japanese origin. If you want to take into consideration the geographic and military situation, the concern of the Soviet dictator appears more justified than that of the American president.&lt;br /&gt;
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Every so often, Arendt appears to realize the problematic nature of the category that she uses. The first edition of &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039; denounces the obsession with the “potential enemy”, but for as long as the Second Thirty Years’ War lasts, the Soviet people see themselves threatened by a mortal threat; being on the alert for a potential enemy could hardly be considered an expression of paranoia. The subsequent editions of the book then prefer to speak of the “objective enemy”, thus accentuating the psychological character of a behavior that continues to be attributed exclusively to totalitarian dictators.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn780|780]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But this linguistic alternation doesn’t at all change the terms of the problem. Despite unhesitatingly opposing Nazi Germany and sympathizing with the land of the Third Republic and the Great Revolution, at the moment of the Second World War’s outbreak Arendt suffered imprisonment in France in a concentration camp, and in the last analysis had suffered that fate of being a “potential enemy” or “objective enemy.&amp;amp;quot; We’ll soon see that this category is also at work in Churchill’s Britain and in F.D. Roosevelt’s United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, Arendt operates on a purely ideological level, without even raising the problem of a comparative analysis of the policies pursued by the leadership groups of different countries in situations of severe crisis. It would be beneficial to fill this gap. After the conclusion of the Second World War, Churchill offers this summary of the situation at the time of the lead-up to the gigantic military clash: “It was known at that time that there were twenty thousand organized Nazis in Britain; an acute danger of sabotage and crime, as a prelude to the outbreak of war, it would align with the procedure already applied in other friendly countries.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn781|781]] That&#039;s how the statesman justified the policy pursued by him during the conflict, when all those suspected of sympathizing with the enemy or their political system could be arrested: “‘To sympathize’ was the all inclusive term that allowed the government to arrest without trial, and for an undetermined amount of time, members not just of fascist organizations but also any group considered by the interior minister to be sympathetic to the Germans, including those that supported negotiations with Hitler.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn782|782]] Those persecuted are not responsible for deliberate and concrete actions, but are rather “potential” or “objective enemies.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Protected by the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as by a powerful navy, the U.S. ought not to feel particularly threatened. But F.D. Roosevelt warns: the enemy is not discouraged by the ocean, it’s necessary to take note of the “lesson from Norway, whose principal ports were captured thanks to a surprise treason prepared over a number of years.&amp;amp;quot; A similar threat looms over the American continent:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The first phase of the invasion of this hemisphere won’t be the landing of regular troops. The strategic and essential ports will be occupied by secret agents, by useful idiots at their service, and there are many of those here and in Latin America.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
So long as the aggressive nations maintain the offensive, it will be them and not us who choose the time, place, and method of their attack.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn783|783]]&lt;br /&gt;
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And that’s not all: It’s also necessary to confront the aggression carried out “by means of the secret diffusion of toxic propaganda by those who seek to destroy unity and promote division.&amp;amp;quot; It’s at this point that traitors or “objective” enemies tend to be those that already express opinions considered to be in opposition to the national interest, and resistance becomes a task that should be realized not only by the army but by the entire country. Both must demonstrate an unbreakable unity:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Those who are on our lines of defense and those in the rear who build these lines must have the energy and courage that arises out of an unbreakable faith in the way of life that they defend. The powerful action that we are calling for can’t be based on disrespect with regard to those things that we are fighting for.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn784|784]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To eliminate an omnipresent threat, that also makes its presence felt at the political level, requires a total mobilization that ends up affecting the political sphere as well. Starting on that basis they develop a “well orchestrated media campaign”:[[footnotes.xhtml#fn785|785]] “When will Hitler invade the U.S.?”, a manifesto asks, with the image of Nazi paratroopers landing over undefended American cities, which are also vulnerable―a second manifesto insists―to a landing by sea. Even more serious is the dangerous fact that “Hitler’s army is already here.&amp;amp;quot; At least that is what a third manifesto thinks, it warns against “the fifth column in the United States.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn786|786]] Films and books that call attention to the seriousness of this threat achieve great success, while the committee that tracks “anti-American” activities calculates exactly 480,000 supporters of organizations ready to assist the invaders![[footnotes.xhtml#fn787|787]] And just like in Britain, in the United States the category of enemy agent or accomplice is also expanded to include even all those who seek to prevent the country’s involvement or entry into the war.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn788|788]] They are accused of being the “Nazi’s transmission belt”, the Third Reich’s “Trojan Horse”, or to cite the very words of F.D. Roosevelt, the “fifth column of appeasement.&amp;amp;quot; This last phrase is especially significant: what becomes synonymous with treason is a political outlook, and just for that those that embrace it became targets of denunciation, trials and intimidation; they are considered, in the last analysis, to be “potential” or “objective” enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
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A climate of fear and suspicion spreads across the country, quickly exploited by the authorities to “increase the powers of the FBI.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn789|789]] The president reveals to the press that pro-German elements have infiltrated “the Army and Navy” and have organized or tried to organize sabotage operations at “forty or fifty factories across the country.&amp;amp;quot; Even a balanced intellectual like William L. Shirer encourages everyone to prepare, with war around the corner, to confront the “sabotage carried out by thousands of Nazi agents from coast to coast.&amp;amp;quot; Everywhere they suspect or are on the lookout for the enemy’s actions. The fifth column carried out a fundamental role at times, weakening Belgium and France from within; and now―so the argument goes―the Nazi “termites” are operating inside the American Republic as well, which runs the risk of suffering the same fate.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn790|790]] Apparently there are “some attempts” on the part of the Third Reich’s agents to “encourage or take advantage of worker discontent in the factories and to obstruct the production of munitions for the allies”; according to the German consulate, these “acts of sabotage” are in fact “industrial accidents attributed by Roosevelt to the Nazis.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn791|791]] It’s not surprising, then, that “children of a tender age are sometimes frightened by the alarmist propaganda”, unrelenting in announcing and depicting in the most awful terms possible the imminent invasion by the Nazi hordes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn792|792]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once the United States officially entered the war, the atmosphere becomes even more tense. The wartime pronouncements against spies and loose talk (“control your tongue”, “silence means security”, Even “casual conversations” can kill) don’t let-up in their warnings, displaying the faces of youths who are soon to be orphans because of irresponsible chatter; against the acts of “sabotage” another pronouncement proclaims a new crime: that of the “poor use of work instruments”, and it shows the image of Mr. Tool Wrecker, charged and put in jail by a police officer.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn793|793]] Obviously, this genuinely dangerous situation is combined with a deliberate distortion of reality. So concludes the American historian we’ll now turn to: “FDR well understood the value of national anxiety”; “FDR and his supporters went beyond the line that separates public concern from mass hysteria.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn794|794]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Before us are the fundamental elements of the Terror that takes hold in Russia. Without a doubt, the phenomenon analyzed with regards to Britain and the United States appears in a monstrously enlarged form in Russia; but do ideology, paranoia and the objective situation play a decisive role? Besides the mutable yet incessant civil war, we have geopolitics to take into account. In April of 1947, with the Cold War already brewing on the horizon, in a conversation with the Republican candidate Harold Stassen, Stalin will highlight, with a kind of envy, the extraordinarily favorable geopolitical situation of the United States, protected by two oceans and with only Canada and Mexico to its north and south, two weak countries that certainly don’t represent a threat.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn795|795]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Things are very different in Soviet Russia. One can ridicule Stalin’s “paranoia”, but we have seen Goebbels speak of the great success of German espionage in France and its total failure in the USSR. Moreover, the first to insist on the penetration of a German fifth column in Russia are the very enemies of Bolshevism. In Kerensky’s eyes, as demonstrated by the “Brest-Litovsk capitulation” and the signing of “traitorous separate peace”, the protagonists of October 1917 act in service to Wilhelm II, for which they are massively financed and aided; according to the Menshevik leader, the German secret services had already carried an important role in the pacifist agitation that had depleted the military strength of the country.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn796|796]] Churchill makes a similar argument, stressing the weight of “German gold” in the disorder in Russia.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn797|797]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In our time, going yet further back, an Israeli historian (originating from the Soviet Union in his time) discovered the fingerprints of Imperial Germany―determined to weaken in any way possible the strength of its neighbor and rival―in Alexander III’s premature death in 1894, “who died because the medical team (among whom the majority were Germans) had applied the wrong treatment to him”, as well as the 1911 assassination of Pyotr Stolypin, that happened with the “involvement” of “some pro-German higher officials”, and in the peculiar behavior of Nicholas II (his wife was a German princess).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn798|798]] In any case, with regards to the collapse of the tsarist regime, it’s important not to lose sight of the “effective German fifth column present in the Russian court and in the highest positions of the army”, therefore at the very center of power. Indeed, “in May of 1915, Moscow was the site of various pogroms against Germans”, however, “the German minority that occupied the highest levels of power were still intact.&amp;amp;quot; In conclusion: “The historians who have given exclusive attention to revolutionary voluntarism or liberal maneuvers have ignored other evidence, from which one can deduce that the revolutionary movement could have been in part provoked by pro-German sectors or by a direct intervention by German espionage in conformity with a plan designed by Brockdorff-Rantzau.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn799|799]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is the overview offered here plausible, or is it also affected by the paranoia generally attributed to Stalin? In any case, one can start with an assumption: while it may have been weakened for some time, the defeat of the Second Reich doesn’t eliminate the activity of its intelligence services within Russia, where, on the other hand, the dissolution of the old regime coincides with the reinforced presence at all levels of the great Western powers. Overall, it’s enough to read any history of the Cold War to understand that the birthplace of the October Revolution was especially exposed to the danger not just of military invasion, but also infiltration and espionage. In the 1920s, thanks to the collaboration of Russian exiles, Britain was able to decode the Soviet Union’s encrypted messages, which remains the principal target of their intelligence services even “in the middle of the 1930s.&amp;amp;quot; Meanwhile, the Third Reich has emerged, which, in preparing its aggression, can count on the proven ability of colonel Reinhard Gehlen, “a master of intelligence, subversion and deception”; later, immediately after the defeat of Hitler&#039;s Germany, Allen Dulles demonstrates “vision” in putting at the service of the recently created CIA the very man who “had played a great role in the German attack on Russia in 1941.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn800|800]] During the Cold War, aside from espionage, the activity of Western intelligence services also included “sabotage operations” and even support to insurrectionary movements.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn801|801]]&lt;br /&gt;
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More than twenty years after Stalin’s death, this outlook hadn’t changed. We can deduce this from an article in a prestigious American newspaper. The author is satisfied to report “how a computer sabotage operation by the CIA resulted [in 1974] in an enormous explosion in Siberia―all of it organized with precision by an economist named Gus Weiss―and it helped the United States win the Cold War.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn802|802]] If we then keep in mind that the use of sabotage also has a particular Russian tradition behind it, we can arrive at a conclusion: to understand what happened in the Stalin years, rather than resort to a single paranoid personality as a &#039;&#039;deus ex machina&#039;&#039;, it would be better to follow the approach raised by an illustrious eyewitness who, in Moscow of 1937, speaks of unquestionable “acts of sabotage”, and at the same time of a “psychosis of sabotage” that arises out of that reality.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn803|803]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The “Paranoia” of the Liberal West ===&lt;br /&gt;
However, while Arendt goes no further than the madness inherent to totalitarianism (Stalinian or Hitlerian), François Furet goes further: “The revolutionary needs to have hateful motives”: this is true for the Jacobins, but also for the Bolsheviks, and for Stalin in particular, for the latter “needs to invoke, in service to his miraculous objectives, the struggle against the saboteurs, the enemies, the imperialists and their agents.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn804|804]] The French historian speaks generally of the “revolutionary”, but in reality he has in mind only Russia and France and thus forgets to add that, aside from the Bolsheviks and the Jacobins (and Rousseau), the protagonists of the the Puritan Revolution are also subjected to a similar psychoanalytic approach, as well as the abolitionist “revolution” that does away with the institution of slavery, first in England and later in the United States. And Furet doesn’t even take into account the fact that, according to an eminent American historian, the “style of paranoia” profoundly marked the history of his country. The belief, shared by George Washington, in London’s intention to enslave the colonies on the other side of the Atlantic is a central element in the American Revolution; later, at the end of the eighteenth century, when sharp contradictions arise within the new leadership group, while Jefferson ends up being suspected of being an agent of France, Hamilton is described as a British agent. A similar dialectic is evident some decades later, on the occasion of the crisis that leads to the American Civil War, when both opposing sides exchange the accusation that the other has betrayed the legacy of the Founding Fathers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn805|805]] Not to mention the fact that, in Nietzsche’s opinion, a disturbed relationship with reality characterizes the entire revolutionary tradition, beginning with those “Christian agitators” who are the “Fathers of the Church”, and earlier, the Jewish prophets.&lt;br /&gt;
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Is Stalin’s personality characterized by particularly accentuated traces of illness? If we start from that assumption, the admiration that leading political figures of the West had for him would be inexplicable. In any case, one fact that gives us cause for consideration: Freud, who passed away in 1939, considered it relevant to conduct a psychoanalytic study, but not of Stalin, nor even Hitler, but of Wilson, putting him on the list of those dangerous “fanatics” who are convinced they “have a special and personal relationship with the divine”, and who thereby considered themselves charged with a providential mission of guiding and transforming the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn806|806]] And it certainly appears a little unusual that a statesman, in taking his country into the First World War, even after witnessing the reality of the carnage, and despite being motivated by very concrete material and geopolitical interests, celebrates the American intervention as a “holy war, more holy than all other wars”, and celebrates the American soldiers as crusaders, protagonists of a “transcendent mission.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn807|807]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But Furet concentrates on a psychopathological reading of the events that began in October 1917, and he especially concentrates on the thirty years governed by Stalin: does he not fear―as someone who is authentically paranoid―dangers, traps and plots everywhere? What would we have to say then of F.D. Roosevelt and his subordinates who, even being able to count on a clearly more favorable political and geopolitical situation, raise the alarm about the possibility of a German invasion of America in the months before the American entry into the Second World War, and who label anti-interventionism as synonymous with national treason, warning against industrial “sabotage” provoked by the enemy and by a fifth column that possibly includes a half a million people? For this reason Hitler accuses the American president of having a “wild” and sick “imagination”, the imagination of a man who’s “truly mentally ill.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn808|808]] As you can see, the accusation of paranoia or madness is not new, it can be thrown by the most unsuspecting people and can strike the most diverse targets.&lt;br /&gt;
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But another consideration is more important: the Bolsheviks played a strong role in the two conspiracy theories that have possibly had the greatest mark on the history of the first half of the twentieth century, yet not as the protagonists but as the targets; and those theories were elaborated and propagated with a decisive contribution by the United States. In September of 1918, Wilson authorizes the publication of documents that contain sensational revelations: not only was the October Revolution nothing more than a German conspiracy; but, even after the seizure of power, Lenin, Trotsky, and the other Bolshevik leaders continued to be at the (paid) service of Imperial Germany; there’s more, the apparently dramatic internal split that happens around Brest-Litovsk had been a complete masquerade with the aim of hiding the German military’s permanent control over Soviet Russia. All of this was demonstrated by the so-called Sisson Papers: taking the name of the Committee on Public Information’s representative in Russia, a committee created by Wilson as part of the plans for total mobilization, including the mobilization of information. The presumed authenticity of the documents (that are later revealed to be a complete fabrication) is notably supported by leading American historians who later justify themselves, making reference to the pressure put upon them “in the name of necessity in times of war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn809|809]] It’s something that is also repeated outside the United States. In “The Cry of the People”, Gramsci quips: “those two citizens in Russia who are named Lenin and Trotsky are imposters, fabricated in German scientific laboratories and who, made as they are by machine, can’t be killed by the gunshots of terrorists” (an allusion to the attack suffered by Lenin on August 30th, 1918).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn810|810]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, a second conspiracy theory arises to explain the October Revolution, but this time, aside from the usual Bolshevik suspects, it’s not the Germans who are blamed, but rather the Jews. After having great resonance in the United States, the denunciation of Judeo-Bolshevik intrigues, which spread sedition throughout the world and threaten order and civilization itself, will then play a principal role in the “final solution.”&lt;br /&gt;
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=== “Immorality” or Moral Indignation? ===&lt;br /&gt;
If the psychopathological focus is misleading, the reading of Russia’s great historical crisis in the twentieth century that accuses the Bolsheviks, and Stalin in particular, of having developed a vision of the world that’s totally blind to moral and human reason is not much more convincing. Rather, if we begin with the years or decades that proceed October 1917, we see that the roles of accused and accusers can easily be inverted: it’s the protagonists of the revolutionary movement who see the world they intend to overthrow as responsible for the crimes which today are attributed to them. Communism leads to genocide? In the years of the First World War, the liberal and bourgeois society that they tried to overthrow was synonymous with genocide. While Stalin speaks of the “bloody massacre” and the “massive extermination of the living force of the peoples”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn811|811]] Bukharin describes it as a “horrible corpse factory.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn812|812]] Terrible yet precise is the description that Rosa Luxemburg makes: the “mass extermination” and the “genocide” (&#039;&#039;Volkermord&#039;&#039;) that takes place is “something daily and boringly monotonous”, meanwhile in the rear “an atmosphere of ritual murder” takes hold. Karl Liebknecht will also call for a struggle against “genocide”, in fact, he speaks against the “triumph of genocide”, condemning as well the “glorification of brutal violence”, the “shipwreck” of “all that is noble in the world” and the spread of “moral barbarization”; while it leads him to welcome the October Revolution, his moral indignation over the horrors of the First World War leads Liebknecht to predict not only a “solid” state but also a “tough” state for Soviet Russia, at least a state able to prevent the tragic return of a system denounced even before the war for its lack of “moral scruples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn813|813]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, it’s worth citing Trotsky: “the Cainite labor of the ‘patriotic’ press” on both sides is “the irrefutable demonstration of the moral decadence of bourgeois society.&amp;amp;quot; Yes, one cannot help but speak of “moral decadence” when they see humanity fall back into a “blind and ruthless barbarity”: one witnesses the outbreak of “a mad and bloody competition” to utilize the most advanced technology for military means; it’s a “scientific barbarity”, which uses the great discoveries of humanity “only to destroy the basis for civilized social life and to annihilate mankind.&amp;amp;quot; All the good produced by civilization drowns in the blood and entrails of the trenches: “health, comfort, hygiene, everyday relations, the bonds of friendship, professional duties, and lastly, the apparently unshakable rules of morality.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn814|814]] The term “genocide” is also used with a small variation by Trotsky, who in 1934 warns of the possibility of a new world war, a new “recurse to genocide” (&#039;&#039;Volkermorden&#039;&#039;) that gathers on the horizon.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn815|815]] As late as August 31st, 1939, Molotov accuses France and Britain of having rejected the Soviet policy of collective security in the hope of pushing the Third Reich against the USSR, thus without a doubt provoking “a new large massacre, a new holocaust of the nations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn816|816]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s clearly moral indignation that inspires this denunciation of the horrors of war. A leading American statesman like Theodore Roosevelt has a completely different position on it. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century, he celebrates war in vitalizing terms, coming from a perspective that in some form seeks to move―you could say using Nietzsche―”beyond good and evil.&amp;amp;quot; We read: “All men that have within them the ability to enjoy battle know how it feels when the beast begins to enter their heart; he does not step back in horror at the sight of blood or thinks that the battle should stop; but enjoys the pain, the regret, the danger as if it adorns their triumph.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn817|817]] They are themes that, in their more attenuated forms, continue to resonate in Churchill who, in reference to the colonial expeditions, affirms that: “War is a game during which one should smile.&amp;amp;quot; The escalating carnage in Europe that starts in August of 1914 doesn’t diminish this outlook: “War is the greatest game in all of history, here we play with the greatest stakes”; war constitutes “the only meaning and purpose in our lives.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn818|818]] Moving on from the celebration of war in crudely vitalistic terms, to its translation into spiritualist terms, the First World War will be welcomed by Max Weber as “great and marvelous”, while Benedetto Croce hopes to get a “regeneration of current social life” out of it,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn819|819]] along with numerous other leading figures of the liberal West at the time. Among them we must also cite Herbert Hoover, a notable representative of the American administration and future president of the U.S., who immediately after the signing of the armistice attributes to the just concluded conflict the purpose of the “purification of men” and therefore the preparation of “a new golden age: we are proud to have taken part in this rebirth of humanity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn820|820]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet Lenin continues to stick to his moral-political condemnation of war; together with it he denounces the social-political system that, in his opinion, caused it. It is evident the moral pathos that inspires the Leninist analysis of capitalism and colonialism in particular. This is how the Italian war in Libya is described: that “typical colonial war by a twentieth century ‘civilized’ state”: we see “a civilized and constitutional nation” perform its “civilizational” work ”by means of bayonets, bullets, the noose, fire, rape”, even by means of “butchery.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, it’s “a massacre by civilized and refined men; a massacre of Arabs through the use of ‘the most modern’ of weapons [...]. ‘As punishment’ nearly 3,000 Arabs have been massacred, entire families have been robbed and massacred, children and women massacred.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn821|821]] The advent of the most advanced bourgeois republic doesn’t in any way put an end to this horror: “with no less cruelty the armies of ‘republican’ France [...] exterminate the African peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn822|822]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The denunciation of the genocidal practices of the West occupies a central role, especially in the overview given by Lenin in the &#039;&#039;Notebooks on Imperialism&#039;&#039;, which collects material extracted from liberal-bourgeois literature at the time. A year before the outbreak of the enormous conflict, in a book by a German author, one can read: “The struggle for existence becomes harder, the hostilities among Europeans escalate and lead to attempts at mutual annihilation.&amp;amp;quot; On the other hand, the policy of annihilation is already a reality in the colonies: in Africa the Hereros are “in large part annihilated” by Germany, which in repressing the “Hottentot uprising” can also count on the active collaboration of Britain. But let’s see how the leading country of the liberal West conducts itself in its colonies: “The British have exterminated the inhabitants of Tasmania to the very last man. But the Irish are not Tasmanians! It’s not simply possible to kill them all.&amp;amp;quot; Despite being subjected to merciless rule and repression, in South Africa blacks multiply to a concerning degree: “Some colonists openly desire an insurrection to halt the dangerous growth of the Kaffir population and to erase their rights, including to their land.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn823|823]] Cold and expressionless, these descriptions become charged with moral indignation in passing from bourgeois historians to Lenin, who notes: these are “the results of the colonial wars”; thanks to the expropriation and annihilation of the Hereros, the new arrivals can “steal the land and become landowners.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn824|824]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No less charged with moral indignation is the reading that Stalin makes of colonialism. But Theodore Roosevelt appears to preemptively respond to this denunciation of the enslavement and genocidal practices that take place in the colonies: “Quite fortunately, the tough and energetic politicians who were the pioneers of the difficult job of civilizing barbarian territories didn’t allow themselves to become overtaken by false sentimentalism”; those “sentimental philanthropists” who are moved by the fate of the colonized peoples should be considered worse than “professional criminals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn825|825]] The same can be said of General Bugeaud, considered by Tocqueville as a model of “energy” and “unequaled vigor” at the time of leading “the only type of war that can be waged in Africa.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn826|826]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In our days, is communism synonymous with the total state and with totalitarianism? In the years of the First World War, it was the capitalist countries, including those of liberal orientation, who incarnated all that. Lenin highlights the fact that what impedes “fraternization” on the frontlines is “a penal colony discipline”, and that even the rearguard posts have become “military prisons.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn827|827]] Civil society is subjected to the same iron-fist discipline; in referring to that, the Russian revolutionary highlights the relevance of the analysis made some decades earlier by Engels, according to whom the growing militarization and “the competition for greater conquest drives political power to the point that it threatens to consume the entire society, even the State.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn828|828]] Bukharin, for his part, in denouncing the “centralization of the garrison State” and the “iron heel of the militarist State”, spots on the horizon a “new Leviathan, to which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems like child’s play.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn829|829]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a theme that is also found in Stalin, for whom war ends up mutilating or destroying “democracy” even where it appears to be more rooted: contrary to Russia, in Britain “national oppression” doesn’t generally assume “the monstrous forms of massacres and pogroms”, it was “less grave, less inhuman”; but with the outbreak of hostility the situation deteriorates drastically, as both Irish and Indians had to experience first hand.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn830|830]] Even the Western democracies tend not to differentiate themselves from a country characterized by a fierce and “inhumane autocracy.&amp;amp;quot; One can counterpose this language to “the frequent use in the writing of [Theodore] Roosevelt of words like ‘virile’, ‘imperial’, ‘able bodied’”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn831|831]] a prose that again transmits an attitude “beyond good and evil” and a cult to a will power lacking any moral limits.&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the common place reading that likes to oppose the moral sense of the liberal bourgeois world to the communist movement’s Machiavellian lack of scruples doesn’t stand up to historical analysis. Immediately after the October Revolution, approvingly welcomed by him, the young Lukács sees in the “historic movement” for “socialism” a radical settling of accounts with &#039;&#039;Realpolitik&#039;&#039;;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn832|832]] for Benedetto Croce, however, the Bolsheviks and the “Russian revolutionaries” are the object of hatred and ridicule, who represent “moralistic politics.&amp;amp;quot; They “have opened a great courthouse of justice, calling everyone to be examined in the name of morality, about their war objectives, to scrutinize them, accepting the honest and excluding the dishonest; thus, proceeding in a moralistic way, they have made public all previous diplomatic treaties”, considered immoral for having planned the war with the aim of obtaining territorial conquests. But the liberal philosopher objects, it’s absurd to want “to make moral judgements on States” and “to treat politics like morality, in the place where politics (and that is the simple truth) is politics, and precisely politics, and nothing more than politics; and [...] their morality consists solely and entirely in being politically excellent.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, it doesn’t make sense to argue for “awarding rights to those who don’t know how to win them or don’t know how to defend them, placing limits and responsibilities on those who rightly, out of their own conviction and by shedding their own blood, don’t recognize any other limit or obligation outside those suggested or put in place by their own mind and strength.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn833|833]] One can say that Stalin has the ideal response to Croce on March 10th, 1939, at a time when the partition and tragedy of Czechoslovakia takes place, thanks to Munich and the complicity of the West, who refuse to condemn it and seek to contain the expansionist will power and vitality of the Third Reich, doing everything possible to direct it to the East: “It’s naive to lecture people who don’t recognize human morality. ‘Politics is politics’, as the old and experienced bourgeois diplomats say.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn834|834]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us concentrate on the First World War. It’s worthwhile to reread what Vilfredo Pareto wrote in 1920: before the conflagration, “the proletarians and especially the socialists” said they were ready to prevent it with a general strike or by still more radical means. “After such beautiful speeches the World War began. The general strike doesn’t happen; while in opposition in various parliaments, the socialists approved the funding for the war, or didn’t make too much opposition to it” so that “the principle of the teacher [Marx]: ‘workers of the world, unite!’ implicitly transformed into another: ‘workers of the world, kill yourselves’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn835|835]] Stalin appears to have preemptively responded to Pareto, who, at least at this time is a typical representative of the liberal-bourgeois world, and who doesn’t hide his cynicism and satisfaction over the bloody defeat of socialist internationalism; but the words of Stalin reverberate with moral indignation and, at the same time with hope (the February Revolution has started):&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Three years have passed since the workers of the world―a day before still brothers, now dressed in uniforms―lined up to face each other as enemies, and who today injure and kill each other, to the enjoyment of the enemies of the proletariat [...]. The Russian Revolution is the first to open a breach in the wall that divides the workers against each other. At a time of general ‘patriotic’ intoxication, the Russian workers are the first to raise the forgotten slogan: “Workers of the world, Unite!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn836|836]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the new situation created in Russia (and around the world) it’s possible to resume the struggle to put an end to the massacre and to promote “mass confraternization on the fronts” and “new bonds of fraternity among the peoples.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn837|837]] To achieve this result, however, it’s necessary to go beyond the February Revolution. “The life in the trenches, the true lives of the soldiers, created a new instrument of struggle: mass confraternization”, which the provisional government nevertheless opposes, calling for an “offensive” and for new bloodbaths,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn838|838]] and it threatens to send to military courts those “guilty” of “confraternization.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn839|839]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s true, in its clandestine period, the Bolshevik party and Stalin eventually carried out their struggle against the autocracy using violent methods (robberies of banks and vehicles transporting valuables), and historians committed to depicting Stalin as a gangster since his youth make use of that past. What is there to say of this approach? Let’s make a comparison with Churchill, five years older than Stalin. The future British statesman begins his career by fighting and sympathetically describing the wars of the British Empire, including the least glorious ones; while in Sudan they don’t take prisoners, in South Africa the conquerors create concentration camps, destined to become a tragic model. From these experiences, Churchill begins to distinguish himself as a political leader, passionately fighting for the defense of the “British race” and the white race in general. To achieve this outcome, it&#039;s not enough to strengthen control over the “colonial peoples”, it’s necessary to intervene in the metropole as well: they must proceed toward the forced sterilization of the “feeble-minded”, misfits, those presumed to be habitual delinquents; at the same time “idle vagabonds” should be locked away in work camps. Only this way could “a national and racial threat impossible to exaggerate” be adequately confronted. The author who cites these fragments comments: as the Home Secretary in 1911, Churchill was the author of “draconian measures” that had “conferred upon him an almost unlimited personal power over the lives of individuals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn840|840]] Are Churchill’s origins truly more inspiring than Stalin’s? Years later, while the latter―from a prison in which he was placed by the tsarist regime allied to Britain―dreams of the confraternization of soldiers and nations, the former is dedicated to carrying out until the very end a war that his view is destined to strengthen the hegemony of the British Empire and the “British race.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, for a historian who ends their work in October of 1917, it would very difficult to point to the Bolshevik party and to Stalin as the side in the struggle that ignores moral reasoning.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Reductio ad Hilterum and its Variants ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even more inconclusive prove to be the psychopathological and moral approaches for the fact that the tragedy that took place in Russia in the twentieth century was predicted decades or even centuries in advance by a number of different personalities; therefore it’s very hard to explain it by the psychology or by the moral deprivation of single individuals. Moreover, like the first approach, the second as well could be used to denounce the leader of the liberal West. One can start with the close support given by Great Britain to the attempted coup d’état by Kornilov, and the support later given to the Whites, at a time when they unleashed a vicious and bloody manhunt, that in some ways foreshadowed the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; To impose upon Russia its permanent participation in what the communists denounced as the “genocide” of World War I, the liberal West closed its eyes to other monstrous crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
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After military victory comes the moment to divide up the colonial booty. To Britain belongs, among others, Iraq, that nevertheless rebels in 1920. Here’s how one of the leading countries of the liberal West faces that situation: British troops initiated “cruel reprisals”, “they set fire to villages and committed other acts which today we’d judge to be excessively repressive, if not outright barbaric.&amp;amp;quot; It’s certainly not Churchill who puts a halt to it, he in fact encourages the air force to offer a severe lesson to the “recalcitrant natives”, using an “experimental method” by resorting to “toxic gas projectiles, especially mustard gas.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn841|841]] In this case, we are forced to think not of the “final solution”, but of the colonial war unleashed by fascist Italy against Ethiopia, and carried out in a particularly barbaric way, resorting to weapons prohibited by international conventions. In this, Churchill appears as the precursor to Mussolini. Moreover, when it’s a matter of preserving or expanding the Empire, the crude methods of the British statesman are unchanging: in 1942, the pro-independence demonstrations in India are repressed by “resorting to extreme measures, like the use of the air force to strafe the multitudes of protesters”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn842|842]] in the following two years, Churchill is stubborn in denying and in neglecting the reality of the famine that decimated the population of Indian Bengal. Finally, to stick with the subject of the colonies and the peoples of colonial origin, to what degree does the “final solution of our indigenous question” in Canada, that until 1931 is part of the British Commonwealth, cast another shadow on an authoritative member of the British political class like Churchill? He, as prime minister from 1951 to 1955, must be considered responsible for the genocidal practices that the government in London resorts to in the effort to smash the Mau Mau rebellion. (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s return to the interwar period in Europe. After Hitler’s rise to power, the London government seeks by all means to redirect the Third Reich’s expansionist drive to the East, and primarily against the Soviet Union. Regarding this, two Canadian historians arrive at a conclusion that gives cause for consideration: “The responsibility for the tragedy of World War II, the Holocaust included, must fall in part on Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, and their closest allies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn843|843]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, Great Britain was unable to avoid the clash with Nazi Germany and it faces it primarily by making use of indiscriminate terror bombings of German cities, with the consequent massacre of the civilian population; that led two American historians to make a comparison to the treatment inflicted by Nazism on the Jewish people (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 2). It’s the Soviet leadership that seeks to restrain it, as follows in a diary entry by Dimitrov from March 17th, 1945:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;This evening with Stalin alongside Molotov, we discussed the questions regarding Germany. The British want to divide Germany (Bavaria, Austria, the Rhineland, etc). They try using all means to destroy their competitor. They furiously bombard German factories. We don’t let their aircraft pass over our area in Germany. But they try by all means to bombard there as well [...] It’s necessary for Germans to emerge who can act to save what can still be saved for the sake of the German people. To organize local government, restore economic life, etc, in the occupied territories and areas soon to be occupied by the Red Army. To create bodies for local administration from which can also emerge a German government.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn844|844]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All the more odious appears the hellfire unleashed by the British air force for the fact that two weeks after the start of the war, British Prime Minister Chamberlain had declared: “regardless of how far others may go, the government of His Majesty will never resort to deliberate attacks against women and children for merely terroristic aims.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn845|845]] In truth, the plans for indiscriminate and terroristic bombardments had begun taking shape during the First World War; while it dragged on without end, Churchill “had planned for 1919 an attack by a thousand bombers on Berlin.&amp;amp;quot; Those planned continued to be developed after their victory.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn846|846]] In other words, one could say, imitating the careless form of argument used by the ideologues in fashion today, that the leading country of the liberal West at that time planned a new “genocide” as was coming to end the one that had been initiated in 1914. In any case, it’s precisely Britain who becomes the protagonist of the systematic destruction of German cities toward the very end of World War II (with Dresden particularly in mind), an organized destruction carried out with the declared objective of leaving no escape for the civilian population, pursued and consumed by the flames, obstructed in their attempt to flee the bombing by delayed explosions and often strafed from above.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those practices appear all the more sinister if we consider the statement made by Churchill in April of 1941: “There’s less than 70 million evil Huns. Some of them can be cured, others must die.&amp;amp;quot; If one doesn’t have in mind a pure and simple genocide, like Nolte thought, it’s clear that a massive thinning of the German population was being considered.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn847|847]] We can put the strategic bombing campaign in that context: “Between 1940-1945, Churchill annihilated the inhabitants of Cologne, Berlin, and Dresden as if they were the Huns.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn848|848]] The British prime minister proved to be no less cruel when it came to carving out London’s sphere of influence and systematically liquidating the partisan forces considered hostile or questionable. The orders given to the British expeditionary force in Greece are significant: “Don’t hesitate in acting as if you found yourselves in a conquered city in which a local revolt has broken out.&amp;amp;quot; In addition: “Certain things can’t be done half-way.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn849|849]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s move on to the Cold War. Some time ago, &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; revealed that between 1946 and 1948, Great Britain prepared camps in Germany in which were to be confined communists or elements suspected of communist sympathies, and real or presumed Soviet spies: “the photos showed the disheveled and tormented faces of the bone-thin youths, for months subjected to a lack of food and sleep, repeatedly beaten and exposed to very low temperatures. An inhumane treatment that sought the death of some of the prisoners.&amp;amp;quot; Imprisoned there as well were “dozens of women who weren’t spared from torture.&amp;amp;quot; In carrying out torture, they used instruments that had been inherited from the Gestapo; in fact, the camps were “worthy of the Nazi ‘lagers’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn850|850]] As one can see, the comparison between the practices used in the twentieth century by Great Britain and the practices dear to the Third Reich continually arises.&lt;br /&gt;
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When we concern ourselves with the United States, we reach results that are no different. In that case, the hypocrisy we saw characterize Chamberlain reaches its apex. Soon after the start of World War II, it’s Franklin D. Roosevelt who condemns the aerial bombardments targeting civilian populations for being against the sentiments of “every civilized man and woman” and “human consciousness”, and as the expression of “inhuman barbarity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn851|851]] Soon to demonstrate even more extreme “inhuman barbarity”, the United States war machine proceeds with the systematic and terroristic destruction of Japanese cities and actively participates in a similar operation carried out against German cities. Nor should it be underestimated the bombardment against Italy, which also aims to strike the civilian population and undermine their morale. It’s F.D. Roosevelt himself who provides evidence of that: “We will make it so the Italians experience an authentic bombardment, and I’m more than convinced that they won’t remain standing under this sort of pressure.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn852|852]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The terror bombing campaign culminates, under the Truman administration, in the use of nuclear weapons against a country already on its knees. To add a further gruesome detail: it’s been noted that the annihilation of the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was aimed, not at a Japan on the brink of surrender, but at the Soviet Union, delivered as a serious warning.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn853|853]] We have before us, then, two acts of terrorism on a grand scale; and moreover, they serve multiple purposes: tens upon tens of thousands of unarmed civilians of the old enemy (or better yet, the former enemy who’s to be transformed into an ally) are massacred with the aim of terrorizing an ally, now picked out as the new enemy and the new target of the genocidal practices that had just been tested!&lt;br /&gt;
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The war in Asia, however, lends itself to further considerations. It’s now widely accepted in the United States the theory according to which the attack on Pearl Harbor was easily foreseen (and in fact provoked with an oil embargo that had left Japan with very few alternatives). Once the attack took place, however, the war is carried out by Washington and inspired by a sense of moral indignation that in light of what we now know is certainly hypocritical, yet much more lethal. It’s not just the destruction of cities. Consider the mutilation of bodies and even the mutilation of enemies moments away from their deaths in order to extract some kind of souvenir, a souvenir then calmly and proudly flaunted. Especially significant is the ideology that presides over these practices: the Japanese are classified as “subhumans”, resorting to a term central to Nazi discourse.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn854|854]] And we are again directed to that discourse when we witness F.D. Roosevelt flirt with the idea of forcing “castration” upon the Germans. After the end of the war, they are confined to concentration camps where, out of pure sadism or vengeance, they are forced to endure hunger, thirst, and all kinds of deprivations and humiliations, while across the entire defeated nation looms the specter of death by starvation.&lt;br /&gt;
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To continue with the statesman who is considered, above all others, to be the champion of freedom: Roosevelt didn’t alter the policy traditionally followed by Washington in Latin America, and in 1937 a bloody dictator, Anastasio Somoza, comes to power in Nicaragua, thanks to the National Guard trained by the United States.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn855|855]] Within the United States, cities built under the F.D. Roosevelt administration continued to explicitly discriminate against African Americans; moreover, “the residencies for workers involved in national defense, either built or financed by the government during World War II, were deliberately subjected to a more rigid segregation than even that enforced in the neighboring communities.&amp;amp;quot; In addition, “the armed forces also maintained a rigid segregation during the war.&amp;amp;quot; There’s more: despite pressure from the Republican Party, “the president never put forth legislative proposals against lynchings”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn856|856]] which continue to be carried out in the South as a spectacle for crowds of men, women and children who enjoy the sight of the humiliation and the most sadistic torture inflicted upon the victim―a slow torment, unending and made to last as long as possible (&#039;&#039;infra&#039;&#039;, ch. 8, § 4).&lt;br /&gt;
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Lastly, after having celebrated in January of 1941 the United States as a country that has continually evolved in a peaceful manner, “without concentration camps”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn857|857]] soon after the outbreak of war, F.D. Roosevelt resorts to that very institution to deprive the Japanese American community of their freedom, without distinctions for age or sex.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays, it’s almost obvious to compare Stalin to Hitler, but it may be interesting to read an evaluation of the strategic bombing of Germany that a German author made regarding the flames that consumed Dresden and its residents:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The fate of the bodies reflected the means of execution. The victim of an act of extermination does not have their own grave, nor their own death, because they have not been given the right to live [...], the deaths of thousands of children beneath the age of ten is not a punishment. The bombardier Harris [leader of the air campaign against German cities] didn’t assign them any blame. Churchill only stated that for him they had no rights of any value. Perhaps they still had some in the First World War, but not anymore in the Second. Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt had taken them away.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn858|858]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Of course, the comparison of these three figures is marked by a polemical overstatement that seems to reflect a mindset widespread in Germany immediately following the war, in a ruined Germany that is isolated by the ban against fraternization and taken to the brink of starvation by the liberal West. A conversation was recorded that, in the zone occupied by the US, takes place between two desperate citizens:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Yes, Hitler was bad, our war was unjust, but now they are committing the same injustices against us, they are the same, there’s no difference, they seek to enslave Germany in the same way Hitler sought to enslave the Polish, now we are the Jews, the ‘inferior race’.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn859|859]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the first of these two cited passages makes a partial comparison between Hitler, Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt, the second arrives at their total assimilation. The ruling ideology today, however, associates Stalin and Hitler, but that’s just as rash as the comparison made by the two German citizens frustrated by hunger and humiliation: ‘There’s no difference’!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Tragic Conflicts and Moral Dilemmas ===&lt;br /&gt;
Even in wanting to fixate on its specifically moral dimension, the comparison between the protagonists of the grand anti-fascist alliance certainly has its contrasts. But how to explain, then, the current Manichean opposition? Let’s return to the secular process behind the catastrophe that explodes with the collapse of the tsarist autocracy. Sadly, while accepted when it comes to historical reconstruction, the long-term perspective disappears like magic when it comes to the formulation of a moral judgement: everything is reduced to the demonization of the period that began with October 1917, and with Stalin in particular. Are those who for a long time supported a regime characterized by such violent social relations―and so violently dehumanizing that the catastrophe was foreseen by such different personalities (Maistre, Marx, Witte)―blameless? Is there nothing to censure in those who unleashed World War I, and that in the West, with the aim of forcing Russia to participate in it until the end, didn’t hesitate in arming and propping up even the most ferocious reactionary groups? If, as sustained by one of the authors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;, “Stalinism” began taking form in 1914, why doesn’t the bench for the accused have those that were responsible for the slaughter, but only those that sought to prevent or hasten its conclusion?&lt;br /&gt;
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At least with regard to the origin and the unfolding of the Second World War, the problematic character of the moral judgement to be formulated on the Western and liberal statesmen didn’t go unnoticed by the more attentive authors. We saw two Canadian historians attribute to the British protagonists of appeasement―in truth, the redirection of Nazi expansionism to the East―shared responsibility “for the tragedy of World War II, including Holocaust.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there’s the problem of how the war was conducted by the liberal West once it began. Of course, in this case as well the ruling ideology gets off easy. A successful historian and journalist, whose articles are also found in the New York Times, and who has very little doubts “about the timing and moral righteousness” of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, goes as far as stating that to not use it “would have been illogical and completely irresponsible.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly a massacre of an innocent civilian population took place, but “those who died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were victims not of American technology, but of a paralyzed system of government, devoted to a twisted ideology that had eliminated not only absolute moral values, but reason itself.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn860|860]] These firmly held certainties rest on a very simple assumption: the responsibility for a horrible action does not necessarily belong to the material author of that action. It’s something that has been similarly argued by the leaders of the USSR: having obviously recognized the horrors that took place at crucial moments in the history of the country, but having attributed its responsibility to “imperialist encirclement” and the aggressive policies of the great capitalist powers. It must be noted, however, that the journalist-historian, who is published and praised by the most prominent press organizations, applies his criteria only to the liberal and Anglo-Saxon West. But to only apply a criteria to one’s own side is the very definition of dogmatism at the theoretical level and it’s hypocrisy at the moral level.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fortunately, it’s possible to hear less simplistic opinions on Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An illustrious American philosopher, Michael Walzer, observes that, for the then victorious American side, to resort to the atomic bomb and “to kill and terrorize civilians”, without even attempting a real negotiation with the Japanese, were “two crimes in one.&amp;amp;quot; Walzer reaches a similar conclusion with regard to the destruction of Dresden and other German and Japanese cities, carried out “when the war had already been virtually won.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn861|861]] The question is put differently during the years in which the triumph of the Third Reich appeared to be taking place, when Great Britain begins its strategic bombing campaign that in Germany systematically and ruthlessly targets the civilian population. It’s a tragic moment and the British rulers find themselves in a terrible moral dilemma that can be formulated as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Can soldiers and statesmen trample over the rights of innocent people to save their own political community? I would be inclined to respond in the affirmative to that question, although not without hesitation and concern. What other choice would be available to them? They can sacrifice themselves for the purpose of defending moral law, but they can’t sacrifice their own countrymen. Faced with an endless and horrible situation, the options in front of them are exhausted, they will do what is necessary to save their own people.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn862|862]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The danger of a victory by the Third Reich, “the personification of evil in the world”, dictates a “supreme emergency”, a “state of necessity”; so it’s then necessary to observe that “necessity knows no limits.&amp;amp;quot; Certainly, bombing campaigns that aim aim to kill and terrorize the civilian population of an enemy country are a crime, however, “I dare say that our history would be wiped out, our future put in jeopardy, if I didn’t accept assuming the burden of the criminal act here and now.&amp;amp;quot; The young Lukács makes a similar argument when, driven by the butchery of World War I, his revolutionary orientation matures. In affirming the inevitability of “guilt” and appealing to “seriousness”, “consciousness”, and a “sense of moral responsibility”, he exclaims paraphrasing Hebbel: “And if God, between me and the task that’s been assigned to me, had placed sin, who am I to be allowed to escape that choice?”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn863|863]] Presumably later, with that same state of mind, as the threat posed by the Third Reich grows ever more imminent, the Hungarian philosopher faced the years of Stalin&#039;s terror.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can now turn our sights to the Soviet Union. It’s worthwhile to observe the thesis formulated by Toynbee, according to which Stalingrad was made possible by the journey taken by Stalin’s USSR “from 1928 to 1941”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn864|864]] is today confirmed by no small number of historians and experts on military strategy: it’s quite possible that, without the abandonment of the NEP, without the collectivization of agriculture (with the steady flow of food products from the countryside to the city and the front) and the rushed industrialization (with the development of the arms industry and with the rise of new industrial centers in the eastern regions, at a safe distance from the invading army), it would have been impossible to successfully oppose Hitler’s aggression: “The unequaled and incontestable contribution by Soviet Russia to the defeat of Nazi Germany is closely linked to the stubborn Second Revolution by Stalin.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn865|865]] Moreover, in Churchill’s judgement, even the trial against Tukhachevsky and the Great Terror as a whole had played a positive and even an important role in the defeat of Operation Barbarossa. Must we then justify the concentrationary universe that made it possible to avoid “a horror without end” for the Soviet people and for all of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
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Walzer rightly subjects his stated principle to rigorous conditions: it can only be considered valid if, aside from being “truly rare and dire”, the danger is also “imminent.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn866|866]] One could possibly say that the second condition is absent in the Soviet Union: Stalin begins coerced collectivization of agriculture and rushed industrialization―which ends up provoking a horrible expansion of the concentrationary universe―when the threat of war is still remote and Hitler hadn’t even seized power. One could also argue in response that Great Britain also promoted its plan for the construction of an air fleet suited to future strategic bombing campaigns at least two decades before the rise of its “supreme emergency.&amp;amp;quot; In fact, that plan began taking shape during the First World War and, therefore, what motivated it was the competition for hegemony underway since at least the end of the nineteenth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The context is very different for the country that is born out of the October Revolution. Widespread in Europe at the time, the analysis offered by General Foch, among others, soon after the signing of the Versailles Treaty (“it’s not a peace, it’s but an armistice for twenty years”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn867|867]] is well known to Stalin, who warns about the urgency of the task of tackling the backwardness demonstrated by Russia during the First World War. With regard to the Eastern Front, that conflict was continuously understood by Wilhelm II as a racial war in which the very existence of the nations in battle was at stake, the “to be or not to be of the Germanic race in Europe.&amp;amp;quot; It was a fight that excluded any reconciliation or mutual recognition: peace “is in no way possible between Slavs and Germans.&amp;amp;quot; Specifically starting with Brest-Litovsk, voices had emerged in Wilhelm’s Reich that looked to the East in search of a solution for the problem of living-space, and who had in mind an understanding with Britain with the aim of carrying out the dismemberment of Russia and “creating the conditions for Germany’s position in the world as an enormous continental power.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn868|868]] A few years later, in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;, Hitler clearly described his program for the construction of a continental German empire to be built primarily over the ruins of the Soviet Union. It’s not hard to identify the line that leads from Brest-Litovsk to Operation Barbarossa, and that’s enough to explain Stalin’s concerns. In any case, the imminence of the threat is anything but unambiguous; there’s no great way of measuring its distance in time; the threat is imminent enough that no delays can be permitted for it to be adequately handled. Moreover, if we understand “imminence” not only with respect to time, but also with respect to location, the Soviet Union was clearly exposed to a more “imminent” threat. Lastly, while the systematic killing of a civilian population by aerial bombardment &#039;&#039;is a crime in itself&#039;&#039;, the collectivization of agricultural and rushed industrialization end up leading to a series of crimes.&lt;br /&gt;
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Those who only contemplate the moral dilemmas of the Anglo-Saxon statesmen demonstrate dogmatism and hypocrisy. Yet, even if we affirm alongside Walzer that when faced with the “supreme emergency” a statesman must know how to assume “the burden of the crime here and now”, it becomes difficult to move on from the general to the particular.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
When we read about the terrible suffering individuals held in the Gulag went through, disturbed by a horrible experience of which they are unable to comprehend either its origin or its reason, we are led to exclaim alongside Petrarch “Povera et nuda vai philosophia” (Rimas, VII, 10). But a similar consideration holds true for the victims of strategic bombing campaigns. Can the “supreme emergency” really justify that which is described in written accounts? “The first round of bombs fell at nine in the morning on streets full of people lined up to shop, and it killed seven hundred people, nearly all of them women and children. Later the warplanes pursued and struck the citizens fleeing to the east, to the forest.&amp;amp;quot; In other places “the warplanes started strafing pedestrians, cyclists, train passengers, farmers working in the fields.&amp;amp;quot; “The funerals take place under low altitude attacks; lacking coffins, bed sheets were used.&amp;amp;quot; “The bombs smash through houses, remaining stuck in the ceiling, they explode ten days later, during the light of day or in the dark of night: they knock down walls, and kill residents while they sleep.&amp;amp;quot; “People had to flee through the flames and thereby rushed to their deaths; there were even those who took their own lives or threw themselves into the flames.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn869|869]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any case, criminal at a time when the defeat of the Third Reich was already becoming evident, are these actions justified while the supreme emergency is in effect? It’s once again evident the difficulty in moving from the general to the particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Soviet Katyn and the American and South Korean “Katyn” ===&lt;br /&gt;
Contrary to the collectivization of agriculture and the rushed industrialization, the massacre of Polish officers, ordered by the Soviet leadership and carried out in Katyn in March and April of 1940, is a crime in itself. The challenge posed by Finland continued to linger; after the unsuccessful attempt to arrange an agreed-upon exchange of territory, undertaken by Stalin with the aim of providing a minimal of territorial depth to the defense of Leningrad (a city that is later protagonist of an epic resistance against the Nazi invasion), now the war appears to be widening and becoming generalized. In such a case, what would be the reaction from the captured Polish officers following the dismemberment of Poland? For Moscow’s part, they try in vain to dissuade them from their stubborn anti-Soviet positions, the legacy of the conflict that began with the collapse of the tsarist empire and that therefore tended to take on the brutal characteristics of a civil war. The situation became very difficult. There was the danger of the USSR itself being consumed by the war, and there were Western circles that were considering an overthrow of Stalin’s regime (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, § 9). That is the “grave security problem” that precipitated the “appalling decision” that Stalin must have later “bitterly lamented due to the troubles and complications that followed.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn870|870]] In other words, in the case of the Katyn executions, the moral dilemmas that Walzer brought up are also present. However, it would be wrong in this case to invoke the “supreme emergency”, further expanding a criteria that inherently runs the risk of becoming excessively broad.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although it’s unjustifiable, the crime we are dealing with doesn’t involve characteristics that are specific to Stalin’s personality or the regime led by him. Let’s consider the crime that stains United States general Patton; upon landing in Sicily, he orders the massacre of Italian soldiers who surrendered after fierce resistance.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn871|871]] Although it’s an atrocity smaller in scope, it’s necessary to have in mind that there’s no real security concerns for the country that provoked it, but rather the spirit of vengeance or maybe even racial contempt. In other words, in this case it’s a matter of a crime of abject motives.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, if we want to find a real analogy to Katyn, we must reference other tragedies and other horrors. Ten years after the Soviet Katyn, that which we can define as the United States and South Korean “Katyn” took place. The Korean War is underway. From the savagely bombarded North, a mass of refugees heads to the South. How are they received? “The United States army had a policy of killing civilians that approached South Korea”; the victims were “mostly women and children”, but they had feared that North Korean infiltrators had been among them, although in researching one of the more documented cases (the killings that occurred in No Gun Ri), “there didn’t appear to be any proof of enemy infiltrators”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn872|872]] Here it’s not a question of orders from a single, albeit high profile, general or marshal like Patton, but rather a policy approved at the highest military (and political) levels in the United States. And it’s that exact situation that makes us think of Katyn, especially because security is at stake in the two cases.&lt;br /&gt;
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To guarantee security, the United States and its allies don’t stop at killing refugees. They considered it necessary to also eliminate the potential fifth column. For example, “in the city of Taejon, in July of 1950, the police order 1,700 Koreans, accused of being communists, to dig their graves, then they were put to the firing squad.” A witness explains:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;On a Sunday morning, at dawn, in the apparently deserted city of Chochiwon, I saw a procession of men and women, bound to one another with their hands behind their backs, beaten and bashed, while they are led from the police station to the trucks they’re forced to climb into. They were later put to the firing squad, left unburied one or two miles away.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn873|873]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;In a cobalt mine near Daegu, in the south of the country, researchers have so far found the remains of 240 people. It’s just a fraction of the presumed 3,500 prisoners or suspected communists grabbed from their cells or homes between July and September of 1950, and later put to the firing squad and tossed to the bottom of the mine.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sometimes the victims of “summary executions” also included “women and children”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn874|874]] one could say in such cases that not even the family of the suspected communist was spared. The obsession with security doesn’t only strike the military rear, but the captured or recaptured cities as well. Here’s what happened in one of them: “they told us to light our cigarettes. Then they started to unload with their rifles and machine guns. After a pause, one officer shouted: ‘those of you still alive, you can get up and go home’. Those that did were again fired upon.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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How many victims in total were there from these two practices of killing refugees and eliminating those suspected of being communists? In truth, it still hasn’t been fully determined the extension of that which “the relatives of the victims call the Korean death camps.&amp;amp;quot; For now a provisional figure can be reached: “The researchers have so far investigated 1,222 cases of mass executions [...]. The cases included 215 incidents in which the survivors claim American ground troops and planes killed unarmed refugees.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn875|875]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The American and South Korean “Katyn” doesn’t appear to be smaller in scale than the Soviet one, and in addition it shows a greater lack of scruples (for a war carried out thousands of kilometers away by a country whose leaders in Washington couldn’t in any way claim a “supreme emergency”). But here it’s not a question of establishing a hierarchy between the two crimes, both are unjustifiable; it’s instead a question of noting the inadequacy of the moral-Manichaean approach to understanding Stalin and the country led by him.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Inevitability and Complexity of the Moral Judgement ===&lt;br /&gt;
In a certain way, while inevitable, the moral judgement would be superficial and hypocritical if it was formulated by abstracting the historical context. From there arises its complexity and difficulty. At the same time, it’s necessary to have in mind and to unravel the objective circumstances and subjective responsibilities and, with respect to the latter, it’s necessary to distinguish between the responsibilities of the leadership group as a whole and those that belong to single individuals. With respect to the leadership group of Soviet Russia, it comes to power at a time when―to use the words of a Christian witness sympathetic to the changes brought by October 1917―”pity was killed by the omnipresence of death”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn876|876]] and it is forced to face a prolonged state of emergency, in a situation characterized―to again use the analysis by one of the authors of &#039;&#039;The Black Book of Communism&#039;&#039;―by an “unparalleled brutality”, generalized and “without possible terms of comparison to that known by Western societies.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, while the major figures of the twentieth century were forced to confront the devastating conflicts and moral dilemmas that characterized the Second Thirty Years’ War, Stalin had to also face the conflicts and moral dilemmas particular to Russian history and the Second Time of Troubles. One could say the shadow of the “supreme emergency” dominated the thirty years when he exercised power.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s necessary, however, not to lose sight of the fact that it’s not only the objective conditions that create serious obstacles or make the transition from the state of emergency to a state of normality impossible. Millenarianism also contributed to that, though certainly in great measure sparked by the horrors of World War I, yet it’s intrinsic to a vision that expects the disappearance of the market, money, the state and juridical order. The disappointment and outrage that none of that had come to pass encourages more conflict, and a conflict that can’t be managed by purely formal juridical norms, as they too are destined to disappear. From this arises a level of violence that isn’t possible to justify by resorting to the state of emergency or the “supreme emergency.&amp;amp;quot; In that sense, the moral judgement coincides with the political judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
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This holds true for the liberal West as well. With regard to the commander of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, it was observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;When he was a young pilot, Harris had bombed rebellious Indian civilians. The psychological shock they experienced was a cultural shock above all else. The primitive tribes that lived in villages with huts made of reeds threw themselves down in awe at the feet of the colonial empire and its industrial arsenal.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn877|877]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, it was Churchill more than anyone else who promoted that kind of warfare, who as we already saw suggests striking “recalcitrant natives” in Iraq with bombs using “chemical weapons and especially mustard gas”, and elsewhere compares the Germans to “evil Huns.&amp;amp;quot; We also encountered the weight of racial ideology in the American war against Japan (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 6, § 4), that, not by chance, goes on to suffer the atomic bombings. Again a level of violence appears that can’t be justified by the “supreme emergency”, but instead relates to the colonial ideology shared by the liberal West and Germany. While the Third Reich compares the “indigenous people” of Eastern Europe to the decimated Native Americans and enslaved blacks, Britain and the United States end up treating the Germans and the Japanese the same way as colonial peoples are treated, needing a lesson in obedience.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Stalin, Peter the Great and the New Lincoln ===&lt;br /&gt;
In specific reference to the role played by him in the Second Time of Troubles, no small number of historians―taking up a theme that we already saw Churchill use―compare Stalin to Peter the Great.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn878|878]] Even the objection raised in regards to it (“Peter, contrary to Stalin, looked to the West and opened up his state to it”)[[footnotes.xhtml#fn879|879]] doesn’t seem persuasive. The condemnation of the “Asiatic dispositions”, the “barbaric, Asiatic measures”, and the “Asiatic methods”, for which the government and bourgeoisie of Tsarist Russia are responsible, is a crucial moment in Stalin’s revolutionary agitation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn880|880]] At least until October 1917, he had no doubt that his country was more backwards at all levels in relation to the Western democracies, where bloody pogroms against the Jews don’t take place, pogroms that rage in a “semi-Asiatic country” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 9). After the seizure of power, Stalin not only insists on the need to embrace Western technology, but also declares that, if they really want to live up to the “principles of Leninism”, the Bolshevik cadre must know how to combine “the Russian revolutionary impetus” with “the practical American spirit.&amp;amp;quot; In 1932, still referring to the United States, he expresses his appreciation for their “industrial and productive traditions”: they are “somewhat democratic.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn881|881]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The reference to Peter the Great seems to be yet more persuasive in explaining the history of Soviet Russia for the fact that Lenin makes explicit reference to it (by May of 1918); and it’s referenced by Stalin as well, who once in a while appears to take up the figure of the great tsar as a model.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn882|882]] Trotsky himself, even while denouncing the “betrayal” of the revolution, writes: “In comparison to other various regions and nationalities, [Stalin’s] regime largely realizes the historic work that Peter I and his comrades realized for old Moscow; he just does it on a much vaster scale and at a much quicker pace.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn883|883]] It’s interesting as well to observe that, at the end of his trip to the Soviet Union in 1927, a great philosopher like Benjamin sympathetically shares the thesis by some “literati [...] who see in Bolshevism the coronation of Peter the Great’s work.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn884|884]] Lastly, one could go further back and recall a prediction by Marx: After having mentioned the violent and unprecedented disturbances provoked by the secular contradictions of Tsarist Russia, he concludes: “The Russian 1793 [...] will be the second turning point in Russian history and will introduce a real and generalized civilization in place of the false, deceptive civilization introduced by Peter the Great.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn885|885]]&lt;br /&gt;
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All that said, while it can in part serve to illuminate the relation between Russian history and the Second Time of Troubles, the comparison in question leaves out the Second Thirty Years’ War and the extraordinary influence exercised by Stalin at the global level. The condemnation in 1924 of the “outrageous disparity” between nations, theorized and imposed by imperialism, and the call to topple “the wall that separated whites and blacks”, nations considered “civilized” and peoples excluded from that recognition (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 7); the approval of a “profoundly internationalist” constitution―as Stalin stresses while presenting his project―and based on the “principle that all nations and races have equal rights”, regardless of the “color of their skin”, their language, and their respective level of economic and military development: all this could not fail to arouse a deep echo not only in the colonies but also in the peoples of colonial origin located in the very heart of the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn886|886]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Southern United States, where the regime of white supremacy still rages on, a new atmosphere takes hold; they look to the Soviet Union with hope and to Stalin as the “new Lincoln”, the Lincoln who would put an end, this time concretely and definitively, to the enslavement of blacks, and to the oppression, degradation, humiliation, violence and lynchings that they continue to endure.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn887|887]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While it advances toward autocracy, Stalin’s USSR has a powerful influence on the struggle by African Americans (and the colonial peoples) against racial despotism. In the South of the United States, a phenomenon is witnessed that is worrying from the point of view of the ruling caste: it’s the growing “imprudence” of black youths. Thanks to the communists, they finally begin to receive that which was stubbornly denied to them: an education that goes further than the basic education traditionally given to all those destined to carry out semi-servile labor for the master race. Now, however, in the schools organized by the communist party in the North of the United States, or in the schools of Moscow in Stalin’s USSR, blacks embrace the study of economics, politics, and world history; they also explore these disciplines to understand the reasons for the hard fate reserved to them in a country that carries itself as the champion of freedom. Those who attend those schools go through a profound change: the “imprudence” they’re condemned for by white supremacy is, in truth, their self esteem, up until that time forbidden and crushed. A black woman, and delegate to the International Congress of Women against War and Fascism that takes place in Paris in 1934, is extremely impressed by the equality and fraternity there, despite the linguistic and racial differences between those participating in that initiative promoted by the communists: “It was paradise on earth.&amp;amp;quot; Those who arrive in Moscow―observes a contemporary American historian―”experience a sense of freedom unheard of in the South.&amp;amp;quot; A black man falls in love with a white Soviet woman and they get married, even if later, in returning back home, he can’t bring her with him, knowing the destiny that awaits in the South for those that are found guilty of the crime of &#039;&#039;miscegenation&#039;&#039; and racial bastardization.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn888|888]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The hopes of African Americans placed in the “new Lincoln” are not as naive as they may seem. Let’s reflect on the times and the modalities that characterize the end of the regime of white supremacy. In December of 1952, the United States Attorney General sends a revealing letter to the Supreme Court as it debated the question of integrating public schools: “Racial discrimination carries water for communist propaganda and raises doubts even among friendly nations about the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.&amp;amp;quot; Washington―observes an American historian retracing those events―would run the risk of alienating “the colored races” not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States: here too communist propaganda has achieved considerable success in attempting to win blacks over to the “revolutionary cause”, undermining their “faith in American institutions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn889|889]] There is no doubt: on these events, the concern over the challenge objectively represented by the USSR, and by the influence exercised by it on the colonial peoples and the peoples of colonial origin, played an essential role.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin doesn’t just indirectly influence democracy in the West with the push in some way given to the process of African American emancipation. The speech presenting the proposed new constitution totally condemns the three great discriminations that characterized the history of the liberal West: “it’s not income, national origin or sex” that must determine political and social placement, but only “the personal capacity and work of each citizen.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn890|890]] At the time in which he expressed himself in that way, the three great discriminations are still present in different forms and intensities in this or that country in the liberal West. Lastly, in pronouncing himself in favor of the overcoming of the three great discriminations, Stalin also declares that the new constitution is destined to guarantee “the right to work, the right to rest, the right to an education” and to assure the “best material and cultural conditions”, all within the realization of “socialist democratism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn891|891]] It is the theorization of the “social and economic rights” that, according to Hayek, represents the ruinous legacy of the “Marxist Russian Revolution” and that profoundly influences the demands for the welfare state in the West.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn892|892]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return to Russia. The reader must have noticed that, in speaking of “Stalinism”, I make use of quotation marks. The term is used by the present day followers of Trotsky in relation to the most distinct political realities; for example, to classify the leadership of post-Maoist China. But in even wanting to exclusively refer to the USSR, the term “Stalinism” is not persuasive; it appears to presuppose a homogeneous collection of doctrines and methods that don’t exist. In the three decades in which he exercised power, we see Stalin make an effort in elaborating and putting into practice a program of government, making note of the disappearance of the hopes for the worldwide triumph of the socialist revolution and clarifying the difference between utopia (that is the legacy of both Marx’s theory and the millenarianism for a totally new world provoked by the horrors of World War I) and the state of emergency (that in Russia takes on an exceptionally long duration and acuteness because of the convergence of the two gigantic crises: The Second Time of Troubles and the Second Thirty Years’ War). Making clear his intention of not putting the communist party’s monopoly on power up for discussion, Stalin repeatedly seeks to move on from the state of emergency to a state of relative normality, with the realization of a “Soviet democracy”, of a “socialist democratism”, and a society “without the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;amp;quot; But those attempts failed. It’s significant how the question of succession is “handled” soon after Stalin’s death: the elimination of Beria is a type of mafia style settling of accounts, it’s a personal violence that doesn’t make reference to any state or juridical order, nor to party statutes.&lt;br /&gt;
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The comparison between Stalin and Peter the Great now becomes totally unworkable. Looking closely, the Second Time of Troubles doesn’t even end with the arrival of autocracy. Its arrival coincides with the start of a new and prolonged state of emergency, that expands first with a dreadful new world war, and later with a Cold War at risk of transforming into a nuclear apocalypse at any moment. One could say that the Second Time of Troubles ends, in fact, with the overthrow of the USSR. Like the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks are unable to adjust to the disappearance or the attenuation of the state of emergency, and they therefore end up seeming obsolete and superficial to the majority of the population. After having managed to overcome the “crisis of the entire Russian nation”, the Bolsheviks in the end were defeated by the arrival of that relative state of normality, that is itself an outcome of their efforts.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s at the international level, however, that the influence of the October Revolution, and the man who led Soviet Russia for three decades, prove to be more solid. One can ridicule the pompous language of a constitution that never came into force, but it’s necessary to have in mind that even purely abstract declarations of principles have an impact on history. We can fall back in horror at a scenario that sees democracy (with the collapse of racist and colonialist despotism and the three great discriminations), and especially social democracy, advance in the wake of the challenge being offered by a dictatorial regime prone to using terror; but to give in to that sort of reaction means, in the last analysis, escaping from the complexity of its historical process. Those who would prefer to have before them a simpler scenario would do well to reflect on an observation by Marx: “It&#039;s the bad side that produces the movement that makes history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn893|893]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;7. The Depiction of Stalin between History and Mythology&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Various Historical Sources in the Current Depiction of Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
However, it’s difficult for the current historiography to distance itself from the depiction of Stalin as an “enormous, shadowy, capricious and degenerate monster of man”―in addition, so lacking in intellectual and political capacity that he becomes the object of ridicule. With regard to mythology, it’s also necessary to search for its historical origin. It’s worthwhile to start with the author (Deutscher) who was just cited, who in other circumstances and in a different period of time observes: “In contrast to the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks don’t execute their Girondins”, namely, the Mensheviks, who were “permitted” and even “encouraged to leave Russia and set up their political center abroad.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn894|894]] From there a harsh campaign is developed against the country first led by Lenin and later, for a longer period of time, by Stalin. Deutscher continues as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;It’s correct that Stalin meditated at length about the terrible French precedent and for a few years that dissuaded him from resorting to more drastic means of repression. More than once Stalin had expressed himself in that sense [...]. In 1929, he decided to exile Trotsky from Russia. One couldn’t yet imagine that Trotsky was to be captured, and much less put before an execution squad.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn895|895]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With the opposition leader’s arrival in Istanbul, a new and more committed political center is formed, this time dedicated exclusively to exposing and denouncing all aspects of Stalin’s personality and actions. Fugitives like General Orlov can be put in that same context; fugitives who, in reaching the West, dedicate themselves to revealing the “Kremlin’s secrets”, earning a “enormous amount of money”, and presumably it’s a sum that’s greater for however much more sensational the revealed secrets are. Beginning with the Gorbachev years, these revelations are eagerly welcomed in the Soviet Union and are still today “one of the most important sources” for Western sovietology―these revelations, however, are a web of “lies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn896|896]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, we must not overlook the fact that the anti-Stalin campaign has its political center in the West. Its motivations had been previously clarified by Lloyd George, who, in the summer of 1919, observed that a united Russia, whether Bolshevik or not, constituted a threat to the British Empire.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn897|897]] In other words, a wide part of public opinion (first British and later American) identify Stalin as the incarnation of a double threat, that represented communist agitation in the capitalist metropole, and especially in the colonies, and that represented a great power, now all the more dangerous and expansionist for the fact it inspires and leads a political movement represented in all parts of the world.&lt;br /&gt;
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Which of the different political centers was the most implacable? At times, we get the impression that we are watching a competition. Soon after the pact of non-aggression between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, Trotsky lets out a type of victory cry: finally, it’s now evident to even the “professional apologists for the Kremlin” and Stalin, “the ‘pro-Soviet’ fools of all types”, those who had the illusion of being able to count on Moscow’s support in containing Nazi Germany’s expansion. Neville Chamberlain is especially targeted. Yes, the British prime minister, who by this time is denounced by Churchill for his policy of &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039; pursued in relation to Hitler, is sharply criticized by Trotsky for having fed illusions toward… Stalin! “Despite all his aversions toward the Soviet regime”, the British conservative leader “had tried to make an alliance with Stalin using all means”: a colossal example of naivety! Trotsky had repeatedly stated since the rise of the Third Reich that―despite all the rhetoric about the anti-fascist popular fronts―”the real objective of Stalin’s foreign policy was to reach a deal with Hitler”; now all are forced to recognize that the Kremlin dictator is “Hitler’s butler.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn898|898]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This competition, seriously weakened by the epic resistance by the Soviet Union against the Third Reich, returns in force after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;. So Khrushchev accused Stalin of having deviated from Lenin? In fact―Orlov immediately increased the dose, publishing an article that in its very title announces a “sensational secret”―the man who led the Soviet Union for thirty years was a secret police agent for the Tsarist regime, obviously prepared to liquidate the unlucky souls who learn of his unspeakable past. Still today a Russian researcher (Rogowin), a zealous follower of Trotsky’s, appears to cling to that revelation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn899|899]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The competition can take on the most unique forms. In 1965, Deutscher reflects on the evolution by the Menshevik leader Dan, who―patriotically blinded by the image of a Russia “triumphantly emerging from a catastrophic war, with the Third Reich prostrated before it”― ended up recognizing the historical correctness of the October Revolution, but also, unfortunately, the correctness of “Stalinism, with all its ideological perversions and violence.&amp;amp;quot; There’s only one excuse for that tolerance toward a “degenerated” and “corrupted” Bolshevism: the fact that “when Dan wrote some of these pages, the pro-Stalinist tide in the allied countries was very strong, especially during the immediate post-war period in the United States!”[[footnotes.xhtml#fn900|900]] Fortunately, the information coming from the very capital of the Soviet Union, and from within that country’s very own communist party, refuted and ridiculed once and for all the naive and ill informed who had in some way or another consumed Moscow’s propaganda.&lt;br /&gt;
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Only through this convergence of heterogeneous interests can one explain the paradox of a historiography that, while unceasingly denouncing the farcical nature of the trials carried out by Stalin in Moscow, has easily accepted the legitimacy of the trial conducted in different manners, first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Periodic Changes in the Depiction of Stalin ===&lt;br /&gt;
The depiction of the “enormous, shadowy, capricious and degenerate monster of man” is so widespread nowadays that we forget the contradictory history that preceded the rise of that image. We saw the acknowledgements directed at Stalin by illustrious statesmen, diplomats and intellectuals. The pages of his thirty years in government, today simply considered horrific, were in the past read very differently.&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays it’s commonplace to identify the revolution from above, that radically changed the face of agricultural in the Soviet Union, as an exclusive product of ideological madness. But in 1944, even while revealing its terrible human costs, De Gasperi nevertheless expresses a fundamentally positive judgement on the “great economic enterprise” of collectivization of the countryside and industrialization, having been made necessary by the danger of war and by the “threat revealed in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn901|901]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays, very few would dare question the thesis according to which the bloody and large scale repression realized by Stalin had been the exclusive product of his &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039; or his paranoia. However, between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, Malaparte had calmly spoken of the preparations for a coup d&#039;état in Moscow and Stalin’s hesitation in counterattacking (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, § 7). An authoritative German press organization went even further, and mocked the naivety demonstrated by the Kremlin dictator “in not sending Trotsky and his crew to the beyond.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn902|902]] Around twenty years after the fact, Churchill himself at least indirectly evaluated the trials against Tukhachevsky and the other military leaders (it was a question of “a cruel, but perhaps not pointless, military-political purge”, that had eliminated “all the pro-German elements”) and, to a certain degree, that’s true even for the Moscow Trials (on the bench of the accused were seated Soviet leaders “full of jealousy toward Stalin who had ousted them”).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn903|903]] This stance by the British statesman, champion of the struggle until the end against Hitler’s Germany, is yet more significant because it’s formulated in a polemic against Chamberlain, the protagonist of the policy of &#039;&#039;appeasement&#039;&#039;. More radical or more explicit was the American ambassador to the USSR, Joseph Davies, who “continued to insist that there really was a conspiracy, that the trials were carried out according to the law, and that consequently, Soviet authority had been strengthened by it.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn904|904]] In 1944, De Gasperi also stressed that the veracity of the charges directed at the anti-Stalin opposition was confirmed by “objective American intelligence.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn905|905]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Then there was a radical change, but the weakness and the inconsistency of the image of Stalin given to us first by the Cold War and then by the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; begin to emerge from the research by a growing number of scholars. In some ways one witnesses an evident turnaround. Let’s take the Great Terror. Alongside the other leading political figures we’ve already encountered, even a fervent admirer of Trotsky’s, namely Deutscher, in 1948 thinks the Moscow trials are more or less credible. In his opinion, Kirov’s assassination was in no way staged by the regime. The long tradition in Russia that “dared to attack the autocracy with bombs and pistols” had returned to influence the young communists. “Was not Lenin’s brother, by chance, among the conspirators who had tried to kill Alexander III? The textbooks depict those martyrs and those heroes with a romantic halo: that’s how the sacred shadows of the past now reappear to arm the more impatient anti-Stalinist &#039;&#039;Komsomols&#039;&#039;.&amp;amp;quot; The “ideas of revolutionary terrorism” had expanded to the point of constituting “a state of mind widespread among the youths” and arming the hand of Kirov’s assassin.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn906|906]] Still in 1949, Deutscher recognized certain “psychological truth” in the Moscow Trials in general, and also a factual truth with regard to the execution of Tukhachevsky in particular. Regarding the latter event, while certain sources speak of a set-up by the Nazi intelligence services, “numerous anti-Stalinist sources argue, however, that the generals had in fact plotted a coup d’état”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn907|907]] in either case, Stalin’s paranoia or his &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039; wouldn’t play any role.&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that a few years later, an American historian unmoved by the revelations of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; and who continued to have sympathy for the anti-Stalinist opposition, defined by him as “the consciousness of the revolution”, wrote: “What Bukharin stated in his guilty confession, and what’s known from other sources, makes a good part of what was revealed in the trial appear plausible, despite the suspicions provoked by the nature of those trials.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn908|908]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Nowadays it’s the very scholars of Trotskyist orientation who are calling attention to the civil war unleashed within the Soviet leadership and demanding the opposition’s recognition for having promoted by all means the overthrow of the Thermidorian regime imposed by the traitors of the revolution. It’s significant that this turn also affects Trotsky’s group of followers, who in their time had dedicated themselves, more than anyone else, to denouncing the Moscow Trials as a pure and simple farce.&lt;br /&gt;
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With regard to the leadership of the USSR, both on the eve and during the Second World War, Deutscher’s evolution is particularly tortured and remarkable. We already came across his quite flattering portrait in 1948 of Stalin as a war leader (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, intro, 1). In 1956, writing in the immediate wake of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;, without much trouble Deutscher believes the “revelations” according to which in the days following the start of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin had retreated in paralysis to “his dacha, unresponsive and angry”, only to later, giving into the demands and pleas from his colleagues, return to lead the country and to conduct a war by “drawing fronts and lines attack on a globe.&amp;amp;quot; The only criticism Deutscher offers to Khrushchev and his circle is that they hadn’t followed the recommendations already put forth by Trotsky in 1927, in other words, of not having understood “the duty of toppling Stalin, in order to conduct the war in a more efficient way and guarantee its final victory”![[footnotes.xhtml#fn909|909]] Ten years later, returning to this subject, Deutscher writes: “I’m not willing to accept the so-called Khrushchev ‘revelations’ without reservations, particularly his statement that during World War II [and the victory over the Third Reich] Stalin had only played a practically insignificant part.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn910|910]] It must be said that more recent historical research goes further than this partial and timid reconsideration.&lt;br /&gt;
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Regarding the thesis of the oppressed nations, we’ve already encountered the radical and positive innovation of &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; put into practice in the USSR to the benefit of national minorities (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 4 § 9). But now it’s worthwhile to read the evaluation recently made by another American historian:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;A new consensus is emerging, on the basis that, far from being the “killer of nations” familiar to Western history and the history of nationalism, the Soviet government takes on an ambitious, complex and prolonged effort to construct ethnically defined nations within a unified state at the political and economic level. With the aim of encouraging this “springtime of Soviet nations”, the Soviet state conceded juridical and political equality with Russians to the peoples of the former empire [...]. On these new national territories it reserved a privileged place for the languages of the national minorities, even when the Soviet ethnographers had to create an alphabet for local dialects, because they had never taken on a written form. That policy of promoting an autonomous national culture went as far as trying to assimilate Russians; Soviet government employees and administrators had to learn the languages of the nations where they worked.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn911|911]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A French historian on Central Asia, Olivier Roy, comes to the same conclusions; favorably cited in an essay published in &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, he summarizes the current outlook on that region as follows: they are solid and functional states that can assert themselves if they know how to “intelligently” take advantage of their Soviet “inheritance.&amp;amp;quot; “The crafters of Moscow’s national policy [...] codified languages (sometimes creating new alphabets for them), built national parliaments, national libraries, and instituted a policy of &#039;&#039;affirmative action&#039;&#039; in favor of ‘local cadre’.&amp;amp;quot; It was “primarily and especially Stalin” who stood out among the protagonists of this enlightened policy. How far we are from the Cold War thesis formulated by Arendt, according to which Stalin had deliberately disorganized and disarticulated “nationalities” with the aim of creating conditions favorable for the triumph of totalitarianism! An author, who was earlier a leader of the anti-Soviet ‘dissidents’, states his admiration for the Soviet Union (and Stalin) for its national policy in the following emphatic terms: “In the decades of Soviet rule, and in its solution to the national question, the positive elements were so numerous that it’s difficult to find a comparable example in the history of humanity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn912|912]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, the caricature of Stalin made first by Trotsky and later by Khrushchev no longer enjoys much credibility. From the present day research by eminent scholars, beyond suspect of having indulged in the “cult of personality”, emerges the portrait of a politician who rises and secures the positions of power in the USSR primarily for the fact that he widely “surpasses his competitors” when it comes to understanding how the Soviet system operated;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn913|913]] a leader of “exceptional political talent” and “enormously gifted”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn914|914]] a statesman who saved the Russian nation from annihilation and enslavement, thanks not only to his astute military strategy, but also his “masterful” wartime speeches, speeches that are at times authentically “brilliant”, that in tragic or decisive moments manage to encourage national resistance;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn915|915]] a figure who doesn’t lack qualities when it comes to theory, as demonstrated by the insight with which he dealt with the national question in his writings from 1913, and the “positive effect” of his “contribution” to the linguistic question, among others.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn916|916]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, they rightly stress at the same time that this recognition is not an absolute moral judgement; however, the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;’s complete lack of credibility is by now clear. There’s not a detail in it that’s not contested today. Take the report of Stalin’s supposed psychological collapse in the days immediately following the start of Operation Barbarossa: according to the analysis we’ve already seen from two Russian historians (of anti-Stalinist orientation, of course), it’s an “episode” that is “totally invented” (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 2), and that―a French historian insists―is in “complete contradiction” with the testimony and documentation that increasingly comes to light.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn917|917]] But it’s not a question of a single episode, however significant it may be. Also with regard to the so-called doctors plot: “Khrushchev crudely and deliberately distorted the truth.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn918|918]] Yes, he “took great liberty with the truth.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn919|919]] This observation made (this time by a British historian previously cited) regarding “Stalin’s wartime leadership” is generally useful: “To get to the truth, it’s necessary to look beyond the Western polemics of the Cold War, as well as the circumstances of de-stalinization in the USSR.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn920|920]]&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Contradictory Motives behind Stalin’s Demonization ===&lt;br /&gt;
Arendt’s thesis―that for a long time had been undisputed in the West and uncritically repeated time and again―that sought to prove the unbreakable attraction, in spite of everything, between communist “totalitarianism” and Nazi “totalitarianism” using these words: “the only man for whom Hitler has ‘unconditional respect’ was the ‘brilliant Stalin’”; moreover, “we know from Khrushchev’s speech to the Twentieth Party Congress that Stalin trusted in only one man, which was Hitler.&amp;amp;quot; It is so evident that, despite all the warnings, “he refused to believe that Hitler had broken the treaty” until the very end. To confirm this, Arendt again cites the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039;, or to be more precise, “the version of Khrushchev’s speech provided by the American state department.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn921|921]] Against that affirmation, which was based on an evidently politicized speech that was certainly not concerned with historical rigor, one could counter with the well documented analysis according to which in post World War II Hungary and Eastern Europe, Stalin “only trusted” in Jewish cadre, who are in fact called upon to construct the framework for a new state apparatus (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 10). As one can see, the antithesis with respect to Hitler couldn’t be more clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s dwell on the fragility of the ideological theme treasured by Arendt and ruling ideology. Recently a reversal of positions has been witnessed. A few years ago, authoritative and ideologically relentless anti-communist scholars insisted on depicting Stalin as an insatiable expansionist, ready at the opportune moment to attack Germany itself, with whom it maintains a pact of non-aggression. To make that case, they specifically cited Stalin’s speech to the military academy graduates; in order to be brief, I’ll cite the summary found in Dimitrov’s diary: “Our peace and security policy is at the same time a policy in preparation for war. There’s no defense without offense. It’s necessary to prepare for war.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn922|922]] It’s May 5th of 1941, the same day that Stalin meets personally with the highest officials of the party and state, in evident preparation for open battle with the Third Reich. The substantial development of Soviet military industry had been promoted by Stalin in preparation for an offensive war, against which Hitler sought to defend.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn923|923]] That thesis, incessantly pushed by historical revisionism, can be easily refuted by referring to something cited by an author who is among the most prominent members of that historical and ideological current: by the beginning of May, 1941, General Antonescu, who will end up taking power in Romania, informs his German allies that “the factories around Moscow had received the order to relocate their machinery to the country’s interior.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn924|924]] Moreover, the Nazis were desperately looking for a &#039;&#039;casus belli&#039;&#039;. The spy chief, Admiral Canaris, writes in his diary: “General Jodl informed me that they are very concerned by the unusual and forgiving Soviet behavior in relation to us, and [...] partly joking, added ‘if those individuals (the Soviets) continue to be so accommodating and letting everything go, it will have to be you who organizes an incident that starts the war’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn925|925]] Debunking revisionist historians’ latest weapon of argument, this testimony unequivocally proves who is the aggressor. Secondly, it clarifies that it was Stalin’s very own behavior, condemned by Khrushchev, that made the Third Reich nervous.&lt;br /&gt;
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The new accusation against Stalin found its immediate consecration in the mass media that, with the aim of giving it more credibility, didn’t hesitate to bring up the speech from August 19th, 1939; a prominent sovietologist commenting with righteous indignation: while he prepared to send the loyal Molotov to Berlin to finish the non-aggression pact, Stalin had already elaborated, with repugnant cynicism, a plan for aggression and sovietization of all of Europe, including Germany, at the opportune moment.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn926|926]] In reality, this is a serious historical falsehood (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 1, § 3). But that isn’t the important point. The revelation of this new treacherous act by Stalin could have been the moment to reconsider the thesis developed by Arendt―with credit also to Khrushchev’s report―about the close relationship between the two highest incarnations of “totalitarianism.&amp;amp;quot; But none of that took place!&lt;br /&gt;
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Historians on the concentrationary universe rightly denounce the subsequent severity experienced in the Gulag and “the super exploitation of the prisoners” that reaches its horrible apex after the “breakneck growth of the economic plans of 1940-1941” (therefore, during the time of the non-aggression pact), when Soviet leadership, in preparation for war, ignore any other consideration in accelerating to the maximum the completion of plans “of great strategic and economic importance”―like, for example, the construction of airports, aircraft factories and industries essential for the war effort.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn927|927]] In light of this, the commonplace accusation made by Arendt becomes ever more grotesque, and yet it continues to be obsessively repeated: it’s necessary to always prove that Stalin had blind trust in Hitler! The ruling ideology, therefore, easily makes use of the most contradictory statements and accusations: what matters is that they are defamatory. The tendency to drift from history and into political mythology is clear.&lt;br /&gt;
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The obligation to demonize, for whatever motive, manifests itself in other fields. Nowadays the black legend of Stalin’s antisemitism is unchallenged. But we’re not without a perspective that’s diametrically opposed. There’s the research by a journalist, an American Jew, who speaks of “Stalin’s fondness toward Jews”, to whom he entrusts the management of the concentration camps where the Germans destined to be expelled from Poland are held. Thus, those who survived the “final solution” can avenge themselves in a terrible way and become the executioners of their executioners, all thanks to the Soviet dictator’s cunning and perfidy.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn928|928]] He is also accused―in a book by an author closely associated with the military of the German Federal Republic―of having circulated “war propaganda” about gas chambers and the plan for the total extermination of the Jewish population by the Third Reich, with the aim of discrediting their enemies.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn929|929]] It’s evidently in total contrast to the understanding of Stalin as an anti-Semite which is still widely accepted.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, it’s also worthwhile to observe how the subject of Stalin’s “paranoia” was often handled in a contradictory way. One historian, who stands out for making that diagnosis, nevertheless stresses the role Beria was to have in the Soviet leader’s death.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn930|930]] Certainly, one could say he had ended up being a victim of a climate he himself created; the fact would remain that, at least starting from a certain moment, the threat was real and no longer the product of a sickness induced fantasy. In addition: those who accused Stalin of being paranoid are sometimes figures and authors who, without providing any proof, claim he is responsible for the death of his closest collaborators, like Kirov and Zhdanov. Do they not resort here to the same attitude for which they condemn the dictator? But those questions and those problems aren’t even raised; what’s important is to highlight, in any way possible, the infamy of the communist and oriental despot.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Political Struggle and Mythology between the French Revolution and the October Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
In June of 1956, under the impression made by just having read the Khrushchev Report, Deutscher observes: “communists had for more than a quarter of a century bowed” before a monstrous tyrant, vile at both the moral and intellectual level; how could all of this have happened?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn931|931]] Following that line of argument, he could have added: What had led illustrious Western philosophers and statesmen to pay tribute to that monster with approving and respectful statements and, in certain cases, even admiration? These questions are legitimate and even inevitable, but maybe they should be complemented by another: how could Deutscher have allowed himself to be affected by that behavior which he sharply condemned in 1956? Yes, after the end of World War II and on the occasion of Stalin’s death, he would pay tribute to the statesman who had made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich and had built socialism in the USSR. In that period, the abject and idiotic monster had not yet entered the scene, and therefore the doubts had not yet emerged over the enormous credit that he enjoyed, despite everything, for a long time. Maybe in 1956, Deutscher would have had a better response if he had asked a very different question: led by a “generalissimo” and by such a ridiculous political leader, how was the Soviet Union able to defeat the terrible Nazi war machine that had so quickly subjugated the rest of continental Europe? And how was the Soviet Union, starting from a position of extreme weakness, able to turn into a military and industrial superpower?&lt;br /&gt;
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Yes, looking closely, with half of century of distance from Stalin’s death and the clamor of de-stalinization, it’s opportune to return to the question made by Deutscher to radically invert it: how did such a grotesque and absurd portrait like the one made by Khrushchev achieve the status of historiographical and political dogma? That dogma was even infused with new details, increasingly fantastical, following the revelations of the &#039;&#039;Secret Report&#039;&#039; that attributed to Stalin a blind confidence in Hitler’s respect for the non-aggression pact. Arendt, in the subsequent editions of &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, put together a theorem of the elective affinity between the two dictators, and that theorem identified an increasing number of points of contact and symmetries, until the two monsters become perfect equivalents in all aspects of their political action and ideology, including the consummation of a holocaust and anti-Semitic hatred.&lt;br /&gt;
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The key to explaining that unique phenomenon can be found in the history of political mythologies. After Thermidor, the Jacobins are also put to the guillotine at the moral level. They become “those sultans”, “those satyrs”, who had nearly everywhere created “places of pleasure” and “places for orgies” in which “they gave into all excesses.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn932|932]] In addition to sexual libido, what especially consumed Robespierre was &#039;&#039;libido dominandi&#039;&#039;, he was preparing to “get married to Capet’s daughter” in order to ascend to the throne of France.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn933|933]] The accusation was undoubtedly sensational, but there was no lack of proof, they were even abundant: “the marriage certificate” had already been signed; moreover, in the house of the recently executed tyrant were found a “seal with the symbol of France” and the dynastic seal of the house of Bourbon.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn934|934]] The execution or the murder of Louis XVI can now be seen in new light: the man responsible for that act had perhaps only intended to rid himself of a rival, he wanted to eliminate the obstacle that prevented him from ascending to the throne.&lt;br /&gt;
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The moral decapitation of Robespierre was linked to the more specifically intellectual decapitation. During the Jacobin period, popular episodes―not promoted from above―of vandalism and revolutionary iconoclasm take place that targeted the symbols of the old regime. Such episodes continued to arise during Thermidor, this time having in mind everything that recalled the Terror. But the new rulers accuse the Jacobins of the following: out of hatred for the culture they were totally deprived of, they had planned to burn libraries, and they had already put that crazy plan into action. Over the course of various passages, the list of accusations grows ever larger and becomes an ever more uncontroversial fact to the degree it loses all contact with reality. Boissy d’Anglas can subject the Jacobins to public derision by affirming:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Without a doubt, these ferocious enemies of humanity would have momentarily shown their villainy only under the light of the libraries burned, since they hoped that the darkness of ignorance would extend even further. Barbarians! They have set the human spirit back many centuries.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn935|935]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Jacobins had introduced mandatory schooling, and against them and against the French Revolution itself the counter-revolutionary propaganda did not tire in denouncing the hubris of reason, and on the contrary celebrating the beneficial function of “prejudice”; but in the ideological and political atmosphere of Thermidor, Robespierre and his collaborators are accused of having sought to spread “the darkness of ignorance.&amp;amp;quot; And the new accusation is made without even reconsidering the previous accusation: logical coherence is the last of their concerns.&lt;br /&gt;
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Also with regard to the Terror’s number of victims, one witnesses a process similar to that which was just seen with the libraries. Again we turn to the words of the eminent scholar that we continue to follow here: “The numbers are not up for discussion: tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, they even speak of millions.&amp;amp;quot; In summary, it’s a matter of genocide, as denounced by the &#039;&#039;jeunesse dorée&#039;&#039; in their anti-Marseillaise anthem against “the drinkers of the blood of humanity”, “that anthropophagic horde”, “those terrible cannibals.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn936|936]] It’s an accusation taken up and radicalized by the left. Soon after Thermidor, Babeuf speaks of a “process of depopulation” carried out in the Vendée by Robespierre, who goes as far as to pursue “the infamous, unprecedented political objective” of “wiping out the human race.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn937|937]] That is how we witness a convergence between the extreme right and the extreme left of the political spectrum, both agreeing to depict Robespierre as a genocidal monster. However, that paradox doesn’t last long. It doesn’t take Babuef long to get to the real meaning of Thermidor: before the judges that were prepared to condemn him to death, in denouncing the desperate situation to which the popular masses are condemned, he appeals to Saint-Just and his ideals for everyone’s “happiness” and salvation from misery; on the other hand, he expresses his disdain for the “system of hunger” put into practice by the new rulers and classifies the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas as “genocidal” (&#039;&#039;populicide&#039;&#039;). That is how the charge of genocide undergoes a radical reversal: it no longer targets Robespierre, but his victorious enemies.&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be interesting to make a comparative analysis of the mythologies that arise from the great revolutions. After October 1917, the Jacobin “drinkers of human blood” are substituted by the Bolsheviks who, according to refugees in the US from Soviet Russia, had invented and frantically used an electric guillotine capable of killing five-hundred men per hour. We saw the Jacobins branded as people who frequented “places of pleasure” and organized “orgies”; in October of 1919, the Hungarian communist leader, Béla Kun, is accused of having established “a harem with a lavish assortment” of women, where the perfidious and insatiable Jew could “rape and dishonor dozens of virgins of the Christian caste.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn938|938]] Repeating this slander is a newspaper that will later become the official press organ for the Nazi party, but at that time, in expressing its horror over the events in Eastern Europe, shares an outlook that’s widespread in Western public opinion and on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, too, the Bolsheviks are synonymous with debauchery and moral depravity: In Russia they had introduced the nationalization of women, as charged by documents published with the authorization of President Wilson and as was described in rich detail by an authoritative newspaper like the &#039;&#039;New York Times&#039;&#039;; yes, every girl upon turning eighteen years old is forced to register in an “office of free love”, and then sadly turned over to a man arbitrarily chosen, and she is forced to suffer on her body and soul the governmental entity’s impositions.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn939|939]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If the Jacobins are ‘barbarians’, even more so are the protagonists of the October Revolution, first classified as agents of imperial Germany (or the “Huns” and the “Vandals”, as Germans are defined by Entente propaganda during World War I), and later as the agents of Jewish internationalism, even more alien to true civilization, both for their geographic origin, as well as the support provided to the colonial revolts and to the peoples of color, just as Nazi propaganda insisted on repeating. Finally, while Robespierre is for some time accused by Babeuf of having wanted to completely “wipe out the human race”, Conquest is satisfied in blaming Stalin for organizing the starvation of the Ukrainian people.&lt;br /&gt;
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The topics sketched out here are only modest suggestions for the future historian. In looking for the appropriate comparison for these political mythologies, it’s worthwhile, at any rate, to observe that Stalin was less fortunate than Robespierre: Yes, in Russia today there are popular demonstrations that raise his portrait, and the majority of adults have a positive view toward Stalin and see in him the “energetic leader” the country needed in such calamitous times. Among the ex-’dissidents’ we see Alexandr Zinoviev classify Yeltsin as the leader of a “criminal counter revolution” and a “colonial democracy”, and he makes a surprising overall evaluation of the history of the Soviet Union, including the three decades of the Stalin era: “Thanks precisely to communism, Russia was able to avoid even greater evils” and to realize, “in extremely difficult historical circumstances”, advancements that “only a cynical rabble can deny.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn940|940]] In the West, however, including on the left, the charge of “Stalinism” can hit anyone who even dares to express any doubts or ask any questions. If anything, it’s in the “bourgeois” camp where we can catch a timid glimpse at some reconsideration. Just a few months after the overthrow of the Soviet Union, an authoritative Italian newspaper reported: “A million and a half people run the risk of not surviving the winter, for lack of food and medicine throughout the Soviet Union; a report by the International Red Cross has stated.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn941|941]] Some time later, still analyzing Yeltsin’s Russia, a prominent political scientist, Maurice Duverger, pointed to the “falling average life expectancy”, whose responsibility fell on the privileged minority that had managed “to accumulate enormous wealth” through parasitical speculation―though not explicitly illegal―and he denounced the “true genocide of the elderly.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn942|942]] If not a reversal, at least the charge of genocide is applied to all sides, with the condemnation of one of the West’s heroes (Yeltsin), and with him the West itself, considered responsible for the tragedy that in no way took place in a situation of acute political and economic crisis, but after the Cold War itself had ended, at a time when, at least in the most advanced countries, shortages were only a distant memory.&lt;br /&gt;
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It comes to mind the summary made by Edgar Quinet regarding the French Revolution: “The Terror had been the first calamity; the second, that which ruined the Republic, was the trial conducted against the Terror.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn943|943]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;8. Demonization and Hagiography in the Reading of the Contemporary World&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== From the Omission of Russia’s Second Time of Troubles, to the Omission of China’s Century of Humiliation ===&lt;br /&gt;
Starting with the Cold War in particular, for decades the West’s anti-communist campaign had centered on the demonization of Stalin. Up until the Soviet Union’s overthrow, there weren’t such exaggerated polemics against Mao, nor even against Pol Pot, who was supported until the end by Washington against the Vietnamese and their Soviet protectors. Hitler had only one monstrous twin, and he had ruled in Moscow for thirty years and continued to loom over the country that had dared to challenge the US’s hegemony.&lt;br /&gt;
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This portrait could only change with China’s prodigious rise: now the great Asian country must be persecuted until it loses its identity and self-esteem. In addition to Stalin, the ruling ideologues are also determined to identify Hitler’s other monstrous twins. Thus, there is one book, which achieved great international success, that classifies Mao Zedong as the greatest criminal of the twentieth century, or maybe of all time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn944|944]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The ”investigative” methods are those we’ve already encountered: they start from the monster’s childhood instead of China’s history. It’s necessary to fill that gap, then. With a long history behind it, China had for centuries and millennia been in a prominent position in the development of human civilization: as late as 1820 it had a gross domestic product of 32.4% of world GDP. However, in 1949, at the time of modern China’s foundation, the People’s Republic of China was the poorest, or among the poorest, countries in the world.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn945|945]] The colonialist and imperialist aggression that began with the Opium Wars caused this drastic fall. A period that is even emphatically celebrated by the most illustrious representatives of the liberal West (think of Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill), those infamous wars open a decidedly tragic chapter in the history of the great Asian country. The Chinese trade deficit caused by the victory of the “British narco-traffickers”, the terrible humiliation suffered (“they have relations with Chinese women and they are raped” by the invaders; “graves are violated in the name of scientific curiosity; a woman’s tiny wrapped foot is exhumed from her grave”) and the crisis represented by the country’s inability to defend itself from external aggression, play a primary role in provoking the Taiping Revolt (1851-1864), which made the struggle against opium the order of the day. It was “the bloodiest civil war in world history, with an estimate between twenty and thirty million deaths.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn946|946]] After having contributed in a powerful way to provoking it, the West became its beneficiary, given that it could extend its control over a country gripped by an increasingly deeper crisis making it increasingly defenseless. A historical period of a “crucified China” begins (during which Russia and Japan had joined the Western executioners). Indeed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;As the end of the nineteenth century approached, China appears to become the victim of a fate against which it cannot fight. It’s a universal conspiracy by men and nature. The China of 1850 to 1950, the era of the most terrible insurrections in history, the target of foreign cannons, the country of invasions and civil wars, is also the country with the greatest natural cataclysms. Without a doubt, in the history of the world the number of victims was never so elevated.&lt;br /&gt;
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The generalized and drastic reduction in living standards, the collapse of the state apparatus and government, together with its general incapacity, corruption and growing subaltern status and subjugation to the outside world, all of this made the impact of floods and famines all the more devastating: “The Great Famine in North China in 1877-1878 [...] killed more than nine million people.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn947|947]] Such tragedies occurred periodically: in 1928, the number of deaths reached “almost three million in Shanxi province alone.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn948|948]] There was no way to flee the hunger nor the cold: “The wooden beams of homes were burned so that they could stay warm.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn949|949]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not only a question of a devastating economic crisis: “The state is almost destroyed.&amp;amp;quot; One figure is in itself significant: “between 1911 and 1928, 1,300 wars between warlords had taken place”, with each opposing “military faction” being supported at times by this or that foreign power. Moreover, “the repeated civil wars between 1919 and 1925 could be considered the new opium wars. What’s at stake is the control of their production and their transportation.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn950|950]] Aside from the warlords’ armed groups, proper banditry was widespread, fed by army deserters and by weapons sold by soldiers. “It’s calculated that by around 1930 the number of bandits in China reached 20 million, in other words, 10% of the total male population.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn951|951]] In these conditions, it’s not difficult to imagine the fate that awaits women. Overall, there&#039;s the dissolution of all social bonds: “Sometimes the peasant sells his wife and children. The press describes columns of young women who’ve been sold passing through the streets, taken by traffickers in Shanxi province, devastated by the famine of 1928. They become domestic slaves or prostitutes.&amp;amp;quot; In Shanghai alone there are “around 50,000 regular prostitutes.&amp;amp;quot; And both banditry and prostitution can count on the support or the complicity of Western concessions, toward which they constitute “profitable activities.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn952|952]] The lives of the Chinese are worth very little, and the oppressed tend to share that point of view with their oppressors. In 1948, in attempting to halt the Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-shek’s air force bombed the Yellow River’s dykes: 900,000 peasants drowned with another 4 million forced to flee.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn953|953]] Nearly fifteen years earlier, Sun Yat-sen had expressed his fear that “the extinction of the nation and the annihilation of our race” could come to pass; yes, maybe the Chinese had expected to suffer the fate inflicted on the “redskins” on the American continent.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn954|954]]&lt;br /&gt;
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That tragic history behind the revolution vanishes in the historiography and propaganda that encompasses the negative cult of heroes. While in their reading of Russian history they pursue the repression of the Second Time of Troubles, for the great Asian country they skip over the Century of Humiliation (the period that stretches from the First Opium War to the seizure of power by the communists). Just as in Russia, in China it’s ultimately the revolution led by the communist party that saves the nation and even the state. In the biography of Mao Zedong earlier cited, not only do they ignore the historical background briefly restated here, but they blame the Chinese communist leader for most of the horrors caused by the starvation and famines that affected China. A rigorous silence is maintained with regard to the embargo imposed on that great Asia country after the communists came to power.&lt;br /&gt;
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On that last point, it’s worthwhile to consult a book by an American author that sympathetically describes the primary role played by a Cold War policy of siege and economic strangulated carried out by Washington at the expense of the People’s Republic of China. In October of 1949, China finds itself in a desperate situation. It’s necessary to note, however, that the Civil War hadn’t completely ended. The bulk of the Kuomintang army had taken shelter in Taiwan, and from there they continued to threaten the new state with air attacks and incursions, on top of the isolated spots of resistance that continued to operate on the continent. But that’s not the principal aspect: “After decades of civil wars and foreign invasions, the national economy was on the brink of total collapse.&amp;amp;quot; The fall in agricultural and industrial production was followed by inflation. And that’s not all: “In those years, great floods had devastated a large part of the nation, and more than 40 million people had been affected by that natural calamity.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn955|955]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The embargo quickly decreed by the United States makes this extremely serious economic and humanitarian crisis more catastrophic than ever. The objectives of the United States clearly emerge in the studies and plans by the Truman administration and the admissions or declarations by its leaders: make it so that China “suffers a plague” and “a standard of living at or below the level of subsistence”; provoke “economic backwardness”, “cultural backwardness”, a “primitive and uncontrolled birth rate”, “mass disorder”; inflict “a heavy and very prolonged cost on its internal social structure” and ultimately create “a situation of chaos.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn956|956]] It’s a concept that’s obsessively repeated: it’s necessary to reduce a country to “desperate necessity”, to a “situation of economic catastrophe”, “to disaster” and “collapse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn957|957]] This “economic weapon” pointed at an overpopulated country is lethal, but for the CIA it’s not enough: the situation that was caused by “the measures of economic warfare and by the naval blockade” could be made even worse with a “naval and aerial bombing campaign against selected ports, railways, industrial structures and storage sites”; with US assistance, the Kuomintang bombing campaigns continued against industrial cities on continental China, including Shanghai.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn958|958]]&lt;br /&gt;
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One president after another takes office in the White House, but the embargo remains and expands to medicine, tractors and fertilizers.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn959|959]] At the start of the 1960s, an advisor in the Kennedy administration, namely Walt W. Rostow, observes that, thanks to this policy, the economic development of China was delayed by at least “decades”, while CIA reports highlight “communist China’s grave agricultural situation”, now seriously weakened by “overwork and malnutrition.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn960|960]] Is it a question, then, of reducing the pressure on a people reduced to a state of hunger? On the contrary, it’s important not to loosen the embargo, “not even for humanitarian relief.&amp;amp;quot; Taking advantage of the fact that “China doesn’t have key natural resources, particularly oil and fertile land”, and also exploiting the serious crisis occurring at the time between China and the USSR, they could try to land the definitive blow: “explore the possibilities of a total Western embargo against China” and block as much as possible the sale of oil and grain.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn961|961]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Does it make sense, then, to exclusively assign Mao blame for the economic catastrophe that for a long time struck China and was intentionally and ruthlessly planned by Washington beginning in October of 1949? Committed as they are in making a caricature out of Mao and denouncing his crazy experiments, the authors of that successful monograph don’t ask that question. However, while they imposed their embargo, the leaders of the United States were well aware of the fact that it would be even more devastating due to “communist inexperience when it comes to the urban economy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn962|962]] It’s no coincidence that we’ve seen them speak explicitly of “economic warfare&#039;&#039; and an “economic weapon.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s a practice that doesn’t even disappear after the end of the Cold War. A few years before China’s entry into The World Trade Organization, an American journalist in 1996 describes Washington’s behavior as follows: “The American leaders unsheathed one of the heaviest weapons in their commercial arsenal, openly pointed at China, to then menacingly discuss whether or not to pull the trigger.&amp;amp;quot; Once put into action, their threatened cancellation of normal commercial relations would have constituted, “in dollar terms, the biggest commercial sanctions in the history of the US, excluding the two world wars”; it would have been “the commercial equivalent to a nuclear attack.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn963|963]] That was also the opinion of a prominent American politician, namely Edward Luttwak: “Metaphorically one could state that the blocking of Chinese imports is the nuclear weapon that America has pointed at China.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn964|964]] Brandished as a threat in the 1990s, the economic “nuclear weapon” was systematically deployed during the Cold War against the great Asian country, while Washington openly and repeatedly reserved the right to use actual nuclear weapons.&lt;br /&gt;
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Upon seizing power, Mao is very well aware that a “very difficult task of economic reconstruction” awaits him; yes, it’s necessary “to undertake work in the industrial and economic fields” and “learn from every expert (whoever it may be).&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn965|965]] In that context, the Great Leap Forward appears to be a desperate and catastrophic attempt at confronting the embargo.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn966|966]] This is true in part for the Cultural Revolution itself, characterized as well by the illusion of political power promoting a rapid economic development, appealing to the mobilization of the masses and to methods successfully used in the armed struggle. All of this is always in the hope of putting an end, once and for all, to the devastation of the “economic war”, behind which lurked the threat of an even more total war. With respect to Mao’s behavior as an oriental despot, especially during the Cultural Revolution, both the history of China as well as the ideology and personality of the man who exercises power help to explain it; the fact is that never has a country democratized while it was savagely attacked economically, isolated diplomatically, and subjected to a terrible and constant military threat. The situation being as it is, it’s all the more grotesque to exclusively blame Mao for “more than seventy million [...] peacetime deaths due to his inability to govern.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn967|967]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In reality, “the social conquests of the Mao era” are “extraordinary”, conquests that achieved a clear improvement in economic, social and cultural conditions, and a big increase in the Chinese people’s “life expectancy.&amp;amp;quot; Without that basis, one can’t understand the prodigious economic development that later freed hundreds of millions of people from hunger and even starvation.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn968|968]] But in the ruling ideology, one witnesses a true inversion of responsibilities: the political leadership that put an end to the Century of Humiliation becomes a gang of criminals, while those responsible for the immense century long tragedy, and those that with their embargo did everything to prolong it, become the champions of freedom and civilization. We saw Goebbels in 1929 label Trotsky as “possibly” the man who could be considered the greatest criminal of all time (&#039;&#039;supra&#039;&#039;, ch. 5, § 15); in the years that followed, maybe Goebbels had made Stalin the number one criminal. In any case, the argument by the Third Reich’s chief of propaganda and manipulation must have seemed too flawed for the authors of the Mao biography acclaimed in the West. They have no doubts: the title of number one criminal in universal history now belongs to the Chinese leader!&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Omission of War and the Production of a Series of Monstrous Twins to Hitler ===&lt;br /&gt;
The omission of history, and especially the history of colonialism and war, is a constant in the mythology determined to transform all communist and anti-colonialist leaders into Hitler’s twin monsters, more or less. This is quite an easy task with Pol Pot. And it’s therefore worthwhile to dwell on him, certainly not to rehabilitate him or to reconsider the dimension of the horrors for which he became responsible, but with the aim of better clarifying the ways with which the dominant mythology today is constructed. In doing this, I will make almost exclusive use of a book by an American scholar on Asia and a monograph about Cambodia written by a journalist who worked for &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;The Economist&#039;&#039;, and &#039;&#039;The BBC&#039;&#039;. We therefore start by asking one question: when and how did the tragedy that culminated in the horrors of the Pol Pot regime start? Here’s an initial answer, offered by the American scholar:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At the start of the 1970s, President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger ordered a bombing campaign against rural Cambodia that included more bombs than had been dropped on Japan during World War II, killing at least 750,000 Cambodians.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn969|969]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The figure that appears in the monograph on Pol Pot’s Cambodia is more cautious: the number of victims reached “half a million.&amp;amp;quot; However, it’s evident that “the bombs fell en masse, and especially on the civilian population”, which was decimated, with the survivors’ bodies often horrendously wounded, and at any rate traumatized by the daily experience of the terror bombings and by the escape from the countryside (reduced to “a lunar landscape”) to the cities in the hands of government troops, and therefore spared of the inferno, but increasingly subjected to the chaos that following the growing influx of refugees, forced to endure “a precarious existence on the brink of starvation.&amp;amp;quot; By the end of the war, in the capital alone there were two million displaced people and they were housed in “shacks” and “slums”, with the sick and injured housed in hospitals, but with “little hope for survival.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn970|970]] To all of this it must be added the “large scale massacres” carried out by the troops led by Lon Nol, who comes to power in 1970 with a coup d’état engineered by Washington. Here’s how the regime backed by the US, supported with “hundreds of millions of dollars”, confronts the problem represented by ethnic minorities: “In the Vietnamese villages to the north of Phnom Penh, at least three thousand residents, all males above the age of fifteen, were rounded up and taken to the river bank and then shot dead. The women that remained were raped.&amp;amp;quot; Or: “In the region called Parrot’s Beak, the [Vietnamese] prisoners in the camp were warned of an imminent Vietcong attack and were given the order to flee. While they ran, the Cambodian guards [allies or in service to the US] opened fire with their machine guns.&amp;amp;quot; Those are only two examples. Authoritative journalists recall their impression at having visited places similar to the one we just saw: “It looked like a slaughterhouse, and it had the smell of a slaughterhouse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn971|971]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let it be clear: the fury of Lon Nol’s troops didn’t just target the Vietnamese: “the communists taken prisoner were often eliminated”; moreover, those responsible for those deaths enjoyed being photographed while they showed off, proud and smiling, the severed heads of guerrillas.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn972|972]] On the other hand, it would wrong to exclusively blame Asians for the atrocities that took place in Cambodia, and more generally in Indochina. Consider the story by an American teacher, told an American magazine, about a CIA agent who lived in Laos “in a house decorated with a collection of ears pulled from the heads of dead [Indochinese] communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn973|973]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point a new question must be asked: is there a connection between the first act of the Cambodian tragedy and the ones that follow? In attempting to minimize that relationship, the book that I cited is not without contradictions and oscillations: “It’s possible that the bombing campaigns had contributed to an atmosphere that would lead to extremism. But the ground war would have caused that, in any case.&amp;amp;quot; Was the “ground war” inevitable? Shouldn’t we start with the war itself? “The equation ‘no Vietnam War, no Khmer Rouge’ is too simplistic, but it reflects an ‘undeniable truth’.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn974|974]] The British journalist has trouble admitting, despite his inconvenient logic, that those primarily responsible for the tragedy have to be sought out in Washington. And from his reporting emerges a truth that’s inconvenient to the simplifications that are commonplace today. Here’s how the monograph on Cambodia reports the conquest of Phnom Penh by the guerrillas: after all that had happened, “it could have been much, much worse.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn975|975]] At least with regard to the very first phase of holding power, there’s a moderation in Pol Pot that could hardly be found in Washington’s leaders!&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, the new rulers were facing real and dramatic difficulties: will the US begin a new round of terror bombing? And how to feed an urban population that had grown too much, with agriculture devastated by the transformation of the countryside into a “lunar landscape”? And how to face the CIA threat which in the cities “had installed secret radio transmitters and clandestine spy cells”?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn976|976]] Certainly, Pol Pot’s extremist and messianic populism was also behind the decision to evacuate the cities, but that very behavior is driven by the sight of terribly overcrowded cities, exposed to the enemy threat and surrounded by chaos, with a large part of the population unable to play any productive role.&lt;br /&gt;
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To conclude, why should the moral judgement on Pol Pot be more severe than the one on Nixon and Kissinger (those responsible for the war)? The same British author I’ve repeatedly cited, while on the one hand he rejects the intentionalist explanation for the massacres to which Pol Pot’s adventure lead (“that was never the political line of the KCP”, that is the Cambodian communist party; “the objective wasn’t to destroy, but to transform”), on the other hand, he observes regarding the ferocity of the American war: “The bombing campaigns had turned into a symbol of virility.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn977|977]] It must be added that, after seizing power, and during the war with Vietnam that follows, Pol Pot is supported politically and diplomatically by the US. However, ruling class ideology remains silent on the crucial and decisive role by Nixon and Kissinger in the Cambodian tragedy. It’s well known that the barbarians are always outside the West; if political leaders must be criminalized, it’s those responsible for the revolution, never those responsible for the war.&lt;br /&gt;
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That hypocrisy is even more repugnant for the fact that, while the torture and killing by Pol Pot comes to an end, the full weight of the American war and all its impacts continue to be felt. “Throughout Indochina there’s people dying of hunger, disease and unexploded projectiles.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn978|978]] At least with respect to Vietnam, it’s necessary to have in mind the figure reached a while ago by a conservative French paper according to which, thirty years after the end of hostilities, there were still “four million” victims disfigured by the “terrible agent orange” (referring to the color of the dioxin endlessly dumped by American planes on an entire people).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn979|979]] And in Cambodia? Let’s put aside the devastating physical injuries. How many Cambodians still suffer from the devastating and irreversible “psychological damage” caused by the bombing campaign?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn980|980]] One conclusion is unavoidable: to concentrate exclusively on Pol Pot means being satisfied with a half truth, which in reality ends up constituting a complete lie, guilty of remaining silent on those principally responsible for the horrors.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Socialism and Nazism, Aryans and Anglo-Celtics ===&lt;br /&gt;
After having assimilated the “monsters of totalitarianism”, the ruling ideology of today goes further. Aside from the individual personalities that have historically embodied it, communism as such would be closely linked, by elective affinities and by sympathetic ties, to Nazism. Conquest is the one most committed to that approach; he begins its “demonstration” by affirming with respect to Hitler: “Although he hated ‘Jewish’ communism, he didn’t hate communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn981|981]] The hostilities between the two political movements is only an illusion. What to say about this new thesis?&lt;br /&gt;
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Soon after coming to power, the Führer explains to the leadership of the armed forces that he first intends to liquidate the “poison” represented by “pacifism, Marxism and Bolshevism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn982|982]] A few days later, Göring further clarifies the new government’s combative program against Marxism (and Bolshevism): “Not only will we annihilate this pest, we will rip out the word Marxism from every book. In fifty years no man in Germany will know what that word means.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn983|983]] On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, Goebbels notes in his diary:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Bolshevism is dead (&#039;&#039;ist gewesen&#039;&#039;). Thus we will achieve before history our true task [...]. The Bolshevik poison must be expelled from Europe. Against that enterprise Churchill himself and Roosevelt have no reason to object. Maybe we’ll even convince the episcopate of both German denominations to bless this war as desired by God [...]. Now we will truly annihilate that which we have fought against for all our lives. I spoke about this with the Führer, and he is in complete agreement with me.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn984|984]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s not just a matter of words, as demonstrated by the systematic annihilation of communist party members, ordered by Hitler on the eve of Operation Barbarossa. There’s more: “By the end of 1941, the Germans had captured three million Soviet prisoners. In February of 1942, two million of these prisoners were dead, the majority from starvation, disease and mistreatment. On top of that, the Germans immediately executed prisoners suspected of being communists.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn985|985]] That means that in the very first months of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazis had killed more than two million Soviets, with the communists as their first target. And that’s not all. While he is forced to hide to escape the “final solution”, Klemperer, the prominent German intellectual of Jewish origin that we already came across, writes a diary entry that’s worth reflecting on. It’s August of 1942 and Zeiss-Ikon makes use of the forced labor by Polish, French, Danish, Jewish and Russian workers; the conditions of the latter are particularly tough: “They so desperately suffer from hunger that Jewish comrades come to their aid. That was prohibited; but they drop a slice of bread. Soon after the Russian bends down and then runs off to the bathroom with the slice of bread.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn986|986]] Therefore, going off that account, the conditions of Russian (or Soviet) slaves was, at times, even worse than those of the Jewish slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his peremptory statements, Conquest won’t stop half way. It’s a matter of proving the theory of the elective affinities between communism and Nazism well beyond Stalin’s personality and the borders of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the “long and mutual hostility” between the “totalitarian parties” is entirely superficial. The reality is quite the opposite: “Gramsci, for example, was one of Mussolini’s most intimate companions.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn987|987]] And yet, all should know that, while the communist leader languished in fascist prisons, his tormentor received the praise of the leading representatives of the liberal world. Let’s consider Churchill in particular, who in speaking of the Duce in 1933, declares: “The brilliant Roman personified by Mussolini, the greatest living legislator, showed many nations how to resist the pressures of socialism and showed the path that a nation can follow when it’s courageously led.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn988|988]] Four years later―while Italy had barbarically carried out its conquest of Ethiopia and is deeply invested in the overthrow of the Spanish Republic―the British statesman repeats his statement: “It would be an act of dangerous madness for the British people to underestimate the long lasting position Mussolini will occupy in world history and the admirable qualities of courage, intelligence, self-control and perseverance that he personifies.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn989|989]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s especially worthwhile to read the evaluation made by Croce at the end of World War II. The target of his criticism is the “submissive attitude by the British conservatives toward the leaders of Germany, Italy and Spain.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn990|990]] Moreover, at least with respect to Italian fascism, Britain went further: “its politicians, including some of its greatest, paid homage to and flirted with fascism and visited their leader and some of them were decorated with fascist insignia.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn991|991]] Yes, Mussolini “received tributes from all over the world, with British politicians at the front of the line and [...], at least judging by what was said to me by people living in England, he is still considered a great man by British public opinion.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn992|992]] The pro-fascist position by the West even finds its consecration in the philosophical field. Let’s consider an author like Ludwig von Mises, who is still today labeled as the master of liberalism, and who in 1927 praised the coup d’état by Mussolini that had stopped the communist threat and saved civilization: “the resulting merit achieved by fascism will live on forever in history.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn993|993]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1937, even Hitler is painted in flattering terms by Churchill, who appreciates him not only as an “extremely competent” politician, but also his “gallant manner”, his “disarming smile” and his “subtle personal magnetism” that is difficult to escape.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn994|994]] More emphatic is former prime minister David Lloyd George, who speaks of the Führer as a “great man”, at a time when the start of the war is not far off, and the challenge announced in &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039; (the subjugation and enslavement of the Slavs) is still considered acceptable to the British ambassador in Berlin, so long as it isn’t “at the same time turned against the British Empire.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn995|995]] At any rate, regardless of any opinion on the Führer, according to the opinion expressed in 1938 by the American ambassador in Paris, everything must be done to build a common front against “Asiatic despotism”, with the goal of saving “European civilization” (&#039;&#039;supra,&#039;&#039; ch. 5, § 3). In his &#039;&#039;Prison Notebooks&#039;&#039;, Gramsci in 1935 instead writes: “after the demonstrations of brutality and unprecedented ignominy of German ‘culture’ dominated by Nazism”, it’s time for everyone to make note of how “fragile modern culture” really is.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn996|996]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, in completing his crusade that, aside from communism, also targets political currents in some way influenced by socialism, Conquest affirms: “eugenics, with all its racist implications, was also popular among the Fabians.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn997|997]] It’s at this time that the &#039;&#039;tour de force&#039;&#039; reaches its conclusion, now any vague reformist ambitions toward existing capitalist society is enough to get labeled as Hitler’s associate or twin. Naturally, to make such an argument one can’t be hindered by empirical historical research; as a term, and even as a “science”, eugenics is born in liberal Britain and immediately experienced great popularity in the United States. The Austrian and German authors who, before even Hitler, recommended “racial hygiene” take the American Republic as their reference; similar to what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic, they tried to introduce norms in Austria and Germany that prohibited sexual relations and marriage between different and unequal races. It’s not by chance that the key term of the Third Reich’s eugenic and racial program, &#039;&#039;Untermensch&#039;&#039;, is just a translation of the American term &#039;&#039;Under Man&#039;&#039;, a definition coined by Lothrop Stoddard, an author celebrated both in the US and in Germany and legitimized by the praise of two American presidents (Harding and Hoover) as well as by the Third Reich’s Führer, and who was personally received with the highest honors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn998|998]] It’s worthwhile to note that the person who criticizes that line of thinking, committed to celebrating white and Nordic supremacy and its application to eugenics, is Antonio Gramsci, the communist leader and theorist targeted by Conquest.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn999|999]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To that author, obsessed with discovering ideological affinities to Nazis in the most remote places and in the most overlooked movements and individuals, I want to make a suggestion: he could try to submit his books to the same treatment he gives to the books of even the vaguest socialist orientation. Consider the thesis formulated in one of Conquest’s last published works: true civilization finds its most complete expression in the “English speaking community”, and the primacy of that community has a precise ethnic basis, constituted by “Anglo-Celtics.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1000|1000]] The Anglo-Celtic mythology traced here recalls the terrible memory of Aryan mythology. There’s only one detail to add. Aryan mythology, cherished by a long tradition that developed on both sides of the Atlantic and later led to Nazism, tended to identify itself with white mythology; in any case, it paid tribute to the Nordic nations and all nations that had their origin on German soil, therefore including the British and the Americans. The Anglo-Celtic community, however, is not only defined in total opposition to those foreign to the West, but also to those on the European continent. The club of truly civilized nations dear to Conquest is, without a doubt, more exclusive.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== The Anti-Communist Nuremberg and the Denial of the Principle of &#039;&#039;Tu Quoque&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
By now the trend is now clear. On the side of the victors there are no small number of voices being raised that recommend or demand a type of anti-communist Nuremberg; and that’s the orientation that inspires the ruling ideology and historiography. It’s known that during the Nuremberg trials the Nazi defendants were denied the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039;, in other words, that based on the charges being contended they could call attention to similar crimes committed by their accusers. The Tokyo trials play out in a similar way. It’s the justice of the victor, of course. Moreover, at the conclusion of the gigantic conflict, that had also played out as an international civil war and as a planetary clash between revolution and counter-revolution (think of the Nazis’ theorization of the master race’s right to enslave the “inferior races”, with a frightening and substantial leap backwards in relation to the process of the abolition of colonial slavery), we see revolutionary tribunals emerge in a number countries (think of Italy), that in the case of Germany and Japan (where the internal front held out until the end) are imposed from above and from outside. The current historical trials of the anti-communist Nuremberg are a farcical replica of a great tragedy. It’s evident that a historical judgement is unthinkable without the reconstruction of the time’s atmosphere: comparisons and the recourse to the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; are absolutely inevitable. It’s with that criteria that I intend to analyze the usual criminalization of the events initiated with the October Revolution and Stalin in particular.&lt;br /&gt;
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There are no doubts about the terroristic methods of power exercised by him. But let’s make use of the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039;. We now know about the hundreds of thousands of victims caused by the American bombing campaign against Cambodia. Here I intend to call attention to one detail in particular:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The peasants became captive to a blind terror. “Their minds were paralyzed and they wandered around silently, without speaking for three or four days”, a young village resident recalled. “Their brains were completely disoriented [...] they couldn’t even have a meal.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And many, driven “partly mad by the terror”, were never able to become themselves again.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1001|1001]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The terror isn’t always exercised at a safe distance, bombarding from high above in the sky. With regard to the US, at the start of the twentieth century a guerrilla war is still underway in the Philippines, and it was repressed―an American historian reports―with the “massacre of entire villages”, or with the execution of all males over the age of ten.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1002|1002]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Other times, the terror is carried out by delegating the dirtiest tasks to third parties, who are always aided in that task. Let’s see how the US got rid of its political opponents in Indonesia: hundreds of thousands of communists were killed after the 1965 coup d’état, orchestrated and supported by Washington. The recourse to terror and even sadism is systematic:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The mass killings began in October of 1965 [...]. The army had made and distributed lists of “communists” to right-wing Muslim groups, armed with &#039;&#039;parangs&#039;&#039; and transported by truck to villages where they killed and mutilated the inhabitants. School children were encouraged to identify “communists”, many of whom were killed on the spot, along with their entire family. Many people were denounced over personal disputes, and “a word or a finger pointed at someone was enough for them to be taken outside and shot dead.&amp;amp;quot; The number of victims was so elevated that it caused serious health problems in the east of Java and the north of Sumatra, where the smell of rotting corpses filled the air and the bodies obstructed navigation on the rivers [...]. In 1968 they ordered mass executions, and at once the army and the civil guard killed in the center of Java “3,500 supporters of the PKI, beating them on the head with iron bars” [...]. According to Amnesty International, boys less than thirteen years old, the elderly, the injured and sick, weren’t exempt from torture, used not only in interrogations, but also as punishment or out of mere sadism.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1003|1003]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Is the terror by the liberal West only practiced outside their national borders? No, it is not; one just needs to think of the violence that, in the first decades of the twentieth century, is still carried out against blacks, and that is often organized as a mass pedagogical spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;News about lynchings was published in local newspapers, and they added additional wagons to trains to transport spectators, at times thousands of them, coming from locations miles away. To allow them to attend the lynching, school children could have the day off. The spectacle could include castration, skinning, immolation, and gunshots. The souvenirs that could be taken include fingers, toes, teeth, bones, and even the victim’s genitals, as well as illustrated postcards of the event.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1004|1004]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, “the final solution to our Indian question” drags on in Canada even after achieving its independence.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s concentrate on the 1930s, the decade when we see Stalin’s terror unfold in the USSR. In the US, the headlines and stories in the local newspapers are in themselves revealing. “Big preparations for tonight’s lynching.&amp;amp;quot; Not a single detail should be neglected: “They fear that shots fired against the negro may miss its target and strike innocent spectators, including women carrying their children”; but if everyone sticks to the rules, “no one will be disappointed.&amp;amp;quot; Let’s look at other headlines: “the lynching was more or less carried out as advertised”; “the crowd applauded and laughed at the negro’s horrible death.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1005|1005]] It’s correct to speak of terror, and not just in consideration of the effects that such a cruel, happily announced and advertised spectacle had on the black community. There’s more. It wasn’t just black men accused of “rape”―or in the majority cases consensual relations with a white woman―who were lynched. Much more minor offenses were enough to be sentenced to death. &#039;&#039;The Atlanta Constitution&#039;&#039; of July 11th, 1934, reported the execution of a 25 year old black man “accused of having written an ‘indecent and insulting’ letter to a young white woman in Hinds County”; in this case “the crowd of armed citizens” were satisfied at firing rounds of gunshots at the body of the unfortunate soul.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1006|1006]] Moreover, besides striking the “guilty”, death, more or less inflicted in a sadistic way, also loomed over mere suspects. Let’s continue to examine the newspapers from that time and read the headlines: “Declared innocent by the jury, then lynched”; “Suspect hung from oak tree in Bastrop’s public square”; “The wrong man lynched.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1007|1007]] Lastly, the violence isn’t limited to the culprit or the suspected culprit: it has happened that, before carrying out a man’s lynching, the cabin where his family lived was set on fire and completely burned.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1008|1008]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to blacks, the terror also strikes at whites who, in becoming excessively close to blacks, become traitors to their race. It’s what emerges in the title of an article in the &#039;&#039;Galveston Tribune&#039;&#039; on July 21st, 1934: “A white girl is put in prison and her black friend is lynched.&amp;amp;quot; The fact is that―an editorial in the &#039;&#039;Chicago Defender&#039;&#039; comments a few days later―a white woman can more freely pair-up with a dog than with a black man.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1009|1009]] And if she doesn’t take that into account, the terroristic regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; lashes out at her twice over: depriving her of her personal freedom and attacking her loved ones. Therefore, terror also strikes at citizens (blacks and whites) who don’t carry out any political activity, but are considered guilty for having a private life contrary to societal norms.&lt;br /&gt;
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“Betrayal” in relation to the white race can take on even more serious forms. Communists are called “nigger lovers” for taking part in a campaign against the practice of lynching, and are therefore targeted by the terror wielded by the regime of white supremacy and forced to “face the possibility of prison, beatings, kidnapping and even murder.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1010|1010]] Once again, the stories from the newspapers of the time are revealing: “‘Fear of communism’ cited as the cause of lynchings.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1011|1011]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s return to Stalin’s USSR. There’s no doubt that, especially starting with the forced collectivization of agriculture, the concentrationary universe, that had already begun taking form soon after the October Revolution, experienced a ghastly expansion. But let’s also apply the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; in this case. Skipping over the concentrationary universe (that we already came across) enforced in the US South at around the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, let’s instead see what happens around the middle of the twentieth century. Between 1952 and 1959 the Mau Mau revolt breaks out in Kenya. Here’s how the London government maintains order in its colony: in the Kamiti concentration camp, the women:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Were whipped, starved and subjected to hard labor that included filling mass graves with the bodies arriving from other concentration camps. Many of them gave birth in Kamiti, but the mortality rate among the children was overwhelming. The women buried their children six at a time.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1012|1012]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Also with regard to genocidal practices, the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; still applies for that accusation. I don’t know if it’s possible to define the massacre of communists in Indonesia (promoted or encouraged by the CIA) as “the second biggest holocaust of the twentieth century.&amp;amp;quot; In any case, it’s a massacre carried out without the industrial efficiency of the Nazis, and therefore with an added level of sadism. At any rate, it should be to everyone’s knowledge that, even after the end of the Third Reich, the liberal West’s interventions in its colonies and semi-colonies not only led to the establishment of ferocious dictatorships, it also aided in the realization of “acts of genocide”; the “Truth Commission” in Guatemala stresses this, referring to the fate suffered by the Maya, guilty of having sympathized with the opponents to the regime supported by Washington.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1013|1013]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, we saw how the Jacobins are “horrible cannibals” in the eyes of the Thermidorian bourgeoisie; later, however, it will be the descendants of that bourgeoisie who will endure the Paris Commune’s denouncement of the “cannibalistic acts by the Versailles bandits.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1014|1014]] Regarding the twentieth century, while the civil war rages on, the Bolsheviks call for the struggle against “bourgeois cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1015|1015]] Later, as we are well aware, it was Stalin himself who classified antisemitism as an expression of “cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot; Nowadays, however, they take the tragedy and horrors of Nazino island, where real cases of cannibalism took place, to reduce the events that began with the October Revolution to pure barbarism and to denounce “red cannibalism.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1016|1016]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, episodes of cannibalism had previously occurred: in 1921, the gravity of the famine reaches “the point of provoking cases of anthropophagy.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1017|1017]] A year later, the liberal Italian philosopher Guido de Ruggiero observes:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The Entente’s blockade, that sought to annihilate Bolshevism, instead killed Russian men, women and children; could the poor going hungry compete in democratic elegance with those from the Entente causing the hunger? As was natural, they rallied around their own government and identified its enemies as their own.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1018|1018]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As you can see, the liberal philosopher blames the Entente more than Soviet rule. “Witnessed cases of anthropophagy” also occur in certain parts of China in 1928,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1019|1019]] cases that could hardly be blamed on the communists, who will seize power more than twenty years later; they will eventually blame the West, starting with the Opium Wars, of having sent that great Asian country into the abyss. But let’s return to the 1930s, yet relocating from Stalin’s Soviet Union to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s United States. Here’s how a fiendish crowd furiously attacks a black man:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The first thing they did was cut off his penis and forced him to eat it. Later they cut off his testicles and forced him to eat them and say that he enjoyed it. Next, they used knives to cut off strips of skin from his torso and stomach, and anyone, one by one, could rip off fingers or toes from his hands or feet. Red hot iron was used to burn the negro from top to bottom. From time to time a rope was tied around Neal’s neck and they removed the stand from under him, until he almost died, strangulated; but then the tortured resumed, starting over from the beginning. After various hours of that punishment they decided to kill him. Neal’s body was tied to the back of a car and dragged through the street all the way to Cannidy’s house. There, a crowd of between 3,000 and 7,000 people, coming from various southern states, excitedly awaited his arrival.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entertainment around the body continues for a long time and concludes with the sale of photographs, “fifty cents each”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1020|1020]] but we’ll stop there. It’s clear that the application of the principle of &#039;&#039;tu quoque&#039;&#039; has led us to discover in F.D. Roosevelt’s United States a case, not of cannibalism provoked by general scarcity, disorder and hunger, but rather self-inflicted cannibalism, forced and organized as a mass spectacle in a society otherwise enjoying a high standard of living.&lt;br /&gt;
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In conclusion, the usual comparison of the communist movement on one side, and the liberal West on the other, makes abstraction, regarding the latter, of the fate reserved to the colonial peoples or people of colonial origin, and the measures approved in situations of more or less acute crisis. The comparison of the two heterogeneous set of measures ends up being Manichaean: one world exclusively analyzed by its sacred spaces and its periods of normality is triumphantly counterposed to a world that, having challenged the barrier that separates the sacred space from the profane space, the civilized and the barbarians, is forced to confront a prolonged state of emergency and the irreducible hostility from the guardians of that exclusive sacred space.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Demonization and Hagiography: the Example of the “Greatest Modern Living Historian” ===&lt;br /&gt;
According to Conquest, the catastrophe of the twentieth century begins, in fact, with the emergence of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; within the West’s “civil and democratic order”: the ideas expressed by Marx and Engels “caused significant problems in the world for more than five generations.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1021|1021]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Let’s look, then, at the world situation of 1848, the year of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto&#039;&#039;’s fatal publication. Let’s begin with Great Britain, which for Conquest is one of the two centers for the exclusive and superior “Anglo-Celtic” community, and therefore true civilization. And yet, around the middle of the nineteenth century, according to Tocqueville the industrial area of Manchester and the working class neighborhoods look like an “infected labyrinth” and “hell” itself: the miserable slums are “the last refuge that man can find between misery and death.&amp;amp;quot; Nevertheless, “the unfortunate souls who live in those hovels draw the jealously of some of their peers.&amp;amp;quot; Let’s now move on to the work houses, again turning to the French liberal: they are the site of the “most horrendous and repugnant misery”; on one side those unable to work or who await their death, on the other women and children were crammed together “like pigs in the mud of their pigsty; it’s hard to avoid stepping on a half-naked body.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In France, the popular classes don’t accept these conditions. Here’s how Tocqueville called for the Revolt of June 1848 to be confronted: anyone who is caught in a “defense stance” must be shot dead on the spot. Yet one can’t be satisfied with “palliatives”: it’s necessary to liquidate once and for all the centers of subversion, eliminating not just the Mountain of Jacobin inspiration, but “all its surrounding hills”; one must not hesitate at all in taking a “heroic [...] remedy.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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Around the middle of the nineteenth century, Ireland is an integral part of Great Britain; there we see the “proto-Eichmann” condemn hundreds of thousands of people to death by starvation. In the United Kingdom’s other colonies, the situation is no better. In 1835, the viceroy of India informs London about the consequences from the destruction of the local textile artisanry, wiped out by British industry: “It’s a state of misery that can hardly find precedents in the history of commerce. The bones of textile workers whiten the plains of India.&amp;amp;quot; The tragedy doesn’t stop there. Two years later, a famine takes place that is so terrible that―another British source, completely committed to celebrating the glory of the empire, candidly remarks―”the British residents [...] are forced to cancel their usual evening walks due to the awful smell of bodies, too numerous to be buried.&amp;amp;quot; There doesn’t appear to be any improved prospects for evening walks: “the successive outbreaks of cholera and smallpox decimated a part of the population that had survived the famine.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1022|1022]] The slaughter isn’t just the result of “objective” economic processes: in New Zealand―&#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039; observes in 1864―the settlers, strengthened by the support from the London government, carried out the “extermination of the natives.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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And now we’ll see what happens in the other center of the “Anglo-Celtic” community and true civilization. While in Europe the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; ruinously emerges, slavery is in full bloom in the United States, which had just earlier reintroduced it in Texas, taken from Mexico by force of arms, and that had previously declared, under Jefferson, its goal of reducing the people of Haiti to starvation, guilty for having broken the bonds of slavery. In the United States, the tragedy suffered by the Native Americans is added to the tragedy suffered by black people. Regarding the Native Americans, we will cite just one episode, summarized as follows by an American historian: “The degradation and annihilation of California’s Native Americans is one of the most shameful pages in United States history, an indelible stain to the honor and intelligence of the United States. It wasn’t a war, but a type of public sport.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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In relation to the colonial peoples or the people of colonial origin, the brutality of Western “civil and democratic order” is not only put into practice, but also explicitly theorized by authors embraced as part of the liberal pantheon without any issues. Tocqueville invites his fellow patriots to not allow themselves to be hindered by residual moral scruples and to accept reality: to complete the conquest of Algeria, which in no way can be renounced, it’s inevitable “that crops will be burned, silos will be emptied, and finally we will overpower unarmed men, women and children.&amp;amp;quot; Yet, it’s necessary to go further, as is revealed by a terrible slogan: “Destroy everything that resembles a permanent concentration of people, in other words, a city [...]. Don’t allow any city to survive or emerge in the regions controlled by Abdel-Kader” (the resistance leader).[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1023|1023]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The flattering depiction that Conquest traces of the world before the publication of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; can be compared to a similar one that is traced of slave society by a critic of abolitionism at the start of the nineteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Protected against the adversities of life, surrounded by comforts unknown to most European countries, secure in the enjoyment of their property (indeed, they had property and it was sacred), treated in illness with expenses and attention that you will search for in vain in those celebrated hospitals in England; protected and respected during the pains of old age, with their children and their families in peace [...] relieved once they had performed important services; this was the true, unembellished picture of how our negros were administered [...]. The most sincere affection linked the master to his slave; we slept soundly among these men, that had become our sons, and many of us didn’t keep locks or bolts on our doors.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1024|1024]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Conquest, the “Cold War veteran”, is celebrated, however, as the “greatest living modern historian”, although it’s yet another court historian who expresses that opinion.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1025|1025]] It’s obvious, the &#039;&#039;reductio ad Hitlerum&#039;&#039; of the events that began with the October Revolution, and especially with the figure who for more time than any other led the Soviet Union, is only the flip side to the insipid hagiography of the world before 1917, and even the world before the publication of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Abolitionist Revolutions and the Demonization of the “Anti-Whites” and the Barbarians ===&lt;br /&gt;
The comparative approach can once again help clarify the underlying logic of these ideological processes. There are three great revolutionary movements that, in different ways, had radically challenged the slavery or semi-slavery of the colonial regime, and the racist regime of white supremacy that existed at both the national and international level. We must first consider the great revolution by black slaves that broke out in Saint-Domingue in the wake of the French Revolution. Led by Toussaint Louverture, the ‘black Jacobin’, that revolution leads to Saint-Domingue-Haiti’s declaration of independence, the first country in the Americas to shake off the institution of slavery. The second great revolutionary movement is that which in the United States, following abolitionist agitation and the American Civil War, leads to the establishment of a multiracial society for a brief period of time (the years of &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;), within which the newly freed blacks enjoy not only full civil rights, but also political rights. Lastly, we must reference the October Revolution that calls upon the colonial slaves to break their chains, and that powerfully encourages those that until then were considered the “inferior races” in the struggle for decolonization and emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
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All of these three great movements suffered, and still in part suffer, summary liquidation or their confinement to the darkness or shadows of history. Let’s take the revolution led by Toussaint Louverture. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, those who are sympathetic to it are called “anti-white and murderers.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1026|1026]] Regarding Saint-Domingue, Tocqueville merely alludes to the “bloody catastrophe that had put an end to its existence.&amp;amp;quot; Paradoxically, the island ceases to exist at the very moment in which it puts an end to, for the first time on the American continent, the institution of slavery! But to reconstruct the atmosphere of that time, it’s perhaps necessary to specifically cite a popular novel by Heinrich von Kleist (&#039;&#039;The Betrothal in Santo Domingo&#039;&#039;), set at the start of the nineteenth century, “when blacks killed whites” and carried out a “massacre of whites” in the name of a “disorientating, generalized revenge.&amp;amp;quot; The criminalization of this great revolution went unchallenged for a long time. It continued on into the start of the twentieth century with Lothrop Stoddard: together with the revolution by black slaves in Saint-Domingue, the theorist of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039; also condemns the second and third stages represented by the anti-slavery and anti-tsarist struggles, and naturally brands as traitors to the white race the French Jacobins, the American supporters of radical abolition and the cause of racial equality, as well as the Bolsheviks.&lt;br /&gt;
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With respect to so-called &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, one must have in mind the warning from an eminent American historian: “Despite its military defeat, the South won the ideological civil war a long time ago.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1027|1027]] It would appear that, at least in this case, there should be no doubt: after centuries of slavery in the fullest sense of the word, Reconstruction is forced to make way to a regime of anti-black terror, so ferocious that it can be identified as the most tragic moment in African-American history. However, let’s see how Wilson summarizes that time in history: “the household slaves were almost always indulgently and even warmly treated by their masters.&amp;amp;quot; In the wake of emancipation Reconstruction sets in, during which majorities are formed in the South that rely on blacks: it’s “an incredible carnival of public crime”, to which “the natural and inevitable rise of the whites” fortunately puts an end.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1028|1028]] A figure who went on to enter the pantheons of the United States and the West is not filled with horror at the time when the slave owner exercises absolute power over his human cattle, nor is it the time when the regime of white supremacy organizes the public spectacle of lynching and the slow martyrdom of the former slaves; synonymous with “public crime” is the brief period of time that followed the American Civil War and during which there’s the effort, despite everything, to take the human rights of African Americans seriously.&lt;br /&gt;
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For a time, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, or &#039;&#039;Radical Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, had been considered synonymous with “totalitarianism”, or as the phenomenon that preceded “fascism and Nazism.&amp;amp;quot; Imposed at the conclusion of a war that was very similar to the “total war by the Nazis”, it had intended to forcefully realize the principle of equality and racial intermixing, trampling on the will of (white) majority and appealing to the savage population, with the consequent “victory achieved through physical force by civilization over barbarism.&amp;amp;quot; Fortunately, the stainless and fearless knights of the Ku Klux Klan were ready to challenge or contain those horrors; the KKK was the organization that kept alive the “knightly order” that had for so long characterized the US South! These are the themes that are promoted by a historiography that continued to make its influence felt well after the collapse of the Third Reich.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1029|1029]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, the events that began in October 1917, with the appeal directed to the colonial slaves to break their chains, culminated with the arrival of Stalin’s autocracy.&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, it’s not in any way a matter of idealizing the protagonists of these three great emancipatory struggles. An eminent historian on the revolution by black slaves in Saint-Domingue argued against “the contemporary legend according to which the abolition of slavery had meant the extermination of the whites”;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1030|1030]] but it’s undeniable that massacres took place on both sides. Nor is their doubt about the brutality, at that time unprecedented, with which the American Civil War was carried out by the North, and particularly by Sherman, who explicitly proposed striking at the civilian population and to “make Georgia howl”,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1031|1031]] and it’s no coincidence that Hitler appears to look to him as a model. Finally, the ruthless nature of the dictatorship maintained first by Lenin, and especially by Stalin later, is not up for debate. At least the second war brought up here now appears to have been lost by the slave owning South in the field of history as well: it is no longer politically correct to regret the end of slavery or the regime of &#039;&#039;white supremacy&#039;&#039;. In contrast, commonplace is the understanding of “Stalinism” (and the history of the October Revolution) as merely criminal, as well as the comparison of Stalin to Hitler, who―inheriting and radicalizing the colonial tradition―explicitly demanded the right of the “master race” to decimate and enslave the “inferior races”: it’s a sign that the champions of colonialism still haven&#039;t lost the battle at either the political level or in the field of history.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Universal History as a “Grotesque Succession of Monsters” and as “Teratology”? ===&lt;br /&gt;
The movement in history condemned to &#039;&#039;damnatio memoriae&#039;&#039; is the one that more than any other radically challenged the arrogance of the “master race” that had ruled for centuries, from the classic colonial tradition, to the attempt by the Third Reich to radicalize it and apply it in the very heart of Europe.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there’s no movement in history that can’t be subjected to a similar process of criminalization. Take liberalism, for example. If we ignore the best pages written by it (the need for limitations on power, the rule of law, or its understanding of the powerful boost to the development of the productive forces and social wealth that can come from the market, competition, and individual initiative), and we concentrated exclusively on the fate suffered by the colonial peoples or those of colonial origin (for centuries subjected to enslavement, to the more or less brutal forms of forced labor and genocidal practices and even “holocausts”, according to the term increasingly used by historians), even liberalism can be read in a more or less criminal perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the current climate of the “War on Terror”, there’s certainly no lack of books that, in referencing the horrific suicide attacks in Beslan, Russia in 2004 (when an indiscriminate and limitless violence takes even children as targets), reconstruct the expansion of Islam as a history of a bloody and cruel conquest, that savagely rules over the defeated and only leaves behind a trail of blood. The role of Islam in the creation of the grand multiethnic and multicultural civilization that characterizes Spain before the Christian reconquest is hidden and forgotten, as is its radical questioning of caste society in India, and more generally of its promotion, beginning in the nineteenth century, of the emancipation struggle by colonial peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the opposition direction, however, we can cite the publication of the monumental &#039;&#039;Criminal History of Christianity&#039;&#039;, completely dedicated to denouncing the intolerance and violence inherent to its pretension of knowing the only true god; it contains an angry condemnation of the crusades of extermination (proclaimed against external infidels and internal heretics), the religious wars, the Inquisition, the witch hunts, the legitimization of the West’s colonial expansion and the horrors in its wake, the support given even in the twentieth century to tyrannical and bloody regimes.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1032|1032]] And again resourcefulness is combined with omission. Preaching the idea of equality between men, and as late as the eighteenth and nineteenth century feeding the abolitionist and anti-slavery movement, Christianity is an essential part in the formation of the democratic society. In his lucid hatred, Nietzsche understood this well; it was precisely for that reason that he denounces the intrinsically violent and criminal impulse that, despite its appearances, characterizes Christianity and the early Judaism of the prophets; rallying around the idea of equality and against wealth, power and the status of masters in general, the Jewish prophets would be first among those responsible for the massacres that took place during the peasant wars, the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. A line of continuity which nineteenth century antisemitism and Hitler extend to the communist movement and the “Judeo-Bolshevik” revolution of October 1917.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, the communist movement was quite often compared to early Christianity or to Islam. Thus, this depiction of universal history, understood as the universal history of crime, is almost complete. That sequencing of crimes not only avoids their motivations, but also the reasons for their uninterrupted duration, such that history as a whole is portrayed, as Hegel would say, as a “slaughterhouse” of planetary dimensions,[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1033|1033]] or as an immensely unfathomable &#039;&#039;mysterium iniquitatis&#039;&#039;. At this moment―we can observe like Gramsci―the past as such looks “irrational” and “monstrous” to us: history as a whole is portrayed as a “grotesque succession of monsters”, as “teratology.&amp;amp;quot;[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1034|1034]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Opposing the reduction of the events that began with October 1917 to a crime or to criminal madness, authors and figures committed in some way to defending communism’s honor react, at times, by distancing themselves from the darker pages of that movement’s history and branding them as the betrayal or the degeneration of the original ideas of the Bolshevik revolution and the teachings by Lenin and Marx. Looking closely, that approach also leads to an outcome not very different from that we just finished analyzing. Are all the pages ruthlessly described in the &#039;&#039;Criminal History of Christianity&#039;&#039; examples of “betrayal” and “degeneration”? How about the Reformation (and the principle of each Christian’s freedom, solemnly proclaimed by Luther) and the regimes that later side with Protestantism? Following that line, Cromwell is a “degenerate” in relation to the original protagonists of the Puritan Revolution, and the Terror by the Jacobins is a “degeneration” of the ideals of 1789. Is modern Islamic fundamentalism a “degeneration” in relation to the Quran and Muhammad’s teachings? Remaining coherent to this approach, anyone can consider the liberal West’s enslavement and annihilation of the colonial peoples to be a degeneration of “liberalism.&amp;amp;quot; Therefore, the “traitors” would be Washington, Jefferson, Madison―all slave owners―and also Franklin, according to whom “the uprooting of those savages [the Native Americans] has been planned by Providence, for the purposes of clearing space for the cultivators of the land.&amp;amp;quot; Locke should also then be classified as a traitor to liberalism, as he is generally considered the father of that line of thinking, and not only did he legitimize the expropriation (and the deportation) of the Native Americans, but he was also, as observed by an eminent scholar (David B. Davis), “the last great philosopher who sought to justify absolute and perpetual slavery.&amp;amp;quot; Proceeding in that way, we thus transform the pantheon of the great figures of liberalism into a gallery of traitors without honor.&lt;br /&gt;
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That sort of argument is even more suspect if we consider the fact that, in the eyes of a great liberal theorist of slavery like John C. Calhoun, It’s precisely the abolitionists with their Jacobinism and anti-slavery fanaticism who betray liberal ideas of tolerance and respect for property rights in all their forms. That approach isn’t much more persuasive if we apply it to the history of Marxism and communism. Especially beginning with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Stalin is the criminal traitor par excellence. But it’s necessary not to forget that those very champions of de-stalinization are accused of betrayal and “revisionism” by the Chinese and Albanian communist parties. In our days, the criminalization process also targets Lenin, Mao Zedong, Tito―without even mentioning Pol Pot―, and not even Ho Chi Minh and Castro are spared. A truly miserable outcome is reached by relying on the category of betrayal. The history of the communist movement as a crime in itself, triumphantly written by the ruling ideology, is simply rebranded―by those who are unable to identify with the ruling ideology―as the history of betrayal of its original ideals. Not all that different results would be reached in the reading of liberalism or Christianity if we wanted to describe their darkest chapters as the betrayal of their original ideals. To conclude, the approach criticized here commits the mistake of erasing the real and profane history, which is substituted by a history of the unfortunate and mysterious corruption and distortion of doctrines elevated a priori to the status of purity and holiness.&lt;br /&gt;
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Theory is never innocent, however. The reading of Soviet Russia’s history in terms of the “betrayal” and “degeneration” of its noble original ideas is, most of the time, dismissively rejected by modern historiography, deeply committed not only to the collective criminalization of the Bolsheviks, but also in denouncing the authors that inspired the Bolsheviks as the original theorists of the Terror and the Gulag. While it’s necessary to avoid drawing hard lines of continuity and mixing up quite different kinds of responsibility, it is nevertheless permitted and even obligatory to question the role (however indirect and limited) played by Marx and Engels, rejecting the myth of their innocence and investigating the real history of their impact and the reasons for that impact. But then it’s necessary to take a similar approach toward all the great intellectuals, including those who are placed within a different and opposing intellectual tradition. Take Locke, for example. Is there a relation between his refusal to extend tolerance and even “compassion” to the “Papists” and the massacres the Catholics suffered in Ireland? And what of the underlying connection between his theoretical justification of slavery in the colonies and the slave trade, and the tragedy suffered by blacks, that which some African Americans today prefer to call the &#039;&#039;Black Holocaust&#039;&#039;? We can also turn to the time of Marx and Engels: must a theorist, like John Stuart Mill, of the West’s “despotism” over the “lesser” races (who must show “absolute obedience”) and the beneficial nature of slavery imposed on “savage tribes” alien to work and discipline, be considered in part responsible for the terror and massacres that accompany colonial expansion?&lt;br /&gt;
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Not a single movement or person can escape those questions. We saw Nietzsche refer to the fiery tirades against power and wealth by the Jewish prophets and founders of the Church to explain the destructive and bloody nature of the revolutionary cycle. In the opposite direction, those that denounce the protagonists of crusades as traitors to Christianity would do well not to overlook a commonly neglected detail: an integral part of that religion’s holy scriptures is the Old Testament, which legitimizes and celebrates the “Lord’s wars” even in its cruelest forms. In this case, it’s also misleading to counterpose the nobility of the original ideas to the mediocrity and the horrors of its real history.&lt;br /&gt;
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Having confirmed theory’s non-innocence, it’s a matter of identifying the different levels of responsibility. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the bodies of black slaves were branded with the letters RAC, the Royal African Company (the corporation that managed the slave trade), in which Locke was a shareholder. The least that one could say is that the authors of the &#039;&#039;Manifesto of the Communist Party&#039;&#039; didn’t profit from the forced labor that, a few decades after their deaths, will characterize the Gulag. Marx and Engels can be accused of having legitimized in advance violence that, at any rate, will be put into practice after their deaths, and with decades separating them. Mill, however, legitimizes practices that are contemporary to him; similarly, in Tocqueville we can read the explicit recommendation of colonial practices that are more or less genocidal (the systematic destruction of urban centers found in areas controlled by the rebels) that don’t refer to the future, but the immediate present.[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1035|1035]] In other words, regarding the atrocities of colonialism that take place under their watch and, at times, with their direct approval, the representatives of the liberal tradition cited here have much more direct responsibility than that attributed to Marx and Engels regarding the shameful aspects of the Soviet regime and “Stalinism.&amp;amp;quot; While the path that leads from Marx to Stalin and the Gulag is problematic, bumpy and at any rate mediated by totally unpredictable events like World War II and the permanent state of emergency, it’s immediately evident the link that connects Locke to the slave trade or Mill and Tocqueville to the forced labor imposed on the indigenous people and the colonial massacres.&lt;br /&gt;
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As a theory, neither can utopianism claim any innocence. Liberals are correct on that point, though unfortunately they resort to that argument in a dogmatic way, applying it only to their adversaries and not to themselves: what were the terrible human and social costs of the utopia of a self-regulated market, with the subsequent rejection of any state intervention, a utopia to which Britain was loyal to even when, around the middle of the nineteenth century, a disease destroyed the potato harvest and the subsequent famine consumed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Irish people? Or, to give a more recent example: how many catastrophes were provoked and continue to be provoked by the utopia (supported by Wilson even before Bush Jr., as well as by prominent modern philosophers like Popper) of a permanent peace to be achieved by spreading democracy around the world through the force of arms? To avoid falling into that very dogmatism, a similar question is also raised in relation to the history of the Soviet Union. There are, of course, those that read the history of the country born out of the October Revolution by lamenting the gradual “betrayal” of the ideals elaborated by Marx and Engels; in reality, and in certain aspects, it’s precisely those “original” ideals (the millenarian hopes for a society without a state and juridical norms, without national borders and without the market and money, where there’s ultimately no real conflicts at all) that played a harmful role, obstructing the transition to a state of normality and prolonging and intensifying the state of emergency (caused by the crisis of the old regime, by the war and by the subsequent invasions).&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite their differences, the two approaches criticized here, that respectively base themselves on the category of crime (or criminal madness) or betrayal, have a shared characteristic: they have a tendency to focus their attention on either the criminal or the treacherous nature of individuals. In fact, they refuse to understand the real historical development and historical effectiveness of the social, political and religious movements that have a worldwide ability to draw people in and whose influence unfolds over quite a long period of time.&lt;br /&gt;
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Such an approach also proves to be inconclusive and misleading with regard to the Third Reich (which lasts for only 12 years and was only able to appeal to those included in the “master race”). It’s way too easy to exclusively blame Hitler for the atrocities of Nazism, suppressing the fact that he extracted from the world that preceded him―and then radicalized―the two essential parts of his ideology: the celebration of the white race’s colonial mission and the West itself, now called upon to further extend its dominion into Eastern Europe; the understanding of the October Revolution as a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy that, in encouraging the rebellion by the colonial peoples and undermining the natural racial hierarchy and, more generally, infecting society like a pathogen, constituted a frightening threat to civilization, to be confronted using all means, including the “final solution.&amp;amp;quot; In other words, to comprehend the genesis of the Third Reich’s horrors, it’s not a question of reconstructing Hitler’s childhood or adolescence; nor does it make sense to start with Stalin’s very beginnings to analyze an institution (the Gulag) that has its roots in the history of Tsarist Russia and which, in ways that are always different, of which the countries of liberal West also made use, both during periods of colonial expansion as well as during the state of emergency caused by the Second Thirty Years’ War. Similarly misleading would be wanting to explain slavery and the decimation and extermination of the Native Americans based primarily on the individual characteristics of the US Founding Fathers, or seeking to explain the strategic and atomic bombings of German and Japanese cities through Churchill’s, Roosevelt’s and Truman’s perverse nature. It would be equally unreasonable to seek to explain the horrors of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib by starting with Bush Jr.’s adolescence or childhood.&lt;br /&gt;
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But let’s return to Stalin. Is it a case of moral indifference to reject the approach that interprets everything as a crime (or criminal madness) or as the betrayal of the original ideals? Historians today still debate individuals and events that go back nearly two thousand years: must we unhesitatingly accept the sinister portrait of Nero traced by both the senatorial aristocracy and by the Christians? In particular, must we accept without question the Christian propaganda that accused the Roman emperor of having started a fire in Rome in order to blame and persecute the innocent followers of the new religion? Or, as suggested by some scholars, was it possibly started by fundamentalist and apocalyptic tendencies within early Latin Christianity, which sought to see reduced to ashes the place par excellence of superstition and sin, and to accelerate the fulfillment of their eschatological hopes?[[footnotes.xhtml#fn1036|1036]] Let’s skip ahead a few centuries. Regarding the large-scale anti-Christian persecution unleashed by Diocletian, historians continue to ask themselves if it was only the result of an inexplicable religious hatred that was alien to Roman traditions, or did genuine concern regarding the future of the state play a role, as its military was being undermined by Christian pacifist agitation, precisely at a time when the danger of barbarian invasions became more threatening? The historians who ask those questions are hardly accused of wanting to downplay the persecution that Christians endured, or of wanting to again send them to the beasts and to the most heinous forms of torment.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, it’s easier to critically analyze the sacred history of Christianity than it is to express doubts regarding the sacred aura that usually surrounds the history of the West and the country that leads it; due to it being much further in the past and its much smaller impact on the interests and passions of the present, it’s much easier to understand the motives of those who were defeated by Christianity than to identify the motives of those whose defeat cleared the way for the triumph of the “American century.&amp;amp;quot; And that explains the heavy influence of demonization and hagiography in the understanding of the twentieth century, as well as the stubborn popularity enjoyed by the negative cult of heroes.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;amp;quot;Concentrate All Our Strength&amp;amp;quot; Against &amp;amp;quot;The Principal Enemy&amp;amp;quot;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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“One of the fundamental qualities of the Bolsheviks [...], and one of the fundamental points of our revolutionary strategy is our ability to understand, at any given moment, who is the principal enemy and to know how to concentrate all our strength against that enemy.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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—Report to the VII Congress of the Communist International&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 1 ― Democracy and Peace? ===&lt;br /&gt;
It’s worthwhile to begin with the Cold War. To specify the time we are dealing with I’ll limit myself to several details. In January of 1952, to break the stalemate in military operations in Korea, US president Harry S. Truman flirted with a radical idea that was even written down in a diary entry: he could send an ultimatum to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, specifying in advance that their lack of compliance “would mean that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Beijing, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dalian, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every industrial center in China and the Soviet Union, would be eliminated” (Sherry 1995, p. 182). It was not a matter of a fantasy with no connection to reality, as disturbing as that may be: in those years nuclear weapons had been repeatedly wielded as a threat against a China determined to complete its anti-colonial revolution and achieve national independence and territorial integrity. The threat was all the more believable due to the terrible and lingering memory of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when Japan had its attention primarily turned to the Soviet Union―on this, authoritative American historians agree (Alperovitz 1995). It also wasn’t only the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China being threatened. On May 7th, 1954, in Dien Bien Phu Vietnam, an army led by the communist party defeated colonialist France’s occupying troops. On the eve of the battle, the American Secretary of State Foster Dulles said to French Prime Minister Georges Bidault: “And what if we were to give you two atomic bombs?” It was understood immediately that they were to be used against Vietnam. (Fontaine 1968, vol. 2, p. 118).&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite not even hesitating at the prospect of a nuclear holocaust to hold back the anti-colonial revolution (an essential constitutive element of the democratic revolution), in those same years the United States and its allies sold NATO as a contribution to the cause of democracy and peace. It must be placed in this context the speech in March of 1949 by Togliatti to the Chamber of Deputies, during the debate over Italy’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Your principal thesis is that democracies, as you call them, don’t wage wars. But gentlemen, who do you take us for? Do you truly believe that we don’t have the most minimal political and historical background? It’s not true that democracies don’t wage wars: all the colonial wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were waged by regimes that classified themselves as democratic. Such as when the United States waged a war of aggression against Spain to establish its rule in a part of the world it was interested in; it waged war against Mexico to conquer specific regions where there were substantial sources of raw materials; for decades they waged war on the indigenous Native American tribes in order to destroy them, offering one of the primary examples of the crime of genocide that is today judicially enshrined and thus should be legally punished in the future.”&lt;br /&gt;
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Nor must one forget “the ‘crusade by nineteen nations’, as Churchill had called it at the time,” against Soviet Russia, and there was also, before the eyes of the world, France’s war against Vietnam, at that time fully underway. (TO, 5; 496-97).&lt;br /&gt;
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Therefore, far from being synonymous with peace, bourgeois democracies had started and continued to be responsible for wars that often had a genocidal character. In any case, from the Italian communist leader’s point of view, to believe in the thesis according to which bourgeois democracy would be free of military impulses would mean having no “political or cultural background.&amp;amp;quot; But that background would truly disappear a few decades later. During the outbreak of the first war against Iraq, while the Italian Communist Party was beginning to crumble, one of its prominent philosophers (Giacomo Marramao) declared to “l’Unità” on January 25th, 1991: “Never in history has a democratic state waged war on another democratic state.&amp;amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The tone of that declaration didn’t allow for responses or doubts. Yet I will allow myself to cite Henry Kissinger, regarding whom there are many things to be criticized, but not being “politically or historically uncultured”:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“When the First World War broke out in Europe, most countries (including Great Britain, France and Germany) were governed by what were essentially democratic institutions. Nevertheless, the First World War―a catastrophe which Europe still hasn’t completely recovered from―was enthusiastically approved by all the (democratically elected) parliaments” (Kissinger 2011, pp. 425-26).&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, war has not even spared those that define themselves as the oldest democracies in the world. Great Britain and the United States were at war from 1812 to 1815. And on that occasion, it is even one of the founding fathers of the American Republic, namely Thomas Jefferson, who invokes against Great Britain a total and “eternal” war, a war that could only come to an end with the “extermination of one side or the other.&amp;amp;quot; And it’s not just a matter of a now distant historical event. Even between the two world wars, for some time the United States continued to consider Great Britain as its most likely enemy. The war plans they prepared in 1930, and approved by general Douglas MacArthur, even considered the use of chemical weapons.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 2 ― The Colonial Wars ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let’s reread Marramao’s statement from 1991: he (incorrectly) maintains that wars between democracies don’t happen while consciously making abstraction of the colonial wars in which the so-called democracies are the protagonists. Are colonial wars even considered wars? In absolving the democracies, must we blame those wars on the colonial peoples, guilty of being backwards and barbarians?&lt;br /&gt;
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Starting in 1935, Togliatti was called upon to confront fascist Italy’s aggression against Ethiopia (or Abyssinia). Mussolini stated his desire to contribute to the spreading of European civilization: it was necessary to put an end to a “centuries long slavery” and to their “pseudo barbarian and slave state”, that is a slave state led by “Negus of the slavers”, by the leader of slavers (Mussolini 1979, pp. 292-96). The regime’s propaganda didn’t relent in insisting that the “horrors of slavery” could not be tolerated; in Milan, cardinal Schuster blessed and consecrated the undertaking that “at the price of blood opens Ethiopia’s doors to the Catholic faith and Roman civilization” and abolishing “slavery, bringing light to the darkness of barbarism” (Salvatorelli, Mira, 1972, vol. 2, pp. 254 and 294). Despite being carried out through the massive use of mustard and asphyxiating gas, and through the large scale massacre of the civilian population, the war was celebrated as civilizing and humanitarian operation, and not without its democratic elements, given that it abolished slavery. We are led to think of the seductive humanitarian operations that exist nowadays.&lt;br /&gt;
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How did Togliatti react to that campaign? In August of 1935, in his Report (The Struggle against the War) to the VII Congress of the Communist International, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“For entire decades, the indigenous people of Africa have been subjected to a regime, not only of exploitation and slavery, but of true and proper physical extermination. The crisis years have added to the horrors of the colonial regime installed by the Europeans on that immense black continent. Moreover, the fascists, in the war carried out in Libya from 1924 to 1929, have unequivocally demonstrated what are the fascist methods of colonization. Even in that field, fascism has demonstrated itself to be the most barbaric form of bourgeois rule. Italy’s war in Libya has been carried out, from beginning to end, as a war of extermination against the indigenous population” (TO, 3.2; 760).&lt;br /&gt;
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Having always had a genocidal tendency, even when unleashed by countries with a liberal and democratic order, the colonial wars with fascism become completely and consciously genocidal.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, Togliatti recognized that “Abyssinia is an economically and politically backward country.&amp;amp;quot; It’s true, “so far there’s no trace of any national revolutionary movement, or even a mere democratic one”; still largely present was the “feudal regime.&amp;amp;quot; Was it necessary, then, to support or at least not oppose the seductive civilizing and humanitarian intervention? Not at all. On the contrary, Togliatti declared himself “ready to support the liberation struggle by the Ethiopian people against the fascist bandits” (TO, 3.2; 761-2); and that’s in consideration not only of the very atrocities of expansionism and colonial rule, but also for the fact that the anti-colonialist struggle, even when conducted by countries and peoples still outside modernity, is nonetheless an integral part of the world revolutionary process that throws imperialism (capitalism) into crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, even this lesson from Togliatti has been lost. In 2011, NATO massively intervened against Gaddafi’s Libya. To use the words of an authoritative philosopher from well outside the communist camp: “Today we know that the war has caused at least 30,000 deaths, against the 300 victims of the initial repression” that the regime was condemned for, a regime that the West was determined to overthrow (Todorov 2012). Among those who called for or approved the intervention in this war―considered neocolonial even by numerous scholars, journalists and news outlets―were Susanna Camusso, secretary general of the CGIL, and Rosanna Rossanda, a historic figure in “il Manifesto”, the Italian “communist daily” (cfr. Losurdo 2014, ch. 1, § 10).&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 3 ― A “Baroque” Outlook on the Anti-Imperialist Struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
As is well known, Togliatti was one of the main protagonists of the political reversal that in 1935 pushes the Communist International to identify Nazi-fascism as the principal enemy and to promote the program of the united front and popular front against it. Taking this position was not straightforward for the communists. Trotskyist propaganda didn’t relent in denouncing it as a betrayal of anti-colonialism, for the fact that it placed the two largest colonial empires at the time (those of Britain and France) among the secondary enemies, and therefore among the Soviet Union’s potential allies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Resistance to the new political line even came from other orientations. Take Carlo Rosselli, for example. In the last years of his life, before being assassinated by Mussolini’s agents in 1937, the leader of liberal-socialism was fairly close to the communists, and he looked sympathetically to the “gigantic Russian experiment” of “socialist revolution” and of the “socialist organization of production” (Roselli 1988, p. 381). Although said between parentheses, yet without absolute clarity: Carlo Roselli’s liberal-socialism was very different to the liberal-socialism that later characterized Norberto Bobbio!&lt;br /&gt;
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And yet, at least at the beginning, Rosselli expressed his reservations about the turn by the Communist International, and he spoke in the name of the revolutionary orthodoxy: “Traditional Marxist theory has been set aside and has increasingly drifted toward the theory of the ‘democratic war’. The present conflict would no longer be the result of an inter-imperialist war, but one between peaceful states (the proletarian state) and fascism, especially German fascism.&amp;amp;quot; The communist parties, at least those “in the countries allied to Russia, will be forced into the “union sacrée” (Rosselli 1989-92, vol. 2, pp. 328-29). In other words, by waving the flag of anti-fascist unity, the communists make their own the patriotic slogans that they condemned during World War I.&lt;br /&gt;
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That argumentative approach lost sight of, or didn’t comprehend, the drastic changes to the international situation. The same representative of liberal-socialism, writing on November 9th of 1934, said that “the fall of the Soviet regime would be a tremendous calamity that we must work to avoid” (Rosselli 1988, p. 304). With respect to 1914, a new contradiction has intervened, that between capitalism and socialism. And that was just one aspect. Twenty years earlier, after having defined World War I as a “war between slave owners for the consolidation and strengthening of slavery” in the colonies, Lenin had added: “The originality of the situation is in the fact that, in this war, the destiny of the colonies are being determined by the military struggle on the continent” (LO, 21; 275 and 277): the “slave owners’, the large colonial powers and the imperialists were alone in having the initiative. That is no longer true on the eve of and during World War II: promoted by the October Revolution, the world anti-colonialist revolution had already begun; the colonial slaves had left behind their state of passivity and resignation. In other words, aside from the inter-imperialist contradiction that characterized World War I, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism, as well as the contradiction between the great colonial powers and the revolting colonial slaves, are both at work. And that latter contradiction became all the more acute due to the intentions of the imperialist powers on the offensive (Hitler’s Germany, Imperialist Japan, fascist Italy) to take up and radicalize the colonial tradition, subjugating and enslaving even nations belonging to older civilizations (like Russia and China). Even a country like France was facing colonial or neo-colonial subjugation. Lenin had even predicted it to some extent. In 1916, while Wilhelm II’s army was at the gates to Paris, the great Russian revolutionary, on the one hand, reaffirmed the imperialist character of the world war then underway, on the other hand, he called attention to a possible reversal: if the gigantic conflict is concluded “with a Napoleonic style victory and with the subjugation of a whole series of nation states retaining some form of autonomy (...), then a great national war would be possible in Europe” (LO, 22; 308). It’s the very scenario that took place in a good part of the world between 1939 and 1945: in both cases, the Napoleonic victories achieved by Hitler in Europe and Japan in Asia ended up provoking wars of national liberation. Ignoring the multiplicity of the contradictions and their interaction with one another, in October of 1934 Rosselli defined the “historical phase that we are passing through” as “the phase of fascism, imperialist war and capitalist decadence” (Rosselli 1988, p. 301). While the reference to “capitalist decadence” may be an implicit reference to the rise of Soviet Russia, in any case the scenario outlined here completely ignores the anti-colonial revolution and the wars of resistance and national liberation.&lt;br /&gt;
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Maybe it wasn’t only the difficulty in understanding the changes to the international situation that explains the resistance to the political turn of 1935. Especially because it has been characterized by the desire to provide a complete understanding of the social and historical totality, Marxism has sometimes been read (and distorted) as a mode of understanding that simplifies and flattens the complexity of historical and social processes. Gramsci (1975, p. 1442) had called attention to the “infantile deviation by the philosophy of praxis” that, in ignoring the role of ideas and ideology, nurtures the “baroque conviction” that the more one relies on “material” objects, the more “orthodox” one becomes. It’s a memorable passage for its stylistic merit, in addition to its philosophical merit: the self-styled champions of orthodoxy are ridiculed as followers of a “baroque conviction”! Unfortunately, that can manifest itself on a very different level: in analyzing international relations there are those who consider themselves to be the foremost champions of anti-imperialism by expanding as much as possible their list of imperialist countries; all of them put on the same level!&lt;br /&gt;
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It goes without saying that such a baroque outlook was entirely alien to Lenin. Lenin, in 1916, in making the distinction between classic colonialism and neo-colonialism, notes that the latter is based not on “political annexation” but rather on “economic annexation”, and regarding that proposition he offers an example in addition to that of Argentina: even Portugal “was in fact a ‘vassal’ of Britain” (LO, 23; 41-42). Certainly, the great revolutionary didn’t ignore that Portugal also possessed a colonial empire (against which, obviously, the struggle had to continue); nevertheless, the principal aspect (which one must never lose sight of) was the neo-colonial subjugation of Portugal, that in some way became a part―at least at the economic level―of the British Empire. Elsewhere, we saw Lenin in 1916 consider the possibility of Wilhelm II’s Germany imposing its neo-colonial subjugation on a country like France, that for its part possessed a vast colonial empire.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s this lesson by Lenin that Togliatti had behind him when he criticized that which could be defined as the baroque conception of anti-imperialism:&lt;br /&gt;
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It must be added that this is not a question of an isolated declaration, however extraordinarily effective it may be. It should be kept in mind that at the time when Togliatti announced the Salerno Turn, Pietro Badoglio was still the leader of the government in Italy; Badoglio who, not by chance, carried the title of duke of Addis Ababa, among others: he had participated in the frenzy of imperialist crimes by fascism. And yet, that infamous chapter of history was secondary with respect to the urgency of the national liberation struggle against the occupation regime imposed on Italy by the Third Reich with Mussolini’s complicity.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 4 ― Togliatti, Stalin and the Cold War ===&lt;br /&gt;
We are now able to understand the attitude taken by Togliatti after the outbreak of the Cold War. Possibly the most uncomfortable year for him was 1952. It was the year in which two statements by Stalin were emitted that were difficult to reconcile with one another. Briefly speaking at the XIX Congress of the CPSU, and denouncing the subaltern status of Washington’s European and Western allies and vassals, the Soviet leader called on the communist parties to take up the banner of national independence and democratic freedom “”thrown out to sea” by their countries’ bourgeoisie. Still during the year before his death, Stalin expressed himself in substantially different terms in writing Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (§ 6): rather than resign themselves to the undisputed hegemony exercised by the United States, the other capitalist powers would have to challenge it; more acute than the very contradiction between capitalism and socialism, the inter-imperialist contradiction would sooner or later provoke a new world war, as had happened in 1914 and 1939; and all this confirms the inevitability of war within capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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As is well known, things have gone in the completely opposite direction with respect to the prediction made in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR: it hasn’t been the imperialist camp that has unraveled, but rather the socialist one; The more acute threats of a world war occurred not as a result of the competition for hegemony between the great capitalist powers, but as a result of the intention by the United States to contain socialism and the anti-colonial revolution and to reverse it (think of the crisis of 1962, which not by chance saw its epicenter in Cuba); the control exercised by Washington over its allies and vassals has not disappeared, instead it has since been consolidated, as has been demonstrated by the inglorious end to the Anglo-French adventure of 1956 in Suez (with the extension of United States rule to the Middle East as well) and the decline of the Gaullist challenge in France. The logical mistake contained in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR is evident: the premise of the inevitability of war in capitalism doesn’t in any way lead to the conclusion that the conflict between imperialist powers is always the order of the day, almost as if that conflict never contained, or contained only for a brief time, distinctions between winners and losers. For example, after the defeat of what Lenin defines as “Napoleonic imperialism” (LO, 22; 309), for almost a century British imperialism had practically no rivals. And this is all the more true for the United States, which hasn’t had any serious rivals in the imperialist camp after the end of World War II, that had witnessed the defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy, but also the wounding and serious decline of Great Britain and France. The fact remains that Stalin in 1952 outlined two contradictory scenarios: the first, looking to Europe at the time, he denounced the bourgeoisie for their capitulation toward the policies of war and oppression carried out by Washington; looking particularly toward the future, the second scenario denounced the intrinsically warmongering nature of the various bourgeois ruling classes, all put on the same level.&lt;br /&gt;
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In his report to the central committee of the PCI on November 10th, 1952, Togliatti warned against taking the “wrong conclusions” from the thesis of the inevitability of war (reaffirmed by Stalin in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR) and against losing sight of the concrete and immediate task of the struggle to keep the peace, at that time threatened by the aggressive policies put into action by the United States against the socialist camp and the anti-colonial revolution (TO, 5; 707). It’s for this reason that the Italian communist leader primarily and almost exclusively referenced the other speech by Stalin, the one that invited communists to defend their national independence and political democracy itself, put at risk by the McCarthyite wave that threatened to cross the Atlantic and establish itself in Italy and Western Europe as well.&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, Togliatti had started elaborating this line before Stalin’s speech to the XIX Congress of the CPSU. In his report to the VII Congress of the PCI, held between April 3rd and April 8th in 1951, he denounced United States imperialism, determined to “disturb every effort toward the development and transformation of Italian democracy” and he demanded a program of “Italian independence, the independence of our country from anyone who seeks to subject our economic and political life to their interests or those of foreign imperialism” (TO, 5; 591 and 601). There’s a lot that suggests it had been Togliatti influencing Stalin, who had from the platform of the XIX Congress invited Western communists to take up the banner of democracy and national independence abandoned by the bourgeoisie. Certainly, in his subsequent report to the central committee of the PCI on November 10th, 1952, Togliatti was much more forceful, pointing the finger at the “reactionaries in our region”, against the Italian and European reactionaries:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“Comrade Stalin has ripped off their masks, he has revealed how they had thrown out to sea all that which in the past had constituted the political action by democratic and liberal bourgeois groups, they had thrown out to sea the banner of freedom and independence for the people, therefore it’s left to us to pick up that banner and carry it forward, to become the patriots of our country and thereby become the nation’s leadership force” (TO, 5; 705).&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In light of the considerations already made, one could say that, in citing Stalin, Togliatti was primarily citing himself. The line that emerged was clear, yet nothing new: it was necessary to first fight against those that sought to “strangle freedom and sell the country’s independence”, who were prepared to accept the transformation of Italy “into a colony subservient to foreign imperialism”; it was necessary to strike at and neutralize the “leadership of countries dominated by the United States of America” (TO, 5; 705-6). The objective pursued by the latter was defined as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“To achieve dominion over the whole world [...]; the economic, political and military subjugation of a whole series of countries that until yesterday were independent countries, and even developed capitalist countries like France and Italy; the preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, China, and the popular democracies. To be specific, in the preparation of the forces necessary for this attack and to complete its objectives, American imperialism has organized military bases all over the world, it sends its own troops and stations them in countries that until yesterday were independent, and who would have never tolerated their occupation by foreign troops” (TO, 5; 708).&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be a serious mistake to read this passage as a banal, propagandistic tirade. Instead, before us is a theoretical and political reflection: what defines imperialism is not just its hostility toward the socialist bloc and the anti-colonial revolution; especially because what also characterizes it is the struggle for hegemony, imperialism can include the subjugation, whether colonial or semi-colonial, of “independent countries, and even those with developed capitalism like France and Italy”, and therefore of a country like France that in 1952 had a large colonial empire in its possession. The contradiction between “developed capitalist” countries is not necessarily and exclusively an inter-imperialist contradiction, it can even be the contradiction between a particularly strong and aggressive imperialist power and a potential colony or semi-colony. It would give it too much credit to think that imperialism would refrain from transforming a “developed capitalist” country into a colony or semi-colony. Togliatti was very familiar with Lenin’s dispute with Kautsky: “what defines imperialism is [...] not just its drive to conquer agrarian lands [like Kautsky predicted]. But to get its hands on heavily industrialized countries as well”, especially because that can weaken its “adversaries” (LO, 22, 268).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the basis of a precise historical and theoretical reading, with the aim of avoiding the danger of Italy being dragged by United States imperialism into a war against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, Togliatti made a call for the broadest mobilization possible: “The movement that Italy needs must be a movement of the great popular masses, from any party, from whatever social group they belong to, for the salvation of peace. Even the citizens who are furthest from us today can and should be drawn into this cause’s work.&amp;amp;quot; And therefore “it’s up to us, the party of the working class, at this time, like during the gravest moments of the past, to recognize and defend the interests of the entire nation” (TO, 5; 602 and 578). Was that the abandonment of the class struggle? The response to this possible objection was already prepared: “no, there’s no contradiction between a national program and a class program by the communist party” (TO, 5; 590). Togliatti knew &#039;&#039;What is to be Done?&#039;&#039; Too well to flatten the class struggle with a trade unionist reading. Especially because in the Soviet Union he had been able to directly follow the epic resistance by Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad against the attempt by the Third Reich to revive and radicalize the colonial tradition in Eastern Europe, reducing the entire Soviet people to a state of slavery, in service to the so-called master race. Togliatti had understood very well that the Great Patriotic War was one of the greatest class struggles, not only in the twentieth century, but in world history.&lt;br /&gt;
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It’s worthwhile to note that in November of 1938, at a time when Japanese imperialism sought to impose a barbaric form of colonial rule and slavery on the Chinese people as a whole, Mao Zedong had theorized, in those circumstances, “the connection between the national struggle and the class struggle.&amp;amp;quot; Like the Great Patriotic War, the war of resistance against Japanese imperialism should also be counted among the great class struggles, not only in the twentieth century, but in world history (Losurdo 2013, cg. VI, § 7-8). It’s almost certain that Togliatti was unaware of the text from the Chinese communist leader that was just cited: all the more significant is the fact that he reaches the very same conclusions by working from the concrete analysis of the concrete situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== 5 ― US Imperialism and the Growing Threat of War ===&lt;br /&gt;
Let it be clear: it’s not a question of giving into a game of analogies. To really understand the political scenario of our time, we have to proceed to the concrete analysis of the concrete situation. It’s a task that remains incomplete, largely. Nevertheless, we can define some essential points.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It goes without saying that we must be relentless in denouncing the infamous role by countries like Germany and Italy in the dismemberment of and the war against Yugoslavia, or the infamous role by Italy in the war against Libya, and the role by Germany in the coup d’état in Ukraine; not to mention the infamous role by France, first with Sarkozy and later by Hollande, in the wars against Libya and Syria. But all these neo-colonial infamies, and still others, were made possible due to the US’s overwhelming military power and its hegemonic role, that has often been promoted in a more or less direct way. And yet, in looking toward the large scale war that’s emerging on the horizon, we must take into consideration the profound changes that have occurred in relation to the past.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On the eve of the First and Second World War, there were two opposing military coalitions; in our time, in practice there’s one single gigantic military coalition (NATO) that increasingly expands and that continues to be under firm American control. On the eve of the First and Second World War, the major capitalist powers accused each other of unleashing an arms race; in our time, however, the United States criticizes its allies for not dedicating more resources to their military budgets, for not sufficiently accelerating their rearmament program. Obviously, the war that Washington has in mind is not against Germany, France or Italy, but one against China (the country that emerged out of the greatest anti-colonial revolution and led by an experienced communist party) and/or Russia (that under Putin had made the mistake, from the White House’s point of view, of shaking off the neo-colonial control that Yeltsin had submitted to or complied with). And in this large scale war, which could even cross the nuclear threshold, the United States plans to carry it out with the subaltern participation―side by side with US and under its command―of Germany, France, Italy and the other NATO member states.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is therefore against the threat of a war unleashed by the superpower that, alone in the world, continues to hold itself up as the “nation chosen by God”, by a superpower that for a long time has sought to guarantee for itself the “ability to deliver a first [nuclear] strike with impunity” (Romano 2014, p. 29), by a superpower that has installed in our country military bases and nuclear arms directly, or indirectly, controlled by Washington, we are called upon to struggle against this concrete threat of war. And we can much more effectively confront this growing threat by taking into consideration Palmiro Togliatti’s great lesson, and adequately adapting it to the current situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Bibliography: ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Opere, a cura di Ernesto Ragionieri, Editori Riuniti, Roma (a questa edizione si rinvia direttamente nel testo, facendo precedere dalla sigla TO l’indicazione del volume e della pagina&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;body13.xhtml&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BESANÇON Alain&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;Le malheur du siècle. Sur le communisme, le nazisme et l’unicité de la Shoah&#039;&#039;, Fayard, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BESYMENSKI Lew&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003) &#039;&#039;Stalin und Hitler. Das Pokerspiel der Diktatoren&#039;&#039; (2002), translation from Russian by Ilde and Helmut Ettinger, Aufbau, Berlin, 2nd reprint.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BLACKMON Douglas A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Slavery by Another Name. The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II&#039;&#039;, Doubleday, New York-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BOBBIO&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Norberto&#039;&#039;&#039; (1977), &#039;&#039;Politica e cultura&#039;&#039; (1955), Einaudi, Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1997), &#039;&#039;Autobiografia,&#039;&#039; Alberto Papuzzi (org.), Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BOYLE Peter G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1990), &#039;&#039;The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence 1953-1955&#039;&#039;, The University of Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BRECHER Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1965), &#039;&#039;Nehru. A Political Biography&#039;&#039; (1959), Italian translation by Corrado Pavolini, &#039;&#039;Vita di Nehru&#039;&#039;, il Saggiatore, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BRENT Jonathan, NAUMOV Vladimir P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Last Crime. The Plot against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953&#039;&#039; (2003), Perennial, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BROUÉ Pierre&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Trotskij&#039;&#039; (1988), Italian translation from French by Piero Arlorio and Stefano Musso, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione perduta. Vita di Lev Trockij, 1879-1940&#039;&#039;, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUKHARIN Nikolai I.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1966), &#039;&#039;L’economia mondiale e l’imperialismo&#039;&#039; (1916), Italian translation from Russian by Ezio Ferrero, Samonà and Savelli, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969a), &#039;&#039;La nuova politica economica e i nostri compiti&#039;&#039; (1925), Italian translation from Russian in: Nikolai Bukharin, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, &#039;&#039;L’accumulazione socialista&#039;&#039;, Lisa Foa (org.), Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969b), &#039;&#039;Critica della piattaforma economica dell’opposizione&#039;&#039; (1924), Italian translation from Russian in: Nikolai Bukharin, Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, &#039;&#039;L’accumulazione socialista&#039;&#039; [cf. Bukharin 1969a].&lt;br /&gt;
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(1970), &#039;&#039;Sulla teoria della rivoluzione permanente&#039;&#039; (1924), Italian translation from Russian in: Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, &#039;&#039;La “rivoluzione permanente” e il socialismo in un solo paese&#039;&#039; (1963), Giuliano Procacci (org.), Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1984), &#039;&#039;Lo Stato Leviatano, Scritti sullo Stato e la guerra 1915-1917&#039;&#039;, Alberto Giasanti (org.), Unicopli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUKHARIN Nikolai I., PREOBRAZHENSKY Yevgeni A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1920), &#039;&#039;Das ABC des Kommunismus. Populäre Erläuterung des Programms der Kommunistischen Partei Russlands (Bolschewiki)&#039;&#039;, Im Verlage der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs, Vienna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BULLOCK Alan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives&#039;&#039;, Knopf, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;BUTLER&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;Susan&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (2005), &#039;&#039;My Dear Mr. Stalin. The Complete Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin&#039;&#039;, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CANFORA Luciano&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Democrazia. Storia di un’ideologia&#039;&#039; (2004), Laterza, Rome-Bari, new edition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARETTO Ennio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Ebrei rinnegati alla corte di Stalin&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Jan. 25th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARR Edward H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1964), &#039;&#039;A History of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923&#039;&#039; (1950), Italian translation by Franco Lucentini, Sergio Caprioglio, and Paolo Basevi, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione bolscevica&#039;&#039;, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1968-1969), &#039;&#039;A History of Soviet Russia. Socialism in one Country 1924-1926&#039;&#039;, vol. 1-2 (1958-1959), Italian translation by Luca Baranelli, Piero Bernardini Marzolla, Carlo Ginzburg and Massimo Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Il socialismo in un solo paese&#039;&#039;, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CARYL Christian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Tyrants on the Take&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (April 11th), p. 27-30.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CATHERWOOD Christopher&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s Folly. How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq&#039;&#039;, Carrol &amp;amp;amp; Graf, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHAMBERLAIN Houston S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1937), &#039;&#039;Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts&#039;&#039; (1898), Ungekürzte Volksausgabe, Bruckmann, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHAMBERLIN William H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;America’s Second Crusade&#039;&#039;, Regnery, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHANG Jung, HALLIDAY Jon&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Mao. The Unknown Story&#039;&#039; (2005), Italian translation by Elisabetta Valdrè, &#039;&#039;Mao. La Storia sconosciuta&#039;&#039;, Longanesi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHEN Jian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of Sino-American Confrontation&#039;&#039;, Columbia University Press, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHOMSKY Noam, HERMAN Edward S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. The Political Economy of Human Rights&#039;&#039;, vol. 1 (1979), Italian translation by Clara Ghibellini, &#039;&#039;La Washington Connection e il fascismo nel Terzo Mondo. L’economia politica dei diritti umani&#039;&#039;, Baldini Castoldi Dalai, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHURCHILL W., ROOSEVELT F.D., STALIN J. V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1957), &#039;&#039;Carteggio di Guerra. 1941-1945&#039;&#039;, Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CHURCHILL Winston&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;The Second World War&#039;&#039; (1948), Italian translation by Olga Ceretti Borsini, &#039;&#039;La seconda guerra mondiale&#039;&#039; (1948), vol. I, Mondadori, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1974), &#039;&#039;His Complete Speeches 1897-1963&#039;&#039;, Chelsea House, New York-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COBAIN Ian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;The interrogation camp that turned prisoners into living skeletons&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Dec. 17th).&lt;br /&gt;
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(2006), &#039;&#039;Revealed: victims of UK’s cold war torture camp&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Apr. 3rd).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COHEN Stephen F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1975), &#039;&#039;Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Political Biography 1888-1938&#039;&#039; (1975), Italian translation by Libero Sosio, &#039;&#039;Bucharin e la rivoluzione bolscevica. Biografia politica 1888-1938&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1986), &#039;&#039;Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Politics and History since 1917&#039;&#039;, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COHN Norman&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Warrant for Genocide&#039;&#039; (1966), French translation by Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;Histoire d’un mythe. La “conspiration” juive et les protocoles des sages de Sion&#039;&#039;, Gallimard, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COLE Wayne S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;America First. The Battle Against Intervention 1940-1941&#039;&#039;, Octagon Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CONQUEST Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Stalin Breaker of Nations&#039;&#039;, Penguin Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996) &#039;&#039;Stalin and the Jews&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (July 11th), p. 46-50.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2000) &#039;&#039;The Great Terror&#039;&#039; (1968), Italian translation by Adriana Valori Piperno, &#039;&#039;Il Grande Terrore&#039;&#039;, new revised and updated edition, Paolo Dossena, (org.), Rizzoli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2004), &#039;&#039;The Harvest of Sorrow&#039;&#039; (1986), Italian translation by Vittoria de Vio Molone and Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;Raccolto di dolore. Collettivizzazione sovietica e carestia terroristica&#039;&#039;, Liberal, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2001), &#039;&#039;Reflections on a Ravaged Century&#039;&#039; (1999), Italian translation by Luca Vanni, &#039;&#039;Il secolo delle idee assassine&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2006), &#039;&#039;Prefazione&#039;&#039; to Khlevniuk 2006.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COOX Alvin D.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Nomonhan. Japan against Russia&#039;&#039;, 1939 (1985), University Press, Stanford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;COSTELLO John&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Ten Days to Destiny. The Secret Story of the Hess Peace Initiative and British Efforts to Strike a Deal with Hitler&#039;&#039;, Morrow, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;CROCE Benedetto&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;L’Italia dal 1914 al 1918. Pagine sulla guerra&#039;&#039;, Laterza, Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1993), &#039;&#039;Scritti e discorsi politici (1943-1947)&#039;&#039;, Angela Carella (editor) (vol. VII, I and VII, Second National Edition), Bibliopolis, Naples.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DALE Reginald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Time to Put Away the Big Trade Gun&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (April 30th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DANIELS Robert V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1970), &#039;&#039;The Conscience of the Revolution. Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia&#039;&#039; (1960), Italian translation by Giulio Lepschy, &#039;&#039;La coscienza della rivoluzione. L’opposizione comunista nell’Unione Sovietica&#039;&#039;, Sansoni, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIES Robert William&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930&#039;&#039;, MacMillan, London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIS David B.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982), &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039; (1969), Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DAVIS Mike&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts (2001),&#039;&#039; Italian Translation by Giancarlo Carlotti, &#039;&#039;Olocausti tardovittoriani&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE CAROLIS Paola&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Churchill inedito: “Gli ebrei in parte responsabili delle loro sciagure”,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Mar. 11th), p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE FELICE Franco&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1973) &#039;&#039;Fascismo, democrazia, Frente popolare. Il movimento comunista alla svolta del VII Congresso dell’internazionale.&#039;&#039; De Donato, Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE FELICE Renzo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Rosso e Nero,&#039;&#039; Pasquale (editor), Baldini and Castoldi, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE GASPERI Alcide&#039;&#039;&#039; (1956), &#039;&#039;La democrazia cristiana e il momento politico&#039;&#039; (1944), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Discorsi politici,&#039;&#039; Tommaso Bozza (editor), CInque lune, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DE RUGGIERO Guido&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;Apologia del Bolscevismo&#039;&#039; (1922), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Scritti politici 1912-1926,&#039;&#039; Renzo De felice (editor), Cappelli, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEÁK István&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;The Crime of the Century,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (Sept. 26th), p. 48-51.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEL BOCA Angelo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Italiani, brava gente?&#039;&#039; (2005), Neri Pozza, Venice.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DESCHNER Karlheinz&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Kriminalgeschichte des Christentums&#039;&#039;, Rowohlt, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DEUTSCHER Isaac&#039;&#039;&#039; (1954), &#039;&#039;La Russia dopo Stalin,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969), &#039;&#039;Stalin. A Political Biography&#039;&#039; (1948),; Italian translation by Gilberto Forti, &#039;&#039;Stalin. Una biografia politica,&#039;&#039; Longanesi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972a) &#039;&#039;Necrologio di Stalin&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;Manchester Guardian&#039;&#039; from March 6th, 1953), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Ironies of History. Essays on Communism&#039;&#039; (1966), Italian translation by Elsa Pelitti, &#039;&#039;Ironie della Storia. Saggi sul comunismo contemporaneo,&#039;&#039; Longanesi, Milan, p. 160-170.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972b), &#039;&#039;Kruscev parla di Stalin&#039;&#039; (June 1956), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Ironies of History&#039;&#039; [cf. Id. 1972a], p. 213-224.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1972c), &#039;&#039;Esilio e umiliazione&#039;&#039; (April 1965), in: id, &#039;&#039;Ironies of History&#039;&#039; [cf. Id. 1972a], p. 213-224.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DI FEO Gianluca&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Sicilia 1943, l’ordine di Patton: “Uccidete i prigionieri italiani”,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (June 23rd), p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2005), &#039;&#039;“Sei un prigioniero italiano? E mi sparò al cuore”&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Mar. 3rd) p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DIAMOND Sander A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1985), &#039;&#039;Herr Hitler. Amerikas Diplomatie, Washington und der Untergang Weimars,&#039;&#039; translation from American English by Stephanie Kreuels, Droste Dusseldorf.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DIMITROV Georgi&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Diario. Gli anni di Mosca (1934-1945),&#039;&#039; Silvio (editor), translation from Russian by Fausto Ibba, the German parts translated by Pasquale Rosafio, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DINNERSTEIN Leonard&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Antisemitism in America,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DOWER John W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;War Without Mercy. Race and Power in the Pacific War,&#039;&#039; Pantheon Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;DUVERGER Maurice&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Mafia e inflazione uccidono la Russia&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Oct. 18th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;E. R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Clinton: “Usammo i neri come cavie umane. Una Vergogna americana”&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (April 10th), p. 8.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ELON Amos&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;A Very Special Relationship. Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (Jan. 15th), p. 15-19.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ESCHENAZI Gabriele, NISSIM Gabriele&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Ebrei invisibili. I sopravvissuti dell’Europa orientale dal comunismo a oggi,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milano.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEITO François&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;Histoire des démocraties populaires après Stalin&#039;&#039; (1969), Italian translation by Giovanni Simcich, &#039;&#039;Storia delle democrazie popolari dopo Stalin&#039;&#039;, Vallecchi, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FERRO Mare&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Ils étaient sept hommes en guerre, 1918-1945. Histoire parallèle,&#039;&#039; Perrin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEST Joachim C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1973), &#039;&#039;Hitler. Eine Biographie,&#039;&#039; Ullstein, Frankfurt a. M.Berlin-Wien.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FEUCHTWANGER Lion&#039;&#039;&#039; (1946), &#039;&#039;Moskau 1937. Ein Reisebericht für meine Freunde&#039;&#039; (1937), Italian translation by Fulvia Carena, &#039;&#039;Mosca 1937. Diario di viaggio per i miei amici,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FIGES Orlando&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;A People’s Tragedy&#039;&#039; (1996), Italian translation by Raffaele Petrillo, &#039;&#039;La tragedia di un popolo. La Rivoluzione russa 1891-1924&#039;&#039; (1997), Tea, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FILENE Peter G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Americans and the Soviet Experiment 1917-1933&#039;&#039;, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FISCHER Fritz&#039;&#039;&#039; (1965), &#039;&#039;Griff nach der Weltmacht&#039;&#039; (1961); Italian translation Enzo Collotti (editor), &#039;&#039;Assalto al potere mondiale. La Germania nella guerra 1914-1918,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FISCHER Ruth&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Stalin und der deutsche Kommunismus&#039;&#039; (1948), Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FITZPATRICK Sheila&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FLORES Marcello&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;L’immagine dell’URSS. L’occidente e la Russia di Stalin (1927-1956),&#039;&#039; Il Saggiatore, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1995), &#039;&#039;L&#039;età del sospetto. I processi della guerra fredda,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FONTAINE André&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;La Tache rouge&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation by Franca Genta Bonelli, &#039;&#039;La Guerra Fredda,&#039;&#039; Piemme, Casale Monferrato.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FORD Henry&#039;&#039;&#039; (1933), &#039;&#039;Der internationale Jude&#039;&#039; (1920), German translation by Paul Lehmann, Hammer, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRANCESCHINI Enrico&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Emergenza in Russia. Un milione alla fame. Eltsin corre ai ripari,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;La Repubblica&#039;&#039; (Oct. 17th), p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRANKLIN John H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Race and History. Selected Essays 1938-1988&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FREIBERGER Steven Z.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Dawn over Suez. The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957,&#039;&#039; Ivan R. Dee, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FREUD Sigmund&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Einleitung zu “Thomas Woodrow Wilson”. Eine psychologische Studie&#039;&#039; (1930; published for the first time in 1971), Italian translation by Renata Colorni, &#039;&#039;Introduzione allo studio psicologico su Thomas Woodrow Wilson,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Opere&#039;&#039;, Cesare Luigi Musatti (editor), vol. 11, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, reprint.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRIEDMAN Lawrence M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Crime and Punishment in American History&#039;&#039;, Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FRIEDRICH Jörg&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;Der Brand&#039;&#039; (2002), Italian translation by Marco Bosonetto, Francesca Pisani and Cristiana Proto, &#039;&#039;La Germania bombardata,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FURET François&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Le passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle&#039;&#039; (1995); Italian translation Marina Valensise (editor),&#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione. L’idea comunista nel XX secolo,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FURET François, RICHET Denis&#039;&#039;&#039; (1980), &#039;&#039;La Révolution française&#039;&#039; (1965), Italian translation by Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;FUSSELL Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Wartime&#039;&#039; (1989), Italian translation by Mario Spinella, &#039;&#039;Tempo di guerra,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GALLI DELLA LOGGIA Ernesto&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Cannibalismo rosso,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (June 3rd), p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GANDHI Mohandas K.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1969-2001), &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,&#039;&#039; Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi (new edition in 100 volumes).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GARDNER Lyod C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Spheres of Influence. The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta,&#039;&#039; Dee, Chicago.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GERNET Jacques&#039;&#039;&#039; (1978), &#039;&#039;Le monde chinois&#039;&#039; (1972), Italian translation by Vera Pegna, &#039;&#039;Il mondo cinese. Dalle prime civiltà alla Repubblica popolare,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GINZBURG Ralph&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;100 years of Lynchings,&#039;&#039; Black Classic Press, Baltimore.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GLEASON Abbot&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Totalitarianism. The Inner History of the Cold War,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GOEBBELS Joseph&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Tagebucher,&#039;&#039; Ralf Georg Reuth (editor), Beck, Munich Zurich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996), &#039;&#039;Diario 1938,&#039;&#039; Italian translation Marina Bistolfi (editor), about the original transcription of the manuscript done by David Irving, Oscar Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GOLDMAN Wendy Z.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin, The Social Dynamics of Repression,&#039;&#039; University Press, Cambridge.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GORBACHEV Mikhail S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;Avant-Mémoires,&#039;&#039; Odile Jacob, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GORTER Herman&#039;&#039;&#039; (1920), &#039;&#039;Offener Brief an den Genossen Lênin,&#039;&#039; Verlag der Kommunistischen Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRAMSCI Antonio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1975), &#039;&#039;Quaderni del carcere,&#039;&#039; critical edition Valentino Gerratana (editor), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1984), &#039;&#039;Il nostro Marx 1918-1919,&#039;&#039; Sergio Caprioglio, (editor), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1987), &#039;&#039;L’Ordine Nuovo 1919-1920,&#039;&#039; Valentino Gerratana and Antonio A. Santucci (editors), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRANT Madison&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;Introduction to Lothrop Stoddard, The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy&#039;&#039; (1921), reedition, Negro University Press, Westport, Connecticut.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRAZIOSI Andrea&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;L’Urss di Lênin e Stalin. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica 1914-1945,&#039;&#039; il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GREGOIRE Henri&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau ou du préjugé des blancs contre la couleur des Africains et celle de leurs descendants noirs et sang-mêlés&#039;&#039; 1826), Jérôme Millon, Grenoble.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GERGORY G. H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1993), &#039;&#039;Posters of World War II,&#039;&#039; Avenel, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;GRUNFELD A. Tom&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;The Making of Modern Tibet,&#039;&#039; revised edition, Sharpe, Armonk (New York)-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HANDLIN Oscar, HANDLIN Lilian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;Liberty in Peril 1850-1920,&#039;&#039; Harper Collins, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HANLEY Charles, MENDOZA Martha&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Pentagon withheld letter on Korea dead&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (April 16th), p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HAUTER François&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;La campagne contre “l’agent Orange” des Américains,&#039;&#039; in &#039;&#039;Le Figaro&#039;&#039; (Oct. 6th), p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HAYEK Friedrich A. von&#039;&#039;&#039; (1986), &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039; (1982, the three parts of the volume are respectively 1973, 1976 and 1979), Italian translation Angelo Petroni and Stefano Monti Bragadin (editors), &#039;&#039;Legge, legislazione e libertà,&#039;&#039; il Saggiatore, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HEGEL Georg W. F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1919-1920), &#039;&#039;Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte&#039;&#039;, Georg Lasson (editor), Meiner, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1969-1979), &#039;&#039;Werke in zwanzig Banden,&#039;&#039; Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (editors), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HERZEL Aleksandr&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;du développement des idées révolutionnaires en Russie&#039;&#039; (1851), Italian translation by Ida Giordano, &#039;&#039;Breve storia dei Russi. Lo sviluppo delle idee rivoluzionarie in Russia,&#039;&#039; Corbaccio, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HERZSTEIN Robert E.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Roosevelt &amp;amp;amp; Hitler. Prelude to War,&#039;&#039; Paragon House, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HILLGRUBER Andreas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Die Zerstörung Europas. Beitrage zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945&#039;&#039; (1988); Italian translation by Guido Mandarino, &#039;&#039;La distruzione dell’Europa,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HITLER Adolf&#039;&#039;&#039; (1939), &#039;&#039;Mein Kampf&#039;&#039; (1925/27) Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1961), &#039;&#039;Hitlers Zweites Burch,&#039;&#039; G. L. Weinberg (editor), Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1965), &#039;&#039;Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945&#039;&#039; (1962-63), Max Dormarus (editor) Süddeutscher Verlag, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1980), &#039;&#039;Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1944,&#039;&#039; Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, Werner Jochmann (editor), Albrecht Knaus, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1989), &#039;&#039;Tischgespräche&#039;&#039;, Henry Picker (editor) (1951), Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOBSBAWN Eric J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Nation and Nationalism since 1790&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Piero Arlorio, &#039;&#039;Nazione e nazionalismo dal 1780. Programma, mito realtà,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOFFMANN Joachim&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945,&#039;&#039; Verlag für Wehwissenschaften, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOFSTADTER Richard&#039;&#039;&#039; (1960, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039; (1951); Italian translation by Giuseppe Vetrano, &#039;&#039;La tradizione politica americana,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&lt;br /&gt;
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(editor) (1982), &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039; (1958), Vintage Books, New York, in vol. 3 (vol. In collaboration with Clarence L, Ver Steeg and vol. 3 in collaboration with Beatrice K. Hofstadter).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HOOPES Townsend, BRINKLEY Douglas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;FDR and the Creation of the U.N.,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HORNE Gerald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956,&#039;&#039;Associated University Press, London and Toronto.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HUGHES Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore. The Epic of Australia’s Founding&#039;&#039; (1986), Italian translation by Anna Ravano and Gabriella Luzzani, &#039;&#039;La riva fatale. L’epopea della fondazione dell’Australia,&#039;&#039; Adelphi, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;HUMBERT-DROZ Jules&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Mémoires&#039;&#039; (1969-72), Italian translation by Danilo Montaldi, &#039;&#039;L’internazionale comunista tra Lênin e Stalin. Memorie di un protagonista 1891/1941,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;IGNATIEFF Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;In the Center of the Earthquake&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The York Review books&#039;&#039; (June 12th).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;IRVING David&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Hitler’s War and the War Path&#039;&#039; (1977 and 1979; expanded and combined edition of the two previously separate volumes, Italian translation by Mario Spataro, &#039;&#039;La guerra di Hitler,&#039;&#039; Settimo Sigillo, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JAMES C. L. R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1968), &#039;&#039;The Black Jacobins. Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution&#039;&#039; (1963), Italian translation by Raffaele Petrillo, &#039;&#039;I Giacobini neri. La prima rivolta contro l’uomo bianco&#039;&#039;, Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JASPIN Elliot&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Buried in the Bitter Waters. The Hidden History of Racial Cleansing in America,&#039;&#039; Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JĘDRZEJEWICZ Wacław&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982), &#039;&#039;Pilsudski: A Life for Poland,&#039;&#039; Hippocrene Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JEFFERSON Thomas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1984), &#039;&#039;Writings,&#039;&#039; Merrill D. Peterson (editor), The Library of American, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JOHNSON Chalmers&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001) &#039;&#039;Blowback. The Costs and Consequences of American Empire&#039;&#039; (2000), Italian translation by Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;Gli ultimi giorni dell’impero americano,&#039;&#039; Garzanti, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;JOHNSON Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Modern Times. From the Twenties to the Nineties,&#039;&#039; Revised Edition, Harper Collins, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KANT Immanuel&#039;&#039;&#039; (1900), &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Schriften,&#039;&#039; Academy of Sciences (editor), Berlin-Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1977), &#039;&#039;Die diktatur des Proletariats&#039;&#039; (1918), Italian translation Luciano Pellicani (editor), &#039;&#039;La Dittatura del proletariato,&#039;&#039; Sugarco, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KELLEY Robin D. G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Hammer and Hoe. Alabama Communists during the Great Depression,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press, Chappell Hill and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KELSEN Hans&#039;&#039;&#039; (1981a), &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Bolshevism. A Critical Analysis&#039;&#039; (1948), Italian translation: &#039;&#039;La teoria politica del bolscevismo e altri saggi di teoria del diritto e dello Stato,&#039;&#039; Riccardo Guastini (editor), Il Saggiatore, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1981b), &#039;&#039;The Communist Theory of Law&#039;&#039; (1955), Italian translation by Giuseppino Treves, &#039;&#039;La teoria comunista del diritto,&#039;&#039; Sugarco, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KENNAN George F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1956), &#039;&#039;Russia Leaves the War,&#039;&#039; Princeton University Press, New Jersey.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2001), &#039;&#039;Memorandum for the Minister,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039; (April 26), p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KERENSKY Alexander F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Memoirs. Russia and History’s Turning Point&#039;&#039; (1965), German translation by Günter Schlichting, &#039;&#039;Memoiren Rußland und der Wendepunkt der Geschichte,&#039;&#039; Rowohlt, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KERSHAW Ian&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Alessio Catania, &#039;&#039;Hitler 1936-1945,&#039;&#039; Bompiani, Milan.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2005), &#039;&#039;Making Friends with Hitler&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation Alessio Catania, &#039;&#039;Gli amici di Hitler,&#039;&#039; Bompiani, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KHLEVNIUK Oleg V.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;Das Politbüro. Mechanismen der Macht in der Sowjetunion der dreißiger Jahre,&#039;&#039; translation of the original Russian (1996) by Ruth and Heinz Deutschland, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2006), &#039;&#039;Storia del Gulag. Dalle Collettivizzazione al Grande terrore&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation from Russian by Emanuela Guercetti, Einaudi Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KHRUSHCHEV Nikita&#039;&#039;&#039; (1958), &#039;&#039;Sul culto della personalità e le sue conseguenze,&#039;&#039; Report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (Feb. 25th, 1956), in: Angelo Tasca (editor), &#039;&#039;Autopsie du stalinisme,&#039;&#039; Italian translation &#039;&#039;Autopsia dello stalinismo,&#039;&#039; Comunità, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KIRILINA Alla&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;L’assassinat de Kirov. Destin d’un stalinien, 1888-1934,&#039;&#039;translation from Russian by Pierre Forgues and Nicolas Werth, Seuil, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KISSINGER Henry&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994) &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, Simon Schuster, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KLEMPERER Victor&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten, Tagebücher 1933-1945,&#039;&#039; Walter Nowojski (editor) with the collaboration of Hadwig Klemperer, Aufbau, Berlin.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(2005), &#039;&#039;LTI. Notizbuch eines Philologen&#039;&#039; (1957), Reclam, Leipzig.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KNIGHT Amy&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Beria. Stalin’s First Lieutenant&#039;&#039; (1993), Italian translation by Silvia Betocchi and Tania Garguilo, &#039;&#039;Beria. Ascesa e caduta del capo della polizia di Stalin&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOJEVE Alexandre&#039;&#039;&#039; (1954), &#039;&#039;Tyrannie et sagesse&#039;&#039; (195)0, in: Leo Strauss, &#039;&#039;de la Tyrannie&#039;&#039;, Gallimard, Paris, p. 217-290.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOLLONTAI Alexandra&#039;&#039;&#039; (1976), &#039;&#039;comunismo, famiglia, morale sessuale,&#039;&#039; Mariella Gramaglia (editor), Savelli, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KOTEK Joël, RIGOULOT Pierre&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Le siècle des camps. Détention, concentration, extermination. Cent ans de mal radical,&#039;&#039; Lattès, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KUPISCH Karl&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1965), &#039;&#039;Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus 1871 bis 1945&#039;&#039; (1960), Siebenstern Taschenbuch, Munich and Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;KUROMIYA Hiroaki&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Industrial Revolution. Politics and Workers, 1928-1932,&#039;&#039; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LASKI Harold J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1848), &#039;&#039;Liberty in the Modern State,&#039;&#039; Allen &amp;amp;amp; Unwin, London (new edition).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEIBOWITZ Clement, FINKEL Alvin&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;In Our Time. The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion&#039;&#039; (1997), Italian translation by Silvio Calzavarini, &#039;&#039;Il nemico comune. La collusione antiisovietica fra Gran Bretagna e Germania nazista,&#039;&#039; Fazi, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LENIN V. I.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1955-1970), &#039;&#039;Opere complete,&#039;&#039; Editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEVIN Nora&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917&#039;&#039; (1988), Tauris, London-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LEWIN Mosche&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Russia’s Twentieth Century, The Collapse of the Soviet System&#039;&#039; (2003), French translation by Denis Paiallard and Florence Prudhomme, &#039;&#039;Le siècle sovietique,&#039;&#039; Fayard-Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LIDDEL HART Basil H.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Stratégie,&#039;&#039; translation from English by Lucien Poirier, Perrin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LIEBKNECHT Karl&#039;&#039;&#039; (1958-1968), &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Reden und Schriften,&#039;&#039; Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LINCOLN W. Bruce&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Passage through Armageddon. The Russians in War and Revolution 1914-1918&#039;&#039; (1986), Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOEWEN James W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Sundown Towns. A Hidden Dimension of American Racism,&#039;&#039; Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, New York-London-Toronto-Sydney.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOSURDO Domenico&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;La comunità, la morte, l’Occidente. Heidegger e “l’ideologia della guerra”,&#039;&#039; Bollati, Boringhieri Torino.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1992), &#039;&#039;Hegel e la libertà dei moderni,&#039;&#039; editori Riuniti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1996), &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico. Problemi e miti,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1997), &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalismo al comunismo critico”,&#039;&#039; Gamberetti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2002), &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico. Biografia intellettuale e bilancio critico,&#039;&#039; Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2005), &#039;&#039;Controstoria del liberalismo,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Roma-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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(2007), &#039;&#039;Il linguaggio dell’Impero. Lessico dell’ideologia americana,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOTH W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte,&#039;&#039; Rowohlt, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LOWER Wendy&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press (in association with the United States Holocaust Museum), Chapell Hill.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUKÁCS György&#039;&#039;&#039; (1967), &#039;&#039;Taktik und Ethik&#039;&#039; (original Hungarian edition, 1919), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Schriften zur ideologie und Politik,&#039;&#039; Peter Ludz (editor), Luchterhand, Neuwied and Berlin.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1974), &#039;&#039;Die Zerstörung der Vernunft&#039;&#039; (1954), Italian translation by Eraldo Arnaud, &#039;&#039;La distruzione della regione&#039;&#039; (1959), Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUTTWAK Edward&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;USA-Giappone-China, la strana geometria,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Limes. Revista italiana di geopolitica&#039;&#039;, n. 1, p. 149-152.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;LUXEMBURG Rosa&#039;&#039;&#039; (1968), &#039;&#039;Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie&#039;&#039; (1916), in: &#039;&#039;Politische Schriften,&#039;&#039; Ossip K. Flechtheim (editor), Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt, vol 2.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MACDONOGH Giles&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;After the Reich. The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation,&#039;&#039; Basic Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MAISTRE Joseph de&#039;&#039;&#039; (1984), &#039;&#039;Oeuvres Complètes&#039;&#039; (Lyon 1884), anastatic republication, Olms, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MALAPARTE Curzio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1973), &#039;&#039;tecnica del colpo di Stato&#039;&#039; (1931), Vallecchi, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1986b), [&#039;&#039;An David McCoy&#039;&#039;] (1945), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Essays,&#039;&#039; H. Kurze (editor), Fischer, Frankfurt, vol. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MANOSCHEK Walter&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1995), &#039;&#039;“Es gibt nur eines für das judentum: Vernichtung”.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Das Judenbild in deutschen Soldatenbriefe 1939-1944&#039;&#039;, Hamburger Edition, Hamburg.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARKUSEN Eric, KOPF David&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing. Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century,&#039;&#039; Westview Press, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARTIN Terry&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939,&#039;&#039; Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARTINEAU Harriet&#039;&#039;&#039; (1857), &#039;&#039;British Rule in India; A Historical Sketch&#039;&#039;, Smith, London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MARX Karl, ENGELS Friedrich&#039;&#039;&#039; (1955-1989), &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, Dietz, Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MAYER Arno J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Why Did the Heavens not Darken?&#039;&#039; (1988); Italian translation by Giusepina Panzieri Saija, &#039;&#039;Soluzione finale. Lo sterminio degli Ebrei nella storia europea&#039;&#039;, Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MCALLISTER LINN Brian&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902,&#039;&#039; The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill-London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MEDVEDEV Roy A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1977), &#039;&#039;Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism&#039;&#039; (1971), Italian translation by Raffaello Uboldi, &#039;&#039;Lo stalinismo. Origini storia conseguenze,&#039;&#039; Mondadori, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MEDVEDEV Zores A., MEDVEDEV Roy A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;The Unknown Stalin&#039;&#039; (2003), Italian translation by Bruno Amato and revisions by Andrea Panaccione, &#039;&#039;Stalin sconosciuto, Alla luce degli archivi segreti sovietici,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MISES Ludwig von&#039;&#039;&#039; (1927), &#039;&#039;Liberalismus,&#039;&#039; Fischer, Jena.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MLECHIN Leonid&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;Perché Stalin creò Israele,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian by Chiara Spano, preface and editing by Luciano Canfora, Sandro Teti, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MONTEFIORE S. S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Stalin. Am Hof des roten Zaren,&#039;&#039; Fischer, Hamburg (German translation).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;MOSSE George L.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Le guerre mondiali dalla tragedia al mito dei caduti,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NAIMARK Norman M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; (2001), Italian translation by Sergio Minucci, &#039;&#039;La politica dell’odio. La pulizia etnica nell’Europa contemporanea,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NAVARRO Mireya&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;U.S. Aid and “Genocide”. Guatemala Inquiry Details CIA’s Help to Military&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Feb. 27-28th), p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NEVINS Allan, COMMAGER Henry S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1960), &#039;&#039;The Pocket History of the United States&#039;&#039; (1942); Italian translation by Enrico Mattioli and Paola Soleri, &#039;&#039;Storia degli Stati Uniti,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NIRENSTEIN Fiamma&#039;&#039;&#039; (1997), &#039;&#039;Israele, la congiura rossa,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;La Stampa&#039;&#039; (July 14th), p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;NOLTE Ernst&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus,&#039;&#039; Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PANNEKOEK Anton&#039;&#039;&#039; (1970), &#039;&#039;Weltrevolution und Kommunistische Taktik&#039;&#039; (1920), Italian translation in: &#039;&#039;Organizzazione rivoluzionaria e Consigli operai,&#039;&#039; Piet Rademakers (editor), Feltrinelli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAPPE Ilan&#039;&#039;&#039; (2008), &#039;&#039;The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine&#039;&#039; (2006), Italian translation by Luisa Corbertta and Alfredo Tradardi (editors), &#039;&#039;La pulizia etnica della Palestina,&#039;&#039; Utet, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PARETO Vilfredo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1966), &#039;&#039;Trasformazione della democrazia&#039;&#039; (1920), in: Id., &#039;&#039;Scritti sociologici,&#039;&#039; Giovanni Busino (editor), Utet, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAUWELS Jacques R.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Il mito della guerra buona. Gli Usa e la Seconda guerra mondiale,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from the original Dutch edition (2000), by Silvio Calzavarini, Datanews, Rome.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PAYNE Matthew J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Railroad. Turksib and the Building of Socialism,&#039;&#039; University Press, Pittsburgh.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;POLIAKOV Léon&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974-1990), &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’antisémitisme&#039;&#039; (1961-1997), Italian translation by Rossella Rossini and Roberto Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’antisemitismo,&#039;&#039; La Nouva Italia, Florence.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1987), &#039;&#039;Le Mythe aryen. Essai sur les sources du racisme et des nationalisme&#039;&#039; (1971), new expanded edition, Complexe, Brussels.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;PONTING Clive&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s plan for race purity&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;The Guardian&#039;&#039; (Jan. 20-21st), p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;RAPOPORT Louis&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s War against the Jews&#039;&#039; (1990), Italian translation by Erica Joy Mannucci, &#039;&#039;La guerra di Stalin contro gli ebrei,&#039;&#039; Rizzoli, Milan.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;REUTH Ralf G.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Goebbels,&#039;&#039; Piper, Munich.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROBERTS Geoffrey&#039;&#039;&#039; (2006), &#039;&#039;Stalin’s Wars. From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROBESPIERRE Maximilien&#039;&#039;&#039; (1912-1967), &#039;&#039;Oeuvres,&#039;&#039; Puf, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROCCUCCI Adriano&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Gerusalemme, la seconda Mosca,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Limes. Rivista Italiana di geopolitica&#039;&#039; n. 1, p. 27-42.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROGOWIN Wadim S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;1937. Jahr des Terrors&#039;&#039; (1996), Russian translation by Hannelore Georgi and Harald Schubärth, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&lt;br /&gt;
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(1999), &#039;&#039;Die Partei der Hingerichteten&#039;&#039; (1997), translation from Russian by Hannelore Georgi and Harald Schubärth, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROMEN Jan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1969), &#039;&#039;Il secolo dell’Asia. Imperialismo occidentale e rivoluzione asiatica nel secolo XX&#039;&#039; (1956), Italian translation from Dutch by Fernando Solinas and Enzo Collotti, Einaudi, Turin.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROSSELLI Carlo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Scritti politici,&#039;&#039; Zeffiro Ciuffoletti and Paolo Bagnoli (editors), Guida, Naples.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROTHBARD Murray N.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Hoover’s 1919 Food Diplomacy in Retrospect,&#039;&#039; in: Lawrence E. Gelfand (ed.), &#039;&#039;Herbert Hoover, The Great War and its Aftermath 1917-23,&#039;&#039; University Press, Iowa.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;ROUX Alain&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;La Chine au XXe siècle&#039;&#039; (1998), Colin, Paris.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;RUGE Wolfgang, SCHUMANN Wolfgang&#039;&#039;&#039; (editors) (1977), &#039;&#039;Dokumente zur Deutschen Geschichte. 1933-1935,&#039;&#039; Rödelberg, Frankfurt.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SABRIN B. F.&#039;&#039;&#039; (editor) (1991), &#039;&#039;Alliance for Murder. The Nazi-Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide,&#039;&#039; Sarpedon, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SACHAR Howard M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993) &#039;&#039;A History of the Jews in America,&#039;&#039; Vintage Books, New York.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;SACK John&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt; (1993), &#039;&#039;An Eye for an Eye. The Untold Story of Jewish Revenge Against Germans in 1945&#039;&#039;, Basic Books, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SAFIRE William&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;A secret victory&#039;&#039;, in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Feb. 3rd), p. 7.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SANG-HUN Choe&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;South Korea excavates its killing fields,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (Nov. 22nd), p. 2.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHLESINGER Arthur M. jr.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1959-1965), &#039;&#039;The Age of Roosevelt&#039;&#039; (1957-60), Italian translation by Giorgio Polla and Isabella Ponzetta, &#039;&#039;L’eta di Roosevelt,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1967), &#039;&#039;A Thousand Days. John F. Kennedy in the White House&#039;&#039; (1965), Fawcett Crest, New &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHMID Alex P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Churchill’s privater Krieg. Intervention und Konterrevolution im russischen Bürgerkrieg, November 1918-März 1920,&#039;&#039; Atlantis, Zürich.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHMIDT Paul&#039;&#039;&#039; (1950), &#039;&#039;Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923-45,&#039;&#039; Athenäum, Bonn.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCHNEIDER James J.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;The Structure of Strategic Revolution. Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State,&#039;&#039; Presidio, Novato (CA).&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SCOTTI Giacomo&#039;&#039;&#039; (1991), &#039;&#039;Goli Otok. Ritorno all’isola calda,&#039;&#039; Lint, Trieste.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHERRY Michael S.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;In the Shadow of War. The United States since the 1930s,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHIRER William L.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich&#039;&#039; (1959): Italian translation by Gustavo Glasser, &#039;&#039;Storia del Terzo Reich,&#039;&#039; Einaudi, Turin (1962).&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SHORT Philipp&#039;&#039;&#039; (2005), &#039;&#039;Pol Pot; The History of a Nightmare&#039;&#039; (2004), Italian translation by Enzo Peru, Pol Pot. &#039;&#039;Anatomia di uno sterminio&#039;&#039;, Rizzoli, Milan. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SINGERMAN Robert&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;The Jew as Racial Alien: The Genetic Component of American Anti-Semitism,&#039;&#039; in: David A. Gerber (editor), &#039;&#039;Anti-semitism in American History,&#039;&#039; University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SISCI Francesco&#039;&#039;&#039; (1994), &#039;&#039;La differenza tra la China e il mondo. La rivoluzione degli anni ottanta,&#039;&#039; Feltrinelli, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SMITH Tony&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;America’s Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century,&#039;&#039; Princeton University Press, New Jersey.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SOUVARINE Boris&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Staline. Aperçu historique du bolchévisme&#039;&#039; (1935), Italian translation by Gisèle Bartoli, &#039;&#039;Stalin,&#039;&#039; Adelphi, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SPENCE Jonathan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1998), &#039;&#039;God’s Chinese Son. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan,&#039;&#039; Harper Collins, London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SPENGLER Oswald&#039;&#039;&#039; (1933), &#039;&#039;Jahre der Entscheidung,&#039;&#039; Beck, Munich.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STALIN Joseph W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1948), &#039;&#039;Storia del Partito comunista (bolscevico) dell’URSS. Breve corso&#039;&#039; (1938), editions in foreign languages, Moscow.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1952), &#039;&#039;Questioni del leninismo,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russia by Palmiro Togliatti, Edizioni Rinascita, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1952-1956), &#039;&#039;Opere complete,&#039;&#039; Rinascita, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1953), &#039;&#039;Problemi della pace,&#039;&#039; preface by Pietro Secchia, Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1968), &#039;&#039;Il marxismo e la linguistica,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian (1950) by Bruno Meriggi, Feltrinelli, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1971-1973), &#039;&#039;Werke,&#039;&#039; Roter Morgen, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1973), &#039;&#039;Problemi economici del socialismo nell’URSS,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from Russian (1952), Cooperativa Editrice Distributrice Proletaria, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STODDARD Lothrop&#039;&#039;&#039; (1971), &#039;&#039;The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy&#039;&#039; (1921), reprint Negro University Press, Westport Connecticut.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1984), &#039;&#039;The Revolt against Civilization. The Menace of the Underman&#039;&#039; (1922), reprint, Scribner, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STRADA Vittorio&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Stalin: si sbranino pure, poi arriveremo noi,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;Corriere della Sera&#039;&#039; (Aug. 10th), p. 25.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;STRONG Anna Louise&#039;&#039;&#039; (2004), &#039;&#039;The Stalin Era&#039;&#039; (1956), Italian translation by Alessandro Mazzone, &#039;&#039;L’era di Stalin,&#039;&#039; La Città del Sole, Naples.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;SUN YAT-SEN&#039;&#039;&#039; (1976), &#039;&#039;I tre principi del popolo,&#039;&#039; Italian translation from French by Settimio Severo Caruso, Einaudi, Turin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TAYLOR Alan J. P.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;The Origins of the Second World War&#039;&#039; (1961); Italian translation by Luciano Bianciardi, &#039;&#039;Le origini della seconda guerra mondiale,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TAYLOR Telford&#039;&#039;&#039; (1993), &#039;&#039;The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials&#039;&#039; (1992), Italian translation by Orsola Fenghi, &#039;&#039;Anatomia dei processi di Norimberga,&#039;&#039; Rizzoli, Milan. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THOMAS Evan&#039;&#039;&#039; (1995), &#039;&#039;The Very Best Men. Four Who Dared. The Early Years of the CIA,&#039;&#039; Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THOMAS Hugh&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Armed Truce. The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46&#039;&#039; (1986), Sceptre, London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;THURSTON Robert W.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1996), &#039;&#039;Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia 1934-1941,&#039;&#039; Yale University Press, New Haven and London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TORRI Michelguglielmo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Storia dell’India,&#039;&#039; Laterza, Rome-Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TOTTLE Douglas&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;Fraud, Famine and Fascism. The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard,&#039;&#039; Progress Books, Toronto. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TOYNBEE Arnold&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;The World and the West&#039;&#039; (1953), Italian translation by Glauco Cambon, &#039;&#039;Il mondo e l’occidente,&#039;&#039; with a note by Luciano Canfora, Sellerio, Palermo. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TRAVERSO Enzo&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;La violenza nazista. Una genealogia,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TROTSKY Lev D.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1962), &#039;&#039;Stalin&#039;&#039; (1946), Italian translation from English by Ugo Tolomei,Garzanti, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1967), &#039;&#039;La loro morale e la nostra&#039;&#039; (1938-39), Italian translation by De Donato, Bari.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1968), &#039;&#039;La Révolution trahie&#039;&#039; (1936-37), Italian translation by Livio Maitan, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione tradita,&#039;&#039; Samonà e Savelli, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1969a), &#039;&#039;Millenovecentocinque&#039;&#039; (1908), Samonà e Savelli, Roma. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1969b), &#039;&#039;La Terza Internazionale dopo Lênin&#039;&#039; (1928), Italian translation by Livio Maitan, Samonà e Savelli, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1988), &#039;&#039;Schriften. Sowjetgesellschaft und stalinistische Diktatur,&#039;&#039; Helmut Dahmer et alii (editors), Rasch und Röhring, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1997-2001), &#039;&#039;Schriften. Linke Opposition und vierte Internationale,&#039;&#039; Helmut Dahmer et alii (editors), Rasch und Röhring, Hamburg.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1998), &#039;&#039;Europa im Krieg,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Hannelore and Harald Schubärath, Arbeiterpresse Verlag, Essen.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;TUCKER Robert C.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1974), &#039;&#039;Stalin as Revolutionary. A Study in History and Personality, 1879-1929&#039;&#039; (1973), Norton, New York-London.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1990), &#039;&#039;Stalin in power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941,&#039;&#039; Norton, New York-London.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WALZER Michael&#039;&#039;&#039; (1990), &#039;&#039;Just and Unjust Wars&#039;&#039; (1977), Italian translation by Fabio Armao, &#039;&#039;Guerre giuste e ingiuste,&#039;&#039; Liguori, Naples.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WARNER Denis&#039;&#039;&#039; (2000), &#039;&#039;Brutality on All Sides Wracked Korea in the Years After WWII,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039; (may 5th), p. 5.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WASHBURN Wilcomb E.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1992), &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039; (1975), Italian translation by Paola Ludovici and Roger Meservey, &#039;&#039;Gli indiani d’America,&#039;&#039; Editori Riuniti, Rome.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WASHINGTON Harriet A.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2007), &#039;&#039;Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present,&#039;&#039; Harlem Moon, Broadway Books, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WEAVER Richard M.&#039;&#039;&#039; (1987), &#039;&#039;The Southern Essays,&#039;&#039; G. M. Curtis III and J. J. Thompson jr. (editors), Liberty Press, Indianapolis.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WEBB Beatrice&#039;&#039;&#039; (1982-1985) &#039;&#039;The Diary&#039;&#039;, Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie (editors), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WERTH Nicolas&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’Union Soviétique,&#039;&#039; PUF, Paris.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(2007a), &#039;&#039;La terreur et le désarroi. Stalin et son système,&#039;&#039; Perrin, Paris.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(2007b), &#039;&#039;L&#039;Île aux cannibales&#039;&#039; (2006), Italian translation by Francesco Roncacci, &#039;&#039;L’isola dei cannibali,&#039;&#039; Corbaccio, Milan.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WHITE Stephen&#039;&#039;&#039; (1980), &#039;&#039;Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution. A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924&#039;&#039;, Holmes &amp;amp;amp; Meier, New York.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WIKLER Daniel&#039;&#039;&#039; (1999), &#039;&#039;The Dalai Lama and the CIA,&#039;&#039; in: &#039;&#039;The New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, (Sept. 23rd), p. 81.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOLKOGONOW Dimitri&#039;&#039;&#039; (1989), &#039;&#039;Stalin. Triumph und Tragödie. Ein politisches Porträt,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Vesna Jovanoska, Claassen, Düsseldorf. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOLKOW Wladimir K.&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Stalin wollte ein anderes Europa. Moskaus Außenpolitik 1940 bis 1968 und die Folgen&#039;&#039;, Edition Ost, Berlin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;WOODWARD C. Vann&#039;&#039;&#039; (1963), &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877-1913&#039;&#039; (1951), Louisiana State University Press, Italian translation by Luciano Serra, &#039;&#039;Le origini del nuovo Sud&#039;&#039;, Il Mulino, Bologna.&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
(1966), &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow,&#039;&#039; Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZHANG Shu Guang&#039;&#039;&#039; (2001), &#039;&#039;Economic Cold War. America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance,&#039;&#039; University Press, Stanford.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZINN Howard&#039;&#039;&#039; (2002), &#039;&#039;A People’s History of the United States. 1492-Present&#039;&#039; (1980), French translation by Frédéric Cotton, &#039;&#039;Une histoire populaire des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. De 1492 à nos jours,&#039;&#039; Agone, Marseilles.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZINOVIEV Alexander&#039;&#039;&#039; (1988), &#039;&#039;Katastroika. Gorbatschows Potemkinsche Dörfer,&#039;&#039; translation from Russian by Erich Hiller, Ullstein, Frankfurt-Berlin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;(1994), &#039;&#039;La Caduta dell’”impero del Male”.&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;Saggio sulle tragedie della Russia,&#039;&#039; Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;br /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span style=&amp;quot;color: #131719&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;ZUBKOVA Elana&#039;&#039;&#039; (2003), &#039;&#039;Russia after the War. Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957&#039;&#039; (1998), Italian translation by Bruna Soravia, &#039;&#039;Quando c’era Stalin. I Russi dalla guerra al disgelo,&#039;&#039; Il Mulino, Bologna. &amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59291</id>
		<title>Library:Liberalism: A Counter-History</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Library:Liberalism:_A_Counter-History&amp;diff=59291"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T09:47:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Fix formatting by getting the ebook source&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0003.html#toc&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;Contents&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[kindle:embed:0007?mime=image/jpg|&#039;&#039;Cover&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0000.html|&#039;&#039;Title Page&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0001.html|&#039;&#039;Copyright&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0002.html|&#039;&#039;Dedication&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0004.html|&#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html|1 What Is Liberalism?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_000.html|2 Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html|3 White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html|4 Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html|5 The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism Either Side of the Atlantic]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html|6 The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html|7 The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html|8 Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html|9 Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocchap1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html|10 Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;tocfm&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0015.html|&#039;&#039;References&#039;&#039;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#fm1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pagevii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgvii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;vii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;A Short Methodological Introduction&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
How does this book differ from existing histories of liberalism, which continue to appear in growing numbers? Does it really succeed in making the innovation promised by the title? Once they have finished it, readers will be able to give their own answer. For now, the author can limit himself to a statement of intent. In formulating it, a great example can aid us. About to embark on the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France, de Tocqueville observed of studies of the eighteenth century:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e imagine we know all about the French social order of that time, for the good reason that its surface glitter holds our gaze and we are familiar not only with the life stories of its outstanding figures but also, thanks to the many brilliant critical studies now available, with the works of the great writers who adorned that age. But we have only vague, often quite wrong conceptions of the manner in which public business was transacted and institutions functioned; of the exact relations between the various classes in the social hierarchy; of the situation and sentiments of that section of the population which as yet could neither make itself heard nor seen; and, by the same token, of the ideas and mores basic to the social structure of eighteenth-century France.[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
There is no reason not to apply the methodology so brilliantly indicated by de Tocqueville to the movement and society of which he was an integral and influential part. Solely because he intends to draw attention to aspects that he believes have hitherto been largely and unjustly ignored, the author refers in the book’s title to a ‘counter-history’. Otherwise, it is a history, whose subject-matter alone remains to be specified: not liberal thought in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pageviii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0004.html#pgviii&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;viii&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;concrete reality. As with any other major historical movement, this involves investigating the conceptual developments, but also—and primarily—the political and social relations it found expression in, as well as the more or less contradictory link that was established between these two dimensions of social reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And so, in commencing the investigation, we are forced to pose a preliminary question concerning the subject whose history we intend to reconstruct: What is liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0004.html#fm1-ftn1a|1]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#c01&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg1&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER ONE =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;What Is Liberalism?&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. A series of embarrassing questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The usual answer to this question admits of no doubt: liberalism is the tradition of thought whose central concern is the liberty of the individual, which is ignored or ridden roughshod over by organicist philosophies of various kinds. But if that is the case, how should we situate John C. Calhoun? This eminent statesman, vice president of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, burst into an impassioned ode to individual liberty, which, appealing to Locke, he vigorously defended against any abuse of power and any unwarranted interference by the state. And that is not all. Along with ‘absolute governments’ and the ‘concentration of power’, he unstintingly criticized and condemned fanaticism[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the spirit of ‘crusade’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] to which he opposed ‘compromise’ as the guiding principle of genuine ‘constitutional governments’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With equal eloquence Calhoun defended minority rights. It was not only a question of guaranteeing the alternation of the various parties in government through suffrage: unduly extensive power was unacceptable in any event, even if limited in duration and tempered by the promise or prospect of a periodic reversal of roles in the relationship between governors and governed.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unquestionably, we seem to have all the characteristics of the most mature and attractive liberal thought. On the other hand, however, disdaining the half-measures and timidity or fear of those who restricted themselves to accepting it as a necessary ‘evil’, Calhoun declared slavery to be ‘a positive good’ that civilization could not possibly renounce. Calhoun repeatedly denounced intolerance and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg2&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;crusading spirit, not in order to challenge the enslavement of blacks or the ruthless hunting down of fugitive slaves, but exclusively to brand abolitionists as ‘blind fanatics’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who ‘consider themselves under the most sacred obligation to use every effort to destroy’ slavery, a form of property legitimized and guaranteed by the Constitution.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were not among the minorities defended with such vigour and legal erudition. In fact, in their case, tolerance and the spirit of compromise seem to turn into their opposite: if fanaticism actually succeeded in its mad project of abolishing slavery, what would follow would be ‘the extirpation of one or the other race’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, given the concrete balance of forces in the United States, it was not difficult to imagine which of the two would succumb: blacks could only survive on condition of being slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So is Calhoun a liberal? No doubts on this score were harboured by Lord Acton, a prominent figure in liberalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, an advisor and friend of William Gladstone, one of the major figures in nineteenth-century England. In Acton’s view, Calhoun was a champion of the cause of the struggle against any form of absolutism, including ‘democratic absolutism’; the arguments he employed were ‘the very perfection of political truth’. In short, we are dealing with one of the major authors and great minds in the liberal tradition and pantheon.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Albeit in less emphatic language, the question has been answered in the affirmative by those who in our time celebrate Calhoun as ‘a strong individualist’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as a champion of the ‘defense of minority rights against the abuse of an overbearing majority’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or as a theorist of the sense of limits and the self-limitation that should characterize the majority.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no doubt is one US publishing house, committed to republishing in a neo-liberal key ‘Liberty Classics’, among which the eminent statesman and ideologue of the slaveholding South features prominently.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The question we have posed does not only emerge from reconstructing the history of the United States. Prestigious scholars of the French Revolution, of firm liberal persuasion, have no hesitation in defining as ‘liberal’ those figures and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg3&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;circles that had the merit of opposing the Jacobin diversion, but who were firmly committed to the defence of colonial slavery. The reference is to Pierre-Victor Malouet and members of the Massiac Club, who were ‘all plantation-owners and slaveholders’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Is it possible to be a liberal and slaveholder at the same time? Such was not the opinion of John Stuart Mill, judging at least from his polemic against the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; British liberals (among them, perhaps, Acton and Gladstone), who, during the American Civil War, rallied en masse to ‘a furious pro-Southern partisanship’, or at any rate viewed the Union and Lincoln coolly and malevolently.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We face a dilemma. If we answer the question formulated above (Is Calhoun a liberal?) in the affirmative, we can no longer maintain the traditional (and edifying) image of liberalism as the thought and volition of liberty. If, on the other hand, we answer in the negative, we find ourselves confronting a new problem and new question, which is no less embarrassing than the first: Why should we continue to dignify John Locke with the title of father of liberalism? Calhoun refers to black slavery as a ‘positive good’. Yet without resorting to such brazen language, the English philosopher, to whom the US author explicitly appealed, regarded slavery in the colonies as self-evident and indisputable, and personally contributed to the legal formalization of the institution in Carolina. He took a hand in drafting the constitutional provision according to which ‘[e]very freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion soever.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke was ‘the last major philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this did not prevent him from inveighing against the political ‘slavery’ that absolute monarchy sought to impose.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in Calhoun the theorization of black slavery as a ‘positive good’ went hand in hand with warnings against a concentration of power that risked transforming ‘the governed’ into ‘the slaves of the rulers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Of course, the American statesman was a slave-owner, but the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg4&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;English philosopher also had sound investments in the slave trade.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the latter’s position proves even more compromising; for good or ill, in the slaveholding South of which Calhoun was the interpreter, there was no longer any place for the deportation of blacks from Africa, in a terrible voyage that condemned many of them to death before they landed in America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Do we want to bring historical distance to bear in order to distinguish the positions of the two authors being compared here, and exclude from the liberal tradition only Calhoun, who continued to justify or celebrate the institution of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century? The southern statesman would have reacted indignantly to such inconsistency of treatment: as regards the English liberal philosopher, he would perhaps have repeated, in slightly different language, the thesis formulated by him in connection with George Washington: ‘He was one of us—a slaveholder and a planter.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Contemporary with Calhoun was Francis Lieber, one of the most eminent intellectuals of his time. Sometimes saluted as a sort of Montesquieu redivivus, in correspondence and on respectful terms with de Tocqueville, he was doubtless a critic, if a cautious one, of the institution of slavery. He hoped it would wither away through its gradual transformation into a kind of servitude or semi-servitude on the autonomous initiative of the slaveholding states, whose right to self-government could not be questioned. That is why Lieber was also admired in the South, all the more so because he himself, albeit on a rather modest scale, owned and sometimes rented male and female slaves. When one of the latter died, following a mysterious pregnancy and subsequent abortion, he recorded in his diary the painful financial loss suffered: ‘fully one thousand dollars—the hard labor of a year’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New, painful economies were required to replace the deceased slave, because Lieber, unlike Calhoun, was not a planter and did not live off profits, but a university professor who essentially used slaves as domestic servants. Does this authorize us in including the first, rather than the second, in the liberal tradition? In any event, temporal distance plays no role here.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us now take a contemporary of Locke’s. Andrew Fletcher was ‘a champion of liberty’ and, at the same time, ‘a champion of slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Politically, he &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg5&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;professed to be ‘a republican on principle’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and culturally was ‘a Scottish prophet of the Enlightenment’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He too fled to Holland in the wake of the anti-Jacobite and anti-absolutist conspiracy, exactly like Locke, with whom he was in correspondence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fletcher’s reputation crossed the Atlantic: Jefferson defined him as a ‘patriot’, whose merit was to have expressed the ‘political principles’ characteristic of ‘the purest periods of the British Constitution’—those that subsequently caught on and prospered in free America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing positions rather similar to Fletcher’s was his contemporary and fellow countryman James Burgh, who also enjoyed the respect of republican circles à la Jefferson,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was mentioned favourably by Thomas Paine in the most celebrated opuscule of the American Revolution (&#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet, in contrast to the other authors—though like them characterized by a peculiar tangle of love of liberty and legitimation or revindication of slavery—Fletcher and Burgh are virtually forgotten today, and no one seems to want to include them among exponents of the liberal tradition. The fact is that, in underlining the necessity of slavery, they were thinking primarily not of blacks in the colonies, but of the ‘vagrants’, the beggars, the odious, incorrigible rabble of the metropolis. Should they be regarded as illiberal for this reason? Were that to be the case, what would distinguish liberals from non-liberals would be not the condemnation of the institution of slavery, but only negative discrimination against peoples of colonial origin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Liberal England presents us with another, different case. Francis Hutcheson, a moral philosopher of some significance (he was the ‘never to be forgotten’ master of Adam Smith),[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the one hand expressed criticisms and reservations about the slavery to which blacks were indiscriminately subjected. On the other hand, he stressed that, especially when dealing with the ‘lower conditions’ of society, slavery could be a ‘useful punishment’: it should be the ‘ordinary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg6&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and their families by any useful labours’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an author who, while evincing unease at hereditary, racial slavery, demanded a sort of penal slavery for those who, regardless of their skin colour, were guilty of vagrancy. Was Hutcheson a liberal?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically positioned between Locke and Calhoun, and with his focus precisely on the reality accepted by the two of them as obvious and indisputable, or even celebrated as a ‘positive good’, Adam Smith constructed an argument and expressed a position that warrants being cited at some length. Slavery could be more easily abolished under a ‘despotic government’ than a ‘free government’, with its representative bodies exclusively reserved in practice for white property-owners. In such circumstances, the condition of the black slaves was desperate: ‘every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves’. Hence ‘[t]he freedom of the free was the cause of the great oppression of the slaves … And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Can an author who, in at least one concrete instance, expressed his preference for ‘despotic government’ be regarded as liberal? Or, differently put, is Smith more liberal or are Locke and Calhoun, who, along with slavery, defended the representative bodies condemned by Smith as the prop, in a slaveholding society, of an infamous institution contrary to any sense of humanity?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, as the great economist had foreseen, slavery was abolished in the United States not thanks to local self-government, but by the iron fist of the Union’s army and the temporary military dictatorship imposed by it. For this Lincoln was accused by his opponents of despotism and Jacobinism. He resorted to ‘military government’ and ‘military commissions’ and interpreted ‘the word “law”‘ as ‘[t]he will of the President’ and habeas corpus as the ‘power of the President to imprison whom he pleases, as long as he pleases’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Together with representatives of the secessionist Confederacy, the drafters of this indictment were those who aspired to a compromise peace, for the purposes of returning to constitutional normality. And once again we are obliged to ask the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#page7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_000.html#pg7&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;question: Is it Lincoln who is more liberal, or his adversaries in the South, or his opponents in the North who came out in favour of compromise?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mill adopt a position in favour of the Union and condemn the &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberals who cried scandal over the energy with which it conducted the war against the South and kept at bay those who, in the North itself, were inclined to tolerate the slaveholders’ secession. However, we shall see that, when he turned his attention to the colonies, the English liberal justified the West’s ‘despotism’ over ‘races’ that were still ‘under age’, and who were obliged to observe an ‘absolute obedience’ in order to be set on the path of progress. This is a formulation that would not have displeased Calhoun, who likewise legitimized slavery by reference to the backwardness and nonage of populations of African origin. It was only in America, and thanks to the paternal care of white masters, that the ‘black race’ succeeded in progressing and making the transition from its previous ‘low, degraded and savage condition’ to ‘its present comparatively civilized condition’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Mill’s view, ‘any means’ were licit for those who took on the task of educating ‘savage tribes’; ‘slavery’ was sometimes a mandatory stage for inducing them to work and making them useful to civilization and progress (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]). But this was also the opinion of Calhoun, for whom slavery was an unavoidable means if one wished to achieve the end of civilizing blacks. Certainly, by contrast with the permanent slavery which, according to the US theorist and politician, blacks must be subjected to, the pedagogical dictatorship Mill refers to was destined to disappear in the distant, uncertain future. But the other side of the coin is that now explicitly subjected to this condition of unfreedom was not a particular ethnic group (the fragment of Africa located at the heart of the United States), but all the peoples invested by the West’s colonial expansion and forced to endure political ‘despotism’ and servile or semi-servile forms of labour. Is demanding ‘absolute obedience’, for an indeterminate period of time, from the overwhelming majority of humanity compatible with the liberal profession of faith? Or is it synonymous with &#039;&#039;‘soi-disant’&#039;&#039; liberalism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#calibre_pb_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The American Revolution and the revelation of an embarrassing truth&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is now clear that what primarily divides the authors mentioned up to this point is the problem of slavery. In one way or another, they all refer to the Britain deriving from the Glorious Revolution or the United States. These are &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg8&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;two countries that for around a century were a single state entity and formed, as it were, a single political party. Prior to the crisis that led to the American Revolution, the British on both sides of the Atlantic felt themselves to be proud subjects or citizens of ‘[a] land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus Blackstone. To confirm his thesis, he referred to Montesquieu, who spoke of England as the ‘one nation in the world whose constitution has political liberty for its direct purpose’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not even the French liberal doubted the fact that ‘England is currently the freest country in the world, not discounting any republic’: the ‘free nation’, the ‘free people’ par excellence.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time, no dark clouds seemed to threaten relations between the two shores of the Atlantic. There were no conflicts and, according to Montesquieu at least, there could not be, because even in its relationship with the colonies what characterized England was its love of liberty:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If this nation sent colonies abroad, it would do so to extend its commerce more than its domination.&lt;br /&gt;
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As one likes to establish elsewhere what is established at home, it would give the form of its own government to the people of its colonies; and as this government would carry prosperity with it, one would see the formation of great peoples, even in the forests to which it had sent inhabitants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, the English colonists in America proudly identified with Blackstone’s thesis that ‘our free constitution’, which ‘falls little short of perfection’, differed markedly ‘from the modern constitutions of other states’, from the political order of ‘the continent of Europe’ as a whole.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the ideology with which the Seven Years’ War was fought by the British Empire. The English colonists in America were the most determined in interpreting it as a clash between the ‘supporters of freedom in the world’—the British ‘sons of noble liberty’, or defenders of Protestantism—and a ‘cruel and oppressive’ France—despotic politically, and follower of ‘Roman bigotry’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg9&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and Popery religiously. At the time, even the British Crown’s transatlantic subjects liked to repeat with Locke that ‘slavery’ was ‘directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation’; it was utterly inconceivable for an ‘Englishman’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French allegedly wanted to reduce the American colonists to a ‘slavish subjection’. Fortunately, however, arriving to foil this attempt was Great Britain, ‘[t]he Mistress of the Nations—the grand Support of Liberty, the Scourge of Oppression and Tyranny!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was an ideology that Edmund Burke sought to breathe new life into as late as 1775, in a desperate attempt to avoid the impending rupture. Presenting his motion of conciliation, he called upon people not to lose sight of, and not to sever, the ties that bound the American colonists to the mother country: what was at stake was a single ‘nation’ that shared ‘the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’, the faith in ‘liberty’. Largely unchallenged in countries like Spain or Prussia, slavery was ‘a weed that grows in every soil’ except the English. Accordingly, it was absurd to try to subdue the rebel colonists by force: ‘An Englishman is the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, the slavery referred to here is the one of which the absolute monarch is guilty. The other slavery, which shackles blacks, is passed over in silence. With the increasing inevitability of the revolution, or ‘civil war’ with all its ‘horrors’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—as loyalists faithful to the Crown and British politicians in favour of compromise and preserving the unity of the English ‘nation’ and ‘race’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] preferred to call it—the picture changed markedly. The element of continuity is clear. Each of the two contending parties accused the other of wanting to reintroduce despotism, or political ‘slavery’. The rebel colonists’ charges are well known: they tirelessly denounced the tyranny of the British Crown and parliament, and their mad project of subjecting residents in America to a condition of ‘perpetual bondage and slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the response was not slow in coming. As early as 1773, a loyalist from New York had issued a warning: hitherto they had been ‘watchful against &#039;&#039;external&#039;&#039; attacks on our freedom’ (the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg10&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;reference is to the Seven Years’ War), but now a much more insidious danger had emerged—that of ‘becom[ing] &#039;&#039;enslaved&#039;&#039; by tyrants within’. Again in New York, another loyalist repeated the point two years later: the rebels aspired ‘to make us worse than slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In polemicizing against one another, the two branches the liberal party had divided into adopted the ideology and rhetoric that had presided over the self-celebration of the English nation in its entirety, as the sworn enemy of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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The novel factor was that, in the wake of the exchange of accusations, the other slavery—the one both branches had repressed as a disruptive element in their proud self-consciousness as members of the people and party of liberty—burst into the polemics alongside political slavery. In the rebel colonists’ view, the London government, which in sovereign fashion imposed taxation on citizens or subjects not represented in the House of Commons, was behaving like a master towards his slaves. But—objected the others—if slavery is the issue, why not start to discuss the slavery that is manifested in brutal, unequivocal form precisely where liberty is so passionately lauded? As early as 1764, Benjamin Franklin, in London at the time to plead the colonists’ cause, had to face the sarcastic comments of his interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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You Americans make a great Clamour upon every little imaginary infringement of what you take to be your Liberties; and yet there are no People upon Earth such Enemies to Liberty, such absolute Tyrants, where you have the Opportunity, as you yourselves are.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The self-styled champions of liberty branded taxation imposed without their explicit consent as synonymous with despotism and slavery. But they had no scruples about exercising the most absolute and arbitrary power over their slaves. This was a paradox: ‘How is it’, Samuel Johnson asked, ‘that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’ Across the Atlantic, those who sought to contest the secession ironized in similar fashion. Thomas Hutchinson, royal governor of Massachusetts, rebuked the rebels for their inconsistency or hypocrisy: they denied Africans those rights that they claimed to be ‘absolutely inalienable’ in the most radical way imaginable.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Echoing him was an American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher), who, having taken refuge in England, revisited the events that forced him into exile and observed: ‘the most &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg11&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clamorous advocates for liberty were uniformly the harshest and worst masters of slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only the people most directly involved in the polemical and political struggle who expressed themselves so harshly. The intervention of John Millar, prominent exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, was especially stinging:&lt;br /&gt;
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It affords a curious spectacle to observe, that the same people who talk in a high strain of political liberty, and who consider the privilege of imposing their own taxes as one of the inalienable rights of mankind, should make no scruple of reducing a great proportion of their fellow-creatures into circumstances by which they are not only deprived of property, but almost of every species of right. Fortune perhaps never produced a situation more calculated to ridicule a liberal hypothesis, or to show how little the conduct of men is at the bottom directed by any philosophical principles.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Millar was a disciple of Adam Smith. The master seems to have seen things in the same way. When he declared that to a ‘free government’ controlled by slaveowners, he preferred a ‘despotic government’ capable of erasing the infamy of slavery, he made explicit reference to America. Translated into directly political terms, the great economist’s words signify: the despotism the Crown is criticized for is preferable to the liberty demanded by the slave-owners, from which only a small class of planters and absolute masters benefits.&lt;br /&gt;
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English abolitionists went even further, calling for the defence of British institutions threatened by ‘arbitrary and inhuman uses, which prevail in a distant land’. So arbitrary and inhuman that, as indicated by an advert in the &#039;&#039;New York Journal&#039;&#039;, a black woman and her three-year-old daughter could be sold on the market separately, as if they were a cow and a calf. And hence (concluded Granville Sharp in 1769) one should not be led astray by ‘theatrical bombast and ranting expressions in praise of liberty’ employed by the slaveholding rebels; free English institutions must be vigorously defended against them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The accused reacted in their turn by upbraiding England for its hypocrisy: it boasted of its virtue and love of liberty, but who promoted and continued to promote the slave trade? And who was it that transported and sold slaves? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#page12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_001.html#pg12&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Thus argued Franklin,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] advancing an argument that became central in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence elaborated by Jefferson. This is how, in the original version of that solemn document, the Britain derived from the Glorious Revolution and George III himself were charged. The latter&lt;br /&gt;
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has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating the most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical war, the opprobrium of &#039;&#039;infidel&#039;&#039; powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The role of slavery between the two Atlantic shores&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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What should we make of this furious, unexpected polemic? There is no doubt that the accusations against the rebels struck a weak point. Virginia played a central role in the American Revolution. Forty per cent of the country’s slaves were to be found there, but a majority of the authors of the rebellion unleashed in the name of liberty also came from there. For thirty-two of the United States’ first thirty-six years of existence, slave-owners from Virginia occupied the post of president. This colony or state, founded on slavery, supplied the country with its most illustrious statesmen. It is enough to think of George Washington (great military and political protagonist of the anti-British revolt) and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (authors, respectively, of the Declaration of Independence and the federal Constitution of 1787), all three of them slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Regardless of this or that state, the influence slavery exercised on the country as a whole is clear. Sixty years after its foundation, we see that ‘of the first sixteen presidential elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern slaveholder in the White House’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence the persistence of the anti-American polemic on this point is understandable.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other side, we are familiar with Franklin’s and Jefferson’s ironic remarks about the moralizing anti-slavery lectures offered by a country deeply &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg13&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved in the slave trade. Burke, theorist of ‘conciliation with the colonies’, likewise stressed this. In rejecting the proposal of those who urged ‘a general enfranchisement of their slaves’ to counter the rebellion of their masters and the colonists generally, he observed: ‘Slaves as these unfortunate black people are, and dull as all men are from slavery, must they not a little suspect the offer of freedom from that very nation which has sold them to their present masters?’ All the more so if this nation insisted on practising the slave trade, clashing with colonies that wished to restrict or abolish it. In the eyes of slaves landed in or deported to America, this would represent a peculiar spectacle:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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An offer of freedom from England, would come rather oddly, shipped to them in an African vessel, which is refused an entry into the ports of Virginia or Carolina, with a cargo of three hundred Angola negroes. It would be curious to see the Guinea captain attempting at the same instant to publish his proclamation of liberty, and to advertise his sale of slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Burke’s irony hits home. In addition to Britain’s role in the slave trade, slaves long continued to be present in the metropolis itself. It has been calculated that in the mid-eighteenth century there were around 100,000 of them.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were British abolitionists horrified by the market in human flesh in the American colonies and New York? In Liverpool in 1766, eleven black slaves were put on sale and the market in ‘black cattle’ was still open in Dublin twelve years later, regularly advertised in the local press.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The role played in the country’s economy by the trade in slaves and their exploitation was sizeable: ‘The &#039;&#039;Liverpool Courier&#039;&#039;, 22 August 1832, estimated that three-quarters of Britain’s coffee, fifteen-sixteenths of its cotton, twenty-two twenty-thirds of its sugar, and thirty-four thirty-fifths of its tobacco were still produced by slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In sum, we should bear in mind the candid judgement of two eighteenth-century British witnesses. The first, Joshua Gee, acknowledged that ‘[a]ll this great increase in our treasure proceeds chiefly from the labour of negroes in the plantations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The second, Malachy Postlethwayt, engaged as he was in defending the role of the Royal African Company—the company that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#page14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_002.html#pg14&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;controlled the slave trade—was even sharper: ‘The &#039;&#039;Negroe Trade&#039;&#039; and the natural Consequences resulting from it, may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible Fund of Wealth and Naval Power to this Nation’; they were ‘the first principle and foundation of all the rest, the main spring of the machine which sets every wheel in motion’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Empire as a whole was merely ‘a magnificent superstructure’ upon this commerce.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, there was the political influence of the institution of slavery. Although obviously inferior to what it was in the American colonies, it was certainly not nugatory in England: in the 1790 parliament, two or three dozen members sat who had interests in the West Indies.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The exchange of accusations between rebel colonists and the mother country—that is, between two branches of the party that had hitherto proudly celebrated itself as the party of liberty—was a mutual, pitiless demystification. Not only did the England derived from the Glorious Revolution not challenge the slave trade, but on the contrary the latter experienced strong growth.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And one of the new liberal monarchy’s first acts of international policy was wresting a monopoly on the slave trade from Spain. On the other side, the revolution that broke out across the Atlantic in the name of liberty involved official consecration of the institution of slavery, and the conquest and prolonged exercise of political hegemony by slave-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Possibly the most articulate and pained intervention in this polemic was by Josiah Tucker, ‘who, though a parson and a Tory, was, apart from that, an honourable man and a competent political economist’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He denounced England’s pre-eminent role in the slave trade: ‘We … the boasted Patrons of Liberty, and the professed Advocates for the natural Rights of Mankind, engage deeper in this murderous inhuman Traffic than any Nation whatever.’ But even more hypocritical was the behaviour of the rebel colonists: ‘the Advocates for Republicanism, and for the supposed Equality of Mankind, ought to have been foremost in suggesting some such humane System for abolishing the worst of all the Species of Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But instead …&lt;br /&gt;
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== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg15&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;4. Holland, England, America&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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If, prior to constituting themselves as an independent state, the rebel colonies in America formed part of the British Empire, the latter assumed its liberal form with the ascent to the throne of William of Orange, who landed in England from Holland. On the other hand, while with his draft constitution for Carolina Locke referred to America, he wrote his first &#039;&#039;Letter Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039; in Holland, which was then ‘the centre of conspiracy’ against Stuart absolutism;[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Holland was also the birthplace of Bernard de Mandeville, unquestionably one of the more important figures in early liberalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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We must not lose sight of the fact that the United Provinces, which emerged from the struggle against Philip II’s Spain, equipped themselves with a liberal type of set-up a century before England. This was a country that from a socio-economic point of view as well had left the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; behind. In the seventeenth century it had a per capita income one-and-a-half times that of England; whereas in the latter 60 per cent of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, the figure in Holland was 40 per cent. Moreover, the power structure was rather significant: in the country which emerged victorious from the clash with Philip II, ‘a bourgeois oligarchy that had broken decisively with the aristocratic landholding ethos’ was dominant.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was these enlightened, tolerant, liberal bourgeois who embarked on colonial expansion; and in this historical period the slave trade was an integral part of it:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he Dutch conducted the first serious slave trade in order to furnish the manpower for the sugar plantations; when they lost the plantations, they tried to remain in the field as slave traders, but by 1675, Dutch primacy ended, yielding place to the newly founded Royal African Company of the English.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke was a shareholder in the Royal African Company. But the history of the United Provinces leads to America as well as Britain. It would seem that it was a Dutch peddler who introduced African slaves into Virginia.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] New Amsterdam, which the Dutch were forced to cede to the British and which became New York, had a population 20 per cent of which was composed of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg16&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;16&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;blacks, in large part slaves. In 1703 around 42 per cent of homeowners were also slave-owners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This represents the paradox already glimpsed in connection with Britain and the United States. Until the mid-seventeenth century, the country where the prologue to the successive liberal revolutions occurred—namely, Holland—had a ‘hold’ on the trade in slaves:[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘By the beginning of the eighteenth century, all of their [Dutch] possessions were slave or bound-labor societies.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, in one respect, it was synonymous with liberty at the time, in another, Holland was synonymous with slavery—and a particularly brutal form of it. In Voltaire’s &#039;&#039;Candide&#039;&#039; a severe blow is dealt to the protagonist’s naive optimism by the encounter in Surinam (‘where the Dutch are’) with a black slave, reduced to a ‘dreadful state’ by his Dutch master. The slave refers as follows to the working conditions to which he is forced to submit:&lt;br /&gt;
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When we’re working at the sugar-mill and catch our finger in the grinding-wheel, they cut off our hand. When we try to run away, they cut off a leg. I have been in both these situations. This is the price you pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his turn, Condorcet, launching his abolitionist campaign in 1781, in particular targeted England and Holland, where the institution of slavery seemed especially deep-rooted on account of ‘the general corruption of these nations’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, it is worth citing the American loyalist (Jonathan Boucher) whom we have seen ironizing about the passion for liberty displayed by slave-owners engaged in the rebellion. In his view, ‘[d]espotic nations treated their slaves better than those under republics; the Spanish were the best masters while the Dutch were the worst.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The first country to embark on the liberal road is one that exhibited an especially tenacious attachment to the institution of slavery. It appears that colonists of Dutch origin offered the most determined resistance to the first abolitionist measures, those introduced in the northern United States during the Revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#page17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_003.html#pg17&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;17&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and in its wake.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As regards Holland itself, in 1791 the States-General formally declared that the slave trade was essential to the development of the colonies’ prosperity and commerce. Still in this period, clearly distinguishing itself from Britain, Holland recognized the right of slave-owners to transport and deposit their human chattels in the mother country before returning to the colonies. Finally, it is to be noted that Holland only abolished slavery in its colonies in 1863, when the secessionist and slaveholding Confederacy of the southern United States was going down to defeat.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Irish, the Indians and the inhabitants of Java&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The English colonists’ revolt in America was accompanied by another major controversy. For a long time, like that of the blacks, the Indians’ fate had not in the slightest unsettled the deep conviction of the English on either side of the Atlantic that they were the chosen people of liberty. In both cases, they appealed to Locke, for whom (as we shall see) the natives of the New World approximated to ‘wild beasts’. But with the eruption of the conflict between colonies and mother country, the exchange of accusations also encompassed the problem of the relationship with the Indians. England, Paine proclaimed in 1776, was ‘that barbarous and hellish power, which hath stirred up the Indians and the Negroes to destroy us’ or ‘to cut the throats of the freemen of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the Declaration of Independence berated George III for having not only ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’ by black slaves, but also ‘endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions’. In 1812, on the occasion of a new war between the two shores of the Atlantic, Madison condemned England for indiscriminately striking the civilian population with its fleet, not sparing women or children, and hence displaying a conduct similar to that of the red-skinned ‘savages’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having been accomplices of the barbarians, the English became barbarians themselves.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the argument had begun much earlier, following the Crown proclamation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg18&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;18&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of 1763 that sought to halt or contain expansion west of the Allegany Mountains. This was a measure that did not please the colonists and George Washington, who regarded it as ‘a temporary expedient’, destined to be rapidly superseded, but which should not be respected even in the immediate present: those ‘who neglect the present opportunity of hunting out good lands’ were foolish.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The future president of the United States was not one of these ‘fools’. In his new capacity, while declaring in official speeches that he wanted to bring the ‘blessings of civilization’ and ‘happiness’ to ‘an unenlightened race of men’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in private correspondence he identified the Indians as ‘savages’ and ‘wild beasts of the forest’. Given this, the British Crown’s pretension to block further expansion by the colonists was absurd and ultimately immoral: they (Washington declared in a letter of 1783) would force ‘the Savage [like] the Wolf to retire’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more extreme in this respect was Franklin, who in his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039; observed: ‘if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth, it seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means. It has already annihilated all the Tribes who formerly inhabited the Seacoast.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The decimation or destruction of a people who worshipped ‘the Devil’ was part of a kind of divinely inspired eugenicist plan.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The de-humanization of the Indians was also subscribed to by those in Britain who supported reconciliation with the rebels. The Crown’s attempt to block the colonists’ expansionistic march seemed to Burke absurd and sacrilegious, for ‘attempting to forbid as a crime, and to suppress as an evil, the command and blessing of Providence, “Increase and multiply.”‘ Ultimately, it was an ill-fated ‘endeavour to keep as a lair of wild beasts, that earth, which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Those on either side of the Atlantic who supported or justified the Crown’s policy of ‘conciliation’ not of the colonists, but of the Indians, mounted some resistance to this process of de-humanization. In this context, a particular mention should be made of the figure of the likeable American loyalist whom &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg19&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;19&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we have encountered several times, in his capacity as a critic of the peculiar libertarian zeal displayed by the ‘harshest and wickedest slave masters’. To these same circles he attributed cruelty to the Indians. Sometimes they were killed and scalped with veritable religious fervour; they even became targets for shooting practice. They were branded savages and yet (objected Jonathan Boucher) they were no more savage ‘than our progenitors appeared to Julius Caesar or to Agricola’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We have seen Paine accuse the London government of seeking an alliance with Indian cut-throats. In reality, warned an English commander in 1783, it was precisely the now victorious colonists who ‘were preparing to cut the throats of the Indians’. The victors’ behaviour (added another officer) was ‘shocking to humanity’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an enduring controversy. In the later nineteenth century a historian descended from a family of loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada argued as follows: Did the rebels claim to be the descendants of those who had disembarked in America to escape intolerance and stay loyal to the cause of liberty? In fact, reversing the policy of the British Crown, which aimed at conversion, the Puritans had initiated a massacre of the Indians, assimilated to ‘Canaanites and Amalekites’—that is, stocks marked out by the Old Testament for erasure from the face of the earth. This was ‘one of the darkest pages in English colonial history’, which was followed by the even more repugnant one written during the American Revolution, when the rebel colonists engaged in ‘the entire destruction of the Six Indian Nations’ that had remained loyal to England: ‘by an order which, we believe, has no parallel in the annals of any civilized nation, [Congress] commands the complete destruction of those people as a nation … including women and children’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his private correspondence at least, Jefferson had no problem acknowledging the horror of the war against the Indians. But in his view responsibility for it resided with the London government, which had incited these savage, bloodthirsty ‘tribes’. This was a situation that ‘will oblige us now to pursue them to extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach’. The ‘confirmed brutalization, if not the extermination of this race in our America’ was to be laid at Britain’s door. As with the similar fate of ‘the same colored man in Asia’, as well as of the Irish—who for the English, whose skin ‘colour’ they shared, should be ‘brethren’—it was attributable to a policy committed to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg20&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;20&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sowing death and destruction ‘wherever … Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in deluging the earth with human blood’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Jefferson was not wrong to compare the treatment suffered by the Indians with that reserved for the Irish. Just as, according to the loyalist accusation, Puritans and rebel colonists assimilated the Indians to ‘Amalekites’, so the Irish had already been compared to ‘Amalekites’ marked out for extermination, this time by the English conquerors.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The colonization of Ireland, with all its horrors, was the model for the subsequent colonization of North America.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If the British Empire as a whole mainly swept away Irish and blacks,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indians and blacks were the principal victims of the territorial and commercial expansion first of the English colonies in America and then of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
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As with the black question, in the case of the Indians the exchange of accusations ended up taking the form of a mutual demystification. There is no doubt that, along with black enslavement and the black slave trade, the rise of the two liberal countries either side of the Atlantic involved a process of systematic expropriation and practical genocide first of the Irish and then of the Indians.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similar observations can be made of Holland. A senior English civil servant, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who during the Napoleonic Wars was deputy governor of Java for a time, stated that the previous administration was ‘one of the extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre and meanness’. It is clear that colonial rivalry played a role in this judgement. Marx reports it, but pools ‘Dutch colonial administration’ and the English administration in his condemnation. As regards Holland more specifically:&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men in Celebes, in order to get slaves for Java … The young people thus stolen were hidden in secret dungeons on Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official report says: ‘This one town of Macassar, for example, is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in chains, forcibly torn from their families.’ … Wherever [the Dutch] set foot, devastation and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#page21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_004.html#pg21&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;21&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, numbered over 80,000 inhabitants in 1750 and only 18,000 in 1811. That is peaceful commerce![[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, processes of enslavement and practical genocide were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Grotius, Locke and the Founding Fathers: a comparative interpretation&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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At the start of the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe underlined the ideological fraternity between the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution and the country which, a century earlier, had rebelled against Philip II and won ‘freedom’ and prosperity thanks to ‘Heaven and the Assistance of England’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century, liberal authors liked to contrast the ordered triumph of liberty that had occurred in Holland, England and the United States with a France in the grip of an interminable revolutionary cycle and Bonapartism.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It might therefore be useful to proceed to a brief comparative analysis of the texts and authors in which the liberal revolutions of these three countries found theoretical expression and consecration.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the case of the Holland, we cannot but refer to Hugo Grotius, who dedicated two of his most important books (&#039;&#039;Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae&#039;&#039;) to the revolt against Philip II and the country that derived from it. Liberal Holland immediately engaged in overseas expansion and slave-trading, and it is interesting to observe the position Grotius adopted towards colonial peoples. Having condemned the superstitious and idolatrous character of the ‘religious rites’ peculiar to paganism, he added:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
when offered … to an evil spirit, it is an act of falsehood and hypocrisy; nay, it is an act of absolute rebellion, whereby we not only deprive our legal sovereign of his just homage, but even transfer that homage to a base apostate and an open enemy!&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg22&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;22&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Targeted here were peoples with&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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modes of worship … of a nature little suited to a Being of goodness and of purity: Human sacrifices; naked races up and down the temples; games and dances replete with obscenity; instances whereof are seen even at this day among the savage natives of America and Africa, who are still lost in the thick clouds of Paganism.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was peoples assailed by Europe’s colonial expansion who were guilty of rebellion against God, and who must be punished for such a crime:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Some … are weak enough to imagine, that God, as a being of infinite goodness, will never be provoked to punish this rebellion; a spirit of revenge, say they, is wholly incompatible with the attribute of perfect goodness. A fatal and absurd idea this! The powers of Mercy must be limited, that her actions may be just; and when wickedness becomes excessive, punishment as it were unavoidably arises out of justice.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Against peoples who, staining themselves with ‘[o]ffences that are committed against GOD’ and violating the most basic norms of natural law, took the form of ‘barbarians’ or ‘rather Beasts than men’, war was ‘natural’, regardless of state borders and geographical distance. Indeed, ‘the justest War is that which is undertaken against wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like Beasts [&#039;&#039;homines belluis similes&#039;&#039;].’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is the ideology that presided over the conquest of the New World. The sin of idolatry was the first of the arguments prompting Sepúlveda to regard war on the Indians and their enslavement as ‘just’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Grotius, along with the implicit legitimation of the genocidal practices underway in America, an explicit and insistent justification of slavery emerges. Sometimes it was punishment for criminal behaviour. Answerable for the latter were not only single individuals: ‘a whole People may be brought into Subjection for a publick Crime’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As well as in their capacity as ‘rebels’ against the Lord of the Universe, the inhabitants of America and Africa could also succumb to slavery &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg23&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;23&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as a result of a ‘just war’ (&#039;&#039;bellum justum&#039;&#039;), conducted by a European power. The prisoners captured during an armed conflict, formally declared in the requisite forms by the supreme authority of a state, were legitimately slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And their descendants too were legitimate slaves: otherwise, what interest would the victor have in keeping the vanquished alive? As the slave of the one who had spared his life, the prisoner became part of the victor’s property, and such property could be transmitted hereditarily or be an object of sale, just like ‘the Property of Goods’ (&#039;&#039;rerum dominium&#039;&#039;).[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, all this did not apply to ‘those Nations where this Right of Bondage over Captives is not practised’; it did not apply to ‘Christian’ countries, which limited themselves to exchanging prisoners.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Banned in intra-European conflicts, slavery by right of war continued to be a reality as and when Christian, civilized Europe confronted colonial peoples, barbarians and pagans in what, by definition, was a ‘just’ war. On the other hand, regardless of their actual behaviour, the lesson of a great master should not be forgotten: ‘as &#039;&#039;Aristotle&#039;&#039; said, some Men are naturally Slaves, that is, turned for Slavery. And some Nations also are of such a Temper, that they know better how to obey than to command’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a truth also confirmed by Holy Scripture: ‘the Apostle St Paul’ called on individuals and peoples who had legitimately been reduced to slavery to put up with their lot and not escape it by rebellion or flight.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the one hand, Grotius paid homage to the ‘free People’ who in Holland had availed themselves of their right of resistance, legitimately shaking off the yoke of a despotic prince.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other, he had no difficulty justifying slavery and even the kind of ‘wild beast’ hunt against Indians underway in America.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us now pass on to the Glorious Revolution and Locke. The &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; may be regarded as key moments in the ideological preparation and consecration of the event that marks the birth of liberal England. We are dealing with texts deeply impregnated with the pathos of liberty, the condemnation of absolute power, the appeal to rise up against the wicked ones who seek to deprive man of his liberty and reduce him to slavery. But every now and then frightening passages open up in this ode to liberty, where slavery in the colonies is legitimized. As ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the institution, Grotius adduced the example of the Germans who, according to Tacitus’ &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg24&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;24&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;testimony, ‘ventured their very Liberty upon the Cast of a Die’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Locke’s view, ‘captives taken in a just war’ (on the part of the victors) had ‘forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties’. They were slaves ‘subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Up to now the thinking applies to blacks deported from Africa. But the fate reserved for Indians was not manifestly better. In addition to having an interest in the slave trade as a shareholder in the Royal African Company, the liberal English philosopher was concerned with the white colonists’ expansionist march as secretary (in 1673–74) of the Council of Trade and Plantations. As has been justly observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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That so many of the examples Locke uses in his &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; are American ones shows that his intention was to provide the settlers, for whom he had worked in so many other ways, with a powerful argument based in natural law rather than legislative decree to justify their depredations.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; makes repeated reference to the ‘wild Indian’, who moved around ‘insolent and injurious in the woods of America’ or the ‘vacant places of America’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ignorant of labour, which was the only thing that could confer property right, and occupying a land not ‘improv[ed] by labour’, or ‘great tracts of unused’ ground’, the Indian inhabited ‘unpossessed quarters’, &#039;&#039;in vacuis locis&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to labour and property, Indians were also ignorant of money. They thus not only proved alien to civilization, but were also ‘not … joined with the rest of mankind’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As a result of their behaviour, they were not solely subject to human condemnation. Unquestionably, ‘God commanded … labour’ and private property, and could certainly not want the world created by him to remain ‘common and uncultivated’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When he sought to challenge the march of civilization, violently opposing exploitation through labour of the uncultivated land occupied by him, the Indian, along with any other criminal, could be equated with ‘one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security’, and who ‘therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger’. Locke never tired of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg25&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;25&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;insisting on the right possessed by any man to destroy those reduced to the level of ‘beasts of prey’, ‘savage beasts’; to the level of ‘a savage ravenous beast that is dangerous to his being’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These are phrases that remind us of those used by Grotius in connection with barbarous peoples and pagans in general, and by Washington in connection with the Indians. However, before coming to the Founding Fathers and the solemn documents that mark the birth of the United States, it is worth dwelling on another macroscopic exclusion clause that characterizes the celebration of liberty in Locke. ‘Papists’, declared the &#039;&#039;Essay Concerning Toleration&#039;&#039;, are ‘like serpents never [to] be prevailed on by kind usage to lay by their venom’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even more than to English Catholics, this harsh declaration was formulated with a view to Ireland, where at the time unregistered priests were branded with a red-hot iron, when they were not punished with more severe penalties or death.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Irish, in endemic, desperate revolt against spoliation and oppression by Anglican settlers, were contemptuously referred to by Locke as a population of ‘brigands’. As for the rest, he reiterated the point the men are:&lt;br /&gt;
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forward to have compassion for sufferers and esteem for that religion as pure, and the professors of it as sincere, which can stand the test of persecution. But I think it is far otherwise with Catholics, who are less apt to be pitied than others because they receive no other usage than what they [by the] cruelty of their own principles and practices are known to deserve.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The warning against feelings of ‘compassion’ makes it clear that we are dealing with Ireland primarily. Locke seems to have had no objections of any kind to the ruthless repression suffered by the Irish, whose fate calls to mind that reserved for Indians across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We can now move on to examine the documents that informed the third liberal revolution and the foundation of the United States. At first sight, the Declaration of Independence and the 1787 Constitution seem inspired and pervaded by a universal pathos of liberty: ‘all men are created equal’—such is the solemn preamble to the first document; it is necessary to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’—such is the no less solemn preamble &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg26&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;26&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to the second. But it requires a scarcely more attentive reading to encounter, already in Article 1 of the Constitution, a contrast between ‘free Persons’ and ‘all other Persons’. The latter were, of course, slaves, whose number, reduced to three-fifths, had to be factored in and added to that of ‘free persons’ when it came to calculating the number of members in the House of Representatives to which slaveholding states were entitled.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With recourse to various euphemisms, a whole series of other Articles refer to this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
No Person held to Service or Labour in One State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Where initially it was concealed among ‘other persons’ (the part of the population not made up of ‘free persons’), now the relationship of slavery is modestly subsumed under the general category of persons ‘held to Service or Labour’. On the basis of the principles of self-government, each individual state has the right to regulate it as it sees fit, while every state’s obligation to return fugitive slaves is a moral obligation to guarantee a legitimate property-owner the services that ‘may be due’. In a further linguistic expedient, tinged with the same discretion, the black slave trade becomes ‘[t]he migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit’. It was ‘not [to] be prohibited by Congress prior to the year [1808]’, and, pending that, could only be subjected to a fairly modest tax (‘not exceeding ten dollars for each person’ or slave). The articles requiring the Union to suppress insurrections or ‘domestic violence’—primarily, a possible dreaded slave revolt in some particular state[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—are formulated in similarly elliptical fashion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although repressed through a strict linguistic proscription, the institution of slavery proves to be a pervasive presence in the American Constitution. It is not even absent from the Declaration of Independence, where the accusation against George III of having appealed to black slaves takes the already noted form of having ‘excited domestic insurrections amongst us’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the transition from Grotius to Locke, and from them to the founding documents of the American Revolution, we observe a phenomenon worth reflecting upon: although regarded as legitimate in all three cases, the institution of slavery was theorized and affirmed without the least reticence solely by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#page27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_005.html#pg27&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;27&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Dutch author, whose life straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Locke, by contrast, at least in the case of the &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, which were written and published on the eve and at the end of the Glorious Revolution, legitimation of slavery tends to occur exclusively between the lines of the discourse celebrating English liberty. The reticence reaches its peak in the documents that consecrate the foundation of the United States as the most glorious chapter in the history of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When it came to the relationship with the Indians, things were different: Grotius, Locke and Washington all referred to them as ‘wild beasts’. A document like the Declaration of Independence, which was addressed to international public opinion and which (as we know) included among George III’s most heinous crimes the fact that he had incited the ‘merciless Indian savages’ against the rebel colonists, was linguistically more cautious. But it remains the case that in all three liberal revolutions the demand for liberty and justification of the enslavement, as well as the decimation (or destruction), of barbarians, were closely intertwined.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#calibre_pb_6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Vulgar historicism and repression of the paradox of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In conclusion, the countries that were the protagonists of three major liberal revolutions were simultaneously the authors of two tragic chapters in modern (and contemporary) history. If that is so, however, can the habitual representation of the liberal tradition—namely, that it is characterized by the love of liberty as such—be regarded as valid? Let us return to our initial question: What is liberalism? As we register the disappearance of the old certainties, a great saying comes to mind: ‘What is well-known, precisely because it is &#039;&#039;well-&#039;&#039;known, is not &#039;&#039;known&#039;&#039;. In the knowledge process, the commonest way to mislead oneself and others is to assume that something is well-known and to accept it as such’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Throwing a widespread apologia into crisis, the paradoxical tangle we have encountered while historically reconstructing the origins of liberalism is disturbing. We can therefore understand the tendency to repression. After all, that was the gesture, in their own day, of Locke and, especially, the rebel American colonists, who liked to draw a more or less thick veil of silence over the institution of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg28&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;28&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The same result can be arrived at in other ways. According to Hannah Arendt, what characterized the American Revolution was the project of realizing a political order based on liberty, while the persistence of black slavery referred to a cultural tradition homogeneously diffused either side of the Atlantic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[T]his indifference, difficult for us to understand, was not peculiar to Americans and hence must [not] be blamed … on any perversion of the heart or upon the dominance of self-interest … Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans …[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, disquiet about slavery was so strongly felt in the Europe of the time that prominent authors not infrequently proceeded to a sharp contrast between the two shores of the Atlantic. Let us attend to Condorcet:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The American forgets that negroes are men; he has no moral relationship with them; for him they are simply objects of profit … and such is the excess of his stupid contempt for this unhappy species that, when back in Europe, he is indignant to see them dressed like men and placed alongside him.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
‘The American’ condemned here is the transatlantic colonist, whether French or English. In his turn, in 1771 Millar denounced ‘the shocking barbarity to which the negroes in our colonies are frequently exposed’. Fortunately, ‘the practice of slavery [has] been … generally abolished in Europe’. Where it survived, across the Atlantic, the practice poisoned the whole society: cruelty and sadism were ‘exhibited even by persons of the weaker sex, in an age distinguished for humanity and politeness’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also the opinion of Condorcet, who pointed out how ‘the young American woman witnesses’, and sometimes even ‘presides over’, the brutal ‘tortures’ inflicted on black slaves.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The thesis formulated by Arendt can even be inverted. In the late eighteenth century the institution of slavery began to be unacceptable in salons where the ideas of the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; circulated, and in churches influenced by the Quakers or other abolitionist sections of Christianity. Even as the Philadelphia Convention ratified the Constitution that sanctioned racial chattel slavery, a French defender of this institution bitterly noted his isolation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg29&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;29&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The extremely powerful empire of public opinion … now offers its support to those in France and England who attack black slavery and pursue its abolition. The most odious interpretations are reserved for those who dare to hold a contrary opinion.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Some years later, another French defender of slavery bemoaned the fact that ‘negrophilia’ had become a ‘fashionable oddity’, to the point of abolishing any sense of distance between the two races: ‘African blood circulates much too abundantly in the veins of the Parisians themselves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If we start out from the presupposition of a general ‘indifference’ to the lot of black slaves in these years, we shall understand nothing of the American Revolution. The ‘last great philosopher’ to justify slavery—Locke—was quite the reverse of unchallenged; and it is interesting to note that he was criticized together with the ‘current American rebellion’, which he was regarded as having inspired.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, celebration of a tendentially republican liberty was bound up with legitimation of the institution of slavery. After having cited various passages from the philosopher that leave no room for doubt in this regard, Josiah Tucker commented: ‘[s]uch is the language of the humane Mr Locke! The great and glorious Assertor of the natural Rights and Liberties of Mankind’; here were ‘his real Sentiments concerning Slavery’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, the American loyalist we have already encountered—Boucher—conjointly condemned the republican secession and Locke’s claim to confer on ‘every freeman of Carolina absolute power and property over his slaves’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While English patriots and loyalists opposed to secession ironized about the flag of liberty waved by slave-owners, the rebel colonists reacted not by invoking the legitimacy of enslaving blacks, but by highlighting the British Crown’s massive involvement and principal responsibility in trafficking and trading human flesh. It is clear that the institution of slavery was now largely delegitimized. This explains the linguistic proscriptions that characterized the new state’s Constitution. As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention observed, his colleagues ‘anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might be odious to the ears of Americans’, but were ‘willing to admit into their system those &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039; which the &#039;&#039;expressions signified’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#page30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_006.html#pg30&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;30&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;is that, from the start of the debate on the new constitutional order (pointed out another witness), people ‘had been ashamed to use the term “Slaves” &amp;amp;amp; had substituted a description’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Less scrupulous (observed Condorcet in 1781) were the slaves’ ‘owners’: they were ‘guided by a false consciousness [&#039;&#039;fausse conscience&#039;&#039;]’ that rendered them impervious to the ‘protests of the defenders of humanity’ and ‘made them act not against their own interests, but to their own advantage’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As we can see, notwithstanding Arendt’s contrary opinion, ‘class interests’—principally of those who owned large plantations and a considerable number of slaves—played an important role, which did not escape contemporary observers. The fact is that Arendt ultimately ends up identifying with the viewpoint of the rebel colonists, who retained a clear conscience as champions of the cause of liberty, repressing the macroscopic fact of slavery by means of their ingenious euphemisms: what takes the place of such euphemisms is now the ‘historicist’ explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#calibre_pb_7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Colonial expansions and the rebirth of slavery: the positions of Bodin, Grotius and Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Decidedly misleading as regards the American Revolution, might the ‘historicist’ approach be of some use in clarifying the reasons for the tangle of freedom and oppression that was already manifest in the two preceding liberal revolutions? Although contemporaries, in as much as both of them straddled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hugo Grotius and Jean Bodin expressed diametrically opposed positions on the issue of concern to us here. While the first justified slavery by appealing to the authority of the Bible and Aristotle, the second refuted both these arguments. Having observed that in the Hebrew world only gentiles could be subjected to perpetual slavery, and that Christians and Muslims observed similar norms and customs, Bodin concluded that ‘those who profess all these three religions only partially observe the law of God with regard to slaves’, as if the prohibition of this horrible institution only applied to blood relations, not humanity as a whole. If a distinction among the three monotheistic religions could be made, it was to the advantage of Islam, which had proved capable of expanding thanks to a courageous policy of emancipation.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg31&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;31&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bodin also rejected Aristotle’s thesis, adopted and even radicalized by Grotius, that some individuals and peoples are naturally slaves. As proof of this, the universal diffusion, temporal and spatial, of the institution of slavery was often cited. But (objected the French author) no less universally diffused were slave revolts:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for the argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil, inclines for the most part to do that which is forbidden and chooses the evil, defying the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While it had long seemed obvious and been generally accepted, and still continued to be, the institution of slavery pertained not to nature but to history—more precisely, to a deplorable and execrable chapter of history, which must rapidly be closed once and for all. It made no sense to try to justify it on the basis of right of war (as did Grotius): ‘[W]hat charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some profit or pleasure from them as if they were cattle?’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, Grotius and Bodin were contemporaries. While the former was an expression of liberal Holland, the latter was a theorist of absolute monarchy. But it was he—not Grotius—who questioned the absolute power wielded by the master over his slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We arrive at a similar result when, rather than with Grotius, we compare Bodin with Locke, whom he predated by some decades. Whereas the English liberal, also justifying slavery with his gaze on the past, pointed to Spartacus as culpable of an ‘aggression’ against ‘property’ and legitimate power, Bodin expressed himself quite differently: ‘The Romans, who were so great and powerful … however many laws they made, could not prevent the revolt of sixty thousand slaves led by Spartacus, who defeated the Roman army in open battle three times’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the English liberal the universalistic charge present in Bodin has disappeared, just as there is no longer any trace of the unconditional &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg32&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;32&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery we can read in the French theorist of absolute monarchy. If we bear in mind ‘the homicides, the cruelties and barbarities inflicted on slaves by their masters, it was an unmitigated catastrophe that the institution was ever introduced, and then, that once it had been declared abolished, it should ever have been allowed to persist.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The quotation above refers to persistence. In fact, Bodin traced a brief history of slavery in the world or, more precisely, the West (and the geographical area dominated by it). Certainly, the institution had been vital in Greco-Roman antiquity. As late as the American Civil War, the theorists and defenders of the southern cause appealed to the example and model of that splendid civilization in order to condemn abolitionism. By contrast, Bodin drew a rather realistic picture of classical antiquity. It was based on the enslavement of a number of human beings that was significantly greater than the number of free citizens. Consequently, it lived under the constant menace of slave revolts and, in order to solve the problem, did not hesitate to resort to the most barbaric measures, as proved by the massacre of 30,000 helots in Sparta ‘in a single night’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Subsequently, as a result also of the influence of Christianity, things seemed to change: ‘Europe was freed of slavery after about 1250’, but ‘we see it today newly restored’. Following colonial expansion, it was ‘in the process of being renewed throughout the world’. There had been a massive restoration of slavery, and already Portugal ‘derives from it veritable herds as of beasts’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence, far from being affected by vulgar historicism’s attempts at repression, the paradox that characterizes the American Revolution and early liberalism in general not only survives, but proves even more marked. We are in the presence of a political movement counter to the trend of authors who, centuries earlier, had pronounced an unequivocal condemnation of the institution of slavery. While Locke, champion of the struggle against absolute monarchy, justified the white master’s absolute power over the black slave, a theorist of monarchical absolutism—Bodin—condemned such power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In analyzing the relationship that the three liberal revolutions developed on the one hand with the blacks, and on the other with the Irish, Indians and natives, it is misleading to start out from the presupposition of a homogeneous historical time unmarked by fractures and flowing in unilinear fashion. Clearly predating Locke and Washington, and a contemporary of Grotius, was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg33&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;33&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Montaigne, in whom we find a memorable self-critical reflection on the West’s colonial expansion that we would seek in vain in them. Such a reflection can even be read as a prefigurative but timely critique of the attitude of Grotius, Locke and Washington towards non-European populations. Among them there was ‘nothing savage or barbarous’; the fact was that ‘every man calls barbarous anything he is not accustomed to’. People took their own country as a model: ‘There we always find the perfect religion, the perfect polity, the most developed and perfect way of doing anything!’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going back further, we encounter Las Casas and his critique of the arguments employed to de-humanize the Indian ‘barbarians’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the arguments that are more or less widely echoed by Grotius, Locke and Washington.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should be added that the ‘historicist’ explanation turns out to be unfounded not only as regards the relationship with colonial peoples. While Fletcher, a self-defined ‘republican on principle’, member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of the liberal political world derived from the Glorious Revolution, called for ‘mak[ing] slaves of all those who are unable to provide for their own subsistence’,[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bodin also condemned slavery for ‘vagrants and idlers’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to the observation of a great historian, it was in ‘the period between 1660 and 1760’ (the decades of the rise of the liberal movement) that an attitude of unprecedented harshness spread in England towards wage-labourers and the unemployed, ‘which has no modern parallel except in the behaviour of the less reputable of white colonists towards coloured labour’.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To understand the radical character of the paradox we are examining, let us return to Bodin. He primarily attributed the return of slavery in the world to the ‘greed of merchants’, and then added: ‘If the princes do not set things in good order, it will soon be full of slaves.’[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later. On the other hand, in recommending the conversion of beggars &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#page34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0005_split_007.html#pg34&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;34&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into slaves, Fletcher polemicized against the Church, which he rebuked for having promoted the abolition of slavery in classical antiquity and for opposing its reintroduction in the modern world, thus encouraging the sloth and dissipation of vagrants.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, too, the institution of slavery was felt to be in contradiction not with the new social and political forces, but with a power that was pre-modern in origin. Such considerations can also be applied to Grotius, who likewise developed an argument, if not against Christianity as such, then against interpretations of it in an abolitionist register:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat the Apostles and antient Canons enjoin Slaves, of not leaving their Masters, is a general Maxim, and only opposed to the Error of those who rejected every Subjection, both private and publick, as a State inconsistent with the Liberty of Christians.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Virginian property-owners who prevented the baptism of slaves in the late seventeenth century, so as not to spoil the spirit of submission and to avoid the emergence of a sense of pride in them because they belonged to the same religious community as the masters, provoked complaints from Church and Crown alike.[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, we see that it was the forces of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; which acted to check and contain the novelty represented by racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Recourse to vulgar historicism to ‘explain’ or repress the surprising tangle of freedom and oppression that characterizes the three liberal revolutions we have referred to is fruitless. The paradox persists and awaits a genuine, less comforting explanation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn1a|1]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R.M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 529.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., pp. 528–31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., pp. 30–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., pp. 30–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 582.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., pp. 529, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn8a|8]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, vol. 1, pp. 240, 250; vol. 3, p. 593.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn9a|9]] C. Gordon Post, Introduction to John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;A Disquisition on Government&#039;&#039;, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. vii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn10a|10]] Ross M. Lence, Foreword to Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. xxiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn11a|11]] Giovanni Sartori, &#039;&#039;Democrazia e definizioni&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976, p. 151; Sartori, &#039;&#039;The Theory of Democracy Revisited&#039;&#039;, Chatham (NJ): Chatham House Publishers, 1987, pp. 239, 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn12a|12]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 120–1, 160–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn13a|13]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 21, p. 157; vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn14a|14]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wooton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn15a|15]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 45.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn16a|16]] See John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, bk 1, ch. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn17a|17]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn18a|18]] Maurice Cranston, &#039;&#039;John Locke&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, 1959, pp. 114–15; Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, pp. 199, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn19a|19]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn20a|20]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 278, 235–58.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn21a|21]] Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox’, &#039;&#039;Journal of American History&#039;&#039;, vol. LIX, no. 1, 1972, p. 11; cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn22a|22]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 882 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn23a|23]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn24a|24]] Henry R. Fox Bourne, &#039;&#039;The Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Aalen: Scientia, 1969, vol. 1, p. 481; John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, ed. Esmond S. De Beer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–89, vols 5–7, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn25a|25]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1134 (letter to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn26a|26]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 382; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn27a|27]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, p. 45 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn28a|28]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, ed. Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 309 (letter to Archibald Davidson, 16 November 1787).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 374–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn30a|30]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 452–3, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn31a|31]] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ed., &#039;&#039;History of US Political Parties&#039;&#039;, New York and London: Chelsea House and Bawker, 1973, pp. 915–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_000.html#c01-ftn32a|32]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn33a|33]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn34a|34]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Roger Caillois, Paris: Gallimard, 1949–51, vol. 1, p. 884; Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 243, 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn36a|36]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 328–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn37a|37]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 122–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn38a|38]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn39a|39]] Janice Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1983, pp. 115–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn40a|40]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, pp. 123–4, 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn41a|41]] Boucher, quoted in Anne Y. Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn42a|42]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn43a|43]] Barry Alan Shain, &#039;&#039;The Myth of American Individualism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn44a|44]] Potter-Mackinnon, &#039;&#039;The Liberty We Seek&#039;&#039;, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 646–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn46a|46]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn47a|47]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn48a|48]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, p. 294.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn49a|49]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 272–3, 386–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn50a|50]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 648–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_001.html#c01-ftn51a|51]] Cf. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 273; Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn52a|52]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 5–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn53a|53]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn54a|54]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 67–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn55a|55]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn56a|56]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174 n. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 170 n. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn58a|58]] Gee, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn59a|59]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, p. 150; Eric R. Wolf, &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn60a|60]] Postlethwayt, quoted in Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn61a|61]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn62a|62]] Richard S. Dunn, ‘The Glorious Revolution and America’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn63a|63]] Marx’s characterization in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 926.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_002.html#c01-ftn64a|64]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn65a|65]] Bourne, &#039;&#039;Life of John Locke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 481.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn66a|66]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 203, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn67a|67]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 2, p. 52.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn68a|68]] Jennings, &#039;&#039;Creation of America&#039;&#039;, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn69a|69]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn70a|70]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn71a|71]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn72a|72]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, trans. and intro. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992, p. 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn73a|73]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Fromman-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn74a|74]] Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 297.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn75a|75]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 165, 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_003.html#c01-ftn76a|76]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 218, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn77a|77]] Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 35, 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn78a|78]] Henry S. Commager, ed., &#039;&#039;Documents of American History&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 208–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn79a|79]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joelle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, p. 39 (letter from Washington to his friend W. Crawford, 21 September 1767).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn80a|80]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 475–6 (presidential message, 25 October 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn81a|81]] Delanoë and Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2 (letter from Washington to J. Duane, 7 September 1783).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn82a|82]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1422.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn84a|84]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn85a|85]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn86a|86]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 278, 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn87a|87]] Egerton Ryerson, &#039;&#039;The Loyalists of America and Their Times&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York: Haskell House, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 297–8 and n.; vol. 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn88a|88]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1312–13 (letter to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn89a|89]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 16, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn90a|90]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 14–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn91a|91]] Hill, &#039;&#039;From Reformation to Industrial Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 164.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_004.html#c01-ftn92a|92]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 916; cf. Werner Sombart, &#039;&#039;Der moderne Kapitalismus&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Munich: DTV, 1987, vol. 1, pt II, p. 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn93a|93]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn94a|94]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. viii; François Guizot, ‘Discours sur l’histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre’, in &#039;&#039;Histoire d’Angleterre&#039;&#039;, Brussels: Société Typographique Belge, 1850, pp. 41–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn95a|95]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;On the Truth of Christianity&#039;&#039;, trans. Spencer Madan, London: J. Dodsby, 1782, pp. 195–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn96a|96]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 1027, 1024.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn97a|97]] Lewis Hanke, &#039;&#039;Aristotle and the American Indians&#039;&#039;, London: Hollis and Carter, 1959, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn98a|98]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 565.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn99a|99]] See ibid., vol. 1, ch. iii, §4; vol. 3, ch. iii, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., vol. 3, ch. vii, §§2, 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1496, 1372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn102a|102]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn103a|103]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xxii, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn104a|104]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. xvi, §16; vol. 1, ch. iv, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn105a|105]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn106a|106]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn107a|107]] Anthony Pagden, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to c. 1700’, in Canny, ed., &#039;&#039;The Origins of Empire&#039;&#039;, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn108a|108]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 129, 162, 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., pp. 136, 139, 152, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn110a|110]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 133, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., pp. 122, 125, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn113a|113]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 202.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn114a|114]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 1, pp. 296–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn115a|115]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_005.html#c01-ftn116a|116]] Cf. Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 3–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn117a|117]] Georg W.F. Hegel, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 20 vols, eds Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Franfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969–79, vol. 3, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn118a|118]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;On Revolution&#039;&#039;, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1963, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn119a|119]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 647–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn120a|120]] Millar, &#039;&#039;Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, pp. 258, 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn121a|121]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 648.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn122a|122]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn123a|123]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 48, 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn124a|124]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn125a|125]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 103–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn126a|126]] Boucher, quoted in Zimmer, &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher&#039;&#039;, p. 296.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn127a|127]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn128a|128]] Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_006.html#c01-ftn129a|129]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn130a|130]] Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books of the Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, abridg. and trans. M.J. Tooley, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, n.d., pp. 18, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn131a|131]] Ibid., pp. 16, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn133a|133]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 216; Jean Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri dello Stato&#039;&#039;, trans. Margherita Isnardi Parente, Turin: UTET, 1988, vol. 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn134a|134]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;Six Books&#039;&#039;, p. 18.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn135a|135]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 247–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn136a|136]] Ibid., pp. 253, 238, 260.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn137a|137]] Michel de Montaigne, &#039;&#039;The Complete Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 231.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn138a|138]] Bartolomé de las Casas, &#039;&#039;La leggenda nera&#039;&#039;, trans. Alberto Pincherle, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981, ch. xii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn139a|139]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 882–3 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn140a|140]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 262 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn141a|141]] R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, West&#039;&#039; Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 267. C.B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 227–8 and Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325 reach the same conclusion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn142a|142]] Bodin, &#039;&#039;I sei libri&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 260 (bk 1, ch. 5).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn143a|143]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn144a|144]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 561.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn145a|145]] Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 332.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#c02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg35&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;35&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER TWO =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;Liberalism and Racial Slavery: A Unique Twin Birth&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The limitation of power and the emergence of an unprecedented absolute power&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To render it explicable, the paradox must first be expounded in all its radicalism. Slavery is not something that persisted despite the success of the three liberal revolutions. On the contrary, it experienced its maximum development following that success: ‘The total slave population in the Americas reached around 330,000 in 1700, nearly three million by 1800, and finally peaked at over six million in the 1850s’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Contributing decisively to the rise of an institution synonymous with the absolute power of man over man was the liberal world. In the mid-eighteenth century, it was Great Britain that possessed the largest number of slaves (878,000). The fact is unexpected. Although its empire was far more extensive, Spain came well behind. Second position was held by Portugal, which possessed 700,000 slaves and was in fact a kind of semi-colony of Great Britain: much of the gold extracted by Brazilian slaves ended up in London.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence there is no doubt that absolutely pre-eminent in this field was the country at the head of the liberal movement, which had wrested primacy in the trading and ownership of black slaves precisely from the Glorious Revolution onwards. It was Pitt the Younger himself who, intervening in April 1792 in the House of Commons on the subject of slavery and the slave trade, acknowledged that ‘[n]o nation in Europe … has … plunged so deeply into this guilt as Great Britain.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg36&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;36&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;That is not all. To a greater or lesser extent, there survived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies ‘&#039;&#039;ancillary&#039;&#039; slavery’, which is to be distinguished from ‘&#039;&#039;systemic&#039;&#039; slavery, linked to plantations and commodity production’. And it was the latter type of slavery, established above all in the eighteenth century (starting from the liberal revolution of 1688–89) and clearly predominant in the British colonies, which most consummately expressed the de-humanization of those who were now mere instruments of labour and chattels, subject to regular sale on the market.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This did not even involve a return to the slavery peculiar to classical antiquity. Certainly, chattel slavery had been widespread in Rome. Yet the slave could reasonably hope that, if not he himself, then his children or grandchildren would be able to achieve freedom and even an eminent social position. Now, by contrast, his fate increasingly took the form of a cage from which it was impossible to escape. In the first half of the eighteenth century, numerous English colonies in America enacted laws that made the emancipation of slaves increasingly difficult.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Quakers lamented the advent of what seemed to them a new and repugnant system. Slavery for a determinate period of time, and the other forms of more or less servile labour hitherto in force, tended to give way to slavery in the strict sense, to a permanent, hereditary condemnation of a whole people, who were denied any prospect of change and improvement, any hope of freedom.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, in a statute of 1696, South Carolina declared that it could not prosper ‘without the labor and service of negroes and other slaves’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The barrier separating service and slavery was as yet not well defined, and the institution of slavery had not yet appeared in all its harshness. But the process that increasingly reduced slaves to chattels, and established the racial character of the condition they were subjected to, was already underway. An unbridgeable gulf separated blacks from the free population. Ever stricter laws prohibited interracial sexual and marital relations, making them a crime. We are now dealing with a hereditary caste of slaves, defined and recognizable by the colour of their skin. In this sense, in John Wesley’s view, ‘American slavery’ was ‘the vilest that ever saw the sun’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#page37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_000.html#pg37&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;37&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The verdict of American Quakers and British abolitionists has been fully confirmed by contemporary historians. At the end of a ‘cycle of degradation’ of blacks, with the ignition of the white ‘engine of oppression’ and the conclusive soldering of ‘slavery and racial discrimination’, we see at work in the ‘colonies of the British empire’ in the late seventeenth century a ‘chattel racial slavery’ unknown in Elizabethan England (and also classical antiquity), but ‘familiar to men living in the nineteenth century’ and aware of the reality of the southern United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence slavery in its most radical form triumphed in the golden age of liberalism and at the heart of the liberal world. This was acknowledged by James Madison, slave-owner and liberal (like numerous protagonists of the American Revolution), who observed that ‘the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man’—power based on ‘mere distinction of colour’—was imposed ‘in the most enlightened period of time’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Correctly stated, in all its radicalism, the paradox we face consists in this: the rise of liberalism and the spread of racial chattel slavery are the product of a twin birth which, as we shall see, has rather unique characteristics.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#calibre_pb_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The self-government of civil society and the triumph of large-scale property&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On its emergence, the paradox we are attempting to explain did not escape the most attentive observers. We have just seen Madison’s admission; and we are familiar with Samuel Johnson’s irony on the passionate love of liberty displayed by slave-owners; and Adam Smith’s observation on the nexus between the persistence and reinforcement of slavery, on the one hand, and the power of representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners, on the other. In this connection, however, we must also record other, no less significant interventions. In fighting for conciliation of the rebel colonies, Burke recognized the influence of slavery within them. But this did not impair the ‘spirit of freedom’. On the contrary, it was precisely here that freedom appeared ‘more noble and liberal’. Indeed, ‘these people of the southern colonies are more much more strongly … attached to liberty, than those to the northward’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is a consideration that we also encounter, some decades later, from a Barbadian planter: ‘you will … &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg38&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;38&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;find that no nations in the world have been more jealous of their liberties than those amongst whom the institution of slavery existed’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, in England, countering Burke and his policy of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Josiah Tucker pointed out how ‘the Champions for American Republicanism’ were simultaneously the promoters of the ‘absurd Tyranny’ they exercised over their slaves: this was ‘a &#039;&#039;republican Tyranny&#039;&#039;, the worst of all Tyrannies’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the authors cited here, there is a more or less clear awareness, accompanied by different value judgements, of the paradox we are examining. And perhaps precisely now it begins to lose its aura of impenetrability. Why should we be surprised that those demanding, or in the forefront of the demand for, self-government and ‘freedom’ from central political power were the major slave-owners? In 1839 an eminent representative of Virginia observed that the position of the slave-owner stimulated in him ‘a more liberal cast of character, more elevated principles, a wider expansion of thought, a deeper and more fervent love, and juster estimate of that liberty by which he is so highly distinguished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The wealth and leisure it enjoyed, and the culture it thus managed to acquire, reinforced the proud self-consciousness of a class that became ever more intolerant of the abuses of power, the intrusions, the interference and the constraints of political power or religious authority. Shaking off these constraints, the planter and slave-owner developed a liberal spirit and a liberal mentality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming this phenomenon are the changes that occurred from the Middle Ages. Between 1263 and 1265, by means of the &#039;&#039;Siete partidas&#039;&#039;, Alfonso X of Castile regulated the institution of slavery, which he seemed to recognize reluctantly because it was always ‘unnatural’. What limited the property right in the first instance was religion: an unbeliever was not permitted to own Christian slaves and, in any event, the slave had to be guaranteed the possibility of living in conformity with Christian principles—whence the recognition of his right to establish a family and have the chastity and honour of his wife and daughters respected. Later, there were even cases of masters denounced to the Inquisition for their failure to respect the rights of their slaves. Further limiting the power of the property-owner was the state, profoundly influenced by religion. It was committed to disciplining and limiting the punishment inflicted &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg39&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;39&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by masters on slaves and variously sought to promote their emancipation (we are dealing with Christian subjects). Emancipation occurred from above when the slave performed a meritorious deed for the country; in such cases, the master deprived of his property was compensated by the state.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of modern property entailed the master’s ability to dispose of it as he saw fit. In the Virginia of the second half of the seventeenth century, a law was in force that sanctioned the effective impunity of a master even when he killed his slave. Such behaviour could not be considered a ‘felony’, since ‘[i]t cannot be presumed that prepense malice (which alone makes murder felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] First with the Glorious Revolution and then later, more completely, with the American Revolution, the assertion of self-government by civil society hegemonized by slaveholders involved the definitive liquidation of traditional forms of ‘interference’ by political and religious authority. Christian baptism and profession of faith were henceforth irrelevant. In Virginia at the end of the seventeenth century, one could proceed ‘without the solemnities of jury’ to the execution of a slave guilty of a capital crime; marriage between slaves was no longer a sacrament, and even funerals lost their solemnity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Virginian jurist (George Tucker) could observe that the slave was positioned ‘below the rank of human beings, not only politically, but physically and morally’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The conquest of self-government by civil society hegemonized by large-scale property involved an even more drastic deterioration in the condition of the indigenous population. The end of the control exercised by the London government swept away the last obstacles to the expansionistic march of the white colonists. Already harboured by Jefferson, and then explicitly and brutally formulated by the Monroe administration (the natives of the East must clear off the land, ‘whether or not they agree, whether or not they become civilized’), the idea of deporting the Indians became a tragic reality with the Jackson Presidency:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#page40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_001.html#pg40&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;40&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;General Winfield Scott, with seven thousand troops and followed by ‘civilian volunteers,’ invaded the Cherokee domain, seized all the Indians they could find, and, in the middle of winter, sent them on the long trek to Arkansas and Oklahoma. The ‘civilian volunteers’ appropriated the Indians’ livestock, household goods, and farm implements and burned their homes. Some fourteen thousand Indians were forced to travel the ‘trail of tears,’ as it came to be called, and about four thousand of them died on the way. An eyewitness to the exodus reported: ‘Even aged females, apparently ready to drop into the grave, were travelling with heavy burdens attached to their backs, sometimes on frozen grounds and sometimes on muddy streets, with no covering for their feet.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#calibre_pb_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The black slave and the white servant: from Grotius to Locke&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it stimulated the development of racial chattel slavery and created an unprecedented, unbridgeable gulf between whites and peoples of colour, the self-government of civil society triumphed, waving the flag of liberty and the struggle against despotism. Between these two elements, which emerged together during a unique twin birth, a relationship full of tensions and contradictions was established. Such a celebration of liberty, which was bound up with the reality of an unprecedented absolute power, can clearly be interpreted as an ideology. But however mystificatory it might be, ideology is never null. In fact, its mystificatory function cannot even be conceived without some incidence in concrete social reality. And still less can ideology be regarded as synonymous with conscious falsehood. Were that to be the case, it would not succeed in inspiring people and generating real social activity, and would be condemned to impotence. The theorists and agents of the liberal revolutions and movements were moved by a powerful, convinced pathos of liberty; and precisely for that reason, they displayed embarrassment at the reality of slavery. Obviously, in a majority of cases, such embarrassment did not push them to the point of questioning the ‘property’ on which the wealth and social influence of the class protagonist in the struggle for the self-government of civil society were based. As regards England, the course was taken that removed slavery in the strict sense to a geographical area remote from the metropolis, situated at the edge of the civilized world, where, precisely on account of the proximity and pressure of barbarous circumstances, the spirit of liberty was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg41&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;41&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not manifested in all its purity, unlike in England proper—the true homeland, the promised land of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, this was a conclusion reached via a route marked by oscillations and contradictions of various kinds. In Grotius the colour barrier is not yet visible that separates the fate reserved for blacks from the condition to which the poorest layers of the white population can be subjected. We read: ‘perfect and utter Slavery, is that which obliges a Man to serve his Master all his Life long, for Diet and other common Necessaries; which indeed, if it be thus understood, and confined within the Bounds of Nature, has nothing too hard and severe in it. However, slavery was not the only form of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, but only the ‘most ignoble … Kind of Subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectionis species ignobilissima&#039;&#039;).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There was also &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039;, peculiar, among others, to serfs and &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, labour as such was subsumed under the category of ‘service’ (&#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;) or ‘subjection’ (&#039;&#039;subjectio&#039;&#039;). Obviously, there is a difference between the two forms of ‘service’ and ‘subjection’. While it violated ‘natural reason’ or ‘the Rules of full and compleat Justice’—i.e. the norms of morality—on the basis of the legislation in force in some countries the master could kill his slave with impunity and hence exercise a right of life and death over him.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was something not found in the sphere of &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; and the labour relationship that employed &#039;&#039;mercenarii&#039;&#039; or wage-labourers. Nevertheless, we are dealing with a particular &#039;&#039;species&#039;&#039; of the single &#039;&#039;genus&#039;&#039; that is service or subjection. The boundary between the various species is fluid. For example, of the ‘apprentices [&#039;&#039;apprenticii&#039;&#039;] in England’, it was to be noted that they ‘come nearest to the State of Slavery, during their Apprenticeship’—that is to say, to the condition of slaves proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, by way of atoning for a crime one could be condemned to labour and to render one’s services either as a slave or as an individual subjected to some form of ‘imperfect slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with Grotius, Locke was concerned to distinguish more rigorously between the various kinds of service. Elements of continuity are certainly not lacking. Speaking of wage-labour and the contract that establishes it, the English philosopher wrote: ‘a free man makes himself a servant to another’. As we can see, labour as such continues to be subsumed under the category of service. In fact, the contract introduces the wage-labourer ‘into the family &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg42&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;42&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof’. This discipline was in fact very different from the unlimited power that characterized the relationship of slavery and defined the ‘perfect condition of slavery’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Grotius’ distinction between &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;servitus imperfecta&#039;&#039; reappears in broad outline.&lt;br /&gt;
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But Locke urges us not to confuse servant and slave. Grotius compared the slave to a &#039;&#039;‘perpetual Hireling’&#039;&#039;, or a wage-labourer bound for the duration of his natural term to the same master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Locke stressed that we are dealing with two different statuses. In addition to being ‘temporary’, the power exercised by the master over a servant ‘is no greater than what is contained in the contract between them’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If, on the one hand, this made the condition of the servant better, on the other, it rendered that of the slave proper manifestly worse. Shaking off the moral inhibitions of Grotius, who called on the master to respect not only the life but also the specificity of his slave, Locke endlessly stressed that the master exercises over the slave an ‘absolute dominion’ and ‘absolute power’, a ‘legislative power of life and death’, an ‘arbitrary power’ encompassing ‘life’ itself.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the slave tends to lose his human characteristics and become reduced to a thing and a chattel, as emerges in particular from the reference to the planters of the East Indies who possess ‘slaves or horses’ on the basis of a regular ‘purchase’, and this ‘by bargain and money’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Without any hint of criticism, Locke engaged in a conjunction that signifies a firm, indignant denunciation in abolitionist literature. This applies to Mirabeau, who (as we shall see) compared the condition of American slaves with ‘our horses and our mules’; and to Marx, who observed in &#039;&#039;Capital:&#039;&#039; ‘The slave-owner buys his worker in the same way as he buys his horse.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Locke marks a turning point theoretically. Sometimes freed by their masters, blacks slaves were long subjected to a condition not markedly dissimilar from that of indentured servants—that is, temporary white semi-slaves on a contractual basis. And it is this ambiguity that finds expression in the text of Grotius, who can hence also apply the category of contract to &#039;&#039;servitus perfecta&#039;&#039;. In Locke, by contrast, we can read the development which chattel slavery and racial &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg43&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;43&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery began to undergo from the late seventeenth century. A whole series of English colonies in America enacted laws intended to make it clear that the slave’s conversion did not entail his emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Locke expressed himself thus in 1660 when, referring to Paul of Tarsus, he asserted that ‘conversion did not dissolve any of those obligations they were tied in before … the gospel continued them in the same condition and under the same civil obligations [under which] it found them. The married were not to leave their consorts, nor the servant freed from his master.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In complete conformity with this theoretical position, in the draft Carolina Constitution Locke reiterated the irrelevance of possible conversion to Christianity for the condition of the slave. And, once again, the element of novelty emerges. Although rejecting an abolitionist interpretation of Christianity, Grotius repeatedly appealed to Christian literature to underscore the common humanity of servant and master, both of them subject to the Father in Heaven, and hence in a relationship with each another that was in some sense one of fraternity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; is concerned, instead, to make it clear that the principle of equality applies exclusively to ‘creatures of the same species and rank’, only if ‘the lord and master of them all should [not], by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Blacks were burdened by the curse which, according to the Old Testament story, Noah had uttered against Ham and his descendants. This ideological motif, often invoked by defenders of the institution of slavery, seems also to find some echo in Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt: the English liberal philosopher legitimized the racial slavery that was being established in the politico-social reality of the time. Subject to ever more onerous conditions, the practice of emancipation tended to disappear; while, together with the neutralization of religion and baptism, laws prohibiting interracial sexual and marital relations sanctioned the insurmountable character of the boundary between whites and blacks. At this point the category of contract can serve to explain only the figure of the servant, while the slave is such as a result of right of war (more precisely, just war, of which Europeans engaged in colonial conquests are protagonists), or of a divine ‘manifest declaration’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#page44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_002.html#pg44&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;44&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In order to clarify the difference between ‘the perfect condition of slavery’ and that of the indentured servant, Locke referred to the Old Testament, which provides for permanent, hereditary slavery only for gentiles, excluding from it servants who are blood relations of the Hebrew master.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Old Testament line of demarcation between Hebrews and gentiles is configured in Locke as the line of demarcation between whites and blacks: servants of European origin are not subject to ‘perfect slavery’, which is intended for blacks and repressed to the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The pathos of liberty and unease about the institution of slavery: the case of Montesquieu&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Liberal unease over slavery found what is perhaps its most acute expression in Montesquieu, who devoted some memorable pages to a critique of the institution. The reasons traditionally adduced by ‘jurists’ in justification of slavery were ‘not sensible’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was pointless trying to find others: ‘If I had to defend the right we had of making Negroes slaves, here is what I would say: The peoples of Europe, having exterminated those of America, had to make slaves of those of Africa in order to use them to clear so much land.’ Yet this condemnation, so ringing and seemingly unequivocal, soon gave way to a much more ambiguous discourse: ‘There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement: slavery there runs less counter to reason’. In such cases, while not conforming to abstract reason, slavery was in accord with ‘natural reason’ (&#039;&#039;raison naturelle&#039;&#039;), which took account of climate and concrete circumstances.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] True, Montesquieu observed that ‘there is no climate on earth where one could not engage freemen to work’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the tone is uncertain here, much clearer is the assertion that a distinction must be made between those countries where the climate can in some way be an element justifying slavery and those where ‘even natural reasons reject it, as in the countries of Europe where it has so fortunately been abolished’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence it is necessary to take cognizance of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ and restrict &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg45&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;45&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘natural slavery [&#039;&#039;servitude naturelle&#039;&#039;] … to certain particular countries of the world’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the one hand, Montesquieu endlessly stressed that freedom is an attribute—in fact, a way of living and being—of Nordic peoples, while, on the other, slavery had been ‘naturalized … among the southern peoples’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A general law could be formulated: ‘one must not be surprised that the cowardice of the peoples of hot climates has almost always made them slaves and that the courage of the peoples of cold climates has kept them free. This is an effect that derives from its natural cause.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Prominent in Grotius and Locke, the contrast between metropolis and colonies also emerges in Montesquieu. It is not by chance that in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, rather than being introduced in the books devoted to analysing freedom, the considerations on slavery make their appearance in the context of the discourse on the relationship between climate and laws and customs. The transition from Books XI–XIII, whose subjects are the ‘Constitution’, ‘political freedom’ and ‘freedom’ as such, to Books XIV-XVI, which deal with ‘climate’, despotism and ‘domestic slavery’ (slavery proper), is, at the same time, the transition from Europe—in particular, England—to the non-European world and the colonies. For that very reason, in asserting a climatic justification of slavery, its supporters would have no difficulty in appealing to Montesquieu.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his argument the French philosopher targeted not the theorists of slavery as such, but those who held to the thesis that ‘it would be good if there were slaves among us’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards the colonies, it was a question of seeing ‘what the laws ought to do in relation to slavery’. Rather than abolition, Montesquieu’s discourse focused on amending the institution: ‘whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Are those ‘civil laws’ the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; issued some years earlier by Louis XIV, which consecrated black slavery and, at the same time, proposed to regulate it? The language of that document suggests as much. While he reiterated his ‘power’, in the preamble the sovereign asserted his concern for black slaves, who lived in ‘climates infinitely remote from our habitual sojourn’. They were to be guaranteed food and adequate clothing (Articles 22 and 25). And such guarantees, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg46&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;46&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;together with any treatment that was necessary, also applied to ‘slaves who are infirm on account of old age, illness or other circumstances, regardless of whether the illness is curable’ (Article 27).[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These are concerns that also find expression in &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws:&#039;&#039; ‘The magistrate should see to it that the slave is nourished and clothed; this should be regulated by law.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Montesquieu went on to assert that the slave must not be left completely at the mercy of the master’s arbitrary power. The latter might impose a death penalty in his capacity as a ‘judge’, respecting legal ‘formalities’, not as a private person. The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; argued in analogous fashion, providing for sanctions for the master guilty of the arbitrary mutilation or killing of his slave (Articles 42–43).&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039; counted the sexual exploitation of female slaves among the main ‘abuses of slavery’: ‘Reason wants the power of the master not to extend beyond things that are of service to him; slavery must be for utility and not for voluptuousness. The laws of modesty are a part of natural right and should be felt by all the nations in the world.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In homage to the precepts of the ‘Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion’, the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; regarded as ‘valid marriages’ those contracted between slaves who professed this religion (Article 8). It banned the separate sale of individual members of the family thus constituted (Article 47) and sought to repress the sexual exploitation of female slaves. A free, single man who had had children by a slave was obliged to marry her and recognize the offspring, who were to be freed together with the mother (Article 9).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further confirming that he intended to amend, rather than abolish, slavery is the fact that Montesquieu, as well as to its ‘abuses’, called attention to the ‘dangers’ it entailed and the ‘precautions’ required to confront them. Particular attention must be paid to the ‘danger of a large number of slaves’ and that represented by ‘armed slaves’. This warranted a recommendation of a general kind: ‘In the moderate state, the humanity one has for slaves will be able to prevent the dangers one could fear from there being too many of them. Men grow accustomed to anything, even to servitude, provided the master is not harsher than the servitude.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In his desire to temper colonial slavery, Montesquieu looked for inspiration to the norms promulgated by the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, which in fact had no influence in the English world admired by him. In any case, his condemnation of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#page47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_003.html#pg47&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;47&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slavery is sharp only when it also seeks to break in ‘among ourselves’, thereby throwing Europe’s proud self-consciousness about being the exclusive locus of liberty into crisis. Along with despotism, slavery was present in Turkey and the Islamic world, and in Russia (in the form of abject serfdom), and prevailed unchallenged in Africa. But there was no room for it in Europe, or, rather, on metropolitan territory. The discourse relating to the colonies was different and more complex.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The Somersett case and the delineation of liberal identity&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Blackstone’s position is close to Montesquieu’s. We are in the mid-eighteenth century: ‘the law of England abhors, and can not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation’; not even its humblest, most base members, not even ‘idle vagabonds’ could be subjected to slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘spirit of liberty’ (argued the great jurist) ‘is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil’ that it could not in any instance permit the presence or spectacle of a relationship that was the concentrated expression of absolute power.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[S]trict slavery’ existed in ‘old Rome’ and continued to flourish in ‘modern Barbary’, but was now incompatible with the ‘spirit’ of the English nation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, among the rights enjoyed by free men was free, undisturbed enjoyment of property, including property in slaves, on condition that the latter remained banished to the colonial world. The relationship between master and slave—and this applied to all ‘sorts of servants’, including slaves—was one of the ‘great relations in private life’;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] political authority had no right to intervene in it. And thus, celebration of England as the land of liberty was not perceived by Blackstone as being in contradiction with his reassertion of the black slave’s duty to serve his master. That was a duty which, on the basis of the ‘general principles’ of the ‘laws of England’, did not come to an end even were the ‘heathen negro’ to be converted to Christianity. Not even in that case could the slave stake a claim to ‘liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although recognized, the institution of slavery was, as it were, repressed from the ‘soil’ of England, confined to the border zone between the civilized &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg48&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;48&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;world and barbarism. But what happened when a white master brought one of his slaves with him from the colonies as movable property? This was the problem raised by an impassioned debate in England in 1772. Turning to the courts, a slave—James Somersett—succeeded in extricating himself from the master who attempted to take him with him, in his capacity as movable property, on his return journey to Virginia. The Chief Justice’s judgment did not challenge the institution of slavery; it limited itself to asserting that ‘colonial laws’ only applied ‘in the colonies’, and hence that slavery had no legal basis in England. Somersett’s counsel eloquently proclaimed: ‘The air of England is too pure for a slave to breathe.’ But from this principle he deduced the conclusion that it was necessary to avoid an influx of blacks from Africa or America into England. Somersett’s master was held responsible for an assault on the purity of the land of the free, who could not tolerate being confused and mixed up with slaves, rather than a violation of the liberty and dignity of a human being. Not by chance, the 1772 judgment provided the premises for the subsequent deportation to Sierra Leone of blacks who, as loyal subjects of the Crown, sought refuge in England after the victory of the rebel American colonists.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of liberal freedom are beginning to become clear. Authors like Burgh and Fletcher could still be regarded as champions of the cause of liberty by Jefferson, who lived in a situation where black slavery and widespread ownership of land (taken from the Indians) made the project of enslaving white vagrants purely academic. In Europe things were different, as emerges from the interventions of Montesquieu and Blackstone. Those who did not subscribe to the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ began to be regarded as foreign to the emerging liberal party. Starting with Montesquieu and then, more clearly, Blackstone and the judgment in the Somersett case, what characterized the emergent liberal party were two essential points: (1) condemnation of despotic political power and the demand for self-government by civil society in the name of liberty and the rule of law; (2) assertion of the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, or of the principle on whose basis England—and, prospectively, Europe—possessed ‘too pure’ an air to be able to tolerate the presence of slaves on its ‘soil’. The second point is no less essential than the first. The legitimation of ‘slavery among ourselves’ would involve the dispersion of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#page49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_004.html#pg49&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;49&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the pathos of liberty that played a key role in the liberal demand for self-government by civil society, or the self-government of the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. ‘We won’t be their Negroes’: the colonists’ rebellion&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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But the metropolis/colonies opposition, with its tendential exclusion of the latter from the sacred space of civilization and liberty, was bound to provoke a reaction from the colonists. Independently of particular concrete political and social demands, what was wounded was their self-consciousness. The metropolis seemed to be assimilating the American colonies to the ‘modern Barbary’ denounced by Blackstone; it seemed to be degrading them to a sort of dustbin, where the metropolitan rejects or prison population were dumped. The inmates of the mother country’s prisons were deported across the Atlantic to supply, along with blacks from Africa, the more or less forced labour required by it. According to the observation of the English abolitionist David Ramsay, slavery continued to survive in the region of the confines of the civilized world—namely, the West—‘where [its] proper religion and laws are not deemed to be in full force; and where individuals too often think themselves loosened from ties, which are binding in the mother country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If it saved the metropolis’s honour as the privileged site of liberty, despite the persistence of slavery on its extreme periphery, this view was wrong in the colonists’ view, because it confounded and assimilated free Englishmen, prison rabble and people of colour. In this way, lamented James Otis, a prominent supporter of the liberal revolution underway, one forgot that the colonies had been founded not ‘with a compound mixture of &#039;&#039;English, Indian and Negro&#039;&#039;, but with freeborn &#039;&#039;British white&#039;&#039; subjects’. Even more swingeing was Washington, who warned that the American colonists felt ‘as miserably oppressed as our own blacks’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having repeated that the American colonists could boast a lineage not less noble and deserving of liberty than the metropolitan English, John Adams exclaimed with reference to the rulers in London: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’![[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Quite apart even from the problem of representation, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free was perceived as an intolerable exclusion. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#page50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_005.html#pg50&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;50&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the other hand, the colonists, in demanding equality with the dominant British class, widened the gulf that separated them from blacks and Indians. While in London the zone of civilization was distinguished from the zone of barbarism, the sacred space from the profane, primarily by opposing the metropolis to the colonies, the American colonists were led to identify the boundary line principally in ethnic identity and skin colour. On the basis of the 1790 Naturalization Act, only whites could become citizens of the United States.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from a spatial delimitation of the community of the free to an ethnic and racial one brought with it combined, contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and dis-emancipation. Whites, even the poorest among them, also came within the sacred space; they found themselves forming part of the community or race of the free, albeit situated at inferior levels. White slavery disappeared, condemned by New York polite society as ‘contrary to … the idea of liberty this country has so happily established’. But the tendential emancipation of poor whites was only the other side of the coin of further dis-emancipation of blacks. The condition of the black slave deteriorated by virtue of no longer being, as in colonial America, one of several systems of unfree labour.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Virginia (and other states) land and black slaves were given to veterans of the War of Independence, in recognition of their contribution to the cause of the struggle against despotism;[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the tendential social rise of poor whites coincided with the consummate de-humanization of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Racial slavery and the further deterioration in the condition of the ‘free’ black&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only a question of slaves. The triumph of the ethnic delimitation of the community of the free was bound seriously to affect the condition of those blacks who were notionally free. They were now struck by a series of measures that tended to render the colour line, the demarcation between the race of the free and the race of slaves, inviolable. Blacks not subject to slavery began to be perceived as an anomaly that would sooner or later have to be rectified. Their condition at the end of the eighteenth century was summed up by one of them in Boston, referring both to strictly legal forms of oppression and to the insults &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg51&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;51&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and threats which, while not legal, were widely tolerated by authority: ‘we may truly be said to carry our lives in our hands, and the arrows of death are flying about our heads’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is a description that might seem unduly emotive. But we should attend to de Tocqueville:&lt;br /&gt;
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The electoral franchise has been conferred upon the Negroes in almost all the states in which slavery has been abolished, but if they come forward to vote, their lives are in danger. If oppressed, they may bring an action at law, but they will find none but whites among their judges.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On close inspection, it can be said of ‘emancipated Negroes’ that ‘their situation with regard to the Europeans is not unlike that of the Indians’. In fact, in some respects, they were ‘still more to be pitied’. In any event, they were ‘deprived of their rights’ and ‘exposed to the tyranny of the laws and the intolerance of the people’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condition of blacks not reduced to slavery was no different and no better as one moved from South to North. In fact (de Tocqueville pitilessly observed), ‘the prejudice of race appears to be stronger in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists; and nowhere is it so intolerant as in those states where servitude has never been known.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condition of the notionally free black was distinguished from that of the slave, but perhaps even more from that of the genuinely free white. Only thus can we explain the danger that constantly threatened him of being reduced to conditions of slavery, and the temptation that periodically emerged among whites—for example, in Virginia after the slave revolt or attempted revolt of 1831—to deport the entire population of free blacks to Africa or elsewhere. The latter were anyhow obliged to register, and could only change residence with the permission of the local authorities; they were presumed to be slaves and detained until they managed to prove otherwise. The despotism exercised over slaves was bound to affect, in one way or another, the population of colour as a whole. This was explained in 1801 by the postmaster general in the Jefferson administration, in a letter in which he recommended to a Georgian senator that blacks and men of colour be excluded from the postal service. ‘Everything which tends to increase their knowledge of natural rights, of men and things, or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#page52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_006.html#pg52&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;52&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain and line of intelligence’ was extremely dangerous. Even the communication of feelings and ideas must be blocked or impeded by all possible means. In fact, the situation in Virginia immediately after the 1831 revolt was described as follows by a traveller: ‘Military service [by white patrols] is performed night and day, Richmond resembles a town besieged … the negroes … will not venture to communicate with one another for fear of punishment.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Spatial and racial delimitation of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The American Revolution threw into crisis the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which seemed established within the liberal movement. Now, far from being confined to the colonies, slavery acquired a new visibility and centrality in a country with a culture, religion and language of European origin, which conversed with European countries as an equal and in fact claimed a kind of primacy in embodying the cause of liberty. Declared legally void in England in 1772, the institution of slavery received its juridical and even constitutional consecration, albeit with recourse to the euphemisms and circumlocutions we are familiar with, in the state born out of the revolt of colonists determined not to be treated like ‘niggers’. There thus emerged a country characterized by ‘a fixed and direct tie between slave ownership and political power’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as strikingly revealed both by the Constitution and the number of slave-owners who acceded to its highest institutional office.&lt;br /&gt;
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But how did the platform of the liberal party shape up in a country which, like late-eighteenth-century England, could also boast of having air ‘too pure’ for it to be breathed by slaves? In fact, in the United States as well the ambition to retrieve the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ continued to make itself heard. Albeit utterly fancifully, Jefferson harboured the idea of re-deporting the blacks to Africa. However, in the new situation that had been created, the project of transforming the North American republic into a land inhabited exclusively by freemen proved difficult to implement. It would be necessary seriously to infringe the right, possessed by genuinely free persons, to enjoy their property without external &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg53&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;53&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;interference! So, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a movement (the American Colonization Society) emerged that contrived a new way out: it was proposed to persuade the owners, by appealing to their religious feelings and also employing economic incentives, to free or sell their slaves, who, along with all the other blacks, would be sent to Africa to colonize it and convert it to Christianity.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, without infringing the property rights guaranteed by law and the Constitution, it would have been possible to transform the United States into a land inhabited exclusively by free (and white) men.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was a project doomed to fail from the outset. For a start, the acquisition of the slaves by the Union presupposed mobilizing enormous financial resources, and hence the imposition of high taxes. Expelled from the door in the shape of enforced expropriation, imposed from above, of the human cattle owned by the colonists, the spectre of despotic interference with private property by political power ended up arrogantly breaking in through the window as the taxation required to induce owners willingly to surrender their slaves, through a profitable sales contract. Moreover, taken as a whole, the class of planters had no intention of abandoning the source not only of its wealth, but also of its power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The situation in the North was different. Here slaves were small in number and performed no essential economic function. Abolishing slavery, but at the same time adhering to the federal order that legitimized and guaranteed it in the South, the northern states seemed to want to give a new lease of life in the new situation to the compromise we have already encountered. Without being abolished, the institution whose presence constituted a kind of ironic counterpoint to the claim to be champions of the cause of liberty was banished to the deep South. In fact, four states (Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Oregon) strictly prohibited access into their territories by blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They thus avoided being contaminated by the presence not only of slaves, but also of blacks as such. This ban was the equivalent of the measure whereby, in the aftermath of the Somersett case, England deported to Sierra Leone blacks who not only were free, but also had the merit of having fought against the rebel colonists on behalf of the Empire. Nevertheless, even in the North of the United States, although it had been abolished, slavery had achieved the recognition it lacked in England, as demonstrated in particular by the constitutional provision that required the return of escaped slaves to their legitimate owners, in an indirect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg54&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;54&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sanction of the institution of slavery in states which were formally free. This was a point to which a representative of the South smugly drew attention: ‘We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clearly, in the United States as a whole the principle of the inadmissibility and ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, which was more than ever reiterated across the Atlantic, had fallen into crisis. How had such a result been arrived at? Let us return to Burke. In asserting that the ‘spirit of freedom’ and the ‘liberal’ vision found their most consummate embodiment in the slave-owners of the southern colonies, he added that the colonists formed an integral part of the nation ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, of ‘the chosen race and sons of England’: it was a question of ‘pedigree’, in the face of which ‘human art’ was powerless.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here, as we can see, the spatial delimitation of the community of the free, which is the principle on which late-eighteenth-century liberal England was based, seems to be on the point of transmuting into a racial delimitation. And hence, in Calhoun and ideologists of the slaveholding South in general, a tendency already present in Burke comes to fruition. Having been spatial, the line of demarcation of the community of the free ends up becoming racial.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, there was no insurmountable barrier between the two types of delimitation. In 1845 John O’Sullivan, popular theorist of the providential ‘manifest destiny’ that put wind in the sails of US expansion, sought to assuage abolitionists’ concerns about the introduction of slavery into Texas (wrested from Mexico and on the point of being annexed to the Union) with a significant argument. It was precisely its temporary extension that created the conditions for abolition of the ‘the slavery of an inferior to a superior race’, and hence ‘furnished much probability of the ultimate disappearance of the negro race from our borders’. At the appropriate time, the ex-slaves would be driven further south, into the ‘only receptacle’ appropriate for them. In Latin America the population of mixed blood, which had formed following the fusion of the Spaniards with the natives, would easily be able to accommodate the blacks.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The racial delimitation of the community would then give way to a territorial delimitation. The end of slavery would, at the same time, entail the end of the presence of blacks in the land of liberty. Despite the abolitionists’ cry of alarm, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg55&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;55&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the concentration of slaves in a zone immediately proximate to territories that were fundamentally foreign to the zone of civilization and liberty pushed in this direction.&lt;br /&gt;
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For some time Lincoln harboured the idea of deporting the blacks, likewise regarded by him as ultimately alien to the community of the free, from the United States to Latin America after their emancipation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, having confronted one another for decades, what clashed during the Civil War were the causes not of liberty and slavery, but precisely two different delimitations of the community of the free: the opposed parties accused one another of not knowing how, or not wanting, to delimit the community of the free effectively. To those who brandished the spectre of racial contamination as an inevitable consequence of the abolition of slavery, Lincoln replied by emphasizing that in the United States the overwhelming majority of ‘mulattoes’ were the result of sexual relations between white masters and their black slaves: ‘slavery is the greatest source of amalgamation’. For the rest, he had ‘no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races’, or to recognize the right of blacks to participate in political life or hold public office or perform the role of jury member. Lincoln declared himself well aware, like any other white man, of the radical difference between the two races and the supremacy of the whites.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crisis took a decisive step towards breaking-point following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Dred Scott case in summer 1857: ‘like an ordinary article of merchandise and property’, a black slave’s legitimate owner had the right to take him with him in any part of the Union.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Lincoln’s reaction: the country could not remain permanently divided, ‘half &#039;&#039;slave&#039;&#039; and half &#039;&#039;free’&#039;&#039;.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In contrast to the England of the Somersett case, the North of the United States could not pose as a land of the free whose air was ‘too pure’ to be breathed by a slave.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from the spatial delimitation to the racial delimitation of the community of the free henceforth made it impossible to repress the reality of slavery. There was now no alternative to the condemnation of this institution except its explicit defence or celebration. As the conflict dividing the two sections of the Union emerged more clearly, the South’s ideologues all the more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#page56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_007.html#pg56&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;56&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;provocatively mocked the circumlocutions and linguistic interdictions that had facilitated the Philadelphia compromise of 1787. ‘Negro slavery’, declared John Randolph, was a reality that ‘the Constitution has vainly attempted to blink, by not using the term’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the lifting of this taboo, the legitimation of slavery lost the timidity that had previously characterized it, assuming a defiant tone. Having been a necessary evil, slavery became (in the words of Calhoun with which we are familiar) a ‘positive good’. It made no sense to try to repress it as something to be ashamed of; in reality, it was the very foundation of civilization. Throwing into crisis the pathos of liberty that had presided over the foundation of the United States, and in a way de-legitimizing the very War of Independence, this new attitude helped make the clash between North and South inevitable.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. The Civil War and the resumption of the controversy initiated with the American Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In these circumstances, while the abolitionists adopted the arguments used during the American War of Independence by the British and the loyalists in their polemic against the South, the theorists of the South used arguments deployed by the rebel colonists. We have seen O’Sullivan, a New York lawyer and journalist, regard the South, bordering as it was on Mexico and Latin America, as the best place to deposit the blacks temporarily, pending their emancipation and deportation from the United States. Hence the South was a territory by no means uncontaminated by the barbarism of the blacks who lived there as slaves. Cohabitation with blacks, and sexual contamination, attested by a high number of mulattos—the abolitionist Theodore Parker piled it on—had also left profound traces on southern whites; it was precisely the influence of the ‘African element’ that explained attachment to an institution contrary to the principles of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And just as pre-revolutionary and revolutionary America had done, so too the South protested against the tendential exclusion, of which it felt itself the victim, from the authentic community of the free. It was now no longer the American colonies in their entirety, but the southern states that considered themselves assimilated to the ‘modern Barbary’ mentioned by Blackstone.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg57&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;57&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Along with the one just noted, further aspects of the legal argument reappeared that had opposed the rebel colonists to England. In Calhoun’s view, the abolitionists of the North, who wanted to abolish slavery by a federal law, were riding roughshod over the right of each individual state to self-government, and seeking to found the Union on political slavery, on ‘the bond between master and slave’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Naturally, the North reacted by ironizing about this impassioned defence of liberty by the ‘democratic’, slaveholding South. To understand the latter’s subsequent response, we can return for a moment to Franklin. Replying to his English interlocutors, who scoffed at the flag of liberty waved by the rebel colonists and slave-owners, he did not limit himself to recalling the Crown’s interest and involvement in the slave trade. He also employed a second argument, drawing attention to the fact that slavery and servitude had not disappeared across the Atlantic. In particular, coalminers in Scotland were ‘absolute Slaves by your law’; they were ‘bought and sold with the Colliery, and have no more Liberty to leave it than our Negroes have to leave their Master’s Plantation’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The authors of the denunciation of black slavery were responsible for a white slavery that was certainly no better than the one they condemned so vehemently.&lt;br /&gt;
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Similarly, on the occasion of the conflict which had been brewing for decades and reached breaking-point with the Civil War, the South retorted in two ways to the accusations against it. It stressed that the North and abolitionist Britain were not in a position to give lectures even on the way blacks (and peoples of colour in general) were treated; and it pointed out how much slavery survived in an industrial society notionally based on ‘free’ labour.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us focus for now on the first point. Already during the Philadelphia Convention, the slave-owners rejected the lectures given them in the name of morality, pointing out that the North derived major benefits from the institution of slavery, since its merchant shipping transported the slaves and the commodities produced by them.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1808 the ban on the ‘immigration or introduction’ of black slaves provided for by the federal Constitution had come into effect. But it remained the case (observed the ideologues of the South) that blacks in the North, in addition to suffering the poverty and oppression that were the lot of the poor in general there, were exposed to maltreatment and violence of every kind, as demonstrated by the periodic outbreak of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#page58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_008.html#pg58&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;58&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;veritable pogroms. Even more repugnant (stressed Calhoun, in particular, in the years leading up to the Civil War) was the hypocrisy of Britain (the country which, having abolished slavery in its colonies, had become the model for the American abolitionists).’[T]he greatest slave dealer on earth’, the country ‘more responsible than any other … for the extent of that form of servitude’ in the American continent, then engaged in waving the banner of abolitionism, with a view to attracting the lucrative production of tobacco, cotton, sugar and coffee to its colonies and ruining potential competitors.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, what results had the putative emancipation of the slaves produced in the English colonies? The condition of the blacks was in no wise improved; in their case, freedom was more of a mirage than ever, while ‘the supremacy of the European race’ continued to be undisputed.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Inevitably, when ‘two races of men, of different color’, and markedly unequal in terms of culture and civilization, tried to live together, the inferior race was destined for subjection.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The very country that elevated itself into champion of the struggle against slavery distinguished itself in completely the opposite direction: not only did it use the labour of ‘slaves’ in India and other colonies, but it ‘[held] in unlimited subjection not less than one hundred and fifty million human beings, dispersed over every part of the globe’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We find an even more explicit reference to the lot of the coolies in another eminent representative of the South, George Fitzhugh. Arraigned once again was Britain, which lauded itself for having abolished slavery in its colonies. In reality, the ‘temporary slaves’ from Asia who had taken the place of the blacks, ‘if not worked to death before their terms of service expire’, subsequently died of starvation.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In its main lines, the controversy that developed on the eve and in the course of the Civil War reproduced and resumed the one that had occurred some decades earlier, during the clash between the two shores of the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Liberal system of policy’, ‘liberality of sentiment’ and the institution of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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To understand the spread of the political use of the term ‘liberal’ in its various senses, we must remember two reference points. The first is the proud self-consciousness &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg59&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;59&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;that matured in the wake of the victory achieved during the Seven Years’ War over the France of monarchical and religious absolutism, which was subsequently reinforced in England by the outcome of the Somersett case. The second is the struggles that developed within the community of the free. When the controversy provoked by the agitation of the rebel colonists erupted, the various positions confronting one another all tended to define themselves as in some sense ‘liberal’. Burke sought to promote conciliation, calling upon ‘the liberal government of this free nation’ to evince a spirit of compromise.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Across the Atlantic, at the moment when the United States was founded, Washington emphasized ‘the benefits of a wise and liberal Government’, or a ‘liberal system of policy’, which asserted itself ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, and which had as its basis ‘the free cultivation of Letters, the unbounded extension of Commerce’, or ‘liberal and free commerce’, ‘the progressive refinement of Manners, the growing liberality of sentiment’, with the prevalence of a ‘liberal sentiment’ of tolerance also regarding relations between ‘every political and religious denomination of men in this country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hitherto the term ‘liberal’ has occurred solely as an adjective. In other contexts, adjective and substantive are interchangeable: ‘every Liberal Briton’ (wrote the &#039;&#039;London Gazette&#039;&#039; in 1798) rejoiced at the problems facing revolutionary, tyrannical France, which had to confront the difficult situation created by the uprising of the black slaves in San Domingo.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, the term in question made its appearance as a noun: signing himself ‘A Liberal’ was the author (possibly Paine) of an article in the &#039;&#039;Pennsylvania Packet&#039;&#039; of 25 March 1780, which came out for the abolition of slavery.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Here we have four interventions, which share a liberal profession of faith, but with orientations that are fairly diverse as regards black slavery. In Europe, while stances in favour of it were not wanting, a critical orientation was prevalent: a more or less clear distance tended to be taken from the institution that had had to be repressed to the colonies, in order to confer credibility on the self-consciousness developed by the community of the free. &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;—Adam Smith’s masterpiece, which appeared the same year as the Declaration of Independence drafted by Jefferson, a pre-eminent representative &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg60&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;60&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of Virginia’s planters and slave-owners—observed that the ‘liberal reward of labour’, with the payment of a wage that the ‘free servant’ and ‘free man’ could freely dispose of, was the only thing likely to stimulate individual industry; while economic stagnation was the result of servile labour, whether serfdom or slavery proper.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Millar regarded the institution of slavery as in contradiction with ‘the liberal sentiments entertained in the latter part of the eighteenth century’, with the ‘more liberal views’ developed in the modern world.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going still further, the great economist’s disciple declared that credibility could be restored to the ‘liberal hypothesis’ only by avoiding its confusion with those who waved the flag of liberty while preserving and, in fact, developing the practice of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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Across the Atlantic, by contrast, defence of that institution was much fiercer. Yet it would be mistaken to construct a clear-cut opposition. It is sufficient to reflect on the fact that the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South was, in the first instance, Burke. In 1832 an influential Virginian ideologue, Thomas R. Dew, lauded the advantages of slavery: ‘the menial and low offices’ were reserved for blacks, so that love of liberty and the ‘republican spirit’, peculiar to free, white citizens, flourished with a purity and vigour unknown in the rest of the United States, and had a precedent only in classical antiquity. But in saying this, Dew appealed to Burke and his thesis that, where slavery flourished, the spirit of liberty developed more abundantly.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this way, the theorist of the slaveholding South indirectly adopted and subscribed to the British Whig’s ‘liberal’ profession of faith.&lt;br /&gt;
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In subsequent decades, during the struggle against the North, which was initially political and then military, the slaveholding South could count on many friends in liberal England. A few years before the Civil War, the arguments of the southern ideologues were explicitly echoed by Benjamin Disraeli. With the abolition of slavery in British and French colonies behind him, he characterized the abolition of slavery as ‘a narrative of ignorance, injustice, blundering, waste, and havoc, not easily paralleled in the history of mankind’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In America, if they mixed with the blacks, the whites ‘would become so deteriorated that their states would probably be reconquered and regained by the aborigines’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Would the abolition of slavery in the United States not encourage this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#page61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_009.html#pg61&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;61&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;admixture, imparting a novel dignity to it? Later, the secessionist Confederacy’s desperate struggle met with a profoundly sympathetic echo from prominent cultural and political representatives of liberal England, provoking the indignation of John Stuart Mill.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the occasion first of the Somersett case, then of the American Revolution and finally of the Civil War, the liberal world appeared profoundly divided over the problem of slavery. How are we to find our bearings in this seeming chaos?&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. From the assertion of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ to the condemnation of slavery as such&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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We are trying to answer the question we posed at the beginning: Can authors like Fletcher and Calhoun be considered liberals? In the liberal England derived from the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher could calmly demand the introduction of slavery for vagrants without being in any way isolated, just as Hutcheson and Burgh, who expressed more or less similar positions, were not isolated. While Hutcheson was the master of Smith, Fletcher was in correspondence with Locke and enjoyed, along with Burgh, the respect of Jefferson and the circles close to him. These were the years when, as Hume put it, ‘[s]ome passionate admirers of the ancients, and zealous partizans of civil liberty … cannot forbear regretting the loss of this institution [slavery]’, which accounted for the grandeur of Athens and Rome.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, with the establishment of the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, the positions expressed by Fletcher ceased to be, or ceased to be accepted as, liberal. It is true that they took a long time to die. As late as 1838, a German liberal reported the ‘advice, certainly more hinted at than clearly stated, which would wish to find a remedy for the serious danger [represented by an unprecedented and acute social question] in the introduction of veritable slavery for factory workers’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it was a suggestion rejected with disdain: the line of demarcation of the liberal ‘party’ had been drawn for a while.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar argument can be advanced in connection with Calhoun. In his view, it was the North that was guilty of betraying the liberal principles which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg62&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;62&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had inspired the American Revolution. In fact, ‘the defence of human liberty against the aggressions of despotic power had always been most efficient in States where domestic slavery was found to prevail’. Within the Union, it was the South that had ‘constantly inclined most strongly to the side of liberty, and been the first to see and first to resist the encroachments of power’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it was in the South that liberalism found its most authentic and mature expression. The term ‘liberal’ (warned John Randolph, sometimes defined as the ‘American Burke’), which originally meant ‘a man attached to enlarged and free principles—a votary of liberty’, would see its true meaning twisted if it had to be used to refer to those who flirted with abolitionism.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A contemporary liberal might be tempted to be shot of the unmanageable presence within the tradition of thought he refers to of an author like Burke, who celebrated the particular intensity of the liberal spirit and love of liberty among slave-owners; or of an author like Calhoun, who in the nineteenth century still hymned the ‘positive good’ that was slavery. And so both of them are officially included in the conservative party. However, such an operation immediately reveals its groundlessness. The category of conservatism is characterized by formalism, in the sense that it can subsume significantly different contents: it is a question of identifying what it is intended to conserve or guard. And there is no doubt that Burke and Calhoun aimed to be vigilant guardians of the social relations and political institutions which emerged, respectively, from the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution—two eminently liberal revolutions. It would make no sense to regard Jefferson and Washington as liberals, but this is not the case with Burke—who, unlike them, was not a slaveowner and who, when he celebrated the ‘liberal spirit’ and ‘liberal’ emphasis of the slaveholding South, had in mind precisely figures like these two Virginian statesmen. As late as 1862 Lord Acton cited at length, and implicitly subscribed to, the passage by the British Whig who, far from excluding slave-owners, conferred on them a privileged position in the party of liberty.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be just as illogical to exclude from that party Calhoun, who tirelessly reiterated his attachment to representative bodies and the principle of the limitation of power. If, then, going beyond the merely formal meaning of the term, conservatism is to be understood as an uncritical attachment to a pre-modern, pre-industrial society, characterized by the cult of clod of earth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg63&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;63&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and bell tower, such a category could hardly account for Calhoun’s positions. Once the rights of minorities had been guaranteed, he had no problem with extending the vote and even introducing male ‘universal suffrage’; and, along with representative bodies, he celebrated the development of ‘manufactures’, industry and free trade.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If to anyone, the category of conservatism might be applied to Jefferson. He identified cultivators of the land as ‘the chosen people of God’, assimilated ‘great cities’ to the ‘sores’ of a ‘human body’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1812, during the war with Britain, accused the latter of being an instrument of ‘Satan’ because it had compelled America to abandon the ‘paradise’ of agriculture and engage in ‘manufacturing’, in order to meet the test of arms (see [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). And the category of conservatism might also be applied to Washington. He too viewed with concern the prospect that the Americans might become ‘a manufacturing people’, rather than continuing to be ‘Cultivators’ of the land, thereby avoiding the scourge of the ‘tumultuous populace of large cities’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In particular, it is against Jefferson that Calhoun seems to be arguing when he rejects the thesis that manufacture ‘destroy[s] the moral and physical power of the people’. In reality, this was a concern rendered ever more obsolete by ‘the great perfection of machinery’ introduced into industry.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, if acceptance of free trade is an integral part of liberalism, it is clear that Calhoun can be included in such a tradition much more easily than his adversaries in the North, who were engaged in strict protectionist practices liable (according to the southern theorist’s denunciation) to ‘destroy the liberty of the country’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Construed in the broadest sense of the term, the liberal party encompassed both Whigs and Tories. The former did not even necessarily represent the more advanced wing. Josiah Tucker was a Tory, who reprehended Locke and Burke for being followers of a ‘republicanism’ based, precisely, upon slavery and serfdom. For the rest, arguing with ‘Republican Zealots’, he liked to position himself among the true interpreters of ‘English constitutional Liberty’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Disraeli was likewise a Tory, who, while on the one hand echoing the arguments of the slaveholding South, on the other significantly widened the social basis of British representative bodies, granting the vote to significant sections of the popular classes and anyway extending it much further than the Whigs had.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg64&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;64&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On the other hand, outside the liberal party even before the Civil War were those who, in their concern to save the institution of slavery and indignation at the weapons supplied by representative bodies to an increasingly threatening abolitionist agitation, spoke with Fitzhugh in the southern United States of the ‘collapse of liberal society’, or ironized with Carlyle in Europe itself over ruinous ‘anarchic–constitutional epochs’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although reiterating the absolute necessity of slavery as the foundation of civilization, both ended up challenging, at least on a theoretical level, the ethnic and spatial delimitations of the institution of slavery. For Fitzhugh, as was demonstrated by the examples of classical antiquity and confirmed by the reality of the modern world, work was inseparable from slavery, so that in one form or another ‘slavery, &#039;&#039;black or white&#039;&#039;, was right and necessary’.[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In justifying the slavery of the Afro-Americans across the Atlantic and branding the Irish ‘black’,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carlyle, admired by Fitzhugh and other southerners, and in correspondence with some of them,[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in his turn reached a general ‘conclusion’: ‘whether established by law, or by law abrogated, [slavery] exists very extensively in this world, in and out of the West Indies; and … you cannot abolish slavery by act of parliament, but can only abolish the &#039;&#039;name&#039;&#039; of it, which is very little!’[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Whether dealing with slaves, ‘servants hired for life’, or &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, it was still slavery. On the other hand, if the slave was a ‘servant hired for life’, why should one prefer the servant hired for a month or a day?[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Spurred by the bitterness of the struggle underway, Fitzhugh and Carlyle ultimately returned to the positions of Fletcher, first marginalized and then regarded as alien to the liberal party. The transition from the liberal party’s first turn to the second can be summarized thus: following the defeat of the South, the emancipation of black slaves and amendments to the US Constitution to that effect, a transition was made from asserting the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ in Europe and the ‘free states’ of the northern United States to general condemnation, on both sides of the Atlantic, of slavery as such. Starting from this second result, the positions expressed by Calhoun were also rejected by the liberal party. But that is not a reason to expel him &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#page65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0006_split_010.html#pg65&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;65&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;retrospectively from the liberal tradition. Otherwise, the same fate would have to be meted out to Locke and a fair number of the protagonists of the American Revolution and the early decades of US history.&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, with the end of the Civil War a historical cycle came to a close. Having emerged together from a unique twin birth, which saw them entwined in a relationship not without its tensions, liberalism as a whole now broke with slavery in the strict sense—with hereditary, racial slavery. But before examining these new courses, it is appropriate to extend our analysis of the society that was established on the two Atlantic shores up to the Civil War. We have hitherto focused attention on the problem of black slavery. But what relations were developing within the white community?&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn1a|1]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1997, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn2a|2]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn3a|3]] Quoted in Hugh Thomas, &#039;&#039;The Slave Trade&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1997, p. 235.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn4a|4]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn5a|5]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 123, 399.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn6a|6]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn7a|7]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn8a|8]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from John Wesley to William Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn9a|9]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_000.html#c02-ftn10a|10]] Max Farrand, ed., &#039;&#039;The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, vol. 1, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn11a|11]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn12a|12]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 199–200.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn13a|13]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, pp. 21, 72.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn14a|14]] Shearer Davis Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn15a|15]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 59–65; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 39 and &#039;&#039;The Making of New World Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn16a|16]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 38–9; Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 59.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn17a|17]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 49, 39.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_001.html#c02-ftn18a|18]] Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn19a|19]] Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, pp. 557, 556.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn20a|20]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §30.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn21a|21]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §28; vol. 3, ch. xiv, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 562–3 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn23a|23]] See ibid., vol. 2, ch. v, §32.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn24a|24]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 157–8, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn25a|25]] Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1483.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn26a|26]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn27a|27]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §6; Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p 90.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn29a|29]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 377.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn30a|30]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, pp. 84–93.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn31a|31]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Tracts on Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Philip Abrams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn32a|32]] See Grotius, &#039;&#039;Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, ch. xiv, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn33a|33]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_002.html#c02-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn35a|35]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., p. 355.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn42a|42]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 394–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn43a|43]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn45a|45]] The &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; is reproduced and commented on in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 89–203.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn46a|46]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_003.html#c02-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn49a|49]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 412.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 410–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_004.html#c02-ftn54a|54]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 37; David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 231, 472, 495–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn55a|55]] Ramsay, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 387.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn56a|56]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 92, 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn57a|57]] Adams, quoted in David B. Davis, ‘A Big Business’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 11 January 1998, p. 50 n. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn58a|58]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_005.html#c02-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., pp. 19, 32; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn61a|61]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 16–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 367–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_006.html#c02-ftn65a|65]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn66a|66]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn67a|67]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 6ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn68a|68]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn69a|69]] Quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;An Imperfect Union&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn70a|70]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 66, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn71a|71]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, pp. 7–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn72a|72]] Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, pp. 254–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn73a|73]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 401, 511–12, 636.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn74a|74]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn75a|75]] Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 426.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_007.html#c02-ftn76a|76]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn77a|77]] Parker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 231–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn78a|78]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 436.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn79a|79]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 651.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn80a|80]] Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn81a|81]] Calhoun, quoted in Massimo L. Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà nel mondo moderno&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, pp. 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn82a|82]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn84a|84]] Calhoun, quoted in Salvadori, &#039;&#039;Potere e libertà&#039;&#039;, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_008.html#c02-ftn85a|85]] George Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, Richmond: Morris, 1854, pp. 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn86a|86]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn87a|87]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 242, 247, 242 (‘Circular to the States’, 4 June 1783), 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786), 545 (letter to the Hebrew Congregation, January 1790).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn88a|88]] Cf. David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 130.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn89a|89]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 132; Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn90a|90]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 98–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn91a|91]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 296, 250.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn92a|92]] Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. II, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn93a|93]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_009.html#c02-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn95a|95]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn96a|96]] Robert von Mohl, ‘Gwerbe- und Fabrikwesen’, in Lothar Gall and Rainer Koch, eds, &#039;&#039;Der europäische Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn97a|97]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 468, 473.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn98a|98]] Randolph, quoted in Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, pp. 63, 43 (for the characterization as ‘the American Burke’).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn99a|99]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn100a|100]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 35–6, 315.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn101a|101]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 290–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn102a|102]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, pp. 455 (‘Fragments of the First Discarded Inaugural Address’, April 1789), 554 (letter to La Fayette, 28 July 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn103a|103]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 308.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn105a|105]] Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. ix, 12, 96.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn106a|106]] Thomas Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, ed. Michael K. Goldberg and Jules P. Seigel, Ottawa: Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 1983, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn107a|107]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, pp. 98, 225; cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12 &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039; and ch. 22, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn108a|108]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, pp. 463–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn109a|109]] Fitzhugh, &#039;&#039;Sociology for the South&#039;&#039;, p. 286; Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn110a|110]] Carlyle, &#039;&#039;Latter-Day Pamphlets&#039;&#039;, p. 439.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., pp. 464–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#c03&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page66&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg67&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;67&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER THREE =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;White Servants between Metropolis and Colonies: Proto-Liberal Society&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Franklin, Smith and ‘vestiges of slavery’ in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
First the rebel colonists during the American Revolution, and then the South of the United States during the conflict that pitted it against the North, accused their opponents of hypocrisy. The latter waxed indignant over black slavery, but shut its eyes to the fact that what were essentially slave relations persisted within the society it held up as a model. As we know, Franklin compared the miners of Scotland to the blacks of the American plantations, and thus challenged the London government’s pretension to elevate itself into a champion of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Obviously, this was a polemical intervention, but one whose validity was confirmed by a rather authoritative witness. Although sharing the proud self-consciousness of his compatriots or the ruling class of his country, Adam Smith acknowledged the persistence in Great Britain of ‘vestiges of slavery’: a labour relationship not dissimilar from serfdom was in force in salt works and coalmines. Just as the &#039;&#039;adscripti glebae&#039;&#039;, still very numerous in Eastern Europe, were forcibly bound to the land to be cultivated and sold at the same time as it, so in the country that had left behind the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; some decades earlier, the &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; were in a sense an integral part of the &#039;&#039;opus&#039;&#039; or works (the salt work or mine) and, when this was sold, passed together with their family into the service of the new master. Hence it was not a question of actual slavery, of chattel slavery, which allowed individual members of a family to be put on the market like any other commodity. The &#039;&#039;adscripti operi&#039;&#039; could marry and lead a genuine family life; they could own a minimum of property; and, naturally, they did not risk being killed with impunity: ‘their lives are under the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg68&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;68&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;protection of the laws of the land’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it remained the case that in Scotland workers in coalmines and salt works were obliged to wear a collar on which the name of their master was inscribed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the wake of the great economist, Millar too could not but ‘regret … that any species of slavery should still remain in Great Britain’; and it was to be hoped that parliament would intervene to remedy the situation, finally sanctioning ‘the freedom of the labouring people’ in Scottish mines and salt works.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Judging from Smith’s &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, these were ‘the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Does this mean that the other labour relations were based on freedom? Referring to England in the second half of the eighteenth century, Blackstone distinguished between three types of ‘servant’ in the strict sense (we ignore here personnel charged with overseeing and guarding the master’s property): ‘menial servants’ or ‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’, and finally ‘labourers’, who worked outside the master’s house. The most modern labour relation, least informed by feudal and servile echoes, would seem to be the last. In this connection, however, the great jurist indulged in celebrating ‘very good regulations’ on the basis of which, for example, ‘all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work’, while those who ‘leave or desert their work’ were punished. Over the domestic or apprentice, the master exercised a right of ‘corporal punishment’ that must not result in death or mutilation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what happened if this limit was exceeded? We can infer Smith’s answer: ‘The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon or with forethought and without provocation.’ It is difficult to regard such servants as free men even if, according to the great economist, they enjoyed ‘almost the same privileges with their master, liberty, wages, etca’. In fact, what creates a radical difference is the power of correction exercised by the one over the other. The same Smith included menial servants, together with slaves proper, in the master’s extended family.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Masters did not confine themselves to monitoring their servant’s industriousness. Let us attend to Hume’s evidence: ‘At present, all masters discourage &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#page69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_000.html#pg69&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;69&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the marrying of their male servants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the females, who are then supposed altogether incapacitated for their service.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The opportunity to have a family seems largely denied not only to the black slave, but also to the white domestic servant: the private lives of both were subject to the master’s power or will.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, it is to be noted that comparable to menial servants were ‘apprentices’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] whose condition, in England at any rate, had been regarded by Grotius as approximating closely enough to the slave’s. And such, basically, was also Blackstone’s opinion. He reiterated the slave’s obligation to provide service ‘for life’ with a rather eloquent argument: fundamentally, it was the same relationship that the apprentice had with his master, except that in the latter case there was a time limit (seven years and sometimes more).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As has justly been observed, ‘[f]or most of human history the expression “free labor” was an oxymoron.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#calibre_pb_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The unemployed, beggars and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As the controversy between the two sides of the Union became increasingly bitter, Calhoun positively contrasted the condition of American slaves with that of inmates of workhouses or poorhouses in England. The former were lovingly treated and cared for by the master or mistress during illness or old age, while the latter were reduced to a ‘forlorn and wretched condition’; the former continued to live among their family and friends, while the latter were uprooted from their environment and also separated from their loved ones.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The apologetic intention that governs the description or transfiguration of the institution of slavery is clear. Yet when it came to workhouses in England, Calhoun was not the only one to underscore the horror. In de Tocqueville’s view, they afforded ‘the most horrendous and repugnant [spectacle] of misery’: on the one hand, the infirm incapable of work and waiting to die; on the other, women and children massed pell-mell ‘like pigs in the mud of their sty; it is difficult not to trample over a semi-naked body’. Finally, there were the comparatively more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg70&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;70&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘fortunate’—those in a position to work: they earned little or nothing and fed off the leftovers of stately homes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But however horrible, poverty and degradation were not the most significant aspect of workhouses. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe favourably mentioned the example of the workhouse in Bristol, which ‘has been such a Terror to the Beggars that none of [them] will come near the City’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the workhouse was subsequently described by Engels as a total institution: ‘Paupers wear the uniform of the house and are subject to the will of the director without any protection whatsoever’; so that ‘the “morally degenerate” parents cannot influence their children, families are separated; the man is sent to one wing, the woman to another, the children to a third’. Families were broken up, but for the rest all were amassed sometimes to the tune of twelve or sixteen in a single room. Any kind of violence was inflicted on them, not even sparing the elderly and children, and involving particular attention to women. In practice, the inmates of workhouses were treated as ‘objects of disgust and horror placed outside the law and the human community’. Thus was explained the fact, underscored by Engels, that in order to escape the ‘Poor Law Bastilles’ (as they were popularly renamed), ‘inmates of work houses often deliberately make themselves guilty of any crime whatsoever in order to go to prison’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact (add contemporary historians), ‘many indigents preferred to die of hunger and illness’ rather than subject themselves to a workhouse.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We are put in mind of the suicide that slaves often resorted to in order to escape their condition. Examined carefully, the 1834 law that shut up anyone requiring assistance in a workhouse in a sense vindicates Calhoun and those who pointed to slavery as the only possible solution to the problem of poverty. Fighting for the new legislation, its inspirer, Nassau William Senior, denounced the fatal contradiction in the rules hitherto in force, which allowed the poor person to enjoy a minimum of assistance for continuing a normal life: ‘The labourer is to be a free agent, but without the hazards of free agency; to be free from the coercion, but to enjoy the assured existence of the slave.’ But ‘unit[ing] the irreconcilable advantages of freedom and servitude’ was utterly absurd: a choice was required.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing thus, the influential economist and liberal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#page71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_001.html#pg71&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;71&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;theorist, interlocutor and correspondent of Tocqueville, ended up recognizing the substantially slave-like character of the relations obtaining in workhouses.&lt;br /&gt;
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Coming as it did in 1834, the new legislation coincided with the emancipation of blacks in the colonies. We can thus understand the irony, on the one hand, of the theorists of the slaveholding South in the United States and, on the other, of the English popular masses faced with a dominant class which, while it lauded itself for having abolished slavery in the colonies, reintroduced it in a different form in the metropolis itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Liberals, vagrants and workhouses&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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We have mentioned the role played by Senior in the passing of the 1834 law. But what position did the liberal tradition as a whole adopt towards workhouses and, more generally, the policy of disciplining poverty? According to Locke, it was necessary to intervene thoroughly and drastically in an infected area of society that was constantly expanding. From the age of three, the children of families not in a position to feed them should be sent out to work.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Moreover, it was necessary to intervene with their parents. To discourage the idleness and dissoluteness of vagrants, it was appropriate to proceed in areas frequented by them to ‘the suppressing of superfluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Secondly, begging should be discouraged and restricted. Beggars were obliged to wear a ‘badge’; to oversee them, and prevent them practising their activity outside the permitted area and hours, a special body was provided, the ‘beadles of beggars’, who in their turn were to be controlled by ‘guardians’ so that they performed their task with the requisite diligence and severity. But the whole community was called upon to participate in the beggar hunt, starting with the inhabitants of the house where the wretches had requested charity.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Draconian penalties awaited vagrants who managed to escape this comprehensive control. It was right that those caught asking for alms outside their parish and near a sea port should be pressed into the navy: they were to be ‘punished as deserters’—i.e. with the death penalty—‘if they go on shore without leave; or, when sent on shore, if they either go further, or stay longer, than they have leave’. The other illegal beggars were to be interned in a normal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg72&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;72&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse or house of correction. The master ‘shall have no other consideration nor allowance but what their labour shall produce; whom therefore he shall have power to employ according to his discretion’. Once again, this arbitrary power summons up the spectre of slavery. As is confirmed by a further detail: that ‘whoever shall counterfeit a pass shall lose his ears for the forgery for the first time that he is found guilty thereof; and the second time, that he shall be transported to the plantations, as in case of felony’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, in the nineteenth century the situation was different. With the 1834 reform, arriving in the workhouses were those who sought to escape death from starvation in some way: the workhouses must be made as odious as possible in order to reduce the number of those who sought refuge in them to a minimum. In this philosophy, which began to take shape with Malthus,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville likewise joined: ‘It is obvious that we must make assistance unpleasant, we must separate families, make the workhouse a prison and render our charity repugnant.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In denouncing this institution, Calhoun referred exclusively to Europe. Yet it was present, in one form or another, in the United States. De Tocqueville referred to it, significantly, in the context of his analysis of the ‘prison system’. Who were the inmates? The answer was clear: ‘The indigent who cannot earn their living by honest work, and those who do not want to.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was therefore understandable that workhouses became particularly crowded at times of crisis:&lt;br /&gt;
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The fluctuations in industry attract, when favourable, a large number of workers who find themselves without work in times of crisis. Thus we see that vagrancy, which is born of idleness, and stealing, which is invariably the result of vagrancy, are the two crimes that are experiencing the most rapid increase in the current state of society.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The crime that led to internment was already identified with unemployment and poverty. Making the judicial decisions, for example in New York, was a functionary who could readily deprive of their liberty those who in his &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg73&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;73&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;judgment ‘have no means of subsistence’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Protests were understandable: the poor person thus confined ‘regards himself as unfortunate, not culpable; he challenges society’s right violently to force him to do fruitless work and to deal with him against his will’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us return to England. John Stuart Mill was inclined to trivialize the horror of workhouses when he observed: ‘Even the labourer who loses his employment by idleness or negligence, has nothing worse to suffer, in the most unfavourable case, than the discipline of a workhouse’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the liberal philosopher’s opinion can be contrasted with that of modern scholars: once they had entered workhouses, the poor ‘ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’, because they lost ‘the civil right of personal liberty’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was a radical loss: the ‘guardians’ of the workhouses had the discretional power of inflicting the corporal punishment deemed most fitting on inmates.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Bentham was decidedly enthusiastic. He tirelessly lauded the benefits of this institution, which he aimed further to perfect, locating the workhouse in a ‘panoptical’ building which allowed the director to exercise secret, total control—that is, to observe every single aspect of the behaviour of the unwitting inmates at any point in time:&lt;br /&gt;
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What hold can any other manufacturer have upon his workmen, equal to what my manufacturer would have upon his? What other master is there that can reduce his workmen, if idle, to a situation next to starving, without suffering them to go elsewhere? What other master is there, whose men can never get drunk unless he chooses that they should do so? and who, so far from being able to raise their wages by combination, are obliged to take whatever pittance he thinks it most for his interest to allow? … and what other master or manufacturer is there, who to appearance constantly, and in reality as much as he thinks proper, has every look and motion of each workman under his eye?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#page74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_002.html#pg74&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;74&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence the contribution to the development of national wealth by workhouses, intended to operate as ‘industry-houses’, would be enormous. They were to be spread over the whole national territory, confining up to 500,000 detainees, and in any event ‘all persons, able-bodied or otherwise, having neither visible or assignable property, nor honest and sufficient means of livelihood’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to this gigantic concentration-camp universe, where people would be interned without having committed any crime and without any control by the judiciary, it would be possible to perform the miracle of transforming the ‘dross’ that was the ‘refuse of the population’ into money.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was not all. Given the isolation it entailed, the workhouse made it possible to experiment, as we shall see, with producing a stock of especially industrious and conscientious labourers. Certainly, for such objectives to be achieved, rigorous discipline was required, which must be thoroughly internalized by the detainees in the workhouse:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;Soldiers&#039;&#039; wear &#039;&#039;uniforms&#039;&#039;, why not paupers?—those who save the country, why not those who are saved by it? Not the &#039;&#039;permanent&#039;&#039; hands only, but likewise the &#039;&#039;coming-and-going&#039;&#039; hands should wear the uniform while in the house, for order, distinction, and recognition, as well as for tidiness …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The servant as soldier&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As we can see, it was Bentham who compared the condition of a workhouse inmate with that of the soldier. But it is appropriate to take a step back. During his residence in London, Franklin, discomfited by his English interlocutors mocking the flag of liberty waved by colonists who were often slave-owners, replied by highlighting, among other things, the persistence in England of slave-like relations even within the armed forces.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The reference was above all to the navy. Let us attend to historians of our day: ‘the men of the fleet were so ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-handled that it was impossible to obtain crews by free enlistment’. Many sought to escape this kind of sequestration, but Great Britain gave chase to them, without hesitating to search American ships and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg75&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;75&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;take by force deserters, including those who had become US citizens in the meantime. It was necessary to resort to drastic measures to ensure the functioning of ‘more than 700 warships in commission, with nearly 150,000 sailors and marines’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so, like Franklin before him, we have Calhoun denouncing ‘the slavery of impressed seamen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This was a common theme in the journalism of the time. In Britain itself, defenders of slavery stressed the analogy between this institution and being pressed into the navy. Both practices were justified by exceptional circumstances—namely, the need to maintain the colonies and the navy, respectively. On the other side, the abolitionist Sharp condemned both practices.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, William Wilberforce sought to make distinctions, and was accused of hypocrisy by his opponents:[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the pious pastor was moved by the condition of black slaves, but was indifferent to the no less grievous suffering of the kind of white slaves on whom the British Empire’s military power and glory were based. The argument was far from trivial. Sailors were ‘seized by press gangs from the streets of London and Liverpool’; and at a popular level no institution was more hated than the press gang.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conditions to which men were then subjected can be readily be inferred from Locke’s indirect comparison between the power of ‘the captain of a galley’ and that exercised by ‘a lord over his slave’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The capture of sailors in popular districts had something in common with the capture of blacks in Africa.&lt;br /&gt;
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And it was not only the navy. A contemporary scholar summarizes the condition of those military ‘captives in uniform’ who were soldiers, called upon to defend a rapidly expanding empire in every corner of the world:&lt;br /&gt;
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They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk and culture of origin for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they might &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg76&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;76&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were apt to die prematurely anyway.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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For the rest, the way Locke described ‘the common practice of martial discipline’ is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This above all calls to mind the ‘absolute power of life and death’ wielded by officers over their subordinates. It is the phrase Locke habitually used to define the essence of slavery. Is it a rhetorical exaggeration? Already in Grotius we find the observation that the condition of the slave is not very different from that of the soldier.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us concentrate on liberal England. The mortality rate of soldiers en route to India was comparable to that affecting black slaves during their deportation from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Moreover, British soldiers were subject to the punishment traditionally reserved for slaves—flogging—and, paradoxically, continued to be even when this form of discipline had been abolished for Indian troops.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Power relations in the army reproduced those existing in society. The figure of the soldier tended to coincide with that of the servant. At the start of the eighteenth century, Defoe observed: ‘any Man would carry a Musket rather than starve … ’tis Poverty makes Men Soldiers, and drives Crowds into the Armies’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At the end of the century, Townsend reiterated that ‘distress and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#page77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_003.html#pg77&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;77&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;poverty’ alone could impel ‘the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean, or in the field of battle’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, to put the point this time with Mandeville, ‘[t]he Hardships and Fatigues of War that are personally suffer’d, fall upon them that bear the Brunt of every Thing’—namely, ‘the working slaving People’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the figure of the officer tended to coincide with that of the master, and the contempt officers/masters had for troops was professed and even ostentatious. Troops of the line (lamented an ordinary soldier) were ‘the lowest class of animals, and only fit to be ruled with the cat o’ nine tails’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—that is, with the whip capable of inflicting the most sadistic punishments, those usually reserved for disobedient slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The penal code, formation of a compulsory workforce, and the process of colonization&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The problem of military recruitment is thus understandable: prisons were ‘rumag’d for Malefactors’; the profession of soldier (observed Defoe) above all devolved on ‘Men taken from the Gallows’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, there were plenty of them. From 1688 to 1820, the number of crimes carrying the death penalty increased from 50 to between 200 and 250, and they were almost always crimes against property. While attempted homicide was regarded as a petty crime until 1803, the theft of a shilling or handkerchief, or the illegal clipping of an ornamental bush, could entail hanging; and one could be consigned to the hangman even at the age of eleven.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, in some cases, even young children ran this risk: in 1833 the death penalty was pronounced on a pickpocket of nine, although the sentence was subsequently commuted.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even more significant than the increase in penalties was the criminalization of behaviour that had hitherto been licit. The enclosure and private appropriation of common land underwent significant development; and the peasant or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg78&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;78&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;commoner who was late in appreciating the new situation became a thief, a criminal to be visited with all the force of the law. This might seem an arbitrary and brutal way to behave; but that is not what Locke thought. In legitimizing the colonists’ appropriation of land left uncultivated by the Indians, the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; simultaneously adopted a clear position in favour of enclosure in England. ‘[I]n the beginning, all the world was America’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and common land was a kind of vestige of this original, wild state, which work, private appropriation and money had subsequently overcome. It was a process that manifested itself on a large scale across the Atlantic, but which was not unknown in England: ‘even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste’, until enclosure and private appropriation intervened positively.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with the despoliation of the Indians and English peasants, Locke also justified terroristic legislation in defence of property: it was ‘lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he pleases, from him’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was only a petty crime in appearance. In reality, the guilty party, if only momentarily, had deprived his victim of his ‘right to liberty’ and had made him a ‘slave’. At this point, no one could exclude the possibility that theft would not be followed by homicide, since it was precisely the power of life and death that defined the relationship of slavery. This was synonymous with a state of war, and hence there was no reason why the thief should not be done to death, whatever the extent of the theft.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What Locke seems to be saying is that at stake is not only the shilling or handkerchief or whatever other rather minor stolen good: private property as such and, over and above it, liberty were in danger. Thus, what legitimized the pickpocket’s killing or execution is the same liberal pathos that had presided over the condemnation of monarchical despotism as the source of political slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to common land, even birds and wild animals became objects of private appropriation by the landed aristocracy. In this instance, it was not possible to appeal to Locke. In fact, on the basis of his theory, not having been transformed by labour, birds and wild animals should have been regarded as common property. And yet, in accordance with legislation enacted after the Glorious Revolution, while the peasant slid into the condition of thief, the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg79&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;79&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hunter was transformed into poacher; and here too the terrorism of the penal code was called on to compel respect for the incursion.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As with the slavery and trading of blacks, the vulgar historicist explanation does not stand up when it comes to the expansion in crimes against property and the increased severity of the penalties provided for them. It is misleading to refer to the spirit of the times. ‘It is very doubtful whether any other country possessed a criminal code with anything like so many capital provisions as there were in this single statute.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruthless character of English legislation was already proverbial on its enactment. While Napoleon exercised his iron rule over France, a reformer like Sir Samuel Romilly felt compelled to offer a bitter observation: ‘there is probably no other country in the world in which so many and so great a variety of human actions are punishable with loss of life as in England’. [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel denounced the ‘draconian’ severity whereby ‘every thief in England [is] hanged’, in an absurd equation of life and property, of the two ‘qualitatively different’ crimes that were homicide and theft. The class origins of such ‘draconian’ severity were even identified: for peasants guilty of illegal hunting ‘the harshest and most disproportionate punishments’ were provided, because ‘those who made those laws and who are now sitting in the courts as magistrates and jurors’ were the aristocracy, the very class that held a monopoly on hunting.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The need to maintain law and order was only one aspect of the problem. Not infrequently, those sentenced to death (or even a long prison term) saw their sentence commuted to deportation to the colonies. Already in force for some time, from 1717 the practice of deportation assumed an official character and significant proportions.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So following the Glorious Revolution, we witness, on the one hand, the enactment of terroristic legislation and, on the other, the burgeoning phenomenon of deportation to remote colonies. Is there a link between the two events? It is difficult to deny that the formation of a large compulsory workforce through drastic harshening of the legal code ultimately made it possible to satisfy ‘the labor needs of the plantations’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, underlying this practice was a specific theory. Locke repeatedly demanded penal slavery for those who made an attempt on another person’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#page80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_004.html#pg80&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;80&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life or property. Already in the state of nature, ‘[t]he damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things were even clearer in the social state:&lt;br /&gt;
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Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death, he to whom he has forfeited it may, when he has him in his power, delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The theory of the colonial war as just war (on the part of Europeans) and the theory of penal slavery legitimized and galvanized the deportation, respectively, of the black slaves and white semi-slaves required by colonial development. On the eve of the American Revolution, in Maryland alone there were 20,000 servants of criminal origin. To put the point with Samuel Johnson, they were ‘a race of convicts, and ought to be content with anything we may allow them short of hanging’. And that is how an inexhaustible source of forced labour was fed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Indentured servants&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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This labour force proved precious for the purposes of populating and exploiting colonies as they were conquered. Initially, the flow of indentured servants went in the direction of America. Subsequently, supplanted and rendered superfluous by the massive introduction of black slaves, and in any event after the achievement of independence by the United States, white semi-slaves were diverted towards Australia, where they made an even more significant contribution to the process of exploiting the new colony. What were the characteristics of this labour relationship? Let us start with the journey of relocation or deportation from Britain. The horrors and mortality rate call to mind the famous ‘middle passage’ to which black slaves were subjected. Sometimes not even half the ‘passengers’ survived the voyage. Among them were to be found children between the ages of one and seven; they rarely escaped death. A witness related &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg81&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;81&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;having seen thirty-two children of tender years cast into the ocean in the course of a single voyage. Diseases continued to rage even after the crossing of the Atlantic; as a result, the new arrivals were often subjected to quarantine. There then intervened the moment of the market. In the papers commercial adverts of the following kind could be read: ‘Just arrived at Leedstown, the Ship &#039;&#039;Justitia&#039;&#039; with about one Hundred Healthy Servants. Men, Women and Boys, among which are many Tradesmen … The Sale will Commence on Tuesday, the 2nd of April’ (&#039;&#039;The Virginia Gazette&#039;&#039;, 28 March 1771). Husband and wife were often separated, and might be separated from their children, permanently or for a long period; children under the age of five were obliged to render service until they were twenty-one. Flogged by their masters in the event of indiscipline or disobedience, servants sometimes fled, and then a manhunt was unleashed. The local press provided an accurate physical description of the fugitives who, once taken, were punished and branded with the letter R (standing for ‘rogue’) or subjected to the excision of ears. Thus rendered immediately recognizable, they no longer had any escape.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What, then, was the difference compared with slaves proper? Sometimes white semi-slaves bemoaned their lot: ‘Many blacks are treated better.’ In fact, unlike real slaves, servants could turn to the judiciary and hope to be accepted into the community of the free, and were indeed admitted ‘assuming they survived their period of labor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that death often intervened first. But we are dealing with a social relation that is different from hereditary racial slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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Was it a social relation marked by freedom? We have seen Locke on the one hand stress the contractual, and hence free, genesis of the figure of servant, and on the other let slip the admission that he was not really free. But on this point we should also attend to Sieyès’ opinion. Looking across the Atlantic, he argued thus:&lt;br /&gt;
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The final class, composed of men who have only their hands, can have need of regulated &#039;&#039;slavery&#039;&#039; in order to escape the &#039;&#039;slavery of need&#039;&#039;. Why restrict natural liberty? I want to sell my time and my services of whatever kind (I do not say my life) for a &#039;&#039;year&#039;&#039;, two &#039;&#039;years&#039;&#039;, etc., as occurs in English America. The law is silent in this connection, and it should only speak to prevent abuses of the institution that endanger liberty. Thus it will be possible to hire oneself or serve [&#039;&#039;s’engager/s’asservir&#039;&#039;] for a maximum of five years.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#page82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_005.html#pg82&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;82&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Sieyès did not disguise the fact that what characterized the figure of the indentured servant was subservience, ‘servile engagement’ (&#039;&#039;engageance serve&#039;&#039;), or ‘legally regulated slavery’. However, especially after the outbreak of the French Revolution, apologetic concerns seem to have got the upper hand: in the new ideological and political climate, it was no longer possible to declare oneself in favour of an institution whose substantially slave-like character was acknowledged. And so we have Sieyès arguing against those for whom the indentured servant was a person who ‘loses some of his freedom’. No:&lt;br /&gt;
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It is more accurate to say that, at the point when the contract is drawn up, far from being impeded in his liberty, he exercises it in the way most opportune to him. Any convention is an exchange in which each likes what he receives more than what he gives up.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that for the duration of the contract the servant could not exercise the liberty ceded by him. But it was a general rule that the liberty of an individual ‘never extends to the point of harming others’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, from the outset Sieyès upheld contractual servitude in the name of ‘natural liberty’, of the right possessed by every individual to draw up the contract that seemed most opportune to him. In other words, the key category of liberal thought (the category of contract), invoked by Grotius to legitimize slavery proper, was applied by Sieyès solely to the labour relation that binds the indentured servant to his master. This was not dissimilar from Locke, the difference being that the French author, prior to the Revolution at least, stressed the fundamentally slave-like character of the relationship. That is why he was concerned to stress the vigilance the law should be called on to exercise: public officials should control the master’s actions in order to prevent the ‘person’ of the servant ‘being harmed through unduly prolonged hire or during the hire’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sieyès seems to propose a kind of code for regulating this white semi-slavery, on the model of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; with which, in theory, the masters of black slaves should comply.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg83&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;83&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;7. ‘The extensive Herod-like kidnappings’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Among the compulsory labour force called on to ensure the development of the colonies were also youngsters of poor condition, deceived with honeyed words, abducted and deported across the Atlantic.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Alternatively, they arrived in America with their parents, who were often compelled to sell them, never seeing them again. The situation of children of popular extraction was not much better in England. Marx denounced ‘the extensive Herod-like kidnappings perpetrated in the early days of the factory system, when children were stolen from the work houses and orphanages, and capital thereby incorporated a mass of unresisting human material’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Going beyond the use of orphanages as a source of low-cost and more or less compulsory labour, we can make a general observation here. If, in the proto-liberal theory and practice of the time, the wage-labourer was (as we shall soon see) the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; Burke mentions, or the ‘bipedal machine’ referred to by Sieyès, his children were ultimately &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;, destined to be used at the first opportunity precisely in their capacity as work tools and machines. Locke explicitly declared that poor children, who were to be sent to work from the age of three, must ‘be taken off their [parents’] hands’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over a century later, Bentham’s attitude was not dissimilar. He invited people to look for inspiration to ‘manufactures where children, down to four years old, earn something, and where children a few years older earn a subsistence, and that a comfortable one’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was permissible and beneficial to ‘tak[e] the children out of the hands of their parents as much as possible, and even, if possible, altogether’. There should be no hesitation:&lt;br /&gt;
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[Y]ou may even clap them up in an inspection-house, and then you make of them what you please. You need never grudge the parents &#039;&#039;a peep behind the curtain&#039;&#039; in the master’s lodge … you might keep up a sixteen or eighteen years separation between the male and female part of your young subjects …[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The children of the poor were at the complete disposal of society. We are reminded of the fate reserved for slaves across the Atlantic. To end their presence on American soil, suggested Jefferson, one might at a moderate price, and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#page84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_006.html#pg84&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;84&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;perhaps even gratis, acquire newborn blacks, place them ‘under the guardianship of the State’, subject them to work as soon as possible, and thus largely recover the expenses required for their deportation to San Domingo, which should be set in train when convenient. Certainly, ‘[t]he separation of infants from their mothers … would produce some scruples of humanity’, but there was no need to be so fussy.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While he was motivated by economic calculations, rather than worries about racial purity, Bentham would have liked to proceed perhaps even more ruthlessly with the children of the poor in England: ‘An inspection-house, to which a set of children had been consigned from their birth, might afford experiments enough … What say you to a &#039;&#039;foundling-hospital&#039;&#039; upon this principle?’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We shall see that Bentham also envisaged experiments of a eugenic character. But for now we can reach a conclusion by attending to an English economist (Edward G. Wakefield), who in 1834 published a successful book devoted to the contrast between America and England: ‘it is the whole press of England, not I, that calls English children [of popular extraction] slaves’. The majority were compelled to work such long hours that they inadvertently fell asleep, only to be awoken and forced back to work with beatings and torments of every kind. As to foundlings, they were dispensed with rapidly enough: adverts were affixed to the doors of workhouses promoting their sale. In London the price of male and female children put on the market thus was significantly below that of black slaves in America; in rural regions, such commodities were even cheaper.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Bearing down on this mass of wretches was legislation that was certainly not marked by the protection of civil liberties. One thinks of the blank warrants that allowed the police to arrest or search a person at will. Abolished by the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, this ‘intolerable tool of oppression’ (to adopt the description of it given by the French liberal Laboulaye in 1866)[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] long continued to survive in England. Smith himself tended if not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg85&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;85&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to justify it, in any case to trivialize it. He was astonished that the ‘common people’, rather than fighting for the free circulation and buying and selling of labour power, exhibited all its indignation ‘against general warrants, an abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion any general oppression’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The death penalty was imposed with great facility but also with some discretion. With the passing in 1723 of the Black Act—the ‘blacks’ were alleged deer rustlers—in some cases it was not necessary to resort to a formal process to provide for the death sentence, which consigned to the hangman even those who had in some way aided a thief (or alleged thief) to escape justice.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Without betraying any disquiet, Mandeville recognized that ‘the Lives of Hundreds, if not Thousands, of Necessitous Wretches, that are daily hanged for Trifles’ were being snuffed out;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] execution often became a mass spectacle with pedagogical purposes.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British liberal called upon magistrates not to be inhibited either by misplaced ‘compassion’ or by undue doubts and scruples. Certainly, thieves might have committed theft under the spur of necessity: ‘what they can get Honestly is not sufficient to keep them’. Yet ‘the Peace of the Society’ required that the guilty be hanged. Yes, ‘the Evidences perhaps want clearness or are otherwise insufficient’; and there was a risk that an innocent person might be put to death. But however ‘terrible’ that would be, the aim must be achieved that ‘not one Guilty Person [be] suffered to escape with Impunity’. It would be a serious thing if overly scrupulous judges prioritized their ‘Conscience’ over the ‘Advantage to a Nation’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The courts of the property-owner judges were called upon to operate as a kind of committee of public safety.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can then conclude that, setting aside the colonies in their entirety (including Ireland), in Britain itself full enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by the law—the ‘modern’ or ‘negative’ liberty that Constant and Berlin, respectively, refer to[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—was the privilege of a small minority. The mass of people was subject to regulation and coercion that extended far beyond the workplace (or the place of punishment that was the prison, but also the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg86&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;86&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;workhouse and the army). While Locke proposed regulating the consumption of alcohol by the popular classes, Mandeville believed that, at least on Sunday, ‘every Amusement Abroad that might allure or draw them from’ attending church should be ‘prohibited’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the subject of alcohol, Burke argued differently: while it had no nutritional properties, it could alleviate hunger pangs in the poor person; moreover, ‘at all times, and in all countries’, alcohol, together with ‘opium’ and ‘tobacco’, had been turned to for the ‘moral consolations’ men sometimes needed.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, even more than the disciplining of workers and vagrants as in Locke and Mandeville, the problem was that of dulling the consciousness and suffering of the starving in general. What remained constant was the tendency to govern the existence of the popular classes even in its smallest details. The reference to opium added a touch of cynicism. Reports by government committees of inquiry would subsequently denounce the catastrophe: in the poorest districts, opium consumption was spreading, and was becoming a means of feeding or a substitute for it. It was sometimes given to infants, who ‘ “shrank up into little old men”, or “wizened like little monkeys” ’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This detailed regulation obviously also included religious indoctrination. In Locke’s view, for poor children to start work from the age of three was a beneficial measure not only economically, but also morally: ‘Another advantage … of bringing poor children … to a working-school is that by this means they may be obliged to come constantly to church every Sunday along with their school-masters or dames, whereby they may be brought into some sense of religion’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Mandeville demanded that Sunday attendance of church become ‘a Duty’ for the poor and illiterate. Appealing to spontaneous religious feelings was insufficient: ‘It is a Duty incumbent on all Magistrates to take particular Care’ of what happened on Sundays. ‘The Poor more especially and their Children should be made to go to Church on it both in the Fore and Afternoon’. Positive results would not be wanting: ‘Where this Care is taken by the Magistrates as far as it lies in their Power, Ministers of the Gospel may instill into the smallest Capacities’ devotion and the virtue of obedience.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Controlled in their private life, the popular classes were even more so in the public existence which, amid a host of difficulties, they sought: ‘Between 1793 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg87&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;87&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp; 1820, more than 60 acts directed at repression of working-class collective action were passed by Parliament.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More even than trade-union activity in the strict sense—that is, action aimed at raising wages and improving working conditions—the very attempt by servants to escape their isolation and communicate with one another was viewed with dismay. They (thundered Mandeville in alarm) ‘assemble when they please with Impunity’. They even developed relations of mutual solidarity; they sought to aid a colleague dismissed or flogged by his master. Simply by virtue of not confining themselves to the vertical, subaltern relationship with their superiors, but seeking to develop horizontal relations with one another, servants were to be considered culpable of unacceptable subversion: they were ‘daily incroaching upon Masters and Mistresses, and endeavouring to be more upon the Level with them’; they had already raised ‘the low Dignity of their Condition … from the Original Meanness which the publick Welfare requires it should always remain in’. Exceeding every limit, the servant posed as a gentleman; this was the ‘comedy’ of the ‘Gentleman Footman’, a comedy which in fact, in the absence of timely intervention, might turn into a ‘tragedy’ for the whole nation.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Particularly significant in this context was the position taken by Adam Smith. He acknowledged that ‘[w]e have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it.’ Besides, ‘[t]he masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily … Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’, or ‘to sink the wages of labour even below this rate’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence even were masters and workers to be treated identically in legislative terms, the former would always enjoy an advantageous situation. But they were also favoured by the precarious living conditions of the opposing party:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they [the workers] have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#page88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_007.html#pg88&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;88&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;All this did not prevent Smith from recommending that the government act severely against working-class combinations. Certainly, ‘[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. However, it was ‘impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which … would be consistent with liberty and justice’. But the government must forestall any working-class gathering, even the most casual and seemingly innocuous. For example, the requirement of bureaucratic registration for those who practice a specific profession ended up ‘connect[ing] individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another’. Utterly intolerable was any ‘regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common interest to manage’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, not only trade-union activity, but even a mutual aid society was to be considered illegal. Smith recognized that he was dealing with ‘desperate men’, who risked dying of starvation. And yet this consideration took second place to the need to avoid meetings, ‘conversations’ or gatherings that tended to be synonymous with a ‘conspiracy against the public’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In order to criminalize at birth any popular association, the dominant class in England resorted to yet more summary methods, which can be described in Constant’s words: ‘the horrendous expedient of sending spies to incite ignorant minds and suggest rebellion to them, so as then to be able to denounce them’. Results were not wanting: ‘The wretches captivated those who had the misfortune to listen to them and probably also accused those they did not succeed in captivating.’ And justice came crashing down on both.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. A whole with singular characteristics&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen Mandeville call on judges to be summary in condemning to death those guilty or suspected of theft and pilferage, even at the cost of striking down some innocents. The priority was the need to safeguard ‘the peace of the society’ or ‘advantage to a nation’. Blackstone acknowledged that press-ganging men into the navy seemed dubious and detrimental to liberty. It was ‘only defensible for public necessity, to which all private considerations must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg89&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;89&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;give way’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Locke repeatedly called on people not to lose sight of ‘the public good’, ‘the good of the nation’, ‘the public weal’, or ‘the preservation of the whole’, ‘the whole commonwealth’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What is so passionately invoked here is a Whole demanding the sacrifice, permanent not temporary, of the overwhelming majority of the population, whose condition was all the more tragic because any prospect of improvement seemed pretty remote. In fact, even to entertain projects tending towards such improvement was synonymous not only with abstract utopianism, but also and above all with dangerous subversion. According to Townsend, the ‘stock of human happiness is … much increased’ by the presence of ‘the poor’, who were compelled to perform the most arduous and painful work. The poor fully deserved their fate, were by definition wastrels and vagrants. But it would be a disaster for society if, by some chance, they were to mend their ways: ‘The fleets and armies of a state would soon be in want of soldiers and of sailors, if sobriety and diligence universally prevailed’;[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the country’s economy would find itself in difficulties. Mandeville reached the same conclusion: ‘To make the society … happy … it is requisite that great numbers … should be ignorant as well as poor’; ‘the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And let us now read Arthur Young: ‘every one but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’,[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and would not produce the ‘wealth of nations’ referred to by Smith. Later, in France, Destutt de Tracy arrived at the same conclusion: ‘In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally poor.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Why was the proposition, in its various forms, that society’s happiness and wealth depended on the hardship and deprivation of the poor, who formed a large majority of the population, not perceived as contradictory? It is Locke who explains the logic of this Whole with special characteristics: slaves ‘cannot … be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And this was also Algernon Sidney’s opinion: ‘a kingdom or city … is composed of freemen and equals: Servants may be in it, but are not members of it.’ Indeed, ‘no man, whilst he is a servant, can be a member of a commonwealth’; he is not even a member of the people, because ‘the people’ comprises &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#page90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_008.html#pg90&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;90&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all the freemen’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The poor were the servile caste required by society; they were the subterranean foundation of the social edifice, those whom Nietzsche defined as ‘the blind moles of culture’. With society and civilization, the poor and the moles continued to have a relationship of estrangement.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#calibre_pb_9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Wage-labour and the categories of slavery&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades after Franklin, in transition from the first to the second great controversy in the liberal party, the governor of South Carolina, James Henry Hammond, likewise applied himself to emphasizing how much quasi-slavery persisted in Britain. He sent an open letter to Thomas Clarkson, the venerable patriarch of English abolitionism, putting his finger on the sore point of the workers’ condition in the country that boasted of having abolished slavery in its colonies:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the world of Slavery? … If you are really humane, philanthropic, and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, reactions in Britain were indignant, insisting on the characteristic feature of the freeman that applied to even the most wretched wage-labourer. However, in defining him, the liberal tradition frequently had recourse to the same categories as were used in classical antiquity and across the Atlantic in relation to the black slave.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Locke’s view, not genuinely capable of intellectual and moral life was ‘the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living’. Wholly absorbed in ‘still[ing] the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children’, such people had no possibility of thinking about other things:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg91&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;91&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;’Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Locke had no hesitation in asserting that ‘there is a greater distance between some Men, and others, in this respect, than between some Men and some Beasts’. To appreciate this, it was enough to contrast ‘Westminster-hall’ and the ‘Exchange’ with ‘Alms-Houses’ and ‘Bedlam’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The boundary separating the human world from the animal world was imperceptible and evanescent: ‘if we compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that ‘twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is either clearer or larger.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Similarly, Mandeville, condemning the spread of education to popular strata, compared the wage-labourer to a ‘horse’: ‘No Creatures submit contentedly to their Equals, and should a Horse know as much as a Man, I should not desire to be his Rider.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a metaphor that reappeared on the occasion of his polemic against the excessive generosity displayed by the rich master to the servant in England: ‘A Man may have Five and Twenty Horses in his Stables without being guilty of Folly, if it suits with the rest of his Circumstances, but if he keeps but one, and overfeeds it to shew his Wealth, he is a Fool for his Pains.’[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only English liberalism that argued in these terms. In fact, the process of de-humanization possibly reached its peak in Sieyès:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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The unfortunates devoted to arduous work, producers of other people’s enjoyments, who receive scarcely enough to sustain their suffering, needy bodies; this enormous crowd of bipedal tools, without liberty, without morality, without intellectual faculties, equipped solely with hands that earn little and a mind burdened with a thousand worries that serves them only to suffer … are these what you call men? They are deemed civilized [&#039;&#039;policés&#039;&#039;], but have we seen a single one of them who was capable of entering into society?[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg92&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;92&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;On other occasions, the process of de-humanization occurred in a different fashion. Adopting the distinction, peculiar to classical antiquity, between the various instruments of labour, Burke subsumed the wage-labourer under the category of &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Sieyès referred to the ‘majority of men’ defined, above all in private notes predating 1789, as ‘work machines’ (&#039;&#039;machines de travail&#039;&#039;), ‘instruments of labour’ (&#039;&#039;instruments de labeur&#039;&#039;), ‘human instruments of production’ (&#039;&#039;instruments humains de la production&#039;&#039;), or ‘bipedal tools’ (&#039;&#039;instruments bipèdes&#039;&#039;).[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traces of this process of de-humanization can even be found in Smith. By dint of the duress and monotony of his work, a wage-labourer ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’, incapable of participating ‘in any rational conversation’ or ‘conceiving any generous … sentiment’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As across the Atlantic with black slaves and slaves in general, so in Europe the dominant class was separated from white servants by a gulf that had ethnic and racial connotations. In Locke’s view, ‘a day-labourer [is] no more capable of reasoning than almost a perfect natural [i.e., an ignorant aborigine]’: neither had yet reached the level of ‘rational creatures and Christians’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Sieyès was of the opinion that the ‘human instruments of production’ pertained to a ‘people’ different from (and inferior to) that comprising ‘the heads of production’ or ‘intelligent persons’, ‘respectable folk’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A further reason intervened to render the gulf separating the community of the free from servants and slaves unbridgeable. The latter were considered incapable of fully appreciating the humiliations, the frustrations, the sufferings, the pain, as well as all the other feelings characteristic of man’s spiritual existence. We have seen how Mandeville argued in relation to the mass of wretches in Europe. They were forced to suffer hardship and privations and often ended up on the gallows ‘for trifles’, which they made themselves guilty of in an attempt to escape hunger. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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To be happy is to be pleas’d, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more content he’ll be with his own … when a Man enjoys &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#page93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0007_split_009.html#pg93&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;93&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself, Laughs and Sings, and in his Gesture and Behaviour shews me all the tokens of Content and Satisfaction, I pronounce him happy …&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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On careful examination, the ‘greatest King’ could envy ‘the Peace of Mind’ of ‘the meanest and most unciviliz’d Peasant’ and his ‘Tranquillity of … Soul’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no less emphatic terms, the Virginian theorist we have already encountered, Thomas R. Dew, expressed himself on the subject of slaves: ‘we have no doubts that they form the happiest portion of our society. A merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe, than the negro slave of the United States’.[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not only is it very difficult to define the condition of white servants in Europe as free, but the image of them transmitted by the liberal thought of the time is not much different from the image of the black slave in the southern United States. So was the governor of South Carolina right to mock the abolitionists’ hypocrisy and credulity? That would be a hasty conclusion. In any event, we are obliged to reflect further on the characteristics of the society that was being formed either side of the Atlantic and on the categories best suited to understanding it.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn1a|1]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn2a|2]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, p. 437.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn3a|3]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289–90.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn4a|4]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 191.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn5a|5]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 413–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn6a|6]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn7a|7]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn8a|8]] Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures&#039;&#039;, p. 456.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn9a|9]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 412–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_000.html#c03-ftn10a|10]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn13a|13]] Daniel Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms no Charity, And Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation&#039;&#039;, London, 1704, p. 15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn14a|14]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn15a|15]] Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, &#039;&#039;Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIX siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_001.html#c03-ftn16a|16]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1966, p. ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn17a|17]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. David Wootton, London and New York: Penguin, 1993, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 460.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn21a|21]] See Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 1, ch. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn22a|22]] Tocqueville, diary note of 4 February 1851, quoted in Hugh Brogan, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pt 2, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn23a|23]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn24a|24]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn25a|25]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, p. 71.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 319–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn28a|28]] T. H. Marshall, &#039;&#039;Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn29a|29]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn30a|30]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 368–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 398; Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_002.html#c03-ftn33a|33]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 389.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn34a|34]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 652.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn35a|35]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 138.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn36a|36]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 291.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn37a|37]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, pp. 376, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn38a|38]] C. Duncan Rice, ‘The Missionary Context of the British Anti-Slavery Movement’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society, 1776–1846&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn39a|39]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 6; E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;The Making of the English Working Class&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Penguin, 1988, p. 88.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn40a|40]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 118.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn41a|41]] Linda Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, London: Random House, 2002, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn42a|42]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn43a|43]] See Hugo Grotius, &#039;&#039;The Rights of War and Peace&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Richard Tuck, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, vol. 2, ch. v, §28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn44a|44]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, pp. 314–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn45a|45]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn46a|46]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn47a|47]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, p. 119.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_003.html#c03-ftn48a|48]] Colley, &#039;&#039;Captives&#039;&#039;, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn49a|49]] Defoe, &#039;&#039;Giving Alms No Charity&#039;&#039;, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn50a|50]] E. P. Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 22–3; Anthony Arblaster, &#039;&#039;The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 172; Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn51a|51]] Ronald W. Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, London: Blandford Press, 1963, p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn52a|52]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 140.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 137.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 126.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn56a|56]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn57a|57]] Thus the legal historian Leon Radzinowicz, quoted in ibid., p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn58a|58]] Harris, &#039;&#039;England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, pp. 211, 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn59a|59]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn60a|60]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn61a|61]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, p. 12; cf. Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn62a|62]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_004.html#c03-ftn64a|64]] Marcus W. Jernegan, &#039;&#039;Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America&#039;&#039;, Westport (CI): Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 77–9, and p. 48 (for the quotation from Dr Johnson).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., pp. 50–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn66a|66]] Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn67a|67]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., pp. 89, 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_005.html#c03-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn70a|70]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 527 n. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn72a|72]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn73a|73]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 64–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn75a|75]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 1450, 1485–7 (letters to Albert Gallatin, 26 December 1820, and Jared Sparks, 4 February 1824).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn76a|76]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 64.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_006.html#c03-ftn77a|77]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 347–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn78a|78]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 541–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn79a|79]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn80a|80]] Thompson, &#039;&#039;Whigs and Hunters&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn81a|81]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 273.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn82a|82]] Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn83a|83]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 272–3, 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn84a|84]] Benajmin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 309–28; Isaiah Berlin, &#039;&#039;Four Essays on Liberty&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 118–72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn85a|85]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn86a|86]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 7, pp. 413–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn87a|87]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 522 and n. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn88a|88]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 454.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn89a|89]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 307–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn90a|90]] Karl Polanyi, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 3, p. 121 n. 333.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn91a|91]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 306.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn92a|92]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, pp. 83–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn94a|94]] Ibid., p. 145.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_007.html#c03-ftn95a|95]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 28 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn96a|96]] Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 407.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn97a|97]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3, 196–7, 205, 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn98a|98]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn99a|99]] Quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 765.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn100a|100]] Young, quoted in R. H. Tawney, &#039;&#039;Religion and the Rise of Capitalism&#039;&#039;, West Drayton: Pelican, 1948, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn101a|101]] Destutt de Tracy, quoted in Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 802.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn102a|102]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn103a|103]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 89, 103.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_008.html#c03-ftn104a|104]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn105a|105]] Clarkson, quote in Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, pp. 233–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn106a|106]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;An Essay Concerning Human Understanding&#039;&#039;, ed. Peter H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 707, 709.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., p. 666.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn108a|108]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 290.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn109a|109]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 305.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn110a|110]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn111a|111]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn112a|112]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 236, 75, 81.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn113a|113]] Smith, &#039;&#039;The Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 782.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn114a|114]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;The Conduct of the Understanding&#039;&#039;, Edinburgh: William and Robert Chambers, 1839, pp. 10, 12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn115a|115]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, pp. 89, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 311–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn117a|117]] Dew, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, p. 318.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page94&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg95&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;95&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER FOUR =&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;Were Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century England and America Liberal?&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The elusive liberalism of de Tocqueville’s America&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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How should we define the political regime which, following the Dutch prologue and starting from the liberal revolutions, was established first in Britain and then in the United States? As regards the latter, Washington was in no doubt. We have seen him immediately after the achievement of independence celebrating the ‘wise and liberal government’ his country had given itself. Some years later, on the eve of the ratification of the federal Constitution, which consecrated a strong executive power, the general-president coined a kind of advertising slogan, declaring himself in favour of a ‘liberal &amp;amp;amp; energetic’ government.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet if by liberalism is meant every individual’s equal enjoyment of a private sphere of liberty guaranteed by law—‘modern liberty’ or ‘negative liberty’—it is not difficult to perceive the rather problematic character of employing such a category. Even if we discount the problem of slavery, we know the condition of semi-slavery to which notionally free blacks were subjected.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can ignore the population of colour in its entirety and still not thereby arrive at a different result. Those in the United States who were untainted by any crime, but interned in workhouses that were (as de Tocqueville himself acknowledged) an integral part of the ‘prison system’, did not exactly enjoy civil equality or modern liberty. And that is not all: such was the condition of the poor that, even in their capacity as witnesses, they were locked up in prison until the legal proceedings were over. And thus, ‘in the same country that the plaintiff is put in prison, the thief remains at liberty if he can pay a bail bond’. Of ‘three thousand examples’ which might be given, there was that of two &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg96&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;96&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;young Irishmen ‘detained for a whole year while waiting for the judges to deign to hear their deposition’. We can now come to de Tocqueville’s unanticipated conclusion: we are dealing with laws consolidated by ‘customs’ and which yet can seem ‘monstrous’; they ‘have provided everything for the convenience of the wealthy and virtually nothing for the protection of the poor’, of whose liberty ‘they dispose cheaply’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But let us now pass over both populations of colonial origin and the poorest strata of the white community, who were denied not only political rights, but also ‘modern liberty’. Let us focus exclusively on the dominant class—i.e. on white, male property-owners. Did full civil and political equality obtain in this milieu? There are reasons to doubt it. One thinks of the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision on the basis of which, in calculating the number of seats due to the southern states, partial account was also taken of the number of slaves. Far from being a negligible detail, this clause played a significant role in the history of the United States: ‘four southern voters’ ended up exercising ‘more political power than ten northern voters’. Thus is explained the ‘Virginia dynasty’ that long succeeded in holding the country’s presidency.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was why Jefferson was branded the ‘black president’ by his opponents:[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he arrived in power thanks to the inclusion in the electoral result of blacks who remained his slaves. On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln proclaimed polemically: ‘It is a truth that cannot be denied, that in all the free States no white man is the equal of the white man of the slave States.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a thesis repeated in 1864 by a French liberal (Édouard Laboulaye). With the ‘three-fifths’ clause, it was as if the US Constitution was addressed to ‘the folks of the South’:&lt;br /&gt;
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Because you have slaves, you will be allowed to elect a representative with ten thousand votes, while the Yankees [of the North], who live off their own labour, will require thirty thousand votes. The conclusion for the folks of the South is that they constitute a particular, superior race, that they are great lords. The aristocratic spirit has been developed and strengthened by the Constitution.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#page97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_000.html#pg97&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;97&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Accused of breaching the principle of political equality within the dominant elite itself, the southern planters replied by declaring that, in actual fact, the principle of civil equality was infringed to their detriment. They regarded themselves as suffering negative discrimination, in as much as they were deprived of the freedom to transfer their human cattle to any part of the Union. They considered it inadmissible that owners of the &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039; should be treated worse than the owners of any other movable goods. As Jefferson Davis, president of the secessionist Confederacy, declared at the moment of abandoning the Union, the North was wrong to hamper in any way ‘property in slaves’, to act ‘to the prejudice, detriment or discouragement of the owners of that species of property’, which was ‘recognized in the Constitution’ and which, on that basis, should enjoy complete equality of treatment with other types of property.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This exchange of accusations played a far from subsidiary role in the conflict that issued in the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. Absolute power and the community obligations of the slave-owners&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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From Constant onwards, modern or liberal liberty has been described and celebrated as the undisturbed enjoyment of private property. But slave-owners were in fact subject to a whole series of public obligations. There can be no doubt that the Glorious Revolution and then the American Revolution consecrated the self-government of a civil society composed of, and hegemonized by, slave-owners, who were more determined than ever not to tolerate interference by central political power and the Church. But it would be mistaken to equate the self-government of civil society, now freed from these fetters, with the free movement of the individual members composing it. Certainly, they could reduce the slaves they legitimately owned to chattels. In the New England of 1732, a master put up for sale a nineteen-year-old female slave along with her son of six months: they could be acquired (the advert announced) ‘together or separately’. There were no obstacles to bringing to market even adulterous offspring; a New Jersey master did this with the offspring of his relations with three black women whom he owned. Not by chance, slaves were frequently given names usually reserved for dogs and horses.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg98&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;98&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There can be no doubt that the slave-master wielded absolute power over his legitimate ‘property’, but not to the extent of being able freely to challenge the process of reification and commodification that had occurred. In this case, the community requirement prevailed of keeping the barrier between the race of masters and the race of servants clear and fixed. Let us attend to de Tocqueville: blacks had been ‘forbidden … under severe penalties, to be taught to read or write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The prohibition aimed to exclude the race of servants from any form of education, which was regarded as a serious source of danger not only because it was liable to fuel unacceptable hopes and claims, but also because it risked facilitating the communication of ideas and sentiments between blacks that was to be frustrated by any means. And yet, in the case of violation of such rules, to be struck in the first instance were white property-owners, who thus saw their negative liberty seriously restricted. The bans affecting slaves did not leave their masters unaffected. After Nat Turner’s rebellion, it became a crime in Georgia even to provide a slave with paper and writing materials.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Particularly significant was the legislation that banned interracial sexual relations and marriages. Later, in 1896, when upholding the constitutional legitimacy of provisions for racial segregation as a whole, the US Supreme Court conceded that the ban on ‘the intermarriage of the two races’ might, ‘in a technical sense’, breach freedom of contract, but extricated itself from an awkward situation by adding that the right of any individual state to legislate in this area was ‘universally recognized’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, opposition was not lacking. The provision made in Virginia at the start of the eighteenth century, according to which not only those directly responsible for the sexual or marital relation were to be punished, was significant: ‘extremely severe penalties’ were prescribed for the priest guilty of having consecrated the interracial family bond.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And hence, along with ‘freedom of contract’, religious freedom itself was in some sense affected.&lt;br /&gt;
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The absolute power exercised over black slaves ended up having negative and even dramatic consequences for whites. Take Pennsylvania in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The free black caught violating the ban on miscegenation (as it later came to be called)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] risked being sold as a slave. This &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg99&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;99&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;involved serious consequences for the white woman, who had to suffer forced separation from her partner and the terrible punishment inflicted on him. Let us now see what happened in colonial Virginia immediately after the Glorious Revolution. On the basis of a law of 1691, a free white woman who had had a child by a black man or mulatto could be sentenced to five years of servitude and, above all, be forced to surrender the child to the parish, which then sold him or her as a servant for a term of thirty years.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But there is more. Well-nigh insurmountable obstacles were placed in the way of recognition of the offspring of a relationship between an owner and one of his slaves. The father faced a tragic alternative: either to suffer exile from Virginia with his de facto family; or to agree to the child being a slave together with the mother.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More summary was New York’s legislation, which automatically converted all children born of a slave mother into slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus find ourselves in the presence of a society that in fact exercised such severe duress over its privileged members, partly legal and partly social, as to choke even the most natural feelings. As has justly been noted, in enslaving ‘their children and their children’s children’, white people were in fact ‘enslaving themselves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Further to clarify the entanglement between the individual property-owner’s absolute power over his human livestock and his subservience to the ‘master race’ of which he was a member, we can offer a final consideration. We have already noted the law in force in Virginia whereby it was meaningless to define and treat the killing of a slave by his owner as a ‘felony’. Yet in not a few states, on the basis of legislation that survived even after the Second World War (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|§5]]), a white man who had sexual relations with a black woman was guilty of a ‘felony’. Thus, it was permissible for an owner to flog and beat his female slave to the point of killing her—property right was sacred; but so strong was the control exercised by the class of property-owners and the community of the free over their individual members that only by exposing himself to risks of various kinds could he have sexual relations with her. Other than by legal provisions, the ban on miscegenation was enforced by the intervention in the 1850s here and there of vigilante gangs, engaged in spying on, intimidating and attacking whites tempted by the fascination of their female slaves and women of colour in general.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg100&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;100&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;While, in one respect, they were a form of property and a chattel completely at the disposal of their legitimate master, in another slaves represented the enemy within, against whom it was necessary to be constantly on guard. Certainly, to avert the threat recourse could be had to terror, ruthlessly and even sadistically striking at guilty individuals and transforming execution into a kind of terrifying educative spectacle for all the rest: the slaves in a particular area were obliged to witness the torment of two of their fellows, guilty of murder and condemned to be burnt alive.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But that was not sufficient. Once again, preservation of the institution of slavery required heavy sacrifices even on the part of the dominant class. In 1741, in New York, mysterious fires fanned fears of a slave revolt: condemned to death and burnt alive were two blacks whose lives the master had in vain sought to save, testifying that at the time of the fire they were at home. Some years later, in the environs of the same city, a black, having confessed to setting fire to a barn, suffered the same torment. There was only one difference: the crowd of white spectators contrived to ensure that the flames were not extinguished too quickly, so that the spectacle and sufferings of the rebel black lasted as long as possible; his cries were heard three miles away. In any case, the master heard them very clearly: he sobbed loudly, because his slave was dear to him. But he was powerless, and the most he could do was to see to it that the torture was not prolonged any further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Faced with the security requirements of the community they belonged to, individual slave-owners could not demand free disposal over their property.&lt;br /&gt;
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Given the circumstances, these security requirements were a permanent given. We can make a general observation:&lt;br /&gt;
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While the colonial slave codes seem at first sight to have been intended to discipline Negroes, to deny them freedoms available to other Americans, a very slight shift in perspective shows the codes in a different light; they aimed, paradoxically, at disciplining white men. Principally, the law told the white man, not the Negro, what he must do; the codes were for the eyes and ears of slaveowners (sometimes the law required publication of the code in the newspaper and that clergymen read it to their congregations). It was the white man who was &#039;&#039;required&#039;&#039; to punish his runaways, prevent assemblages of slaves, enforce the curfews, sit on the special courts, and ride the patrols.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg101&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;101&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Specific penalties were provided for slave-owners who failed to inflict the punishments prescribed by law. According to a law in force in South Carolina, on her fourth attempt at flight a female slave was to be ‘severely whipped … branded on the left cheek with the letter R, and [have] her left ear cut off’. Until 1722, it was the slave-owners themselves who, directly or indirectly, had to provide for the execution of these operations.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In crisis situations the duty of vigilance made itself strongly felt. We have seen a ‘military service’ of whites patrolling day and night in Richmond in 1831. In such cases, observed Gustave de Beaumont during his journey in de Tocqueville’s company, ‘society arms itself with all its rigours’ and mobilizes ‘all social forces’, seeking in every possible way to encourage ‘informing’ and control; in South Carolina, along with the fugitive slave the death penalty awaited ‘any person who has helped him in his escape’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significant too were the results of the passage of laws on fugitive slaves in 1850. Subject to punishment was not only the citizen who sought to hide or help the black pursued or sought by his legitimate owners, but also those who did not collaborate in his capture. This was a legal provision which (as its critics put it) sought to compel ‘every freeborn American to become a manhunter’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as slave-owners, slave society ended up affecting the white community as a whole. Precisely because, in addition to being chattels, black slaves were also the enemy within, abolitionists were immediately suspected of treason, thus becoming the target of a series of more or less harsh repressive measures depending on the gravity of the impending danger. Severe restrictions were placed on the press: in 1800 the slave revolt in Virginia was often ignored by southern newspapers; there was the danger of spreading the contagion of subversion further.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1836 the president of the United States (Andrew Jackson) permitted the postmaster general to block the circulation of all publications critical of the institution of slavery. Rounding off the gag placed on abolitionists, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution banning the examination of anti-slavery petitions.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Repression could take much more drastic forms. In 1805, denouncing writings liable to have an incendiary impact on slaves, South Carolina passed laws that provided for executing as traitors those who were in some way stained with the guilt of having stirred up a slave revolt or supported it. Georgia &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#page102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_001.html#pg102&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;102&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;proceeded similarly.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bound up with terror from above was terror from below. While it took less ruthless forms in the North (it aimed at preventing meetings and destroying the means of propaganda or the property of ‘agitators’), in the South violence against abolitionists took the form of a pogrom that did not hesitate to torture and physically eliminate traitors and their supporters, with complete impunity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The situation in the South in the years preceding the Civil War was described as follows by Joel R. Poinsett, an important political figure in the Union, in a letter written by him at the end of 1850:&lt;br /&gt;
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We are both [i.e., Poinsett and his correspondent] heartily sick of this atmosphere redolent of insane violence … There is a strong party averse to violent men and violent measures, but they are frightened into submission—afraid even to exchange opinions with others who think like them, lest they should be betrayed.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the contemporary historian who cites this testimony concludes that, through recourse to lynching, violence and threats of every kind, the South succeeded in silencing not only any opposition, but also any mild dissent. In addition to abolitionists, those who wanted to distance themselves from this pitiless witch-hunt felt threatened, and were threatened. They were impelled by terror into ‘holding one’s tongue, killing one’s doubts, burying one’s reservations’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is no doubt about it: the terroristic power wielded by slave-owners over their blacks also ended up affecting, on a lasting basis, members and fractions of the dominant race and class.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. Three legislations, three castes, one ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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So how are we to define the political regime of the society we are examining? Are we dealing with a liberal society? The problem posed in connection with a figure like Calhoun is now presented in more general terms. At least until the Civil War, there were three different sets of legislation in the United States. In relation to slaves, things are immediately clear. In the mid-nineteenth century, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass calculated that there were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg103&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;103&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;seventy-two crimes in Virginia which, when committed by a slave, carried the death penalty, whereas only two of them involved the same penalty for a whiteman.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But special laws also affected men of colour who were notionally free—and not only because, in different ways depending on diverse local realities and in different historical periods, they were excluded from certain professions, from the right to own land, from the possibility of testifying in courts against whites or forming part of the judicial panel. There was a still more revealing circumstance: even ignoring slaves, the same crime continued to have very different consequences depending on the skin colour of the person responsible for it. Obviously, only free people of colour ran the risk of being reduced to slavery. This was the fate that befell those in Pennsylvania, who, in the early decades of the eighteenth century, were caught breaking the ban on miscegenation, or if they were not able to pay the fine issued to them for having traded with other blacks without permission.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the situation in the North changed with the abolition of slavery that followed the Revolution. But the complete control whites had over the magistracy remained in place. This was something highlighted by de Tocqueville, and its consequences were spelt out in the North as follows by a particularly courageous judge from Ohio: ‘The white man may now plunder the Negro, he may abuse his person; he may take his life: He may do this in open daylight … and he must be acquitted, unless [there be] some white man present [prepared to give evidence against the culprit]’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Clear and insuperable was the barrier separating whites, the dominant race, from people of colour as such. In the words of Beaumont, ‘[w]hether slaves or freemen, negroes everywhere form a different people from the whites.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was an observation confirmed by de Tocqueville: ‘In Philadelphia blacks are not buried in the same cemetery as whites’. Segregation also obtained in prisons: ‘blacks were also separated from whites for meals’. And again: ‘in Maryland [a slaveholding state] free blacks pay taxes for schools just like whites, but cannot send their children to them’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And (we might add) in mid-nineteenth-century Virginia, the law denied notionally free blacks ‘the right to learn how to read and write’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg104&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;104&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are in the presence of a racial state, articulated (according to the explicit declaration of its theorists and apologists in the South), into ‘three &#039;&#039;castes—&#039;&#039; … free whites, free colored, and slave colored population’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Still in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the caste model was also evoked by some observers of the North. Referring to their own society, where slavery had been abolished, they spoke of a division into ‘Brahmins and pariahs’, as demonstrated by the racial segregation that operated at every level, from public transport to theatres and from churches to cemeteries, and which allowed blacks to enter hotels, restaurants and meeting-places for the most part solely in the capacity of servants. Yes, acknowledged another observer, who proposed to banish blacks from Indiana in order to spare them a yet worse fate, they were treated like ‘a race legally and socially excommunicated, as the Helots of Sparta—as the Pariahs of India—disfranchised outcasts; a separate and degraded caste’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When we identify three castes in the post-bellum United States, we are obviously ignoring the Indians, who were regarded until the Dawes Act of 1887 as ‘domestic dependent nations’—that is, as a set of nations with their own particular identity, under the protectorate of Washington, and whose members did not form part of American society in the strict sense.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It should be added that the discourse of the three castes is not without a dubious ideological component: it tends to neglect the differences that remained within the white community, which could impact heavily not only on the material living conditions, but also on the civil rights, of the poorest strata. The Articles of the Confederacy, designed to regulate the new state that was being formed, explicitly excluded ‘paupers’ and ‘vagrants’ from the group of ‘free inhabitants’ (Article IV). But it is true that, when we examine the society as a whole, the main demarcations were colour lines and, within the black community, the line separating slaves proper from the rest—from ‘free’ blacks, who in fact lived the nightmare of being deported or enslaved in their turn. On the other side, the absolute centrality of the colour line galvanized (as the southern ideologue of the three castes pointed out) the ‘spirit of equality’ within the white community, with a fairly rapid disappearance of the most odious forms of discrimination.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg105&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;105&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In this sense we can speak of ‘castes’, as do distinguished historians of the institution of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But registration of the naturalistic and racial rigidity of the relations between social classes tells us little about the nature of the political regime in the society under examination. On the basis of the history of South Africa, reference has sometimes been made to ‘segregationist liberalism’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in order to explain the tangle of freedom (for whites) and oppression (of colonial populations). It is a category that completely excludes from the focus of attention the practices of expropriation, deportation and annihilation implemented against the native populations of southern Africa or the Amerindians. Even as regards blacks and other ethnic groups, such a category seems to refer only to the period subsequent to the abolition of slavery. Like the adjective, the substantive is misleading. On the one hand, the white community soon shook off censitary discrimination, long recommended and in fact regarded as insuperable by exponents of classical liberalism. On the other, the property-owner-citizens were subject to a series of obligations that it would be very difficult to integrate into the modern liberty theorized by Constant.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On other occasions, rather than to ‘segregationist liberalism’, reference has been made to ‘aristocratic republicanism’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] explicitly in connection with the pre–Civil War United States. Such a definition completely obscures the character both of the dominant aristocracy and of the plebs oppressed by it, and the entanglement between social classes and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the substantive makes it possible to take a step forward: we are not dealing with property-owners interested solely in the enjoyment of their private sphere; they also led a rich political life. While far from being generally enjoyed, ‘modern liberty’ was scarcely the sole objective of the protagonists of the Revolution and the Founding Fathers of the United States. For Hamilton, the ‘distinction between freedom and slavery’ was clear: in the first case, ‘a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent’; in the second, ‘he is governed by the will of another’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, in Franklin’s words, submitting to taxation from a legislative body where one is not represented signifies being considered and treated as ‘a conquer’d People’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be excluded from political decisions, to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg106&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;106&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be subject to laws imposed from without, however reasonable and liberal, was synonymous with political slavery or, at any rate, represented the onset of it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, Calhoun, the author with whom we began when we posed the crucial question—what is liberalism?—professed democracy even more than liberalism; he was an eminent member of the Democratic Party of the United States. The category of liberalism should unify the two Anglo-Saxon countries. But Calhoun defined the Constitution of his country as ‘democratic, in contradistinction to aristocracy and monarchy’, and hence in contradistinction to Great Britain, where ‘title[s] of nobility’ and other ‘artificial distinctions’ that had been abolished in the North American republic survived.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, it was not an unqualified democracy, as might appear from the title of de Tocqueville’s book, which (as we shall see), in expressing itself thus, thought it possible to ignore the condition of Indians and blacks. Still less was it the ‘frontier democracy’ to which an eminent US historian, inclined to hagiography, pays homage.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Apart from anything else, the definition suggested by him evokes, in reticent, uncritical fashion, only the gradual expansion of the white colonists to the West, and hence only the relationship between two of the ‘three races’ referred to (as we shall see) by &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Calhoun was concerned to distinguish the democracy whose theorist he aspired to be from ‘absolute democracy’, guilty of wanting to ride roughshod over the rights of states and slave-owners.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are at the antipodes of the ‘abolitionist democracy’ dear to an eminent US historian and passionate Afro-American activist.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But then how are we to define a democracy which, far from wanting to abolish or even simply repress or hide slavery, celebrated it as a ‘positive good’? Reference has sometimes been made to ‘Hellenic democracy, based on the work of non-European slaves’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this definition too is inadequate. It overlooks, or does not accurately describe, the fate reserved for Indians. And it does not take account of another crucial element: absent from ancient Greece was the racial chattel slavery which, in the American case, was conjoined not with direct democracy but representative democracy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg107&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;107&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to the modernity of the mode of production was the modernity of the political regime.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference in particular to the English colonies, another distinguished black theorist and activist speaks interchangeably of ‘white plantocracy’ or ‘planter democracy’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, calling attention to but one narrow social caste, this definition commits the error of concentrating exclusively on the South, which was not in fact separated by any barrier from the North. This applies at an economic level: after land, slaves were the country’s largest property; in 1860 their value was three times greater than the share capital in manufacturing and the railway industry. The cotton grown in the South was far and away the most sizeable US export, and made a decisive contribution to financing the country’s imports and industrial development.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At a political—constitutional level, the obligation to take part in hunting down escaped slaves and returning them obviously also extended to the citizens of the North. Finally, on an ideological level, we must not forget the racial apartheid in force in the free states. If the process of expropriating and deporting Indians is added to this, it is clear that, albeit with obvious differences between its two parts, the racial discrimination practised in the United States played a decisive role at a national level. Finally, although more adequate than those cited above, even the category of ‘white democracy’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] has a limitation—that of not stressing the proud seigneurial self-consciousness of the community of the free and the explosive violence such a community could unleash against the excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Following, then, the suggestion of distinguished US historians and sociologists, we should speak of a ‘&#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’—that is, a democracy which applied exclusively to the ‘master race’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The clear line of demarcation between whites, on the one hand, and blacks and Indians, on the other, was conducive to the development of relations of equality within the white community. The members of an aristocracy of class or race tended to celebrate themselves as ‘peers’; the manifest inequality imposed on the excluded was the other aspect of the relationship of parity established between those who enjoyed the power to exclude ‘inferiors’. It must be added that the equality in question was primarily a clear line of demarcation from the excluded. This is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#page108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_002.html#pg108&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;108&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;what was expressed by the slogan that presided over the American Revolution: ‘We won’t be their Negroes’! For the rest, conflicts and mutual charges of abuses of power and violations of the principle of equality were (as we know) not lacking within the community of freemen and masters.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After all, it was Josiah Tucker who had already come close to understanding the true nature of the republicanism for which he reprehended Locke and the rebellious American colonists: ‘all Republicans ancient and modern … suggest no other Schemes but those of pulling down and leveling all Distinctions above them, and of tyrannizing over those miserable Beings, who are unfortunately placed below them.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again: ‘he that is a Tyrant over his Inferiors is, of Course, a Patriot, and a Leveller in respect to his Superiors.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Freemen, servants and slaves&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, if they can serve to analyse the society that emerged from the American Revolution, what help is the discourse of the three castes and the category of ‘master-race democracy’ when it comes to understanding the politico-social relations that obtained in England? At least until the abolition of slavery in the colonies, the situations on both sides of the Atlantic had not a few points in common—and not only because slaves and the slave market were far from absent from the metropolis itself. More important is the consideration that the British Empire should be analysed as a whole, without repressing the reality of the colonies. Its economic development and political and military rise owed much to the &#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;—that is, to a monopoly on the slave trade. At the same time, those who derived their wealth from trade and property in human cattle were well represented in the British parliament. Hence we see the caste of white freemen and that of slaves operative here as well. Certainly, viewed from the London observatory, the third caste—notionally free blacks—was completely irrelevant. An initial difference between the two shores of the Atlantic thus emerges.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is another, more significant one, which concerns the bulk of the metropolitan population. Within the American white community itself, there were small sections to which legal equality and even negative liberty were denied. This emerges from the description of de Tocqueville, who comments that it was the legacy of the ‘civil laws’ of England, clearly weighted in favour of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg109&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;109&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rich.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States the group of whites denied these privileges was a rather small sector, which fairly rapidly disappeared. The very presence of blacks, whether slaves or semi-slaves, encouraged the spread of a sense of relative equality between members of the higher ‘caste’. The situation of the white community in England was very different. Here exclusion from the enjoyment of legal equality and negative liberty was much more widespread. Let us ignore Ireland, which even after the formation of the United Kingdom in fact continued to be a colony. Let us focus on England proper, starting with Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He made a sharp distinction between three groups: men ‘by the right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters’, or subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’,[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who were the black slaves from Africa; then freemen; and finally, white servants who were blood relations of the freemen. A key paragraph of the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise of Government&#039;&#039; clarifies this:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]e find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but it is plain this was only to drudgery, not to slavery; for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power, for the master could not have power to kill him at any time, whom at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. xxi).[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Here Locke primarily had in mind the two figures of the black slave and the indentured white servant. As we know, even the second was subject to buying and selling, was in large measure a commodity, exported to America and regularly traded on the market where possible purchasers arrived alerted by adverts in the local press. It goes without saying that the master possessed an extensive right of punishment, even if not as unlimited as that wielded over the black slave. We can understand then the comparison with the servant in the Old Testament, who, although not subject to a ‘perfect condition of slavery’, experiences a condition that might by contrast be defined as ‘imperfect slavery’. This imperfect slavery was defined by Locke by the term of servitude or drudgery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg110&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;110&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Within the British Empire three different legal situations coexisted—the first marked by liberty, the second by servitude, and the third by slavery in the strict sense. Notwithstanding the racial abyss that was now open, and which separated black slave from white servant, in England the latter did not form part of the community of the free in the strict sense. Even if different from that wielded by ‘a lord over his slave’, the power of ‘a master over his servant’, who was subject to the ‘ordinary discipline’ applied by the master within his family, was indisputable.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, although he was concerned to distinguish between slave and servant, Locke sometimes also used the second term to refer to the figure of the slave proper. In the &#039;&#039;First Treatise of Government&#039;&#039;, we can read: ‘those who were rich in the patriarch’s days, as in the West Indies now, bought men and maid-servants, and by their increase as well as purchasing of new, came to have large and numerous families’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As demonstrated by the reference to the property-owners of the West Indies and the property right they exercised over the offspring of ‘servants’, it is clear that the discourse here concerns hereditary slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tripartite division formulated by Locke also appears in Mandeville. In the first place, we have ‘the great Number of Slaves, that are yearly fetch’d from Africa’ to America.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England, on the other hand, ‘Slaves are not allow’d’, but free men can avail themselves of ‘the Children of the Poor’, of ‘willing Hands for all the Drudgery and hard and dirty Labour’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again we encounter the three figures of the freeman, the servant and the slave. It is so difficult to confuse the second with the first that the similarities with the third leap to the eye: ‘the meanest Indigent part of the Nation’ is ‘the working slaving People’, which is eternally destined to perform ‘dirty slavish Work’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, let us turn to Blackstone. In celebrating England as the land of liberty, he stressed that there was no place in it for ‘proper slavery’, ‘strict slavery’, ‘absolute slavery’, wherein the master was endowed with absolute, unlimited power over the life and fate of the slave. This insistent clarification left room for forms of compulsory labour different from that to which blacks in the colonies were subjected. In the great jurist’s writings too an intermediate condition between liberty and slavery ends up emerging, a sort of non-‘absolute’ slavery, slavery not understood in the ‘strict’ sense. Along with slaves, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#page111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_003.html#pg111&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;111&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘domestics’, ‘apprentices’ and ‘labourers’ were servants. We are dealing with ‘different types of servant’, each with its specific characteristics, but all brought together by the fact of being subject to servitude.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Active once again is the legacy of Grotius, for whom &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; was the general category for understanding and defining the character of work. In Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone what is new is the stress on the distinction between two types of &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;—that in force in the metropolis and that operative in the colonies. Thus, we pass from Grotius’ bipartite division to a tripartite division.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. England and the three ‘castes’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But now, setting aside major authors, let us take a look at the social reality and ideology that characterized Britain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Far from the ‘vestiges of slavery’ referred to by Smith, the persistence of servile relations is very clear from the treatment of the poor and the possibility of disposing of their children as a &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039; in workhouses, in the army, in prisons, and in the recruitment of servants sent to settle the colonies. An economist we have already encountered, Wakefield, drew attention to ‘English slavery’ and ‘white slaves’ in 1834.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this time authors of the most varied political persuasion compared slaves across the Atlantic with suffering workers in England: anti-abolitionists who echoed Calhoun-type statements; more or less radical currents that aimed at a more general emancipation of labour; more detached observers who confined themselves to registering the fact, like the economist we have just cited. And the comparison was established not simply by focusing on the spectre of death from starvation that constantly haunted the English worker. Certainly, this is an aspect that cannot be ignored: the number of poor people who, in order to avoid starvation, committed some crime in the hope of being able to survive as deportees or ‘galley slaves’, was not negligible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But considerable attention was also paid to encroachments on a more specifically liberal freedom—namely, ‘modern liberty’. For this to emerge with greater clarity, let us leave behind the cities and industrial centres and move to the countryside to hear the rural labourers’ grievances:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg112&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;112&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Speaking generally, since all laws have their exceptions, the privileged classes of our rural districts take infinite pains to be abhorred by their poorest neighbours. They enclose commons. They stop footpaths. They wall in their parks. They set spring-guns and man-traps … They build jails, and fill them. They make new crimes and new punishments for the poor. They interfere with the marriages of the poor, compelling some, and forbidding others to come together. They shut up paupers in workhouses, separating husband and wife, in pounds by day and wards by night. They harness poor men to carts. They superintend alehouses, decry skittles, deprecate beer-shops, meddle with fairs, and otherwise curtail the already narrow amusements of the poor.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Around twenty years later, the popular and radical &#039;&#039;Reynold’s Newspaper&#039;&#039;, condemning the ‘slavery’ that existed in England, listed the flogging of soldiers and sailors, the separation of husbands and wives in workhouses, the obligation of rural servants to request permission from their masters before they could marry, and the systematic sexual abuse to which ‘the wives and daughters of the poorer orders’ were subject.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield reported the &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; deriving from the countryside and considered them incontrovertible. Writing on the immediate eve of the abolition of slavery in British colonies, he believed it possible to distinguish three figures—‘freeman’, ‘slave’ and ‘pauper’—within the empire as a whole.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are put in mind of the discourse of the three castes we have encountered in a theorist from the American South. In fact, in 1864 the &#039;&#039;Saturday Review&#039;&#039; (a periodical that circulated among the middle and upper classes) observed that the poor in England formed ‘a caste apart, a race’, placed in a social condition that underwent no alteration ‘from the cradle to the grave’, and which was divided from the rest of society by a barrier similar to that existing in America between whites and blacks. The respectable English periodical proceeded as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him. The relation in both instances is that of perpetual superior to perpetual inferior, of chief to dependant, and no amount of kindness or goodness is suffered to alter this relation.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#page113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_004.html#pg113&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;113&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;We are—it is important not to forget it—in 1864. Many decades had passed since the Glorious Revolution and the birth of liberal England. And yet, if the situation was unstable and tending to change as a result of popular struggles, the reality of a caste society continued to make itself felt. Already abolished thirty years earlier in the English colonies, the caste of slaves was on the point of disappearing in the United States as well. Having been three, the castes were becoming two in number on both sides of the Atlantic: corresponding to the black semi-slaves of the United States were the white servants of England. A more or less rigid barrier continued to separate both from the caste of genuine freemen.&lt;br /&gt;
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A sort of social apartheid seems to correspond to the racial apartheid. In eighteenth-century England we find Charles Seymour, Duke of Somerset, having his coach preceded by outriders who were charged with clearing the road in order to spare the nobleman the annoyance of meeting with plebeian persons and glances.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even a century later, a kind of segregation existed between the different social classes in English churches.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the already noted &#039;&#039;cahier de doléances&#039;&#039; drawn up by rural labourers bemoaned the fact that even then the aristocracy resorted to a curtain to shield itself from any ‘vulgar gaze’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When Senior visited Naples, what made him angry was the mixing of ranks: ‘In cold countries the debased classes keep at home; here they live in the streets’. Worse, they were so little removed from the upper classes that they lived in the cellars of seigneurial palaces. The result? ‘[Y]ou never are free from the sight, or, indeed, from the contact of loathsome degeneration.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The reproduction of the servile caste and the beginnings of eugenics&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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How to ‘continue the race of journeymen and servants’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Smith’s phrase reveals that social mobility was limited or non-existent. The heaviest, worst-paid work was entrusted to a stratum that tended to be reproduced from one generation to the next, and hence to a kind of hereditary servile caste.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg114&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;114&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The reproduction of this caste or race was absolutely necessary. According to Mandeville, a decidedly beneficial role was played by war. If, with its periodic massacres, it did not provide a remedy for excess male births, women, sought after by too many aspiring, competitive males, would become a kind of rare commodity accessible only to the rich. Society would then lose its re-supply of ‘the Children of the Poor; the greatest and most extensive of all temporal Blessings’. The hereditary reproduction of the poor destined to perform ‘the Drudgery of hard and dirty Labour’ would prove difficult or impossible.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The natural order, of which war was a part, spontaneously generated the race of semi-slaves that society could never do without. However, this supposedly spontaneous process must be encouraged by timely political interventions from above. According to Mandeville, access to education on the part of the ‘Labouring Poor’ was to be avoided at all costs: the ‘Proportion of the Society’ would be compromised by it.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The requisite cheap, docile and obedient labour force would risk disappearing. Other representatives of the liberal tradition invoked much more extensive intervention. For the purposes of generating a potentially perfect race of docile workers and instruments of labour, the concentration-camp universe of the ‘workhouses’ could prove useful. Locking up the children of delinquents and ‘suspects’ therein, one could (observed Bentham) produce an ‘indigenous class’ that would be distinguished for its industriousness and sense of discipline. If early marriage was promoted within this class, treating the offspring as apprentices until they attained their majority, the workhouses and society would dispose of an inexhaustible reserve of manpower of the highest quality. In other words, through the ‘gentlest of all revolutions’—a sexual revolution[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the ‘indigenous class’, propagating itself in hereditary fashion from one generation to the next, would be transformed into a kind of indigenous race.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sieyès envisaged a similarly ‘gentle’ revolution, and likewise for the purposes of producing a class or race of labourers as docile as possible. Like Bentham, the French liberal indulged in a eugenicist utopia (or dystopia). He imagined a ‘cross’ (&#039;&#039;croisement&#039;&#039;) between monkeys and ‘blacks’ for creating domesticated beings adapted to servile work: ‘the new race of anthropomorphic monkeys’. In this way, whites, who remained at the top of the social hierarchy as directors of production, could dispose of blacks as auxiliary instruments of production, or slaves proper, who would precisely be the anthropomorphic monkeys:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#page115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_005.html#pg115&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;115&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However extraordinary, however immoral this idea might seem at first sight, I have reflected on it at length, and can find no other way in a great nation, especially in countries that are very hot or very cold, to reconcile the directors of works with the simple instruments of labour.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While, on the one hand, it was necessary to encourage the production and reproduction of a race of servants or actual slaves, on the other, it was necessary to limit, so far as possible, the unproductive, parasitic surplus population, the mass of poor who, far from creating wealth, devoured it like locusts. To maintain the demographic balance, Malthus called for a policy that postponed marriage and procreation among the popular classes; otherwise, nature would dispose of them with wars, famines and epidemics. In this respect the role of medicine was problematic. In 1764 Franklin wrote to a doctor: ‘Half the Lives you save are not worth saving, as being useless; and almost the other Half ought not to be sav’d, as being mischievous. Does your Conscience never hint to you the Impiety of being in constant Warfare against the Plans of Providence?’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville hoped that one could finally be shot of the ‘prison rabble’ like rats, maybe thanks to a massive fire.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Did the French liberal ‘dream of genocide’?[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The claim is exaggerated. But there remains his harsh polemic against a ‘bastard charity’ that threatened order: ‘It is the philanthropy of Paris that is killing us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A general conclusion is indicated. The eugenic temptation runs deep in the liberal tradition. Not by chance, the discipline that took this name had its baptism in Great Britain and experienced extraordinary success in the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The elusive liberalism of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, we are compelled to pose a crucial question in connection with Great Britain: Was it a liberal society? Even after the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg116&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;116&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;abolition of slavery in the colonies proper, we certainly cannot speak of generalized enjoyment of the quintessential liberal freedom—modern liberty—by the United Kingdom’s inhabitants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Irish certainly did not enjoy it, being as they were (acknowledged de Tocqueville) constantly subjected to ‘emergency measures’ and at the mercy of ‘military tribunals’ and a numerous, hateful gendarmerie. In Castlebar, on the basis of the Insurrection Act, ‘any man caught without a passport outdoors after sunset is deported’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the press of the time, the condition of the Irish was often compared with that of blacks across the Atlantic. According to the judgement in 1824 of a rich English merchant, who was a disciple of Smith and an ardent Quaker and abolitionist (James Cropper), the Irish found themselves in a worse situation than black slaves.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, the Irish represented for Britain what the blacks were for the United States; they were ‘two phenomena of the same kind’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Beaumont’s opinion found indirect confirmation from de Tocqueville. From &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; we know of the complete deafness of the judiciary, monopolized by whites, to the legitimate complaints of blacks. A conclusion suggests itself, also indicated by evidence gathered in Maryland: ‘The white population and the black population are in a state of war. They never mix. One of them must give way to the other.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French liberal heard a similar observation in the island subjugated and colonized by Britain: ‘To tell the truth, there is no justice in Ireland. Virtually all the country’s magistrates are in open warfare with the population. So the population does not even have the idea of public justice.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases a cornerstone of the &#039;&#039;Rechtsstaat&#039;&#039;—the judiciary—was at war with a substantial part of the population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On both sides of the Atlantic, laws that prevented or hampered access to education and outlawed marriage with members of the higher caste served to prolong the oppression of the blacks and the Irish. In Ireland, too, miscegenation was a crime punished with great severity; on the basis of a law of 1725, a priest guilty of secretly celebrating a mixed marriage could even be condemned to death.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And in Ireland as well, attempts were made to obstruct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg117&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;117&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the native population’s access to education. We can conclude on this point by attending to the words of a nineteenth-century liberal Anglo-Irish historian: British legislation aimed to deprive the Irish of their ‘property’ and ‘industry’; it ‘was intended to make them poor and to keep them poor, to crush in them every germ of enterprise, to degrade them into a servile caste who could never hope to rise to the level of their oppressors’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1798, three years prior to the formation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish numbered ‘about four and a half million—a third of the population of the British Isles’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, a higher percentage of people were to be deprived of their negative liberty than in the United States, where, at the time of independence, blacks made up one-fifth of the population. It must be added that, before and after the Glorious Revolution, Britain’s rulers treated the Irish, on the one hand, like Indians, to be deprived of their land and thinned out through more or less drastic measures; and on the other, like blacks whose forced labour might conveniently be used. Hence the oscillation between practices of enslavement and genocidal practices.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain itself the popular classes saw their negative liberty seriously infringed, to the extent that they were assimilated in the culture and press of the time to an inferior ‘caste’ or ‘race’. But now it is appropriate to concentrate on relations within the upper ‘caste’. As we know, the American colonists’ rebellion developed out of protests against the negative discrimination they suffered by dint of their exclusion from the legislative body. At the same time, we must not forget that in eighteenth-century Britain the right to representation was a privilege granted by the Crown, so that even large industrial towns were excluded from the House of Commons, where, by contrast, boroughs which had virtually been abandoned, but which had the right to be ‘represented’ in London mainly by local nobles, were present. Bearing in mind that the House of Lords was the hereditary preserve of the landed aristocracy, a conclusion is dictated: in the case of Britain itself, not even relations within the property-owning classes were stamped by equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Equality was further compromised by another circumstance: only the second electoral Reform Act, put through by Disraeli in 1867, ‘effected the full political emancipation of Non-conformists’. Until then, significant forms of religious discrimination were in force:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg118&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;118&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Persons, whether Protestant or Catholic, who would not take the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England, were still debarred from holding office either under the Crown or in the municipalities; the doors of Parliament were still closed to Roman Catholics, and the doors of the Universities to dissenters of every kind. [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Hence, on closer inspection, the non-conformists (among whom must obviously be included the Jews)[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] were deprived not only of political equality, but also of full legal equality. Only in 1871 did all universities, including Oxford and Cambridge, ‘throw open College Fellowships and University posts to persons of every, or of no, religious denomination’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The argument with which Macaulay criticized the exclusion of Jews from political rights in 1831 is significant:&lt;br /&gt;
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It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money; and money may make members of Parliament … That a Jew should be privy-councilor to a Christian king would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money-market, and the money-market may govern the world.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In a paradoxical argument against the forms of discrimination of which Jews were victims, Macaulay seems to echo anti-Jewish stereotypes, but in reality the meaning of his discourse is clear: it was absurd and inadmissible to seek to deny political and even civil equality to those who, economically at any rate, were already members of the dominant elite.&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, it should be borne in mind that, like the class that was the protagonist of the American Revolution and the establishment of a racial state, the English aristocracy in no way restricted itself to aspiring to a merely negative liberty. Some decades before Hamilton (and the American revolutionaries), in England Sidney had already declared that ‘nothing denotes a slave but a dependence upon the will of another’, or upon a law to which he had not given his consent.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg119&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;119&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Locke did not formulate things very differently, when with political ‘slavery’ he contrasted ‘liberty’ understood as ‘be[ing] under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again it was Locke who stressed the equivalence between the English and Latin terms;[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the latter clearly implied the participation of the &#039;&#039;cives&#039;&#039; in public life. The English philosopher argued along similar lines to the American revolutionaries, who not by chance appealed to him: he who wants to decide on his own, excluding me from the process of forming laws, may legitimately be suspected of ‘hav[ing] a design to take away everything else’, not just political ‘liberty’; he ultimately aims to ‘make me a slave’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the position adopted by this or that theorist, the English aristocracy aimed to play, and really did play, a political role of the first order. In addition to the upper house, ‘the lower house of Parliament was essentially a landowners’ club’ until almost the end of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy exercised political power directly: ‘it was the landed elite, not a separate service elite, that was in control of public affairs’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a control that encompassed the judiciary and local government and which, above all in the countryside, was seamless. Virtually until the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the grandees and gentry were still the unchallenged authorities, responsible to no one but themselves.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the South of the United States, the uncontested power of a social class in England did not preclude the imposition of restrictions on its individual members. The titled property-owner was required to respect a series of obligations, sanctioned partly by law and partly by custom. One thinks of primogeniture and the inalienability of property, as well as the endogamy that was fairly widespread within the aristocracy—a practice that once again calls to mind the ban on miscegenation in the United States. The members of the nobility ‘were concerned with voluntary service to the state, both locally and nationally, as civilians and as military men’. While they enjoyed their property and their wealth, patrician officers adopted the pose of ‘chivalric heroes’ required, when the nation was in danger, to exhibit ‘spartan and stoical bravery’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#page120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_006.html#pg120&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;120&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;How should we define the society we have been analysing? Once again, we encounter the problem that has dogged us since the beginning of this book: Can we speak of liberalism in connection with Calhoun’s thinking and the reality of the United States where he lived and worked? And can we speak of it in relation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland? Given the dominant representation of liberalism today, what sense would it make to define as liberal a society where a considerable part of the population was subject to military dictatorship, where the popular metropolitan classes were at least partially excluded from negative liberty, where this type of liberty was by no means the ideal of the possessing classes, and where the principle of civil and political equality was limited among the latter in various ways?&lt;br /&gt;
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A constitutive element of a liberal regime should be competition between various candidates. But what actually happened?&lt;br /&gt;
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Many elections saw no contest at all. In seven general elections from 1760 to 1800, less than a tenth of the country seats were contested. Of the boroughs, some were purely inert in that their owners sold the seats or appointed the members without question; some seats were as much a property as seats in the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Liberalism, ‘property-owning individualism’ and ‘aristocratic society’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In an attempt to overcome the difficulty encountered in defining eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British society, reference has sometimes been made to ‘individualism’ rather than liberalism; and the history of the intellectual tradition being examined now seems profoundly stamped with a ‘property-owning individualism’ or ‘possessive individualism’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This definition has some legitimacy. In Locke, political power begins to be configured as tyranny, and hence violence, when it attacks private property (belonging to the dominant class); and it is then licit to resist such violence. The citizen, in fact the individual, takes back the power he already possessed in the state of nature, which consists in ‘us[ing] such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and Nature allows him’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of legality is the sphere of respect &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg121&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;121&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for private property, while violence is defined in the first instance by its violation.&lt;br /&gt;
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On closer examination, however, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ proves completely inadequate. We are confronted with a society and intellectual tradition which, far from being inspired by a superstitious respect for property and property right in general, in fact promoted and legitimized massive expropriations of the Irish and Indians. It is true that a central chapter in the second of Locke’s &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; bears the title ‘Of Property’. But ‘Expropriation’ might have been more fitting, given that it aims to justify white colonists’ appropriation of land from idle Indians incapable of cultivating it. Ignoring the colonies and colonial populations, or populations of colonial origin, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ seems to focus attention exclusively on the white community in the capitalist metropolis, and on the conflict between property-owners and non-property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we confine our attention to the metropolis, we see that the &#039;&#039;Second Treatise&#039;&#039; justifies and demands the enclosure of common land in England, and hence the massive expropriation of peasants. Like the transatlantic territories occupied by the Indians, common land was not properly fertilized by labour; and hence in both cases there was as yet no legitimate owner. In classic authors of the liberal tradition, we find the assertion and detailed demonstration that the property claimed by natives, and by social groups in the metropolis assimilated to natives, was in reality &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Paradoxically, despite its critical intentions, the category of ‘property-owning individualism’ ends up crediting the ideological self-consciousness of the classes that arrived in power in England and America advancing the slogan of liberty and property. Marx argued quite differently. &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; denounced the ‘stoical peace of mind [of] the political economist’ and of liberal thinkers in the face of ‘the most shameless violation of the “sacred rights of property”‘, and ‘the forcible expropriation of the people’, carried out in England. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, in order to speed up the enclosure process, brutal methods were sometimes employed without hesitation: entire villages were destroyed and razed to the ground, so as to force the peasants to flee and transform common land into private property and pasture in the service of the textile industry.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In examining the category of ‘property-owning individualism’, we have hitherto concentrated on the adjective. If we now turn our attention to the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#page122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_007.html#pg122&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;122&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;noun, we shall find that it too proves rather problematic. The excluded were likened by the dominant class to instruments of labour, bipedal machines. In other words, they saw their quality as human beings and individuals denied. Certainly, the privileged insisted strongly on this quality, which they attributed exclusively to themselves. But is this individualism? Here, too, we find the modern historian aligning himself with the ideological self-consciousness of a social class and political movement he intends to criticize.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than ‘property-owning individualism’, the categories applied to England by some leading liberal authors of the nineteenth century seem more apt. In Constant’s view, ‘England is, at bottom, simply a vast, opulent and vigorous aristocracy.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The judgement formulated by de Tocqueville in the 1830s was no different: ‘Not only does the aristocracy seem more solidly stable than ever, but the nation leaves the government, seemingly without any signs of disapproval, to a very small number of families’, an ‘aristocracy’ primarily based on ‘birth’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence we are dealing with an ‘aristocratic community’ characterized by the domination of ‘a small number of powerful and wealthy citizens’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Besides, it was Disraeli himself who criticized the Whig Party, which long dominated the country that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, for having aimed to establish an aristocracy and oligarchy on the Venetian model.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#calibre_pb_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. ‘Master-race democracy’ between the United States and England&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A question remains unanswered: Albeit intrinsically aristocratic, was England nevertheless a liberal society? Constant was in no doubt: it was the country where ‘social differences are most respected’ (wholly to the advantage of the aristocracy), but where, at the same time, ‘the rights of each man are most guaranteed’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was also de Tocqueville’s opinion, but only after 1848, once anxiety about the socialist and Bonapartist drift of France had eclipsed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg123&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;123&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;any other consideration. ‘[T]he aristocratic constitution of English society’ was incontestable, and yet it was still the ‘wealthiest and freest country’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prior to the fall of the July Monarchy, by contrast, de Tocqueville had his doubts and reservations. It was necessary to distinguish between ‘two different forms of liberty’. One should not confuse ‘the democratic and, dare I say it, correct conception of liberty’ with the ‘aristocratic conception of liberty’, understood not as ‘common right’ but as ‘privilege’. The latter prevailed in England, as in ‘aristocratic societies’ in general, with the result that there was no place for ‘general liberty’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; referred and subscribed to the observation of a US citizen who had journeyed extensively in Europe: ‘The English treat their servants with a stiffness and imperiousness of manner which surprises us.’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not that the pathos of liberty was absent among those who adopted the stance of absolute masters. On the contrary: ‘It can happen that the love of liberty is all the more alive among some the less one encounters guarantees of liberty for all. The rarer it is, the exception in such cases is all the more precious.’ This aristocratic conception of liberty produces, among those who have been thus educated, an exalted sense of their individual value and a passionate taste for independence.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Regardless of the value judgement, which is the converse, we are put in mind of Burke’s well-known observation: freedom appears even ‘more noble and more liberal’ to slave-masters. Should we equate England with slaveholding Virginia? In fact, points in common were not wanting, as emerges from a reading of de Tocqueville. He observed that in the United States whites refused to recognize ‘the common features of humanity’ in blacks.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But in England, too, inequalities were so marked and insuperable that ‘each class assumes the aspect of a distinct race’; ‘general ideas’ were lacking, starting precisely with the idea of humanity.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point, de Tocqueville was concerned to distinguish American democracy from the aristocracy predominant in England. However, on several occasions his analysis ended up drawing attention to the similarities between the two societies. What took the form of class relations on one side of the Atlantic presented itself as race relations on the other. In the case of England, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg124&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;124&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;we can speak of liberal society in the same way that Burke spoke of liberal society in connection with the Virginia and Poland of his time. An essential point remains: often excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights and negative liberty in England itself, the popular classes, by de Tocqueville’s indirect but all the more significant admission, continued to be separated from the upper class or caste by a gulf that calls to mind the one obtaining in a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, it can be said that for some time even the society which emerged in England from the Glorious Revolution was configured as a sort of ‘master-race democracy’, on condition that this category is not understood in a purely ethnic sense. On this side of the Atlantic, too, an insurmountable barrier separated the community of the free and masters from the mass of servants, not fortuitously compared by Locke to ‘natives’. And far from being satisfied with negative liberty, the dominant aristocracy cultivated the ideal of active participation in political life, cultivating ‘republican’ ideals. Several influential contemporary interpreters base their arguments on this, when referring to a ‘neo-Roman’ vision or ‘Machiavellian moment’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we face the danger of inadvertent transfiguration: these two categories highlight the pathos of free, egalitarian participation in public life, but end up passing in silence over the macroscopic exclusion clauses presupposed by such pathos. The ideal of a rich public life, of ‘neo-Roman’ or ‘Machiavellian’ character, is indeed present in an author like Fletcher, who on the one hand declared himself ‘republican in principle’, while on the other he advocated slavery for vagrants. Locke can be assimilated to such a milieu. He declared in favour of black slavery in the colonies and ‘drudgery’ for wage-labourers in the metropolis. At the same time, with his focus on the aristocracy he developed a pathos of the Commonwealth and the &#039;&#039;civitas&#039;&#039;, which echoes the republican models of antiquity. This, at least, was the opinion of Josiah Tucker, who identified and denounced Locke as a ‘republican Whig’ and supporter of slavery.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But perhaps the author who in England best expressed the ideal of ‘master-race democracy’ was Sidney. His insistence on the equality of free men was very marked: ‘the equality in which men are born is so perfect, that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others do the like’. Definitive is his condemnation of political slavery, inherent not only in absolute monarchy, but also in any political regime that claimed to subject the freeman to laws decided without his consent. But this pathos of liberty implied the demand for &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#page125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0008_split_008.html#pg125&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;125&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the master’s right to be ‘judge’ of his own servant without outside interference.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One should not lose sight of the fact that ‘in many places (even by the law of God) the master hath a power of life and death over his servant’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the base and effeminate Asiaticks and Africans’, incapable of understanding the value of ‘liberty’, were rightly regarded by Aristotle as &#039;&#039;‘slaves by nature’&#039;&#039; and ‘little different from beasts’.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance—together with Locke, Fletcher and Burgh—Sidney was indicated by Jefferson as a leading authority for understanding ‘the general principles of liberty’ that inspired the United States.[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Tucker also conjoined Locke and Sidney, but this time critically. He further pointed out that Sidney was an admirer of ‘Polish liberty’[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and of a country where serfdom in its harshest form, to which peasants were subjected, was intertwined with the rich political life of the aristocracy that dominated the Diet), and paid homage to ‘republican liberty’ (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Also expressing himself in flattering terms about Poland, as well as the ‘southern colonies’ of America, was Burke, who not by chance became the tutelary deity of the slaveholding South. Admiration for a regime of republican liberty founded on the slavery or servitude of a considerable proportion of the population, for a ‘master-race democracy’, was well represented in English liberalism. The authors expressing such positions could in their turn count on widespread sympathy across the Atlantic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn1a|1]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonopartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn2a|2]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn3a|3]] Francis Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America&#039;&#039;, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 301.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn4a|4]] Garry Wills, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn5a|5]] Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 2, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn6a|6]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_000.html#c04-ftn7a|7]] Jefferson Davis, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 399–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn8a|8]] Arthur Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 10–11, 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn9a|9]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn10a|10]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;A Consuming Fire&#039;&#039;, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998, p. 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn11a|11]] Plessy versus Ferguson, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Isssues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn12a|12]] Herbert S. Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, pp. 51, 234–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn13a|13]] The term was coined in late 1863: cf. Forrest G. Wood, &#039;&#039;Black Scare&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, pp. 53ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn14a|14]] Klein, &#039;&#039;Slavery in the Americas&#039;&#039;, pp. 50–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn16a|16]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn17a|17]] Joel Williamson, &#039;&#039;New People&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 66.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn19a|19]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn20a|20]] Ibid., pp. 19–22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn21a|21]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn22a|22]] Ibid., p. 112.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn23a|23]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie, ou L’esclavage aux États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gosselin, 1840, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn24a|24]] Robert William Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Consent or Contract&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1991, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn25a|25]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn26a|26]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn27a|27]] Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 399.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn28a|28]] David Grimsted, &#039;&#039;American Mobbing, 1828–1861&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_001.html#c04-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn31a|31]] Frederick Douglass, ‘What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July’, in Alice Moore Dunbar, ed., &#039;&#039;Masterpieces of Negro Eloquence, 1818–1913&#039;&#039;, Mineola (NY): Dover Publications, 2000, pp. 23–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn32a|32]] Zilversmit, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation&#039;&#039;, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn34a|34]] Beaumont, &#039;&#039;Marie&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn35a|35]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn36a|36]] Brenda Stevenson, &#039;&#039;Life in Black and White&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 275; David B. Davis, ‘White Wives and Slave Mothers’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 20 February 1997, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn37a|37]] Dew quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn38a|38]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 97, 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn39a|39]] Nelcya Delanoë and Joëlle Rostkowski, &#039;&#039;Les Indiens dans l’histoire américaine&#039;&#039;, Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1991, pp. 74–5, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn40a|40]] Dew, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 320.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn41a|41]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 6, 10; Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 62, 205, 425.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn42a|42]] Hosea Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, trans. Alda Carrer and Davide Danti, Milan: Jaca Book, 1997, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn43a|43]] Fogel, &#039;&#039;Without Contract or Consent&#039;&#039;, p. 413.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn44a|44]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, p. 11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn45a|45]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 405.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn46a|46]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn47a|47]] Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’, in &#039;&#039;The Significance of the Frontier in American History and Other Essays&#039;&#039;, ed. John Mack Faragher, New York: Holt, 1994, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn48a|48]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 120, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn49a|49]] William E. B. Du Bois, &#039;&#039;Black Reconstruction in America&#039;&#039;, ed. David L. Lewis, New York: Athenaeum, 1992, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn50a|50]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn51a|51]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 95 and &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, pp. 394, 397.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn52a|52]] George M. Frederickson, ‘America’s Original Sin’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 25 March 2004, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn53a|53]] Jaffe, &#039;&#039;Sudafrica&#039;&#039;, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn54a|54]] Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism, passim&#039;&#039;; George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;; Jennings, &#039;&#039;The Creation of America, passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 5, p. 22.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_002.html#c04-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 326.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn58a|58]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 158, 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., p. 158.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn62a|62]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 119, 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_003.html#c04-ftn65a|65]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, pp. 411–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn66a|66]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 339, 343.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., p. 344.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn69a|69]] Douglas A. Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978, p. 94.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn70a|70]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 339.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn71a|71]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, pp. 101–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn72a|72]] John Cannon, &#039;&#039;Aristocratic Century&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn73a|73]] Lorimer, &#039;&#039;Colour, Class and the Victorians&#039;&#039;, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn74a|74]] Wakefield, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, p. 342.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_004.html#c04-ftn75a|75]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in France and Italy from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn76a|76]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn77a|77]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 258–9, 261–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 302.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn79a|79]] Bentham, quoted in Gertrude Himmelfarb, &#039;&#039;The Idea of Poverty&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, pp. 78–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn80a|80]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn81a|81]] Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 803 (letter to John Fothergill, 14 March 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn82a|82]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 173–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 22 November 1836).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn83a|83]] Michelle Perrot, Introduction to ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_005.html#c04-ftn85a|85]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 19, §1; ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn86a|86]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 38.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn87a|87]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 180, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn88a|88]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 2, p. 307.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn89a|89]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94–5. De Tocqueville is reporting a conversation between two influential representatives of the English political world, Nassau William Senior and John Revans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn91a|91]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 2, pp. 371–3; cf. also vol. 1, p. 289.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn93a|93]] Thomas Pakenham, &#039;&#039;The Year of Liberty&#039;&#039;, New York: Random House, 1969, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn94a|94]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945, pp. 631, 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn95a|95]] Michael C. N. Salbstein, &#039;&#039;The Emancipation of the Jews in Britain&#039;&#039;, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn96a|96]] Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, p. 681.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, p. 295.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn98a|98]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, p. 402.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn99a|99]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn100a|100]] See ibid., p. 183.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn101a|101]] Ibid., pp. 125–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn102a|102]] David Cannadine, &#039;&#039;The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 14, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn103a|103]] Ibid., p. 14&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn104a|104]] Ibid., pp. 13, 74.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_006.html#c04-ftn105a|105]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn106a|106]] C. B. Macpherson, &#039;&#039;The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn107a|107]] Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn108a|108]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 889, 891.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn109a|109]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 1, p. 23.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 327 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 4 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn111a|111]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_007.html#c04-ftn112a|112]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 323–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn113a|113]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, pp. 155, 150–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 333 (letter to L. de Kergorlay, 27 February 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn116a|116]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn117a|117]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 1, p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn118a|118]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 358.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn120a|120]] Quentin Skinner, &#039;&#039;Liberty Before Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 1ff.; J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;The Machiavellian Moment&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn121a|121]] Tucker, quoted in J. G. A. Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 119, 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn122a|122]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 548–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn123a|123]] Ibid., p. 312.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn124a|124]] Ibid., p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn125a|125]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 479.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn126a|126]] Tucker, quoted in Pocock, &#039;&#039;Virtue, Commerce, and History&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#c05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page126&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg127&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;127&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER FIVE =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;The Revolution in France and San Domingo, the Crisis of the English and American Models, and the Formation of Radicalism either Side of the Atlantic&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have hitherto been concerned almost exclusively with England and the United States. The truth is that the liberal party in France betrayed its weakness fairly early on. And yet, several years before the appearance of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, Voltaire likewise proceeded to celebrate the country that embodied the cause of liberalism at the time: ‘Commerce, which has brought wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has developed commerce in its turn. By means of it the nation has grown great’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘[t]he English are the only people on earth who have managed to prescribe limits to the power of kings’; they alone were genuinely free.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More generally, given the difficulty they faced in dealing with comprehensive censorship, the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; hoped to escape this kind of cage and hence looked with sympathy across the Channel. Even Helvétius, whom Diderot rebuked for his indulgence towards enlightened despotism, was compelled to make a significant concession: ‘It is said that this century is the century of philosophy … Today, everyone seems occupied with the search for truth. But there is only one country where it can be published with impunity—and that is England.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The island happily &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg128&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;128&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rid of absolute monarchy exercised a powerful attraction. In the columns of the &#039;&#039;Encyclopédie&#039;&#039;, Diderot held up England as an example of ‘temperate monarchy’, where ‘the sovereign is repository solely of executive power’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A little less than ten years later, proposing to restrict representative bodies to ‘major property-owners’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] he still viewed cross-Channel political institutions with great interest. In Condorcet’s view, too, they had the merit of having realized, albeit to an inadequate extent, the principles of the limitation of royal power, freedom of the press, habeas corpus and judicial independence.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, two years prior to the storming of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses on the political scene, the English model seemed to have triumphed in France as well. Supported by a wide popular consensus, the noble &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; challenged royal absolutism: ‘the anti-absolutism of the parlements’, or ‘aristocratic liberalism’, became the vehicle for widespread ‘liberal demands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Preserve of a nobility which, as a result also of the sale of offices, was open to the bourgeoisie, the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; for a while seemed destined to play godfather to the advent of a constitutional monarchy and to perform a role similar to that of the House of Lords and the House of Commons in England. Not by chance they appealed to Montesquieu, president of the Bordeaux &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; and a great admirer of the country that had emerged from the Glorious Revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Burke viewed this sensationally missed opportunity with regret, when he delivered his harsh indictment of a revolution that had degenerated rapidly and wickedly. Had it ended at the stage when the struggle was led by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, the French&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
would have shamed despotism from the earth [and] rendered the cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in every nation … You would have had a free constitution … a liberal order of commons to emulate and recruit that nobility …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg129&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;129&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unfortunately, this happy, auspicious moment had been short-lived; and people had started chasing after ‘a pure democracy’ that in fact secreted a tendency to a ‘party tyranny’ and ‘a mischievous and ignoble oligarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Reflections on the Revolution in France&#039;&#039; was published on 1 November 1790, but its basic arguments had already been set out with great clarity in a speech by Burke in the Commons on 9 February of that year. Jacobinism lay in the future. Rather than transforming the British Whig into the prophet of a catastrophe no one was in a position to predict at the time, we should examine the events that had occurred when he levelled his serious charges against the French Revolution. Revealing is the observation that, rather than striving to create a ‘bad constitution’ &#039;&#039;ex nihilo&#039;&#039;, the French should have engaged in further improving the ‘good one’, of which ‘[t]hey were in possession … the day the states met in separate orders’. The ruinous turn occurred when, in the course of the meeting of the Estates-General summoned by the King—at which the ‘good’ Constitution finally emerged or, rather, re-emerged—the tradition whereby the orders sat in separate chambers was abandoned and the transition to voting by head was decided, with the consequent transformation on 9 July of the Estates-General into a constituent National Assembly wherein the former Third Estate now possessed a majority. Thus burst onto the scene the ‘bad constitution’, which ‘melted down the whole into one incongruous, ill-connected mass’. Everything else flowed from this: the attack on ‘the root of all property’ and ‘confiscat[ion] [of] all the possessions of the church’—the reference is to the night of 4 August 1789 and the abolition of feudal privileges (hunting rights, tithes, and so on)—and the promulgation on 26 August of the ‘mad declaration’ of the Rights of Man, that ‘sort of &#039;&#039;institute&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;digest&#039;&#039; of anarchy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But everything began on 9 July. The French Revolution proved fatally degenerate even before the capture of the Bastille and the intervention of the popular masses—in a sense, even before its inception. And in fact Burke was concerned to stress that ‘the glorious event commonly called the Revolution in England’ was in fact ‘a revolution, not made, but prevented’: William of Orange ‘was called in by the flower of the English aristocracy to defend its antient constitution, and not to level all distinctions’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as, alas, had happened in France. The latter had now gone beyond its fleeting liberal phase, which extended from the agitation of the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; to the summoning of the Estates-General.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#page130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_000.html#pg130&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;130&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The subsequent liberal tradition is inclined to extend the felicitous phase of the French Revolution somewhat, and identify the turning point in the tumultuous intervention of the popular masses, initially rural and then urban; thus de Tocqueville. But it is interesting to note that he, too, after 1848 at any rate, extolled the period when the movement was directed by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;, all of them striving to reverse ‘the old absolute power’ and ‘the old arbitrary system’, and win ‘political liberty’, in a struggle promoted and led not by the ‘low classes’ but by the ‘higher’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, contrary to Burke, who tended to conceive the parliamentary agitation on the model of the so-called Glorious Revolution, de Tocqueville was prepared to stress that in this phase, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, an authentic revolution was underway:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It should not be thought that the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; presented these principles as novelties. On the contrary, it derived them very industriously from the depths of the antiquity of the monarchy … It is a strange sight to see ideas that had hardly been born thus wrapped in ancient swaddling clothes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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It was ‘a very great revolution, but one that should rapidly have faded into the immensity of what happened and thus disappeared from the view of history’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only in a subsequent phase ‘was the &#039;&#039;Parlement&#039;&#039; no longer praised’ in the revolutionary movement, but ‘reviled, turning its liberalism against it’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ruinous parabola of the French Revolution could be synthesized thus: ‘At the outset it was Montesquieu who was quoted and expounded; at the end people spoke exclusively of Rousseau.’ The turning point was described in terms similar to those we have noted in Burke: the rot set in when people rushed towards ‘pure democracy’ and laid claim to change ‘the very structure of society’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Even closer to Burke was Guizot, who pointed to the eruption of the ‘Third Estate’s struggle against the nobility and the clergy’ as the moment when the French Revolution ceased to have ‘liberty’ as its goal and aimed exclusively at ‘power’, paving the way for the subsequent, interminable struggles—‘those of the poor against the rich, of the common people against the bourgeoisie, of the rabble against respectable folk [&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;]’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg131&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;131&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;2. Parliaments, diets, the liberal aristocracy and serfdom&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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For Burke, the revolution in France should ultimately have confined itself to liberalizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. This was not an isolated, polemical idea. In stressing the particular attachment to liberty displayed by slave-owners, the discourse of reconciliation with the rebel colonists offered a general consideration:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]hese people of the southern colonies are much more strongly, and with an higher and more stubborn spirit, attached to liberty, than those to the northward. Such were all the ancient commonwealths; such were our Gothick ancestors; such in our days were the Poles; and such will be all masters of slaves, who are not slaves themselves. In such a people, the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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No distinction is made here between slavery in the strict sense and the serfdom prevalent, in its harshest forms, in eastern Europe. In any event, the servile subjection of blacks or peasants, far from contradicting it, rendered the love of liberty by property-owners and freemen stronger and more credible.&lt;br /&gt;
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Sidney too was an admirer of Poland. Along with other ‘northern nations’, it was inspired by a love of liberty. What demonstrated this was, among other things, the fact that the king derived from ‘popular elections’—in other words, appointment by the Diet of nobles.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, proudly asserting their condition as free, equal men in the face of the monarch were magnates who wielded absolute power over their serfs. But Sidney argued along the lines we have already encountered: as with slavery, liberalism was also compatible with serfdom. In fact, both institutions rendered the appreciation of liberty more profound and more jealous.&lt;br /&gt;
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In Burke there is complete consistency between the recognition granted Poland and that granted the French &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039;. The latters’ agitation was quite the reverse of an isolated phenomenon: ‘In Sweden the years from 1719 to 1772 are known as the Age of Freedom, because at this time the Diet or Riksdag ruled without interference by the King. Indeed, these Swedish Whigs, after their revolution of 1719, had the works of John Locke translated into Swedish.’ In Hungary the nobles instead appealed above all to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while, in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg132&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;132&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even more ringing language, the Polish aristocracy paid homage to ‘republican liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[t]he diets, estates, parlements, and councils all stoutly defended liberty, and indeed stood for many genuine liberal ideas; but at the same time they palpably insisted on the maintenance or enlargement of their own privileges.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this context we can also situate Bismarck’s celebration some decades later of the ‘liberal caste sentiments’ (&#039;&#039;ständisch-liberale Stimmung&#039;&#039;) of the class he belonged to,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which was interested in extending the jurisdiction and powers of representative bodies also in order to reinforce control over servants.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar observation can be made in connection with the agitation set off by the French &#039;&#039;parlements:&#039;&#039; guiding the ‘assault’ on royal absolutism was ‘one of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime’s&#039;&#039; most traditional institutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in addition to the English model, it was to this initial phase of the French Revolution—the one admired by Burke and de Tocqueville post-1848—that the liberal nobility of the Hapsburg Empire appealed to condemn Joseph II’s anti-feudal reforms, to reassert the role of diets and intermediate bodies, and hence ‘regain … control over their peasants’ and the ‘other political liberties’ they had lost.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sidney had already specified that a common feature of ‘northern nations’, which embodied the principle of liberty, was assignment of a decisive role to ‘lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The aristocratic liberalism represented in France by the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; was thus widely diffused in Europe, especially central and eastern Europe. Certainly, unlike Burke, Montesquieu expressed a negative opinion of Poland, ‘where the peasants are slaves of the nobility’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The British Whig was well aware of these social relations. In fact, he started out from them to underscore the emphatic love of liberty displayed by slave-owners in Poland, as across the Atlantic. By contrast, Montesquieu saw liberty at work in the English colonies in America, but not in Poland. Does Burke demonstrate greater logical rigour? In reality, in accordance with his principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’, Montesquieu did not identify with Poland, which could not invoke the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#page133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_001.html#pg133&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;133&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;justification or extenuation of a hot climate and where the zone of unfreedom lacked spatial as well as racial delimitation.&lt;br /&gt;
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It remains the case that Burke’s attitude had deep roots in the philosophy of history of the liberal tradition, which from Montesquieu onwards tended to date the inception of the history of freedom and free, representative government from the ancient Germans. Among them, as we know from Grotius, the institution of slavery was very much present and yet (according to the author of &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;), ‘the English have taken their idea of political government from the Germans’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such presuppositions, Madame de Staël celebrated the liberty enjoyed by old France, despite the heavy presence of serfdom,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and Constant ‘the intermediate bodies’ and &#039;&#039;‘Parlements’&#039;&#039; wrongly weakened by royal despotism,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which played an important role in the initial phase of the revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The American Revolution and the crisis of the English model&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the seemingly favourable initial prospects, the English model met with rapid defeat in Paris. In reality, it was already deeply tarnished when the crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; reached maturity in France. In the 1760s, while the colonists’ rebellion was brewing across the Atlantic, John Wilkes attacked ‘the whole organization of the British oligarchy’ in London and initiated a crisis of such gravity as to make the Italian Pietro Verri believe in the imminence of ‘civil war’. Persecuted at home, Wilkes for a time found refuge in Paris, where he formed relations with the group of &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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However, the turning point in the process that threw the English model into crisis in France was represented by the American Revolution. The British Constitution now ceased to be celebrated, and criticisms of Montesquieu for having transfigured it were not lacking.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The increasingly bitter condemnation of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; derived comfort from transatlantic political and social developments. Although not refusing England acknowledgement of the merits earned with the liquidation of royal absolutism, Condorcet looked primarily to America, with its magnificent ‘spectacle of equality’, without any trace of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg134&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;134&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belief diffused, albeit to different degrees, on both sides of the Channel that nature had ‘divided the human race into three or four orders’, condemning only one of them to ‘work much and eat little’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now appeal was no longer made to the Glorious Revolution, from which a liberal but also aristocratic England had emerged, but to the ‘happy revolution’ across the Atlantic,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] which had given birth to a markedly superior politico-social reality: ‘there is no distinction of orders’ and ‘there is nothing that confines one part of the human species to an abjectness consigning it to idiocy as well as misery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Diderot was even more swingeing. The new country, which offered ‘all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum from fanaticism and tyranny’, was an alternative model to the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that continued to be all the rage in the old continent as a whole, and where ‘the inept, the corrupt rich and the pernicious [are promoted] to the most important offices’. Adherence to the cause of the rebel colonists was, at the same time, a ruthless critique of the behaviour of British troops and against Britain as such. This emerges from celebration of the ‘brave Americans, who have preferred to see their women outraged, their children slain, their homes destroyed, their fields ruined, their cities burnt, and who have preferred to shed their blood and die, rather than lose the least part of their liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks also to the support furnished to the American revolutionaries by France, their arguments were bound to find a favourable echo in Paris, and they involved an unequivocal condemnation of the country that Paine in &#039;&#039;Common Sense&#039;&#039; (substantially translated immediately after its publication) branded as ‘British barbarity’, ‘the Royal Brute of Britain’, whose aristocratic character was already evident from ‘what is called the Magna Charta’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nor should we lose sight of the presence in Paris, in the decisive years of the revolutionary crisis, of Jefferson, who, a few weeks after the storming of the Bastille, advised France to keep its distance from England’s worst aspects (a form of representation that was quite the reverse of equal—in fact, ‘abominably partial’—as well as the ‘absolute’ power which the monarch continued to possess in reality thanks to the venality of parliamentarians).[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg135&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;135&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This was the intellectual climate in which Brissot and Clavière, two figures destined to play a central role in the French Revolution, published a book in 1787 dedicated ‘to the American Congress and the friends of the United States in the two worlds’, and marked throughout by admiration for ‘free Americans’ and ‘free America’, for its ‘free’ and ‘excellent’ Constitution and noble ‘republican customs’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The counterpoint to such celebration was, of course, condemnation of ‘London’s ministerial despotism’ and the ‘ferocity’ of its troops. The ‘English nation’ was now vainly seeking to remedy the ‘devastation of its cruel dementia’ and renew relations with the country born in the wake of the struggle against it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This division must be followed by an intellectual and political alliance between those who had struggled together against England—namely, the United States and France, which ‘with its arms helped assert the independence of free America’, and which was now summoned to take inspiration from the great new model embodied by the country thrown up by the revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On this basis, Brissot and Clavière set up the French–American Society.&lt;br /&gt;
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When, two years later, the debate began that issued in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, not a few interventions appealed to the American example and the sort of synthetic proclamation of the rights of man contained in the Declaration of Independence. In an attempt to counter the revolution’s radicalization, Malouet, who became the spokesman for the interests of slave-owners in the colonies, drew attention to the radical differences between the United States and France. In the first case, there was a society ‘entirely composed of property-owners already accustomed to equality’. In the second, one witnessed the agitation of ‘an immense multitude of men without property’ in a daily struggle for survival and ‘placed by fate in a condition of dependency’: a gulf separated ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society’. This was where appeals to ‘democracy’ and the rights of man could have devastating consequences for the social order.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Stripped of its ideological caution and reticence, the meaning of the speech was clear. In America, thanks to expansion into territories occupied by the Indians and their expropriation, it was possible significantly to expand the ranks of property-owners who were European in origin. On the other hand, the ‘unfortunate classes’ were not in a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#page136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_002.html#pg136&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;136&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;position to do harm: they mainly comprised blacks reduced to slavery or relegated to a subaltern caste and subject to iron social control. Waved exclusively within the white community and the superior race, the flag of democracy and the rights of man had nothing subversive about it. But in France …&lt;br /&gt;
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Malouet’s reasoning was not flawless. However, it was no longer possible to revert to the situation prior to the American Revolution. After the formation of significantly more democratic representative bodies at federal and state levels in the United States, little credibility could attach to the British parliament, which on the basis of a law of 1716 that remained in force for nearly two centuries (until 1911) was elected every seven years,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and monopolized by the landed aristocracy. Moreover, it was undermined by a corruption that had become proverbial in Europe and across the Atlantic, which seemed in France to be a repeat of the sale of offices—an essential element of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; that was to be got rid of.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the course of their argument with London, the American revolutionaries had equated citizens deprived of the right of representation with slaves. But now this argument came to be applied in France by those who were opposed to censitary discrimination in the suffrage. This, thundered Robespierre, criticizing those inspired by the ‘example of England’, reduced the excluded to a condition similar to the slave: ‘liberty consists in obeying the laws one has given oneself and slavery in being forced to submit to an alien will’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, Babeuf argued in similar fashion: ‘citizens whose will is inactive—such men are slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] These were declarations that could have come from the mouth of an American revolutionary; only now, pronounced in favour not of a narrow elite of gentlemen and property-owners, but of the mass of the dispossessed, they assumed a very different political and social value.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The transfiguration of American ‘master-race democracy’ in a universalistic key&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Focusing attention on the problem of slavery, the argument that developed on both sides of the Atlantic initially discredited England, protagonist of the slave trade, more than it did the rebel colonists: ‘staining the reputation of that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg137&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;137&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;nation’ (observed Diderot in 1774) ‘is the fact that its blacks are the unhappiest of blacks’. Indeed, ‘the Englishman, enemy of tyranny at home, is the most ferocious despot abroad’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &#039;&#039;Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; reiterated the point: ‘The English, this people so jealous of their own liberty, have contempt for that of other men’. They did not hesitate to employ the most bestial methods and the most refined forms of torture to smother any hint of rebellion and any aspiration to freedom by their slaves; ‘it is to this excess of barbarism that the trading and slavery of blacks have necessarily led the usurpers’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, when it allied with the powers of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to fight revolutionary France, and refused to follow the latter’s example in abolishing slavery (decreed by the Jacobin Convention in February 1794, in the wake of the revolution by the black slaves led by Toussaint L’Ouverture), England was widely discredited in Europe. Robespierre was not alone in declaring that the island across the Channel could seem like a model of liberty only at a time when France groaned under monarchical absolutism. This was also Kant’s opinion: ‘England, which at one time could count on the sympathy of the best men in the world … has now completely lost that sympathy.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While it provoked the crisis of the English model, the American Revolution prompted portrayals and hopes that were destined to prove completely unrealistic. At work was the illusion that the institution of slavery was destined rapidly to disappear in the republic produced by a great struggle for freedom. The founders of the French–American Society explicitly expressed themselves in such terms: ‘The most beautiful feature for which one honours the public spirit in the United States’ was ‘the emancipation of the blacks’. Thanks to the Quakers’ abolitionist campaigning, it ‘will soon be universal in all this part of the world’, so that only the Europeans, still committed to the slave trade and the oppression of blacks, would remain to blush at ‘their barbarism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Condorcet adopted a similar position: the rebel colonists were the ‘friends of universal liberty’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Consequently, one could start from the presupposition that the stain of slavery would soon be washed away:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#page138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_003.html#pg138&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;138&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Slavery is universally regarded in the thirteen states as a crime of &#039;&#039;lèse-humanité&#039;&#039; … Now, given this opinion, it will be hard for the private interests of the slave-owners to prevail for long in a country where the press is free and where all measures of public authority, all the deliberations of the legislative body … are necessarily public acts.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This illusion is readily explicable: it involved a confusion between the abolition of the slave trade (effectively provided for by the US Constitution, which sanctioned its termination in 1808) and the abolition of slavery (which continued to flourish); and there was a sense that the process set in train in the North would shortly encompass the Union as a whole. More generally, the rebel colonists’ passionate denunciation of despotism and political slavery sounded like a declaration of war on any form of enslavement, and hence like the inception of black emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
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The process of transfiguring events across the Atlantic sometimes became a total misunderstanding. Enthusiastically saluting the rebel colonists, Raynal advertised a prize for answers to the question whether ‘the discovery of America has been useful or harmful to the human race’. The four responses submitted concurred in denouncing the event as a harbinger of intolerance and slavery and pointing to the American Revolution as the remedy for such ills.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The rebellion that broke out in the name also of the right to untrammelled expansion into lands inhabited by savages was thus construed in the completely opposite sense!&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The colonists of San Domingo, the American model and the second liberal inception of the French Revolution&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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At the outset, it was not understood in France that the independence secured by the white colonists strengthened their control over the Indians and blacks; and it was not realized that a similar dialectic was tending to develop in the French colonies. In the 1781 edition of the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039;, Diderot on the one hand evoked the figure of a ‘black Spartacus’, summoned to rise up against the slave-owners, but on the other, harking back to the example of the American Revolution, declared for the concession of self-government to San Domingo too, which would precisely have entailed the triumph of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg139&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;139&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;slave-owners. The philosopher did not perceive the contradiction, and nor did Brissot, who took a similar position.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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With the outbreak of the French Revolution, self-government became the watchword of colonists interested in preserving the institution of slavery and shielding their property from the interference, whims and despotism attributed to central government. Among the first to make himself spokesman for these ideas and interests was Malouet, who in 1788 had already engaged in a sharp polemic against the abolitionists. Certainly, the institution of slavery was out of the question for a ‘free and proud nation’ like France. To tolerate it on metropolitan territory would risk erasing the boundary between liberty and slavery and inducing a ‘general enslavement’. Malouet was a liberal and admired England, where he took refuge following the failure of projects for establishing a monarchy on the English model in France. He appealed to the ‘wise Locke’ and his &#039;&#039;Treatises of Government&#039;&#039; to argue that slavery for ‘barbarous peoples … does not offend the right of nature’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence Malouet took care not to challenge the spatial and racial delimitation of slavery, as had his contemporary and fellow countryman Melon (against whom Montesquieu argued): slavery was inconceivable in the metropolis and, within the colonies, for the white race.&lt;br /&gt;
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In relation to blacks, however, the discourse was very different: transported to America, they were providentially released from the ‘most absurd despotism’, which raged in Africa. It was true that they continued to suffer slavery, albeit of a decidedly milder variety than that prevalent in their countries of origin. However, much more so than the American slave, whose subsistence was guaranteed and who was protected by a series of laws, it was the European ‘worker’ (&#039;&#039;journalier&#039;&#039;) who was ‘subject to the &#039;&#039;absolute will’&#039;&#039;, the power of life and death, of his master, who, denying or ejecting him from work, could calmly condemn him to death. People cried scandal at the punishments inflicted on slaves, but what happened in Europe? A peasant who stole was hanged, a poacher was condemned to ‘forced labour’—a slavery much more pitiless than that typically existing across the Atlantic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, we encounter the arguments that would later receive more developed theoretical systematization particularly in Calhoun.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg140&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;140&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Once the French Revolution had broken out, supporting the colonists’ interests and arguments was the Massiac Club, founded in Paris in August 1789, of which Malouet was a prominent member. Likewise aligned in defence of the colonists’ right to self-government and the undisturbed enjoyment of their property (plantations and slaves) was Antoine Barnave. We are dealing with an important author who expressed his liberal convictions not only in immediately political terms, but also at the level of the philosophy of history. In him too we find the dialectic we are already familiar with: ringing condemnation of political ‘slavery’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] did not prevent him from forcefully and skilfully defending the cause of the slaveholding colonists. The ‘spirit of liberty’ (he observed) increased and strengthened with the expansion of ‘industry’, ‘wealth’ and, above all, ‘movable wealth’. That was why, even prior to England with its splendid ‘Constitution’, it emerged in Holland, ‘the country where movable wealth has accumulated most’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Slaves were an integral part of this ‘movable property’, and had already been classified among the ‘movable’ goods in Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The Massiac Club and Barnave were generally considered ‘Anglomanes’ and genuinely were, in the sense that they opposed the radicalization of the French Revolution and admired and envied the country across the Channel for its orderly rule of law and strict censitary discrimination, which consecrated the untrammelled, exclusive domination of the property-owning classes. However, in another respect they were led to appeal predominantly to the American model, with its pathos of the inviolable autonomy of representative bodies and states from central power and the guarantee that derived from it of the inviolability of the institution of slavery. In the face of central government, the colonies adopted the stance of the southern states. In March 1790 the colonists won a temporary victory:&lt;br /&gt;
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The National Assembly declared that it had not the slightest intention of updating any branch of its trade with the colonies. It placed the colonists and their property under the special protection of the nation. It declared anyone who plotted to incite uprisings against them a criminal to the nation.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg141&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;141&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a success that was repeated about a year later: ‘The National Assembly made it a constitutional rule that no law on the condition of unfree persons in the colonies could be made except at the formal, unsolicited request of the colonial Assemblies.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the whole discourse revolved around the problem of slavery, the relevant term did not appear: the articles of the US Constitution were imitated in substance and form alike. This was the French Revolution’s second liberal inception. Just as the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; expressed the desire for self-government by the liberal nobility in the metropolis, so the colonial Assemblies gave voice to the slave-owners’ desire for self-government in the colonies.&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet this second liberal inception was even more precarious than the first. Following the defeat suffered during the Seven Years’ War, France had lost virtually all its colonial empire in 1763. This had imparted to the critique of colonialism and the institution of slavery a diffusion and radicalism hampered, by contrast, in the English and American world by substantial material interests and a national, chauvinistic spirit understandably reinforced by victory. We can thus understand the split that immediately occurred in the French liberal party. Aspiring to a constitutional monarchy with the right to make war and peace reserved to the king, Mirabeau, like Malouet and Barnave, looked to England. Unlike them, however, he ended up rejecting the American model when it came to regulating the relations between central power, on the one hand, and colonies and colonists, on the other. In the Constituent Assembly the latter demanded that they be represented in proportion not only to their numbers, but also to the number of their slaves, in accordance with a criterion identical or similar to that adopted by the US Constitution. Here is Mirabeau’s stinging reply:&lt;br /&gt;
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If the colonists want the blacks and people of colour to be men, well then, emancipate them, so that all are electors and all can be elected. Otherwise, we beg them to note that, in proportioning the number of deputies to the population of France, we have not taken into consideration the number of our horses and mules. The colonists’ claim to have twenty representatives is therefore utterly ridiculous.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was an argument that also applied in the United States, as is confirmed by a subsequent position of Mirabeau’s:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#page142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_004.html#pg142&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;142&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I shall not debase either this assembly or myself by seeking to prove that the blacks have a right to liberty. You decided this question when you declared that all men are born and remain equal and free. And it is not on this side of the Atlantic that corrupt fallacies will dare to maintain that blacks are not men.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The condemnation of ideologies of slavery targeted both French colonists and the English colonists who had now constituted themselves as an independent state: the polemic against the former could not but encompass the latter; the initial ambiguity, which had led French abolitionists to attribute a completely imaginary universalistic impetus to the authors of the American Revolution, was dispelled—all the more so in that it was the very ideologues of slavery who drew attention to the vitality of that institution in the United States. Brissot had believed that the example of the Quakers of Pennsylvania would act as a model; in a sense adopting an observation already present in Smith, Malouet had pointed out in 1788 that the abolition of slavery decided by it affected a fairly limited number of people and certainly did not extend to the southern states, where the presence of slaves and blacks was much more pronounced.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1802 Baudry des Lozières’ sarcasm was stinging. Precisely where ‘Brissot locates perfection’, slavery not only flourished undisturbed, but manifested itself in particularly rigid form: ‘The North Americans, those lovers of liberty, those ardent republicans, who in their books celebrate their independence so much, buy and sell slaves.’ Moreover, ‘this country of liberty is very miserly in granting freedom’ and ‘those who are freed’ were treated ‘extremely harshly’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The crisis of the English and American models and the formation of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, figures were not lacking in the abolitionist camp who continued to harbour illusions about a possible restoration of the American model to its former splendour. The abolition of an institution whose stubborn survival was incomprehensible in a country so strongly attached to the cause of liberty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg143&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;143&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;would suffice. When in 1824 Lafayette visited the United States, where nearly fifty years earlier he had fought in the War of Independence, he cautiously tried to point out ‘the disadvantages of slavery’ in Ohio. However, his speech met with no success; in fact, his good intentions had an ironic objective accompaniment, since in various southern cities public notices warned ‘people of color’ to stay away from the ceremonies in honour of the illustrious guest.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Residual illusions were also evident in Grégoire. Demonstrating political naivety, in an attempt to convince Jefferson to abandon his racial prejudices, he referred to the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture to prove the ability of blacks to achieve a level of excellence![[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The French abbot was unaware of his interlocutor’s efforts, in his capacity as US president, to reduce the republic born in the wake of the black slave revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture to hunger and force it to surrender (see below, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn8|§8]]). Similarly, he did not know that in 1801 the latter was lamenting in his correspondence the fact that citizens of San Domingo were abducted by American corsairs and sold as slaves.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Leading the United States in 1801 was precisely Jefferson who, some years later, wrote to a friend in ironic terms about the French abolitionist abbot.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As the predicted and desired emancipation of black slaves became an ever more problematic and remote prospect, bitter disappointment set in, as demonstrated in particular by Condorcet’s evolution. On the immediate eve of the French Revolution, when the Constitution consecrating slavery was in force across the Atlantic, he still continued to draw a rather optimistic picture. The various states of the new republic and the ‘common Senate that represents them’ were unanimous in desiring the abolition of slavery; it was an ‘act of justice’ dictated by ‘humanity’, but also by ‘honour’. A severe warning was already implicit in this final observation: ‘How, without blushing, can one dare to demand these declarations of rights, these inviolable bulwarks of the liberty and security of citizens, if every day one permits oneself to violate the most sacred articles?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Some years later, where once it had been implicit, the distancing became explicit, even if it continued to be cautiously phrased. Compared with the French Revolution, the American presented itself as ‘more peaceful’, but also as ‘slower’ and ‘more incomplete’. Sooner or later, it too would end up applying &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg144&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;144&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principle of liberty and equality in its universality. But for the time being there continued the ‘crimes whose avarice soils the shores of America, Africa or Asia’, the ‘bloody contempt for men of another colour’, the slave trade between the two shores of the Atlantic, the tragedy of Africa and the ‘shameful brigandage that has corrupted and depopulated it for two centuries’. By contrast, it was a merit of the more advanced French culture to treat as ‘&#039;&#039;friends …&#039;&#039; those blacks whom their stupid tyrants disdain to rank among men’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We have seen Condorcet denounce the ‘general corruption’ of Holland and England as slaveholding societies. This denunciation increasingly tended also to encompass the country that emerged from the third liberal revolution. The Terror was already hanging over Condorcet himself, who nevertheless identified revolutionary France as the country called upon to put an end to&lt;br /&gt;
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the cunning and false policy which, forgetting that all men have equal rights by virtue of their very nature, wanted on the one hand to measure the extent of the rights to be granted by the size of the territory, the climate, national character, the wealth of the people, the degree of perfection of trade and industry; and on the other to sub-divide these same rights unequally between different classes of men, assigning them to birth, wealth and profession, thus creating contrary interests and opposed powers, to then establish a balance between them that is rendered necessary solely by these institutions and which does not even correct their dangerous influences.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The United States no longer represented the genuine antithesis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, construed by Condorcet as a complex system of forms of discrimination and privilege that lacerated the unity of the human race. It was necessary to overcome once and for all a political order in which, intertwined with the hierarchization of peoples on the basis of climate, geographical location or differential economic development, there was a hierarchization within any individual people on the basis of birth or membership of an estate. While the first type of discrimination found concentrated expression across the Atlantic, the second had certainly not disappeared in England. The critical or scornful reference to the argument of ‘climate’ (a position prominent in Montesquieu and often used to justify the slavery of colonial peoples), and to the argument of the ‘balance’ of powers (often invoked in England to justify the privileges of the House of Lords and the landed aristocracy), demonstrates that Condorcet &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg145&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;145&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;had become critical of the American and English models alike, and had ultimately broken with both fractions of the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
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Fully to understand Condorcet’s mature view, it is important to take account of a peculiarity of the French Revolution. In the course of its development, the popular uprising in the metropolis against the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; was soon followed by the clash in the colonies between freemen and slaves and between blacks and whites. The two conflicts were all the more closely intertwined because sections of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, engaged against the process of radicalization underway in Paris, were sometimes simultaneously interested, as the owners of slaves in the colonies, in preventing their emancipation. Those on the opposite side were thus led to assimilate noble privilege and racial privilege, branding them conjointly as two different expressions of aristocratic arrogance. In 1791 the Jacobin Sonthonax pointed to the liberal and spokesman for the slaveholding colonies, Barnave, as the ‘protector of the aristocracy of the epidermis’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years before the outbreak of the July Revolution, although now ferociously critical of Jacobinism, Abbé Grégoire issued a firm denunciation, already encapsulated in the title of his little book, of the ‘nobility of the skin’. The analogy was now developed in all its aspects. The ban on interracial marriages in the United States was compared to the social obligation which, under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, required the aristocracy not to contaminate itself with elements alien to it, with commoners: at work in both cases was an insane concern to safeguard ‘the purity of the blood’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was understood that ‘the nobility of the skin will suffer the same fate as the nobility of the scroll’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In short, the absolute power possessed by the slave-owner was certainly no more tolerable than that exercised by the monarch, and hence the ‘colonists’ were ‘similar to all despots’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this comparative perspective, the negative judgement on the United States was manifest: ‘Civilization is only dawning: five million Africans transported to America are still in chains there.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And if there was an encouraging example in the New World, it was not afforded by the ‘colonists’ and the country they had founded in North America:&lt;br /&gt;
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Simply by virtue of its existence, the republic of Haiti will be able to have a major influence on the destiny of Africans in the new world … A black &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg146&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;146&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;republic in the mid-Atlantic is a raised beacon to which the blushing oppressors and the sighing oppressed look. Seeing it, hope smiles on five million slaves scattered over the Antilles and the American continent.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Criticism of the American model became even more explicit and bitter as those who wished to preserve slavery in the colonies appealed to it. Against the abolitionist projects or ambitions of Paris, the colonists invoked the spectre of a repeat of the American Revolution. They too would be forced into independence if they did not succeed in securing self-government, so as to be able to freely dispose of their slaves, without a ‘despotic’ power interfering with their legitimate property from without and above. Again, after the July Revolution, the French colonists declared themselves ready ‘to hand themselves over to the American Union if the metropolis did not permit them slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Making this observation in 1842 was Victor Schoelcher who, six years later, played a key role in the definitive abolition of slavery in the French colonies, which had been reintroduced by Napoleon in 1802. And we can then understand the bitterness of the polemic against the transatlantic republic. ‘Skin prejudices’ remained particularly ‘inveterate among the Americans’; they could be considered ‘the most ferocious masters on the earth’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] authors of ‘one of the most upsetting spectacles the world has ever offered’. Not only blacks, but also white abolitionists, were hit by the most savage violence. Lynching threatened anyone who dared to challenge the ‘iniquitous property’ and ‘demand freedom for all members of the human race’. ‘There is no cruelty of the most barbarous age that has not been committed by the slave states of North America.’ Hence the hope for a revolution from below: ‘I hope that these brusque lynchers will one day all be hung by rebellious slaves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not by chance, Schoelcher, in condemning the crimes committed by ‘us other barbarians of the West’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] expressed his admiration for the ‘colossal revolution of S. Domingo’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and for the figure of Toussaint L’Ouverture, to whom he devoted a sympathetic biography.&lt;br /&gt;
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The gulf separating the new political current forming in France from the two fractions of the liberal party is clear. Like Schoelcher, Brissot, who had played a significant part in founding the French–American Society, did not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#page147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_005.html#pg147&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;147&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;hesitate to justify armed rebellion by black slaves and their right to revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] At this point the French–American Society was dead and buried. Between the July Revolution and the 1848 Revolution, manifestly in debate with French radicalism, de Tocqueville could once again present the United States as a model or source of inspiration only on condition of dropping the analogy between noble aristocracy and racial aristocracy, between monarchical despotism and slave despotism—the analogy on whose basis the North American republic was configured not as a model of liberty and democracy, but as a variant (and then not even the best) of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The liberal inception of the revolution in Latin America and its radical outcome&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In the metropolis and colonies alike, the French Revolution was transformed in a radical direction. To clarify this process further, we must begin with the definition which, in the course of the struggle against Stuart absolutism, at the start of the English liberal movement, one of its exponents gave of the ‘true liberty’ dear to him: ‘we know by a certain law that our wives, our children, our servants, our goods, are our own, that we build, we plough, we sow, we reap, for ourselves’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the event, ‘our servants’ did not passively endure assimilation to ‘our goods’ and, in opposition to the ‘true liberty’ cherished by the exponent of English proto-liberalism, demanded a quite different liberty, which required the intervention of political power to abolish servitude in its various forms and promote the emancipation of the subaltern classes. This is what occurred in France, thanks to the historically auspicious context already analysed. In the metropolis, the first liberal inception of the French Revolution was immediately followed by the revolt of the peasants (with the end, sealed on the night of 4 August 1789, of the feudal system), and then the agitation of the urban popular masses. The second liberal inception, which was to have consecrated self-government by slave-owners, ended up inciting the revolution of the slaves themselves. The latter achieved emancipation and later managed to frustrate the terrible war machine of Napoleonic France.&lt;br /&gt;
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A similar dialectic manifested itself in Latin America. Initially, the independence movement and revolution took the form of reactions against reform by the Spanish crown, which ‘reversed the old policy of segregating the Indians and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg148&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;148&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;urged them to assimilate by speaking Spanish and dressing in European style’. Such integrationist measures soon provoked the hostility of the Creole elite. The latter professed liberalism, and was liberal: it read Locke, Montesquieu and Adam Smith; it sometimes sought to enter into relations with Jefferson; it protested against central government interference and the obstacles it placed in the way of developing local industry; it aspired to emulate the example of the American Revolution.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the English colonists in the North, so for the Latin American Creoles in the South, the slave, as the planter’s private property, did not pertain to the public sphere. In the various manifestos that signalled the start of the war of independence against Spain, no positions in favour of abolishing slavery were adopted.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Where the English colonists had indignantly rejected London’s attempt to block their expansion beyond the Allegany Mountains, and proudly declared that they did not want to be treated ‘like negroes, the Latin American Creoles claimed equality with the peninsula’s ruling class and superiority to the Indians and, obviously, slaves deported from Africa. To this end they reminded Madrid that they were descendants of the conquistadores and, ultimately, artisans of the grandeur of the Spanish Empire. We are reminded of Franklin who, in the course of the controversy with the London government, had stressed the merits earned by the American colonists, ‘hazarding their Lives and Fortunes in subduing and settling new Countries, extending the Dominion and encreasing the Commerce of their Mother Nation’, enhancing the glory, ‘the Grandeur and Stability of the British Empire’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But it was not long before the two roads diverged sharply. The fact is that in Spanish America, together with the Creole revolution but counter to it, an Indian revolution developed. In fact, the latter had announced itself decades earlier, as demonstrated by the series of revolts culminating in 1780–81 in the Túpac Amaru rebellion, which sought to win the blacks to its cause, liberating them too from the shackles of slavery. By contrast, the Creoles initially rose up with liberal slogans, demanding self-government, challenging interference by central power, aiming, like the North American colonists, to strengthen their control over the native populations and blacks. It was precisely this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg149&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;149&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political project that formed the main target of the struggle by the Latin American Indians. Their revolution brings to mind the one that later erupted in San Domingo, and which issued in the formation of a new country: Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt: it was San Domingo–Haiti that gave the Creole independence movement a decisive turn. To overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish troops, Simón Bolívar sought to secure the support of the rebel ex-slaves of the Caribbean state, which he personally visited. The president at the time was Alexandre Pétion, who immediately received the Latin American revolutionary. He promised him the aid he requested on condition that he freed the slaves in areas as they were wrested from Spanish control. Transcending the class and caste limits of the social group he belonged to, and demonstrating intellectual and political courage, Bolívar accepted. Seven ships, 6,000 men with arms and munitions, a printing press and numerous advisors set out from the island.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the beginning of the abolition of slavery in much of Latin America.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bolívar started out as a liberal, appealing to Montesquieu,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] underlining the need for ‘a liberal Constitution’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] with ‘eminently liberal provisions’, which were to sanction ‘the rights of man, the freedom to act, think, speak and write’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] as well as ‘the division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience, a free press’—in short, ‘everything sublime that there is in politics’. He celebrated the ‘British Constitution’ and, above all, the American, the ‘most perfect of Constitutions’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, when he demanded not only liberty, but the ‘absolute freedom of the slaves’, Bolívar in fact took his distance from the United States, where, even in the North, blacks were confined to a caste which was not that of genuinely free men. And this distancing from the North American republic was confirmed by a further observation that ‘it is impossible to be free and slaves at the same time’. But especially significant was another element: the slave revolution from below, which in the United States represented a general nightmare, now became an object of explicit celebration. Bolívar not only appealed to the ‘history of the helots, Spartacus and Haiti’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] but in so doing defined Venezuelan and Latin American identity in a way that is worth reflecting on:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg150&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;150&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Let us bear in mind that our people is neither European nor North American. Rather than an emanation of Europe, it is a mixture of Africa and America because Spain itself ceased to be Europe on account of its African blood, its institutions and its character. It is impossible to determine exactly which human family we belong to. The majority of the indigenous population has been destroyed, the Europeans have mixed with Americans and Africans, and the latter with Indians and Europeans. All born from the breast of one and the same Mother, our fathers, different by origin and blood, are foreigners to one another and all visibly differ in their skin. Such diversity entails a consequence of the greatest importance. Thanks to the Constitution, interpreter of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The countries formed out of the independence struggle against the Madrid government thus acquired a political, social and ethnic identity characterized by an admixture of black and Indian, and hence very different from US identity. While the North American colonists identified with the chosen people who sailed across the Atlantic to conquer the promised land, to be wrested from its unauthorized inhabitants and cleansed of their presence (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|§5]]), the Latin American revolutionaries, in the wake of their argument with Spain, tended to denounce the genocidal practices of the conquistadores, Spanish in particular and European in general. Here too the road had been indicated by the black slaves of San Domingo who, after having broken with Napoleonic France and defeated its attempts to re-conquer it and reintroduce slavery, had assumed the Indian name of Haiti. For Bolívar miscegenation—the mixing denounced in the United States, and sometimes with particular fervour by abolitionist circles—became a political project, which rejected any racial discrimination, and an essential element in a new, proud identity. However, precisely on account of its radicalism, this project found itself confronting almost insurmountable difficulties. Thanks to the politico-social homogeneity (strengthened by the availability of land and westward expansion) of its dominant class, and thanks also to the confinement of much of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery, the North American republic soon succeeded in achieving a stable structure. It took the form of a ‘master-race democracy’ and a racial state, based on the rule of law within the white community and among the chosen people. The situation in Latin America was very different: between liberal beginnings and radical outcomes, the revolution had mobilized a front stamped with profound social and ethnic contradictions. Thus two contrasting &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#page151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_006.html#pg151&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;151&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ideas of liberty confronted one another: one calls to mind the English gentleman determined to dispose freely of his servants; the other ultimately refers to the struggle that had put an end to black slavery in San Domingo—Haiti.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#calibre_pb_7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. The United States and San Domingo—Haiti: two antagonistic poles&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Around 1830 the American continent presented a rather telling picture. While it had disappeared in a considerable part of Latin America, slavery remained in force in the European colonies, including British and Dutch ones, and above all in the United States. We can say that from the slave revolution onwards there developed a pent-up confrontation, a kind of cold war, between San Domingo and the United States. On one side, we have a country that saw ex-slaves in power, authors of a revolution that was possibly unique in world history; on the other, a country almost always led in the early decades of its existence by slave-owning presidents. On one side, we have a country that sanctioned the principle of racial equality to the point where, at least when it was ruled by Toussaint L’Ouverture, whites could play a leading role in the plantations; on the other, a country that constituted the first historical example of a racial state.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence the tension between those two poles is understandable. When, in 1826, Abbé Grégoire pointed to Haiti as the ‘beacon’ looked to by slaves, he clearly had in mind the island’s contribution to the abolition of slavery in Latin America. On the other side, with the emergence and advance of the slave revolution, the French colonists of San Domingo responded by entertaining the idea, and brandishing the threat, of secession from France and adhesion to the North American Union. Once the new revolutionary power had consolidated itself, it was a constant concern of the United States, where not a few ex-colonists took refuge, to overthrow or at least isolate it through a cordon sanitaire. It would be dangerous, observed Jefferson in 1799, to enter into commercial relations with San Domingo. That would result in ‘black crews’ disembarking in the United States, and these emancipated slaves could represent ‘combustion’ for the slaveholding South.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of such concerns, South Carolina banned the entry into its territory of any ‘man of colour’ from San Domingo or any of the other French islands, which might in some way have been infected by the new, dangerous ideas of liberty and racial equality.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg152&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;152&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Regardless of commercial exchanges, stressed influential political figures in the North American republic, by its very example the island risked challenging the institution of slavery far beyond its borders. Its inhabitants would in fact be ‘dangerous neighbors to the Southern States, and an asylum for renegades from these parts’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘the peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful negro revolution to be exhibited among them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can now understand Jefferson’s support for Napoleon’s attempt to re-conquer the island and reintroduce slavery. The US president assured the representative of France that ‘nothing will be easier than to furnish your army and fleet with everything and to reduce Toussaint to starvation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having succeeded Jefferson, Madison was likewise in no doubt as to the position to adopt: France was ‘the sole sovereign of Saint Domingue’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the consolidation of black power and the emergence of Haiti, the conflict did not come to an end. It also extended to the Caribbean islands under British control. Unrest spread among the black slaves and the governor of Barbados was well aware of ‘the dangers of insurrection’. For this reason, projects to reform and moderate the institution of slavery were entertained in London. This was a prospect immediately opposed by the colonists of Jamaica, who, sheltering behind defence of ‘their undoubted and acknowledged rights’ to self-government, threatened revolt against royal despotism and secession and adhesion to the North American republic.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But the example of San Domingo—Haiti had its most profound influence on Latin America. In 1822 the president, Jean-Pierre Boyer, proceeded to the annexation (which proved short-lived) of the Spanish part of the island, with the consequent emancipation of several thousand blacks, who along with freedom experienced notable social ascent, becoming small landowners. Slaves and free blacks in Cuba, who secretly kept the image of the Haitian leader, hoped for something similar. On the opposite side, sensing the danger, slave-owners of a liberal persuasion had already made contact with the US consul in Havana a decade earlier and outlined a project for joining the United States, which elicited the interest of Madison and Jefferson. In Calhoun’s view the annexation desired by him was a sort of pre-emptive counter-revolution: it would put paid for ever to the danger of a Cuba ‘revolutionized by Negroes’, which would have increased or doubled the threat already posed by Haiti.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#page153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_007.html#pg153&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;153&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Later, while the island of black power helped spread black emancipation in much of Latin America, the United States reintroduced slavery in Texas, which had previously been taken from Mexico. In the years immediately preceding the Civil War, an attempt was made to expand the territory of the North American republic and, with it, the institution of slavery into other parts of Mexico and, above all, Nicaragua. One participant in this adventure, which after initial successes ended in dramatic failure, was William Walker. He considered himself—and in his own way was—a liberal, who enjoyed significant support in the United States. He proposed to fight the despotic legacy of Spanish power and extend his country’s free institutions, but exclusively for the benefit of the authentic white community. For those alien to the ‘strong, haughty race, bred to liberty’ who were the custodians of ‘a mission to place Americans under the rule of free laws’, slavery was indicated. The decree of abolition promulgated in the wake of a movement that had found inspiration and support in Haiti was therefore cancelled.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only after the end of the Civil War did the United States agree to open diplomatic relations with Haiti. But it was a move bereft of any warmth, and in fact functional for a project of ethnic cleansing. The idea, also entertained by Lincoln, of depositing on the island of black power the ex-slaves, who were to be deported from the republic that continued to be inspired by the principle of white supremacy and purity, had not yet been abandoned.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#calibre_pb_8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Liberalism and the critique of abolitionist radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hence a distinguished historian of slavery has appropriately warned against the tendency ‘to confuse liberal principles with antislavery commitment’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Let us examine the reaction of various authors and sections of the liberal movement to the conflict that issued in the Civil War. We shall set aside Calhoun and the other theorists of the slaveholding South. And we already know Disraeli’s denunciation of the catastrophe of abolishing slavery in English colonies. On the point of the Confederacy’s military collapse, Lord Acton wrote to the general who had commanded its army:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg154&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;154&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;I saw in States Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy … Therefore I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The defeat of the liberalism embodied in the Confederacy weighed more than the victory won some decades earlier by liberal England over Napoleonic despotism. Why? On the outbreak of the Civil War, although acknowledging ‘all the horrors of American slavery’, Lord Acton had unhesitatingly rejected ‘the categorical prohibition of slavery’ demanded by the abolitionists, as informed by an ‘abstract, ideal absolutism’ quite contrary to ‘the English spirit’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and to the liberal spirit as such, characterized as it was by flexibility and practical common sense.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some years earlier, Lieber had expressed himself in similar terms. He condemned the abolitionists as ‘jacobins’, followers of the ‘fifth monarchy’, incorrigible visionaries and fanatics: ‘if people must have slaves it is their affair to keep them’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were such a declaration to be interpreted literally, not only would the right of states to self-government be inviolable, but also the right of each individual citizen to choose the type of property he preferred: let us not forget that at the time Lieber was himself a slave-owner! And hence while Disraeli ironized about the naive, misinformed ‘philanthropy’ of ‘the pure abolitionists’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the American liberal took his distance from such circles even more clearly: ‘I am not an abolitionist.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lieber was on excellent terms with de Tocqueville, who in his turn declared: ‘I have never been an abolitionist in the ordinary sense of the term’; ‘I have always been strongly opposed to the abolitionist party’. What was meant by these declarations, contained in two letters from 1857? ‘I have never believed it possible to destroy slavery in old states’: the abolitionists’ error was to seek ‘to effect a premature, dangerous abolition of slavery in countries where this abominable institution has always existed’. We are dealing with a firm &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg155&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;155&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;condemnation of slavery at a theoretical level, but one without results on the practical level. The situation in the South could only be altered through an initiative from above and from the centre, thereby throwing ‘the great experiment of Self-Government’ into crisis. And so? Preservation of the status quo was appropriate. However regrettable, people must resign themselves to the continuation of slavery in the South for a long time. However,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to introduce it into new states, to spread this horrible plague over a large area of the earth that has hitherto been immune to it, to impose all the crimes and all the miseries that accompany slavery on millions of men of future generations (masters or slaves), who could avoid this, is a crime against the human race, and this seems to me horrendous and inexcusable.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, an expansion of the zone of slavery had already occurred at the time of the annexation to the Union of Texas, seized from Mexico. De Tocqueville seemed to be ready to accept a compromise even more favourable to the slaveholding South, as emerges from a letter of 13 April 1857, once again sent to a transatlantic interlocutor:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I agree with you about the fact that the greatest internal threat to the northern states today is not so much slavery as the corruption of democratic institutions … As for the policy permitting slavery to develop in a whole portion of the territory where it was hitherto unknown, I will concede, as you argue, that one can do nothing but tolerate this extension in the special, current interests of the Union.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Yet this could not go on indefinitely. It was inadmissible that there ‘can be contained in the clauses of any contract the destruction of the right and duty of the present generation to prevent the spread of the most horrible of all social evils to millions and millions of men of future generations’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The condemnation of slavery was passionate, but it was possibly necessary to tolerate the preservation and even the extension of the institution for some time. The reason emerges from a letter sent to the English economist Senior: dismemberment of the country which, more than any other, embodied the cause of liberty, ‘would inflict a serious wound on the whole human race, stoking up war in the heart of a great continent from which it has been banished for more than a century’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg156&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;156&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville was ready to sacrifice the cause of abolishing slavery to the objective of preserving the unity and stability of the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although powerfully encouraged first by French defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of many of its colonies, and then by the revolution in San Domingo, radical abolitionism was a short-lived affair in France itself. Immediately after Thermidor, and in fact even at the moment of its preparation, the colonists’ agitation in defence of the liberal principle of self-government (and white supremacy) resumed: it must be local assemblies that determined people’s status and hence the condition of the blacks in the colonies. As we know, this was the position of the liberal Massiac Club. Those who resisted the Thermidorian turn were immediately branded traitors and renegades to the white race (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|§12]]). The ‘Anglomane’ and pro-slaveholding Malouet returned to hold positions of power under Napoleon,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who reintroduced colonial slavery and the black slave trade.&lt;br /&gt;
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The liberal movement certainly did not respond to this restoration, terminated only by the revolution of February 1848, with united, decisive opposition. There were some (including Granier de Cassagnac) who defended the institution of slavery in the name of liberalism, who in fact (polemically observed an ardent abolitionist) even claimed ‘a monopoly on liberalism’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To be precise, along with ‘liberalism’, Cassagnac also professed himself a follower of ‘democracy’: positions no different from those maintained across the Atlantic by Calhoun, with the difference that the former regarded slavery as ‘a provisional and empirical means of creating order’ and ‘maintaining the blacks in the apprenticeship of Christianity, work and the family’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side of the scale it is to be noted that, at least in his opponents’ view, the French author was mistaken in having developed in justification of slavery a philosophy of history that did not maintain the spatial or racial delimitation of the institution, with a tendency hence to regress to positions à la Fletcher, who was now alien to the liberal movement. By contrast, an integral part of it was Thiers, who, drawing up a catastrophic balance sheet of the abolition of slavery in Britain’s colonies, pointed to the ‘base and barbarous idleness [of] Negroes left to their own devices’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#page157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_008.html#pg157&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;157&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Guizot seemed more susceptible to abolitionist ideas. Nevertheless, he stressed their impracticality with an argument that is already familiar from US history: it would be necessary to compensate the owners of a legitimate form of property, but there were insufficient funds for this operation.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Le Courier de la Gironde&#039;&#039; came out in favour of a gradual abolitionism which, avoiding the ‘savage liberty’ of ‘brutalized beings’, would take the form of an extended phase of ‘liberal slavery’ (&#039;&#039;esclavage libéral&#039;&#039;)—i.e. a somewhat mitigated slavery.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise opposed to hasty measures was de Tocqueville. In May 1847, noting that the ‘Bey of Tunisia’ had already abolished the ‘odious institution’—which in Muslim countries, by the French liberal’s admission, took a ‘milder’ form—de Tocqueville expressed the opinion that ‘we should doubtless only proceed to the abolition of slavery with care and moderation’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can conclude with a general consideration relating to the France of the July Monarchy: ‘Immediate and complete emancipation was not even considered as an abolitionist program until less than a year before the Revolution of 1848.’ In fact, the golden age of French liberalism, far from involving the abolition of slavery, saw its expansion: ‘as a result of the expanding French conquest of Algeria, there was far more territory with slaves under French sovereignty by the mid-1840s than there had been at the time of the July Revolution in 1830.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. The enduring effectiveness of the black revolution from below&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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But if things stood thus, how was the abolition of slavery achieved? Although firmly opposed by a formidable international coalition and the liberal movement as a whole, the San Domingo revolution had a lasting influence, which proved all the stronger when conflicts within the community of the free and the white community as a whole intensified. We already know the decisive role played by the country governed by ex-slaves in propelling the independence movement in Latin America towards abolitionist positions.&lt;br /&gt;
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Outside the southern United States, slavery continued to be very much present in the European colonies in the Caribbean. However, here too Haiti’s &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg158&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;158&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;presence made itself felt. Proceeding in 1822 to annexation of the Spanish part of the island, the ex-slaves now in power delivered a further serious blow to the institution of slavery. The following year, the revolt of the black slaves in Demerara (today’s Guyana) erupted. This was a colony that had been affected by the upheavals which had reverberated in San Domingo from France. In 1794–95 a revolution exported and imposed by French forces had transformed Holland into the Batavian Republic and forced the Prince of Orange to flee to England. In the wake of events in Demerara, at the time under Dutch control, liberal agitation had developed, promoted by slave-owners who, witnessing the emergence of the prospect of black emancipation on the San Domingo model, had rapidly abandoned any sympathy for France and sought Britain’s intervention and protection.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But the incorporation of Demerara into the British Empire did not extinguish the fire, which smouldered under the ashes. A black revolt broke out in 1823 and led to the death of three whites; martial law was proclaimed and 250 slaves were killed or executed. And yet, repressed in one place, revolts exploded again some years later and only a short distance away—this time in Jamaica, in 1831. In both cases Methodist and Baptist missionaries played a significant role. By converting the slaves to Christianity, they furnished them with a culture, consciousness and the possibility of meeting and communicating that clashed irreconcilably with the de-humanization and commodification of human livestock upon which the institution of slavery was based. The first revolt saw the death sentence for the Reverend John Smith, and his death in prison shortly before execution of the sentence and the arrival from London of a notice of pardon. The second became known as the ‘war of the Baptists’. In both cases, in addition to rebellious slaves, the repression by the white dominant class struck the Baptist and Methodist community. In Jamaica hundreds of black Christians were flogged, tortured or shot; and English missionaries also suffered arrest and humiliation of every kind. In fact, in neighbouring Barbados churches were sacked and destroyed and there were riots and attempted pogroms against the Methodist community. The colonists’ hatred of the non-conformist churches, accused of encouraging the slave revolt, could not be contained.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a danger that seemed all the more real and immediate because of Haiti’s proximity and the processes of emancipation underway in Latin America. Thanks to this geographical proximity, there now intervened in the struggle (wrote &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#page159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_009.html#pg159&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;159&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;a white Jamaican to his governor) a ‘third party’ (in addition to the Crown, prompted in a reformist direction by Christian abolitionism, and the colonists, engaged in defence of self-government and their property). And this ‘third party’ comprised the slave, who ‘knows his strength, and will assert his claim to freedom’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point, the abolition of slavery in the colonies presented itself to the dominant class of liberal England as the requisite way out in the face of two challenges: the first consisted in the black slaves’ revolution from below; the second in the indignation that was widespread in the British Christian community which, with growing impatience, demanded decisive measures against the colonists, guilty of enslaving blacks and persecuting Christians.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The role of Christian fundamentalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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This second challenge brings us to a movement we have not hitherto been concerned with, and which cannot be confused with either the liberal tradition or French-style radicalism. While the crisis that soon led to the black revolution in San Domingo was deepening, at a time when the campaign to suppress the slave trade seemed to be at an impasse, the dying John Wesley wrote a heartfelt letter to William Wilberforce:&lt;br /&gt;
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Unless the Divine power has raised you up to be an Athanasius contra mundum, I see not how you can go through your glorious enterprise, in opposing that execrable villainy which is the scandal of religion, of England, and of human nature. Unless God has raised you up for this very thing, you will be worn out by the opposition of men and devils; but if God be for you who can be against you? Are all of them together stronger than God? Oh be not weary of well-doing. Go in the name of God, and in the power of His might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The recipient of this letter was unquestionably one of the major actors in the struggle that led to the abolition first of the slave trade and then of slavery as such. A fervent Christian, member of the House of Commons and on close &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg160&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;160&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;terms with Pitt the Younger, while he received honorary French citizenship in 1792 for his anti-slavery campaign, he had nothing to do with the revolution of 1789 or, a fortiori, with radicalism. Far from welcoming the black slave revolt in San Domingo, he continued in his unwavering support for the British government, which, during the war against France, was the guarantor in the West Indies of the repression of slave revolts and the preservation of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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But if he identified with the England of the time and its dominant class, Wilberforce can scarcely be regarded as a liberal. Prior to directing his efforts against slavery, his religious zeal was engaged in the ‘reform of public manners’, to be advanced through the foundation of a new society intended as the ‘guardian of the religion and morals of the people’, which proposed to struggle ‘against Vice and Immorality’ and even aspired to the ‘suppression of Vice’. Hence the crusade launched against publications branded blasphemous and indecent, against rural feasts considered licentious, against the non-observance of the Sabbath among the popular classes.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only subsequently did Christian fervour target the particular sin that was slavery—an institution completely unacceptable not only because of the obstacles it often put in the way of the spread of Christianity among slaves, but also because of the sexual libertinism in which it permitted their masters to indulge. Thus, another prominent supporter of English abolitionism (James Ramsay), along with slavery, called for an attack on ‘arbitrary divorces and bigamy’. Similarly, Granville Sharp combined abolitionist campaigning with a struggle against divorce legislation which, in flagrant violation of divine law, allowed the guilty couple to proceed to new weddings; and from this he moved on to announce that, together with those responsible for the slave trade and their accomplices, adulterers and those guilty of immorality would not escape divine punishment.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Sharp’s view, defenders of the institution of slavery were ‘refined modern Sadducees’. The Sadducees of Biblical fame had not hesitated to come to terms with Hellenistic and Roman culture, thereby contaminating Judaism and the word of God, and depriving them of their purity. Caught up in the enjoyment of wealth and the material world, they had forgotten or denied spiritual, otherworldly values. According to the English abolitionist, the modern Sadducees were no different. Ultimately, they were susceptible to the blandishments of the Demon, or the ‘Demon of Demons’. But the Bible must not be venerated in church, while remaining a dead letter in real life. On the contrary, it must serve as a guide in all political questions and the smallest problems of everyday &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg161&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;161&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;life. All the more so in that the turning point was at hand: the times in which slavery continued to survive were the ‘latter days of Infidelity &amp;amp;amp; Deism’, representing the agony of the apocalyptic ‘Beast’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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There is no doubt that here we have an attitude which, in contemporary terms, we would define as fundamentalist. It is a trait that was even more clearly exhibited in the United States. Here too Christian abolitionism had a programme which, along with slavery, wanted to attack vice and immorality as such. Theodore Parker denounced as contrary to the Scriptures and divine law (the only truly valid law) the ‘usury’ by which ‘banking capital’ was stained, the ‘brothels’ and bars that sold rum, and which the police not only did not target, but in fact frequented more assiduously than the ‘house of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Compared with Britain, there was in fact a novel element. In the United States, where the law on the return of fugitive slaves required all citizens to be complicit with an institution that became ever more odious, a delicate dilemma of conscience emerged. The ‘higher laws’ of Holy Scripture must not be forgotten. For a true Christian, admonished the English abolitionist Sharp in an indignant letter to Franklin, the other laws were ‘so clearly null and void by their iniquity, that it would be even a &#039;&#039;crime&#039;&#039; to regard them as law’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Along with its fundamentalist character, the radicalism of Christian abolitionism was strengthened in the United States. ‘When rulers have inverted their function and enacted wickedness into a law that treads down the inalienable rights of man’, declared Parker, the Christian must know how to go to the limit: ‘I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice … I am not afraid of men. I can offend them. I care nothing for their hate or their esteem. But I should not dare to violate His laws, come what may come …’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Sanctioned by Holy Scripture, divine, eternal, natural law was, in any event, inviolable: ‘To say that there is no law higher than what the State can make is practical atheism … If there is no God to make a law for me, then there is no God for me.’ The challenge to constituted authority was open and declared: ‘REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The federal Constitution, which obliged the Union as a whole to defend the slaveholding states against any potential slave revolution, seemed to William Garrison ‘An Agreement with Hell’ and a ‘Covenant with Death’. In 1845 &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg162&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;162&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;another abolitionist, Wendell Phillips, drew attention to slave-owners’ purchase of the most important public offices and the tripling of slavery that had occurred since the ratification of the federal Constitution, which came to be branded as a ‘pro-Slavery Compact’. The coexistence of slaveholding states and free states was no longer licit, unless the latter wanted to become ‘partners in the guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Street demonstrations in which the American Constitution was burnt were understandable. In the years preceding the Civil War, when he briefly harboured the illusion that the South was on the point of giving in, Parker exulted in these terms: ‘The Devil is in great wrath because he knoweth that his time is short.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this view, no compromise was possible. And Garrison explicitly stated as much. His polemic against defenders of the institution of slavery and their accomplices assumed openly threatening tones. But also unequivocal was his condemnation of theorists of &#039;&#039;‘gradual&#039;&#039; abolition’ and ‘moderation’, and even of those in the North who displayed ‘apathy’ or limited enthusiasm for the ‘standard of emancipation’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the struggle against slavery, that ‘heinous crime in the sight of God’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Abolitionist radicalism and Christian fundamentalism were closely interwoven, as emerges from the summons to a crusade against ‘the governments of this world’, which ‘in their essential elements, and as present administered … are all Anti-Christ’. This involved achieving&lt;br /&gt;
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the emancipation of our whole race from the dominion of man, from the thraldom of self, from the government of brute force, from the bondage of sin—and bringing them under the dominion of God, the control of an inward spirit, the government of the law of love, and into the obedience and liberty of Christ …[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The fundamentalist character of such positions did not escape Calhoun. He thundered against ‘the rabid fanatics, who regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it, deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union’. For them abolition was a conscientious obligation; only thus did they conceive it possible to liberate &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#page163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_010.html#pg163&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;163&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;themselves from the agonizing sense of being accomplices of the unforgivable ‘sin’ allegedly represented by slavery, against which they then proclaimed a full-scale ‘crusade’, ‘a general crusade’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of southern theorists, these Christians blinded by abolitionist fury were alien to the liberal world and substantially akin to Jacobins. In fact, a movement similar to French radicalism tended to emerge in the United States, at various times and in various modes, but always on the basis of the crisis of the English and American models. The crisis of the first coincided with the rebellion against the London government. What provoked or intensified the crisis of the second was the progressive isolation of the North American republic as a slaveholding state, engaged not only in the defence of slavery but also its expansion, and which resisted unperturbed, despite the disappearance of that institution first in much of Latin America and subsequently in British and French colonies. At this point, the country that at its birth had celebrated itself as the land of liberty appeared as the champion of slavery.&lt;br /&gt;
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There thus developed in the United States as well a radicalism that drew on Christianity. Such a ‘party’ no longer identified with either the English or the American model. It rejected both the spatial and the racial delimitation of the community of the free, and thus regarded the exclusion clauses that characterized the English and American models as unacceptable. And in order to change things, it did not preclude appeals to the revolutionary initiative of the excluded. This was the religious and political climate in which John Brown’s armed raid into Virginia in 1859 matured, intent on inciting a slave uprising and convinced that, without the shedding of blood, there was no remission of sins. The attempt failed miserably and ended with the protagonist being hanged, but Parker reiterated the slaves’ right to armed rebellion: sooner or later, ‘the Fire of Vengeance may be waked up even in an African’s heart’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. What is radicalism? The contrast with liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Formed in the wake of disappointment in the English and American models, how did ‘radicalism’ differ from liberalism? The answer is obvious, if we refer to authors like Locke and Calhoun, profoundly liberal and yet at the same time without any doubts as to the legitimacy of black slavery. The answer is not &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg164&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;164&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;even difficult if we draw a comparison with authors such as Burke, Jefferson and Acton who, notwithstanding reservations and criticisms of the institution, on various grounds represented ideological and political reference points for the slaveholding South, or even continued to defend it to the end. The line of demarcation also proves sufficiently clear if we compare authors like Blackstone and Montesquieu, who tended to contest ‘slavery among ourselves’ rather than slavery as such, with a radicalism committed to rejecting both the spatial delimitation (the English model until 1833) and the racial delimitation (the American model until 1865) of the community of the free. But how is de Tocqueville clearly distinguished from authors like Diderot, Condorcet and Schoelcher, whom I have included in the process of French radicalism’s formation and development? What sense does it make to situate in two different, even opposed formations de Tocqueville and Condorcet, who were, respectively, one of the great critics of the Terror and one of its most illustrious victims? Is it right to include in the same party French and American radicals who adopted such a different attitude towards Christianity?&lt;br /&gt;
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Before answering these questions, it is worth lingering over something that characterized the liberal tradition from its outset. Let us take authors like Montesquieu, Smith and Millar. Although condemning slavery more or less sharply, all three continued to regard England—a country in the front rank in the slave trade—as a model. In no instance did criticism or condemnation of slavery involve exclusion of the beneficiaries or theorists of the institution from the community of the free and the liberal party. On more than one occasion, Burke distanced himself from the institution of slavery, but when the conflict between the two Atlantic shores erupted he not only celebrated the love of liberty which particularly animated southern colonies, but disdainfully rejected the idea that, in an attempt to suppress the rebellion, appeal might be made to ‘servile hands’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, the British Whig continued to include slave-owners in the community of the free while excluding a priori their victims.&lt;br /&gt;
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Criticism of the institution of slavery was clear and firm in Hume. But this did not prevent him from asserting that ‘European nations’ represented ‘that part of the globe [which] maintain[s] sentiments of liberty, honour, equity and valour superior to the rest of mankind’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, there was reason to believe that blacks were ‘naturally inferior to the whites’ and inferior to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg165&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;165&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the point of lacking any ‘symptoms’ of ‘ingenuity’ and free spirit.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So once again, despite the condemnation of slavery, it was its beneficiaries—not its victims—who formed an integral part of the community of the free and the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
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The boundaries of the community of the free could lose something of their naturalistic rigidity; but the rituals of self-celebration, and the enormous repression it was based on, persisted. In 1772 Arthur Young calculated that, out of 775 million global inhabitants, only 33 million enjoyed liberty; and they were concentrated in a fairly restricted zone of the planet, excluding Asia, Africa and virtually all of America, as well as the southern and eastern parts of Europe itself.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a theme subsequently taken up and eloquently developed by Adam Smith:&lt;br /&gt;
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We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In similar vein, Millar contrasted ‘Great Britain, in which liberty is generally so well understood, and so highly valued’, with ‘all those tribes of barbarians, in different parts of the world, with which we have any correspondence’ and among whom ‘the practice of domestic slavery’ continued to rage.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Europe and the West were complacently depicted as a tiny island of liberty and civilization in a tempestuous ocean of tyranny, slavery and barbarism. In order to indulge in such self-celebration, Young, Smith and Millar were in fact obliged to overlook a far from trivial detail: the slave trade, which involved the most brutal form of slavery—chattel slavery—and in which western Europe, starting precisely with liberal England, was engaged for centuries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was not very different. When he published &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, there were few countries or colonies in the western hemisphere where slavery persisted, since it had been abolished in much of Latin America and the British colonies. In the interval between the publication of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg166&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;166&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;first and second volumes of the work, the United States introduced into Texas the institution that should have been synonymous with the absolute power of man over man. But this prompted no uncertainty in the French liberal when it came to identifying the American continent as the locus of liberty. Volume One of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; appeared shortly after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. But that would appear to have been an irrelevant event in the opinion of de Tocqueville, who, when it came to comparing England and the United States, had no doubt that the latter country most fully embodied the cause of liberty. And Jefferson, the president slave-owner and unyielding opponent of the country born out of a revolution by black slaves, seemed to the French liberal to be ‘the greatest democrat whom the democracy of America has as yet produced’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lincoln himself initially conducted the Civil War as a crusade against rebellion and separatism, not for the abolition of slavery, which could continue to survive in states loyal to central government. It was only later, with the recruitment of blacks into the Union army and hence with the direct intervention of slaves and ex-slaves in the conflict, that the civil war between whites was transformed into a revolution, conducted partly from above and partly from below, making the abolition of slavery inevitable. But in the first phase of the war the Union did not a priori exclude slave states from its bosom, just as liberal critics of the institution of slavery did not expel those who had a different and even contrary position on the problem from the liberal party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The tendency we are examining finds fullest expression in Lieber. Cautious criticisms of the institution of slavery did not prevent him, even on the immediate eve of the Civil War, from attributing to the United States—the country that even more than England embodied the great cause of ‘liberal institutions’ and ‘self-government’—the ‘great mission’ of spreading liberty throughout the world. ‘[E]very American’ must always bear in mind the grandeur of the constitutional principles and texts of his country. Otherwise, they would resemble ‘the missionary that should proceed to convert the world without bible or prayer-book’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While it was the sacred text of liberty for the liberal author, for the radicals Garrison and Phillips the US Constitution, which sanctioned slavery and the racial state, was an instrument of Satan. Over and above the very different significance assigned to the problem of slavery, here we have two opposed &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg167&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;167&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;delimitations of political geography, of the camp of friends and enemies. Notwithstanding the argument and conflict over slavery, liberalism’s various exponents continued to recognize themselves as members of the same party and the same community of the free. By contrast, excluded from it were blacks, whom at an interval of decades Jefferson and Lincoln intended to deport from the Union and who, not by chance, after emancipation first in the North and then in the South did not come to enjoy either political or civil equality. Montesquieu and de Tocqueville, not to mention Lieber and Acton, could indeed criticize slavery, but it was understood that that their interlocutors were not black slaves but their masters. The latter were called upon to demonstrate moral sensitivity and political consistency and hence agree to expunge a stain that affected the credibility of the community of the free as such.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Condorcet’s attitude was very different. Here is how he addressed the black slaves in 1781:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Dear friends, although I am not the same colour as you, I have always regarded you as my brothers. Nature has fashioned you to have the same spirit, the same reason and the same virtues as whites. I am only speaking here of whites in Europe, for when it comes to whites in the colonies, I shall not insult you by comparing them to you … Should one set off in search of a man in the islands of America, one would certainly not find him among the populations of white flesh.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The French philosopher was not yet aware of it, but the ruling group in the North American republic was on the point of being situated outside not only the party of liberty, but even the human race. What we have here is a political and ideological current different from liberalism—the radicalism that had been formed or was in the process of being formed. It might seem debatable to apply this category to an author who recommended extreme gradualism in the process of abolishing slavery. But that is not the main point. Marat himself, in 1791, proposed ‘gradually to prepare the transition from slavery to liberty’. And yet, already unequivocally condemning ‘the barbarism of the colonists’, it was not to them that he looked to make the desired change, and not even to the National Assembly which, coming to terms with the slaveholders, rode roughshod over the rights of man and ‘the sacred foundations of the Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The actual interlocutors tended to be the black slaves themselves, as would &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg168&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;168&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;become clear in the course of Marat’s subsequent evolution. As for Condorcet, despite the gradualist character of his abolitionism, he deflected back onto slaveholding whites the de-humanizing drive they had mobilized against blacks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was an attitude that could also develop on the basis of a profoundly Christian consciousness. Here is how Garrison expressed himself in 1841 on the subject of slave-owners:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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No political, no religious copartnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the convicts at Botany Bay and New Zealand … We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
But some decades earlier the English abolitionist Percival Stockdale had already declared: &#039;&#039;‘We&#039;&#039; are the savages; the Africans act like men; like beings endowed with rational and immortal minds’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, indignation at the treatment inflicted on the black slaves could even conduce to a de-humanization of the de-humanizers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In regarding slaves as their interlocutors, radicals did not hesitate to appeal to a revolution from below by victims of the institution it was intended to abolish. Even prior to the revolution by San Domingo’s slaves, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; evoked a massive uprising, led by a black Spartacus, which might involve replacing the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in force by a &#039;&#039;‘Code blanc’&#039;&#039; that repaid the slaveholders for the injustices they had committed.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the liberal tradition, in Smith we can come across evocation of a dictatorship from above putting an end to the scandal of an institution that sullied the community of the free, but certainly not hopes for a revolution from below. We know the sympathy or admiration with which Grégoire and Schoelcher viewed Toussaint L’Ouverture and Haiti. These are two names that do not appear in de Tocqueville. In connection with San Domingo, he limited himself to mentioning the ‘bloody catastrophe that has put an end to its existence’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Paradoxically, the island ceased to exist the moment it put an end, for the first time in the Americas, to the institution of slavery!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#page169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_011.html#pg169&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;169&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Finally, Diderot reported an observation by Helvétius: ‘What is the cause of England’s extreme power? Its government.’ He followed up this assessment with a polemical question: ‘But what is the cause of the extreme poverty of Scotland and Ireland?’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Judgement of the metropolis could not be separated from judgement of the colonies and semi-colonies. From the standpoint of authors like Diderot and Schoelcher, England and the United States, the holy sites of liberty in de Tocqueville’s view, were responsible for the most ferocious and barbarous despotism. Even when it criticized slavery, the liberal tradition did not question the identification of the West with civilization and of the colonial world with barbarism. Radicalism’s position was different: in the first instance, it identified and denounced barbarism in those responsible for, and complicit with, the most macroscopic violation of the rights and dignity of man.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels may be regarded as critical inheritors of radicalism. For the first in particular, not only was it epistemologically and politically arbitrary to ignore the politico-social reality of the colonies, but (as we shall see) those colonies were the requisite starting-point for understanding the ‘barbarism’ of bourgeois society.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#calibre_pb_12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. Liberalism, the self-celebration of the community of the free and repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The discourse developed by liberalism is profoundly marked by repression of the lot imposed on colonial peoples. The self-celebration of the land of the free or the people of the free proved all the more persuasive in that it overlooked the slavery inflicted on colonial populations or populations of colonial origin. Only on this condition could Montesquieu, Blackstone and the American revolutionaries point to England or the United States as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This also applies to de Tocqueville. He lucidly and unsparingly described the inhuman treatment meted out to Indians and blacks. The former were forced to endure the ‘frightful sufferings’ attendant upon ‘forced migrations’ (the successive deportations imposed by the whites), and were even close to being wiped off the face of the earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the blacks, let us leave to one side the specifically slaveholding states of the South: What was the situation in the rest? Over and above harsh material living conditions, ‘a wretched and precarious &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg170&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;170&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;existence’, desperate poverty and a higher mortality rate than among slaves,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the notionally free black also weighed exclusion from the enjoyment of civil rights (as well as political rights): he was subjected to the ‘tyranny of the law’ and the ‘intolerance of customs’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn7|§7]]). And so, discounting the Far West and the South, even in the case of the free states we cannot speak of democracy or even strictly of the rule of law. But that was not the conclusion reached by de Tocqueville, who celebrated the democracy, ‘alive, active, triumphant’, he saw operative in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You will see there a people among whom conditions are more equal than they have ever been among us; among whom the social structure, the customs, the laws, everything is democratic; among whom everything comes from the people and returns to it, and where, nevertheless, each individual enjoys an independence that is fuller, and a liberty that is greater, than in any other time or place on earth.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While he felt sympathy for the tragedy of the Indians and blacks, their fate had no epistemological relevance and in no way altered his overall political judgement. The programmatic declaration made by de Tocqueville at the start of the chapter devoted to the problem of ‘the three races that inhabit the territory of the United States’ is unequivocal: ‘The principal task that I had imposed upon myself is now performed: I have shown, as far as I was able, the laws and the customs of the American democracy. Here I might stop’. It was only in order to avoid possible disappointment on the reader’s part that de Tocqueville spoke of relations between the three ‘races’: ‘These topics are collaterally connected with my subject without forming a part of it; they are American without being democratic, and to portray democracy has been my principal aim.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Democracy could be defined and liberty lauded focusing exclusively on the white community. If, instead, we regard this abstraction as arbitrary, and bear in mind the entanglement of slavery and liberty revealed by authoritative US scholars, we cannot but be even more surprised by de Tocqueville’s epistemological than his political naivety. He celebrated as the locus of liberty one of the few countries in the New World where racial chattel slavery reigned and flourished and which, at the time of the French liberal’s journey, had as its president Andrew Jackson, slave-owner and protagonist of a policy of deporting and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg171&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;171&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;decimating the Indian; a president, moreover, who, blocking the circulation of abolitionist material by post, also struck at the freedom of expression of significant sections of the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Such naivety reached its culmination in a French follower of de Tocqueville—namely, Édouard Laboulaye. He too contrasted the United States with a France plagued by constant revolutionary upheavals. In the former, he observed in 1849 in the inaugural lecture (published separately the following year) of a course devoted to US history, a Constitution characterized by extraordinary ‘wisdom’ and rejection of any ‘demagogic’ element made it possible to enjoy peace and, at the same time, the greatest liberty and ‘the most absolute political equality’—an equality that was ‘complete, absolute, in laws and customs alike’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As to the problem of the relations between the three races referred to by de Tocqueville, nothing remains in the text we are examining but the celebration of the remarkable successes achieved by ‘a nation of European race’, by this ‘strong race of emigrants’ or this ‘people of Puritans’—in other words, the ‘American race’. Even if it was a story that had unfolded across the Atlantic, it covered ‘our race’ (European and white) as a whole in glory.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a view reiterated ten years later, in an emotional essay published on the occasion of de Tocqueville’s death: the homage paid to the author of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; ended with homage to the ‘beautiful federal Constitution that has protected the liberty of the United States for seventy years’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are on the eve of the Civil War. But even its outbreak does not seem to have prompted any second thoughts in Laboulaye: it was understood that ‘complete, candid, sincere liberty’ reigned in the United States. The bloody conflict underway demonstrated the ‘courage’ of a ‘free people who sacrificed everything to maintain the unity’ of the country.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only when reconstructing the history of America in the colonial period did Laboulaye feel obliged to confront the issue of slavery. Although mitigated by reference to ‘climate’ (which rendered work intolerable for whites but not blacks), historical circumstances (at the time it was at its height, ‘the slave trade was regarded as a pious undertaking’), and the particular characteristics of the people subjected to it (it involved a ‘race of eternal minors’),[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] condemnation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg172&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;172&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the institution was sharp. In the first volume, whose Preface is dated 1855, we read:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In half of the United States there are two societies established on the same soil: the one powerful, active, united and prudent; the other weak, disunited, indifferent and exploited like cattle. And yet this despised herd is a constant threat to America … The stain that soils this great society places it beneath Europe.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although sketching this realistic picture, the Preface continued to celebrate the United States indiscriminately as the privileged site of liberty, guaranteed and guarded by an ‘admirable Constitution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However hard the lot of the blacks—silence persisted about the Indians—it was irrelevant when it came to formulating an overall judgement of the country under investigation. But there is more. Laboulaye acknowledged that slavery made its oppressive influence felt on the white master himself: he was denied the right to educate and emancipate his own slave, even if he or she was a child born from a relationship with a slave. He was required by law to inflict even the most drastic of punishments, including castration, on the guilty slave.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although criticized, these serious interferences with the individual freedom of white property-owners did not in the slightest darken the bright picture we already know.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1864 Laboulaye denounced the privilege granted by the ‘three-fifths’ constitutional provision to the ‘particular, superior race’ made up of the ‘great lords’ of the South who were the slave-owners (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). But if things stood thus, if inequality marked relations within the elite itself, if even within the white community there was a privileged ‘particular race’, what was the meaning of the claim that the United States was characterized by ‘the most absolute political equality’? Laboulaye felt no need to revise his positions. On the contrary, he did not hesitate to reiterate them in the Preface to the third volume, which continued to celebrate the American Revolution as the sole genuinely democratic one.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Like colonies in the strict sense, Ireland continued to be ignored. In the course of his journey to the British Isles, de Tocqueville visited the unhappy island and described its desperate situation unsparingly. It was not simply that ‘the poverty is horrible’; denied here was liberal freedom itself, crushed by &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#page173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_012.html#pg173&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;173&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘military tribunals’ and a ‘large gendarmerie hated by the people’. At this point a comparison between England and Ireland occurred: ‘The two aristocracies I have referred to have the same origin, the same customs and almost the same laws. Yet the one has for centuries given the English one of the best governments in the world, while the other has given the Irish one of the most detestable imaginable’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is an astonishing statement: not only are readers not informed that the aristocracy dominant in Ireland was itself British or of British origin, but they have the impression that they are dealing with two different countries, not two regions of a single state, subject to the authority of the same government and the same crown.&lt;br /&gt;
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We can then understand de Tocqueville’s admiring conclusion: ‘I see the Englishman secure under the protection of his laws’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, the Irish were not subsumed under the category of ‘English’, but such non-subsumption does not seem to be a problem, does not affect the laudatory judgement passed on the country visited and held up as a model of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The colonial question and the differential development of radicalism in France, England and the United States&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Reference has sometimes been made to ‘philosophic radicalism’ in connection with Bentham and his school.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theorist of utilitarianism adopted a debunking tone towards his country’s political, legal and ideological tradition. He did hesitate to denounce the ‘almost universal corruption’ that raged in England and the ill-starred role of a ‘corrupted and corrupting aristocracy’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He did not even spare the Glorious Revolution, despite the religious aura habitually surrounding it: the &#039;&#039;‘original compact&#039;&#039;—the compact between king and people—was a fabulous one—the &#039;&#039;supervening&#039;&#039; compact—the compact between King, Lords, and Commons, was but too real a one’,[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and sanctioned the domination of an oligarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is sufficient to look at the attitude Bentham took towards the liberal tradition’s exclusion clauses to realize that we are very far removed from &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg174&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;174&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;radicalism in the sense specified here. Of the refuse and ‘dross’ and those confined in workhouses, we have already spoken. We must now concern ourselves with the condition of the blacks. Bentham included ‘the still unabrogated sanction given to domestic slavery on account of difference of colour’ among the ‘imperfections of detail’ to be found even in the ‘matchlessly felicitous system’ of the United States.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from this rather euphemistic description of the institution of slavery, the English liberal stressed that a project of emancipation must proceed with extreme gradualism, and be implemented exclusively from above. In a text from 1822, we come across a significant declaration: ‘The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are led to think of the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. But instead, as a note makes clear, the reference is to Louis XIV’s &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039;!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As for gradualism, this was necessary for the purposes not only of respecting ‘rights of property’ (which must be compensated for the loss suffered), but also of educating slaves for liberty.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Bentham wanted an emancipation ‘lottery’ that might occur at the moment of hereditary transmission of this special property, and from which one-tenth of the slaves owned by the deceased could benefit. An appeal to masters to demonstrate flexibility was the counterpart of indignant condemnation of any initiative from below:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The injustice and the calamity which have accompanied precipitate attempts, form the greatest objection against projects of emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This operation need not be suddenly carried into effect by a violent revolution, which, by displeasing every body, destroying all property, and placing all persons in situations for which they were not fitted, might produce evils a thousand times greater than all the benefits that can be expected from it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Unquestionably, the prime site of the formation of radicalism, in the sense I have defined it, was France. It is easy to see why. The country was favourably disposed to accommodate it following defeat in the Seven Years’ War and the loss of a large number of colonies. Subsequently, the controversy that developed either side of the Atlantic on the occasion of the English colonists’ rebellion ended up discrediting both fractions of the liberal party. The American Revolution, with its development of relations of equality within the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg175&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;175&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;white community and clear demarcation from the world of feudal privilege, galvanized harsher criticism of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; in France and the crisis of the English model. Disenchantment with the non-abolition of slavery in America and the emergence of an unprecedented racial state also threw the American model into crisis. The roots of French radicalism lay in this dual crisis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But what was its influence across the Channel and the Atlantic? The problem can be reformulated as follows. Liberal England, derived from the Glorious Revolution, and especially the American Revolution, made a powerful contribution to the ideological preparation of the French Revolution and subsequently, through the crisis of the two models, to the formation of radicalism. But why did the latter not seem to take deep root in the two classical countries of the liberal tradition? Obviously, the vexed course of the revolution and the explosion of the Terror immediately damaged France’s powers of attraction. A far from negligible role in frustrating the diffusion of radicalism was also played by repression. In England in 1794 habeas corpus was suspended for eight years; a further suspension followed in 1817; while two years later there occurred what has passed into history as the Peterloo Massacre or (to put it in the indignant words of an English paper of the time) the ‘slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, unprovoked and unnecessary’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Suffering deportation to Australia and meeting with a horrible fate, sometimes dying under the lashes of merciless flogging, were members of workers’ societies, clubs that were or more or less Jacobin in orientation, and Chartists engaged in the struggle to extend the suffrage, not to mention ‘Irish dissidents’ for whom ‘Australia was the official Siberia … at the turn of the century’. In total, ‘between 1800 and 1850 … about 1,800 were deported for political “crimes”. Among them were representatives of nearly every protest movement known to the British Government’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, the repression also struck circles that regarded violent revolution by black slaves as legitimate, or even invoked it.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1798 the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed in the United States, containing serious restrictions on constitutional liberties, granting the president a wide range of discretionary power and particularly hitting followers of ideas suspected of being influenced by the French Revolution. And we already know about the violence, predominantly from below, to which abolitionists were subject.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, neither the Terror in France nor the repression in Britain and the United States suffice to explain the weakness of radicalism across the Channel &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg176&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;176&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;or the Atlantic. The analysis must be taken further. In England the outbreak of war made it possible for the dominant class to present as a patriotic duty the struggle against the revolutionary fanaticism raging in France, and which threatened to spread to Ireland, posing a mortal risk to the British Empire. As for the United States, it is interesting to observe the debate which, on the eve of the war against Britain that broke out in 1812, involved two prestigious representatives of the South. The first, Randolph, declared himself against the opening of hostilities. The situation was full of peril on the home front, where the ‘infernal principles of French liberty’ risked provoking a revolt by slaves; ‘[t]he French Revolution has polluted them.’[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Calhoun, by contrast, did not share these concerns. Certainly, attention should be paid to the slaves’ moods, but happily ‘more than one-half of them never heard of the French revolution’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So radicalism, with its recognition of the right of black slaves or Irish semi-slaves to take up arms against their masters, posed a serious threat to the stability of the United States and the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The lesser weight of the colonial question, or of populations of colonial origin, also helps explain the greater diffusion of radicalism in France. When the black revolution in San Domingo broke out, radical circles in Paris had no great difficulty recognizing and legitimating the fait accompli. Even if there was a risk of losing the remaining colonies, as anti-abolitionists never tired of warning, that would not be an irreparable tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The situation was different when it came to Britain and the United States. The black revolution in San Domingo provoked a wave of indignation in both countries. ‘A Black State in the Western Archipelago’, wrote &#039;&#039;The Times&#039;&#039;, ‘is utterly incompatible with the system of all European colonisation.’ And hence ‘Europe will, of course, recover in that quarter the ascendancy and dominion which it justly claims from the superior wisdom and talents of its inhabitants’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The United States not only refused to recognize the country born of a black revolution, but did everything it could to isolate, weaken and overthrow it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Jefferson distinguished himself in this operation. At first sight he seems closest to radicalism. In January 1793, without allowing himself to be impressed by the charges against the Jacobins levelled by his former private secretary (referring to Paris, he spoke of ‘streets … literally red with blood’), he continued passionately to defend the ‘cause’ of the French Revolution: ‘rather than it &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#page177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_013.html#pg177&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;177&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam &amp;amp;amp; an Eve left in every country, &amp;amp;amp; left free, it would be better than it now is.’ Moreover, Jefferson positively contrasted France with the United States, where Anglophiles regarded the 1787 Constitution, with the very wide powers it conferred on the president and executive, as a first step towards the establishment of a monarchy.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet the picture changed markedly following the black revolution in San Domingo. We know that Jefferson interpreted the principle of equality in radical fashion, but always within the ambit of the white community. He never believed in the possibility of whites and blacks coexisting on an equal basis: it would represent an unjustifiable challenge to ‘the real distinctions which nature has made’ and end in ‘the extermination of the one or the other race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the conflict between white owners and black slaves exploded on the Caribbean island, the North American statesman’s sympathy immediately went to the former; his anxiety about ‘the revolutionary storm now sweeping the globe’ was profound. Hence his support for the invading army sent by Napoleon, which did not cease even in the face of recourse to revolting practices, such as the introduction of trained dogs to tear blacks to pieces and the organization around such events of mass spectacles, at once thrilling and educative.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#calibre_pb_14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. The liberal ebb of Christian radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the United States radicalism took shape on a Christian basis. Interpretation of the conflict in religious terms in fact involved serious limitations. Scarce attention was paid to the humiliation and oppression blacks also suffered in the North: this was a condition which did not take the immediately obvious form of slavery and sin. With the end of the Civil War, the abolitionist movement soon split, and thus was not in a position to offer theoretical, and still less practical, resistance to the regime of terroristic white supremacy that asserted itself in the South after the (anti-black) compromise of 1877 between the two sections of the white community. The weight of racial prejudice was too strong, and only the massive, prolonged presence of Union troops could have &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#page178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_014.html#pg178&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;178&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;guaranteed blacks the enjoyment of political rights and full recognition of their civil rights. But all this would have involved too serious a violation of the liberal principle of self-government. Among the theorists of abolitionism, possibly the only one who was inclined to go the whole way on the road of imposing the principle of racial equality by force of arms was Wendell Phillips. But when in 1875 he sought to set out his reasons at an assembly in Boston, he was brusquely silenced. The previous year, a senator from the South had observed with satisfaction: &#039;&#039;‘Radicalism&#039;&#039; is dissolving—going to pieces’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, local self-government was reasserted, but radical democracy disappeared and the Calvary of the blacks resumed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Moreover, what prompted Anglo-American Christian abolitionism to condemnation of the sin of slavery was sympathy for a people largely converted to Christianity, who regarded Christianity as an instrument with which to overcome the condition of total de-humanization and achieve a minimum of recognition. Liberated from an obsession with sin and complicity in sin thanks to the abolition of slavery, Parker believed that there was no political solution to the persistent problem of the discrimination and injustice suffered by blacks: one could only place hope in the matrimonial fusion of the two races or the beneficent effects of the infusion of ‘dreadful Anglo-saxon blood’ in black veins. In a sense, this was a radical perspective, strongly counter to the dominant ideology. However, rather than on organizing the oppressed blacks, attention focused on overcoming the prejudices on the part of the oppressors that cemented barriers of race and caste. Radicalism thus tended to be reabsorbed by liberalism. Things were even worse for the Indians, regarded as savages and pagans. Parker had no hesitation in justifying the policy of ‘continual aggression, invasion, and extermination’ pursued by the indomitable people that were the Anglo-Saxons.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, the end of the Civil War gave new impetus to the march into the Far West. The influence of the colonial question once again intervenes to explain the weakness of American radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#calibre_pb_15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. Liberal socialism and radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Much more so than Bentham, it was Kant who came close to radicalism. His clear adoption of a position favourable to revolutionary France is not so significant. More relevant is the fact that, intervening in 1795, a year after the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, with clear critical reference to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg179&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;179&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;England, &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039; identified ‘the sugar cane islands’ as the ‘site of the cruellest slavery that has ever been imagined’. There were two further decisive elements. Like the French radicals—we must not forget that the colonial question weighed even less heavily on Germany than France—Kant problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism: it was England that now represented the cause of ‘slavery and barbarism’. Finally, quite unlike the liberals, he did not confine himself to criticizing Pitt, whom he said was rightly ‘hated as an enemy of the human race’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The German philosopher’s radicalism did not escape his contemporaries: while Goethe regarded his attitude towards England as scarcely ‘liberal’, Wilhelm von Humboldt sharply distanced himself from the ‘democratism’ pervading &#039;&#039;Perpetual Peace&#039;&#039;.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, rather than Bentham, it was John Stuart Mill who approximated to radicalism, when he identified slavery as ‘the most flagrant of all possible violations’ of liberal principles and branded those who defended it ‘the powers of evil’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, along with ‘the noble body of Abolitionists’, Mill also celebrated John Brown, author of the failed attempt to get the slaves of the southern United States to rise up.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a text of 1824 the English philosopher expressed his sympathy for the cause of the blacks of San Domingo–Haiti, whom the Napoleonic expedition vainly sought half to ‘exterminate’ and half to reduce to conditions of slavery once again.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Putting clear distance between himself and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries, Mill did not seem to recoil in horror from the prospect of a revolution from below by black slaves. And yet, in another respect, he was the theorist of a new ‘slavery’, temporary and pedagogical in kind, for ‘savages’ (see below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|§3]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The English author asserted that the final stage of his development was characterized by gravitation towards ‘socialism’ and, at the same time, renewed distrust of ‘democracy’. What caused and justified the latter was ‘the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass’.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Already problematic in the metropolis, democracy proved decidedly dangerous and inadvisable when it came to the colonies and peoples of colonial origin (including Afro-Americans). Theorist of the planetary despotism of the West, Mill seems equally remote from radical, ‘abolitionist democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#page180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0009_split_015.html#pg180&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;180&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Hence radicalism and socialism must not be confused. Socialist aspirations can readily be combined with colonialism. Followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon envisaged building communities of a more or less socialist type on land taken from the Arabs in Algeria.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ can be envisaged restrictively for the ‘master race’ and at the expense of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin. At certain points in his evolution towards liberal socialism, Mill approached the threshold separating it from radicalism, but without crossing it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With reference to Zionism, Arendt drew attention to the presence within it of what at first sight is a peculiar tendency. It was characterized, on the one hand, by support for ‘chauvinist’ objectives and, on the other, by commitment to pursuing collectivist experiments and a ‘rigorous realization of social justice’ within its own community. Thus crystallized ‘a most paradoxical conglomerate of radical approach and revolutionary social reforms domestically, with outmoded and outright reactionary political lines in the field of foreign policy’, and in the field of relations with colonial peoples.[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, ‘master-race democracy’ can also go further and take the form of ‘master-race socialism’, whereas what defines radicalism is precisely the argument against any claim by a particular ethnic or social group to pose as ‘master race’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When in 1860, during the Second Opium War, a Franco-British expedition destroyed the Summer Palace, it was Victor Hugo who proved to be the inheritor of radicalism with his denunciation of the barbarity committed by self-styled civilizers, while for Mill, as for the liberal culture of the time, there continued to be few doubts about the complete identity between the West and civilization (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|§3]] and [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn1a|1]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, trans. Ernest Dilworth, New York: Mineola, 2003, p. 39.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn2a|2]] Ibid., p. 31.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn3a|3]] Claude-Adrien Helvétius, &#039;&#039;De l’homme&#039;&#039;, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vols 7–12, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967–69, vol. 8, p. 86. For the criticism of Helvétius, cf. Denis Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘L’homme’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Laurent Versini, vol. 1, Paris: Laffont, 1994, p. 862.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn4a|4]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Paul Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1963, p. 41 (article on &#039;&#039;Représentants&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn5a|5]] Ibid., p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn6a|6]] Cf. Gabriel Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1931, p. 156.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn7a|7]] François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, pp. 47, 49, 55.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn8a|8]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn9a|9]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 230–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn10a|10]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18–20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 47–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn13a|13]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 55–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 2, pt 2, p. 107.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_000.html#c05-ftn17a|17]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. 2–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn18a|18]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn19a|19]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 167, 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn20a|20]] Robert R. Palmer, &#039;&#039;The Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959–64, vol. 1, pp. 31, 106.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Manuskripte über die polnische Frage&#039;&#039;, ed. Werner Conze and Dieter Hertz-Eichenrode, ‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1961, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn22a|22]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 108.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn23a|23]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Gedanken und Erinnerungen&#039;&#039;, Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1928, pp. 51–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn24a|24]] Furet and Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn25a|25]] Palmer, &#039;&#039;Age of Democratic Revolution&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 384–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn26a|26]] Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn27a|27]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn28a|28]] Ibid., p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn29a|29]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, pp. 85–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_001.html#c05-ftn30a|30]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, ed. Alfred Roulin, Paris: Gallimard, 1957, p. 1078.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn31a|31]] Franco Venturi, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90, vol. 3, pp. 383, 398–400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn32a|32]] Bonno, &#039;&#039;La Constitution britannique&#039;&#039;, pp. 133ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn33a|33]] Marie-Jean-Antoine Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 12 vols, ed. Arthur Condorcet O’Connor and François Arago, Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1968, vol. 8, p. 19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 8, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn36a|36]] Denis Diderot, &#039;&#039;Saggio sui regni di Claudio e di Nerone e sui costume e gli scritti di Seneca&#039;&#039;, trans. Secondo Carpanetto and Luciano Guerci, Palermo: Sellerio, 1987, pp. 327–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn37a|37]] Thomas Paine, &#039;&#039;Collected Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Eric Foner, New York: Library of America, 1995, pp. 31, 34, 33; Bernard Faÿ, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII siècle&#039;&#039;, Paris: Champion, 1925, p. 62 (for the translation of substantial extracts in France).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn38a|38]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 957–8 (letter to Diodati, 3 August 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn39a|39]] Étienne Clavière and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1996, pp. 64, 95 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn40a|40]] Ibid., pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn41a|41]] Ibid., p. 340.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn42a|42]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn43a|43]] Cf. Joel H. Wiener, &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983, vol. 1, p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn44a|44]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 7, pp. 162–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_002.html#c05-ftn45a|45]] François-Noël Babeuf, &#039;&#039;Écrits&#039;&#039;, ed. Claude Mazauric, 1988, p. 189.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn46a|46]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn48a|48]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso nel pensiero politico di Kant&#039;&#039;, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn49a|49]] Clavière and Brissot, &#039;&#039;De la France et des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, pp. 324–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn50a|50]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_003.html#c05-ftn52a|52]] Fay, &#039;&#039;L’esprit révolutionnaire&#039;&#039;, pp. 132–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn53a|53]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française et la fin des colonies&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1988, pp. 189–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn54a|54]] Pierre-Victor Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire sur l’esclavage des nègres&#039;&#039;, Neufchâtel, 1788, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., pp. 27, 33–4. Cf. Carminella Biondi, &#039;&#039;Mon frère, tu es mon esclave&#039;&#039;, Pisa: Libreria Goliardica, 1973, pp. 23–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn56a|56]] Antoine-P.-J. M. Barnave, &#039;&#039;Introduction à la révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Fernand Rude, Paris: Colin, 1960, pp. 13, 18, 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., pp. 28–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn58a|58]] See articles 44–46 of the &#039;&#039;Code noir&#039;&#039; in Louis Sala-Molins, &#039;&#039;Le Code noir&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988, pp. 178–83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn59a|59]] Jean-Pierre Biondi and François Zuccarelli, &#039;&#039;16 pluviôse an II&#039;&#039;, Paris: Denoël, 1989, pp. 48, 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn60a|60]] Mirabeau, quoted in Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 86 n. 4 (speech in National Assembly, 3 July 1789).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn61a|61]] Mirabeau, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn62a|62]] Malouet, &#039;&#039;Mémoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 43–4; Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 388.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_004.html#c05-ftn63a|63]] Louis-Narcisse Baudry des Lozières, &#039;&#039;Les égarements du nigrophilisme&#039;&#039;, Paris: Migneret, 1802, pp. 82–3, 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn64a|64]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, p. 47.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn65a|65]] See Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature of Negroes&#039;&#039;, trans. David Bailie Warden, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1997, pp. 42–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn66a|66]] Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn67a|67]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn68a|68]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 471.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 194–202 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;, 239–40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn71a|71]] Sonthonax, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, p. 82.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn72a|72]] Henri Grégoire, &#039;&#039;De la noblesse de la peau&#039;&#039;, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1996, pp. 50–1, 61.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., p. 83.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn74a|74]] Ibid., p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., p. 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., pp. 81–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn77a|77]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Des colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998, p. 242 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., pp. 166, 172.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn80a|80]] Victor Schoelcher, &#039;&#039;Esclavage et colonisation&#039;&#039;, ed. Émile Tersen, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 75.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_005.html#c05-ftn82a|82]] Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution francaise&#039;&#039;, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn83a|83]] Sir Thomas Aston, quoted in Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn84a|84]] Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, pp. 161–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn85a|85]] Richard Hocquellet, ‘Crise de la monarchie hispanique et question coloniale ‘, in Yves Benot and Marcel Dorigny, eds, &#039;&#039;Rétablissement de l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises&#039;&#039;, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn86a|86]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, pp. 407, 760.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn87a|87]] Robin Blackburn, &#039;&#039;The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 345–7; Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn88a|88]] Simón Bolívar, &#039;&#039;Obras completas&#039;&#039;, ed. Vicente Lecuna, Caracas: Ministerio de Educación nacional de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; vol. 3, p. 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 170.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn90a|90]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 679.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 685, 680.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 694.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_006.html#c05-ftn93a|93]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 682.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn94a|94]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 381.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn95a|95]] Michael Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 182.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn96a|96]] Albert Gallatin, quoted in Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn97a|97]] Thomas Hart Benton, quoted in ibid., p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn98a|98]] Jefferson, quoted in Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, p. 205.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn99a|99]] Madison, quoted in ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn100a|100]] Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990, pp. 202, 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn101a|101]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 388, 395–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn102a|102]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, pp. 245–61, in particular p. 257 (for the quotation from Walker).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_007.html#c05-ftn103a|103]] Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 270.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn104a|104]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn105a|105]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, pp. xx–xxi (letter to Robert E. Lee).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn107a|107]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn108a|108]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 324, 327.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 125.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn110a|110]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 189–90 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 10 January 1857), p. 193 (letter to E. V. Childe, 2 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn111a|111]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 195–6 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 13 April 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 190 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 4 September 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn113a|113]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 260–3, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn114a|114]] Henri-Alexandre Wallon, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974, p. v.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn115a|115]] See the letter from Granier de Cassagnac published in &#039;&#039;Journal des Débats&#039;&#039;, 23 July 1841.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn116a|116]] Thiers, quoted in Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn117a|117]] Cf. ibid., pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn118a|118]] André-Jean Tudesq, &#039;&#039;Les grands notables en France&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 842.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn119a|119]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_008.html#c05-ftn120a|120]] Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, pp. 163, 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn121a|121]] Emília Viotti da Costa, &#039;&#039;Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn122a|122]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;Slavery and Human Progress&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 195–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_009.html#c05-ftn123a|123]] Williams, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn124a|124]] Robert Isaac Wilberforce, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838, vol. 1, p. 297 (letter from Wesley to Wilberforce, 24 February 1791).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn125a|125]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn126a|126]] Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, pp. 387, 394.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn127a|127]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, Ibid., pp. 387–90, 395.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn128a|128]] Parker, quoted in Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1978, p. 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn129a|129]] Sharp, quoted in Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn130a|130]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn131a|131]] Parker, quoted in ibid., pp. 208, 210–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn132a|132]] Phillips, quoted in Paul Finkelman, &#039;&#039;Slavery and the Founders&#039;&#039;, Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1996, pp. 1–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn133a|133]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn134a|134]] Garrison, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn135a|135]] Garrison, quoted in Aileen S. Kraditor, &#039;&#039;Means and Ends in American Abolitionism&#039;&#039;, Chicago: Dee, 1989, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn136a|136]] Garrison, quoted in ibid., p. 86.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn137a|137]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 528–31, 261–2, 469.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_010.html#c05-ftn138a|138]] Parker, quoted in Commager, &#039;&#039;Theodore Parker&#039;&#039;, p. 254.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn139a|139]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 67.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn140a|140]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 1, p. 161.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn141a|141]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1987, p. 208 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;Capitalism and Antislavery&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn143a|143]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 451–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn144a|144]] John Millar, &#039;&#039;The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1986, pp. 289, 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn145a|145]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 206.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn146a|146]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 264, 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn147a|147]] Condorcet, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn148a|148]] Cf. &#039;&#039;L’Ami du peuple&#039;&#039;, 18 May 1791, quoted in Benot, &#039;&#039;La révolution française&#039;&#039;, pp. 120–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn149a|149]] Garrison, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn150a|150]] Stockdale, quoted in David Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, in James Walvin, ed., &#039;&#039;Slavery and British Society&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 127.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn151a|151]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, pp. 202–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn152a|152]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, pt 1, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_011.html#c05-ftn153a|153]] Diderot, ‘Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius’, p. 895.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn154a|154]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 339, 354–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 368 and n. 41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn156a|156]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 174 (speech to the Constituent Assembly, 12 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn157a|157]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn158a|158]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;De la Constitution américaine et de l’utilité de son étude&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hennuyer, 1850, pp. 10–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., pp. 6, 9–10, 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn160a|160]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;L’état et ses limites suivi d’essais politiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn161a|161]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. viii–ix.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn162a|162]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, pp. 420–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn163a|163]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 431.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn164a|164]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. vi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn165a|165]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 425–7, 430.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn166a|166]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 94, 128, 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_012.html#c05-ftn167a|167]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn168a|168]] See Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn169a|169]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 3, p. 442.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn170a|170]] Ibid., vol. 4, p. 447.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn172a|172]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn173a|173]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 312–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn174a|174]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 346.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn175a|175]] The text, taken from &#039;&#039;Sherwin’s Weekly Political Register&#039;&#039;, 18 August 1819, is quoted in Paola Casana Testore and Narciso Nada, &#039;&#039;L’età della Restaurazione&#039;&#039;, Turin: Loescher, 1981, pp. 226–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn176a|176]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, pp. 181, 195.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn177a|177]] Blackburn, &#039;&#039;Overthrow of Colonial Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 325–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn178a|178]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 167–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn179a|179]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 293.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn180a|180]] Geggus, ‘British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti’, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn181a|181]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 1004 (letter to William Short, 3 January 1793). On all this, see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric McKitrick, &#039;&#039;The Age of Federalism&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 316–17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn182a|182]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_013.html#c05-ftn183a|183]] Jefferson, quoted in Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, p. 386; Zuckerman, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People&#039;&#039;, pp. 197, 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn184a|184]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1989, pp. 554, 528.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_014.html#c05-ftn185a|185]] Slotkin, &#039;&#039;Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, pp. 232, 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn186a|186]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Autocensura e compromesso&#039;&#039;, pp. 90–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn187a|187]] Cf. ibid., pp. 91, 177, 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn188a|188]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 1, pp. 266–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn189a|189]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 266.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn190a|190]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 304–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn191a|191]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn192a|192]] Tocqueville mentions this critically in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn193a|193]] Hannah Arendt, ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, &#039;&#039;The Menorah Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 33, October 1945, pp. 171, 169, 175.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#c06&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg181&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;181&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER SIX =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;The Struggle for Recognition by the Instruments of Labour in the Metropolis and the Reaction of the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The excluded and the struggle for recognition&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen that the liberal tradition is shot through with two macroscopic exclusion clauses. In reality, there is a third—that directed at women, which in fact presents peculiar characteristics. When they belonged to the upper classes, they formed part, albeit in a subordinate role, of the community of the free; one thinks, in particular, of female slave-owners. The women’s liberation movement was only able to acquire a mass social base later, when women previously confined to a position of slavery or restricted to the inferior levels of a caste society were able to participate in it. The development of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is explained, in the first instance, by the struggle waged by the bipedal machines of the metropolis, on the one hand, and slaves and colonial populations or populations of colonial origin, on the other.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In both cases, even more than for the achievement of specific objectives, the excluded protested against the fact that the dignity of man was denied them. This was a struggle for recognition—in the sense specified by Hegel in a celebrated chapter of &#039;&#039;The Phenomenology of Spirit&#039;&#039;. The shackled black depicted by abolitionist propaganda demanded freedom, stressing (in the text attached to the image) that he too was a ‘man’. In his turn, Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the San Domingo revolution, invoked ‘the absolute adoption of the principle that no man, whether red, black or white, can be the property of his fellow being’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similar accents could be heard in Paris immediately &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg182&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;182&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;following the July Revolution, when popular periodicals accused ‘bourgeois notables’ of insisting on viewing workers not as ‘men’ but ‘machines’, nothing but ‘machines’ called upon to produce exclusively for the ‘needs’ of their masters. After the revolution of February 1848, the achievement by proletarians of political rights demonstrated in their view that they too were finally beginning to be raised to the ‘rank of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Condorcet emphatically recognized this status in black slaves, but denied it to their white masters. Similarly, Engels, referring to the English workers whom he was ‘happy and proud’ to have known and who suffered a ‘slavery worse than that of the American negroes’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] exclaimed: ‘I have found you to be men, members of the great, universal family of humanity’ who proclaimed ‘the cause of humanity’, trampled underfoot by capitalists engaged in an ‘indirect trade in human flesh’, in a barely disguised slave trade.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Corresponding to the struggle of the excluded to be recognized in their dignity as men was the polemic against the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the other side. In the liberal camp the most celebrated intervention was Burke’s. His condemnation of this subversive theory was absolute: it paved the way for the political and social demands of ‘hair-dressers’ and ‘tallow-chandlers’, ‘to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments’, for the demands of the ‘swinish multitude’, or at any rate people whose ‘sordid mercenary occupation’ entailed ‘a mean contracted view of things’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some decades later, in Bentham’s view the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was nothing but a pile of ‘anarchical fallacies’. It sanctioned &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; between all men? The English liberal’s comment was sarcastic:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;All men&#039;&#039; (i.e. all human creatures of both sexes) &#039;&#039;remain equal in rights&#039;&#039;. The apprentice, then, is equal in rights to his master; he has as much liberty with relation to the master, as the master has with relation to him; he has as much right to command and to punish him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
And hence the ‘absurd principle of &#039;&#039;égalité&#039;&#039; can only please “fanatics” and the “ignorant multitude”‘. The Declaration referred to law as an expression of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg183&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;183&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘general will’? But it is clear that therewith censitary restrictions of the vote could not be justified. The very theorization of property right contained in this solemn text was suspect to Bentham: the concrete object of such right was not clearly specified, and hence it involved a right which, once again, belonged ‘to every individual, without any limit’, even the propertyless person suffering from hunger:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In other words, a universal property right is established—that is, everything is common to everyone. But because what belongs to everyone belongs to no one, what follows from it is that the effect of the Declaration is not to establish property but to destroy it. And that is how it was understood by Babeuf’s supporters, those true interpreters of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, who can be criticized for nothing but being consistent in applying the most false and absurd of principles.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Condemning these abstract ‘general principles’, for which Britain rightly displayed ‘extreme repugnance’ and which, when pronounced by ‘famished mouths’, could only result in catastrophe, Bentham referred to Malouet, one of the few in France to have attempted to dispel ‘the cloud of confused ideas’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, it was the Anglomanes who sought to block the ratification of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In appealing to ‘general principles’ and ‘metaphysical’ concepts, Malouet warned, people were playing with fire: they risked inciting the ‘immense multitude of propertyless men’, ‘the unfortunate classes of society’, ‘the men placed by fate in a condition of dependency’ and ‘lacking enlightenment and means’. They must be taught ‘just limits’, rather than the ‘extension of natural liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is significant that one of those to adopt a clear position against the category of rights of man was Malouet, who subsequently played a prominent part in the argument against abolitionism. It was this second aspect that played a central role in the United States, where within the white community the social question did not have the significance it possessed in France, but where the conflict over black slavery became increasingly impassioned. A particular target was the statement (contained in the Declaration of Independence) that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#page184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_000.html#pg184&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;184&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘all men are created equal’, with the right to enjoy ‘certain unalienable Rights’. Present in it was the ‘metaphysical folly’ that subsequently found more concentrated expression in the French Revolution. This was the charge formulated by the ‘American Burke’—namely, Randolph—who in this context explicitly appealed to the British liberal.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Born in the wake of the revolt against the alleged ‘imprescriptible rights of the king’ invoked by the British Crown, the United States now risked succumbing to the folly of the ‘imprescriptible rights of black slaves’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In similar fashion, Calhoun drew attention to the ‘poisonous fruits’ of that ‘place in the declaration of our independence’ which claimed to confer ‘the same right to liberty and equality’ on all men. This was the abolitionists’ starting-point in the fanatical struggle they had unleashed against black slavery and ‘Southern institutions’ as ‘outrageous on the rights of men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In England, it was with his focus mainly on the colonies that Disraeli characterized the ‘rights of man’ as ‘nonsense’ in 1880.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The struggle for recognition waged by colonial populations or populations of colonial origin proved particularly long and complex. It would only achieve decisive results in the twentieth century. For now we must turn our attention to the struggle waged by the bipedal machines in the capitalist metropolis and within the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#calibre_pb_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The instrument of labour becomes a passive citizen&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The social and political milieus which, on either side of the Atlantic, celebrated themselves as the community of the free understood by liberty not only the undisturbed enjoyment of the private sphere. Exclusion from representative bodies and political life was also perceived as an expression of despotism. On the other hand, denial of political rights to those with no title to be recognized as members of the community of the free seemed self-evidently proper. How could the ‘horse’ or ‘beast of burden’ to which Locke and Mandeville compared the wage-labourer, or the ‘speaking instrument’, ‘bipedal instrument’ or ‘work machine’ that Burke and Sieyès referred to, claim to form part of it? &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg185&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;185&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In other words, those who continued to be defined via the categories used by Aristotle to conceptualize the figure of the slave could not enjoy political citizenship. If they were men, they were members of a different, inferior people; they were barbarians (the quintessential slaves).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the French case at least, the picture began to change significantly with the revolution. For some time Sieyès spoke nonchalantly of wage-labourers as the set of ‘work machines’ and ‘bipedal machines’, or of the ‘always childlike multitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But after 14 July 1789, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed, he felt a new need—the need for greater ‘clarity of language’. Hence a distinction between ‘natural and civil rights’, or ‘passive rights’, on the one hand, and ‘political rights’, or ‘active rights’, on the other. The first, which included the protection of the ‘person’, ‘property’ and ‘liberty’, applied to every man. The former bipedal machine now saw his dignity not only as a man but also as a citizen recognized, albeit a ‘passive citizen’ excluded from participation in political life, like ‘women’, ‘children’ and ‘foreigners’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are in the presence of a significant innovation. Just as ‘free labour’ had long been an oxymoron, because labour was in reality synonymous with &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, so the category of ‘passive citizen’ had long sounded like an oxymoron. He who was subject to the necessity of labour, and hence to &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039;, was by definition excluded from the group of freemen, who enjoyed liberty and citizenship to the full. For Locke it was meaningless to grant political rights to those who, as we have seen, were ‘made slaves’ by destitution, need, labour and the servitude implicit in this—and who did not form part of civil society, whose purpose was the defence of property. Blackstone argued in similar fashion: the right to vote could not be extended to ‘persons of indigent fortunes’, who by that token were ‘under the immediate domination of others’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, Constant resorted to the same justification when he excluded the wage-labourer from the enjoyment of political rights: he lacked ‘the necessary revenue to subsist independently of any external will’ and ‘property holders are the masters of his existence, since they may refuse him work.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is especially interesting to observe the development of the first major theorists of passive citizenship. In September 1789 Sieyès still did not hesitate to define as ‘forced’ the labour of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg186&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;186&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘uneducated multitude’, which was therefore ‘lacking freedom’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to pose the problem of conferring political liberty on someone destined to be deprived of liberty as such. On the contrary, it might be asked if it was not appropriate to transform the actually existing ‘slavery of need’ into a ‘legally sanctioned slavery’, in accordance with the model adopted in America for indentured white servants.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French Revolution challenged the configuration of the servant as a mere instrument of labour. The figure now emerged of the purely passive citizen, which in fact had a long gestation period behind it. A significant role was played by an exigency internal to the community of the free, interested in imparting credibility to its discourse and self-celebration. In the wake of the Glorious Revolution, Locke, Mandeville and Blackstone on the one hand recognized and, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, even highlighted the &#039;&#039;servitus&#039;&#039; to which the wage-labourer was—and must be—subject. On the other, they celebrated England as the land of the free, where there was no place for ‘perfect slavery’ (Locke), ‘slavery in the strict sense’ (Blackstone), or colonial slavery (Mandeveille). In the nineteenth century Burke observed that among the subaltern classes the ‘common blessing’ of liberty ‘may be united with much abject toil, with great misery, with all the exterior of servitude’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There is here an obvious concern to stress the liberty of the wage-labourer, who is called upon not to let himself be vexed and misled by the harshness of his material living conditions, but to identify with an order that, despite everything, guarantees him liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ideological dimension of this discourse clearly emerges from reading an eighteenth-century English author. Compared with legal coercion of the labourer–slave, Joseph Townsend regarded economic compulsion as more effective. It silently but unfailingly imposed obedience on servants, terrorized by the prospect of death from starvation. Taken for granted was the power exercised by ‘the more delicate’, who were excused work and ‘left at liberty, without interruption’, over those who, in one way or another, must be forced to perform ‘the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the transition from one condition to the other, coercion had not disappeared, but become more imperious. This did not prevent the English liberal pastor from painting an edifying picture of his country: even the poorest was a &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#page187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_001.html#pg187&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;187&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘freeman’, who supplied ‘free service’ on the basis of ‘his own judgement and discretion’, without the ‘compulsion’ to which the ‘slave’ was subjected.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the figure of the passive citizen there is something more. It is the expression of an exigency internal to the community of the free, but also and above all a response to the struggle for recognition waged by servants in the metropolis. At least potentially, the idea of universal citizenship, even if merely passive in a majority of cases, called into question the caste ordering of society with which Townsend continued to identify. Precisely on account of its novelty, the category of citizen did not impose itself at a stroke on Sieyès, who compared non-property-owners to ‘foreigners’ and ‘children’: the slave too was a foreigner—in fact, the foreigner par excellence, the barbarian. Or he was a child, and as such formed part of the master’s extended family. In this sense, Constant was less shrewd than Sieyès, given that he continued to refer to non-property-owners excluded from political rights primarily as ‘foreigners’ and ‘minors’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The category of ‘passive citizenship’ possessed the further advantage of answering Rousseau’s objection, subsequently taken up by Robespierre. In a well-ordered state, the Genevan philosopher had stressed, no-one should be able to feel himself a ‘stranger’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly distancing himself from absolute monarchy and aristocracy, where a single individual or a few individuals could say they had a ‘homeland’, while everyone else was stateless, it was a question of constructing a society, a ‘democratic regime’, the Jacobin leader later reiterated, where ‘the state is genuinely the homeland of all individuals’, all of them admitted on an equal footing ‘to the rights of the citizen in full’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Now, if not exactly in the strict sense of the term, the proletarian was likewise a citizen, a member of the ‘nation’ dear to Sieyès that Boulainvilliers and the nobility had wrongly wanted to divide into an aristocratic people, descended from the victorious Franks, and a plebeian people, descended from the vanquished Gallo-Romans.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#calibre_pb_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg188&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;188&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;3. The invention of passive citizenship and negative liberty and the restriction of the political sphere&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Compelled by the struggle waged by the excluded to grant them at least passive citizenship, the community of the free now found itself facing a new challenge to its exclusivism. Already in June 1790, Marat had a representative of the ‘unlucky ones’ to whom political citizenship was denied argue thus against the ‘aristocracy of the rich’: ‘In your eyes we are still the rabble’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And we have seen Robespierre compare non-property-owners excluded from political rights to slaves: the concession of passive citizenship did not end the struggle for recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Constant sought to answer the objections of the most radical currents that had emerged during the French Revolution. No, the non-property-owner excluded from the enjoyment of political rights could not be confused with the slave.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the latter, the former, in common with all other citizens, was protected by laws and enjoyed full liberty within his private sphere. And this was what modern liberty consisted in. During the conflict with the monarchy, the community of the free in England and America had demanded a very different liberty, since it was in no way prepared to renounce administering public affairs. But it is clear that this platform could not survive the emergence of a struggle by the popular masses, which protested against exclusion from political rights and at the same time sought to change their labour relations and material living conditions. The dominant elite now developed a very different discourse: participation in political life was not an essential element of liberty; and, in the second place, labour relations and material living conditions pertained to an eminently private sphere, so that it was absurd and illegitimate to seek to change them through political action.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The new discourse did not impose itself at a stroke and wholly consistently. Constant let slip the admission that the provider of work was in fact ‘master’ of the worker’s ‘existence’. But even more significant is the oscillation we find in Macaulay. Fighting in 1831 for the political emancipation of Jews, the British liberal unhesitatingly rejected the thesis that a distinction should be made between civil rights and political rights, and that exclusion from the latter was not a factor of ‘mortification’ and discrimination. In reality, this was sophistry designed to justify ‘a system full of absurdity and injustice’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg189&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;189&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;polemic was incisive and effective, but the liberal author was careful not to intervene on behalf of the British popular masses as well as of property-owners whose religion was Judaism!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A similar consideration applies to other exponents of the liberal tradition. In regarding the enjoyment of political rights as an essential element of liberty, the Jacobins argued no differently from the American revolutionaries. But in Burke the proposal of ‘conciliation’ of the rebel colonists, who with their demand for the right to representation had confirmed that they were worthy members of the community of the free, was followed by the proclamation of a crusade against a revolution led by the mob, which had demanded and wrested political rights. As to de Tocqueville, his notes on his travels in England were almost coeval with the publication of &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;. But the warm appreciation of widespread political participation in the North American republic was certainly not matched by bitter denunciation of strict censitary discrimination in Britain, or the slightest support for the Chartist demand for an extension of the suffrage.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s intervention was especially significant as regards the second point in the new liberal ideological platform, which drastically restricted the political sphere. In a text of 1842 he observed: ‘Equality is everywhere extending its dominion, except in industry, which is daily organized in increasingly aristocratic form’. The wage-labourer found himself in a ‘strict dependency’ (&#039;&#039;étroite dépendance&#039;&#039;) on the provider of work. Despite the charming appearance of ‘great French society’ as a whole, ‘industrial society’ (&#039;&#039;société industrielle&#039;&#039;) in the strict sense continued to be characterized by a strict hierarchy, which left little room not only for equality, but also for the individual liberty of those placed on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The harshness of the relations obtaining in factories was further confirmed by de Tocqueville’s comparison between working conditions and prison conditions, even if it was made not to challenge the former but to reject naively philanthropic projects for reform of the latter:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The majority of free workers, who in France painfully earn a living, have no rest but that taken at meal times, and cannot understand why criminals punished by society arouse so lively an interest that it gives way to tenderhearted exclamations and is on the verge of shedding tears at the idea of inflicting on them a deprivation suffered by all honest labourers.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg190&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;190&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Besides, we should not forget that the panopticon theorized by Bentham, a building designed to achieve surveillance from which there was no escape, could serve as prison, workhouse or even factory.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are put in mind of the ‘immediate dominion’ or ‘forced labour’ to which Blackstone and Sieyès, respectively, refer. However, this coercive relationship was no longer explicitly highlighted to justify censitary discrimination in political rights (whose enjoyment belonged only to freemen in the full sense of the term). Instead, the condition that subjected the worker to a ‘strict dependency’ (de Tocqueville), compelled him to work in prison-like institutions (Bentham and de Tocqueville), and to sell his labour power to buyers who were ultimately the ‘masters of his existence’ (Constant), was now recognized reluctantly, declared to be without political relevance and hence not corrosive of negative liberty, from which no one in the metropolis was excluded.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point we can read the notes written by de Tocqueville during his trips to England in 1833 and 1835. The picture that emerges is no less dramatic than the one Engels was to draw some years later. The industrial region of Manchester and the working-class districts appeared as an ‘infected labyrinth’, an ‘inferno’: the miserable little cottages were like&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
the last asylum man can occupy between misery and death. Yet the unfortunate beings that inhabit such cubby-holes arouse the envy of their fellows. Under their wretched abodes one finds a row of cellars to which a semi-underground corridor leads. In each of these damp, repugnant places, ten or fifteen human creatures are massed higgledy-piggledy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The appalling mass poverty formed a shocking contrast to the opulence of a few: ‘the organized forces of a multitude produce for the benefit of a single one’. Such a spectacle elicited a significant exclamation: ‘Here the slave, there the master; here the wealth of some, there the poverty of the greatest number’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On another occasion, de Tocqueville even warned against the danger of ‘slave wars’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby indirectly comparing modern proletarians with ancient slaves. We thus encounter the reality of unfreedom, and of unfreedom in its most drastic form. Yet this realistic analysis disappears as if by magic when it comes to drawing up an overall political balance sheet. We are dealing with the country that France was called upon to regard as a model, if it wished to save ‘the future &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#page191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_002.html#pg191&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;191&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of free institutions’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] English liberal society realized liberty as such, regardless of the conditions of the kind of slavery had had to register in the inferno of the industrial regions. The fact is that this inferno had nothing to do with the political sphere proper. And once poverty or even a condition of tangible slavery had been confined to a sphere lacking political relevance (for pertaining to private life), in a sphere where it was not legitimate or possible to intervene politically, the initially slimy and repugnant portrait of Manchester turned into its opposite:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the external appearance of the city, everything attests to the individual power of man and nothing to the regulatory power of society. At every step, liberty reveals its capricious, creative force there. Nowhere is the slow, continuous action of the government to be seen.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#calibre_pb_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. ‘Civil laws’ and ‘political laws’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The restriction of the political sphere is so radical as to seem paradoxical. Analysing the prison system in the United States, de Tocqueville drew attention to legislation that threw the poor into prison even for utterly insignificant debts. In Pennsylvania the number of individuals annually incarcerated for debt amounted to 7,000. If to this figure was added the number of those condemned for more serious crimes, it turned out that for every 144 inhabitants virtually one a year ended up in prison. But this was not the most important aspect. The French liberal was obliged to acknowledge the influence, direct as well as indirect, exercised by the wealthy over the administration of justice. The ‘vagrant’ or someone suspected of vagrancy was locked up in prison without having committed any offence. Worse, while awaiting legal proceedings, the poor witness or plaintiff lost his liberty, while the thief capable of standing bail retained his (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn1|§1]]). Clearly, the very principle of equality before the law ended up being travestied. But this was not de Tocqueville’s conclusion: ‘Of all modern peoples, it is the English who have instilled the greatest liberty in their political laws and made most frequent use of prison in their civil laws’. In their turn, although having largely altered the ‘political laws’, Americans had ‘preserved most of the civil laws’ of England.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#page192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_003.html#pg192&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;192&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;With this distinction we have reached a key point. The liberal author formulated his judgement on the countries visited by him exclusively on the basis of their &#039;&#039;lois politiques&#039;&#039;, while the &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039; were by definition politically irrelevant. Not by chance, there is little trace in &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; of the data gathered in the course of the inquiry into the US prison system. It might be said that de Tocqueville’s most interesting pages are those that did not make it into the work which sealed his fame. The almost triumphant conclusion then becomes explicable: in the transatlantic republic liberty had been comprehensively diffused, and did not constitute a privilege. Accustomed as he was to very different &#039;&#039;lois civiles&#039;&#039;, the traveller from France expressed his disappointment at legislation in the United States that seemed to him ‘monstrous’. But ‘the mass of [American] men of law’ found no fault with it and did not regard it as contradicting the ‘democratic constitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was precisely the standpoint de Tocqueville ended up adopting—though not without contradictions and embarrassment. We can glimpse the former if we give the French liberal the floor once again:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It must be acknowledged that the American prison regime is severe. While US society affords the example of the most extensive liberty, this country’s prisons offer a spectacle of utter despotism. The citizens subject to the law are protected by it; they cease to be free only when they become felons.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, by de Tocqueville’s own admission, vagrants and poor witnesses also suffered ‘severe’ treatment in prisons, or workhouses similar to prisons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And now let us observe the embarrassment. We have already encountered the protests of vagrants locked up in prison by a society that cannot solve the problem of unemployment in any other way. What was de Tocqueville’s reaction? Just as it did not come within his ‘tasks’ to investigate possible remedies for unemployment, so it did not fall to him ‘even to investigate to what extent the society is just that punishes the man who does not work and lacks work, and how it might furnish means of subsistence without putting him in prison’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The sphere of politics and ‘political laws’ was so narrowly defined as to exclude not only material living conditions and relations of dependency in factories, but even the censitary discrimination that pervaded the administration of justice in the United States.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#calibre_pb_4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg193&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;193&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;5. The de-politicization and naturalization of economic and social relations&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Any expansion of the political was utterly intolerable to the liberal tradition, because it would involve relations that were not only private in character, but whose immutability was consecrated by nature or Providence. In Burke’s view it was at once mad and blasphemous to believe that among ‘the competence of government’ was ‘supply[ing] to the poor, those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine Providence for a while to with-hold from them’. Poverty was the result of ‘Divine displeasure’ and the latter could certainly not be placated by challenging ‘the laws of commerce’, which were ‘the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some decades later, de Tocqueville argued no differently. On the eve of the 1848 Revolution, he noted with concern the behaviour of the ‘working classes’. They seemed calm, no longer ‘bedevilled by political passions’. Unfortunately, however, ‘where once they had been political, their passions have become social’. Rather than the make-up of this or that ministry, they tended to question property relations themselves and hence the natural order of ‘society’, tearing ‘to shreds the basis on which it rests’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] When the revolution broke out, the French liberal regarded it as socialist or infected with socialism as early as February, because prominent in it were ‘the economic and political theories’ which would have people ‘believe that human miseries are the work of the laws and not of Providence, and that poverty can be abolished by changing the social order’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ranging beyond the political sphere, the ‘threat of change in the social constitution’ was configured as an attack on the ‘ancient, holy laws of property and family on which Christian civilization is based’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, on the one hand political economy was merged with theology, while on the other it tended to take its place, in the sense that ‘science’ was now called on to sanction and sanctify existing social relations. According to Malthus, it was wholly desirable that political economy be ‘taught to the common people’. Thanks to it, the poor would understand that they must attribute the cause of their privations to Mother Nature or their own improvidence. Indeed, ‘[p]olitical economy is perhaps the only science of which it may be said that the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg194&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;194&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great evil.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was also the opinion of de Tocqueville, who believed it necessary&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
to diffuse among the working classes … some of the most elementary and certain notions of political economy, which would make them understand, for example, what is constant and necessary in the economic laws that govern the wage rate. Because such laws, being in some sense of divine law, in that they derive from the nature of man and the very structure of society, are situated beyond the reach of revolutions. [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
While for Burke, ‘Divine displeasure’ explained the misery of the popular masses, for Malthus it was the immorality of their behaviour, the sexual incontinence that brought into the world beings whose subsistence people were not in a position to ensure. Referring to ‘Malthus’s principle of population’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] de Tocqueville reprehended ‘all the excesses of intemperance’ widespread among ‘the lower classes’, their ‘improvidence’, or their tendency to live ‘as if there will be no tomorrow’, and above all ‘these early, imprudent marriages that seem to have no other purpose than multiplying the number of unfortunates on earth’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Notwithstanding the radical attitudes he liked to adopt, Bentham did not reach very different conclusions: ‘with respect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws’; the poor man was like a ‘savage’ who had not succeeded in transcending the state of nature. Or, to put it in the words of a French disciple and collaborator of the English philosopher, ‘Poverty is not a result of the social order. So why rebuke it? It is a legacy of the state of nature’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Arguing against natural law, the English philosopher waxed ironic about the recourse to nature to ground rights that only made sense in society. But now nature popped up again to remove responsibility for poverty from the politico-social order.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Given this elevation of existing social relations to the status of nature, and to nature sanctioned by Providence, attempts to alter them could only be an expression of madness. Burke expressed his utter ‘horror’ at revolutionaries or hasty reformists, who did not hesitate ‘to hack that aged parent [their &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#page195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_004.html#pg195&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;195&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;country] in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, for de Tocqueville the illusion that there was a political ‘cure for this hereditary, incurable ill of poverty and work’ provoked the incessant, ruinous &#039;&#039;expérimentations&#039;&#039; that characterized the French revolutionary cycle,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or ‘the great social revolution’ begun in 1789.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#calibre_pb_5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. Liberalism and radicalism: two different phenomenologies of power&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In pronouncing his judgement on England and the United States, de Tocqueville ignored, in addition to colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, material living conditions, labour relations and even ‘civil laws’. Extraneous to his research and analysis of democracy, he declared, was not only the oppression of blacks and Indians, but also the detention of white citizens (‘vagrants’ or poor people summoned to testify in a trial) who were not guilty of any offence. The cult of the &#039;&#039;‘holy&#039;&#039; thing’ that was liberty[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ignored the fate of the excluded in their entirety, whether they lived in the colonies or the metropolis. And, once again, the divergence between liberalism and radicalism—of which Marx and Engels were the critical heirs—is already apparent at an epistemological level. In England, observed Engels, the ‘aiding and abetting of the rich is explicitly recognized even in the law’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Analysing the English ‘civil laws’ inherited by the United States, de Tocqueville arrived at the same conclusion. But this fact had political relevance only for Engels. And like the authors of the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;, the French liberal compared the worker of the time to the slave, forced to suffer a ‘strict dependency’ inside the factory and a degrading, oppressive poverty outside it. But de Tocqueville considered all this foreign to the political sphere proper.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was precisely the drastic restriction of the political, and the consequent exclusion from it of the most profound dimension of the social totality, that prompted Marx’s criticisms. From the standpoint of bourgeois society and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg196&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;196&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;political theory, he observed in his early writings, social relations ‘have only a private significance, not any political significance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In its most developed form, the bourgeois state limited itself ‘to closing its eyes and declaring that certain &#039;&#039;real&#039;&#039; oppositions do not have a &#039;&#039;political character&#039;&#039;, that these do not bother it’. While regarded as lacking political relevance, bourgeois social relations and power relations in the factory and society could develop without inhibition or external impediment.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above poverty, the reality of the factory (stressed the &#039;&#039;Communist Manifesto&#039;&#039;) highlighted the ‘despotism’ that hung over workers, ‘organised like soldiers’ and ‘[a]s privates of the industrial army … placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s conclusion was scarcely milder. But now the despotism identified and denounced was not this reality, but attempts by political power to change or alleviate it. Against demands to put ‘the prescience and wisdom of the state in the place of individual prescience and wisdom’, the French liberal proclaimed that ‘nothing authorizes the state to interfere in industry’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the famous speech of 12 September 1848, made to persuade the Constituent Assembly to reject demands for the ‘right to work’ that had already been drowned in blood in the June Days. De Tocqueville went so far as to attribute to ‘socialist doctrines’ the regulation and reduction of working hours (‘the twelve-hour day’), which therefore became an object of unequivocal condemnation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Likewise dismissed as an expression of socialism and despotism was any legislative measure to alleviate the misery of the ‘lower classes’ through rent controls.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The French liberal insisted on this intransigently. Immediately after the bloody June Days, he did not hesitate to accuse the Interior Minister of being inconsistent and soft: ‘While Cavaignac and Lamorcière fought socialism in the streets, Sénard supported socialist doctrine as regards the twelve-hour day’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some months later, in his draft electoral circular of May 1849, de Tocqueville advertised as a badge of merit the fact that he had voted, &#039;&#039;inter alia&#039;&#039;, ‘against the limit it was proposed to place on the working day, against progressive taxation, and finally against the abolition of military substitution’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The last point was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#page197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_005.html#pg197&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;197&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;no less significant than the others. In de Tocqueville’s view, the option the rich man had of hiring a poor man to replace him when it came to performing the duty of military service did not involve an inequality, based on wealth and sanctioned by law, even in the face of the danger of death. Rather, it was a contract between individuals, which pertained to the private sphere and hence did not infringe the principle of legal equality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even in his capacity as a historian, when reconstructing the history of the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, de Tocqueville stuck to this restriction of the political sphere and this peculiar phenomenology of power, which identified dominion and oppression exclusively with the intervention of political power in a private sphere that had been unduly expanded. He drew a terrible picture of the conditions of the popular classes. ‘Beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ were sometimes proceeded against ‘in the most violent way’, with the arrest and condemnation of thousands of people to forced labour without trial. Not much better was the treatment reserved for peasants. While, materially and socially, they lived in an ‘abyss of misery and isolation’, in terms of civil rights they were deprived of any protection: they ‘were constantly arrested in connection with the levies of forced labour or the militia; for begging, for misdemeanours, and countless other minor offences’. In conclusion, the peasants were viewed rather like ‘the Negroes in our colonies’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Was the revolution therefore legitimate and necessary? Such was not de Tocqueville’s opinion. France, which with the economists radically criticized and readied itself to overthrow the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, ‘wanted not so much a recognition of the “rights of man” as reforms in the existing system’![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An organ of the titled aristocracy and hence jointly responsible for the degradation of the peasants to ‘negroes’, the &#039;&#039;parlements&#039;&#039; were the body which, before unfortunately being dissolved by the revolution, embodied the whole cause of liberty. In the years preceding the fatal 1789, ‘our judicial institutions were still those of a free people.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#calibre_pb_6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. The new self-representation of the community of the free as a community of individuals&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To the revolutionary demand for the rights of man and the equal dignity of every individual, which risked grinding society ‘into the dust and powder of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg198&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;198&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’, Burke opposed the sacredness of a community: ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’, in ‘the great primaeval contract of eternal society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thanks to a ‘relation in blood’ that united and founded in an indivisible unity ‘our state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In other words, as against the individualism reprehended in the French revolutionaries, the British liberal vindicated an emphatic organicism. Not by chance, the partnership celebrated by him subsequently became in German culture the &#039;&#039;Gemeinschaft&#039;&#039; that played such an important role in nineteenth- and twentieth-century conservative and reactionary thinking.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the dissolvent charge contained in revolutionary individualism can also be found in de Tocqueville, who in 1843 observed: ‘For some years, doubt and individualism have made us such progressives that the nation will soon no longer offer any foothold for resistance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But already during the French Revolution a different attitude had begun to emerge. Barnave warned as follows against the demand for an extension of political rights to non-property-owners: ‘Another step on the road of equality would mean the destruction of liberty.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to Constant, too, the diffusion among the popular masses of the demand for political rights and stress on their enjoyment risked making people lose sight of the centrality of ‘private independence’ or ‘individual independence’, leading to the subjection of individual existence to the collective body.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albeit in a different idiom, Barnarve’s argument was reintroduced: the generalization of political rights had a levelling, homogenizing effect at the expense of individual liberty. Later, Guizot declared that to fight for a society where everything revolved around ‘order’, ‘well-being’ and the ‘equitable distribution … of the means of life’ meant forgetting ‘the development of individual life, the development of the human mind and its faculties’, and aspiring to an ‘ant-hill or bee-hive’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a theme that enjoyed enormous success after 1848. The more the struggle for recognition developed as a struggle for the conquest of political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg199&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;199&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;rights and of economic and social rights, the more the popular and socialist movement was accused of not understanding the autonomous dignity of the individual, and in fact of wanting to trample it underfoot. Rejecting the social demands that issued from the February Revolution, de Tocqueville gave full vent to his disgust at the emergence on the horizon of the spectre of a ‘levelled society’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a ‘society of bees and beavers’, composed ‘more of sapient animals than free, civilized men’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And so in his turn did John Stuart Mill: ‘At present individuals are lost in the crowd … The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hence, in a reversal of positions compared with Burke, liberalism now rebuked the most radical currents not for their individualism, but for riding roughshod over the rights of the individual. De Tocqueville sought to provide this accusation with an epistemological foundation: conferring ‘a separate existence on the species [espèce]’, and expanding ‘the notion of genus [&#039;&#039;genre&#039;&#039;]’, radicalism and socialism were simply the application to politics of the ‘doctrine of the realists’ of scholastic fame. It entailed ‘contempt for particular rights’ and devaluation of the individual as such.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But what is the value of this theoretical construct? It is interesting to see how de Tocqueville rejects proposals for reforming the prison system promoted primarily by the radical and socialist movement:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philanthropy elicits our pity for an isolated unfortunate, we must not forget to reserve a little of our sympathy for a yet greater interest—that of the whole society. Let us distrust these narrow, ungenerous views that notice the individual but never the mass of men and let us eternally remember this thought of a great philosopher: pity for the wicked is a great cruelty to the good … The social interest, which is nothing if not the interest of the honest mass, requires that the wicked be severely punished.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Even the troubled diagnosis of massification was made with an eye to the fate of ‘[t]he nation, taken as a whole’, which now risked turning out to be ‘less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was also in the name of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg200&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;200&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an emphatic (and chauvinist) idea of the nation that de Tocqueville invoked ‘terror’ against those who risked compromising the honour of France (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At a concrete level, too, de Tocqueville was concerned to see what were for him the requirements of society prevail. In the years of the July Monarchy, faced with the spread of mass misery, he proposed nothing to prevent it except police measures gravely corrosive of the liberty of the individual (the poor individual): ‘Could we not prevent the rapid movement of the population, so that men do not abandon the earth and move to industry, except to the extent that the latter can readily meet their needs?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Restrictions on freedom of movement should also be imposed on ‘vagrants’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although committed to denouncing the expansion of the state—‘the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power’—Mill did not hesitate to assert: ‘The laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state’; they were ‘not objectionable as violations of liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The view that any ‘interference’ in the procreation of human life was illegitimate was ‘a superstition which will one day be regarded with as much contempt, as any of the idiotic notions and practices of savages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We can understand Proudhon’s irony in connection with the liberal school:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It, which in all circumstances and places professes &#039;&#039;laissez-faire, laissez-passer&#039;&#039;, which reprehends socialists for substituting their convictions for the laws of nature, which protests against any state intervention, and which demands liberty here, there and everywhere, nothing but liberty, does not hesitate when it comes to conjugal fertility to cry to the spouses: Stop there! What devil incites you![[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In the conflict between liberalism and its critics, an inversion of positions has occurred as regards laissez-faire for the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Disgusted by the radicalism of the 1848 revolution and Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, de Tocqueville arrived at a bitter conclusion: ‘The revolution &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#page201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_006.html#pg201&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;201&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in England was made solely with a view to liberty, while that in France was made principally with a view to equality.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The criticism also encompassed the Enlightenment culture that had prepared and promoted the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime:&#039;&#039; in it a sure ‘zeal for equality’ was matched by a rather ‘tepid’ ‘desire for liberty’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we know, the first to counterpose liberty and equality and denounce the demand for political equality as an attack on liberty was Barnarve, who was nevertheless a defender of slavery. This institution continued to be alive and well in the United States when de Tocqueville held up the transatlantic republic, together with England, as the model country for love of liberty to a France devoured by the passion for equality. It was precisely here that slavery was justified and even celebrated by southern theorists as an instrument to ensure, along with their liberty, the equality of members of the white community. For confirmation of the problematic character of the opposition between liberty and equality, we might adduce the pre-1848 de Tocqueville, who criticized England for an erroneous conception of liberty in as much as it was based on ‘privilege’ (and inequality), and who attributed to the French Revolution the merit of having, in the name of equality, promoted the cause of the abolition of slavery and the freedom of the blacks (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]; below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|§7]]). At this time, far from being in opposition, liberty and equality were fully in accord.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The opposition was represented, in significantly different form, in the work of another important representative of the liberal tradition. In Bentham we read: ‘When security and equality are in opposition, there should be no hesitation: equality should give way’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the very country held up by de Tocqueville as a model for its ability to understand the absolute priority of the value of liberty, we see that the reassertion of the subordinate value of equality occurs, in the first instance, in the name of the ‘security’ of society and the existing order.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#calibre_pb_7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. Economic and social rights, the socialist ‘ants’ nest’ and liberal ‘individualism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point it is appropriate to analyse nineteenth-century liberals’ individualist profession of faith at greater length. Especially after 1848, in the midst &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg202&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;202&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the massification they reprehended in socialism, they sometimes seemed to consider individualism a pre-modern reality, which had, alas, faded in the course of subsequent historical developments. According to Mill, ‘[i]n ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself’; he was not ‘lost in the crowd’ and the ‘masses’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville likewise paid homage to the ‘individualism of the Middle Ages’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Manifestly, he did not take into consideration the fate of serfs, just as he did not take account of the fate of slaves and blacks in general when he pointed to the United States as the country where &#039;&#039;‘every&#039;&#039; individual’ enjoyed unprecedented ‘independence’. When he subsequently asserted that in colonized Algeria, ‘the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the motherland’, de Tocqueville ignored the Arabs, who, by his own admission, were often equated with the occupying forces to ‘evil beasts’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]; below, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|§6]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus emerges the somewhat problematic character of the pathos of the individual, which was the flag waved by liberalism in its conflict with radicalism and socialism. Who was more individualist? Toussaint L’Ouverture, the great protagonist of the slave revolution? Or Calhoun, the great US theorist of the slaveholding South? Who demonstrated respect for the dignity of the individual as such? The black Jacobin who, taking the Declaration of the Rights of Man seriously, considered that it was always inadmissible to reduce a man to an object of ‘property’ of one of ‘his follow men’? Or Jefferson, who kept silent about his doubts about slavery out of a conviction of white superiority and his concern not to endanger the peace and stability of the South and the Union? Who expressed individualism better? Mill and his English and French followers, who considered the subjection and even slavery (albeit temporary) of colonial peoples beneficial and necessary? Or the French radicals who began to question colonial despotism as such (‘Let the colonies perish if they are to cost honour, freedom’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]])?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The doubts are not dispelled even if we ignore the colonies and peoples of colonial origin. Prominent in the liberal tradition (for example, Laboulaye) is the polemic against the fanaticism of the French revolutionaries, who regarded access to the vote and representative office as a ‘natural, absolute right’ of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg203&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;203&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;every individual, rather than a ‘political function’ of society.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So which of the two positions better expressed individualism? On the other hand, if the generalization of political rights imperilled ‘individual independence’, as Constant seemed to believe, why direct such a reproof solely against French radicalism and not also against the American Revolution (which erupted in the wake of the demand for the colonists’ right to political representation)?&lt;br /&gt;
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Examined more closely, the cry of alarm at the danger of the disappearance of individuality, and the impeding ‘ants’ nest’, expressed the disquiet of the restricted community of the free first at the extension of political rights and then, increasingly, at the extension of economic and social rights. Yet it was de Tocqueville himself who compared the hungry man to a slave—that is, a man or an individual deprived of liberty and recognition. Compared with the liberal tradition, Nietzsche proved much more lucid and consistent. Although inspired by an implacable hatred of socialism and the social state demanded by it, and in fact precisely because inspired by such hatred, the brilliant reactionary thinker understood that, with its ‘individualistic agitation’, socialism aimed to ‘render many individuals possible’, raising them above their condition as instruments of labour and their herd-like relationship to the masters. With its universalistic charge, socialism issued in the recognition of every individual, independently of wealth, sex or race, as a subject endowed at a moral level with equal human dignity and possessor, politically, of inalienable rights. That was why Nietzsche indignantly condemned individualism and socialism. Albeit with a converse value judgement, Oscar Wilde also connected the two terms: ‘Individualism … is what through Socialism we are to attain.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confirming the ambiguous character of the liberal tradition’s individualism, it is worth noting that, in criticizing the French Revolution and the danger of subversion represented by the working-class and socialist movement, it liked positively to oppose the countryside to the city. This is readily intelligible in the case of the theorist of organicist ‘partnership’, Burke, who with utter consistency celebrated the ‘agricultural class’ that ‘of all others is the least inclined to sedition’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] With his attention still fixed on the French Revolution and the role in it played by Paris, Constant stressed the danger of ‘[a]rtisans, crowded into the towns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the theme of distrust or hostility towards the city, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg204&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;204&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the prime site for development of the individual, runs deep in the liberal tradition. In Mandeville’s view, ‘London is too big for the Country’, and it was precisely there that disturbing phenomena of social insubordination were emerging. Much more reassuring were rural areas, where it was possible to count on ‘the poor silly Country People’, who in fact were conspicuous for their ‘Innocence and Honesty’ and who, ‘from their very Infancy’, could be educated into obedience to authority and respect for customs and tradition.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A certain regret for this world can also be observed in de Tocqueville, when in 1834 he described the condition of the poor man in the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. Characterized by ‘limited’ desires and calm indifference to ‘a future that did not belong to him’, his lot ‘was less to be felt sorry for than that of men of the people of our days’. Accustomed to their condition from time immemorial, the poor under the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; ‘enjoyed the kind of vegetative happiness whose attractiveness is so difficult for the civilized man to understand that he denies its existence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With the resumption of revolution in France, against those who sought to ‘stir up the working population of the city’, Tocqueville called for reliance on ‘the inhabitants of the countryside, [who] are full of good sense and, thus far, of balance’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The first person to take this recommendation to heart was de Tocqueville himself, who described how he organized the elections in his native village as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
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We all had to go to vote together in the village of Saint-Pierre, a league from our hamlet. The morning of the election, all the electors (that is, the whole male population over the age of twenty) met in front of the church, and all these men formed a queue in twos in alphabetical order … I reminded these good folk of the seriousness and importance of the act they were performing and recommended that they not allow themselves to be approached or led astray by those who, on our arrival in the village, might seek to mislead them, but instead proceed in a group and stay together, each in his place, until we had voted. ‘Let no one—I said—go home either to eat something or to dry himself (it rained that day) before he has done his duty’. They shouted that they would do this and did it. All the votes were cast at the same time, and I have reason to believe that virtually all of them were given to the same candidate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#page205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_007.html#pg205&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;205&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It is hard to regard as a manifestation of individualism the events narrated here by the French liberal, beneficiary of the plebiscitary vote of the village whose lord he remained.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Just as the dichotomy between English love of liberty and French egalitarianism proves unfounded, so the opposition between the individualism of the liberal tradition (whose favoured site was England) and the anti-individualism of radicalism (whose centre was in France) does not withstand critical analysis. To the French revolutionaries, who with their Declaration of the Rights of Man aimed simply ‘to excite and keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws—a spirit of insurrection against all governments’, Bentham opposed his principle of social utility: ‘there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was the view condemned by Marx, who indignantly reported the reasons with which the prime minister, Palmerston, had once justified his distrust or hostility towards the demand for emancipation advanced by Irish Catholics: ‘because the legislature of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare of the whole’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. Criticism of liberalism as anti-modern reaction?&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, we encounter a paradoxical phenomenon. While, on the one hand, it cultivated pre-modern nostalgia, on the other, liberalism contested the movement engaged in the demand for political rights and economic and social rights, accusing it of a basic inability to understand and accept modernity. The first to set off in this direction was Constant. Clinging to the idea of unanimous participation in political life and hence to ‘ancient liberty’, the Jacobins forgot that the latter was based on slavery, the institution that made it possible for freemen to enjoy the &#039;&#039;otium&#039;&#039; required for them to be genuinely active citizens in every respect.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was 1819 when the French liberal argued thus. At this time, in every country where modern liberty flourished, slavery continued in one form or another to be a living reality and, what is more, had assumed a harshness and naturalistic rigidity unknown in classical antiquity. Certainly, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg206&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;206&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;although it had not ceased to play a significant role, the institution was mostly isolated and concealed in the colonies. But that was not the case in the United States. There slavery was not only highly visible but, according to the analysis of not a few southern theorists (who took up and developed a suggestion of Burke’s), it encouraged the republican spirit of the free. In other words, ‘ancient liberty’ continued to survive in some sense in the United States, which was nevertheless pointed to by Constant as a ‘great example’ of the modern liberty dear to him.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, in stressing the invigorating function that the presence of slaves had on the spirit of liberty of free citizens, Burke explicitly referred to the example of the ‘ancient states’ (above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn2|§2]]). Hence Constant’s theoretical construct is based on a colossal repression, which is all the more amazing if we bear in mind the bitter struggles over slavery that developed in France. Abolished by the Jacobins, it had been restored by Napoleon, who arrived in power with the support not only of Sieyès, but also (as we shall see) of Constant himself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Rather than emulating a model from antiquity, the French Revolution and the most radical currents thrown up by it were sometimes accused of encouraging nostalgia for the Middle Ages. Spencer compared progressive taxation to a corvée (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|§4]]). This was a theme subsequently developed by him with the observation that ‘national charity’ (i.e. laws benefiting the poor) was merely a new version of the pre-modern ‘established church’. And just as the old dissenter had fought for respect for the spontaneity of authentic religious sentiment, so the new ‘dissenter from a poor law, maintains that charity will always be more extensive, and more beneficial, when it is voluntary’. While the old dissenter denied any authority the right to dictate laws to his religious conscience, the new ‘dissenter from established charity, objects that no man has a right to step in between him and the &#039;&#039;exercise&#039;&#039; of his religion’, and indignantly rejected ‘the interference of the state, in the exercise of one of the most important precepts of [the] gospel’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the last analysis, the demand for economic and social rights, to be legally ratified in the name of moral and religious values such as compassion and human solidarity, were simply a claim to restore life to a state religion! And the prophets of this state religion likewise referred to a pre-modern world. From the French Revolution onwards, as we shall soon see, the liberal tradition was fond of equating trade unions with medieval corporations. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Lecky reproved trade unions and the working-class movement for aspiring to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg207&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;207&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an ‘industrial organization’ similar to that of the Middle Ages and the Tudor period.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Trade unions, Pareto stressed some years later, claimed to enjoy (and did enjoy) a kind of ‘Mediaeval immunity’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In Lord Acton’s view, even more so than the demand by unions for alleged economic and social rights, it was that for universal suffrage that amounted to a pre-modern, regressive phenomenon. It was ‘absolutist and retrograde’, since it favoured the expansion of the state and of despotism that had happily been transcended by liberalism.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, rather than classical antiquity as for Constant, Jacobinism, socialism and sometimes democracy itself were now accused of cultivating nostalgia for the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, whether it was of the Middle Ages or absolute monarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
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The latter theme found fullest expression in de Tocqueville, according to whom, with their statist pathos, radicalism, Jacobinism and socialism were in a line of continuity with the statism, ‘administrative centralization’ and ‘paternal government’ of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, this was an argument which, albeit with timely variations, proved especially dear to defenders of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; themselves! In Berlin the &#039;&#039;Berliner politische Wochenblatt&#039;&#039; never tired of repeating that revolution and absolutism were ‘identical, when regarded from a higher viewpoint’. In citing Louis XIV’s motto (‘L’état c’est moi!’), the journal observed that ‘revolutionary freedom … is reconciled with this centralization, this bureaucratic despotism, with this tutelage through ministerial assistants of the provinces and the community, with this Hobbesian governmental omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville stressed the revolutionary role played, even before 1789, by the figure of the ‘intendant’ and ‘public administration’, which had in fact already expelled the nobility.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The periodical cited above arrived at the same conclusion, identifying and branding in the figure of the ‘civil servant’ the author of the cancellation of ‘local liberties’ and all intermediate bodies liable to overshadow ‘state power’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] According to de Tocqueville, ‘those peoples who are so constituted as to have the utmost difficulty in getting rid of despotic government for any considerable period are the ones in which aristocracy has &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg208&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;208&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;ceased to exist and can no longer exist’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was precisely the guiding thread of the condemnation of the French Revolution pronounced by the organ of the Prussian nobility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Immediately after the publication of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the Revolution&#039;&#039;, expressing his agreement and admiration, Lieber observed that the book as a whole was a historical running commentary on the analysis of ‘Gallican’ political tendencies he had already developed.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, a degree of boasting is not absent. Yet we should understand the German-American liberal’s point of view. In 1849 he had underlined the continuity between Louis XIV and the 1789 revolution, and between it and Napoleon Bonaparte and the 1848 Revolution. It was a history utterly pervaded by the ideal of ‘equality’ and the ‘concentration’ and ‘centralization of power’, the ‘organization’ and generalized ‘interference of public power’, with a consequent inevitable sacrifice of freedom, ‘individualism’ and the principle of the ‘limitation of government’. By contrast, the latter was at the heart of the concerns and aspirations of the ‘Britannic race’ or ‘Anglican race’—i.e. England and the United States.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are, I repeat, in 1849; and at this time de Tocqueville confined himself to an indictment of socialism. While ‘on many points’ it had a different orientation from the ‘&#039;&#039;ancien régime’&#039;&#039;, it had inherited ‘the opinion that the only wisdom lies in the state’. But the partial and limited continuity established here did not in any way include the French Revolution. In fact, in his anti-socialist polemic, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to refer to Robespierre:&lt;br /&gt;
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Flee … flee the old mania … of wanting to govern excessively; allow individuals, allow families the right freely to do anything that does not harm others; allow the communes the right to manage their own affairs; in a word, restore to the liberty of individuals everything that has illegitimately been taken from them, everything that does not of necessity pertain to the public authority.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this time, far from formulating the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution, de Tocqueville was refuting it in advance. Someone who did support it was Lieber, who was in a sense justified in claiming priority. In fact, it must be added that, by his own explicit admission, he had derived the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#page209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_008.html#pg209&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;209&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thesis from Niebuhr, whose disciple he considered himself to be,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and, more generally, from the German culture he had absorbed before leaving Prussia at the age of twenty-seven. In the first instance, the thesis of continuity between the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; and the Revolution met with great success in the country where the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; proved most tenacious.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We are clearly dealing with a rhetorical strategy: the revolutionary movement that claimed to be constructing a new world was branded as antiquated. Yet the strains are obvious. If we analyse the arguments of the various exponents of the liberal tradition, we see that the French Revolution and Jacobinism are variously situated in a line of continuity with classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and monarchical absolutism. The past to which the new is returned and reduced can assume the most diverse forms. Thus, the revolution was criticized with arguments that are difficult to reconcile with one another, and which are even opposed. On the one hand, it was accused of having destroyed the intermediate bodies that predated the advent of the absolute state; on the other, of wanting to preserve or reintroduce bodies, such as trade unions, that pertained to feudal particularism and that tended to take the form of a state within the state.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the light of subsequent historical experience, it is difficult to regard the demand for economic and social rights (in our day also ratified by the UN) as pre-modern and, contrariwise, the view, which was not foreign even to de Tocqueville, regarding mass poverty as a datum of nature pertaining to Providence, rather than determinate politico-social relations, as modern. And, still with reference to the French liberal, it is difficult to reconcile condemnation of Jacobinism and socialism as movements situated in the wake of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, with alarmist and apocalyptic denunciation of the ‘new race’ of delirious ideologues and agitators,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who menaced ‘European civilization’, in fact civilization as such, with an unprecedented danger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg210&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;210&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;10. ‘Individualism’ and the repression of working-class coalitions&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In some instances, the individualist profession of faith played a manifestly repressive role. Together with the phenomenology of power and the restriction of the political sphere we are already familiar with, it operated to justify the proscription of working-class coalitions. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mandeville expressed his utter consternation at a new, disturbing phenomenon:&lt;br /&gt;
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I am credibly inform’d that a parcel of Footmen are arriv’d to that height of Insolence as to have enter’d into a Society together, and made Laws by which they oblige themselves not to serve for less than such a Sum, nor carry Burdens or any Bundle or Parcel above a certain Weight, not exceeding Two or Three Pounds, with other Regulations directly opposite to the Interest of those they Serve, and altogether destructive to the Use they were design’d for.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What prompted the ban at this time was simply a refusal of recognition, as emerges from the contempt, in fact the disgust, provoked by the unheard of behaviour among servants. Organizing themselves autonomously, as if they were gentlemen, they pretended to raise themselves to the level of masters or even to usurp their rights (above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). The absence of recognition continued to play a role in Burke. Certainly, in regarding only contracts drawn up outside any ‘collusion or combination’ as valid [[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the allusion to and support for the Combination Acts, which banned and penalized working-class coalitions in these years, are transparent—he appealed to the principle of freedom of trade, which did not tolerate impediments of any kind. But it is clear that the wage labourer, unrecognized in his autonomous subjectivity and dignity and degraded to an &#039;&#039;instrumentum vocale&#039;&#039;, was to see himself denied the right of autonomous organization from below.&lt;br /&gt;
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Smith’s position was more tortured. He recognized that what led to the formation of workers’ coalitions was the desperate attempt to counter the de facto coalition whereby suppliers of work lowered wages, and to escape the threat of death from starvation. However, these ‘enlarged monopolies’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] must &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg211&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;211&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be prevented and repressed in order to assert the rights not only of the market, but also of the individual. It was necessary to ‘allow … every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice’;[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in accordance with ‘the system of natural liberty’, every man must be able to contribute and bring into competition ‘both his industry and his capital’, without any obstacles whatsoever.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case could ‘violations of natural liberty [and justice]’ be tolerated.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, the Le Chapelier law, which banned workers’ coalitions in France in 1791, was also said to be aimed at defending individual freedom. In the name of ‘alleged common interests’, such coalitions violated the freedom to work possessed by every individual.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And de Tocqueville referred to this law when, after 1848, he condemned the working-class and socialist movement thus: while ‘the revolution has swept away all the obstructions that impeded the liberty of the citizen, that is, corporations and craft associations [&#039;&#039;les maîtrises, les jurandes&#039;&#039;]’, the socialists proposed to reintroduce this junk, albeit ‘in a new form’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Perhaps Marx had in mind the liberalism of his time, as well as the French Revolution, when he criticized the Le Chapelier law for having banned ‘working-class associations of any kind’, on the pretext that they represented the ‘re-establishment of the mediaeval guilds’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The theme, which stigmatized trade unions as a residue or reminiscence of the Middle Ages and the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, was widely diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century. In England, while Lecky condemned resumption of the ‘guilds’,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more vehement: acting as new tyrants and taking the place of monarchical despotism, trade unions suffocated individual autonomy and liberty in every way. It was true that they could also be consenting, but this did not alter the terms of the problem: ‘If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The picture was the same across the Atlantic. Lieber condemned unions in the name of economics and morality alike: they were guilty of encouraging &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg212&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;212&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;sloth and, ultimately, vice.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, Laboulaye demonstrated an attitude of cautious openness,[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] while Mill continued to be fundamentally hostile. He targeted the ‘moral police, which occasionally becomes a physical one’, exercised by the trade-union movement: ‘the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry’ tried to block ‘piecework’ and thus oppressed workers of ‘superior skill or industry’, who sought to earn more. In reality, the consequences of piecework had been described as follows by Smith some decades earlier: the workers subjected to it ‘are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years’; if they listened to ‘the dictates of reason and humanity’, it would be the masters themselves who restricted this type of remuneration. But philanthropic intervention from above was one thing. Quite another was intervention from below by organizations that trampled over individual rights and arbitrarily interfered in what Mill too continued to regard as ‘private concerns’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While they sought to impose intervention from above on bourgeois government itself, workers promoted an autonomous movement of transformation from below. However, in the sphere sovereignly declared by it to be ‘private’, the liberal bourgeoisie did not tolerate the intervention of political power, or even that deriving from civil society. Theoretically legalized in England in 1825, following a phase of persecution that even saw culprits condemned to deportation, trade unions continued to be attacked by the judiciary, in as much as they were defined as corporations hampering free enterprise. They acquired full legitimacy in 1871. However, ‘what Gladstone’s government gave with one hand it took away with another.’ If not trade unions as such, it was individual workers who could be dragged before the courts on the basis of a new law: ‘ “Watching and besetting”, that is “picketing” workmen continuing at work during a strike, was made illegal even when done only by a single person.’ This law was repealed by Disraeli in 1875.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In France, the Le Chapelier law was only repealed in 1887. What lay behind full recognition of the legitimacy of workers’ coalitions and organizations was the gigantic struggles that culminated in the Paris Commune. Hence we are beyond 1870, the date that according to Hayek marks the beginning of ‘the decline of the liberal movement’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#page213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_009.html#pg213&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;213&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;himself thus is an author who, not by chance, seems to want to call everything back into question. In his view, by destroying ‘the competitive determination of the price’ of labour power, and claiming to interfere in the ‘game’ of the market, trade unions undermined the liberal system at its roots; and it was ‘the clear moral duty of government’ to prevent this happening.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Paris Commune was a watershed in Europe, but not across the Atlantic. Passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act was ‘applied first and most effectively to labour’, which was guilty of combining in trade-union ‘monopolies’ that did not respect individual initiative and freedom. By contrast, so-called yellow-dog contracts were long considered perfectly respectful of the rules of the market and individual liberty: on the basis of them, when hired, workers and employees committed themselves (were forced to commit themselves) not to join any trade-union organization.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#calibre_pb_10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The demand for economic and social rights and the transition from paternalistic liberalism to social-Darwinist liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A social-Darwinist streak ran through liberal thought from the start. The arguments used by Joseph Townsend in England in the second half of the eighteenth century against any attempt to introduce legislation in favour of the poor are eloquent: it would only end up destroying the balance of nature, cancelling the ‘peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure’ that was hunger and encouraging the growth of an idle, redundant surplus population. Left to itself, without the artificial interference of law-makers moved by false compassion, nature would restore its own balance, just as occurred on an island inhabited solely by goats and dogs. The struggle for survival selected the strongest, most vital elements, condemning the rest to their fate.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the outset, the tendency to naturalize social conflict, and to present the wealth and power of the dominant classes as the expression of an immutable natural law (in this sense Burke referred to a &#039;&#039;‘natural&#039;&#039; aristocracy’ consecrated by ‘Nature’),[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] contained a social-Darwinist element &#039;&#039;avant la lettre&#039;&#039;. We are familiar with Franklin’s criticisms of doctors &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg214&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;214&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;for their commitment to saving lives ‘not worth saving’. The ‘disease’ such people suffered from was the manifestation of divine anger at ‘Intemperance, Sloth, and other Vices’; and it was fitting that all this met with the ‘punishment’ provided for by nature and Providence.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] God’s higher design must not be hindered, especially if colonial populations were the target. This applied not only to the Indians. The terrible famine that decimated an Irish population already severely tried by the British colonizers’ plundering and oppression in the mid-nineteenth century seemed to Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan—charged by the London government with following the situation—to be the expression of ‘omniscient Providence’, which thereby solved the problem of overpopulation.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the social-Darwinist element was accentuated as the popular classes, shaking off their traditional subalternity, intervened directly on the political scene to assert their rights. In the United States, following the abolition of slavery, paternalism rapidly gave way to an explicitly violent attitude towards blacks, subject to the terror that threatened anyone who dared to challenge white supremacy. Something similar occurred in Europe. Large sections of the dominant class reacted to the new situation achieved by the struggle for recognition by brandishing the law of natural selection, which condemned the unfit to an early death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most conservative sections of the liberal movement responded to the demand for economic and social rights with a radical, uncompromising liberalism. The state must not in any way interfere with the kind of divine judgement, or struggle for existence, to which Spencer had referred before Darwin. The English political and economic liberal condemned any state interference in the economy with the argument that one should not frustrate that cosmic law which required the elimination of the unfit and life’s failures: ‘the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better’. All men were as if subject to a divine judgment: ‘If they are sufficiently complete to live, they &#039;&#039;do&#039;&#039; live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.’[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was necessary to respect ‘that universal law of Nature under which life has reached its present height—the law that a creature not energetic enough to maintain itself must die’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg215&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;215&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Distancing himself from attempts to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the popular classes, Lecky observed that, in reality, ‘in not a few cases’, infant mortality was ‘a blessing in disguise’. Indeed,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sanitary reform is not wholly a good thing when it enables the diseased and feeble members of the community, who in another stage of society would have died in infancy, to grow up and become parent stocks, transmitting a weakened type or the taint of hereditary disease.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Arguing thus, Lecky aligned himself with eugenics, the new ‘science’ that had made its appearance in England and met with extraordinary success in the United States, where between 1907 and 1915 as many as thirteen states passed legislation for compulsory sterilization. According to the legislation of Indiana (the first state to move in this direction), subject to it were ‘habitual delinquents, idiots, imbeciles and rapists’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Like eugenics, Spencer celebrated his greatest triumph in the transatlantic republic.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here William G. Sumner, often regarded as a kind of US Spencer, warned people not to forget the ‘struggle for existence’, as ‘poets and sentimentalists’ liked to.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Socialism’s mistake primarily consisted in its claim ‘to save individuals from any of the difficulties or hardships of the struggle for existence and the competition of life by the intervention of “the state”‘.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Anti-statism and Social Darwinism went hand in hand.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In Germany Heinrich von Treitschke drew attention to the example of the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Let us examine the most delectable common people in the world, that of New York. It is a set of rejects who have merged from all over the whole earth. Yet left to themselves, these corrupted elements are compelled to control themselves. Do you think there is a Prussian police capable of keeping them at bay in the same way that they are held at bay by the harsh law of necessity? All are well aware: nobody takes any notice if someone dies of hunger.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg216&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;216&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Still in Germany, in August L. von Rochau’s view the United States had the merit of applying the principle that every individual must, in the first instance, know how to help himself, unlike revolutionary, centralist France, which delegated care of individual well-being to the state, transforming the latter into a ‘hospital’ for ‘sickly, deformed people’ (&#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039;). The country across the Atlantic also asserted its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in its foreign policy, taking territory after territory from Mexico or the Indians, the latter a people now doomed to an ‘unstoppable decline’, and thus the equivalent on the international plane of the &#039;&#039;Schwächlinge und Krüppel&#039;&#039; who demanded state aid.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It makes no sense to seek to exclude Treitschke and Rochau from the liberal tradition by looking forward to the Third Reich and presupposing a variety of infernal negative teleology at work in Germany. In reality, both authors, especially the first, viewed England and the United States with sympathy and admiration and, echoing a theme widely diffused in the liberal culture of the time, unstintingly denounced the statist and anti-individualist tradition that revolutionary, socialist and Bonapartist France had inherited from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;. In particular, the presence in Treitschke of the influence of Constant and de Tocqueville is immediately obvious. One thinks of his condemnation of the ‘deification of the state’ and the subsequent expansion of the political sphere. From ‘semi-ancient concepts’ and ‘Rousseau’s enthusiasm for the civic sense of the ancients’ derived the ‘omnipotent state power’ constructed by the Jacobins, who were likewise oblivious of the cost of the unanimous participation of citizens in political life: ‘the civic splendour of Athens rested on a vast foundation of slavery’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This inability to understand modern liberty led to tragedy: from the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; to the revolution, from Napoleon I to Napoleon III, ‘under all the regimes, the state’s excessive activity has remained the hereditary disease of France’, whose ideal was ‘the state’s providential omnipotence’.[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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We can understand why social Darwinism established itself above all in Britain, the United States and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, these were three countries on the crest of a wave of economic development and international influence and prestige. If the first two were able to boast powerful expansion overseas or continentally, the third was already engaged in a frenetic scramble for colonies. We shall see that all three regarded themselves &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#page217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0010_split_010.html#pg217&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;217&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;as members of a single family or race which, setting out from Germany, had first crossed the Channel and then the Atlantic. And all three tended to regard Latins (not to mention colonial peoples) as failures, and to attribute their own success to the action of natural selection, which rewarded the best within any individual state, but especially at an international level.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn1a|1]] L’Ouverture, quoted in Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn2a|2]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn3a|3]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 2, pp. 229, 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn4a|4]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 230–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn5a|5]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 5, pp. 154, 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn6a|6]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. Étienne Dumont, Brussels: Société belge de librairie, 1840, vol. 1, pp. 509–21. The text quoted here was subsequently reprinted with alterations in Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 2, pp. 491ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn7a|7]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 524–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn8a|8]] Malouet, quoted in Antoine de Baecque, Wolfgang Schmale and Michel Vovelle, eds, &#039;&#039;L’An des droits de l’homme&#039;&#039;, Paris: CNRS Press, 1988, pp. 104–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn9a|9]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, pp. 63–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn10a|10]] Randolph, quoted in ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn11a|11]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lence, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 568–9, 464.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_000.html#c06-ftn12a|12]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn13a|13]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn15a|15]] William Blackstone, &#039;&#039;Commentaries on the Laws of England&#039;&#039;, 4 vols, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, vol. 1, p. 165.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn16a|16]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn17a|17]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., p. 76.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn19a|19]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn20a|20]] Joseph Townsend, &#039;&#039;A Dissertation the Poor Laws by a Well-Wisher to Mankind&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn21a|21]] Ibid., p. 24. On Townsend, cf. Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 800–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn22a|22]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 214.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn23a|23]] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Discours sur l’économie politique’, in &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris: Gallimard, 1964, vol. 3, p. 255.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn24a|24]] Maximilien de Robespierre, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1912–67, vol. 10, pp. 352–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_001.html#c06-ftn25a|25]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 12, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn26a|26]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1967, p. 13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn27a|27]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn28a|28]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 1, pp. 291–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn29a|29]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 3, pt 2, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn30a|30]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 122.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn31a|31]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, p. 40.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn32a|32]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, pp. 80–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn33a|33]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 2, p. 727.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_002.html#c06-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 323–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn37a|37]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 325.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn38a|38]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_003.html#c06-ftn39a|39]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn40a|40]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 404.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 750 (speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 27 January 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 12, pp. 92–4, 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 221, 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Robert Malthus, &#039;&#039;An Essay on the Principle of Population&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Patricia Joyce, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Royal Economic Society, 1989, vol. 2, p. 152 n. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn45a|45]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 241 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 283 (letter to L. von Thun, 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn48a|48]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 309; Étienne Dumont, Introduction to Bentham, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn49a|49]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn50a|50]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 240 (speech to the Academy of Moral and Political Science, 3 April 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_004.html#c06-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 256.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn52a|52]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 91.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn53a|53]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 590.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 284.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn55a|55]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 101, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn56a|56]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn57a|57]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, pp. 179–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 November 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 182 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 38 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn62a|62]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, pp. 155, 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_005.html#c06-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn65a|65]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pp. 183–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 79–80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §1; ch. 7, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn68a|68]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 2, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn69a|69]] Barnarve, quoted in François Furet and Denis Richet, &#039;&#039;La rivoluzione francese&#039;&#039;, trans. Silvia Brilli Cattarini and Carla Patanè, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1980, p. 168.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn70a|70]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 316–17, 318–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn71a|71]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;General History of Civilisation in Europe&#039;&#039;, Oxford and London: D. A. Talboys, 1837, pp. 13–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn72a|72]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 12, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 544.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn74a|74]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1 (letter to H. Reeve, 3 February 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 139.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn80a|80]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 165, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn81a|81]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 20, p. 350.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn82a|82]] Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, &#039;&#039;La giustizia nella rivoluzione e nella Chiesa&#039;&#039;, ed. Mario Albertini, Turin: UTET, 1968, p. 408.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn83a|83]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, p. 334.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 185.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_006.html#c06-ftn85a|85]] Bentham, quoted in Élie Halévy, &#039;&#039;The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism&#039;&#039;, trans. Mary Morris, London: Faber &amp;amp;amp; Faber, 1972, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn86a|86]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 123.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn87a|87]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn88a|88]] Pierre Dockès, ‘Condorcet et l’esclavage des nègres’, in Jean-Michel Servet, ed., &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, p. 85 n. (this is an assertion which, with some variations, can be found in Dupont de Nemours as well as Robespierre).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn89a|89]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 3, p. 319.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn90a|90]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 33, §1 (for Nietzsche); Alain Laurent, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’individualismo&#039;&#039;, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994, p. 66 (for Wilde’s &#039;&#039;The Soul of Man under Socialism&#039;&#039;).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn91a|91]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 400.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn92a|92]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn93a|93]] Bernard de Mandeville, &#039;&#039;The Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Frederick B. Kaye, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, vol. 1, pp. 269, 306–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 121.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn95a|95]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 242 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 3 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn97a|97]] Bentham, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_007.html#c06-ftn98a|98]] Palmerston, quoted in Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston&#039;&#039;, ed. Lester Hutchinson, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn99a|99]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 309–28.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn100a|100]] Ibid., p. 211.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn101a|101]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 197–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn102a|102]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, p. 218; vol. 2, p. 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn103a|103]] Vilfredo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et ideologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1999, pp. 14, 24.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn104a|104]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 3, pp. 554–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 61, 70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn106a|106]] Wolfgang Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’ und die politische und soziale Revolution in Frankreich und England&#039;&#039;, Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1964, pp. 74, 80–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn107a|107]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, pp. 214, 217, 220.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn108a|108]] Scheel, &#039;&#039;Das ‘Berliner politische Wochenblatt’&#039;&#039;, p. 78.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn109a|109]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn110a|110]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, p. 259 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn111a|111]] Francis Lieber, ‘Anglican and Gallican Liberty’, &#039;&#039;New Individualist Review&#039;&#039;, vol. IV, no. 2, 1966, pp. 718–21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn112a|112]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 173; Robespierre &#039;&#039;Oeuvres&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 501–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn113a|113]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 51, 326; on his relations with Berthold Georg Niebuhr, cf. Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Erinnerungen aus meinem Zusammenleben mit Georg Berthold Niebuhr&#039;&#039;, trans. Karl Thibaut, Heidelberg: Winter, 1837.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn114a|114]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 13, pt 2, p. 337 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 16 May 1858).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_008.html#c06-ftn115a|115]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 292.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn116a|116]] Mandeville, &#039;&#039;Fable of the Bees&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn117a|117]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn118a|118]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 79.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn119a|119]] Ibid., p. 664.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., p. 687.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn121a|121]] Ibid., p. 530.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn122a|122]] The text of the Le Chapelier law is quoted in Jean-Pierre Potier, ‘L’Assemblé constituante et la question de la liberté du travail’, in Jean-Michel Servet, &#039;&#039;Les idées économiques sous la Révolution&#039;&#039;, Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1989, pp. 251–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn123a|123]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 193.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn124a|124]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 31, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn125a|125]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 218–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn126a|126]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 512–13, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn127a|127]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 194.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn128a|128]] Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Le parti libéral&#039;&#039;, Paris: Charpentier, 1863, pp. 25–6, 310.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn129a|129]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 144; Smith, &#039;&#039;Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, p. 100.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn130a|130]] George M. Trevelyan, &#039;&#039;British History in the Nineteenth Century and After&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 369.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn131a|131]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 128.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn132a|132]] Ibid., p. 146; Hayek, &#039;&#039;Law, Legislation and Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 142.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_009.html#c06-ftn133a|133]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 318; Valerie Jean Conner, &#039;&#039;The National War Labor Board&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, p. 10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn134a|134]] Townsend, &#039;&#039;Dissertation on the Poor Laws&#039;&#039;, pp. 23, 36–41.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn135a|135]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn136a|136]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 803 (letter to J. Fothergill, 1764).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn137a|137]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 5, §10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn138a|138]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;Social Statics&#039;&#039;, New York: Appleton, 1877, pp. 414–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, pp. 32–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn140a|140]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn141a|141]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 23, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn142a|142]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism in American Thought&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. 18–36.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn143a|143]] William Graham Sumner, &#039;&#039;On Liberty, Society and Politics&#039;&#039;, ed. Robert C. Bannister, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, pp. 187, 190–1.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn144a|144]] Sumner, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;Social Darwinism&#039;&#039;, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn145a|145]] Heinrich von Treitschke, &#039;&#039;Politik&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Max Cornicelius, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897–98, vol. 2, p. 272.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn146a|146]] Augus Ludwig von Rochau, &#039;&#039;Grundsätze der Realpolitik&#039;&#039;, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1972, pp. 150, 186, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn147a|147]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Die Freiheit’, in &#039;&#039;Historische und politische Aufsätze&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, Leipzig: Hirzel, 1886, pp. 9–10.&lt;br /&gt;
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[[#part0010_split_010.html#c06-ftn148a|148]] Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Der Bonapartismus’, &#039;&#039;Preussische Jahrbücher&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, 1865, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#c07&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page218&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg219&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;219&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER SEVEN =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;The West and the Barbarians: A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Self-government by white communities and deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Asserting the principle of consent by the governed as a condition of the legitimacy of political power, liberalism galvanized national independence movements. This initially occurred with the American Revolution. And it immediately offered an example. Some years later, it was the French colonists of San Domingo, determined to defend their property in slaves against interference from central power, who entertained projects of independence or adhesion to the North American Union. However, the colonists’ agitation had an utterly unanticipated consequence, in the emergence on the American continent of a new independent state ruled by blacks and which was the first to abolish the institution of slavery. But San Domingo–Haiti was the exception—and an exception that filled the liberal world in its entirety with horror and scandal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The outcome of the war of independence against Spain also induced perplexity and unease. It was crowned with success thanks to the aid of the ex-slaves of San Domingo and, albeit amid bitter conflicts, witnessed the emergence of a new identity stamped by a restoration of pre-Columbian ancestry and a mixing of races. Giving vent to a widespread sentiment, at the start of the Latin American revolution a senator from South Carolina (Robert Y. Hayne) scornfully referred to its leaders as ‘men of color’, who were ‘looking to Hayti … with feelings of the strongest confraternity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] They admired the island which, in Jefferson’s view, could serve only as a dumping ground where blacks could &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg220&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;220&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;be deported and deposited. For the purposes of that operation—i.e. ‘the definitive disappearance of the black race from our borders’—John O’Sullivan, the theorist of ‘manifest destiny’, thought above all of the Latin American continent: ‘The Spanish-Indian-American population of Mexico, Central America and South America, afford the only receptacle capable of absorbing that race … [They are] themselves already of mixed and confused blood’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the view of Elam Lynds, ‘father of the prison system’ then in force and a prominent US figure, ‘whose practical talents are universally acknowledged’ (the characterization is de Tocqueville’s) ‘the Spanish of South America’ formed ‘a race closer to the ferocious beast and the savage than civilized man’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The category traditionally employed to define Indians was now also applied to the populations that had committed the error of mixing with them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While white colonists in the British Commonwealth saw their right to self-government recognized, the Latin American peoples, excluded from the white community and the community of the free strictly defined, became part of the colonial world. This explains the Monroe Doctrine. Reinterpreted and radicalized in 1904 by Theodore Roosevelt, it conferred an ‘international police power’ on ‘civilized society’ in general, and the United States in particular, in relation to Latin America.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The white colonists of the British Empire encountered no serious difficulty achieving recognition. Having learnt the lesson implicit in the American Revolution, the London government decided to pursue the policy of ‘conciliation’ formerly suggested by Burke in its relationship with peoples ‘in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. Thus, from the second half of the nineteenth century, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa first achieved significant autonomy inside the Commonwealth and subsequently attained complete independence. It was a well-founded principle (observed John Stuart Mill in 1861) that, at least in domestic policy, the ‘colonies of European race’ were fully entitled to self-government.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in the case of the United States, self-government by the colonists could entail a drastic deterioration in the conditions of colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin, now subject to the exclusive, unhampered control of their direct &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg221&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;221&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;oppressors. We are familiar with Smith’s observation about the catastrophic consequences that ‘free’ representative bodies monopolized or controlled by slave-owners could have for black slaves. Several decades later, in 1841, James Stephen, one of the actors in the struggle that had led to the abolition of slavery in British colonies, declared himself in favour of their firm control by the Crown: ‘popular franchises in the hands of a great body of owners of slaves were the worst instruments of tyranny which were ever yet forged for the oppression of mankind’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The pertinence of this warning was tragically confirmed by subsequent developments. In 1864, referring to New Zealand, which for some years had been able to count on ‘responsible government’—that is, ultimately, self-government by the white community&#039;&#039;—The Times&#039;&#039; observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lost all imperial control in this portion of the Empire, and are reduced to the humble but useful function of finding men and money for a Colonial Assembly to dispose of in exterminating natives with whom we have no quarrel.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In Australia the extermination of the Aborigines had already begun some time earlier. But in this case too it was the de facto self-government which the colonists succeeded in exercising that pressed on the accelerator, whereas expressing concern in 1830 about the ‘indelible stain’ being imprinted ‘upon the character of the British Government’ was the Colonial Secretary.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this sense, according to the observation made at the start of the twentieth century by an English liberal whose position was highly anomalous—namely, John Hobson—what was occurring was a kind of ‘private slaughter’, carried out by colonists who had wrested self-government or substantial freedom of action.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of South Africa, once the government had defeated the Boer settlers and subjected them to the Empire, it reassured them: ‘Your fate is in your own hands … the good sense of the British people will never tolerate any intermeddling in the purely domestic concerns of the people to whom it has conceded the fullest liberties of government.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Self-government by white &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#page222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_000.html#pg222&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;settlers involved the emergence of a racial state, which segregated blacks in a semi-servile condition and remained in place for almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Significantly, this regime took the South of the United States as its model.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There, following a brief interlude (so-called Reconstruction) immediately after the Civil War, when African Americans were genuinely able to enjoy civil and political rights, the reconciliation between the former enemies in 1877 reestablished in the southern states the self-government of whites, who subjected the recently emancipated slaves to a terroristic dictatorship based on the principle of white supremacy. As in South Africa with the compromise between the British and the Boers, in the United States the compromise between central government and the dominant class in the South, which re-acquired the right to self-government, paved the way for the reassertion of ‘master-race democracy’.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#calibre_pb_1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The abolition of slavery and the development of servile labour&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this point a question suggests itself. The military defeat of the South was clear and irreversible, but had the principle of the racial delimitation of the community of the free really been overcome? Scorning abolitionism, Calhoun summarized the change that had occurred in Britain’s colonies following the desired emancipation: blacks were ‘forced to labor, not by the authority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This statement dates from 1837. Laws against vagrancy forced the former slaves to work as ‘apprentices’. In what conditions? A year prior to the intervention of the theorist of the slaveholding South, a representative of the British colonial administration, inspired by evangelical sentiments, had observed in a letter to the governor of the island of Mauritius:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The design of the law might more accurately have been described as the substitution of some new coercion for that state of slavery which had been abolished; the effect of it, at least, is to establish a compulsory system scarcely less rigid, and in some material respects even less equitable than that of slavery itself.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg223&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;De Tocqueville would later observe that ‘having nominally abolished slavery, the British have reintroduced it under the rubric of apprenticeship for a certain period of time’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Certainly, the apprenticeship only lasted a few years, even if much time had to pass before the ex-slaves could shake off the negative discriminations of every kind they continued to suffer. In any event, even before the abolition of slavery in its colonies, Britain was concerned to replace the blacks, importing indentured servants from Africa and Asia. Here we see at work Indian and Chinese coolies in particular. On their arrival in the British colonies, they were settled in the accommodation reserved for slaves. It is true that this involved indentured servants, but in fact many of them did not survive until the expiry of their contract. Even the sexual exploitation of women was not lacking. In the popular art of the time, the coolie was represented in chains, exactly like a slave. Obviously, there was no longer a hereditary transmission of the servile condition; in a sense, there was not even any need for it. British ships could continue to transport coolies from Asia in a voyage that resembled the classic slave trade. Conditions were harsh and the mortality rate high.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But the losses could rapidly be made up. A distinguished American historian of the institution of slavery has offered a summary of the golden age of liberalism that is worth quoting:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, as in 1760, non-European compulsory labor was still the labor of choice for rational capitalists who chose to cultivate the vast undeveloped parts of the tropics … The 20 millions who left India alone, mostly as indentured servants, between the 1830s and the 1910s, amounted to twice the number of Africans forcibly landed in the Americas during the four centuries of the Atlantic slave trade.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In Britain in 1840 a political figure of the first importance—Lord John Russell—expressed his unease at the advent of a ‘new system of slavery’. Initially, it met with resistance from the abolitionist movement, which was still fairly strong. However, as a result of the already noted weakness of abolitionism inspired by Christianity, demands for the import from Africa and Asia of indentured servants, who in reality were a more or less compulsory labour force, soon got the upper hand.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#page224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_001.html#pg224&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;224&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;As well as in British colonies, this new servile labour force also made its appearance in the United States. Around 10,000 coolies imported from China were engaged in building inaccessible railroads, intended to consolidate the conquest of the Far West.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As Engels put it, this was an attempt to replace black slavery with the ‘disguised slavery of Indian and Chinese coolies’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Was this confirmation of the thesis maintained by Calhoun of the inseparability of work and slavery? In North America, prior to being overshadowed and then definitively supplanted by more profitable black slavery, Indian slavery had long persisted here and there, even after the Glorious Revolution. In 1767 Sharp, the abolitionist we have already encountered, felt obliged to denounce it. In the case of Virginia it was only in 1808 that the Supreme Court definitively pronounced its illegality.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] From the American Revolution onwards, the indentured servant or temporary white slave was completely replaced by the black slave, who in turn, after the end of the Civil War, gave way to the coolie from China or India—another temporary slave, even if the skin colour was now yellow. In 1834, the same year as the abolition of slavery in British colonies, the liberal Wakefield acknowledged that ‘yellow slaves’ were beginning to take the place of ‘blacks’, just as the latter had taken over from ‘red’ (Indian) slaves.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, ‘red’ slavery or semi-slavery would have a new lease of life in the second half of the nineteenth century in Texas and California, taken from Mexico (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|§2]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, it can reasonably be objected to Calhoun that semi-slavery or slavery for a specified period of time is not the same thing as perpetual and hereditary slavery. But let us note the further development of the argument by the theorist of the slaveholding South. In any ‘wealthy and civilized society’, part of the population ‘live[s] on the labor of the other’. This was a manifestly conflictual relationship: the best way of regulating it was achieved when ‘the labor of the African race is, [as] among us, commanded by the European’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#calibre_pb_2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg225&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;225&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;3. The expansion of Europe in the colonies and the diffusion of ‘master-race democracy’ in Europe&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not even Mill had any doubts about the dominion the ‘European race’ was called upon to exercise over the rest of the world. Certainly, he declared for recognition of the right of self-government by the ‘colonies of European race’. But only for them. As for the rest,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.&lt;br /&gt;
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It is clear: freedom applied ‘only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’ and could not be demanded by minors or ‘those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No different was the position of Lecky, who at the start of the twentieth century celebrated the glory of the United Kingdom thus:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Nothing in the history of the world is more wonderful than that under the flag of these two little islands there should have grown up the greatest and most beneficent despotism in the world, comprising nearly two hundred and thirty millions of inhabitants under direct British rule, and more than fifty millions under British protectorates …[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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The ‘despotism’ theorized here was certainly synonymous with slavery from the standpoint of Locke and the protagonists of the American Revolution, all the more so in that it seemed to know no limits. In Mill’s view, ‘a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Political ‘slavery’ could not be equated with slavery in the strict sense. Yet Mill went further. He demanded the barbarians’ ‘obedience’ for the purposes of their education for ‘continuous &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg226&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;226&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;labour’, which was the foundation of civilization. And, in this context, he did not hesitate to theorize a transitional phase of ‘slavery’ for ‘uncivilized races’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The point was forcefully reiterated: there were ‘savage tribes so averse from regular industry, that industrial life is scarcely able to introduce itself among them until they are … conquered and made slaves of’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the slave had no cause for complaint; he was ‘one step in advance of a savage’, and thanks to the conditions imposed on him had already achieved a certain progress. We are put in mind of Calhoun and the slaveholding South, all the more so when Mill refers to &#039;&#039;‘born&#039;&#039; slaves’ recalcitrant to work and discipline.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, despite his employment of the expression just noted, the English liberal envisaged a temporary slavery. This would in fact seem to hang over ‘the great majority of the human race’, which unfortunately was ‘in a savage or semi-savage state’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the condition dictating slavery. While, on the one hand, Mill sided decisively with the Union during the Civil War, on the other, he legitimized the practice of forced labour imposed by colonial powers on subject populations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The other side of the coin of this opposition between civilized, adult England and savage races of minors was the process whereby the barrier separating servants from masters in the metropolis tended to lose its caste rigidity. The attitude adopted in the mid-nineteenth century by Disraeli, champion of the colonial expansion of ‘superior’ races and major theorist of race as the ‘key to history’ (see below, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|§10]]), was significant. He denied that it was possible to speak of the existence in England of ‘two nations’—‘the rich and the poor’—as the Chartists claimed. On the basis of his assertion of the unity that now characterized the ‘privileged, prosperous English people’, Disraeli promoted the Second Reform Act, which extended political rights to significant sections of the popular masses.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Class differences within the white community remained, but were being reduced even at a social level. The exploitation of Chinese coolies and other more or less servile labour forces created the possibility of ‘raising to the position of “independent gentlemen”‘, if not ‘whole white populations of the West’, as Hobson maintained,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] then at least a significant proportion of them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#page227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_002.html#pg227&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;227&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The decisive barrier now lay elsewhere. The three ‘castes’ had become two—in the United States thanks to the abolition of slavery, and in Europe thanks to the reduction of differences within the white community, which was tending to develop more egalitarian internal relations than in the past, similar to those of the white community across the Atlantic. In this sense, ‘master-race democracy’ now characterized the overall relations between the West and the colonial world, whether internal or external.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Thus, Hobson could denounce the extreme expansion of ‘the area of British despotism’. The London government resorted to ‘distinctively autocratic methods’ in its relations with an enormous number of human beings:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Of the three hundred and sixty-seven millions of British subjects outside these isles, not more than eleven millions, or one in thirty-four, have any real self-government for purposes of legislation and administration.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Political freedom, and civil freedom, so far as it rests upon the other, are simply non-existent for the overwhelming majority of British subjects.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Essentially, this was the same analysis as Mill’s (and Lecky’s), with the difference that ‘despotism’ now had a negative connotation. Suffering it (stressed Hobson) were populations coerced into forced labour. And here too we have a convergence with Mill as regards factual analysis, but a sharp contrast when it comes to value judgement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#calibre_pb_3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. De Tocqueville, Western supremacy and the danger of ‘miscegenation’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model of ‘master-race democracy’ also had a clear influence on de Tocqueville. It is true that during the July Monarchy he stood for the abolition of slavery in French colonies. But how were the ex-slaves to be treated once they had been emancipated? It was necessary ‘to prevent the negroes of our colonies imitating those of the English colonies and, like them, abandoning the major industries to retire to a piece of fertile soil, which has been bought cheaply or grabbed’. Hence emancipated slaves could be permitted to choose their ‘master’, but not to ‘remain idle or to work exclusively for themselves’. That could not be tolerated:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg228&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;228&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In temporarily banning negroes from owning land, what are we doing? We are artificially placing them in the position in which the European labourer naturally finds himself. This is certainly not tyranny and the man this obstacle is imposed on when he escapes slavery would not seem to have any right to complain.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In fact, the measure suggested here was the one historically implemented in the colonies, making it possible to transform slavery proper into a semi-servile labour relationship. In any event, in addition to their political rights, notionally emancipated blacks were thus also deprived of civil rights, by its ‘artificially’ being made impossible for them to own a piece of land and freely choose their occupation. While he condemned legal regulation of working hours as ‘despotism’, de Tocqueville had nothing against the creation from above of a caste of wage-labour denied any possibility of social mobility. When he referred to workers from India or other parts of the world, called on by England to replace the emancipated black slaves, the French liberal also made indirect mention of the coolies.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Significantly, however, he ventured no critical remarks about a labour relationship construed even by influential representatives of the liberal world as a recreation of the institution of slavery in a different form. As in Mill, so in Tocqueville, the supremacy pertaining to Europeans was not only political, but also had direct consequences economically and socially. In any event, the gulf separating dominant and dominated was unbridgeable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The European race has received from heaven, or acquired by its own efforts, such incontestable superiority over the other races which compose the great human family that the man placed by us, on account of his vices and ignorance, on the bottom rung of the social scale is still first among the savages.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
It was fitting that such colossally different races continued to remain clearly distinct. De Tocqueville referred with horror to the behaviour of some prisoners deported to Australia:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The condemned have fled in large numbers into the woods. There they have formed companies of looters; they have allied with the savages, married their children and partially adopted their customs. Out of this crossbreeding, a race of half-castes has been born that is more barbarous than the Europeans &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#page229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_003.html#pg229&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;229&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;but more civilized than the savages, and whose hostility has constantly disturbed the colony and sometimes caused it to run the greatest dangers. [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This denunciation of miscegenation, which imperilled European or white supremacy, is a theme that takes us back to the United States and, above all, to the ideology that continued to inspire the South even after the Civil War.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#calibre_pb_4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The ‘empty cradle’ and the ‘destiny’ of the Indians&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While for some peoples it involved subjection to a form of servile labour, for others ‘master-race democracy’, which was now on the point of becoming established on a planetary scale, issued in decimation or destruction. Leading the Union’s war against the secessionist states and promoting the abolition of slavery was a figure (Lincoln) who, like Jefferson before him, toyed with the idea of deporting the blacks to Africa or Latin America, and who was a veteran of the wars against the Indians, against ‘men, women, and children … mercilessly cut to pieces’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1871 General Francis C. Walker, commissioner for Indian affairs, proposed to treat ‘wild men’ no differently from ‘wild beasts’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison we have already encountered in Washington, and which presided over the substantial erasure of the Indians (and the natives of Australia and New Zealand) from the face of the earth, thus makes its reappearance.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A genealogical myth derived from the Old Testament was called upon to legitimize these genocidal practices. A major modern historian, Arnold Toynbee, observed:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The ‘Bible Christian’ of European origin and race who has settled among peoples of non-European race overseas has inevitably identified himself with Israel obeying the will of Jehovah and doing the Lord’s work by taking possession of the Promised Land, while he has identified the non-Europeans who have crossed his path with the Canaanites whom the Lord has delivered into the hand of his Chosen People to be destroyed or subjugated. Under this inspiration, the English-speaking Protestant settlers in the New World exterminated the North American Indian, as well as the bison, from coast to coast of the Continent … [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg230&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;230&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This genealogical myth, which presided over the expropriation, deportation and decimation of the Irish and the Indians, was explicitly present in Lieber: ‘[God] has given [this great country] to us, as much as He gave Palestine to the Jews’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention was made of the Indians, even if they seem to be implicitly compared to the populations that occupied the Promised Land without authorization prior to the arrival of the chosen people.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; seems to support this deadly genealogical myth. De Tocqueville underlined the religious fervour of New England’s founders, who regarded themselves as descendants from ‘Abraham’s stock’. In the writings and documents left behind by them, one sensed ‘the very savor of Gospel antiquity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was an aroma that in a way ended up turning the head of the French liberal himself. He uncritically adopted and subscribed to the description Nathaniel Morton, one of the colony’s founders and first leaders, gave of the Pilgrim Fathers’ arrival in America:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[W]hat could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wilde beasts and wilde men? [A]nd what multitudes of them there were, they then knew not … the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hew.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this text, as in the Old Testament description of the unauthorized inhabitants of Canaan, those destined to be subjugated or wiped out by the chosen people—or, as de Tocqueville characterized it, ‘the germ of a great nation wafted by Providence to a predestined shore’—are completely confounded with nature.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This providential design is all the more clear because, ultimately, it involved a desert. It is a theme &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; returns to repeatedly: the Indian ‘has nothing to oppose to our perfection in the arts but the resources of the wilderness’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] One phrase is especially significant: ‘the Indians were the sole inhabitants of the wilds whence they have since been expelled’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The desert ceased to be such, becoming a place inhabited by humans, only with the entry of the Europeans and the flight or deportation of the indigenous population. As we know, Locke and Montesquieu preferred to speak of ‘virgin &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg231&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;231&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;forests’. But even though the two metaphors are different, their meaning is identical: we are dealing with places where there is no human trace, an area that is (as Locke put it) ‘vacant’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When subsequently forced to register the presence of the Indians, de Tocqueville hastened to stress that they had no right to the land occupied by them:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Although the vast country that I have been describing was inhabited by many indigenous tribes, it may justly be said, at the time of its discovery by Europeans, to have formed one great desert. The Indians occupied without possessing it. It is by agricultural labor that man appropriates the soil, and the early inhabitants of North America lived by the produce of the chase.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
For Locke already, the sole possible foundation of property right was labour, of which a people dedicated exclusively to hunting were incapable. But an explicitly theological justification was added by de Tocqueville to seal the fate of the Indians:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
They seem to have been placed by Providence amid the riches of the New World only to enjoy them for a season; they were there merely to wait till others came. Those coasts, so admirably adapted for commerce and industry; those wide and deep rivers; that inexhaustible valley of the Mississippi; the whole continent, in short, seemed prepared to be the abode of a great nation yet unborn.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, de Tocqueville ended up legitimizing the policy of deportation implemented by Jackson, president of the transatlantic republic when the French liberal visited it. The argument of the ‘empty cradle’ was widespread in the US culture of the time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a ‘freethinker’ aligned with the liberals and a writer and intellectual who enjoyed undisputed prestige in Boston,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] had no doubts in interpreting God’s will. Only pending the arrival of a superior stock had the Indians been placed on American soil. Thereafter &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg232&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;they were clearly marked out for ‘destruction’ or ‘extermination’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Franklin had not argued very differently, when he attributed to a providential design the devastating effect of alcohol on a population destined to be wiped off the face of the earth (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville’s attitude was more pained. He did not shut his eyes to the horrors that were occurring. Yet, however distressing, the tragedy of the Indians expressed both the progress of civilization and a providential design. In any event, it was ineluctable:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Their implacable prejudices, their uncontrolled passions, their vices, and still more, perhaps, their savage virtues, consigned them to inevitable destruction. The ruin of these tribes began from the day when Europeans landed on their shores; it has proceeded ever since, and we are now witnessing its completion.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
True, de Tocqueville expressed unease at the ‘cold egotism’, ‘utter insensitivity’ and ‘ruthless sentiment’ with which the white population of the United States, so attached to its morality and Christianity, viewed the fate of the Indians. Yet the French liberal’s description of the ‘savages’, more than ever recalcitrant to ‘civilization’, certainly did not conduce to the cause of their salvation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As a general rule, their mouth was disproportionately large and their facial expression ignoble and wicked … Their physiognomy exhibited that deep depravity which can only derive from a long abuse of civilization, and yet they were still savages. Mixed with the vices they have adopted from us is something barbaric and uncivilized, making them a hundred times more repugnant … Their movements were rapid and uncoordinated, their voice shrill and tuneless, their glance worried and savage. On first contact, one would be tempted to regard them as nothing but a beast of the forest on which education has been able to confer a semblance of humanity, but which has nevertheless remained an animal.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We can now understand the question de Tocqueville posed to his US interlocutors: ‘Do the Indians have an idea that sooner or later their race will be destroyed by ours?’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#page233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_004.html#pg233&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The Indians’ deportation and decimation made explicit the fact that the North American territory was an ‘empty cradle’, awaiting the white settler committed from the time of his arrival to ‘struggl[ing] against the obstacles that nature opposes to him’, against ‘the wilderness and savage life’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, what ends up emerging is the process of de-humanization of the natives, reduced, even more than to barbarism, to inanimate nature.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. De Tocqueville, Algeria and ‘master-race democracy’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In de Tocqueville the American model asserted itself with particular clarity when he confronted the problem of Algeria. The letter sent to Francis Lieber on 22 July 1846 is revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At this time I am very concerned about our affairs in Africa, which assume greater importance with every passing day. For us &#039;&#039;war&#039;&#039; has become, and will remain, the secondary aspect as long we do not have quarrels in Europe. The principal aspect today is colonization, is how to attract a major &#039;&#039;European&#039;&#039; population of cultivators to Algeria and, above all, keep them there. We already have 100,000 &#039;&#039;Christians&#039;&#039; in Africa, not counting the army. But they have almost all settled in the towns, which are becoming large, beautiful cities, while the countryside remains a &#039;&#039;desert&#039;&#039;. It is impossible to consider colonization in Africa without thinking of the great examples furnished by the United States in this field. But how to study them? Have books or documents of any kind been published in the United States that can enlighten us on this point and tell us how things unfolded? Can this information be found in official or other kinds of reports? Anything you could provide in this connection would be received with great gratitude.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
I have highlighted four phrases in italics. Let us begin with the last of them. Like the lands inhabited or, rather, occupied without authorization by the Indians, Algeria was a desert prior to the arrival of the French or ‘Christians’. A sort of Biblical aroma begins to make itself felt in connection with the landing in North Africa of a civilized people, who likewise seem invested with a providential mission. It was a people at once European and Christian: the colonial war tended to assume a religious character. Certainly, expelling the Algerians &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg234&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;234&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from their ‘desert’ was an operation that met with fierce resistance, but de Tocqueville was careful in this instance not to speak of ‘war’. That was a category which could only be applied to armed conflicts in Europe and between civilized peoples. It somehow implied recognition of the enemy, which was something denied Arabs and Indians alike.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precisely because of this lack of recognition, the campaign of colonial conquest could resort to pitiless violence that did not spare the civilian population. On account of their brutal, indiscriminate character, the methods used to subjugate Algeria ended up eliciting reservations and disquiet in France. De Tocqueville was not among the ‘excellent philanthropists’ about whom Bugeaud, the general in charge of military operations,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ironized:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I have often heard in France men whom I respect, but do not support, consider it reprehensible that crops are burned, silos emptied, and lastly that unarmed men, women and children are seized.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For me, this is a regrettable necessity, but one to which any people that wants to make war on the Arabs will have to submit.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
According to de Tocqueville, the head of military operations in Algeria had the merit of having understood all this:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He is the first who has known how to apply ubiquitously and simultaneously the kind of war which, in my view as in his, is the only kind of war that is feasible in Africa. He has pursued this system of war with incomparable energy and vigour.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
This was a ‘new science’ that must be taken to heart.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In order to starve them, and confront them with the clear alternative of capitulation or death from starvation, Arabs who insisted on resisting must be deprived not only of their harvest, but also of the possibility of trading with neighbours: ‘They suffer greatly from being parked between our bayonets and the desert’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And again we are explicitly referred to the American model; this is how ‘the most barbaric Indian tribes’ were disciplined: ‘the tribe from which a robbery or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg235&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;235&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;murder has been committed’ was subjected to collective punishment, which excluded it from the trade with Europeans absolutely vital to it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Finally, the rebel Arabs must by all means be prevented from the possibility of combining or settling anywhere:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the passionate taste they display for a nomadic existence, they need settlements. It is of the utmost importance to prevent them being able to establish a single one. All expeditions whose aim is to occupy or destroy existing towns and emerging towns seem to me useful.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville had no hesitation in issuing a radical watchword:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To destroy anything that resembles a permanent gathering of population or, in other words, a town: I believe it is of the utmost importance not to allow any town to survive, or arise, in the regions controlled by Abd el-Kader [the leader of the resistance].[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Thus the modality of the war. But what results was it intended to achieve? We know the model that inspired de Tocqueville. In May 1841, while visiting Philippeville, founded on land acquired at a derisory price from the indigenous inhabitants, he was pleased by the ‘American aspect of the city’, which was rapidly expanding.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expropriation and colonization were proceeding apace. Once the process had been completed, what kind of society should be built? What relations might be developed between the Arabs and the French? De Tocqueville was in no doubt:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fusion of these two peoples is a chimera that can be dreamt of only when one has not been on the spot. Hence it is possible and necessary that there be two clearly distinct sets of laws in Africa, because we are faced with two clearly separate societies. When one is dealing with Europeans, &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; nothing prevents us from treating them as if they were alone; the laws enacted for them must always be applied exclusively to them.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg236&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;236&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Corresponding to scrupulous protection of the invaders’ civil liberties was a terroristic law of suspects directed at the indigenous population. During his visit to Philippeville, the French liberal was invited to lunch by a colonel in the occupying army, who painted an eloquent picture of the situation:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Sir, only force and terror work with these people … The other day, a murder was committed in the street. An Arab was brought before me who was a suspect. I interrogated him and then had him beheaded. You will see his head on the gate of Constantine.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Tocqueville seems to have betrayed no emotion. He repeated the idea of two sets of laws. As regards criminal trials of ‘natives’, ‘if it is thought that our forms are too slow (which I do not think), war tribunals could be set up for them’. And even for ‘civil trials’, the ‘emergency procedure’ already in force could be retained.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Arabs must also be discriminated against economically, as well as legally: ‘Allow free entry into France of all produce from Algeria, especially that derived not from native industry but colonial industry’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only on these conditions would French settlers in North Africa genuinely be able to develop on the American model:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is no easy thing to instil in Europeans the desire to abandon their country, because they are happy there and enjoy certain rights and certain goods that are dear to them. It is even more difficult to attract them to a country where from the outset they encounter a torrid, unhealthy climate and a formidable enemy, who incessantly hangs around you to take your property or your life. To get inhabitants to come to such a country, it is first of all necessary to give them great opportunities to make their fortune; in the second place, they must find social conditions that conform to their habits and tastes.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
We have seen de Tocqueville celebrate the unprecedented zone of liberty enjoyed by the individual in the United States (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn13|§13]]). But now something similar is to be found in the African space conquered by France: ‘The colonies of all the European peoples afford the same spectacle. Rather &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg237&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;237&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;than being smaller, the role of the individual is everywhere greater than in the mother country. His freedom of action is less restricted’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Naturally, the other side of the coin was a drastic deterioration in the condition of the Arabs. De Tocqueville did not hide the fact: ‘We have decimated the population’ and the survivors were being exterminated by the starvation caused by the methods of war we have noted; ‘at this moment Abd el-Kader is &#039;&#039;literally&#039;&#039; dying of hunger’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It had to be admitted that ‘we have made Muslim society much more miserable, disorganised, ignorant and barbarous than it was before it knew us’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So what was to be done? The French liberal distanced himself from the attitude of not a few officers and soldiers of the French army: in their view, ‘the Arabs are like noxious beasts’ and ‘the death of each and every one of them seems a good thing’. No, ‘it is not only cruel, but absurd and impracticable to want to snuff out or exterminate the natives’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a second, de Tocqueville lets slip an admission: ‘At this time we are making war in much more barbarous fashion than the Arabs themselves. Currently, civilization is to be found on their side.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Immediately afterwards, however, we find the declaration we have already noted: there was no room for humanitarian scruples in a colonial war that directly targeted the civilian populations, who were denied means of subsistence and the possibility of combining. Or: ‘Once we have committed the major violence of the conquest, I believe we must not shrink from the minor forms of violence absolutely required to consolidate it.’[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Once the conquest had been completed, it was necessary to promote self-government by civil society (French and white). It was called on to free itself altogether of military control, which must continue to be deployed with the requisite firmness over the Arabs. The conflict across the Atlantic, which during the War of Independence against Britain and in subsequent decades saw local self-government reject any interference by central political power—be it in London or Washington—in the colonists’ expansion or slave-owners’ enjoyment of their legitimate property, also manifested itself in Algeria. On one side were the colonists, who demanded complete freedom of action and expropriation, and on the other the political and military authorities, called upon to administer a ruthless colonial conquest with a minimum of prudence. How &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg238&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;238&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;many colonists could Africa absorb and how far could the process of expropriation of the indigenous population be pushed? De Tocqueville criticized hesitations and doubts: ‘It is not correct to say that the introduction of European farmers is a measure whose implementation is impractical’, or feasible only to a limited extent. At issue was a territory over which ‘the indigenous population is fairly scarce or fairly dispersed’. In any event, ‘the common property of the tribe is not founded on any title’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The colonel encountered by de Tocqueville, who did not hesitate to have Arabs decapitated on the basis of mere suspicion, on the other hand expressed his contempt for the colonists, a ‘mass of scoundrels’ and ‘thieves’, for whom the army was nothing more than a tool for accumulating a ‘fortune’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The date is 30 May 1841. The previous year, Bugeaud had set out his policy to the Chamber of Deputies: ‘Wherever there is clean water and fertile soil, it is necessary to settle colonists, without worrying about whom the land belongs to. It must be distributed to them so that it is enjoyed as rightful property’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, in the previously cited article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039; on 25 December 1843, he observed that, although conducting the merciless war dictated by circumstances, his army demonstrated generosity towards the Arab who finally decided to surrender: ‘We return to him all his world and sometimes part of his herd’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This attitude seems to have prompted reservations in de Tocqueville, judging at any rate from his intervention in the Chamber in June 1846:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In some localities, rather than reserving the most fertile land, the best irrigated and most adapted for government property for Europeans, we have given it to the natives … After betrayals and rebellions, the natives have often been received by us with singular magnanimity. There are some who, having indulged in soaking their hands in our blood, have had their goods, their honour and their power restored to them, thanks to our generosity. There is more. In many places where the civilized European population is mixed with the indigenous population, there are not unfounded complaints that in general it is the native who is better protected, while the European obtains justice with greater difficulty.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg239&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;239&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a letter from the same period, de Tocqueville even ended up ironizing about ‘the tenderness towards the Arabs that came over Monsieur Bugeaud at the point when he saw in it a powerful means of blocking the development of civilized colonization’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We seem to hear once again the laments and protests of the American colonists against the London government, or of the southern planters of the United States against the threat of interference by federal government. And, in fact, de Tocqueville elaborated on his indictment of the political and military authorities. At issue was not only the assignment of land:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We have lavished honorific distinctions on the Arab, which are intended to indicate the merit of our citizens … One is led to conclude that our government in Africa is taking softness towards the vanquished so far as to forget its conquering position … It is neither useful nor obligatory for us to permit exaggerated ideas of their own importance in our Muslim subjects, and not even to persuade them that we are obliged in any circumstances to treat them as if they were our co-citizens and equals. They know that we have a dominant position in Africa and they expect us to retain it.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The idea of human equality could not be extended to embrace ‘semi-civilized peoples’ located outside the West: it was absolutely vital to avoid occasioning ‘astonishment and confusion in their spirits, filling them with erroneous and dangerous ideas’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In no case was it permissible to lose sight of the objective of building a society based on the legally sanctioned domination of French, Christian and European colonists. The attainment of this objective was now close at hand: ‘The Arab element is ever more isolated and little by little is dissolving. The Muslim population is tending to decline relentlessly, while the Christian population is growing relentlessly’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed: ‘Our weapons have decimated some tribes … On the other hand, our cultivators willingly use native manpower. The European needs the Arab to make the most of his land; the Arab needs the European to obtain a high wage’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt that de Tocqueville had not lost sight of the American model. The Algerians were part Indians, forced to suffer expropriation, and part blacks. In the latter guise, Arabs could not claim to enjoy the rights of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#page240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0011_split_005.html#pg240&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;240&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;citizenship either on a civil level or, still less, politically. Without being slaves, now deprived of land they could earn a living only by supplying ‘manpower’ to the new property-owners. The society hoped for here was not very different from the one that would be realized in the southern United States after the Civil War. In Algeria, French and Western supremacy took the place of ‘white supremacy’. For the rest, there continued to exist two sets of laws, separated by a racial barrier, and the prejudice, on a more or less accentuated racial basis, called upon to justify these relations. Already at the beginning of the conquest, writing to de Tocqueville, Kergolay (his cousin and a life-long friend) had spoken of the Arabs as an ‘infamous, despicable race’, to be kept under constant control ‘by force combined with simple, uncomplicated equity’.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The recipient of this letter seems not to have seen things very differently. After a notable interval of time, we find him using, in slightly different form, some of the expressions we have just noted: ‘semi-civilized peoples’ were only capable of understanding the discourse of ‘correct but strict justice’; hence France should beware of indulging in ‘magnanimity and leniency’—virtues that would be incomprehensible and, worse, might produce dangerous results.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, writing precisely to Kergolay, de Tocqueville denounced the ‘greed’ and ‘fanaticism’ of the Arabs,[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] who, by his own admission, were suffering the systematic expropriation carried out by occupying forces inclined to regard their enemies as ‘noxious beasts’.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To complete this picture, it is appropriate to mention a final detail. There was a moment in 1833 when the French liberal thought of settling as a colonist in Algeria.[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Identification with the regime of white or Western supremacy, or ‘master-race democracy’, seems to have been total.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn1a|1]] Hayne, quoted in Lester D. Langley, &#039;&#039;The Americas in the Age of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn2a|2]] John O’Sullivan, ‘Annexation’, &#039;&#039;United States Magazine and Democratic Review&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, July 1845, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn3a|3]] Lynds, quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 63–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn4a|4]] Roosevelt, quoted in Jean-Pierre Martin and Daniel Royot, &#039;&#039;Histoire et civilisation des États Unis&#039;&#039;, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn5a|5]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, p. 378.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn6a|6]] Stephen, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn7a|7]] Quoted in Henri Grimal, &#039;&#039;De l’Empire britannique au Commonwealth&#039;&#039;, Paris: Colin, 1999, p. 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn8a|8]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 420.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn9a|9]] J. A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn10a|10]] Chamberlain, quoted in Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_000.html#c07-ftn11a|11]] Ibid., pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn12a|12]] John C. Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, ed. R. M. Lene, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1992, p. 475.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn13a|13]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 17.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn14a|14]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 92, 97.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn15a|15]] Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, pp. 176–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn16a|16]] Seymour Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Macmillan, 1999, p. 432.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn17a|17]] Cf. Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, p. vii; Drescher, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, p. 421.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn18a|18]] Allan Nevins and Henry S. Commager, &#039;&#039;America: Story of a Free People&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 246.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn19a|19]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 4, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn20a|20]] Almon Wheeler Lauber, &#039;&#039;Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States&#039;&#039;, Williamstown (MA): Corner House, 1979, pp. 306–7, 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn21a|21]] Edward Gibbon Wakefield, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968, pp. 473ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_001.html#c07-ftn22a|22]] Calhoun, &#039;&#039;Union and Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 474.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn23a|23]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn24a|24]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Historical and Political Essays&#039;&#039;, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910, p. 48.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn25a|25]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 198.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn27a|27]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 2, p. 247.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn28a|28]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn29a|29]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn30a|30]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn31a|31]] Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, p. 313.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_002.html#c07-ftn32a|32]] Ibid., pp. 124, 114.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn33a|33]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 103, 105.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn34a|34]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn35a|35]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, p. 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_003.html#c07-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., vol. 4, pt 1, pp. 271–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn37a|37]] Nevins and Commager, &#039;&#039;America&#039;&#039;, p. 167.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn38a|38]] Walker, quoted in Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn39a|39]] A. J. Toynbee, &#039;&#039;A Study of History&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 211–12.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn40a|40]] Lieber, quoted in Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, p. 317.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn41a|41]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 34.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn43a|43]] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 25, 33.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn44a|44]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 335.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn45a|45]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 337.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn46a|46]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 134.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn47a|47]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn49a|49]] Vernon L. Parrington, &#039;&#039;Main Currents in American Thought&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 454–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn50a|50]] Thomas F. Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 243.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn51a|51]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn52a|52]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 1, pp. 73–6, 223–5; cf. pp. 343–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_004.html#c07-ftn53a|53]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 434.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn54a|54]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (letter to Francis Lieber, 22 July 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn55a|55]] In an article published in the &#039;&#039;Moniteur algérien&#039;&#039;, 25 December 1843: ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 226–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn58a|58]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 316.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn61a|61]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 230.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 229.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn64a|64]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn65a|65]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn66a|66]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 280.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 252.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 323.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn72a|72]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 224–5 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 December 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn73a|73]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 226.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn74a|74]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 304 (unpublished letter to C. L. L. J. de Lamorcière, 5 April 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn75a|75]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 380–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn76a|76]] Ibid., vol. 5, pt 2, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn77a|77]] Bugeaud, quoted in Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi and André Prenant, &#039;&#039;L’Algérie, passé et présent&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1960, p. 314.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn78a|78]] Bugeaud, quoted in Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 227 (editorial note by André Jardin).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn80a|80]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 220 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 321–2, 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 275.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn84a|84]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 329.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 1, pp. 193, 199 (letters of 22 June and 8 July 1830).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn86a|86]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 324.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn87a|87]] Ibid., vol. 13, pt 2, p. 86 (letter to L. de Kergolay, 23 May 1841).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn88a|88]] Cf. Jean-Jacques Chevallier and André Jardin, Introduction to Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#c08&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg241&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;241&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER EIGHT =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;Self-Consciousness, False Consciousness and Conflicts in the Community of the Free&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Return to the question: What is liberalism? The well-born, the free and the liberals&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having briefly reconstructed periods in the history of liberalism and the concrete politico-social relationships developed in its name, we must now return to our opening question. Use of the term ‘liberal’ is usually dated to the political struggles that developed in Spain in the wake of the 1812 revolution and the opposition that emerged between ‘liberals’, engaged in defending the constitution, and their opponents, whom they branded ‘servile’. Only now was the adjective transformed into a substantive. In fact, in revolutionary America the author of an article opposed to the institution of slavery had already signed himself ‘A Liberal’ (see [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn10|§10]]). But that is not the key point. When we come across a text from 1818 in which Constant sets out and supports the programme of the ‘liberal party’, it can be said that we are dealing with an adjective.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The political meaning of the term is clear; and implicit in it is the transition to the noun employed to define members of the party in question. On the other hand, there is not much difference between this stance in favour of the ‘liberal party’ and the stance in favour of the ‘liberal political system’ that we have seen make its appearance in a text by Washington as early as 1783. Hence the real problem is to identify the moment when, partly inheriting and partly transforming the meaning bequeathed by a long tradition, the term ‘liberal’ began to assume its modern political meaning. This was the precondition for the transition from the adjective to the substantive.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg242&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;242&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;It was a semantic event that cannot be uncoupled from the actual history of the liberal movement and liberal revolutions. We can start with the Glorious Revolution. Arguing against Robert Filmer, defender of the thesis that the Almighty had conferred exclusive ownership of, and dominion over, the earth to Adam, the first absolute monarch, Locke objected that God had bestowed his blessings ‘with a liberal hand’. The hypothetical absolute property-owner or monarch who, rather than displaying ‘liberal allowance’, sought to exploit the needy situation of all other men in order to reduce them to ‘hard service’ or even the condition of a ‘vassal’, would be acting no differently from the bandit who threatened a man with death in order to reduce him to ‘slavery’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Clearly, ‘liberal’ is synonymous with generous here. However, God’s liberal generosity is in contradiction with the political slavery that Filmer would like to impose on all men. The, as it were, constitutional and liberal God presupposed here refutes the claims of absolute monarchy. The vile, miserable condition of the ‘vassal’, of the individual subjected to ‘hard service’, of the servant or ‘slave’, was incompatible with the mode of being and feeling, in the first instance, of an Englishman and ‘gentleman’, who scornfully rejected the servile view that ‘we are all born slaves’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In his turn, Hume on the one hand used the term ‘liberal’ synonymously with ‘disinterested’ and ‘generous’, and on the other criticized as ‘illiberal’ the popular agitation and plebeian riots that characterized the first English revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Smith distinguished in the moral field between the ‘liberal’ view peculiar to the well-off classes, restive at overly rigid bans on ‘luxury’ and the other pleasures of life, and the ‘strict or austere’ view peculiar to poorer classes, who by force of circumstance could not indulge in ‘thoughtlessness and dissipation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the context of the ‘liberal’/‘servile’ opposition that was crystallizing, the ‘liberal’ attitude was defined by antithesis either to the absolute power of the monarch or the servile or even merely plebeian condition. The liberal/illiberal dichotomy referred to a difference and conflict between two world-views, but also between two social conditions. In the course of the American Revolution, adopting a position in favour of conciliation of the rebel colonists, Burke deplored the restrictions on individual liberty introduced in Britain on account of the war, and regretted the fact that ‘the liberal government of this &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg243&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;243&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;free nation is supported by the hireling sword of German boors and vassals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the liberal profession of faith criticized the unwarranted expansion of the Crown’s power, on the one hand, and distanced itself from the subaltern classes, subjected to work and hence servile, on the other. We can now understand the British Whig’s scorn for those who, in the name of a so-called ‘indiscriminate’ freedom, wished to appeal to the servile hands of slaves or emancipated slaves to suppress the revolt of colonists who, precisely as slaveowners, nurtured with particular sincerity the love of liberty that must dwell in any non-servile soul. And we can also understand why as early as 1790, on account of the restructuring of the nobility’s political influence, the ‘liberty’ of the French seemed to the British statesman to be contaminated with ‘coarseness and vulgarity’: it ‘is not liberal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Opposed to anything vulgar and plebeian, ‘liberal’ tended to be synonymous with aristocratic. In fact, among Virginia’s slave-owners the ‘aristocratic spirit’ was intimately bound up with ‘a spirit of liberty’ distinguished by its ‘more noble and liberal’ character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While paying homage to the ‘liberal government of this free nation’, Burke declared himself a member of the ‘aristocratick Party’—the party ‘connected with the solid, permanent long possessed property of the Country’—and felt committed to fighting with all his energy for ‘aristocratick principles, and the aristocratick Interests connected with them’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the American Revolution, along with the celebration of the ‘liberal political system’ we have already noted, we find in Washington a celebration of patrons of the ‘liberal arts’, contrasted with ‘mechanics’, with immigrants of a modest social condition from Europe.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But particularly illuminating is the discourse of John Adams. For a well-ordered liberty to be achieved, it could not be ‘mechanics’ and the ‘common people’, ‘without any knowledge in liberal arts or sciences’, who exercised power. Instead, it must be those who had ‘received a liberal education, an ordinary degree of erudition in liberal arts and sciences’; and they were the ‘well-born and wealthy’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg244&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;244&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In France, too, the liberal party, which was in the process of being formed, defined itself during the polemic against the absolute monarchy but also, and possibly above all, against the popular masses and their vulgarity. Attention was turned to the Third Estate, to those circles where ‘a sort of affluence allows men to receive a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was Sieyès, who subsequently played an important role on the occasion of the 18th Brumaire in 1799. Sealing the coup d’état was the ‘proclamation of general-in-chief Bonaparte’, who announced the ‘disbandment of factions’—i.e. of popular and plebeian agitation—and the triumph of ‘conservative, tutelary, liberal ideas’ (&#039;&#039;idées conservatrices, tutélaires, libérales&#039;&#039;). This language was not the invention of a general, however brilliant: he enjoyed the support of the liberal circles of the time. The adjectival usage just noted refers to them. Constant, who later (as we know) declared himself a member of the ‘liberal party’, had already been recommended by Talleyrand to Napoleon in 1797 as a man ‘passionate about liberty’ and as an ‘unshakeable, liberal republican’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The following year, Constant had underlined the Directory’s merit in having ‘proclaimed its unshakeable attachment to the conservative system’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, shortly after the coup d’état, he paid homage to ‘France’s tutelary genius which, from 9 Thermidor, has rescued it from so many dangers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ in Burke, ‘liberal’ was now synonymous with ‘conservative’ (and tutelary). For Constant (as for Madame de Staël), the cause of liberalism found expression in ‘respectable people’ (&#039;&#039;honnêtes gens&#039;&#039;),[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] or (as Necker made clear in a letter to his daughter) well-off, ‘decent people’ (&#039;&#039;gens de bien:&#039;&#039; see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As in England and America, so too in France it was the property-owning classes, proud of their non-servile condition and spirit, who tended to define themselves as liberals. This is further confirmed, even after the mid-nineteenth century, by de Tocqueville’s stance. Those genuinely capable of defending the cause of liberty against Louis Bonaparte’s ‘illiberal’ government were not ‘the people strictly speaking, with their incomplete education’, but the ‘property-owners’, the ‘bourgeoisie’, the ‘men of culture’—‘in a word, all those who have received a liberal education’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg245&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;245&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Under the spur also of popular struggles, the liberal/servile dichotomy gradually tended to lose its class connotation and came to refer exclusively to political ideologies. But at moments of acute struggle the original meaning re-emerged with all its discriminatory charge. For de Tocqueville, as we shall see, anyone who wanted to endow the ideal of liberty with a social content was ‘made for serving’!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bitter conflicts could, and did, develop within the property-owning classes. Debating with Burke, who suspected wealth not rooted in the mother country’s land and soil of lacking in patriotism and even of subversive tendencies, Mackintosh declared that ‘[t]he commercial, or monied interest, has … been less prejudiced, more liberal, and more intelligent, than the landed gentry.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in France, Sieyès saw ‘liberal education’ embodied in the Third Estate, and certainly not in an aristocracy used to pursuing ‘the favour of servitude’ at court.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Invitations not to discriminate, and create conflicts, between the different types of property were more frequent. In the view of the anti-Jacobin Jean-Joseph Mounier, in addition to the United States, the country that had diffused ‘in the France the idea of liberty’ was England, construed in fact as the country where ‘a liberal education without genealogical tests confers the quality of gentleman’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It is clear that the term ‘liberal’ was generated by a proud self-consciousness, which had a simultaneously political, social and even ethnic connotation. We are dealing with a movement and party that intended to rally persons furnished with a ‘liberal education’ and genuinely free, or people who had the privilege of being free, the ‘chosen race’ (as Burke put it), the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of liberty circulates’. All this is not surprising. As has been made clear by distinguished scholars of the Indo-European languages, ‘freemen’ is a ‘collective notion’—a sign of distinction that applies to the ‘well-born’ and them alone. For this very reason, outside the community of the free and the well-born, not only was service or slavery not excluded, it was even presupposed. In Cicero’s view, at the head of the &#039;&#039;liberi populi&#039;&#039; was Rome, which engaged in the mass enslavement of defeated peoples considered unworthy of freedom.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, in eighteenth-century liberal England what became a popular song (‘Rule Britannia’) lauded in these terms the empire that had just wrested the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#page246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_000.html#pg246&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;246&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;asiento&#039;&#039;, a monopoly on the slave trade, from Spain: ‘This was the charter of the land, / And guardian angels sang this strain: / “Rule, Britannia! rule the waves: / Britons never will be slaves.”‘&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The pyramid of peoples&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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This was a self-proclamation that was simultaneously an act of exclusion. It was not only colonial peoples who were affected by it. Even before the American Revolution, Franklin had established a hierarchy of nations on the basis of skin colour, which claimed to classify the whole human race: ‘All &#039;&#039;Africa&#039;&#039; is black or tawny. &#039;&#039;Asia&#039;&#039; chiefly tawny.’ The same applied to pre-Columbian America; it was ‘wholly so’. The quantitative prevalence of peoples of colour was evident. In a way, their presence even made itself felt in Europe: ‘the &#039;&#039;Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;Swedes&#039;&#039;, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion’. The inhabitants of Germany did not come off much better. Representing the highest form of humanity were the English settled on both shores of the Atlantic, ‘the Principal Body of White People’, of ‘purely white People’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and the only community to embody the cause of liberty. The classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theme of the great chain of Being[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] becomes here the great chain of Colour. And it excluded the non-European peoples from the sacred space of civilization, relegating much of the West to its margins.&lt;br /&gt;
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If it rarely took such a naively naturalistic form, the pyramid dear to Franklin continued, in one shape or another, to be present in liberal culture. We find it again in Lieber. At its apex, obviously, was the ‘Anglican race’, which fully expressed authentic liberty, while forming the base were the colonial peoples (not only the blacks, but also the Chinese). In the middle we find jostling Spanish, Portuguese and Neapolitans, who had hitherto proved incapable of elevating themselves to the principle of self-government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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John Stuart Mill employed a language that was scarcely different. The apex continued to be composed of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ (to be precise, England and the United States), peerless champions of representative government and ‘the general improvement of mankind’, while at the base, in addition to more or &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg247&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;247&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;less savage peoples,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we find the Chinese. It is true that the latter could boast a very ancient civilization. Yet ‘they have become stationary—have remained so for thousands of years; and if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland could be assimilated to the other colonies or semi-colonies. ‘[H]alf civilized’, in Bentham’s view,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Ireland for Mill was not only incapable of self-government, but also in need of ‘a good stout despotism’, exactly like India.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not much better was the situation of Greece: situated as it was at the confines of Europe, it was still ‘too Oriental’ in many respects to be able to govern itself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, at the centre of the pyramid we have the people of ‘southern Europe’, whose ‘inactivity’ and ‘envy’ prevented the development of industrial society, the establishment of a strong ruling group and the orderly functioning of institutions. By comparison with them, too, the Anglo-Saxons proved superior, free as they were of those characteristics (‘submission’, ‘endurance’, statism) typical of the French and ‘continental nations’, all of them rendered gangrenous by ‘bureaucracy’ and an envious craving for equality.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Certainly, the ‘continental nations’ were not some homogenous whole. With its geographical location close to Africa and an Arabic past behind it, Spain came out of things badly. In the list Mill drew up of ‘envy’ of grandeur and ‘inactivity’, its inhabitants came immediately after ‘Orientals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Visiting Spain in 1836, at a time when it was plunged in a civil war, Richard Cobden, rather than taking sides with one of the parties, reached a general conclusion about ‘barbarians beyond the Bay of Biscay’: Spain was ‘a nation of bigots, beggars and cut-throats with a government of whores and rogues’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Spanish of Latin America were not worth speaking about because, from the standpoint of the dominant ideology in the United States at any rate, they formed part of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#page248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_001.html#pg248&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;248&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;colonial world. Finally, distinguishing themselves negatively in Senior’s view were also the Neapolitans: ‘I never saw so hateful a people; they look as wicked as they are squalid and unhealthy.’ Moreover, no barrier separated the plebs from the upper classes.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The community of the free and its dictatorship over peoples unworthy of liberty&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, the charge of exclusion implicit in the self-proclamation of the community of the free displayed its full force in the relationship with colonial peoples. In most cases, far from being perceived as a contradiction, the theorization and practice of slavery at the expense of the excluded further strengthened the proud self-consciousness of the community of the free, who lauded themselves for their immunity from the servile spirit attributed to the barbarians subjugated by them. That was why Locke could set himself up as a champion of liberty and, at the same time, legitimize the absolute power the community of the free was called upon to exercise over black slaves. In 1809 Jefferson celebrated the United States as ‘an empire for liberty’, founded on a constitution that guaranteed ‘self government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Expressing himself thus was a slave-owner, who exercised power over his slaves brutally, if need be selling the individual members of the family of his property as separate pieces or chattels. And he indulged in this celebration in a letter sent to another slave-owner, who had just taken his place in the US presidency. The Constitution held up as a model consecrated the birth of the first racial state, while the self-government extolled here guaranteed southern slave-owners legitimate enjoyment of their property without interference by the federal government.&lt;br /&gt;
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The transition from hereditary slavery to semi-slavery, still at the expense of colonial peoples, did not radically change the overall picture. Albeit in different forms, the phenomenon we are already familiar with emerged. Thus, major authors such as Mill, de Tocqueville and Lecky passionately denounced monarchical or Jacobin absolutism, and at the same time enthusiastically saluted despotism at the expense of colonial peoples. This was a power relationship which, for a whole historical period, far from being fought or contained, was to be extended and generalized. Given that a ‘vigorous despotism’ was the only &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg249&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;249&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;method capable of raising backward peoples or ‘barbarians’ to a higher level, the interests of civilization and peace were served by colonial conquests, which must therefore be expanded to embrace the entire globe. Already ‘common’, ‘direct subjection’ of ‘backward populations’ by ‘the more advanced’ was becoming ‘universal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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So proud and self-confident was the self-consciousness of the community of the free that it could face down possible refutations from the history or empirical analysis of society without difficulty. In the years of the July Monarchy, unperturbed, de Tocqueville registered a disconcerting fact: in the Islamic world and ‘the whole East’, slavery presented itself in a ‘milder’ form than in the West. Tunisia was engaged in abolishing this institution, which by contrast continued to survive in the colonies of liberal France (and democratic America).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The balance-sheet drawn up by Mill on the morrow of the American Civil War was significant. In the United States a ‘[h]opeless slavery’ that ‘brutifies the intellect’, and where ‘it was a highly penal offence to teach a slave to read’, had only just been abolished. Even worse, added the English liberal, was the situation at the time of the slave trade in ‘our slave colonies’, where slaves were in practice condemned to work themselves to death, to be rapidly replaced through the ‘importation’ of other unfortunates, who in their turn were soon doomed to be consumed. In the British colonies and the United States a form of slavery had prevailed with particularly repugnant characteristics, which was largely unknown ‘in the ancient world and the East’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Here the phenomenon of the twin birth of liberalism and racial chattel slavery seems to be perceived or intuited. And yet, like de Tocqueville, Mill had no doubts about the complete coincidence of the West and the cause of liberty, or about the West’s right to exercise despotism over Islamic peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
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The English liberal had no difficulty construing the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and for liberty as such: ‘the prohibition of the importation of opium into China’ violated ‘the liberty … of the buyer’, rather than that of ‘the producer or seller’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The lesson taught to the Chinese ‘barbarians’ could only be salutary. This was not the time to split hairs over forms: ‘appeals to humanity and Christianity in favour of ruffians, &amp;amp;amp; to international law in favour of people who recognize &#039;&#039;no&#039;&#039; laws of war at all’, were ‘ridiculous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are in 1857–58: even if we pass over the lot of the coolies in silence, in these years &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg250&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;250&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Britain had stained itself with the ‘barbarism’ referred to by de Tocqueville in connection with the repression of the sepoys’ mutiny in India; in China it gave decisive support to the liquidation of the attempt by the Taiping to reverse the autocratic and decrepit Manchu dynasty; in Ireland a ferocious dominion continued to obtain (‘in no country have I ever seen so many gendarmes’, observed Engels);[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] finally, in the United States, Britain contributed to the wealth of the South, absorbing much of the cotton produced by the labour of black slaves. Yet Mill was in no doubt: his country promoted the cause of liberty in the world, imposing on China by force of arms the importation of opium produced in India on the initiative of the colonial power!&lt;br /&gt;
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When the sepoys’ revolt broke out in India, de Tocqueville did not conceal the fact that ‘massacres by the [Indian] barbarians’ were followed by ‘the barbarism of the civilized’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prevent him from arriving at a Manichaean conclusion: ‘these Hindus are beasts who are as brutal as they are ferocious’; their victory would mean ‘the restoration of barbarism’, the victory of ‘savages’ and the defeat of the ‘only surviving country of political liberty in Europe’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The aspiration of the Chinese or Indians to maintain or recover their national independence, the desire to liberate themselves from colonial domination, were not even taken into consideration. Precisely because it assumed the position of exclusive representative of the cause of liberty, the community of the free interpreted the challenges it occasionally had to confront as attacks on liberty, as expressions of the servile spirit as well as barbarism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Macaulay acknowledged that the English colonists in India behaved like Spartans confronting helots: we are dealing with ‘a race of sovereigns’ or a ‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this did not prompt any doubts about the right of free England to exercise dictatorship over the barbarians of the colonies. It was a dictatorship that could take the most ruthless forms. Macaulay powerfully describes how the governor of India, Warren Hastings, proceeded when, at a difficult moment for Britain, already engaged in the struggle against the American colonists and their French allies, he had to confront the colony’s native population:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#page251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_002.html#pg251&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;251&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;A reign of terror began, of terror heightened by mystery; for even that which was endured was less horrible than that which was anticipated. No man knew what was next to be expected from this strange tribunal … It consisted of judges not one of whom was familiar with the usages of the millions over whom they claimed boundless authority. Its records were kept in unknown characters; its sentences were pronounced in unknown sounds. It had already collected round itself an army of the worst part of the native population …&lt;br /&gt;
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A wave of arrests without any charge was unleashed, not even sparing the elderly of ‘the most venerable dignity’. There was an orgy of violence that did not respect sanctuaries and unchained the most bestial instincts. There were Indians who ‘shed their blood in the doorway, while defending, sword in hand, the sacred apartments of their women’. In conclusion: ‘All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the Supreme Court.’ And yet, despite this horrifying description, Macaulay concluded that, for having saved England and civilization, Hastings deserved ‘high admiration’ and to rank among ‘the most remarkable men in our history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. How to confront the barbarian threat in the metropolis in timely fashion&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The challenge to the community of the free could arise in the metropolis as well as from the colonies. The status of the popular classes, whom the dominant elite often tended to assimilate to ‘savages’, long remained uncertain. The assimilation became a veritable identification on the occasion of rebellions and revolutions. And as in the case of external barbarism, the remedy for the internal variety was dictatorship. Montesquieu was in no doubt about the fact that ‘the usage of the freest peoples that ever lived on earth makes me believe that there are cases where a veil has to be drawn, for a moment, over liberty, as one hides the statues of the gods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This is what occurred in a state of emergency: in facing it, it was necessary to take to heart the ‘admirable institution’ that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg252&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;252&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;was the Roman dictatorship.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However ‘terrible’, at the opportune moment it ‘violently return[ed] the state to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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People argued no differently across the Atlantic. The &#039;&#039;Federalist&#039;&#039; maintained that, with the onset of a state of emergency, the powers granted to the federal authorities ‘ought to exist without limitation’ and without ‘constitutional shackles’. Hamilton pointed out that even the Roman republic did not hesitate ‘to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator’, when this was required to confront grave dangers and defend Rome against ‘the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘existence of all government’ mentioned by Hamilton took the form of ‘the public good’ in Locke. When it was imperilled, ‘prerogative’ legitimately enabled the ‘prince’ to safeguard it through ‘an arbitrary power’, or ‘discretion’, which could be exercised ‘without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In favour of granting emergency powers to General Cavaignac, during the crisis of 1848, was de Tocqueville (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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It is particularly interesting to note that what prompted an energetic reaction from the community of the free was not necessarily an actual revolt. An indirect, potential threat was enough. For Locke the right to employ force already existed in the event of the imposition of a tax not authorized by those directly affected: ‘the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if mediated by the intervention of the legislative power, the intrusion of non-property-owners in the sphere of property was always an act of illegality and plunder, of violence, and hence one that could legitimately be countered with violence by the person under attack. There is more: paving the way for unlawful interventions in property, any alteration in the composition of the legislative power, with the restructuring, for example, of the House of Lords or abolition of the hereditary transmission of its seats, betokened ‘the dissolution of government’ and hence the unavoidability of a test of arms.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Montesquieu was fairly explicit on the subject:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg253&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;253&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In a state there are always some people who are distinguished by birth, wealth or honors; but if they were mixed among the people and if they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty would be their enslavement and they would have no interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions would be against them. Therefore, the part they have in legislation should be in proportion to the other advantages they have in the state, which will happen if they form a body that has the right to check the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to check theirs … The nobility should be hereditary.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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While Montesquieu denounced any interference that abolished the hereditary privileges of the nobility as illiberal and despotic, Constant regarded any challenge to a property-owners’ monopoly on representative bodies as inadmissible. Since ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them are sure to be used for this purpose’; and political rights ‘will inevitably serve to encroach upon property’. It was sufficient for non-property-owners to be admitted into ‘representative assemblies’ for ‘[t]he wisest of laws’ to be ‘suspected and consequently disobeyed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicitly, the Thermidorian Boissy d’Anglas, having warned against the ‘fatal taxes’ that would inevitably be imposed by the legislative power once it was at the mercy or under the influence of non-property-owners, added: ‘A country governed by property-owners is in the social order; by contrast, one where non-property-owners govern is in the state of nature.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, in a situation without a legal order and legal norms, arms obviously came to the fore.&lt;br /&gt;
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Constant’s reasoning continued to resonate in de Tocqueville: ‘For various reasons, all governments can be led to maintain the poor at state expense, but the democratic form of government is led by its very &#039;&#039;nature&#039;&#039; to act in this way.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Encouraged by democracy more than by any other political regime, ‘legal charity’ (i.e. aid to the poor through the use of resources procured by the state through taxes on the wealthy) could only be synonymous with despoliation in the view of its victims: ‘The rich man whom the law, without consultation, strips of part of his surplus regards the poor man as nothing but a grasping &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg254&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;254&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;foreigner summoned by the legislator for the division of his goods’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In effect, this was an expropriation: if prolonged, laws in favour of the poor would end up transforming ‘proletarians’ into effective beneficiaries of the land and ‘property-owners’ into their mere ‘farm managers’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Mill fluctuated more. On the one hand, he reiterated positions we have already encountered: ‘any power of voting’ in the hands of those who did not pay taxes was ‘a violation of the fundamental principle of free government’; to assign political rights, and hence participation in legislative power, to poor citizens, not subject to taxation, ‘amounts to allowing them to put their hands into other people’s pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, the English left-liberal expressed a more flexible position:&lt;br /&gt;
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The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them … It is not so with the Distribution of Wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is a distinction that would seem to pave the way for a policy of income redistribution.&lt;br /&gt;
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Any such prospect was violently opposed by the most conservative wing of liberalism. According to Spencer, taxation aimed at income redistribution ultimately introduced a sort of ‘state &#039;&#039;corvée’&#039;&#039;, which was no less iniquitous and slave-like than the medieval one just because it imposed payment of a determinate sum of money, rather than the provision of free services to the master.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his turn, Lecky, having adopted the thesis already noted in Constant, according to which non-property-owners with political rights would inevitably be led to pursue ‘predatory and anarchic purposes’ and even ‘break up society’, defined the system that enabled non-property-owners to burden the well-off with taxes as ‘a system of veiled confiscation’. In this way, the latter would in fact end up being ‘completely disenfranchised’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The unwarranted political &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#page255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_003.html#pg255&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;255&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;emancipation of the popular classes involved the dis-emancipation of the only classes qualified to run the country.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. The liberal tradition and its three theories of dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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As well as averting the real or potential threat of the barbarians in the colonies or metropolis, dictatorship could also be useful and indispensable in confronting the most serious problems that the community of the freemen could not resolve by ordinary means. To abolish the institution of slavery, to which representative bodies hegemonized by slave-owners proved stubbornly attached, Smith looked to ‘despotism’, which effectively took shape during the Civil War and in the early post-war years. The attitude adopted in these circumstances by Lieber was significant. In publishing his principal work, he certainly foresaw the possibility of recourse to ‘martial law’ to confront a possible state of emergency, but was concerned to specify that it would not be the executive power which declared it. But with the outbreak of hostilities, he discarded his previous constitutional scruples: the suspension of habeas corpus must be implemented in any event and as extensively and radically as possible. In silencing his critics, Lincoln declared: ‘Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier-boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?’ Lieber was not only in full agreement, but as early as January 1862 was amazed and angry at the fact that no traitor or spy had as yet been hanged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A theory of temporary modernizing dictatorship can also be found in de Tocqueville. Reconstructing the catastrophe of the French Revolution, he arrived at a conclusion: given the irreversible crisis of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, the radical transformation of society was inevitable, but it would have been better if, ‘instead of being carried out by the masses on behalf of the sovereignty of the people, [it] had been the work of an enlightened autocrat’; indeed, ‘[a]n absolute monarch would have been a far less dangerous innovator.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He would have been able to exercise against the most reactionary feudal aristocracy the temporary dictatorship over slave-owners invoked by Smith. Modernizing dictatorship was not evoked by de Tocqueville solely with a view to the past. The French liberal asked himself, and one of his English interlocutors, whether a ‘temporary dictatorship, exercised in firm, enlightened fashion like that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg256&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;256&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Bonaparte after 18 Brumaire, is not the only way of saving Ireland’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The dictatorship hypothesized here is different from that theorized by Locke against ‘papists’, which was directly exercised by the British Protestant settlers, albeit with the support of central government. De Tocqueville seems to envisage a power imposed from London that would be above the parties (Catholic peasants and Anglo-Protestant property-owners), just as in Smith ‘dictatorship’ is called upon to situate itself above both property-owners and their slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, the position taken by Mill was more general in character: ‘I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.’ The dictator could, ‘for a time strictly limited’, ‘employ … the whole power he assumes in removing obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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An integral part of the self-celebration of the community of the free (and the liberal tradition) was the opposition between intransigent, unconditional guardianship of the liberty it assigned itself and the inclination to despotism reprehended in opponents. In reality, we have seen three theories of dictatorship emerge: the dictatorship of civilized peoples over barbarians in the colonies; the dictatorship that suppresses popular subversion in the metropolis; and the dictatorship which, in a situation of stalemate, imposes the requisite reforms from above. A contrast with authors not within the liberal tradition, or even foreign to it, might prove useful. Mazzini invoked ‘a highly centralized dictatorial Power’, which proceeded to the ‘suspension’ of the bill of rights and finished its work only with the achievement of national independence and the final victory of the national revolution.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Marx applied this perspective to the social revolution as well as the national revolution. In both cases a dictatorship is envisaged that emerges in the wake of a popular revolution from below. But for de Tocqueville (and the liberal tradition as a whole), it was precisely ‘revolutionary dictatorship’ from below that was ‘most hostile to liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Although not free of uncertainties, in Marx criticism of the pedagogical dictatorship that the community of the free claimed to exercise over barbarians was recurrent. In reality, it was precisely in the colonies that the ‘profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#page257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_004.html#pg257&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;257&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This also applied to Ireland: it groaned under ‘police terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘English terrorism’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] a regime that kept the population under control ‘solely by bayonets and by a state of siege sometimes open and sometimes disguised’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] resorting to summary executions and the most drastic war measures.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The ills of the community of the free: the psychopathology of French radicalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In the central area of the pyramid of peoples, Mill also inserted the French. Likewise, along with the Spanish, Portuguese and Neopolitans despised by him, Lieber combined the people who more than any other embodied the spurious and wicked ‘Gallic’ or ‘Gallican’ freedom, which in reality was synonymous with extreme centralization and despotism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The combination is surprising. According to Burke, at the point when the Estates General was summoned France was already in possession of a good legal order. Rid of the absolute monarchy, it had become a full member of the community of the free. What had occurred in the intervening years to provoke such a ruinous descent and consequent confinement to the grey border area between civilization and barbarism?&lt;br /&gt;
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Unfortunately, Burke observed on 9 February 1790, with the transformation of the Estates General into a constituent National Assembly, and hence with the restructuring of the political influence of the nobility and clergy, the French had turned out to be infected with a ‘disease’. Passing from despotism to anarchical subversionism, they had proved that they were ‘a people, whose character knows no medium’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and (added the British Whig a year later) ‘[i]t is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.’ Lecky referred to this analysis some years later, repeating it: ‘It was … in the opinion of Burke a total mistake to suppose that political liberty of any kind can be, or ought to be, possessed by all nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg258&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;258&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The further radicalization of the revolution that had been sparked off in Paris confirmed this diagnosis. While the outbreak and manifestation of the disease could be variously dated, it was understood that the French lacked the ‘practical good sense’ that had enabled the Anglo-Americans and the United States in particular to avoid ‘revolutionary times’, the devastation and ‘adventure’ of civil war. This was a point tirelessly stressed by de Tocqueville and, in his wake, by Laboulaye and Guizot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, on inspection, it was not merely good sense and practical spirit that were wanting. In Anglo-Americans these qualities were a constitutive element in a more general mental disposition, whereby ‘a man by following his own interest, rightly understood, will be led to do what is just and good’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We know that, although de Tocqueville deplored it, the fate of Indians and blacks was irrelevant when it came to forming an overall judgement on the republic across the Atlantic. What promoted the undisturbed flourishing of liberty here was the mature personality of its inhabitants, who displayed manifest political and moral superiority to the French. De Tocqueville found the explanation suggested by his fellow countryman Victor Lanjuinais ‘profound and original’: ‘socialism is our natural disease’. And socialism was synonymous with abstraction, but also with something worse. The French were ‘afraid of isolation’ and harboured a ‘desire to be in the crowd’; they felt themselves members of a ‘nation that marches to the same step in perfect alignment’; they regarded liberty as ‘the least important of their possessions, and thus are always ready to offer it up with reason at moments of danger’. Hence a France irremediably ‘revolutionary and servile’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Immediately after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, having stressed that it was ‘contained in germ in the February revolution’, when ‘socialism had been seen to make its appearance’, de Tocqueville offered a kind of epitaph on the French nation: ‘It is incapable and, I say it certainly with regret, unworthy of being free’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The oscillation between anarchical revolutionism and submission to despotism, and an inclination to surrender to passing impulses and moods, confronted one with a people whose ‘basic characteristics are so constant that we can recognise the France we know in portraits made of it two or three &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg259&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;259&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;thousand years ago’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The fact that the process begun in 1789 or 1787 had finally issued in the establishment of the Bonapartist dictatorship, dragging the country down to the level of the ‘nations best made for servitude’, clarified everything. In France, ‘what at first seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant. But what a nation with a real instinct for freedom cannot endure is the feeling of not being its own master.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The closing chapters of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; are a bravura rhetorical performance. Rarely has the love of liberty been hymned in such impassioned terms. And the beauty and power of these passages prove all more the engaging if we bear in mind the polemic, allusive but transparent and courageous, against Napoleon III’s despotism. However, read more coolly, this hymn to liberty proves problematic and even disturbing, with the opposition it sets up between ‘peoples made to be free’ and ‘nations best made for servitude’. It was a divide reproduced within France at the level of social classes. The enlightened love of liberty, which had manifested itself at the start of the revolution, was rapidly overwhelmed by the blind passion for equality, from which the Terror and the equal enslavement of all to an unprecedented despotic power derived. How was this distortion to be explained? De Tocqueville had no doubts: it became ‘less startling when we remember that the Revolution, though sponsored by the most civilized classes of the nation, was carried out by its least educated and most unruly elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A disdainful warning was issued to the latter, intent on pursuing ‘material benefits’ and incapable of appreciating liberty in and for itself: ‘The man who asks of freedom anything other than itself is born to be a slave.’ Once again we are presented with an opposition between those born for liberty and those born for servitude, between freemen and servants, between liberals and serviles. And for de Tocqueville it was futile to try to explain the presence or absence, or variable intensity, of the ‘desire’ for liberty by the level of historical development and material living conditions of particular peoples and social classes. It was ultimately of little use even to challenge the influence of erroneous theories; or rather, these referred to something more profound. The ‘lofty aspiration’ to liberty was a thing that some men are capable of feeling, while others are not: ‘[i]t is a privilege of noble minds which God has fitted to receive it, and it inspires them with a generous fervour.’ The discourse has hitherto focused on a few noble souls: ‘to meaner souls, untouched by the sacred flame, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#page260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_005.html#pg260&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;260&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;it may well seem incomprehensible’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An original curse, which cannot be lifted, seems to hang over the men, classes or peoples who, on account of their vulgarity or coarseness, are excluded or expelled from the community of the free.&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, in its sad destiny France was not alone. Some years earlier—in September 1848, to be precise—de Tocqueville had seen the spectre of socialism lurking across the Alps and had not hesitated to conclude that the Italians ‘have likewise shown themselves unworthy of liberty’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘Likewise’: which country is being alluded to? At this time, not yet invested by a coup d’état, France was still part of the community of the free. The reference is to Germany: as in much of Europe, there too the revolution continued to flare up and pursue radical objectives. The ambit of countries deserving of liberty thus risked being extremely restricted.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Interpretations of the interminable French Revolutionary cycle: from ‘disease’ to ‘race’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not by chance that politico-social conflict came to be interpreted in a psychopathological register. Immediately after the February revolution, de Tocqueville was concerned to specify that ‘[i]t is not needs but ideas that have led to this great upheaval’ and made the French ‘so ill’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was madness that encouraged the socialist pretension to alter not only ‘political laws’, but even social and ‘civil laws’—in particular, relations of property and production consecrated by nature and Providence. In the course of his journey in England, de Tocqueville compared workers to slaves and drew attention to the relations of ‘strict dependency’ that were being established within the factory. On the basis of this analysis, the struggle to overcome or alleviate the condition of slavery or ‘strict dependency’ could be construed as a struggle for freedom. But, as we know, this was not how the French liberal argued, as he denounced the ‘despotism’ of those who sought to regulate working hours and the servile spirit of those who contaminated the ideal of liberty with economic and social demands. The community of the free claimed the merit of pursuing the ideal of liberty in all its purity and in any circumstances for itself. Hence it interpreted not only challenges from the colonial and barbaric world, but also challenges &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg261&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;261&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arising in the zone of civilization itself, as an attack on the ideal of liberty, which was lashed out at by those not in a position to appreciate its grandeur and beauty. Wholly understandable and, indeed, natural among savages, such deafness was construed as a pathological anomaly in a civilized people.&lt;br /&gt;
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In this sense, the resort to explaining conflict in a psychopathological register was immanent in the liberal tradition. Burke spoke of French ‘disease’ in the very first stages of the revolution. And it should be added that for a time it was in fact the ‘American inoculation’, and hence a disease from across the Atlantic, which was held responsible for the contraction and contagious spread of ideas marked by abstract, insane extremism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the disease and psychopathological diagnosis of the adversary could occur in the converse direction. As the abolitionist movement developed, it became a commonplace in the United States to condemn it as an expression of an illiberal spirit, fanaticism and madness. However, at the time of the British colonists’ revolt in America, we find Josiah Tucker inviting the London government to accept and even encourage the secession, so as to avoid the ‘contagion’ of a ‘mad, &#039;&#039;fanatical&#039;&#039; liberty’, which was sweeping through slaves or serfs, the contagion of a ‘republicanism’ that was indeed ‘American’, but which ultimately dated back to Locke and the ‘Lockian Sect’ and could count on the sympathy of Burke himself.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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After 1848, following the umpteenth return of revolution with yet more radical slogans, the tendency to warn against the disease raging in France dramatically intensified. Underlining the rootedness in the United States of the rule of law and liberal institutions, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; attributed much more weight to history and geography than &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;. Why had Napoleon Bonaparte’s military dictatorship been imposed on France?&lt;br /&gt;
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War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government … If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg262&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;262&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The situation across the Atlantic was very different: ‘Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness, where they have, so to speak, no neighbours; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While we once again encounter the dubious assimilation of the Indians (and even Mexico) to a ‘wilderness’, we are far removed from the explanation that peremptorily and definitively opposes a ‘sublime desire’ for freedom to vulgar indifference to it, ‘noble souls’ to ‘mediocre souls’.&lt;br /&gt;
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By way of confirming the anthropological drift that manifested itself with 1848, we can adduce the long letter (a small essay) sent by de Tocqueville twenty years earlier to his friend de Beaumont. The history of Europe was conceived here in such a unitary way that the terminology became interchangeable: mention was made of the ‘Commons’ in the case of France and the ‘Third Estate’ in the case of England. In the two countries the victory of the bourgeoisie had been achieved in different ways, which were in fact the ‘forced result of the state of things’—that is, of the different configuration of power relations between the contending politico-social subjects.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Were statism and despotism the hereditary disease of the country where Jacobinism and Bonapartism had made their appearance? In truth, England had not only succeeded in constructing a strong state and military apparatus before France, but at the time of the Tudors had suffered an unlimited despotism: ‘I know of no tyranny in history more complete than that of … Henry VIII’; the Commons, ‘which had denied the king’s will a man’s life’, now ended up ‘condemning without even giving a hearing’. A worse terror than the Jacobin version had manifested itself, as demonstrated by ‘ “bills of attainder”, a diabolical invention that not even the revolutionary Tribunal called into being’. Yet it was nonetheless a revolution that had played a positive role. It nurtured the ‘first fruit of civilization’ as a result of the fact that, albeit in its terrible absolutism, in England royal power attacked the ‘vices of the feudal system’ and subdued ‘oligarchical liberty’. This was a general tendency, though in no country did ‘despotism prove more terrible’. Was the island across the Channel, unlike France, characterized and blessed by a gradualism of historical evolution? The letter/essay we are examining explicitly argued against the thesis that the English Constitution had passed through ‘successive, regular stages, before reaching the point it has arrived at today’, so that it could be considered ‘a fruit which has matured over &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg263&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;263&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;successive centuries’. In truth, de Tocqueville observed, from Henry VIII onwards, ‘I see the English people change religion four times according to the will of their master’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn91|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;91&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Naturally, one might try to devalue the letter/essay of 1828 as ‘youthful’. However, even in subsequent years, if there was a contrast between France and England, it was often to the detriment of the latter, which continued to interpret liberty as a ‘privilege’ rather than a ‘common right’, as occurred in the country that was the protagonist of the 1789 revolution (see above, [[#part0008_split_000.html#c04|Chapter 4]], [[#part0008_split_008.html#c04-ftn9|§9]]). In 1843, having compared slave-masters in the colonies with the ‘aristocracy’ overthrown by the French Revolution, de Tocqueville celebrated ‘the great principles’ of the revolution, ‘which was carried out entirely in the name of equality’, in the name of the equality of the ‘human race’, and which had the further merit of being first to abolish slavery.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn92|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;92&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Starting from the 1848 revolution, under the impression made by the spectre of socialism, it was precisely the pathos of equality that defined the failure of the French Revolution and the disease of an entire people, who now prostrated themselves before Louis Napoleon.&lt;br /&gt;
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The psychopathological interpretation of developments in the French situation had the advantage of dispelling possible anxieties in the community of the free, which absolved itself of any responsibility for the Bonapartist outcome of the 1848 revolution. De Tocqueville might have drawn up a critical balance-sheet of the conduct of the liberal party and himself. After the dictatorship’s advent, with some exaggeration he denounced the limited resistance met with by Louis Napoleon in French society. Had the disappointment they experienced with the exclusion of three million Frenchmen from political rights contributed to the passivity of the popular masses? This was a measure the liberal bourgeoisie had been guilty of in 1850, thereby furnishing the dictator with the possibility of elevating himself into a champion of universal suffrage and the struggle against privilege and discrimination.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn93|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;93&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And what role in undermining the Second Republic had been played by intransigent liberalism à la de Tocqueville, who had branded the reduction of working hours and any intervention by political power in favour of the most deprived as intolerable ‘despotism’? The Bonapartist regime had its stronghold in the countryside: had it not been primarily the liberal bourgeoisie, with de Tocqueville’s active participation, which stirred it up against the city and mobilized it in the name &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg264&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;264&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the struggle against the terrible threat that hung over civilization, dictating extraordinary measures commensurate with the situation? And again: Had the discrediting of institutions and the rule of law been aided by the supreme contempt for the Constitution displayed by de Tocqueville, when in his capacity as foreign minister he demanded ‘the right, in spite of our Constitution, to overthrow the Roman Republic’?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn94|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;94&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Moreover, a basic contradiction ran through the French liberal’s attitude. On the one hand, on an immediate political level, he vigorously condemned the Bonapartist regime; on the other, as an historian he regretted the fact that the requisite modernization of France had not been completed by an ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’, rather than a popular revolution (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn5|§5]]). But a modernizing ‘absolute prince’ or ‘despot’ is precisely what Napoleon I had wanted to be and what Napoleon III aspired to be! Rather than engage in an examination that was possibly too painful at a personal level, the author of &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039; preferred to come to blows with a mythical, eternal France.&lt;br /&gt;
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A not dissimilar evolution is found in Mill. In 1849 he vigorously defended the February Revolution of the previous year. Thereafter, he continued to make an important acknowledgement of ‘the heroic and calumniated Provisional Government of France’ for having promptly abolished slavery in the colonies, in an implicit contrast not only with the North American republic, but also with England, on whose history ‘a lasting blot’ was left by the support of ‘the leading portion of our higher and middle classes’ for the South’s pro-slavery secession from the United States.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn95|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;95&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In his &#039;&#039;Autobiography&#039;&#039;, reminiscing about the debate that developed in Europe over the American Civil War, having denounced the ‘furious’ pro-Southern position of much of the English liberalism of the time, Mill added: ‘None of the Continental Liberals committed the same frightful mistake.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn96|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;96&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet in 1861 we have seen him inclined to exclude the French people and ‘continental nations’ in general from the community of the free in the strict sense. These were years when, not altogether in jest, people liked to say that ‘negroes begin in Calais’, just across the Channel.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn97|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;97&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, if not skin colour alone, ‘race’ was now called on to explain the differential development of European countries. What must not be overlooked, observed Lieber, still pointing a finger at France, was ‘the Celtic spirit of being &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#page265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_006.html#pg265&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;265&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;swayed by masses’ and hence surrendering to political, religious and literary ‘centralization’. Absent there was ‘the original Teutonic spirit of individual independence’, which exhibited itself with particular vigour in the ‘Anglican race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn98|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;98&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;8. ‘Disease’ as a symptom of racial degeneration&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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From ‘disease’ we have passed to ‘race’. Were these two interpretations of politico-social conflict compatible? Burke, who denounced the outbreak of ‘disease’ across the Channel, celebrated the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’, the ‘chosen race of the sons of England’. It was a ‘nation’ and a ‘race’ possibly less vulnerable than others to the pathological manifestations raging in France. In other words, the question is whether the servile, herd spirit and inability to enjoy a regular, orderly liberty were a passing disturbance in the personality of a civilized people or possessed an ethnic origin that was yet to be identified.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the United States, from the mid-nineteenth century the threat represented by the immigration of yellow skins—the coolies—was added to the traditional peril of miscegenation with blacks. The coastal region of the Pacific, warned Lieber, risked being ‘mongolized’ by Chinese, whose proliferation resembled that of ‘mice’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn99|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;99&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer was even more drastic. Large-scale settlement by the Chinese (or Japanese) in America would result in catastrophe: ‘they must either, if they remain unmixed, form a subject race in the position, if not of slaves, yet of a class approximating to slaves; or if they mix they must form a bad hybrid.’ The upshot would be individuals with a ‘chaotic constitution’ internally, as was sadly demonstrated by ‘the Eurasians in India, and the half-breeds in America’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn100|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;100&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Hitherto we have been dealing with populations of colonial or semi-colonial origin, and hence extraneous to the West. And Lieber and Spencer’s agreement with legislation that prohibited non-whites from access to the land of liberty is not surprising. Although an enthusiastic expansionist, the former declared himself opposed to the annexation of any territory that involved a further incorporation of peoples of colour. But, as his biographer observes, he went further. He feared that an influx of immigrants from southern Europe &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg266&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;266&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;belonging to the ‘Latin Race’ might also cause a ‘dilution of American blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn101|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;101&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, likewise focusing on the United States, another distinguished representative of liberalism—Lecky—drew attention to the effect of ‘the contamination of the immigrant vote’, since immigrants were often ‘revolutionary elements’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn102|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;102&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These are concerns that were powerfully echoed by de Tocqueville. As the storm clouds gathered over the North American republic that would shortly lead to the Civil War, the French liberal posed an anxious question: How was the fading of the ‘practical good sense’ that had hitherto spared the transatlantic republic the catastrophe of France and continental Europe to be explained? What had provoked the crisis was the ‘rapid introduction into the United States of men alien to the English race’, who for that very reason caused America to run ‘the greatest danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn103|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;103&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Its inhabitants were now no longer so ‘united by … common opinions’ as to render a bloody division inconceivable, as &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; had believed.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn104|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;104&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville warned his US friends and interlocutors that ‘however great your capacity for assimilation, it is very difficult for so many foreign bodies to be digested’ with such rapidity as to avoid their disturbing ‘the economy and the health of your social body’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn105|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;105&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The looming civil war was put down to the new immigrants from southern or eastern Europe: they were configured as a pathogenic element, attacking from without a social organism that was in itself healthy. In the face of such a danger, de Tocqueville tirelessly warned his transatlantic friends and interlocutors:&lt;br /&gt;
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Alas, every day brings you so many foreign elements that you will soon no longer be yourselves: all the arguments that could be made about your nature become ever more uncertain. In fact, mixed as you are today with so many races, who could now say what your nature is?&lt;br /&gt;
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And again: ‘What frightens me is the prodigious number of foreigners that makes of you a new people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn106|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;106&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The waves of migration condemned here obviously involved the North of the United States. Did they lead to the emergence of radical abolitionism? In that case, de Tocqueville’s position would not be very different from that of &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg267&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;267&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the theorists of the South. They branded as fundamentally alien to America, and ultimately reducible to radicalism of a European (and French and Jacobin) variety, the positions of those who, to abolish slavery, did not even shrink at the prospect of a bloody conflict. At all events, de Tocqueville’s tendency in explaining the impending civil war is clear: he assigned responsibility for it to the growing presence of ethnic groups traditionally lacking in the political and moral qualities attributed to Anglo-Americans.&lt;br /&gt;
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This type of explanation obviously proves impossible when dealing with an ethnically homogenous country. Or should we assume that such homogeneity is merely apparent? To this question de Gobineau replied decisively in the affirmative. But let us observe his starting-point. He fully shared the pitiless psychopathological diagnosis of the French people made by de Tocqueville. It was necessary to register the raging of an age-old disease in France that rendered the functioning of ‘free institutions’ impossible and which, in the name of ‘public utility’ or the ‘monstrosity’ that was alleged ‘social right’, constantly promoted ‘the absorption of private rights into single state right’. We are dealing with ‘a people for whom absolute centralization is the height of good government’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn107|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;107&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, the same ideological themes and even the same language we have heard in de Tocqueville, Lieber and Mill recur.&lt;br /&gt;
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But there was in fact something new. The disease now had a specific ethnic base. The carriers of it in France and the rest of the world were non-Aryans. Given the importance of such an innovation, it is an exaggeration to claim that de Gobineau was ‘not so far removed from Alexis de Tocqueville, at one time his mentor and superior, as might be supposed’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn108|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;108&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other hand, there is no doubt they moved in a cultural and political circle with not a few points of contact and commonality. On close epistolary and intellectual terms, de Tocqueville and Lieber were in full agreement in their diagnosis of the disease raging in France and which, as a result of waves of migration, also risked having a harmful impact on the United States. Advancing further down the road of interpreting history in an ethnic key, Lieber counterposed to the herd and servile spirit of the ‘Celts’ the jealous sense of individuality peculiar to the ‘Teutons’. The latter were the vanguard of the West, or the ‘western Caucasian portion of humanity’. Perhaps, concluded Lieber, for brevity’s sake one could speak of ‘cis-Caucasians’, while the phrase ‘Japhetics’ had the drawback of being too broad.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn109|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;109&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, we are on the threshold of the Aryan mythology: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#page268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_007.html#pg268&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;268&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘Japhetics’ were the descendants of Japheth, by contrast with the progeny of Sem (‘Semites’) and Ham (‘Hamites’). And the American liberal expressed reservations about the category of Japhetics or Aryans solely because it referred to the mythical deeds of a people that had started out from India—in other words, a region foreign to the West. Hence the distance from de Gobineau was not great, even if the latter preferred to speak of Aryans, rather than employing what he regarded as the less rigorous categories of ‘Japhetics, Caucasians and Indo-Germans’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn110|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;110&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;9. De Gobineau, liberalism and the genealogical myths of the community of the free&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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From the outset, the self-proclamation of the community of the free felt the need to resort to genealogical myths that endowed this distinguishing gesture with a foundation. Montesquieu pointed to ‘the forests’ inhabited by ‘the Germans’ as the birthplace of free, representative government.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn111|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;111&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The origin was not accidental: if slavery was at home among ‘the peoples of the south’ (see above, [[#part0006_split_000.html#c02|Chapter 2]], [[#part0006_split_010.html#c02-ftn4|§4]]), by contrast ‘the peoples of the north have and will always have a spirit of independence and liberty that the peoples of the south do not’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn112|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;112&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, ‘the peoples of the north’, who had demonstrated ‘remarkable wisdom against the Roman power’ they ultimately destroyed, were also distinguished by ‘good sense’, courage, ‘generous sentiment’, and ‘the strength of spirit necessary to guide one’s own conduct’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn113|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;113&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The ‘northern nations’ were referred to in England by Sidney and Hume, who celebrated as ‘extremely free’ the ‘government of the Germans, and that of all the northern nations’, which was established on the ‘ruins of Rome’ and its ‘military despotism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn114|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;114&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Again, for the Mill of 1861, the French were excluded from the community of the free because they were ‘essentially a southern people’, stamped by ‘the double education of despotism and Catholicism’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn115|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;115&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Burke instead preferred to glory in descent from ‘our Gothic ancestors’, as well as in belonging to the English &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#page269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_008.html#pg269&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;269&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;‘chosen race’ of liberty, while Lieber worked ‘Teutonic’ ancestors into the coat of arms of the United States and the Anglican race.&lt;br /&gt;
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the Teutonic genealogical myth met with great success. Notwithstanding the stabilization achieved with the Third Republic, the memory of the Paris Commune and of the interminable revolutionary cycle behind it influenced France’s image. The scourge of brigandage in the south, and the geographical location (not properly Nordic) especially of its southern regions, affected the image of Italy. The Second Reich, by contrast, seemed to stand unproblematically alongside England and the United States in enjoying representative bodies, a liberal order and economic development. These were the three countries now celebrated as the vanguard of the community of the free, or as the peoples who best embodied the cause of liberty. In England, as early as 1860 Lord Robert Cecil—future Marquis of Salisbury and prime minister—contrasted ‘the people of a southern climate’ with those of ‘Teutonic parentage’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn116|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;116&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and in 1889 Joseph Chamberlain (the colonial secretary) officially called on the United States and Germany to form a ‘Teutonic’ alliance with his country.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn117|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;117&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a position shared across the Atlantic by Alfred T. Mahan, the great theorist of geopolitics, who likewise declared for the unity of the ‘Teutonic family’, of peoples belonging to the same Germanic ‘stock’. Mahan was on excellent terms with Theodore Roosevelt who, going still further in his celebration of ‘German’ and ‘Teutonic’ peoples, hymned the ‘war-like prowess of the stalwart sons of Odin’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn118|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;118&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideological climate prompted a reinterpretation of the category of Anglo-Saxons, which now tended to include Germany—the starting-point for the great adventure of the emigration of the descendants of liberty, praiseworthy for having rebelled against first Roman despotism and then Papal despotism.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;10. Disraeli, de Gobineau and ‘race’ as the ‘key of history’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The cultural and political universe to which de Gobineau belonged is becoming clear. With him, the approach chosen by de Tocqueville to explain the crisis &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg270&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;270&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in the United States became a key to understanding universal history. Why did ‘liberal institutions’ in the North American republic exhibit a vitality unimaginable in Latin America? Because in the latter Europeans had mixed with the defeated natives. And as for Europe, why had France suffered a catastrophe unknown to England? Because the mixing of races had been much more radical in the former than the latter, ‘that of all the countries of Europe where modifications of blood have been slowest and hitherto least varied’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn119|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;119&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And why was an unprecedented crisis impending in the United States? De Gobineau’s answer was substantially identical to de Tocqueville’s: as a result of massive waves of migration that were heterogeneous in origin, the original Anglo-Saxon element was on the point of losing its identity.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn120|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;120&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is true that in de Gobineau the anthropological explanation underwent such a naturalistic rigidification as to prompt de Tocqueville to ironize about the decisive role of ‘blood’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn121|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;121&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Must we then regard the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039; as foreign to the liberal tradition? In reality, even if we ignore the South of the United States, where the theory and practice reigned whereby a single drop of black blood was enough to exclude a person from the community of the free (and the enjoyment of political and civil rights), in Europe itself and, what is more, in the other classic country of the liberal tradition, voices echoed that were not very different from that just heard. Declaring himself in favour of a legal ban on miscegenation, Spencer stressed: ‘It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant proof, alike furnished by the inter-marriages of human races and by the inter-breeding of animals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn122|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;122&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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But in this context the figure of Disraeli assumes particular prominence. The positions he adopted were clear: race was ‘the key of history’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn123|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;123&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It made no sense to speak of ‘progress’ and ‘reaction’: in reality, ‘[a]ll is race’;[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn124|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;124&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] ‘[a]ll is race; there is no other truth.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn125|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;125&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Only thus could it be understood how, although fairly small in numbers, the Spanish conquistadores (or ‘Goths’, as Disraeli preferred to call them) had managed to triumph in America and the English in China.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn126|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;126&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that was how the constant ravages devastating France &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg271&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;271&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;were to be explained: we were witnessing ‘the great revolt of the Celts’, or the ancient ‘conquered races’, against ‘the northern and western races’, who had assimilated ‘the Semitic principle’ (the Old and New Testaments) and embodied civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn127|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;127&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The principal and primary aspect of these processes was not culture: the ‘greatness’ of a race ‘results from its organisation’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn128|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;128&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a physiological fact, and it was therefore necessary to ‘study physiology’, [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn129|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;129&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] so as to be able to orientate oneself correctly in the conflicts of the historical and political world: ‘Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which makes a race, and that is blood.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn130|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;130&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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On the basis of this blood mythology, Disraeli too insisted on the superiority of the ‘pure races of the Caucasus’, to which the Jewish race belonged.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn131|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;131&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It was a purity to be jealously guarded: ‘that pernicious doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man’, the doctrine of ‘cosmopolitan fraternity’ which led to mixing and contamination, was condemned out of hand; if really implemented, it ‘would deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn132|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;132&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Despite the partial difference of idiom, we are not removed from the ideological universe of de Gobineau. The latter, who celebrated the Aryans in the first instance for their liberal and individualistic ‘traditions’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn133|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;133&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] not by chance dedicated his book ‘to His Majesty George V, King of Hanover’. Along with England, de Gobineau took the other classical country of the liberal tradition, the United States, as his model. It was an ‘essentially practical land’, as had been confirmed by the fact that, without allowing themselves to be fettered by the abstractions rampant in France, even the ‘abolitionist papers had acknowledged the correctness’ of the thesis of the natural inequality of races.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn134|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;134&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The celebration of racial purity was the celebration primarily of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, the branch of the ‘Aryan family’ that more than any other had resisted the general bastardization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn135|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;135&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg272&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;272&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;There is no reason to include Disraeli in the liberal tradition while excluding the author of the &#039;&#039;Essay on the Inequality of Human Races&#039;&#039;, all the less so given that the latter drew considerable inspiration from the English writer and statesman.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn136|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;136&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] If de Gobineau ceased to be a liberal, it was when, now discouraged, he ended up accommodating, in de Tocqueville’s harsh but accurate judgement, to the ‘government of the sabre, and even of the baton’—that is, to the dictatorship of Napoleon III.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn137|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;137&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should not be forgotten that in these same years Disraeli believed the ‘government of the sword’ and the ‘military camp’ inevitable and legitimate, for France and continental Europe (see below, [[#part0014_split_000.html#c10|Chapter 10]], [[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|§1]]). In any event, as a theorist of race, admirer and collaborator of de Tocqueville, and follower of Disraeli, the author, disgusted by the French revolutionary cycle and statism, and filled with admiration for the Anglo-Saxon world and the ‘liberal traditions of the Aryans’, fitted into the milieu of liberalism without difficulty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The fact that the Aryan mythology was explicitly present in other exponents of this intellectual tradition should not be overlooked. Here is how Lecky came to the defence of Ireland, from which he originated: while they were Celts, the Irish were nevertheless part of ‘the great Aryan race’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn138|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;138&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Spencer reached the same conclusion in the course of his visit to the United States: ‘descendants of the immigrant Irish lose their Celtic aspect, and become Americanised’; they had fused with the other ‘varieties of the Aryan race’ and, in this instance, the admixture had proved beneficial.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn139|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;139&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Things stood differently in the case of France. What explained its defeat in the war with Prussia and the raging of the Paris Commune was ‘race’, which seemed to have remained stubbornly Celtic (unlike Lecky, Spencer considered the Celts wholly alien to the Aryan race).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn140|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;140&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the authors we have just cited might be added Renan, who also regarded himself as a liberal, was ‘in regular contact’ with de Gobineau,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn141|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;141&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and was a no less passionate cantor (as we shall see) of the excellence of the Aryan race and, more generally, the ‘Aryan–Semitic races’. Finally, it should be noted that across the Atlantic the Aryan mythology was prominent, and in fact so widespread as to go beyond the circle of ideologies. In 1902 Arthur &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#page273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_009.html#pg273&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;273&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, demanded the United States’ right to dominion on the grounds that it belonged to the ‘magnificent Aryan people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn142|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;142&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;11. The repression of conflict, the search for the pathogenic element, and conspiracy theory&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Even if he rejected the facile Aryan solution, this did not make de Tocqueville any less obsessed than de Gobineau with the problem of identifying the pathogenic element attacking a social organism that was healthy in itself. After 1848 there was no doubt: the carrier of the ‘revolutionary disease’, the ‘permanent disease’, the ‘virus of a new and unknown kind’, which raged incessantly in France, was a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;): ‘we are always dealing with the same men, even if the circumstances vary’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn143|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;143&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is to be added that this ‘virus’ or ‘race’ was spreading alarmingly throughout the world. Having made their appearance in France, these ‘[r]evolutionaries of a hitherto unknown breed came on the scene … They were the first of a new race of men who subsequently prospered and proliferated in all parts of the civilized world, everywhere retaining the same characteristics.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn144|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;144&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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What once again leaps to the eye is the transition from ‘disease’ or ‘virus’ to ‘race’. Likewise in Constant, ‘cold in their delirium’, subversive intellectuals, those ‘jugglers of sedition’ (&#039;&#039;jongleurs de sédition&#039;&#039;), never tired of undermining not just a particular society, but ‘the very foundations of the social order’. They were ‘beings of an unknown species’ (&#039;&#039;êtres d’une espèce inconnue&#039;&#039;) and in fact formed a ‘new race’ (&#039;&#039;race nouvelle&#039;&#039;), a ‘detestable race’ (&#039;&#039;déstestable race&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn145|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;145&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In a crescendo, an anthropological type of explanation tends to become a racial type of explanation—the transition from the category of &#039;&#039;espèce&#039;&#039; to that of &#039;&#039;race&#039;&#039; is symptomatic. At this point the idea of a radical solution emerges. One could only hope for the ‘eradication’ of this ‘detestable race’ composed of pathogenic agents:[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn146|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;146&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] such was the precondition for restoring the health and safety of society.&lt;br /&gt;
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The term ‘race’ does not possess a genuinely ethnic connotation in either Constant or de Tocqueville. Yet its recurrence is a symptom of a tendency to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg274&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;274&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;racialize the intellectuals who were carriers of the virus of subversion. Burke went significantly further. In addition to a clearly defined social stratum (non-property-owning intellectuals, who were not connected with the land and lacked roots), the ideological ‘intoxication’ of which radicalism was culpable[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn147|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;147&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] pertained to a social bloc that began to exhibit an ethnic dimension. What explained the catastrophe of the French Revolution was an alliance between two significantly different social strata: on the one hand, ‘political men of letters’ and, on the other, the ‘new monied interest’. The reasons for this alliance, at first sight so strange, were readily understandable. To begin with, the two parties shared a hatred of Christianity: ‘[t]he literary cabal had some years ago formed something like a regular plan for the destruction of the Christian religion.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn148|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;148&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But if the irreligiousness and atheism of intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment were well-known, one should not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Jews in Change-alley’, already alien to Christianity for religious and ideological reasons, also had a material interest in undermining or destroying it: they were hoping for ‘a mortgage on the revenues belonging to the see of Canterbury’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn149|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;149&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The attack on the Church was also an attack on ‘the landed property of ecclesiastical corporations’, on landed property as such. The revolutionaries’ programme was sinister: ‘Is the house of lords to be voted useless? Is episcopacy to be abolished? Are the church lands to be sold to Jews and jobbers[?]’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn150|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;150&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Intent on destroying a society whose pillars were Christianity and the landed aristocracy was an alliance between subversive intellectuals gathered in ‘the revolution society’ and ‘the pulpit of the Old Jewry’, or the ‘gentlemen of the Old Jewry’, engaged in distorting the real meaning of the Glorious Revolution and spreading ‘the spurious revolution principles of the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn151|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;151&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, Burke did not tire of stressing the role of the Jews. These two components of the revolutionary bloc were linked by multiple affinities. Over and above hatred of the Church and the agrarian, Christian nobility, an important role was also played by their fundamental foreignness to the nation. The intellectual stratum was itself stateless, because intellectuals displayed ‘attachment to their country’ only to the extent that it conduced to their ‘fleeting projects’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn152|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;152&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg275&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;275&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But whence did subversion draw its shock force? To overthrow the existing order, intellectuals and usurers were insufficient. In reality, an integral, albeit subaltern, part of the subversive attack was ‘the Tavern’, the inebriated, bloodthirsty rabble. How was the unnatural union repeatedly denounced by Burke as the social bloc between ‘Old Jewry’ and ‘the London Tavern’ formed and sealed?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn153|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;153&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Who enrolled the most desperate in the retinue and service of the wealthiest, and in fact of the most parasitic, repugnant wealth—the wealth which, rather than being based on the land and love of the land, pertained exclusively to speculation and usury? It was the intellectuals—more precisely, rootless intellectuals of humble origin. It was ‘feathered scoundrels’ [&#039;&#039;gueux plumées&#039;&#039;],[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn154|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;154&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] wretches like the scoundrels of the Tavern whom they were constantly inciting. Wanting in religion, faith and genuine ideals, they called on the scoundrels, of whom they were an integral part, to rise up against wealth, but only against the most respectable wealth—landed wealth—while financial (and Jewish) wealth was spared. In France these intellectuals ‘pretended to a great zeal for the poor … They became a sort of demagogues. They served as a link to unite, in favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to restless and desperate poverty.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn155|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;155&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In their turn, the Jews were perfectly content to support the French rabble’s attacks on monarchy and aristocracy, on the pillars of Christianity. The revolutionary atrocities seemed to Burke ‘Theban and Thracian orgies, acted in France, and applauded only in the Old Jewry’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn156|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;156&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The contours of the subversive social bloc were now clear. Thanks to the work of plebeian, subversive intellectuals, here were the propertyless in the retinue of the usurers, the Tavern in the service of Old Jewry, or ‘Jewish brokers contending with each other who could best remedy with fraudulent circulation and depreciated paper the wretchedness and ruin brought on their country by their degenerate councils’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn157|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;157&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Jews were ultimately at the head of the variegated social bloc of subversion. It was enough to observe the development of the revolution in France: ‘The next generation of the nobility will resemble the artificers and clowns, and money-jobbers, usurers, and Jews, who will be always their fellows, sometimes their masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn158|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;158&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Levelling and homogenizing everything, the French Revolution ended up making a single ‘difference’ prevail, that &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg276&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;276&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;constituted by ‘money’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn159|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;159&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and hence sanctioning the predominance of finance (largely controlled by Jews). If remedial action was not promptly taken, a ‘general earthquake’ threatened to flatten the social order and civilization.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn160|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;160&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Unquestionably, we are dealing with the first organic theory of revolution as a Jewish conspiracy. The &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; and the denunciation of the infamous role of Old Jewry date from 1790. Only later did Abbé Barruel set himself to work. Exiled in England, he was received with honour by Burke, who warmly greeted him and the work that was taking shape: ‘The whole of the wonderful narrative is supported by documents and proofs with almost juridical regularity and exactness.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn161|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;161&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In addition to chronological priority, another, more important characteristic highlights the novelty and perilousness of the conspiracy theory in Burke. While the &#039;&#039;Reflections&#039;&#039; also referred to the disturbing role of Enlightenment ‘confederacies’,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn162|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;162&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it was now no longer a question of pointing a finger at this or that sect or at freemasonry, as did Barruel, and exposing the role of Jews therein. Foremost among the charges against the latter was not hostility towards the dominant religion or throne and altar, as in the traditional Christian polemic. Burke, who was himself a mason,[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn163|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;163&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] aimed to explain a new politico-social conflict that was destined to last a long time. In the British Whig’s view, we have on the one hand the countryside, as the site embodying the natural order of society and the values of attachment to the land, and a national community cemented (as we know) by a ‘relation in blood’; on the other, the city as the site of rootlessness and stateless subversion, jointly promoted by Jewish finance, abstract, revolutionary intellectuals and the rabble. For the first time, the Jews were accused of simultaneously operating through rapacious, parasitic finance and a plebeian movement inspired by blind, destructive fury.&lt;br /&gt;
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This motif reappeared in the liberal tradition after another major revolutionary upheaval. On the outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, Disraeli immediately put them down to the ‘manoeuvres’ of ‘secret associations’, which were ‘always vigilant and always prepared’ to take ‘society by surprise’ and ‘strik[e] at property and Christ’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn164|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;164&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, the English statesman of Jewish origin drew up a more sophisticated, highly surprising balance-sheet. On &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg277&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;277&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;account of ‘their accumulated wealth’, attachment to their religious tradition and proud racial self-consciousness, Jews tended to be hostile to ‘the doctrine of the equality of man’ and ‘conservative’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn165|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;165&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, although shaking off oppression, they were not averse to the most unscrupulous operations and alliances: ‘you find the once loyal Hebrew invariably arrayed in the same ranks as the leveller and the latitudinarian’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn166|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;166&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There then spread the ‘destructive principle’ and ‘insurrection … against tradition and aristocracy, against religion and property’. Fuelling all of this was an unexpected ethnic and social group: the destruction of Christianity, ‘the natural equality of man and the abrogation of property, are proclaimed by the secret societies who form provisional governments, and men of Jewish race are found at the head of every one of them’. There was no doubt: ‘If the reader throws his eye over the provisional governments of Germany, and Italy, and even of France, formed at that period, he will recognise everywhere the Jewish element.’ Thus, ‘[t]he people of God co-operate with atheists; the most skilful accumulators of property ally themselves with communists; the peculiar and chosen race touch the hand of all the scum and low castes of Europe!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn167|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;167&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is not difficult to hear in this discourse an echo of the resentment of the Jew at humiliations and persecution suffered. But it remains the case that we are once again dealing with a new conspiracy theory destined to enjoy fatal success in the twentieth century. What encouraged such a theory was the tendency, widespread in the liberal culture of the time, to repress the objectivity of politico-social conflict. The picture Disraeli paints of the great revolutionary wave of 1848 is eloquent. Had it not been for the occult Jewish leadership, ‘the uncalled for outbreak would not have ravaged Europe.’ Not objective social needs, but ‘the fiery energy and teeming resources of the children of Israel maintained for a long time the unnecessary and useless struggle’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn168|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;168&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, still within the ambit of the liberal tradition, the cry of alarm at ‘conspiracy’ also resounded during another great revolutionary upheaval. When Napoleonic France’s attempt to reintroduce slavery into San Domingo was defeated by the fierce resistance of the ex-slaves, Malouet warned against the ‘universal plot of the blacks’ who, with the complicity of the abolitionists, aspired to dominate and massacre the whites.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn169|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;169&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this theme was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#page278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_010.html#pg278&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;278&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;widely diffused in the South of the United States. Obsession with ‘conspiracy’ runs deep in the history of that country and both the contending alliances, in different forms, were constantly concerned to uncover and fight it. For example, in the years leading up to the Civil War, while the South denounced the North’s ‘abolitionist conspiracy’, the latter endlessly warned against the plot that aimed to impose slaveholding power at a federal level. For this reason, reference has been made to a widespread ‘paranoid style’ in connection with the history of the North American republic.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn170|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;170&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In this mythology of the conspiracy, one element was especially significant and pregnant with consequences. The actor in the black, abolitionist plot, the anti-slavery militant, tended to be delineated in accordance with the model generally used to stigmatize the Jew: ‘Essentially weak and cowardly, he would pose no threat in a fair and open fight’; but this was where deception, intrigue and, precisely, conspiracy came in.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn171|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;171&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;12. The conflict of the two liberalisms, and mutual accusations of betrayal&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In confronting the challenges represented by the struggle for recognition waged by the excluded, obviously the community of the free did not always react as one. On more than a few occasions, there were internal clashes and divisions. In broad terms, we can distinguish two tendencies. One fraction more or less stubbornly identified with the positions of the representatives of English proto-liberalism, who equated ‘true liberty’ with untrammelled control by the master over &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; family, as well as &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; servants and &#039;&#039;his&#039;&#039; goods. By contrast, another fraction sought to come to terms with the idea of liberty originally mobilized by servants, who refused to let themselves be assimilated to the master’s belongings and pursued emancipation through intervention by political power on their behalf, be it existing political power or that formed in the wake of a revolution from below. The struggles waged by servants aggravated the sense of unease in some sections of the community of the free, who soon sought to acquire a good conscience by repressing slavery to the colonies and changing or masking the politico-social relations that most blatantly gave the lie to their proclaimed attachment to the cause of liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
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The entanglement of, and clash between, these two different ideas of liberty, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg279&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;279&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;and of the politico-social subjects who appealed to them, explains the especially complex and tortuous character of the first English revolution and the French Revolution as such. Not even the United States was spared this conflict. In fact, it flared up there in the most violent and bloody way during the Civil War, in a clash between, on the one hand, the idea of liberty understood as self-government by the dominant class and race and, on the other, the idea of liberty that experienced increasing disquiet because of the persistence of the institution of slavery. Defeated militarily, in slightly different form, as a regime of terroristic white supremacy, the idea of liberty dear to the South ended up achieving a political success in the United States that lasted beyond the mid-twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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The two liberalisms we are referring to are to be construed in an ideal-typical sense: within the same author, it is possible to register fluctuation from one to the other. In condemning as contrary to liberty coalitions composed of ‘desperate men’, who sought to escape death from starvation, Smith clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the very wealthy. On the other hand, in calling for a ‘despotic government’ to abolish slavery, he was embracing a different theoretical paradigm, which identified liberty with the abolition of oppressive relations existing within civil society itself. And the great economist adhered to this second paradigm when he observed that in eastern Europe ‘serfdom’ continued to exist in ‘Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority’, and thus was not in a position to foil the resistance of feudal lords.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn172|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;172&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is an observation which, albeit to a lesser extent, also applies to de Tocqueville. When he condemned the reduction of the working day in factories to twelve hours as an expression of despotism, he clearly identified liberty with the self-government of civil society hegemonized by the bourgeoisie. But on other occasions the French liberal argued differently. In a letter of 1840 to an American correspondent, he observed:&lt;br /&gt;
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For me it is a rather melancholy reflection to think that your nation has incorporated slavery to such an extent that they expand together … In practice, there are no precedents for an abolition of slavery on the master’s initiative. It has only been abolished thanks to the power of a government that dominated master and slave alike. That is why, precisely because you are completely independent, slavery will last longer among you than anywhere else.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn173|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;173&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg280&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;280&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Rather than the locus of liberty, here self-government is the condition for the perpetuation of the evil of slavery. Only a strong government would be able to abolish it. More concerned about the stability of the United States than the freedom of blacks, de Tocqueville, unlike Smith, did not go so far as to come out in favour of a ‘despotic government’. But in the case of Ireland, the same French liberal harboured the idea of a temporary dictatorship that would put an end to the terrible ills visited on the native population by the self-government of Anglo-Irish, Protestant property-owners.&lt;br /&gt;
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Although convinced that ‘public education is salutary, above all in free countries’, Constant was firmly opposed to the introduction of compulsory schooling, since he considered unacceptable any form of ‘restriction’ that violated the ‘rights of individuals’, including ‘those of fathers over their children’. True, poverty meant that in poor families children were taken out of school and put to work early. Yet it was necessary to renounce any restrictions and wait for poverty to fade away.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn174|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;174&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the basis of this logic, in addition to rejecting compulsory schooling, Constant did not even entertain the hypothesis of state intervention against the scourge of child labour. Some decades later, by contrast, declaring himself in favour of compulsory schooling, Mill argued against the ‘misplaced notions of liberty’ of parents and added: ‘The State … is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his [the individual’s] exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn175|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;175&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this different judgement, we see the transition from one theoretical paradigm to another; and the transition was also the result of the struggle of those who were excluded from liberty construed simply as self-government by civil society.&lt;br /&gt;
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Reacting to the protests and challenge of the working-class movement, it was liberal England that regulated working hours and conditions in factories, abolishing or tempering the most odious aspects of what Marx and Engels branded as employers’ ‘despotism’. This aroused the protests of not a few liberal representatives and English capitalists themselves, who (observed &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039;) ‘denounced the factory inspector as a species of revolutionary commissioner reminiscent of the [Jacobin] Convention’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn176|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;176&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Similarly, Bismarck made a profession of liberalism and thundered against the ‘Royal Prussian Court Jacobin’, who claimed to interfere in the relationship between masters and servants and hence to ride roughshod over the principle of self-government by civil society, hegemonized in this instance by feudal property and not an aristocratic—bourgeois &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg281&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;281&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;coalition, as in the British case. And it was precisely the Prussian–German statesman who distinguished between two types of liberalism in this connection. The first was characterized by ‘repugnance at the power of bureaucracy’, on the basis of ‘liberal caste sentiments’ widely diffused among the Junkers and nobility of pre-revolutionary Prussia; the second, utterly odious in Bismarck’s view, was ‘Rhineland–French liberalism’, or the ‘liberalism of civil servants’ (&#039;&#039;Geheimratsliberalismus&#039;&#039;), inclined to incisive anti-feudal reforms from above, which inspired an oppressive, suffocating state bureaucracy with its ‘tendency … to levelling and centralization’ and even ‘bureaucratic omnipotence’ (&#039;&#039;geheimrätliche Allgewalt&#039;&#039;).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn177|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;177&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It is interesting to note that a similar distinction occurs in the young Marx. The &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; edited by him defined itself as a ‘liberal paper’, but was careful to specify that its liberalism was not in any way to be confused with ‘vulgar liberalism’ (&#039;&#039;gewöhnlicher Liberalismus&#039;&#039;). While the latter saw ‘all good on the part of representative bodies and all evil on the part of government’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039;, by contrast, was characterized by its attempt to analyse relations of domination and oppression in their concrete form, without hesitating in particular circumstances to underline ‘the general wisdom of the government against the private egotism of representative bodies’ (often monopolized by feudal strata and a narrow-minded, short-sighted big bourgeoisie). Contrary to ‘vulgar liberalism’, far from fighting ‘bureaucracy one-sidedly’, the &#039;&#039;Rheinische Zeitung&#039;&#039; had no difficulty acknowledging the merits of its struggle against the ‘romantic’ or ‘romantic–feudal’ current.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn178|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;178&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Despite the contrasting value judgements, in both Bismarck and Marx we witness a distinction between a liberalism inclined to consecrate the self-government of a civil society hegemonized by the feudal aristocracy or grand bourgeoisie, and a liberalism ready to intervene in the relations of domination and oppression that manifest themselves within civil society itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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When they are located in this historical and theoretical context, we can understand two significant turns that occurred in the course of the liberal tradition. We know that, initially, the liberal/servile dichotomy had a strong social and ethnic connotation. This connotation tended to weaken as the struggle for recognition intensified and the concessions that the community of the free was forced to make became more significant. We can then understand the attempt &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg282&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;282&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;by some sections of the liberal movement to differentiate between political liberalism and economic liberalism, and thus distance themselves from those (economic-liberal) sections which, crying scandal at any state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, refused to question the relations of domination and oppression present within civil society, within the ‘private sphere’.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, with every significant concession that the community of the free (or its most advanced sectors) found itself obliged to make to the excluded, engaged in the struggle for recognition, there were denunciations of ‘betrayal’ from the most intransigent sectors, with a consequent laceration and division of the liberal movement. Clearly distancing himself from those who refused to follow him in the crusade against the French Revolution, in 1791 Burke, in the name of loyalty to the ‘Old Whigs’, authors of the Glorious Revolution, broke with the ‘new Whigs’, guilty of having derived ideas and ideals ‘from a French die, unknown to the impress of our fathers in the constitution’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn179|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;179&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this case, at the heart of the conflict was the idea of representation, which the French revolutionaries and their followers on British soil, in the name of the imaginary, ‘pretended rights of man’, interpreted in a merely quantitative sense, invoking the principle of calculating a majority by head, ignoring the special function of the aristocracy and trampling the healthy arrangement of society into estates underfoot.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn180|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;180&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A century or so later, the struggle for recognition was continuing to develop in new, more advanced conditions. Over and above political citizenship, the ‘multitude’, previously branded ‘swinish’, demanded the right to health, education and a minimum of free time. It succeeded in wresting more or less sizeable concessions and enjoyed support from significant representatives of liberalism. In Britain this was true above all of T. H. Green, who theorized ‘freedom in the positive sense’ in controversy with the economic liberals of his time. They condemned state regulation of working hours in factories or of female and child labour, in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ and liberty understood exclusively as non-interference by political power in the private sphere of production and labour relations.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn181|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;181&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again, responding to the attempts at adaptation and reconciliation by some sectors of liberalism were cries of scandal from the movement’s most intransigent sections. Spencer, Acton and Henry S. Maine were among the many to denounce the ‘betrayal’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn182|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;182&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg283&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;283&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Spencer particularly stood out. Those who, under the pretence of improving popular living conditions, banned the employment of children under the age of twelve, forced parents to send their children to school, subjected factory work (especially female labour) to a whole variety of regulations, and introduced compulsory insurance for illness and old age had ceased to be liberals: they had arrived at a ‘New Toryism’. In effect, they were simply inflating the state, enlarging the zone of coercion and limiting that of freedom of contract and the autonomous development of the individual.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn183|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;183&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As in the case of Burke with the ‘new Whigs’, so Spencer branded the ‘New Toryism’: albeit in a different idiom, what was targeted was a spurious liberalism forgetful of its own noble past; a liberalism guilty of abandoning the cause of self-government by civil society (whether aristocratic or bourgeois) and of the spontaneity of the market, giving way to the blandishments of statism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Celebration of the spontaneity of the market, as if its historically determinate form was not the result of political action, was philosophically ingenuous enough. For centuries the market of the liberal West had involved the presence of chattel slavery and the buying and selling of indentured white servants. Even the borderline that separated commodities on the one hand, and the figure of the buyer/seller on the other, was the result of political and even military intervention, abhorred for centuries as being synonymous with artificial, violent constructivism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us ignore the peculiar ‘commodities’ long represented by slaves and indentured servants. When can the market be regarded as free of external disturbance, and hence such that the parties to any exchange find themselves in a position of liberty and equality? Locke regarded the truck-system, whereby workers were paid not in money but in commodities produced by the factory they worked in, as perfectly legitimate. In agreement with him was Frederick William III, who in 1832 silenced voices raised in protest against this system with the argument that the state did not have the right to intervene in a ‘relationship of private right’, trampling over ‘civil liberty’ or arbitrarily restricting it. For Smith, by contrast, ‘the law which obliges the masters … to pay their workmen in money and not in goods is quite just and equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn184|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;184&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unlike the liberal philosopher and the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg284&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;284&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Prussian monarch, the great economist was of the opinion that the truck-system violated the principle of equality between the contracting parties and therefore justified legal intervention that would have seemed intolerable to Locke.&lt;br /&gt;
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Much later liberal authors like Lecky and others condemned state regulation of working hours as an inadmissible interference in the market sphere.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn185|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;185&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In our times, by contrast, Hayek believed that the promulgation by the state of ‘general, equal, and known rules’, of ‘general conditions’ which must be fulfilled by any contract, was not in itself a violation of the principle of liberty. But the Austro-American author, who distinguished himself by thundering against any form of statism and constructivism, would have seemed statist and constructivist to Lecky, whom Hayek regarded as a classic proponent of liberalism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn186|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;186&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Potentially a traitor in the eyes of economic liberals of the second half of the nineteenth century, Hayek elsewhere identified and denounced the betrayal of liberalism. Although in favour of the social state and hence aligning himself with Green, Hobhouse continued to profess himself a follower of that intellectual current. &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, read the title of his book, which in fact, according to Hayek, would more accurately have been entitled Socialism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn187|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;187&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years earlier, von Mises had reached the same conclusion: most British ‘liberals’ were ‘so in name only. In fact, they are rather moderate socialists.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn188|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;188&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The charges of treason against the wing of liberalism disposed to make concessions to colonial peoples were even more violent. In France, immediately after Thermidor, anyone who resisted the turn intended to re-establish if not slavery, then the regime of white supremacy in the colonies, was branded ‘African’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn189|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;189&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the United States of the 1820s, arguing against abolitionist tendencies, Randolph declared that the term ‘liberal’ now risked becoming synonymous with ‘black alliance’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn190|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;190&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The polemic against the ‘black republicans’ subsequently became the guiding thread of the struggle against the abolitionist tendencies that were coagulating in Lincoln’s Republican Party, as emerges in particular from the debate which, a few years before the Civil War, pitted the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#page285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_011.html#pg285&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;285&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;future president against Senator Stephen A. Douglas.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn191|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;191&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In subsequent years, Lecky was among those crying treason. The brief period of interracial and multi-ethnic democracy experienced by the South—Reconstruction—was, in his view, the triumph of the ‘negro vote’ and the disappearance of ‘the influence of property and intelligence’; it was the advent, ‘under the protection of the Northern bayonets’, of ‘a hideous orgie of anarchy, violence, unrestrained corruption, undisguised, ostentatious, insulting robbery, such as the world had scarcely ever seen’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn192|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;192&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;13. The community of the free as a community of peace? Policing operations and colonial wars&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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We have hitherto concentrated on the challenges to the community of the free that might be mounted by the barbarians in the colonies or the metropolis, and on the acute crisis situations that could arise within an individual country. But what were the relations between the various countries into which the community of the free was divided? Precisely because it was inclined to repress the genesis of the conflict and situate it outside itself, it tended to present itself as the community of peace, deaf to the sirens of war and bellicose adventures, which were a pre-modern legacy, and as wholly absorbed in the production, exchange and peaceful enjoyment of the goods that constituted civilization. George Washington expressed the hope that the development of ‘free commerce’ and civilization, ‘in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age’, would put a stop to ‘the devastations and horrors of war’, uniting humanity ‘like one great family in fraternal ties’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn193|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;193&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, repeated Constant, in ‘the age of commerce’ even ‘a successful war always costs more than it brings in’: having become obsolete as a tool for acquiring wealth, war was destined to disappear; ‘the uniform tendency is towards peace’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn194|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;194&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This ideal of perpetual peace, produced by freedom of industry and trade, was sometimes so deeply felt that it prompted harsh criticism of the realpolitik of war and conquest pursued, for example, by England. Thus authors like Cobden and Spencer, bitter critics of their country’s foreign and military policy. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg286&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;286&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;In the mid-nineteenth century, the former exclaimed,&lt;br /&gt;
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We have been the most combative and aggressive community that has existed since the days of the Roman dominion. Since the Revolution of 1688 we have expended more than fifteen hundred millions of money upon wars, not one of which has been upon our own shores, or in defence of our hearths and homes … this pugnacious propensity has been invariably recognized by those who have studied our national character.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn195|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;195&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Yet the self-proclamation of the community of the free as a community of peace could generate a different line of argument. However pitiless, the struggle against the ‘savage beasts’ represented (in Washington’s view) by Indians was not an act of war, but a policing operation. This applied to conflicts with those peoples or, rather, those hordes that had not yet attained the stage of civilization and peace. Against barbaric pirates it was necessary to organize an expedition that ‘would crush them into non-existence’; sooner or later, it would be necessary to ‘exterminate those nests of Miscreants’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn196|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;196&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville likewise tended to liken conflict with barbarians to a policing operation. In September 1856 he expressed the fear that the clash between North and South in the United States would end up provoking ‘war in the heart of a great continent whence it has been banished for more than a century’ (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]). Clearly, subsumed under the category of war were neither the expeditions that had decimated and were decimating the Indians, nor the armed conflict that had involved a significant amputation of Mexican territory.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the growing colonial expansion of Europe, and primarily of Britain, which now also encompassed a country of ancient civilization like China, made resort to the category of policing operation problematic. On the other side, recognizing the reality of war might also play a positive role at the level of domestic policy, might serve to overshadow the worsening social conflict, and counter the vulgarly hedonistic ideology in whose wake radical and socialist agitation had developed. The ideal tension that presided over war was thus positively contrasted with the pettiness of material demands advanced by popular protest movements: ‘The masses want tranquillity and earnings’, and hence peace, but the merit of war precisely lay in throwing this philistine view of life &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#page287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_012.html#pg287&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;287&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;into crisis, observed Burckhardt, who in this connection quoted Heraclitus’ motto (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’).[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn197|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;197&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For de Tocqueville war and ‘great events’ could form a useful antidote to ‘our mediocre democratic and bourgeois soup’, which was the breeding ground of sensualism and socialist hedonism.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn198|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;198&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; forcefully asserted that ‘I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and elevates their character.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn199|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;199&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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When it involved an advance by the West, and hence by the cause of liberty, war revealed its true nobility and beauty. De Tocqueville expressed himself in lyrical terms on the first Opium War (see below, [[#part0013_split_000.html#c09|Chapter 9]], [[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|§6]]), in a letter whose addressee was the English liberal Reeve. He in turn, on the occasion of the Crimean War (which saw England allied with Bonapartist France), expressed himself no less magniloquently in the course of correspondence with the French liberal:&lt;br /&gt;
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We live at a time when it is necessary to know how to suffer and witness suffering. The sword of war cuts to the heart. But what a mighty influence this struggle has on the political and social body! What a unity of sentiment and endeavour it creates! What a reawakening of the forces which, after all, make up the greatness of a people. I willingly accept all the anguish and all the ills of war for what it brings morally even more than politically.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn200|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;200&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;14. The proud self-consciousness of the community of the free and the emergence of ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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War against barbarians in the colonies, or against countries situated on the margins of civilization, had hitherto been a subject for appreciation or celebration. At first sight, no cloud seemed to trouble the unity of the community of the free. However, after having desired the extension to the entire planet of the enlightened ‘despotism’ of civilized countries, Mill continued as follows: the gigantic ‘federation’, albeit ‘unequal’, that was the British Empire&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg288&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;288&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognise as desirable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Backward populations had an interest in becoming part of the British Empire, in order to avoid ‘being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn201|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;201&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the years of the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville had responded prematurely and indirectly to Mill’s claim to raise the British Empire to the status of unique, privileged representative of a universal cause. The English were characterized by&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
their constant commitment to seek to demonstrate that they are acting in the interests of a principle, or for the good of the natives, or even for the benefit of the sovereigns whom they subjugate; honest is their indignation at those who put up resistance; these are the procedures with which they always cover up violence.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn202|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;202&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
With the disappearance of the semblance of complete unity, rivalry emerged between the different countries that made up the community of the free—rivalry that became all the more intense as the liquidation of despotism and, more generally, the construction of a new political regime deemed more advanced reinforced the self-consciousness of the individual protagonists. This was soil wherein was rooted the celebration, dear to Burke, of the ‘nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates’. The most lucid exponents of liberalism were perfectly well aware of this. While it also made itself felt in the works of authors such as Constant and, above all, Spencer, in this intellectual tradition the illusion that the collapse of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039; betokened the advent of perpetual peace did not play the role it had in the French Revolution and radicalism. A source of possible conflicts between the various countries, observed Hamilton, was not only the diversity of political orders and interests:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg289&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;289&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? … Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn203|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;203&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The advent of the representative regime and the transfer of power from absolute monarchy to the nation were not in themselves an antidote to war. Holland and England, the first two nations to have equipped themselves with liberal orders, had turned out to be ‘frequently engaged in war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn204|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;204&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Hamilton felt great admiration for Britain: ‘I believe the British government forms the best model the world ever produced.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn205|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;205&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Yet on the level of international policy, Britain remained an enemy to be defeated. The American statesman rebuked Europe, which wanted ‘to plume herself as the Mistress of the World’ and tended ‘to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit’. This was a pretence that must be countered with force: ‘It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.’ Sooner or later, the new Union would be the one ‘able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn206|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;206&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even if the enemy was generically identified as Europe and the Old World, the particular reference was to Britain which at this time (1787), following France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, was the only great imperial power. Jefferson was more explicit. The ‘empire for liberty’ desired by him presupposed Britain’s defeat: not only was it called upon to be the most grand and glorious ‘since the creation’, and hence to outclass the British Empire, but it also presupposed the annexation of Canada (in addition to Cuba), ‘which would be of course in the first war’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn207|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;207&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For de Tocqueville, too, shared membership of the community of the free by certain countries did not guarantee permanent relations of friendship and peace between them. In defining its foreign policy, France must not exclusively assert its ‘interest in developing the principles of liberty in the world’. Only the naive could believe that their spread meant the simultaneous disappearance of the threat of war:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg290&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;290&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Will anyone go so far as to claim that two peoples must necessarily live in peace with one another just because they have similar political institutions? That all the causes of ambition, rivalry, jealousy, all the bad memories have been abolished? Free institutions render these feelings even more vital.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn208|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;208&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In its turn, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039; stressed that ‘[a]ll free nations are vainglorious’; the ‘restless and insatiable vanity of a democratic people’ was self-evident. This was confirmed, in particular, by the transatlantic republic: ‘The Americans, in their intercourse with strangers, appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise … Their vanity is not only greedy, but restless and jealous’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn209|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;209&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We are dealing with an excessive ‘national pride’, an ‘irritable patriotism’ (&#039;&#039;patriotisme irritable&#039;&#039;), which did not tolerate criticism of any kind.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn210|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;210&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a demand for primacy that sought utter exclusivity. If a foreigner admired the ‘freedom’ enjoyed by Americans, they would react by accepting the compliment, but immediately rendering it more emphatic and more exclusive: ‘few nations are worthy of it’. If a foreigner admired their ‘purity of morals’, the American interlocutor would react by denouncing ‘the corruption that prevails in other nations’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn211|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;211&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When he turned to the international rivalry between the countries making up the community of the free and the West, de Tocqueville did not hesitate to speak harshly of the United States. Writing to an American interlocutor, and referring to attempts to expand southwards also made by ‘private’ adventurers (he was thinking of William Walker), the French liberal wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not without concern, I have seen this spirit of conquest, even of rapine, exhibited among you for some years. It is not a sign of good health in a people that already has more territory than it can fill. I confess that I could not but be sad if I came to learn that the [American] nation had embarked on an operation against Cuba or—even worse—entrusted it to its lost sons.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn212|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;212&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The American interlocutor might easily have retorted by recalling de Tocqueville’s enthusiastic support for France’s policy of ‘conquest’ and ‘rapine’ in Algeria. But the key point is different. Far from damping it down, the common waving of the flag of liberty further fuelled international rivalry. After &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#page291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_013.html#pg291&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;291&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the February Revolution, de Tocqueville declared that ‘starting from 1789’ France once again donned the ‘role’ of ‘saviour’ ‘of peoples whose liberty is in danger’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn213|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;213&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] An ‘empire for liberty’ was thus evoked whose capital was Paris, and which tended to come into conflict with the ‘empire for liberty’ cherished by Jefferson.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#calibre_pb_14&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;15. De Tocqueville’s ‘irritable patriotism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The realism with which the most lucid representatives of the liberal tradition analysed the persistence of national rivalries, despite their shared reference to the ideal of liberty, had another aspect to it: the candid, avowed chauvinism presiding over the international policy programme. This applies to de Tocqueville in particular. The principle of consent by the governed as a criterion for legitimizing political power gave impetus to national movements in Europe as well. Prima facie, it would seem that the liberal world as a whole should have felt unequivocal sympathy for them. In this case, we are dealing not with colonial peoples, but with peoples regarded as more or less civilized, who primarily came into conflict with the Habsburg Empire—that is, a power which had remained foreign to liberal development. Yet de Tocqueville proved cool, or frankly hostile. A partial explanation of this attitude can be found in the social demands that contaminated such movements and imperilled the traditional liberal delimitation of the political sphere. The Mazzinian republic established in Rome was ‘the red republic’ and against it, and ‘the anarchical party in Rome and the rest of the world’, no blows should be spared. Ideological fury impelled the French liberal to speak of his political opponents in Italy as ‘a whole category of political criminals’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn214|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;214&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville proved harsh and even cynical about one of the protagonists of the Hungarian national revolution: rather than agitating to save ‘Kossuth’s skin’, it might happily be made into a ‘drum’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn215|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;215&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above rejection of radicalism, what motivated this attitude was ‘irritable patriotism’, concerns of a chauvinistic kind, as emerges in particular from de Tocqueville’s furious polemic against ‘our imbecile agents’ in Germany, who were guilty of not countering the prospect of that country’s ‘political unification’ more firmly and effectively. Certainly, ‘the population’s passion for this idea seems sincere and profound’; but ‘nothing would be more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg292&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;292&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;frightful for us’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn216|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;216&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But did this not ride roughshod over the liberal principle of self-government and consent by the governed as a criterion of the legitimacy of any government? That was a problem de Tocqueville did not pose. He hoped for ‘the victory of the princes’ and the Prussian army to put paid to ‘excessive decentralization’ that encouraged the swarming of ‘revolutionary breeding grounds’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn217|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;217&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In relation to Italy, chauvinistic concerns should have played a more modest role. Yet in September 1848, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, de Tocqueville summarized his position as follows: ‘preservation of the old territories … and real, significant changes in institutions’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn218|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;218&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As we can see, there was no place for demands for national unity. And the principle of consent by the governed? Having invited the organization of ‘a &#039;&#039;Roman demonstration’&#039;&#039; in favour of restoring the Pope’s temporal power, de Tocqueville continued as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In my opinion, this is &#039;&#039;indispensable&#039;&#039;. And, in order to achieve this result, if we do not also have the reality, it is &#039;&#039;absolutely&#039;&#039; necessary to produce at least the semblance. This is the only way to connect the expedition with one of the main objectives we have always assigned it and on which the National Assembly has always wished to stand firm—coming to the aid of the real will and hidden desires of the people of Rome.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn219|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;219&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In this passage the roles of appearance and reality are reversed rapidly and inadvertently. The ‘semblance’ of a demonstration to be organized at all costs expressed the ‘hidden’ but nevertheless ‘real’ will of the Roman population, whose interpreter was the government of the occupying power. At this point it was also possible to resort to radical measures with a clear conscience:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I cannot really understand why, in the twenty-four hours following the city’s capture, we did not, with utmost rapidity and energy, close the clubs, tear down the flag of the Republic, disarm the citizens and soldiers, arrest all those who, in their attitude, indicated that they disapproved of our presence [&#039;&#039;tous ceux qui faisaient mine de trouver mauvais notre présence&#039;&#039;]—in a word, strike our enemies with terror in order to conquer the terror that had gripped our friends.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn220|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;220&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#page293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_014.html#pg293&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;293&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;So here we have an invitation to make arrests even on the basis of mere suspicion. Not by chance, reference is made to terror. It is a term that recurs frequently; it amounts to a veritable watchword: ‘strike the demagogic party with terror and lift the liberal party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn221|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;221&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But another watchword was immediately added: ‘negate the rigours of the past, although leaving terror to waft over the future’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn222|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;222&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, European public opinion, which already felt ‘deep repulsion’ at France’s conduct, must not be unduly ruffled. Yet it was a question of ‘advancing and advancing with the most extreme rigour’; all the more so because the country’s honour was at stake. It found itself faced with a ‘terrible alternative’—a Hobson’s choice:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Either to deliver Rome over to all the horrors of war or to retreat shamefully, beaten by the same men who for eighteen months fled all the battlefields of Italy. The first would be a great misfortune, but the second would be a fearful disaster and, as far as I am concerned, I have no hesitation.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn223|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;223&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Once again, chauvinism took priority over any other concern.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#calibre_pb_15&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;16. The conflict of ideas of mission from the American Revolution to the First World War&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So we can understand the recurrent divisions that opened up in the community of the free. The one that occurred in the two decades preceding the foundation of the United States is illuminating. The Seven Years’ War was also experienced and fought by the English colonists in America, and in fact primarily by them, not only as a war for the defence of English liberty, but also (as the sermons of Protestant ministers never tired of repeating) as a holy war in which it was God himself who guided and saved England–Israel from the threat represented by France. The victory achieved over the enemies of Israel was proof of the ‘favourable providential presence of God with his people’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;224&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A few years later, it was England’s turn to form the core of the alliance of the ‘enemies of God’, while the rebel American colonists continued to be ‘true Christians, good &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg294&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;294&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;soldiers of Jesus Christ’, called upon to cultivate ‘a martial spirit’ and ‘the art of war’, so as to accomplish ‘the work of the Lord’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;225&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was the first major conflict to convulse the community of the free, and it spans the period that extends from the American Revolution to the war of 1812–15. As the latter was coming to an end, Jefferson expressed the opinion that Great Britain was no less despotic than Napoleon. Moreover, while the latter would take ‘his tyrannies’ to the grave with him, a whole ‘nation’ was seeking to impose its absolute domination over the seas; and it was an ‘insult to the human understanding’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;226&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Such was his ideological fury that the American statesman ended up declaring: ‘Our enemy has indeed the consolation of Satan on removing our first parents from Paradise: from a peaceable and agricultural nation, he makes us a military and manufacturing one.’[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;227&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Having heard the news of the end of hostilities, Jefferson wrote that it was ‘an armistice only’. So radical was the antagonism not only of interests, but also of principles, that the two countries were in fact engaged in an ‘eternal war’, which would terminate or was destined to end with the ‘extermination of the one or the other party’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;228&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The second major conflict was the one that exploded with the American Civil War. The dialectic we have already encountered was on display once again. The fact that for decades the antagonists had regarded themselves as members of the chosen people of liberty, far from reducing the bitterness of the clash, accentuated it. Both sides were convinced that they were fighting a holy war; they appealed to Holy Scripture and half of their propaganda texts were written by ecclesiastics.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;229&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The first major conflict survived the second, which was eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century by the rising tide of chauvinism that invested the United States as a whole, without significant distinctions between North and South. In 1889 Kipling noted with disappointment that the 4 July celebrations in San Francisco were the occasion for official speeches against what the Americans defined as ‘our natural enemy’, represented by Great Britain ‘with her chain of fortresses across the world’.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;230&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, this antagonism too was &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#page295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0012_split_015.html#pg295&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;295&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;being damped down, because a completely new international situation was maturing. More than ever engaged in colonial expansion, and increasingly taken in by the idea of the freedom mission they assigned themselves in competition with one another, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the various national centres of the community of the free turned out to be on a collision course. This is the context in which we can situate the third major conflict in the history of liberalism. Starting with the First World War, in particular it saw ranged against one another Britain (and the United States) and Germany—the most recent and ambitious recruit to the community of the free, which at the end of the nineteenth century had likewise begun to cherish the idea of an empire for liberty, putting itself at the head of a crusade for the abolition of slavery in the colonies.[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;231&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The interpretation of the third major conflict suggested here might occasion astonishment. What obstructs an understanding of this event is the negative teleology that tends to interpret German history in its entirety as a series of stages leading inexorably to the horror of the Third Reich. In reality, on the eve of the First World War Germany was not obviously less ‘democratic’ than the United States, where racial oppression raged, or than Great Britain, which completely disregarded universal male suffrage (on which elections to the Reichstag were based), and exercised imperial domination on a global scale and even in Europe itself, at the expense of Ireland. Above all, it must not be forgotten that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, even in England and America, Germany was regarded as a full member of the exclusive club of free peoples.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So the by now familiar dialectic emerges once again. Confronting one another in a total war, which required the mobilization of culture as well as armies, were antagonists who had previously congratulated one another on being members, or even especially influential members, of the community of the free—in this case, of the great Teutonic or Aryan family, united by a jealous custodianship of individual autonomy and love of self-government and liberty.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn1a|1]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Recueil d’articles&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Éphraim Harpaz, Geneva: Droz, 1972, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn2a|2]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, pp. 29–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn3a|3]] Ibid., p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn4a|4]] David Hume, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983–85, vol. 6, p. 84; vol. 5, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn5a|5]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations&#039;&#039;, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, 1981, p. 794.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn6a|6]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;The Works: A New Edition&#039;&#039;, 16 vols, London: Rivington, 1826, vol. 3, p. 153.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn7a|7]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 155–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn8a|8]] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 54.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn9a|9]] Edmund Burke, &#039;&#039;Correspondence&#039;&#039;, 10 vols, ed. Thomas W. Copeland and John A. Woods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 7, pp. 52–3 (letter to William Weddell, 31 January 1792).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn10a|10]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, pp. 397 (letter to La Fayette, 28 May 1788), 455 (fragments of the discarded first inaugural address, April 1789)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn11a|11]] Adams, quoted in Charles Edward Merriam, &#039;&#039;A History of American Political Theories&#039;&#039;, New York: Kelley, 1969, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn12a|12]] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Zapperi, Paris: Éditions des archives contemporaines, 1985, p. 133.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn13a|13]] Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., pp. 194–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn15a|15]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel de France et de la nécessité de s’y rallier&#039;&#039;, ed. Philippe Raynaud, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 46.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn16a|16]] Constant, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 60, 183, 271.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn17a|17]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 7, pp. 144–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn18a|18]] James Mackintosh, &#039;&#039;Vindiciae gallicae&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Woodstock, 1989, pp. 136–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn19a|19]] Sieyès, &#039;&#039;Écrits politiques&#039;&#039;, p. 171.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn20a|20]] Jean-Joseph Mounier, &#039;&#039;De l’influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-maçons et aux illuminés sur la révolution de France&#039;&#039;, Tübingen: Cotta, 1801, pp. 31, 36–7, 50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_000.html#c08-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002, ch. 33, §2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn22a|22]] Benjamin Franklin, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay, New York: Library of America, 1987, p. 374.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn23a|23]] Arthur O. Lovejoy, &#039;&#039;The Great Chain of Being&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1957.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn24a|24]] Francis Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1859, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn25a|25]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn26a|26]] Ibid., p. 129.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn27a|27]] Jeremy Bentham, &#039;&#039;The Works&#039;&#039;, 11 vols, ed. John Bowring, Edinburgh: Tait, 1838–43, vol. 1, p. 577.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn28a|28]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, 33 vols, ed. John M. Robson, Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press and Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963–91, vol. 12, p. 365 (letter to J. P. Nichol, 21 December 1837). On this see Eileen P. Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, &#039;&#039;Journal of the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, 1983, p. 606.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn29a|29]] Pasquale Villari, &#039;&#039;Dai cargeggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984, p. 151 (letter from Mill to Villari, 11 June 1862).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn30a|30]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 213–15.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn31a|31]] Ibid., p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn32a|32]] Cobden, quoted in Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 25–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_001.html#c08-ftn33a|33]] Nassau William Senior, &#039;&#039;Journals Kept in Italy and France from 1848 to 1852&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. M. C. M. Simpson, London: Henry S. King and Co., 1871, vol. 2, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn34a|34]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. James Morton Smith, New York: Norton, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 1585–6 (letter to James Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn35a|35]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 382.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn36a|36]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 330.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn37a|37]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 245–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn38a|38]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 151.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn39a|39]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 21, p. 528 (letter to Edwin Chadwick, 13 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn40a|40]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 29, p. 26 (letter from Engels to Marx, 23 May 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn41a|41]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 496 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 17 August 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn42a|42]] Ibid., vol. 18, p. 424 (letter to A. de Circourt, 25 October 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn43a|43]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;The History of England&#039;&#039;, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper, London: Penguin, 1986, pp. 301–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_002.html#c08-ftn44a|44]] Thomas Babington Macaulay, &#039;&#039;Critical and Historical Essays&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1850, vol. 4, pp. 273–4, 266, 300–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn45a|45]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 204.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn46a|46]] Ibid., p. 177.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn47a|47]] Ibid., p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn48a|48]] Alexander Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Joanne B. Freeman, New York: Library of America, 2001, pp. 253, 373.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn49a|49]] John Locke, &#039;&#039;Two Treatises of Government&#039;&#039;, ed. William S. Carpenter, London and New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924, p. 223, 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn51a|51]] Ibid., pp. 224, 242.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn52a|52]] Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn53a|53]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 215–16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn54a|54]] Boissy d’Anglas, quoted in Georges Lefebvre, &#039;&#039;La France sous le Directoire&#039;&#039;, Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1984, p. 35.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn55a|55]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 2, p. 70 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 21 February 1835).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 132.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn57a|57]] Ibid. vol. 4, pt 1, p. 321.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn58a|58]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 281.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn59a|59]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 199.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn60a|60]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Principles of Ethics&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Tibor R. Machan, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_003.html#c08-ftn61a|61]] William Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 2, 21, 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn62a|62]] Frank Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, Gloucester (MA): Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 309–19 (for the quotation from Lincoln, see p. 312).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn63a|63]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 187.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn64a|64]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, pt 2, p. 131.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn65a|65]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn66a|66]] Giuseppe Mazzini, &#039;&#039;Note autobiografiche&#039;&#039;, ed. Roberto Pertici, Milan: Rizzoli, 1986, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn67a|67]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 16, p. 234 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn68a|68]] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, &#039;&#039;Selected Works&#039;&#039;, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969, vol. 1, p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn69a|69]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 136.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 16, p. 449.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn71a|71]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 863.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_004.html#c08-ftn72a|72]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 11, p. 392 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn73a|73]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty and Self-Government&#039;&#039;, pp. 21, 294–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn74a|74]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn75a|75]] Ibid., vol. 6, p. 64; William Lecky, &#039;&#039;A History of England in the Eighteenth Century&#039;&#039;, 8 vols, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883–88, vol. 5, p. 501.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn76a|76]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 19 August and 14 October 1856); Édouard Laboulaye, &#039;&#039;Histoire des États-Unis&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, Paris: Charpentier, 1866, vol. 1, p. xviii; and on Guizot, cf. Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn77a|77]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, London: Everyman’s Library, 1994, vol. 1, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn78a|78]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 331–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn79a|79]] Tocqueville, quoted in André Jardin, &#039;&#039;Alexis de Tocqueville&#039;&#039;, Paris: Hachette, 1984, p. 437 (letter of 14 December 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn80a|80]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 227.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 188.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn83a|83]] Ibid., pp. 188–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_005.html#c08-ftn84a|84]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn85a|85]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 101 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 10 April 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn86a|86]] François-Alphonse Aulard, &#039;&#039;Histoire politique de la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Aalen: Scientia, 1977, p. 19 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn87a|87]] Josiah Tucker, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1993–96, vol. 4, pp. 65, 100, 140; vol. 5, p. 72.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn88a|88]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 268–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn89a|89]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 264.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn90a|90]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 57–8 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 5 October 1828).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn91a|91]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 1, pp. 64, 67–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn92a|92]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, pp. 124–5, 109.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn93a|93]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn94a|94]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 15, pt 1, p. 342 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn95a|95]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 20, pp. 319–63; and vol. 2, pp. 250–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn96a|96]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn97a|97]] Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Britannica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 2, p. 87.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_006.html#c08-ftn98a|98]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, p. 55 n. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn99a|99]] Lieber, quoted in Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn100a|100]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 322–3 (letter to Kentaro Keneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn101a|101]] Freidel, &#039;&#039;Francis Lieber&#039;&#039;, pp. 393–6, 409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn102a|102]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 78, 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn103a|103]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 3, p. 229 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 6 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn104a|104]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn105a|105]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 159 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 14 August 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn106a|106]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 177, 182 (letters to T. Sedgwick, 29 August and 14 October 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn107a|107]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 272–4 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 29 November 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn108a|108]] Ernst Nolte, &#039;&#039;Three Faces of Fascism&#039;&#039;, trans. Leila Vennewitz, New York: Mentor, 1969, p. 635 n. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn109a|109]] Lieber, &#039;&#039;Civil Liberty&#039;&#039;, pp. 55 n. 1 and 22 n. 2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_007.html#c08-ftn110a|110]] Arthur de Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Paris: Librairie de Paris, vol. 1, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn111a|111]] Charles-Louis Montesquieu, &#039;&#039;The Spirit of the Laws&#039;&#039;, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 166.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn112a|112]] Ibid., p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn113a|113]] Ibid., pp. 235, 234.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn114a|114]] Algernon Sidney, &#039;&#039;Discourses Concerning Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Thomas G. West, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990, pp. 103, 167; Hume, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn115a|115]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 213.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn116a|116]] David Cannadine, ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual’, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, &#039;&#039;The Invention of Tradition&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 101.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn117a|117]] Chamberlain, quoted in Henry Kissinger, &#039;&#039;Diplomacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Simon &amp;amp;amp; Schuster, 1994, p. 186.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_008.html#c08-ftn118a|118]] Alfred Thayer Mahan, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Asia&#039;&#039;, New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 125–6; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, pp. 55–7, 48–50.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn119a|119]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, pp. 41ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn120a|120]] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 536–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn121a|121]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 18, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn122a|122]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, p. 322 (letter to Kentaro Kaneko, 26 August 1892).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn123a|123]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1976, vol. 1, p. 359.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn124a|124]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, p. 331.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn125a|125]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Tancred&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1847, vol. 1, p. 169.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn126a|126]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn127a|127]] Ibid., pp. 508–9, 553.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn128a|128]] Ibid., p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn129a|129]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn130a|130]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Endymion&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 361.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn131a|131]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, pp. 221, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn132a|132]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 496.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn133a|133]] Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 29.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn134a|134]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, pp. 260–1 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 20 March 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn135a|135]] See Gobineau, &#039;&#039;Essai sur l’inégalité&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 520–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn136a|136]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The History of Anti-Semitism&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, Natalie Gerardie and Mirian Kochan, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974–75, vol. 3, p. 336.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn137a|137]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 280 (letter from Arthur de Gobineau, 24 January 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn138a|138]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;History of England&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn139a|139]] Spencer, quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, New York: Schocken Books, 1965, pp. 151–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn140a|140]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;Life and Letters&#039;&#039;, pp. 154–5 (letter to E. Cazelles, 3 May 1871).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn141a|141]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 9, p. 305 (letter of 21 March 1859).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_009.html#c08-ftn142a|142]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 20, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn143a|143]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pt 2, pp. 348–9; vol. 13, pt 2, pp. 337–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn144a|144]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Ancien Régime&#039;&#039;, p. 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn145a|145]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14, 84, 194; Constant, &#039;&#039;De la force du gouvernement actuel&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn146a|146]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 13–14.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn147a|147]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 135.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn148a|148]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 207.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn149a|149]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn150a|150]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 211, 113.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn151a|151]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 75, 50–51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn152a|152]] Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 169–70.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn153a|153]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn154a|154]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn155a|155]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 210.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn156a|156]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn157a|157]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 102.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn158a|158]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 104.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn159a|159]] Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 18–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn160a|160]] Ibid., vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn161a|161]] Burke, quoted in Johannes Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These von der Verschwörung&#039;&#039;, Bern and Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1976, p. 111 n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn162a|162]] See Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 5, p. 282.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn163a|163]] Cf. Rogolla von Bieberstein, &#039;&#039;Die These&#039;&#039;, p. 117.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn164a|164]] Disraeli, quoted in George E. Buckle and William F. Monypenny, &#039;&#039;The Life of Benjamin Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield&#039;&#039;, 6 vols, New York: Macmillan, 1914–20, vol. 3, p. 173.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn165a|165]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 496–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn166a|166]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, p. 218.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn167a|167]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, pp. 497–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn168a|168]] Ibid., p. 498.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn169a|169]] Malouet, quoted in Yves Benot, &#039;&#039;La démence coloniale sous Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: La Découverte, 1992, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn170a|170]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982, p. 38 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_010.html#c08-ftn171a|171]] Ibid., p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn172a|172]] Adam Smith, &#039;&#039;Lectures on Jurisprudence&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982, p. 455.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn173a|173]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 83 (letter to J. Sparks, 13 October 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn174a|174]] Benjamin Constant, &#039;&#039;Mélanges de littérature et de politique&#039;&#039;, Louvain: Michel, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn175a|175]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, pp. 159–60, 163.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn176a|176]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 396.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn177a|177]] Otto von Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Die großen Reden&#039;&#039;, ed. Lothar Gall, Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1984, p. 137; Bismarck, &#039;&#039;Werke in Auswahl&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, ed. Gustave Adolf Rein, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, p. 354 (speeches in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 18 October 1849 and 14 February 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn178a|178]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 424.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn179a|179]] Burke, &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, p. 267.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn180a|180]] See ibid., vol. 6, pp. 89, 248, 257, 220, 228.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn181a|181]] Thomas Hill Green, ‘Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in &#039;&#039;Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Richard L. Nettleship, vol. 3, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1973, p. 372.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn182a|182]] George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classsics, 1981; Henry S. Maine, &#039;&#039;Popular Government&#039;&#039;, ed. George W. Carey, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1976.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn183a|183]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. 5–30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn184a|184]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Hegel and the Freedom of the Moderns&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Durham (NC) and London: Duke University Press, 2004, ch. 3, §6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn185a|185]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 321–2.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn186a|186]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 230, 401.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn187a|187]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Conceit&#039;&#039;, ed. William Warren Bartley III, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 110.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn188a|188]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. xviii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn189a|189]] Florence Gauthier, &#039;&#039;Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution&#039;&#039;, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992, pp. 262–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn190a|190]] Randolph, quoted in Russell Kirk, &#039;&#039;John Randolph of Roanoke&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn191a|191]] Cf. Abraham Lincoln, &#039;&#039;Speeches and Writings&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher, New York: Library of America, 1989, vol. 1, pp. 498–504 and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_011.html#c08-ftn192a|192]] Lecky, &#039;&#039;Democracy and Liberty&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 80.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn193a|193]] George Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988, p. 326 (letter to La Fayette, 15 August 1786).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn194a|194]] Constant, &#039;&#039;Political Writings&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn195a|195]] Cobden, quoted in Daniel Pick, &#039;&#039;War Machine&#039;&#039;, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn196a|196]] Washington, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, p. 401 (letter to La Fayette, 19 June 1788).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn197a|197]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, pp. 150, 118–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn198a|198]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, pt 1, p. 421 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 9 August 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn199a|199]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, p. 268.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_012.html#c08-ftn200a|200]] Reeve, quoted in de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 150.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn201a|201]] Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism&#039;&#039;, p. 380.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn202a|202]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 505.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn203a|203]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 179.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn204a|204]] Ibid., p. 180.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn205a|205]] Hamilton, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, ed., &#039;&#039;Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn206a|206]] Hamilton, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn207a|207]] Jefferson, &#039;&#039;The Republic of Letters&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, p. 1586 (letter to Madison, 27 April 1809).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn208a|208]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn209a|209]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Democracy in America&#039;&#039;, vol. 2, pp. 225–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn210a|210]] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 244.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn211a|211]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 225.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn212a|212]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, p. 147 (letter to T. Sedgwick, 4 December 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_013.html#c08-ftn213a|213]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 3, p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn214a|214]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, pp. 249, 277, 399 (letters to F. de Corcelle, 10 and 20 June and 12 September 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn215a|215]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 2, p. 92 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 30 January 1854).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn216a|216]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 29, 38 (letters to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August and 3 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn217a|217]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, pp. 133–4 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 18 May 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn218a|218]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 44 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 14 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn219a|219]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 276 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 20 June 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn220a|220]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn221a|221]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 323 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 18 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn222a|222]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 294 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 2 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_014.html#c08-ftn223a|223]] Ibid., vol. 15, pt 1, p. 293 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 1 July 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn224a|224]] Ellis Sandoz, ed., &#039;&#039;Political Sermons of the American Founding Era&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991, pp. 216–19.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn225a|225]] Ibid., pp. 623–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn226a|226]] Thomas Jefferson, &#039;&#039;Writings&#039;&#039;, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, New York: Library of America, 1984, pp. 1272–3 (letter to Madame de Staël, 24 May 1813).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn227a|227]] Ibid., p. 1357 (letter to William Short, 28 November 1814).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn228a|228]] Ibid., p. 1366 (letter to La Fayette, 14 February 1815).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn229a|229]] Eugene D. Genovese, ‘Religion in the Collapse of the American Union’, in Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds, &#039;&#039;Religion and the American Civil War&#039;&#039;, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 74–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn230a|230]] Kipling, quoted in Gosset, &#039;&#039;Race&#039;&#039;, p. 322.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn231a|231]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Nietzsche&#039;&#039;, ch. 17, §3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page296&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg297&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;297&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER NINE =&lt;br /&gt;
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= &#039;&#039;Sacred Space and Profane Space in the History of Liberalism&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. Historiography and hagiography&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Our history of liberalism ends with the outbreak of the First World War, when (according to Weber) even in countries with the most stable liberal tradition the state was assigned ‘ “legitimate” power over the life, death and liberty’ of individuals, and ‘unlimited disposition over all the economic goods accessible to it’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Indeed, as Furet puts it, ‘in virtually all of Europe, the canons of August 1914 literally and metaphorically buried liberty in the name of country’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is appropriate to take a look back from this watershed.&lt;br /&gt;
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Following the prelude of the revolt against Philip II’s absolutism by the Netherlands, liberalism asserted itself in two counties so positioned that they were sheltered from the threats to which continental European states were exposed. It should be added that, not by chance, the Glorious Revolution succeeded England’s victory first over Spain and then over France, while the American colonists’ revolt only began with the defeat of France in the Seven Years’ War. Thus, the two liberal revolutions both presupposed a clear improvement in the geopolitical situation.&lt;br /&gt;
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As regards continental Europe, we can distinguish two phases: after the defeat of Turkey at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and the fading of the Ottoman threat, criticism of absolutism became widespread. The second phase was the so-called hundred years’ peace, which extended from the end of the Napoleonic &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg298&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;298&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wars to the outbreak of the First World War. This was the period when liberalism also asserted itself at a concrete political level. And just as the institutions that emerged from the 1789 revolution did not survive the war which engulfed revolutionary France, from 1914 the liberal institutions that had flourished in continental Europe during the hundred years’ peace experienced a dramatic crisis. Taken as a whole, as well as enjoying a more or less high degree of peace and geopolitical security, the liberal countries had another characteristic in common: in the period under investigation here, they had marked possibilities of defusing politico-social conflict in the metropolis through colonial expansion, whether continentally or overseas.&lt;br /&gt;
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With the epochal rupture of 1914 there erupted in all its horror the second Thirty Years’ War, as the two global conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century, separated by a fragile armistice, have often been defined. What is the relationship between all this and the preceding historical period? Or are we to believe that there is no relationship and that the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; came to an unanticipated end, brought about exclusively by circumstances altogether foreign to the liberal West? This is the conclusion that seems to be suggested by an eminent English historian of the modern world, A. J. P. Taylor:&lt;br /&gt;
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Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country forever without a passport or any sort of official permission. He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction or limit … Unlike the countries of the European continent, the state did not require its citizens to perform military service … It left the adult citizen alone.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Citing this picture, already problematic enough in itself, a contemporary British liberal scholar elevates it into ‘the historical paradigm of a liberal civilization’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reality, a couple of pages later, Taylor himself observes that ‘[s]ome 50 million Africans and 250 million Indians were involved, without consultation, in a war of which they understood nothing’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But let us ignore the colonies, and even Ireland, which formed part of the United Kingdom and experienced such political and military oppression from the London government that it was (again in Taylor’s words) the protagonist of ‘the only national rebellion in any &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg299&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;299&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;European country during the First World War—an ironical comment on the British claim to be fighting for freedom’ and to represent the cause of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As for England specifically, I do not know if Cobden ‘noticed’ the state that inspected his mail, but it was certainly on its guard against a citizen who was unquestionably ‘sensible and law-abiding’, but whose fault was to be suspected of Chartist sympathies.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And the state even more readily ‘noticed’ the Chartism and the working-class movement in general, which faced repeated suspension of habeas corpus and recourse to the use of &#039;&#039;agents provocateurs&#039;&#039; who elicited horror not only in the liberal Constant, but also in a ‘statist’ like Hegel.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the England of the time, ‘a whole subclass of informers, police narks and thief-takers’ was at work.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even the contrast with the continent as regards military conscription is mistaken: this had already made its appearance some years earlier in the United States during the Civil War and, in order to impose it, Lincoln, putting down violent resistance, had no hesitation in having an army corps march on New York.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Military conscription was not a practice imposed on the liberal world from without, from the continent!&lt;br /&gt;
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Historiography tends to shade into hagiography. I use this term in a technical sense: it involves a discourse completely focused on what, for the community of the free, was the restricted sacred space. It is enough, however briefly, to introduce the profane space (slaves in the colonies and servants in the metropolis) into the analysis, to realize the inadequate, misleading character of the categories (absolute pre-eminence of individual liberty, anti-statism, individualism) generally used to trace the history of the liberal West. Was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain the land of religious freedom? Referring to Ireland, the liberal de Beaumont, who was de Tocqueville’s companion during his trip to America, spoke of ‘unimaginable religious oppression’. We are dealing with a people not only deprived of its ‘religious freedom’, but also forced, notwithstanding its poverty, to subsidize the wealthy Anglican Church that oppressed it with tithes. The vexations, humiliations and suffering inflicted by British ‘tyranny’ on this ‘slave people’ proved that ‘a degree of egotism and madness is present in human institutions whose limits cannot be defined’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg300&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;300&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But let us concentrate on the metropolis. Celebrating the individualism and anti-statism attributed to the liberal tradition, Hayek pays homage to Mandeville, for whom the ‘arbitrary exertions of government power would be minimized’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In truth, the author elevated into a model here was not only completely undisturbed by the spectacle of hundreds or thousands of wretches ‘daily hanged for trifles’, but invoked summary trials and an acceleration in death sentences—and demanded state intervention even in the private life of these poor people, on whom the observance of Sunday worship should be imposed from infancy (see above, [[#part0007_split_000.html#c03|Chapter 3]], [[#part0007_split_009.html#c03-ftn8|§8]]). It is clear that what held Hayek’s attention was neither the colonies nor metropolitan servants.&lt;br /&gt;
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Things do not fall out right even if such neglect is regarded as innocuous. The experience of the British colonies in America that subsequently became the United States is particularly revealing. Servile, semi-servile and free labourpower came from across the Atlantic in ways and in accordance with rules fixed by the political authorities, which also played a decisive role in delimiting the area opened up to colonization from time to time. The slavery or marginalization and degradation imposed on blacks ended up impinging on the ‘modern liberty’ of the whites themselves—and so seriously that the wrong choice of sexual or marriage partner risked transforming the culprit into a ‘felon’, a traitor to his own country and race! The white population as a whole, and slave-owners themselves, were subject to a whole series of laws that gravely interfered in even the most intimate aspect of private life. The political authorities exercised comprehensive surveillance so that miscegenation and, above all, the potential fruit of such noxious mixing did not lead to emancipation and did not threaten the purity of the community of the free with its false presence. It was a crime to give or even merely furnish writing materials to slaves. The postal administration prevented the circulation of materials vaguely critical of the institution of slavery. In the South a climate of terror reigned over citizens suspected of harbouring abolitionist ideas.&lt;br /&gt;
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It was not only the race issue and the dark cloud it suspended over the civil rights of the white community itself. We can take a key state in the history of the North American revolution and republic: ‘Pennsylvania was … renowned in the nineteenth century for its stringent laws against blasphemy, profanity, and desecrating the sabbath’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Independently of the prohibition of miscegenation, which remained in force beyond the mid-twentieth century, sexual &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#page301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_000.html#pg301&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;301&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;freedom in the United States was restricted in ways that were largely foreign to the despised, ‘statist’ continental Europe. Here is the picture drawn in 2003 by a distinguished US newspaper:&lt;br /&gt;
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All 50 states had laws banning sodomy until 1961 … The number had dwindled to 24 states by 1968 and stands at 13 today … Most of the remaining states with anti-sodomy laws forbid anal or oral sex among consenting adults no matter their sex or relationship.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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To this we must add the constitutional amendment of 1919 that sought to prevent the production and consumption of ‘intoxicating liquors’—a further intervention in the private life of citizens with few parallels in other Western countries.&lt;br /&gt;
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Overall, the history of the English colonies in America and then of the United States—both classical countries of the liberal tradition are thus involved to differing degrees—is better explained by the complexity of the process of constructing and protecting the sacred space, than by the categories of anti-statism and individualism.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The liberal revolution as a tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Once the field of hagiography has been evacuated, in reconstructing the history of liberalism it is better to start with the slogan advanced by the rebel American colonists: ‘We won’t be their Negroes!’ On the one hand, the rebellion began by demanding equality, while on the other it reasserted inequality and further deepened it. The two demands were indissolubly linked: precisely because they established a marked superiority over blacks and Indians, the colonists felt themselves completely equal to gentlemen and property-owners residing in London, and demanded that such equality be recognized and consecrated at every level. The dialectic that issued in the Glorious Revolution was not very different. We have seen an exponent of English proto-liberalism demanding, in the face of interference by monarchical power, peaceful enjoyment of his own possessions and servants. Far from questioning it, ‘true liberty’ consecrated the existing relations of service (and, in the colonies, slavery) as belonging to &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg302&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;302&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;an inviolable private sphere. The equality property-owners demanded with the sovereign, who could now be nothing but &#039;&#039;primus inter pares&#039;&#039;, went hand in hand with the reification of servants, who tended to be likened to other objects of property. That is why liberalism and racial chattel slavery emerged together in a twin birth.&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point we should analyse as a whole the three revolutions from which we started out. Of the first, which occurred in Holland, Huizinga observed that ‘the revolt against the Spanish government was a conservative revolution and could not have been otherwise’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same conclusion has been reached by other eminent historians. Philip II was concerned to ‘require that bishops be technically skilled (that is, theologians rather than sons of great lords)’ and was opposed to the nobility’s attempt to transform the Council of State into ‘an exclusively aristocratic executive body’. We can then understand that ‘large parts of the “Netherlands” nobility were suddenly afraid that the prince was not their &#039;&#039;agent&#039;&#039;, that his policies would in the short and medium run threaten their interests significantly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] So, on the one hand, we have Philip II, who surrounded himself with ‘secretaries who were generally from modest origins, passive instruments of his will’; on the other, ‘an oligarchic princely republic of communal cities and feudal lordships’, a ‘grand aristocracy’, a ‘feudal oligarchy’ engaged in defending ‘privileges and customs’ that consecrated its power and prestige.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is as if the nobles of the Netherlands, like large English property-owners and the English colonists in America subsequently, declared: ‘We don’t want to be treated as your servants!’ In its initial stages, the revolt against Philip II was not very different from the contemporaneous agitation of the Fronde in France.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In both cases, what ignited the powder was the clash between the high nobility’s autonomist and in some sense liberal aspirations and the Crown’s centralizing tendencies—except that, in the second case, the influence of the struggle for national independence and the intervention of the popular masses in it profoundly altered the initial picture.&lt;br /&gt;
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We have already seen the impetus given by the Glorious Revolution to the slave trade and the development of racial slavery in the colonies. The aspect of dis-emancipation also emerges with clarity in Ireland. Systematic expropriation &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg303&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;303&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of the natives intensified; in 1688 Catholics still owned 22 per cent of Irish land, but the figure fell to ‘14 per cent in 1703 and a mere 5 per cent in 1778’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And that is not all: ‘Catholics—the overwhelming majority of the Irish population—were excluded from all public offices and from the legal profession.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In England itself, the Glorious Revolution swept away the obstacles that still stood in the way of enclosures. As Marx put it, having attained full control of power, land-owners and capitalists ‘inaugurated the new era by practising on a colossal scale the thefts of state lands which had hitherto been managed more modestly’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] To the extent that rural labourers had found an ear more or less attentive to their lamentations, it was from the Stuart monarchy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Up to 1688, by dint of the control over them exercised from above, Justices of the Peace had some autonomy from the landed aristocracy. They subsequently lost it, becoming ‘virtual dictators of local government’ and answering only to the members of their own class who sat in parliament.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Finally, we must not lose sight of the incredible increase in the number of crimes against property that carried the death penalty, with the establishment of a regime of terror over the popular masses.&lt;br /&gt;
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The dimension of dis-emancipation is even more obvious in the American Revolution. The terms in which Theodore Roosevelt celebrated it at the start of the twentieth century are revealing:&lt;br /&gt;
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The chief factor in producing the Revolution, and later in producing the War of 1812, was the inability of the motherland country to understand that the freemen who went forth to conquer a continent should be encouraged in that work … The spread of the hardy, venturesome backwoodsmen was to most of the statesmen of London a matter of anxiety rather than of pride, and the famous Quebec Act of 1774 was in part designed with the purpose of keeping the English-speaking settlements permanently east of the Alleghanies, and preserving the mighty and beautiful valley of the Ohio as a hunting-ground for savages …[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg304&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;304&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Unquestionably, the tragedy of the Indians was dramatically hastened by the foundation of the United States.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Great Britain’s interests in its transatlantic possessions were commercial rather than territorial; and, as we know, it was loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada who accused the insurgents of a systematic policy of genocide.&lt;br /&gt;
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If Indians gained nothing from the American Revolution, what about blacks? The foundation of the United States involved the advent of a racial state and an unprecedented consolidation of racial chattel slavery. It is true that, in line with the watchword of the struggle against (political) slavery advanced during the revolt against Britain, the Northern states abolished slavery in the strict sense. But blacks did not thereby acquire freedom, confined as they were to a ‘caste’ different from that of freemen. In any event, there is a fact that provides food for thought: Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1834, while it survived in the United States for another three decades. Even the condition of free blacks was worse there, for example, than in Canada. In that British colony between 1850 and 1860, 20,000 blacks found refuge who had abandoned the United States, where they feared that laws on the return of fugitive slaves to their legitimate owners might furnish pretexts for the enslavement even of free blacks. But already, some decades earlier, more than a thousand black slaves had sought refuge in Canada after their delegation had been benevolently received by the local authorities with a stinging polemic against the United States: ‘Tell the Republicans on your side of the line that we royalists do not know men by their colour. Should you come to us you will be entitled to all the privileges of the rest of His Majesty’s subjects.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Obviously, this declaration was not free from an ideological, self-serving element. But it remains the case that blacks in the US looked to Canada as the promised land of liberty.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The most significant steps in the expansion of the United States simultaneously sealed the extension of the democracy and domination, in its harshest forms, of the ‘master race’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1803 Napoleon sold Louisiana. Although already in force, slavery had not yet assumed a clearly racial form. There were &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#page305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_001.html#pg305&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;305&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;20,000 half-castes, who to all intents and purposes were free and sometimes engaged in the liberal professions. They might even be very wealthy, and thus form part of the dominant elite. Transfer to the United States involved the consecration of local self-government and the power, in the final analysis, of white property-owners (French and Anglo-American). The result was a deterioration in the conditions not only of slaves—emancipation became increasingly difficult—but, above all, of freemen of colour. Their numbers diminished in absolute terms, and even more appreciably in percentage terms (their immigration was discouraged, while that of whites was encouraged). Hit by a series of discriminatory measures, freemen of colour now began to form an intermediate caste closer to slaves than freemen proper. In Louisiana, annexed to the United States, the twin birth of free representative bodies and racial chattel slavery was also seen in due course.&lt;br /&gt;
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A new, considerable expansion of US territory occurred some decades later with the drastic amputation of Mexico. We already know about the introduction of slavery into Texas. But even more significant was the tragedy that struck the Indians in both Texas and California. Subjected to forced labour and a thinly disguised slavery, their children in effect became &#039;&#039;res nullius&#039;&#039;. Particularly desirable were young girls because, as a local paper put it, they served the dual purpose of ‘work and lust’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But this was only one chapter in a horrific story: ‘The destruction and degradation of the California Indians is one of the sorriest blotches on the honor and intelligence of a nation. It was less a matter of war than of “sport”.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;&#039;and comparativism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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Viewed comparatively and from the perspective of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, the American Revolution appears as the start of a long series of attempts by white colonists to rid themselves of the obstacle represented by central power, whether ecclesiastical or monarchical. In 1537 Pope Paul III declared that the sacraments must be forbidden to colonists who, denying the humanity of Indians, reduced them to slavery. ‘Moralistic interference’ was also carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Thus, a ‘continuing tension between slavery and Christian ideals’ made itself felt. But the colonists, for whom forced labour was an &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg306&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;306&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;unavoidable necessity, responded by expelling the Jesuits from Brazil or provoking veritable ‘colonial insurrections’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On the other side, the first rebellions by black slaves tended to appeal to the Crown and to look to central government for a counter-weight to the despotism of local masters.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As for British America, the revolt that developed in Virginia a century before the American Revolution, and which was led by Nathaniel Bacon, must be borne in mind. While on the one hand targeting the privileges of the governing faction, on the other the rebels ‘demanded land, without regard to the rights or needs of the border Indians’, who in fact were exterminated in some instances.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The conflicts that subsequently emerged in the American Revolution are present here &#039;&#039;in nuce:&#039;&#039; on the one hand, the polemic against central government arrogance and interference; on the other, the demand for complete freedom vis-à-vis ‘savages’. And in fact, when we read in Bacon’s manifesto his denunciation of the collusion, in the course of the struggle against the champions of liberty, between the governor of Virginia and the ‘barbarous’, bloodthirsty Indians,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] we are reminded of the Declaration of Independence.&lt;br /&gt;
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We know that the French and English colonists also waved the flag of self-government, independence and imitation of the US model against the policy of emancipating slaves, for which they criticized the central political power. But events in Southern Africa are especially significant. Here, too, whether the colonies were controlled by the Dutch or British, the development of self-government by civil society went hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of racial slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, revolts erupted which, in the name of liberty and the struggle against despotism, denounced interference by central government and its claim to limit the right of masters to punish their slaves.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The civil society referred to was, obviously, the white community. The natives were descendants of Ham, condemned to perpetual slavery by the Old Testament, or were assimilated to the inhabitants of Canaan, doomed to destruction by the chosen people, the Boer settlers who embodied the cause of liberty and self-government.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg307&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;307&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The crucial question posed by eminent US historians in connection with the English colonists’ revolt in America is thus wholly understandable: Was the ‘movement of political emancipation by a section of the white settlers against control from England’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] really a revolution? Or are we dealing with ‘a reactionary slaveholders’ rebellion’? In the case of the South at least, this was the principal aspect: ‘With the threat of British interference removed and a relatively weak central government to contend with, the road to regional power lay open before the slaveholders, who constituted the only class capable of treading it.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A not dissimilar conclusion has been reached on the basis of an analysis of the relationship the Union as a whole had with the Indians: the American Revolution ‘had some of the character of a white settlers’ revolt against imperial policy’, which afforded relative protection to the natives.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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At this point we can draw a comparison between the role played by the ‘redskin question’ in the colonists’ rebellion that issued in the American Revolution and the part the ‘negro question’ played in the sparking off the Civil War:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he British authorities prior to 1776, by promulgating regulations restricting the colonists’ geographic expansion beyond the Appalachians, also alienated wealthy planters and merchants with speculative investments in western territory, as well as less affluent farmers who hoped for a new and inexpensive start on fresh lands … In 1860–61, when a newly elected Republican administration promised to prohibit the further westward expansion of slavery, the response from most white Southerners was another revolution for political autonomy.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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If this is the case, the history of the United States is characterized by two reactionary secessions (or secessions with more or less strong reactionary components), the one victorious, the other defeated. And, although defeated, the second would be situated in a line of substantial continuity with the first.&lt;br /&gt;
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The triumphal rise of the United States created an ideological climate in which, when reconstructing the American Revolution, historians tended to identify directly and naively with the rebel colonists’ arguments. But today it is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg308&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;308&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;inadmissible to continue to ignore the voices of their opponents, in particular those (for example, Samuel Johnson and Josiah Tucker) who from the outset highlighted the significance of the black and Indian questions in the divisions that occurred between the two shores of the Atlantic. When the subsequent clash between the two sections of the Union loomed, claiming the legacy of the American Revolution were also, and perhaps primarily, the theorists of the South. Calhoun referred to Washington the ‘slave-owner’. An utterly instrumental attitude? It was in fact endorsed by the most radical currents in abolitionism, which had no hesitation in publicly burning a Constitution branded as intrinsically pro-slavery and hence, ultimately, satanic. In their interpretation of the American Revolution, Calhoun and Garrison in a way vindicated Johnson and Tucker. Just as the Declaration of Independence accused George III of seeking to incite black slaves against the colonists, so the Confederacy accused Lincoln of wanting to provoke a slave war in the South. In both cases the rebels criticized central political power for misunderstanding the self-government that was due to free, civilized men and for attempting to erase the boundary line between civilization and barbarism. Not by chance, the attempted secession could count on passionate support from prominent representatives of the liberal world and culture even in England. One thinks, in particular, of Lord Acton, who to the end believed he was supporting an authentic, great liberal revolution, just as the leaders of the secessionist, slaveholding South thought they were promoting an authentic, great liberal revolution (see above, [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn9|§9]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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Further developing a comparative perspective and the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039;, it might be observed that in the twentieth century the process of decolonization was itself accompanied by secessionist movements, initiated by colonists who sought to maintain control over the natives and colonial populations in general, waving the flag of self-government and continuing to be inspired by the model of ‘master-race democracy’—one thinks, in particular, of South Africa and Rhodesia.&lt;br /&gt;
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However, it is precisely the optic of the &#039;&#039;longue durée&#039;&#039; and a comparative perspective that expose the reductive, misleading character of the view which conceives the American Revolution as a mere ‘reactionary rebellion’. To begin with, we are dealing with a more general problem. We find Marx defining the Glorious Revolution as a ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, thanks to which the English landed aristocracy succeeded in consolidating its domination over the unfortunate Irish (the Indians and blacks of the situation) and giving impetus to the enclosure of common land and the expulsion of the peasantry. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the other side of the coin. The conquest of self-government by civil society had a genuine revolutionary significance. Liberated &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#page309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_002.html#pg309&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;309&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;from an arbitrary power, the members of the class that had assumed power granted one another liberty and respect for the rules, with the construction of the constitutional state and the advent of the liberal rule of law. The first to achieve this novel phenomenon were precisely the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution, which therefore cannot be put on the same level as subsequent historical movements inspired by them. In other words, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that characterized the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution subsequently saw the second aspect prevail ever more markedly.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. Realization of the rule of law within the sacred space and the widening of the gulf with the profane space&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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At its inception, liberalism expressed the self-consciousness of a class of owners of slaves or servants that was being formed as the capitalist system began to emerge and establish itself, thanks in part to those ruthless practices of expropriation and oppression implemented in the metropolis, and especially the colonies, which Marx described as ‘original capitalist accumulation’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Against monarchical despotism and central power, this class demanded self-government and peaceful enjoyment of its property (including that in slaves and servants), under the sign of the rule of law. We can then say that this liberalism was the intellectual tradition which most rigorously circumscribed a restricted sacred space wherein the rules of the limitation of power obtained. It was an intellectual tradition characterized more by celebration of the community of free individuals that defined the sacred space than by celebration of liberty or the individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not by accident, the classical countries of the liberal tradition were those where, through Puritanism, the Old Testament had the deepest impact. This already applies to the Dutch Revolution or, at least, to the Boers of Dutch origin, who identified themselves with the ‘chosen people’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And it applies a fortiori to England. Especially from the Reformation, the English regarded themselves as the new Israel, ‘the people chosen by the Almighty for a special and at the same time a universal mission’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This ideology and missionary consciousness were diffused, in accentuated form, across the Atlantic. It is &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg310&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;310&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;enough to think of Jefferson, who suggested that the US coat of arms should represent the children of Israel guided by a ray of light.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Once again the distinction between sacred space and profane space is seen in all its radicalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the Old Testament beloved of the dominant elite, which liked to identify with the chosen people that conquered Canaan and destroyed its inhabitants, or which recruited its slaves from gentiles, two strict, drastic delimitations are operative. Anthropocentrism sharply separates from circumambient nature the human world, wherein an absolutely privileged and unique role is reserved for the ‘chosen people’. The sacred space, the tiny sacred island, is thus delimited with the utmost clarity from the infinite profane space. We might say that outside the chosen people everything tended to be reduced to deconsecrated nature, within whose orbit also came the populations condemned by Jehovah to be wiped off the face of the earth. The destruction fell upon ‘both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and sheep, and ass’; or, in more pregnant terms, ‘all the souls’, ‘all that breathed’, ‘all the inhabitants of the cities, and that which grew upon the ground’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Within the specifically profane space, the distinction between man and nature does not seem to emerge, or does not play a prominent role.&lt;br /&gt;
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But the exclusive restriction of the sacred space also performs an enormously positive function. Among the chosen people specific rules are in force, so that there is room for servitude but not for slavery in the strict sense. Thousands of years later, this was the viewpoint of Locke who, explicitly appealing to the Old Testament, distinguished between the servitude of wage-labourers (in the metropolis) and slavery in the colonies. And the continuity turns out to be even more striking when we bear in mind that destined for slavery were blacks, whom the theology and ideology of the time regarded as the descendants of Ham and Canaan, condemned in perpetuity by Noah, according to Genesis, to wear chains.&lt;br /&gt;
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We thus arrive at a paradoxical result, at least with respect to the dominant ideology. The West is at once the culture which most rigorously and effectively theorizes and practises the limitation of power, and which, with the greatest success and on the largest scale, is engaged in the development of chattel slavery—an institution that involves the full deployment of the master’s power over slaves reduced to chattels and ‘nature’. And this paradox is exhibited in especially striking fashion precisely in the countries with the most established liberal tradition.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#page311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_003.html#pg311&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;311&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Certainly, already within Judaism the exclusivist pathos of the sacred space tended to take the form of a universalism that relied sometimes on the subjugation (or destruction) of the profane, and sometimes on its co-option. As becomes apparent above all in post-exile Judaism, the absolute transcendence of Jehovah prompted a process of de-naturalization of the sacred space/profane space dichotomy. The mobility of borders, and hence the possibility of effecting co-options within the sacred space and civilization, applies a fortiori to the Puritans and the liberal tradition, which inherited Judaism filtered through Christianity. On the other hand, the albeit partial amplification of the sacred space was a necessary response to the struggles waged by the excluded, who often derived different motifs from the Old Testament opposed to those dear to the dominant elite. They were inspired by the story of the people reduced to slavery in a foreign land who finally managed to free themselves from the Pharaoh’s domination. This was the ideology that inspired the slave revolt which broke out in 1800 in Virginia, whose leader posed as a new Moses.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The slaves’ ability to derive justifications for rebellion from the dominant culture itself led property-owners to regard even religious education with suspicion.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. Delimitation of the sacred space and theorization of a planetary dictatorship&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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By rigorously delimiting the sacred space, liberalism radically widened the gulf separating it from the profane space. The element of regression in this is clear. A comparison will suffice to account for it.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the most exalted texts of its culture, Europe long strove to maintain a lucid and self-critical view of itself, refusing to allow itself to be intoxicated and carried away by euphoria on account of the irresistible march begun with the discovery–conquest of America. And this approach continued to display its vitality in the Enlightenment and the culture that became part of the inheritance of French radicalism. Let us read Raynal and Diderot: ‘The conquistadores’ first steps were marked by rivers of blood … In the inebriation of their success, they took the decision to exterminate those they had robbed. Countless people vanished from the face of the earth on the arrival of these barbarians’, who took to ‘treating the brothers they had just discovered without remorse, as they treated the wild beasts of the old hemisphere’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Denunciation of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg312&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;312&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;extermination of the Indians was rounded off with condemnation of the trade in slaves called upon to replace them as labour.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In any event, it was not only in the New World that the ‘European barbarians’ stained themselves with genocide;[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the ‘unhappy Hottentots’ likewise suffered a ‘pitiless’ massacre.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In addition to the colonial conquest, Louis-Sébastien Mercier drew attention to further dark pages in Europe’s history in the second half of the French eighteenth century. His utopian novel imagined a ‘singular monument’ in which ‘the nations represented … asked humanity’s pardon’ for the cruelty shown by them. Along with the genocide of the Indians, the expiatory monument recalled forced labour, or ‘the slow torture of so many unfortunates condemned to the mines’, and the subsequent black slave trade symbolized by ‘numerous mutilated slaves’. Incontestably responsible for all this were ‘the Europeans’, also charged with ‘the atrocity of the crusades’, ‘the horrible Saint Bartholomew’s night’ and the wars of religion.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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By contrast, let us now observe the way Edgar Quinet argues. In 1845, sketching in broad outline the history of the West, the French liberal historian came to the Spanish conquest of America. He could not ignore the extermination of the indigenous populations, but hit upon an explanation that was simultaneously ingenuous and reassuring. True, it had been carried out by Spain, a country that was an integral part of the West. But at the time Spain had experienced a decisive influx of the culture and religion of Islam, which was thus the actual, if indirect, executioner of the Indians.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The same line of argument was adopted for other black pages in the West’s history. Had not the Inquisition had its centre in a Spain widely influenced by barbarians? And as to the crusade that destroyed the Albigensian heretics, without distinction of age and sex, was it not perhaps prepared by the prayers of the Spaniard San Domenico di Guzmán?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Via Spain, all signs pointed to Islam, at whose door could be laid even the Crusades, which precisely had as their stated target the Muslim ‘infidels’. Quinet passed judgement: ‘In the Crusades the Catholic Church enacted the principle of Islamism: extermination.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg313&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;313&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;But not only Islam was stigmatized as synonymous with barbarism. European high culture had long regarded China with curiosity and interest. Where were the wars of religion that had covered Europe with blood? They were prevented by a religion that shunned mystery and dogma, resolving itself into an ethics.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; it was easier to recognize themselves in the mandarins than the Catholic clergy or Protestant ministers. The importance of the role played by a layer of secular intellectuals in the great Asiatic country was confirmed by the fact that the highest administrative public offices were often allocated through public competition, rather than being the monopoly (as in France) of a titled aristocracy, allied and intertwined with the clergy. In any event, in China the secular, modern principle of merit prevailed over the obscurantist principle of privilege based on birth and blood. The Enlightenment’s sympathetic attention to non-European cultures, employed as a critical mirror of Europe, became a charge in the indictment drawn up by de Tocqueville: the &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; had turned for a ‘model’ to China, ‘[t]hat unenlightened, barbarian government which lets itself be manipulated at will by a handful of Europeans’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The feudal aristocracy’s prevalence in Europe was also the prevalence of bellicose values, while China (observed Leibniz, an author already completely infused with the pathos of Enlightenment) was distinguished by its aversion to anything that ‘creates or nourishes ferocity in men’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] thereby constituting a reference point for &#039;&#039;philosophes&#039;&#039; engaged in criticizing the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;‘s privy wars. Thus the &#039;&#039;History of the Two Indias&#039;&#039; applauded the pacific spirit exhibited by Chinese culture.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this became off-key at the moment of the triumph of colonial expansionism. And so in de Tocqueville, corresponding to the celebration of war as an expression of the nation’s grandeur and an antidote to the socialist movement’s vulgar hedonism, we find an intensification of the indictment against China, also reproved for its unwarlike character. The French liberal displayed his contempt for a country whose army enjoyed ‘peacefully scraping a living’, overwhelmed as it was by the ‘general softness of ideas and desires’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Fortunately, all this facilitated the conquest of China: ‘It would be &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg314&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;314&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;difficult for me to console myself if, before dying, I did not see China opened and the eye of Europe penetrate there with its arms’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Now there was nothing to be learnt from non-European civilizations. In 1835 Macaulay declared that ‘a single shelf of a good European library [is] worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Accordingly, we can understand the indifference with which the destruction of the Summer Palace, in all its incomparable beauty, by English and French troops during the second Opium War was viewed. Expressing his indignation was Victor Hugo: ‘We Europeans are the civilized ones and for us the Chinese are barbarians. And here is what civilization has done to barbarism. In history’s eyes, one bandit will be called France, the other will be called England’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Some years later, on the occasion of the Commune, the good liberal Bagehot expressed his contempt for the behaviour of the rebels, whom he criticized for having wanted to destroy everything worth seeing and admiring in Paris, any testament to ‘culture’ and civilization.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus was credited the rumour, which subsequently proved unfounded, that the communards had destroyed the Louvre. But no mention was made here of the destruction of the Summer Palace in Peking, which actually occurred roughly ten years earlier, with the decisive participation of the country that for Bagehot was the privileged embodiment of the cause of liberty and civilization.&lt;br /&gt;
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Authors like Las Casas and Montaigne had problematized the boundaries between civilization and barbarism and made them fluid. In this perspective civilization advanced through exchanges between different cultures. Developing their thinking in the years when missionaries from Christian Europe were received with respect and benevolence in China, while in France Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes and resumed persecution of the Huguenots, Bayle and Leibniz reached a radical conclusion. It was a pity that the relationship between China and European was marked by its one-sidedness; the presence of Chinese missionaries in Europe would definitely be beneficial![[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Later, Raynal and Diderot’s &#039;&#039;History&#039;&#039; assigned a black Spartacus the task of advancing the cause of freedom, breaking the chains of slavery and putting an end to the barbarism of which Europeans were the agents. But this attempt to cast a glance at &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#page315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_004.html#pg315&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;315&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Europe, as it were, from without, recognizing the contributions of different cultures to the cause of advancing civilization, did not survive the irresistible march of colonial expansionism. Having triumphed on a planetary scale, the liberal West saw fit to identify itself permanently with the cause of civilization and liberty. On the basis of this absolute and immutable pre-eminence, we see an exclusive elite—the restricted community of the free—explicitly formulate the claim, hitherto unknown and unheard of, to exercise a planetary dictatorship over the rest of humanity.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. The triumph of colonial expansionism: liberalism as an ideology of war&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The celebration of civilization and liberty now took the form of an ideology of war. It was an ideology refuted by Raynal and Diderot who, addressing the ‘monsters’ or European conquistadores, expressed themselves as follows:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are proud of your &#039;&#039;lumières&#039;&#039;, but what use are they to you, and what use would they be to the Hottentot? … If, disembarking on his shores, you proposed to lead him towards a more civilized life, to customs that seem to you preferable to his, you might be excused. But you have landed in his country to take it from him. You have approached his hut to expel him, to replace him, if you can, by an animal that works under the farmer’s lash.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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This criticism is all the more apt if we bear in mind Washington’s characterization of the Indians as an ‘unenlightened race’ (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
So exalted was the self-consciousness of the liberal West in the nineteenth century that sometimes it did not even feel the need to confer ideological legitimacy on its wars. Unlike John Stuart Mill, de Tocqueville did not present the Opium War as a crusade for free trade and liberty as such. For the French liberal the main cause for celebration was the West’s overwhelming power, and this power was also configured as a war machine ideologically:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here finally we have Europe’s mobility at grips with Chinese immobility! It is a great event, above all if one believes that it is merely the sequel, the latest step in a multiplicity of events of the same kind that are gradually impelling the European race beyond its borders and successively subjecting all the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg316&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;316&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;other races to its empire and influence. It is the enslavement of four-fifths of the world by the other fifth. Hence it is best not to be unduly despairing about our century and ourselves; the men are petty, but the events are great.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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De Tocqueville’s attitude left de Gobineau puzzled. The first ridiculed the mythology of blood entertained by the second. There was in fact another side to the coin. Once adopted as the key to explaining universal history, racial contamination cast its fatal shadow over the West itself, which was likewise condemned to decadence. Hence for de Gobineau there was no insurmountable barrier between conquerors and colonial peoples. As for the economy, the latter would sooner or later manage to develop the textile industry (the key industry of the period) and defeat British and European competition in general.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Morally, there was no reason to idealize the conquerors: in Persia and the Middle East ‘their immorality and rapacity’ were manifest. If the natives ‘are rogues’, ‘in some respects they can be considered our cousins’; ‘this is how we will be tomorrow’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville’s criticism focused precisely on this point: ‘You say that one day we shall resemble the rabble you see before you: maybe. But before this happens, we shall have been its masters.’ As we can see, from the ‘rogues’ they were in de Gobineau, the peoples of the Middle East have now been transformed into a ‘rabble’, with this fully legitimizing the domination exercised over them by European ‘masters’. It is with reference to the latter that de Tocqueville employs the more indulgent term ‘rogues’: ‘If, as I agree, they are often great rogues, at least they are rogues to whom God has given strength and power and whom He has manifestly placed, for a certain period, at the head of the human race’. Faced with this, de Gobineau’s reservations about the ‘immorality’ and ‘rapacity’ of the conquerors, and the thesis of their basic kinship with subject peoples, seemed to lose any significance. De Tocqueville continued:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;block&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
You are in the heart of the Asiatic and Muslim world: I would be curious to know to what you attribute the rapid and seemingly unstoppable decadence of all the races you have seen passing through … Some millions of men who, a few centuries back, lived virtually without shelter, in the forests and marshes, will in less than one hundred years be the transformers of the globe they inhabit and the dominators of their whole species. Nothing is more &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg317&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;317&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;clearly preordained in the sight of Providence … Nothing will resist them on the surface of the earth. I have no doubt of it. I fear that all this might sound to you like a philosophical heresy. But if you have theory on your side, I am confident that I have the facts on mine—a not unimportant detail.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
De Gobineau, who regarded himself as a ‘citizen of the world’, refused to give in: ‘I take an extraordinary interest in my daily conversations with the natives, and am very far from having the bad opinion of them people are pleased to entertain in Europe’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not a viewpoint de Tocqueville could share. We already know his opinion that the ‘last’ member of the ‘European race’ was always ‘first next to the savages’—that is, in the last analysis, next to ‘all the other races’. Of his daughter, de Gobineau remarked: ‘She has made herself a true Turkoman, save for her colour, which is that of an Abyssinian’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] De Tocqueville did not respond to this observation, but it should not be forgotten that for him it was precisely ‘half-breeds’ who represented the most serious threat to the West’s supremacy and civilization as such (see above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn4|§4]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is no doubt about the greater intellectual and political subtlety of de Tocqueville who, criticizing the blood myth, distanced himself from the ideology increasingly prevalent in the South of the United States, where de Gobineau’s views about the natural and eternal inequality of races met with understandable success. Yet it is to be noted that, much more so than the latter, it was the former who created an unbridgeable gulf between the West and colonial peoples. How are we to explain this fact?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Straddling the American Revolution, ‘[r]acism became an essential, an unacknowledged, ingredient of the republican ideology’—that is, of the ideology which presided over the construction of ‘master-race democracy’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the mid-nineteenth century this regime tended to characterize the relationship between the West as a whole and colonial peoples. Certainly, in order to impart credibility to its self-proclamation, the community of the free was ever more inclined in this period to abolish slavery in the strict sense—hereditary slavery—which was in fact replaced by other forms of forced labour. But the model of a ‘master-race democracy’ remained unchanged. The gradual abolition of censitary discrimination in the metropolis gave further impetus &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#page318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_005.html#pg318&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;318&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to colonial expansion, which now in fact enjoyed the consent of the popular classes in the metropolis. These, like the poor whites in the North American republic, aspired to be co-opted into the bloc of ‘masters’. And once again what explained and legitimized the barrier dividing masters and servants was a more or less marked, and more or less crude racial ideology, which was now pervasive. This was a trend that also made its influence felt on de Tocqueville.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Having been asserted in countries (Holland, England and the United States) more involved than any others in the slave trade and colonial expansion (overseas in the case of the first two, continentally in that of the third), liberalism spread in the West at a time when it seemed destined by Providence itself to dominate the whole world and wipe out all other cultures. In these circumstances, the self-critical thinking and awareness of limits that had characterized the pre-eminent voices of European and Western culture tended to disappear. The inheritors of that tradition were French radicalism, and then Marx. The latter waxed ironic about the ‘civilizing wars’ of the colonial powers. In reality, during the Opium War, while China, ‘the semi-barbarian[,] remained faithful to the principles of the moral law’, the ‘civilized’ opposed to it the principle of free trade,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the principle so eloquently defended by Mill. But especially significant are the pages of &#039;&#039;Capital&#039;&#039; devoted to original capitalist accumulation and denunciation of ‘the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population’, and the transformation of Africa into ‘a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was a chapter of history that was extended in the subsequent colonial expansion.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#calibre_pb_6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;7. Oscillations and limitations of the Marxian model&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Clearly distancing himself from the apologetics more dominant than ever today, Marx drew attention to the ‘conservative character of the English revolution’. While, on the one hand, it marked ‘the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy’, and promoted the development of industry and the bourgeoisie,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on the other, it gave impetus to a gigantic, ruthlessly implemented expropriation of peasants. Examined closely, the Glorious Revolution emerged as ‘a parliamentary coup d’état for [the] transformation of [communal &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg319&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;319&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;property] into private property’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We thus encounter a formula that in a way evokes the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation I have stressed: the mention, albeit vague, of parliament’s decisive role in this event draws attention to the disappearance of the absolute monarchy, while making clear reference to the tragedy of the peasantry. Someone who distinguished himself in the ideological legitimation of the colossal expropriation and ruthless repression that struck its victims was Locke. This ‘most particular supporter of the lash for vagrants and paupers’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was in fact, at the same time, the ‘father’ of ‘free-thinking’,[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the protagonist of the great ideological battle that deconsecrated absolute monarchy and stripped it of its Christian and Biblical cover. And once again, as in the Glorious Revolution, so in the liberal philosopher in whom it found theoretical expression, the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation reveals itself. Finally, Marx recalled that corresponding to the advent of constitutional monarchy in England was a further intensification of the dictatorship exercised by English property-owners over Ireland.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Over and above any particular country, what should especially be borne in mind are the general considerations offered by &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;. With the disappearance of the &#039;&#039;ancien régime&#039;&#039;, corresponding to the dissolution of the ‘political existence’ of property was its ‘more potent existence’, which could now unfold ‘the full scale of its own existence’.[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Or, as &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; put it: ‘The shaking-off of the political yoke was at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which had held in check the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even the &#039;&#039;appearance&#039;&#039; of a universal content.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx brought out the entanglement of emancipation and dis-emancipation. The ‘more potent existence’ injected into property was also the autonomization of property in human cattle from the controls, albeit vague, of the Church and Crown, with the consequent crystallization of racial chattel slavery. And it was also the disappearance of the restrictions placed by the Crown on the expansion of the colonists, who could now proceed unhindered, without being in any way concerned with the terrible human costs inflicted on the Indians. In England, enclosure of common land was followed by the new law of 1834 which, abolishing any other form of assistance, confronted the poor with a brutal alternative: death from starvation or internment in a total institution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg320&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;320&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, we must not lose sight of the fact that we are not dealing with an autonomization of property as such. What corresponded to the ‘more potent existence’ of the colonists’ property was the death-agony of another form of property. It was a gigantic process of expropriation (justified and theorized by Locke and de Tocqueville alike), which unfolded at the expense not only of colonial peoples—in America or Ireland—but also of English peasants. The same reasons that led me to regard the category of ‘proprietorial individualism’ as inadequate and misleading now prompt me to seek to clarify Marx’s analysis. The process we are examining was the autonomization of the property of those who already enjoyed recognition, of those who aspired to form themselves into the community or caste of freemen. Liberated from the fetters of control by Crown and Church was not only bourgeois property, but also traditional noble property. In the England that emerged from the Glorious Revolution, the landed aristocracy consolidated its enjoyment of certain privileges (hunting, for example) and consecrated its political power in representative bodies—in the first instance, the House of Lords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With Marx we can say that ‘[t]he political revolution is the revolution of civil society.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But it should be added that civil society can be hegemonized by the bourgeoisie or the landed aristocracy, or can be characterized by a compromise between these two classes. And the liberal revolution consists in this political revolution. Up to this point we can only subscribe to Marx’s analysis and admire it for its acuteness. But he continues by opposing the ‘political revolution’ to the ‘social revolution’, or ‘political emancipation’, which is the objective of the first, to ‘social emancipation’ (the end of class domination), which is the objective of the second. The limitation of this conceptual couplet is that it does not take account of the fact that for some social or ethnic groups the liberal revolution did not involve any kind of emancipation, but in fact meant the reverse. Is it really correct to define the United States of 1844 (the year &#039;&#039;On the Jewish Question&#039;&#039; was published) as ‘the country of complete political emancipation’?[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, the reference is to the rapid disappearance of censitary discrimination, which continued to be marked in France under the July Monarchy, and in Britain. However, what induced this differential development in the case of the North American republic was the availability of land (taken from the Indians) and the confinement of a large part of the ‘dangerous classes’ in slavery. In other words, the property barrier proved much weaker because the race barrier was much more rigid. Differently put, in the United &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg321&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;321&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;States democracy emerged first because it emerged as a &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy, as a ‘master-race democracy’, and this specific form proved so tenacious that it survived the Civil War by many decades. It is highly problematic to regard &#039;&#039;Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy as complete political emancipation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even if we restrict the comparison to New World countries, some questions are indicated: Was political emancipation more advanced in the North American republic, which saw slavery flourish in these years and which a little earlier had extended that institution to the Texas taken from Mexico? Or was political emancipation more advanced precisely in Mexico and those Latin American countries that had abolished the institution of slavery some decades before? In these years US leaders and ideologues liked positively to contrast the ban on miscegenation imposed by them with the cross-breeding that was spreading in Latin America: Where was political emancipation more advanced?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We cannot even unreservedly endorse Marx’s thesis that ‘&#039;&#039;[p]olitical&#039;&#039; emancipation is certainly a big step forward.’[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] We already know that the most tragic chapter in the history of the Indians began with the American Revolution, and that the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution witnessed the emergence of a racial chattel slavery of unprecedented harshness. In the case of Britain, it was Marx himself who drew attention to the far from positive consequences of the ‘coup d’état’ of 1688–89 for English peasants and the Irish population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Even more debatable is the subsequent identification of political revolution with bourgeois revolution. The latter category is at once too narrow and too broad. As regards the first aspect, it is difficult to subsume under the category of bourgeois revolution the Glorious Revolution and the parliamentary revolt that preceded the upheavals that began in France in 1789, not to mention the struggles against monarchical absolutism, explicitly led by the liberal nobility, which developed in Switzerland and other countries. On the other hand, the category of bourgeois revolution is too broad: it subsumes both the American Revolution that sealed the advent of a racial state and the French Revolution and the San Domingo Revolution, which involved complete emancipation of black slaves.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The model proposed here is different. It equates ‘political revolution’ qua ‘revolution of civil society’, referred to by Marx, with the liberal revolution in the strict sense. Certainly, in order to be able to promote its emancipation from absolute power, civil society had to have achieved a certain level of development. Analysed in their initial phases, the revolutions that occurred in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#page322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0013_split_006.html#pg322&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the Netherlands, England, America, France and Latin America were not very different from one another: they were all liberal revolutions. What clearly differentiated them were three factors: the varying configurations of civil society; the social, political and ideological conflicts that developed within it (one thinks in the French case of the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie); and the irruption in the struggle of servants and slaves. With the emergence of the last factor, the struggle for the emancipation of civil society waged by the property-owning classes became entangled with the struggle waged against them by those who did not want to be regarded as objects of property and who sought to secure recognition.&lt;br /&gt;
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The secessionist revolt of the slaveholding South also presented itself as a liberal revolution: it was a new struggle for self-government by civil society, like the one that had sanctioned the independence of the United States. Was the Confederacy a liberal country? If we regard the country born from the War of Independence against England and long led by slave-owners as liberal, it is hard to see why such recognition should be denied to the Confederacy. Yet, rather than at a conceptual level, the solution to the problem is to be sought at a historical level. At the point when the principle of the ‘uselessness of slavery among ourselves’ was imposed in the liberal world, an author like Fletcher, who also recommended slavery for white vagrants, ceased to be a liberal. Almost a century after its first turn, the liberal world underwent a second: now condemnation of hereditary slavery as such was dictated as a constitutive element in its identity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, the racial state largely survived. And once again the question arises: Was the United States, where discrimination and oppression raged against blacks and genocidal practices against Indians, a liberal country? The principle of racial equality became a constitutive element in liberal identity only from the mid-twentieth century onwards. The racial state continued to exist for some decades in South Africa. However, although historically inspired by Britain in the area of self-government and representative bodies, and by the southern United States in that of race relations, it was henceforth regarded as alien to the liberal world.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn1a|1]] Max Weber, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968, p.276.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn2a|2]] François Furet, &#039;&#039;Il passato di un’illusione&#039;&#039;, ed. Marina Valensise, Milan: Mondadori, 1995, p. 98.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn3a|3]] A. J. P. Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History 1914–1945&#039;&#039;, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn4a|4]] John Gray, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986, p. 26.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn5a|5]] Taylor, &#039;&#039;English History&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn6a|6]] Ibid., p. 56.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn7a|7]] Wendy Hinde, &#039;&#039;Richard Cobden&#039;&#039;, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 111.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn8a|8]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 5, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn9a|9]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins, Harvill, 1987, p. 27.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn10a|10]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Il revisionismo storico&#039;&#039;, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1996, ch. 2, §5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn11a|11]] Gustave de Beaumont, &#039;&#039;L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. Goderlaine Charpentier, Villeneuve d’Ascq: CERIUL-Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille III, 1990, vol. 1, p. 331; vol. 2, pp. 306, 201.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn12a|12]] Nathan Rosenberg, quoted in Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 259.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn13a|13]] Eric Foner, &#039;&#039;The Story of American Freedom&#039;&#039;, London: Picador, 1999, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_000.html#c09-ftn14a|14]] Joel Brinkley, ‘US Court Strikes Down Sodomy Ban’, &#039;&#039;International Herald Tribune&#039;&#039;, 27 June 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn15a|15]] Huizinga, quoted in Hans-Christoph Schröder, &#039;&#039;Die Revolutionen Englands im 17. Jahrundert&#039;&#039;, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, p. 51.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn16a|16]] Immanuel Wallerstein, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89, vol. 1, pp. 203–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn17a|17]] Giorgio Spini, &#039;&#039;Storia dell’età moderna&#039;&#039;, Turin: Einaudi, 1982, pp. 272, 276–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn18a|18]] Charles Tilly, &#039;&#039;European Revolutions, 1492–1992&#039;&#039;, Oxford and Cambridge (MA): Blackwell, 1993, p. 160.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., p. 115.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn20a|20]] Christopher Hill, &#039;&#039;The Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1961, p. 258.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn21a|21]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, p. 884.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn22a|22]] Barrington Moore Jr, &#039;&#039;The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy&#039;&#039;, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 12–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn23a|23]] Hill, &#039;&#039;Century of Revolution&#039;&#039;, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn24a|24]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;The Strenuous Life&#039;&#039;, New York: Century, 1901, pp. 246–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn25a|25]] Colin G. Calloway, &#039;&#039;The American Revolution in Indian Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn26a|26]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;North of Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. 249, 73.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn27a|27]] Reginald C. Stuart, &#039;&#039;United States Expansionism and British North America&#039;&#039;, Chapel Hill: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, pp. 167ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn28a|28]] Ronald Creagh, &#039;&#039;Nos cousins d’Amérique&#039;&#039;, Paris: Payot, 1988, pp. 248–9; Joseph Zitomersky, ‘Culture, classe ou État?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson and de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001, pp. 77–84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn29a|29]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_001.html#c09-ftn30a|30]] Wilcomb E. Washburn, &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975, p. 196.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn31a|31]] David B. Davis, &#039;&#039;The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture&#039;&#039;, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1966, pp. 165, 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn32a|32]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;From Rebellion to Revolution&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, pp. 84–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn33a|33]] Bernard Bailyn &#039;&#039;et al., The Great Republic&#039;&#039;, Lexington (MA): D. C. Heath, 1977, p. 149.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn34a|34]] Bacon, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 1, pp. 105–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn35a|35]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 40–6, 146–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn36a|36]] Ibid., pp. 170–1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn37a|37]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 77.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn38a|38]] Eugene D. Genovese, &#039;&#039;The World the Slaveholders Made&#039;&#039;, London: Allen Lane, 1970, p. 99.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn39a|39]] Frederickson, &#039;&#039;White Supremacy&#039;&#039;, p. 44.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_002.html#c09-ftn40a|40]] Shearer David Bowman, &#039;&#039;Masters and Lords&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 141.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn41a|41]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, pp. 873ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn42a|42]] Thomas J. Noer, &#039;&#039;Briton, Boer and Yankee&#039;&#039;, Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1978, p. 21.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn43a|43]] Léon Poliakov, &#039;&#039;The Aryan Myth&#039;&#039;, trans. Edmund Howard, London: Sussex University Press and Heinemann Educational Books, 1974, p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn44a|44]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 3, §9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn45a|45]] Joshua 6, 25; 10, 35 and 40; Genesis 19, 25.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_003.html#c09-ftn46a|46]] Winthrop D. Jordan, &#039;&#039;White over Black&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 393.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn47a|47]] Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes&#039;&#039;, ed. Yves Benot, Paris: Maspero, 1981, p. 143.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn48a|48]] Ibid., p. 257.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn49a|49]] Ibid., p. 49.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn50a|50]] Ibid., pp. 54–5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn51a|51]] Louis-Sébastien Mercier, &#039;&#039;L’An deux mille quatre cent quarante&#039;&#039;, ed. Raymond Trousson, Bordeaux: Ducros, 1971, pp. 201–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn52a|52]] Edgar Quinet, &#039;&#039;Le Christianisme et la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1984, p. 146.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn53a|53]] Ibid., p. 159.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn54a|54]] Ibid., p. 137 (Quinet had already expressed himself to this effect in the subtitles to the eighth lecture).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn55a|55]] Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 69, 219.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn56a|56]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution&#039;&#039;, trans. Stuart Gilbert, London: Fontana, 1966, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn57a|57]] Leibniz, quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, Norton: New York, 1998, p. 84.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn58a|58]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 19, 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn59a|59]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, 1951–, vol. 15, pt 2, p. 54 (letter to F. de Corcelle, 13 May 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn60a|60]] Ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, p. 199 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1857).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn61a|61]] Quoted in Ramsay Muir, ed., &#039;&#039;The Making of British India 1756–1858&#039;&#039;, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 299.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn62a|62]] Hugo, quoted in Nora Wang, Xin Ye and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savantes, 2003, pp. 9–10 (letter to Captain Butler, 25 November 1861).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn63a|63]] Walter Bagehot, ‘The Destruction in Paris of What the World Goes to See in Paris’, in &#039;&#039;Collected Works&#039;&#039;, ed. Norman St John-Stevas, vol. 8, London: The Economist, 1974, p. 197.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_004.html#c09-ftn64a|64]] Cf. Giorgio Borsa, &#039;&#039;La nascita del mondo modern in Asia orientale&#039;&#039;, Milan: Rizzoli, 1977, pp. 84, 89; Spence, &#039;&#039;The Chan’s Great Continent&#039;&#039;, p. 85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn65a|65]] Raynal, &#039;&#039;Histoire&#039;&#039;, pp. 53–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn66a|66]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 6, pt 1, p. 58 (letter to Henry Reeve, 12 April 1840).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn67a|67]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 254–6 (letter of 15 January 1856).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn68a|68]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., vol. 9, pp. 243–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn70a|70]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 241.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn71a|71]] Ibid., vol. 9, p. 231 (letter of 7 July 1851).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn72a|72]] Edmund S. Morgan, &#039;&#039;American Slavery, American Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Norton, 1995, p. 386.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn73a|73]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 13, p. 516; vol. 12, p. 552.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_005.html#c09-ftn74a|74]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 915.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn75a|75]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 7, pp. 209–10.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn76a|76]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Capital: Volume One&#039;&#039;, p. 886.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn77a|77]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pp. 510–11.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn78a|78]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 209.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn79a|79]] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn80a|80]] Karl Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, p. 233.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn81a|81]] Ibid., p. 232.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn82a|82]] Marx and Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, p. 352.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0013_split_006.html#c09-ftn83a|83]] Marx, &#039;&#039;Early Writings&#039;&#039;, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#c10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
= &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg323&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;CHAPTER TEN =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;Liberalism and the Catastrophe of the Twentieth Century&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== &#039;&#039;&#039;1. The struggle for recognition and coups d’état: the conflict in the metropolis&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The catastrophic crisis that struck Europe and the whole planet with the outbreak of the First World War was already maturing within the liberal world. To account for it, we must take stock of the situation on the eve of 1914. Let us deal with the metropolis first. There is no doubt that the struggle for recognition had achieved important successes. True, we are still a long way from the universal assertion of the principle ‘one person, one vote’—and not only because women continued to be excluded from the enjoyment of political rights. More or less conspicuous traces of censitary discrimination still survived. But the fact remains that the vote was no longer the exclusive privilege of wealth. Also largely defeated was the attempt to reintroduce through the back window the censitary discrimination that had been shown the door, in the shape of plural votes to be granted to the more ‘intelligent’ (this was a solution entertained above all by John Stuart Mill!). Here and there the first elements of a social state began to emerge; and if this involved fairly modest results, we should bear in mind the legalization of workers’ coalitions and trade unions, determined to wrest much more substantial concessions. Even in this milieu, the long road travelled by the former instruments of labour leaps to the eye![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn1|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;1&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it must immediately be added that this was quite the reverse of a pacific development. Each of its stages was marked not only by intense struggles, but also by profound divisions in the liberal alliance. While one &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg324&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;324&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;wing of it was open to concessions, the other proved intransigent and sought confrontation. Thus, we witness a succession of coups d’état which, prior to issuing in the establishment of an open dictatorship at any rate, could count on the support or sympathy of distinguished representatives of the liberal world. Availing itself of Sieyès’ active participation, Napoleon’s 18th Brumaire elicited the ‘enthusiasm’ of Madame de Staël, as emerges from the letter her father sent her a few days later: ‘You paint for me in lively colours the part you take in the power and glory of your hero’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn2|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;2&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Constant too viewed the turn with confidence. Thirty years later, he recalled having on its eve been in daily contact with Sieyès, ‘the true author of the 18th Brumaire’, or the ‘main motor’ of the novelty that was already foreshadowed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn3|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;3&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As early as 1795, Constant had made it clear that it was necessary to go beyond Thermidor: the taxation that continued to weigh on property for the benefit of the poor, who were now turning into ‘a privileged caste’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn4|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;4&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] was excessive. In fact, according to various pieces of evidence (including Madame de Staël’s), the combined effect of famine and inflation was reducing ‘the last class of society to the most wretched condition’, visiting ‘unheard of ills’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn5|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;5&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] on it, up to and including ‘starvation’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn6|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;6&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] However, for the liberalism of the time there was no doubt: the risks run by property legitimized the coup d’état. After the homage already noted to ‘conservative, liberal, tutelary ideas’, in the days immediately afterwards the new government hastened to abolish any trace of progressive taxation. On 24 December 1799, the same day Bonaparte became First Consul, Constant entered the Tribunate. But Madame de Staël harboured the idea of an even more ambitious political career for him, in the shadow of the one who (wrote Necker to his daughter at the end of 1800) promised to be ‘the protector of all respectable’ and well-off folk, finally liberated—such was Constant and Madame de Staël’s sigh of relief—from the threat of the ‘riffraff’ (&#039;&#039;populace&#039;&#039;).[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn7|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;7&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The significance of the initial hopes and subsequent disappointment in liberal circles was clarified by Guizot in 1869. Acquitting the task of ‘putting an end to anarchy’, Napoleon’s ‘dictatorship’ was ‘natural, urgent’—in fact, ‘beneficial and glorious’. However, contrary &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg325&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;325&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;to expectations, ‘this accidental, temporary regime’ transformed itself into ‘a dogmatic and permanent system of government’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn8|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A not dissimilar dialectic emerged after Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, greeted with ‘indecent haste’ (the phrase is Marx’s) by liberal England.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn9|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;9&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] This was not opportunism: once the beneficent ‘traditionary influences’ had disappeared, wrote Disraeli in 1851, what checked anarchy and dissolution was ‘the government of the sword’. Indeed, ‘the state quits the senate and takes refuge in the camp’; only thus was it possible to avoid the catastrophe of the domination of ‘secret societies’ and a ‘convention’ of the Jacobin variety.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn10|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;10&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the case of France, setting aside a figure like Granier de Cassagnac, who declared himself a ‘liberal’ and openly sided with Louis Napoleon,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn11|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;11&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] it is worth dwelling on de Tocqueville’s participation in the various stages of the ideological and political reaction that ended up de-legitimizing and then overthrowing the Second Republic. In the French liberal’s view, it was the product of a revolution—that of February 1848—which had developed in a socialist and hence despotic spirit, and which had unfolded throughout continental Europe. In Germany and Italy, de Tocqueville desired and promoted ‘the victory of the princes’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]). But was his attitude towards France very different? As early as March, even before the working-class revolt of June, de Tocqueville thundered against ‘this ultra-democratic revolution, which has extended the right to vote beyond all the limits known even in America’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn12|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;12&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] While the clouds that presaged the June storm were gathering, the French liberal expressed his opinion that ‘the National Guard and the army will be without pity this time’. In order to achieve the objective of maintaining or restoring order and destroying the ‘anarchical party’, one should not hesitate to recruit into the police unscrupulous types and rabble—‘outlaws’, ‘thieves’, ‘scoundrels’ and all the ‘rejects of society’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn13|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;13&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Evoked with precision here is the politico-social formula that subsequently presided over Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état, which was successful thanks to the support not only of the property-owning classes and traditional state apparatuses, but also of a sub-proletariat happy to perform the function of gang intimidation entrusted to it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg326&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;326&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;After the outbreak of the workers’ revolt, de Tocqueville was not only in favour of conferring emergency powers on Cavaignac, but recommended shooting on sight anyone caught ‘in a posture of defence’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn14|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;14&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The bloody repression of the June Days was not enough to assuage anxiety; and so we have the invocation of an ‘energetic and definitive reaction on behalf of order’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn15|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;15&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] required to put an end to revolutionary and anarchic chaos not only in France, but in Europe as a whole. In any event, ‘France is among those who will restore order’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn16|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;16&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and terminate the ‘follies of 1848’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn17|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;17&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More than a year after the desperate working-class revolt, when pitiless repression seemed to have averted the Jacobin and socialist peril for good, the French liberal believed that an iron fist was still required: it was necessary to proceed ‘as far as reaction’; ‘palliatives’ would not do; to sweep away not only the Mountain, but also ‘all the surrounding hills’, it was necessary ‘courageously to take the lead of all those who want to re-establish order, whatever their complexion’. There should be no hesitation even over ‘a heroic … remedy’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn18|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;18&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What is indirectly suggested is the need for emergency measures with the suspension of constitutional liberties. If as a historian he tirelessly condemned the Jacobin Terror, as a politician de Tocqueville had no hesitation invoking ‘terror’ for the purposes of suppressing ‘the demagogic party’ (see above, [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn15|§15]]).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In these years, every so often a shudder ran through the liberal self-consciousness: perhaps there was a risk of the ruthless methods used to subjugate barbarians in the colonies spreading in Europe. Although warmly applauding the pitiless energy with which the conquest of Algeria was conducted, de Tocqueville let slip a sort of exclamation: ‘God spare us ever seeing France led by an officer of the army of Africa’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn19|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;19&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, Cavaignac, having implemented the ‘new science’ called on to liquidate Arab resistance at any cost, was subsequently the author of the bloody, ruthless repression that struck the barbarians of the metropolis, the Parisian workers who rose up demanding the right to work and life. Notwithstanding the preceding admonition, however, de Tocqueville offered him constant, unwavering support.&lt;br /&gt;
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Later, starting with the Paris Commune, there spread throughout the liberal West a tendency to challenge not only the democratic concessions wrested by the popular masses, but also the rule of law itself. In the United States &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg327&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;327&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Theodore Roosevelt stated an expeditious method for putting down strikes and social conflicts: ‘The sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be suppressed … by taking ten or a dozen of their leaders out, standing … them against a wall, and shooting them dead.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn20|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;20&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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These tendencies underwent further radicalization after the October Revolution. We can now fully understand the fascist coup d’état in Italy in 1922. Numerous figures who professed themselves liberals, and who in fact claimed to be restoring genuine liberalism, supported it for a more or less extended period of time. This was true of Luigi Einaudi, who saluted the return of ‘classical liberalism’. For a while Croce likewise viewed the attempt to return to ‘pure liberalism’, not to be confused with insensate ‘democratic liberalism’, with sympathy. Even in 1929, implicitly endorsing Mussolini’s condemnation of any ‘demo-liberal regime’, Antonio Salandra defined himself as an ‘old liberal of the right (without the demo)’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn21|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;21&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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As we can see, a benevolent attitude towards the fascist coup d’état is not explicable solely by the severe social and political crisis of the time. Instead, at issue was cancelling, or more or less drastically reducing, the democratic concessions won from liberal society by the popular movement. While the &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039; still persisted, in 1909 Einaudi had branded progressive taxation a kind of ‘organized brigandage to steal money from others through the state’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn22|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;22&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Mussolini hastened to put an end to such ‘brigandage’, thereby eliciting applause from not a few liberals. In the preceding decades Pareto had, as a liberal, developed a sharp polemic against the ‘myth’ of the social state, had agreed with the positions of Spencer and Maine, and had adhered, still as a liberal, to the Liberty and Property Defence League.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn23|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;23&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In 1922–23 he breathed a sigh of relief at the coup d’état that finally averted threats, if not to liberty, in any event to property.&lt;br /&gt;
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On the other hand, von Mises seemed to be referring exclusively to the state of emergency when, in 1927, he pointed to fascist &#039;&#039;squadrismo&#039;&#039; as ‘an emergency makeshift’ adequate to the task of saving ‘European civilization’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn24|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;24&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, five &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#page328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_000.html#pg328&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;328&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years earlier, having distanced himself from the democratic and even socialist contaminations liberalism had undergone in England, he had thundered against the ‘destructionism’, the ‘destructionist policy’ and ‘terrorism’ of the trade unions with their strikes.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn25|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;25&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thanks to Mussolini, all this had ceased in Italy. The fact remains that, in a book whose very title is devoted to the celebration of liberalism, we can read an emphatic eulogy of the coup d’état which, albeit with rough and ready methods, had saved civilization: ‘The merit that Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn26|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;26&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;2. The struggle for recognition by colonial peoples and threats of secession&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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While the struggle for recognition waged by the servants in the metropolis was constantly countered by the threat or implementation of a coup d’état, the more intransigent sectors of the liberal and bourgeois world reacted to the struggle for recognition waged by colonial peoples or peoples of colonial origin with the threat or implementation of secession. This is a dialectic we have already analysed in relation to San Domingo in the late eighteenth century and the British West Indies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. During the July Monarchy, de Tocqueville observed that the colonists, in rejecting any abolitionist project, were denying the French parliament and government ‘the right to take this great work in hand and carry it through’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn27|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;27&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Obviously, in this context the most striking case was the secession of the South of the United States, which effected advancing liberal slogans in defence of the natural right to self-government and the peaceful enjoyment of property. The North’s military victory did not terminate the conflict. Supporters of white supremacy immediately reacted to the fleeting advent of multiracial democracy not only with the lynchings and anti-black terrorism unleashed by the Ku Klux Klan, but by resorting to guerrilla warfare and armed violence. In 1874 an appeal circulated in the South to found a White League to foil by any means attempts by Congress to make black emancipation effective: ‘our war [will be] interminable and merciless’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn28|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;28&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In conclusion, ‘[a]s surely as the struggle between 1861 and 1865 was civil war, so was the conflict from 1865 to 1877, with all the more bitterness and hatred, but less bloodshed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn29|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;29&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#page329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_001.html#pg329&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;329&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;This second stage in the Civil War ended in a substantial victory for the South. While slavery in the strict sense was not reintroduced, a regime of terroristic white supremacy was imposed. Although formally emancipated, the Afro-Americans now embarked on one of the most tragic phases in their history. It might even be said that their condition touched a ‘nadir’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn30|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;30&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] By contrast, racist ‘dogmas’ and ‘racial fundamentalism’ reached their zenith.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn31|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;31&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A sequence of events with notable similarities to the American Civil War unfolded in Great Britain. Here what was at stake was the emancipation not of the blacks but of the Irish. The dominant class in Ulster reacted to the London government’s decision to introduce Home Rule for the island as had the southern US to the challenge of central power, even when democratically elected. It threatened and prepared secession, arming a militia tens of thousands strong. While the planters across the Atlantic could not tolerate the loss of the domination guaranteed to them by the possession of human cattle, the Protestant property-owners in Ireland rejected with horror the prospect of being governed at a local level by Catholic ragamuffins. In both cases the self-government demanded was the self-government that the descendants of the settlers were summoned to enjoy, and which sanctioned white supremacy or Anglo-Protestant supremacy. In both cases the secessionists proclaimed that they were the true inheritors of the American Revolution and the Glorious Revolution, respectively. And only the outbreak of the First World War blocked an impending war of secession in Britain: in Northern Ireland thousands of men armed to the hilt and organized militarily were ready to go into action.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn32|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;32&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;3. The de-humanization of colonial peoples and ‘social cannibalism’&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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On the eve of the First World War, unlike that waged by the servants in the metropolis, the struggle for recognition by colonial servants or servants of colonial origin could boast very few successes. In fact, the advances made by the former on the road of emancipation were often used to widen still further the gulf that separated the dominant ‘European race’ from the rest. In the late nineteenth century, while a sign was displayed at the entrance to some public parks in the southern United States reading ‘No Dogs and Niggers Allowed’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn33|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;33&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg330&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;330&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;in Shanghai the French concession defended its purity by clearly drawing attention to the notice ‘No Entry for Dogs and Chinese’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn34|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;34&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] What made the comparison between colonial populations and domestic animals more credible was certain collective punishments, like that provided for by the British government in India in 1919:&lt;br /&gt;
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[T]he most degrading measure was a ‘crawling order’ imposed on all Indians who passed a narrow lane in the city where a medical missionary, Miss Sherwood, had been assaulted during the disturbances. The humiliation of crawling on all fours to and from one’s home, for many lived in this lane, was not to be forgotten or forgiven by those who were subjected to this indignity, or indeed, by any sensitive Indian.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn35|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;35&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It was only in 1920, after the First World War and the October Revolution, that the chapter of history involving the coolies was definitively concluded, in the wake of a movement of anti-colonial struggle which no longer intended to tolerate ‘the blot of indentured labour’ imprinted by that institution on the whole Indian race.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn36|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;36&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] It is true that, having played a central role in black enslavement and the black slave trade, and then in the promotion of the semi-slavery of the coolies, the liberal West presented itself as the champion of the struggle against slavery. It was precisely with this watchword that it promoted colonial expansion. But this is how a missionary described the work the indigenous population was forced to perform in the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo:&lt;br /&gt;
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Each town and district is forced to bring in a certain quantity to the headquarters of the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; every Sunday. It is collected by force; the soldiers drive the people into the bush. If they will not go, they are shot down, and their left hands cut off and taken as trophies to the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039; … these hands, the hands of men, women and children [are] placed in rows before the &#039;&#039;Commissaire&#039;&#039;.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn37|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;37&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The imposition of forced labour was sometimes bound up with genocidal practices, while on other occasions it gave way to them. In the late nineteenth century Theodore Roosevelt issued a general warning to ‘inferior races’: &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg331&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;331&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;should one of them attack the ‘superior’ race, the latter would be entitled to react with ‘a war of extermination’, destined ‘to put to death man, woman and child, exactly as if they were crusaders’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn38|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;38&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In truth, there were races whose disappearance was desired regardless of their actual behaviour. Franklin greeted as a providential design the slaughter that the rum diffused by the conquerors was wreaking among the Indians. However, according to the charge formulated by loyalists who had taken refuge in Canada, the rebel colonists proceeded directly to the annihilation of entire ethnic groups (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]). In 1851, while the hunt for individual Indians was raging, the governor of California pronounced judgement:&lt;br /&gt;
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That a war of extermination will continue to be waged between the two races until the Indian race becomes extinct, must be expected; while we cannot anticipate this result with but painful regret, the inevitable destiny of the race is beyond the power and wisdom of man to avert.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn39|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;39&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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The programme set out by General Sherman was unambiguous: ‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children. Nothing else will reach the root of the case.’ In the course of his two expeditions against the Cheyenne and the Arapaho, a colonel ordered that even the new-born should be killed and scalped: ‘Nits make lice!’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn40|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;40&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] All this would not seem to have particularly disturbed Theodore Roosevelt: ‘I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are the dead Indians. But I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn41|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;41&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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It should not be thought that this sinister ideology, in its variations and different gradations, caught on exclusively in the United States, where, for obvious historical reasons, the racial question was more acutely felt. Let us take a look at Europe. Lord Acton coldly observed: ‘The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn42|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;42&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] There were races, Disraeli in turn believed, which &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg332&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;experienced ‘exterminat[ion] without persecution, by that irresistible law of Nature which is fatal to curs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn43|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;43&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, this was not a completely spontaneous process, as Disraeli ended up acknowledging, when he mentioned the tragic end of the ‘Aztecs’, ‘overthrown by Cortez and a handful of Goths’, in accordance with ‘the inexorable law of nature’ that sanctioned the complete victory of ‘a superior race’ and the irrevocable defeat of ‘an inferior’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn44|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;44&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] More explicit was Burckhardt, for whom the ‘erasure or enslavement of the weakest races’ seemed to pertain to the ‘great economy of world history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn45|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;45&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Renan, an author who liked to situate himself among the ‘enlightened liberals’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn46|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;46&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] (and who was appreciated by Hayek for his ‘important’ contribution to this intellectual tradition),[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn47|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;47&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] reached the same conclusion: the ‘semi-savage races’ were destined to be subjugated or exterminated by the ‘great Aryan-Semitic family’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn48|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;48&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Not even the greatest figures in the liberal tradition succeeded in mounting effective resistance to this view. This applies to de Tocqueville who, while he drew a decidedly repugnant picture of the Aborigines, was a passionate cantor of the motif of the ‘empty cradle’—that is, of the deadly genealogical myth dear to colonists. And, to a lesser extent, it applies to Mill. His discourse could hardly arouse a strongly sympathetic interest in the victims. The Indians seemed to belong to the ‘community’ whose state, ‘in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts’. In any event, ‘[n]othing but foreign force would induce a tribe of North American Indians to submit to the restraints of a regular and civilised government.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn49|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;49&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No mention is made here of the fated disappearance, still less of the destruction, of the Indians; instead, a temporary pedagogical dictatorship is theorized. However, as emerges from the stance of another distinguished exponent of English liberalism, on the occasion of bitter conflicts the dictatorship over barbarians, having been pedagogical, risked turning exterminatory. After the rebellion that challenged the British Empire in India, Macaulay wrote:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#page333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_002.html#pg333&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;333&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The cruelties of the Sepoy natives have inflamed the Nation to a degree unprecedented within my memory. Peace Societies, Aborigines Protection Societies, and societies for the reformation of criminals are silent. There is one terrible cry to revenge … The almost universal feeling is that not a single Sepoy within the walls of Delhi should be spared, and I own that is a feeling with which I cannot help sympathizing.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn50|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;50&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Expressing genuine dissent were unexpected representatives of the liberal tradition or figures who moved on its margins. While he interpreted the social conflict in the metropolis in a social-Darwinist register, Spencer protested against ‘the barbarous maxim’ that the strongest ‘have a lawful right to whatever territories they can conquer’. What followed the expropriation of the defeated was in fact their ‘extermination’. Paying the price were not only the ‘North American Indians’ and the ‘natives of Australia’; in India ‘whole regiments of [natives] have been put to death, for daring to disobey the tyrannical commands of their oppressors’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn51|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;51&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Unfortunately, ‘we have entered upon an era of social cannibalism in which the strong nations are devouring the weaker’; it could now indeed be said that ‘the white savages of Europe are overrunning the dark savages everywhere’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn52|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;52&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Certainly, Spencer pointed an accusing finger at the state ‘system of colonisation’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn53|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;53&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] at the statism that was now expanding at every level—as if this statism had not accompanied the history of the liberal West from the outset, and as if the terrible practices denounced by Spencer had not often actually been promoted in the name of the self-government and free disposal of property, and had not taken the form (to use Hobson’s phrase) of ‘private slaughter’! (See above, [[#part0011_split_000.html#c07|Chapter 7]], [[#part0011_split_005.html#c07-ftn1|§1]]).&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;4. The ‘final and complete solution’ of the Indian and black questions&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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It was precisely Hobson (an author close to the liberal circles branded ‘socialist’ by von Mises and Hayek) who effectively summed up the attitude to barbarians adopted by the West, and in the first instance the liberal West, which was in &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg334&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;334&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the forefront of colonial expansion in the Far West and overseas. The populations that were susceptible to ‘profitable exploitation by the superior white settlers’ survived, while the rest ‘tend[ed] to disappear’ or be destroyed.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn54|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;54&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In fact, from the late nineteenth century the theme of the inevitable disappearance of savages and peoples who could not be used as forced labour became an obsession. Articulating it were often authors who at the same time saluted the triumph of liberal institutions and ideas in the civilized world. In 1885 a book by a Protestant minister, Josiah Strong, enjoyed extraordinary success. His celebration of ‘liberty’, of ‘self-government’, of ‘the right of the individual to himself’, was passionate.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn55|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;55&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] He frequently appealed to Burke, de Tocqueville, Guizot, Macaulay and Spencer. Strong and emphatic was his assertion of the primacy of the Anglo-Saxon world, which had the merit of quintessentially embodying both ‘love of liberty’ and a ‘genius for colonizing’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn56|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;56&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] that expanded the zone of freedom. But this expansion also entailed the inexorable ‘extinction of inferior races’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn57|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;57&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Albert J. Beveridge, a Republican senator and prominent US political figure, argued in similar fashion at the start of the twentieth century. The homage paid to the ‘gospel of liberty’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn58|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;58&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] the sons of liberty and, in particular, the United States as the country and people that were ‘leading the world to liberty’ went hand in hand with the assertion that ‘a part of the Almighty’s infinite plan [was] the disappearance of debased civilisations and decaying races before the higher civilisation of the nobler and more virile types of man’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn59|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;59&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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A watchword even emerged that was to assume an unambiguously genocidal meaning in the twentieth century and know tragic success. While Strong invoked ‘God’s final and complete solution of the dark problem of heathenism among many inferior peoples’,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn60|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;60&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] in 1913 a book published in Boston evoked the ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘negro problem’ in its title. Even in this instance, it did not involve an author foreign to the liberal world, and not only because he lived and worked in the United States, advancing ideas diffused and echoed even by influential political figures of the time. Far from regretting the ‘abhorrent practice’ of slavery, he identified with the ‘comparatively few liberal and enlightened men’ or ‘liberal intellects’ who had wanted to abolish it when deliberating the ‘splendid instrument’ that was the Constitution of the &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg335&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;335&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;United States, ‘the guiding star of the greatest temporal power in history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn61|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;61&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Nevertheless, in the land of liberty there was no room for races intellectually incapable of participating in the superior ‘Caucasic civilization and culture’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn62|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;62&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In reaching this conclusion, the author knew that he was situated in the wake of Franklin and Jefferson. Happily, nature and the law of the ‘survival of the fittest’ were already acting on their behalf: Afro-Americans were being wiped out by tuberculosis, pneumonia, venereal disease and other illnesses that confirmed the natural inferiority of this people. ‘[F]ew Negro children are born without scrofulous tendencies, rickets, blindness, or other transmitted evidence of ancestral infection’. The ‘ultimate solution’ of the ‘Negro problem’ was in sight, and it would be a happy repeat of the already accomplished final solution of the Amerindian question.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn63|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;63&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In the words of a southern senator who was on the same wavelength, ‘God’s law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, and the extinction of the unfit is operating’, and would bring about ‘a gradual whitening of the South’ and the United States as a whole[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn64|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;64&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]—the touch of white already dreamt of by Franklin.&lt;br /&gt;
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In fact, the Indians had largely been wiped off the face of the earth. In 1876, to celebrate its centenary as an independent country, the United States organized an exhibition in Philadelphia that drew the world’s attention to its extraordinary development. Along with marvels of industry and technology, sideshows exhibited ‘wild children from Borneo, a five-legged horse, and wax figures of famous Indian chiefs’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn65|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;65&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In summer 1911, in a remote part of California, an Indian was discovered who could not communicate in English or Spanish. Ethnological experts subsequently verified that he was a survivor of the Yahi tribe, largely exterminated over the course of a generation. The unknown, who refused to give his name or recount the history of his destroyed family, was put in a museum, where he became an object of much amused curiosity on the part of adults and children, all the more so in that the local press drew attention to the ‘last aborigine’, the ‘wild man of California’, a ‘genuine survivor of Stone Age barbarism’. After his death, his brain was conveniently preserved for further study.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn66|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;66&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] A great philosopher, Edmund Husserl, who was certainly liberal and democratic in orientation, observed twenty &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#page336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_003.html#pg336&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;336&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;years later, alas without any critical accent, that totally foreign to Europe and the West, the Indians (or rather the surviving ones) ‘are exhibited in fairground booths’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn67|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;67&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;5. From the nineteenth to the twentieth century&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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In the years leading up to the outbreak of the second Thirty Years’ War, we witness the accumulation of a mass of explosive material. At the end of the nineteenth century, corresponding to the formation of the Liberty and Property Defence League in England was the formation of the White Leagues (and the Ku Klux Klan) in the United States. At stake was halting or reversing the two struggles for recognition with which we are familiar. Across the Atlantic the restoration of white supremacy registered its triumph as early as 1877; in Europe the Liberty and Property Defence League would have to wait until 1922 to record its first victory, in Italy. The persistent unrest of servants or ex-servants in the metropolis, and of slaves or ex-slaves in the colonies or of colonial origin, and the increasing aggressiveness of the social and political circles that felt threatened by these two agitations, were compounded by contradictions within the community of the free and of Teutonic stock (previously celebrated in its entirety as the chosen people or race of liberty), which now tended to assume an antagonistic form. Moreover, these multiple conflicts were further exacerbated by an ideological climate marked by the assertion of trends—social Darwinism, a racial interpretation of history and conspiracy theory—present from the outset in the liberal tradition, but which now met with ever weaker resistance, rendering a rational understanding and limitation of the conflict impossible. Not by chance have we heard two deadly slogans echo: the first declared that ‘race is everything’; the second invoked the ‘ultimate solution’, or the ‘final and complete solution’, of the racial question!&lt;br /&gt;
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The degree of continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not escaped a whole series of scholars who cannot be suspected of preconceived hostility to the liberal world. While she generously overlooked the North American republic (which had had the merit of offering her refuge), Hannah Arendt explained the genesis of twentieth-century totalitarianism commencing with the colonies of the British Empire. It was here that ‘a new form of government’, ‘a more dangerous form of governing than despotism and &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg337&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;337&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;arbitrariness’ saw the light of day,[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn68|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;68&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] and where the temptation of ‘administrative massacres’ as an instrument for maintaining domination began to emerge.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn69|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;69&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] But especially interesting in this context is the fact that not a few US scholars, in order to explain the history of their country, have turned to the category of ‘master-race democracy’ or &#039;&#039;‘Herrenvolk&#039;&#039; democracy’, in an eloquent linguistic admixture of English and German, and a German that in several respects refers to the history of the Third Reich.&lt;br /&gt;
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Not only the concentration-camp universe as a whole, but also the individual total institutions of the twentieth century, began to take shape well before the end of the supposed &#039;&#039;belle époque&#039;&#039;. We may begin with deportation. The successive bloody deportations of Indians, starting with the one implemented by Jackson’s America (held up as a model of democracy by de Tocqueville), recall the ‘horrors created by the Nazi handling of subject peoples’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn70|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;70&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The Indians were not the only victims of this practice. The slave trade represented ‘the largest involuntary movement of human beings in all history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn71|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;71&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The deportees were subsequently forced to work in a slave plantation that bore some similarities to the concentration camp.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn72|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;72&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The comparison does not seem exaggerated. Precisely in this context the process of de-humanization reached levels that were difficult to match. In Jamaica, in the liberal British Empire of the mid-eighteenth century, we find a type of punishment at work that speaks volumes: ‘a slave was forced to defecate into the offending slave’s mouth, which was then wired shut for four or five hours’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn73|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;73&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Even his completely innocent fellow slaves were forced to participate in the de-humanization of the victim and, with him, of the ethnic group. Should all this not seem sufficiently cruel, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, white supremacy was imposed in the United States:&lt;br /&gt;
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Notices of lynchings were printed in local papers, and extra cars added to trains for spectators from miles around, sometimes thousands of them. Schoolchildren might get a day off school to attend the lynching.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg338&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;338&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;The spectacle could include castration, skinning, roasting, hanging, and shooting. Souvenirs for purchasers might include fingers, toes, teeth and bones, even genitals of the victim, as well as picture postcards of the event.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn74|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;74&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Once again we encounter a process of de-humanization difficult to emulate.&lt;br /&gt;
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First in the North and then, after the Civil War, in the South, notionally ‘free’ blacks suffered humiliation and persecution of every kind. In fact, stresses a historian in language that once again demands our attention, they became the target of veritable ‘pogroms’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn75|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;75&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Carrying them out were gangs already active in the North in the 1820s and 1830s and which later, in the South, achieved consummate form in the Ku Klux Klan, an organization that seems to anticipate the ‘Blackshirts’ of Italian fascism and the ‘Brownshirts’ of German Nazism.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn76|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;76&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] No less brutal than extra-legal violence was official justice: in the South blacks continued to be subject to a prison system so sadistic that it calls to mind ‘the prison camps of Nazi Germany’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn77|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;77&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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In any event, the two situations were united by the violence of racist ideology. Theodore Roosevelt can calmly be approximated to Hitler.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn78|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;78&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Over and above individual figures, we must not lose sight of the general picture: ‘The effort to guarantee “race purity” in the American South anticipated aspects of the official Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.’ If we bear in mind the rule whereby a single drop of impure blood was enough for someone to be excluded from the white community in the South of the United States, a conclusion dictates itself: ‘the Nazi definition of a Jew was never as stringent as “the one-drop rule” that prevailed in the categorization of Negroes in the race-purity laws of the American South.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn79|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;79&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Again, two US scholars have recently referred to the ‘Nazi Connection’, or the ‘American legacy’ present in Nazism, to explain the parabola of eugenics, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg339&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;339&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the ‘science’ born in liberal England and massively diffused in the other classic country of that intellectual tradition, which experienced its greatest triumphs in the Third Reich![[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn80|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;80&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] In this connection we in fact encounter a paradox. Having disappeared together with Hitler’s Germany, eugenic measures continued to survive for some time in the United States. Let us observe the situation in 1952: ‘At the present time some thirty states in the Union legally forbid “interracial marriage.” In almost all these states miscegenation is a felony; in many a crime.’ Regarded as elements of contamination were not only ‘Negroes’ but also, in this or that state, ‘Mulattoes’, ‘Indians’, ‘Mongolians’, Koreans, ‘members of the Malay race’, Chinese, or ‘[any] person of negro or Indian descent to the third generation inclusive’, or even anyone ‘having one-eighth or more negro, Japanese or Chinese blood’, or even someone with ‘one-fourth or more’ ‘Kanak [Hawaiian] blood’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn81|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;81&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Reporting these facts is a US scholar who feels obliged to draw a bitter conclusion in respect of ‘racism’ (and Nazism): ‘The monster that has been let loose upon the world is to a large extent of our own making, and whether we are willing to face the fact or not we are, all of us, individually and collectively, responsible for the ghastly form which he has assumed.’[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn82|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;82&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Finally, genocide. An eminent scholar, Tzvetan Todorov, has defined the destruction of the Indians, whose final chapter was written in the English colonies in America and then in the United States, as ‘the greatest genocide in human history’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn83|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;83&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] As for the tragedy of the natives in America, Australia or the British colonies in general, other authors have referred, respectively, to the ‘American holocaust’ (or the ‘final solution’ of the Amerindian question), the ‘Australian holocaust’ and ‘late Victorian holocausts’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn84|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;84&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Not to mention the ‘black holocaust’—the deportation and enslavement of the survivors, who numbered one in three or four—that Afro-Americans seek to draw attention to, and whose main protagonist was the liberal world. Finally, branded as the author of a tragedy to be regarded as the prototype of twentieth-century genocides, &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#page340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_004.html#pg340&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;340&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;the principal official (Sir Charles Edward Trevelyan) of the British policy that led to the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Irish in the mid-nineteenth century has sometimes been defined as the ‘proto-Eichmann’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn85|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;85&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
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This is not the place to proceed to a comparative history of massacres, decimations and genocides, or to discuss the pertinence of the categories employed to describe them. But one point seems to me to be settled: it is banally ideological to characterize the catastrophe of the twentieth century as a kind of new barbarian invasion that unexpectedly attacked and overwhelmed a healthy, happy society. The horror of the twentieth century casts a shadow over the liberal world even if we ignore the fate reserved for peoples of colonial origin. ‘Totalitarian society’: thus has been defined the one that swallowed up deportees from Britain in Australia.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn86|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;86&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] And, with particular reference to the ‘development of industrial capitalism’ in England, it has been claimed that ‘the gulag is not a twentieth-century invention’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn87|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;87&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] The usual hagiography proves unfounded even when, in reconstructing the liberal world, we restrict ourselves to analysing the metropolis and the white community.&lt;br /&gt;
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Let us take an author celebrated by de Tocqueville as the apex of the liberal tradition. Jefferson raised the spectre of genocide in three very different contexts. He referred to ‘extermination’ in connection with the Indians as a process that was underway in the United States, could not be stopped, and was in fact to be attributed exclusively to the British. He pointed to the ‘extermination’ of the blacks as the inevitable outcome of the utopia of constructing a multiracial society. Finally, he experienced the clash with Britain as a total war, destined to issue in the ‘extermination’ of one of the contending parties (see above, [[#part0005_split_000.html#c01|Chapter 1]], [[#part0005_split_007.html#c01-ftn5|§5]]; [[#part0009_split_000.html#c05|Chapter 5]], [[#part0009_split_015.html#c05-ftn14|§14]]; and [[#part0012_split_000.html#c08|Chapter 8]], [[#part0012_split_015.html#c08-ftn16|§16]]). As we can see, even a conflict completely internal to the community of the free provoked an ideological violence that might well bring to mind the twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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== &#039;&#039;&#039;6. After the catastrophe and beyond hagiography: the enduring legacy of liberalism&#039;&#039;&#039; ==&lt;br /&gt;
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The horror of the twentieth century was not something that burst into a world of peaceful coexistence suddenly and from without. At the same time, being dissatisfied with the edifying picture of the habitual hagiography and situating oneself on the firm ground of reality, with its contradictions and conflicts, does &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg341&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;341&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;not in any way mean denying the merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination. But we certainly must bid farewell once and for all to the myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.&lt;br /&gt;
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Meanwhile, the presupposition of that discourse turns out to be wholly imaginary: the community of the free asserted itself demanding both negative and positive liberty, while excluding populations of colonial origin and metropolitan semi-slaves and servants from both. In addition, I would like to adduce a series of reasons, which I shall set out in ascending order of importance.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the first place, it should not be forgotten that not only did the classics of the liberal tradition refer to democracy with coldness, hostility and sometimes frank contempt, but regarded its advent as an unlawful, intolerable rupture of the social contract and hence as a legitimate cause for the ‘appeal to Heaven’ (in Locke’s words) or to arms.&lt;br /&gt;
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Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the exclusion clauses were not overcome painlessly, but through violent upheavals of a sometimes quite unprecedented violence. The abolition of slavery in the wake of the Civil War cost the United States more victims than both world wars combined. As for censitary discrimination, a decisive contribution was made to its abolition by the French revolutionary cycle. Finally, in major countries like Russia, Germany and the United States the accession of women to political rights had behind it the war and revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century.&lt;br /&gt;
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Thirdly, in addition to not being painless, the historical process that resulted in the advent of democracy was quite the reverse of unilinear. Emancipation—that is, the acquisition of rights previously not recognized or enjoyed—might well be followed by dis-emancipation—that is, deprivation of the rights whose recognition and enjoyment the excluded had won. Asserted in France in the wake of the February 1848 revolution, universal (male) suffrage was abolished two years later by the liberal bourgeoisie and was shortly afterwards reintroduced not as a result of the maturation of liberalism, but by the coup d’état of Louis Napoleon, who used it to stage the ritual of plebiscitary acclamation. In this context the most striking example is provided by the United States. The end of the Civil War inaugurated the happiest phase in the history of Afro-Americans, who now won civil and political rights and began to participate in representative bodies. But this was a kind of brief interlude in the tragedy. The 1877 compromise between the whites of the North and South involved the loss of political and, often, civil rights for blacks, as is attested by the regime of racial segregation and the savage violence of pogroms and lynching. This phase &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg342&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;342&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;of dis-emancipation, which developed in a society that continued to define itself as liberal, lasted almost a century.&lt;br /&gt;
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There is then a fourth reason. The process of emancipation very often had a spur completely external to the liberal world. The abolition of slavery in British colonies cannot be understood without the black revolution in San Domingo, which was viewed with horror, and often combated, by the liberal world as a whole. Around thirty years afterwards, the institution of slavery had been abolished even in the United States. But we know that the most ardent abolitionists were accused by their opponents of being influenced or infected by French and Jacobin ideas. The brief experience of multiracial democracy was followed a long phase of dis-emancipation marked by a terroristic white supremacy. When was the turning point? In December 1952 the US Justice Secretary sent the Supreme Court, which was engaged in deliberating on the issue of integration in public schools, an eloquent letter: ‘Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.’ Washington, observes the American historian who has reconstructed this story, ran the risk of alienating the ‘colored races’ not only in the East and the Third World, but in the very heart of the United States. Even there communist propaganda met with considerable success in its attempt to win blacks to the ‘revolutionary cause’, making them lose ‘faith in American institutions’.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;88&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] On close examination, first slavery and then the terrorist regime of white supremacy were thrown into crisis by the San Domingo revolt and the October Revolution, respectively. The implementation of an essential principle, if not of liberalism then of liberal democracy (in the usual sense of the term), is inconceivable without the decisive contribution of two of the chapters of history most hated by the liberal culture of the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fifth and final reason is the most important. I refer to the tangle of emancipation and dis-emancipation that distinguishes the individual stages in the process of overcoming the exclusion clauses characteristic of the liberal tradition. In the United States the disappearance of censitary discrimination, and affirmation of the principle of political equality, were aided by the quantitative containment and political and social neutralization of the ‘dangerous classes’, thanks to the expropriation and deportation of Indians—which for a long time made it possible to enlarge the class of landowners—and the enslavement of blacks. In Europe extension of the suffrage in the nineteenth &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg343&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;343&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;century proceeded in tandem with colonial expansion and the imposition of forced labour on peoples or ‘races’ deemed barbarous or childlike. This tangle sometimes presented itself in a decidedly tragic form. Subject to humiliation, discrimination and persecution of every kind in the South, Afro-Americans sought to win recognition by participating in the front line in the Union’s wars. And so in some circles homage began to be paid to the courage displayed by soldiers of colour in the Battle of Wounded Knee.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;89&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] Thus, blacks’ hopes for emancipation took the form—were obliged to take the form—of their active participation in destroying Indians!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, it is precisely from such historical reconstruction, remote from any apologetic, edifying tones, that the genuine merits and real strong points of liberalism emerge. Demonstrating an extraordinary flexibility, it constantly sought to react and rise to the challenges of the time. It is true that, far from being spontaneous and painless, such transformation was largely imposed from without, by political and social movements with which liberalism has repeatedly and fiercely clashed. But precisely in this resides its flexibility. Liberalism has proved capable of learning from its antagonist (the tradition of thinking that, starting with ‘radicalism’ and passing through Marx, issued in the revolutions which variously invoked him) to a far greater extent than its antagonist has proved capable of learning from it. Above all, the antagonist has proved incapable of learning what constitutes the second major strong point of liberalism. Certainly, liberalism’s learning process was quite the reverse of smooth, at least for those who wanted to overcome the exclusion clauses that run deep in this intellectual tradition. None has been as committed as it to thinking through the decisive problem of the limitation of power. However, historically, this limitation of power went hand in hand with the delimitation of a restricted sacred space: nurturing a proud, exclusivist self-consciousness, the community of the freemen inhabiting it was led to regard enslavement, or more or less explicit subjection, imposed on the great mass dispersed throughout the profane space, as legitimate. Sometimes they even arrived at decimation or annihilation. Has this dialectic on the basis of which liberalism was transformed into an ideology of domination, and even an ideology of war, wholly disappeared?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In economics, clearly distancing itself from an insipid ideology of social harmony miraculously lacking any element of contradiction, conflict and tension, liberal thought has vigorously insisted on the need for competition between individuals in the market, in order to develop social wealth and the productive forces. This is a further, major historical merit to be acknowledged. &amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#page344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0014_split_005.html#pg344&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;344&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;However, at this level, too, there emerged the awful exclusion clauses we are already familiar with. Far from being a site where all individuals freely meet as sellers and buyers of commodities, for centuries the liberal market was a site of exclusion, de-humanization and even terror. In the past the ancestors of today’s black citizens were commodities, not autonomous buyers and sellers. And for centuries the market functioned as an instrument of terror: even more than the lash, what imposed total obedience on the slave was the threat of being sold, like a commodity exchanged on the market, separately from other family members.[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90|&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;90&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;]] For a long time indentured white servants were also bought and sold on the market, and thus condemned to a fate not very different from that of black slaves. And in the name of the market, workers’ coalitions were repressed and economic and social rights ignored and denied, with a consequent commodification of essential aspects of the human personality and human dignity (health, education, and so on). In extreme cases the superstitious cult of the Market sealed huge tragedies, like the one which in 1847 saw Britain condemn an enormous mass of actual (Irish) individuals to death from starvation. Is all this a definitively concluded chapter of history? Moreover, has liberalism definitively left behind it the dialectic of emancipation and dis-emancipation, with the dangers of regression and restoration implicit in it? Or is this dialectic still alive and well, thanks to the malleability peculiar to this current of thought?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Yet however difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task. On the other hand, liberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it. If one starts out from such a presupposition, the tragedy of peoples subjected to slavery or semi-slavery, or deported, decimated and destroyed, becomes utterly inexplicable. This was a tragedy which, far from being impeded or prevented by the liberal world, developed in close connection with it. Unfounded on a historiographical level, the habitual hagiography is also an insult to the memory of the victims. Only in opposition to the pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a ‘counter-history’: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;footnote&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn1a|1]] On all this, cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1993, ch. 1, §7 (on the plural vote) and &#039;&#039;passim&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn2a|2]] Necker, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant et Napoléon&#039;&#039;, Paris: Plon, 1959, p. 7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn3a|3]] Constant, quoted in Henri Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant muscadin&#039;&#039;, Paris: Gallimard, 1958 ibid., p. 249.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn4a|4]] Constant, quoted in ibid., pp. 76–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn5a|5]] Germaine de Staël-Holstein, &#039;&#039;Considérations sur la Révolution française&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacques Godechot, Paris: Tallandier, 1983, p. 347.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn6a|6]] According to the testimony of J. Mallet du Pan, quoted in Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, p. 37.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn7a|7]] Guillemin, &#039;&#039;Madame de Staël&#039;&#039;, pp. 8–19 and &#039;&#039;Benjamin Constant&#039;&#039;, pp. 29, 63n.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn8a|8]] François Guizot, &#039;&#039;Mélanges politiques et historiques&#039;&#039;, Paris: Lévy, 1869, pp. iii–iv.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn9a|9]] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, &#039;&#039;Werke&#039;&#039;, 38 vols, Berlin: Dietz, 1955–89, vol. 17, p. 278.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn10a|10]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, London: Colburn, 1852, pp. 554–6.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn11a|11]] Cf. Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Democrazia o bonapartismo&#039;&#039;, ch. 2, §1; ch. 3, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn12a|12]] Alexis de Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob-Peter Mayer, Paris: Gallimard, (1951–), vol. 6, pt 2, p. 108 (letter to Nassau William Senior, 8 March 1849).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn13a|13]] This emerges from a conversation of 25 May 1848 reported by Nassau William Senior: cf. ibid., vol. 6, pt 2, pp. 242–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn14a|14]] Ibid., vol. 12, p. 176.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn15a|15]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 52 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn16a|16]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 31 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 27 August 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn17a|17]] Ibid., vol. 7, p. 143 (letter to Francis Lieber, 4 August 1852).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn18a|18]] Ibid., vol. 8, pt 2, p. 53 (letter to Gustave de Beaumont, 24 September 1848).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn19a|19]] Ibid., vol. 3, pt 1, p. 236.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn20a|20]] Richard Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1951, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn21a|21]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;La Seconda Repubblica&#039;&#039;, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1994, ch. 2, §1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn22a|22]] Einaudi, quoted in Paolo Favilli, &#039;&#039;Riformismo e sindicalismo&#039;&#039;, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1984, pp. 106–7.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn23a|23]] See, especially, Vilfedo Pareto, ‘L’éclipse de la liberté’, in &#039;&#039;Mythes et idéologies&#039;&#039;, ed. Giovanni Busino, Geneva: Droz, 1966, pp. 224–5; Thomas Mackay, Introduction to George Howell, ‘Liberty for Labour’, in Herbert Spencer &#039;&#039;et al., A Plea for Liberty&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, pp. vii, xii (on Pareto’s adhesion to the League).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn24a|24]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn25a|25]] Ludwig von Mises, &#039;&#039;Die Gemeinwirtschaft&#039;&#039;, Jena: Fischer, 1922, pp. 469ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_000.html#c10-ftn26a|26]] Mises, &#039;&#039;Liberalism&#039;&#039;, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn27a|27]] Tocqueville, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 3, pt 1, p. 116.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn28a|28]] Richard Hofstadter, ed., &#039;&#039;Great Issues in American History&#039;&#039;, New York: Vintage Books, 1958–82, vol. 3, p. 43–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn29a|29]] John Hope Franklin, &#039;&#039;From Slavery to Freedom&#039;&#039;, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 328.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn30a|30]] Rayford W. Logan, &#039;&#039;The Betrayal of the Negro&#039;&#039;, New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, p. xxi.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn31a|31]] Stanley M. Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 13, 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_001.html#c10-ftn32a|32]] Cf. Jan Morris, &#039;&#039;Pax Brittanica&#039;&#039;, London: Folio Society, 1992, vol. 3, pp. 179–85.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn33a|33]] Leon F. Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 467.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn34a|34]] Office d’Information, &#039;&#039;Les droits de l’homme en Chine&#039;&#039;, Beijing, 1991, p. 3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn35a|35]] Michael Brecher, &#039;&#039;Nehru&#039;&#039;, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 63.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn36a|36]] Hugh Tinker, &#039;&#039;A New System of Slavery&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 364.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn37a|37]] Colm Tóibín, ‘The Tragedy of Roger Casement’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 27 May 2004, p. 53.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn38a|38]] Theodore Roosevelt, &#039;&#039;Letters&#039;&#039;, ed. Elting E. Morison and John M. Blum, 8 vols, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1951–54, vol. 1, p. 377 (letter to Charles Henry Pearson, 11 May 1894).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn39a|39]] Reginald Horsman, &#039;&#039;Race and Manifest Destiny&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 279.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn40a|40]] Dee Brown, &#039;&#039;Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee&#039;&#039;, London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1970, p. 90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn41a|41]] Roosevelt, quoted in Hofstadter, &#039;&#039;The American Political Tradition&#039;&#039;, p. 208.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn42a|42]] Lord Acton, &#039;&#039;Selected Writings&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985–88, vol. 1, p. 261.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn43a|43]] Benjamin Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Coningsby&#039;&#039;, ed. Sheila M. Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 221.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn44a|44]] Disraeli, &#039;&#039;Lord George Bentinck&#039;&#039;, p. 495.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn45a|45]] Jacob Burckhardt, &#039;&#039;Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen&#039;&#039;, ed. Jacob Oeri, in &#039;&#039;Gesammelte Werke&#039;&#039;, vol. 4, Basel: Schwabe, 1978, p. 190.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn46a|46]] Ernest Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, ed. Henriette Psichari, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–, vol. 1, p. 443.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn47a|47]] Friedrich von Hayek, &#039;&#039;The Constitution of Liberty&#039;&#039;, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p. 435 n. 32.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn48a|48]] Renan, &#039;&#039;Oeuvres complètes&#039;&#039;, vol. 8, p. 585.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn49a|49]] John Stuart Mill, &#039;&#039;Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government&#039;&#039;, ed. Harry B. Acton, London: Dent, 1972, pp. 197, 178.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn50a|50]] Macaulay, quoted in Eric Williams, &#039;&#039;British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972, p. 152.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn51a|51]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn52a|52]] Herbert Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer&#039;&#039;, ed. David Duncan, London: Routledge and Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 410 (letter to Moncure D. Conway, 17 July 1898).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_002.html#c10-ftn53a|53]] Spencer, &#039;&#039;The Man versus the State&#039;&#039;, p. 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn54a|54]] J.A. Hobson, &#039;&#039;Imperialism&#039;&#039;, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 253.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn55a|55]] Josiah Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1963, p. 200.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn56a|56]] Ibid., pp. 200, 212.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn57a|57]] Ibid., p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn58a|58]] Albert J. Beveridge, &#039;&#039;The Meaning of the Times&#039;&#039;, Freeport (NY): Books for Libraries Press, 1968, pp. 50, 288.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn59a|59]] Ibid., p. 42.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn60a|60]] Strong, &#039;&#039;Our Country&#039;&#039;, p. 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn61a|61]] Edward Eggleston, &#039;&#039;The Ultimate Solution of the American Negro Problem&#039;&#039;, New York: AMS Press, 1973, pp. 133–5, 141–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn62a|62]] Ibid., p. 62.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn63a|63]] Ibid., pp. 183–5, 224.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn64a|64]] John Sharp Williams, quoted in George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;The Black Image in the White Mind&#039;&#039;, Hanover (NH): Wesleyan University Press, 1987, pp. 257–8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn65a|65]] Richard Slotkin, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Environment&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper Perennial, 1994, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn66a|66]] Clifford Geertz, ‘Morality Tale’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 7 October 2004, p. 4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_003.html#c10-ftn67a|67]] Cf. Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Heidegger and the Ideology of War&#039;&#039;, trans. Marella and Jon Morris, Amherst (NY): Humanity Books, 2001, ch. 3, §8.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn68a|68]] Hannah Arendt, &#039;&#039;The Origins of Totalitarianism&#039;&#039;, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966, pp. 186, 212–13.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn69a|69]] Ibid., pp. 131, 133–4, 216.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn70a|70]] Thus William T. Hagan, quoted in agreement by Laurence M. Hauptman, &#039;&#039;Between Two Fires&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn71a|71]] Davis, quoted in Gordon S. Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November 2004, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn72a|72]] Elkins, &#039;&#039;Slavery&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn73a|73]] Wood, ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, p. 43.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn74a|74]] C. Vann Woodward, ‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February 1998, p. 16.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn75a|75]] Richard Maxwell Brown, &#039;&#039;Strain of Violence&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 30.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn76a|76]] Nancy MacLean, &#039;&#039;Behind the Mask of Chivalry&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 184.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn77a|77]] Fletcher M. Green, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951, p. 215.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn78a|78]] Pierre L. Van den Berghe, &#039;&#039;Race and Racism&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967, p. 13; Thomas G. Dyer, &#039;&#039;Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race&#039;&#039;, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980, p. xiii.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn79a|79]] George M. Frederickson, &#039;&#039;Racism&#039;&#039;, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 2, 124.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn80a|80]] Stefan Kühl, &#039;&#039;The Nazi Connection&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; Edwin Black, &#039;&#039;War against the Weak&#039;&#039;, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003, pp. 385–409.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn81a|81]] Ashley Montagu, &#039;&#039;Man’s Most Dangerous Myth&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1966, pp. 302ff.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn82a|82]] Ibid., p. 265.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn83a|83]] Tzvetan Todorov, &#039;&#039;The Conquest of America&#039;&#039;, trans. Richard Howard, London: Harper Perennial, 1992, p. 5.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn84a|84]] David E. Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Philippe Jacquin, &#039;&#039;Storia degli indiani d’America&#039;&#039;, trans. Franco Moccia, Milan: Mondadori, 1976; Thomas Schmid, ‘Australiens Holocaust’, &#039;&#039;Die Zeit&#039;&#039;, 31 May 2000; Mike Davis, &#039;&#039;Late Victorian Holocausts&#039;&#039;, London and New York: Verso, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn85a|85]] Domenico Losurdo, &#039;&#039;Antonio Gramsci dal liberalism al ‘comunismo critico’&#039;&#039;, Rome: Gamberetti, 1997, ch. 5, §§10, 13; Stannard, &#039;&#039;American Holocaust&#039;&#039;, pp. 317–18 n. 9.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn86a|86]] Robert Hughes, &#039;&#039;The Fatal Shore&#039;&#039;, London: Collins Harvill, 1987, p. 383.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_004.html#c10-ftn87a|87]] Robert Castel, &#039;&#039;Les métamorphoses de la question sociale&#039;&#039;, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 157.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn88a|88]] C. Vann Woodward, &#039;&#039;The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 131–4.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn89a|89]] Litwack, &#039;&#039;Trouble in Mind&#039;&#039;, p. 463.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[#part0014_split_005.html#c10-ftn90a|90]] Walter Johnson, &#039;&#039;Soul by Soul&#039;&#039;, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 19, 22–3.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
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Van den Berghe, Pierre L., &#039;&#039;Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective&#039;&#039;, New York: Wiley, 1967.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Venturi, Franco, &#039;&#039;Settecento riformatore&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1969–90.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Villari, Pasquale, &#039;&#039;Dai carteggi&#039;&#039;, ed. Maria Luisa Cicalese, Rome: Istituto storico per l’età moderna e contemporanea, 1984.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Voltaire, &#039;&#039;Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations&#039;&#039;, 2 vols, ed. René Pomeau, Paris: Garnier, 1963 [1751].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Candide and Other Stories&#039;&#039;, transl. and introd. Roger Pearson, London: Everyman’s Library, 1992 [1759].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Philosophical Letters&#039;&#039;, transl. Ernest Dilworth, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003 [1734].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, &#039;&#039;The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield&#039;&#039;, ed. M. F. Lloyd Prichard, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1968.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wallerstein, Immanuel, &#039;&#039;The Modern World System&#039;&#039;, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press, 1974–89.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wallon, Henri-Alexandre, Introduction to &#039;&#039;Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité&#039;&#039;, vol. 1, Aalen: Scientia, 1974 [1879].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wang, Nora, Xin Ye, and Lou Wang, &#039;&#039;Victor Hugo et le sac du Palais d’été&#039;&#039;, Paris: Indes savants, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Washburn, Wilcomb E., &#039;&#039;The Indian in America&#039;&#039;, New York: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1975.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Washington, George, &#039;&#039;A Collection&#039;&#039;, ed. William B. Allen, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1988.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Weber, Max, ‘Der Sinn der “Wertfreiheit” der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften’, in &#039;&#039;Methodologische Schriften. Studiensausgabe&#039;&#039;, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968 [1917].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#page361&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;&amp;lt;span id=&amp;quot;part0015.html#pg361&amp;quot; class=&amp;quot;pagebreak&amp;quot; title=&amp;quot;361&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/span&amp;gt;Wiener, Joel H., &#039;&#039;Great Britain: The Lion at Home—A Documentary History of Domestic Policy, 1689–1973&#039;&#039;, New York: Chelsea House, 1983.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wilberforce, Robert Isaac, &#039;&#039;The Life of William Wilberforce, by His Sons&#039;&#039;, 5 vols, London: Murray, 1838.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Williams, Eric E., &#039;&#039;From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492–1969&#039;&#039;, New York and Evanston: Harper &amp;amp;amp; Row, 1970.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——British Historians and the West Indies&#039;&#039;, New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972 [1964].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——Capitalism and Slavery&#039;&#039;, London: Deutsch, 1990 [1942].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Williamson, Joel, &#039;&#039;New People: Miscegenation and Mulattos in the United States&#039;&#039;, New York: Free Press, 1980.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wills, Garry, &#039;&#039;‘Negro President’: Jefferson and the Slave Power&#039;&#039;, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wolf, Eric R., &#039;&#039;Europe and the Peoples without History&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wood, Forrest G., &#039;&#039;Black Scare: The Racist Response to Emancipation and Reconstruction&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Wood, Gordon S., ‘What Slavery Was Really Like’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 18 November, 2004.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Woodward, C. Vann, &#039;&#039;Origins of the New South 1877–1913&#039;&#039;, Louisiana State University Press and Littlefield Fund for Southern History, University of Texas, 1951.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——The Strange Career of Jim Crow&#039;&#039;, 2nd edn, New York: OUP, 1966 [1955].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;——&#039;&#039;‘Dangerous Liaison’, &#039;&#039;New York Review of Books&#039;&#039;, 19 February, 1998.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zilversmit, Arthur, &#039;&#039;The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North&#039;&#039;, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969 [1967].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zimmer, Anne Y., &#039;&#039;Jonathan Boucher, Loyalist in Exile&#039;&#039;, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zitomersky, Joseph, ‘Culture, classe ou État? Comment interpréter les relations raciales dans la Grande Louisiane française avant et après 1803?’, in Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, eds, &#039;&#039;La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson et de Miranda&#039;&#039;, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 2001.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Zuckerman, Michael, &#039;&#039;Almost Chosen People: Oblique Biographies in the American Grain&#039;&#039;, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59288</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59288"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T07:29:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added the Cuban revolution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marxism|Read more]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Base and superstructure]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Reserve army of labour]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Alienation]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Cuban Revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Democratic Republic of Yemen]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Mozambique]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;!-- Copy and paste this template --&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=&lt;br /&gt;
|content=&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59286</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59286"/>
		<updated>2023-11-05T07:27:12Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added more Marxian economic theory to the list&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marxism|Read more]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Base and superstructure]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Reserve army of labour]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Alienation]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Democratic Republic of Yemen]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Mozambique]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;!-- Copy and paste this template --&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=&lt;br /&gt;
|content=&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59177</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59177"/>
		<updated>2023-11-04T19:31:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Sort revolutionaries alphabetically&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marxism|Read more]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Democratic Republic of Yemen]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Mozambique]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;!-- Copy and paste this template --&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=&lt;br /&gt;
|content=&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59174</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59174"/>
		<updated>2023-11-04T19:27:44Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added more former socialist countries&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marxism|Read more]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
(not actually alphabetical yet)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Democratic Republic of Yemen]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Angola]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Mozambique]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;!-- Copy and paste this template --&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=&lt;br /&gt;
|content=&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59172</id>
		<title>Portal:Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Portal:Marxism&amp;diff=59172"/>
		<updated>2023-11-04T19:21:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added the former eastern bloc countries&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Portal CSS}}{{Library homepage}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal banner|image=Marx_and_Engels_1848.png|title=Marxism portal|title color=white}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content= == Introduction ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]] in the mid 1800s.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism as a framework contains three components: the philosophical side (dialectical materialism), the economic theory (labour theory of value), and the political analysis (class struggle). Used together, Marxism becomes a very powerful tool with which to analyze the world and the [[contradictions]] inherently present in capitalism that inevitably create the foundations for [[socialism]] and then [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels themselves did not invent socialism, as several theorists had already coined the term and used it. However, these thinkers lacked a grounded framework with which to advocate for socialism and bring it about in society, and became known as [[utopian socialism|utopian socialists]]. Marxism instead analyzes the world through its three components and, due to this methodic approach, became known as [[scientific socialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marxism|Read more]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== Concepts ==&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin wrote the three sources and components of Marxism to be:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;portal&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Labour theory of value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Value]] and [[Exchange value]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Commodity]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Commodity fetishism]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Start here:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Contradiction]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Praxis]]&lt;br /&gt;
Then follow up with:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Historical materialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** And its opposite, [[Idealism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Dialectics]]&lt;br /&gt;
** And its opposite, [[metaphysics]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=4&lt;br /&gt;
|content==== Class struggle ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Social class]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Proletariat]]&lt;br /&gt;
** [[Bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[Comprador bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
*** [[National bourgeoisie]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And historic events:&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Russian revolution of 1917]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Chinese revolution]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12|border=no&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Library works==&lt;br /&gt;
We recommend works from the most important theorists of communism:&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;div class=&amp;quot;library-container&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Karl Marx|image=Marx_colorised_thumb.jpeg|category=Library works by Karl Marx}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Friedrich Engels|image=Engels colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Friedrich Engels|}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Vladimir Lenin|image=Lenin colorised thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Vladimir Lenin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Joseph Stalin|image=Iosif Stalin colorised thumb.png|category=Library works by Joseph Stalin}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Library card mid|name=Mao Zedong|image=Mao Zedong thumb.jpg|category=Library works by Mao Zedong}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Currents==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Maoism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hoxhaism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Trotskyism]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=6&lt;br /&gt;
|content=== People ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Marx.jpg|150px|thumb|Picture of Karl Marx, the founder of [[scientific socialism]]]]&lt;br /&gt;
There have been many important people to Marxism. Below, in alphabetical order, are some of them:&lt;br /&gt;
(not actually alphabetical yet)&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Karl Marx]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Friedrich Engels]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Vladimir Lenin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Mao Zedong]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Kim Il Sung]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=12&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Historical gallery==}}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=7&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Parties==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Communist parties}} }}&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=5&lt;br /&gt;
|content===Countries==&lt;br /&gt;
Sorted by date of proclamation:&lt;br /&gt;
=== Former Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Socialist Republic of Albania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of Bulgaria]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Polish People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[German Democratic Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Hungarian People&#039;s Republic]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Currently Existing Socialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
* [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Republic of Cuba]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/div&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;!-- Copy and paste this template --&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{{Portal container|width=&lt;br /&gt;
|content=&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/noinclude&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Main_Administration_of_Camps&amp;diff=58816</id>
		<title>Main Administration of Camps</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Main_Administration_of_Camps&amp;diff=58816"/>
		<updated>2023-11-02T15:39:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Fixed grammar and spelling&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Gulag Location Map.svg|thumb|Map of all gulag prisons in the USSR. They were not all operating at the same time. Notably, it appears most were opened around Moscow and other large cities.]]&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;&#039;Main Administration of Camps&#039;&#039;&#039; (Russian: &#039;&#039;Главное управление лагерей&#039;&#039;) abbreviated as &#039;&#039;&#039;GULag&#039;&#039;&#039;, was the system of prisons, remote camps, psychiatric hospitals and special laboratories that housed prisoners and fulfilled their penal sentences in the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the opening of the USSR archives in the early 1990s, it was confirmed that most of the prisoners were convicted of regular crimes and were not political prisoners or [[Counterrevolution|counterrevolutionaries]]. At the peak of the GULag system, shortly after the [[Second World War]] in 1951, 2.4% of the adult Soviet population was entangled in the system in some way.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Saed Teymuri|newspaper=The Stalinist Katyusha|title=The Truth about the Soviet Gulag - Surprisingly Revealed by the CIA|date=2018-10-31|url=|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401100827/https://stalinistkatyusha.wixsite.com/stalinist-katyusha/single-post/2018/10/04/The-Truth-about-the-Soviet-Gulag---Surprisingly-Revealed-by-the-CIA|archive-date=2019-04-01|retrieved=2022-09-11}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Central Intelligence Agency|year=1957|title=Four reports covering various aspects of forced labor in the USSR from 1945 to 1955|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/File:CIA_four_reports_on_forced_labour_in_USSR,_1945-1955.pdf}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; 20 to 40% of prisoners were released every year.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Austin Murphy|year=2000|title=The Triumph of Evil|chapter=The Documented Facts about Eastern Europe and Communism|page=|pdf=https://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil.pdf|city=Fucecchio|publisher=European Press Academic Publishing|isbn=8883980026}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many gulags were mostly self-sufficient, especially the more remote ones. Most could be compared to small villages or towns, and the less accessible ones did not even need any enclosures such as fences or walls; inmates were free to move around the prison as they pleased. The belief in the USSR was that labour was rehabilitative, and thus putting inmates to work for their benefit as well as the benefit of the collective (the building of the [[Volga canal]], for example) was believed to help discourage people from committing crimes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Establishment ===&lt;br /&gt;
The GULag administration was established in 1919. The Soviet Union had inherited the [[katorga]] system of the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Tsarist empire]], including the existing infrastructure, and decided to use it as the basis for its own penal institution. In 1921, while the civil war ravaged the yet-nascent USSR, we can observe the conditions of the Butyrka prison in Moscow: the prisoners organized the GULag, they organized morning gymnastic sessions, they founded an orchestra, a chorus, a library, and a club where they read foreign journals. There was a prisoners&#039; council too, which occupied itself with the assignment of cells. One inmate remarked that they &amp;quot;strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards,&amp;quot; another one stating, &amp;quot;Can’t they even lock us up seriously?&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era|section=A Concentrationary Universe Full of Contradictions|page=128|quote=The prisoners were allowed free run of the prison. They organized morning gymnastic&lt;br /&gt;
sessions, founded an orchestra and a chorus, created a “club” supplied with foreign journals and a good library. According to tradition―dating back to pre-revolutionary days―every prisoner left behind his books after he was freed. A prisoners’ council assigned everyone cells, some of which were beautifully supplied with carpets on the floors and walls. Another prisoner remembered that “we strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards.” To Babina, prison life seemed unreal: “Can’t they even lock us up seriously?”|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;[[File:Gulag population chart.png|thumb|390x390px|Historical chart of prison population in the USSR. This chart is not valid for other facilities under the gulag system.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Purges ===&lt;br /&gt;
There were 510,307 GULag prisoners in 1934, including 127,000 to 170,000 political prisoners. The number of prisoners rose to 1,317,195 in 1939, and there were about 116,000 deaths in the camps.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=169}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Second World War ===&lt;br /&gt;
During the [[Second World War]], the GULag population peaked, as did its mortality rate. As the whole country was focused on a [[war economy]] and fighting a devastating invasion from [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]], sacrifices had to be made, and many in the gulags felt it harshly (as did the civilian population).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Post-war period ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1953 and 1954, under his anti-[[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] campaign, [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] released many GULag inmates under the guise of them being falsely convicted. After the opening of the USSR archives, however, it was found that most of those inmates were common criminals who were released back into the general population. In 1953, amnesty was given to 70% of the &amp;quot;ordinary criminals&amp;quot; of a sample camp studied by the CIA. Within the next 3 months, most of them were re-arrested for committing new crimes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conditions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Working conditions ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Gulag death rate.png|thumb|Death rate in Russian/Soviet prison camps from 1885 to 1952. The highest death rate in the Soviet gulags was around 18% compared to a more than 40% in the Russian Empire.]]&lt;br /&gt;
Inmates worked 10-hour days until 1954, when the work day was reduced to 8 hours. After 1954, prisoners who worked very productively could have their sentences reduced by up to half and were given extra food or money.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=[[Central Intelligence Agency]]|title=Forced Labor Camps in the USSR|date=1957-02-11|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230328014642/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf|archive-date=2023-03-28|retrieved=2023-07-01}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The death rate in the GULags was highest during the [[Second World War]], but was always lower than the death rate in the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Tsarist]] prison camps that existed before the [[Russian revolution of 1917|revolution]], which had a death rate of over 40%.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Anatoly Vishnevsky|year=2006|title=The Demographic Modernization of Russia, 1900-2000|title-url=https://www.panrus.com/books/details.php?bookID=11971|page=432|city=Moscow|isbn=5983790420}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Food ===&lt;br /&gt;
Until 1952, all prisoners received 122 grams of grain, 10 grams of flour, 20 grams of sugar, 75 grams of fish, 500 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 15 grams of fat, 45 grams of meat, and 650 grams of bread each day. Prisoners who overfulfilled the quota by 100% or more could receive extra bread and sugar.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Deaths ===&lt;br /&gt;
On average, 4% of inmates died every year. This figure includes executions and people who died of natural causes. As the death rate was significantly higher during the Second World War, only 2.5% died each year during peacetime.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== In popular fiction ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]], a counter-revolutionary [[Antisemitism|antisemitic]] [[Pogrom|pogromist]], spent some time in the GULags. After his release, he fled the USSR and wrote a fictional tale called &#039;&#039;The Gulag Archipelago&#039;&#039; to garner support and funding abroad. Notably, his wife Natalya said that:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The subject of &#039;&#039;Gulag Archipelago&#039;&#039;, as I felt at the moment when he was writing it, is not in fact the life of the country and not even the life of the camps but the folklore of the camps&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=New York Times|title=Solzhenitsyn&#039;s Ex‐Wife Says ‘Gulag’ Is ‘Folklore’|date=1974-02-06|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1974/02/06/archives/solzhenitsyns-exwife-says-gulag-is-folklore.html}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;She also claimed that she typed part of the book for Aleksandr when they were still living together.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Debunking myths]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Main_Administration_of_Camps&amp;diff=58814</id>
		<title>Main Administration of Camps</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Main_Administration_of_Camps&amp;diff=58814"/>
		<updated>2023-11-02T15:31:09Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about the GULag conditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Gulag Location Map.svg|thumb|Map of all gulag prisons in the USSR. They were not all operating at the same time. Notably, it appears most were opened around Moscow and other large cities.]]&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;&#039;Main Administration of Camps&#039;&#039;&#039; (Russian: &#039;&#039;Главное управление лагерей&#039;&#039;) abbreviated as &#039;&#039;&#039;GULag&#039;&#039;&#039;, was the system of prisons, remote camps, psychiatric hospitals and special laboratories that housed prisoners and fulfilled their penal sentences in the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the opening of the USSR archives in the early 1990s, it was confirmed most of the prisoners were convicted of regular crimes and were not political prisoners or [[Counterrevolution|counterrevolutionaries]]. At the peak of the GULag system, shortly after the [[Second World War]] in 1951, 2.4% of the adult Soviet population was entangled in the system in some way.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Saed Teymuri|newspaper=The Stalinist Katyusha|title=The Truth about the Soviet Gulag - Surprisingly Revealed by the CIA|date=2018-10-31|url=|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401100827/https://stalinistkatyusha.wixsite.com/stalinist-katyusha/single-post/2018/10/04/The-Truth-about-the-Soviet-Gulag---Surprisingly-Revealed-by-the-CIA|archive-date=2019-04-01|retrieved=2022-09-11}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Central Intelligence Agency|year=1957|title=Four reports covering various aspects of forced labor in the USSR from 1945 to 1955|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/File:CIA_four_reports_on_forced_labour_in_USSR,_1945-1955.pdf}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; 20 to 40% of prisoners were released every year.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Austin Murphy|year=2000|title=The Triumph of Evil|chapter=The Documented Facts about Eastern Europe and Communism|page=|pdf=https://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil.pdf|city=Fucecchio|publisher=European Press Academic Publishing|isbn=8883980026}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Many gulags were mostly self-sufficient, especially the more remote ones. Most could be compared to small villages or towns, and the less accessible ones did not even need any enclosures such as fences or walls; inmates were free to move around the prison as they pleased. The belief in the USSR was that labour was rehabilitative, and thus putting inmates to work for their benefit as well as the benefit of the collective (the building of the [[Volga canal]] for example) was believed to help discourage people from committing crimes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Establishment ===&lt;br /&gt;
The GULag administration was established in 1919. The Soviet Union had inherited the [[katorga]] system of the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Tsarist empire]], including the existing infrastructure, and decided to use it as its basis for their own penal institution. In 1921, while the civil war ravaged the yet nascent USSR, we can observe the conditions of the Butyrka prison of Moscow: the prisoners organized the GUlag, they organized morning gymnastic sessions, founded an orchestra, a chorus, a library, and a club where they read foreign journals. There was a prisoners&#039; council too, which occupied itself with the assignment of cells. One inmate remarked that they &amp;quot;strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards,&amp;quot; another one stating &amp;quot;Can’t they even lock us up seriously?&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era|section=A Concentrationary Universe Full of Contradictions|page=128|quote=The prisoners were allowed free run of the prison. They organized morning gymnastic&lt;br /&gt;
sessions, founded an orchestra and a chorus, created a “club” supplied with foreign journals and a good library. According to tradition―dating back to pre-revolutionary days―every prisoner left behind his books after he was freed. A prisoners’ council assigned everyone cells, some of which were beautifully supplied with carpets on the floors and walls. Another prisoner remembered that “we strolled along the corridors as if they were boulevards.” To Babina, prison life seemed unreal: “Can’t they even lock us up seriously?”|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;[[File:Gulag population chart.png|thumb|390x390px|Historical chart of prison population in the USSR. This chart is not valid for other facilities under the gulag system.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Purges ===&lt;br /&gt;
There were 510,307 gulag prisoners in 1934, including 127,000 to 170,000 political prisoners. The number of prisoners rose to 1,317,195 in 1939, and there were about 116,000 deaths in the camps.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=169}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Second World War ===&lt;br /&gt;
During the [[Second World War]], the gulag population peaked, as did its mortality rate. As the whole country was focused on a [[war economy]] and fighting a devastating invasion from [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]], sacrifices had to be made and many in the gulags felt it harshly (as did the civilian population).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Post-war period ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1953 and 1954, under his anti-[[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] campaign, [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] released many gulag inmates under the guise of them being falsely convicted. After the opening of the USSR archives however, it was found most of those inmates were common criminals that were released back into the general population. In 1953, amnesty was given to 70% of the &amp;quot;ordinary criminals&amp;quot; of a sample camp studied by the CIA. Within the next 3 months, most of them were re-arrested for committing new crimes.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Conditions ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Working conditions ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Gulag death rate.png|thumb|Death rate in Russian/Soviet prison camps from 1885 to 1952. The highest death rate in the Soviet gulags was around 18% compared to a more than 40% in the Russian Empire.]]&lt;br /&gt;
Inmates worked 10-hour days until 1954, when the work day was reduced to 8 hours. After 1954, Prisoners who worked very productively could have their sentences reduced by up to half and were given extra food or money.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=[[Central Intelligence Agency]]|title=Forced Labor Camps in the USSR|date=1957-02-11|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230328014642/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf|archive-date=2023-03-28|retrieved=2023-07-01}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The death rate in the gulags was highest during the [[Second World War]], but was always lower than the death rate in the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Tsarist]] prison camps that had existed before the [[Russian revolution of 1917|revolution]], which had a death rate of over 40%.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Anatoly Vishnevsky|year=2006|title=The Demographic Modernization of Russia, 1900-2000|title-url=https://www.panrus.com/books/details.php?bookID=11971|page=432|city=Moscow|isbn=5983790420}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Food ===&lt;br /&gt;
Until 1952, all prisoners received 122 grams of grain, 10 grams of flour, 20 grams of sugar, 75 grams of fish, 500 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 15 grams of fat, 45 grams of meat, and 650 grams of bread each day. Prisoners who overfulfilled the quota by 100% or more could receive extra bread and sugar.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Deaths ===&lt;br /&gt;
On average, 4% of inmates died every year. This figure includes executions and people who died of natural causes. As the death rate was significantly higher during the Second World War, only 2.5% died each year during peacetime.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== In popular fiction ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]], a counter-revolutionary [[Antisemitism|antisemitic]] [[Pogrom|pogromist]], spent some time in Gulags. After his release, he fled the USSR and wrote a fictional tale called &#039;&#039;The Gulag Archipelago&#039;&#039; to garner support and funding abroad. Notably, his wife Natalya said that:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The subject of &#039;&#039;Gulag Archipelago&#039;&#039;, as I felt at the moment when he was writing it, is not in fact the life of the country and not even the life of the camps but the folklore of the camps&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=New York Times|title=Solzhenitsyn&#039;s Ex‐Wife Says ‘Gulag’ Is ‘Folklore’|date=1974-02-06|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1974/02/06/archives/solzhenitsyns-exwife-says-gulag-is-folklore.html}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;She also claimed that she typed part of the book for Aleksandr when they were still living together.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Debunking myths]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58794</id>
		<title>Joseph Stalin</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58794"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:59:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Stalin&amp;#039;s war activity&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox revolutionary&lt;br /&gt;
| name = Josef Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| native_name = Иосиф Сталин&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;იოსებ სტალინი&lt;br /&gt;
| image = File:Iosif_Stalin.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
| image_size = 225px&lt;br /&gt;
| caption = Portrait of comrade Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| nationality = Georgian&lt;br /&gt;
|political_party=[[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]]| birth_name          = Ioseb Besarionis dze Jugashvili&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_date          = {{Birth date|1878|12|21}}&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_place         = Gori, Tiflis Governorate, Russian Empire (present-day [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]])&lt;br /&gt;
| death_date          = {{Death date and age|1953|3|5|1878|12|18}}&lt;br /&gt;
| death_place         = Moscow, [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
| death_cause         = Cerebral hemorrhage&lt;br /&gt;
| political_line = [[Marxism–Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili&#039;&#039;&#039; (21 December 1878 – 5 March 1953), better known as &#039;&#039;&#039;Joseph Stalin&#039;&#039;&#039;, was a Georgian [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] revolutionary, political theorist, and the elected&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=34, 48|quote=After the conference, in May 1917, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee was instituted, to which Stalin was elected and to which he has been successively re-elected ever since.&lt;br /&gt;
[...]&lt;br /&gt;
On Lenin&#039;s motion, the Plenum of the Central Committee, on April 3, 1922, elected Stalin, Lenin&#039;s faithful disciple and associate, General Secretary of the Central Committee, a post at which he has remained ever since.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; leader of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] from 3 April 1922 to 16 October 1952, serving several terms as the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] during that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin oversaw the great period of [[collectivization|collectivisation]] and industrialisation which transformed the USSR from an illiterate rural backwater to a [[Socialism|socialist]] superpower by the late-1930s and early-1940s. Under Stalin&#039;s leadership, the USSR played a principal role in the defeat of [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]] and [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Imperial Japan]] during [[Second World War|World War II]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Life and work ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life (1878–1899) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinAtTiflisSeminary.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1896 as a student at the Tiflis Seminary]]&lt;br /&gt;
Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili was born on 21 December, 1878&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Although some historians claim he was born in 18th December, his birthday was officially celebrated on 21st December.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in Gori,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The city of Gori was part of the Tiflis Governorate, which was one of the administrative divisions of the [[Russian Empire]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a city of the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russian Empire]], in the family of a craftsman, later a worker of a shoe factory. Like his parents, Stalin was an ethnic [[Georgia|Georgian]], and he grew up speaking the Georgian language. Both his father and his mother came from a family of serfs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ian Grey|year=1979|title=Stalin, man of history|chapter=|section=|page=9|quote=Vissarion, his father, came from the village of Didi-Lilo, near Tiflis, where his parents, like their forebears, had been peasant­ serfs. For Vissarion emancipation meant that he was free to fol­low his trade as a cobbler. Around 1870 he moved to Gori, where in 1874 he married Ekaterina Georgievna Geladze, daughter of a serf family from a nearby village. She was about eighteen years of age, some five years younger than her husband. They were humble working people, poor and illiterate.|pdf=|city=|publisher=|isbn=|doi=|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=A341F7377CB157DD7730A9A416CDC302|mia=|title-url=|chapter-url=|trans-title=|trans-lang=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s revolutionary activities can be traced to his time as a student after 1894, when he joined the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=5|quote=In the autumn of 1888 Stalin entered the church school in Gori, from which, in 1894, he passed to the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a period when, with the development of industrial capitalism and the attendant growth of the working-class movement, Marxism had begun to spread widely throughout Russia. The St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded and led by Lenin, had given a powerful stimulus to the Social-Democratic movement all over the country.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|year=1931|title=[[Library:Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig|Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig]]|quote=I joined the revolutionary movement at the age of fifteen, when I became connected with certain illegal groups of Russian Marxists in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted a great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for illegal Marxian literature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1896 and 1897, Stalin was a part of Marxist study groups in the seminary, and in August 1898, he formally joined the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) and began to conduct [[propaganda]] work among the workers in the Tiflis railway workshops. An avid reader, he read &#039;&#039;[[Capital, vol. I|Capital]]&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;[[Manifesto of the communist party]]&#039;&#039;, written by [[Marx|Karl Marx]], subsequently taking a profound interest in [[Marxism]]. At that time, he became acquainted with some of Lenin&#039;s articles criticizing the [[Narodniks]] and the &amp;quot;Legal Marxists&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1945|title=Joseph Stalin: a short biography|page=5|quote=Jn 1896 and 1897, Stalin conduoled Marxist study circles in the seminary, and in August 1898 he formally enrolled as a member of the Tiflis Branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. [...]&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin worked hard to broaden his knowledge. He studied Capital, the Communist Manifesto and other works of Marx and Engels. He acquainted himself with Lenin&#039;s polemical writings against Narodism, &amp;quot;Legal Marxism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Economism.&amp;quot; His theoretical interests were extremely broad. He studied philosophy, political economy, history and natural science. He read widely in the classics. He thus trained himself to he an educated Marxist. Even at this early date Lenin&#039;s writings made a deep impression on him. &amp;quot;I must meet him al all costs,&amp;quot; one of Stalin&#039;s friends. reports him to have said. after reading an article by Tulin (Lenin).|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=034C4C1A4DBC437BC939DCF13A1D9EBD}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1899, Stalin was expelled from the seminary for the propaganda of Marxism, and he went to an illegal position and became a professional revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Beginning of revolutionary activities (1900–1917) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin played a central role in the revolutionary activities of the [[Bolsheviks]], a faction of the [[Russian Social Democratic Labor Party|Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]] (RSDLP) led by [[Vladimir Lenin]], before and during the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].[[File:Stalin1902Mugshot.jpg|thumb|Stalin&#039;s mugshot after being arrested in 1902]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin exile painting.png|thumb|Stalin in exile in Siberia]]&lt;br /&gt;
While organizing in the [[Caucasus]], Stalin exposed the [[Mensheviks]] as [[Liberalism|liberal]] [[Reformism|reformists]]. He met Lenin in person for the first time at a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] conference in Tampere, [[Grand Duchy of Finland (1809–1917)|Finland]] in 1905.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, the party elected Stalin to the Central Committee even though he was in exile at the time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Stolypin Reaction. The Bolsheviks Constitute Themselves an Independent Marxist Party|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch04.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, Stalin helped found the newspaper &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party during the New Rise of the Working Class Movement before the First Imperialist War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch05.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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After the [[February Revolution]], Stalin returned from exile in [[Siberia]]. He called for an overthrow of the [[Russian Republic (1917–1918)|provisional government]] and opposed the [[Imperialism|imperialist]] [[First World War]]. At a party conference in April 1917, he argued with [[Nikolai Bukharin|Bukharin]] and [[Georgy Pyatakov|Pyatakov]], who did not support the right of [[Nation|nations]] to [[self-determination]]. In September, Stalin opposed participating in the [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] [[Provisional Council of the Russian Republic|Provisional Council]] and called for a revolution instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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On 29 October 1917, the Central Committee elected Stalin as head of the Party Center to direct the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Preparation and Realization of the October Socialist Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch07.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Civil War (1918–1920) ===&lt;br /&gt;
In summer 1919, the Central Committee sent Stalin, [[Kliment Voroshilov|Voroshilov]], [[Sergo Orjonikidze|Orjonikidze]], and [[Semyon Budyonny|Budyonny]] to the southern front, where he organized an attack against [[Anton Denikin]] from the [[Donbass]]. The [[Workers&#039; and Peasants&#039; Red Army|Red Army]] defeated Denikin in October 1919 and liberated all of [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919–1991)|Ukraine]] by early 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch08.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Establishment of the USSR (1921–1924) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin painting 1920s.png|thumb|270x270px|Painting of Stalin from the 1920s]]&lt;br /&gt;
After the defeat of the interventionists and the [[Russian Civil War|civil war]], when in connection with the transition to a peaceful economic construction of the anti-party groups launched a struggle against the party line developed by Lenin, Stalin defended the [[Leninist]] line and fought against anti-party groups and factions ([[Trotskyism|Trotskyists]], &amp;quot;workers&#039; opposition&amp;quot;). At the 10th Congress of the Party (1921) Stalin presented &amp;quot;The Report on the next tasks of the Party in the [[national question]]&amp;quot;. After the 11th Party Congress (1922) the Plenum of the Party Central Committee elected Joseph Stalin as the Secretary General of the Central Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Party during this period carried out extensive work on the creation of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]]. Lenin believed that the USSR should be a voluntary union of equal and sovereign [[Soviet republic|union republics]]. On this question, Stalin at first took the wrong stand, putting forward the project of so-called &amp;quot;autonomization&amp;quot;, i.e., the entry into the RSFSR of other Soviet republics on the rights of autonomous units. V. I. Lenin strongly opposed this proposal, criticized Stalin&#039;s mistakes in conducting the national policy, his partiality to the manifestations of great-power [[chauvinism]]. The Leninist principles were accepted by the Central Committee and formed the basis of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The report on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922) was made at the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR by the order of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) by I.V. Stalin in view of Lenin&#039;s illness.&lt;br /&gt;
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After Lenin&#039;s death, the Communist Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee, firmly and confidently led the Soviet people along the path of implementation of Lenin&#039;s precepts, on the path of building socialism. At this time, Stalin made a number of works that were of great importance in the protection and propaganda of Leninism and in the ideological defeat of the currents hostile to Leninism. In this respect, a great role was played by Stalin&#039;s work &amp;quot;On the Foundations of Leninism&amp;quot; (1924), which set forth the basic issues of Leninism and disclosed the new things that Lenin contributed to Marxism. The defense by I. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the Party, of the Leninist theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism initially [[Socialism in one country|in one country]], and of the possibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR in the capitalist encirclement, was of particular importance in the struggle against the Trotskyists.{{Citation needed}} &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 14th Party Congress (1925–1926) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the instructions of V. Lenin, who developed a scientifically sound program for building socialism in the USSR, the party set a course for the [[socialist industrialization]] of the country. This line was set out in the political report of the Central Committee at the XIV Party Congress (1925), made by Stalin. The report emphasized that the essence of [[industrialization]] was the priority development of [[heavy industry]], and first of all the [[mechanical engineering]], the fundamental difference of socialist industrialization, which was inextricably linked with the improvement of the working people&#039;s material condition, from the capitalist one, which was held by means of colonial seizure, robbery and ruthless exploitation of the working people. &lt;br /&gt;
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In early 1926 he published a book of Stalin &amp;quot;Toward Leninism&amp;quot;, which was criticized opportunistic views of [[Grigory Zinoviev|Zinovievites]], who were descending to the ideological positions of Trotskyism and wanted wanted the Soviet Union to stay mostly [[Agriculture|agricultural]] and import its industry from [[Capitalism|capitalist]] countries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Transition to the Peaceful Work of Economic Restoration|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch09.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the 15th Party Conference (November 1926) Stalin made a report &amp;quot;On the Social Democratic bias in our party&amp;quot; and at the VII Extended Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (December 1926) with the report &amp;quot;About the Social Democratic bias in our party again&amp;quot;. Both these reports played an important role in rallying the party ranks under the banner of Leninist ideas and in exposing the Trotskyites, their capitulation to capitalism and their disorganizing activities. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== Collectivization campaign (1927–1934) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the successes of socialist industrialization and guided by Lenin&#039;s [[cooperative plan]], the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b) (1927) put forward [[collectivization]] of the [[agriculture]] as the most important task of the Party and Soviet people. These questions were covered in the political report of the Central Committee of the Party, made at the Congress by I. V. Stalin. During this period, an anti-party group of [[Opportunism|right-wing opportunists]]—[[Bukharin]], [[Alexei Rykov|Rykov]], [[Mikhail Tomsky|Tomsky]] and others—openly opposed the general line of the Party. In the reports of Stalin &amp;quot;On the industrialization of the country and the right deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1928), &amp;quot;On the right - the deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1929), etc. exposed the line of the right opportunists, which expressed the ideology of the [[kulak]], rich peasant class. &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1930, Stalin released the &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; article &amp;quot;Dizzy with Success,&amp;quot; criticizing people who were overenthusiastic about [[collectivization]] and forced [[Peasantry|peasants]] onto collective farms. This issue was most severe in [[Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Transcaucasia]] and Central Asia, where collectivization was not scheduled to finish until 1933.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle for the Collectivization of Agriculture|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch11.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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At the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b) (1930) and XVII Congress of the CPSU(b) (1934) Stalin made reports on the work of the Central Committee of the Party. During this period, the Communist Party and the Soviet state carried out an all-out offensive of socialism against the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] elements. Under the conditions of a tense international situation, the country overcame enormous difficulties in order to put an end to the technical and economic backwardness within the shortest historical period. In pursuing a course of priority and predominant development of heavy industry, the Party made decisive progress in the socialist industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 1936 Constitution and later (1936–1939) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin 1936.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1936]]&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin helped draft the [[1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union]], which the Eighth Congress of Soviets approved in November 1936.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society. Introduction of the New Constitution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch12.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This constitution remained in effect until 1977.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1938 Stalin wrote his work &amp;quot;On dialectical and historical materialism&amp;quot;, which gives a brief coverage of the foundations of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and shows its importance for the practical work of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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In March 1939 the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held. In the report of the Central Committee at the Congress Stalin outlined the program developed by the Central Committee of the struggle of the party and the Soviet people for the completion of building a socialist society in the gradual transition from socialism to communism.{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Second World War (1939–1945) ===&lt;br /&gt;
From December 1940 to January 1941, Stalin attended a military conference with all top military officers. The 18th Congress of the CPSU in February 1941 focused on preparing industry and transportation for the war. In early March, [[Semen Tymoshenko|Tymoshenko]] and [[Georgy Zhukov|Zhukov]] asked him to call up 800,000 reservists, which he initially refused but approved at the end of the month.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=192–8|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The size of the Red Army grew from two million in 1938 to over six million in 1941.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Socialist industrialization|page=35–42|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On 21 June 1941, a German defector said that Germany would attack the Soviet Union the next night. Stalin alerted all units and told troops to camouflage themselves and their aircraft. He ordered them to secretly occupy firing posts on the border. Germany began bombing border cities at 3:40 a.m. on 22 June, and Stalin met with the Politburo at 4:30. He approved Zhukov&#039;s request to immediately attack the enemy, which was sent at 7:15 a.m. On 26 June, Stalin began creating a reserve front 300 kilometers behind the main front.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Joseph Stalin became [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of People&#039;s Commissars]] in 1941, a position he would hold until his death.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Samuel Totten, Paul Bartrop|year=2008|title=Dictionary of Genocide: A–L|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=9780313346422}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He worked fourteen or fifteen hours daily during the war, taking his first vacation since 1937 in 1946.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era|section=Bureaucracy or “Zealous Faith”?|page=121|quote=[At least during the years of the war] Stalin worked fourteen or fifteen hours a day in the Kremlin or at the dacha [...]. In autumn of 1946, Stalin went to the south to enjoy a vacation for the first time since 1937 [...]. A few months before his death, and ignoring urgent recommendations from doctors, Stalin rejected the possibility of taking a break in the autumn or winter of 1952, despite the enormous amount of time and effort dedicated to organizing the XIX party congress in October.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee, People&#039;s Commissar of Defense, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and remained in these positions until the victorious end of the war. The great victory over the [[Adolf Hitler|Hitlerite]] coalition was won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, headed by Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin had extensive knowledge of the war situation and demanded exact accuracy from his staff. He required front commanders to send reports every day and criticized [[Rokossovsky]] when he did not do so on 16 August 1943. Stalin also had an excellent memory and remembered all the names of over 100 front commanders in addition to many other commanders, members of the [[People&#039;s Commissariat of Defense]], and party officials. He personally knew and often convened builders of planes, artillery, and tanks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Library:Another_view_of_Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=229–236|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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During the war, Joseph Stalin, as a head of the Soviet government, took part in the conferences of the leaders of the three powers—the USSR, the USA and Great Britain—in Tehran (1943), in Yalta and Berlin (1945). During these years, Stalin maintained everyday correspondence with the presidents of the USA and the prime-ministers of Great Britain, in which he insistently fought for strengthening of anti-Hitler coalition, consistently defended the national interests of the peoples of the countries which were subject to Hitlerite aggression. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== Postwar period and death (1946–1953) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinFinalSpeech1952.jpg|thumb|Stalin giving his final speech to the CPSU congress on October 14, 1952]]&lt;br /&gt;
In the postwar period, I. V. Stalin published his works &amp;quot;Marxism and questions of linguistics&amp;quot; (1950) and &amp;quot;Economic problems of socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; (1952), which considers important questions of Marxist-Leninist theory. &amp;quot;The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; had a great influence on the development of some positions in the political economy of socialism. I.V. Stalin stressed the objective character of economic laws in socialism; based on the classical Marxism-Leninism statements, he formulated the main economic law of socialism, the law of systematic and proportional development of national economy; noted the importance of priority growth of means of production for the expanded socialist reproduction. At the same time, the work contains a number of erroneous and controversial positions (e.g.: assertion that commodity circulation begins to hinder the development of productive forces of the country and the gradual transition to product exchange is necessary; underestimation of the law of value in production, especially with regard to means of production; the statement about inevitability of reduction of the volume of capitalist production after World War II and about inevitability of wars between capitalist countries in the current conditions).{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
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In October 1952 the 19th Congress of the CPSU was held. At the closing session of the Congress Stalin made a speech. The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place after the Congress, elected Joseph Stalin a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin continued to fight against [[revisionism]] and [[opportunism]] but underestimated the strength it would have without a capitalist [[Base and superstructure|base]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=From Stalin to Khrushchev|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=253–262}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Outstanding work of Stalin was highly appreciated by the Soviet Union. Stalin&#039;s outstanding activities were highly appreciated by the Soviet government. He was awarded the ranks of a Hero of Socialist Labor (1939), a Hero of the Soviet Union (1945) and Generalissimo of the Soviet Union (1945). He was awarded with three Orders of Lenin, the Order of Victory, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov of the 1st degree and medals. &lt;br /&gt;
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==== Death ====&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s health declined during the early 1950s due to overwork during the war. He rejected to take a break in the autumn or winter of 1952, despite recommendations from doctors.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In the last few months before his death, his security was dismantled. [[Alexander Proskryobychev|Proskryobychev]], Stalin&#039;s personal secretary since 1928, was put under house arrest, and [[Nikolai Vlasik]], Stalin&#039;s bodyguard, was arrested in December 1952 and died in prison. [[Pyotr Kosynkin]], Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, died of a supposed heart attack on 17 February 1953. [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] was the only one capable of such a plot, and [[Vyacheslav Molotov|Molotov]] suspected that MVD chief [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] poisoned Stalin, while [[Enver Hoxha|Hoxha]] believed [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] and [[Anastas Mikoyan|Mikoyan]] had planned to assassinate him.&lt;br /&gt;
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On 1 March 1953, at 23:00 Stalin&#039;s guards found him unconscious in his room but did not call a doctor. He did not receive first aid until twelve hours after his collapse and died on 5 March.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Common myths ==&lt;br /&gt;
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===Antisemitism===&lt;br /&gt;
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While anti-semitism has been a historical tool of the [[Far-right politics|far-right]] and [[Fascism|fascists]] in particular, &amp;quot;Judeo-Bolshevism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;cultural bolshevism&amp;quot; being classic fascist [[Conspiracy theory|conspiracy theories]] linking the communist movement with fictional [[Judaism|Jewish]] cabals plotting world domination or ethnic domination, some historians still claim that Stalin too was an [[Anti-Semitism|anti-Semite]]. While [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russia]] had a long and troubled history with [[Mikhail Bakunin|anti-Semitism]] before revolution, there is no evidence that Stalin held these views. The below letter from Stalin opposes this notion.&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|In answer to your inquiry:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at [[capitalism]]. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.|J. Stalin|Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States {{Refn|Stalin: &#039;&#039;Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States&#039;&#039; [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/01/12.htm MIA link]}}}}During Stalin&#039;s time in office, Jews made up 4.3% of party membership, which was much higher than their share of the total population. [[Lazar Kaganovich|Kaganovich]] and [[Maxim Litvinov|Litvinov]], two members of Stalin&#039;s leadership, were both Jewish. During the late 1930s, 10% of Central Committee members were Jewish even though only about 1% of the total population was Jewish.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The European Nationalities in the USSR|page=88–94|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Autocratic rule ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is accepted in bourgeois circles that Stalin was a dictator who imposed his personal will on the entire country. However, during the Great Patriotic War, the Politburo and military leadership made collective decisions. If they could not agree, they would create a commission of opposing sides to create a proposal. Stalin, as Commander in Chief of the Red Army, took his generals&#039; opinions into account and listened to their advice.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The CIA itself admitted in now-declassified documents that the USSR always operated under collective leadership, and that Stalin was not the &#039;dictator&#039; that the Western powers portrayed him to be.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Central Intelligence Agency|title=Comments in the Change in Soviet Leadership|date=2008-02-26|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0.pdf|quote=Even in Stalin&#039;s time there was collective leadership. The western idea of a dictator within the communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin was elected Chairman of the CPSU several times by the Plenum of the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He also tried to resign four times, but each time was turned down by the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Socialist Musings|title=Stalin’s Four Attempts at Resignation|date=2017-02-23|url=https://socialistmlmusings.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/stalins-four-attempts-at-resignation/}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Personality cult ===&lt;br /&gt;
While there is no doubt that Stalin was a revered figure in the USSR, there is no evidence to suggest he made any active efforts to build up a [[cult of personality]] around himself. In fact, in 1938 he requested the destruction of a book that portrayed him too positively and stated that the theory of &amp;quot;heroes&amp;quot; was an [[Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries|SR]] and not a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1938|title=Letter on Publications for Children Directed to the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Youth|title-url=https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2014/06/24/stalin-on-the-cult-of-personality/|city=London|publisher=Red Star Press|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/02/16.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Stalin also condemned the &amp;quot;Great man&amp;quot; in a speech to collective farmers in 1933:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railways, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life.|Joseph Stalin|[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1933/02/19.htm Speech Delivered at the 1st All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigadiers]|1933}}Kaganovich proposed the replacement of Marxism-Leninism with Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, to which Stalin rejected saying: &amp;quot;you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=In fact, when Kaganovich suggests substituting the term Marxism-Leninism for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the leader to whom that tribute is directed responds: “you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After winning the Great Patriotic War, Stalin declined the title of &amp;quot;Hero of the Soviet Union&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=Immediately after the victory parade, a group of marshals reach out to Molotov and Malenkov: they propose to them the commemoration of the victory achieved in the Great Patriotic War by offering the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” to Stalin, who nonetheless rejects the offer.|lg=http://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not only that, but he declared to tour Berlin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=The Soviet leader also sought to escape rhetorical excesses on the occasion of the Potsdam Conference: “Both Churchill and Truman took their time walking among Berlin’s ruins; Stalin showed no such interest. Without drawing attention, he arrived by train, and even ordered Zhukov to cancel any welcoming ceremony with a military band and an honor guard.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On his 70th birthday, he categorically refused a state award.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=He [Stalin] called in Malenkov and warned him: “Don’t even think about honoring me again with a ‘star’.&amp;quot; “But comrade Stalin, on an anniversary like this? The people would not understand.” “It’s not up to the people. I don’t want to argue. No personal initiative! Understand me?” “Of course, comrade Stalin, but the politburo members think…” Stalin interrupted Malenkov and declared the discussion closed.|lg=http://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Popular support ==&lt;br /&gt;
In a poll made in 2019, 70% of [[Russian Federation|Russians]] said they had a positive view of Stalin&#039;s role in history. This was a 12% increase from 58% in 2015.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{News citation|newspaper=[[In Defense of Communism]]|title=Anticommunism Fails: 70% of Russians have a positive opinion on Joseph Stalin|date=2019-04-17|url=http://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210629093512/https://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-date=2021-06-29}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quotes:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxist theorists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Former heads of state]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of bourgeois media]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Russian Marxists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communist leaders]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Korean_War&amp;diff=58792</id>
		<title>Korean War</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Korean_War&amp;diff=58792"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:46:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Truman&amp;#039;s blackmail of the USSR and PRC in the Korean War article&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox military conflict|combatant1=[[File:Flag of the DPRK.svg|20px]] [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:Flag of the People&#039;s Republic of China.svg|20px]] [[People&#039;s Republic of China]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Major support:&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:The Flag of the USSR.png|20px]] [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]]|conflict=Fatherland Liberation War|combatant2=[[File:Flag of the UN.png|20px]] [[United Nations]] Command (de jure; US-led)&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;  -  [[File:South Korea flag.png|20px]] [[Republic of Korea]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;  -  [[File:Flag of the United States.svg|20px]] [[United States of America]]|place=[[Korea|Korean Peninsula]], Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea|date=25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953 &#039;&#039;(de-facto)&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;25 June 1950 – present &#039;&#039;(de-jure)&#039;&#039;|result=Military stalemate, inactive conflict (post-1953)|image=Korean war image.jpg|strength1=&#039;&#039;&#039;Peak strength:&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:Flag of the DPRK.svg|20px]] 266,600&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:Flag of the People&#039;s Republic of China.svg|20px]] 1,450,000&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:The Flag of the USSR.png|20px]] 26,000&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Total:&#039;&#039; 1,742,000&#039;&#039;&#039;|strength2=&#039;&#039;&#039;Peak strength:&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:South Korea flag.png|20px]] 602,902&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:Flag of the United States.svg|20px]] 326,863&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[File:Flag of the UN.png|20px]] 42,569&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Total:&#039;&#039; 972,334&#039;&#039;&#039;}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;&#039;Korean War&#039;&#039;&#039;, also known as the &#039;&#039;&#039;Fatherland Liberation War&#039;&#039;&#039; (Korean: 조국해방전쟁) in the [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea]] (DPRK), the &#039;&#039;&#039;War to Resist American Imperialism and Aid Korea&#039;&#039;&#039; (Chinese: 抗美援朝战争; pinyin: &#039;&#039;Kàngměi Yuáncháo Zhànzhēng&#039;&#039;)  in the [[People&#039;s Republic of China]] (PRC)  and the &#039;&#039;&#039;6.25 War&#039;&#039;&#039; (Korean: 6·25 전쟁) in [[Republic of Korea|south Korea]], was a highly devastating armed conflict which developed in [[Korea]] after the peninsula was divided between North and South at the end of the [[Second World War]] with the surrender of [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japan]], who had been occupying Korea since 1910. The war is conventionally considered to have occurred from 1950 to 1953, however, this time frame conforms to the [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] [[Imperialism|imperialist]] [[United States of America|U.S.]] perspective of the conflict and is challenged by [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] narratives of the nature and timeline of the war. The main period of armed conflict ceased in 1953 with an armistice agreement, which the U.S. abrogated in 1958 by delivering nuclear weapons to South Korea.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lee Jae-Bong (2009-02-07). [https://apjjf.org/-Lee-Jae-Bong/3053/article.html &amp;quot;US Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea &amp;amp; North Korea&#039;s Nuclear Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula&amp;quot;] &#039;&#039;The Asia-Pacific Journal&#039;&#039;. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://apjjf.org/-Lee-Jae-Bong/3053/article.html Archived] 2022-08-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although the armistice was signed in 1953, a peace agreement is still yet to be put in place, and the Korean peninsula remains divided.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The division of Korea into North and South was originally intended to be only temporary, with the United States and [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] helping ease Korea&#039;s transition out of [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japanese]] [[Colonialism|colonial]] rule. While the Soviet Union promptly withdrew its troops from the North in 1948, the imperialist United States took steps to ensure the entrenchment of the Southern regime, holding elections and declaring the formations of the Republic of Korea in 1948 despite widespread opposition among the Korean masses, which the U.S. and Southern forces, working jointly with far-right paramilitary gangs, repressed in mass arrests and killings, such as in the case of the [[Jeju Uprising]]. The US carried out sexual slavery of Korean women during their occupation in line with Japan&#039;s colonial &amp;quot;[[comfort stations]].&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|page=33|quote=Sexual slavery carried on even after the fall of the Empire of the Rising Sun, resurrected by the South Korean army during the Korean War. It is perhaps of some significance that the ROK Army was, at the time, dominated at its highest levels by Koreans who had served in the Japanese Imperial Army, some of whom had even served in army units tasked with hunting down Kim Il-sung. Is it any surprise, then, that this very same army, with its historical connections to the Japanese through its officer corps, should set up a Japanese-style system of sexual bondage? It’s also of significance that at the time, the South Korean army was, as it has been throughout its history, under the operational control of a US commander. Hence, the United States was complicit in the sexual slavery practiced by the ROK Army|pdf=https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sQ8X87LjIlmdGTOL1Gb_073PtRSrMmjL/view?usp=sharing|publisher=Baraka Books}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The North-South division of the Korean nation and the U.S. occupation of the South has persisted to the present day, South Korea being a &amp;quot;complete colony occupied by the U.S. military&amp;quot; in the words of the People&#039;s Democracy Party, a revolutionary workers&#039; party in South Korea.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;People&#039;s Democracy Party and Liberation School. [https://www.liberationschool.org/korean-war-70-years/ “70 Years Too Long: The Struggle to End the Korean War – Liberation School.”] &#039;&#039;Liberation School – Revolutionary Marxism for a New Generation of Fighters&#039;&#039;, 25 June 2020. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.liberationschool.org/korean-war-70-years/ Archived].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the 1950-1953 conflict, the DPRK was supported by its sister socialist nations, the USSR and the People&#039;s Republic of China, and the Southern regime was backed by the United States and the U.S.-controlled [[United Nations]] Command (UNC). Although the United States led the UNC and provided the bulk of its troops and funding, the operation was referred to as &amp;quot;UN-led&amp;quot; and was called a &amp;quot;police action.&amp;quot; The [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|USSR]] was absent during the decisions to form this joint security operation, as it was boycotting the United Nations due to the non-admission of PRC.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/united-nations-korea &amp;quot;The United Nations in Korea.&amp;quot;] Harry S. Truman Library. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/united-nations-korea Archived] 2022-08-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Events ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:The Japanese flag in front of the Japanese Government-General of Korea building in Seoul is replaced with the U.S. flag..png|thumb|U.S. forces lower the Japanese flag in Seoul and replace it with the U.S. flag.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[http://jeju43peace.org/historytruth/fact-truth/factstruth_article2/ &amp;quot;Liberation from Japan in 1945.&amp;quot;] Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/http://jeju43peace.org/historytruth/fact-truth/factstruth_article2/ Archive].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Background ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets had agreed to an impromptu proposal from the American side that Korea should be divided along the 38th parallel for the purpose of acceptation of military surrender. The persistence of this divide in the Korean peninsula had been the result of a class conflict which broke out following the departure of the occupying [[Japan|Japanese]] colonial forces and differing occupation regimes. A revolutionary tide was sweeping the peninsula with People&#039;s Committees being formed and a united Korean People&#039;s Republic had been formed, constituting a heavy socialist presence much to the anguish of the then-temporary American Occupation forces.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to Ahn Hak-sop, a former officer in the Korean People’s Army who was captured in 1952 and endured decades of torture as a political prisoner in the South until 1995:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;At first, I thought the US Army was a liberation army. But soon [[Douglas MacArthur|General MacArthur]] referred to the US as an occupying army. There was no word of liberation, only occupation; so I was suspicious, but only partly so. Although I was young, the whole nation was full with division between the rule of the US and Soviets. In September of 1945, Koreans went out to greet the US Army, but the US Army shot at them. After the Moscow Committee, the US Army said explicitly that they were there to block the Soviet Union. But in 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew all of their troops. But the US Army didn’t withdraw.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In almost every town, there was a People’s Committee for self-rule, but the US Army crushed the People’s Committees with tanks and soldiers. There was a lot of resistance and revolt at that time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Liberation School|title=Still fighting for Korea’s liberation: An interview with Ahn Hak-sop|date=Jul 27, 2022|url=https://www.liberationschool.org/interview-with-ahn-hak-sop/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804035822/https://www.liberationschool.org/interview-with-ahn-hak-sop/|archive-date=2022-08-19}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;The [[Syngman Rhee]] regime in the South was marked by mass repressions against the revolutionary movements and political activity generally. He abolished the press and liquidated left-wing political opposition. Rhee claimed that [[Republic of Korea|South Korea]]&#039;s army would be able to take the northern capital of Pyongyang in three days.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|author=Ernie Trory|newspaper=New Worker|title=The Invasion of North Korea|url=http://www.newworker.org/ncptrory/nkorea.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305021303/http://www.newworker.org/ncptrory/nkorea.htm|archive-date=2022-03-05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There was a lot of migration between the two occupation zones: political refugees went to the North, the dispossessed classes of landlords and merchants who supported the Japanese occupation fled to the South. Extreme right-wing anti-communist gangs, such as the Northwest Youth League, proliferated in the South and worked jointly with U.S. and Southern forces to repress South Korean dissidents and suspected communists.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1949, there were frequent skirmishes between northern and southern troops on the 38th parallel. These skirmishes, most of which were started by the south, caused hundreds of deaths.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|chapter=The Campaign of 1950-1953|page=123–128|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaced4iiga4ngtxusr2civjxewbili5jne2sbpefbx2s3im2kphattzc?filename=Stephen%20Gowans%20-%20Patriots%2C%20Traitors%20and%20Empires_%20The%20Story%20of%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Struggle%20for%20Freedom-Baraka%20Books%20%282018%29.pdf|city=Montreal|publisher=Baraka Books|isbn=9781771861427|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=8435F6FF91279531705764823FDC2A7F}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Beginning of war ===&lt;br /&gt;
South Korea invaded the DPRK on 25 June 1950.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Years later, Rhee stated that the purpose of the war was to destroy [[communism]].{{Citation needed}} The southern government quickly collapsed, with Rhee and his inner circle fleeing. The [[Korean People&#039;s Army]] liberated [[Seoul]] within three days, and most of the southern soldiers immediately retreated or defected to the DPRK. By late August, the KPA controlled 90% of Korea, with the U.S. and ROK only controlling Busan in the southeast. Following their liberation, south Koreans reestablished the people&#039;s committees that the U.S. occupiers had disbanded. They confiscated the property of Japanese collaborators and carried out land reform. Retreating southern forces executed at least 300,000 leftists to prevent them from helping the KPA.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:12&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== UN invasion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The United States organized an invasion of Korea through the United Nations Security Council. The USSR was boycotting the Security Council to protest the [[Kuomintang]] instead of the PRC representing China at the UN instead. On 15 September 1950, [[Douglas MacArthur]] invaded Korea at Inchon near Seoul. He cut off KPA forces from the north and captured Seoul on 25 September. With [[Harry S Truman|Harry Truman]]&#039;s authorization, MacArthur&#039;s forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the north on 30 September.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:12&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Entry of People&#039;s China ===&lt;br /&gt;
The US invaders continued north towards the Yalu River which separates Korea from China. On 25 October, [[Mao Zedong]] deployed 300,000 soldiers of the [[People&#039;s Volunteer Army]] to Korea. Chinese and Korean forces drove the US back past the 38th parallel and liberated Pyongyang on 5 December. MacArthur threatened to use 50 nuclear bombs against Korea, but Truman declined. Though, the president In 1952, considered launching atomic bombs on Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and other industrial centres of the [[People&#039;s Republic of China|PRC]] and [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] in order to reverse their loss.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|section=From “Socialism without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” to the Cold War Clamp Down|page=120|quote=Not an unfounded concern if we consider January of 1952. To reverse the stalemate in military operations in Korea, Truman entertains a radical idea which he records in his diary: they could deliver an ultimatum to the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, clarifying in advance that failure to comply “means that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and all the industrial centers of China and the Soviet Union would be eliminated.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Instead, the US bombed Korea with 635,000 tons of conventional bombs and 32,557 tons of napalm, more explosives than had been used in the entire Pacific theater of the [[Second World War]]. The US killed roughly three million Koreans or 10% of the total population.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The US destroyed 600,000 houses, 8,700 factories, 5,000 schools, and 1,000 hospitals. By the end of the war, only two modern buildings were left in Pyongyang. Korean society moved underground, with farmers working at night and staying in bunkers during the day. By the fall of 1952, the US had destroyed all towns and cities in the DPRK, and they then bombed irrigation dams on the Yalu River, flooding thousands of acres of farmland.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:12&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Armistice agreement ===&lt;br /&gt;
After three years, the war was essentially stalemated and an armistice agreement was signed that stopped the active fighting. The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. The signed armistice established the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the de facto new border between the two nations, put into force a cease-fire, and finalized repatriation of prisoners of war. The DMZ runs close to the 38th parallel and has continued to separate north and south Korea since the agreement was signed in 1953. &lt;br /&gt;
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== Aftermath ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== U.S. violation of armistice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Paragraph 13d of the agreement mandated that neither side introduce new weapons into Korea. However, at a meeting in 1957, the U.S. informed the north Korean representatives that the United Nations Command no longer considered itself bound by paragraph 13d of the armistice,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,809583,00.html &amp;quot;Korea: The End of 13d&amp;quot;] (1957-07-01). &#039;&#039;Time Magazine&#039;&#039;. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220728030416/https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,809583,00.html Archived] 2022-07-28.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and in 1958 the U.S. abrogated paragraph 13d of the armistice by introducing nuclear weapons into south Korea.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Lee Jae-Bong (2009-02-07). [https://apjjf.org/-Lee-Jae-Bong/3053/article.html &amp;quot;US Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea &amp;amp; North Korea&#039;s Nuclear Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula&amp;quot;] &#039;&#039;The Asia-Pacific Journal&#039;&#039;. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220819105903/https://apjjf.org/-Lee-Jae-Bong/3053/article.html Archived] 2022-18-19.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Continued U.S. occupation of south Korea ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See also: [[Republic of Korea]], [[United States imperialism]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;The armistice has never been replaced with a peace treaty and the two sides remain technically at war, with the U.S. occupying the south and retaining operational control over the south Korean military in wartime, and regularly engaging in provocative joint military exercises with south Korea aimed at &amp;quot;decapitating&amp;quot; DPRK&#039;s government,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Flounders, Sara. [https://www.workers.org/2022/08/66398/ “Faced with U.S. ‘Decapitation Drill’/DPRK Korea Missile Launch Is Self-Defense.”] Workers World. August 26, 2022. [https://web.archive.org/web/20221014032939/https://www.workers.org/2022/08/66398/ Archived] 2022-10-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; while enforcing strict [[economic sanctions]] against DPRK as a form of siege warfare. The U.S. also blocks inter-Korean reconciliation efforts initiated between north and south Korea. For example, in January 2020 when south Korean President [[Moon Jae-in|Moon Jae-In]] expressed interest in developing tourism to north Korea, the US ambassador Harry Harris blocked this effort, claiming that &amp;quot;independent&amp;quot; tourism plans would have to undergo U.S. consultation. The U.S. ambassador emphasized that the items inside South Korean tourists&#039; luggage could violate sanctions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://nodutdol.org/sanctions-of-empire/ &amp;quot;제국의 제재 - Sanctions of Empire.&amp;quot;] Nodutdol. October 20, 2020. [https://nodutdol.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Sanctions-of-Empire.pdf PDF]. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220520095404/https://nodutdol.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Sanctions-of-Empire.pdf Archive].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Through a combination of military, economic, and political means, the U.S. prevents north and south Korea from reconciling and continues to target and threaten the DPRK. The United States also has wartime control over south Korea&#039;s armed forces, with this being used to deploy south Korean troops to Iraq and Afghanistan (the wartime stipulation is seen as an empty reform of the original policy of total control).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|page=154-155|quote=Because the total armed forces of the ROK were under the complete control of the US until 1994, the US could deploy hundreds of thousands of troops from the south Korean army to Indochina, where they would fight for the US in the Vietnam War. Since then, the ROK has maintained control of their armed forces except in wartime, when a US general is required to take over. This has not stopped tens of thousands of ROK troops from being deployed to fight with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. “A military exists to wage war. War-making can be defensive, what it’s supposed to be, or aggressive, what it shouldn’t be, but almost invariably is where the United States is concerned. Andrew Bacevich, a US historian and retired career US Army officer, points out that the function of the US military is not self defense, but ‘power projection’—the use, or threat, of violence to impose Washington’s will on other countries. Self-defense is what Homeland Security does. Washington’s granting the ROK control of Washington’s Power Projection Platform in the Pacific 155 the South Korean military in peacetime, i.e., when it’s not fulfilling its primary power projection function, is tantamount to the United States yielding control of an asset when it’s not in use but insisting on full command when it’s needed. In other words, Washington’s ceding peacetime operational control of its East Asian army in reserve—a military which has been historically used as a US auxiliary power projection force in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq—was nothing more than a sop to mollify South Koreans|pdf=https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sQ8X87LjIlmdGTOL1Gb_073PtRSrMmjL/view?usp=sharing|publisher=Baraka Books}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== International involvement/reactions ==&lt;br /&gt;
The Korean war became an international flashpoint because it represented the broad social struggle between two global camps which represented antagonistic class interests. Socialist governments supported the DPRK, while U.S. imperialism and the other imperialist countries, including Japan and [[Federal Republic of Germany|West Germany]], supported the south Korean government. The imperialists united under the command of the United States and fought a socialist camp based on antagonistic class interests. On the imperialist side, military forces from 26 capitalist countries fought alongside the U.S. forces.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Becker, Brian. [https://www2.liberationschool.org/from-inter-imperialist-war-to-global-class-war-understanding-distinct-stages-of-imperialism/ “From Inter-Imperialist War to Global Class War: Understanding Distinct Stages of Imperialism – Liberation School.”] Liberation School – Revolutionary Marxism for a New Generation of Fighters. July 20, 2018. [https://web.archive.org/web/20221014031056/https://www2.liberationschool.org/from-inter-imperialist-war-to-global-class-war-understanding-distinct-stages-of-imperialism/ Archived] 2022-10-14.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== United Nations ===&lt;br /&gt;
At the time the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] was boycotting the [[Security Council of the UN|Security Council]] due to the dispute over the Chinese seat in the UN going to the representatives of the [[Kuomintang]] regime in [[Taiwan]], effectively disenfranchising the Chinese. While American influence already dominated the UN vis-a-vis the Marshall Plan, taking advantage of Soviet absence the US hijacked the United Nations Security Council for its own designs upon Korea. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== United States ===&lt;br /&gt;
A Liberation School article characterizes U.S. involvement in Korea, after the Japan&#039;s defeat in the Second World War, saying: &amp;quot;The U.S. imperialists were terrified that the whole peninsula would go socialist, with Soviet help, if the Japanese occupation forces simply withdrew. When the Japanese government surrendered unconditionally to the United States on August 15, 1945 the U.S. government insisted that the Japanese occupation forces in southern Korea stay in place and hold Korea under subjugation until U.S. military forces could arrive and assume control, which they did almost three weeks later on Sept. 8. [...] When the U.S. military leadership decisively entered the war, they believed that they could reunite the Korean Peninsula under the leadership on the U.S.-sponsored puppet regime in the South.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== USSR ===&lt;br /&gt;
Although the Soviets did not enter the Korean War in a major way, it was Soviet-made weaponry and other Soviet industrial products helped supply the fighting troops.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Soviet Union provided MIG fighter planes to depend the DPRK, which were flown by Chinese, Soviet, and Korean pilots. They were limited in number to avoid too much direct conflict with the United States, which could have caused a larger war.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Xiaoming Zhang|year=2002|title=Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea|title-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N-0b-94OJPcC&amp;amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;amp;dq=Red+Wings+over+the+Yalu:+China,+the+Soviet+Union,+and+the+Air+War+in+Korea&amp;amp;hl=de&amp;amp;sa=X&amp;amp;ved=2ahUKEwiVg8uE-c_3AhXuRjABHddnDa8Q6AF6BAgFEAI#v=onepage&amp;amp;q=Red%20Wings%20over%20the%20Yalu%3A%20China%2C%20the%20Soviet%20Union%2C%20and%20the%20Air%20War%20in%20Korea&amp;amp;f=false|publisher=Texas A&amp;amp;M University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== People&#039;s Republic of China ===&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Korean People&#039;s Army]] in the north were joined in battle by hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the People’s Republic of China, which itself had just successfully completed a socialist revolution. The Chinese People&#039;s Volunteers fought alongside the Korean People&#039;s Army. The combined counter-offensive carried out by north Korean soldiers and their Chinese counterparts drove the United States and its allies back south below the 38th parallel.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; After the war, they helped the DPRK rebuild its infrastructure.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Non-Aligned Movement ===&lt;br /&gt;
The delegates of [[India]] and [[Egypt]] both initially voted in favour of the UN resolution declaring DPRK aggressor. Though the Egyptian delegate, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, reverted to abstention. However, the Indian delegation went on to endorse even the second resolution which sanctioned the use of armed force against the DPRK, under U.S. pressure. This achieved in deceiving the opinions of several Asian people that DPRK was indeed the aggressor here. These acts undertaken without sufficient inquiry are termed by historian Karunakar Gupta as &amp;quot;not consistent with its professed policy of its non-alignment.&amp;quot; [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/how-did-the-korean-war-begin/E87C0302A6B899865E0CEA822EDD9492]&lt;br /&gt;
== Impact and legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Thatched huts go up in flames after B-26 bombers unload napalm bombs on a village near Hanchon, North Korea, on May 10, 1951 (AP photo).png|thumb|Thatched huts go up in flames after B-26 bombers unload napalm bombs on a village near Hanchon, North Korea, on May 10, 1951.]]&lt;br /&gt;
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Although DPRK survived and claimed victory against U.S. forces, the war was very disastrous. 635,000 tons of bombs and 32,557 tons of [[napalm]] were used by the United States.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Rosemary Foot|year=1990|title=A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks|title-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n5eSAAAACAAJ&amp;amp;dq=A+Substitute+for+Victory:+The+Politics+of+Peacemaking+at+the+Korean+Armistice+Talks&amp;amp;hl=de&amp;amp;sa=X&amp;amp;ved=2ahUKEwiNv4r99s_3AhXVTTABHYh6D2QQ6AF6BAgIEAE|page=207–208|city=Ithaca|publisher=Cornell University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; More than 8,700 factories were destroyed and 90,000 hectares of farmland had been spoilt.[https://espressostalinist.com/2013/03/29/kcna-on-the-korean-war/] Even biowarfare was said to have been used against communist forces in the form of infected fleas.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Andrea Andreen, et al.|year=1952|title=Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Biological Warfare in Korea and China|title-url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4334133-ISC-Full-Report-Pub-Copy.html|city=Beijing}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Massive civilian losses were incurred—approximately 4 million have been estimated. By 1952, the bombing was so complete that the U.S. Air Force had effectively run out of targets.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Talmadge, Eric. [https://apnews.com/article/international-news-asia-pacific-ap-top-news-north-korea-dd6256bad51e458cb2e8a1bf64b5c2b6 “64 Years after Korean War, North Still Digging up Bombs.”] AP NEWS. Associated Press. July 24, 2017. [https://web.archive.org/web/20230313163201/https://apnews.com/article/international-news-asia-pacific-ap-top-news-north-korea-dd6256bad51e458cb2e8a1bf64b5c2b6 Archived] 2023-03-13.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The strategic bombing operations against civilian populations is laid bare by the following words of General Curtis LeMay:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;There are no innocent civilians. It is their government and you are fighting a people, you are not trying to fight an armed force anymore. So it doesn&#039;t bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Sherry, Michael (September 10, 1989). &#039;&#039;The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon&#039;&#039;, p. 287 (from &amp;quot;LeMay&#039;s interview with Sherry,&amp;quot; interview &amp;quot;after the war,&amp;quot; p. 408 n. 108). Yale University Press. ISBN-13: 978-0300044140.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;In the present day, DPRK citizens continue to find unexploded ordinance and be injured by old bombs that were dropped by the US and UN forces, and have to evacuate areas and send in bomb squads where such explosives are found, as well as educate citizens, especially children, about the explosives. Each of DPRK&#039;s nine provinces maintains a bomb squad. In 2016, the bomb squad that covers [[Hamhung]], DPRK&#039;s second-largest city, located in [[South Hamgyong Province]], reported handling 2,900 leftover explosives in an interview with AP News. The Hamhung area and the nearby port of Hungnam were hit particularly hard by U.S. bombers because they were an industrial center and home to the largest nitrogen fertilizer plant in Asia. Later rebuilt, the fertilizer plant is still functioning today and remains one of Hamhung’s most famous landmarks. Other areas where bombs may be found include places where railways were located during the war. The bomb squads respond to calls when ordnance is discovered and check construction sites before excavation work begins &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Suppression of dissident narratives of the war ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:South Korean soldiers walk among dead political prisoners, Taejon, South Korea.jpg|thumb|July 1950 U.S. Army file photograph once classified &amp;quot;top secret&amp;quot;, South Korean soldiers walk among dead political prisoners, Taejon (Daejeon), South Korea.]]&lt;br /&gt;
In the work &#039;&#039;From Occupation to War: Cold War Legacies of US: Army Historical Studies of the Occupation and Korean War&#039;&#039;, Seoul National University professor Chung Yong Wook writes that &amp;quot;a divergent understanding&amp;quot; of this era &amp;quot;was repressed or rooted out by force in the US and around the ‘free world&#039;&amp;quot; due to the official U.S. history of the war being written in the context of the emerging Cold War. Military historian Richard Robinson, who wrote a work critical of the U.S. role in Korea, &#039;&#039;Betrayal of a Nation&#039;&#039;, was unable to find a publisher for his work and it remained in manuscript form. I.F. Stone&#039;s work &#039;&#039;The Hidden History of the Korean War&#039;&#039; (1952) which was also critical of U.S. conduct in Korea was removed from many libraries. Professor Chung notes that &amp;quot;military historians were not, in essence, allowed to criticize information given to them, nor did they have leeway in interpreting and critiquing facts, they were left only to describe &#039;&#039;sanitized&#039;&#039; history&amp;quot; at all stages of the information-gathering and history-writing process.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Chung, Yong Wook. From Occupation to War; Cold War Legacies of US Army Historical Studies of the Occupation and Korean War. Korea Journal, vol. 60, no. 2 (summer 2020): 14–54. doi: 10.25024/kj.2020.60.2.14 © The Academy of Korean Studies, 2020. URL: https://kj.accesson.kr/assets/pdf/8518/journal-60-2-14.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20220725044626/https://kj.accesson.kr/assets/pdf/8518/journal-60-2-14.pdf Archive] URL. Suppression of counter-narratives (&amp;quot;Abstract&amp;quot; p. 15, PDF p.1); &amp;quot;sanitized history&amp;quot; (p. 20, PDF p. 7)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Prisoners lie on the ground before execution by South Korean troops near Daejon, South Korea, July 1950. Photo by U.S. Army Maj. Abbott.jpg|thumb|July 1950 U.S. Army file photograph once classified &amp;quot;top secret,&amp;quot; prisoners lie on the ground before their execution by South Korean troops in Taejon (Daejeon), South Korea. Photo by U.S. Army Maj. Abbott.]]&lt;br /&gt;
According to Richard Robinson, who had been working as a historian for the military during the occupation, the official American military history of the occupation is &amp;quot;highly prejudiced and inaccurate&amp;quot; adding that the official U.S. histories were &amp;quot;written upon explicit orders not even to imply criticism of anything American&amp;quot; and says that &amp;quot;if the truth were known, the American occupation of South Korea was incredibly bungled by an incompetent and corrupt administration—all in the name of American democracy.&amp;quot; Robinson had his work suppressed as he expressed criticism of the U.S. military government&#039;s failures in Korea and eventually was compelled to leave the country.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;김환균 (2004-08-09). [http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=25874 &amp;quot;&#039;미국의 배반&#039;이 미국에서 금서가 된 이유. (Why &amp;quot;American Betrayal&amp;quot; is Banned Reading in the U.S.)&amp;quot;] &#039;&#039;미디어오늘 (Media Today)&#039;&#039;. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220724050252/http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=25874 Archived] from the original on 2022-07-24.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Western civilian eyewitnesses of the Korean War, many of them leftists who published their eyewitness accounts as well as interviews and letters from captured soldiers behind North Korean lines, also had their work suppressed. In a research article entitled &amp;quot;Civil Liberties in the Korean War&amp;quot; appearing in the journal &#039;&#039;Modern Law Review&#039;&#039;, Ewing, et. al. write, &amp;quot;The atrocities committed by the US-led UN forces are beyond dispute [...] Almost as shameful as the atrocities in Korea were the extreme steps taken to silence and eventually to punish those who sought to expose them.&amp;quot; According to their research, the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|British]] government threatened eyewitnesses reporting on what they had seen in Korea with allegations of treason, which would have carried a death sentence. The British government also refused to renew some of these witnesses&#039; passports, such as that of [[Alan Winnington]], author of the pamphlet &amp;quot;I Saw the Truth In Korea,&amp;quot; whose passport the government did not restore for 14 years. Others subjected to silencing and intimidation tactics by the British government include women&#039;s movement activist [[Monica Felton]], solicitor [[Jack Gaster]], and journalist [[Michael Shapiro]]. Korean War eyewitness and [[Australia|Australian]] journalist [[Wilfred Burchett]] also had his passport revoked for several years due to his critical reporting, which included reporting on Korea.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Ewing, K. D., Mahoney, J., &amp;amp; Moretta, A. (2018). [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/94544925/Ewing_Korean_2017_Article.pdf &amp;quot;Civil Liberties and the Korean War.&amp;quot;] Modern Law Review, 81(3), 395-421. &amp;lt;nowiki&amp;gt;https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12339&amp;lt;/nowiki&amp;gt; [https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/94544925/Ewing_Korean_2017_Article.pdf Archive].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Ewing, et. al. write in &amp;quot;Civil Liberties in the Korean War&amp;quot;:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;What the experience of Winnington, Felton and Gaster expose is the importance of the administrative power of the state to threaten, intimidate and punish. That power could hardly be greater than in the use of treason as a weapon [...] Despite intimidation of the most appalling kind, Winnington, Felton and Gaster have left a body of work that is now of great contemporary significance, and it is work to which we may be encouraged to return if we are fully to understand the modern crisis in Korea. Those who need to read this work most urgently, however, are the ministers and officials in the government departments that so aggressively abused legal authority, unsuccessfully to deny the British people information about the full scale of the atrocities alleged to have been committed in their name.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Alan Winnington&#039;s reports of mass executions of political prisoners, reported in the Daily Worker, were denounced as an &amp;quot;atrocity fabrication&amp;quot; by the U.S. Embassy in London, although the [[Daejeon Massacre]], of which he made a report including photos of the mass graves, has since been proven true, with additional abundant photographic evidence now available. [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and U.S. military intelligence documents were circulating before the Winnington report, but were classified as &amp;quot;secret&amp;quot; and have since been declassified. These reports told of the executions that Winnington had reported on.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Charles J. Hanley &amp;amp; Jae-Soon Chang|newspaper=The Asia-Pacific Journal|title=Summer of Terror: At least 100,000 said executed by Korean ally of US in 1950|date=July 2, 2008|url=https://apjjf.org/-Charles-J.-Hanley/2827/article.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://apjjf.org/-Charles-J.-Hanley/2827/article.html|archive-date=2022-08-26}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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A 2008 article in the Telegraph states that British journalist James Cameron wrote about mass prisoner shootings in the South Korean port city of Busan in the fall of 1950, but publisher Edward Hulton ordered the story removed at the last minute. The article further states that in 1953, after the war ended in stalemate, after the deaths of at least 2 million people, half or more of them civilians, &amp;quot;a US Army war crimes report attributed all summary executions here in Daejeon to the &#039;murderous barbarism&#039; of North Koreans&amp;quot; and adds that &amp;quot;Such myths survived a half-century, in part because those who knew the truth were cowed into silence.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/1984746/Death-squads-and-mass-graves-the-full-horror-of-the-Korean-War-finally-unearthed.html “Death Squads and Mass Graves: The Full Horror of the Korean War, Finally Unearthed&amp;quot;] 19 May 2008. Telegraph. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/1984746/Death-squads-and-mass-graves-the-full-horror-of-the-Korean-War-finally-unearthed.html Archived] 2022-08-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The Telegraph article also comments on the suppression of the narrative concerning the mass killings conducted by South Korean forces, sometimes under U.S. supervision at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, as well as &amp;quot;cases in which the U.S. military is accused of the indiscriminate killing of South Korean civilians in 1950-51, usually in air attacks.&amp;quot; Regarding the suppression of such realities, the article states &amp;quot;Through the postwar decades of South Korean right-wing dictatorships, victims&#039; fearful families kept silent about that blood-soaked summer. American military reports of the South Korean slaughter were stamped &#039;secret&#039; and filed away in Washington. Communist accounts were dismissed as lies.&amp;quot; The article notes that it was not until South Korean truth commissions began investigations that the truth started to come out after the 1990s, sometimes prompted by chance discoveries of mass graves unearthed by natural disasters, stating that &amp;quot;corroboration comes from a trickle of declassified U.S. military documents&amp;quot; and refers to the hiding of this information as a &amp;quot;long-running cover-up.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Darangshigul remains being investigated.jpg|thumb|In 1992, investigators from the 4.3 Research Institute study the long-hidden remains of massacre victims in Darangshi cave on Jeju island, where civilians including men, women, and children were suffocated to death 45 years prior, when south Korean government forces set fire to the narrow cave entrance.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2483 &amp;quot;Darangshi Cave Unearths yet More Jeju Massacre Tragedy.&amp;quot;] 2012-03-23. Jeju Weekly. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220903155605/http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2483 Archived] 2022-09-04.&lt;br /&gt;
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An article in the Asia-Pacific Journal notes that &amp;quot;Even educated South Koreans remained ignorant of their country&#039;s past. As a young researcher in the late 1980s, Yonsei University&#039;s Park Myung-lim, today a leading Korean War historian, was deeply shaken as he sought out confidential accounts of those days from ordinary Koreans. &amp;quot;I cried,&amp;quot; he said. &amp;quot;I felt, &#039;Oh, my goodness. Oh, Jesus. This was my country? It was true?&#039;&amp;quot;. As a doctoral student in the late 1980s, when South Korea&#039;s right-wing dictatorship was beginning to weaken somewhat, Park was among the few scholars to begin researching the mass killings. He was regularly harassed by the police. Previous attempts at exposing the killings, mainly by groups of aggrieved families of the victims, saw their leaders arrested and punished.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The facts of the [[Jeju Uprising|Jeju massacre]], which occurred from 1948-49, just prior to the Korean War, were also officially suppressed for decades, only coming to light in January 2000 when a Special Act was decreed by the South Korean Government calling for an official investigation of the incident. According to researcher Kim Hun Joon in &#039;&#039;The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea&#039;&#039;, &amp;quot;the massacres were systematically hidden from the general public, and calls for truth and justice were totally suppressed under consecutive anti-Communist military regimes until 1987.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Kim, Hun Joon. (2014). &#039;&#039;The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea&#039;&#039;. Cornell University Press.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Author Hyun Ki Young is noted in an article from &#039;&#039;The Jeju Weekly&#039;&#039; as being credited with writing the first public mention of the Jeju massacre in a 1978 short story. According to the article, Hyun &amp;quot;was unofficially arrested and tortured after the story’s publication,&amp;quot; this being one example of the kind of violent suppression measures taken to silence mentions of the massacres in South Korean history. The article quotes Hyun and describes his experience with violent political repression:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;“After the publication of his story he attended a protest with a friend of his. They were both arrested. “I was tortured for three days. I was tortured by the [[National Intelligence Service|NIS]] [the Korean equivalent to the CIA],” said Hyun. There were two men, one holding Hyun from behind while the other beat him, threatening him to not write about the massacre again. In the booth of the restaurant Hyun, slight in stature, demonstrated how he was restrained and mimicked taking blows to his ribs. They made sure not to break his bones, he said. “If bones were broken there would be problems.” Evidence that this unofficial arrest and torture occurred. Technically Hyun had committed no crime. If they arrested him there would have to be a trial, one that would expose to the rest of Korea the truth of the Jeju Massacre.”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Darryl Coote (2012.11.20). [http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2841 &amp;quot;My Dinner With Hyun Ki Young&amp;quot;] &#039;&#039;The Jeju Weekly&#039;&#039;. [https://web.archive.org/web/2/http://www.jejuweekly.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2841 Archived] 2022-08-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;On the topic of general censorship during the Korean War era, author Jeffrey Kaye writes that &amp;quot;When it comes to documents from the period of the Korean War, most Americans are totally unaware that during the 1950s and first half of the 1960s, the U.S. government &#039;engaged in wholesale confiscation of publications mailed into this country&#039; from Communist countries. This meant any materials emanating from North Korea, China, the Soviet Union or other allied countries (such as those in East Europe at that time) were intercepted and destroyed by U.S. postal officials.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Jeffrey Kaye|newspaper=Medium|title=Massive Mail Censorship Program Hid North Korea Accusations of U.S. BW, Collaboration with Unit 731 War Criminals|date=2021-01-06|url=https://jeff-kaye.medium.com/censored-north-korea-accused-u-s-of-working-with-unit-731-war-criminals-on-bw-attacks-d7fd819ed8b7|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/2/https://jeff-kaye.medium.com/censored-north-korea-accused-u-s-of-working-with-unit-731-war-criminals-on-bw-attacks-d7fd819ed8b7|archive-date=2022-08-26|retrieved=2022-08-26}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In his article, he cites a 1959 article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, &amp;quot;Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship&amp;quot; which deals with this policy in detail, stating that &amp;quot;thousands of publications containing &#039;foreign political propaganda&#039; are intercepted on arrival in this country and destroyed. Precisely how much is destroyed and precisely what is destroyed (e.g., by title) remain somewhat a mystery because security policies censor much information on this censorship program.&amp;quot; After listing a number of examples of the very broad application of this policy, which resulted in the seizure of many non-propaganda foreign materials as well as the loss of many &amp;quot;irreplaceable&amp;quot; materials that could have been used for academic study of international affairs, the authors state that &amp;quot;The total impact of this censorship on American, culture, science and research during this period can hardly be estimated in any quantitative way [...] It would seem unnecessary, here and now, to labor the point that what happened from 1951 to 1955 was unfortunate and undesirable as a matter of national policy--even if that policy is to be formulated in terms of the most narrow national self-interest.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Shwartz, Murray L., and Paul, C.N. James. [https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7046&amp;amp;context=penn_law_review &amp;quot;Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship.&amp;quot;] 1959. University of Pennsylvania Legal Scholarship Repository. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220826140106/https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7046&amp;amp;context=penn_law_review Archived] 2022-08-26.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:History of Korea]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Wars started by the USA]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Harry_S._Truman&amp;diff=58791</id>
		<title>Harry S. Truman</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Harry_S._Truman&amp;diff=58791"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:42:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added source&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox politician|name=Harry S. Truman|image_size=200|birth_date=May 8, 1884|birth_place=Lamar, [[Missouri]], [[United States of America|United States]]|death_date=December 26, 1972|death_place=Kansas City, Missouri, United States|nationality=Statesian|political_orientation=[[Anti-communism]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[Imperialism]]|political_party=[[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]]|image=Harry Truman.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Harry S. Truman&#039;&#039;&#039; (May 8, 1884 – December 26, 1972) was the 33rd President of the [[United States of America]] from 1945 to 1953. His presidency is associated with the final stages of the [[Second World War]] and the early years of the [[Cold War]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harry-S-Truman “Harry S. Truman | U.S. President &amp;amp; History | Britannica.”] &#039;&#039;Encyclopædia Britannica&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Notable events occurring under Truman&#039;s presidency are the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]],&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=John Catalinotto|newspaper=[[Workers World]]|title=Truman was a war criminal|date=2005-08-05|url=https://www.workers.org/2005/world/hiroshima-0811/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230723212435/http://www.workers.org/2005/world/hiroshima-0811/|archive-date=2023-07-23}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the [[Marshall Plan]], the founding of [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization|NATO]], and the [[Korean War|invasion of Korea]]. Truman also created the [[Truman Doctrine]],&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://www.rt.com/news/years-since-truman-doctrine/ “60 Years since Truman Doctrine.”] [[RT (TV Network)|RT]] International. March 13, 2007. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220522235047/https://www.rt.com/news/years-since-truman-doctrine/ Archived] 2022-05-22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which represented a shift in U.S. foreign policy from a nominally isolationist policy to a more openly interventionist one, in which Truman argued that the United States was compelled to assist &amp;quot;free peoples&amp;quot; in their struggles against so-called &amp;quot;[[Totalitarianism|totalitarian]] regimes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine “Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian.”] State.gov. [https://web.archive.org/web/20230326135104/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine Archived] 2023-03-06.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1947, Truman issued an order requiring federal employees to take loyalty oaths.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The Land of the Free|page=180|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Truman Doctrine was one of the guiding notions of the USA&#039;s [[United States imperialism|imperialist]], [[Anti-communism|anti-communist]] efforts at [[containment]] and rollback of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] and other socialist nations and liberation movements throughout the Cold War.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;  Instead of officially annexing former [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japanese]] [[Colonialism|colonies]] in the Pacific, he made them [[United Nations|UN]] trust territories similar to the mandates formed after the [[First World War]]. The [[United States Navy|Navy]] ruled the islands until 1951, when the Department of the Interior took over.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=David Vine|year=2020|title=The United States of War|chapter=The Spoils of War|page=283–4|city=Oakland|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=9780520972070|lg=http://library.lol/main/191568BFAC73F009132DB00ECD0F0F05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1952, Truman considered launching atomic bombs on Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and other industrial centres of the [[People&#039;s Republic of China|PRC]] and [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] in order to reverse their loss in the [[Korean War]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Complex and Contradictory Course of the Stalin Era|section=From “Socialism without the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” to the Cold War Clamp Down|page=120|quote=Not an unfounded concern if we consider January of 1952. To reverse the stalemate in military operations in Korea, Truman entertains a radical idea which he records in his diary: they could deliver an ultimatum to the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, clarifying in advance that failure to comply “means that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and all the industrial centers of China and the Soviet Union would be eliminated.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Presidents of the United States]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Harry_S._Truman&amp;diff=58789</id>
		<title>Harry S. Truman</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Harry_S._Truman&amp;diff=58789"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:36:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Truman&amp;#039;s blackmail of the USSR and PRC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox politician|name=Harry S. Truman|image_size=200|birth_date=May 8, 1884|birth_place=Lamar, [[Missouri]], [[United States of America|United States]]|death_date=December 26, 1972|death_place=Kansas City, Missouri, United States|nationality=Statesian|political_orientation=[[Anti-communism]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[Imperialism]]|political_party=[[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]]|image=Harry Truman.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Harry S. Truman&#039;&#039;&#039; (May 8, 1884 – December 26, 1972) was the 33rd President of the [[United States of America]] from 1945 to 1953. His presidency is associated with the final stages of the [[Second World War]] and the early years of the [[Cold War]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://www.britannica.com/biography/Harry-S-Truman “Harry S. Truman | U.S. President &amp;amp; History | Britannica.”] &#039;&#039;Encyclopædia Britannica&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Notable events occurring under Truman&#039;s presidency are the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]],&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=John Catalinotto|newspaper=[[Workers World]]|title=Truman was a war criminal|date=2005-08-05|url=https://www.workers.org/2005/world/hiroshima-0811/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230723212435/http://www.workers.org/2005/world/hiroshima-0811/|archive-date=2023-07-23}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; the [[Marshall Plan]], the founding of [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization|NATO]], and the [[Korean War|invasion of Korea]]. Truman also created the [[Truman Doctrine]],&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[https://www.rt.com/news/years-since-truman-doctrine/ “60 Years since Truman Doctrine.”] [[RT (TV Network)|RT]] International. March 13, 2007. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220522235047/https://www.rt.com/news/years-since-truman-doctrine/ Archived] 2022-05-22.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which represented a shift in U.S. foreign policy from a nominally isolationist policy to a more openly interventionist one, in which Truman argued that the United States was compelled to assist &amp;quot;free peoples&amp;quot; in their struggles against so-called &amp;quot;[[Totalitarianism|totalitarian]] regimes.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine “Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian.”] State.gov. [https://web.archive.org/web/20230326135104/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine Archived] 2023-03-06.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1947, Truman issued an order requiring federal employees to take loyalty oaths.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The Land of the Free|page=180|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Truman Doctrine was one of the guiding notions of the USA&#039;s [[United States imperialism|imperialist]], [[Anti-communism|anti-communist]] efforts at [[containment]] and rollback of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] and other socialist nations and liberation movements throughout the Cold War.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;  Instead of officially annexing former [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japanese]] [[Colonialism|colonies]] in the Pacific, he made them [[United Nations|UN]] trust territories similar to the mandates formed after the [[First World War]]. The [[United States Navy|Navy]] ruled the islands until 1951, when the Department of the Interior took over.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=David Vine|year=2020|title=The United States of War|chapter=The Spoils of War|page=283–4|city=Oakland|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=9780520972070|lg=http://library.lol/main/191568BFAC73F009132DB00ECD0F0F05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1952, Truman considered launching atomic bombs on Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and other industrial centres of the [[People&#039;s Republic of China|PRC]] and [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] in order to reverse their loss in the [[Korean War]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Presidents of the United States]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Goebbels&amp;diff=58788</id>
		<title>Joseph Goebbels</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Goebbels&amp;diff=58788"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:31:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Goebbels&amp;#039; involvement with a Trotskyist radio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox politician|name=Joseph Goebbels|image_size=200|birth_date=29 October 1897|birth_place=Rheydt, [[Kingdom of Prussia]], [[German Empire]]|death_date=1 May 1945|death_place=[[Berlin]], [[Nazi Germany]]|death_cause=Suicide|nationality=German|political_orientation=[[Nazism]]|political_party=[[NSDAP]]|image=Joseph Goebbels.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Paul Joseph Goebbels&#039;&#039;&#039; (29 October 1897 – 1 May 1945) was a prominent [[National Socialist German Workers&#039; Party|Nazi]] politician, author, and propagandist who briefly succeeded [[Adolf Hitler]] as [[Chancellor of Germany]] for one day, from 30 April to 1 May 1945.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In September 1941, he admitted that Germany had, &amp;quot;totally underestimated the strength of the [[Workers&#039; and Peasants&#039; Red Army|Bolsheviks]].&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Domenico Losurdo]]|year=2019|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|page=21|quote=|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzacecbvccldjvnq5j66bwxd7mpk3rthypyt36b5ykxgj33nsalba74uy?filename=Domenico%20Losurdo%2C%20David%20Ferreira%20-%20Stalin_%20The%20History%20and%20Critique%20of%20a%20Black%20Legend%20%282019%29.pdf|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=978159484621AC3A9C94C444A835A0D7}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Goebbels helped various anti-Soviet propaganda radio outlets broadcast into the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]], one of them being [[Trotskyism|Trotskyist.]]&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War|section=Civil War and International Maneuvers|page=74|quote=In April of 1939, Goebbels writes in his diary: “Our clandestine radio station in Eastern Prussia which broadcasts into Russia has caused an uproar. It operates in Trotsky’s name and causes trouble for Stalin.&amp;quot;|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Fascists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Germans of Dutch descent]]&lt;br /&gt;
{{DEFAULTSORT:Goebbels, Joseph}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Marxism&amp;diff=58787</id>
		<title>Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Marxism&amp;diff=58787"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T15:25:34Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Stalin&amp;#039;s opinion on worker incentives&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Marx and Engels 1848.png|thumb|Painting illustrating [[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]], the founders of scientific socialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]]. The theoretical framework developed by Marx and Engels was a critical synthesis of [[French Republic|French]] [[utopian socialism]], [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|British]] [[political economy]] and [[Federal Republic of Germany|German]] classical [[philosophy]]. Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxism&#039;&#039;–&#039;&#039;Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many other schools of thought. The Marxist scientific worldview has developed through the study of social and historical development based on the [[Historical materialism|historical materialist]] method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marx]] and [[Engels]] first developed [[scientific socialism]] through their struggle against the utopian socialists, and reached new grounds with the publication of [[Capital, vol. I]]. Marxism was elevated in the 20th century with the practice of the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]], which was the [[Leninism|Leninist]] contribution to Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels critically rethought and creatively reworked the achievements of the previous scientific and social thought of mankind and summarized the experience of the class struggle and revolutionary movement of the working masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism, as a complete theoretical system, was developed in the course of integration with the practice of workers&#039; movements and revolutionary struggles in various countries, as well as in the course of struggle against all kinds of erroneous ideological trends, and in the course of creative research on new problems and new situations raised by the development of the times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the death of Marx and Engels, their successors continued to push Marxism forward. Lenin combined Marxism with the concrete practice of the Russian Revolution to develop Marxism creatively. Lenin created Marxism&#039;s theory of [[imperialism]]. He developed the theories of Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and formulated the doctrine of the establishment of a new type of proletarian party. He summed up the practical experience of Soviet Russia and put forward the basic principles and guiding theory of socialist construction. Lenin&#039;s development of Marxism brought Marxism to a new stage - the stage of Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the [[October Revolution]] in 1917 the [[Bolsheviks]] took power from the [[Russian Provisional Government]]. The Bolsheviks established the first [[socialist state]] based on the ideas of [[soviet democracy]] and [[Leninism]]. Their newly formed federal state promised to end Russian involvement in [[World War I]] and establish a revolutionary worker&#039;s state. Following the October Revolution the Soviet government was involved in a struggle with the [[White Movement]] and several independence movements in the [[Russian Civil War]]. This period is marked by the establishment of many socialist policies and the development of new socialist ideas mainly in the form of [[Marxism–Leninism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1919, the nascent Soviet Government established the [[Communist Academy]] and the [[Marx–Engels–Lenin Institute]] for doctrinal Marxist study as well as to publish official ideological and research documents for the Russian Communist Party. With Lenin&#039;s death in 1924, there was an internal struggle in the Soviet Communist movement, mainly between [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Leon Trotsky]] in the form of the [[Right Opposition]] and [[Left Opposition]] respectively. These struggles were based on both sides different interpretations of Marxist and Leninist theory based on the situation of the [[Soviet Union]] at the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin explicitly stated that Marxism is &amp;quot;the enemy of egalitarianism&amp;quot; because &amp;quot;one can&#039;t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model&amp;quot;, mentioning that Marxism understands equality as leveling the class differences, not uniformizing personal needs or living standards.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War|section=The End of “the Money Economy” and “Market Morality”|page=45|quote=Leveling in the context of necessities and personal life is a reactionary and petty-bourgeois absurdity, worthy of any primitive ascetic sect, but not for a socialist society organized in the Marxist spirit, because one can’t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model [...]. In terms of equality, Marxism no longer understands it as leveling in the context of personal necessities and living standards, but as the elimination of classes.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He realized the fact that workers needed material incentives, asides from moral ones.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War|section=The End of “the Money Economy” and “Market&lt;br /&gt;
Morality”|page=46|quote=Stalin’s long term objective is quite ambitious, both at the social and national level: “To make our Soviet society the society with the greatest standard of living”; to complete the “transformation of our country into the most advanced country”; but to achieve this result “it’s necessary that in our country labor productivity surpass the labor productivity of the most advanced capitalist countries”,162 which once again requires material incentives in addition to moral incentives, and therefore the need to overcome that egalitarianism, considered by the Soviet leader to be crude and mechanistic.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chinese Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War and more widely World War II, the Chinese Communist Revolution took place within the context of the Chinese Civil War. The [[Communist Party of China]], represented by [[Mao Zedong]], combined the basic theories of Marxism with Chinese history and social practice, and founded Mao Zedong Thought. The [[People&#039;s Republic of China]] (PRC) was declared in 1949, founded on the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Late 20th century ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1959, the [[Cuban Revolution]] led to the victory of [[Fidel Castro]] and his [[26th of July Movement]]. Although the revolution was not explicitly socialist or Marxist, upon victory Castro ascended to the position of prime minister and adopted the Leninist model of socialist development, forging an alliance with the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 21st century ===&lt;br /&gt;
At the turn of the 21st century, China, [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]], [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic|Laos]], [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea|DPRK]] and [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam|Vietnam]] remained the only officially Marxist–Leninist states remaining, although a Maoist government led by Prachanda was elected into power in [[Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal|Nepal]] in 2008 following a long guerrilla struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The early 21st century also saw the election of socialist governments in several Latin American nations, in what has come to be known as the &amp;quot;[[pink tide]]&amp;quot;. Dominated by the [[Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela|Venezuelan]] government of [[Hugo Chávez]], this trend also saw the election of [[Evo Morales]] in [[Plurinational State of Bolivia|Bolivia]], [[Rafael Correa]] in [[Republic of Ecuador|Ecuador]] and [[Daniel Ortega]] in [[Nicaragua]]. Forging political and economic alliances through international organizations like the [[Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas]], these socialist governments allied themselves with Marxist–Leninist Cuba and although none of them espoused a Leninist path directly, most admitted to being significantly influenced by Marxist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At an event celebrating the 200th anniversary of Marx&#039;s birth, Chinese president [[Xi Jinping]] said &amp;quot;We must win the advantages, win the initiative, and win the future. We must continuously improve the ability to use Marxism to analyze and solve practical problems&amp;quot;, adding that Marxism is a &amp;quot;powerful ideological weapon for us to understand the world, grasp the law, seek the truth, and change the world&amp;quot;. Xi has further stressed the importance of examining and continuing the tradition of the CPC and embrace its revolutionary past, cstruggle and revolutionary movement of the working masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important theoretical sources of Marxism were classical German philosophy, English political economy and French utopian socialism. Marxism took a fundamentally new approach to solving practical and theoretical problems and gave a scientific answer to the main questions posed by the course of social development and, above all, by the development of capitalism and the labor movement; it overcame the idealism and anti-historical, contemplative nature typical of previous social thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Theory ==&lt;br /&gt;
Marx famously states in the [[Library:Manifesto of the communist party|Communist Manifesto]]:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The theory of Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[[Library:Manifesto of the communist party]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Marxist theory can be divided into three parts, each part deriving from a different period of his life: Marxist Philosophy, inspired by German Philosophy, Marxist Political Theory, inspired by French Socialism, and Marxian Economics, inspired by English Political Economy.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[[Library:The three sources and three component parts of Marxism]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist philosophy is a [[Materialism|materialist]] philosophy, and it is principally concerned with [[Dialectical Materialism|Dialectical materialism]], and [[Historical Materialism|Historical materialism]]. Marx was originally a [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelian]] scholar and was often associated with the [[Young Hegelians]], a group of radical Hegelian philosophers in Germany at the time. Like many other Young Hegelians, he distanced himself from them but his philosophy continued to use the same foundation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Politics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political thought is his by far Marx&#039;s most famous legacy. Marx was initially persuaded by the views of French Socialists such as [[Robert Owen]], [[Henri Saint-Simon]] and [[Charles Fourier]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He later rejected their theories, denouncing it as [[Utopian Socialism|utopian socialism]] with no theoretical basis, proposing [[scientific socialism]] instead.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political economy is an application of his philosophy to capitalist economies. His theories were inspired by the British Political Economists [[Adam Smith]] and [[David Ricardo]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He showed how capitalism can be analyzed through its own contradictions, beginning in [[Library:Capital, vol. I|Capital]] with the commodity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Socialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Left-wing ideologies]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Sociology]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communist ideologies]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Marxism&amp;diff=58780</id>
		<title>Marxism</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Marxism&amp;diff=58780"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T08:35:25Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Stalin&amp;#039;s opinion on egalitarianism, and what it means for Marxism.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Marx and Engels 1848.png|thumb|Painting illustrating [[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]], the founders of scientific socialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Marxism&#039;&#039;&#039; is a scientific worldview and school of thought first developed by [[Marx|Karl Marx]] and [[Engels|Friedrich Engels]]. The theoretical framework developed by Marx and Engels was a critical synthesis of [[French Republic|French]] [[utopian socialism]], [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|British]] [[political economy]] and [[Federal Republic of Germany|German]] classical [[philosophy]]. Since the 19th century, Marxism has then developed into several different currents of thought, such as [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxism&#039;&#039;–&#039;&#039;Leninism]], [[Maoism]] or [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Ho Chi Minh Thought]] and many other schools of thought. The Marxist scientific worldview has developed through the study of social and historical development based on the [[Historical materialism|historical materialist]] method.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Marx]] and [[Engels]] first developed [[scientific socialism]] through their struggle against the utopian socialists, and reached new grounds with the publication of [[Capital, vol. I]]. Marxism was elevated in the 20th century with the practice of the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]], which was the [[Leninism|Leninist]] contribution to Marxism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels critically rethought and creatively reworked the achievements of the previous scientific and social thought of mankind and summarized the experience of the class struggle and revolutionary movement of the working masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Marxism, as a complete theoretical system, was developed in the course of integration with the practice of workers&#039; movements and revolutionary struggles in various countries, as well as in the course of struggle against all kinds of erroneous ideological trends, and in the course of creative research on new problems and new situations raised by the development of the times.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the death of Marx and Engels, their successors continued to push Marxism forward. Lenin combined Marxism with the concrete practice of the Russian Revolution to develop Marxism creatively. Lenin created Marxism&#039;s theory of [[imperialism]]. He developed the theories of Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and formulated the doctrine of the establishment of a new type of proletarian party. He summed up the practical experience of Soviet Russia and put forward the basic principles and guiding theory of socialist construction. Lenin&#039;s development of Marxism brought Marxism to a new stage - the stage of Leninism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union ===&lt;br /&gt;
With the [[October Revolution]] in 1917 the [[Bolsheviks]] took power from the [[Russian Provisional Government]]. The Bolsheviks established the first [[socialist state]] based on the ideas of [[soviet democracy]] and [[Leninism]]. Their newly formed federal state promised to end Russian involvement in [[World War I]] and establish a revolutionary worker&#039;s state. Following the October Revolution the Soviet government was involved in a struggle with the [[White Movement]] and several independence movements in the [[Russian Civil War]]. This period is marked by the establishment of many socialist policies and the development of new socialist ideas mainly in the form of [[Marxism–Leninism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1919, the nascent Soviet Government established the [[Communist Academy]] and the [[Marx–Engels–Lenin Institute]] for doctrinal Marxist study as well as to publish official ideological and research documents for the Russian Communist Party. With Lenin&#039;s death in 1924, there was an internal struggle in the Soviet Communist movement, mainly between [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Leon Trotsky]] in the form of the [[Right Opposition]] and [[Left Opposition]] respectively. These struggles were based on both sides different interpretations of Marxist and Leninist theory based on the situation of the [[Soviet Union]] at the time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin explicitly stated that Marxism is &amp;quot;the enemy of egalitarianism&amp;quot; because &amp;quot;one can&#039;t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model&amp;quot;, mentioning that Marxism understands equality as leveling the class differences, not uniformizing personal needs or living standards.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=The Bolsheviks: From Ideological Conflict to Civil War|section=The End of “the Money Economy” and “Market Morality”|page=45|quote=Leveling in the context of necessities and personal life is a reactionary and petty-bourgeois absurdity, worthy of any primitive ascetic sect, but not for a socialist society organized in the Marxist spirit, because one can’t demand everyone have the same needs and tastes, that everyone live their personal lives according to a single and universal model [...]. In terms of equality, Marxism no longer understands it as leveling in the context of personal necessities and living standards, but as the elimination of classes.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Chinese Revolution ===&lt;br /&gt;
At the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War and more widely World War II, the Chinese Communist Revolution took place within the context of the Chinese Civil War. The [[Communist Party of China]], represented by [[Mao Zedong]], combined the basic theories of Marxism with Chinese history and social practice, and founded Mao Zedong Thought. The [[People&#039;s Republic of China]] (PRC) was declared in 1949, founded on the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Late 20th century ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1959, the [[Cuban Revolution]] led to the victory of [[Fidel Castro]] and his [[26th of July Movement]]. Although the revolution was not explicitly socialist or Marxist, upon victory Castro ascended to the position of prime minister and adopted the Leninist model of socialist development, forging an alliance with the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 21st century ===&lt;br /&gt;
At the turn of the 21st century, China, [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]], [[Lao People&#039;s Democratic Republic|Laos]], [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea|DPRK]] and [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam|Vietnam]] remained the only officially Marxist–Leninist states remaining, although a Maoist government led by Prachanda was elected into power in [[Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal|Nepal]] in 2008 following a long guerrilla struggle.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The early 21st century also saw the election of socialist governments in several Latin American nations, in what has come to be known as the &amp;quot;[[pink tide]]&amp;quot;. Dominated by the [[Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela|Venezuelan]] government of [[Hugo Chávez]], this trend also saw the election of [[Evo Morales]] in [[Plurinational State of Bolivia|Bolivia]], [[Rafael Correa]] in [[Republic of Ecuador|Ecuador]] and [[Daniel Ortega]] in [[Nicaragua]]. Forging political and economic alliances through international organizations like the [[Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas]], these socialist governments allied themselves with Marxist–Leninist Cuba and although none of them espoused a Leninist path directly, most admitted to being significantly influenced by Marxist theory.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At an event celebrating the 200th anniversary of Marx&#039;s birth, Chinese president [[Xi Jinping]] said &amp;quot;We must win the advantages, win the initiative, and win the future. We must continuously improve the ability to use Marxism to analyze and solve practical problems&amp;quot;, adding that Marxism is a &amp;quot;powerful ideological weapon for us to understand the world, grasp the law, seek the truth, and change the world&amp;quot;. Xi has further stressed the importance of examining and continuing the tradition of the CPC and embrace its revolutionary past, cstruggle and revolutionary movement of the working masses.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most important theoretical sources of Marxism were classical German philosophy, English political economy and French utopian socialism. Marxism took a fundamentally new approach to solving practical and theoretical problems and gave a scientific answer to the main questions posed by the course of social development and, above all, by the development of capitalism and the labor movement; it overcame the idealism and anti-historical, contemplative nature typical of previous social thought.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Theory ==&lt;br /&gt;
Marx famously states in the [[Library:Manifesto of the communist party|Communist Manifesto]]:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The theory of Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[[Library:Manifesto of the communist party]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Marxist theory can be divided into three parts, each part deriving from a different period of his life: Marxist Philosophy, inspired by German Philosophy, Marxist Political Theory, inspired by French Socialism, and Marxian Economics, inspired by English Political Economy.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;[[Library:The three sources and three component parts of Marxism]]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Philosophy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist philosophy is a [[Materialism|materialist]] philosophy, and it is principally concerned with [[Dialectical Materialism|Dialectical materialism]], and [[Historical Materialism|Historical materialism]]. Marx was originally a [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelian]] scholar and was often associated with the [[Young Hegelians]], a group of radical Hegelian philosophers in Germany at the time. Like many other Young Hegelians, he distanced himself from them but his philosophy continued to use the same foundation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Politics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political thought is his by far Marx&#039;s most famous legacy. Marx was initially persuaded by the views of French Socialists such as [[Robert Owen]], [[Henri Saint-Simon]] and [[Charles Fourier]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He later rejected their theories, denouncing it as [[Utopian Socialism|utopian socialism]] with no theoretical basis, proposing [[scientific socialism]] instead.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Economics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Marxist political economy is an application of his philosophy to capitalist economies. His theories were inspired by the British Political Economists [[Adam Smith]] and [[David Ricardo]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He showed how capitalism can be analyzed through its own contradictions, beginning in [[Library:Capital, vol. I|Capital]] with the commodity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Socialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Left-wing ideologies]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Sociology]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communist ideologies]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58779</id>
		<title>Joseph Stalin</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58779"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T08:27:04Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Stalin&amp;#039;s opinion on honoring him.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox revolutionary&lt;br /&gt;
| name = Josef Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| native_name = Иосиф Сталин&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;იოსებ სტალინი&lt;br /&gt;
| image = File:Iosif_Stalin.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
| image_size = 225px&lt;br /&gt;
| caption = Portrait of comrade Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| nationality = Georgian&lt;br /&gt;
|political_party=[[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]]| birth_name          = Ioseb Besarionis dze Jugashvili&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_date          = {{Birth date|1878|12|21}}&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_place         = Gori, Tiflis Governorate, Russian Empire (present-day [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]])&lt;br /&gt;
| death_date          = {{Death date and age|1953|3|5|1878|12|18}}&lt;br /&gt;
| death_place         = Moscow, [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
| death_cause         = Cerebral hemorrhage&lt;br /&gt;
| political_line = [[Marxism–Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili&#039;&#039;&#039; (21 December 1878 – 5 March 1953), better known as &#039;&#039;&#039;Joseph Stalin&#039;&#039;&#039;, was a Georgian [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] revolutionary, political theorist, and the elected&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=34, 48|quote=After the conference, in May 1917, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee was instituted, to which Stalin was elected and to which he has been successively re-elected ever since.&lt;br /&gt;
[...]&lt;br /&gt;
On Lenin&#039;s motion, the Plenum of the Central Committee, on April 3, 1922, elected Stalin, Lenin&#039;s faithful disciple and associate, General Secretary of the Central Committee, a post at which he has remained ever since.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; leader of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] from 3 April 1922 to 16 October 1952, serving several terms as the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] during that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin oversaw the great period of [[collectivization|collectivisation]] and industrialisation which transformed the USSR from an illiterate rural backwater to a [[Socialism|socialist]] superpower by the late-1930s and early-1940s. Under Stalin&#039;s leadership, the USSR played a principal role in the defeat of [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]] and [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Imperial Japan]] during [[Second World War|World War II]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Life and work ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life (1878–1899) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinAtTiflisSeminary.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1896 as a student at the Tiflis Seminary]]&lt;br /&gt;
Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili was born on 21 December, 1878&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Although some historians claim he was born in 18th December, his birthday was officially celebrated on 21st December.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in Gori,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The city of Gori was part of the Tiflis Governorate, which was one of the administrative divisions of the [[Russian Empire]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a city of the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russian Empire]], in the family of a craftsman, later a worker of a shoe factory. Like his parents, Stalin was an ethnic [[Georgia|Georgian]], and he grew up speaking the Georgian language. Both his father and his mother came from a family of serfs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ian Grey|year=1979|title=Stalin, man of history|chapter=|section=|page=9|quote=Vissarion, his father, came from the village of Didi-Lilo, near Tiflis, where his parents, like their forebears, had been peasant­ serfs. For Vissarion emancipation meant that he was free to fol­low his trade as a cobbler. Around 1870 he moved to Gori, where in 1874 he married Ekaterina Georgievna Geladze, daughter of a serf family from a nearby village. She was about eighteen years of age, some five years younger than her husband. They were humble working people, poor and illiterate.|pdf=|city=|publisher=|isbn=|doi=|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=A341F7377CB157DD7730A9A416CDC302|mia=|title-url=|chapter-url=|trans-title=|trans-lang=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s revolutionary activities can be traced to his time as a student after 1894, when he joined the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=5|quote=In the autumn of 1888 Stalin entered the church school in Gori, from which, in 1894, he passed to the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a period when, with the development of industrial capitalism and the attendant growth of the working-class movement, Marxism had begun to spread widely throughout Russia. The St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded and led by Lenin, had given a powerful stimulus to the Social-Democratic movement all over the country.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|year=1931|title=[[Library:Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig|Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig]]|quote=I joined the revolutionary movement at the age of fifteen, when I became connected with certain illegal groups of Russian Marxists in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted a great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for illegal Marxian literature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1896 and 1897, Stalin was a part of Marxist study groups in the seminary, and in August 1898, he formally joined the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) and began to conduct [[propaganda]] work among the workers in the Tiflis railway workshops. An avid reader, he read &#039;&#039;[[Capital, vol. I|Capital]]&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;[[Manifesto of the communist party]]&#039;&#039;, written by [[Marx|Karl Marx]], subsequently taking a profound interest in [[Marxism]]. At that time, he became acquainted with some of Lenin&#039;s articles criticizing the [[Narodniks]] and the &amp;quot;Legal Marxists&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1945|title=Joseph Stalin: a short biography|page=5|quote=Jn 1896 and 1897, Stalin conduoled Marxist study circles in the seminary, and in August 1898 he formally enrolled as a member of the Tiflis Branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. [...]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin worked hard to broaden his knowledge. He studied Capital, the Communist Manifesto and other works of Marx and Engels. He acquainted himself with Lenin&#039;s polemical writings against Narodism, &amp;quot;Legal Marxism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Economism.&amp;quot; His theoretical interests were extremely broad. He studied philosophy, political economy, history and natural science. He read widely in the classics. He thus trained himself to he an educated Marxist. Even at this early date Lenin&#039;s writings made a deep impression on him. &amp;quot;I must meet him al all costs,&amp;quot; one of Stalin&#039;s friends. reports him to have said. after reading an article by Tulin (Lenin).|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=034C4C1A4DBC437BC939DCF13A1D9EBD}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1899, Stalin was expelled from the seminary for the propaganda of Marxism, and he went to an illegal position and became a professional revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Beginning of revolutionary activities (1900–1917) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin played a central role in the revolutionary activities of the [[Bolsheviks]], a faction of the [[Russian Social Democratic Labor Party|Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]] (RSDLP) led by [[Vladimir Lenin]], before and during the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].[[File:Stalin1902Mugshot.jpg|thumb|Stalin&#039;s mugshot after being arrested in 1902]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin exile painting.png|thumb|Stalin in exile in Siberia]]&lt;br /&gt;
While organizing in the [[Caucasus]], Stalin exposed the [[Mensheviks]] as [[Liberalism|liberal]] [[Reformism|reformists]]. He met Lenin in person for the first time at a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] conference in Tampere, [[Grand Duchy of Finland (1809–1917)|Finland]] in 1905.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, the party elected Stalin to the Central Committee even though he was in exile at the time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Stolypin Reaction. The Bolsheviks Constitute Themselves an Independent Marxist Party|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch04.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, Stalin helped found the newspaper &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party during the New Rise of the Working Class Movement before the First Imperialist War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch05.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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After the [[February Revolution]], Stalin returned from exile in [[Siberia]]. He called for an overthrow of the [[Russian Republic (1917–1918)|provisional government]] and opposed the [[Imperialism|imperialist]] [[First World War]]. At a party conference in April 1917, he argued with [[Nikolai Bukharin|Bukharin]] and [[Georgy Pyatakov|Pyatakov]], who did not support the right of [[Nation|nations]] to [[self-determination]]. In September, Stalin opposed participating in the [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] [[Provisional Council of the Russian Republic|Provisional Council]] and called for a revolution instead.&lt;br /&gt;
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On 29 October 1917, the Central Committee elected Stalin as head of the Party Center to direct the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Preparation and Realization of the October Socialist Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch07.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Civil War (1918–1920) ===&lt;br /&gt;
In summer 1919, the Central Committee sent Stalin, [[Kliment Voroshilov|Voroshilov]], [[Sergo Orjonikidze|Orjonikidze]], and [[Semyon Budyonny|Budyonny]] to the southern front, where he organized an attack against [[Anton Denikin]] from the [[Donbass]]. The [[Workers&#039; and Peasants&#039; Red Army|Red Army]] defeated Denikin in October 1919 and liberated all of [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919–1991)|Ukraine]] by early 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch08.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Establishment of the USSR (1921–1924) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin painting 1920s.png|thumb|270x270px|Painting of Stalin from the 1920s]]&lt;br /&gt;
After the defeat of the interventionists and the [[Russian Civil War|civil war]], when in connection with the transition to a peaceful economic construction of the anti-party groups launched a struggle against the party line developed by Lenin, Stalin defended the [[Leninist]] line and fought against anti-party groups and factions ([[Trotskyism|Trotskyists]], &amp;quot;workers&#039; opposition&amp;quot;). At the 10th Congress of the Party (1921) Stalin presented &amp;quot;The Report on the next tasks of the Party in the [[national question]]&amp;quot;. After the 11th Party Congress (1922) the Plenum of the Party Central Committee elected Joseph Stalin as the Secretary General of the Central Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
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Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Party during this period carried out extensive work on the creation of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]]. Lenin believed that the USSR should be a voluntary union of equal and sovereign [[Soviet republic|union republics]]. On this question, Stalin at first took the wrong stand, putting forward the project of so-called &amp;quot;autonomization&amp;quot;, i.e., the entry into the RSFSR of other Soviet republics on the rights of autonomous units. V. I. Lenin strongly opposed this proposal, criticized Stalin&#039;s mistakes in conducting the national policy, his partiality to the manifestations of great-power [[chauvinism]]. The Leninist principles were accepted by the Central Committee and formed the basis of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The report on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922) was made at the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR by the order of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) by I.V. Stalin in view of Lenin&#039;s illness.&lt;br /&gt;
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After Lenin&#039;s death, the Communist Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee, firmly and confidently led the Soviet people along the path of implementation of Lenin&#039;s precepts, on the path of building socialism. At this time, Stalin made a number of works that were of great importance in the protection and propaganda of Leninism and in the ideological defeat of the currents hostile to Leninism. In this respect, a great role was played by Stalin&#039;s work &amp;quot;On the Foundations of Leninism&amp;quot; (1924), which set forth the basic issues of Leninism and disclosed the new things that Lenin contributed to Marxism. The defense by I. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the Party, of the Leninist theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism initially [[Socialism in one country|in one country]], and of the possibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR in the capitalist encirclement, was of particular importance in the struggle against the Trotskyists.{{Citation needed}} &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 14th Party Congress (1925–1926) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the instructions of V. Lenin, who developed a scientifically sound program for building socialism in the USSR, the party set a course for the [[socialist industrialization]] of the country. This line was set out in the political report of the Central Committee at the XIV Party Congress (1925), made by Stalin. The report emphasized that the essence of [[industrialization]] was the priority development of [[heavy industry]], and first of all the [[mechanical engineering]], the fundamental difference of socialist industrialization, which was inextricably linked with the improvement of the working people&#039;s material condition, from the capitalist one, which was held by means of colonial seizure, robbery and ruthless exploitation of the working people. &lt;br /&gt;
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In early 1926 he published a book of Stalin &amp;quot;Toward Leninism&amp;quot;, which was criticized opportunistic views of [[Grigory Zinoviev|Zinovievites]], who were descending to the ideological positions of Trotskyism and wanted wanted the Soviet Union to stay mostly [[Agriculture|agricultural]] and import its industry from [[Capitalism|capitalist]] countries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Transition to the Peaceful Work of Economic Restoration|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch09.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the 15th Party Conference (November 1926) Stalin made a report &amp;quot;On the Social Democratic bias in our party&amp;quot; and at the VII Extended Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (December 1926) with the report &amp;quot;About the Social Democratic bias in our party again&amp;quot;. Both these reports played an important role in rallying the party ranks under the banner of Leninist ideas and in exposing the Trotskyites, their capitulation to capitalism and their disorganizing activities. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== Collectivization campaign (1927–1934) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the successes of socialist industrialization and guided by Lenin&#039;s [[cooperative plan]], the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b) (1927) put forward [[collectivization]] of the [[agriculture]] as the most important task of the Party and Soviet people. These questions were covered in the political report of the Central Committee of the Party, made at the Congress by I. V. Stalin. During this period, an anti-party group of [[Opportunism|right-wing opportunists]]—[[Bukharin]], [[Alexei Rykov|Rykov]], [[Mikhail Tomsky|Tomsky]] and others—openly opposed the general line of the Party. In the reports of Stalin &amp;quot;On the industrialization of the country and the right deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1928), &amp;quot;On the right - the deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1929), etc. exposed the line of the right opportunists, which expressed the ideology of the [[kulak]], rich peasant class. &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1930, Stalin released the &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; article &amp;quot;Dizzy with Success,&amp;quot; criticizing people who were overenthusiastic about [[collectivization]] and forced [[Peasantry|peasants]] onto collective farms. This issue was most severe in [[Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Transcaucasia]] and Central Asia, where collectivization was not scheduled to finish until 1933.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle for the Collectivization of Agriculture|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch11.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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At the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b) (1930) and XVII Congress of the CPSU(b) (1934) Stalin made reports on the work of the Central Committee of the Party. During this period, the Communist Party and the Soviet state carried out an all-out offensive of socialism against the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] elements. Under the conditions of a tense international situation, the country overcame enormous difficulties in order to put an end to the technical and economic backwardness within the shortest historical period. In pursuing a course of priority and predominant development of heavy industry, the Party made decisive progress in the socialist industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== 1936 Constitution and later (1936–1939) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin 1936.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1936]]&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin helped draft the [[1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union]], which the Eighth Congress of Soviets approved in November 1936.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society. Introduction of the New Constitution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch12.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This constitution remained in effect until 1977.&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1938 Stalin wrote his work &amp;quot;On dialectical and historical materialism&amp;quot;, which gives a brief coverage of the foundations of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and shows its importance for the practical work of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
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In March 1939 the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held. In the report of the Central Committee at the Congress Stalin outlined the program developed by the Central Committee of the struggle of the party and the Soviet people for the completion of building a socialist society in the gradual transition from socialism to communism.{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Second World War (1939–1945) ===&lt;br /&gt;
From December 1940 to January 1941, Stalin attended a military conference with all top military officers. The 18th Congress of the CPSU in February 1941 focused on preparing industry and transportation for the war. In early March, [[Semen Tymoshenko|Tymoshenko]] and [[Georgy Zhukov|Zhukov]] asked him to call up 800,000 reservists, which he initially refused but approved at the end of the month.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=192–8|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The size of the Red Army grew from two million in 1938 to over six million in 1941.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Socialist industrialization|page=35–42|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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On 21 June 1941, a German defector said that Germany would attack the Soviet Union the next night. Stalin alerted all units and told troops to camouflage themselves and their aircraft. He ordered them to secretly occupy firing posts on the border. Germany began bombing border cities at 3:40 a.m. on 22 June, and Stalin met with the Politburo at 4:30. He approved Zhukov&#039;s request to immediately attack the enemy, which was sent at 7:15 a.m. On 26 June, Stalin began creating a reserve front 300 kilometers behind the main front.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Joseph Stalin became [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of People&#039;s Commissars]] in 1941, a position he would hold until his death.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Samuel Totten, Paul Bartrop|year=2008|title=Dictionary of Genocide: A–L|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=9780313346422}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee, People&#039;s Commissar of Defense, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and remained in these positions until the victorious end of the war. The great victory over the [[Adolf Hitler|Hitlerite]] coalition was won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, headed by Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
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Stalin had extensive knowledge of the war situation and demanded exact accuracy from his staff. He required front commanders to send reports every day and criticized [[Rokossovsky]] when he did not do so on 16 August 1943. Stalin also had an excellent memory and remembered all the names of over 100 front commanders in addition to many other commanders, members of the [[People&#039;s Commissariat of Defense]], and party officials. He personally knew and often convened builders of planes, artillery, and tanks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Library:Another_view_of_Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=229–236|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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During the war, Joseph Stalin, as a head of the Soviet government, took part in the conferences of the leaders of the three powers—the USSR, the USA and Great Britain—in Tehran (1943), in Yalta and Berlin (1945). During these years, Stalin maintained everyday correspondence with the presidents of the USA and the prime-ministers of Great Britain, in which he insistently fought for strengthening of anti-Hitler coalition, consistently defended the national interests of the peoples of the countries which were subject to Hitlerite aggression. &lt;br /&gt;
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=== Postwar period and death (1946–1953) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinFinalSpeech1952.jpg|thumb|Stalin giving his final speech to the CPSU congress on October 14, 1952]]&lt;br /&gt;
In the postwar period, I. V. Stalin published his works &amp;quot;Marxism and questions of linguistics&amp;quot; (1950) and &amp;quot;Economic problems of socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; (1952), which considers important questions of Marxist-Leninist theory. &amp;quot;The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; had a great influence on the development of some positions in the political economy of socialism. I.V. Stalin stressed the objective character of economic laws in socialism; based on the classical Marxism-Leninism statements, he formulated the main economic law of socialism, the law of systematic and proportional development of national economy; noted the importance of priority growth of means of production for the expanded socialist reproduction. At the same time, the work contains a number of erroneous and controversial positions (e.g.: assertion that commodity circulation begins to hinder the development of productive forces of the country and the gradual transition to product exchange is necessary; underestimation of the law of value in production, especially with regard to means of production; the statement about inevitability of reduction of the volume of capitalist production after World War II and about inevitability of wars between capitalist countries in the current conditions).{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
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In October 1952 the 19th Congress of the CPSU was held. At the closing session of the Congress Stalin made a speech. The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place after the Congress, elected Joseph Stalin a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin continued to fight against [[revisionism]] and [[opportunism]] but underestimated the strength it would have without a capitalist [[Base and superstructure|base]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=From Stalin to Khrushchev|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=253–262}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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Outstanding work of Stalin was highly appreciated by the Soviet Union. Stalin&#039;s outstanding activities were highly appreciated by the Soviet government. He was awarded the ranks of a Hero of Socialist Labor (1939), a Hero of the Soviet Union (1945) and Generalissimo of the Soviet Union (1945). He was awarded with three Orders of Lenin, the Order of Victory, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov of the 1st degree and medals. &lt;br /&gt;
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==== Death ====&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s health declined during the early 1950s due to overwork during the war. In the last few months before his death, his security was dismantled. [[Alexander Proskryobychev|Proskryobychev]], Stalin&#039;s personal secretary since 1928, was put under house arrest, and [[Nikolai Vlasik]], Stalin&#039;s bodyguard, was arrested in December 1952 and died in prison. [[Pyotr Kosynkin]], Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, died of a supposed heart attack on 17 February 1953. [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] was the only one capable of such a plot, and [[Vyacheslav Molotov|Molotov]] suspected that MVD chief [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] poisoned Stalin, while [[Enver Hoxha|Hoxha]] believed [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] and [[Anastas Mikoyan|Mikoyan]] had planned to assassinate him.&lt;br /&gt;
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On 1 March 1953, at 23:00 Stalin&#039;s guards found him unconscious in his room but did not call a doctor. He did not receive first aid until twelve hours after his collapse and died on 5 March.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Common myths ==&lt;br /&gt;
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===Antisemitism===&lt;br /&gt;
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While anti-semitism has been a historical tool of the [[Far-right politics|far-right]] and [[Fascism|fascists]] in particular, &amp;quot;Judeo-Bolshevism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;cultural bolshevism&amp;quot; being classic fascist [[Conspiracy theory|conspiracy theories]] linking the communist movement with fictional [[Judaism|Jewish]] cabals plotting world domination or ethnic domination, some historians still claim that Stalin too was an [[Anti-Semitism|anti-Semite]]. While [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russia]] had a long and troubled history with [[Mikhail Bakunin|anti-Semitism]] before revolution, there is no evidence that Stalin held these views. The below letter from Stalin opposes this notion.&lt;br /&gt;
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{{Quote|In answer to your inquiry:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at [[capitalism]]. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.&lt;br /&gt;
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In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.|J. Stalin|Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States {{Refn|Stalin: &#039;&#039;Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States&#039;&#039; [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/01/12.htm MIA link]}}}}During Stalin&#039;s time in office, Jews made up 4.3% of party membership, which was much higher than their share of the total population. [[Lazar Kaganovich|Kaganovich]] and [[Maxim Litvinov|Litvinov]], two members of Stalin&#039;s leadership, were both Jewish. During the late 1930s, 10% of Central Committee members were Jewish even though only about 1% of the total population was Jewish.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The European Nationalities in the USSR|page=88–94|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Autocratic rule ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is accepted in bourgeois circles that Stalin was a dictator who imposed his personal will on the entire country. However, during the Great Patriotic War, the Politburo and military leadership made collective decisions. If they could not agree, they would create a commission of opposing sides to create a proposal. Stalin, as Commander in Chief of the Red Army, took his generals&#039; opinions into account and listened to their advice.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The CIA itself admitted in now-declassified documents that the USSR always operated under collective leadership, and that Stalin was not the &#039;dictator&#039; that the Western powers portrayed him to be.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Central Intelligence Agency|title=Comments in the Change in Soviet Leadership|date=2008-02-26|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0.pdf|quote=Even in Stalin&#039;s time there was collective leadership. The western idea of a dictator within the communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin was elected Chairman of the CPSU several times by the Plenum of the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He also tried to resign four times, but each time was turned down by the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Socialist Musings|title=Stalin’s Four Attempts at Resignation|date=2017-02-23|url=https://socialistmlmusings.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/stalins-four-attempts-at-resignation/}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Personality cult ===&lt;br /&gt;
While there is no doubt that Stalin was a revered figure in the USSR, there is no evidence to suggest he made any active efforts to build up a [[cult of personality]] around himself. In fact, in 1938 he requested the destruction of a book that portrayed him too positively and stated that the theory of &amp;quot;heroes&amp;quot; was an [[Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries|SR]] and not a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1938|title=Letter on Publications for Children Directed to the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Youth|title-url=https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2014/06/24/stalin-on-the-cult-of-personality/|city=London|publisher=Red Star Press|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/02/16.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Stalin also condemned the &amp;quot;Great man&amp;quot; in a speech to collective farmers in 1933:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railways, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life.|Joseph Stalin|[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1933/02/19.htm Speech Delivered at the 1st All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigadiers]|1933}}Kaganovich proposed the replacement of Marxism-Leninism with Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, to which Stalin rejected saying: &amp;quot;you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=In fact, when Kaganovich suggests substituting the term Marxism-Leninism for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the leader to whom that tribute is directed responds: “you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; After winning the Great Patriotic War, Stalin declined the title of &amp;quot;Hero of the Soviet Union&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=Immediately after the victory parade, a group of marshals reach out to Molotov and Malenkov: they propose to them the commemoration of the victory achieved in the Great Patriotic War by offering the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” to Stalin, who nonetheless rejects the offer.|lg=http://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Not only that, but he declared to tour Berlin.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=The Soviet leader also sought to escape rhetorical excesses on the occasion of the Potsdam Conference: “Both Churchill and Truman took their time walking among Berlin’s ruins; Stalin showed no such interest. Without drawing attention, he arrived by train, and even ordered Zhukov to cancel any welcoming ceremony with a military band and an honor guard.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On his 70th birthday, he categorically refused a state award.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=He [Stalin] called in Malenkov and warned him: “Don’t even think about honoring me again with a ‘star’.&amp;quot; “But comrade Stalin, on an anniversary like this? The people would not understand.” “It’s not up to the people. I don’t want to argue. No personal initiative! Understand me?” “Of course, comrade Stalin, but the politburo members think…” Stalin interrupted Malenkov and declared the discussion closed.|lg=http://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Popular support ==&lt;br /&gt;
In a poll made in 2019, 70% of [[Russian Federation|Russians]] said they had a positive view of Stalin&#039;s role in history. This was a 12% increase from 58% in 2015.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{News citation|newspaper=[[In Defense of Communism]]|title=Anticommunism Fails: 70% of Russians have a positive opinion on Joseph Stalin|date=2019-04-17|url=http://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210629093512/https://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-date=2021-06-29}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quotes:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxist theorists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Former heads of state]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of bourgeois media]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Russian Marxists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communist leaders]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58776</id>
		<title>Joseph Stalin</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Joseph_Stalin&amp;diff=58776"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T08:17:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Stalin&amp;#039;s opinion on honoring him&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox revolutionary&lt;br /&gt;
| name = Josef Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| native_name = Иосиф Сталин&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;იოსებ სტალინი&lt;br /&gt;
| image = File:Iosif_Stalin.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
| image_size = 225px&lt;br /&gt;
| caption = Portrait of comrade Stalin&lt;br /&gt;
| nationality = Georgian&lt;br /&gt;
|political_party=[[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]]| birth_name          = Ioseb Besarionis dze Jugashvili&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_date          = {{Birth date|1878|12|21}}&lt;br /&gt;
| birth_place         = Gori, Tiflis Governorate, Russian Empire (present-day [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]])&lt;br /&gt;
| death_date          = {{Death date and age|1953|3|5|1878|12|18}}&lt;br /&gt;
| death_place         = Moscow, [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], [[Soviet Union]]&lt;br /&gt;
| death_cause         = Cerebral hemorrhage&lt;br /&gt;
| political_line = [[Marxism–Leninism]]&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili&#039;&#039;&#039; (21 December 1878 – 5 March 1953), better known as &#039;&#039;&#039;Joseph Stalin&#039;&#039;&#039;, was a Georgian [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] revolutionary, political theorist, and the elected&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=34, 48|quote=After the conference, in May 1917, a Political Bureau of the Central Committee was instituted, to which Stalin was elected and to which he has been successively re-elected ever since.&lt;br /&gt;
[...]&lt;br /&gt;
On Lenin&#039;s motion, the Plenum of the Central Committee, on April 3, 1922, elected Stalin, Lenin&#039;s faithful disciple and associate, General Secretary of the Central Committee, a post at which he has remained ever since.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; leader of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] from 3 April 1922 to 16 October 1952, serving several terms as the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] during that time.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin oversaw the great period of [[collectivization|collectivisation]] and industrialisation which transformed the USSR from an illiterate rural backwater to a [[Socialism|socialist]] superpower by the late-1930s and early-1940s. Under Stalin&#039;s leadership, the USSR played a principal role in the defeat of [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany]] and [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Imperial Japan]] during [[Second World War|World War II]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Life and work ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life (1878–1899) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinAtTiflisSeminary.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1896 as a student at the Tiflis Seminary]]&lt;br /&gt;
Iósif Vissariónovich Dzhugashvili was born on 21 December, 1878&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Although some historians claim he was born in 18th December, his birthday was officially celebrated on 21st December.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in Gori,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;The city of Gori was part of the Tiflis Governorate, which was one of the administrative divisions of the [[Russian Empire]].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; a city of the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russian Empire]], in the family of a craftsman, later a worker of a shoe factory. Like his parents, Stalin was an ethnic [[Georgia|Georgian]], and he grew up speaking the Georgian language. Both his father and his mother came from a family of serfs.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ian Grey|year=1979|title=Stalin, man of history|chapter=|section=|page=9|quote=Vissarion, his father, came from the village of Didi-Lilo, near Tiflis, where his parents, like their forebears, had been peasant­ serfs. For Vissarion emancipation meant that he was free to fol­low his trade as a cobbler. Around 1870 he moved to Gori, where in 1874 he married Ekaterina Georgievna Geladze, daughter of a serf family from a nearby village. She was about eighteen years of age, some five years younger than her husband. They were humble working people, poor and illiterate.|pdf=|city=|publisher=|isbn=|doi=|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=A341F7377CB157DD7730A9A416CDC302|mia=|title-url=|chapter-url=|trans-title=|trans-lang=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s revolutionary activities can be traced to his time as a student after 1894, when he joined the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1949|title=Joseph Stalin: a political biography|page=5|quote=In the autumn of 1888 Stalin entered the church school in Gori, from which, in 1894, he passed to the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This was a period when, with the development of industrial capitalism and the attendant growth of the working-class movement, Marxism had begun to spread widely throughout Russia. The St. Petersburg League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, founded and led by Lenin, had given a powerful stimulus to the Social-Democratic movement all over the country.|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=26C959185500A43A5CFF3947ECEF2FCB}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|year=1931|title=[[Library:Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig|Stalin interview with Emil Ludwig]]|quote=I joined the revolutionary movement at the age of fifteen, when I became connected with certain illegal groups of Russian Marxists in Transcaucasia. These groups exerted a great influence on me and instilled in me a taste for illegal Marxian literature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1896 and 1897, Stalin was a part of Marxist study groups in the seminary, and in August 1898, he formally joined the Tiflis branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) and began to conduct [[propaganda]] work among the workers in the Tiflis railway workshops. An avid reader, he read &#039;&#039;[[Capital, vol. I|Capital]]&#039;&#039; and the &#039;&#039;[[Manifesto of the communist party]]&#039;&#039;, written by [[Marx|Karl Marx]], subsequently taking a profound interest in [[Marxism]]. At that time, he became acquainted with some of Lenin&#039;s articles criticizing the [[Narodniks]] and the &amp;quot;Legal Marxists&amp;quot;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute|year=1945|title=Joseph Stalin: a short biography|page=5|quote=Jn 1896 and 1897, Stalin conduoled Marxist study circles in the seminary, and in August 1898 he formally enrolled as a member of the Tiflis Branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. [...]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin worked hard to broaden his knowledge. He studied Capital, the Communist Manifesto and other works of Marx and Engels. He acquainted himself with Lenin&#039;s polemical writings against Narodism, &amp;quot;Legal Marxism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Economism.&amp;quot; His theoretical interests were extremely broad. He studied philosophy, political economy, history and natural science. He read widely in the classics. He thus trained himself to he an educated Marxist. Even at this early date Lenin&#039;s writings made a deep impression on him. &amp;quot;I must meet him al all costs,&amp;quot; one of Stalin&#039;s friends. reports him to have said. after reading an article by Tulin (Lenin).|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=034C4C1A4DBC437BC939DCF13A1D9EBD}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1899, Stalin was expelled from the seminary for the propaganda of Marxism, and he went to an illegal position and became a professional revolutionary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Beginning of revolutionary activities (1900–1917) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin played a central role in the revolutionary activities of the [[Bolsheviks]], a faction of the [[Russian Social Democratic Labor Party|Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]] (RSDLP) led by [[Vladimir Lenin]], before and during the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].[[File:Stalin1902Mugshot.jpg|thumb|Stalin&#039;s mugshot after being arrested in 1902]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin exile painting.png|thumb|Stalin in exile in Siberia]]&lt;br /&gt;
While organizing in the [[Caucasus]], Stalin exposed the [[Mensheviks]] as [[Liberalism|liberal]] [[Reformism|reformists]]. He met Lenin in person for the first time at a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] conference in Tampere, [[Grand Duchy of Finland (1809–1917)|Finland]] in 1905.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, the party elected Stalin to the Central Committee even though he was in exile at the time.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the Period of the Stolypin Reaction. The Bolsheviks Constitute Themselves an Independent Marxist Party|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch04.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1912, Stalin helped found the newspaper &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party during the New Rise of the Working Class Movement before the First Imperialist War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch05.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the [[February Revolution]], Stalin returned from exile in [[Siberia]]. He called for an overthrow of the [[Russian Republic (1917–1918)|provisional government]] and opposed the [[Imperialism|imperialist]] [[First World War]]. At a party conference in April 1917, he argued with [[Nikolai Bukharin|Bukharin]] and [[Georgy Pyatakov|Pyatakov]], who did not support the right of [[Nation|nations]] to [[self-determination]]. In September, Stalin opposed participating in the [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] [[Provisional Council of the Russian Republic|Provisional Council]] and called for a revolution instead.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On 29 October 1917, the Central Committee elected Stalin as head of the Party Center to direct the [[Russian revolution of 1917|October Revolution]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Preparation and Realization of the October Socialist Revolution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch07.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Civil War (1918–1920) ===&lt;br /&gt;
In summer 1919, the Central Committee sent Stalin, [[Kliment Voroshilov|Voroshilov]], [[Sergo Orjonikidze|Orjonikidze]], and [[Semyon Budyonny|Budyonny]] to the southern front, where he organized an attack against [[Anton Denikin]] from the [[Donbass]]. The [[Workers&#039; and Peasants&#039; Red Army|Red Army]] defeated Denikin in October 1919 and liberated all of [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919–1991)|Ukraine]] by early 1920.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch08.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Establishment of the USSR (1921–1924) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin painting 1920s.png|thumb|270x270px|Painting of Stalin from the 1920s]]&lt;br /&gt;
After the defeat of the interventionists and the [[Russian Civil War|civil war]], when in connection with the transition to a peaceful economic construction of the anti-party groups launched a struggle against the party line developed by Lenin, Stalin defended the [[Leninist]] line and fought against anti-party groups and factions ([[Trotskyism|Trotskyists]], &amp;quot;workers&#039; opposition&amp;quot;). At the 10th Congress of the Party (1921) Stalin presented &amp;quot;The Report on the next tasks of the Party in the [[national question]]&amp;quot;. After the 11th Party Congress (1922) the Plenum of the Party Central Committee elected Joseph Stalin as the Secretary General of the Central Committee.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Party during this period carried out extensive work on the creation of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]]. Lenin believed that the USSR should be a voluntary union of equal and sovereign [[Soviet republic|union republics]]. On this question, Stalin at first took the wrong stand, putting forward the project of so-called &amp;quot;autonomization&amp;quot;, i.e., the entry into the RSFSR of other Soviet republics on the rights of autonomous units. V. I. Lenin strongly opposed this proposal, criticized Stalin&#039;s mistakes in conducting the national policy, his partiality to the manifestations of great-power [[chauvinism]]. The Leninist principles were accepted by the Central Committee and formed the basis of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The report on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922) was made at the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR by the order of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) by I.V. Stalin in view of Lenin&#039;s illness.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After Lenin&#039;s death, the Communist Party, under the leadership of the Central Committee, firmly and confidently led the Soviet people along the path of implementation of Lenin&#039;s precepts, on the path of building socialism. At this time, Stalin made a number of works that were of great importance in the protection and propaganda of Leninism and in the ideological defeat of the currents hostile to Leninism. In this respect, a great role was played by Stalin&#039;s work &amp;quot;On the Foundations of Leninism&amp;quot; (1924), which set forth the basic issues of Leninism and disclosed the new things that Lenin contributed to Marxism. The defense by I. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the Party, of the Leninist theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism initially [[Socialism in one country|in one country]], and of the possibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR in the capitalist encirclement, was of particular importance in the struggle against the Trotskyists.{{Citation needed}} &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 14th Party Congress (1925–1926) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the instructions of V. Lenin, who developed a scientifically sound program for building socialism in the USSR, the party set a course for the [[socialist industrialization]] of the country. This line was set out in the political report of the Central Committee at the XIV Party Congress (1925), made by Stalin. The report emphasized that the essence of [[industrialization]] was the priority development of [[heavy industry]], and first of all the [[mechanical engineering]], the fundamental difference of socialist industrialization, which was inextricably linked with the improvement of the working people&#039;s material condition, from the capitalist one, which was held by means of colonial seizure, robbery and ruthless exploitation of the working people. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In early 1926 he published a book of Stalin &amp;quot;Toward Leninism&amp;quot;, which was criticized opportunistic views of [[Grigory Zinoviev|Zinovievites]], who were descending to the ideological positions of Trotskyism and wanted wanted the Soviet Union to stay mostly [[Agriculture|agricultural]] and import its industry from [[Capitalism|capitalist]] countries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Period of Transition to the Peaceful Work of Economic Restoration|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch09.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the 15th Party Conference (November 1926) Stalin made a report &amp;quot;On the Social Democratic bias in our party&amp;quot; and at the VII Extended Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (December 1926) with the report &amp;quot;About the Social Democratic bias in our party again&amp;quot;. Both these reports played an important role in rallying the party ranks under the banner of Leninist ideas and in exposing the Trotskyites, their capitulation to capitalism and their disorganizing activities. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Collectivization campaign (1927–1934) ===&lt;br /&gt;
Based on the successes of socialist industrialization and guided by Lenin&#039;s [[cooperative plan]], the 15th Congress of the CPSU (b) (1927) put forward [[collectivization]] of the [[agriculture]] as the most important task of the Party and Soviet people. These questions were covered in the political report of the Central Committee of the Party, made at the Congress by I. V. Stalin. During this period, an anti-party group of [[Opportunism|right-wing opportunists]]—[[Bukharin]], [[Alexei Rykov|Rykov]], [[Mikhail Tomsky|Tomsky]] and others—openly opposed the general line of the Party. In the reports of Stalin &amp;quot;On the industrialization of the country and the right deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1928), &amp;quot;On the right - the deviation in the CPSU (b)&amp;quot; (1929), etc. exposed the line of the right opportunists, which expressed the ideology of the [[kulak]], rich peasant class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1930, Stalin released the &#039;&#039;Pravda&#039;&#039; article &amp;quot;Dizzy with Success,&amp;quot; criticizing people who were overenthusiastic about [[collectivization]] and forced [[Peasantry|peasants]] onto collective farms. This issue was most severe in [[Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Transcaucasia]] and Central Asia, where collectivization was not scheduled to finish until 1933.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle for the Collectivization of Agriculture|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch11.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b) (1930) and XVII Congress of the CPSU(b) (1934) Stalin made reports on the work of the Central Committee of the Party. During this period, the Communist Party and the Soviet state carried out an all-out offensive of socialism against the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] elements. Under the conditions of a tense international situation, the country overcame enormous difficulties in order to put an end to the technical and economic backwardness within the shortest historical period. In pursuing a course of priority and predominant development of heavy industry, the Party made decisive progress in the socialist industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== 1936 Constitution and later (1936–1939) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Stalin 1936.jpg|thumb|Stalin in 1936]]&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin helped draft the [[1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union]], which the Eighth Congress of Soviets approved in November 1936.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society. Introduction of the New Constitution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch12.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This constitution remained in effect until 1977.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1938 Stalin wrote his work &amp;quot;On dialectical and historical materialism&amp;quot;, which gives a brief coverage of the foundations of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and shows its importance for the practical work of the Party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1939 the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held. In the report of the Central Committee at the Congress Stalin outlined the program developed by the Central Committee of the struggle of the party and the Soviet people for the completion of building a socialist society in the gradual transition from socialism to communism.{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Second World War (1939–1945) ===&lt;br /&gt;
From December 1940 to January 1941, Stalin attended a military conference with all top military officers. The 18th Congress of the CPSU in February 1941 focused on preparing industry and transportation for the war. In early March, [[Semen Tymoshenko|Tymoshenko]] and [[Georgy Zhukov|Zhukov]] asked him to call up 800,000 reservists, which he initially refused but approved at the end of the month.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=192–8|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The size of the Red Army grew from two million in 1938 to over six million in 1941.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Socialist industrialization|page=35–42|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On 21 June 1941, a German defector said that Germany would attack the Soviet Union the next night. Stalin alerted all units and told troops to camouflage themselves and their aircraft. He ordered them to secretly occupy firing posts on the border. Germany began bombing border cities at 3:40 a.m. on 22 June, and Stalin met with the Politburo at 4:30. He approved Zhukov&#039;s request to immediately attack the enemy, which was sent at 7:15 a.m. On 26 June, Stalin began creating a reserve front 300 kilometers behind the main front.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Joseph Stalin became [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of People&#039;s Commissars]] in 1941, a position he would hold until his death.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Samuel Totten, Paul Bartrop|year=2008|title=Dictionary of Genocide: A–L|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=9780313346422}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee, People&#039;s Commissar of Defense, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and remained in these positions until the victorious end of the war. The great victory over the [[Adolf Hitler|Hitlerite]] coalition was won by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, headed by Stalin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin had extensive knowledge of the war situation and demanded exact accuracy from his staff. He required front commanders to send reports every day and criticized [[Rokossovsky]] when he did not do so on 16 August 1943. Stalin also had an excellent memory and remembered all the names of over 100 front commanders in addition to many other commanders, members of the [[People&#039;s Commissariat of Defense]], and party officials. He personally knew and often convened builders of planes, artillery, and tanks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Library:Another_view_of_Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|page=229–236|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|publisher=Editions EPO|isbn=9782872620814}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During the war, Joseph Stalin, as a head of the Soviet government, took part in the conferences of the leaders of the three powers—the USSR, the USA and Great Britain—in Tehran (1943), in Yalta and Berlin (1945). During these years, Stalin maintained everyday correspondence with the presidents of the USA and the prime-ministers of Great Britain, in which he insistently fought for strengthening of anti-Hitler coalition, consistently defended the national interests of the peoples of the countries which were subject to Hitlerite aggression. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Postwar period and death (1946–1953) ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:StalinFinalSpeech1952.jpg|thumb|Stalin giving his final speech to the CPSU congress on October 14, 1952]]&lt;br /&gt;
In the postwar period, I. V. Stalin published his works &amp;quot;Marxism and questions of linguistics&amp;quot; (1950) and &amp;quot;Economic problems of socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; (1952), which considers important questions of Marxist-Leninist theory. &amp;quot;The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR&amp;quot; had a great influence on the development of some positions in the political economy of socialism. I.V. Stalin stressed the objective character of economic laws in socialism; based on the classical Marxism-Leninism statements, he formulated the main economic law of socialism, the law of systematic and proportional development of national economy; noted the importance of priority growth of means of production for the expanded socialist reproduction. At the same time, the work contains a number of erroneous and controversial positions (e.g.: assertion that commodity circulation begins to hinder the development of productive forces of the country and the gradual transition to product exchange is necessary; underestimation of the law of value in production, especially with regard to means of production; the statement about inevitability of reduction of the volume of capitalist production after World War II and about inevitability of wars between capitalist countries in the current conditions).{{Citation needed}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In October 1952 the 19th Congress of the CPSU was held. At the closing session of the Congress Stalin made a speech. The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which took place after the Congress, elected Joseph Stalin a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin continued to fight against [[revisionism]] and [[opportunism]] but underestimated the strength it would have without a capitalist [[Base and superstructure|base]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=From Stalin to Khrushchev|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=253–262}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Outstanding work of Stalin was highly appreciated by the Soviet Union. Stalin&#039;s outstanding activities were highly appreciated by the Soviet government. He was awarded the ranks of a Hero of Socialist Labor (1939), a Hero of the Soviet Union (1945) and Generalissimo of the Soviet Union (1945). He was awarded with three Orders of Lenin, the Order of Victory, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov of the 1st degree and medals. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Death ====&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin&#039;s health declined during the early 1950s due to overwork during the war. In the last few months before his death, his security was dismantled. [[Alexander Proskryobychev|Proskryobychev]], Stalin&#039;s personal secretary since 1928, was put under house arrest, and [[Nikolai Vlasik]], Stalin&#039;s bodyguard, was arrested in December 1952 and died in prison. [[Pyotr Kosynkin]], Vice-Commander of the Kremlin Guard, died of a supposed heart attack on 17 February 1953. [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] was the only one capable of such a plot, and [[Vyacheslav Molotov|Molotov]] suspected that MVD chief [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] poisoned Stalin, while [[Enver Hoxha|Hoxha]] believed [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] and [[Anastas Mikoyan|Mikoyan]] had planned to assassinate him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On 1 March 1953, at 23:00 Stalin&#039;s guards found him unconscious in his room but did not call a doctor. He did not receive first aid until twelve hours after his collapse and died on 5 March.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Common myths ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Antisemitism===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While anti-semitism has been a historical tool of the [[Far-right politics|far-right]] and [[Fascism|fascists]] in particular, &amp;quot;Judeo-Bolshevism&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;cultural bolshevism&amp;quot; being classic fascist [[Conspiracy theory|conspiracy theories]] linking the communist movement with fictional [[Judaism|Jewish]] cabals plotting world domination or ethnic domination, some historians still claim that Stalin too was an [[Anti-Semitism|anti-Semite]]. While [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russia]] had a long and troubled history with [[Mikhail Bakunin|anti-Semitism]] before revolution, there is no evidence that Stalin held these views. The below letter from Stalin opposes this notion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|In answer to your inquiry:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at [[capitalism]]. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty.|J. Stalin|Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States {{Refn|Stalin: &#039;&#039;Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States&#039;&#039; [https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/01/12.htm MIA link]}}}}During Stalin&#039;s time in office, Jews made up 4.3% of party membership, which was much higher than their share of the total population. [[Lazar Kaganovich|Kaganovich]] and [[Maxim Litvinov|Litvinov]], two members of Stalin&#039;s leadership, were both Jewish. During the late 1930s, 10% of Central Committee members were Jewish even though only about 1% of the total population was Jewish.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The European Nationalities in the USSR|page=88–94|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Autocratic rule ===&lt;br /&gt;
It is accepted in bourgeois circles that Stalin was a dictator who imposed his personal will on the entire country. However, during the Great Patriotic War, the Politburo and military leadership made collective decisions. If they could not agree, they would create a commission of opposing sides to create a proposal. Stalin, as Commander in Chief of the Red Army, took his generals&#039; opinions into account and listened to their advice.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The CIA itself admitted in now-declassified documents that the USSR always operated under collective leadership, and that Stalin was not the &#039;dictator&#039; that the Western powers portrayed him to be.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Central Intelligence Agency|title=Comments in the Change in Soviet Leadership|date=2008-02-26|url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0.pdf|quote=Even in Stalin&#039;s time there was collective leadership. The western idea of a dictator within the communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Stalin was elected Chairman of the CPSU several times by the Plenum of the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; He also tried to resign four times, but each time was turned down by the Central Committee.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Socialist Musings|title=Stalin’s Four Attempts at Resignation|date=2017-02-23|url=https://socialistmlmusings.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/stalins-four-attempts-at-resignation/}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Personality cult ===&lt;br /&gt;
While there is no doubt that Stalin was a revered figure in the USSR, there is no evidence to suggest he made any active efforts to build up a [[cult of personality]] around himself. In fact, in 1938 he requested the destruction of a book that portrayed him too positively and stated that the theory of &amp;quot;heroes&amp;quot; was an [[Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries|SR]] and not a [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik]] theory.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1938|title=Letter on Publications for Children Directed to the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Youth|title-url=https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2014/06/24/stalin-on-the-cult-of-personality/|city=London|publisher=Red Star Press|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/02/16.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Stalin also condemned the &amp;quot;Great man&amp;quot; in a speech to collective farmers in 1933:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Quote|The times have passed when leaders were regarded as the only makers of history, while the workers and peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of nations and of states are now determined, not only by leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of the working people. The workers and the peasants, who without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, constructing mines and railways, building collective farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, feeding and clothing the whole world—they are the real heroes and the creators of the new life.|Joseph Stalin|[https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1933/02/19.htm Speech Delivered at the 1st All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Brigadiers]|1933}}Kaganovich proposed the replacement of Marxism-Leninism with Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, to which Stalin rejected saying: &amp;quot;you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Cult of Personality in Russia, from Kerensky to Stalin|page=33|quote=In fact, when Kaganovich suggests substituting the term Marxism-Leninism for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, the leader to whom that tribute is directed responds: “you want to compare a dick to a guard tower.&amp;quot;|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Popular support ==&lt;br /&gt;
In a poll made in 2019, 70% of [[Russian Federation|Russians]] said they had a positive view of Stalin&#039;s role in history. This was a 12% increase from 58% in 2015.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{News citation|newspaper=[[In Defense of Communism]]|title=Anticommunism Fails: 70% of Russians have a positive opinion on Joseph Stalin|date=2019-04-17|url=http://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210629093512/https://www.idcommunism.com/2019/04/anticommunism-fails-70-of-russians-have-positive-view-on-joseph-stalin.html|archive-date=2021-06-29}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== See also ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Quotes:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Joseph Stalin]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxist theorists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Former heads of state]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of bourgeois media]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Russian Marxists]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Communist leaders]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Franklin_D._Roosevelt&amp;diff=58774</id>
		<title>Franklin D. Roosevelt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Franklin_D._Roosevelt&amp;diff=58774"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T08:10:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about Roosevelt&amp;#039;s opinion on Germans after WW2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox politician|name=Franklin D. Roosevelt|image_size=200|birth_date=January 30, 1882|birth_place=Hyde Park, [[State of New York|New York]], [[United States of America|United States]]|death_date=April 12, 1945|death_place=Warm Springs, [[State of Georgia|Georgia]], United States|political_orientation=[[Social democracy]]|political_party=[[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]]|image=FDR.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Franklin Delano Roosevelt&#039;&#039;&#039; (January 30, 1882 – April 12, 1945), commonly known as &#039;&#039;&#039;FDR&#039;&#039;&#039;, was a Statesian politician who served as President of the United States from 1933 to 1945. He viewed the outside world as a threat and encouraged [[militarism]] that continued into the [[Cold War]] after his death.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=David Vine|year=2020|title=The United States of War|chapter=The Spoils of War|page=280|city=Oakland|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=9780520972070|lg=http://library.lol/main/191568BFAC73F009132DB00ECD0F0F05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Family ==&lt;br /&gt;
Roosevelt&#039;s grandfather, Warren Delano, became rich from the opium trade in [[Qing dynasty (1636–1912)|China]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=David Vine|year=2020|title=The United States of War|chapter=The Military Opens Doors|page=206|city=Oakland|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=9780520972070|lg=http://library.lol/main/191568BFAC73F009132DB00ECD0F0F05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Presidency ==&lt;br /&gt;
In 1940, Roosevelt made an agreement with [[Winston Churchill]] to give the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|UK]] 50 destroyers from the [[First World War]] in exchange for 99-year leases for U.S. military bases in eight British [[Colonialism|colonies]]: [[Antigua and Barbuda|Antigua]], the [[Commonwealth of The Bahamas|Bahamas]], [[Bermuda]], [[Jamaica]], [[Newfoundland]], [[Saint Lucia]], [[Republic of Trinidad and Tobago|Trinidad]], and [[Co-operative Republic of Guyana|Guyana]]. He compared this action to [[Thomas Jefferson]]&#039;s [[Louisiana Purchase]]. It was the first U.S. expansion into British territory since the [[War of 1812]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=David Vine|year=2020|title=The United States of War|chapter=Reopening the Frontier|page=|city=Oakland|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=9780520972070|lg=http://library.lol/main/191568BFAC73F009132DB00ECD0F0F05}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;:222–8&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt; Presidential candidate [[Wendell Wilkie]] criticized him for taking this action without approval from [[United States Congress|Congress]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0222&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;:235&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Towards the end of the [[Second World War]], Roosevelt stated that he&#039;s &amp;quot;more thirsty than ever for German blood,&amp;quot; and suggested the idea of castrating Germans.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=Lacking “Common Sense” and “The Mass Deportations of Entire Populations”|page=29|quote=While toward the end of the war F.D. Roosevelt insists he’s “more thirsty than ever for German blood” because of the atrocities they committed, and even entertains the idea, for some time, of “castrating” such a perverse people, Stalin’s position is quite different;|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Presidents of the United States]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Social democrats]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics_(1922%E2%80%931991)&amp;diff=58772</id>
		<title>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Union_of_Soviet_Socialist_Republics_(1922%E2%80%931991)&amp;diff=58772"/>
		<updated>2023-11-01T07:33:22Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Added details about the Great Patriotic War.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox country&lt;br /&gt;
| name                       = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics&lt;br /&gt;
| native_name                = Союз Советских Социалистических Республик&lt;br /&gt;
| image_flag                 = File:Flag of the Soviet Union (1955-1991).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| image_coat                 = File:Coat of arms of the Soviet Union.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| image_map                  = File:Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (orthographic projection).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| map_width                  = 220px&lt;br /&gt;
| official_languages         = None (1922–1990)&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Russian (1990–1991)| capital = [[Moscow]]&lt;br /&gt;
| largest_city               = capital&lt;br /&gt;
| mode_of_production         = [[Socialism]]&lt;br /&gt;
| government_type            = Federal [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] [[socialist state]] (until 1990)&lt;br /&gt;
| established_event1         = October Revolution&lt;br /&gt;
| established_date1          =  1917 November 7th&lt;br /&gt;
| established_event2         = [[Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics|Establishment of the USSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| established_date2          = 1922 December 30th&lt;br /&gt;
| established_event3         = [[World War II]] victory&lt;br /&gt;
| established_date3          = 1945 May 9th&lt;br /&gt;
| established_event4         = Dissolution&lt;br /&gt;
| established_date4          = 1991 December 26th&lt;br /&gt;
| population_estimate        = 285,742,511&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Демоскоп Weekly. [http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php  Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР] [The 1989 All-Union Population Census. National composition of the population by republics of the USSR].&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| population_estimate_year   = 1989&lt;br /&gt;
| labour_force               = 152.3 million&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;&amp;gt;CIA World Factbook (1990). &#039;&#039;[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_World_Factbook_(1990)/Soviet_Union Soviet Union – World Factbook (Wikisource)]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| labour_occupation          = 80% industry and other nonagricultural fields&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;20% agriculture&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| unemployment               = 1–2%&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1991&amp;quot;&amp;gt;CIA World Factbook (1991). &#039;&#039;[https://www.theodora.com/wfb1991/soviet_union/soviet_union_economy.html Soviet Union Economy]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| leader_title1              = Notable leaderships&lt;br /&gt;
| leader_name1               = [[Vladimir Lenin]] (1922–1924)&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[Joseph Stalin]] (1924–1953)&lt;br /&gt;
| currency                   = Soviet ruble (РУБ)&lt;br /&gt;
| p1                         = &#039;&#039;&#039;1922:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p1                    =&lt;br /&gt;
| p2                         = [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1917–1991)|Russian SFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p2                    = Flag_of_the_RSFSR_%281918–1925%29.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p3                         = [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (1919–1991)|Ukrainian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p3                    = Flag_of_the_UkSSR_%281919-1929%29.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p4                         = [[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (1920–1991)|Byelorussian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p4                    = Flag of the BSSR (1919–1927).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p5                         = [[Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1922–1936)|Transcaucasian SFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p5                    = Flag of the Transcaucasian SFSR (1925-1936).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p6                         = &#039;&#039;&#039;1923:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p6                    = &lt;br /&gt;
| p7                         = [[Provisional Priamurye Government]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p7                    = Flag of the Provisional Priamurye Government (1896–1918).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p8                         = &#039;&#039;&#039;1924:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p8                    =&lt;br /&gt;
| p9                         = [[Bukharan People&#039;s Soviet Republic|Bukharan SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p9                    = Flag of the Bukharan PSR (1920-1924).png&lt;br /&gt;
| p10                        = [[Khorezm People&#039;s Soviet Republic|Khorezm SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p10                   = Flag of the Khorezm PSR (1920-1923).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p11                        = &#039;&#039;&#039;1939:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p11                   =&lt;br /&gt;
| p12                        = [[Republic of Poland (1918–1939)|Poland (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p12                   = Flag_of_Poland_(1927–1980).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p13                        = &#039;&#039;&#039;1940:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p13                   =&lt;br /&gt;
| p14                        = [[Republic of Finland|Finland (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p14                   = Flag_of_Finland.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p15                        = [[Kingdom of Romania (1881–1947)|Romania (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p15                   = Flag of Romania.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p16                        = [[Republic of Estonia|Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p16                   = Flag of Estonia.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p17                        = [[Republic of Latvia|Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p17                   = Flag_of_Latvia.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p18                        = [[Republic of Lithuania|Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p18                   = Flag_of_Lithuania.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p19                        = &#039;&#039;&#039;1944:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_19                    = &lt;br /&gt;
| p20                        = [[Tuvan People&#039;s Republic|Tuva]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p20                   = Flag of the Tuvan People&#039;s Republic (1943-1944).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p21                        = &#039;&#039;&#039;1945:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_21                    =&lt;br /&gt;
| p22                        = [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi Germany (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p22                   = Flag of Germany (1935–1945).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p23                        = [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japan (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p23                   = Flag of Japan (1870–1999).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| p24                        = &#039;&#039;&#039;1946:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p24                   =&lt;br /&gt;
| p25                        = [[Czechoslovak Republic (1945–1948)|Czechoslovakia (portion)]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_p25                   = Flag of the Czech Republic.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s1                         = &#039;&#039;&#039;1990:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s1                    =&lt;br /&gt;
| s2                         = [[Republic of Lithuania|Lithuania]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s2                    = Flag_of_Lithuania.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s3                         = &#039;&#039;&#039;1991:&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s3                    = &lt;br /&gt;
| s4                         = [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s4                    = Flag of Georgia (1990–2004).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s5                         = [[Republic of Estonia|Estonia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s5                    = Flag of Estonia.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s6                         = [[Republic of Latvia|Latvia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s6                    = Flag_of_Latvia.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s7                         = [[Ukraine]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s7                    = Flag of Ukraine (1991-1992).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s8                         = [[Republic of Moldova|Moldova]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s8                    = Flag of Moldova (1990–2010).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s9                         = [[Kyrgyz Republic|Kyrgyzstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s9                    = Flag of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s10                        = [[Republic of Uzbekistan|Uzbekistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s10                   = Flag of Uzbekistan.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s11                        = [[Republic of Tajikistan|Tajikistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s11                   = Flag of Tajikistan (1991–1992).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s12                        = [[Republic of Armenia|Armenia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s12                   = Flag of Armenia.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s13                        = [[Republic of Azerbaijan|Azerbaijan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s13                   = Flag of Azerbaijan.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s14                        = [[Republic of Turkmenistan|Turkmenistan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s14                   = Flag of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (1973–1991).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s15                        = [[Republic of Belarus|Belarus]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s15                   = Flag of Belarus (1918, 1991–1995).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s16                        = [[Russian Federation|Russia]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s16                   = Flag of Russia (1991–1993).svg&lt;br /&gt;
| s17                        = [[Republic of Kazakhstan|Kazakhstan]]&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_s17                   = Flag of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.svg&lt;br /&gt;
| GDP_nominal_year           = 1989&lt;br /&gt;
| GDP_nominal                = $2.66 trillion&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| GDP_nominal_rank           = 2nd&lt;br /&gt;
| GDP_nominal_per_capita     = $9,211&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;CIA World Factbook (1990). &#039;&#039;[https://www.theodora.com/wfb/1990/rankings/gdp_per_capita_1.html GDP per Capita 1990]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| export_year                = 1988&lt;br /&gt;
| export                     = $110.7 billion&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| export_commodities         = Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods and arms)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| export_partners            = Eastern Europe (49%),&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Western Europe (14%), [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]] (5%), [[United States of America|United States]]&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| import_year                = 1988&lt;br /&gt;
| import                     = $107.3 billion&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| import_commodities         = Grain and other agricultural products, machinery and equipment, steel products (including large-diameter pipe), consumer manufactures&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| import_partners            = Eastern Europe (43%),&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Western Europe (18%),&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]], [[People&#039;s Republic of China|China]], [[United States of America|United States]]&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;CIA-factbook-1990&amp;quot;/&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
| flag_caption               = [[Flag of the Soviet Union|Flag]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;(1955–1991)&lt;br /&gt;
| motto                      = Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!&lt;br /&gt;
| englishmotto               = [[Workers of the world, unite!]]&lt;br /&gt;
| anthem                     = [[State Anthem of the Soviet Union|Государственный гимн СССР]][[File:Soviet anthem 1944.ogg]]&lt;br /&gt;
| life_span                  = 1922–1991&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;&#039;Soviet Union,&#039;&#039;&#039; officially known as the &#039;&#039;&#039;Union of Soviet Socialist Republics&#039;&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;&#039;USSR&#039;&#039;&#039;),&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;note&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Russian: Союз Советских Социалистических Республик (СССР)&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; was a transnational union of [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] [[socialist state|socialist states]] that existed in Eurasia from 1922 to 1991.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
It was established in 1922 as a union of four [[Socialist state|socialist republics]] created after the 1917 [[October Revolution of 1917|October Revolution]], namely the [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]], the [[Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1922–1936)|Transcaucasian SFSR]], the [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic|Ukrainian SSR]] and [[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic|Byelorussian SSR]]. The years that followed saw the addition of the [[Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (1924–1991)|Uzbek]] and [[Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (1929–1991)|Tajik SSRs]]; the Transcaucasian SFSR was dissolved in 1936 in favor of the elevated SSRs of [[Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (1921–1991)|Georgia]], [[Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic|Armenia]] and [[Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Azerbaijan]]. From 1956 to 1991, the union comprised 15 member republics, two of which had their own member seats at the [[United Nations]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR represented a groundbreaking political alternative for the [[working class]] as the first stable socialist state in history. This was remarkable especially in a time period where workers in the [[Imperial core|Western world]] were still struggling for basic [[Trade union|union]] rights; the [[1924 Soviet Constitution]] and the [[1936 Soviet Constitution]] represented some of the most progressive political advancements in history. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet Union developed under extreme pressure from [[capitalist]] states and global [[Imperialist|imperialism]]; during the [[Russian Civil War]], starting from 1918, it suffered successive invasions by [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|Britain]], [[French Republic (1870–1940)|France]], the [[United States of America|United States]], [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japan]], [[Republic of Poland (1918–1939)|Poland]], and several other minor European powers. Some of these interventions temporarily succeeded in overthrowing local [[Soviet (governmental body)|soviets]] and installing [[anti-communist]] puppet regimes, although they were ultimately unsuccessful in preventing the founding of the Soviet Union. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Barely two decades later, during [[World War II]], the [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi]] invasion represented the second imperialist war on the USSR, this time in the name of [[fascism]]. Although the fascists inflicted catastrophic damage on the western USSR and its population, the [[Workers&#039; and Peasants&#039; Red Army|Red Army]] ultimately succeeded in repelling the Nazi forces and went on to play an integral role in the defeat of German [[National Socialism|Nazism]] in 1945.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite these difficulties, the Soviet Union achieved some of the most impressive economic developments in modern history.  Socialism transformed a country of illiterate and starving [[Peasantry|peasants]] into an industrial superpower with one of the fastest growing economies on Earth.  The Soviet people were one of the world&#039;s best-educated and healthiest populations, responsible for some of history&#039;s most impressive industrial and scientific achievements to date. And it provided a very influential model for other later socialist projects in places such as [[People&#039;s Republic of China|China]], [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]] and [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam|Vietnam]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Starting from 1988, many SSRs seceded from the USSR before [[Dissolution of the USSR|its illegal overthrow]] in 1991. Its past territory is now occupied by the successor states of [[Russian Federation|Russia]], [[Republic of Latvia|Latvia]], [[Republic of Lithuania|Lithuania]], [[Republic of Estonia|Estonia]], [[Republic of Belarus|Belarus]], [[Ukraine]], [[Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic|Pridnestrovie]], [[Republic of Moldova|Moldova]], [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], [[Republic of Azerbaijan|Azerbaijan]], [[Republic of Armenia|Armenia]], [[Artsakh]], [[Republic of Abkhazia|Abkhazia]], [[Republic of South Ossetia|South Ossetia]], [[Republic of Kazakhstan|Kazakhstan]], [[Republic of Uzbekistan|Uzbekistan]], [[Republic of Turkmenistan|Turkmenistan]], [[Republic of Tajikistan|Tajikistan]], and [[Kyrgyz Republic|Kyrgyzstan]]. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Background ===&lt;br /&gt;
In early 20th century, the [[Russian Empire]] was a semi-feudal country ruled by an absolute [[monarchy]]. The average life expectancy in Russia was about 35 years. Literacy rates were only about 20%. The [[Proletariat|workers]] and [[Peasant|peasants]] lived horrible lives without minimum wage laws or basic work safety regulations and worked 60 or 70 hours per week.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:7&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Oktaybr|title=Standard of living in the Soviet Union|date=2021-08-23|url=https://oktyabrvperedi.wordpress.com/2021/08/23/standard-of-living-in-the-soviet-union/?preview=true|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210824102918/https://oktyabrvperedi.wordpress.com/2021/08/23/standard-of-living-in-the-soviet-union/?preview=true|archive-date=2021-08-24|retrieved=2022-09-11}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Despite the size of the country, there was a constant shortage of farm land and famines were common. Most of the land belonged to the wealthy [[Landlord|landlords]] and [[Kulak|rich peasants]]. Because of technological backwardness, only the softest and most fertile soil could be used, which severely limited the amount of available farm land. There were many large [[Strike action|strikes]] and protests but it was not uncommon that the [[police]] would be deployed and break the strike, often by firing at the strikers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1898, the [[Russian Social Democratic Labor Party]] (RSDLP) was created, uniting the several communist study groups scattered around Russia. Among its founders were people like [[Vladimir Lenin]] and [[Julius Martov]]. It established itself as a Marxist party that had the task of overthrowing the monarchy and bring about socialism. However, during the course of the struggle, there was a lot of disagreement about when this goal was to be implemented and how. In 1903, emerged a &#039;&#039;de facto&#039;&#039; split in the party, and two factions were formed: the [[Mensheviks]] led by Martov and the [[Bolsheviks]] led by Lenin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Through the leadership of the RSDLP, and against the worsening life conditions, the Russian workers attempted a [[Russian revolution of 1905|democratic revolution in 1905]]. Massive protests erupted all over the country, mutinies were widespread in the army and the people organized public meetings, called “soviets” or councils, which would get together and discuss what to do in an early form of organisation. The revolution eventually failed however. It won some democratic liberties from the Tsar, but those liberties would be constantly under attack by the monarchy afterwards. This revolution would be seen as a rehearsal for the later revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1914, the [[First World War]] began and launched Russia into chaos. The economy was ruined by the war, there was a shortage of food and large amounts of the population were drafted to fight in the war. The war is seen by many people, especially the socialist, as an unjust imperialist conquest, where millions of poor and working class people from different countries had to die for the profits and wealth of the capitalist and monarchist governments of their countries.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The attitude towards the war ended up splitting the international socialist movement and the [[Second International]]. Many parties initially opposed the war, but then chose to support their own government in it, so as to protect their country from the other imperialist powers. Lenin, [[Rosa Luxemburg]] and other revolutionaries saw this as treachery. In their opinion, if everyone only supported their own imperialist government in an imperialist war, it wouldn&#039;t do anything to stop the war. They called for “turning the imperialist war to a class war”, friendship between the workers of the various countries, and unity against the capitalist governments of all warring countries. This led to the splitting of the International.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== February Revolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
In February 1917, the Russian monarchy was overthrown. This led to the creation of the [[Russian Provisional Government]], consisting of the capitalist [[Constitutional Democratic Party|Cadet]] party, the [[Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries|Socialist-Revolutionary Party]] (or SRs) and the Mensheviks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks initially gave “conditional support” for the Provisional Government, meaning they supported it to the degree that it carried out the democratic reforms and other policies demanded by the population. However, it soon became very evident the Provisional Government was a failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Provisional government refused to carry out [[Land reform|land reforms]]. This was necessary to prevent famine and reduce the land shortage, but it would have meant going against the landlords.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Provisional government also refused to impose stricter regulations on trading and the economy. This would have been necessary to prevent economic disaster, but it would have meant going against the capitalists who greatly profited from the war and chaos.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lastly, the Provisional government supported the war. They advocated a “war to a finish”, meaning until they won. It became evident that Russia was losing the war, however the Provisional government was still committed to fulfill the treaties and agreements with their allies in World War 1.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks were quick to point out that the Provisional government acted exactly like the Tsarist government, which also sided with the landlords, capitalists and started the imperialist war. In their view, the Provisional government was continuing the Tsarist policy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In April 1917, Vladimir Lenin returned to Russia from exile and puts forward his &#039;&#039;April theses&#039;&#039;, political proposals which call for the overthrow of the Provisional government.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks put forward their slogans:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Down with the provisional government!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Down with the capitalist ministers!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Factories for the workers, land to the peasants, end to the imperialist war!&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Peace, Bread &amp;amp; Land&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;In June of that year, the capital city Petrograd (today called St. Petersburg) held municipal elections. Bolsheviks achieved a massive victory, growing from essentially nothing to one of the biggest parties in Russia. The so-called “defencist bloc” still held the majority of seats however. This bloc consisted of the SR-party and Mensheviks. Defencism meant that they supported the war effort. The biggest loser of the election was the Cadet party, which achieved only 15% of the votes and lost its power as the biggest party.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On July 1, Russia launched an offensive on the front, which was known as the “Kerensky offensive” or the “July offensive.” The war was going badly and casualties were mounting for Russia, the thirst for blood from the imperialists and the Provisional government were very evident.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
On July 3 and 4, there was a massive demonstration in Petrograd, of hundreds of thousands of people. Among the demonstrators were armed soldiers who came from the front to demand change and revolution. The Bolsheviks urged caution and said that the demonstration should be peaceful and organized. They opposed bringing weapons to the demonstration and said that they were not yet strong enough for a revolution. The workers and soldiers decided to bring weapons despite the advice of the Bolsheviks but the Bolsheviks still took part in the demonstrations to lend support to the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The workers and soldiers carried the Bolshevik slogans of &amp;quot;End the war”, &amp;quot;Peace, bread and land&amp;quot;. There was a government crack down against the demonstrators. Machine guns were turned towards the crowd, leaving countless dead. The Bolsheviks were now seen as a serious threat by the government. A warrant was issued for Lenin’s arrest, which forced him into hiding. Bolshevik newspaper &#039;&#039;[[Pravda]]&#039;&#039; was banned, their printing plant and party offices were destroyed. This period of repression is known as the “July Days&amp;quot;. The Provisional government restored the death penalty on the front against soldiers who disobeyed orders.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Bolsheviks lost a lot of their forces, and many of their important resources. They began publishing their newspapers under new names to avoid censorship. Despite all their difficulties the workers supported them more than ever, the Provisional government was exposed as a supporter of the capitalist elite and the imperialists. The Provisional government started forming stronger ties with the old capitalist party, the Cadets, to make up for the support they lost from the workers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In August, there was an attempted coup against the Provisional government, called the “Kornilov Affair”. Kornilov was a general of the White Guard in the Russian army, who wanted to institute military dictatorship and strong rule of law, to stop the chaos in Russia. In other words, complete counter-revolution, end to the demonstrations, end to democracy, end to the working class movement.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The railway workers started a strike and refused to transport his troops while the workers and soldiers of Petrograd formed the armed Red Guard units and took up the defence of Petrograd against Kornilov. Kornilov’s coup ended in failure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the overthrow of the monarchy, the formation of soviets had begun again in all large cities, but at the time their leadership would be predominantly Menshevik.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In September, the Bolsheviks gained the majority in the Petrograd Soviet and soon after in the soviets of Moscow and other large cities. The Soviets already carried out many important functions in the cities as the Russian government was incapable of doing so. The Soviets even organized the defence of Petrograd. As the economy was in ruins and the war effort was failing, more people turned towards the Soviets&#039; leadership.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Great October Socialist Revolution ====&lt;br /&gt;
{{Main article|October Revolution}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Lenin_proclaims_Soviet_power.jpeg|thumb|315x315px]]&lt;br /&gt;
The 6th Bolshevik party congress had agreed that they should carry out an armed revolution. In October, the Petrograd Soviet created a Military Revolutionary Committee. These special bodies were formed all over the country connected with each soviet in each city. The Menshevik and SR minorities in the soviets opposed revolution, but the SR party split. The “left-SR” group sided with the Bolsheviks.&lt;br /&gt;
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The Bolshevik soldiers organization took over the garrison. On 24 October the Military Revolutionary Committee occupied the telegraph, telephone offices and other important buildings. The cruiser &#039;&#039;Aurora&#039;&#039;, which was controlled by Bolshevik sailors, fired a shot to signal the beginning of the revolution. The workers and soldiers stormed the winter palace. The same evening there was a congress of Soviets, where delegates arrived from all over the country. This congress elected the new Russian government, elected by the soviets of workers and soldiers, the Soviet Government. The October Revolution had taken power.&lt;br /&gt;
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The October Revolution showed that a revolution by the ordinary people was possible. It showed that capitalism is ultimately incapable of solving its internal contradictions. Despite getting moderate leftists into the government, the policy was as imperialist, profit-driven and anti-popular as during the Tsarist era. The moderate leftists didn’t improve capitalism, they were used by capitalism. Only revolution stopped Russia’s involvement in the World War, carried out land reform and dealt with the crisis of unregulated capitalism, and began the process of building a new economic model which would serve the needs and interests of the people, not profits.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:9&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|journalist=TheFinnishBolshevik|date=2017-11-08|title=Brief History of the October Revolution|url=https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2017/11/08/brief-history-of-the-october-revolution/|retrieved=2022-03-25}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Civil War ====&lt;br /&gt;
{{Main article|Russian Civil War}}&lt;br /&gt;
The October Revolution led to a civil war where the capitalists tried to seize back the state. 14 capitalist governments including the [[United States of America|USA]], [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|Great Britain]], [[French Republic (1870–1940)|France]], [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japan]], [[Republic of Poland (1918–1939)|Poland]] and many others invaded [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1917–1991)|Soviet Russia]] to destroy the Soviet government, but they failed, and the Soviet Union was created.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:9&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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===Treaty on formation of the USSR ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See main article: [[Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== New Economic Policy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin proposed the [[New Economic Policy]] at the [[10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)|10th Party Congress]] in March 1921. The NEP allowed peasants to keep their grain and sell their surplus. By 1924, the Soviet Union had defeated foreign invaders and the counterrevolutionary Whites and nationalized key industries. [[Leon Trotsky|Trotsky]] and the [[Left Opposition]] believed that the Soviet Union could only survive if there was a socialist revolution in the [[imperial core]]. The [[14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)|14th Party Congress]] in 1925 rejected the Left Opposition and adopted a course of rapid industrialization for the Soviet economy to catch up to the West.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Central Committee purged Trotsky and his supporters from the party in 1927.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=116–119}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The [[Right Opposition]], led by [[Nikolai Bukharin|Bukharin]] and [[Alexei Rykov|Rykov]], strongly supported the NEP and encouraged private enterprise. They opposed [[collectivization]] and rapid industrialization.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Two Trends in Soviet Politics|page=18–25|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; When the Five Year Plans finally began, Bukharin wanted to prioritize light industry over heavy industry.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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During the NEP, the rural economy recovered from the wars. The agricultural production of the peasants alone in 1926 was higher than the peasants and landlord&#039;s estates combined before World War I. The number of pigs and cattle in 1928 was between 7% and 10% higher than in 1914. Agriculture continued to be mostly individualized. Kulaks and Orthodox priests controlled much of the countryside and continued to take land from poor and middle peasants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:052&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Collectivization|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=45–61}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Industrialization and collectivization ===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Life has become better poster.png|thumb|315x315px|&amp;quot;Widen the front of the [[Alexei Stakhanov|Stakhanovite]] movement.&amp;quot;]]&lt;br /&gt;
By the end of the NEP in 1928, different fields of heavy industry had reached or surpassed the pre-war level. The Soviet Union began its first Five Year Plan in 1928 to create modern industry in order to mechanize agriculture and strengthen the country against invaders.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Socialist industrialization|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=35–42}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; From 1928 to 1940, industrial production grew by an average of 11% every year. Literacy rates increased from 46% to 80%.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1936, the Soviet Union adopted a [[Library:Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1936)|new constitution]] that replaced the previous constitution from 1924. It guaranteed [[gender]], [[Race|racial]], and [[Nation|national]] equality and freedom of [[religion]], speech, and the press. It also established universal suffrage and equal election of deputies, whereas urban areas had previously had previously been overrepresented.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Joseph Stalin]]|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society. Introduction of the New Constitution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch12.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Between 1938 and 1941, the Red Army grew from two to six or seven million soldiers. Construction of railroads and factories continued in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Industrialization ====&lt;br /&gt;
The industrial output of the Soviet Union doubled between 1929 and 1933. During this same time period, the economies of capitalist countries were shrinking because of the [[Great Depression]], which did not affect the Soviet Union.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:6&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=[[TheFinnishBolshevik]]|newspaper=ML-Theory|title=The results of the 1st &amp;amp; 2nd Five-Year Plans: Soviet industrial revolution.|date=2016-08-07|url=https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/the-results-of-the-1st-2nd-soviet-five-year-plans-soviet-industrial-revolution/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220622100104/https://mltheory.wordpress.com/2016/08/07/the-results-of-the-1st-2nd-soviet-five-year-plans-soviet-industrial-revolution/|archive-date=2022-06-22|retrieved=2022-08-07}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Electrical generation reached 4.07 gigawatts by 1935, surpassing Lenin&#039;s goal by 133%.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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From 1928 to 1932, the number of industrial workers in the USSR doubled from three to six million, and the country began establishing industrial centers in the Urals and Siberia. By 1932, 56% of the USSR&#039;s national income was reinvested in capital outlay.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:05&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Collectivization ====&lt;br /&gt;
A series of bad harvests in 1924, 1927, and 1928 led the Soviet government to seize grain from the kulaks to avoid famine in the cities. The government decided to collectivize farming as fast as possible, but Bukharin disagreed and believed kulak production would naturally develop into collective farms. By 1929, cities had to ration bread, meat, sugar, and tea.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:052&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Central Committee officially began collectivization in November 1929 and divided the USSR into three groups: the North Caucasus and Middle and Lower Volga would have to collectivize by spring 1931; Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Urals, and the Central Black Earth Region by spring 1932; and Transcaucasia, Moscow, and the rest of Central Asia by 1933.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle for the Collectivization of Agriculture|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch11.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Collective farms (&#039;&#039;kolkhozy&#039;&#039;) surpassed the kulaks in 1929, and 7.5% of peasants had joined collective farms by October 1929. The peasants expropriated kulaks and exiled many of them. By January 1930, 18.1% of peasant families were collectivized including more than 39% in the Volga and Ural regions. Some local authorities were overenthusiastic and tried to collectivize too quickly. Because rural areas lacked a strong party presence, the Central Committee sent [[Sergo Orjonikidze|Orjonikidze]], [[Lazar Kaganovich|Kaganovich]], and [[Yakov Yakovlev|Yakovlev]] to the countryside in February 1930 to educate and oversee the peasantry. Ukraine organized almost 4,000 courses for 275,000 peasants, and the Red Army trained tractor drivers and radio and agriculture specialists.&lt;br /&gt;
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In January 1930, the party sent 25,000 industrial workers to the countryside to help with collectivization and prevent excesses. Many were [[All-Union Leninist Young Communist League|Komsomol]] members or veterans of the Civil War. They criticized local authorities for forcing peasants to collectivize without preparation and helped win support for collectivization. Kulaks murdered many of these workers and claimed they made an alliance with the antichrist. The workers organized literacy campaigns and ended the cycle of famines that had existed for centuries.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:052&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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During the First Five Year Plan, crop area increased from 118 million hectares to 129.7 million. In 1929, only 3.9% of farms had been collectivized, but by 1933 75% of farmland was in collective farms, 10.8% was in state farms (&#039;&#039;sovkhozy&#039;&#039;), and 15.7% was farmed by individual peasants. Over 167,000 collective farms were established during this period. The number of livestock decreased dramatically due to kulaks killing their animals to sabotage the Soviet Union. The number of tractors increased from 34,900 to 204,100 during the First Five Year Plan, and the number of combine harvesters increased from 1,700 to 13,500.&lt;br /&gt;
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During the Second Five Year Plan, livestock recovered from the kulak sabotage. By 1938, there were more than twice as many sheep, goats, and hogs as there had been in 1933. The number of cattle increased by 64.6% during the Second Five Year Plan and the number of horses increased by 5.4%. The amount of mechanical farm equipment continued to increase, and the number of tractors grew from 210,900 to 483,500.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:6&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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==== Internal struggles ====&lt;br /&gt;
In early 1932, Trotsky sent letters to [[Karl Radek|Radek]], [[Grigory Sokolnikov|Sokolnikov]] and [[Yevgeni Preobrazhensky|Probrazhensky]] and encouraged them to join anti-[[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] activities. [[Leonid Nikolaev]] assassinated [[Sergei Kirov]] in December 1934 in a party office in Leningrad. [[Grigory Zinoviev]], a [[Trotskyism|Trotskyist]], had inspired the assassination.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Members of the Right Opposition also planned to overthrow the Soviet government, and Moscow party leader [[Martemyan Ryutin]] released a 200-page platform calling for the overthrow of the CPSU leadership and decollectivization.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=135–141}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Marshal [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky|Tukhachevsky]] and other military officials were executed in 1937 for planning to assassinate Stalin and install a pro-German government, and the political commissar system of the Civil War was introduced to prevent a [[Napoleon Bonaparte|Napoleon]]-style military coup.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=150–152}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1939, Colonel Tokaev met with five high-ranking Red Army officers and discussed a plan to overthrow Stalin in the case of war.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02232&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In July 1937, Stalin and [[Vyacheslav Molotov|Molotov]] released a list of 72,950 criminals and wreckers to be executed, and [[Nikolai Yezhov|Yezhov]] signed the list. All executions had to be approved by troikas. In late 1937, local authorities attempted to increase execution quotas and purge innocent party members. In January 1938, the Central Committee criticized excessive repression, and [[Lavrentiy Beria|Beria]] even called Yezhov a [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Nazi]] agent in late 1938. On 11 November 1938, Stalin ordered Yezhov to stop the purges.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022332&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=The Great Purge|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=166–167}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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===Great Patriotic War===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See main article: [[Second World War]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;[[File:Death to invaders poster.png|thumb|290x290px|&amp;quot;Death to the German invaders&amp;quot;]]Contrary to the propaganda that mentioned that Stalin wasn&#039;t ready for the war, on January 31st, 1931, he mentions the importance of the creation of an industrial base in the Ural mountains, Siberia and Kazakhstan.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Quick Unraveling of the Blitzkrieg|page=22|quote=In fact, Stalin had insisted repeatedly and vigorously on this. On January 31st, 1931, he pushes forward the “creation of a new and well-equipped industrial base in the Ural Mountains, Siberia and Kazakhstan.”|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Following the [[Kingdom of Italy (1861–1946)|Italian]] invasion of [[Ethiopian Empire|Ethiopia]] in 1935, the USSR proposed a collective security system for Europe and signed defense treaties with France and [[Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)|Czechoslovakia]]. Germany and [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japan]] signed the [[Anti-Comintern Pact]] in November 1936, and Italy joined soon after. In May 1938, the USSR sent 40 divisions to guard the western border of Czechoslovakia from Germany, but Britain and France negotiated with Germany to let the Nazis annex the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. When the Nazis annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia, the USSR began more negotiations with Britain and France, but they refused to make an alliance and Britain instead made a secret agreement with the Nazis agreeing to protect the British Empire. Poland also refused a defense agreement against Germany. From May to August 1939, the USSR fought off a Japanese invasion of [[Mongolian People&#039;s Republic (1924–1992)|Mongolia]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223322&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=185–187}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In March 1941, Stalin sent 800,000 reservists to the western border of the USSR. On 21 June, a German deserter reported that the Nazis would attack the next night. [[Semen Tymoshenko|Tymoshenko]] and [[Georgy Zhukov|Zhukov]] alerted all units and told them to occupy firing posts in fortified areas. Germany bombed border cities in the morning of 22 June and Stalin ordered the Politburo to convene. Two days after the Nazi invasion, the Soviets managed to move over 1500 major industrial companies after the Urals.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Quick Unraveling of the Blitzkrieg|page=22|quote=Yes, “created two days after the German invasion, the Evacuation Committee managed to move to the East 1,500 major industrial companies, after titanic operations of great logistic complexity.”|lg=http://libgen.li/ads.php?md5=fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; On 26 June, the Red Army began building a reserve front 300 km behind the front lines. The Nazis broke the Western Front and approached Minsk in the same day.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0223323&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=Stalin and the anti-fascist war|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=191–223}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Hitler himself was amazed at the resistance posed by the Soviet Union, mentioning that they found railways that weren&#039;t on the maps, huge factories where only villages were before, and himself exclaiming &amp;quot;How is it possible that such a primitive people can reach such technical objectives in such a short period of time?&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo, David Ferreira|year=2020|title=Stalin: The History and Critique of a Black Legend|chapter=How to Cast a God into Hell: The Khrushchev Report|section=The Quick Unraveling of the Blitzkrieg|page=23|quote=November 29th, 1941:&lt;br /&gt;
How is it possible that such a primitive people can reach such technical objectives in such a short period of time?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
August 26th, 1942:&lt;br /&gt;
With respect to Russia, it is incontestable that Stalin raised the standard of living. The&lt;br /&gt;
Russian people don’t go hungry [at the moment when Operation Barbarossa was launched]. In general, it’s necessary to recognize that they have built factories of similar importance to Hermann Goering Reichswerke where two years ago nothing but unknown villages existed. We come across railway lines that aren’t on the maps.|lg=http://library.lol/main/fab891d8f6bbf7bb49e78240483751e4|trans-lang=Italian}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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During the Second World War, the Soviet Union took control of the [[Baltics|Baltic states]] and liberated them from [[Fascism|fascist]] rule.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:04&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The European Nationalities in the USSR|page=78–82|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd.|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; On 8 August 1945, exactly three months after the defeat of Nazi Germany, Soviet troops entered [[Empire of (Great) Manchuria|Manchuria]] and [[Korea]], and Japan surrendered within a week.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:12&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|chapter=The Patriot|page=72|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaced4iiga4ngtxusr2civjxewbili5jne2sbpefbx2s3im2kphattzc?filename=Stephen%20Gowans%20-%20Patriots%2C%20Traitors%20and%20Empires_%20The%20Story%20of%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Struggle%20for%20Freedom-Baraka%20Books%20%282018%29.pdf|city=Montreal|publisher=Baraka Books|isbn=9781771861427|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=8435F6FF91279531705764823FDC2A7F}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The USSR and United States then agreed to temporarily divide Korea along the 38th parallel, with the occupation lasting no more than five years. The Soviets left Korea in late 1948, but the US military did not and continues to occupy [[Republic of Korea|south Korea]] to this day.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:13&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|chapter=The US Occupation|page=79|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaced4iiga4ngtxusr2civjxewbili5jne2sbpefbx2s3im2kphattzc?filename=Stephen%20Gowans%20-%20Patriots%2C%20Traitors%20and%20Empires_%20The%20Story%20of%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Struggle%20for%20Freedom-Baraka%20Books%20%282018%29.pdf|city=Montreal|publisher=Baraka Books|isbn=9781771861427|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=8435F6FF91279531705764823FDC2A7F}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Postwar period ===&lt;br /&gt;
==== Stalin&#039;s last years ====&lt;br /&gt;
The Fourth Five-Year Plan began in February 1946, and industry recovered to prewar levels by 1948. By 1950, industrial production was 73% higher than 1940 and consumer goods were 23% higher. The USSR developed its first [[Nuclear weapon|atomic bomb]] in 1947, ending the USA&#039;s nuclear monopoly.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02233232&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Ludo Martens|year=1996|title=Another View of Stalin|chapter=From Stalin to Khrushchev|isbn=9782872620814|publisher=Editions EPO|pdf=https://gateway.ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceab64vxtxpqt2cdl4zsrsftmedqidn4foq74gr25qkd35z5nwogdi?filename=Ludo%20Martens%20-%20Another%20View%20of%20Stalin-Editions%20EPO%20%281996%29.pdf|page=239–245}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
After the war, Stalin and [[Andrei Zhdanov|Zhdanov]] initially wanted to reduce military and heavy industry spending. Stalin changed his mind when the [[Marshall Plan]] and [[Truman Doctrine]] showed that the United States was committed to destroying the USSR. By 1952, industrial production reached 2.5 times the amount from before the Second World War.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR recognized [[State of Israel|Israel]] shortly after its founding but reversed its position in 1953 and supported [[Arab Republic of Egypt|Egypt]] against Israel in the [[Six-Day War]].&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:025&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The European Nationalities in the USSR|page=90–95|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Khrushchev period ====&lt;br /&gt;
After Stalin died in 1953, [[Nikita Khrushchev]] became General Secretary and [[Georgy Malenkov]] became Chairman of the Council of People&#039;s Commissars. The Central Committee under Khrushchev secretly arrested [[Lavrentiy Beria]], head of the [[People&#039;s Commissariat for Internal Affairs|NKVD]], and began releasing [[Counterrevolution|counterrevolutionaries]] from prison.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In January 1954, Khrushchev introduced the Virgin Lands policy in an attempt to increase agricultural production by farming new areas in Siberia and Kazakhstan. 300,000 volunteers cultivated 13 million hectares of land in the first year and another 14 million the next year. Molotov criticized this policy for redirecting resources away from industrialization. The campaign was initially very successful, peaking in 1956, but it declined after that and ended in 1964. Khrushchev also tried to increase cattle production by growing corn to feed livestock and promoted chemical fertilizers instead of rotating crops.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khrushchev delivered a &amp;quot;Secret Speech&amp;quot; in 1956 condemning Stalin. Although most of the Central Committee supported the speech, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and [[Kliment Voroshilov|Voroshilov]] said it gave an unbalanced account of Stalin. In 1957, the Presidium voted 7 to 3 (with one abstention) to remove Khrushchev from power. The Central Committee then expelled Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich from positions of power.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Khrushchev decentralized economic planning and replaced it with local planning authorities. He allowed some counterrevolutionary propaganda including [[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn|Solzhenitsyn]]&#039;s novels to be published. He reduced quality of cadre by allowing mass recruitment into the party, required a third of officials to be replaced at every election, and split the party into industrial and agricultural sections.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Two Trends in Soviet Politics|page=18–53|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union rescinded the 1920 [[Karakhan Manifesto]], which returned all Chinese territories occupied by the Russian Empire to China.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:122222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Vijay Prashad]]|year=2008|title=The Darker Nations: A People&#039;s History of the Third World|chapter=Tawang|page=166|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceascnzh26r5d6uitjjs2z7rflhaxlt7rboz5whzdf76qg6xxvecqq?filename=%28A%20New%20Press%20People%27s%20history%29%20Vijay%20Prashad%20-%20The%20darker%20nations_%20a%20people%27s%20history%20of%20the%20third%20world-The%20New%20Press%20%282008%29.pdf|publisher=The New Press|isbn=9781595583420|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=9B40B96E830128A7FE0E0E887C06829F}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Brezhnev period ====&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]] removed Khrushchev from power in 1964 and reintroduced central planning. [[Leonid Brezhnev|Brezhnev]] succeeded Khrushchev as General Secretary and served until 1982. He replaced Khrushchev&#039;s replacement policy with a stability of cadre policy which resisted changes in leadership. He also reversed Khrushchev&#039;s division of the party and mass recruitment. Although the Brezhnev period is often seen as a period of stagnation, the Soviet economy continued to grow more than twice as fast as Western countries. Unfortunately, Brezhnev was also responsible for nepotism and corruption.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In addition, the black market grew during this period and led to the creation of a [[Petty bourgeoisie|petty-bourgeois]] class.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:033&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=The Second Economy|page=63|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Andropov year ====&lt;br /&gt;
After Brezhnev&#039;s death in 1982, [[Yuri Andropov]] was elected as General Secretary. He attempted to reverse the revisionist policies of his predecessors but died of kidney failure only 15 months into his term. He planned to modernize Soviet technology, improve economic planning, and combat absenteeism and drunkenness in the workplace.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Decline and counterrevolution===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Glasnost and perestroika====&lt;br /&gt;
[[Mikhail Gorbachev]] became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985 and introduced [[Liberalism|liberal]] reforms. A group led by Premier [[Nikolai Ryzhkov]] favored using science and technology to increase production instead of Gorbachev&#039;s privatization. Central Committee Secretary [[Lev Zaikov]] supported changing investment policy and promoting inspections and wage differentials. Second Secretary [[Yegor Ligachyov]] opposed consumerism and corruption and upheld central planning and discipline.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Promise and Foreboding, 1985-86|page=110–111|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
At the 19th Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev proposed a new system of government. It consisted of a Congress of People&#039;s Deputies with 50% of seats reserved for non-party members, and a smaller Supreme Soviet elected by the Congress. The Congress would elect an executive president instead of a Council of People&#039;s Commissars.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Turning Point, 1987-88|page=148–149|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gorbachev ended assistance to Soviet allies in [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (1978–1992)|Afghanistan]] and [[Warsaw Pact|Eastern Europe]] in 1988, allowing widespread [[Counterrevolutions of 1989|counterrevolution]]. He and [[Alexander Yakovlev|Yakovlev]] ignored [[Nationalism|nationalist]] and separatist movements in the Baltics. Gorbachev also failed to respond to nationalist riots in [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Kazakhstan]] and even incited a rebellion of Armenians in [[Nagorno-Karabakh]] to embarrass his political opponents.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Turning Point, 1987-88|page=157–164|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Shortages were common, caused by Gorbachev&#039;s policies, as well as economic sanctions, and being forced to participate in the Arms Race, which drained money and resources.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Between 1989 and 1991, Gorbachev changed the CPSU from a [[vanguard party]] into a parliamentary party, undermined central planning, encouraged black market activity, allowed the West to infiltrate media through &#039;&#039;[[glasnost]]&#039;&#039;, and surrendered to  the United States in terms of foreign policy, abandoning [[anti-imperialism]] and seeking Western support. He changed positions on the national question and initially attempted to repress Baltic separatists before negotiating with them.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:032&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Roger Keeran, Thomas Kenny|year=2010|title=Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union|chapter=Crisis and Collapse, 1989-91|page=170–205|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj5ucph44bjwyhlhsbycckr3ts76zbucn2hbrea32tltcd4s5ekg?filename=Roger%20Keeran_%20Thomas%20Kenny%20-%20Socialism%20Betrayed_%20Behind%20the%20Collapse%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union-iUniverse.com%20%282010%29.pdf|publisher=iUniverse.com|isbn=9781450241717}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Yeltsin–Gorbachev struggle ====&lt;br /&gt;
The March 1989 elections to Congress of People&#039;s Deputies overrepresented intellectuals and underrepresented workers and peasants. 87% of its members were from the CPSU, but 44% of party members who ran unopposed were not elected. [[Boris Yeltsin]] was elected, but many party leaders lost their positions. Members of the Congress disputed basic ideas of Marxism–Leninism such as the vanguard party and [[Marxist economics]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1989, a massive mine strike began, which was the first major labor unrest since the 1920s. The government shipped large quantities of food and supplies to mining areas.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
By early 1990, there was a system of [[dual power]] in which Gorbachev controlled the USSR and Yeltsin controlled Russia. Yeltsin took control of most of the Soviet media between 1989 and 1991 and took power in Moscow and Leningrad by March 1990. Anti-Soviet groups such as the [[Social democracy|social-democratic]] [[Democratic Platform]] and the [[Market socialism|market socialist]] [[Marxist Platform]] formed within the CPSU. After the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, Yeltsin and the Democratic Platform left the CPSU, and left-oppositionists such as [[Yegor Ligachyov|Ligachyov]] founded the [[Communist Party of the Russian Federation|CPRF]]. The party collapsed after the Congress and approached bankruptcy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Gorbachev removed the CPSU&#039;s influence in the [[Soviet Army]] and shrank the army from 5.3 million to under 4 million. As late as May 1990, 70% of the Central Committee opposed Gorbachev, and the majority of the workers voted to keep the USSR in March 1991. Black market profits and organized crime funded pro-capitalist politicians. The [[Democratic Russia]] group opposed the vanguard party and promoted parliamentary control of the [[Committee for State Security|KGB]], a market economy, and the sovereignty of the RSFSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In July 1990, Gorbachev removed Ryzhkov from power and made a deal with Yeltsin, then the head of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Ryzhkov and his economist, [[Leonid Abalkin]], had proposed a six-year plan of gradual privatization, but Gorbachev and Yeltsin chose [[Stanislav Shatalin]] to privatize the economy within 500 days. The plan gave all taxing power to the republics and prioritized the laws of each republic over all-union laws. Gorbachev eventually criticized the plan for being too rapid, but his followers, including Yakovlev, [[Eduard Shevardnadze|Shevardnadze]], [[Georgy Shakhnazarov|Shakhnazarov]], [[Roy Medvedev|Medvedev]], and [[Anatoly Chernyayev|Chernyayev]], supported it.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:032&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== August Coup ====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See main article: [[August Coup|August Coup]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;The August Coup occurred between August 19 and 22, 1991 and was an attempt by hardliners in the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) to oust revisionist [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] from office and roll-back his policies. The coup was planned by top military and civilian officials, including Vice President [[Gennady Yanayev]], who together formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The GKChP hardliners dispatched [[KGB]] agents, who detained Gorbachev at his dacha in [[Crimea]] but failed to detain the recently elected president of a newly reconstituted [[Russia]], [[Boris Yeltsin]], who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The coup&#039;s failure was instrumental in the [[Overthrow of the Soviet Union|counterrevolution which overthrew the Soviet Union]] four months later in December 1991.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Dissolution====&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See main article: [[Overthrow of the Soviet Union|Overthrow of the USSR]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;The overthrow of the Soviet Union was the process of [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] counter-revolution which culminated in the disintegration of the USSR into independent states in December of 1991. Among the various causes for dissolution was the organization of a bourgeois class inside the USSR under a &#039;shadow economy&#039; which effectively guaranteed their interests through corrupt officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It&#039;s generally accepted that the political and economic policies of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and ultimately Gorbachev paved the way for counter-revolution in the USSR.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Government==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Elections===&lt;br /&gt;
Before 1936, [[Clergy|priests]], landlords, [[Bourgeoisie|capitalists]], and former [[White movement|Whites]] were not allowed to vote. The 1936 Soviet constitution removed these restrictions so all citizens aged 18 or older could vote, with the exception of insane people and convicted criminals disenfranchised by a court. Under the 1924 constitution, the people elected the lowest level of representatives and higher soviets were elected indirectly. The 1936 constitution made all soviets from the local to all-union level directly elected.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1939|title=History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)|chapter=The Bolshevik Party in the Struggle to Complete the Building of the Socialist Society. Introduction of the New Constitution|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch03.htm|chapter-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch12.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supreme Soviet===&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union]] was the legislature of the USSR and was elected every four years. It consisted of two branches: the [[Soviet of the Union]], which was elected based on population, and the [[Soviet of Nationalities]], which was elected according to the republics, [[Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics|ASSRs]], [[autonomous oblasts]], and [[autonomous okrugs]] of the Soviet Union. Either house could initiate legislation and it had to be passed by a majority vote of both houses to become law. Each house elected a chairman and two vice-chairmen to preside over their sessions, which occurred twice every year. The [[Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union|Presidium of the Supreme Soviet]] could also convene special sessions.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Before 1936, the Supreme Soviet was known as the [[Congress of Soviets]] and the Soviet of the Union was known as the [[Federal Soviet]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Second All-Union Congress of Soviets|year=1924|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1924)|chapter=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Federal Soviet was elected with one deputy per 25,000 urban inhabitants or 125,000 rural inhabitants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; After 1936, the Soviet of the Union had one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Joseph Stalin]]|year=1936|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1936)|chapter=The Highest Organs of State Authority of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From 1924 to 1936, the Soviet of Nationalities had five deputies for every union republic and one for every autonomous republic and autonomous oblast.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In 1936, this was changed to 25 for every union republic, ten for each ASSR, five for each autonomous oblast, and one for each autonomous okrug.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; In 1977, it was changed again so that every SSR would have 32 deputies and every ASSR would have 11.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Government of the Soviet Union|year=1977|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1977,_Unamended)|chapter=Higher Bodies of State Authority and Administration of the USSR}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Presidium===&lt;br /&gt;
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union was elected at a combined session of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. It consisted of a [[President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union|President]], Secretary, one vice president from every union republic, and 24 members.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Council of People&#039;s Commissars===&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Council of People&#039;s Commissars of the Soviet Union|Council of People&#039;s Commissars]] (Sovnarkom) was the executive branch of the USSR and was elected at a joint session of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Supreme Court===&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Supreme Court of the Soviet Union|Supreme Court]] was the highest court in the Soviet Union and was elected by the Supreme Soviet once every five years.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Administrative divisions==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;See main articles: [[Soviet republic (system of government)]] and [[Republics of the Soviet Union]]&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Constitutionally, the USSR was a federation of constituent Union Republics, which were either unitary states, such as [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic|Ukraine]] or [[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic|Byelorussia]] (SSRs), or federations, such as [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russia]] or [[Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic|Transcaucasia]] (SFSRs), all four being the founding republics who signed the [[Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] in December 1922. In 1924, during the [[National delimitation in the Soviet Union|national delimitation]] in [[Central Asia]], [[Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic|Uzbekistan]] and [[Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic|Turkmenistan]] were formed from parts of Russia&#039;s [[Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic|Turkestan ASSR]] and two Soviet dependencies, the [[Khorezm People&#039;s Soviet Republic|Khorezm]] and [[Bukharan People&#039;s Soviet Republic|Bukharan SSRs]]. In 1929, [[Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic|Tajikistan]] was split off from the Uzbekistan SSR. With the constitution of 1936, the Transcaucasian SFSR was dissolved, resulting in its constituent republics of [[Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic|Armenia]], [[Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic|Georgia]] and [[Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic|Azerbaijan]] being elevated to Union Republics, while [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|Kazakhstan]] and [[Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic|Kirghizia]] were split off from Russian SFSR, resulting in the same status.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|last=Adams, Simon |title=Russian Republics |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LyqIDCc-cSsC |year=2005 |page=21 |publisher=Black Rabbit Books |isbn=978-1-58340-606-9|access-date=20 June 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150512041101/http://books.google.com/books?id=LyqIDCc-cSsC&amp;amp;dq|archive-date=12 May 2015|url-status=live}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In August 1940, [[Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic|Moldavia]] was formed from parts of Ukraine and [[Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina|Bessarabia]] and Ukrainian SSR. [[Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic|Estonia]], [[Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic|Latvia]] and [[Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic|Lithuania]] (SSRs) were also [[Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940)|admitted into the union]]. [[Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic|Karelia]] was split off from Russia as a Union Republic in March 1940 and was reabsorbed in 1956. Between July 1956 and September 1991, there were 15 union republics (see map below).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|last=Feldbrugge, Ferdinand Joseph Maria |title=Russian Law: The Rnd of the Soviet system and the Role of Law |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JWt7MN3Dch8C |year=1993 |page=94 |publisher=[[Martinus Nijhoff Publishers]] |isbn=978-0-7923-2358-7|access-date=20 June 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150512041218/http://books.google.com/books?id=JWt7MN3Dch8C&amp;amp;dq|archive-date=12 May 2015|url-status=live}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
While nominally a union of equals, in practice the Soviet Union was dominated by [[Russians]]. The domination was so absolute that for most of its existence, the country was commonly (but incorrectly) referred to as &amp;quot;Russia&amp;quot;. While the RSFSR was technically only one republic within the larger union, it was by far the largest (both in terms of population and area), most powerful, and most highly developed. The RSFSR was also the industrial center of the Soviet Union.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;margin: 1em auto 1em auto;&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
! colspan=&amp;quot;2&amp;quot; |Republic&lt;br /&gt;
!Map of the Union Republics between 1956 and 1991&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|1&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Armenian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1952–1990).svg|25x25px|]] [[Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic|Armenian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
| rowspan=&amp;quot;15&amp;quot; style=&amp;quot;width:350px;&amp;quot; |[[File:Republics_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1956-1991).svg|600px]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|2&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Azerbaijan_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1956–1991).svg|25x25px|]] [[Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Azerbaijan SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|3&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Byelorussian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1951–1991).svg|25x25px|]] [[Byelorussian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1920–1991)|Byelorussian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|4&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Estonian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1953–1990).svg|25x25px|]] [[Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940–1991)|Estonian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|5&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Georgian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1951–1990).svg|25x25px|]] [[Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (1921–1991)|Georgian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|6&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Kazakh_Soviet_Socialist_Republic.svg|25x25px|]] [[Kazakh_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1936–1991)|Kazakh SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|7&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Kyrgyz_Soviet_Socialist_Republic.svg|25x25px|]] [[Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Kirghiz SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|8&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Latvian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1953–1990).svg|25x25px|]] [[Latvian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic|Latvian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|9&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Lithuanian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1953–1988).svg|25x25px|]] [[Lithuanian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic|Lithuanian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|10&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Moldavian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1952–1990).svg|25x25px|]] [[Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940–1991)|Moldavian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|11&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic_(1954–1991).svg|25x25px|]] [[Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic_(1917–1991)|Russian SFSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|12&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Tajik_Soviet_Socialist_Republic.svg|25x25px|]] [[Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (1929–1991)|Tajik SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|13&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Turkmen_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1973–1991).svg|25x25px|]] [[Turkmen_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1925–1991)|Turkmen SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|14&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic.svg|25x25px|]] [[Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1919–1991)|Ukrainian SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|15&lt;br /&gt;
|[[File:Flag_of_the_Uzbek_Soviet_Socialist_Republic_(1952–1991).svg|25x25px|]] [[Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (1924–1991)|Uzbek SSR]]&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Economy==&lt;br /&gt;
In the Soviet Union, the richest people earned about five times as much money as the poorest. The income gap was tiny compared to the United States, where billionaires have many thousands of times more money than the poorest workers.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:8&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Carlos Martinez|newspaper=[[Invent the Future]]|title=Why doesn’t the Soviet Union exist any more? Part 1: Introduction|date=2017-11-19|url=https://invent-the-future.org/2017/11/why-doesnt-the-soviet-union-exist-any-more-part-1-introduction/#fnref:12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220211213148/https://invent-the-future.org/2017/11/why-doesnt-the-soviet-union-exist-any-more-part-1-introduction/|archive-date=2022-02-11|retrieved=2022-10-08}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Peasants made up 83% of the population in 1926 but only 20% in 1975, while the industrial workforce grew from five to 62 million during the same period.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:033&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Planning===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Tenth five year plan poster.png|thumb|240x240px|&amp;quot;Shock work for the 10th five-year plan!&amp;quot;]]&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviet economy was a [[planned economy]], in which much of the economic planning was aided by teams of mathematicians and economists. These plans were enacted in the form of five year plans.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These five year plans used production quotas to encourage growth of the Soviet economy. Contrary to popular belief, these quotas were based on previous production records, available technology, amid many other factors&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Agriculture===&lt;br /&gt;
Farms and farm equipment in the USSR were collectively owned. Grain production increased by 63% from the late 1950s to the late 1970s to reach 199 million tonnes per year. In the late 1950s, the USSR began to increase the proportion of grain used as animal feed in order to increase meat, egg, and dairy production. Total agricultural production increased by 147% between 1950 and 1977 while U.S. production only increased by 64% during the same period.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR&#039;s geography made agriculture difficult because only 10% of its land was suitable for grain farming and 30% was too cold for any agriculture.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=Economic Rights|page=128–140|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Housing and construction===&lt;br /&gt;
After the October Revolution, hundreds of thousands of workers moved from slums to nationalized houses. In 1919, a decree was passed setting a minimum of at least 8.25 square meters of living space per person, 30 cubic meters of air space for every adult, and 20 cubic meters for every child. This space only included living and bed rooms, not bathrooms or entrances. Rent in the Soviet Union was kept at under 4% of workers&#039; total incomes,&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|newspaper=[[Stalin Society]]|title=Housing in the USSR|date=2017-01-13|url=https://stalinsocietygb.wordpress.com/2017/01/13/housing-in-the-ussr/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220330020740/https://stalinsocietygb.wordpress.com/2017/01/13/housing-in-the-ussr/|archive-date=2022-03-30|retrieved=2022-05-20}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and its proportion of income gradually decreased because rent was not increased at all after 1928.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1920, 254 residential buildings were built and 2,347 were repaired. From 1923 to 1927, 12.5 million square meters of living space were built. From 1927 to 1931, another 28.85 million were built. The average living space for each worker greatly increased from the revolution to 1938: there was a 94% increase in Moscow, 100% in Leningrad, 176% in the [[Donbass]], and 195% in the Urals.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:3&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Industry and manufacturing===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Services===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Environment===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Infrastructure==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Transportation===&lt;br /&gt;
The standard fare for the Soviet subway was only five kopeks, or roughly eight U.S. cents, and remained constant from the 1930s to the 1980s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Energy===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Science and technology===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Demographics==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Living standards===&lt;br /&gt;
In 1917, the Bolsheviks reduced the working day to 8 hours. Workers had 12 to 48 guaranteed vacation days per year. The average person in the Soviet Union ate over 3,000 kilocalories per day and had a better diet than in the United States. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union had the seventh best diet in the world.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Soviet citizens ate an average of 103 grams of protein per day, more than the UK, [[Federal Republic of Germany|West Germany]], [[Kingdom of Sweden|Sweden]], or [[Italian Republic|Italy]], and had a higher caloric intake than the UK, West Germany, or Sweden.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Literacy increased from under 30% before the revolution to 87.4% in 1939 and reached 100% by 1970.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Basic foods like bread, meat, dairy, and potatoes were heavily subsidized. Housing, medicine, transportation, and insurance combined only took up 15% of an average family&#039;s income.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Working conditions====&lt;br /&gt;
In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union adopted the 40-hour work week. The 1977 Constitution set the maximum at 41 hours with exceptions for national security; averting disasters; socially essential work such as transport, water supply, and electricity; completing work to avoid damage to [[means of production]]; and repair/maintenance to avoid putting other workers out of work.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Workers throughout the USSR had three weeks of paid vacation plus optional unpaid vacation. People who worked at night or in dangerous industries such as coal mining only worked for six or seven hours but received eight hours of pay.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Education===&lt;br /&gt;
Education in the Soviet Union was free&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Joseph Stalin|year=1936|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1936)|chapter=Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens|section=Article 121|city=Moscow}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and was mandatory between the ages of 8 and 15. There were also ten-year schools that went to the age of 18, but the last three years were not mandatory before the Great Patriotic War. The curriculum included nature study, art, music, social science, and foreign languages.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|author=Anglo-Soviet Youth Friendship Alliance|newspaper=Revolutionary Democracy|title=Education in the U.S.S.R.|url=http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/archive/anglosov.htm|retrieved=2022-04-17|date=1942}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; School days lasted between 4.5 and 6 hours, depending on age.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Education was available in 52 different languages.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Eugene Puryear|newspaper=[[Liberation School]]|title=Nations and Soviets: The National Question in the USSR|date=2022-06-12|url=https://www.liberationschool.org/nations-and-soviets-the-national-question-in-the-ussr/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613003437/https://www.liberationschool.org/nations-and-soviets-the-national-question-in-the-ussr/|archive-date=2022-06-13|retrieved=2022-08-31}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
{| class=&amp;quot;wikitable&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
|+Number of school students&lt;br /&gt;
!&lt;br /&gt;
!1913&lt;br /&gt;
!1929&lt;br /&gt;
!1933&lt;br /&gt;
!1942&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|7-year schools&lt;br /&gt;
|6,800,000&lt;br /&gt;
|11,700,000&lt;br /&gt;
|21,300,000&lt;br /&gt;
|23,000,000&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|10-year schools&lt;br /&gt;
|1,000,000&lt;br /&gt;
|2,700,000&lt;br /&gt;
|5,500,000&lt;br /&gt;
|17,000,000&lt;br /&gt;
|-&lt;br /&gt;
|Total&lt;br /&gt;
|7,800,000&lt;br /&gt;
|14,400,000&lt;br /&gt;
|33,400,000&lt;br /&gt;
|40,000,000&lt;br /&gt;
|}&lt;br /&gt;
Between 1932 and 1937, 20,000 schools were built in the Soviet Union. Between 1938 and 1941, 20,000 more schools were built and 500,000 new teachers were trained. Between 1913 and 1940, the number of libraries in the USSR increased by 57,400. 12% of the USSR&#039;s national budget was spent on education.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Children aged 12 and older formed committees to care for school property and help other students. Corporal punishment was illegal.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Literacy rates====&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:To have more we must produce more.png|thumb|257x257px|&amp;quot;To have more, we must produce more. To produce more, we must know more.&amp;quot;]]&lt;br /&gt;
Before the October Revolution, most people in Central Asia were illiterate. By the late 1930s, most people throughout the Soviet Union could read and literacy was nearly universal by the late 1950s.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:8&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Preschool====&lt;br /&gt;
Optional preschool and kindergarten were available in the Soviet Union from birth to the age of 8. In 1932, there were 600,000 children in daycares; this number increased to three million by 1937.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Child care was either free or very cheap.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Universities====&lt;br /&gt;
In 1940, there were 700 universities in the USSR with 650,000 students enrolled. There were 22 universities in [[Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic|Belarus]], 13 in [[Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic|Azerbaijan]], and 30 in [[Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic|Uzbekistan]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Soviet Union had one of the highest levels of university attendance in the world.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Health===&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Soviet doctor poster.png|thumb|323x323px|&amp;quot;Honor and Respect for the Rural Doctor! The Doctor is the Friend of the People!&amp;quot;]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Nikolai Semashko]], the People&#039;s Commissar for Public Health from 1918 to 1930, proposed a health system based on the following principles: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
*Unified principles of organization and centralization of the health care system&lt;br /&gt;
*Equal accessibility of healthcare for all citizens&lt;br /&gt;
*Priority attention to childhood and maternity&lt;br /&gt;
*Unity of preventive healthcare and treatment&lt;br /&gt;
*Elimination of social bases of diseases&lt;br /&gt;
*Involvement of the society in the cause of healthcare&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The public health budget of the USSR increased by 75 times from the Russian Empire&#039;s budget in 1913. From the Civil War to 1928, the number of physicians increased from 19,785 to 63,219,&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|author=Carlos Rule|newspaper=[[Stalin Society]]|title=Health in the USSR|date=2017-01-18|url=https://stalinsocietygb.wordpress.com/2017/01/18/health-in-the-ussr/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220216095354/https://stalinsocietygb.wordpress.com/2017/01/18/health-in-the-ussr/|archive-date=2022-02-16|retrieved=2022-06-27}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and it reached 334,000 doctors (including dentists) by 1955.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{News citation|newspaper=[[Politsturm]]|title=Healthcare Under Socialism: The History of the Soviet Healthcare System|date=2021-09-07|url=https://us.politsturm.com/healthcare-under-socialism-the-history-of-the-soviet-healthcare-system/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112182526/https://us.politsturm.com/healthcare-under-socialism-the-history-of-the-soviet-healthcare-system/|archive-date=2021-11-12|retrieved=2022-05-20}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Production of pharmaceutical chemicals increased by five times from 1940 to 1950 and 3.1 times from 1950 to 1955 and there were 1,290,000 hospital beds in 1955.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Infant mortality decreased from 25% before the revolution to lower than [[Italian Republic|Italy]] or [[Republic of Austria|Austria]] by 1960,&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; and child mortality decreased by half from 1917 to 1928.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1978, the [[World Health Organization]] recognized the Soviet principles of healthcare as some of the best in the world.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The Soviet Union had the most doctors per capita in the world, 34.6 per 10,000 people, which was more than twice the British level and almost twice the U.S. level. Drugs from hospitals or prescribed for chronic illnesses (70% of all medicines) were completely free.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====By republic====&lt;br /&gt;
By 1941, [[Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Azerbaijan]] had 2,500 doctors compared to 291 before the revolution. The number of physicians in [[Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (1929–1991)|Tajikistan]] increased from 13 to 372 over the same time period.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:5&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Life expectancy====&lt;br /&gt;
In the Russian Empire, the life expectancy was only 30 years.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; Soviet life expectancy was 59.4 years in 1953. By 1965, it had increased to 68.4 years, more than twice as long as before the revolution and 15 years more than the world average at the time.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:7&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; It increased to 70.4 years by 1975, which was slightly lower than [[Japan]] or Western Europe but higher than [[Republic of Finland|Finland]] or [[Latin America]]. The Soviet life expectancy was 2.5 years longer than the non-white life expectancy in the United States.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:023&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Infectious diseases====&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Soviet cholera poster.png|thumb|352x352px|&amp;quot;Citizens! Get yourself a cholera vaccine. Only against a vaccine death is powerless.&amp;quot;]]&lt;br /&gt;
During the [[Russian Civil War]], there were outbreaks of cholera, typhus, and smallpox. The prevalence of typhus decreased by more than twice from 1919 to 1922 and by 80 times by 1927 and the prevalence of malaria decreased by more than three times from 1917 to 1930. Compulsory vaccination for smallpox was introduced in 1919 and it was eradicated by 1937.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:4&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Human rights==&lt;br /&gt;
Article 123 of the 1936 [[Constitution of the Soviet Union|Soviet Constitution]] guaranteed national equality and banned [[racism]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:10&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Joseph Stalin]]|year=1936|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union (1936)|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1936)|chapter=Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens|section=|city=Moscow}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 1977, it was moved to article 36.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:11&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Government of the Soviet Union|year=1977|title=Constitution of the Soviet Union (1977, Unamended)|title-url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1977,_Unamended)|chapter=The State and the Individual|city=Moscow}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Women&#039;s rights===&lt;br /&gt;
After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks gave women equal rights in marriage. Women did not have to live with their husbands anymore and could now divorce without their husband&#039;s permission as well as own [[personal property]]. Husbands could also divorce without their wife&#039;s permission unless she was pregnant or had a child under one year old.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:024&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=Women in the USSR|page=102–111|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd.|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Article 122 of the 1936 Constitution and 35 of the 1977 Constitution banned [[sexism]] and guaranteed equal rights for women.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:10&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:11&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Spouses and ex-spouses did not have to support each other economically in most cases. However, an ex-husband had to pay child support to his ex-wife if she was looking after children: 25% of his income for one child, one-third for two children, and 50% for three or more children.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:024&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Women&#039;s pay could not be lowered because of pregnancy or caring for young children. It was illegal to fire women who were pregnant or had children under one year of age. They could receive pensions starting at the age of 55, five years earlier than men.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:024&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In higher education, women earned a majority of the country&#039;s economics, law, biology, and chemistry degrees. They also earned engineering, math, and physics degrees at a higher ratio than women in the United States.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:024&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Culture==&lt;br /&gt;
[[File:Youth-soviet-sports.jpg|thumb|334x334px|&amp;quot;Youth to the stadiums!&amp;quot; B. Reshetnikov, 1962]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Sports===&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR put a lot of emphasis on sports, as evidenced by the material they produced (such as posters). They were also a participant in the Olympic Games and created their own competing event, the [[Spartakiads]] (named after [[Spartacus]], the rebel slave).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
====Weightlifting====&lt;br /&gt;
The USSR produced many record-setting athletes, mainly in weightlifting, which was a very popular sport in the USSR and remains one to this day in existing socialist countries such as [[People&#039;s Republic of China|China]] or the [[Democratic People&#039;s Republic of Korea|DPRK]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The Soviets pioneered their own system, which is today mostly saved and translated by [[Pavel Tsatsouline]]. While most weightlifters today reach their peak around 26 and retire around the age of 35, a few Soviet weightlifters produced world records well past their 30s. This is because their method focused on preserving longevity in their athletes, developed with the scientific method. Athletes were followed by scientists who analysed their data and produced a routine adapted to their level.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{News citation|journalist=Craig Marker|date=2014-11-14|title=4 secrets of Soviet weightlifting as revealed by Pavel Tsatsouline|url=https://breakingmuscle.com/4-secrets-of-soviet-weightlifting-as-revealed-by-pavel/|newspaper=Breaking Muscle}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The most famous Soviet weightlifter is arguably [[Vasily Alekseyev]], who set 80 world records in an eight-year period. He retired at the age of 38 after failing to register a total at the Moscow Olympics, following an injury he sustained in 1978.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{News citation|title=Vasily Ivanovich Alekseyev Soviet weightlifter|url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vasily-Ivanovich-Alekseyev|newspaper=Britannica}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Film===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Notes===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;note&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxist-Leninist states]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of bourgeois media]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of intelligence operations]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Former socialist states]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Targets of imperialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Islam&amp;diff=58381</id>
		<title>Islam</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Islam&amp;diff=58381"/>
		<updated>2023-10-19T16:56:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Chay: Change million to billion, seems to be a typo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Islam&#039;&#039;&#039; is an Abrahamic and monotheistic religion based on the teachings of [[Muhammad]] and the writings contained in the Quran. It is the major religion of up to 49 countries in the northern part of the [[Africa|African continent]], the [[Middle East]], [[South Asia]] and [[Southeast Asia]], with the majority of Muslims located in [[Asia]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|newspaper=Pew Research Center|title=Muslim-Majority Countries|date=2011-01-27|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-muslim-majority/|retrieved=2022-11-24|quote=As of 2010, there are 49 countries in which Muslims comprise more than 50% of the population. A total of 1.2 billion Muslims live in these nations, representing 74% of the global Muslim population of 1.6 billion.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; It shares many features with [[Judaism]] and [[Christianity]] such as the prophets Abraham and Moses.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Neil Faulkner|year=2013|title=A Marxist History of the World: From Neanderthals to Neoliberals|chapter=The End of Antiquity|page=58–59|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzacedljwr5izotdclz23o3c5p4di4t3ero3ncbfytip55slhiz4otuls?filename=Neil%20Faulkner%20-%20A%20Marxist%20History%20of%20the%20World_%20From%20Neanderthals%20to%20Neoliberals-Pluto%20Press%20%282013%29.pdf|publisher=Pluto Press|isbn=9781849648639|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=91CA6C708BFE15444FE27899217FBA8E}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; There are about 1.8 billion Muslims in the world.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|date=2023-07-10|title=Burning the Quran and the Counter-Offensive: Why the West Is Panicking|url=https://www.mintpressnews.com/burning-quran-counter-offensive-west-panicking/285240/|newspaper=[[MintPress News]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230712173258/https://www.mintpressnews.com/burning-quran-counter-offensive-west-panicking/285240/|archive-date=2023-07-12|author=Ramzy Baroud}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== History ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Muhammad ===&lt;br /&gt;
Muhammad founded Islam in 620 when he told a small group of followers that he had seen visions and that God (Allah) had spoken to him. He was driven out of Mecca in 622 and fled to Medina, where he formed a mass movement. He and his army returned to Mecca in 630 and took control of western-central Arabia, but Muhammad died in 632.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Rashidun Caliphate ===&lt;br /&gt;
Muhammad&#039;s first two successors, [[Abu Bakr]] and [[Umar]], directed their armies against the [[Empire of Iranians (224–651)|Persian]] and [[Byzantium|Byzantine]] empires, who had already been weakened by massive wars. Islam quickly spread, with Muslims conquering Damascus ([[Syrian Arab Republic|Syria]]), Ctesiphon ([[Republic of Iraq|Iraq]]), Cairo, and Alexandria ([[Arab Republic of Egypt|Egypt]]) by 642. Their use of camels allowed them to easily travel across deserts and ambush larger armies. Muslim rulers tolerated previous religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and [[Zoroastrianism]], although many of their followers converted. Muslim rule usually increased quality of life as taxes were lowered and [[Landlord|landlords]] fled.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; The second, third, and fourth caliphs (Umar, [[Uthman]], and [[Ali]]) were all murdered, and Mu&#039;awiya took power in 661 following a civil war and founded the [[Umayyad Caliphate (661–750)|Umayyad Caliphate]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Neil Faulkner|year=2013|title=A Marxist History of the World: From Neanderthals to Neoliberals|chapter=The Medieval World|page=61–62|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzacedljwr5izotdclz23o3c5p4di4t3ero3ncbfytip55slhiz4otuls?filename=Neil%20Faulkner%20-%20A%20Marxist%20History%20of%20the%20World_%20From%20Neanderthals%20to%20Neoliberals-Pluto%20Press%20%282013%29.pdf|publisher=Pluto Press|isbn=9781849648639|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=91CA6C708BFE15444FE27899217FBA8E}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Umayyad Caliphate ===&lt;br /&gt;
The Umayyads took power in 661 and held power for a century while developing strong literature, art, and [[agriculture]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; They conquered Kabul in what is now [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan|Afghanistan]] in 664. Their armies quickly crossed North Africa and invaded Spain, which they fully controlled by 711.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Abbasid Caliphate ===&lt;br /&gt;
In 750, [[Abu al-Abbas]] led a revolution against the Umayyads and established the [[Abbasid Caliphate (750–1517)|Abbasid Caliphate]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Divisions ==&lt;br /&gt;
Sunni Muslims support Mu&#039;awiya, the cousin of the third caliph Uthman, while Shi&#039;ites support the fourth caliph Ali and his son Husayn, who also died in the civil war.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:022&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Wahhabism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Wahhabism is a reactionary form of Islam created by [[Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab]] in the 18th century. It seeks to return to the conditions of the seventh century and is supported by the [[Kingdom of Saudi Arabia|Saudi monarchy]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1222&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[Vijay Prashad]]|year=2008|title=The Darker Nations: A People&#039;s History of the Third World|chapter=Mecca|page=261|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceascnzh26r5d6uitjjs2z7rflhaxlt7rboz5whzdf76qg6xxvecqq?filename=%28A%20New%20Press%20People%27s%20history%29%20Vijay%20Prashad%20-%20The%20darker%20nations_%20a%20people%27s%20history%20of%20the%20third%20world-The%20New%20Press%20%282008%29.pdf|publisher=The New Press|isbn=9781595583420|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=9B40B96E830128A7FE0E0E887C06829F}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Stubs]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Religions]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Chay</name></author>
	</entry>
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